[Senate Document 106-4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress                                                  S. Doc.
                                 SENATE                         
 1st Session                                                     106-4
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                          PROCEEDINGS OF THE


                         UNITED STATES SENATE



                                IN THE


 
   IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON VOLUME II:  
                       FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

 


                            VOLUME II OF IV

               February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-102                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

                         Gary Sisco, Secretary

                 Sharon A. Zelaska, Assistant Secretary

   Ronald Kavulick and Jerald D. Linnell, Chief Reporters of Debates

                     Bruce E. Kasold, Chief Counsel

                         Keith Simmons, Counsel

                                ------                                


                      UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

                   In the Senate of the United States

                           February 12, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be 
authorized to include these statements [of Senators explaining 
their votes], along with the full record of the Senate's 
proceedings, the filings by the parties, and the supplemental 
materials admitted into evidence by the Senate, in a Senate 
document printed under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Senate, that will complete the documentation of the Senate's 
handling of these impeachment proceedings.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                 To the memory of Raymond Scott Bates,

                    Legislative Clerk of the Senate,

who, until his untimely and tragic accidental death on February 
5, 1999, in the midst of these proceedings, brought to the 
conduct of this trial the constant dedication, skill, and 
professionalism that characterized his Senate career. Scott 
represented the best of the Senate staff who work tirelessly to 
support the institution and its members.
                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    This document contains the full record of the United States 
Senate proceedings in the impeachment trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton. Its purpose is to preserve for the 
future use of the Senate, the American people, and historians 
the formal record of the only Presidential impeachment trial of 
the 20th century. Together with the 24-volume Senate Document 
106-3, which contains all publicly available materials 
submitted to or produced by the Judiciary Committee of the 
House of Representatives, these four volumes represent the 
entire official record of the impeachment actions against 
President Clinton.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Senate, by a unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 
1999, authorized the Secretary of the Senate to oversee the printing of 
the Senate proceedings in order to complete the documentation of the 
impeachment trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The present four volumes include the Senate proceedings in 
open session; filings by the parties; supplemental materials 
received in evidence that were not part of the House record, 
such as affidavits and depositions; floor statements of 
Senators in open session expressing their views regarding the 
proceedings; and statements delivered in closed deliberations 
that individual Senators elected to make public.
    The document is divided into four sections--
          Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings
          Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings
          Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits
          Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the 
        Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson 
        Clinton

                   Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings

    This volume contains the portion of the Senate proceedings 
that occurred before the actual trial commenced. On December 
19, 1998, the House of Representatives adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton (House Resolution 611, 
105th Congress) and a subsequent resolution appointing managers 
on the part of the House (House Resolution 614, 105th 
Congress).
    Because the Senate of the 105th Congress had already 
completed its business and adjourned sine die, the House 
managers, in the late afternoon of December 19, 1998, delivered 
the articles of impeachment to the Secretary of the Senate. The 
Senate of the 106th Congress convened and organized on January 
6, 1999, and the House notified the Senate that it had 
reappointed the managers (House Resolution 10, 106th Congress). 
On January 7, 1999, the House managers exhibited the articles 
of impeachment to the Senate and the Chief Justice of the 
United States, as presiding officer during the impeachment 
trial, took the prescribed oath, as did all Senators.
    On January 8, 1999, the Senate unanimously directed that 
the summons be issued to President Clinton and that his answer 
to the articles be filed, together with the response of the 
House of Representatives (Senate Resolution 16, 106th 
Congress). This resolution admitted into evidence the materials 
submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and authorized their 
publication. It also allowed the parties to file preliminary 
motions (none was filed), established a schedule for the filing 
of trial briefs by the parties, and established further 
procedures for the conduct of the trial. Although all these 
documents were previously printed in Senate Document 106-2--as 
well as the text of the provisions of the United States 
Constitution applicable to impeachment and the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice of the Senate When Sitting in 
Impeachment Trials--they are reprinted here for ease of 
reference.

                   Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings

    This volume reproduces the full record of the Senate floor 
proceedings in the impeachment trial as provided under Senate 
Resolution 16. The resolution first permitted the parties an 
extended period to make their presentations. The managers 
presented their case on behalf of the House of Representatives 
on January 14, 15, and 16, 1999. Counsel for the President 
presented their case on January 19 and 20, 1999. The Senate 
then devoted January 22 and 23, 1999, to posing questions to 
the House managers and counsel.
    Senate Resolution 16 also provided that, at the end of the 
question-and-answer period, the Senate would consider 
separately a motion to dismiss and a motion to subpoena 
witnesses and to present additional evidence not in the record. 
On January 25, 1999, the Senate heard argument on the motion to 
dismiss and, on January 26, 1999, considered the motion by the 
House managers to call witnesses and admit additional evidence. 
The Senate voted to deny the motion to dismiss and to grant the 
motion to subpoena witnesses.
    On January 28, 1999, the Senate established procedures for 
the taking of depositions (Senate Resolution 30), and three 
witnesses were deposed on February 1, 2, and 3, 1999. On 
February 4, 1999, the Senate heard argument and voted on 
motions to admit the deposition testimony into evidence, to 
call witnesses to testify on the Senate floor, and to proceed 
directly to closing arguments. The portions of the deposition 
transcripts admitted into evidence are reproduced in this 
volume, while the full transcripts of the three depositions 
appear in Volume III. Both parties presented evidence to the 
Senate on February 6, 1999.
    On February 8, 1999, the parties presented final arguments 
to the Senate. The Senate then considered proposals by various 
Senators to suspend the Senate impeachment rules to permit 
deliberation in open session, but all deliberations on motions 
and on the articles of impeachment occurred in closed session. 
(The proceedings in closed session are not published here, but 
statements that Senators elected to make public are printed in 
Volume IV.) Volume II concludes with the record of the February 
12, 1999, vote and judgment of the Senate to acquit President 
Clinton on both articles of impeachment.

                 Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits

    This volume reproduces the complete transcripts of the 
depositions taken by the Senate of witnesses Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal. It also 
contains the affidavits of Christopher Hitchens, Carol Blue, 
and R. Scott Armstrong, which were admitted into evidence by a 
unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 1999.

 Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the Impeachment Trial of 
                  President William Jefferson Clinton

    By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to provide each 
Senator an opportunity to place in the Congressional Record a 
statement describing his or her own views on the impeachment. 
The statement could, if a Senator so chose, be a statement he 
or she had delivered during closed deliberations. Since not all 
Senators chose to publish their remarks, the fact that a 
statement of a particular Senator does not appear in Volume IV 
does not mean that the Senator did not address the Senate 
during its closed deliberations.


    The publication of these four volumes, supplemented with 
Senate Document 106-3, contributes to a fuller understanding of 
the way in which the Senate conducted these important and 
historic proceedings.


                               Gary Sisco,                 
                          Secretary of the Senate.                 


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................     V

                   VOLUME I: PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment.........................     1
Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
  Impeachment Trials.............................................     3

                            January 6, 1999

Statements of Senators Lott and Reid regarding access to Senate 
  floor, galleries, and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]........................    15
Unanimous-consent agreement on access to Senate floor, galleries 
  and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S7-8 
  (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]......................................    16
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives by 
  Secretary of the Senate during sine die adjournment announcing 
  impeachment of President and appointment of Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S14-15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\1\.......................    17
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives 
  announcing reappointment of Managers, H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. 
  (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\2\........    19
Unanimous-consent agreement on receiving Managers and requesting 
  attendance of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................    20
Message from House of Representatives announcing reappointment of 
  Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].........    22
H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    23
H. Res. 614, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    29
H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    31
Sample of Senate Impeachment Trial gallery tickets...............    33

                            January 7, 1999

Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson 
  Clinton, President of the United States [145 Cong. Rec. S39-41 
  (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]......................................    35
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize taking 
  photograph in Senate Chamber of swearing-in, S. Res. 11, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].....    38
Appointment of escort committee to receive Chief Justice [145 
  Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].......................    38
Administration of oath to Chief Justice and Members of Senate 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S41-42 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]...............    40
S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    41
Photographs taken pursuant to S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).....    42

                            January 8, 1999

Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle providing for issuance of 
  summons to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
  States, and establishing trial procedures, S. Res. 16, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999)].....    45
    Rollcall Vote No. 1 [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 
      1999)].....................................................    47
S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    48
Writ of Summons (January 8, 1999)................................    53

                            January 11, 1999

Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999).................................    58
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999)....................................    71

                            January 13, 1999

Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999)......................................................   365
Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
  Clinton (January 20, 1999)\3\..................................   500

                            January 14, 1999

Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment (January 
  14, 1999)......................................................   735
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999)..........................................................   740

                   VOLUME II: FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
                            January 14, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott to authorize installation of 
  appropriate equipment and furniture in Senate Chamber, S. Res. 
  17, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   773
Unanimous-consent agreement on floor privileges during closed 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S59-60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]......   774
Unanimous-consent agreement on authority to print documents filed 
  by the parties and other impeachment documents \4\ [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................   775
Writ of Summons and Return of Service by Sergeant at Arms 
  (January 8, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S60-61 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   776
Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S61-63 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................................   778
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S63-190 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 14, 1999)]................................................   783
Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S191-214 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]..   938
Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S214-15 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]........................   992
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S215-21 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].......   994
Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S221-51 
  (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].....................................  1007
S. Res. 17, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1087
Floor plan and seating arrangements in Senate Chamber for 
  impeachment trial proceedings..................................  1089

                            January 15, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S260-79 
  (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999)].....................................  1091

                            January 16, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S281-300 
  (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)].....................................  1144

                            January 19, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S483-95 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]............................................  1195
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S720-21 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]........................  1225

                            January 20, 1999

Statement of Senator Harkin in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S729-32 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1227
Statement of Senator Wellstone in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S732-33 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1234
Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S810-30 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]............................................  1237

                            January 21, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S832-48 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]............................................  1292
Statement of Senator Lott regarding procedure for question-and-
  answer period [145 Cong. Rec. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]..  1335
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Harkin and Wellstone [145 Cong. Rec. S848-49 (daily ed. Jan. 
  21, 1999)].....................................................  1336

                            January 22, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S869-92 (daily ed. Jan. 
  22, 1999)].....................................................  1338
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Hutchison, Specter, Lieberman, Hagel, Collins, and Snowe [145 
  Cong. Rec. S892 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999)].....................  1396
Sample question card used by Senators............................  1398

                            January 23, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S933-56 (daily ed. Jan. 
  23, 1999)].....................................................  1400
Letter from Senator Harkin to Chief Justice (January 23, 1999)...  1461

                            January 25, 1999

Letter from Chief Justice to Senator Harkin (January 25, 1999)...  1462
Unanimous-consent agreement on argument on motion to dismiss and 
  on motion to open debate [145 Cong. Rec. S962-63 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 25, 1999)]................................................  1466
Motion of Senator Byrd to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................  1469
Argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S963-65 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1469
Argument of counsel for President in support of motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S965-70 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1476
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to 
  dismiss [145 Cong. Rec. S970-73 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....  1489
Motion to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin, 
  Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye, 
  Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb, 
  Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer, 
  Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 
  (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................................  1495
    Rollcall Vote No. 2 [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 (daily ed. Jan. 
      25, 1999)].................................................  1496
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S974 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 
  1999)].........................................................  1497
Statement of Senator Mikulski in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)]...........................  1498

                            January 26, 1999

Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of United States House 
  of Representatives for Appearance of Witnesses at Deposition 
  and to Admit Evidence Not in Record (January 26, 1999).........  1500
Motion of House of Representatives for appearance of witnesses 
  and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S991-92 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 26, 1999)]................................................  1531
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S992-99 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1532
Unanimous-consent agreement on order of consideration of and 
  deliberation on motions to suspend rules and for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S999-1000 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1552
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence, cont. [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1000-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]............................  1552
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1002-07 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1558
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  appearance of witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1007-09 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].......................  1571
Motion of Senator Harkin to Suspend the Rules of the Senate [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]....................  1578
    Rollcall Vote No. 3 [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
      1999)].....................................................  1579
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
  1999)].........................................................  1580

                            January 27, 1999

Vote on motion to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]............................  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 4 [145 Cong. Rec. S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 
      27, 1999)].................................................  1582
Vote on motion for appearance of witnesses and admission of 
  evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]......  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 5 [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 
      1999)].....................................................  1583
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Affidavit of Barry W. Ward, Law Clerk to Honorable Susan 
      Webber Wright, U.S. District Judge for Eastern District of 
      Arkansas...................................................  1585
    Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, with attachments............  1586
    Telephone records documenting conversations between President 
      Clinton and Monica S. Lewinsky.............................  1594
Statement of Senator Hollings in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1028-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1595
Statements of Senator Abraham in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1029-30, 1031 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)] 

aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
8 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
601982
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601984
I74February 11, 1999
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
(1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
d to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
 in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate

Statement of Senator Lieberman in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1030-31 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1599

                            January 28, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott and amendments thereto by Senator 
  Daschle relating to procedures for taking depositions, S. Res. 
  30, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1069-73 (daily ed. Jan. 
  28, 1999)].....................................................  1605
    Rollcall Vote No. 6 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1608
    Rollcall Vote No. 7 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071-72 (daily ed. Jan. 
      28, 1999)].................................................  1609
    Rollcall Vote No. 8 [145 Cong. Rec. S1072 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1610
Unanimous-consent agreement on taking of depositions [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1073-74 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1614
S. Res. 30, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1616
Leadership protocol on depositions pursuant to S. Res. 16 and S. 
  Res. 30 (January 28, 1999).....................................  1623
Statement of Senator Cleland in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1105-06 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1624
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1628
Statements of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1107-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1631

                            January 29, 1999

Subpoenas issued for witnesses to appear at depositions:
    Monica S. Lewinsky (January 29, 1999)........................  1639
    Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (January 29, 1999).....................  1642
    Sidney Blumenthal (January 29, 1999).........................  1645

                            February 3, 1999

Statement of Senator Dorgan in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1117-19 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999)]........................  1648

                            February 4, 1999

Motion of House of Representatives for admission of evidence, 
  appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1199-1200 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]................  1653
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for admission of 
  evidence, appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S1200-05 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............  1654
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1205-07 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1667
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1207-08 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1673
Votes on motions for admission of evidence, appearance of 
  witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-
  10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]...................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 9 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 10 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1678
    Rollcall Vote No. 11 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-10 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1680
    Rollcall Vote No. 12 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1681
Motion of Senator Daschle to proceed to closing arguments [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].....................  1681
    Rollcall Vote No. 13 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1682
Motion of counsel for President for provision of written notice 
  by House Managers of designated video excerpts [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............................  1683
    Rollcall Vote No. 14 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1685
Unanimous-consent agreement on printing partial transcripts of 
  depositions in Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1212 
  (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]......................................  1687
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1212-29 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1687
    Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1229-46 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1736
    Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1246-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1776

                            February 6, 1999

Presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1290-
  1303 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].................................  1800
Presentation of evidence by counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1303-15 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1836
Rebuttal presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1315-17 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]........................  1866
Unanimous-consent request of Senator Boxer to show additional 
  deposition testimony [145 Cong. Rec. S1317-18 (daily ed. Feb. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................  1873
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Lott, Daschle, Hutchison, Harkin, Collins, Specter, Wellstone, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]......  1873
Statements of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1330-32 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1874

                            February 8, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Lott for admission of 
  affidavits into evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1337 (daily ed. Feb. 
  8, 1999)]......................................................  1882
Final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1337-44 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 8, 1999)].............................................  1882
Final arguments of counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S1344-54 
  (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......................................  1900
Rebuttal final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1354-
  65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]...................................  1925
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle, Lott, Hutchison, Harkin, Wellstone, Collins, Specter, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......  1955
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle and Feinstein [145 Cong. Rec. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 
  1999)].........................................................  1955
Letter from House Managers to Senators Lott and Daschle (Feb. 8, 
  1999)..........................................................  1956

                            February 9, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Specter to allow parties to 
  take additional discovery [145 Cong. Rec. S1385 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1964
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to Suspend the Rules of the 
  Senate [145 Cong. Rec. S1385-86 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]......  1964
    Rollcall Vote No. 15 [145 Cong. Rec. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1965
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize Senators to 
  insert statements delivered in closed deliberations into 
  Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1386-87 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1966
Motion of Senator Lott to close doors of Senate for final 
  deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...  1970
    Rollcall Vote No. 16 [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1970
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1388 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
  1999)].........................................................  1971
Statement of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1406-09 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1971
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...........................  1978
Statement of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1409-10 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1980

                           February 10, 1999

Colloquy on record of closed deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411-
  12 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)]..................................  1982
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
  1999)].........................................................  1984

                           February 11, 1999

Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 
  1999)].........................................................  1986
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to 
  authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment 
  vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437-38 
  (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)].....................................  1987
Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate 
  Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1454-55 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]............................  1987
Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]....  1988
S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1989

                           February 12, 1999

Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators 
  in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document 
  containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  1992
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1993
Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................................  1994
    Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1995
Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458-59 
  (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....................................  1997
    Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1997
Order to Secretary of the Senate to communicate judgment of 
  Senate to Secretary of State and House of Representatives [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  1998
Statement of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 
  12, 1999)].....................................................  1998
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle expressing gratitude of 
  Senate to Chief Justice of the United States, S. Res. 37, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1459-60 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1999
Unanimous-consent agreement on admitting affidavits into evidence 
  and making full deposition transcripts part of the record [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  2000
Adjournment sine die [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  2000
Statements of Senators Lott, Daschle and Chafee in legislative 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......  2001
Motion of Senator Feinstein in legislative session to suspend the 
  rules in order to permit the consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....  2002
Motion of Senator Gramm in legislative session to indefinitely 
  postpone consideration of motion to suspend rules [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2002
    Rollcall Vote No. 19 [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 
      12, 1999)].................................................  2003
Statement of Senator Feinstein in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1664-66 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2004
Statement of Senator Snowe in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1546-47 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................  2010
Statement of Senator Ashcroft in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1461 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2011
Statement of Senator Chafee in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1639 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2013
Statement of Senator Kohl in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]...............................  2014
Resolution by Senator Hollings in legislative session to censure 
  President [145 Cong. Rec. S1657 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....  2015
Statement of Senator Daschle in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1637-38 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2015
Statement of Senator Warner in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1667 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2017
S. Res. 37, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  2019
Photograph taken pursuant to S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)......  2021
Legislative Clerk's tally sheets for Senate votes on articles of 
  impeachment....................................................  2022
Judgment of United States Senate (Feb. 12, 1999).................  2024

                         TABLE OF ROLLCALL VOTES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Measure/
 Vote No.        Date           Description           Result        Page
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........  1/8/99.........  S. Res. 16........  Resolution Agreed     47
                                                 to 100-0.
2........  1/25/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1496
                             suspend the rules.  43-57.
3........  1/26/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1579
                             suspend the rules.  41-58.
4........  1/27/99........  Byrd motion to      Motion Rejected     1582
                             dismiss the         44-56.
                             impeachment
                             proceedings.
5........  1/27/99........  House Managers'     Motion Agreed to    1583
                             motion to           56-44.
                             subpoena
                             witnesses and
                             admit evidence
                             not in record.
6........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1608
                             1 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 44-54.
7........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1609
                             2 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 43-55.
8........  1/28/99........  S. Res. 30 as       Resolution Agreed   1610
                             amended.            to 54-44.
9........  2/4/99.........  Division I of       Motion Agreed to    1677
                             House Managers'     100-0.
                             motion re:
                             admission of
                             evidence.
10.......  2/4/99.........  Division II of      Motion Rejected     1678
                             House Managers'     30-70.
                             motion re:
                             appearance of
                             witnesses.
11.......  2/4/99.........  Murray motion to    Motion Rejected     1680
                             substitute          27-73.
                             Division III of
                             House Managers'
                             motion.
12.......  2/4/99.........  Division III of     Motion Agreed to    1681
                             House Managers'     62-38.
                             motion re:
                             presentation of
                             evidence.
13.......  2/4/99.........  Daschle motion to   Motion Rejected     1682
                             proceed to          44-56.
                             closing arguments.
14.......  2/4/99.........  White House         Motion Rejected     1685
                             Counsel's motion    46-54.
                             on video
                             deposition
                             excerpts.
15.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Rejected     1965
                             suspend the rules.  59-41.
16.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Agreed to    1970
                             close the doors.    53-47.
17.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 45-55.   1995
                             Article I.
18.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 50-50.   1997
                             Article II.
19.......  2/12/99........  Gramm motion to     Motion Rejected     2003
                             postpone            43-56.
                             consideration of
                             rules suspension
                             motion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 VOLUME III: DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS

Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (full transcript)  2027
Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (full 
  transcript)....................................................  2224
Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (full transcript).  2399
Affidavit of Christopher Hitchens (Feb. 5, 1999).................  2534
Affidavit of Carol Blue (Feb. 7, 1999)...........................  2535
Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong (Feb. 8, 1999)...................  2536

 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON \5\
                           February 12, 1999

Sen. Specter \6\.................................................  2537
Sen. Gorton......................................................  2537
Sen. Feingold \7\................................................  2545
Sen. Hutchison...................................................  2548
Sen. Conrad......................................................  2558
Sen. Hutchinson..................................................  2561
Sen. Murray......................................................  2563
Sen. McCain......................................................  2565
Sen. Johnson.....................................................  2567
Sen. Lugar.......................................................  2570
Sen. Biden.......................................................  2573
Sen. Abraham.....................................................  2616
Sen. Mikulski....................................................  2622
Sen. Grams.......................................................  2625
Sen. Breaux......................................................  2627
Sen. Domenici....................................................  2630
Sen. Sarbanes....................................................  2633
Sen. Campbell....................................................  2637
Sen. Kerrey......................................................  2639
Sen. Voinovich...................................................  2641
Sen. Lautenberg..................................................  2643
Sen. Bond \8\....................................................  2646
Sen. Robb........................................................  2652
Sen. Boxer.......................................................  2656
Sen. Mack........................................................  2659
Sen. Fitzgerald..................................................  2672
Sen. Roth........................................................  2681
Sen. Burns.......................................................  2684
Sen. Inhofe \9\..................................................  2685
Sen. Cleland.....................................................  2689
Sen. Frist.......................................................  2694
Sen. Bunning.....................................................  2703
Sen. Durbin......................................................  2706
Sen. Kyl.........................................................  2710
Sen. Specter.....................................................  2715
Sen. Levin.......................................................  2738
Sen. Kohl........................................................  2758
Sen. Thompson....................................................  2761
Sen. Moynihan....................................................  2789
Sen. Graham......................................................  2792
Sen. Allard......................................................  2794
Sen. McConnell...................................................  2799
Sen. Kennedy.....................................................  2807
Sen. Collins.....................................................  2812
Sen. Harkin......................................................  2814
Sen. Reid........................................................  2826
Sen. Edwards.....................................................  2830
Sen. Akaka.......................................................  2833
Sen. Leahy \10\..................................................  2837
Sen. Grassley....................................................  2867
Sen. Craig.......................................................  2870
Sen. Dodd \11\...................................................  2873
Sen. Jeffords....................................................  2877
Sen. Wellstone...................................................  2884
Sen. Stevens.....................................................  2888
Sen. Lieberman...................................................  2892
Sen. Brownback...................................................  2905
Sen. Bryan.......................................................  2913
Sen. Ashcroft....................................................  2917
Sen. Thurmond....................................................  2934
Sen. Crapo.......................................................  2937
Sen. Dorgan......................................................  2939
Sen. Kerry.......................................................  2943
Sen. DeWine......................................................  2948
Sen. Lincoln.....................................................  2956
Sen. Helms.......................................................  2959
Sen. Hollings....................................................  2962
Sen. Wyden.......................................................  2965
Sen. Smith (Ore.)................................................  2967
Sen. Hagel.......................................................  2971
Sen. Rockefeller.................................................  2972
Sen. Murkowski...................................................  2977
Sen. Byrd........................................................  2981
Sen. Inhofe......................................................  2987
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  2996
Sen. Snowe.......................................................  3000

                           February 22, 1999

Sen. Nickles.....................................................  3005
Sen. Landrieu....................................................  3013
Sen. Smith (N.H.)................................................  3016
Sen. Bingaman....................................................  3022
Sen. Bennett.....................................................  3024
Sen. Reed \12\...................................................  3026
Sen. Enzi........................................................  3033
Sen. Feingold....................................................  3042

                           February 23, 1999

Sen. Daschle.....................................................  3053
Sen. Bond........................................................  3058
Sen. Sessions \13\...............................................  3059
Sen. Coverdell...................................................  3063
Sen. Hatch.......................................................  3066
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3090
Sen. Sessions....................................................  3094
Sen. Dodd........................................................  3099
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3102

                           February 24, 1999

Sen. Reed........................................................  3103

    \1\ On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives agreed to H. 
Res. 611, 105th Cong., the Articles of Impeachment, [144 Cong. Rec. 
H12040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998)] and H. Res. 614, 105th Cong., 
which provided for the appointment of managers and procedures relating 
to impeachment proceedings [id. at H12042-43].
    \2\ The House of Representatives agreed to H. Res. 10, 106th Cong., 
on January 6, 1999 [145 Cong. Rec. H216-17 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].
    \3\ The Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, consisting of exhibits, was filed separately on January 20, 
1999, but is inserted here for ease of reference.
    \4\ For ease of reference, the documents contained in S. Doc. 106-
2, i.e., the pertinent constitutional provisions, the Senate 
Impeachment Rules, the Articles of Impeachment, the Answer of President 
Clinton, and the Replication of the House of Representatives, are 
reprinted in this publication. Separately, the Senate admitted into 
evidence and authorized the printing, pursuant to S. Res. 16, 106th 
Cong., of the publicly available materials submitted to or produced by 
the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings 
or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives 
or the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to H. Res. 525 and H. Res. 
581, 105th Cong. (1998). That evidentiary record, S. Doc. 106-3 (1999) 
[24 vols.], is not reproduced here.
    \5\ The unanimous-consent agreement of February 9, 1999, allowed 
each Senator to place in the Congressional Record his or her statement 
delivered during closed deliberations. Not all Senators chose to 
publish their remarks; the fact that a statement of a particular 
Senator does not appear here does not mean that Senator did not address 
the Senate during the closed sessions. Additionally, the unanimous-
consent agreement of February 12, 1999, allowed Senators to have 
statements and opinions explaining their votes printed in the 
Congressional Record.
    \6\ Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2715 below.
    \7\ Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, 
see p. 3042 below.
    \8\ Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see 
p. 3058 below.
    \9\ Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2987 below.
    \10\ Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and 
February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, 3102 below.
    \11\ Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see 
pp. 3099 and 3100 below.
    \12\ Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24, 
see p. 3103 below.
    \13\ Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February 
23, see p. 3094 below.
                       Thursday, January 14, 1999

                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                

                                 prayer
    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all 
through our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure 
of wisdom for the women and men of this Senate as they act as 
jurors in this impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's 
refuge and strength in triumphs and troubles, prosperity and 
problems. Now, dear Father, help us through this difficult 
time. As You guided the Senators to unity in matters of 
procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the 
truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in 
a spirit of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial 
days to come. Bless the distinguished Chief Justice as he 
presides over this trial. We commit to You all that is said and 
done and ultimately decided. In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States 
is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by 
the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the 
majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        installing equipment and furniture in the senate chamber
    Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for 
installing equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and 
ask that it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid 
upon the table.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by 
title.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of 
appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for the 
impeachment trial.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is 
considered and agreed to.
    The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows:

                               S. Res. 17

  Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements raised by 
the impeachment trial of a President of the United States, the Sergeant 
at Arms shall install appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate 
chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives and 
counsel to the President in their presentations to the Senate during 
all times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief Justice 
of the United States presiding.
  Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to in the 
first section is as follows:
          (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and 
        tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers 
        from the House of Representatives and counsel for the President 
        which shall be placed in the well of the Senate.
          (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display 
        of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and 
        microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by the 
        managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel to 
        the President.
  Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this resolution 
shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that provides the least 
practicable disruption to Senate proceedings.

                         Privilege of the Floor

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent 
that floor privileges be granted to the individuals listed on 
the document I send to the desk, during the closed impeachment 
proceedings of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The document follows.

                 Floor Privileges During Closed Session

    David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader.
    Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader.
    Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader.
    Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Andrea LaRue, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip.
    Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader.
    Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader.
    Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel.
    Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel.
    Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
    Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms.
    David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary.
    Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary.
    Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian.
    Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian.
    Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk.
    Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk.
    David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk.
    Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter.
    Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter.
    Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter.
    Joel Breitner, Official Reporter.
    Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter.
    Paul Nelson, Official Reporter.
    Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter.
    Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter.
    Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter.
    Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk.
    Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland.

    Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate 
document all documents filed by the parties together with other 
materials for the convenience of all Senators.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series 
of unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the 
consideration of the Senate. In addition to these matters, I 
would like to state for the information of all Senators that, 
pursuant to S. Res. 16, the evidentiary record on which the 
parties' presentations over the next days will be based was 
filed by the House managers yesterday and was distributed to 
all Senators through their offices. These materials are now 
being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate 
documents. The initial documents of the record have been 
printed and are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of 
the rest of the volumes of the record is completed over the 
next few days, they will also be placed on the Senators' desks 
for their convenience.

                              THE JOURNAL

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in 
the Senate Journal the following documents:
    The precept, issued on January 8, 1999;
    The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the 
receipt of summons, dated January 8, 1999.
    The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in 
the Senate Journal the following documents, which were received 
by the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 
16, 106th Congress, first session:
    The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the 
House of Representatives against him on January 7, 1999, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
    The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
    The trial brief filed by the President, received by the 
Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999;
    The replication of the House of Representatives, received 
by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and
    The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999.
    Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed 
in the Congressional Record.
    The documents follow:

The United States of America, ss:

The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms, 
United States Senate, greeting:
    You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with William 
Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if not, to leave at 
his usual place of abode, a true and attested copy of the within writ 
of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in 
whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least 2 days 
before the answer day mentioned in the said writ of summons.
    Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with 
your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the day for answering 
mentioned in the said writ of summons.
    Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at 
Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and 
twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
    Attest:
                                                Gary Sisco,
                                           Secretary of the Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
The United States of America, ss:

The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, greeting:
    Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of 
America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to the Senate 
articles of impeachment against you, the said William Jefferson 
Clinton, in the words following:
    ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people 
of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support 
of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

                               Article I

    ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
    ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: 
(1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate 
Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; 
(3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to 
make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his 
corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

                               Article II

    ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, 
and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged 
personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of 
conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the 
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
    ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included one or more of the following acts:
    ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he 
knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.
    ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and 
when called to testify personally in that proceeding.
    ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him.
    ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a 
witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order 
to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that 
proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would 
have been harmful to him.
    ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading 
statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a 
communication to that judge.
    ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.
    ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in 
a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
    ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
to the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.''

And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, should be put 
to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such 
proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had 
as are agreeable to law and justice.
    You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore hereby 
summoned to file with the Secretary of the United States Senate, S-220 
The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an answer to the said articles of 
impeachment no later than noon on the 11th day of January, 1999, and 
therefore to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and 
judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises 
according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
    Hereof you are not to fail.
    Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at 
Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and 
twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
    Attest:
                                                Gary Sisco,
                                           Secretary of the Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
    The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William Jefferson 
Clinton, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept, 
addressed to me, were duly served upon the said William Jefferson 
Clinton, by my delivering true and attested copies of the same to 
Charles Ruff, at the White House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at 
5:27 p.m.
    Attest:
                                           James W. Ziglar,
                                                  Sergeant at Arms.
                                             Loretta Symms,
                                           Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
    Dated: January 8, 1999.

Witnesseth:
    Gary Sisco, Secretary,
    United States Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
        States

   ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF 
                              IMPEACHMENT

    The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, in response to the summons of the Senate of the United States, 
answers the accusations made by the House of Representatives of the 
United States in the two Articles of Impeachment it has exhibited to 
the Senate as follows:

                                Preamble

     The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or 
                              Misdemeanors

    The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the 
conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The 
President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper. 
But Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the 
President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to the level of 
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by the Founding 
Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standard 
applied throughout our Nation's history. Accordingly, the Articles of 
Impeachment should be dismissed.

        The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice

    The President denies each and every material allegation of the two 
Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in this answer.

                               Article I

    President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.

                     Factual Responses to Article I

    Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers 
the following factual responses to the allegations in Article I:
(1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of 
        his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before the 
grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to admit his improper 
intimate relationship with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated 
by Article I, which accuses the President of lying about ``the nature 
and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to the 
grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I 
engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters . . . did involve 
inappropriate intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand 
jury how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence 
early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He also 
described to the grand jury how he had attempted to testify in the 
deposition in the Jones case months earlier without having to 
acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he ultimately admitted to the 
grand jury--that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury 
acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The statement was 
offered at the beginning of his testimony to focus the questioning in a 
manner that would allow the Office of Independent Counsel to obtain 
necessary information without unduly dwelling on the salacious details 
of the relationship. The President's statement was followed by almost 
four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his statement was in 
any respect perjurious, false and misleading, the President denies it. 
The President also denies that the statement was in any way an attempt 
to thwart the investigation.
    The President states, as he did during his grand jury testimony, 
that he engaged in improper physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
President was truthful when he testified before the grand jury that he 
did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood 
that term to be defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning 
of him in that deposition. The President further denies that his other 
statements to the grand jury about the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were perjurious, false, and misleading.
(2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury when he testified about statements 
        he had made in the Jones deposition
    There is a second myth about the President's testimony before the 
grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted his entire Jones 
deposition testimony in the grand jury. The President was not asked to 
and did not broadly restate or reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony. 
Instead, in the grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers 
he gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury about 
statements he made in the Jones deposition. The President stated to the 
grand jury that he did not attempt to be helpful to or assist the 
lawyers in the Jones deposition in their quest for information about 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the 
grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition 
without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Accordingly, the 
full, underlying Jones deposition is not before the Senate.
    Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an article 
of impeachment based on the President's deposition in the Jones case. 
The House managers should not be allowed to prosecute before the Senate 
an article of impeachment which the full House has rejected.
(3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``statements he allowed his 
        attorney to make'' during the Jones deposition
    The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to the grand jury about the statements his attorney made 
during the Jones deposition. The President was truthful when he 
explained to the grand jury his understanding of certain statements 
made by his lawyer, Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The 
President also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing 
on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the attorneys and 
Judge Wright.
(4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury concerning alleged efforts ``to 
        influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
        discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
    For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article II, the 
President denies that he attempted to influence the testimony of any 
witness or to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. Thus, 
the President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements before the grand jury when he testified about these matters.

 First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

    For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, 
Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional standard for 
conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President and 
should be dismissed.

Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction 
                              and Removal

    Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could 
know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. It 
alleges that the President provided the grand jury with ``perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four 
subject areas. But it fails to identify any specific statement by the 
President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. The 
House has left the Senate and the President to guess at what it had in 
mind.
    One of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution 
is that a person has a right to know what specific charges he or she is 
facing. Without such fair warning, no one can prepare the defense to 
which every person is entitled. The law and the Constitution also 
mandate adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the 
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific identification of 
false statements, a trial becomes a moving target for the accused. In 
addition, the American people deserve to know upon what specific 
statements the President is being judged, given the gravity and effect 
of these proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national 
election.
    Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required definite 
and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be 
dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally 
defective and should fail.

 Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One 
                                Article

    Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple instances 
of alleged perjurious, false and misleading statements in one article. 
The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule 
XXIII provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible 
for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' By 
the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if 
he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony in ``one or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very 
real possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators were 
in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. Put simply, the 
structure of Article I presents the possibility that the President 
could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted if separate 
votes were taken on each allegedly perjurious statement. For example, 
it would be possible for the President to be convicted and removed from 
office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single statement 
was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the four categories in 
Article I would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict and 
remove.
    By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of 
Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article I should fail.

                    Factual Responses to Article II

    Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers 
the following factual responses to the allegations in Article II:
(1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn 
        affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
        false and misleading''
    The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute 
a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, the only witness 
cited in support of this allegation, denies this allegation as well. 
Her testimony and proffered statements are clear and unmistakable:
     ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.''
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie . . .''
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
    The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky 
asked him whether she might be able to avoid testifying the Jones case 
because she knew nothing about Ms. Jones or the case. The President 
further states that he told her he believed other witnesses had 
executed affidavits, and there was a chance they would not have to 
testify. The President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The 
President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a 
limited but truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid 
having to testify in the Jones case.
(2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, 
        false and misleading testimony of and when called to testify 
        personally'' in the Jones litigation
    Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie 
if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case. The 
testimony and proffered statements of Monica Lewinsky, the only witness 
cited in support of this allegation, are clear and unmistakable:
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.''
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie . . .''
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
    The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in 
the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have talked about what to do 
to conceal their relationship from others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a 
witness in any legal proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own 
testimony and statements support the President's recollection. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the possibility 
that she and the President ever had discussions about denying the 
relationship after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case. Ms. 
Lewinsky also stated that ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to 
say about their relationship] is specific relation to the Jones 
matter,'' and that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of 
any deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.''
(3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to 
        conceal evidence'' in the Jones case
    The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or supported 
any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in the Jones case, 
including any gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. The President states 
that he gave numerous gifts to Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997. 
The President states that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired 
as to what to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he 
had given her, to which the President responded that she would have to 
turn over whatever she had. The President states that he was 
unconcerned about having given her gifts and, in fact, that he gave Ms. 
Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1997. The President denies 
that he ever asked his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts 
he had given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie told 
prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly thereafter that it 
was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her about retrieving gifts.
(4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
        Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York to 
        ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones 
        case
    The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or sought to prevent her truthful 
testimony in the Jones case. The President states that he discussed 
with Ms. Lewinsky her desire to obtain a job in New York months before 
she was listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms. 
Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations more than 
a month before she was identified as a possible witness. The President 
also states that he believes that Ms. Lewinsky raised with him, again 
before she was ever listed as a possible witness in the Jones case, the 
prospect of having Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms. 
Lewinsky corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for 
Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was aware that Mr. 
Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain employment in New York. The 
President denies that any of these efforts had any connection 
whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's status as a possible or actual witness in 
the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's 
denial when she testified, ``I was never promised a job for my 
silence.''
(5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
        make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' 
        concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements concerning Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to 
a Federal judge during the Jones deposition. The President denies that 
he was focusing his attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange 
between his attorney and Judge Wright.
(6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false 
        and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
        Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    The President denies that he obstructed justice or endeavored in 
any way to influence any potential testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. The 
President states that he spoke with Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998. The 
President testified that, in that conversation, he was trying to find 
out what the facts were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether 
his own recollection was correct about certain aspects of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she felt no 
pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's statements and no pressure 
``to agree with [her] boss.'' The President denies knowing or believing 
that Ms. Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time of 
this conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness lists 
proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton states that, after 
the Independent Counsel investigation became public, when Ms. Currie 
was scheduled to testify, he told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.''
(7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
        allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    The President denies that he obstructed justice when he misled his 
aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the 
days immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky 
investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days following 
the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he misled his family, 
his friends and staff, and the Nation to conceal the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He sought to avoid disclosing his 
personal wrongdoing to protect his family and himself from hurt and 
public embarrassment. The President profoundly regrets his actions, and 
he has apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation. 
The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose or any intent to 
influence the ongoing grand jury proceedings.

First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article 
II does not meet the constitutional standard for convicting and 
removing a duly elected President from office and should be dismissed.

     Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit 
                         Conviction and Removal

    Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could 
know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. 
Article II alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the 
administration of justice'' in both the Jones case and the grand jury 
investigation. But it provides little or no concrete information about 
the specific acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or 
with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise impeded the 
administration of justice.
    As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to Article I, one 
of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a 
person has the right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. 
Without such fair warning, no one can mount the defense to which every 
person is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the 
President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he is able 
to confront those charges and defend himself.
    Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little definite and 
specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. 
As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and 
should fail.

Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One 
                                Article

    For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense to 
Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges 
multiple instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which 
makes it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional 
mandates that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of 
the members. Accordingly, Article II should fail.
            Respectfully submitted,
                                   David E. Kendall,
                                   Nicole K. Seligman,
                                   Emmet T. Flood,
                                   Max Stier,
                                   Glen Donath,
                                   Alicia Marti,
                                           Williams & Connolly,
                                           725 12th Street, N.W.,
                                           Washington, D.C. 20005.
                                   Charles F. C. Ruff,
                                   Gregory B. Craig,
                                   Bruce R. Lindsey,
                                   Cheryl D. Mills,
                                   Lanny A. Breuer,
                                           Office of the White House 
                                               Counsel,
                                           The White House,
                                           Washington, D.C. 20502.

    Submitted: January 11, 1999.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

     TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

    Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by and 
through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully submits to the 
United States Senate its Brief in connection with the Impeachment Trial 
of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                Summary

    The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury and 
false and misleading testimony and statements under oath before a 
federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in a course of conduct 
or scheme to delay and obstruct justice (Article II).
    The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a unified 
whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges.
                perjury and false statements under oath
    President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified falsely 
under oath when he appeared before a federal grand jury on August 17, 
1998. Although what follows is not exhaustive, some of the more overt 
examples will serve to illustrate.
     At the very outset, the President read a prepared 
statement, which itself contained totally false assertions and other 
clearly misleading information.
     The President relied on his statement nineteen times in 
his testimony when questioned about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
     President Clinton falsely testified that he was not paying 
attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at 
the Jones deposition.
     He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. Lewinsky did 
not fall within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that was given 
at his deposition.
     He falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully 
at his deposition concerning, among other subjects, whether he had been 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky.
     He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky to 
turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed.
     He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie after his 
deposition.
     He falsely testified that he was truthful to his aides 
when he gave accounts of his relationship, which accounts were 
subsequently disseminated to the media and the grand jury.
                         obstruction of justice
    The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both the 
Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he undertook a continuing 
and concerted plan to tamper with witnesses and prospective witnesses 
for the purpose of causing those witnesses to provide false and 
misleading testimony. Examples abound:
     The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story to 
conceal their relationship, and the President suggested that she employ 
that story if subpoenaed in the Jones case.
     The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide an 
affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he knew that the 
affidavit would need to be false to accomplish its purpose.
     The President knowingly and willfully allowed his attorney 
to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it for the purpose of 
obstructing justice in the Jones case.
     The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she provide a 
false account of how she received her job at the Pentagon.
     The President attempted to influence the expected 
testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with a false 
account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky.
     The President provided several of his top aides with 
elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that those 
aides would convey the false information to the public and to the grand 
jury. When he did this, he knew that those aides would likely be called 
to testify, while he was declining several invitations to testify. By 
this action, he obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury.
     The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie 
to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the Jones case, and 
thereby delayed and obstructed justice.
     The President and his representatives orchestrated a 
campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect adversely her 
credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted to obstruct justice 
both in the Jones case and the grand jury.
     The President lied repeatedly under oath in his 
disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice in that 
case.
     The President's lies and misleading statements under oath 
at the grand jury were calculated to, and did obstruct, delay and 
prevent the due administration of justice by that body.
     The President employed the power of his office to procure 
a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false affidavit by causing 
his friend to exert extraordinary efforts for that purpose.
    The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern of 
obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending over a period 
of several months, and having the effect of seriously compromising the 
integrity of the entire judicial system.
    The effect of the President's misconduct has been devastating in 
several respects.
    (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.''
    (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law enforcement 
officer to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's rights 
as a citizen to due process and the equal protection of the laws, 
though he had sworn to protect those rights.
    (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading statements and 
deceit, he has seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of 
the Office of President and thereby the honor and integrity of the 
United States.
    (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and witness 
tampering has affected the truth seeking process which is the 
foundation of our legal system.
    (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he has 
attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government.
    The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred state 
offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and removal from 
office of President William Jefferson Clinton. The Articles charge that 
the President has committed perjury before a federal grand jury and 
that he obstructed justice in a federal civil rights action. The 
Senate's own precedents establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants 
conviction and removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and 
removed three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of 
justice undermines the judicial system in the same fashion that perjury 
does, and it also warrants conviction and removal.
    Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same 
standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments for perjury set the 
standard here. Finally, the Senate's own precedents further establish 
that the President's crimes need not arise directly out of his official 
duties. Two of the three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for 
perjury that had nothing to do with their official duties.

                              Introduction

    This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate generally of the 
evidence that the Managers intend to produce, if permitted, and of the 
applicable legal principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively 
all of the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every 
witness and document that the Managers would produce in the course of 
the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline for the use of the 
Senate in reviewing and assessing the evidence as it is set forth at 
trial--it is not, and is not intended to be a substitute for a trial at 
which all of the relevant facts will be developed.

               H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998)

    The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with high 
crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One alleges that 
President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial 
process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, 
impeding the administration of justice'' in that he willfully provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has 
prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and 
engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a federal civil rights action brought against him.'' Both Articles 
are now before the Senate of the United States for trial as provided by 
the Constitution of the United States.
    The Office of President represents to the American people and to 
the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of all, the honor and 
integrity that makes us a great nation and an example for the world. 
Because all eyes are focused upon that high office, the character and 
credibility of any temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to 
the domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, serious 
breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely influence the 
reputation of the United States.
    This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about multiple 
obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, and 
witness tampering--all committed or orchestrated by the President of 
the United States.
    Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it is 
important to place the events in the proper context. If this were only 
about private sex we would not now be before the Senate. But the manner 
in which the Lewinsky relationship arose and continued is important 
because it is illustrative of the character of the President and the 
decisions he made.

                               Background

    Monica Lewinsky, a 22-year-old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during the government 
shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 730) Prior 
to their first intimate encounter, she had never even spoken with the 
President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President 
Clinton flirted with each other. (Id.) The President of the United 
States of America then invited this unknown young intern into a private 
area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited her back 
later and when she returned, the two engaged in the first of many acts 
of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732)
    Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. Lewinsky were 
seen, she was bringing papers to the President. That story was totally 
false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p. 
34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1314) The only papers she brought were personal 
messages having nothing to do with her duties or those of the 
President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 774-775) 
After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the Pentagon, her 
frequent visits to the President were disguised as visits to Betty 
Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are important, because they play a 
vital role in the later perjuries and obstructions.

                               Encounters

    Over the term of their relationship the following significant 
matters occurred:
    1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least twenty-
one occasions;
    2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, excluding 
phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 1997;
    3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least seventeen 
of which involved phone sex;
    4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and,
    5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. Referral, 
App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111)
    These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for all of 
the events that followed.
    The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, 
though relevant, need not be detailed either in this document or 
through witness testimony. It is necessary, though, briefly to outline 
that evidence, because it will demonstrate that the President 
repeatedly lied about that sexual relationship in his deposition, 
before the grand jury, and in his responses to the Judiciary 
Committee's questions. He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky 
merely performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual 
manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn grand jury 
testimony of three of her friends and the statements by two 
professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared the 
details of her relationship. (O.I.C. Referral, H.Doc. 105-310, pgs. 
138-140)
    While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is much more 
offensive for the President to expect the Senate to believe that in 
1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky was so 
limited that it did not fall within his narrow interpretation of a 
definition of ``sexual relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not 
even conceive his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his 
grand jury appearance.

                        How To View the Evidence

    We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must be 
viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is essential to 
avoid considering each event in isolation, and then treating it 
separately. Events and words that may seem innocent or even exculpatory 
in a vacuum may well take on a sinister, or even criminal connotation 
when observed in the context of the whole plot. For example, everyone 
agrees that Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie; 
nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 1161)
    When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, in the 
context of the other evidence, another picture emerges. Of course no 
one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in there and lie.'' They didn't have 
to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what was expected of her. Similarly, nobody 
promised her a job, but once she signed the false affidavit, she got 
one.

                               The Issue

    The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of conduct is 
such as to affect adversely the Office of the President and also upon 
the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in a manner 
contrary to his trust as President and subversive to the Rule of Law 
and Constitutional government.

                             The Beginning

    The events that form the basis of these charges actually began in 
late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the winter of 1997 and the 
first month of 1998. The event culminated when the President of the 
United States appeared before a federal grand jury, raised his right 
hand to God and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth.

                           December 5-6, 1997

    On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty Currie if 
the President could see her the next day, Saturday, but Ms. Currie said 
that the President was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that 
Friday, Ms. Lewinsky spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas 
party. (ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
p. 108; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 828)

                      The Witness List Is Received

    That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of potential 
witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC-00000128; 849-DC-
00000121-37; Referral, H.Doc. 105-311, p. 88) The list included Monica 
Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did not find out that her name was on 
the list until the President told her ten days later, on December 17. 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 121-123; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay 
is significant.

                       Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit

    After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the President at 
the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President 
terminating their relationship. (ML-55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms. 
Lewinsky went to the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts 
for the President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H.Doc. 
105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, Ms. 
Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and one of them told 
her that the President was not with his lawyers, as she thought, but 
rather, he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-316, 
pgs. 2907-2908; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie 
from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98 
GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie 
told the Secret Service watch commander that the President was so upset 
about the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted 
somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H.Doc. 105-316, 
pgs. 3356-3357).

                      The Telephone Conversations

    At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged Bruce 
Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC-00000862; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, 
while she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
spoke by phone. The President was very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that 
no one had every treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
113-14; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to the 
grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and 
considered it inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
537). Nevertheless, in a sudden change of mood, he invited her to visit 
him at the White House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 834)

                      Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit

    Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time that 
day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 827-DC-00000018) 
Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry'' 
with her during their recent telephone conversation, he was ``sweet'' 
and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-
15; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would talk 
to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-16; 
H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836)

                The Discussions With the Secret Service

    The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the Secret 
Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if they kept quiet 
about the Lewinsky incident, there would be no disciplinary action. 
(Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery 
7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret 
Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President 
personally told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I 
can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3353) Deputy 
Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that he 
knew of no other time in his fourteen years of service at the White 
House where the President raised a performance issue with a member of 
the Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., pgs. 40-
41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his conversation with the 
President, Captain Purdie told a number of officers that they should 
not discuss the Lewinsky incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3343; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316, 
p. 3114)
    When the President was before the grand jury and questioned about 
his statements to the Secret Service regarding this incident, the 
President testified, ``I don't remember what I said and I don't 
remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 534) When confronted with Captain Purdie's testimony, the President 
testified, ``I don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I 
have no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 543)

             The President's Knowledge of the Witness List

    President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he learned 
that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that evening, Saturday, 
December 6, during a meeting with his lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-
84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535-536) He stood by this answer in response to 
Request Number 16 submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18). 
The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left the 
White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to Bruce Lindsey, at the 
meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the Jones witness list faxed to Mr. 
Bennett the previous night. (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 2419) (Exhibit 15)
    However, during his deposition, the President testified that he had 
heard about the witness list before he saw it. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
70) In other words, if the President testified truthfully in his 
deposition, then he knew about the witness list before the 5 p.m. 
meeting. It is valid to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a 
witness list prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained 
change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that Saturday 
afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it prompted him to give 
the unique instruction to a Secret Service watch commander to use 
``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which 
the watch commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from 
discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-
316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33; H.Doc. 105-315, 
pgs. 3360-3361)

                    The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky

    Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high profile 
job in New York since the previous July. She was not having much 
success despite the President's promise to help. In early November, 
Betty Currie arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan who was supposed to 
help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592)
    On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. Jordan 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No action followed; no 
job interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts with 
Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that he made no effort to find a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so unimportant to him that he ``had no 
recollection of an early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was 
not a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) (Chart R) 
Nothing happened throughout the month of November, because Mr. Jordan 
was either gone or would not return Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 825-826)
    During the December 6 meeting with the President, she mentioned 
that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. Jordan and that it 
did not seem he had done anything to help her. The President responded 
by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something to 
that effect. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There 
was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met the 
President the next day, December 7, but the meeting was unrelated to 
Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805, 
1810)

                     The December 11, 1997 Activity

    The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually procure 
employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky 
and gave her a list of contact names. The two also discussed the 
President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840) 
That meeting Mr. Jordan remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 1798) Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective 
employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1800-
1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the President to give him 
a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. Jordan and the President were now very 
interested in helping Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98 
GJ, p. 95; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807)

                   Significance of December 11, 1997

    This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered on 
December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that 
Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any state or federal 
employee with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual 
relations, or sought to have sexual relations.
    The President knew that it would be politically and legally 
expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
And the President knew that that relationship would be fostered by 
finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was accomplished through enlisting the 
help of Vernon Jordan.

         December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List

    On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, Monica 
Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the President of the United 
States. The President said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two 
things: one was that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car 
accident; secondly, the President said that he ``had some more bad 
news,'' that he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and 
her name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) The 
President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke 
his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be subpoenaed, 
[she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that [she] had received 
the subpoena.'' (Id.) Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if 
subpoenaed. The President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to 
be false and misleading to accomplish the desired result.

                     The President's ``Suggestion''

    Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for Monica 
Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He did not 
specifically tell her to lie. What he did say is ``you know, you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843)
    In order to understand the significance of this statement, it is 
necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had previously structured in order to deceive those who 
protected and worked with the President.
    Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited the 
President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, `here are your 
letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would answer, `Okay that's good.' '' 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left 
White House employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the 
guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775)
    Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she would always 
deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The President 
would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of encouragement. (ML 
8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1078)
    So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on December 
17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her 
of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the 
President brought up the misleading stories, she understood that the 
two would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception.

                       The President's Intention

    It became clear that the President had no intention of making his 
sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public affair. And he would 
use lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not be 
known.
    It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked the 
President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m., 
he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . . . it is quite 
possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 567)
    And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to 
continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the 
letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that 
night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565)
    Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' lawyers 
were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. Lewinsky could file a 
false affidavit, but it might not work. It was absolutely essential 
that both parties told the same story. He knew that he would lie if 
asked about Ms. Lewinsky, and he wanted to make certain that she would 
lie also. That is why the President of the United States called a 
twenty-four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning.

                          The Evidence Mounts

    But the President had an additional problem. It was not enough that 
he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the relationship. The evidence was 
beginning to accumulate. Because of the emerging evidence, the 
President found it necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time, 
the evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts, 
that the President and Monica Lewinsky were spending a significant 
amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. It was no longer 
expedient simply to refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'', 
``stalker'', ``clutch'', or ``home wrecker'' as the White House first 
attempted to do. The unassailable facts were forcing the President to 
acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he still had 
the opportunity to establish a non-sexual explanation for their 
meetings, since his DNA had not yet been identified on Monica 
Lewinsky's blue dress.

                        Need for the Cover Story

    Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along with 
the cover story in order to provide an innocent, intimate-free 
explanation for their frequent meetings. And that innocent explanation 
came in the form of ``document deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with 
Betty Currie.''
    Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 17, 1998, 
he used the exact same cover stories that had been utilized by Ms. 
Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent with any future Lewinsky 
testimony while still maintaining his defense in the Jones lawsuit.
    In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was ever 
alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . She--
it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. 
In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, 
exchange a few words and go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-
53)
    Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. Lewinsky's 
frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President did not hesitate to 
mention Betty Currie in his answers, for example:

    And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after [the 
pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] but my 
secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 58)
    Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. She 
came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there 
talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/
98 Dep., p. 68)

             December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed

    On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in a 
deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the Jones case. (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) (Charts F and G) Extremely 
distraught, she immediately called the President's closest friend, 
Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President 
previously told her to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She 
called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died 
and she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; H.Doc. 
105-311, pgs. 848, 849)

                          Vernon Jordan's Role

    Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she arrived 
shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. Around this time, 
Mr. Jordan called the President and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1) 
During the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as 
``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1716), she 
talked about her infatuation with the President. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan decided that he would call a lawyer 
for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726)

                    Mr. Jordan Informs the President

    That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed his 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely important 
because the President, in his deposition, did not recall that meeting. 
Mr. Jordan told the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her fascination with the 
President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the 
President would leave the First Lady. He also asked the President if he 
had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc 
105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition:

    Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica 
Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?
    A. I don't think so.
    Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility 
that she might be asked to testify in this case?
    A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she was, I 
think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I want to be as 
accurate as I can.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69)
    In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial that Mr. 
Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when given more specific facts, he 
admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the 
subpoena on the night of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. . 
. .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an 
attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, the President 
testified in the grand jury that he was trying to remember who told him 
first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that 
was not the question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one 
considers the nature of the conversation between the President and Mr. 
Jordan, the suggestion that it would be forgotten defies common sense.

                           December 28, 1997

    December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence shows 
that the President made false and misleading statements to the federal 
court, the federal grand jury and the Congress of the United States 
about the events on that date. (Chart J) It is also a date on which he 
obstructed justice.

                        The President's Account

    The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he invited 
Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 33; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that he ``probably'' gave Ms. 
Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/
98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts 
on other occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many 
gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he 
said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks later, the President forgot that 
he had given any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky.
    As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not tolerate 
someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that answer is unreasonable 
under the circumstances. He also knew that, under those circumstances, 
his answer in the deposition could not be believed. When asked in the 
grand jury why he was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms. 
Lewinsky so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the deposition, 
the President put forth an obviously contrived explanation.

    ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not 
that I don't recall whether I had given them.''

 (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503)

                     Response to Committee Requests

    The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 to the 
House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. (Exhibit 18) He was 
not asked in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked, 
``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a 
witness to insert unstated premises or mental reservations into the 
question to make his answer technically true, if factually false. The 
essence of lying is in deception, not in words.
    The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves that his 
explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee is also false. The 
President would have us believe that he was able to analyze questions 
as they were being asked, and pick up such things as verb tense in an 
attempt to make his statements at least literally true. But when he was 
asked a simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it. 
Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted explanation is 
reasonable or true.

                       Testimony Concerning Gifts

    The President was asked in the deposition if Monica Lewinsky ever 
gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
77) This is also false testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He 
answered this question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee 
by saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the 
precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not support the 
President's position. An answer that baldly understates a numerical 
fact in response to a specific quantitative inquiry can be deemed 
technically true but actually false. For example, a witness is 
testifying falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in 
fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had also gone five 
times. So too, when the President answered once or twice in the face of 
evidence that Ms. Lewinsky was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying. 
(Chart C)

                          Concealment of Gifts

    On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct justice 
and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and 
that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. She recalled telling 
the President that the subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused 
her concern. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872) 
The President told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, 
p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she 
take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe to Betty. The 
President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L) 
Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I 
understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you 
have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-
311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about this incident, 
but says that ``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. 
(Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581)

                         The Cell Phone Record

    There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is 
wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie called from her 
cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms. 
Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves 
conclusively that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several 
hours after she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself 
later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on 
this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) The facts 
prove that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.

                       Ms. Currie's Later Actions

    That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If Ms. 
Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, Ms. Currie 
would logically ask the reason for such a transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was 
giving her a box of gifts from the President yet she did not tell the 
President of this strange request. She simply took the gifts and placed 
them under her bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
pgs. 57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 114; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582)
    The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 and 25 
from the House Committee that he was not concerned about the gifts. 
(Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he recalled telling Monica that if 
the Jones lawyers request gifts, she should turn them over. The 
President testified that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena 
asked for gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494-
495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning over gifts 
to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena 
asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested 
gifts, why would he give Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she never 
questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but keep this 
private'' and that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to 
be taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 886) The only logical inference is that the gifts--including the 
bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that 
they would deny the relationship--even in the face of a federal 
subpoena.

                  The President's Deposition Testimony

    Furthermore, the President, at various times in his deposition, 
seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 28 in order to obstruct the administration of justice. First, 
he was asked: ``Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in 
this case?'' The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she 
had been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68)
    He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . .,'' he said. he 
then added that he may have joked to her that the Jones lawyers might 
subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we 
ever had more of a conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/
98 Dep., p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this 
testimony, but the President also directly contradicted himself before 
the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said that 
he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and that 
they had a ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.'' 
(WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this conversation about 
her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks before his deposition. Again, 
his version is not reasonable.

   January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job

    The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to execute a 
false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content that when she asked 
if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen fifteen of 
them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his 
information from discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan 
generally about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President 
had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be 
certain the mission was accomplished.

                     Additional Presidential Advice

    In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with her 
lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 192; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some hard questions about 
how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) 
After the meeting, she called Betty Currie and said that she wanted to 
speak to the President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President discussed 
the issue of how she would answer under oath if asked about how she got 
her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) 
The President told her: ``Well, you could always say that the people in 
Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and misleading.

                        Vernon Jordan's New Role

    The President was also kept advised as to the contents of the 
Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the 
Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to 
look at the Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his 
imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 194-
195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. 
Jordan conferred about the contents and agreed to delete a paragraph 
inserted by Mr. Carter which might open a line of questions concerning 
whether she had been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he had 
nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 12; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, that he spoke with the 
President after conferring with Ms. Lewinsky about the changes made to 
her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827)

                 Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit

    The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 924-925) 
(Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that 
same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4) 
Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified the President that she signed an 
affidavit denying a sexual relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1739)

                       Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job

    On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for Ms. 
Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky 
called Mr. Jordan and informed him. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's 
job search from early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews 
and Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could 
happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1829) Mr. Jordan 
called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928-929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was 
called by MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given more 
interviews the next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
929)
    After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, 
she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 210; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan to tell him, he passed 
the good news on to Betty Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ 
5/28/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called 
the President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P)

              The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior

    After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job--since July 
according to the President's lawyers--Vernon Jordan made the critical 
call to a CEO the day after the false Affidavit was signed. Mr. 
Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a 
job recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman 
to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a 
very talented attorney from Akin Gump; (3) a Harvard business school 
graduate; and (4) Monica Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 1747) Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. 
Lewinsky's qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals 
previously recommended by Mr. Jordan.
    Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. Lewinsky 
worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59) 
and that she did not like her Pentagon job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point 
during this process you wondered about her qualifications for 
employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to 
make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1707) Yet, when he 
called Mr. Perelman the day after she signed the Affidavit, he referred 
to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman 
4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that 
she had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic 
expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 37-
38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a disturbing story 
about the President leaving the First Lady, and how the President was 
not spending enough time with her. Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan 
pause in making the recommendation, especially after Monica was 
subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1725)

                 The Importance of the False Affidavit

    Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, through 
his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition ``. . . 
there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form 
with President Clinton. . . .'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When 
questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President stated 
specifically that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was 
``absolutely true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later 
affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before the grand 
jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 473) Paragraph 8 
of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states:

    ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me 
employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he 
did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
relationship.''

    Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on January 
6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being alone 
with the President. She showed a copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon 
Jordan, who called the President and told him that she had signed it. 
(VJ, 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98 
GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828)

                     The Rush To File the Affidavit

    For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding questions 
by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it had to be filed with 
the Court and provided to the President's attorneys in time for his 
deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called 
Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out if he 
had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 15, the President's 
attorneys called her attorney twice. When they finally reached him, 
they requested a copy of the Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on 
time?'' (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms. 
Lewinsky's lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123, 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of its 
contents and used it powerfully in the deposition.
    Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on January 
15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on Saturday, January 17. 
(Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424) 
(Exhibit 5) He finished the Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition 
in the early morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court 
with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. (Carter 6/18/
98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The President's lawyers left him 
another message on January 16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.'' 
(Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the 
President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court to support 
his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in the deposition, and 
thereby obstruct justice.

                          The Newsweek Inquiry

    On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty Currie and 
asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her by courier. (BC 5/6/
98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie then called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about 
it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The 
President was out of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky 
back, and asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with Bruce Lindsey and 
Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. Currie testified that she spoke 
immediately to Mr. Lindsey about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584)

                 January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath

    By the time the President concluded his deposition on January 17, 
he knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who had personal knowledge 
was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky 
created, and that he used himself during the deposition, were now in 
jeopardy. It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky, 
but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the relationship 
from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night 
of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she 
come in the following day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President 
ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday night. (BC 1/
27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart S) Sometime in the 
early morning hours of January 18, 1998, the President learned of a 
news report concerning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/
17/98 GJ, p. 142-143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14)

              The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie

    As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., there 
were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the President. (Exhibit 
7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) He told her that he had just been 
deposed and that the attorneys asked several questions about Monica 
Lewinsky. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then 
made a series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T)

    (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
    (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 
GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked whether 
she believed that the President wished her to agree with the 
statements:

    Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he stated [these 
five points] and the demeanor that he was using at the time that he 
stated it to you--that he wished you to agree with that statement?
    A. I can't speak for him, but----
    Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these [previous] 
meetings in the last several days that that is how you took it.
    A. [Nodding.]
    Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President made to 
you, ``You remember I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' Was 
that also a statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you to 
agree with that?
    A. Correct.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559)
    Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not necessarily 
feel pressured by the President, she did state that she felt the 
President was seeking her agreement (or disagreement) with those 
statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669)

                    Was This Obstruction of Justice?

    The President essentially admitted to making these statements when 
he knew they were not true. Consequently, he had painted himself into a 
legal corner. Understanding the seriousness of the President 
``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the argument has been made that those 
statements to her could not constitute obstruction because she had not 
been subpoenaed, and the President did not know that she was a 
potential witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law 
and the facts.
    The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and 
stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if he 
urges or persuades a prospective witness to give false testimony. 
Neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time of the 
offense, nor must he or she actually give testimony at a later time.'' 
United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing, 
e.g., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 1981)).
    Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the President 
clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate him, as his testimony 
demonstrates. The President claims that he called Ms. Currie into work 
on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But the President 
knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had 
told the truth during his deposition the day before, then he would have 
no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, the 
President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his demeanor, and the 
blatant lies that he suggested clearly prove that the President was not 
merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was looking for 
corroboration for his false cover-up, and that is why he coached her.

                January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky

    Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 p.m., 
the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica Lewinsky began. 
(Chart S) Between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms. 
Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky 
and Ms. Currie agreed to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
216; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms. 
Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 
160; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 702)

                    January 19, the Search Continues

    The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to work 
diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. and 8:41 a.m., 
she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After 
the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called the President at 8:43 a.m. and said 
that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-
162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again 
paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family 
Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky into 
calling back. That may have been the President's idea, since Ms. Currie 
had just spoken with him. The President was obviously quite concerned 
because he called Betty Currie only six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. 
Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different 
tact, sending the message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the 
President's suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good 
news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. Lewinsky to 
call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 165; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's recollection of why she was 
calling was again fuzzy. She said at one point that she believes the 
President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and she thought she was 
calling just to tell her that her name came up in the deposition. (BC 
7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed; of course her name came up in the deposition. There was 
obviously another and more important reason the President needed to get 
in touch with her.

         Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search

    At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who then 
joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four minutes, from 
10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White House three times, 
paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. 
Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. 
Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House.

                    Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer

    Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter. 
Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer represented Ms. 
Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan 
then made feverish attempts to reach the President or someone at the 
White House to tell them the bad news, as represented by the six calls 
between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to 
relay this information to the White House because ``[t]he President 
asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was 
``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, pgs. 45-46; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan then called Mr. Carter 
back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they had already talked about. (VJ 3/
5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104-316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached 
the President at 5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired. 
(VJ 6/9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970)

                    The Reason for the Urgent Search

    This activity shows how important it was for the President of the 
United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom she was talking. 
Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. Lewinsky. The President 
had just completed a deposition in which he provided false and 
misleading testimony about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was 
a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, 
and he was losing control over her. The President never got complete 
control over her again.

     Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury

    Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of false grand 
jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some salient examples of 
false statements are described below. When judging the statements made 
and the answers given, it is vital to recall that the President spent 
literally days preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his 
attorney were fully aware that the testimony would center around his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony in the 
Jones case.

                          Grand Jury Testimony

    On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the United 
States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow citizens and took an 
oath to tell the complete truth. The President proceeded to equivocate 
and engage in legalistic fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony 
was calculated to mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct 
its process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He set the 
tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a witness can tell the 
truth, lie or assert his privileges against self incrimination. (Chart 
Y) President Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was 
permitted to read a statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9)

                   The President's Prepared Statement

    That statement itself is demonstrably false in many particulars. 
President Clinton claims that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' 
Notice he did not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three 
``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual contact 
with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year old intern at 
the time.
    The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three visits 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they engaged in sexual 
conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/
6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's 
ruling, this evidence was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual 
harassment claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11, 
1997, p. 3)
    The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The 
encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that 
term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 deposition.'' That assertion 
is patently false. It is directly contradicted by the corroborated 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32; 
H.Doc. 311, p. 1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357, 
1358)
    Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
``sexual relations'' as the President understood the term to be defined 
at his deposition and as any reasonable person would have understood 
the term to have been defined.
    Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's conduct 
during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits did constitute 
``sexual relations'' as he understood the term to be defined at his 
deposition. Before the grand jury, the President admitted that directly 
touching or kissing another person's breast, or directly touching 
another person's genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual 
relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 94-95; H.Doc 
105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President maintained that he did 
not engage in such conduct. (Id.) These statements are contradicted by 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and the testimony of numerous individuals with 
whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with 
the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky repeated and 
unilaterally performed acts on the President while he tailored his 
conduct to fit a contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' which he 
had not contemplated at the time of the acts, defies common sense.
    Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted 
interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in the grand 
jury until after his deposition had concluded. This is demonstrated by 
the substantial evidence revealing the President's state of mind during 
his deposition testimony. First, the President continuously denied at 
his deposition any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship, 
including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-
53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. Lewinsky had ever given him 
gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) Second, the President testified that 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely 
true'' when, even by his current reading of the definition, it is 
absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White House 
produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' 
stating flatly that the President's definition of ``sexual relations'' 
included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the President made statements to 
staff members soon after the deposition, saying that he did not have 
sexual relations, including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/
98 GJ, pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to tell 
people she and the President had an affair when he rebuffed her sexual 
advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth, 
President Clinton's Answer filed in Federal District Court in response 
to Paula Jones' First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that 
``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with 
respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of Defendant William 
Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, para. 39) Sixth, in 
President Clinton's sworn Answers to Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11, 
as amended, he flatly denied that he had sexual relations with any 
federal employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his 
deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat silently 
while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, represented 
to the court that there was no sex of any kind or in any manner between 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54)
    This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state of mind 
at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in technically or 
legally accurate answers, but in categorically denying anything 
improper. His grand jury testimony about his state of mind during the 
deposition is false.

                    Reasons for the False Testimony

    The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect himself from 
embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the affair. Before his grand 
jury testimony, the President's semen had been identified by laboratory 
tests on Ms. Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an 
``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, In fact, 
when he testified before the grand jury, he was only hours away from 
admitting the affair on national television. Embarrassment was 
inevitable. But, if he truthfully admitted the details of his 
encounters with Ms. Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be 
acknowledging that he lied under oath during his deposition when he 
claimed that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. 
(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, he chose to lie, not to 
protect his family or the dignity of his office, but to protect himself 
from criminal liability for his perjury in the Jones case.

              Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement

    The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what began as 
a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 9; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much more troubling. As Ms. 
Lewinsky testified, her relationship with the President began with 
flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky showing the President her underwear. 
(ML 7/30/98 Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky 
candidly admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her 
name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295)

                         Reason for the Falsity

    The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, was not 
an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to a particular 
question. It was carefully drafted testimony which the President read 
and relied upon throughout his deposition. The President attempted to 
use the statement to foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on 
nineteen separate occasions. Yet, this prepared testimony, which along 
with other testimony provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually 
contradicts his sworn deposition testimony.

                     Contrary Deposition Testimony

    In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. Lewinsky 
were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to make this admission 
in his deposition in the Jones case. During the deposition, the 
following exchange occurred:

    Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica 
Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky together alone in 
the Oval Office?
    A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the 
legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on the 
weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring 
me things on the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to me 
once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be 
in there, drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I 
don't have any specific recollections of what the issues were, what was 
going on, but when the Congress is there, we're working all the time, 
and typically I would do some work on one of the days of the weekends 
in the afternoon.
    Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then, 
that you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of 
that ever happening?
    A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was 
working there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought 
it to me, she was the only person there. That's possible.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
    After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President was given 
an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange followed:

    Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone 
together in any room in the White House?
    A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it 
is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on 
duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs 
office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend. 
That's--I have a general memory of that.
    Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those meetings?
    A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't remember.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
    Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he testified 
truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, in part, the basis 
for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My goal in this deposition was to 
be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to 
walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the 
law, and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he certainly was alone 
with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, as the President 
conceded in his prepared grand jury statement.
    In other words, the President's assertion before the grand jury 
that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he testified truthfully 
in his deposition, is inconsistent. Yet, to this day, both the 
President and his attorneys have insisted that he did not lie at his 
deposition and that he did not lie when he swore under oath that he did 
not lie at his deposition.
    In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his deposition. All 
of those lies are incorporated in Article I, Item 2.

                Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit

    Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing perjurious, 
false and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury concerning 
false and misleading statements his attorney Robert Bennett made to 
Judge Wright at the President's deposition. In one statement, while 
objecting to questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the 
Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] is fully 
aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in 
possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., 
pgs. 53-54) When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her 
concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett responded, 
``In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness is 
fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a 
single thing he doesn't know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis 
added)
    When asked before the grand jury about his statement to Judge 
Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I paid attention 
to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p. 
476) He added, ``I didn't pay much attention to this conversation, 
which is why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the 
deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) Finally, 
``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the 
exact words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully 
for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed me by.'' 
(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 29; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 481)
    This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his 
deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. Jones' 
attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which continued while Ms. 
Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he did not want the truth to be 
known. Of course, when Ms. Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the 
deposition, particularly in connection with sex, the President is going 
to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. Bennett's 
representations are eliminated by watching the videotape of the 
President's deposition. The videotape shows the President looking 
directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to 
Judge Wright.

           False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice

    Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury perjury 
regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and his 
efforts to impede discovery in the Jones  v. Clinton lawsuit. These 
lies are perhaps the most troubling, as the President used them in an 
attempt to conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office.
    For example, the President testified before the grand jury that he 
recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the 
gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should 
provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He 
stated, ``And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have 
to give them whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.) 
This testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony and common sense.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she discussed 
with the President the subpoena's request for her to produce gifts, 
including a hat pin. She told the President that it concerned her, (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 871) and he said that it 
``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) 
Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe 
to Betty. But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms. 
Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me 
think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 872) 
Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky on her cellular 
phone and said, ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the 
President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875)
    Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she remembers is that 
Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) 
She later conceded that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers 
on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A 
telephone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie 
did call her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. Lewinsky's 
meeting with the President. The only logical reason Ms. Currie called 
Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from the President is that the President 
told her to do so. He would not have given this instruction if he 
wished the gifts to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys.

                    Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie

    The President again testified falsely when he told the grand jury 
that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made 
a series of statements to Ms. Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC 
8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that 
she met with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, and 
he proceeded to make these statements to her:

    (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
    (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 
GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements than 
questions, and that, as far as she understood, the President wanted her 
to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
559)
    The President was asked specifically about these statements before 
the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he was ``trying to 
refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He added that he wanted to ``know what 
Betty's memory was about what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 506) and that he was ``trying to get as much 
information as quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's explanation is 
contrived and false.
    A person does not refresh his recollection by firing declarative 
sentences dressed up as leading questions to his secretary. If the 
President was seeking information, he would have asked Ms. Currie what 
she recalled. Additionally, a person does not refresh his recollection 
by asking questions concerning factual scenarios of which the listener 
was unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener knew 
were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always there when Ms. 
Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, acknowledged during her grand 
jury testimony that Ms. Lewinsky could have visited the President at 
the White House when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 65-
66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that there were 
several occasions when the President and Ms. Lewinsky were in the Oval 
Office or study area without anyone else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 
32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 552-553)
    More importantly, the President admitted in his statement to the 
grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions. 
(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his 
own admission, his statement to Ms. Currie about never being alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky was false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie 
certainly could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or 
not.
    The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear 
everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury testimony. 
During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, he ensured 
everyone, including Ms. Currie, was excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why would someone refresh his recollection by 
making a false statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is 
obvious--he would not.
    Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was 
``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently explaining that 
he made these statements because he did not have time to listen to 
answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 508) But, if he was in such a hurry, why did the President not 
ask Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on 
the telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate explanation 
as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 minutes with Ms. 
Currie on January 18 to get her version of the events. In fact, Ms. 
Currie testified that she first met the President on January 18 while 
he was on the White House putting green, and he told her to go into the 
office and he would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, why did he 
repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560-561) The reason for these 
statements had nothing to do with time constraints or refreshing 
recollection; he had just finished lying during the Jones deposition 
about these issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary.

                   Testimony About Influencing Aides

    Not only did the President lie about his attempts to influence Ms. 
Currie's testimony, but he lied about his attempts to influence the 
testimony of some of his top aides. Among the President's lies to his 
aides, described in detail later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky 
did not perform oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him 
while he rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then disseminated 
to the media and attributed to White House sources. They were also 
disseminated to the grand jury.
    When the President was asked about these lies before the grand 
jury, he testified:

    ``And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's 
nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I never 
would have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
    ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter 
further. So I said things that were true. They may have been 
misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and 
I'm sorry.''

(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558)
    To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must believe that 
many of the President's top aides engaged in a concerted effort to lie 
to the grand jury in order to incriminate him at the risk of subjecting 
themselves to a perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative 
of the President's character that he never felt any compunction in 
exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he could conceal 
his own perjuries. Simply put, such a conspiracy did not exist.
    The above are merely highlights of the President's grand jury 
perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In order to keep 
these lies in perspective, three facts must be remembered. First, 
before the grand jury, the President was not lying to cover up an 
affair and protect himself from embarrassment, as concealing the affair 
was now impossible. Second, the President could no longer argue that 
the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow 
irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent Counsel and the 
grand jury had mandates to explore them. Third, he cannot claim to have 
been surprised or unprepared for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before 
the grand jury, as he spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses 
to such questions.

                         The President's Method

    Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to give the 
appearance of being candid, when actually his intent was the opposite. 
In addition, throughout the testimony, whenever the President was asked 
a specific question that could not be answered directly without either 
admitting the truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said, 
``I rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and 
misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those lies in 
``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg. 
139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591)

                     The House Committee's Request

    In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its inquiry to 
an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives submitted to the President 81 requests to admit or deny 
specific facts relevant to this investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although, 
for the most part, the questions could have been answered with a simple 
``admit'' or ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of 
selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, 
artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. When he did answer, 
he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting in an obvious attempt to skirt 
the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct the due proceedings of the 
Committee.

                  The President Repeats His Falsities

    Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a lack of 
memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable memory, for 
his amazing ability to recall details.
    In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to ``White 
House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior testimony and that 
of others. He answered several of the requests by merely restating the 
same deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury. We will point 
out several false statements in this Brief.
    In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive and 
misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct the efforts of 
the House Committee. They had the effect of seriously hampering its 
ability to inquire and to ascertain the truth. The President has, 
therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry and an investigation before 
the Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the 
Judicial Branch of our constitutional system of government.

                    The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky

    After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office of 
President was marshaled to destroy the character and reputation of 
Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been ill-used by the President. 
As soon as her name surfaced, the campaign began to muzzle any possible 
testimony, and to attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted 
effort to obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed 
by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked.
    When the President testified at his deposition that he had no 
sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with Monica Lewinsky, he 
felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only other witness was on board. She 
had furnished a false affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he 
realized from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were taped 
conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he had to develop a 
new story, and he did. In addition, he recounted that story to White 
House aides who passed it on to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct 
that tribunal too.
    On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post published a 
story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes 
Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones' 
Lawyers.'' The White House learned the substance of the Post story on 
the evening of January 20, 1998.

                          Mr. Bennett's Remark

    After the President learned of the existence of the story, he made 
a series of telephone calls.
    At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a 
conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the 
Washington Post stating:

    ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added, 
``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.''

                            Additional Calls

    After that conversation, the President had a half hour conversation 
with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey.
    At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke to her 
for 20 minutes.
    He then called Bruce Lindsey again.
    At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan.
    After that, the President again conversed with Bruce Lindsey.
    This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which the 
President would soon inflict upon top White House aides and advisors.

                  The President's Statements to Staff

                             erskine bowles
    On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with White 
House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two deputies, John 
Podesta and Sylvia Matthews.
    Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 9:00 
a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's immediate words as 
he and two others entered the Oval Office:

    And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said to the 
American people.
    He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual relationships 
with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. And 
when the facts come out, you'll understand.''

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the President 
made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded:

    I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I don't 
know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever they are, you 
ought to get them out. And you ought to get them out rignt now.''

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
    When counsel asked whether the President responded to Bowles' 
suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded:

    I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree with me.

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
                              john podesta
January 21, 1998
    Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the 
President on the morning of January 21, 1998.
    He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval 
Office that morning:

    A. And we started off meeting--we didn't--I don't think we said 
anything. And I think the President directed this specifically to Mr. 
Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not 
true.''
    Q. What else did he say?
    A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship with 
her, and that he never asked anybody to lie.

(Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310)
January 23, 1998
    Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another 
discussion with the President:

    ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working on this 
draft and he said to me that he never had sex with her, and that--and 
that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he was 
extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.''

Then Podesta testified as follows:

    Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more specific than 
sex, than the word ``sex.''
    A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
    Q. Okay, share that with us.
    A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate. Of, 
you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had 
sex with her in any way whatsoever----
    Q. Okay.
    A. That they had not had oral sex.

(Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) (Exhibit V)
                           sidney blumenthal
    Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called Sidney 
Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note how the President's 
lies become more elaborate and pronounced when he has time to concoct 
this newest line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and 
Mr. Podesta, he simply denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to 
Mr. Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his defense 
strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the aggressor; (2) he 
launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her as a 
``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent victim being 
attacked by the forces of evil.
    Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 4, 1998 
testimony: (Chart U)

    And it was at this point that he gave his account of what had 
happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, 
``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.'' He 
rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused 
pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'' She 
threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an 
affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she 
hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she 
wouldn't be the stalker anymore.

(Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
    And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal moments 
later:

    And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like 
somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a 
lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character 
in the novel Darkness at Noon.
    And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were 
you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of 
someone.''

(Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
    At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to 
describe the President's manner and demeanor during the exchange.

    Q. In response to my question how you responded to the President's 
story about a threat or discussion about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky, 
you mentioned you didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally 
the nature of your response to the President?
    A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I certainly 
believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he was pouring out 
his heart, and I believed him.

(Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 192-193)
                              betty currie
    When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she could not 
recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with the President 
on Tuesday, January 20, or Wednesday, January 21. But she did state 
that on one of those days, the President summoned her back to his 
office. At that time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday 
afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It was at that 
meeting that the President made a series of statements to Ms. Currie, 
to some of which she could not possibly have known the answers. (e.g. 
``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98 
GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the same tone 
and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday session.
    Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned that she 
might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 Int., p. 8; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 536)

                        Motive for Lies to Staff

    It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff 
were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more 
important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate 
that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that 
this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had 
recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the 
Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys 
and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post 
journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky 
affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on 
Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to 
interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because 
the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of 
events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The 
President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called 
before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311, 
pgs. 557-557)
    In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely 
to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He 
said that he was ``sensitive about not exchanging information because I 
knew I was a potential witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to 
provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta 
had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3332)
    In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White 
House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the 
effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and 
grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told 
them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the 
President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn, 
gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to 
base any decisions.

                             Win, Win, Win

    President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-costs strategy 
calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case 
and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by 
Richard ``Dick'' Morris to the federal grand jury.
    Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on 
January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the 
turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations 
against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an 
overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive 
the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When 
Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President:

    ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, 
it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to 
forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice 
or the various other things.' ''

(Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929)
    Morris recalls the following exchange:

    Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' meaning the 
voters.
    WJC: Well, we just have to win, then.

(Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930)
    The President, of course, cannot recall this statement, 
(Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71)

                 The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky

    In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the public, and 
hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica 
Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky 
to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in 
and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and 
that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President 
employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its 
press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998:

    Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to 
destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky. 
Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker? 
(The Plain Dealer)

Again:

    ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. Charles 
Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of 
the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played 
with a full deck in her other experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer)

From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30:

    ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this 
thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and 
take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in 
which the President was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like 
the woman who followed David Letterman around.'' (NBC News)

From another ``source'' on February 1:

    ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as 
`the stalker.' ''

And on February 4:

    ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as 
`infatuated' with the President, `star struck' and even `a stalker'.'' 
(Buffalo News)

Finally, on January 31:

    ``One White House aide called reporters to offer information about 
Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was 
her nickname--`The Stalker.' ''
    ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be 
identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, 
and was `A little bit weird.' ''
    ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between 
U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White 
House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as 
an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.''
    ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made 
unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the `troubled' product of 
divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her 
mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three 
famous opera singers.''
    ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George 
Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he 
ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup 
of the same coffee to `surprise him.' '' (Toronto Sun)

    This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy 
the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that 
these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of 
the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his 
deportment in the highest office in the land.
    On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury. 
He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides 
(Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called 
before the grand jury.

    Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after 
January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was 
looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that 
they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
    WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after 
that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but 
I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't 
want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you 
information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by 
and large, didn't talk to people about it.
    Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute. 
Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine 
Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's 
involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a 
sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
    WJC. No.
    Q. And you've told us that you----
    WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I 
meant by it when they started this deposition.
    Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it 
might have been misleading. Is that correct?
    WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do was to 
give them something they could--that would be true, even if misleading 
in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and 
let's deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous 
suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, 
in other words.

(WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560)
    As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained 
that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that 
when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The 
President stated that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual 
relations'' to be literally true because he was only referring to 
intercourse.
    However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied 
sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' The President 
told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he 
did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman.
    Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury 
appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, ``Talking 
Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This ``Talking 
Points'' document outlines proposed questions that the President may be 
asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The 
``Talking Points'' purport to state the President's view of sexual 
relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
(Exhibit 17)
    The ``Talking Points'' state as follows:

    Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual 
relationship?
    A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I 
am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' discussion of what 
constitutes a sexual relationship.
    Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the 
President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the 
President, constitute a sexual relationship?
    A. Of course it would.

    The President's own talking points refute the President's ``literal 
truth'' argument.

                   Effect of the President's Conduct

    Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's deportment 
affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity 
and honor of the country.
    Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of 
the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he is required to take an oath 
to ``Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.'' Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol, 
raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath.
    The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.''
    The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved.''
    Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and 
the equal protection of the laws.

                    The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights

    Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt 
that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong 
was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed 
essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in 
turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was 
not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the 
United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve 
and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-
minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously right violations by 
someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to 
enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test. 
As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to 
petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by 
filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At 
this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due 
process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the 
defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates that right to a 
full and fair trial, which, in turn, means the right to call and 
question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her 
case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she 
actually get? None of the above.
    On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to 
zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' Paula Jones ``has a 
right to an orderly disposition of her claims.`` In accordance with the 
Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber 
Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to 
information regarding state or federal employees with whom the 
President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge 
Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this 
ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. 
The President's Answer stated: ``President Clinton denies that he 
engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other 
woman.''
    Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by 
perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit 
testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false 
and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the 
case, it would have been deprived of critical information.
    That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional 
proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the 
President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve, 
protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the ``sanctity of 
an oath'' means to the President.

                 The Effect on the Office of President

    Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the 
people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign 
matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the 
credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of 
a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a 
long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is 
seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our 
country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to 
confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States?
    Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound 
to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it 
affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it 
affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without 
which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a 
pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of 
justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the 
resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is, 
of necessity, devastating.

                        The Effect on the System

    Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath. 
Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the 
foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of 
obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely 
affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a 
lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain 
that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough 
pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So 
too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and 
unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of 
them, the system itself will implode.
    That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been 
indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under 
oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury 
in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they 
gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that 
they should not be charged because their motives may have been to 
protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the 
perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports; 
i.e., betting on college football games.

                      Disregard of the Rule of Law

    Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an 
attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law. 
Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights 
of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of 
the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of 
the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the 
United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the 
entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the 
Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those 
supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will 
collapse altogether.

                     Effect on the Judicial Branch

    The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth-seeking 
process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial 
Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies, 
half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers 
to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated 
his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative 
Branch.
    Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may 
not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the 
Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect 
on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that 
manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely 
destructive.

          The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal

    The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction 
and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that 
perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office. 
Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need 
not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties.

                               Precedents

    In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three 
federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History 
of Impeachment Hearings Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. 
Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'') 
Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that 
perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor 
did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment 
proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and 
misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon, 
it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with 
the exercise of the judges' judicial powers.

                              Judge Nixon

    In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and 
removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense 
stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal 
officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of 
Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge 
Nixon's.
    Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew 
Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley 
Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the 
prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend 
of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of 
Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. 
Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again 
denied his involvement before that grand jury.
    After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on 
two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years 
in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge 
Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged 
him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury 
that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case with the 
prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative 
false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had ``nothing 
whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild 
case.'' The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false 
statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand 
jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03.
    The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House 
Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable 
offense:

    ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal 
process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his 
testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain 
on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he 
sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary 
citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial 
oath?''

House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of 
Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the 
question even more directly:

    ``There are basically two questions before you in connection with 
this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles 
of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate 
on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and 
wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. 
Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives 
Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on 
the bench.''

135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
    The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of 
perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As 
Senator Carl Levin explained:

    ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that 
Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading 
and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I 
and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon 
and remove him from office.''

135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin).

                             Judge Hastings

    Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for, 
among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate 
convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge 
Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy 
stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr. 
William Borders to ``fix'' cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for 
cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his 
own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any 
participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted 
Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge 
Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of 
which were for lying under oath at his trial.
    The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report 
left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable:

    ``It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony 
charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to 
convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence 
were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the 
conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes, 
the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct 
that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster 
one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt 
conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from 
public office.''

The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of 
Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) 
also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings:

    ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high 
crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve 
than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be 
disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to 
attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy 
and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, 
we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that 
we demand of everyone else.''

134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers).

                            Judge Claiborne

    In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and 
removed from office for making false statements under penalties of 
perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax 
returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result, 
he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false 
statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206 
(a). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles 
of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal 
income tax filings were not impeachable was never even seriously 
considered. As the House Managers explained:

    ``[T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two Articles of 
Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax returns] are readily 
resolved. The Constitution provides that Judge Claiborne may be 
impeached and convicted for ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article 
II, Section 4. The willful making or subscribing of a false statement 
on a tax return is a felony offense under the laws of the United 
States. The commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge 
Claiborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate.''

Proceedings of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of Judge 
Harry E. Claiborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986) (Claiborne 
Proceedings'') (emphases added).
    House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate, 
emphatically made the same point:

    ``Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public officials 
who respect the law, not in those who violate the trust that has been 
given to them when they are trusted with public office. Judge Harry E. 
Claiborne has, sad to say, undermined the integrity of the judicial 
branch of Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public 
confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne must be 
convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that of reducing 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary].''

132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino).
    The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator Albert 
Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and remove him from 
office:

    ``The conclusion is inescapable that Claiborne filed false income 
tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than negligently. . . . 
Given the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. An 
individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no business 
receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens. 
More importantly, an individual quality of such reprehensible conduct 
ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers which the 
Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary.''

Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986).

                      Application to the President

    To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents--and in 
particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment for, conviction, 
and removal for perjury--the only recourse for the President's 
defenders is to argue that a high crime or misdemeanor for a judge is 
not necessarily a high crime or misdemeanor for the President. The 
arguments advanced in support of this dubious proposition do not 
withstand serious scrutiny. (See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193)
    The Constitution provides that Article III judges ``shall hold 
their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. III, 1. Thus, 
these arguments suggest that judges are impeachable for ``misbehavior'' 
while other federal officials are only impeachable for treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.
    The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and the 
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in the 1990s 
both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 1974, the staff of 
the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a report which 
included the following conclusion:

    ``Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states 
that judges `shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the 
relevance of the ten impeachments of judges with respect to 
presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by some? It does 
not. The argument is that `good behavior' implies an additional ground 
for impeachment of judges not applicable to other civil officers. 
However, the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention and 
included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its 
expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and 
defines impeachment offenses as `Treason, Bribery, and other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.' ''

Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., 
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print 1974) 
(``1974 Staff Report'') at 17.
    The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal came to 
the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that ``the most plausible 
reading of the phrase `during good Behavior' is that it means tenure 
for life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification 
debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the 
assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through 
impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on Judicial 
Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on Judicial 
Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993) (footnote omitted).
    The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also argues 
against different impeachment standards for federal judges and 
presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to dismiss 
the articles of impeachment against him for failure to state 
impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was that ``[t]he 
standard for impeachment of a judge is different than that for other 
officers'' and that the Constitution limited ``removal of the judiciary 
to acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office.'' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment 
on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter 
cited as ``Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986) 
(hereinafter cited as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings'').
    Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the term 
`good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is totally misplaced 
and virtually all commentators agree that that is directed to affirming 
the life tenure of judges during good behavior. It is not to set them 
down, differently, as judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. at 
81-82. He further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any support for 
the notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the 
United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II of the 
Constitution.'' Id. at 81.
    The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the Senate 
was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained therein because it 
later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus rejected the claim that the 
standard of impeachable offenses was different for judges than for 
presidents.
    Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and 
misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely the 
President ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than 
judges. In the course of the 1980s judicial impeachments, Congress 
emphasized unequivocally that the removal from office of federal judges 
guilty of crimes indistinguishable from those currently charged against 
the President was essential to the preservation of the rule of law. If 
the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule of law as to make 
it intolerable that he remain in office, then how much more so does 
perjury committed by the President of the United States, who alone is 
charged with the duty ``to take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'' (See generally, Cooper Testimony at 194)
    It is just as devastating to our system of government when a 
President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in 
justifying an article of impeachment against President Nixon, the 
President not only has ``the obligation that every citizen has to live 
under the law,'' but in addition has the duty ``not merely to live by 
the law but to see that law faithfully applied.'' Impeachment of 
Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides that he 
``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const. 
Art. II, Sec. 3. When a President, as chief law enforcement officer of 
the United States, commits perjury, he violates this constitutional 
oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a 
nation ruled by laws and not men.

           Perjury and Obstruction Are as Serious as Bribery

    Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction 
and removal comes directly from the text of the Constitution. Because 
the Constitution specifically mentions bribery, no one can dispute that 
it is an impeachable offense. U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 4. Because the 
constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take it to 
mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically criminalize 
bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony in 
judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See 
also 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute), 
1512 (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the 
efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return for 
submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles might easily have 
been charged under these statutes. No one could reasonably argue that 
the President's bribing a witness to provide false testimony--even in a 
private lawsuit--does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. 
The plain language of the Constitution indicates that it is.
    Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a witness 
is illegal because it leads to false testimony that in turn undermines 
the ability of the judicial system to reach just results. Thus, among 
other things, the Framers clearly intended impeachment to protect the 
judicial system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and obstruction of 
justice are illegal for exactly the same reason, and they accomplish 
exactly the same ends through slightly different means. Simple logic 
establishes that perjury and obstruction of justice--even in a private 
lawsuit--are exactly the types of other high crimes and misdemeanors 
that are of the same magnitude as bribery.

                      High Crimes and Misdemeanors

    Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' much of the background and history of the 
impeachment process contradicts the President's claim that these 
offenses are private and therefore do not warrant conviction and 
removal. Two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of 
impeachment are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's 
defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts in this 
case compel the conviction and removal of President Clinton.
    Many have commented on the report on ``Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment'' prepared in February 1974 by the staff of 
the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The general principles concerning 
grounds for impeachment set forth in that report indicate that perjury 
and obstruction of justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key 
language from the staff report describing the type of conduct which 
gives rise to impeachment:
    ``The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--
undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties 
and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental 
process, adverse impact on the system of government.''

1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphasis added).
    Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the 
integrity of office.'' They unavoidably erode respect for the office of 
the President. Such offenses obviously involve ``disregard of [the 
President's] constitutional duties and oath of office.'' Moreover, 
these offenses have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system 
of government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on 
the due administration of justice--a core function of our system of 
government.
    The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment'' 
prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 
January of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive 
impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of office:
    It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for

``impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . . . 
Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of 
government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen to 
constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, the 
essential nexus to damaging the integrity of government may be found in 
acts which constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers 
of, official position. It may also be found in acts which, without 
directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of 
public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers 
that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
society.''

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential 
Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphasis added). The commission of perjury 
and obstruction of justice by a President are acts that without doubt 
``undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of the [the 
President] that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a 
free society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law which 
is essential to the well-being of our constitutional system.
    That the President's perjury and obstruction do not directly 
involve his official conduct does not diminish their significance. The 
record is clear that federal officials have been impeached for reasons 
other than official misconduct. As set forth above, two recent 
impeachments of federal judges are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge 
Walter Nixon was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for 
committing perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury 
involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a business 
partner--a matter in which he had no official role. In 1986, Judge 
Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office 
for making false statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax 
returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his official 
responsibilities.
    Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution 
suggests that officials are subject to impeachment only for official 
misconduct. Perjury and obstruction of justice--even regarding a 
private matter--are offenses that substantially affect the President's 
official duties because they are grossly incompatible with his 
preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' 
Regardless of their genesis, perjury and obstruction of justice are 
acts of public misconduct--they cannot be dismissed as understandable 
or trivial. Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters; 
they are crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment, 
conviction, and removal are appropriate.
    The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings affirms 
that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the ranking member of 
the Judiciary Committee and one of the House managers in the Senate 
trial, stated that ``[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in 
the course of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence 
of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be 
justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of 
public office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 132 
Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
    Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate dismiss the 
articles of impeachment for failure to state impeachable offenses 
provides additional evidence that personal misconduct can justify 
impeachment. One of the arguments his attorney made for the motion was 
that ``there is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge 
Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in his official 
function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' (Senate Claiborne 
Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar 
Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3)
    Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it would be 
absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape, 
or perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from 
office by the U.S. Senate.'' (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81) 
Kastenmeier's response was repeated by the House of Representatives in 
its pleading opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to 
Claiborne Motion at 2)
    The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it later 
voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 
1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that private improprieties 
could be, and were in this instance, impeachable offenses.
    The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it relates to 
a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's official duties--a 
judge's personal tax returns--is an impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's 
false statements were also in regard to a matter distinct from his 
official duties. In short, the Senate's own precedents establish that 
misconduct need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal.

                               Conclusion

    This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an institution, 
because if the President is not convicted as a consequence of the 
conduct that has been portrayed, then no House of Representatives will 
ever be able to impeach again and no Senate will ever convict. The bar 
will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to 
be concerned.
    Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to impeach 
President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. Can you imagine a 
future President, faced with possible impeachment, pointing to the 
perjuries, lies, obstructions, and tampering with witnesses by the 
current occupant of the office as not rising to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can 
the standard be lowered without completely compromising the credibility 
of the office for all time?
    Dated: January 11, 1999.
                                   The United States
                                   House of Representatives

                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham.
                                  Managers on the Part of the House
                                 ______
                                 

                                APPENDIX

 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

  Appendix to Trial Memorandum of the Managers Appointed by the U.S. 
                        House of Representatives

                           Table of Contents

                                 charts
    A. The President's Contacts Alone With Lewinsky
    B. The President's Telephone Contacts With Lewinsky
    C. Lewinsky's Gifts to The President
    D. The President's Gifts to Lewinsky
    E. 12/5/97 Facsimile Transmission of Witness List in Jones v. 
Clinton
    F. The December 19, 1997 Subpoena to Lewinsky in Jones v. Clinton
    G. December 19, 1997 Activities Following Lewinsky's Receipt of 
Subpoena
    H. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 
10 in Jones v. Clinton
    I. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 
11 in Jones v. Clinton
    J. December 28, 1997, The President's Final Meeting With Lewinsky 
and Concealment of Gifts
    K. Currie's Cell Phone Records for 12/28/97
    L. The President's Statements About Concealing Gifts
    M. Lewinsky's Draft Affidavit
    N. Lewinsky Final Affidavit dated January 7, 1998 Paragraph 8, 
Jones v. Clinton
    O. Filing Lewinsky's Affidavit and Motion to Quash (1/14/98-1/17/
98)
    P. Mission Accomplished: Lewinsky Signs Her Affidavit and Is Hired 
By Revlon in New York (1/5/98-1/9/98)
    Q. The President's Involvement With Lewinsky's Job Search
    R. Jordan's Testimony About His Pre-Witness List Job Search Efforts
    S. Activity Following The President's Deposition (1/17/98-1/19/98)
    T. The President's Statements to Currie 1/18/98
    U. The President's Denial of Sexual Relations
    V. The President's 1/21/98 Denial of Sexual Relations to 
Blumenthal, Podesta and Morris
    W. The White House 1/24/98 ``Talking Points''
    X. The President's Claims That He Was Truthful With Aides
    Y. The Three Options of a Grand Jury Witness
    Z. The President's Grand Jury ``Statement''
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart A]

              THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS ALONE WITH LEWINSKY

               Lewinsky White House Employee (7/95-4/96)

                                  1995
11/15/95 (Wed): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in Oval 
            Office study and hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual 
            Encounter)
11/17/95 (Fri): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in The 
            President's private bathroom outside the Oval Office study. 
            (Sexual Encounter)
12/5/95 (Tues): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office and study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/31/95 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office and Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
                                  1996
1/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the bathroom 
            outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
1/21/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway 
            outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
2/4/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study and in the adjacent hallway. (Sexual 
            Encounter)
2/19/96 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office. (No Sexual Encounter)
3/31/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in hallway 
            outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter)
4/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway 
            outside the Oval Office study and in the Oval Office study. 
            (Sexual Encounter)
                                  1997
2/28/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office private bathroom. (Sexual Encounter)
3/29/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
5/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office dining room, study and hallway. (No Sexual 
            Encounter)
7/4/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter)
7/14/97 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in Heinreich's 
            office. (No Sexual Encounter)
7/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
8/16/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
10/11/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
11/13/97 (Thurs): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/6/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/28/97 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart B]

            THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONTACTS WITH LEWINSKY

1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--first call to ML's home.
1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at office.
1/15 or 1/16/96 (Mon or Tue): Conversation, approx. 12:30 a.m.--ML at 
            home.*
Approx. 1/28/96 (Sun): Caller ID on ML's office phone indicated POTUS 
            call.
1/30/96 (Tues): Conversation--during middle of workday at ML's office.
2/4/96 (Sun): Conversations--ML at office--multiple calls.
2/7 or 2/8/96 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
2/8 or 2/9/96 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--ML at home.*
2/19/96 (Mon): Conversation--ML at home.
Approx. 2/28 or 3/5/96: Conversation--approx. 20 min.--after chance 
            meeting in hallway--ML at home.
3/26/96 (Tues): Conversation--approx. 11 a.m.--ML at office.
3/29/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 8 p.m.--invitation to 
            movie.
3/31/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 1 p.m.--Pres. ill.
4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation----ML at home.
4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation--ML at home--why ML left.
4/12/96 (Fri): Conversation--ML at home--daytime.
4/12 or 4/13/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home--after midnight.
4/22/96 (Mon): Conversations--job talk--ML at home.
4/29 or 4/30/96 (Mon or Tues): Message--after 6:30 a.m.
5/2/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.*
5/6/96 (Mon): Possible phone call.
5/16/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
5/21/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
5/31/96 (Fri): Message.
6/5/96 (Wed): Conversation--ML at home--early evening.
6/23/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
7/5 or 7/6/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
7/19/96 (Fri): Conversation--6:30 a.m.--ML at home.*
7/28/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.
8/4/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
8/24/96 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
9/5/96 (Thur): Conversation--Pres. In Fla--ML at home.*
9/10/96 (Tues): Message.
9/30/96 (Mon): Conversation.*
10/22/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
10/23 or 10/24/96 (early am): Conversation--ML at home.
12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--approx. 10-15 min.--ML at home.
12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--later that evening--ML at home--approx. 
            10:30 p.m.--Pres fell asleep.*
12/18/96 (Wed): Conversation--approx. 5 min.--10:30 p.m.--ML at home.
12/30/96 (Mon): Message.
1/12/97 (Sun): Conversation--job talk--ML at home.*
2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home--mid-day--11:30-12:00.
2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--job talk--1:30 or 2:00 p.m.--ML at home.*
3/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--three minutes--ML at work.
4/26/97 (Sat): Conversation--late afternoon--20 min.--ML at home.
5/17/97 (Sat): Conversations--multiple calls.
5/18/97 (Sun): Conversations--multiple calls.
7/15/97 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.
8/1/97 (Fri): Conversation.
9/30/97 (Tues): Conversation.*
10/9 or 10/10/97 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--long, from 2 or 2:30 a.m. 
            until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m.--job talk--argument--ML at home.
10/23/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--end b/c HRC.
10/30/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--interview prep.
11/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--discuss re: ML visit.*
12/6/97 (Sat): Conversation--approx. 30 min--ML at home.
12/17 or 12/18/97 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--b/t 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 
            a.m.--ML at home--witness list.
1/5/98 (Mon): Conversation.

    *Conversation that involved and may have involved phone sex.
                               [Chart C]

                    LEWINSKY GIFTS TO THE PRESIDENT

10/24/95: Lewinsky (before the sexual relationship began) gives her 
            first gift to The President of a matted poem given by her 
            and other White House interns to commemorate ``National 
            Boss' Day''. It is the only gift the President sent to the 
            archives instead of keeping.
11/20/95: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie.
3/31/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Hugo Boss Tie.
Christmas 1996: Lewinsky gives The President a Sherlock Homes game and 
            a glow in the dark frog.
Before 8/16/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie and a t-
            shirt from Bosnia.
Early 1997: Lewinsky gives The President Oy Ve, a small golf book, golf 
            balls, golf tees, and a plastic pocket frog.
3/97: Lewinsky gives The President a care package after he injured his 
            leg including a metal magnet with The Presidential seal for 
            his crutches, a license plate with ``Bill'' for his 
            wheelchair, and knee pads with The Presidential seal.
3/29/97: Lewinsky gives The President her personal copy of Vox, a book 
            about phone sex, a penny medallion with the heart cut out, 
            a framed Valentine's Day ad, and a replacement for the Hugo 
            Boss tie that had the bottom cut off.
5/24/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Banana Republic casual shirt 
            and a puzzle on gold mysteries.
7/14/97: Lewinsky gives The President a wooden B, with a frog in it 
            from Budapest.
Before 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President The Notebook.
8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique book on Peter the 
            Great, the card game ``Royalty'', and a book, Disease and 
            Misrepresentation.
10/21/97 or 10/22/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Calvin Klein tie, 
            and pair of sunglasses.
10/97: Lewinsky gives The President a package Before filled with 
            Halloween-related items, such as a Halloween pumpkin lapel 
            pin, a wooden letter opener with a frog on the handle, and 
            a plastic pumpkin filled with candy.
11/13/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique paperweight that 
            depicted the White House.
12/6/97: Lewinsky gives The President Our Patriotic President: His Life 
            in Pictures, Anecdotes, Sayings, Principles and Biography; 
            an antique standing cigar holder; a Starbucks Santa Monica 
            mug; a Hugs and Kisses box; and a tie from London.
12/28/97: Lewinsky gives The President a hand-painted Easter Egg and 
            ``gummy boobs'' from Urban Outfitters.
1/4/98: Lewinsky gives Currie a package with her final gift to The 
            President containing a book entitled The Presidents of the 
            United States and a love note inspired by the movie 
            Titanic.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart D]

                   THE PRESIDENT'S GIFTS TO LEWINSKY

12/5/95: The President gives Lewinsky an autographed photo of himself 
            wearing the Zenga necktie she gave him.*
2/4/96: The President gives Lewinsky a signed ``State of the Union'' 
            Address.*
3/31/96: The President gives Lewinsky cigars.
2/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky a hat pin*, ``Davidoff'' cigars, 
            and the book the Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman as belated 
            Christmas gifts.
    The President gives Lewinsky a gold brooch.*
    The President gives Lewinsky an Annie Lennox compact disk.
    The President gives Lewinsky a cigar.
7/24/97: The President gives Lewinsky an antique flower pin in a wooden 
            box, a porcelain object d'art, and a signed photograph of 
            the President and Lewinsky.*
Early 9/97: The President brings Lewinsky several Black Dog items, 
            including a baseball cap*, 2 T-shirts*, a hat and a dress.*
12/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky the largest number of gifts 
            including:
    1. a large Rockettes blanket,*
    2. a pin of the New York skyline,*
    3. a marblelike bear's head from Vancouver,*
    4. a pair of sunglasses,*
    5. a small box of cherry chocolates,
    6. a canvas bag from the Black Dog,*
    7. a stuffed animal wearing a T-shirt from the Black Dog.*

    (*Denotes those items Lewinsky produced to the OIC on 7/29/98).
    
    
                               [Chart F]

                           LEWINSKY SUBPOENA

                            Jones v. Clinton

                           december 19, 1997
    The Jones v. Clinton subpoena to Lewinsky called for:

(1) Her testimony on January 23, 1998 at 9:30 a.m.;
(2) Production of ``each and every gift including but not limited to, 
            any and all dresses, accessories, and jewelry, and/or hat 
            pins given to you by, or on behalf of, Defendant Clinton;'' 
            and
(3) ``Every document constituting or containing communications between 
            you and Defendant Clinton, including letters, cards, notes, 
            memoranda and all telephone records.''
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart G]

                           DECEMBER 19, 1997

                                (Friday)

         Lewinsky is Served with a Subpoena in Jones v. Clinton

1:47-1:48 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan's office.
3:00-4:00 p.m.: Lewinsky is served with a subpoena in Jones v. Clinton.
--: Lewinsky telephones Jordan immediately about subpoena.
3:51-3:52 p.m.: Jordan telephones The President and talks to Debra 
            Schiff.
4:17-4:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Social Office.
4:47 p.m.: Lewinsky meets Jordan and requests that Jordan notify The 
            President about her subpoena.
5:01-5:05 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan; Jordan notifies The 
            President about Lewinsky's subpoena.
5:06 p.m.: Jordan telephones attorney Carter to represent Lewinsky.
Later that Evening: The President meets alone with Jordan at the White 
            House.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart H]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 10

    Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name, address, and telephone 
number of each and every individual (other than Hillary Rodham Clinton) 
whom you had sexual relations when you held any of the following 
positions:

a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
c. President of the United States.

(Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present 
involving state or federal employees.)
    Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (as modified by 
direction of the Court): None.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart I]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 11

    Interrogratory No. 11: Please state the name, address, and 
telephone number of each and every individual (other than Hillary 
Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual relations, when you 
held any of the following positions:

    a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
    b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
    c. President of the United States.

(Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present 
involving state or federal employees.)
    Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 11 (as modified by 
direction of the Court): None.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart J]

                           DECEMBER 28, 1997

                                (Sunday)

The President's Final Meeting with Lewinsky and The Concealment of the 
                           Gifts to Lewinsky

8:16 a.m.: Lewinsky meets The President at the White House at Currie's 
            direction.

 The President gives Lewinsky numerous gifts.
 The President and Lewinsky discuss the subpoena, calling for, 
            among other things, the hat pin. The President acknowledges 
            ``that sort of bothered [him] too.''
 Lewinsky states to The President: ``Maybe I should put the 
            gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
            someone, maybe Betty [Currie].''

3:32 p.m.: Currie telephones Lewinsky at home from Currie's cell phone.

``I understand you have something to give me.'' or
``The President said you have something to give me.''

Later that Day: Currie picks up gifts from Lewinsky. 


                               [Chart L]

           THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT CONCEALING GIFTS

                                12/28/97

    ``[Lewinsky]: And then at some point I said to him [The President], 
`Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my 
house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of 
said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about 
that.' And left that topic.''--(Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 152)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart M]

                        AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #

    1. My name is Jane Doe # . I am 24 years old and I currently reside 
at 700 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
    2. On December 19, 1997, I was served with a subpoena from the 
plaintiff to give a deposition and to produce documents in the lawsuit 
filed by Paula Corbin Jones against President William Jefferson Clinton 
and Danny Ferguson.
    3. I can not fathom any reason that the plaintiff would seek 
information from me for her case.
    4. I have never met Ms. Jones, nor do I have any information 
regarding the events she alleges occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May 
8, 1991 or any other information concerning any of the allegations in 
her case.
    5. I worked at the White House in the summer of 1995 as a White 
House intern. Beginning in December, 1995, I worked in the Office of 
Legislative Affairs as a staff assistant for correspondence. In April, 
1996, I accepted a job as assistant to the Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense. I maintained that job 
until December 26, 1997. I am currently unemployed but seeking a new 
job.
    6. In the course of my employment at the White House, I met 
President Clinton on several occasions. I do not recall ever being 
alone with the President, although it is possible that while working in 
the White House Office of Legislative Affairs I may have presented him 
with a letter for his signature while no one else was present. This 
would have lasted only a matter of minutes.
    7. I have the utmost respect for the President who has always 
behaved appropriately in my presence.
    8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he 
did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me 
employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he 
did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a sexual 
relationship with the President, was offered employment or other 
benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied 
employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The 
occasions that I saw the President, with crowds of other people, after 
I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996 related to 
official receptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S. 
Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were 
other people present on all of these occasions.
    9. Since I do not possess any information that could possibly be 
relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible 
evidence in this case, I asked my attorney to provide this affidavit to 
plaintiff's counsel. Requiring my deposition in this matter would cause 
unwarranted attorney's fees and costs, disruption of my life, 
especially since I am looking for employment, and constitute an 
invasion of my right to privacy.
    I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct.
                                                Monica S. Lewinsky.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:
    Monica S. Lewinsky, being first duly sworn on oath according to 
law, deposes and says that she has read the foregoing Affidavit of Jane 
Doe # by her subscribed, that the matters stated herein are true to the 
best of her information, knowledge and belief.
                                                Monica S. Lewinsky.

    Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of __________, 
1998.
                                         __________________________
                                                Notary Public, D.C.
    My Commission expires: ________
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart N]

               FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #6 [LEWINSKY]

                                 1/7/98

8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
            not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not 
            offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a 
            sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other 
            benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. I do not know 
            of any other person who had a sexual relationship with the 
            President, was offered employment or other benefits in 
            exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied 
            employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
            relationship. The occasions that I saw the President after 
            I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996, 
            were official receptions, formal functions or events 
            related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
            working at the time. There were other people present on 
            those occasions.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart O]

                    LEWINSKY'S AFFIDAVIT GETS FILED

                           (1/14/98-1/17/98)

                      january 14, 1998 (wednesday)
7:45 p.m.: Bennett's firm (Sexton) leaves Carter telephone message.
--: Carter faxes signed affidavit to Bennett's firm.
                      january 15, 1998 (thursday)
9:17 a.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
12:59 p.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
--: Currie called by Newsweek.
--: Lewinsky drives Currie to meet Jordan.
--: Sexton telephones Carter: ``STILL ON TIME?''
--: Carter telephones Court Clerk for Saturday (1/17/98) Filing of 
            Affidavit and motion to quash.
                       january 16, 1998 (friday)
2 a.m. (Approx.): Carter completes motion to quash Lewinsky's 
            deposition.
    Carter sends by overnight mail motion to quash and affidavit to 
            Bennett's firm and to the Court.
11:30 a.m.: Sexton message to Carter: ``Please call.''
                      january 17, 1998 (saturday)
--: Lewinsky Affidavit is submitted to the Court.
--: The President is deposed.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart P]

 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: LEWINSKY SIGNS AFFIDAVIT AND GETS A NEW YORK JOB

                            (1/5/98-1/9/98)

                            january 5, 1998
Lewinsky meets with attorney Carter for an hour; Carter drafts an 
            Affidavit for Lewinsky in an attempt to avert her 
            deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton scheduled for 
            January 23, 1998.
Lewinsky telephones Currie stating that she needs to speak to the 
            President about an important matter; specifically that she 
            was anxious about something she needed to sign--an 
            Affidavit.
The President returns Lewinsky's call; Lewinsky mentions the Affidavit 
            she'd be signing; Lewinsky offers to show the Affidavit to 
            The President who states that he doesn't need to see it 
            because he has already seen about fifteen others.
                            january 6, 1998
11:32 a.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter.'' 
            Lewinsky meets Carter and receives draft Affidavit.
2:08-2:10 p.m.: Jordan calls Lewinsky. Lewinsky delivers draft 
            Affidavit to Jordan.
3:14 p.m.: Carter again pages Lewinsky: ``Frank Carter at [telephone 
            number] will see you tomorrow morning at 10:00 in my 
            office.''
3:26-3:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
3:38 p.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich, Deputy Assistant to The 
            President.
3:48 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
3:49 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky to discuss draft Affidavit. Both 
            agree to delete implication that she had been alone with 
            The President.
4:19-4:32 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan.
4:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
4:34-4:37 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Carter.
5:15-5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
9:26-9:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
10:00 a.m.: Lewinsky signs false Affidavit at Carter's Office.
--: Lewinsky delivers signed Affidavit to Jordan.
11:58 a.m.-12:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
5:46-5:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House (Hernreich's Office).
6:50-6:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House and tells The 
            President that Lewinsky signed an Affidavit.
                            january 8, 1998
9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's Office.
9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
--: Lewinsky interviews in New York at MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
            Inc. (MFH)
11:50-11:51 a.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
3:09-3:10 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
4:48-4:53 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New 
            York MFH Interview went ``Very Poorly.''
4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ronald Perelman in New York, CEO of Revlon 
            (subsidiary of MFH) ``to make things happen . . . if they 
            could happen.''
4:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky stating, ``I'm doing the best I 
            can to help you out.''
6:39 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Counsel's Office (Cheryl 
            Mills), possibly about Lewinsky.
Evening: Revlon in New York telephones Lewinsky to set up a follow-up 
            interview.
9:02-9:03 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan about Revlon interview in 
            New York.
                            january 9, 1998
--: Lewinsky interviews in New York with Senior V.P. Seidman of 
            MacAndrews & Forbes and two Revlon individuals.
    Lewinsky offered Revlon job in New York and accepts.
1:29 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
4:14 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan to say that Revlon offered her a 
            job in New York.
    Jordan notifies Currie: ``Mission Accomplished'' and requests she 
            tell The President.
    Jordan notifies The President of Lewinsky's New York job offer. The 
            President replies ``Thank you very much.''
4:37 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Carter.
5:04 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
5:05 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
5:08 p.m.: The President telephones Currie.
5:09-5:11 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
5:12 p.m.: Currie telephones The President.
5:18-5:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
5:21-5:26 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Q]

          THE PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT WITH LEWINSKY JOB SEARCH

``Q: Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that this 
            has happened [Carter had been fired]?
[Jordan]: Thought they had a right to know.
Q: Why?
[Jordan]: The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got 
            her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new 
            counsel. I thought that was information that they ought to 
            have. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/9/98 Tr. 45-46)
``Q: Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank Carter 
            had been replaced?
[Jordan]: Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew 
            that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was 
            interested in this matter. He is the source of it coming to 
            my attention in the first place. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 
            6/9/98 Tr. 58-59)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart R]

              JORDAN'S PRE-WITNESS LIST JOB SEARCH EFFORTS

``[Jordan]: I have no recollection of an early November meeting with 
            Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of 
            it and I have no record of it.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 3/3/98 
            Tr. 50)
          * * * * * * *
``Q: Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica Lewinsky a 
            job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?
[Jordan]: I think that's fair to say.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 Tr. 
            76)
          * * * * * * *
``[Lewinsky]: [Referring to 12/6/97 meeting with the President]. I 
            think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch with 
            Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work 
            out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job 
            front].
Q: Did the President say what he was going to do?
[Lewinsky]: I think he said he would--you know, this was not sort of 
            typical of him, to sort of say, `Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll 
            get on it.' '' (Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 115-116)
          * * * * * * *
``Q: But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 11th, you 
            are clear that at that point you had made a decision that 
            you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.
[Jordan]: There is no question about that.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 
            Tr. 95)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart S]

                            January 17, 1998

                                saturday
 4:00 p.m. (approx): THE PRESIDENT finishes testifying under 
            oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al.
 5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
 5:38 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home but does 
            not speak with her.
 7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT places a call to Jordan's office.
 7:13 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks 
            her to meet with him on Sunday.

                            January 18, 1998

                                 sunday
 6:11 a.m.: Drudge Report Released.
 --: The President learns of the Drudge Report and [Tripp] 
            tapes.
 11:49 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 12:30 p.m.: Jordan has lunch with Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey 
            informs Jordan about the Drudge Report and [Tripp] tapes.
 12:50 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 1:11 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 2:15 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 2:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT.
 5:00 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT meets with Currie, concerning his 
            contacts with Lewinsky.
 5:12 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 6:22 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 7:06 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 7:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills, White House 
            Counsel's Office.
 8:28 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Call Kay.''
 10:09 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie at home.
 11:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks 
            if she reached Lewinsky.

                            January 19, 1998

                     monday--martin luther king day
 7:02 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home at 
            8:00 this morning.''
 8:08 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay .''
 8:33 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 8:37 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home. 
            It's a social call. Thank you.''
 8:41 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Kay is at home. Please 
            call.''
 8:43 a.m.: Currie telephones The President from home to say 
            she has been unable to reach Lewinsky.
 8:44 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kate re: 
            family emergency.''
 8:50 a.m. THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 8:51 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Msg. From Kay. Please 
            call, have good news.''
 8:56 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 10:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from his office.
 10:35 a.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the White 
            House.
 10:36 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at 
            [number redacted].''
 10:44 a.m.: Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the White 
            House.
 10:53 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
 10:58 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office.
 11:04 a.m.: Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the White 
            House.
 11:16 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at 
            [number redacted].''
 11:17 a.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey at the White House.
 12:31 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular 
            phone.
 --: Jordan lunches with Carter.
 1:45 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 2:29 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular 
            phone.
 2:44 p.m.: Jordan enters the White House and over the course 
            of an hour meets with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine Bowles, Bruce 
            Lindsay, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm Emanuel and 
            others.
 2:46 p.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter 
            at [number redacted].''
 4:51 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 4:53 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at home.
 4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at his office. Carter 
            informs Jordan that Lewinsky has replaced Carter with a new 
            attorney.
 4:58 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 4:59 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ruff, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Lindsey, White House 
            Counsel's Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 5:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:14 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter concerning his termination 
            as Lewinsky's attorney.
 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 5:56 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office; 
            Jordan informs The President that Carter was fired.
 6:04 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 6:26 p.m.: Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide to THE 
            PRESIDENT.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart T]

          THE PRESIDENT'S POST-DEPOSITION STATEMENTS TO CURRIE

                                1/18/98

     ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
     ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
     ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
     ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
     ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do 
that.''--(Currie Grand Jury 7/22/98 Tr. 6-7; Currie Grand Jury 1/27/98 
Tr. 70-75)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart U]

                        THE PRESIDENT'S DENIALS

                                1/21/98

    ``And it was at that point that he gave his account of what had 
happened to me [sic] and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He 
said, `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He 
rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused 
pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'
    She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had 
an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that 
she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then 
she wouldn't be the stalker any more.''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 
Tr. 49)
    ``And he said, `I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like 
somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a 
lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character 
in the novel Darkness at Noon.'
    And I said to him, I said, `When this happened with Monica 
Lewinsky, were you alone? He said, `Well, I was within eyesight or 
earshot of someone.' ''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 Tr. 50)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart V]
    ``Q. Okay. Share that with us.
    ``A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of, 
you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had 
sex with her in any way whatsoever--
    ``Q. Okay.
    ``A. --that they had not had oral sex''--(John Podesta Grand Jury 
6/16/98 Tr. 92)
          * * * * * * *
    ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, 
it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to 
forgive you [The President] for adultery, but not for perjury or 
obstruction of justice or the various other things.' ''--(Dick Morris 
Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 10, 12, 20)
          * * * * * * *
    ``And I said, `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the voters.' 
And he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to win, then.' ''--
(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 30)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart W]

                          ``TALKING POINTS'' *

                            January 24, 1998

          * * * * * * *
    ``Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the 
President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the 
President, constitute a sexual relationship?''
    ``A. Of course it would.''
          * * * * * * *
    * Produced by the White House pursuant to OIC Subpoena.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart X]

            THE PRESIDENT CLAIMS HE WAS TRUTHFUL WITH AIDES

    [President]: And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's 
nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I would 
never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
    But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter 
further. So I said things that were true. They may have been 
misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and 
I'm sorry.--(The President Grand Jury 8/17/98 Tr. 106)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Y]

                          GRAND JURY WITNESSES

    A person testifying before a federal grand jury has three options 
under the law:
          (1) To obey the oath and testify to the truth, the whole 
        truth and nothing but the truth;
          (2) To lie;
          (3) To assert the Fifth Amendment or another legally 
        recognized privilege.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Z]

               PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
    While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I 
can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and 
others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, 
this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
    I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions 
including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions 
about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood 
it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions 
concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my statement.''
                                 ______
                                 

                           Table of Contents

                                exhibits
Telephone records
    (1) Summary chart, 12/19/97
    (2) Currie Cell phone records, 12/28/97
    (3) Summary chart, 1/6/98
    (4) Summary chart, 1/7/98
    (5) Summary chart, 1/15/98-1/16/98
    (6) Summary chart, 1/17/98
    (7) Summary chart, 1/18/98
    (8) Summary chart, 1/19/98
Court Documents
    (9) Jones v. Clinton. Jan. 29, 1998 District Court Order regarding 
discovery
    (10) President Clinton's Answer to First Amended Complaint. Jones 
v. Clinton
    (11) In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3053 & 3059, U.S. Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia
    (12) Jane Doe #6 (Lewinsky) Affidavit filed in Jones v. Clinton
    (13) ``Sexual Relations'' definition
Miscellaneous
    (14) 1/18/98 Drudge Report
    (15) Jones' attorneys fax cover sheet of witness list to Bennett
    (16) White House ``Talking Points,'' January 24, 1998
    (17) LA Times 1/25/98 Article regarding White House ``Talking 
Points''
    (18) Response of William J. Clinton to Judiciary Committee 
Questions
    (19) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 138 L. 16-23 (From GJ Tape 2)
    (20) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 100 L. 20-25, Tr. 105 L. 19-
25, Tr. 106 L. 1-12 (From GJ Tape 3)
    (21) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 75 L. 2-8, Tr. 76 L. 24-25, 
Tr. 77 L. 1-2, (From Dep. Tape 1)
    (22) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 52 L. 18-25, Tr. 53 L. 1-9, 
10-18, Tr. 58 L. 22-25, Tr. 59 L. 1-3, 7-16, 17-20 (From Dep. Tape 3)
    (23) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 78 L. 4-23, (From Dep. Tape 
4)
    (24) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 53 L. 22-25, Tr. 54 L. 1-7, 
20-25, Tr. 55 L. 1-3 (From Dep. Tape 5)
    (25) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 204 L. 5-14, (From Dep. Tape 
8)
    (26) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 9-11
    
    
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
        States

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                           Table of Contents

    I. INTRODUCTION
    A. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been 
Satisfied
    B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice
    C. Compound Charges and Vagueness
    II. BACKGROUND
    A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End
    B. The Paula Jones Litigation
    C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky
    D. Proceedings in the House of Representatives
    III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION
    A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors
    1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question 
Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
    2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
    a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an Intentionally High 
Standard for Removal
    b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government
    3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not 
Alone State Impeachable Offenses
    a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon
    b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton
    4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm 
that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
    a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
    b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations Would Forever 
Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and to Our Government 
of Separated Powers
    5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
    B. The Standard of Proof
    IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I
    A. Applicable Law
    B. Structure of the Allegations
    C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article I
    1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading 
statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his 
relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the 
Jones case
    3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements of his 
attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
    4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence'' in the Jones case
    V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II
    A. Applicable Law
    B. Structure of the Allegations
    C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II
    1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit 
in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
misleading''
    2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in 
the Jones litigation
    3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, 
or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to 
Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
    a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
    b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
    c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the 
President's Actions
    4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection 
with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an effort 
to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case
    a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge
    b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
    c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
    (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan
    (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment offer
    d. Conclusion
    5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning 
Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating 
``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    VI. THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND VOTE
    A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in 
Specificity
    1. The Structure of Article I
    2. The Structure of Article II
    B. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate the Constitutional 
Requirement That Two-Thirds of the Senate Reach Agreement that Specific 
Wrongdoing Has Been Proven
    1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation 
of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
    a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence 
Requirement
    b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections 
that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single Accusation
    C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process 
Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations
    1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
    2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
    D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak 
Clearly and Intelligibly
    VII. THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY
    VIII. CONCLUSION

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

    Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left their 
homes and work places to travel to schools, church halls and other 
civic centers to elect a President of the United States. And on January 
20, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term 
of office for four years.
    The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the House of 
Representatives, is now gathered in trial to consider whether that 
decision should be set aside for the remaining two years of the 
President's term. It is a power contemplated and authorized by the 
Framers of the Constitution, but never before employed in our nation's 
history. The gravity of what is at stake--the democratic choice of the 
American people--and the solemnity of the proceedings dictate that a 
decision to remove the President from office should follow only from 
the most serious of circumstances and should be done in conformity with 
Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation and its 
people.
    The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the Senate 
fall far short of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they 
placed in the hands of the Congress the power to impeach and remove a 
President from office. They fall far short of what the American people 
demand be shown and proven before their democratic choice is reversed. 
And they even fall far short of what a prudent prosecutor would require 
before presenting a case to a judge or jury.
    Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-
flying rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see clearly that the 
House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from 
office because he:
     used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe the 
frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. 
There were, according to the House Managers, eleven such contacts over 
the course of approximately 500 days.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because he used the phrase 
``certain occasions'' to describe eleven events over some 500 days? 
That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
     used the word ``occasional'' to describe the frequency of 
inappropriate telephone conversations between he and Monica Lewinsky. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
between ten and fifteen such conversations spanning a 23-month period.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because he used the word 
``occasional'' to describe up to 15 telephone calls over a 23-month 
period? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to 
do.
     said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began in 
early 1996, while she recalls that it began in November 1995. And he 
said the contact did not include touching certain parts of her body, 
while she said it did.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because two people have a 
different recollection of the details of a wrongful relationship--which 
the President has admitted? That is what the House of Representatives 
asks the Senate to do.
    The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples cited 
above, but the other allegations of wrongdoing are similarly 
unconvincing. There is the charge that the President unlawfully 
obstructed justice by allegedly trying to find a job for Monica 
Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about their relationship. This 
charge is made despite the fact that no one involved in the effort to 
find work for Ms. Lewinsky--including Ms. Lewinsky herself--testifies 
that there was any connection between the job search and the affidavit. 
Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. Lewinsky's statements to Ms. 
Tripp, was expressly repudiated by Ms. Lewinsky under oath.
    There is also the charge that the President conspired to obstruct 
justice by arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts that he had given 
her, even though the facts and the testimony contain no evidence that 
he did so. In fact, the evidence shows that the President gave her new 
gifts on the very day that the articles allege he conspired to conceal 
his gifts to her.
    In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to remove the 
President because he had a wrongful relationship and sought to keep the 
existence of that relationship private.
    Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse the 
President's actions. By his own admission, he is guilty of personal 
failings. As he has publicly stated, ``I don't think there is a fancy 
way to say that I have sinned.'' He has misled his family, his friends, 
his staff, and the Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He hoped to avoid exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to 
protect his family and himself and to avoid public embarrassment. He 
has acknowledged that his actions were wrong.
    By the same token, these actions must not be mischaracterized into 
a wholly groundless excuse for removing the President from the office 
to which he was twice elected by the American people. The allegations 
in the articles and the argument in the House Managers' Trial 
Memorandum do not begin to satisfy the stringent showing required by 
our Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected President from office, 
either as a matter of fact or law.
 a. the constitutional standard for impeachment has not been satisfied
    There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal scholars 
and historians that the substance of the articles does not amount to 
impeachable offenses. On November 6, 1998, 430 Constitutional law 
professors wrote:

    ``Did President Clinton commit `high Crimes and Misdemeanors' 
warranting impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that 
the misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . . 
does not cross the threshold. . . . [I]t is clear that Members of 
Congress could violate their constitutional responsibilities if they 
sought to impeach and remove the President for misconduct, even 
criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high constitutional 
standard required for impeachment.''

    On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a joint 
statement warning that because impeachment had traditionally been 
reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive 
power, impeachment of the President based on the facts alleged in the 
OIC Referral would set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward, 
they will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, 
at the mercy as never before of caprices of any Congress. The 
Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great 
national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges 
of the future.''
    We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise to the 
level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' in Section III, 
Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof.
      b. the president did not commit perjury or obstruct justice
    Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. Article II 
alleges obstruction of justice. Both perjury and obstruction of justice 
are statutory crimes. In rebutting the allegations contained in the 
articles of impeachment, this brief refers to the facts as well as to 
laws, legal principles, court decisions, procedural safeguards, and the 
Constitution itself. Those who seek to remove the President speak of 
the ``rule of law.'' Among the most fundamental rules of law are the 
principles that those who accuse have the burden of proof, and those 
who are accused have the right to defend themselves by relying on the 
law, established procedures, and the Constitution. These principles are 
not ``legalisms'' but rather the very essence of the ``rule of law'' 
that distinguishes our Nation from others.
    We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance we can 
decipher in Section IV, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I, 
and in Section V, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article II.
                   c. compound charges and vagueness
    If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives has 
utterly failed in its constitutional responsibility to the Senate and 
to the President, that doubt vanishes upon reading the Trial Memorandum 
submitted by the House Managers. Having proferred two articles of 
impeachment, each of which unconstitutionally combines multiple 
offenses and fails to give even minimally adequate notice of the 
charges it encompasses, the House--three days before the Managers are 
to open their case--is still expanding, not refining, the scope of 
those articles. In further violation of the most basic constitutional 
principles, their brief advances, merely as ``examples,'' nineteen 
conclusory allegations--eight of perjury under Article I and eleven of 
obstruction of justice under Article II, some of which have never 
appeared before, even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary 
Committee (``Committee Report''), much less in the Office of 
Independent Counsel (``OIC'') Referral or in the articles 
themselves.\1\ If the target the Managers present to the Senate and to 
the President is still moving now, what can the President expect in the 
coming days? Is there any point at which the President will be given 
the right accorded a defendant in the most minor criminal case--to know 
with certainty the charges against which he must defend?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For example, the House managers add a charge that the President 
engaged in ``legalistic hair splitting [in his response to the 81 
questions] in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to 
deceive and obstruct'' the Committee. This charge was specifically 
rejected by the full House of Representatives when it rejected Article 
IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and has, in 
past proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles far less flawed 
than these. The constitutional concerns raised by the House's action 
are addressed in Section VI, The Structural Deficiencies of the 
Articles Preclude a Constitutionally Sound Vote.

                             II. Background

                a. the whitewater investigative dead-end
    The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the long-
running Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the Special 
Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Court Circuit appointed Kenneth W. Starr as Independent 
Counsel to conduct an investigation centering on two Arkansas entities, 
Whitewater Development Company, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings and 
Loan Association.
    In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any expansion of 
jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state troopers who had once been 
assigned to the Governor's security detail, and ``[t]he troopers said 
Starr's investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including 
Paula Corbin Jones. . . .'' Woodward & Schmidt, ``Starr Probes Clinton 
Personal Life,'' The Washington Post (June 25, 1997) at A1 (emphasis 
added). ``The nature of the questioning marks a sharp departure from 
previous avenues of inquiry in the three-year old investigation. . . . 
Until now, . . . what has become a wide-ranging investigation of many 
aspects of Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of 
questions about Clinton's relationships with women. . . .'' \2\ One of 
the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater 
investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones case. One 
of the troopers interviewed declared, ``[t]hey asked me about Paula 
Jones, all kinds of questions about Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton 
and Paula together and how many times.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid. Trooper Roger Perry, a 21-year veteran of the Arkansas 
state police, stated that he ``was asked about the most intimate 
details of Clinton's life: `I was left with the impression that they 
wanted me to show he was a womanizer. . . . All they wanted to talk 
about was women.' '' Ibid. (Ellipsis in original).
    \3\ Ibid. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had conducted these 
interrogations and acknowledged that at that time, he had not sought 
expansion of his jurisdiction from either the Special Division or the 
Attorney General.\4\ Mr. Starr contended that these inquiries were 
somehow relevant to his Whitewater investigation: ``we were, in fact 
interviewing, as good prosecutors, good investigators do, individuals 
who would have information that may be relevant to our inquiry about 
the President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty Savings 
and Loan and the like.''\5\ It seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC 
was in fact engaged in an unauthorized attempt to gather embarrassing 
information about the President--information wholly unrelated to 
Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, but potentially 
relevant to the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Transcript of November 19, 1998 House Judiciary Committee 
Hearing at 377-378.
    \5\ Ibid. at 378.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     b. the paula jones litigation
    The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about events she 
said had occurred three years earlier, in 1991, when the President was 
Governor of Arkansas. Discovery in the case had been stayed until the 
Supreme Court's decision on May 27, 1997, denying the President 
temporary immunity from suit.\6\ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal 
team began a public relations offensive against the President, headed 
by Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Mr. Susan Carpenter-McMillan, and her 
new counsel affiliated with the conservative Rutherford Institute.\7\ 
``I will never deny that when I first heard about this case I said, 
`Okay, good. We're gonna get that little slimeball,' said Ms. 
Carpenter-McMillan.'' \8\ While Ms. Jones' previous attorneys, Messrs. 
Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata, had largely avoided the media, as 
the Jones civil suit increasingly became a partisan vehicle to try to 
damage the President, public personal attacks became the order of the 
day.\9\ As is now well known, this effort led ultimately to the Jones 
lawyers being permitted to subpoena various women, to discover the 
nature of their relationship, if any, with the President, allegedly for 
the purpose of determining whether they had information relevant to the 
sexual harassment charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
    \7\ Ms. Jones was described as having ``accepted financial support 
of a Virginia conservative group,'' which intended to ``raise $100,000 
or more on Jones's behalf, although the money will go for expenses and 
not legal fees.'' ``Jones Acquires New Lawyers and Backing,'' The 
Washington Post (October 2, 1998) at A1. Jones' new law firm, the 
Dallas-based Radar, Campbell, Fisher and Pyke, had ``represented 
conservatives in antiabortion cases and other causes.'' Ibid. See also 
Dallas Lawyers Agree to Take on Paula Jones' Case--Their Small Firm Has 
Ties to Conservative Advocacy Group,'' The Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2, 
1997) (Rutherford Institute a ``conservative advocacy group.'').
    \8\ ``Cause Celebre: An Antiabortion Activist Makes Herself the 
Unofficial Mouthpiece for Paula Jones.'' The Washington Post (July 23, 
1998) at C1. Ms. Carpenter-McMillan, ``a cause-oriented, self-defined 
`conservative feminist' '', described her role as ``flaming the White 
House'' and declared `` `Unless Clinton wants to be terribly 
embarrassed, he'd better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody that comes 
out and testifies against Paula better have the past of a Mother 
Teresa, because our investigators will investigate their morality.' '' 
``Paula Jones' Team Not All About Teamwork,'' USA Today (Sept. 29, 
1997) at 4A.
    \9\ After Ms. Jones' new team had been in action for three months, 
one journalist commented: ``In six years of public controversy over 
Clinton's personal life, what is striking in some ways is how little 
the debate changes. As in the beginning, many conservatives nurture the 
hope that the past will be Clinton's undoing. Jones' adviser, Susan 
Carpenter-McMillan, acknowledged on NBC's `Meet the Press' yesterday 
that her first reaction when she first heard Jones' claims about 
Clinton was, `Good, we're going to get that little slime ball.' '' 
(Harris, ``Jones Case Tests Political Paradox,'' The Washington Post 
(Jan. 19, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 1998, Ms. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of certain 
information she believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in 
the Jones case. At that time, the OIC investigation began to intrude 
formally into the Jones case: the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the 
week of January 12, and with her cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky 
discussing the Jones case and the President. Ms. Tripp also informed 
the OIC that she had been surreptitiously taping conversations with Ms. 
Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in exchange for her 
cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from federal 
prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from state 
prosecution.\10\ On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp wore a body 
wire and had taped conversations with Ms. Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC 
received jurisdiction from the Attorney General and formalized an 
immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United States 
House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code 
Section 595(C), H.Doc. 105-316 (hereinafter ``Supp.'') at 3758-3759, 
4371-4373 (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled to take 
place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we now know, Ms. Tripp 
met with and briefed the lawyers for Ms. Jones the night before the 
deposition on her perception of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky 
and the President--doing so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had 
entrusted to her.\11\ She was permitted to do so even though she has 
been acting all week at the behest of the OIC and was dependent on the 
OIC to use its best efforts to protect her from state prosecution. At 
the deposition the next day, the President was asked numerous questions 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky by lawyers who already knew 
the answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Baker, ``Linda Tripp Briefed Jones Team on Tapes: Meeting 
Occurred Before Clinton Deposition,'' The Washington Post (Feb. 14, 
1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She was a 
peripheral player and, since her relationship with the President was 
concededly consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' case. Shortly after the 
President's deposition, Chief Judge Wright ruled that evidence 
pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Jones trial 
because ``it is not essential to the core issues in this case.'' \12\ 
The Court also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones 
case, the Lewinsky evidence ``might be inadmissible as extrinsic 
evidence'' under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it involved 
merely the ``specific instances of conduct'' of a witness.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Order, at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.) 
(Jan. 29, 1998).
    \13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no case and 
granted summary judgment for the President. Although Judge Wright 
``viewed the record in the light most favorable to [Ms. Jones] and 
[gave] her the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences,'' \14\ the 
Court ruled that, as a matter of law, she simply had no case against 
President Clinton, both because ``there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact'' and because President Clinton was ``entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'' Id. at 11-12. After reviewing all the 
proffered evidence, the Court ruled that ``the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for'' Ms. Jones. Id. at 
39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), Memorandum 
Opinion and Order (April 1, 1998), at 3 n.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       c. the president's grand jury testimony about ms. lewinsky
    On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to the 
grand jury and specifically acknowledged that he had had a relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky involving ``improper intimate contact,'' and that he 
``engaged in conduct that was wrong.'' App. at 461.\15\ He described 
how the relationship began and how he had ended it early in 1997--long 
before any public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury 
``it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,'' App. at 533, and told the grand 
jurors, ``I take full responsibility for it. It wasn't her fault, it 
was mine.'' App. at 589-90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 
595(c), H.Doc. 105-311 (hereinafter ``App.'') at 461 (House Judiciary 
Committee) (Sept. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also explained how he had tried to navigate the 
deposition in the Jones case months earlier without admitting what he 
admitted to the grand jury--that he had been engaged in an improper 
intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Id. a 530-531. He further 
testified that the ``inappropriate encounters'' with Ms. Lewinsky had 
ended, at his insistence, in early 1997. He declined to describe, 
because of considerations of personal privacy and institutional 
dignity, certain specifics about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky,\16\ but 
he indicated his willingness to answer,\17\ and he did answer, the 
other questions put to him about his relationship with her. No one who 
watched the videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt that 
the President admitted to having had an improper intimate relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my 
family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of 
the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these 
particular matters.'' App. at 461.
    \17\ ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations,' as I 
understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and 
questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of 
justice, and intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             d. proceedings in the house of representatives
    On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to the House 
of Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the President related to 
the Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion of the OIC, ``may constitute 
grounds for an impeachment.'' \18\ The allegations fell into three 
broad categories: lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and abuse 
of power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c), at 1 (House Judiciary Committee) (printed September 11, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Judiciary held a total of four hearings and called but 
one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee allowed the President's 
lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House 
presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses who testified 
that the facts, as alleged, did not constitute an impeachable offense, 
did not reveal an abuse of power, and would not support a case for 
perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable prosecutor would 
bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the 
Committee on behalf of the President, which is incorporated into this 
Trial Memorandum by reference.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Also incorporated by reference into this Trial Memorandum are 
the four prior submissions of the President to the House of 
Representatives: Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral of Office 
of Independent Counsel (September 11, 1998) (73 pages); Initial 
Response to Referral of Office of Independent Counsel (September 12, 
1998) (42 pages); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment 
(October 2, 1998) (30 pages); Submission by Counsel for President 
Clinton to the Committee on the House Judiciary of the United States 
House of Representatives (December 8, 1998) (184 pages).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted essentially 
along party lines to approve four articles of impeachment. Republicans 
defeated the alternative resolution of censure offered by certain 
Committee Democrats. Almost immediately after censure failed in the 
Committee, the House Republican leadership declared publicly that no 
censure proposal would be considered by the full House when it 
considered the articles of impeachment.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ See Baker & Eilperin, ``GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate 
Censure in House: Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article of Impeachment,'' 
The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, the House 
of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment: Article I, 
which alleged perjury before the grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to 
206 and Article III, which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a 
vote of 221 to 212. The full House defeated two other Articles: Article 
II, which alleged that the President committed perjury in his civil 
deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse of power. Consideration 
of a censure resolution was blocked, even though members of both 
parties had expressed a desire to vote on such an option.
    From beginning to end the House process was both partisan and 
unfair. Consider:
     The House released the entire OIC Referral to the public 
without ever reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or allowing the 
President's counsel to review it;
     The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee said he had 
``no interest in not working in a bipartisan way''; \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Associated Press (March 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The Chairman also pledged a process the American people 
would conclude was fair; \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ ``This whole proceeding will fall on its face if it's not 
perceived by the American people to be fair.'' Financial Times (Sept. 
12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote of 
conscience on a motion to censure; \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ ``The next House Speaker, Robert Livingston, said the coming 
impeachment debate should allow lawmakers to make a choice between 
ousting President Clinton and imposing a lesser penalty such as 
censure. The Louisiana Republican said the House can't duck a vote on 
articles of impeachment if reported next month by its Judiciary 
Committee. But an `alternative measure is possible' he said, and the 
GOP leadership should `let everybody have a chance to vote on the 
option of their choice.' '' Wall Street Journal (Nov. 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Members of the House were shown secret ``evidence'' in 
order to influence their vote--evidence which the President's counsel 
still has not been able to review.

   III. The Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof for Decision

a. the offenses alleged do not meet the constitutional standard of high 
                        crimes and misdemeanors
1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question 
        Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
    It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the question 
whether the articles state an impeachable offense.\24\ That 
Constitutional question has not, in the words of one House Manager, 
``already been resolved by the House.'' \25\ To the contrary, that 
question now awaits the Senate's measured consideration and independent 
judgment. Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this question has 
been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional obligation to 
``try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. Art. Sec. 3, cl.7. In the words 
of John Logan, a House Manager in the 1868 proceedings:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ In the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the President's 
counsel answered (to at least one article) that the matters alleged 
``do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this 
respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor the 
omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty 
in his office of President of the United States.'' 1 Trial of Andrew 
Johnson (1868) (``TAJ'') 53.
    \25\ See Statement of Rep. Bill McCollum: ``[A]re these impeachable 
offenses, which I think has already been resolved by the House. I think 
constitutionally that's our job to do.'' Fox News Sunday (January 3, 
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``It is the rule that all questions of law or fact are to be 
decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. It is also the rule, that in determining this 
general issue senators must consider the sufficiency or insufficiency 
in law or in fact of every article of accusation.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Closing argument of Manager John H. Logan, 2 TAJ 18 (emphasis 
added). See also Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on 
Impeachment Issues at 25-26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (``Because the Senate acts 
as both judge and jury in an impeachment trial, the Senate's conviction 
on a particular article of impeachment reflects the Senate's judgment 
not only that the accused engaged in the misconduct underlying the 
article but also that the article stated an impeachable offense'').

We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do not state 
wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses under our 
Constitution.
2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High Crimes 
        and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
            a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an 
                    Intentionally High Standard for Removal
    The Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from 
office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Constitution, 
Art. II, section 4. The charges fail to meet the high standard that the 
Framers established.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ For a more complete discussion of the Standards for 
Impeachment, please see Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to 
the House Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives at 
24-43 (December 8, 1998); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment 
(October 2, 1998); and Impeachment of William Jefferson, President of 
the United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to 
Accompany H. Res. 611, H. Rpt. 105-830, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 332-39 
(citing Minority Report). References to pages 2-203 of the Committee 
Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Committee Report.'' References to 
pages 329-406 of the Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as 
``Minority Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The syntax of the Constitutional standard ``Treason, Bribery or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' (emphasis added) strongly 
suggests, by the interpretive principle noscitur a sociis,28 
that, to be impeachable offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be 
of the seriousness of ``Treason'' and ``Bribery.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ `` `It is known from its associates' . . . the meaning of a 
word is or may be known from the accompanying words.'' Black's Law 
Dictionary 1209 (4th ed. 1968).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard must be a 
very high one. Ours is a Constitution of separated powers. In that 
Constitution, the President does not serve at the will of Congress, but 
as the directly elected,\29\ solitary head of the Executive Branch. The 
Constitution reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the 
law independently of legislative will, is a necessary protection for a 
free people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Of course, that election takes place through the mediating 
activity of the Electoral College. See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 
2-3 and Amend. XII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These elementary facts of constitutional structure underscore the 
need for a very high standard for impeachment. The House Managers, in 
their Brief, suggest that the failure to remove the President would 
raise the standard for impeachment higher than the Framers intended. 
They say that if the Senate does not remove the President, ``The bar 
will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to 
be concerned.'' But that standard is just a modified version of the 
plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which says 
a President can only be impeached and removed for ``Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The Framers wanted a high bar. 
It was not the intention of the Framers that the President should be 
subject to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander 
Hamilton said in a warning against the politicization of impeachment: 
``There will always be the greater danger that the decision will be 
regulated more by comparative strength of parties than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.'' Federalist 65. Our system of 
government does not permit Congress to unseat the President merely 
because it disagrees with his behavior or his policies. The Framers' 
decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one reason they 
caused the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' to appear in the Constitution itself. They chose to 
specify those categories of offenses subject to the impeachment power, 
rather than leave that judgment to the unfettered whim of the 
legislature.
    Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably viewed 
by the public as arising from one of those rare cases when the 
Legislature is compelled to stand in for all the people and remove a 
President whose continuation in office threatens grave harm to the 
Republic. Indeed, it is not exaggeration to say--as a group of more 
than 400 leading historians and constitutional scholars publicly 
stated--that removal on these articles would ``mangle the system of 
checks and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of 
public power.'' \30\ Removal of the President on these grounds would 
defy the constitutional presumption that the removal power rests with 
the people in elections, and it would do incalculable damage to the 
institution of the Presidency. If ``successful,'' removal here ``will 
leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the 
mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution (Oct. 
28, 1998) (``Statement of Historians''); see also Schmitt, ``Scholars 
and Historians Assail Clinton Impeachment Inquiry,'' The New York Times 
(Oct. 19, 1998) at A18.
    \31\ Statement of Historians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected public 
official (together with the Vice-President), responsible to all the 
people. Therefore, when articles of impeachment have been exhibited, 
the Senate confronts this inescapable question: is the alleged 
misconduct so profoundly serious, so malevolent to our Constitutional 
system, that it justifies undoing the people's decision? Is the wrong 
alleged of a sort that not only demands removal of the President before 
the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also justifies the 
national trauma that accompanies the impeachment trial process itself? 
The wrongdoing alleged here does not remotely meet that standard.
            b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
                    Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of 
                    Government
    ``[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors'' refers to nothing short of 
Presidential actions that are ``great and dangerous offenses'' or 
``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \32\ Impeachment was never 
intended to be a remedy for private wrongs. It was intended to be a 
method of removing a President whose continued presence in the Office 
would cause grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of 
government.\33\ Thus, ``in all but the most extreme instances, 
impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office, not private 
misconduct unrelated to public office.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ George Mason, 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787 550 (Rev. ed. 1966).
    \33\ As the 1975 Watergate staff report concluded ``Impeachment is 
the first step in remedial process--removal from office and possible 
disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment 
is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government. . . . In an impeachment proceeding a 
President is called to account for abusing powers that only a President 
possesses.'' Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, 
Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on 
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1974) (``Nixon Impeachment 
Inquiry'').
    \34\ Minority Report at 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing wrongful 
public conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson wrote, ``our 
President . . . is amendable to [the laws] in his private character as 
a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.'' \35\ As such, 
impeachment is limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander 
Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction 
as ``those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or 
in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They 
are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society 
itself.'' 36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ 2 Elliot, The Debate in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 480 (reprint of 2d ed.)
    \36\ The Federalist No. 65 at 331 (Gary Wills ed. 1982). As one of 
the most respected of the early commentators explained, the impeachment 
``power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to 
the society in its political character.'' Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution, Sec. 744. (reprint of 1st ed. 1833).

    The Framers ``intended that a president be removable from office 
for the commission of great offenses against the Constitution.'' \37\ 
Impeachment therefore addresses public wrongdoing, whether denominated 
a ``political crime [  ] against the state,'' \38\ or ``an act of 
malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \39\ or a ``great offense [  ] 
against the federal government.'' \40\ Ordinary civil and criminal 
wrongs can be addressed through ordinary judicial processes. And 
ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box and by 
public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most serious public 
misconduct, those aggravated abuses of executive power that, given the 
President's four-year term, might otherwise go unchecked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ John Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 94 (1978).
    \38\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment 61 (1973).
    \39\ Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal 
Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 724 (1987/1988).
    \40\ Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its 
Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone 
        State Impeachable Offenses
    Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular will of 
the people, as evidence by an election, it must be used with great 
circumspection. As applicable precedents establish, it should not be 
used to punish private misconduct.
            a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
                    Nixon
    Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then-President 
Nixon by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in 
1974. Three were approved and two were not. The approved articles 
alleged official wrongdoing. Article I charged President Nixon with 
``using the powers of his high office [to] engage [  ] . . . in a 
course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct'' the 
Watergate investigation.\41\ Article II described the President as 
engaging in ``repeated and continuing abuse of the powers of the 
Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle of the rule of law 
in our system of government'' thereby ``us[ing] his power as President 
to violate the Constitution and the law of the land.'' \42\ Article III 
charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary Committee 
subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to ``preserve the 
integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability of Congress 
to act as the ultimate safeguard against improper Presidential 
conduct.'' \43\
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    \41\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, H. 
Rep. 93-1305 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereinafter ``Nixon Report'') at 133.
    \42\ Nixon Report at 180.
    \43\ Id. 212-13.
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    On article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee charged 
that President Nixon both ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to report 
certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal 
income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' \44\ The 
President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of 
perjury,\45\ and there was reason to believe that the underlying facts 
would have supported a criminal prosecution against President Nixon 
himself.\46\
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    \44\ Id. at 220. The President was alleged to have failed to report 
certain income, to have taken improper tax deductions, and to have 
manufactured (either personally or through his agents) false documents 
to support the deductions taken.
    \45\ Given the underlying facts, that act might have provided the 
basis for multiple criminal charges; conviction on, for example, the 
tax evasion charge, could have subjected President Nixon to a 5-year 
prison term.
    \46\ See Nixon Report at 344 (``the Committee was told by a 
criminal fraud tax expert that on the evidence presented to the 
Committee, if the President were an ordinary taxpayer, the government 
would seek to send him to jail'') (Statement of Additional Views of Mr. 
Mezvinsky, et al.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the majority 
staff concluded that ``[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave 
step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our 
government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the 
president office.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Nixon Impeachment Inquiry at 26 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And the minority views of many Republican members were in 
substantial agreement: ``the framers . . . were concerned with 
preserving the government from being overthrown by the treachery or 
corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is our judgment, based upon this 
constitutional history, that the Framers of the United States 
Constitution intended that the President should be removable by the 
legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system 
of government established by the Constitution.'' \48\
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    \48\ Nixon Report at 364-365 (Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson, 
Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and 
Latta).
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    The legal principle that impeachable offenses required misconduct 
dangerous to our system of government provided one basis for the 
Committee's rejection of the fraudulent-tax-return charge. As 
Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter, the Constitution's phrase 
``high crime signified a crime against the system of government, not 
merely a serious crime,''\49\ As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving 
an act which did not demonstrate public misconduct, was rejected by an 
overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12 margin.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Id. (quoting with approval conclusion of Nixon Impeachment 
Inquiry).
    \50\ Nixon Report at 220.
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            b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander 
                    Hamilton
    In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton for alleged financial misdealings with a convicted swindler. 
Hamilton had made payments to the swindler and had urged his wife 
(Hamilton's paramour) to burn incriminating correspondence. Members of 
Congress investigated the matter and it came to the attention of 
President Washington and future Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison 
and Monroe.
    This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. Hamilton 
as Secretary of the Treasury.\51\ Even when it eventually became 
public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's appointment to high position in 
the United States Army. Although not insignificant, Hamilton's behavior 
was essentially private. It was certain not regarded as impeachable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See generally Rosenfeld, ``Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch,'' 
The Los Angeles Times (September 18, 1980).
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4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that 
        Impeachable Offenses Are not Present
            a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
    There is strong agreement among constitutional scholars and 
historians that the articles do not charge impeachable offenses. As 
Professor Michael Gerhardt summarized in his recent testimony before a 
subcommitte of the House of Representatives, there is ``widespread 
recognition [of] a paradigmatic case for impeachment.'' \52\ In such a 
case, ``there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable 
official and the latter's official duties.'' \53\
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    \52\ Statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt Before the House 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee 
Regarding the Background and History of Impeachment (November 9, 1998) 
at 13 (``Subcommittee Hearings'').
    \53\ Ibid. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so far 
removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to 
weaken significantly the Presidency itself. As the more than 400 
prominent historians and constitutional scholars warned in their public 
statement: ``[t]he theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is 
unprecedented in our history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for 
the future of our political institutions. If carried forward, [the 
current processes] will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and 
diminished, at the mercy as never before of the caprices of any 
Congress.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Statement of Historians.
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    Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an 
extraordinary group of 430 legal scholars argued together that these 
offenses, even if proven true, did not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.\55\ The gist of these scholarly objections is that 
the alleged wrongdoing is insufficiently connected to the exercise of 
public office. Because the articles charge wrongdoing of an essentially 
private nature, any harm such behavior poses is too removed from our 
system of government to justify unseating the President. Numerous 
scholars, opining long before the current controversy, have emphasized 
the necessary connection of impeachable wrongs to threats against the 
state itself. They have found that impeachment should be reserved for:
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    \55\ See Letter of 430 Law Professors to Messrs. Gingrich, 
Gephardt, Hyde and Conyers (released Nov. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``offenses against the government''; \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 26.
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     ``political crime against the state''; \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Berger, Impeachment at 61.
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     ``serious assaults on the integrity of the processes of 
government''; \58\
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    \58\ Charles L. Black, Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39 (1974).
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     ``wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so egregious 
that [the President's] continuation in office is intolerable''; \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Labovitz Presidential Impeachment at 110.
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     ``malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \60\ bearing a 
``functional relationship'' to public office; \61\
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    \60\ Rotunda, 76 Ky. L.J. at 726.
    \61\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``great offense[s] against the federal government''; \62\
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    \62\ Gerhardt, 68 Tex. L. Rev. at 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine the 
integrity of government.'' \63\
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    \63\ Committee on Federal Legislation of the Bar Ass'n of the City 
of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment 18 (1974).

The articles contain nothing approximating that level of wrongdoing. 
Indeed the House Managers themselves acknowledge that ``the President's 
[alleged] perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official 
conduct.'' \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ House Br. at 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations would 
                    Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the 
                    Presidency and to Our Government of Separated 
                    powers
    These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about 
sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual 
misbehavior. These kinds of wrongs are simply not subjects fit for 
impeachment. To remove a President on this basis would lower the 
impeachment bar to an unprecedented level and create a devastating 
precedent. As Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., addressing this 
problem, has testified:
    ``Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel . . . 
revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send us on an 
adventure with ominous implications for the separation of powers that 
the Constitution established as the basis of our political order. It 
would permanently weaken the Presidency.'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Arthur 
Schlesinger, Tr. at 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger described must 
stop here. Professor Jack Rakove made a similar point when he stated 
that ``Impeachment [is] a remedy to be deployed only in . . . 
unequivocal cases where . . . the insult to the constitutional system 
is grave.'' \66\ Indeed, he said, there ``would have to be a high 
degree of consensus on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in both 
Houses to proceed.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Professor Jack 
Rakove at 4).
    \67\ Subcommittee Hearings (Oral Testimony of Professor Rakove).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the House 
of Representatives. No civil officer--no President, no judge, no 
cabinet member--has ever been impeached by so narrow a margin as 
supported the articles exhibited here.\68\ The closeness and partisan 
division of the vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the 
charges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ The present articles were approved by margins of 228-206 
(Article I) and 221-212 (Article II). All prior resolutions were 
approved by substantially wider margins in the House of 
Representatives. See Impeachments of the following civil officers: 
Judge John Pickering (1803) (45-8; Justice Samuel Chase (1804) (73-32; 
Judge James Peck (1830) 143-49; Judge West Humphreys (1862) (no vote 
available, but resolution of impeachment voted ``without division,'' 
see 3 Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2386); 
President Andrew Johnson (1868) (128-47; Judge James Belknap (1876) 
(unanimous); Judge Charles Swayne (1903) (unanimous); Judge Robert 
Archibald (1912) (223-1); Judge George English (1925) (306-62); Judge 
Harold Louderback (1932) (183-143); Judge Halsted Ritter (1933) (181-
146); Judge Harry Claiborne (1986) (406-0); Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. 
(1988) (417-0); Judge Alcee L. Hastings (1988) (413-3). The impeachment 
resolution against Senator William Bount in 1797 was by voice vote and 
so no specific count was recorded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they have 
passed only by the narrowest, partisan margin, the future of our 
constitutional politics is in the balance. The very stability of our 
Constitutional government may depend upon the Senate's response to 
these articles. Nothing about this case justifies removal of a twice-
elected President, because no ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are 
alleged.
5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
    The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an impeachable 
offense because (1) several federal judges have been impeached and 
removed for perjury, and (2) those precedents control this case. See 
House Br. at 95-105. That notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the 
qualitative differences among different allegations of perjury and the 
very basic differences between federal judges and the President.
    First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, while a very 
solemn task, implicates very different considerations than the 
impeachment of a president. Federal judges are appointed without public 
approval and enjoy life tenure without public accountability. 
Consequently, they hold their offices under our Constitution only 
``during good behavior.'' Under our system, impeachment is the only way 
to remove a Federal judge from office--even a Federal judge sitting in 
jail.\69\ By contrast, a president is elected by the Nation to a term, 
limited to a specified number of years, and he faces accountability in 
the form of elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, during 
a recent judicial impeachment proceeding, cogently explained the unique 
position that Federal judges hold in our Constitutional system:
    ``The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position of 
trust and responsibility in our government: They are the only members 
of any branch that hold their office for life; they are purposely 
insulated from the immediate pressures and shifting currents of the 
body politic. But with the special prerogative of judicial independence 
comes the most exacting standard of public and private conduct . . . 
The high standard of behavior for judges is inscribed in article III of 
the Constitution, which provides that judges ``shall hold offices 
during good behavior. . . .'' (132 Cong. Rec. H4712 (July 22, 1986) 
(impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to the 
level of an impeachable offense depends necessarily on the particulars 
of that statement, and the relation of those statements to the 
fulfillment of official responsibilities. In the impeachment of Judge 
Harry Claiborne, the accused had been convicted of filing false income 
tax returns.\70\ As a judge, Claiborne was charged with the 
responsibility of hearing tax-evasion cases. Once convicted, he simply 
could not perform his official functions because his personal probity 
had been impaired such that he could no longer be an arbiter of others' 
oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct connection to the performance of 
his judicial tasks. The inquiry into President Nixon disclosed similar 
wrongdoing, but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an 
article of impeachment against the President on that basis. The case of 
Judge Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted of making perjurious 
statements concerning his intervention in a judicial proceeding, which 
is to say, employing the power and prestige of his office to obtain 
advantage for a party.\71\ Although the proceeding at issue was not in 
his court, his use of the judicial office for the private gain of a 
party to a judicial proceeding directly implicated his official 
functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for 
making perjurious statements at his trial for conspiring to fix cases 
in his own court.\72\ As with Judges Claiborne and Nixon, Judge 
Hastings' perjurious statements were immediately and incurably 
detrimental to the performance of his official duties. The allegations 
against the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) ``do not 
directly involve his official conduct,'' House Br. at 109, simply do 
not involve wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to foreclose effective 
performance of the Presidential office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-48 at 
291-98 (1986) (``Claiborne Proceedings'').
    \71\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 
at 430-440 (1989) (``Judge Nixon Proceedings'').
    \72\ See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 
(1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial 
impeachment cases predating Watergate, observed that:

    ``For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial 
impeachment] cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for 
impeachment of a president. The practical reason was that it seemed 
inappropriate to determine the fate of an elected chief executive on 
the basis of law developed in proceedings directed at petty misconduct 
by obscure judges. The legal reason was that the Constitution provides 
that judges serve during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good behavior] 
clause made a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the 
application of these cases to presidential impeachment''.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 92-93 (emphasis added).

Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House Managers have 
only ``limited force when applied to the impeachment of a President.'' 
\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Impeachment 
Issues at 26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (summarizing view of some commentators).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes from 
President Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, offered as a 
congressman in 1970 in connection with an effort to impeach Associate 
Justice William O. Douglas--that it is, in essence, ``whatever the 
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be''--has been 
cited. Almost never noted is the more important aspect of then-
Congressman Ford's statement--that, in contrast to the life-tenure of 
judges, because presidents can be removed by the electorate, ``to 
remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes of the 
magnitude of treason and bribery.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ 116 Cong. Rec. 11912, 11913, (1970).
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                        b. the standard of proof
    Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense, 
each Senator must confront the question of what standard the evidence 
must meet to justify a vote of ``guilty.'' The Senate has, of course, 
addressed this issue before--most recently in the trials of Judge 
Claiborne and Judge Hastings. We recognize that the Senate chose in the 
Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in the Hastings trial, not to 
impose itself any single standard of proof but, rather, to leave that 
judgment to the conscience of each Senator. Many Senators here today 
were present for the debate on this issue and chose a standard by which 
to test the evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new 
one. And none previously has had to face the issue in the special 
context of a Presidential impeachment.
    We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must treat a 
vote to impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the President from 
office and that a decision of such moment ought not to be based on 
anything less than ``clear and convincing'' evidence. That standard is 
higher than the ``preponderance of the evidence'' test applicable to 
the ordinary civil case but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless, we felt that the clear 
and convincing standard was consistent with the grave responsibility of 
triggering a process that might result in the removal of a President. 
In fact, it had been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate 
Committee majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for 
President Nixon) twenty-four years ago.
    Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the Senate. 
Indeed, we submit that the gravity of the decision the Senate must 
reach should lead each Senator to go further and ask whether the House 
has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of proof as 
meaningless legal jargon with no application to the real world of 
difficult decisions. But it is much more than that. In our system of 
justice, it is the guidepost that shows the way through the labyrinth 
of conflicting evidence. It tells the factfinder to look within and 
ask: ``Would I make the most important decisions of my life based on 
the degree of certainty I have about these facts?'' In the unique 
legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects against 
partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that this grave 
decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a disciplining force to 
carry into the deliberations.
    This point is given added weight by the language of the 
Constitution. Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United States 
Constitution gives to the Senate ``the Power to try all Impeachments. . 
. . and no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two 
thirds of the Members present.'' (Emphasis added.) Use of the words 
``try'' and ``convicted'' strongly suggests that an impeachment trial 
is akin to a criminal proceeding and that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard of criminal proceedings should be used. This position was 
enunciated in the Minority Views contained in the Report of the House 
Judiciary Committee on the impeachment proceedings against President 
Nixon (H. Rep. 93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct 
standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, Strom 
Thurmond and John Stennis.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Claiborne Proceedings at 106-107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is 
appropriate for judicial impeachments, it does not follow that it 
should be applied where the Presidency itself is at stake. With judges, 
the Senate must balance its concern for the independence of the 
judiciary against the recognition that, because judges hold life-time 
tenure, impeachment is the only available means to protect the public 
against those who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is 
on trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the Senate 
is asked, in effect, to overturn the results of an election held two 
years ago in which the American people selected the head of one of the 
three coordinate branches of government. It is asked to take this 
action in circumstances where there is no suggestion of corruption or 
misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our system of 
government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's term, 
when once again the people will judge who they wish to lead them. In 
this setting, the evidence should be tested by the most stringent 
standard we know--proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the 
American people be confident that this most serious of constitutional 
decisions has been given the careful consideration it deserves.

           IV. The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I

    The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I.
                           a. applicable law
    Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading 
statements, before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a statutory crime 
that is set forth in the United States Code at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623.\77\ 
Before an accused may be found guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a 
prosecutor must prove all elements of the offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ Section 1623 provides in relevant part:
    ``(a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly 
makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other 
information . . . knowing the same to contain any false material 
declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both.'' (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a) (1994)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the criminal law context, Sec. 1623 requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an accused (1) while 
under oath (2) knowingly (3) made a false statement as to (4) material 
facts. The ``materiality'' element is fundamental: it means that 
testimony given to a grand jury may be found perjurious only if it had 
a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper the grand jury's 
investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). If an answer provided to a grand jury has no impact on the grand 
jury's investigation, or if it relates to a subject that the grand jury 
is not considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being 
perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details that a 
grand jury is not investigating cannot as a matter of law constitute 
perjury, since such testimony by definition is immaterial. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where 
defendant admitted signing letter and testified to its purpose, his 
denial of actually writing letter was not material to grand jury 
investigation and was incapable of supporting perjury charge); United 
States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (details such as 
whether defendant ``paid the rent on her Washington apartment, as she 
testified that she did'' were ``not pertinent to the issue being 
tried;'' therefore, ``the false statement attributed to [defendant] was 
in no way material in the case in which she made it and did not 
constitute perjury within the meaning of the statute.'') In other 
words, mere falsity--even knowing falsity--is not perjury if the 
statement at issue is not ``material'' to the matter under 
consideration.
    An additional ``element'' of perjury prosecutions, at least as a 
matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury conviction cannot 
rest solely on the testimony of one witness. In United States v. 
Weiler, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945), the Supreme Court observed that 
the ``special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the 
evidence of a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries.'' 
While Sec. 1623 does not literally incorporate the so-called ``two-
witness'' rule, the case law makes clear that perjury prosecutions 
under this statute require a high degree of proof, and that prosecutors 
should not, as a matter of reason and practicality, try to bring 
perjury prosecutions based solely on the testimony of a single witness. 
As the Supreme Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest 
merely upon ``an oath against an oath.'' Id. at 609.
    Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former federal 
prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A panel of former 
federal prosecutors, some Republican, testified that they would not 
charge perjury based upon the facts in this case. For example, Mr. 
Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the Northern 
District of Illinois, told the Committee that ``the evidence set out in 
the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a 
responsible federal prosecutor.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial 
Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 
1998); see generally Minority Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan 
emphasized, ``because perjury and obstruction charges often arise from 
private dealings with few observers, the courts have required either 
two witnesses who testified directly to the facts establishing the 
crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the facts constituting the 
alleged perjury, that there be substantial corroborating proof to 
establish guilt.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for 
Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998). The other 
prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who served as an 
Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
and as a Task Force Leader for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 
testified that ``it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury 
prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.'' 
Id. A review of the perjury alleged here thus requires both careful 
scrutiny of the materiality of any alleged falsehood and vigilance 
against conviction merely on an ``oath against an oath.'' Weiler, 323 
U.S. at 609.
                    b. structure of the allegations
    Article I charges that the President committed perjury when he 
testified before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It alleges he 
``willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury concerning ``one or more of the following: (1) the nature 
and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; 
(2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence in that civil rights action.'' As noted above, the article 
does not provide guidance on the particular statements alleged to be 
perjurious, false and misleading. But by reference to the different 
views in the House Committee Report, the presentation of House Majority 
Counsel David Schippers, the OIC Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of 
the House Managers, we have attempted to identify certain statements 
from which members of the House might have chosen.
    Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury before the 
grand jury about the details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--
including apparently such insignificant matters as mis-remembering the 
precise month on which certain inappropriate physical contact started, 
understating as ``occasional'' his infrequent inappropriate physical 
and telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months, 
characterizing their relationship as starting as a friendship, and 
touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for certain purposes during 
their intimate encounters.
    Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made 
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he 
testified about certain responses he had given in the Jones civil 
deposition. The House Managers erroneously suggest that in the grand 
jury President Clinton was asked about and reaffirmed his entire 
deposition testimony, including his deposition testimony about whether 
he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2, 60. That is 
demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did in fact 
make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his deposition testimony, 
were truthful. Moreover, to the extent this subpart repeats allegations 
of Article II of the original proposed articles of impeachment, the 
full House of Representatives has explicitly considered and 
specifically rejected those charges, and their consideration would 
violate the impeachment procedures mandated by the Constitution.
    Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the grand 
jury when he testified about certain activities in late 1997 and early 
1998. They are based on statements about conduct that the House 
Managers claim constitutes obstruction of justice under Article II and 
in many respects track Article II. Compare Article I (3) (perjury in 
the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading 
statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with 
Article II (5) (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to 
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and compare 
Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``corrupt 
efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery 
of evidence'') with Article II (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when 
he (3) ``engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence,'' i.e., gifts; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' 
of Betty Currie; (7) ``made false and misleading statements to 
potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses''). These perjury 
allegations are without merit both because the obstruction charges upon 
which they are based are wrong and because the statements that 
President Clinton made in the grand jury about these charges are true. 
Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in this 
submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these overlapping 
allegations in the next section addressing Article II (obstruction of 
justice), and address them only briefly in this section.
         c. response to the particular allegations in article i
    The president testified truthfully before the grand jury. There 
must be no mistake about what the President said. He admitted to the 
grand jury that he had engaged in an inappropriate intimate 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months. He 
admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
admitted to the grand jury that he had misled his family, his friends 
and staff, and the entire Nation about the nature of that relationship. 
No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched the 
President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt that he had 
admitted to an ongoing physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The article makes general allegations about his testimony but does 
not specify alleged false statements, so direct rebuttal is impossible. 
In light of this uncertainty, we set forth below responses to the 
allegations that have been made by the House Managers, the House 
Committee, and the OIC, even though they were not adopted in the 
article, in an effort to try to respond comprehensively to the charges.
1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of 
        his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    (a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President specifically 
acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that 
involved ``improper intimate contact.'' App. at 461. He described how 
the relationship began and how it ended early in 1997--long before any 
public attention or scrutiny.
    In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the President 
read the following statement:

    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    ``These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
    ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I 
can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and 
others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, 
this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
    ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions 
including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions 
about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood 
it to be denied at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions 
concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
intimidation of witnesses.''

App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to this 
statement--but only when asked very specific questions about his 
physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and he otherwise responded 
fully to four hours of interrogation about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, his answers in the civil deposition, and his conduct 
surrounding the Jones deposition.
    The articles are silent on precisely what statements the President 
made about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that were allegedly 
perjurious. But between the House Brief and the Committee Report, both 
drafted by the Managers, it appears there are three aspects of this 
prepared statement that are alleged to be false and misleading because 
Ms. Lewinsky's recollection differs--albeit with respect to certain 
very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first, when the President 
admitted that inappropriate conduct occurred ``on certain occasions in 
early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because 
in the Managers' view, the first instance of inappropriate conduct 
apparently occurred a few months prior to ``early 1996,'' see House Br. 
at 53; second, when the President admitted to inappropriate conduct 
``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly 
committed perjury because, according to the House Committee, there were 
eleven total sexual encounters and the term ``on certain occasions'' 
implied something other than eleven. see Committee Report at 34; and 
third, when the President admitted that he ``had occasional telephone 
conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included sexual banter,'' he 
allegedly committed perjury because, according to the House Committee 
(although not Ms. Lewinsky), seventeen conversations may have included 
sexually explicit conversation, ibid. Apart from the fact that the 
record itself refutes some of the allegations (for example, seven of 
the seventeen calls were only ``possible,'' according even to the OIC, 
App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky recalled fewer than seventeen, App. at 
744), simply to state them is to reveal their utter immateriality. \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ Even the OIC Referral did not allege perjury based on these 
latter two theories and mentioned the first only briefly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President categorically denies that his prepared statement was 
perjurious, false and misleading in any respect. He offered his written 
statement to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC 
to obtain the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the 
salacious details of his relationship. It preceded almost four hours of 
follow-up questions about the relationship. It is utterly remarkable 
that the Managers now find fault even with the President's very painful 
public admission of inappropriate conduct.
    In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The Committee 
Report takes issue with the terms ``on certain occasions'' and 
``occasional,'' but neither phrase implies a definite or maximum 
number. ``On certain occasions''--the phrase introducing discussion of 
the physical contacts--has virtually no meaning other than ``it 
sometimes happened.'' It is unfathomable what objective interpretation 
the Majority gives to this phrase to suggest that it could be false. An 
attack on the phrase ``occasional''--the phrase introducing discussion 
of the inappropriate telephone contacts--is little different. 
Dictionaries define ``occasional'' to mean ``occurring at irregular or 
infrequent intervals'' or ``now and then.'' \79\ It is a measure of the 
Committee Report's extraordinary overreaching to suggest that the 
eleven occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority over 
well more than a year did not occur, by any objective reading, ``on 
certain occasions.'' And since even the OIC Referral acknowledges that 
the inappropriate telephone contact occurred not ``at least 17 times'' 
(as the Committee Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at 
8; House Br. at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month 
period,\80\ ``occasional'' would surely seem not just a reasonable 
description but the correct one.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) p. 803; see 
also Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary (1988) p. 812 (``occurring 
from time to time; infrequent''); Chambers English Dictionary (1988 
ed.) p. 992 (``occurring infrequently, irregularly, now and then''); 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.) (``occurring from time 
to time''); Webster's New World Dictionary (3d Coll. ed.) p. 937 (``of 
irregular occurrence; happening now and then; infrequent'').
    \80\ The OIC chart of contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President identifies ten phone conversations ``including phone sex'' 
and seven phone conversations ``possibly'' including phone sex. App. at 
116-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise number of such 
encounters, it is of no consequence whatsoever to anything, given his 
admission of their relationship. This is precisely the kind of 
disagreement that the law does not intend to capture as perjury.
    The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally 
immaterial. Having acknowledged the relationship, the President had no 
conceivable motive to misstate the date on which it began. The Managers 
assert that the President committed perjury when he testified about 
when the relationship began, but they offer no rationale for why he 
would have done so.\81\ The President had already made a painful 
admission. Any misstatement about when the intimate relationship began 
(if there was a misstatement) cannot justify a charge of perjury, let 
alone the removal of the President from office. As Chairman Hyde 
himself stated in reference to this latter allegation, ``It doesn't 
strike me as a terribly serious count.'' Remarks of Chairman Hyde at 
Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ The Committee Report did not adopt the baseless surmise of the 
OIC Referral, i.e., that the President lied about the starting date of 
his relationship because Ms. Lewinsky was still an intern at the time, 
whereas she later became a paid employee. For good reason. The only 
support offered by the Referral for this conjecture is a comment Ms. 
Lewinsky attributes to the President in which he purportedly said that 
her pink ``intern pass'' ``might be a problem.'' Referral at 149-50. 
But even Ms. Lewinsky indicated that the President was not referring to 
her intern status, but rather was noting that, as an intern with a pink 
``intern pass,'' she had only limited access to the West Wing of the 
White House. App. at 1567 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98). Moreover, Ms. 
Lewinsky had in fact become an employee by late 1995, so even under the 
OIC theory the President could have acknowledged such intimate contact 
in 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, after 
admitting that he had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, he maintained that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner 
that met the definition used in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at 
54. The President admits that he engaged in inappropriate physical 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in 
activity that met the convoluted and truncated definition he was 
presented in the Jones deposition.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ At the deposition, the Jones attorneys presented a broad, 
three-part definition of the term ``sexual relations'' to be used by 
them in the questioning. Judge Wright ruled that two parts of the 
definition were ``too broad'' and eliminated them. Dep. at 22. The 
President, therefore, was presented with the following definition (as 
he understood it to have been amended by the Court):
    Definition of Sexual Relations--
    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in ``sexual 
relations'' when the person knowingly engages in or causes--
    (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, 
or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the 
sexual desire of any person;
    (2) contact between any part of the person's body or an object and 
the genitals and anus of another person; or
    (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and any part 
of another person's body.
    ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either directly or through 
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that this Jones definition was not of the 
President's making. It was one provided to him by the Jones' lawyers 
for their questioning of him. Under that definition, oral sex performed 
by Ms. Lewinsky on the President would not constitute sexual relations, 
while touching certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent to 
arouse her would meet the definition. The President testified in the 
grand jury that [he] believed that oral sex performed on him fell 
outside the Jones definition. App. at 544.\83\ As strange as this may 
sound, a totally reasonable reading of the definition supports that 
conclusion, as many commentators have agreed.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ The Managers erroneously suggest that the President's 
explanation of his understanding of the Jones deposition definition of 
``sexual relations'' is a recent fabrication rather than an accurate 
account of his view at the time of the deposition. House Br. at 54-55. 
To support this contention, the Managers, among other meritless 
arguments, point to a document produced by the White House entitled 
``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating that oral sex would 
constitute a sexual relationship for the President. Id. at 55. This 
document, however, was not created, reviewed or approved by the 
President and did not represent his views. It is irrelevant to the 
issue at hand for the additional reason that it does not speak by its 
own terms to the meaning of the contorted definition of ``sexual 
relations'' used in the Jones deposition.
    \84\ See, e.g., Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998 (Statement of 
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg at 2) (``That definition defined certain 
forms of sexual contact as sexual relations but, for reasons known only 
to the Jones lawyers, limited the definition to contact with any person 
for the purpose of gratification.''); MSNBC Internight, August 12, 1998 
(Cynthia Alksne) (``[W]hen the definition finally was put before the 
president, it did not include the receipt of oral sex''); ``DeLay Urges 
a Wait For Starr's Report,'' The Washington Times (August 31, 1998) 
(``The definition of sexual relations, used by lawyers for Paula Jones 
when they questioned the president, was loosely worded and may not have 
included oral sex''); ``Legally Accurate,'' The National Law Journal 
(August 31, 1998) (``Given the narrowness of the court-approved 
definition in [the Jones] case, Mr. Clinton indeed may not have 
perjured himself back then if, say, he received oral sex but did not 
reciprocate sexually'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial 
details concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship.
2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the 
        Jones case
    First, it is important to understand that the allegation of Article 
I that the President ``willfully provided false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . prior perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony he gave in'' the Jones deposition is premised 
on a misunderstanding of the President's grand jury testimony. The 
President was not asked to, and he did not, reaffirm his entire Jones 
deposition testimony during his grand jury appearance. For example, 
contrary to popular myth and the undocumented assertion of the House 
Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never even asked in the 
grand jury about his answer to the deposition question whether he and 
Ms. Lewinsky had been ``together alone in the Oval Office.'' Dep. at 
52-53,\85\ and he therefore neither reaffirmed it nor even addressed 
it. In fact, in the grand jury he was asked only about a small handful 
of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated below, his 
explanation of these answers were not reaffirmations or in any respect 
evasive or misleading--they were completely truthful, and they do not 
support a perjury allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ The only questions the OIC asked the President about being 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky did not reference the deposition at all. 
Instead, the OIC asked the President to elaborate on his 
acknowledgement in his prepared statement before the grand jury that he 
had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, App. at 481, and to explain why he 
made a statement, ``I was never alone with her'' to Ms. Currie on 
January 18th. See, e.g., App. at 583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority misses 
the mark is dramatically apparent when it is compared with the OIC's 
Referral. The OIC did not charge that the President's statements about 
his prior deposition testimony were perjurious (apart from the charge 
discussed above concerning the nature and details of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky).\86\ See OIC Ref. at 145. It would be remarkable to 
contemplate charges beyond those brought by the OIC, particularly in 
the context of a perjury claim where the OIC chose what to ask the 
President and itself conducted the grand jury session.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Specifically, the Referral alleges that the President lied 
when he testified (1) that ``he believed that oral sex was not covered 
by any of the terms and definitions for sexual activity used at the 
Jones deposition''; (2) that their physical contact was more limited 
than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony suggests; and (3) that their intimate 
relationship began in early 1996 and not late 1995. Id. at 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Managers point to a single statement made by President 
Clinton in the grand jury to justify their contention that every 
statement from his civil deposition is now fair game. House Br. at 60. 
Specifically, the House Managers rely on President Clinton's 
explanation in the grand jury of his state of mind during the Jones 
deposition: ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mine 
field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I 
did.'' App. at 532. In addition to being a true statement of his belief 
as to his legal position, this single remark plainly was not intended 
as and was not a broad reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the 
statements the President made during the Jones deposition. Indeed, 
given that he told the grand jury that he had an intimate relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with her, no one who heard 
the grand jury testimony could have understood it to be the unequivocal 
reaffirmation that is alleged.
    The Managers charge that the President did not really mean it when 
he told the grand jury how he was trying to be literally truthful in 
the Jones deposition without providing information about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President had endeavored to 
navigate the deposition without having to make embarrassing admissions 
about his inappropriate, albeit consensual, relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to the line 
between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive testimony and (b) 
false testimony as he could without crossing it. He sought, as he 
explained to the grand jury, to give answers that were literally 
accurate, even if, as a result, they were evasive and thus misleading. 
We repeat: what is at issue here is not the underlying statements made 
by the President in the deposition, but the President's explanations in 
the grand jury of his effort to walk a fine line. Anyone who reads or 
watches that deposition knows the President was in fact trying to do 
precisely what he has admitted--to give the lawyers grudging, 
unresponsive or even misleading answers without actually lying. However 
successful or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no evidence 
that controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's 
intention.
    An examination of the statements that the President actually did 
make in the grand jury about his deposition testimony further 
demonstrates the lack of merit in this article. In the grand jury, the 
President only was asked about three areas of his deposition testimony 
that were covered in the failed impeachment article alleging perjury in 
the civil deposition.\87\ The first topic was the nature of any 
intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has already been addressed 
above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ The proposed article of impeachment alleging perjury in the 
civil deposition, like the two that are before the Senate, did not 
identify any specific instances of false testimony, but we have made 
our comparison with the Committee Report's elaboration of the 
deposition perjury article as it undoubtedly represents the largest 
universe of alleged perjurious statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second topic was the President's testimony about his knowledge 
of gifts he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, 
the President had the following exchange with the OIC:

    Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was only two 
and a half weeks after you had given her these six gifts, you were 
asked, at page 75 in your deposition, lines 2 through 5, ``Well, have 
you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?'' And you answered, ``I 
don't recall.''
    And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually asked them, 
for prompting, ``Do you know what they were?''
    A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, 
not that I don't recall whether I had given them. And then if you see, 
they did give me these specifics, and I gave them quite a good 
explanation here. I remembered very clearly what the facts were about 
The Black Dog. . . .

App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not recall 
the exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and that he 
affirmatively sought prompting from the Jones lawyers is entirely 
consistent with his deposition testimony. This record plainly does not 
support a charge of perjury.
    The third and last topic was the President's deposition testimony 
that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying having a sexual 
relationship with the President was correct:

    Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement 
that she had no sexual relationship with him] was absolutely correct.
    A: I did. . . . I believe at the time that she filled out this 
affidavit, if she believed that the definition of sexual relationship 
was two people having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe 
that this is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it. 
. . .

App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was truthful. As Ms. 
Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before any of this matter was 
public, this was in fact Ms. Lewinsky's definition of ``sex'' and 
apparently the President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape); 
see also App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no evidence 
whatever that the President did not believe this definition of sexual 
relations, and his belief finds support in dictionary definitions, the 
courts and commentators.\88\ Moreover, the record establishes that Ms. 
Lewinsky shared this view.\89\ Since the President's grand jury 
testimony about his understanding is corroborated both by dictionaries 
and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky, it simply cannot be 
labeled ``wrong'' or, more seriously, ``perjurious.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ As one court has stated, ``[i]n common parlance the terms 
`sexual intercourse' and `sexual relations' are often used 
interchangeably.'' J.Y. v. D.A, 381 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. App. 1978). 
Dictionary definitions make the same point:
     Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st ed. 
1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
     Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 1996) 
at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; 
coitus;''
     Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) at 
1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
     Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560, 
defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and
     Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1996) 
at 1775, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; 
coitus.''
    \89\ Ms. Lewinsky took the position early on that her contact with 
the President did not constitute ``sex'' and reaffirmed that position 
even after she had received immunity and began cooperating with the 
OIC. For example, in one of the conversations surreptitiously taped by 
Ms. Tripp, Ms. Lewinsky explained to Ms. Tripp that she ``didn't have 
sex'' with the President because ``[h]aving sex is having 
intercourse.'' Supp. at 2664; see also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stated that Ms. Lewinsky had said that 
the President and she ``didn't have sex''). Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed 
this position even after receiving immunity, stating in an FBI 
interview that ``her use of the term `having sex' means having 
intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). Likewise, 
in her original proffer to the OIC, she wrote, ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was 
comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the `sexual 
relationship' because she could justify to herself that she and the 
Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 
Proffer).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in the grand 
jury about his civil deposition testimony.
3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about the statements of his 
        attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
    It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such as this 
one that even the OIC, which conducted the President's grand jury 
appearance, chose not to include in the Referral (presumably because 
there was no ``substantial and credible information'' to support the 
claim). Subpart (3) appears to allege that the President lied in his 
grand jury testimony when he characterized his state of mind in his 
civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky affidavit as 
meaning ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form.'' 
Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the House Managers appear to base their 
perjury claim on President Clinton's grand jury statement that ``I'm 
not even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying.'' 
House Br. at 62.
    The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's statement that 
he was ``not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange'' 
because, it alleges, the ``videotape [of the deposition] shows the 
President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to 
his argument to Judge Wright.'' Ibid. While it is true that the 
videotape shows the President staring in what is presumably Mr. 
Bennett's direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was indeed 
``paying close attention'' to the lengthy exchange. Notably absent from 
the videotape is any action on the part of the President that could be 
read as affirming Mr. Bennett's statement, such as a nod of the head, 
or any other activity that could be used to distinguish between a fixed 
stare and true attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The 
President was a witness in a difficult and complex deposition and, as 
he testified, he was ``focussing on [his] answers to the questions.'' 
App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the common law has never seen a 
perjury charge based on so little.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ This allegation is nearly identical to the allegation of 
Article II(5), and, for the sake of brevity, it is addressed at greater 
length in the response to Article II, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to 
        influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
        discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
    The general language of the final proviso of Article I, according 
to the House Managers, is meant to signify a wide range of allegations, 
see House Br. at 60-69, although none were thought sufficiently 
credible to be included in the OIC Referral. These allegations were not 
even included in the summary of the Starr evidence presented to the 
Committee on October 5, 1998, by House Majority Counsel Schippers. They 
are nothing more than an effort to inflate the perjury allegations by 
converting every statement that the President made about the subject 
matter of Article II into a new count for perjury. As the discussion of 
Article II establishes, the President did not attempt to obstruct 
justice. Thus, his explanations of his statements in the grand jury 
were truthful.
    The House Brief asserts that the President committed perjury with 
respect to three areas of his grand jury testimony about the 
obstruction allegations. These claims are addressed thoroughly in the 
next section along with the corresponding Article II obstruction 
claims, and they are addressed in a short form here. The first claim is 
that the President committed perjury ``when he testified before the 
grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' 
lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President, she should provide them.'' House Br. at 63. The House 
Managers contest the truthfulness of this statement by asserting that 
the President was responsible for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to 
Ms. Currie in late December. In other words, if the obstruction claim 
is true, they allege, this statement is not true. As is laid out in 
greater detail in the next section, the House Manager's view of this 
matter ignores a wealth of evidence establishing that the idea to 
conceal some of the gifts she had received originated with, and was 
executed by, Ms. Lewinsky. See e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); 
Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98); 
App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 1481 (``LEWINSKY . 
. . suggested to the President that Betty Currie hold the gifts'') 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98).
    Second, the House Managers contend that the President provided 
perjurious testimony when he explained to the grand jury that he was 
trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he spoke with Betty Currie 
on January 18, 1998 about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br. 
at 65. The House Managers completely ignore the numerous statements 
that Ms. Currie makes in her testimony that support the President's 
assertion that he was merely trying to gather information. For example, 
Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with the OIC that ``Clinton 
then mentioned some of the questions he was asked at his deposition. 
Currie advised the way Clinton phrased the queries, they were both 
statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 
302 1/24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue 
also supports the President's explanation of his questioning:

    Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the 
President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel 
pressured when he told you those statements?
    A: None whatsoever.
    Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    A: At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
    Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say--because he 
would end each of the statements with ``Right?,'' with a question.
    A:  I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say ``Right'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
    Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true?
    A: Correct.
    Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    A: None.

Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added).
    Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he 
was looking for information as a result of his deposition. There is no 
basis to doubt the President's explanation that his expectation of a 
media onslaught prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed, 
neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the only 
two participants in this conversation--conceivably supports the 
inference that he had any other intent. The House Managers' contention 
that the President's explanation to the grand jury was perjurious 
totally disregards the testimony of the only two witnesses with first-
hand knowledge and has no basis in fact or in the evidence.
    Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton ``lied 
about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top 
aides.'' House Br. at 68. The basis for this charge appears to be the 
President's testimony that, although he said misleading things to his 
aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things 
that were true. Id. at 69. Once again, the record does not even 
approach a case for perjury. The President acknowledged that he misled; 
he tried, however, not to lie. It is a mystery how the Managers could 
try to disprove this simple statement of intent.

           V. The President Should be Acquitted on Article II

    The evidence does not support the allegations of Article II.
                           a. applicable law
    Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory crime that 
is set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, the ``Omnibus Obstruction 
Provision.'' In the criminal law context, Sec. 1503 requires proof of 
the following elements: (1) that there existed a pending judicial 
proceeding; (2) that the accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that 
the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct 
or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See, 
e.g., United States  v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989). 
False statements alone cannot sustain a conviction under Sec. 1503. See 
United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).\91\
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    \91\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 covers witness tampering. It is clear that 
the allegations in Article II could not satisfy the elements of 
Sec. 1512. That provision requires proof that a defendant knowingly 
engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, 
or corrupt persuasion with intent to influence, delay, or prevent 
testimony or cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an 
official proceeding. It is clear from the case law that ``misleading 
conduct'' as contemplated by Sec. 1512 does not cover scenarios where 
an accused urged a witness to give false testimony without resorting to 
coercive or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., United States  v. Kulczyk, 
931 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction under Sec. 1512 
because ``there is simply no support for the argument that [defendant] 
did anything other than ask the witnesses to lie''); United States v. 
King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (``Since the only allegation in 
the indictment as to the means by which [defendant] induced [a witness] 
to withhold testimony was that [the defendant] misled [the witness], 
and since the evidence failed totally to support any inference that 
[the witness] was, or even could have been, misled, the conduct proven 
by the government was not within the terms of Sec. 1512.''). Deceit is 
thus the gravamen of an obstruction of justice charge that is 
predicated on witness tampering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    b. structure of the allegations
    Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives alleges that 
the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the 
administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and 
through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme 
designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of 
evidence and testimony'' in the Jones case. The Article alleges that 
the President did so by engaging in ``one or more of the following 
acts'': the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky ``to 
execute a sworn affidavit . . . that he knew to be perjurious, false 
and misleading''; (2) ``corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to 
testify personally'' in the Jones case; (3) ``corruptly engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been 
subpoenaed'' in the Jones case, namely gifts given by him to Ms. 
Lewinsky; (4) ``intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky between December 7, 1997 and January 14, 
1998, ``in order to corruptly prevent [her] truthful testimony'' in the 
Jones case; (5) ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements'' to Judge Susan Webber Wright at the Jones 
deposition; (6) ``related a false and misleading account of events'' 
involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a ``potential witness'' in the 
Jones case, ``in order to corruptly influence'' her testimony; and (7) 
made false and misleading statements to certain members of his staff 
who were ``potential'' grand jury witnesses, in order to corruptly 
influence their testimony.
    As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of the 
perjury allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges particular 
acts of obstruction while Article I (4) alleges that the President lied 
in the grand jury when he discussed those allegations.\92\ Both sets of 
allegations are unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of 
these charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the 
allegations in Article I (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning 
alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to 
impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II (1)-(3), (6) 
(obstructing justice when he (1) ``encouraged witness . . . to execute 
a [false] sworn affidavit''; (2) ``encouraged a witness . . . to give 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony''; (3) ``engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''; (6) 
``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty Currie). Compare also 
Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior 
false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by 
``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        c. response to the particular allegations in article ii
1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn 
        affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
        false and misleading''
    Article II (1) alleges that the President ``corruptly encouraged'' 
Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that 
he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.'' The House Managers 
allege that during a December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked 
the President what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones 
case and that the President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.'' House Br. at 22. This admitted statement by the President 
of totally lawful conduct is the Managers' entire factual basis for the 
allegation in Article II (1).
    The Managers do not allege that the President ever suggested to Ms. 
Lewinsky she should file a false affidavit or otherwise told her what 
to say in the affidavit. Indeed they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky 
has repeatedly and forcefully denied any such suggestions:
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 
(2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
     ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that 
she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie. . . .'' App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
98).
     ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various 
times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That 
wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
    In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence 
supporting their theory,\93\ the Managers offer their view that ``both 
parties knew the affidavit would have to be false and misleading in 
order to accomplish the desired result.'' House Br. at 22; see also 
Committee Report at 65 (the President ``knew [the affidavit] would have 
to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying''). But there is no 
evidence to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is 
true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President testified that, given the 
particular claims in the Jones  case, they thought a truthful, limited 
affidavit might establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to 
offer. The President explained to the grand jury why he believed that 
Ms. Lewinsky would execute a truthful but limited affidavit that would 
have established that she was not relevant to the Jones case:\94\
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    \93\ The myth that the President told Ms. Lewinsky to lie in her 
affidavit springs not from the evidence but from the surreptitiously 
recorded Tripp tapes. But as Ms. Lewinsky explained to the grand jury, 
many of the statements she made to Ms. Tripp--including on this 
subject--were not true: ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know 
at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to 
lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
    \94\ Indeed, the Committee Report alleges without support that the 
President lied to the grand jury when he indicated his belief that Ms. 
Lewinsky could indeed have filed a truthful but limited affidavit that 
might have gotten her out of testifying in the Jones case. Article I 
(4). This claim fails for the reasons discussed in the text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what 
she says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no benefit 
in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual harassment. And 
if she defined sexual relationship in the way I think most Americans 
do, meaning intercourse, then she told the truth.'' App. at 474.
     ``You know, I believed then, I believe now, that Monica 
Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under 
reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit of what Linda Tripp 
did to her, would have given her a chance not to be a witness in this 
case.'' App. at 521.
     ``I believed then, I believe today, that she could execute 
an affidavit which, under reasonable circumstances with fair-minded, 
nonpolitically-oriented people, would result in her being relieved of 
the burden to be put through the kind of testimony that, thanks to 
Linda Tripp's work with you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have 
been put through. I don't think that's dishonest. I don't think that's 
illegal.'' App. at 529.
     ``But I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable 
that she could have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have 
disclosed the embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had, 
which had been over for many, many months by the time this incident 
occurred.'' App. at 568-69.
     ``I've already told you that I felt strongly that she 
could issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be 
factually truthful, that might get her out of having to testify. . . . 
And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? 
Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? No, I did 
not.'' App. at 571.

The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual 
solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President was 
consensual, and she knew nothing about the factual allegations of the 
Jones case.
    Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need not be 
false in order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a deposition:
     LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the affidavit was 
to avoid being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that one does this by giving a 
portion of the whole story, so the attorneys do not think you have 
anything of relevance to their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/
29/98) (emphasis added).
     LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be as 
benign as possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 1421 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added).
     I thought that signing an affidavit could range from 
anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being 
deposed and so that that could range from anywhere between maybe just 
somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe 
having to deny any kind of a relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
6/98) (emphasis added).
    The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have known that 
the President wanted her to lie because he never told her to fully 
detail their relationship in her affidavit and because an affidavit 
fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship would have 
been damaging to him in the Jones case. Committee Report at 65. The 
Managers wisely appear to have abandoned this argument.\95\ Ms. 
Lewinsky plainly was under no obligation to volunteer to the Jones 
lawyers every last detail about her relationship with the President--
and the failure of the President to instruct her to do so is neither 
wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited, truthful affidavit 
might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not relevant to the Jones 
case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. Lewinsky could submit an 
affidavit in lieu of a deposition, as the President knew other 
potential deponents in the Jones case had attempted to do, in order to 
avoid the expense, burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones 
case was entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United 
States could face removal from office not because he told Monica 
Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged her to do so, but because he did not 
affirmatively instruct her to disclose every detail of their 
relationship to the Jones lawyers is simply not supportable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky ``contextually 
understood that the President wanted her to lie'' because he never told 
her to file an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their 
relationship. Committee Report at 65. The only support cited for this 
``contextual understanding'' obstruction theory advanced by the 
Committee Report was a reference back to the OIC Referral. The OIC 
Referral, in turn, advanced the same theory, citing only the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie, 
he remained silent about what she should do or say, and by such 
silence, ``I knew what that meant.'' App. at 954 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) 
(cited in Referral at 174). It is extraordinary that the President of 
the United States could face removal from office not because he told 
Ms. Lewinsky to lie, or said anything of the sort, but instead because 
he stayed silent--and Ms. Lewinsky thought she ``knew what that 
meant.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, at the 
time she executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly believed that 
her denial of a sexual relationship was accurate given what she 
believed to be the definition of a ``sexual relationship'':
     ``I never even came close to sleeping with [the President] 
. . . We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is having intercourse. That's 
how most people would--'' Supp. at 2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/
97).\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ A friend of Ms. Lewinsky's also testified that, based on her 
close relationship with her, she believed that Ms. Lewinsky did not lie 
in her affidavit based on her understanding that when Ms. Lewinsky 
referred to ``sex'' she meant intercourse. Supp. at 4597 (6/23/98 grand 
jury testimony of Ms. Dale Young). See also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stating that Ms. Lewinsky had said that 
the President and she ``didn't have sex'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit 
with regard to the sexual relationship because she could justify to 
herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' 
App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having sex' 
means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/
98).
    The allegation contained in Article II(1) is totally unsupported by 
evidence. It is the product of a baseless hypothesis, and it should be 
rejected.
2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, 
        false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
        personally'' in the Jones litigation
    Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky 
to give false testimony if and when she was called to testify 
personally in the Jones litigation. Again, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly 
denied that anyone told her or encouraged her to lie:
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 
(2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
     ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that 
she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie. . . . App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
98).
     ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various 
times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That 
wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added).
    The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 17 to inform her that she had been listed as a potential 
witness in the Jones case, and that during this conversation, he ``sort 
of said, `You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or 
that you were bringing me letters.' '' House Br. at 22; App. at 843 
(Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). Other than the fact that Ms. Lewinsky recalls 
this statement being made in the same conversation in which she learned 
that her name was on the Jones witness list, the Managers cite no 
evidence whatsoever that supports their claim that the President 
encouraged her to make such statements ``if and when called to testify 
personally in the Jones case.'' They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had 
discussed such explanations for her visits with the President in the 
past. Unremarkably, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been concerned 
about concealing their improper relationship from others while it was 
ongoing.
    Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements undercut 
their case:
     When asked what should be said if anyone questioned Ms. 
Lewinsky about her being with the President, he said she should say she 
was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or 
visiting Betty Currie (after she left the WH). There is truth to both 
of these statements. . . . [This] occurred prior to the subpoena in the 
Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis 
added).
     After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the Pres[ident], that 
she was identified as a possible witness in the Jones case, the 
Pres[ident] and Ms. L[ewinsky] discussed what she should do. The 
President told her he was not sure she would be subpoenaed, but in the 
event that she was, she should contact Ms. Currie. When asked what to 
do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could sign an 
affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. In 
general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to see Ms. Currie 
and, on occasion when working at the WH, she brought him letters when 
no one else was around. Neither of those statements untrue. App. at 712 
(2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
     To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does not 
believe they discussed the content of any deposition that Ms. 
L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date. App. at 712 (2/1/98 
Proffer) (emphasis added).
     LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the issue in 
specific relation to the JONES matter, she and CLINTON had discussed 
what to say when asked about LEWINSKY's visits to the White House. App. 
at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (emphasis added).
    Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the President 
what to say if ``anyone'' asked about her visits, that the President 
said ``in general'' she could give such an explanation, and that they 
``did not discuss the issue in specific relation to the Jones matter.''
    This is consistent with the President's testimony that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at 
some point in the past,'' although he had no specific memory of that 
conversation. App. at 569. The President also stated in his grand jury 
testimony that he did not recall saying anything like that in 
connection with Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case:

    Q: And in that conversation, or in any conversation in which you 
informed her she was on the witness list, did you tell her, you know, 
you can always say that you were coming to see Betty or bringing me 
letters? Did you tell her anything like that?
    A: I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can tell you 
this. I absolutely never asked her to lie.

App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this discussion was had 
in reference to testimony she may or may not have been called to give 
personally, and the Managers' implication is directly contradicted by 
Ms. Lewinsky's statement that she and the President did not discuss her 
deposition testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 (2/1/98 
Proffer) (``To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, she does not 
believe they discussed [in the December 17 conversation] the content of 
any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later 
date.'').
    In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony that she told the President she would deny the 
relationship and that the President made some encouraging comment. 
House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the President 
any such thing on December 17, or at any other time after she had been 
identified as a witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that that 
discussion did not take place after she learned she was a witness in 
the Jones case:

    Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions [about 
denying the relationship] after you learned that you were a witness in 
the Paula Jones case?
    A: I don't believe so. No.
    Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
    A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it would 
be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that would 
show me different, but I--it was 2:30 in the--I mean, the conversation 
I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 17th, which was----
    Q: The telephone call.
    A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I 
remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so.

App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
    Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that neither of 
these so-called ``cover stories'' was untrue. In her handwritten 
proffer, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she asked the President what to say 
if anyone asked her about her visits to the Oval Office and he said 
that she could say ``she was bringing him letters (when she worked in 
Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left the White 
House).'' App. at 709 (Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer). Ms. Lewinsky expressly 
stated: ``There is truth to both of these statements.'' Id.  (emphasis 
added); see also App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``[n]either of those 
statements [was] untrue.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky 
testified to the grand jury that she did in fact bring papers to the 
President and that on some occasions, she visited the Oval Office only 
to see Ms. Currie:

    Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all?
    A: Yes.
    Q: All right. Tell us a little about that.
    A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of letters. . . .

App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

``I saw Betty on every time that I was there . . . most of the time my 
purpose was to see the President, but there were some times when I did 
just go see Betty but the President wasn't in the office.''

App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that those 
stories were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also Committee Report at 
66 (delivering documents to the President was a ``ruse that had no 
legitimate business purpose.''). In other words, while the so-called 
``cover stories'' were literally true, such explanations might have 
been misleading. But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and 
obstruction cases, as is Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the statements 
were, in fact, literally true.
    The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported by the 
evidence and should be rejected.
3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or 
        supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to 
        Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
    This allegation charges that the President participated in a scheme 
to conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky. It apparently 
centers on two events allegedly occurring in December 1997: (a) a 
conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two 
allegedly discussed the gifts the President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and 
(b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and 
storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not support the 
charge.
            a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
    Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 1997, 
sometime shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas presents. App. at 
868 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the 
subject of gifts she had received from the President in relation to the 
Jones subpoena, and this was the first and only time that this subject 
arose. App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky Depo. 
8/26/98).
    The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one version of 
Ms. Lewinsky's description of that December 28 conversation:

``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--maybe I 
should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I 
don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' App. 
at 872 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

    In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky has 
addressed this crucial exchange with prosecutors on at least ten 
different occasions, which we lay out in the margin for review.\97\ The 
accounts varied--in some Ms. Lewinsky essentially recalled that the 
President gave no response, but the House Managers, like the Committee 
Report and the OIC Referral, cite only the account most favorable to 
their case, failing even to take note of the other inconsistent 
recollections. But the important fact about Ms. Lewinsky's various 
descriptions of this conversation is that, at the very most, the 
President stated ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about it'' when Ms. 
Lewinsky raised the issue of the gifts. Even by the account most 
unfavorable to the President, the record is clear and unambiguous that 
the President never initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he 
tell or even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the gifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Those statements, from earliest to latest in time:
    1. Proffer (2/1/98): ``Ms. L then asked if she should put away 
(outside her home) the gifts he had given her or, maybe, give them so 
someone else.'' App. at 715.
    2. FBI 302 (7/27/98): ``LEWINSKY expressed her concern about the 
gifts that the President had given LEWINSKY and specifically the hat 
pin that had been subpoenaed by PAULA JONES. The President seemed to 
know what the JONES subpoena called for in advance and did not seem 
surprised about the hat pin. The President asked LEWINSKY if she had 
told anyone about the hat pin and LEWINSKY denied that she had, but may 
have said that she gave some of the gifts to FRANK CARTER. . . . 
LEWINSKY asked the President if she should give the gifts to someone 
and the President replied `I don't know.' '' App. at 1395.
    3. FBI 302 (8/1/98): ``LEWINSKY said that she was concerned about 
the gifts that the President had given her and suggested to the 
President that BETTY CURRIE hold the gifts. The President said 
something like, `I don't know,' or `I'll think about it.' The President 
did not tell LEWINSKY what to do with the gifts at that time.'' App. at 
1481.
    4. Grand Jury (8/6/98): ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you 
know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house 
somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I 
think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And 
left that topic.'' App. at 872.
    5. FBI 302 (8/13/97): ``During their December 28, 1997 meeting, 
CLINTON did not specifically mention which gifts to get rid of.'' App. 
at 1549.
    6. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``It was December 28th and I was there to 
get my Christmas gifts from him. . . And we spent maybe about five 
minutes or so, not very long, talking about the case. And I said to 
him, `Well, do you think' . . . And at one point, I said, `Well do you 
think I should--' I don't think I said `get rid of,' I said, `But do 
you think I should put away or maybe give to Betty or give someone the 
gifts?' And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something 
like, `I don't know,' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.'' 
App. at 1121-22.
    7. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's 
name [at the December 28 meeting during which gifts were supposedly 
discussed] or did the President bring up Betty's name? THE WITNESS: I 
think I brought it up. The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's 
name because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. . .'' App. 
at 1122.
    8. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: You had said that the President 
had called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone 
there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed 
concern, the President really didn't say anything.'' App. at 1126.
    9. FBI 302 (8/24/98): ``LEWINSKY advised that CLINTON was sitting 
in the rocking chair in the Study. LEWINSKY asked CLINTON what she 
should do with the gifts CLINTON had given her and he either did not 
respond or responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what 
was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not 
have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566.
    10. FBI 302 (9/3/98): ``On December 28, 1997, in a conversation 
between LEWINSKY and the President, the hat pin given to Lewinsky by 
the President was specifically discussed. They also discussed the 
general subject of the gifts the President had given Lewinsky. However, 
they did not discuss other specific gifts called for by the PAULA JONES 
subpoena. LEWINSKY got the impression that the President knew what was 
on the subpoena.'' App. at 1590.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of the 
President's reaction depict the President as not even acknowledging her 
suggestion. Among those versions, ignored by the Committee Report and 
the Managers, are the following:
     ``And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was 
something like, `I don't know,' '' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no 
response.'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
     ``[The President] either did not respond or responded `I 
don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is 
certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in 
her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98) 
(emphasis added).
     ``The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name, 
because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . .'' App. at 
1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
     ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you 
initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had 
a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed concern, the 
President didn't really say anything.'' App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/
98) (emphasis added).\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Here a grand juror is restating Ms. Lewinsky's earlier 
testimony, with which Ms. Lewinsky appeared to agree (she did not 
dispute the accuracy of the grand juror's recapitulation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially no 
discussion of gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no evidence of 
any ``scheme . . . designed to . . . conceal the existence'' of any 
gifts.
            b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
    Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction by the 
President at his December 28 meeting with Monica Lewinsky, Article II 
(3) necessarily depends on the added assumption that, after the 
December 28 meeting, the President must have instructed his secretary, 
Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby 
consummating the obstruction of justice. As the following discussion 
will demonstrate, the record is devoid of any direct evidence that the 
President discussed this subject with Ms. Currie. At most, it 
conflicted on the question of whether Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky 
initiated the gift retrieval.
    We begin with what is certain. The record is undisputed that Ms. 
Currie picked up a box containing gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and placed 
them under her bed at home. The primary factual dispute, therefore, is 
which of the two initiated the pick-up. According to the logic of the 
Committee Report, if Ms. Currie initiated the retrieval, she must have 
been so instructed by the President. Committee Report at 69 (``there is 
no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the President'').
    But the facts are otherwise. Both Ms. Currie and the President have 
denied ever having any such conversation wherein the President 
instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. App. at 
502 (President Clinton GJ 8/17/98); Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). In 
other words, the only two parties who could have direct knowledge of 
such an instruction by the President have denied it took place.
    In the face of this direct evidence that the President did not ask 
Ms. Currie to pick up these gifts, the Committee Report's obstruction 
theory hinges on the inference that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky and 
must have done so at the direction of the President. To be sure, Ms. 
Lewinsky has stated on several occasions that Ms. Currie initiated a 
call to her to inquire about retrieving something. The Managers and the 
Committee Report cited the following passage from Ms. Lewinsky's grand 
jury testimony:

    Q: What did [Betty Currie] say?
    A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give me.'' Or, 
``The President said you have something to give me.'' Along those 
lines. . . .
    Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I understand you 
have something to give me,'' or ``The President says you have something 
for me,'' what did you understand her to mean?
    A: The gifts.
App. at 874 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). See also App. at 715 (2/1/98 Proffer) 
(``Ms. Currie called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres. 
had told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her.'').
    However, Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged that it was she who first raised 
the prospect of Ms. Currie's involvement in holding the gifts:

    A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the President 
bring up Betty's name?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: I think I brought it up. The President wouldn't 
have brought up Betty's name because he really didn't--he really didn't 
discuss it.

App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). And contrary to the Committee 
Report's suggestion that Lewinsky's memory of these events has been 
``consistent and unequivocal'' and she has ``recited the same facts in 
February, July, and August,'' Committee Report at 69, Ms. Lewinsky 
herself acknowledged at her last grand jury appearance that her memory 
of the crucial conversation is less than crystal clear:

    A JUROR: . . . Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the 
President had told her to call?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right now. I don't. I don't remember. . . .

App. at 1141 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
    Moreover, Ms. Currie has repeatedly and unvaryingly stated that it 
was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted Ms. Currie about the gifts, not the 
other way around. A few examples include:
     ``LEWINSKY called CURRIE and advised she had to return all 
gifts CLINTON had given LEWINSKY as there was talk going around about 
the gifts.'' Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98);
     ``Monica said she was getting concerned, and she wanted to 
give me the stuff the President had given her--or give me a box of 
stuff. It was a box of stuff.'' Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98);
     Q: . . . Just tell us for a moment how this issue first 
arose and what you did about it and what Ms. Lewinsky told you.
     A: The best I remember it first arose with a conversation. 
I don't know if it was over the telephone or in person. I don't know. 
She asked me if I would pick up a box. She said Isikoff had been 
inquiring about gifts.'' Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
     ``The best I remember she said that she wanted me to hold 
these gifts--hold this--she may have said gifts, I'm sure she said 
gifts, box of gifts--I don't remember--because people were asking 
questions. And I said, `Fine.' '' Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
     ``The best I remember is Monica calls me and asks me if 
she can give me some gifts, if I'd pick up some gifts for her.'' Supp. 
at 706 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).
    The Committee Report attempts to portray Ms. Currie's memory as 
faulty on the key issue of whether Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift 
retrieval by unfairly referencing Ms. Currie's answer to a completely 
different question. Ms. Currie was asked whether she had discussed with 
the President Ms. Lewinsky's ``turning over to [her]'' the gift he had 
given her. Ms. Currie indicated that she could remember no such 
occasion. ``If Monica said [Ms. Currie] talked to the President about 
it,'' she was then asked, ``would that not be true?'' Then, only on the 
limited question of whether Ms. Currie ever talked to the President 
about the gifts--wholly separate from the issue of who made the initial 
contact--did Ms. Currie courteously defer, ``Then she may remember 
better than I. I don't remember.'' Supp. at 584 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). 
Ironically, it is the substance of this very allegation--regarding 
conversations between Ms. Currie and the President--that Ms. Lewinsky 
told the grand jury she could not recall. (In later testimony, 
referring to a conversation she had with the President on January 21, 
Ms. Currie testified that she was ``sure'' that she did not discuss the 
fact that she had a box of Ms. Lewinsky's belongings under her bed. 
Supp. at 705 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).)
    To support its theory that Ms. Currie initiated a call to Ms. 
Lewinsky, the House Managers place great reliance on a cell phone 
record of Ms. Currie, calling it ``key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy 
recollection is wrong'' and which ``conclusively proves'' that ``the 
President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.'' House Br. at 33. 
There is record of a one-minute call on December 28, 1998 from Ms. 
Currie's cell phone to Ms. Lewinsky's home at 3:32 p.m. Even assuming 
Ms. Lewinsky is correct that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts on December 
28, her own testimony refutes the possibility that the Managers' 
mysterious 3:32 p.m. telephone call could have been the initial contact 
by Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts. To the contrary, the timing and 
duration of the call strongly suggest just the opposite. It is 
undisputed that Ms. Lewinsky entered the White House on the morning of 
December 28 at 8:16 a.m. App. at 111 (White House entry records). While 
no exit time for Ms. Lewinsky was recorded because she inadvertently 
left her visitor badge in the White House, she has testified that the 
visit lasted around an hour. App. at 870-72 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). 
Consistent with this timing, records also indicate that the President 
left the Oval Office at 9:52 a.m., thus placing Ms. Lewinsky's exit 
around 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. App. at 111. Ms. Lewinsky has indicated on 
several occasions that her discussion with Betty Currie occurred just 
``several hours'' after she left. App. at 875 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); 
App. at 1395 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Ms. Lewinsky three times 
placed the timing of the actual gift exchange with Ms. Currie ``at 
about 2:00 p.m.'' App at 1127 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1396 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98); App. at 1482 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98). 
This, in light of undisputed documentary evidence and Ms. Lewinsky's 
own testimony, it becomes clear that the 3:32 p.m. telephone record 
relied upon by the Committee Report in fact is unlikely to reflect a 
call placed to initiate the pick-up.
    Apart from this conspicuous timing defect, there is another, 
independent reason to conclude that the 3:32 p.m. telephone call could 
not have been the conversation Ms. Lewinsky describes. The 3:32 p.m. 
call is documented to have lasted no longer than one minute, and 
because such calls are rounded up to the nearest minute, it quite 
conceivably could have been much shorter in duration. It is difficult 
to imagine that the conversation reflected in Ms. Lewinsky's statements 
could have taken place in less than one minute. Both Ms. Currie and Ms. 
Lewinsky have described the various matters that were discussed in 
their initial conversation: not only was this the first time the topic 
of returning gifts was discussed, which quite likely generated some 
discussion between the two, but they also had to discuss and arrange a 
convenient plan for Ms. Currie to make the pick-up.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ The OIC Referral, which took great pains to point out every 
allegedly incriminating piece of evidence, made no reference to this 
telephone record, perhaps because the OIC knew it tended not to 
corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's time line. In its place, the Referral rested 
its corroboration hopes in the following bizarre analysis: ``More 
generally, the person making the extra effort (in this case, Ms. 
Currie) is ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' Referral at 
170. Wisely, the House Managers chose not to pursue this groundless 
speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What, then, to make of this call so heavily relied upon by the 
House Managers? The record is replete with references that Ms. Currie 
and Ms. Lewinsky communicated very frequently, especially during this 
December 1997-January 1998 time period. See, e.g., Supp. at 554 (Currie 
GJ 1/27/98) (many calls around Christmas-time). They often called or 
paged each other to discuss a host of topics, including Ms. Lewinsky's 
pending job search, Ms. Currie's mother's illness, and her contacts 
with Mr. Jordan. There is simply no reason to believe this call was 
anything other than one of the many calls and exchanges of pages that 
these two shared during the period.
            c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds 
                    With the President's Actions
    Ultimately, and irrespective of the absence of evidence implicating 
the President in Ms. Lewinsky's gift concealment, the charge fails 
because it is inconsistent with other events of the very same day. 
There is absolutely no dispute that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky 
numerous additional gifts during their December 28 meeting. It must 
therefore be assumed that on the very day the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky were conspiring to hide the gifts he had already given to her, 
the President added to the pile. No stretch of logic will support such 
an outlandish theory.
    From the beginning, this inherent contradiction has puzzled 
investigators. If there were a plot to conceal these gifts, why did the 
President give Ms. Lewinsky several more gifts at the very moment the 
concealment plan was allegedly hatched? The House Managers OIC 
prosecutors, grand jurors, and even Ms. Lewinsky hopelessly searched 
for an answer to that essential question:

    Q: Although, Ms. Lewinsky, I think what is sort of--it seems a 
little odd and, I guess really the grand jurors wanted your impression 
of it, was on the same day that you're discussing basically getting the 
gifts to Betty to conceal them, he's giving you a new set of gifts.
    A: You know, I have come recently to look at that as sort of a 
strange situation, I think, in the course of the past few weeks. . . .

App. at 887-88 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). See House Br. at 
34.
    The Committee Report fails to resolve this significant flaw in its 
theory.\100\ The report admits that Ms. Lewinsky ``can't answer'' why 
the President would in one breath give her gifts and in the next hatch 
a plan to take them back. But it cites only to Ms. Lewinsky's 
understanding of the relationship's pattern of concealment and how she 
contemplated it must apply to the gifts. It creates the erroneous 
impression that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky instructions to conceal 
the gifts in the December 28 meeting by quoting her testimony that 
``from everything he said to me'' she would conceal the gifts. But we 
know that Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly testified that no such discussion 
ever occurred. Her reliance on ``everything he said to me'' must, 
therefore, reflect her own plan to implement discussions the two had 
had about concealing the relationship long before her role in the Jones 
litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Incredibly, not only does the Committee Report fail to offer 
a sensible answer to this perplexity, but without any factual or 
logical support it accuses the President of lying to the grand jury 
when he testified that he was not particularly concerned about the 
gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky and thus had no compunction about 
giving her additional gifts on December 28. Article I (4). For whatever 
reason, neither the Committee Report nor the OIC Referral acknowledges 
the most reasonable explanation for these events: as the President has 
testified repeatedly, he was not concerned about the gifts he had given 
Ms. Lewinsky.
     ``I was never hung up about this gift issue. Maybe it's 
because I have a different experience. But, you know, the President 
gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe more. I have always given a lot of 
gifts to people, especially if they give me gifts. And this was no big 
deal to me.'' App. at 495.
     ``this gift business . . . didn't bother me.'' App. at 
496.
     ``I wasn't troubled by this gift issue.'' App. at 497.
     ``I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have always 
been given gifts. I do not think there is anything improper about a man 
giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving a man a gift, that necessarily 
connotes an improper relationship. So, it didn't bother me.'' App. at 
498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What this passage confirms is that Ms. Lewinsky had very much in 
her mind that she would do what she could to conceal the relationship--
a modus operandi she herself acknowledged well pre-dated the Jones 
litigation. That she took such steps does not mean that the President 
knew of or participated in them. Indeed, it appears that the entire 
gift-concealment plan arose not from any plan suggested by the 
President--which the Committee Report so desperately struggles to 
maintain--but rather more innocently from the actions of a young woman 
taking steps she thought were best.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ As the President has stated about this potentiality, ``I 
didn't then, I don't now see this [the gifts] as a problem. And if she 
thought it was a problem, I think it--it must have been from a, really 
a misapprehension of the circumstances. I certainly never encouraged 
her not to, to comply lawfully with a subpoena.'' App. at 497-98 
(emphasis added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In any event, the record evidence is abundantly clear that the 
President has not obstructed justice by any plan or scheme to conceal 
gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and logic and reason fully undercut 
any such theory.
4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
        Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an 
        effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in 
        the Jones case
    Again, in the absence of specifics in Article II itself, we look to 
the Committee Report for guidance on the actual charges. The Committee 
Report would like to portray this claim in as sinister a light as 
possible, and it alleges that the President of the United States 
employed his close friend Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job in 
New York to influence her testimony or perhaps get her away from the 
Jones lawyers. To reach this conclusion, and without the benefit of a 
single piece of direct evidence to support the charge, it ignores the 
direct testimony of several witnesses, assigns diabolical purposes to a 
series of innocuous events, and then claims that ``[i]t is logical to 
infer from this chain of events'' that the job efforts ``were motivated 
to influence the testimony of'' Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 71. 
Again, the evidence contradicts the inferences the Committee Report 
strives to draw. Ms. Lewinsky's New York job search began on her own 
initiative long before her involvement in the Jones case. By her own 
forceful testimony, her job search had no connection to the Jones case.
    Mr. Jordan agreed to help Ms. Lewinsky not at the direction of the 
President but upon the request of Betty Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-time 
friend. And bizarrely, the idea to involve Mr. Jordan (which arose well 
before Ms. Lewinsky became a possible Jones witness) came not from the 
President but apparently emanated from Ms. Tripp. In short, the facts 
directly frustrate the House Majority's theory.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ This allegation has gone through several iterations. As 
initially referred to the House of Representatives, the charge was that 
the President ``help[ed] Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York at a 
time when she would have been a witness against him'' in the Jones 
case. OIC Referral at 181. Faced with the significant evidence that Ms. 
Lewinsky's job efforts had originated long before she became involved 
in the Jones case and were in fact entirely unrelated to the Jones 
case, the Judiciary Committee Majority was forced to recraft this 
claim. Instead of implying a complete connection between the job search 
and the Jones ligitation, the article now oddly charges that the 
President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky ``at a time when the truthful testimony 
of [Ms. Lewinsky] would have been harmful to him,'' Article II (5) 
(emphasis added)--thereby admitting that the initial effort was 
motivated by appropriate concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This 
                    Charge
    It is hard to overstate the importance of the fact that--by the 
House Managers', the Committee Report's and the OIC's own admission--
there is not one single piece of direct evidence to support this 
charge. Not one. Indeed, just the contrary is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified that there was never an 
explicit or implicit agreement, suggestion, or implication that Ms. 
Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for her silence or false 
testimony. One need look no further than their own testimony:

    Lewinsky: ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised 
a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98);
    ``There was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, or anyone else 
that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones affidavit before getting a job in 
New York. LEWINSKY never demanded a job from Jordan in exchange for a 
favorable affidavit. Nether the President nor JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY 
that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
    Jordan: ``As far as I was concerned, [the job and the affidavit] 
were two very separate matters.'' Supp. at 1737 (Jordan GJ 3/5/98).
    ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no''--in response to the question 
whether the job search and the affidavit were in any way connected. 
Supp. at 1827 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ The only person who suggested any such quid pro quo was Ms. 
Tripp, who repeatedly urged Ms. Lewinsky to demand such linkage. App. 
at 1493 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/2/98 (``TRIPP told LEWINSKY not to sign the 
affidavit until LEWINSKY had a job.''). To appease Linda Tripp's 
repeated demands on this point, Ms. Lewinsky ultimately told Ms. Tripp 
that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't sign the affidavit until she 
had a job. But as she later emphasized to the grand jury, ``That was 
definitely a lie, based on something Linda had made me promise her on 
January 9th.'' App. at 1134 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).

    This is the direct evidence. The House Managers' circumstantial 
``chain of events'' case, House Br. 39-41, cannot overcome the hurdle 
the direct evidence presents.
            b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
    By its terms, Article II(4) would have the Senate evaluate Ms. 
Lewinsky's job search by considering only the circumstances 
``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1997.'' Article II(4). Although 
barely mentioned in the Committee Report's ``explanation'' of Article 
II(4), the significant events occurring before December 7, 1997 cannot 
simply be ignored because they are inconsistent with the Majority's 
theory. Without reciting every detail, the undisputed record 
establishes that the following facts occurred long before Ms. Lewinsky 
was involved in the Jones case:
    First, Ms. Lewinsky had contemplated looking for a job in New York 
as early as July 1997. App. at 1414 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (July 3 
letter ``first time [Lewinsky] mentioned the possibility of moving to 
New York''); App. at 787-788 (On July 4, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky wrote the 
President a letter describing her interest in a job ``in New York at 
the United Nations''); Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had been 
searching for a highly paid job in New York since the previous July.'') 
She conveyed that prospect to a friend on September 2, 1997. App. at 
2811 (Lewinsky e-mail).
    Second, in early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, then-Deputy 
Chief of Staff John Podesta asked U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson to 
consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. Supp. at 3404 
(Richardson GJ 4/3/98). Ms. Currie testified that she was acting on her 
own in this effort. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98).
    Third, around October 6, Ms. Tripp told Ms. Lewinsky that an 
acquaintance in the White House reported that it was unlikely Ms. 
Lewinsky would ever be re-employed at the White House. After this 
disclosure, Ms. Lewinsky ``was mostly resolved to look for a job in the 
private sector in New York.'' App. at 1543-44 (Lewinsky FBI 302) 8/13/
98; see also App. at 1460 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (remarks by the 
Linda Tripp acquaintance were the ``straw that broke the camel's 
back'').
    Fourth, sometime prior to October 9, 1997, Ms. Tripp and Ms. 
Lewinsky discussed the prospect of enlisting Mr. Vernon Jordan to 
assist Ms. Lewinsky in obtaining a private sector job in New York. App. 
at 822-24 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); see also App. at 1079 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
20/98) (``I don't remember . . . if [enlisting Jordan] was my idea or 
Linda's idea. And I know that that came up in discussions with her, I 
believe, before I discussed it with the President''). On either October 
9 or 11, Ms. Lewinsky conveyed to the President this idea of asking Mr. 
Jordan for assistance. Id.
    Fifth, in mid-October, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky purchased a book on jobs 
in New York. App. at 1462 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky 
completed and sent to Betty Currie at the White House a packet of jobs-
related materials on October 15 or 16. Supp. at 735 (Lewinsky Tripp 
tape of 10/15/97 conversation).
    Sixth, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for a position 
with Ambassador Bill Richardson at the United Nations in New York. 
Ambassador Richardson was ``impressed'' with Ms. Lewinsky and, on 
November 3, offered her a position, which she ultimately rejected. 
Supp. at 3411 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3731 (Sutphen GJ 5/27/
98). Ms. Currie informed the President that Ms. Lewinsky had received a 
job offer at the U.N. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ambassador 
Richardson never spoke to the President or Mr. Jordan about Ms. 
Lewinsky, and he testified emphatically and repeatedly that no one 
pressured him to hire her. Supp. at 3422-23 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); 
Supp. at 3418 (same); Supp. at 3429 (same).
    Seventh, as of late October or November, Ms. Lewinsky had told Mr. 
Kenneth Bacon, her boss at the Pentagon, that she wanted to leave the 
Pentagon and move to New York. In a series of conversations, she 
enlisted his assistance in obtaining a private sector job in New York. 
Supp. at 11 (Kenneth Bacon FBI 302 2/26/98). In response, Mr. Bacon 
contacted Howard Paster, CEO of the public relations firm Hill & 
Knowlton about Ms. Lewinsky. Id.
    Eighth, in November, Ms. Lewinsky gave notice to the Pentagon that 
she would be leaving her Pentagon job at year's end. Supp. at 116 
(Clifford Bernath GJ 5/21/98).
    Ninth, Ms. Lewinsky apparently had a preliminary meeting with Mr. 
Jordan on November 5, 1997 to discuss her job search. During this 
twenty-minute meeting, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan discussed a list of 
potential employers she had compiled. App. at 1464-65 (Lewinsky FBI 302 
7/31/98). In that meeting, Ms. Lewinsky never informed Mr. Jordan of 
any time constraints on her need for job assistance. Supp. at 2647 
(Lewinsky-Tripp Tape of 11/8/97 conversation). Mr. Jordan had to leave 
town the next day. App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 Form 7/31/98). Ms. 
Lewinsky had a follow-up telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan around 
Thanksgiving wherein he advised her that he was ``working on her job 
search'' and instructed her to call him again ``around the first week 
of December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98); see also App. 
at 825 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (``And so Betty arranged for me to speak 
with [Jordan] again and I spoke with him when I was in Los Angeles 
before--right before Thanksgiving.'') \104\ Inexplicably, the Committee 
Report, the presentation by its chief counsel, and the Starr Referral 
all choose to ignore this key piece of testimony--that contact resumed 
in early December because Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan agreed (in 
November) that it would. See Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had 
no further contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time [early November to mid 
December].''); Schippers Dec. 10, 1998 Presentation at 38 (``Vernon 
Jordan, who, by the way, had done nothing from early November to mid-
December.''); Referral at 182 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no contact with . . . 
Mr. Jordan for another month [after November 5].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Mr. Jordan was then out of the country from the day after 
Thanksgiving until December 4. Supp. at 1804 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, the record is clear that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to 
seek a job in New York many months before her involvement in the Jones 
case. She had asked her Pentagon boss to help, as well as Ms. Currie, 
who arranged indirectly for Ms. Lewinsky to interview with Ambassador 
Richardson at the United Nations. Mr. Jordan became involved in the job 
search at the request of Ms. Currie (apparently at the suggestion of 
Ms. Tripp) and, notwithstanding his travels in November, Supp. at 1811 
(Jordan GJ 5/5/98), kept in contact with Ms. Lewinsky with plans to 
reconvene early in December.
            c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
    Article II ignores this background and merely alleges that efforts 
to aid Ms. Lewinsky's job search ``intensified and succeeded'' in 
December 1997. While not adopted in the article, the House Brief, the 
Committee Report, and the accompanying final presentation by Majority 
Counsel Schippers offer some guidance as to the meaning of the actual 
charge. They cite three events--Mr. Jordan's December 11 meeting with 
Ms. Lewinsky to discuss job prospects in New York, Ms. Lewinsky's 
execution of her Jones affidavit, and her receipt of a job--in an 
effort to portray Ms. Lewinsky's job search as sinister. But the full 
record easily dispels any suggestion that there were any obstructive or 
improper acts.

      (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan

    The House Managers and the Committee Report suggest that Mr. Jordan 
took action on Ms. Lewinsky's job search request only after, and 
because, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list on December 5 
and only after, and because, Judge Wright ordered the President to 
answer certain questions about ``other women'' on December 11. See 
House Br. at 21. Consider the Committee Report portrayal:

    ``[T]he effort to obtain a job for Monica Lewinsky in New York 
intensified after the President learned, on December 6, 1997, that 
Monica Lewinsky was listed on the witness list for the case Jones v. 
Clinton.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Committee Report at 70. That portrayal flatly contradicts the 
Committee Report's earlier statement that on December 6 ``there was 
still no urgency to help Lewinsky.'' Committee Report at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon Jordan at 
the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan on December 11 to 
discuss specific job contacts in New York. Mr. Jordan then made calls 
to certain New York companies on Ms. Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan 
telephoned President Clinton to keep him informed of the efforts to get 
Ms. Lewinsky a job.'' Committee Report at 70.
    ``Something happened that changed the priority assigned to the job 
search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright 
ordered President Clinton to provide information regarding any state or 
federal employee with whom he had, proposed, or sought sexual 
relations. To keep Ms. Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical 
importance.'' Committee Report at 11.

    The unmistakable intention of this narrative is to suggest that, 
after the President learned Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list 
on December 6, he (1) contacted Mr. Jordan on December 7 to engage his 
assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, and only then did Mr. Jordan agree to meet 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and further, that (2) Mr. Jordan met with Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 11 and took concrete steps to help Ms. Lewinsky 
only after and as a result of Judge Wright's December 11 order. Both 
suggestions are demonstrably false.
    The President had nothing to do with arranging the December 11 
meeting between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. As the record indicates, 
after receiving a request from Ms. Currie on December 5 that he meet 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and telling Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call 
him, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan on December 8. Supp. at 1705 
(Jordan GJ 3/3/98). As noted above, that call had been presaged by a 
conversation between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky around Thanksgiving in 
which Jordan told her ``he was working on her job search'' and asked 
her to contact him again ``around the first week of December.'' App. at 
1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In the December 8 call, the two 
arranged for Ms. Lewinsky to come to Mr. Jordan's office on December 
11; on the same day, Ms. Lewinsky sent Mr. Jordan via courier a copy of 
her resume. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). At the time of that 
contact, Mr. Jordan did not even know that Ms. Lewinsky knew President 
Clinton. Id.
    In the intervening period before Ms. Lewinsky's December 11 meeting 
with Mr. Jordan, the President met with Mr. Jordan on December 7. As 
the Committee Report acknowledges, that meeting had nothing to do with 
Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 11. Yet the House Managers' Brief, 
like the Committee Report before it, states that ``the sudden interest 
[in helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job] was inspired by a court order 
entered on December 11, 1997'' in the Jones case.\106\ House Br. at 21. 
No evidence supports that supposition. The December 11 meeting had been 
scheduled on December 8. Neither the OIC Referral nor the Committee 
Report nor the Managers' Brief cites any evidence that the President or 
Mr. Jordan had any knowledge of the contents of that Order at the time 
of the December 11 meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ That Order authorized Paula Jones' attorneys to obtain 
discovery relating to certain government employees ``with whom the 
President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to 
have sexual relations.'' House Br. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky shortly after 1:00 p.m. on 
December 11. Supp. at 1863 (Akin Gump visitor log); Supp. at 1809 
(Jordan GJ 5/5/98). In anticipation of that meeting, Mr. Jordan had 
made several calls to prospective employers about Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. 
at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). Mr. Jordan spoke about Ms. Lewinsky with 
Mr. Peter Georgescu of Young & Rubicam at 9:45 a.m. that morning, and 
with Mr. Richard Halperin of Revlon around 1:00 p.m., immediately 
before meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). 
Again, there is no evidence that any of this occurred after Mr. Jordan 
learned of Judge Wright's order.
    Although the Committee Report claims that a heightened sense of 
urgency attached in December which ``intensified'' the job search 
efforts, it ignores the sworn testimony of Mr. Jordan denying any such 
intensification: ``Oh, no. I do not recall any heightened sense of 
urgency [in December]. What I do recall is that I dealt with it when I 
had time to do it.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ Mr. Jordan explained that not much activity occurred in 
November because ``I was traveling.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 9/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``heightened urgency'' theory also is undermined by the simple 
fact that Mr. Jordan indisputably placed no pressure on any company to 
give Ms. Lewinsky a job and suggested no date by which Ms. Lewinsky had 
to be hired. The first person Mr. Jordan contacted, Mr. Georgescu of 
Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller, told investigators that Mr. Jordan 
did not engage in a ``sales pitch'' for Lewinsky. Supp. at 1222 
(Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). Mr. Georgescu told Mr. Jordan that the 
company ``would take a look at [Ms. Lewinsky] in the usual way,'' Supp. 
at 1219 (Georgescu FBI 302 1/29/98), and that once the initial 
interview was set up, Ms. Lewinsky would be ``on [her] own from that 
point.'' Supp. at 1222 (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). The executive who 
interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at Burson-Marsteller stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky's recruitment process went ``by the book'' and, ``while 
somewhat accelerated,'' the process ``went through the normal steps.'' 
Supp. at 111 (Berk FBI 302 3/31/98).
    At American Express, Mr. Jordan contacted Ms. Ursula Fairbairn, who 
stated that Mr. Jordan exerted ``no . . . pressure'' to hire Lewinsky. 
Supp. at 1087 (Fairbairn FBI 302 2/4/98). Indeed, she considered it 
``not unusual for board members'' like Mr. Jordan to recommend talented 
people for employment and noted that Mr. Jordan had recently 
recommended another person just a few months earlier. Id. The person 
who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky stated that he felt ``absolutely no 
pressure'' to hire her and indeed told her she did not have the 
qualifications necessary for the position. Supp. at 3521 (Schick FBI 
302 1/29/98).
    Perhaps most telling of the absence of pressure applied by Mr. 
Jordan is the fact that neither Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller or 
American Express offered Ms. Lewinsky a job.
    Similarly, at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon, where Ms. Lewinsky 
ultimately was offered a job (see below), Mr. Jordan initially 
contacted Mr. Halperin, who has stated that it was not unusual for Mr. 
Jordan to make an employment recommendation. Supp. at 1281 (Halperin 
FBI 302 1/26/98). Moreover, he emphasized that Mr. Jordan did not ``ask 
[him] to work on any particular timetable,'' Supp. at 1294 (Halperin GJ 
4/23/98), and that ``there was no implied time constraint or 
requirement for fast action.'' Supp. at 1286 (Halperin FBI 3/27/98.)
            (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment 
                    offer
    The Committee Report attempts to conflate separate and unrelated 
acts--the signing of the affidavit and the Revlon job offer--to sustain 
its otherwise unsustainable obstruction theory. The Committee Report's 
description of these events is deftly misleading:

    ``The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit. She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. 
She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to President Clinton that 
it had been signed and another mission had been accomplished.
    On January 8, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan 
with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. The interview went poorly. 
Afterwards, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Mr. 
Jordan, who had done nothing from early November to mid-December, then 
called the chief executive officer of MacAndrews & Forbes, Ron 
Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' Mr. Jordan 
called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. That evening, 
MacAndrews & Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told her that she would be 
given more interviews the next morning.
    The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for signing the 
false affidavit. After a series of interviews with MacAndrews & Forbes 
personnel, she was informally offered a job. Committee Report at 18 
(citations omitted).

    By this portrayal, the Committee Report suggests two conclusions: 
first, that Ms. Lewinsky was ``reward[ed]'' with a job for her signing 
of the affidavit; second, that the only reason Ms. Lewinsky was given a 
second interview and ultimately hired at Revlon was Mr. Jordan's 
intervention with Mr. Perelman. Once again, both conclusions are 
demonstrably false.
    Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky have testified under oath that there 
was no causal connection between the job search and the affidavit. The 
only person to draw (or, actually, recommend) any such linkage was Ms. 
Tripp. The factual record easily debunks the second insinuation--that 
Ms. Lewinsky was hired as a direct result of Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. 
Perelman. One fact is virtually dispositive: the Revlon executive who 
scheduled Ms. Lewinsky's January 9 interview and decided to hire her 
that same day never even knew about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman, 
or any interest Mr. Perelman might have in Ms. Lewinsky, and thus could 
not have been acting in furtherance of such a plan.
    Ms. Lewinsky initially interviewed with Mr. Halperin of MacAndrews 
& Forbes (Revlon's parent company) on December 18, 1997. (Mr. Jordan 
had spoken with Mr. Halperin on December 11.) Prior to interviewing Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin forwarded a copy of her resume to Mr. Jaymie 
Durnan, also of MacAndrews & Forbes, for his consideration. Supp. at 
1286-87 (Halperin FBI 302 3/27/98). Following his interview of Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin thought that she would likely be ``shipped to 
Revlon'' for consideration. Id.
    Mr. Durnan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume from Mr. Halperin in mid-
December and, after reviewing it, decided to interview Ms. Lewinsky 
after the first of the year. (He was going on vocation the last two 
weeks of December). Supp. at 1053 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). When he 
returned from vacation, his assistant scheduled an interview with Ms. 
Lewinsky for January 7, 1998, but, because of scheduling problems, he 
rescheduled the interview for the next day, January 8, 1998. Supp. at 
1049 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Durnan's decision to interview Ms. 
Lewinsky was made independently of the decision by Mr. Halperin to 
interview her. Indeed, only when Mr. Durnan interviewed Ms. Lewinsky in 
January did he discover that she had had a December interview with Mr. 
Halperin. Id.
    It was this interview with Mr. Durnan that Ms. Lewinsky later 
described as having gone poorly in her view. App. at 926 (Lewinsky GJ 
8/6/98). The House Managers (``[t]he interview went poorly,'' House Br. 
at 38), the Committee Report (``The interview went poorly'', id. at 
21), and the OIC Referral (``The interview went poorly,'' id. at 184) 
all emphasize only Ms. Lewinsky's impression of the job interview--for 
obvious reasons: it tends to heighten the supposed relevance of the 
Jordan call to Mr. Perelman. In other words, under this theory, Ms. 
Lewinsky had no prospect of a job at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon until 
Mr. Jordan resurrected her chances with Mr. Perelman.
    Unfortunately, like so much other ``evidence'' in the obstruction 
case, the facts do not bear out this sinister theory. Mr. Durnan had no 
similar impression that his interview with Ms. Lewinsky had gone 
``poorly.'' In fact, just the opposite was true: he was ``impressed'' 
with Ms. Lewinsky and thought that she would ``fit in'' with MacAndrews 
& Forbes but ``there was nothing available at that time which suited 
her interests.'' Supp. at 1054 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Durnan 
therefore decided to forward Ms. Lewinsky's resume to Ms. Allyn Seidman 
of Revlon. After the interview, he called Ms. Seidman and left her a 
voicemail message about his interview with Ms. Lewinsky and explained 
that, while there was no current opening at MacAndrews & Forbes, 
``perhaps there was something available at Revlon.'' Id.
    In the meantime, Mr. Jordan had called Mr. Perelman about Ms. 
Lewinsky. Mr. Perelman described this conversation as ``very low key 
and casual.'' Supp. at 3273 (Perelman FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Jordan 
``made no specific requests and did not request'' him ``to intervene''; 
nonetheless, Mr. Perelman agreed to ``look into it.'' Id. Later that 
day, Mr. Durnan spoke to Mr. Perelman, who mentioned that he had 
received a call from Mr. Jordan about a job candidate. Mr. Perelman 
told Mr. Durnan ``let's see what we can do,'' Supp. at 3276 (Perelman 
FBI 302 3/27/98), but Mr. Durnan never concluded that hiring Ms. 
Lewinsky was ``mandatory.'' Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. 
Perelman later called Mr. Jordan and said they would do what they 
could; Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency to Mr. Perelman. Supp. at 3276 
(Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98).
    By the time Mr. Durnan had discussed Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. 
Perelman, he had already forwarded her resume to Ms. Seidman at Revlon. 
Supp. at 1049-50 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). After speaking with Mr. 
Perelman, Mr. Durnan spoke with Ms. Seidman, following up on the 
voicemail message he had left earlier that day. Supp. at 1055 (Durnan 
FBI 302 3/27/98). Upon speaking to Ms. Seidman about Ms. Lewinsky, 
however, Mr. Durnan did not tell Ms. Seidman that CEO Perelman has 
expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Rather, he simply said that 
if she liked Ms. Lewinsky, she should hire her. Supp. at 1050 (Durnan 
FBI 302 1/26/98).
    For her part, Ms. Seidman has testified that she had no idea that 
Mr. Perelman had expressed interest in Ms. Lewinsky:

    Q: Did [Mr. Durnan] indicate to you that he had spoken to anyone 
else within MacAndrews or Revlon about Monica Lewinsky?
    A: Not that I recall, no.
    Q: Do you have knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Perelman spoke 
with anyone either on the MacAndrews & Forbes side or the Revlon side 
about Monica Lewinsky?
    A: No.

Supp. at 3642 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). Rather, Ms. Seidman's 
consideration of Ms. Lewinsky proceeded on the merits. Indeed, as a 
result of the interview, Ms. Seidman concluded that Ms. Lewinsky was 
``bright, articulate and polished,'' Supp. at 3635 (Seidman FBI 302 1/
26/98), and ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman'' who would 
be a ``good fit in [her] department.'' Supp. at 3643 (Seidman Depo. 4/
23/98). She decided after the interview to hire Ms. Lewinsky, and 
thereafter called Mr. Durnan ``and told him I thought she was great,'' 
Id.
    In sum, Ms. Seidman made the decision to grant an interview and 
hire Ms. Lewinsky on the merits. She did not even know that Mr. 
Perelman had expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky or that Mr. Jordan 
had spoken to Mr. Perelman the day before. As amply demonstrated, the 
House Managers' Jordan-Perelman intervention theory just doesn't hold 
water.
            d. Conclusion
    From the preceding discussion of the factual record, two 
conclusions are inescapable. First, there is simply no direct evidence 
to support the job-for-silence obstruction theory. From her initial 
proffer to the last minutes of her grand jury appearance, the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky has been clear and consistent: she was never asked or 
encouraged to lie or promised a job for her silence or for a favorable 
affidavit. Mr. Jordan has been equally unequivocal on this point. 
Second, the ``chain of events'' circumstantial case upon which this 
obstruction allegation must rest falls apart after inspection of the 
full evidentiary record. Ms. Lewinsky's job search began on her own 
volition and long before she was ever a witness in the Jones case. Mr. 
Jordan's assistance originated with a request from Ms. Currie, which 
had no connection to events in the Jones litigation. No pressure was 
applied to anyone at any time. And Ms. Lewinsky's ultimate hiring had 
absolutely no connection to her signing of the affidavit in the Jones 
case. Viewed on this unambiguous record, the job-search allegations are 
plainly unsupportable.
5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
        make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' 
        concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    Article II (5) charges that the President engaged in an obstruction 
of justice because he ``did not say anything'' during his Jones 
deposition when his attorney cited the Lewinsky affidavit to Judge 
Wright and stated that ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape, or form.'' Committee Report at 72. The rationale underlying this 
charge of obstruction of justice hinges on an odd combination of a 
bizarrely heightened legal obligation, a disregard of the actual record 
testimony, and a good does of amateur psychology. This claim is 
factually and legally baseless.
    The law, of course, imposes no obligation on a client to monitor 
every statement and representation made by his or her lawyer. 
Particularly in the confines of an ongoing civil deposition, where 
clients are routinely counseled to focus on the questions posed of them 
and their responses and ignore all distractions, it is totally 
inappropriate to try to remove a President from office because of a 
statement by his attorney. Indeed, the President forcefully explained 
to the grand jury that he was not focusing on the exchange between 
lawyers but instead concentrating on his own testimony:
     ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he was 
saying. I was thinking, I was ready to get on with my testimony here 
and they were having these constant discussions all through the 
deposition.'' App. at 476;
     ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to this 
exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.'' App. at 510;
     ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges 
between the lawyers all that carefully.'' App. at 510;
     ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made that 
statement that I was concentrating on the exact words he used.'' App. 
at 511;
     ``When I was in there, I didn't think about my lawyers. I 
was, frankly, thinking about myself and my testimony and trying to 
answer the questions.'' App. at 512;
     ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went 
on. I was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I was 
worried about my own testimony.'' App. at 513.
    The Committee Report ignores the President's repeated and 
consistent description of his state of mind during the deposition 
exchange. Instead, the Committee Report and majority counsel's final 
presentation undertake a novel exercise in video psychology, claiming 
that by studying the President's facial expressions and by noting that 
he was ``looking in Mr. Bennett's direction'' during the exchange, it 
necessarily follows that the President was in fact listening to and 
concentrating on every single word uttered by his attorney \108\ and 
knowingly made a decision not to correct his attorney.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ It is upon this same fanciful methodology that the Committee 
Report premises the allegation of Article I (3) that the President lied 
to the grand jury in providing these responses. Citing the President's 
oft-criticized response about Mr. Bennett's use of the present tense in 
his statement ``there is no sex of any'' (``It depends on what the 
meaning of the word `is' is.'' App. at 510), the Committee Report 
claims that such parsing contradicts the President's claim that he was 
not paying close attention to the exchange. But contrary to the 
Committee Report's suggestion, the President's response to this 
question did not purport to describe the President's contemporaneous 
thinking at the deposition, but rather only in retrospect whether he 
agreed with the questioner that it was ``an utterly false statement.'' 
Id. The President later emphasized that he ``wasn't trying to give . . 
. a cute answer'' in his earlier explanation, but rather only that the 
average person thinking in the present tense would likely consider that 
Mr. Bennett's statement was accurate since the relationship had ended 
long ago. App. at 513.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The futility of such an exercise is manifest. It is especially 
unsettling when set against the President's adamant denials that he 
harbored any contemporaneous or meaningful realization of his 
attorney's colloquy with the Judge. The theory is factually flimsy, 
legally unfounded, and should be rejected.
6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false 
        and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
        Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    There is no dispute that the President met with his secretary, Ms. 
Currie, on the day after his Jones deposition and discussed questions 
he had been asked about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers cast this 
conversation in the most sinister light possible and alleges that the 
President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness'' by 
pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of facts 
about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers claim that ``the President essentially 
admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true.'' 
House Br. at 47. That is totally false. The President admitted nothing 
of the sort and the Managers cite nothing in support. The President has 
adamantly denied that he had any intention to influence Ms. Currie's 
recollection of events or her testimony in any manner. The absence of 
any such intention is further fortified by the undisputed factual 
record establishing that to the President's knowledge, Ms. Currie was 
neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones litigation at 
the time of the conversation. And critically, Ms. Currie testified 
that, during the conversation, she did not perceive any pressure 
``whatsoever'' to agree with any statement made by the President.
    The President's actions could not as a matter of law support this 
allegation. To obstruct a proceeding or tamper with a witness, there 
must be both a known proceeding and a known witness. In the proceeding 
that the President certainly knew about--the Jones case--Ms. Currie was 
neither an actual nor prospective witness. As for the only proceeding 
in which Ms. Currie ultimately became a witness--the OIC 
investigation--no one asserts the President could have known it existed 
at that time.
    At the time of the January 18 conversation.\109\ Ms. Currie was not 
a witness in the Jones case, as even Mr. Starr acknowledged: ``The 
evidence is not that she was on the witness list, and we have never 
said that she was.'' Transcript of November 19, 1998 Testimony at 192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Ms. Currie remembers a second conversation similar in 
substance a few days after the January 18 discussion, but still in 
advance of the public disclosure of this matter on January 21, 1998. 
Supp. at 561 (Currie GJ 1/27/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor was there any reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play any role 
in the Jones case. The discovery period was, at the time of this 
conversation, in its final days, and a deposition of Ms. Currie 
scheduled and completed within that deadline would have been highly 
unlikely.
    Just as the President could not have intended to influence the 
testimony of ``witness'' Betty Currie because she was neither an actual 
nor a prospective witness, so too is it equally clear that the 
President never pressured Ms. Currie to alter her recollection. Such 
lack of real or perceived pressure also fatally undercuts this charge. 
Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into saying 
she was pressured to agree with the President's statements, Ms. Currie 
adamantly denied any such pressure. As she testified:

    Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the 
President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel 
pressured when he told you those statements?
    A: None whatsoever.
    Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
          * * * * * * *
    Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because he 
would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', with a question.
    A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say ``Right'' and I could have said. ``Wrong.''
    Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true?
    A: Correct.
    Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    A: None.

Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). Ms. Currie explained that she felt no 
pressure because she basically agreed with the President's statements:

    Q: You testified with respect to the statements as the President 
made them, and, in particular, the four statements that we've already 
discussed. You felt at the time that they were technically accurate? Is 
that a fair assessment of your testimony?
    A: That's a fair assessment.
    Q: But you suggested that at the time. Have you changed your 
opinion about it in retrospect?
    A: I have not changed my opinion, no.

Supp. at 667 (Currie GJ 7/22/98); see also Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 
1/24/98) (``Currie advised that she responded ``right'' to each of the 
statements because as far as she knew, the statements were basically 
right.''); Supp. at 665 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (``I said `Right' to him 
because I thought they were correct, `Right, you were never really 
alone with Monica, right' '').
    What, then, to make of this conversation if there was no effort to 
influence Ms. Currie's testimony? Well, to understand fully the 
dynamic, one must remove the memory of all that has transpired since 
January 21 and place oneself in the President's position after the 
Jones deposition. The President had just faced unexpectedly detailed 
questions about Ms. Lewinsky. The questions addressed, at times, minute 
details and at other times contained bizarre inaccuracies about the 
relationship. As the President candidly admitted in his grand jury 
testimony, he had long thought the day would come when his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky would become public:

    ``I formed an opinion early in 1996, once I got into this 
unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when it stopped, which I knew I'd 
have to do and which I should have done long before I did, that she 
would talk about it. Not because Monica Lewinsky is a bad person. She's 
basically a good girl. She's a good young woman with a good heart and a 
good mind. . . . But I knew that the minute there was no longer any 
contact, she would talk about this. She would have to. She couldn't 
help it. It was, it was part of her psyche.''

App. at 575-76 (emphasis added). Now, with the questioning about Ms. 
Lewinsky in the Jones case and the publication of the first internet 
report article about Ms. Lewinsky, the President knew that a media 
storm was about to erupt. And erupt it did.
    So it was hardly surprising that the President reached out to Ms. 
Currie at this time. He was trying to gather all available information 
and assess the political and personal consequences that this revelation 
would soon have. Though he did not confide fully in Ms. Currie, he knew 
Ms. Currie was Ms. Lewinsky's main contact and thus could have 
additional relevant information to help him assess and respond to the 
impending media scrutiny. As the President testified:

    ``I do not remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie or 
when. I don't. I can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I 
first heard about this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the 
facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was. I remember 
that I was highly agitated, understandably, I think.''

App. at 593. And further, ``[W]hat I was trying to determine was 
whether my recollection was right and that she was always in the office 
complex when Monica was there. . . . I thought what would happen is 
that it would break in the press, and I was trying to get the facts 
down.'' App. at 507-08 (emphasis added). As the President concluded: 
``I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something that was 
untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I 
could.'' App. at 508.
    Ms. Currie's grand jury testimony confirms the President's 
``agitated'' state of mind and information-gathering purpose for the 
discussion. She testified that the President appeared, in her words, to 
be ``shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just 
talking.'' Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). She described the 
President's remarks as ``both statements and questions at the same 
time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98).
    Finally, the inference that the President intended to influence Ms. 
Currie's testimony before she ever became a witness is firmly undercut 
by the advice the President gave to her when she ultimately did become 
a witness in the OIC investigation:

    ``And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to testify 
to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she had been through 
this loss of her sister, this horrible accident Christmas that killed 
her brother, and her mother was in the hospital. I was trying to do--to 
make her understand that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the 
grand jury. And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine, 
just go in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I 
remember.''

App. at 593; see also App. at 508 (``I think Ms. Currie would also 
testify that I explicitly told her, once I realized you were involved 
in the Jones case--you, the Office of Independent Counsel--and that she 
might have to be called as a witness, that she should just go in there 
and tell the truth, tell what she knew, and be perfectly 
truthful.'').\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Only groundless speculation and unfounded inferences support 
the Committee Report's mirror allegation of Article I (4) that the 
President lied to the grand jury when he described his motivation in 
discussing these matters with Ms. Currie. That allegation should be 
rejected for the same reasons discussed more fully in the text of this 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the 
President--the only two participants in this conversation--supports the 
inference that the conversation had an insidious purpose. The 
undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor 
contemplated witness in the Jones case. And when Ms. Currie did 
ultimately become a witness in the Starr investigation, the President 
told her to tell the truth, which she did.
7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
        allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    This final allegation of Article II should be rejected out of hand. 
The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff, and the 
Nation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he has expressed 
his profound regret for such conduct. But this Article asserts that the 
President should be impeached and removed from office because he failed 
to be candid with his friends and aides about the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. These allegedly impeachable denials 
took place in the immediate aftermath of the Lewinsky publicity--at the 
very time the President was denying any improper relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky in nearly identical terms on national television. Having made 
this announcement to the whole country on television, it is simply 
absurd to believe that he was somehow attempting corruptly to influence 
the testimony of aides when he told them virtually the same thing at 
the same time.\111\ Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the 
President spoke with these individuals regarding the allegations 
because of the longstanding professional and personal relationships he 
shared with them and the corresponding responsibility he felt to 
address their concerns once the allegations were aired. The Managers 
point to no evidence--for there is none--that the President spoke to 
these individuals for any other reason, and certainly not that he spoke 
with them intending to obstruct any proceeding.\112\ They simply assert 
that since he knew there was an investigation, his intent had to be 
that they relate his remarks to the investigators and grand jurors. 
House Br. at 80.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ As the Supreme Court has held, to constitute obstruction of 
justice such actions must be taken `'with an intent to influence 
judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' United States v. Aguilar, 515 
U.S. 592, 599 (1995).
    \112\ The Committee Reports's allegation under Article I (4) that 
the President committed perjury before the grand jury when, in the 
course of admitting that he misled his close aides, he stated that he 
endeavored to say to his aides ``things that were true,'' App. at 557-
60, without disclosing the full nature of the relationship is simply 
bizarre.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, there is no allegation that the President attempted to 
influence these aides' testimony about their own personal knowledge or 
observations. Nor is there any evidence that the President knew any of 
these aides would ultimately be witnesses in the grand jury when he 
spoke with them. None was under subpoena at the time the denials took 
place and none had any independent knowledge of any sexual activity 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, the only evidence these 
witnesses could offer on this score was the hearsay repetition of the 
same public denials that the members of the grand jury likely heard on 
their home television sets. Under the strained theory of this article, 
every person who heard the President's public denial could have been 
called to the grand jury to create still additional obstructions of 
justice.
    To bolster this otherwise unsupportable charge, the Managers point 
to an excerpt of the President's testimony wherein he acknowledged 
that, to the extent he shared with anyone any details of the facts of 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, they could conceivably be called 
before the grand jury--which for the sake of his friends the President 
wanted to avoid:

    ``I think I was quite careful what I said after [January 21]. I may 
have said something to all of these people to that effect [denying an 
improper relationship], but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any 
details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you 
into a witness or give you information that could get you in trouble. I 
just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about 
this.''

App. at 647. The point was not that the President believed these people 
would be witnesses and so decided to mislead them, but rather that he 
decided to provide as little information as possible (consistent with 
his perceived obligation to address their legitimate concerns) in order 
to keep them from becoming witnesses solely because of what he told 
them.
    In conclusion, this Article fails as a matter of law and as a 
matter of common sense. It should be soundly rejected.

      VI. The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a 
                      Constitutionally Sound Vote

    The Constitution prescribes a strict and exacting standard for the 
removal of a popularly elected President. Because each of the two 
articles charges multiple unspecified wrongs, each is 
unconstitutionally flawed in two independent respects.
    First, by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of 
Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members. Since Senate Rules require that an entire 
article be voted as a unit, sixty-seven Senators could conceivably vote 
to convict while in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong 
committed--for example, they could completely disagree on what 
statement they believe is false--in direct violation of the 
Constitutional requirements of ``Concurrence'' and due process.
    Second, by charging perjury without identifying a single allegedly 
perjurious statement, and charging obstruction of justice without 
identifying a single allegedly obstructive action by the President, the 
House of Representatives has failed to inform the Senate either of the 
statements it agreed were perjurious (if it agreed), or of the actual 
conduct by the President that it agreed constituted obstruction of 
justice (again, if it agreed). The result is that the President does 
not have the most basic notice of the charges against him required by 
due process and fundamental fairness. He is not in a position to defend 
against anything other than a moving target. The guesswork involved 
even in identifying the charges to be addressed in this Trial 
Memorandum highlights just how flawed the articles are.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ The House Managers cannot constitutionally unbundle the 
charges in the articles or provide the missing specifics. This is 
because the Constitution provides that only the House of 
Representatives can amend articles of impeachment, and judicial 
precedent demonstrates that unduly vague indictments cannot be cured by 
a prosecutor providing a bill of particulars. Only the charging body--
here, the House--can particularize an impermissibly vague charge.
    Indeed, Senate precedent confirms that the entire House must grant 
particulars when articles of impeachment are not sufficiently specific 
for a fair trial. During the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge Harold 
Louderback, counsel for the Judge filed a motion to make the original 
Article V, the omnibus or ``catchall'' article, more definite. 77 Cong 
Rec. 1852, 1854 (1933). The House Managers unanimously consented to the 
motion, which they considered to be akin to a motion for a bill of 
particulars, and the full House amended Article V to provide the 
requested specifics. Id. Thereafter, the Clerk of the House informed 
the Senate that the House had adopted an amendment to Article V. Id. 
Judge Louderback was then tried on the amended article. Judge 
Louderback was subsequently acquitted on all five articles. Impeachment 
of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report by Staff of 
the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., Appendix B at 55 (Feb. 1974).
    The power to define and approve articles of impeachment is vested 
by the Constitution exclusively in the House of Representatives. U.S. 
Const. Art I, Sec. 2, cl. 5. It follows that any alteration of an 
Article of Impeachment can be performed only by the House. The House 
cannot delegate (and has not delegated) to the Managers the authority 
to amend or alter the Articles, and Senate precedent demonstrates that 
only the House (not the Managers unilaterally) can effect an amendment 
to articles of impeachment.
    Case law is consistent with this precedent. When indictments are 
unconstitutionally vague, they cannot be cured by a prosecutor's 
provision of a bill of particulars, because only the charging body can 
elaborate upon vague charges. As the Supreme Court noted in Russell v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 749, 771 (1962):
    ``It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in these 
cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. But it is a 
settled rule that a bill of particular cannot save an invalid 
indictment . . . To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a 
subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the 
time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a 
basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury 
was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the 
basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the 
grand jury which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected 
by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be 
amended except by resubmission to the grand jury. . . .''
    See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214, 216 (1960) 
quoting Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (``If it lies within the 
province of a court to charging part to an indictment to suit its own 
notions of what it ought to have been or what they grand jury would 
probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested 
changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an 
indictment by a grand jury . . . may be frittered away until its value 
is almost destroyed.'').
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    The result is a pair of articles whose structure does not permit a 
constitutionally sound vote to convict. If they were counts in an 
indictment, these articles would not survive a motion to dismiss. Under 
the unique circumstances of an impeachment trial, they should fail:
  a. the articles are both unfairly complex and lacking in specificity
    A cursory review of the articles demonstrates that they each allege 
multiple and unspecified acts of wrongdoing.
1. The Structure of Article I
    Article I accuses the President of numerous different wrongful 
actions. The introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) 
violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and 
defend the Constitution; (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed; (iii) willfully corrupting 
and manipulating the judicial process; and (iv) impeding the 
administration of justice.
    The second paragraph charges the President with (a) perjurious, (b) 
false, and (c) misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one 
or more'' of four different subject areas:
    (1) the nature and details of this relationship with a subordinate 
government employee;
    (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him;
    (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney 
to make to a federal judge in that action;
    (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and 
to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    The third paragraph alleges that, as a consequence of the 
foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States:
     undermined the integrity of his office;
     brought disrepute on the Presidency;
     betrayed his trust as President; and
     acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and 
justice.
    It is imperative to note that although Article I alleges 
``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony concerning ``one or 
more'' of four general subject areas, it does not identify the 
particular sworn statements by the President that were allegedly 
``perjurious,'' (and therefore potentially illegal), or ``false'' or 
``misleading'' (and therefore not unlawful). In fact, contrary to the 
most basic rules of fairness and due process, Article I does not 
identify a single specific statement that is at issue.
    In sum, Article I appears to charge the President with four general 
forms of wrongdoing (violations of two oaths, manipulation of legal 
process, impeding justice), involving three (perjurious, false, 
misleading) distinct types of statements, concerning different subjects 
(relationship to Ms. Lewinsky, prior deposition testimony, prior 
statements of his attorney, obstruction of justice),\114\ resulting in 
four species of harms either to the Presidency (undermining its 
integrity, bringing it into disrepute) or to the people (acting in a 
manner subversive of the rule of law and to the manifest injury of the 
people). And it alleges all of this without identifying a single, 
specific perjurious, false or misleading statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ It appears that each of these topic areas includes various, 
unspecified allegedly perjurious, false and misleading statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Absent a clear statement of which statements are alleged to have 
been perjurious, and which specific acts are alleged to have been 
undertaken with the purpose of obstructing the administration of 
justice, it is impossible to prepare a defense. It is a fundamental 
tenet of our jurisprudence that an accused must be afforded notice of 
the specific charges against which he must defend. Neither the Referral 
of the Office of the Independent Counsel, nor the Committee Report of 
the Judiciary Committee, nor the House Managers' Trial Memorandum was 
adopted by the House, and none of them can provide the necessary 
particulars. It is impossible to know whether the different statements 
and acts charged in the Referral, or the Report, or the Trial 
Memorandum, or all, or none, are what the House had in mind when it 
passed the Articles.
2. The Structure of Article II
    Article II accuses the President of a variety of wrongful acts. The 
introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) violating his 
constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and defend the 
Constitution and (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed by (iii) preventing, obstructing 
and impeding the administration of justice by engaging (personally and 
through subordinates and agents) in a scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action.
    The second paragraph specifies the various ways in which the 
violations in the first paragraph are said to have occurred. It states 
that the harm was effectuated by ``means'' that are not expressly 
defined or delimited, but rather are said to include ``one or more'' of 
seven ``acts'' attributed to the President:
    (1) corruptly encouraging a witness to execute a perjurious, false 
and misleading affidavit;
    (2) corruptly encouraging a witness to give perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony if called to testify;
    (3) corruptly engaging in, encouraging or supporting a scheme to 
conceal evidence;
    (4) intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
testimony of that witness at a time when that witness's truthful 
testimony would have been harmful;
    (5) allowing his attorney to make false and misleading statements 
to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant questioning;
    (6) relating a false and misleading account of events to a 
potential witness in a civil rights action in order to corruptly 
influence the testimony of that person;
    (7) making false and misleading statements to potential witnesses 
in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence 
their testimony and causing the grand jury to receive false and 
misleading information.
    The third paragraph alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, the 
President has, to the manifest injury of the people of the United 
States:
     undermined the integrity of his office;
     brought disrepute on the Presidency;
     betrayed his trust as President; and
     acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and 
justice.
    As with the first article, Article II does not set forth a single 
specific act alleged to have been performed by the President. Instead, 
it alleges general ``encourage[ment]'' to execute a false affidavit, 
provide misleading testimony, and conceal subpoenaed evidence. This 
Article also includes general allegations that the President undertook 
to ``corruptly influence'' and/or ``corruptly prevent'' the testimony 
of potential witnesses and that he ``engaged in . . . or supported'' a 
scheme to conceal evidence. Again, the Senate and the President have 
been left to guess at the charges (if any) actually agreed upon by the 
House.
   b. conviction on these articles would violate the constitutional 
requirement that two-thirds of the senate reach agreement that specific 
                       wrongdoing has been proven
1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of 
        the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
            a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds 
                    Concurrence Requirement
    Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``no person 
shall be convicted [on articles of impeachment] without the Concurrence 
of two thirds of the Members present.'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 
6. The Constitution's requirement is plain. These must be 
``Concurrence,'' which is to say genuine, reliably manifested, 
agreement, among those voting to convict. Both the committing of this 
task to the Senate and the two-thirds requirement are important 
constitutional safeguards reflecting the Framers' intent that 
conviction not come easily. Conviction demands real and objectively 
verifiable agreement among a substantial supermajority.
    Indeed, the two-thirds supermajority requirement is a crucial 
constitutional safeguard. Supermajority provisions are constitutional 
exceptions \115\ to the presumption that decisions by legislative 
bodies shall be made by majority rule.\116\ These exceptions serve 
exceptional ends. The two-thirds concurrence rule serves the 
indispensable purpose of protecting the people who chose the President 
by election. By giving a ``veto'' to a minority of Senators, the 
Framers sought to ensure the rights of an electoral majority--and to 
safeguard the people in their choice of Executive. Only the Senate and 
only the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence could provide that 
assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ See e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2 (two thirds vote 
required to override Presidential veto); U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2, 
cl. 2 (two thirds required for ratification of treaties); U.S. Const. 
Art. V (two thirds required to propose constitutional amendments); U.S. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2 (two thirds required to expel members of 
Congress).
    \116\ Madison referred to majority voting as ``the fundamental 
principal of free government.'' Federalist No. 58 at 248 (G. Wills ed. 
1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Concurrence'' required is agreement that the charges stated 
in specific articles have in fact been proved, and the language of 
those articles is therefore critical. Since the House of 
Representatives is vested with the ``sole Power of Impeachment,'' U.S. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5, the form of those articles cannot be 
altered by the Senate. And Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials (``Senate 
Rules'') provides that ``[a]n article of impeachment shall not be 
divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the 
trial.''
    It follows that each Senator may vote on an article only in its 
totality. By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for 
impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in any ``one or more'' of four topic areas. But 
that prospect creates the very real possibility that ``conviction'' 
could occur even though fewer than two-thirds of the Senators actually 
agree that any particular false statement was made.\117\ Put 
differently, the article's structure presents the possibility that the 
President could be convicted on Article I even though he would have 
been acquitted if separate votes were taken on individual allegedly 
perjurious statements. To illustrate the point, consider that it would 
be possible for conviction to result even with as few as seventeen 
Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because 
seventeen votes for one statement in each of four categories would 
yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict. The problem is even 
worse if Senators agree that there is a single perjurious statement but 
completely disagree as to which statement within the 176 pages of 
transcript they believe is perjurious. Such an outcome would plainly 
violate the Constitution's requirement that there be conviction only 
when a two-thirds majority agrees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ There remains the additional problem that the articles allege 
not specific perjurious statements, but perjury within a topic area. 
Perjury as to a category (rather than as to specific statements) is an 
incomprehensible notion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The very same flaw renders Article II unconstitutional as well. 
That Article alleges a scheme of wrongdoing effected through ``means'' 
including ``one or more'' of seven factually and logically discrete 
``acts.'' That compound structure is fraught with the potential to 
confuse. For example, the Article alleges both concealment of gifts on 
December 28, 1997, and false statements to aides in late January 1998. 
These two allegations involve completely different types of behavior. 
They are alleged to have occurred in different months. They involved 
different persons. And they are alleged to have obstructed justice in 
different legal proceedings. In light of Senate Rule XXIII's 
prohibition on dividing articles, the combination of such patently 
different types of alleged wrongdoing in a single article creates the 
manifest possibility that votes for conviction on this article would 
not reflect any two-third agreement whatsoever.
    The extraordinary problem posed by such compound articles is well-
recognized and was illustrated by the proceedings in the impeachment of 
Judge Walter Nixon. Article III of the Nixon proceedings, like the 
articles here, was phrased in the disjunctive and charged multiple 
false statements as grounds for impeachment. Judge Nixon moved to 
dismiss Article III on a number of grounds, including on the basis of 
its compound structure.\118\ Although that motion was defeated in the 
full Senate by a vote of 34-63,\119\ the 34 Senators who voted to 
dismiss were a sufficient number to block conviction on Article III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ See Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Hearings 
Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
at 257, 281-84 (1989).
    \119\ Judge Nixon Proceedings at 430-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Nixon (although convicted on the first two articles) was 
ultimately acquitted on Article III by a vote of 57 (guilty) to 40 (not 
guilty).\120\ Senator Biden, who voted not guilty on the article, 
stated that the structure of the article made it ``possible . . . for 
Judge Nixon to be convicted under article III even though two-thirds of 
the members present did not agree that he made any one of the false 
statements.'' \121\ Senator Murkowski concurred: ``I don't appreciate 
the omnibus nature of article III, and I agree with the argument that 
the article could easily be used to convict Judge Nixon by less than 
the super majority vote required by the Constitution.'' Id. at 
464.\122\ And Senator Dole stated that ``Article III is redundant, 
complex and unnecessarily confusing. . . . It alleges that Judge Nixon 
committed five different offenses in connection with each of fourteen 
separate events, a total of seventy charges. . . . [I]t was virtually 
impossible for Judge Nixon and his attorney's to prepare an adequate 
defense.'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ Id. at 435-36.
    \121\ Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., id. at 459.
    \122\ See also Statement of Senator Bailey, Impeachment of Judge 
Harold Louderback, 77 Cong. Rec. 4238 (May 26, 1933) (respondent should 
be tried on individual articles and not on all of them assembled into 
one article).
    \123\ Statement of Senator Robert Dole, Judge Nixon Proceedings at 
457.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his written statement filed after the voting was completed, 
Senator Kohl pointed out the dangers posed by combining multiple 
accusations in a single article:

    ``Article III is phrased in the disjunctive. It says that Judge 
Nixon concealed his conversations through `one or more' of 14 false 
statements.
    ``This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all, it 
means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two thirds of the 
Senate does not agree on which of his particular statements were false. 
. . .
    ``The House is telling us that it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on 
Article III even if we have different visions of what he did wrong. But 
that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the American 
people. Let's say we do convict on Article III. The American people--to 
say nothing of history--would never know exactly which of Judge Nixon's 
statements were regarded as untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, 
this ambiguity would prevent us from being totally accountable to the 
voters for our decision.'' \124\

    \124\ Statement of Senator Herbert H. Kohl, id. at 449 (emphasis 
added). Senator Kohl did not believe that the constitutional question 
concerning two-thirds concurrence had to be answered in the Judge Nixon 
proceedings because he believed that the bundling problem created an 
unfairness (in effect, a due process violation) that precluded 
conviction. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, the Senate acquitted Judge Nixon on the omnibus article--very 
possible because of the constitutional and related due process and 
fairness concerns articulated by Senator Kohl and others.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ See also Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment: 
Modern Precedents, Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, 
Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1998) (discussing Sen. 
Kohl's position).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The constitutional problems identified by those Senators are 
significant when a single federal judge (one of roughly 1000) is 
impeached. But when the Chief Executive and sole head of one entire 
branch of our government stands accused, those infirmities are 
momentous. Fairness and the appearance of fairness require that the 
basis for any action this body might take be clear and specific. The 
Constitution clearly forbids conviction unless two thirds of the Senate 
concurs in a judgment. Any such judgment would be meaningless in the 
absence of a finding that specific, identifiable, wrongful conduct has 
in fact occurred. No such conclusion is possible under either article 
as drafted.
            b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process 
                    Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a 
                    Single Accusation
    Even apart from the Constitution's clear requirement of 
``Concurrence'' in Article I, section 3, the fundamental principles of 
fairness and due process that underlie our Constitution and permeate 
our procedural and substantive law compel the same outcome. In 
particular, the requirement that there be genuine agreement by the 
deciding body before an accused is denied life, liberty or property is 
a cornerstone of our jurisprudence.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\ Judicial precedent is persuasive here on these due process 
and fairness questions. Indeed, in prior impeachment trials, the Senate 
has been guided by decisions of the courts, because they reflect 
cumulative wisdom concerning fairness and the search for justice. 
During the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Senator 
Specter stated:
    ``[T]he impeachment process relies in significant measure on 
decisions of the court and the opinion of judges . . . [T]he decisions 
and interpretations of the courts should be highly instructive to us. 
In our system of Government, it has been the courts that through the 
years have been called upon to construe, define and apply the 
provisions of our Constitution. Their decisions reflect our values and 
our evolving notions of justice . . . Although we are a branch of 
Government coequal with the judiciary, and by the Constitution vested 
with the `sole' power to try impeachments, I believe that the words and 
reasoning of judges who have struggled with the meaning and application 
of the Constitution and its provisions ought to be given great heed 
because that jurisprudence embodies the values of fairness and justice 
that ought to be the polestar of our own determinations.'' (S. Doc. 
101-18, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 740-41.)
    (As Senator Specter observed, judicial rules have been developed 
and refined over the years to assure that court proceedings are fair, 
and that an accused is assured the necessary tools to prepare a proper 
defense, including proper notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While in the federal criminal context due process requires that 
there be genuine agreement among the entire jury, see United States v. 
Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir. 1998), Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 
624 (1991) (plurality), in the impeachment context, that requirement of 
genuine agreement must be expressed by a two-thirds supermajority. But 
the underlying due process principles is the same in both settings. 
This basic principle is bottomed on two fundamental notions: (1) that 
there be genuine agreement--mutuality of understanding--among those 
voting to convict, and (2) that the unanimous verdict be understood (by 
the accused and by the public) to have been the product of genuine 
agreement.
    This principle is given shape in the criminal law in the well-
recognized prohibition on ``duplicitous'' charges. ``Duplicity is the 
joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate 
offenses.'' United States v. UCO Oil, 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 
1976.) In the law of criminal pleading, a single count that charges two 
or more separate offenses is duplicitous. See United States v. Parker, 
991 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hawkes, 753 
F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985).\127\ A duplicitous charge in an 
indictment violates the due process principle that ``the requisite 
specificity of the charge may not be compromised by the joining of 
separate offenses.'' Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) 
(plurality).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a): 
``Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or 
information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses 
charged . . . are of the same or similar charter or are based on the 
same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'' 
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More specifically, a duplicitous charge poses the acute danger of 
conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury; some jurors may find the 
defendant guilty of one charge but not guilty of a second, while other 
jurors find him guilty of a second charge but not the first. See United 
States v. Saleh, 875 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1979); Bins v. United States, 331 
F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).\128\ Our federal system of justice 
simply does not permit conviction by less than unanimous agreement 
concerning a single, identified charge. See United States v. Fawley, 
137 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (conviction requires unanimous agreement 
as to particular statements); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 
929 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversal required where no instruction was given 
to ensure that all jurors concur in conclusion that at least one 
particular statement was false); see also United States v. Gipson, 553 
F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to unanimous verdict violated 
by instruction authorizing conviction if jury found defendant committed 
any one of six acts proscribed by statute).\129\ The protection against 
conviction by less than full agreement by the factfinders is enshrined 
in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which dictates 
that ``[t]he verdict shall be unanimous.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Each of the four categories charged here actually comprises 
multiple allegedly perjurious statements. Thus, the dangers of 
duplicitousness are increased exponentially.
    \129\ The Supreme Court has stated that ``[u]nanimity in jury 
verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.'' 
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (same).
    \130\ That rule gives expression to a criminal defendant's due 
process right to a unanimous verdict. See United States v. Fawley, 137 
F.2d 458, 4771 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the Constitution does not 
tolerate the risk of a less than unanimous verdict in the criminal 
setting, ``where the complexity of a case or other factors create the 
potential for confusion as to the
legal theory or factual basis which sustains a defendant's conviction, 
a specific unanimity instruction is required.'' United States v. 
Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Beros, 
833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). Such instructions are required where 
the government charges several criminal acts, any of which alone could 
have supported the offense charged, because of the need to provide 
sufficient guidance to assure that all members of the jury were 
unanimous on the same act or acts of illegality. Id. at 88. As the 
Seventh Circuit recently concluded in a case alleging multiple false 
statements, ``the jury should have been advised that in order to have 
convicted [the defendant], they had to unanimously agree that a 
particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made.'' 
Fawley, 137 F.2d at 470.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, where the charging instrument alleges multiple types of 
wrongdoing, the unanimity requirement ``means more than a conclusory 
agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question; 
there is a requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal 
factual elements underlying a specified offense.'' United States v. 
Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, although there need not be unanimity as to every bit of 
underlying evidence, due process ``does require unanimous agreement as 
to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply that a violation 
has occurred.'' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Such agreement is necessary to fulfill the 
demands of fairness and rationality that inform the requirement of due 
process. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 637.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ In our federal criminal process, a duplicitous pleading 
problem may sometimes be cured by instructions to the jury requiring 
unanimous agreement on a single statement, see Fawley, supra, but that 
option is not present here. Not only do the Senate Rules not provide 
for the equivalent of jury instructions, they expressly rule out the 
prospect of subdividing an article of impeachment for purposes of 
voting. See Senate Impeachment Rule XXIII. Nor is the duplicitousness 
problem presented here cured by any specific enumeration of elements 
necessary to be found by the factfinder. See, e.g., Santarpio v. United 
States, 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977) (duplicitous charge harmless 
because indictments adequately set out the elements of the federal 
crime; appellants were not misled or prejudiced). Article I does not 
enumerate specific elements to be found by the factfinder. To the 
contrary, the Article combines multiple types of wrong, allegedly 
performed by different types of statements, the different types 
occurring in multiple subject matter areas, and all having a range of 
allegedly harmful effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Where multiple accusations are combined in a single charge, neither 
the accused nor the factfinder can know precisely what that charge 
means. When the factfinder body cannot agree upon the meaning of the 
charge, it cannot reach genuine agreement that conviction is warranted. 
These structural deficiencies preclude a constitutionally sound vote on 
the articles.
 c. conviction on these articles would violate due process protections 
             prohibiting vague and nonspecific accusations
1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
    Impermissibly vague indictments must be dismissed, because they 
``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what he must be 
prepared to meet.' '' United States v. Russell, 369 U.S. 749, 764 
(1962) (internal quotation omitted). In Russell, the indictment at 
issue failed to specify the subject matter about which the defendant 
had allegedly refused to answer questions before a Congressional 
subcommittee. Instead, the indictment stated only that the questions to 
which the answers were refused ``were pertinent to the question then 
under inquiry'' by the Subcommittee. Id. at 752. The Court held that 
because the indictment did not provide sufficient specificity, it was 
unduly vague and therefore had to be dismissed. Id. at 773. The Supreme 
Court explained that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy for an 
unduly vague indictment, because only the charging body can elaborate 
upon vague charges:

    ``To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess 
as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned 
the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which 
the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to 
secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts 
not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grant jury which 
indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by the settled 
rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except 
by resubmission to the grand jury . . .''

Id. at 771. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216 
(1960); see also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 
1954) (perjury count too vague to be valid cannot be cured even by bill 
of particulars); United States v. Tonelli, 557 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 
1978) (vacating perjury conviction where ``the indictment . . . did not 
`set forth the precise falsehood[s] alleged' '').
    Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited Articles present 
paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely to enable the 
accused to meet the accusations fairly. More than a century ago, the 
Supreme Court stated that ``[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal 
pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at 
common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient 
that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms 
as in the definition; but it must state the species--it must descend to 
particulars.'' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). 
The Court has more recently emphasized the fundamental ``vice'' of 
nonspecific indictments: that they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the 
defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' Russell, 369 U.S. 
at 764.
    The Supreme Court emphasized in Russell that specificity is 
important not only for the defendant, who needs particulars to prepare 
a defense, but also for the decision-maker, ``so it may decide whether 
[the facts] are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one 
should be had.'' Id. at 768 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). An unspecific indictment creates a ``moving target'' for the 
defendant exposing the defendant to a risk of surprise through a change 
in the prosecutor's theory. ``It enables his conviction to rest on one 
point and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives 
the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by 
surmise and conjecture.'' Russell, 369 U.S. at 766. Ultimately, an 
unspecific indictment creates a risk that ``a defendant could . . . be 
convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even 
presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.'' Id. at 770.
2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
    Article I alleges that in his August 17, 1998 grand jury testimony, 
President Clinton provided ``perjurious, false and misleading'' 
testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four subject 
areas. Article I does not, however, set forth a single specific 
statement by the President upon which its various allegations are 
predicated. The Article haphazardly intermingles alleged criminal 
conduct with totally lawful conduct, and its abstract generalizations 
provide no guidance as to actual alleged perjurious statements.
    Article I thus violates the most fundamental requirement of perjury 
indictments. It is fatally vague in three distinct respects: (1) it 
does not identify any statements that form the basis of its 
allegations,\132\ (2) it therefore does not specify which of the 
President's statements to the grand jury were allegedly ``perjurious,'' 
which were allegedly ``false,'' and which were allegedly 
``misleading,'' and (3) it does not even specify the subject matter of 
any alleged perjurious statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ One of the cardinal rules of perjury cases is that ``[a] 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623 may not stand where the indictment 
fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis 
of its falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine 
its verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality 
of those falsehoods.'' United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d 
Cir. 1977). Courts have vacated convictions for perjury in instances 
where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the precise 
falsehood(s) alleged.'' Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first defect is fatal, because it is axiomatic that if the 
precise perjurious statements are not identified in the indictment, a 
defendant cannot possibly prepare his defense properly. See, e.g., 
Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977). Indeed, in past impeachment 
trials in the Senate where articles of impeachment alleged the making 
of false statements, the false statements were specified in the 
Articles. For example, in the impeachment trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 
Articles of Impeachment II-XIV specified the exact statements that 
formed the basis of the false statement allegations against Judge 
Hastings.\133\ Similarly, in the impeachment trial of Walter L. Nixon, 
Jr., Articles of Impeachment I-III specified the exact statements that 
formed the basis of their false statement allegations.\134\ In this 
case, Article I falls far short of specificity standards provided in 
previous impeachment trials in the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 at 4-7 
(1989). See, e.g., Id. at 2 (Article II alleging that the false 
statement was ``that Judge Hastings and Wiliam Borders, of Washington, 
D.C., never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in 
United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings'').
    \134\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 
at 430-32 (1989). See, e.g., Id., at 432 (Article I alleging that the 
false statement was ``Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes 
never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As to the second vagueness defect, there is a significant legal 
difference between, on the one hand, statements under oath which are 
``perjurious,'' and those, on the other hand, which are simply 
``false'' or misleading.'' Only the former could form the basis of a 
criminal charge. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that 
``misleading'' statements alone cannot form the basis of a prejury 
charge. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court 
held that literally true statements are by definition non-perjurious, 
and ``it is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the 
defendant] intended to mislead his examiner,'' since ``[a] jury should 
not be permitted to enage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer. 
. . was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.'' Id. at 358-60 
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized that ``the perjury statute is 
not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a 
wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner so long as the 
witness speakes the literal truth.'' Id. Thus, specification of the 
exact statements alleged to be prejurious is required, because ``to 
hold otherwise would permit the trial jury to inject its inferences 
into the grand jury's indictment, and would allow defendants to be 
convicted for immaterial falsehoods or for `intent to mislead' or 
`perjury by implication,' which Bronston specifically prohibited.'' 
Slawik, 538 F.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added). Thus, if the House meant 
that certain statements were misleading but literally truthful, they 
might be subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense 
was not impeachable.
    The same is true for allegedly ``false'' answers, because it is 
clear that mere ``false'' answers given under oath, without more, are 
not criminal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the statute proscribing perjury 
before a federal grand jury, requires additional elements beyond 
falsity, including the defendant's specific intent to testify falsely 
and the statement's materiality to the proceeding. A defense to a 
perjury charge is therefore tied directly to the specific statement 
alleged to have been perjurious. Did the defendant know the particular 
answer was false? Was it material? \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Not surprisingly, courts have specifically held that because 
of these additional elements (the lack of which may undermine a perjury 
prosecution), a defendant must know exactly which statements are 
alleged to form the basis of a perjury indictment to test whether the 
requisite elements are present. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 
215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (``The accused is entitled under the 
Constitution to be advised as to every element in respect to which it 
is necessary for him to prepare a defense''). For example, because of 
the intent requirement, one potential defense to a perjury prosecution 
is that the question to which the allegedly perjurious statement was 
addressed was fundamentally ambiguous, as courts have held that 
fundamentally ambiguous questions cannot as a matter of law produce 
perjurious answers. See, e.g., Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 199; United States 
v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967). A separate defense to a perjury 
prosecution is that the statement alleged to have been perjurious was 
not material to the proceeding. Thus, ``false'' statements alone are 
not perjurious if they were not material to the proceeding. By not 
specifying which statements are alleged to be ``false'' or 
``misleading,'' Article I precludes the President from preparing a 
materiality defense, and it also fails to distinguish allegedly 
criminal conduct from purely lawful conduct. As one court explained,
    ``It is to be observed that * * * it is not sufficient to 
constitute the offense that the oath shall be merely false, but that it 
must be false in some `material matter.' Applying that definition to 
the facts stated in either count of this indictment, and it would seem 
that there is an entire lack in any essential sense to disclose that 
the particulars as to which the oath is alleged to have been false were 
material in the essential sense required for purposes of an indictment 
for this offense.'' (United States v. Cameron, 282 F. 684, 692 (D. 
Ariz. 1922).).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article I's third vagueness defect is that it does not specify the 
subject matter of the alleged perjurious statements. Instead, it simply 
alleges that the unspecified statements by the President to the grand 
jury were concerning ``one or more'' of four enumerated areas. The 
``one or more'' language underscores the reality that the President--
and, critically, the Senate--cannot possibly know what the House 
majority had in mind, since it may have failed even to agree on the 
subject matter of the alleged perjury. The paramount importance of this 
issue may be seen by reference to court decisions holding that a jury 
has to ``unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the 
indictment was falsely made.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 
471 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also discussion of unanimity 
requirement in Section VI.B, supra.
    Article II is also unconstitutionally vague. It alleges that the 
President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice * * * 
in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up 
and conceal'' unspecified evidence and testimony in the Jones case. It 
sets forth seven instances in which the President allegedly 
``encouraged'' false testimony or the concealment of evidence, or 
``corruptly influenced'' or ``corruptly prevented'' various other 
testimony, also unspecified. In fact, not only does Article II fail to 
identify a single specific act performed by the President in this 
alleged scheme to obstruct justice, it does not even identify the 
``potential witnesses'' whose testimony the President allegedly sought 
to ``corruptly influence.''
    The President cannot properly defend against Article II without 
knowing, at a minimum, which specific acts of obstruction and/or 
concealment he is alleged to have performed, and which ``potential 
witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to influence. For example, 
it is clear that, in order to violate the federal omnibus obstruction 
of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, an accuser must prove that 
there was a pending judicial proceeding, that the defendant knew of the 
proceeding, and that the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the 
specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due 
administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 
1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 729 F. Supp. 1380, 
1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990). Without knowing which ``potential witnesses'' he 
is alleged to have attempted to influence, and the precise manner in 
which he is alleged to have attempted to obstruct justice, the 
President cannot prepare a defense that would address the elements of 
the offense with which he has been charged--that he had no intent to 
obstruct, that there was no pending proceeding, or that the person 
involved was not a potential witness.
    It follows that the requisite vote of two-thirds of the Senate 
required by the Constitution cannot possibly be obtained if there are 
no specific statements whatsoever alleged to be perjurious, false or 
misleading in Article I or no specific acts of obstruction alleged in 
Article II. Different Senators might decide that different statements 
or different acts were unlawful without any concurrence by two-thirds 
of the Senate as to any particular statement or act. Such a scenario is 
antithetical to the Constitution's due process guarantee of notice of 
specific and definite charges and it threatens conviction upon vague 
and uncertain grounds. As currently framed, neither Article I nor 
Article II provides a sufficient basis for the President to prepare a 
defense to the unspecified charges upon which the Senate may vote, or 
an adequate basis for actual adjudication.
  d. the senate's judgment will be final and that judgment must speak 
                        clearly and intelligibly
    An American impeachment trial is not a parliamentary inquiry into 
fitness for office. It is not a vote of no confidence. It is not a 
mechanism whereby a legislative majority may oust a President from a 
rival party on political grounds. To the contrary, because the 
President has a limited term of office and can be turned out in the 
course of ordinary electoral processes, a Presidential impeachment 
trial is a constitutional measure of last resort designed to protect 
the Republic.
    This Senate is therefore vested with an extremely grave 
Constitutional task: a decision whether to remove the President for the 
protection of the people themselves. In the Senate's hands there rests 
not only the fate of one man, but the integrity of our Constitution and 
our democratic process.
    Fidelity to the Constitution and fidelity to the electorate must 
converge in the impeachment trial vote. If the Senate is to give 
meaning to the Constitution's command, any vote on removal must be a 
vote on one or more specifically and separately identified ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as set forth in properly drafted impeachment 
articles approved by the House. If the people are to have their twice-
elected President removed by an act of the Senate, that act must be 
intelligible. It must be explainable and justifiable to the people who 
first chose the President and then chose him again. The Senate must 
ensure that it has satisfied the Constitution's requirement of a 
genuine two-thirds concurrence that specific, identified wrongdoing has 
been proven. The Senate must also assure the people, through the sole 
collective act the Senate is required to take, that its decision has a 
readily discernible and unequivocal meaning.
    As matters stand, the Senate will vote on two highly complex 
Articles of Impeachment. Its vote will not be shaped by narrowing 
instructions. Its rules preclude a vote on divisible parts of the 
articles. There will be no judicial review, no correction of error, and 
no possibility of retrial. The Senate's decision will be as conclusive 
as any known to our law--judicially, politically, historically, and 
most literally, irrevocable.
    Under such circumstances, the Senate's judgment must speak clearly 
and intelligibly. That cannot happen if the Senate votes for conviction 
on these articles. Their compound structure and lack of specificity 
make genuine agreement as to specific wrongs impossible, and those 
factors completely prevent the electorate from understanding why the 
Senate as a whole voted as it did. As formulated, these articles 
satisfy neither the plain requirement of the Constitution nor the 
rightful expectations of the American people. The articles cannot 
support a constitutionally sound vote for conviction.

                      VII. The Need for Discovery

    The Senate need not address the issue of discovery at this time, 
but because the issue may arise at a later date, it is appropriate to 
remark here on its present status. Senate Resolution 16 provides that 
the record for purposes of the presentation by the House Managers and 
the President is the public record established in the House of 
Representatives.\136\ Since this record was created by the House itself 
and is ostensibly the basis for the House's impeachment vote, and 
because this evidence has been publicly identified and available for 
scrutiny, comment, and rebuttal, it is both logical and fair that this 
be the basis for any action by the Senate. Moreover, Senate Resolution 
16 explicitly prohibits the President and the House Managers from 
filing at this time any ``motions to subpoena witnesses or to present 
any evidence not in the record.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ S. Res. 16 defined the record for the presentations as 
``those publicly available materials that have been submitted to or 
produced by the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of 
public hearings or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of 
Representatives or House Judiciary Committee pursuant to House 
Resolutions 525 and 581.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the event, however, that the Senate should later decide, 
pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, to allow the House 
Managers to expand the record in some way, our position should be 
absolutely clear. At such time, the President would have an urgent need 
for the discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these 
proceedings has he been able to subpoena documents or summon and cross-
examine witnesses. He would need to use the compulsory process 
authorized by Senate Impeachment Rules V and VI\137\ to obtain 
documentary evidence and witness depositions. While the President has 
access to some of the grand jury transcripts and FBI interview 
memoranda of witnesses called by the OIC, the President's own lawyers 
were not entitled to be present when these witnesses were examined. The 
grand jury has historically been the engine of the prosecution, and it 
was used in that fashion in this case. The OIC sought discovery of 
evidence with the single goal of documenting facts that it believed 
were prejudicial to the President. It did not examine witnesses with a 
view toward establishing there was no justification for impeachment; it 
did not follow up obvious leads when they might result in evidence 
helpful to the President; and it did not seek out and document 
exculpatory evidence. It did not undertake to disclose exculpatory 
information it might have identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials (Senate Manual 99-2, as revised by S. Res. 479 (Aug. 
16, 1986)). There is ample precedent for liberal discovery in Senate 
impeachment trials. For example, in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, 
the Senate issued numerous orders addressing a range of pretrial issues 
over several months including:
     requiring the parties to provide witness lists along with 
a description of the general nature of the testimony that was expected 
from each witness months in advance of the scheduled evidentiary 
hearing;
     requiring the House Managers to turn over exculpatory 
materials, certain prior statements of witnesses, and documents and 
other tangible evidence they intended to introduce into evidence;
     requiring the production from the House Managers of other 
documents in the interest of allowing the Senate to develop ``a record 
that fully illuminates the matters that it must consider in rendering a 
judgment;''
     setting a briefing schedule for stipulations of facts and 
documents;
     setting a number of pretrial conferences;
     designating a date for final pretrial statements; and
     permitting a number of pre-trial depositions.
     Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Hearings 
Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. at 
281, 286-87, 342-43, 606-07, 740.
    The need for discovery in this case is in fact greater than in 
prior impeachment proceedings. In all other impeachment trials, there 
were either substantive investigations by the House or prior judicial 
proceedings in which the accused had a full opportunity to develop the 
evidentiary record and cross-examine witnesses. See Id. at 163-64 
(pretrial memorandum of Judge Hastings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor did the House of Representatives afford the President any 
discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be helpful in his 
defense. Indeed, the House called no fact witnesses at all, and at the 
few depositions it conducted, counsel for the President were excluded. 
Moreover, the House made available only a selected portion of the 
evidence it received from the OIC. While it published five volumes of 
the OIC materials (two volumes of appendices and three volumes of 
supplements), it withheld a great amount of evidence, and it denied 
counsel for the President access to this material. It is unclear what 
the criterion was for selecting evidence to include in the published 
volumes, but there does not appear to have been an attempt to include 
all evidence that may have been relevant to the President's defense. 
The President has not had access to a great deal of evidence in the 
possession of (for example) the House of Representatives and the OIC 
which may be exculpatory or relevant to the credibility of witnesses on 
whom the OIC and the House Managers rely.
    Should the Senate decide to authorize the House Managers to call 
witnesses or expand the record, the President would be faced with a 
critical need for the discovery of evidence useful to his defense--
evidence which would routinely be available to any civil litigant 
involved in a garden-variety automobile accident case. The House 
Managers have had in their possession or had access at the OIC to 
significant amounts of non-public evidence, and they have frequently 
stated their intention to make use of such evidence. Obviously, in 
order to defend against such tactics, counsel for the President are 
entitled to discovery and a fair opportunity to test the veracity and 
reliability of this ``evidence,'' using compulsory process as necessary 
to obtain testimony and documents. Trial by surprise obviously has no 
place in the Senate of the United States where the issues in the 
balance is the removal of the one political leader who, with the Vice-
President, is elected by all the citizens of this country.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ In another context, the Supreme Court has observed that ``the 
ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery 
which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information 
from which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility 
of surprise at trial.'' Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The need for discovery does not turn on the number of witnesses the 
House Managers may be authorized to depose.\139\ If the House Managers 
call a single witness, that will initiate a process that leaves the 
President potentially unprepared and unable to defend adequately 
without proper discovery. The sequence of discovery is critical. The 
President first needs to obtain and review relevant documentary 
evidence not now in his possession. He then needs to be able to depose 
potentially helpful witnesses, whose identity may only emerge from the 
documents and from the depositions themselves. Obviously, he also needs 
to depose potential witnesses identified by the House Managers. Only at 
that point will the President be able intelligently to designate his 
own trial witnesses. This is both a logical procedure and one which is 
the product of long experience designed to maximize the search for 
truth and minimize unfair surprise. There is no conceivable reason it 
should not be followed here--if the evidentiary record is opened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ It is not sufficient that counsel for the President have the 
right to depose the witnesses called by the Managers, essential as that 
right is. The testimony of a single witness may have to be refuted 
indirectly, circumstantially, or by a number of witnesses; it is often 
necessary to depose several witnesses in order to identify the one or 
two best.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, it is simply impossible to ascertain how a witness 
designated by the House Managers could fairly be rebutted without a 
full examination of the available evidence. It is also the case that 
many sorts of helpful evidence and testimony emerge in the discovery 
process that may at first blush appear irrelevant or tangential. In any 
event, the normal adversarial process is the best guarantor of the 
truth. The President needs discovery here not simply to obtain evidence 
to present a trial but also in order to make an informed judgment about 
what to introduce in response to the Managers' expanded case. The 
President's counsel must be able to make a properly knowledgeable 
decision about what evidence may be relevant and helpful to the 
President's defense, both in cross-examination and during the 
President's own case.
    The consequences of an impeachment trial are immeasurably grave: 
The removal of a twice-elected President. Particularly given what is at 
stake, fundamental fairness dictates that the President be given at 
least the same right as an ordinary litigant to obtain evidence 
necessary for his defense, particularly when a great deal of that 
evidence is presently in the hands of his accusers, the OIC and the 
House Managers. The Senate has wisely elected to proceed on the public 
record established by the House of Representatives, and this provides a 
wholly adequate basis for Senate decision-making. In the event the 
Senate should choose to expand this record, affording the President 
adequate discovery is absolutely essential.

                            VIII. Conclusion

    As the Senate considers these Articles of Impeachment and listens 
to the arguments, individual Senators are standing in the place of the 
Framers of the Constitution, who prayed that the power of impeachment 
and removal of a President would be invoked only in the gravest of 
circumstances, when the stability of our system of government hung in 
the balance--to protect the Republic itself from efforts to subvert our 
Constitutional system.
    The Senate has an obligation to turn away an unwise and unwarranted 
misuse of the awesome power of impeachment. If the Senate removes this 
President for a wrongful relationship he hoped to keep private, for 
what will the House ask the Senate to remove the next President, and 
the next? Our Framers wisely gave us a constitutional system of checks 
and balances, with three co-equal branches. Removing this President on 
these facts would substantially alter the delicate constitutional 
balance, and move us closer to a quasi-parliamentary system, in which 
the President is elected to office by the choice of people, but 
continues in office only at the pleasure of Congress.
    In weighing the evidence and assessing the facts, we ask that 
Senators consider not only the intent of the Framers but also the will 
and interests of the people. It is the citizens of these United States 
who will be affected by and stand in judgment of this process. It is 
not simply the President--but the vote the American people rendered in 
schools, church halls and other civic centers all across the land 
twenty-six months ago--that is hanging in the balance.
    Respectfully submitted.

David E. Kendall                      Charles F.C. Ruff
Nicole K. Seligman                    Gregory B. Craig
Emmet T. Flood                        Bruce R. Lindsey
Max Stier                             Cheryl D. Mills
Alicia L. Marti                       Lanny A. Breuer
Williams & Connolly                   Office of the White House Counsel
725 12th Street, N.W.                 The White House
Washington, D.C. 20005                Washington, D.C. 20502
 

    January 13, 1999.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT 
        WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

    The House of Representatives, through its Managers and counsel, 
replies to the Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to the 
Articles of Impeachment (``Answer''), as follows:

                                Preamble

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in the Preamble to the Answer, including the sections 
entitled ``The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' and ``The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct 
Justice.'' With respect to the allegations in the Preamble, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Articles I and II is true and that Articles I and II properly state 
impeachable offenses, are not subject to a motion to dismiss, and 
should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court 
of Impeachment.

                               Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in 
the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or 
wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. 
With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article I, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Article I is true and that Article I properly states an impeachable 
offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be 
considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment.

                 First Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article I 
warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from 
holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article I is not 
unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson 
Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                 Third Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article I does not charge 
multiple offenses in one article.

                               Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in 
the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or 
wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. 
With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article II, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Article II is true and that Article II properly states an impeachable 
offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be 
considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment.

                First Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article II 
warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from 
holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article II is not 
unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson 
Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                Third Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article II does not charge 
multiple offenses in one article.

               Conclusion of the House of Representatives

    The House of Representatives further states that it denies each and 
every material allegation of the Answer not specifically admitted in 
this Replication. By providing this Replication to the Answer, the 
House of Representatives waives none of its rights in this proceeding. 
Wherefore, the House of Representatives states that both of the 
Articles of Impeachment warrant the conviction, removal from office, 
and disqualification from holding further office of President William 
Jefferson Clinton. Both of the Articles should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate.
    Respectfully submitted,
    The United States House of Representatives.
                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                   Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                   General Counsel.

                                   David P. Schippers,
                                       Chief Investigative Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

   REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TRIAL 
           MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

    The President's Trial Memorandum contains numerous factual 
inaccuracies and misstatements of the governing law and the Senate's 
precedents. These errors have largely been addressed in the Trial 
Memorandum of the House of Representatives filed with the Senate on 
January 11, 1999, and given the 24-hour period to file this reply, the 
House cannot possibly address them all here. The House of 
Representatives will address them further in its oral presentation to 
the Senate, and it reserves the right to address these matters further 
in the briefing of any relevant motions. However, President Clinton has 
raised some new issues in his Trial Memorandum, and the House of 
Representatives hereby replies to those issues.

                               II. Facts

    The President's Trial Memorandum outlines what he claims are facts 
showing that he did not commit perjury before the grand jury and did 
not obstruct justice. The factual issues President Clinton raises are 
addressed in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
    A complete and impartial review of the evidence reveals that the 
President did in fact commit perjury before the grand jury and that he 
obstructed justice during the Jones litigation and the grand jury 
investigation as alleged in the articles of impeachment passed by the 
House of Representatives. The House believes a review of the complete 
record, including the full grand jury and deposition testimony of the 
key witnesses in this case, will establish that.
    The evidence which President Clinton claims demonstrates that he 
did not commit the offenses outlined in the Articles of Impeachment are 
cited in Sections IV and V of his Memorandum. Regarding Article I, 
President Clinton maintains that his testimony before the grand jury 
was entirely truthful. At the outset of his argument, he states that he 
told the truth about the nature and details of his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, and he insists that any false impressions that his 
deposition testimony might have created were remedied by his admission 
of ``improper intimate contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky. However, his 
subsequent testimony demonstrates that this admission is narrowly 
tailored to mean that Ms. Lewinsky had ``sexual relations'' with him, 
but he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her, as he understood the 
term to be defined. In other words, he admitted only what he knew could 
be conclusively established through scientific tests. He denied what 
the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the testimony of a number of her 
confidantes, and common sense proves: that while she engaged in sexual 
relations with him, he engaged in sexual relations with her, regardless 
of how President Clinton attempts to redefine the term.
    Following this pattern, President Clinton discounts substantial 
evidence as well as common sense when he maintains that he testified 
truthfully in the grand jury about, among other things, his prior 
deposition testimony, his attorney's statements to Judge Wright during 
his deposition, and his intent in providing a series of false 
statements to his secretary after his deposition. Again, a complete 
review of the record and witness testimony reveals that President 
Clinton committed perjury numerous times in his grand jury testimony.
    In regard to Article II, President Clinton extracts numerous items 
of evidence from the record and analyzes them in isolation in an effort 
to provide innocent explanations for the substantial amount of 
circumstantial evidence proving his guilt. Yet when the record is 
viewed in its entirety, including the portions of President Clinton's 
deposition testimony concerning Ms. Lewinsky and his grant jury 
testimony, it demonstrates that President Clinton took a number of 
actions designed to prevent Paula Jones's attorneys, the federal 
district court, and a federal grand jury from learning the truth. These 
actions are described in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
    To the extent that President Clinton's Trial Memorandum raises 
issues of credibility, those issues are best resolved by live testimony 
subject to cross-examination. The Senate, weighing the evidence in its 
entirety, will make an independent assessment of the facts as they are 
presented, and a detailed, point-by-point argument of these matters is 
best resolved on the Senate floor. The House is confident that a 
thorough factual analysis will not only refute President Clinton's 
contentions, but will prove the very serious charges contained in the 
articles.

           III. The Articles Properly State Removal Offenses

        a. the offenses alleged are high crimes and misdemeanors
1. The Senate Has Never Exercised Its Power To Dismiss an Article of 
        Impeachment Except When the Official Impeached Has Resigned
    The House acknowledges that the Senate has the power to dismiss an 
article of impeachment on the ground that it does not state a removable 
offense. Beyond that, however, President Clinton completely ignores the 
Senate's precedents concerning the use of that power. In the fifteen 
cases in which the House has forwarded articles of impeachment to the 
Senate, the Senate has never granted a dispositive motion to preclude a 
trial on the articles with one exception. In the 1926 case of Judge 
George English, the Senate granted a motion to adjourn after Judge 
English resigned from office making a trial moot on the issue of 
removal. See Impeachment of George W. English, U.S. District Judge, 
Eastern District of Illinois, 68 Cong. Rec. 347-48 (1926). The Senate 
also granted a motion to adjourn in the 1868 trial of President Andrew 
Johnson, but only after a full trial and votes to acquit on three 
articles. III Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives 
Sec. 2443.
    In addition, the Senate has never granted a motion to dismiss or 
strike an article of impeachment. However, in the 1936 case of Judge 
Halsted Ritter, the House managers themselves moved to strike two 
counts of a multi-count article to simplify the trial, and the motion 
was granted. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898-99 (April 3, 1936). However, the 
remainder of the article was fully considered, and Judge Ritter was 
convicted on that article. The House managers in the 1986 Judge Harry 
Claiborne case made the only motion for summary judgment in the history 
of impeachment. Hearings of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee 
(Judge Harry Claiborne), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1986). They did so 
on the basis that Judge Claiborne had already been convicted of the 
charges in a criminal trial. Id. The Senate postponed a decision on the 
motion and never ruled on it, but it ultimately convicted Judge 
Claiborne. In short, the Senate precedents firmly establish that the 
Senate has always fulfilled its responsibility to give a full and fair 
hearing to articles of impeachment voted by the House of 
Representatives.
2. The Constitutional Text Sets One Clear Standard for Removal
            a. There is Only One Impeachment Standard
    The Constitution sets one clear standard for impeachment, 
conviction, and removal from office: the commission of ``Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II, 
Sec. 4. The Senate has repeatedly determined that perjury is a high 
crime and misdemeanor. Simple logic dictates that obstruction of 
justice which has the same effect as perjury and bribery of witnesses 
must also be a high crime and misdemeanor. Endless repetition of the 
claim that this standard is a high one does not change the standard.
    President Clinton claims that to remove him on these articles would 
permanently disfigure and diminish the Presidency and mangle the system 
of checks and balances. President's Trial Memorandum at 18. Quite the 
contrary, however, it is President Clinton's behavior as set forth in 
the articles that has had these effects. Essentially, President Clinton 
argues that the Presidency and the system of checks and balances can 
only be saved if we allow the President to commit felonies with 
impunity. To state that proposition is to refute it. Convicting him and 
thereby reaffirming that criminal behavior that strikes at the heart of 
the justice system will result in removal will serve to strengthen the 
Presidency, not weaken it.
            b. Impeachment and Removal Are Appropriate for High Crimes 
                    and Misdemeanors Regardless of Whether They Are 
                    Offenses Against the System of Government
    President Clinton argues that impeachment may only be used to 
redress wrongful public misconduct. The point is academic. Perjury and 
obstruction of justice as set forth in the articles are, by definition, 
public misconduct. See generally House Trial Memorandum at 107-12. 
Indeed, it is precisely their public nature that makes them offenses--
acts that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm 
become crimes when they enter that realm. Lying to one's spouse about 
an extramarital affair, although immoral, is not a crime. Telling the 
same lie under oath in a judicial proceeding is a crime. Hiding gifts 
given to an adulterous lover to conceal the affair, although immoral, 
is not a crime. When those gifts become potential evidence in a 
judicial proceeding, the same act becomes a crime. One who has 
committed these kinds of crimes that corrupt the judicial system simply 
is not fit to serve as the nation's chief law enforcement officer.
    Apart from that, the notion that high crimes and misdemeanors 
encompass only public misconduct will not bear scrutiny. Numerous 
``private'' crimes would obviously require the removal of a President. 
For example, if he killed his wife in a domestic dispute or molested a 
child, no one would seriously argue that he could not be removed. All 
of these acts violate the President's unique responsibility to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
3. President Clinton Cites Precedents That Do Not Apply Rather Than 
        Relying on the Senate's Own Precedents Clearly Establishing 
        Perjury as a Removable Offense
            a. President Clinton Continues To Misrepresent the 
                    Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
                    Nixon
    In his trial memorandum, President Clinton argues that the failure 
in 1974 of the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an article of 
impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud supports the claim 
that current charges against President Clinton do not rise to the level 
of impeachable and removable offenses. President's Trial Memorandum at 
21. The President's lawyers acknowledge the charge in the article 
against President Nixon of ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to 
report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his 
Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' Id. The 
President's lawyers go on to state that ``[t]he President had signed 
his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,'' Id., trying to 
distinguish away the Claiborne impeachment and removal precedent from 
1986, and by extension all the judicial impeachments from the 1980s 
which clearly establish perjury as an impeachable and removable 
offense.
    President Clinton's argument that a President was not and should 
not be impeached for tax fraud because it does not involve official 
conduct or abuse of presidential powers simply is unfounded based on 
the 1974 impeachment proceedings against President Nixon. Moreover, the 
fact that the President and his lawyers make this argument in defense 
of the President is telling. He effectively claims that a large scale 
tax cheat could be a viable chief executive.
    It is undisputed that the Judiciary Committee rejected the proposed 
tax fraud article against President Nixon by a vote of 26 to 12. A slim 
minority of Committee members stated the view that tax fraud would not 
be an impeachable offense. That minority view is illustrated by the 
comments of Rep. Waldie that in the tax fraud article there was ``not 
an abuse of power sufficient to warrant impeachment. . . .'' Debate on 
Article of Impeachment 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary 
Pursuant H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 548 (1974) (Statement 
of Rep. Waldie). Similar views were expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep. 
Mayne. Rep. Railsback took the position that there was ``a serious 
question,'' id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Railsback), whether 
misconduct of the President in connection with his taxes would be 
impeachable.
    Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their 
opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based his 
opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that these charges 
may be reached in due course in the regular process of law.'' Id. at 
549 (Statement of Rep. Thornton). Rep. Butler stated his view that the 
tax fraud article should be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound 
judgment would indicate that we not add this article to the trial 
burden we already have.'' Id. at 550 (Statement of Rep. Butler).
    The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of 
those who expressed a view in the debate in opposition to the tax fraud 
article based their opposition on the insufficiency of the evidence, 
and not on the view that tax fraud, if proven, would not be an 
impeachable offense.
    The comments of then-Rep. Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974 
directly contradict the view that Mr. Owens has expressed in recent 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. Although Mr. Owens in 
1974 expressed his ``belief'' that President Nixon was guilty of 
misconduct in connection with his taxes, he clearly stated his 
conclusion that ``on the evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's offenses were 
not impeachable. Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Owens). Mr. Owens spoke 
of the need for ``hard evidence'' and discussed his unavailing efforts 
to obtain additional evidence that would tie ``the President to the 
fraudulent deed'' or that would otherwise ``close the inferential gap 
that has to be closed in order to charge the President.'' Id. He 
concluded his comments in the 1974 debate by urging the members of the 
Committee ``to reject this article . . . based on that lack of 
evidence.'' Id.
    In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee stated 
the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax fraud to support 
the article against President Nixon. Wiggins: ``fraud . . . is wholly 
unsupported in the evidence.'' Id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Wiggins). 
McClory: ``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Id. at 531 
(Statement of Rep. McClory). Sandman: ``There was absolutely no intent 
to defraud here.'' Id. at 532 (Statement of Rep. Sandman). Lott: ``mere 
mistakes or negligence by the President in filing his tax returns 
should clearly not be grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 533 (Statement 
of Rep. Lott). Maraziti: discussing absence of evidence of fraud. Id. 
at 534 (Statement of Rep. Maraziti). Dennis: ``no fraud has been 
found.'' Id. at 538 (Statement of Rep. Dennis). Cohen: questioning 
whether ``in fact there was criminal fraud involved.'' Id. at 548 
(Statement of Rep. Cohen). Hungate: ``I think there is a case here but 
in my judgment I am having trouble deciding if it has as yet been 
made.'' Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Hungate). Latta: only ``bad 
judgment and gross negligence.'' Id. at 554 (Statement of Rep. Latta). 
Fish: ``There is not to be found before us evidence that the President 
acted wilfully to evade his taxes.'' Id. at 556 (Statement of Rep. 
Fish). Moorhead: ``there is no showing that President Nixon in any way 
engaged in any fraud.'' Id. at 557 (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
    The group of those who found the evidence insufficient included 
moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, as well as 
Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. McClory, all of whom 
supported the impeachment of President Nixon.
    In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert that the 
House Judiciary Committee in 1974 determined that tax fraud by the 
President would not be an impeachable offense. The failure of the 
Committee to adopt the tax fraud article against President Nixon simply 
does not support the claim of President Clinton's lawyers that the 
offenses charged against him do not rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses.
    In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made that tax 
fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient evidence--would be an 
impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who later served as chairman of the 
Committee, said:

    ``No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty to 
establish now that evidence of specific statutory crimes and 
constitutional violations by the President of the United States will 
subject all Presidents now and in the future to impeachment.
          * * * * * * *
    ``No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and the laws 
of the United States from accountability for personal misdeeds any more 
than he is for official misdeeds. And I think that we on this Committee 
in our effort to fairly evaluate the President's activities must show 
the American people that all men are treated equally under the law.''

(Debate on Articles of Impeachment, 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 525, 554.)
    Professor Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large-scale tax 
cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' Charles Black, Impeachment: A 
Handbook, (Yale University Press, 1974) at 42. What is true of tax 
fraud is also true of a persistent pattern of perjury by the President. 
An incorrigible perjurer is not a viable chief magistrate.
            b. President Clinton Continues to Misrepresent The 
                    Allegations Against Alexander Hamilton
    President Clinton continues to try to persuade the American public 
that the House of Representatives has impeached him for having an 
extramarital affair. See Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton 
to the Articles of Impeachment at 1 (``The charges in the two Articles 
of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of 
a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.'') (emphasis added). In doing so, the 
President's lawyers refer to an incident involving then Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton being blackmailed by the husband of a 
woman named Maria Reynolds with whom he was having an adulterous 
affair. However, the President's lawyers omit the relevant 
distinguishing facts even as they cast aspersions upon Alexander 
Hamilton: none of Hamilton's ``efforts'' to cover up his affair 
involved the violation of any laws, let alone felonies. Indeed, the 
fact of the matter is that Hamilton was the victim of the crime of 
extortion.
    Never did Hamilton raise his right hand to take a sacred oath and 
then willfully betray that oath and the rule of law to commit perjury. 
Never did Alexander Hamilton obstruct justice by tampering with 
witnesses, urging potential witnesses to sign false affidavits, or 
attempt to conceal evidence from a Federal criminal grand jury.
    Again, the significance of the distinctions are glaringly obvious: 
it is apparent from the Hamilton case that the Framers did not regard 
private sexual misconduct as an impeachable offense. It is also 
apparent that efforts to cover up such private behavior outside of a 
legal setting, including even paying hush money to induce someone to 
destroy documents, did not meet the standard. Neither Hamilton's high 
position, nor the fact that his payments to a securities swindler 
created an enormous appearance problem, were enough to implicate the 
standard. These wrongs were real, and they were not insubstantial, but 
to the Framers they were essentially private and therefore not 
impeachable. David Frum, ``Smearing Alexander Hamilton,'' The Weekly 
Standard (Oct. 19, 1998) at 14.
    But the Alexander Hamilton incident President Clinton cites 
actually clarifies the precise point at which personal misconduct 
becomes a public offense. Hamilton could keep his secret only by a 
betrayal of public responsibilities. Hamilton came to that point and, 
at immense personal cost, refused to cross the line. President Clinton 
came to that point and, fully understanding what he was doing, 
knowingly charged across the line. President Clinton's public acts of 
perjury and obstruction of justice transformed a personal misconduct 
into a public offense.
4. The Views of the Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars the 
        President Cites Do Not Stand Up to Careful Scrutiny
    It speaks volumes that the most distinguished of the 400 historians 
referred to in President Clinton's trial brief is Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. Professor Schlesinger had a different view of impeachment 25 years 
ago. President Clinton himself asserts that ``the allegations are so 
far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here 
threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself.'' President's 
Trial Memorandum at 24. However, Schlesinger has written that:

    ``The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could punish 
the man without [ ] punishing the office. For, in the Presidency as 
elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to [do] good meant also the 
power to do harm, the power to serve the republic also the power to 
demand and defile it.''

(Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Easton Press edit. 
1973) (hereinafter ``Schlesinger'') at 415.)
    The statement of the 400 historians cited with approval in the 
President's trial memorandum makes the following statement: ``[t]he 
Framers explicitly reserved that step for high crimes and misdemeanors 
in the exercise of executive power.'' Statement of Historians in 
Defense of the Constitution, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 1998) at A15. 
The 400 historians then believe that commission of a murder or rape by 
the President of the United States in his personal capacity is not 
subject to the impeachment power of Article II, Section 4.
    President Clinton in his trial memorandum asserts that this case 
does not fit the paradigmatic case for impeachment. President's Trial 
Memorandum at 24. However, none of his predecessors ever faced 
overwhelming evidence of repeatedly lying under oath before a federal 
court and grand jury and otherwise seeking to obstruct justice to 
benefit himself--directly contradicting his oath to ``take care that 
the laws are faithfully executed.'' But as former Attorney General 
Griffin Bell, who served under President Carter, said before the House 
Judiciary Committee recently, ``[a] President cannot faithfully execute 
the laws if he himself is breaking them.'' Background and History of 
Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 203 (Comm. Print 
1998) (Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell).
    President Clinton goes on to state that to make the offenses 
alleged against him impeachable and removable conduct ``would forever 
lower the bar in a way inimical to the Presidency and to our government 
of separated powers. These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) 
statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the 
fact of sexual misbehavior.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26. While 
President Clinton and his able counsel would like to define the case 
this way, what is at issue in the articles of impeachment before the 
Senate is clear: perjury and obstruction of justice committed by the 
President of the United States in order to thwart a duly instituted 
civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit against him as well as a 
subsequent grand jury investigation. While the President may think such 
allegations would forever lower the bar in terms of the conduct we 
expect from our public officials, we must square his opinion and that 
of his lawyers with the fact that his Justice Department puts people in 
prison for similar conduct. While the President's brief again quotes 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. for the proposition that we must not ``lower 
the bar,'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26, Schlesinger held a 
different view during the impeachment of President Nixon:

    ``If the Nixon White House escaped the legal consequences of its 
illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and their associates not 
suppose themselves entitled to do what the Nixon White House had done? 
Only condign punishment would restore popular faith in the Presidency 
and deter future Presidents from illegal conduct.''
(Schlesinger at 418.)
5. The President and Federal Judges are Impeached, Convicted, and 
        Removed From Office Under the Same Standard
    President Clinton's argument that Presidents are held to a lower 
standard of behavior than federal judges completely misreads the 
Constitution and the Senate's precedents. See generally House Trial 
Brief at 101-06. The Constitution provides one standard for the 
impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of ``[t]the President, 
the Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States.'' U.S. 
Const. art II, Sec. 4. It is the commission of ``Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Id.  The Senate has already 
determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the cases of 
Judge Nixon, Judge Hastings, and Judge Claiborne.
    President Clinton argues that the standard differs because judges 
have life tenure whereas Presidents are accountable to the voters at 
elections. That argument fails on several grounds. The differing 
tenures are set forth in the Constitution, and there is simply no 
textual support for the idea that they affect the impeachment standard 
at all. If electoral accountability were a sufficient means of 
remedying presidential misconduct, the framers would not have 
explicitly included the President in the impeachment clause. Finally, 
even if this argument were otherwise valid, it does not apply to 
President Clinton because he will never face the voters again. U.S. 
Const. amend. XXII. Indeed, all of the conduct charged in the Articles 
occurred after the 1996 election.
    Then President Clinton rejects the Senate's own precedents showing 
that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the three judicial 
impeachments of the 1980s arguing that all of the lying involved there 
concerned the judges' official duties. That is true with respect to 
Judge Hastings, but completely false with respect to Judge Claiborne 
and Judge Nixon. Judge Claiborne was impeached and convicted for lying 
on his income tax returns, an entirely personal matter. President 
Clinton tries to explain this away by saying: ``Once convicted, [Judge 
Claiborne] simply could not perform his official functions because his 
personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an 
arbiter of others' oaths.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 29. The 
same is true of President Clinton. He ultimately directs the Department 
of Justice which must decide whether people are prosecuted for lying. 
If he has committed perjury and obstructed justice, how can he be the 
arbiter of other's oaths? As Professor Jonathan Turley put it:

    ``As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate authority 
over the Justice Department and the Administration's enforcement 
policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let 
alone prosecute, citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of 
justice under circumstances nearly identical to the President's. Such 
inherent conflict will be even greater in the military cases and the 
President's role as Commander-in-Chief.''

(Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess. at 274 (Comm. Print 1998) (Testimony of Professor Jonathan 
Turley).)
    In the same vein, President Clinton claims that Judge Nixon 
``employ[ed] the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage 
for a party.'' President's Trial Brief at 29. In fact, Judge Nixon 
intervened in a state criminal case in which he had no official role. 
His ability to persuade the prosecutor to drop the case rested on his 
friendship with the state prosecutor--not his official position. 
President Clinton argues that it was Judge Nixon's intervention in a 
judicial proceeding that ties it to his official position. The same is 
true of President Clinton. He intervened in two judicial proceedings 
and his actions had the same effect as Judge Nixon's--to defeat a just 
result.
    As the person who ultimately directs the Justice Department--the 
federal government's prosecutorial authority--the President must follow 
his constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed. U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 3. His special constitutional duty 
is at least as high, if not higher, than the judge's. Indeed, President 
Clinton acknowledged as much early in his Administration when 
controversy arose about the nomination of Zoe Baird and the potential 
nomination of Judge Kimba Wood to be Attorney General. Questions were 
raised about whether they had properly complied with laws relating to 
their hiring of household help. At that time, President Clinton said 
the Attorney General ``should be held to a higher standard than other 
Cabinet members on matters of this kind [i.e. strictly complying with 
the law].'' Remarks of President Clinton with Reporters Prior to a 
Meeting with Economic Advisers, February 8, 1993, 29 Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents 160. If the Attorney General is held to a 
higher standard of compliance with the law, then her superior, 
President Clinton, must be also.
  b. the individual consciences of senators determines the burden of 
                      proof in impeachment trials
    The Constitution does not discuss the standard of proof for 
impeachment trials. It simply states that ``the Senate shall have the 
Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const., Art I, Sec. 3, clause 5. 
Because the Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to 
look at the past practice of the Senate. Historically, the Senate has 
never set a standard of proof for impeachment trials. ``In the final 
analysis the question is one which historically has been answered by 
individual Senators guided by their own consciences.'' Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, Standard of Proof in Senate 
Impeachment Proceedings, Thomas B. Ripy, Legislative Attorney, American 
Law Division (January 7, 1999).
    President Clinton argues that the impeachment trial is similar to a 
criminal trial and that the appropriate standard should therefore be 
``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' That argument is not new: it has been 
made in the past, and the Senate has rejected it, as indeed, President 
Clinton acknowledges. He asserts, however, that the impeachment trial 
of a President should proceed under special procedures that do not 
apply to the trial of other civil officers. His arguments are 
unpersuasive.
1. The Senate has Never Adopted the Criminal Standard of ``Beyond a 
        Reasonable Doubt'' or Any Other Standard of Proof for 
        Impeachment Trials
    The Senate has never adopted the standard of ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' in any impeachment trial in U.S. history. In fact, the Senate 
has chosen not to impose a standard at all, preferring to leave to the 
conscience of each senator the decision of how best to judge the facts 
presented.
    In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, counsel for the 
respondent moved to designate ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the 
standard of proof for conviction. Gray & Reams, The Congressional 
Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the 
Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5, 
Document 41, X (1987). The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion by 
a vote of 17-75. In the floor debate on the motion, House Manager 
Kastenmeier emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each 
member to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. 132 Cong. Rec. 
S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
    The question of the appropriate standard of proof was also raised 
in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings. In the Senate Impeachment Trial 
Committee, Senator Rudman said in response to a question about the 
historical practice regarding the standard of proof that there has been 
no specific standard, ``you are not going to find it. It is what is in 
the mind of every Senator. . . . I think it is what everybody decides 
for themselves.'' Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on 
the Articles Against Judge Alcee Hastings: Hearings before the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee (Part 1) 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75, 
(discussion involving Senator Lieberman and Senator Rudman).
2. The Criminal Standard of Proof is Inappropriate for Impeachment 
        Trials
    President Clinton argues that an impeachment trial is akin to a 
criminal trial and that, therefore, the criminal standard should apply. 
That assertion is, of course, at direct odds with his apparent 
opposition to the presentation of evidence through witnesses, another 
normal criminal trial procedure. The Senate Rules Committee rejected 
this analogy in 1974, stating, ``an impeachment trial is not a criminal 
trial,'' and advocating a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
Executive Session Hearings, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration, ``Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment 
Trials'' 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (August 5-6, 1974). Indeed, it is 
undisputed that impeachable offenses need not be criminal offenses. See 
Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 
2d Sess. at 14 (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998) (``Impeachable acts need 
not be criminal acts.'')
    Moreover, the result of conviction in an impeachment trial is 
removal from office, not punishment. As the House argued in the 
Claiborne trial, the reasonable standard was designed to protect 
criminal defendants who risked ``forfeitures of life, liberty and 
property'' (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 
(1949)). This standard is inappropriate here because the Constitution 
limits the consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from 
office and disqualification from holding office in the future, 
explicitly preserving the option for a subsequent criminal trial in the 
courts. U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 6.
    In addition, as the House argued in the Claiborne trial, the 
criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by its 
nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more heavily than 
the interest of the individual defendant. Gray & Reams, The 
Congressional Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and 
Materials on the Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, 
Volume 5, Document 41, X (1987). During the course of the floor debate 
on this motion in the Claiborne trial, Representative Kastenmeier 
argued for the House that the use of the criminal standard was 
inappropriate where the public interest in removing corrupt officials 
was a significant factor. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed. 
October 7, 1986).
3. A President Who Is Impeached Should Not Receive Special Procedural 
        Benefits That Do Not Apply in the Impeachment Trials of Other 
        Civil Officers
    President Clinton argues that he should be exempted from the weight 
of historical practice and precedent and be given a special rule on the 
standard of proof. This argument is based on fallacious assertions, the 
first of which is that different constitutional standards apply to the 
impeachment of judges and presidents. See above at 14-16 and House 
Trial Memorandum at 101-06.
    President Clinton also employs inflammatory rhetoric to suggest 
that a presidential impeachment trial ought to be treated differently, 
explaining that the criminal standard is needed because ``the 
Presidency itself is at stake'' and because conviction would ``overturn 
the results of an election.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 32-33. 
The presidency is, of course, not at stake, though the tenure of its 
current office holder may be. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution 
ensures that impeachment and removal of a President would not overturn 
an election because it is the elected Vice President who would replace 
the President not the losing presidential candidate.
    Finally, President Clinton argues that the evidence should be 
tested by the most stringent standard because ``there is no suggestion 
of corruption or misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our 
system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the 
President's term.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. While the 
President might be expected to argue that he did not act corruptly, he 
cannot credibly assert that ``there is no suggestion of corruption,'' 
because ``corrupt'' conduct is precisely what he is charged with in the 
articles of impeachment. Though not persuasive as an argument, this 
statement is significant in what it concedes--that corruption is among 
the ``conduct that places our system of government at risk.'' 
President's Trial Memorandum at 33. Having acknowledged this, President 
Clinton cannot be heard to complain that the House has failed to charge 
him with conduct which rises to the level of an impeachable offense.

       IV. The Structure of the Articles is Proper and Sufficient

            a. the articles are not unconstitutionally vague
    President Clinton's trial memorandum argues that the two articles 
of impeachment are unfairly complex. To the contrary, the articles 
present the misdeeds of President Clinton and their consequences in as 
transparent and understandable a manner as possible.
    The first article of impeachment charges that President Clinton 
violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by willfully 
corrupting and manipulating the judicial process. He did this by 
providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a grand jury in 
regard to one or more of four matters. The deleterious consequences his 
actions had for the people of the United States are then described. The 
second article charges that President Clinton violated his enumerated 
constitutional responsibilities by a course of conduct that prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice. One or more of 
seven listed acts constitute the particulars of President Clinton's 
course of conduct. As in the first article, the deleterious 
consequences his actions had for the people of the United States are 
then described.
    To do as President Clinton requests would require separating out 
into a unique article of impeachment each possible combination of (a) a 
particular violation of his duties, (b) a particular wrongful act, and 
(c) a particular consequence of his actions. This would require 48 
different articles in the case of the first article and 84 in the case 
of the second. Such a multiplicity of articles is not required and 
would assist no one. Of course, if the president had violated fewer 
presidential duties, committed fewer misdeeds, and been responsible for 
fewer harmful consequences to the American people, the articles could 
have been drafted more simply.
    The trial memorandum then makes the contention that the two 
articles of impeachment are impermissibly vague and lacking in 
specificity in that they do not meet the standards of a criminal 
indictment. This contention clearly misses the mark. Impeachment is a 
political and not a criminal proceeding, designed, as recognized by 
Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest nineteenth century 
interpreter, ``not . . . to punish an offender'' by threatening 
deprivation of his life or liberty, but to ``secure the state'' by 
``divest[ing] him of his political capacity''. J. Story, Commentaries 
on the Constitution (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) Sec. 803. 
Justice Story thus found the analogy to an indictment to be invalid:

    ``The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict 
form and accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in 
the form of the allegations; but always contain, or ought to contain, 
so much certainty, as to enable the party to put himself upon the 
proper defense, and also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of 
it, as a bar to another impeachment.''

(Id. at Sec. 806).
    In explaining the impeachment process to the citizens of New York 
in Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton stated in more general terms 
that impeachment ``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either 
in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the 
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the 
discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' The Federalist 
No. 65, at 398 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
    Can the president legitimately argue that he is unable to put on a 
proper defense? President Clinton has committed a great number of 
impeachable misdeeds. The House Judiciary Committee's committee report 
requires 20 pages just to list the most glaring instances of the 
president's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before a 
federal grand jury and it requires 13 pages just to list the most 
glaring incidents in the president's course of conduct designed to 
prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice. The House 
believes that President Clinton's attorneys have reviewed the committee 
report. They know exactly what he is being charged with, as is 
acknowledged in the president's trial memorandum. The memorandum states 
in its introduction that ``[t]ake away the elaborate trappings of the 
Articles and the high-flying rhetoric that accompanied them, and we see 
clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the 
President from office because he . . .'' President's Trial Memorandum 
at 2. In addition, in the House proceedings, the President filed three 
documents: a Preliminary Memorandum, an Initial Response, and a 
Submission by Counsel. The first two documents were printed together 
and ran to 57 pages. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the 
United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the Independent 
Counsel and Initial Response of the President of the United States to 
Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess., H.Doc. No. 105-317 (1998). The third was printed and ran to 404 
pages. Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998). He was also given 30 
hours to present his case before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
during which he called numerous witnesses. The Committee repeatedly 
asked President Clinton to provide it with any exculpatory evidence, an 
offer which he never accepted. Now President Clinton's Trial Memorandum 
to the Senate runs to 130 pages. Clearly, President Clinton has not 
suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles of impeachment.
    If he had, he would have availed himself of the opportunity to file 
a motion for a bill of particulars. He had that opportunity on January 
11, 1999, and he waived it. He should not now be heard to claim that he 
does not know what the charges are.
    Unlike the judicial impeachments of the 1980s, President Clinton 
has not committed a handful of specific misdeeds that can easily be 
listed in separate articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the 
whole melange of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives to 
impeach President Clinton, the Judiciary Committee looked to the only 
analogous case--that of President Nixon. In 1974, the Committee was 
also faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable length 
against a president who had committed a long series of improper acts 
designed to achieve an illicit end.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon charged 
that in order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of 
the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and obstruct 
the consequent investigation (and for certain other purposes), he 
engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or causing to be made 
false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative 
officers'', ``endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency'', 
and ``endeavoring to cause prospective defendants and individuals duly 
tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in 
return for their silence or false testimony.'' Impeachment of Richard 
M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). The article did not list each false or 
misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, and did not 
list each prospective defendant and what they were promised.
    In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against President 
Clinton charge him with providing perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony concerning four subjects, such as an his relationship with a 
subordinate government employee, and engaging in a course of conduct 
designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of 
justice, such course including four generals acts such as an effort to 
secure job assistance for that employee. An argument can be made that 
the articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted with 
more specificity than those against President Nixon. Unless President 
Clinton is arguing that the Senate should have dismissed the first 
article of impeachment against President Nixon (had the president not 
resigned), he has little ground to complain about the articles against 
himself. In short, President Clinton knows exactly what the charges 
are, and the Senate should now require him to account for his behavior.
   b. the articles do not improperly charge multiple offenses in one 
                                article
    President Clinton argues unpersuasively that the articles of 
impeachment are ``unconstitutionally flawed'' in two respects. First, 
he argues that ``by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House 
of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 101. 
Second, he argues that the articles do not provide him ``the most basic 
notice of the charges against him required by due process and 
fundamental fairness.'' Id. Both arguments are factually deficient, 
ignore Senate precedent and procedure, and are constitutionally flawed.
    The articles of impeachment allege that the President made ``one or 
more'' ``perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand 
jury'' and committed ``one or more'' acts in which he obstructed 
justice. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998). The articles of 
impeachment are modeled after those adopted by the House Committee on 
the Judiciary against President Nixon and were drafted with the rules 
of the Senate in mind. Senate Rules specifically contemplate that the 
House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner and prior 
rulings of the Senate have held that such drafting is not deficient and 
will not sustain a motion to dismiss.
    In 1986, the United States Senate amended the Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials. S. Res. 
479, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). As part of the reform, Rule XXIII, 
which deals generally with voting the final question, was amended to 
clarify the articles of impeachment are not divisible. Rule XXIII 
provides in relevant part that:

    ``An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose 
of voting thereon at any time during the trial. Once voting has 
commenced on an article of impeachment, voting shall be continued until 
voting has been completed on all articles of impeachment unless the 
Senate adjourns for period not to exceed one day or adjourns sine 
die.''

    The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, after thoroughly 
reviewing the impeachment rules, prior articles of impeachments, and 
prior Senate trials, decided that articles of impeachment should not be 
divisible. In drafting the amendment to Rule XXIII providing that 
articles of impeachment not be divided, the Senate was aware that the 
House may combine multiple counts of impeachable conduct in one article 
of impeachment. The Committee report explains the Senate's position:

    ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the divisions 
of an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the 
most judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a 
general manner and, in particular, with respect to the form of the 
articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon. 
The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an 
impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the 
first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges 
alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of 
transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of 
Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had 
thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the'' enumerated 
specifications. The general review of the Committee at that time was 
expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division 
of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted 
specifications might ``be time consuming and confusing, and a matter 
which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will * 
* *.'' Accordingly, it was agreed to write into the proposed rules 
language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either 
the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person 
impeached was ``guilty'' or one or more of the enumerated 
specifications.''

Amending the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting 
on Impeachment Trials, Report of the Comm. on Rules and Administration, 
S. Rept. 99-401, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 8 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Because the Senate was aware that multiple specifications of 
impeachment conduct may be contained in an article of impeachment, the 
Senate's rules implicitly countenance such drafting.
    The issue regarding whether articles of impeachment are divisible 
is not new to the Senate. In fact, the Senate's Committee on Rules and 
Administration reviewed the Senate's impeachment procedures in 1974 to 
prepare for a possible trial of President Richard Nixon. The Committee 
passed the exact same language as the Committee did in 1986 prohibiting 
the division of an article of impeachment. Because President Nixon 
resigned, the full Senate never considered the amendments.
    Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York submitted a statement to the 
Committee in 1974 addressing the divisibility issue and advised that 
Rule XXIII be amended to prohibit the division of an article of 
impeachment. His comments, as follows, are instructive:

    ``Rule XXIII provides for the yeas and nays to be taken on each 
article separately but does not set any order for a vote when there are 
several articles. In the [President] Johnson trial, this was done by 
order of the Senate and several votes were taken on the order. This 
procedure, setting a vote for final consideration, should be stated in 
the rules. Also the rule is silent about the division of any article. 
In the Johnson trial a division was requested and the Chief Justice 
attempted to devise one, but could not, and the article as a whole was 
submitted for a vote to the Senate. I believe articles should not be 
divided because this raises a further question of whether a two-thirds 
vote is required on each part of an article and whether the House 
action on the construction of a particular article can be changed 
without further action by the House. Thus the rule should provide for 
no division of an article by the Senate.''

(Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials, 
Executive Session Hearings before the Comm. on Standing Rules and 
Administration, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 116 (August 5th and 6th, 1974) 
(emphasis added).)
    In addition to implicitly recognizing that articles of impeachment 
may contain multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the Senate 
has convicted a number of judges on such ``omnibus'' articles, 
including Judges Archbald, Ritter, and Claiborne. In the case of Judge 
Nixon, the Senate acquitted on the article, but refused to dismiss it.
    The most recent example, that of Judge Nixon in 1989, is 
instructive. Judge Walter L. Nixon filed a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that Article III was duplicative, among other things. Senator 
Fowler, the chairman of the committee appointed to take evidence in the 
impeachment trial of Judge Nixon explained the reasons for denying 
Nixon's motion to refer the motion to dismiss to the full Senate:

    ``To the extent that the motion rests on the House's inclusion of 
fourteen distinct allegations of false statements in one article, we 
believe that Article III states an intelligible and adequately discrete 
charge of an impeachable offense by alleging that Judge Nixon concealed 
information concerning several conversations in which he had engaged by 
making ``one or more'' false statements to a grand jury. The House has 
substantial discretion in determining how to aggregate related alleged 
acts of misconduct in framing Articles of Impeachment and has 
historically frequently chosen to aggregate multiple factual 
allegations in a single impeachment article. The House's itemization of 
the fourteen particular statements whose knowing falsity it is alleging 
serves to give Judge Nixon fair notice of the contours of the charge 
against him without reducing the intelligibility of the article's 
essential accusation that Judge Nixon knowingly concealed material 
information from the government's law enforcement agents. Because the 
Committee believes that evidentiary proceedings may fairly be conducted 
on Article III as it is presently drafted, Judge Nixon's motion to 
refer his motion to dismiss Article III to the Senate at this time is 
denied.''

(135 Cong. Rec. 19635-36 (September 6, 1989).)
    The full Senate eventually rejected Judge Nixon's motion to dismiss 
by a vote of 34 to 63. Mr. Manager Cardin persuasively summed up the 
argument against the motion to dismiss as follows:

    ``Judge Nixon argues, in his brief, that you must find all 14 
statements to be false to vote guilty on article III. But that is 
untrue. Read the article closely. The question posed by article III is, 
did Judge Nixon conceal information? Did he conceal information, first 
by one or more false or misleading statements in his interview, and 
then by one or more false and misleading statements in his grand jury 
testimony?
    ``You need not find all 14 statements to be false. The House is 
unanimously convinced that all 14 are complete and utter lies. We hope 
you will agree. But after considering the evidence, perhaps you will 
conclude that only 12 of the statements are false. It really does not 
matter. Just one intentionally false and misleading statement in the 
interview, or one in the grand jury, should be enough. Because if you 
conclude that Judge Nixon concealed information, whether by 1 false 
statement or 14, he should be removed from the bench. You should vote 
guilty on article III.
    ``And you need not necessarily agree on which statements are false, 
if you reach the conclusion that he concealed information. If two-
thirds of the Senators present believe Judge Nixon lied, regardless of 
how each individual Senator reached that conclusion, he will properly 
be removed from office.
          * * * * * * *
    ``This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if you might 
differ on which particular statements are lies, the bottom line is that 
two-thirds of you will have agreed that he concealed information, 
rendering him unfit for office. That is what the Constitution 
requires.''

(Id. at 26751.)
    Given the clear Senate precedent permitting articles of impeachment 
containing multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the 
President's attack on the construction of the articles is an attack on 
Senate rules and precedent. The President's concerns, if assumed to be 
valid, could be addressed simply by permitting a division of the 
question. Under the standing rules of the Senate, any Senator may have 
the same divided if ``the question in debate contains several 
propositions.'' Senate Rule XV. A question is divisible if it contains 
two or more separate and distinct propositions. The Senate, however, 
has made an affirmative decision to dispense with the regular order 
which governs bills, resolutions, and amendments thereto, and instead 
adopted a different procedure not permitting the division of articles 
of impeachment. The Senate has not acted unconstitutionally in the past 
regarding prior impeachments, and is not on a course to do so in the 
trial of President Clinton.
    The claim that President Clinton is not on notice regarding the 
charges is ludicrous. The Lewinsky matter is arguably the most reported 
and scrutinized story of 1998 and possibly of 1999. The facts of the 
case are contained in numerous documents, statements, reports, and 
filings. Specifically, President Clinton has had the following 
documents, among others, containing the facts and specifics of the 
case: (1) Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c), H.Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998); (2) 
Investigatory Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary with Respect to its 
Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rept. 105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 
7, 1998); (3) Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Rept. 105-830 (Dec. 16, 
1998); and (4) Trial Memorandum of the United States House of 
Representatives. If all of these reports and the thousands of pages of 
documents are not enough, President Clinton will have the opportunity 
to review the presentation of the Managers on the Part of the House for 
up to twenty-four hours.

    V. President Clinton Completely Misstates the Record as to the 
    Discovery Procedures That Were Available to Him in the House of 
                            Representatives

    President Clinton's trial memorandum claimed to the Senate that, 
should it decide ``to allow the House managers to expand the record in 
some way . . . the President would have an urgent need for the 
discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these 
proceedings has been able to subpoena documents or summon or cross-
examine witnesses.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 125 (emphasis 
added). The President also states that ``the House of Representatives 
[did not] afford the President any discovery mechanisms to secure 
evidence that might be helpful in his defense.'' Id.
    We will not address every discovery issue here since those issues 
will be resolved in the coming days; however, the Senate should know 
that these claims are absolutely false. In fact, the President's own 
brief refutes his claims. ``The Committee allowed the President's 
lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House 
presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses. . . .'' White 
House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on 
behalf of the President. . . .'' Id. at 13.
    The House Committee on the Judiciary repeatedly asked the 
President's attorneys to supply any exculpatory evidence to the 
Committee, both orally and in writing. They never did. When, at the 
last minute, the President's counsel requested witnesses, the Committee 
invited to testify every witness they requested. Aside from this, 
President Clinton nor his attorneys never asked to ``subpoena 
documents'' or ``summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' If President 
Clinton's argument is that the Committee did not provide his staff a 
stack of blank subpoenas, that is correct. However, neither the House 
of Representatives, nor the Senate, has the ability to ``turn over'' 
its constitutionally based subpoena power to the executive branch.
    President Clinton's attorneys never asked to do the things they now 
claim they never had the ability to do. In fact, when minority members 
of the Committee publicly asked that Judge Starr be called as a 
witness, Judge Starr was called. In fact, President Clinton's attorney 
and minority counsel questioned Judge Starr for over two hours. Every 
Member of the Committee questioned him for at least five minutes each. 
Judge Starr was a witness, and he was cross-examined by David Kendall, 
President Clinton's private attorney. President Clinton's claims are 
just not accurate.
    President Clinton's attorneys raise the issue of fairness. They are 
entitled to their own opinion about the House's proceedings, but they 
are not entitled to rewrite history. The truth is that the Committee's 
subpoena power could have been used to subpoena documents or witnesses 
on behalf of the President if they had so requested. They did not. All 
they requested, is that lawyers, law professors, and historians testify 
before the Committee. In short, President Clinton's statements about 
what happened in the House completely misstate what occurred.

                             VI. Conclusion

    For the reasons stated herein and in the Trial Memorandum of the 
United States House of Representatives, the House respectfully submits 
that the articles properly state impeachable offenses, that the Senate 
should proceed to a full trial on the articles, and that after trial, 
the Senate should vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton, 
remove him from office, and disqualify him from holding further office.
            Respectfully submitted,

                                   The United States
                                   House of Representatives.

                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                          Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                   General Counsel.
                                        David P. Schippers,
                                       Chief Investigative Counsel.
    Dated: January 14, 1999.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I would like to inform Members of the 
Senate and the parties in this case of my need to stand on 
occasion to stretch my back. I have no intention that the 
proceedings should be in any way interrupted when I do so.
    The Presiding Officer notes the presence in the Senate 
Chamber of the managers on the part of the House of 
Representatives and counsel for the President of the United 
States.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
managers for the House of Representatives have 24 hours to make 
the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you.
    The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde to begin 
the presentation of the case for the House of Representatives.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel 
for the President, and Senators, we are brought together on 
this solemn and historic occasion to perform important duties 
assigned to us by the Constitution.
    We want you to know how much we respect you and this 
institution and how grateful we are for your guidance and your 
cooperation.
    With your permission, we, the managers of the House, are 
here to set forth the evidence in support of two articles of 
impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. You 
are seated in this historic Chamber not to embark on some great 
legislative debate, which these stately walls have so often 
witnessed, but to listen to the evidence, as those who must sit 
in judgment.
    To guide you in this grave duty, you have taken an oath of 
impartiality. With the simple words ``I do,'' you have pledged 
to put aside personal bias and partisan interest and to do 
``impartial justice.'' Your willingness to take up this calling 
has once again reminded the world of the unique brilliance of 
America's constitutional system of Government. We are here, Mr. 
Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, as advocates for the 
rule of law, for equal justice under the law and for the 
sanctity of the oath.
    The oath. In many ways, the case you will consider in the 
coming days is about those two words: ``I do,'' pronounced at 
two Presidential inaugurations by a person whose spoken words 
have singular importance to our Nation and to the great globe 
itself.
    More than 450 years ago, Sir Thomas More, former Lord 
Chancellor of England, was imprisoned in the Tower of London 
because he had, in the name of conscience, defied the absolute 
power of the King. As the playwright Robert Bolt tells it, More 
was visited by his family, who tried to persuade him to speak 
the words of the oath that would save his life, even while, in 
his mind and heart, he held firm to his conviction that the 
King was in error. More refused. As he told his daughter, 
Margaret, ``When a man takes an oath, Meg, he's holding his own 
self in his hands. Like water. And if he opens his fingers 
then--he needn't hope to find himself again . . .'' Sir Thomas 
More, the most brilliant lawyer of his generation, a scholar 
with an international reputation, the center of a warm and 
affectionate family life which he cherished, went to his death 
rather than take an oath in vain.
    Members of the Senate, what you do over the next few weeks 
will forever affect the meaning of those two words: ``I do.'' 
You are now stewards of the oath. Its significance in public 
service and our cherished system of justice will never be the 
same after this. Depending on what you decide, it will either 
be strengthened in its power to achieve justice or it will go 
the way of so much of our moral infrastructure and become a 
mere convention, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
    The House of Representatives has named myself and 12 other 
Members as managers of its case. I have the honor of 
introducing those distinguished Members and explaining how we 
will make our initial presentation. The gentleman from 
Wisconsin, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, will begin the 
presentation with an overview of the case. Representative 
Sensenbrenner is the ranking Republican member of the House 
Judiciary Committee, and has served for 20 years. In 1989, 
Representative Sensenbrenner was a House manager in the 
impeachment trial of Judge Walter L. Nixon, who was convicted 
on two articles of impeachment for making false and misleading 
statements before a federal grand jury.
    Following Representative Sensenbrenner will be a team of 
managers who will make a presentation of the relevant facts of 
this case. From the very outset of this ordeal, there has been 
a great deal of speculation and misinformation about the facts. 
That has been unfortunate for everyone involved. We believe 
that a full presentation of the facts and the law by the House 
managers--will be helpful.
    Representative Ed Bryant, from Tennessee, was a United 
States Attorney from the Western District of Tennessee. As a 
captain in the Army, Representative Bryant served in the Judge 
Advocate General Corps and taught at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point. Representative Bryant will explain the 
background of the events that led to the illegal actions of the 
President.
    Following Representative Bryant,  Representative Asa 
Hutchinson, from Arkansas, will give a presentation of the 
factual basis for article II, obstruction of justice. 
Representative Hutchinson is a former United States Attorney 
for the Western District of Arkansas.
    Next, you will hear from Representative Jim Rogan of 
California. Representative Rogan is a former California State 
judge and Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney. 
Representative Rogan will give a presentation of the factual 
basis for article I, grand jury perjury. This should conclude 
our presentation for today.
    Tomorrow, Representative Bill McCollum of Florida will tie 
all of the facts together and give a factual summation. 
Representative McCollum is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Crime, a former Naval Reserve Commander and member of the Judge 
Advocate General Corps.
    Following the presentation of the facts, a team of managers 
will present the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of 
justice and how it applies to the articles of impeachment 
before you. While the Senate has made it clear that a crime is 
not essential to impeachment and removal from office, these 
managers will explain how egregious and criminal the conduct 
alleged in the articles of impeachment is. This team includes 
Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania, Representative 
Steve Chabot of Ohio, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, and 
Representative Chris Cannon of Utah. Representative Gekas is 
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. And in 1989, Representative Gekas served as 
a manager of the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, who 
the Senate convicted on eight articles for making false and 
misleading statements under oath and one article of conspiracy 
to engage in a bribery. Representative Gekas is a former 
assistant district attorney. Representative Chabot serves on 
the Subcommittee on Crime and has experience as a criminal 
defense lawyer. Representative Barr is a former United States 
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, where he 
specialized in public corruption. He also has experience as a 
criminal defense attorney. Representative Cannon has had 
experience as the Deputy Associate Solicitor General of the 
Department of the Interior and as a practicing attorney. That 
should conclude our presentation for Friday.
    On Saturday, three managers will make a presentation on 
Constitutional law as it relates to this case. There has been a 
great deal of argument about whether the conduct alleged in the 
articles rises to the level of removable offenses. This team's 
analysis of the precedents of the Senate and application of the 
facts of this case will make it clear that the Senate has 
established the conduct alleged in the articles to be removable 
offenses. In this presentation you will hear from 
Representative Charles Canady of Florida, Representative Steve 
Buyer of Indiana and Representative Lindsey Graham of South 
Carolina. Representative Canady is the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution and one of the leading voices 
on constitutional law in the House. Representative Buyer served 
in the United States Army as a member of the Judge Advocate 
General's Corps where he was assigned as Special Assistant to 
the United States Attorney in Virginia. He also served as a 
deputy to the Indiana Attorney General. Representative Graham 
served in the Air Force as a member of the Judge Advocate 
General's Corps and as a South Carolina Assistant Attorney.
    Following the presentation of the facts, the law of perjury 
and obstruction of justice and constitutional law, Mr. Rogan 
and myself will give you a final summation and closing to our 
initial presentation.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner is recognized.
    Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
counsel to the President, and Senators, in his third annual 
message to Congress on December 7, 1903, President Theodore 
Roosevelt said:

    No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we 
ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. 
Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a 
favor.

    We are here today because President William Jefferson 
Clinton decided to put himself above the law--not once, not 
twice, but repeatedly. He put himself above the law when he 
engaged in a multifaceted scheme to obstruct justice during the 
Federal civil rights case of Paula Corbin Jones versus William 
Jefferson Clinton, et. al. He put himself above the law when he 
made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath 
during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998. In both 
instances, he unlawfully attempted to prevent the judicial 
branch of Government--a coequal branch--from performing its 
constitutional duty to administer equal justice under the law.
    The U.S. House of Representatives has determined that the 
President's false and misleading testimony to the grand jury 
and his obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit are high 
crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Should the Senate conduct a fair and impartial trial which 
allows each side to present its best case, then the American 
public can be confident that justice has been served, 
regardless of the outcome.
    We hear much about how important the rule of law is to our 
Nation and to our system of government. Some have commented 
that this expression is trite. But, whether expressed by these 
three words, or others, the primacy of law over the rule of 
individuals is what distinguishes the United States from most 
other countries and why our Constitution is as alive today as 
it was 210 years ago.
    The framers of the Constitution devised an elaborate system 
of checks and balances to ensure our liberties by making sure 
that no person, institution, or branch of Government became so 
powerful that a tyranny could ever be established in the United 
States of America.
    We are the trustees of that sacred legacy and whether the 
rule of law and faith in our Nation emerges stronger than ever 
or are diminished irreparably, depends upon the collective 
decision of the message each Senator chooses to send forth in 
the days ahead.
    The evidence you will hear relates solely to the 
President's misconduct, which is contrary to his constitutional 
public responsibility to ensure the laws be faithfully 
executed. It is not about the President's affair with a 
subordinate employee, an affair that was both inappropriate and 
immoral. Mr. Clinton has recognized that this relationship was 
wrong. I give him credit for that. But he has not owned up to 
the false testimony, the stonewalling and legal hairsplitting, 
and obstructing the courts from finding the truth. In doing so, 
he has turned his affair into a public wrong. And for these 
actions, he must be held accountable through the only 
constitutional means the country has available--the difficult 
and painful process of impeachment.
    Impeachment is one of the checks the framers gave to 
Congress to protect the American people from a corrupt or 
tyrannical executive or judicial branch of Government. Because 
the procedure is cumbersome and because a two-thirds vote in 
the Senate is required to remove an official following an 
impeachment trial, safeguards are there to stop Congress from 
increasing its powers at the expense of the other two branches. 
The process is long. It is difficult. It is unpleasant. But, 
above all, it is necessary to maintain the public's trust in 
the conduct of their elected officials--elected officials, such 
as myself and yourselves, who through our oaths of office have 
a duty to follow the law, fulfill our constitutional 
responsibilities, and protect our Republic from public 
wrongdoing.
    The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a separate and 
distinct process in the House and in the Senate. They did not 
expect the House and Senate to conduct virtually identical 
proceedings with the only difference being that conviction in 
the Senate requires a two-thirds vote. That is why the 
Constitution reserves the sole power of impeachment to the 
House of Representatives and the sole power to try all 
impeachments to the Senate. History demonstrates different 
processes were adopted to reflect very different roles.
    In the case of President Andrew Johnson, no hearings were 
held or witnesses called by the House on the President's 
decision to remove Secretary of War Stanton from office. The 
House first approved a general article of impeachment that 
simply stated that President Johnson was impeached for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Five days later, a special House 
committee drew up specific articles. Eleven articles were 
passed by the House, all but two of which were based upon 
President Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office 
Act by his actions in removing Secretary of War Stanton. The 
trial was then conducted with witnesses in the Senate.
    In the case of President Nixon, the House Judiciary 
Committee passed three articles of impeachment based not upon 
their own investigation, but upon the evidence gathered by the 
Ervin Committee, the Patman Committee, the Joint Tax Committee, 
and material from the special prosecutor and various court 
proceedings. Nine witnesses were called at the end of the 
impeachment inquiry, five of them at the request of the White 
House, and their testimony was not at the center of the 
impeachment articles.
    In the Judge Walter Nixon impeachment in 1989, a trial with 
live witnesses was held even after the Senate rejected by less 
than a two-thirds vote a defense motion to dismiss one article 
of impeachment on the grounds that it did not constitute an 
impeachable offense.
    The House managers submit that witnesses are essential to 
give heightened credence to whatever judgment the Senate 
chooses to make on each of the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton.
    The matter of how this proceeding will be conducted remains 
somewhat unsettled. Senate impeachment precedent has been to 
hold a trial. In every impeachment case, the Senate has heard 
from live witnesses. Should the President's counsel dispute the 
facts as laid out by the House of Representatives, the Senate 
will need to hear from live witnesses in order to reach a 
proper and fair judgment as to the truthful facts of this case.
    The House concluded the President made perjurious, false 
and misleading statements before the grand jury, which the 
House believes constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Our 
entire legal system is based upon the courts being able to find 
the truth. That's why witnesses must raise their right hand and 
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. That's why there are criminal penalties for perjury and 
making false statements under oath. The need for obtaining 
truthful testimony in court is so important that the Federal 
sentencing guidelines have the same penalties for perjury as 
for bribery.
    The Constitution specifically names bribery as an 
impeachable offense. Perjury is the twin brother of bribery. By 
making the penalty for perjury the same as that for bribery, 
Congress has acknowledged that both crimes are equally serious. 
It follows that perjury and making false statements under oath, 
which is a form of perjury, be considered among the ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' the framers intended to be grounds 
for impeachment.
    The three judicial impeachments of the 1980s were all about 
lies told by a federal judge. Judge Claiborne was removed from 
office for lying on his income tax returns, Judge Hastings was 
removed for lying under oath during a trial, and Judge Nixon 
was removed for making false statements to a grand jury. In 
each case, the Senate showed no leniency to judges who lied. 
Their misconduct was deemed impeachable and more than two-
thirds of the Senate voted to convict.
    If the Senate is convinced that President Clinton lied 
under oath and does not remove him from office, the wrong 
message is given to our courts, those who have business before 
them, and to the country as a whole. That terrible message is 
that we as a nation have set a lower standard for lying under 
oath for Presidents than for judges. Should not the leader of 
our country be held to at least as high a standard as the 
judges he appoints? Should not the President be obliged to tell 
the truth when under oath, just as every citizen must? Should 
not our laws be enforced equally? Your decision in this 
proceeding will answer these questions and set the standard of 
conduct of public officials in town halls and courtrooms and 
the Oval Office for generations.
    Justice is never served by the placing of any public 
official above the law. The framers rejected the British law of 
``The King can do no wrong,'' when they wrote our basic law in 
1787. Any law is only as good as its enforcement, and the 
enforcement of the law against the President was left to 
Congress through the impeachment process.
    A Senate conviction of the President in this matter will 
reaffirm the irrefutable fact that even the President of the 
United States has no license to lie under oath. Deceiving the 
courts is an offense against the public. It prevents the courts 
from administering justice and citizens from receiving justice. 
Every American has the right to go to court for redress of 
wrongs, as well as the right to a jury trial. The jury finds 
the facts. The citizens on the jury cannot correctly find the 
facts absent truthful testimony. That's why it's vital that the 
Senate protect the sanctity of the oath to obtain truthful 
testimony, not just during judicial proceedings but also during 
legislative proceedings.
    Witnesses before Congress, whether Presidential nominees 
seeking Senate confirmation to high posts in the executive or 
judicial branches, federal agency heads testifying during 
investigative hearings, or witnesses at legislative hearings 
giving their opinions on bills are sworn to tell the truth. 
Eroding the oath to tell the truth means that Congress loses 
some of its ability to base its decisions upon truthful 
testimony. Lowering the standard of the truthfulness of sworn 
testimony will create a cancer that will keep the legislative 
branch from discharging its constitutional functions as well.
    Mr. Chief Justice, we are here today because William 
Jefferson Clinton decided to use all means possible--both legal 
and illegal--to subvert the truth about his conduct relevant to 
the federal civil rights suit brought against President Clinton 
by Ms. Paula Jones. Defendants in civil lawsuits cannot pick 
and choose which laws and rules of procedure they will follow 
and which they will not. That's for the trial judge to decide, 
whether the defendant be President or pauper.
    In this case, a citizen claimed her civil rights were 
violated when she refused then Governor Clinton's advances and 
was subsequently harassed at work, denied merit pay raises, and 
finally forced to quit. The court ruled she had the right to 
obtain evidence showing other women including Ms. Lewinsky, got 
jobs, promotions, and raises after submitting to Mr. Clinton, 
and whether other women suffered job detriments after refusing 
similar advances.
    When someone lies about an affair and tries to hide the 
fact, they violate the trust their spouse and family put in 
them. But when they lie about it during a legal proceeding and 
obstruct the parties from obtaining evidence, they prevent the 
courts from administering justice.
    That is an offense against the public, made even worse when 
a poor or powerless person seeks the protections of our civil 
rights from the rich or powerful.
    When an American citizen claims his or her civil rights 
have been violated, we must take those claims seriously. Our 
civil rights laws have remade our society for the better. The 
law gives the same protections to the child denied entry to a 
school or college based upon race as to an employee claiming 
discrimination at work. Once a hole is punched in civil rights 
protections for some, those protections are not worth as much 
for all. Many in the Senate have spent their lives advancing 
individual rights. Their successful efforts have made America a 
better place. In my opinion, this is no time to abandon that 
struggle--no matter the public mood or the political 
consequence.
    Some have said that the false testimony given by the 
President relating to sex should be excused, since as the 
argument goes: ``Everyone lies about sex.'' I ask the Senate to 
stop to think about the consequences of adopting that attitude. 
Our sexual harassment laws would become unenforceable since 
every sexual harassment lawsuit is about sex and much of 
domestic violence litigation is at least partly about sex. If 
defendants in these types of suits are allowed to lie about 
sex, justice cannot be done, and many victims, mostly women, 
will be denied justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the House has adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. Each 
meets the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and each 
is amply supported by the evidence.
    Article I impeaches the President for ``perjurious, false 
and misleading'' testimony during his August 17, 1998, 
appearance before a grand jury of the United States in four 
areas.
    First, the nature and details of his relationship with a 
subordinate government employee;
    Second, prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he 
gave in a federal civil rights action brought against him;
    Third, prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
attorney to make to a federal judge in that federal civil 
rights lawsuit;
    Fourth, his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil 
rights action.
    The evidence will clearly show that President Clinton's 
false testimony to the grand jury was not a single or isolated 
instance which could be excused as a mistake but, rather, a 
comprehensive and calculated plan to prevent the grand jury 
from getting the accurate testimony in order to do its job. 
Furthermore, it is important to dispel the notion that the 
President's false testimony before the grand jury simply 
relates to details of the relationship between President 
Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky. These charges only make up a small 
part of article I. The fact is, the evidence will show that 
President Clinton made numerous perjurious, false and 
misleading statements regarding his efforts to obstruct 
justice.
    Before describing what the evidence in support of article I 
shows, it is also important to clearly demonstrate that the 
Senate has already decided that making false statements under 
oath to a federal grand jury is an impeachable offense.
    The last impeachment decided by the Senate, that of United 
States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, 
involved the Judge's making false statements under oath to a 
federal grand jury, precisely the same charges contained in 
article I against President Clinton. Following an unanimous 417 
to 0 vote in the House, the Senate conducted a full trial and 
removed Judge Nixon from office on the two articles charging 
false statements to a grand jury by votes of 89 to 8 and 78 to 
19. The Senate was clear that the specific misconduct, that is, 
making false statements to a grand jury, which was the basis 
for the Judge's impeachment, warranted his removal from office 
and the Senate proceeded to do just that.
    These votes, a little more than nine years ago on November 
3, 1989, set a clear standard that lying to a grand jury is 
grounds for removal from office. To set a different standard in 
this trial is to say that the standard for judicial 
truthfulness during grand jury testimony is higher than that of 
presidential truthfulness.
    That result would be absurd. The truth is the truth and a 
lie is a lie. There cannot be different levels of the truth for 
judges than for presidents.
    The President's perjurious, false and misleading statements 
regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began early in his 
grand jury testimony. These statements included parts of the 
prepared statement the President read at the beginning of his 
testimony. He referred or reverted to his statement at least 19 
times during the course of his testimony.
    Further, the evidence will show the President made other 
false statements to the grand jury regarding the nature and 
details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at times when he 
did not refer to his prepared statement.
    Second, the evidence will show that the President piled 
perjury upon perjury when he provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in Ms. Paula 
Jones' case.
    On two occasions, the President testified to the grand jury 
that his deposition testimony was the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, and that he was required to give a 
complete answer to each question asked of him during the 
deposition. That means he brought to the grand jury his 
untruthful answers to questions at the deposition.
    Third, the evidence will show the President provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a Federal grand 
jury regarding his attorney's use of an affidavit he knew to be 
false during the deposition in Ms. Paula Jones' case before 
Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright.
    The President denied that he even paid attention to Mr. 
Bennett's use of the affidavit. The evidence will show he made 
this denial because his failure to stop his attorney from 
utilizing a false affidavit at a deposition would constitute 
obstruction of justice. The evidence will also show the 
President did not admit that Mr. Bennett's statement was false 
because to do so would be to admit that he had perjured himself 
earlier that day during the grand jury testimony, as well as at 
the deposition.
    Fourth, the evidence will show that the President provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury 
concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in Ms. Paula 
Jones' civil rights action.
    The evidence will show that these statements related to at 
least four areas:
    First, his false statements relating to gifts exchanged 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The subpoena served on 
Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case required her to produce each and 
every gift she had received from the President. These gifts 
were not turned over as required by the subpoena but ended up 
under Ms. Betty Currie's bed in a sealed container. The 
President denied under oath that he directed Ms. Currie to get 
the gifts, but the evidence will show that Ms. Currie did call 
Ms. Lewinsky about them and that there was no reason for her 
doing so unless directed by the President.
    Second, the President made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to the grand jury regarding his knowledge that the 
Lewinsky affidavit submitted at the deposition was untrue. The 
evidence will show that the President testified falsely on this 
issue on at least three separate occasions during his grand 
jury testimony. He also provided false testimony on whether he 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit.
    Third, the President made false and misleading statements 
to the grand jury by reciting a false account of the facts 
regarding his interactions with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie, 
who was a potential witness against him in Ms. Jones' case.
    The record reflects the President tried to coach Ms. Currie 
to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions should she 
be called as a witness. The evidence will show the President 
testified to the grand jury that he was trying to figure out 
what the facts were, but in reality the conversation with Ms. 
Currie consisted of a number of very false and misleading 
statements.
    Finally, the President made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to aides regarding his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President tried 
to have it both ways on this issue. He testified that his 
statements to aides were both true and misleading--true and 
misleading.
    The evidence will show that he met with four aides who 
would later be called to testify before the grand jury. They 
included Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. John Podesta, Mr. Erskine 
Bowles, and Mr. Harold Ickes. Each of them related to the grand 
jury the untruths they had been told by the President. I have 
recited this long catalogue of false statements to show that 
the President's false statements to the grand jury were neither 
few in number nor isolated but, rather, pervaded his entire 
testimony.
    There can be no question that the President's false 
statements to the grand jury were material to the subject of 
the inquiry. Grand juries are utilized to obtain sworn 
testimony from witnesses to determine whether a crime has been 
committed. The Attorney General and the Special Division of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit appointed an independent counsel pursuant to law and 
added areas of inquiry because they believed there was evidence 
that the President may have committed crimes. Grand jury 
testimony relevant to the criminal probe is always material to 
the issue of whether someone has committed a crime.
    Based upon the precedent in the Judge Nixon impeachment, 
the law, the facts, and the evidence, if you find the President 
made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath to 
the grand jury, I respectfully submit that your duty will be to 
find William Jefferson Clinton guilty with respect to article I 
and to remove him from office.
    Article II impeaches William Jefferson Clinton for 
preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of 
justice in the Jones case by either directly or through 
subordinates and agents engaging in a scheme to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony 
relating to Ms. Jones' Federal civil rights action.
    As in the case of article I, the President's direct and 
indirect actions were not isolated mistakes but were 
multifaceted actions specifically designed to prevent Ms. Paula 
Jones from having her day in court.
    While the Senate determined in the Judge Nixon trial that 
the making of false statements to a Federal grand jury 
warranted conviction and removal from office, no impeachment on 
an obstruction of justice charge has ever reached the Senate.
    Therefore, this article is a matter of first impression. 
However, the impeachment inquiry of the House Judiciary 
Committee into the conduct of President Richard Nixon, as well 
as the relevant Federal criminal statutes, clearly shows 
President Clinton's actions to be within the definition of 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' contained in the Constitution.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon 
approved by the Judiciary Committee charged Mr. Nixon with 
``engag(ing) personally and through his subordinates and agents 
in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and 
obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up, 
conceal and protect those responsible and to conceal the 
existence and scope of other unlawful activities.''
    The article charged that the implementation of the plan 
included nine separate areas of misconduct. Included among 
these were, one, making or causing to be made false and 
misleading statements to investigative officers and employees 
of the United States; two, withholding relevant and material 
evidence from such persons; three, approving, condoning, 
acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to the 
giving of false and misleading statements to such persons as 
well as in judicial and congressional proceedings.
    History shows us that President Nixon's resignation was the 
only act that prevented the Senate from voting on this article, 
and that the President's conviction and removal from office 
were all but certain.
    There are two sections of the Federal Criminal Code placing 
penalties on those who obstruct justice. Title 18, United 
States Code, section 1503, punishes ``whoever . . . corruptly, 
or by threats or force . . . obstructs, or impedes or endeavors 
to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of 
justice.''
    The courts have held that this section relates to pending 
judicial process, which can be a civil action. Ms. Jones' case 
fits that definition at the time of the President's actions as 
alleged in article II, as does the Office of Independent 
Counsel's investigation.
    Title 18, United States Code, section 1512, punishes, 
``Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts 
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to . . . influence, delay or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding . . . (or) 
cause or induce any person to . . . withhold testimony, or 
withhold a record, document, or other object from an official 
proceeding. . . .''
    The evidence will show that President Clinton's actions 
constituted obstruction of justice in seven specific instances 
as alleged in article II. Paragraph one alleges that on or 
about December 17, 1997, the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky, 
who would be subpoenaed as a witness in Ms. Jones' case two 
days later, to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew would be 
perjurious, false, and misleading.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
    Second, article II alleges that on or about that same day, 
the President corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called 
to testify personally in that proceeding. Ms. Lewinsky, on the 
witness list at that time, could have been expected to be 
required to give live testimony in the Jones case and in fact 
she was subsequently subpoenaed for a deposition in that case.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
    Third, article II alleges on or about December 28, 1997, 
the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
scheme to conceal evidence which had been subpoenaed in Ms. 
Jones' civil rights case. He did so by asking Ms. Betty Currie 
to retrieve evidence from Ms. Lewinsky that had been subpoenaed 
in the case of Jones v. Clinton.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated the 
second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
    Fourth, article II alleges that beginning on or about 
December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 
14, 1998, the President intensified and succeeded in an effort 
to secure job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in order to corruptly 
prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case at a time when 
her truthful testimony would have been harmful to him.
    While Ms. Lewinsky had sought employment in New York City 
long before the dates in question, helping her find a suitable 
job was clearly a low priority for the President and his 
associates until it became obvious she would become a witness 
in the Jones case. The evidence will clearly show an 
intensification of that effort after her name appeared on the 
witness list. This effort was ultimately successful and the 
evidence will show that the President's actions violated both 
Federal obstruction statutes.
    Fifth, article II alleges on January 17, 1998, the 
President corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements to Judge Wright characterizing the 
Lewinsky affidavit in order to prevent questioning deemed 
relevant by the judge. The President's attorney, Robert 
Bennett, subsequently acknowledged such false and misleading 
statements in a communication to Judge Wright.
    The evidence will show the President's actions clearly 
violate the second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
    Sixth, article II alleges that on or about January 18, 20, 
and 21, 1998, the President related a false and misleading 
account of events relevant to Ms. Jones' civil rights suit to 
Ms. Betty Currie, a potential witness in the proceeding, in 
order to corruptly influence her testimony.
    The evidence will show that President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, his personal 
secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to 
possible questions that might be asked of her if called to 
testify in Ms. Paula Jones' case. The President did this 
shortly after he had been deposed in the civil action.
    During the deposition, he frequently referred to Ms. 
Currie, and it was logical that, based upon his testimony, Ms. 
Currie would be called as a witness.
    The evidence will show that two hours after the completion 
of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie to ask her 
to come to the office the next day, which was a Sunday.
    When Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, she 
acknowledged the President made a series of leading statements 
or questions and concluded that the President wanted her to 
agree with him.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both statutes but, most particularly, section 1512.
    In United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77 at 82 (2d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said,

    The most obvious example of a section 1512 violation may be 
the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a 
false story as if the story were true, intending that the 
witness believes the story and testifies to it before the grand 
jury.

    If the President's actions do not fit this example, I'm at 
a loss to know what actions do.
    Seventh, and last, article II alleges on or about January 
21, 23, and 26, 1998, the President made false and misleading 
statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury 
proceeding in order to corruptly influence this testimony of 
those witnesses. The article further alleges these false and 
misleading statements were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and 
misleading information.
    The evidence will show that these statements were made to 
Presidential aides Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. Erskine Bowles, 
Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Harold Ickes. They all testified to 
the grand jury. By his own admission seven months later, on 
August 17, 1998, during his sworn grand jury testimony, the 
President said that he told a number of aides that he did not 
have an affair with Ms. Lewinsky and did not have sex with her. 
He told one aide, Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, that Ms. Monica 
Lewinsky came on to him and he rebuffed her. President Clinton 
also admitted that he knew these aides might be called before 
the grand jury as witnesses. The evidence will show they were 
called; they related the President's false statements to the 
grand jury; and that by the time the President made his 
admission to the grand jury the damage had already been done.
    This is a classic violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1512.
    The seven specific allegations of obstruction of justice 
contained in article II were designed to prevent the judicial 
branch of government, a separate and coequal branch, from doing 
its work in Ms. Paula Jones' lawsuit. Based upon the allegation 
of article I against President Nixon in 1974, as well as 
repeated and calculated violations of two key criminal 
obstruction statutes, William Jefferson Clinton committed an 
impeachable offense.
    In article II, the evidence is conclusive that President 
Clinton put himself above the law in obstructing justice, not 
once, not just a few times, but as a part of a extensive scheme 
to prevent Ms. Jones from obtaining the evidence she thought 
she needed to prove her civil rights claims.
    Complying with the law is the duty of all parties to 
lawsuits and those who are required to give truthful testimony. 
A defendant in a Federal civil rights action does not have the 
luxury to choose what evidence the court may consider. He must 
abide by the law and the rules of procedure. William Jefferson 
Clinton tried to say that the law did not apply to him during 
his term of office in civil cases were concerned. He properly 
lost that argument in the Supreme Court in a unanimous 
decision.
    Even though the Supreme Court decided that the President 
wasn't above the law and that Ms. Jones' case could proceed, 
William Jefferson Clinton decided--and decided alone--to act as 
if the Supreme Court had never acted and that Judge Wright's 
orders didn't apply to him. What he did was criminal, time and 
time again. These criminal acts were in direct conflict with 
the President's obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.
    Based upon the repeated violations of Federal criminal law, 
its effect upon the courts to find the truth, and the 
President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, if you find that the President did, indeed, obstruct 
the administration of justice through his acts, I respectfully 
submit your duty will be to find William Jefferson Clinton 
guilty with respect to article II and to remove him from 
office.
    It is truly sad when the leader of the greatest nation in 
the world gets caught up in a series of events where one 
inappropriate and criminal act leads to another and another and 
another.
    Even sadder is that the President himself could have 
stopped this process simply by telling the truth and accepting 
the consequences of his prior mistakes. At least six times 
since December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton could have 
told the truth and suffered the consequences. Instead, he chose 
lies, perjury, and deception. He could have told the truth when 
he first learned that Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the 
Jones case. He could have told the truth at his civil 
deposition. He could have told the truth to Betty Currie. He 
could have told the truth when the news media first broke the 
story of his affair. He could have told the truth to his aides 
and cabinet. He could have told the truth to the American 
people. Instead, he shook his finger at each and every American 
and said, ``I want you to listen to me,'' and proceeded to tell 
a straight-faced lie to the American people.
    Finally, he had one more opportunity to tell the truth. He 
could have told the truth to the grand jury. Had he told the 
truth last January, there would have been no independent 
counsel investigation of this matter, no grand jury appearance, 
no impeachment inquiry, no House approval of articles of 
impeachment, and we would not be here today fulfilling a 
painful but essential constitutional duty. Instead, he chose 
lies and deception, despite warnings from friends, aides, and 
members of the House and Senate that failure to tell the truth 
would have grave consequences.
    When the case against him was being heard by the House 
Judiciary Committee, he sent his lawyers, who did not present 
any new evidence to rebut the facts and evidence sent to the 
House by the Independent Counsel. Rather, they disputed the 
Committee's interpretation of the evidence by relying on 
tortured, convoluted, and unreasonable interpretations of the 
President's words and actions.
    During his presentation to the House Judiciary Committee, 
the President's very able lawyer, Charles Ruff, was asked 
directly: Did the President lie during his sworn grand jury 
testimony?
    Mr. Ruff could have answered that question directly. He did 
not, and his failure to do so speaks a thousand words.
    Is there not something sacred when a witness in a judicial 
proceeding raises his or her right hand and swears before God 
and the public to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth? Do we want to tell the country that its leader 
gets a pass when he is required to give testimony under oath? 
Should we not be concerned about the effect of allowing 
perjurious, false, and misleading statements by the President 
to go unpunished on the truthfulness of anyone's testimony in 
future judicial or legislative proceedings? What do we tell the 
approximately 115 people now in Federal prison for the crime of 
perjury?
    The answers to all these questions ought to be obvious.
    As elected officials, our opinions are frequently shaped by 
constituents telling us their own stories. Let me tell you one 
related to me about the poisonous results of allowing false 
statements under oath to go unpunished.
    Last October while the Starr report was being hotly 
debated, one circuit court judge for Dodge County, WI, 
approached me on the street in Mayville, WI. He said that some 
citizens had business in his court and suggested that one of 
them take the witness stand and be put under oath to tell the 
truth. The citizen then asked if he could tell the truth ``just 
like the President.''
    How many people who have to come to court to testify under 
oath about matters they would like to keep to themselves think 
about what that citizen asked Judge John Storck? How will the 
courts be able to administer the ``equal justice under law'' we 
all hold so dear if we do not enforce the sanctity of that oath 
even against the President of the United States?
    When each of us is elected or chosen to serve in public 
office, we make a compact with the people of the United States 
of America to conduct ourselves in an honorable manner, 
hopefully setting a higher standard for ourselves than we 
expect of others. That should mean we are careful to obey all 
the laws we make, execute, and interpret.
    There is more than truth in the words, ``A public office is 
a public trust.''
    When someone breaks that trust, he or she must be held 
accountable and suffer the consequences for the breach. If 
there is no accountability, that means a President can set 
himself above the law for 4 years, a Senator for 6, a 
Representative for 2, and a judge for life. That, Mr. Chief 
Justice, poses a far greater threat to the liberties guaranteed 
to the American people by the Constitution than anything 
imaginable.
    For the past 11 months, the toughest questions I have had 
to answer have come from parents who wanted to know what to 
tell their children about what President Clinton did.
    Every parent tries to teach their children to know the 
difference between right and wrong, to always tell the truth, 
and when they make mistakes, to take responsibility for them, 
and to face the consequences of their actions.
    President Clinton's actions at every step since he knew Ms. 
Lewinsky would be a witness in Ms. Jones' case have been 
completely opposite to the values parents hope to teach their 
children.
    But being a poor example isn't grounds for impeachment. 
Undermining the rule of law is. Frustrating the court's ability 
to administer justice turns private misconduct into an attack 
upon the ability of one of the three branches of our government 
to impartially administer justice. This is a direct attack upon 
the rule of law in our country and a very public wrong that 
goes to the constitutional workings of our government and its 
ability to protect the civil rights of even the weakest 
American.
    What is on trial here is the truth and the rule of law. 
Failure to bring President Clinton to account for his serial 
lying under oath and preventing the courts from administering 
equal justice under law will cause a cancer to be present in 
our society for generations.
    Those parents who ask the questions should be able to tell 
their children that even if you are the President of the United 
States, if you lie when sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, you will face the consequences 
of that action even when you won't accept the responsibility 
for it.
    How those parents will answer those questions is up to the 
U.S. Senate.
    While how today's parents answer those questions is 
important, equally important is what parents tell their 
children in the generations to come about the history of our 
country and what has set our government in the United States of 
America apart from the rest of the world.
    Above the President's dais in this Senate chamber appears 
our national motto: ``E pluribus unum''--``out of many, one.'' 
When that motto was adopted more than 200 years ago, the First 
Congress referred to how 13 separate colonies turned themselves 
into one united nation.
    As the decades have gone by, that motto has taken an 
additional meaning. People of all nationalities, faiths, 
creeds, and values have come to our shores, shed their 
allegiances to their old countries and achieved their dreams to 
become Americans.
    They came here to flee religious persecution, to escape 
corrupt, tyrannical and oppressive governments, and to leave 
behind the economic stagnation and endless wars of their 
homelands.
    They came here to be able to practice their faiths as they 
saw fit--free of government dictates and to be able to provide 
better lives for themselves and their families by the sweat of 
their own brows and the use of their own intellect.
    But they also came here because they knew America has a 
system of government where the Constitution and laws protect 
individual liberties and human rights. Everyone--yes, 
everyone--can argue that this country has been a beacon for the 
individual citizen's ability to be what he or she can be.
    From countries where the rulers ruled at the expense of the 
people, they fled to America where the leaders were expected to 
govern for the benefit of the people.
    Throughout the years, America's leaders have tried to earn 
the trust of the American people, not by their words but by 
their actions.
    America is a place where government exists by the consent 
of the governed, and that means our Nation's leaders must earn 
and re-earn the trust of the people with everything they do.
    Whenever an elected official stumbles, that trust is eroded 
and public cynicism goes up. The more cynicism that exists 
about government, its institutions, and those chosen to serve 
in them, the more difficult the job is for those who are 
serving.
    That's why it is important--yes, vital--that when a cancer 
exists in the body politic, our job--our duty--is to excise it. 
If we fail in our duty, I fear the difficult and dedicated work 
done by thousands of honorable men and women elected to serve 
not just here in Washington but in our State capitals, city 
halls, courthouses and school board rooms, will be swept away 
in a sea of public cynicism. We must not allow the beacon of 
America to grow dim or the American dream to disappear with 
each waking morning.
    In 1974, the Congress did its painful public duty when the 
President of the United States broke the public trust.
    During the last decade, both Houses impeached and removed 
three Federal judges who broke their trust with the people.
    During the last 10 years, the House of Representatives 
disciplined two Speakers for breaking the rules and their trust 
with the public.
    Less than 6 years ago, this honorable Senate did the same 
to a senior Senator whose accomplishments were widely praised.
    In each case, Congress did the right thing to help restore 
the vital trust upon which our Government depends. It wasn't 
easy, nor was it always popular, but Congress did the right 
thing. Now this honorable Senate must do the right thing. It 
must listen to the evidence; it must determine whether William 
Jefferson Clinton repeatedly broke our criminal laws and thus 
broke his trust with the people--a trust contained in the 
Presidential oath put into the Constitution by the framers--an 
oath that no other Federal official must take, an oath to 
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
    How the Senate decides the issues to be presented in this 
trial will determine the legacy we pass to future generations 
of Americans.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who have made 
America what it is.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who put their 
``lives, fortunes and Sacred Honor'' on the line when they 
signed the Declaration of Independence.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of the framers of the 
Constitution whose preamble states that one of its purposes is 
``to establish justice.''
    The Senate can follow the legacy of James Madison and the 
Members of the First Congress who wrote and passed a Bill of 
Rights to protect and preserve the liberties of the American 
people.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who achieved 
equal rights for all Americans during the 1960s in Congress, in 
the courts, on the streets, in the buses, and at the lunch 
counters.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who brought 
President Nixon to justice during Watergate in the belief that 
no President can place himself above the law.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt who 
lived and governed by the principle that no man is above the 
law.
    Within the walls of the Capitol and throughout this great 
country there rages an impassioned and divisive debate over the 
future of this Presidency. This Senate now finds itself in the 
midst of the tempest. An already immense and agonizing duty is 
made even more so because the whims of public opinion polls, 
the popularity and unpopularity of individuals, even questions 
over the strength of our economy, risk subsuming the true 
nature of this grave and unwelcome task.
    We have all anguished over the sequence of events that have 
led us to this, the conclusive stage in the process. We have 
all identified in our own minds where it could have and should 
have stopped, but we have ended up here, before the Senate of 
the United States, where you, the Senators, will have to render 
judgment based upon the facts.
    A scientist in search of the basic nature of a substance 
begins by boiling away what is not of the essence. Similarly, 
the Senate will sift through the layers of debris that shroud 
the truth. The residue of this painful and divisive process is 
bitter, even poisonous at times. But beneath it lies the 
answer. The evidence will show that at its core, the question 
over the President's guilt and the need for his conviction will 
be clear because at its core, the issues involved are basic 
questions of right versus wrong--deceptive, criminal behavior 
versus honesty, integrity, and respect for the law.
    The President engaged in a conspiracy of crimes to prevent 
justice from being served. These are impeachable offenses for 
which the President should be convicted. Over the course of the 
days and weeks to come, we, the House managers, will endeavor 
to make this case.
    May these proceedings be fair and thorough. May they embody 
our highest capacity for truth and mutual respect. With these 
principles as our guides, we can begin with the full knowledge 
our democracy will prevail and that our Nation will emerge a 
stronger, better place.
    Our legacy now must be not to lose the trust the people 
should have in our Nation's leaders.
    Our legacy now must be not to cheapen the legacies left by 
our forebears.
    Our legacy must be to do the right thing based upon the 
evidence.
    For the sake of our country, the Senate must not fail.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, and my distinguished colleagues from the bar, I am Ed 
Bryant, the Representative from the Seventh District of 
Tennessee. During this portion of the case, I, along with 
Representative Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas, Representative James 
Rogan of California, and Representative Bill McCollum of 
Florida, will present the factual elements of this case. Our 
presentation is a very broad roadmap with which, first, I will 
provide the history and background of the parties, followed by 
Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Rogan, who will review the articles of 
impeachment. Mr. McCollum will close with a summation of these 
facts and evidence.
    It is our intent to proceed in a chronological fashion, 
although by necessity there will be some overlap of the facts 
and circumstances arising from what I have called ``the four-
way intersection collision'' of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, Ms. Paula Corbin Jones, Monica Lewinsky, and the U.S. 
Constitution.
    As a further preface to my remarks, permit me to say that 
none of us present here today in this hallowed Chamber relishes 
doing this job before us. But we did not choose to be involved 
in that reckless misconduct, nor did we make those reasoned and 
calculated decisions to cover up that misconduct which 
underlies this proceeding. However, this collision at the 
intersection, if you will, of the President, Ms. Jones, and Ms. 
Lewinsky, is not in and of itself enough to bring us together 
today. No. Had truth been a witness at this collision and 
prevailed, we would not be here. But when it was not present, 
even under an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth in a judicial matter, the impact of our 
Constitution must be felt. Hence, we are together today--to do 
our respective duties.
    By voting these articles of impeachment, the House is not 
attempting to raise the standard of conduct to perfection for 
our political leadership. Such a person does not walk the world 
today. Everyone falls short of this mark every day.
    Political life is not so much about how an individual fails 
but, rather, how the person reacts to that failure. For 
example, a person campaigning for a political office admits 
wrongdoing in his past and says he will not do that again. Most 
people accept that commitment. He is elected. Thereafter, he 
repeats this wrongdoing and is confronted again. What does he 
do? He takes steps to cover up this wrongdoing by using his 
workers and his friends. He lies under oath in a lawsuit which 
is very important to the person he is alleged to have harmed. 
He then takes a political poll as to whether he should tell the 
truth under oath. The poll indicates the voters would not 
forgive him for lying under oath. So he then denies the truth 
in a Federal grand jury. If this person is the President of the 
United States, the House of Representatives would consider 
articles of impeachment. It did and voted to impeach this 
President.
    But do not let it be argued in these chambers that ``we are 
not electing Saints; we are electing Presidents.'' Rather, let 
it be said that we are electing people who are imperfect and 
who have made mistakes in life but who are willing to so 
respect this country and the Office of the President that he or 
she will now lay aside their own personal shortcomings and have 
the inner strength to discipline themselves sufficiently that 
they do not break the law which they themselves are sworn to 
uphold.
    Every trial must have a beginning and this trial begins on 
a cold day in January 1993.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    I, William Jefferson Clinton, do solemnly swear that I will 
faithfully execute the office of President of the United 
States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States. So help me 
God.

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. I had expected a video portion, but all 
of you heard the audio portion. As you can hear from the audio 
portion--perhaps some of you can see--William Jefferson Clinton 
placed his left hand on the Bible in front of his wife, the 
Chief Justice, and every American watching that day and 
affirmatively acknowledged his oath of office. On that very day 
and again in January of 1997, the President joined a privileged 
few; he became only the 42nd person in our Nation to make the 
commitment to ``faithfully execute'' the office of the 
President and to ``preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution.'' He has the complete executive power of the 
Nation vested in him by virtue of this Constitution.
    As we progress throughout the day, I would ask that you be 
reminded of the importance of this oath. Before you is a copy 
of it and certainly available as anyone would like to look at 
it on breaks.
    William Jefferson Clinton is a man of great distinction. He 
is well-educated, with degrees from Georgetown University and 
Yale Law School. He has taught law school courses to aspiring 
young lawyers. He served as Governor and Attorney General for 
the State of Arkansas, enforcing the laws of that state. The 
President now directs our great Nation. He sets our agenda and 
creates national policy in a very public way. He is in fact a 
role model for many.
    President Clinton also serves as the Nation's chief law 
enforcement officer.
    It is primarily in this capacity that the President 
appoints Federal judges. Within the executive branch, he 
selected Attorney General Janet Reno and appointed each of the 
93 U.S. attorneys who are charged with enforcing all Federal, 
civil, and criminal law in Federal courthouses from Anchorage, 
AK, to Miami, FL, and from San Diego, CA, to Bangor, ME.
    Before you we have another chart which shows the schematics 
of the Department of Justice and how it is under the direct 
control of the President through his Cabinet, Attorney General 
and then down to such functions as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Immigration, U.S. Marshals Office, Bureau of Prisons, and so 
many other very important legal functions this Federal 
Government performs.
    As protectors of our Constitution, the U.S. attorneys and 
their assistants prosecute more than 50,000 cases per year.
    Through these appointments and his administration's 
policies, the President establishes the climate in this country 
for law and order. Each and every one of these 50,000 cases 
handled by his U.S. attorneys is dependent upon the parties and 
witnesses telling the truth under oath. Equally as important in 
these proceedings is that justice not be obstructed by 
tampering with witnesses nor hiding evidence.
    Quoting from the November 9, 1998 Constitution Subcommittee 
testimony of attorney Charles J. Cooper, a Washington, DC 
attorney, he states:

    The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the 
crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses 
against our system of government, visiting injury immediately 
upon society itself, whether or not committed in connection 
with the exercise of official government powers. Before the 
framing of our Constitution and since, our law has consistently 
recognized that perjury primarily and directly injures the body 
politic, for it subverts the judicial process and this strikes 
at the heart of the rule of law itself.

    Professor Gary McDowell, the Director at the Institute for 
United States Studies at the University of London, also 
testified in the same hearing in reference to the influential 
writer William Paley, and this is also in chart form for those 
who would like to review it later. Paley saw the issue of oaths 
and perjury as one of morality as well as law. Because a 
witness swears that he will speak the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, a person under oath cannot cleverly 
lie and not commit perjury. If the witness conceals any truth, 
Paley writes, that relates to the matter in adjudication, that 
is as much a violation of the oath as to testify a positive 
falsehood. Shame or embarrassment cannot justify his 
concealment of truth; linguistic contortions with the words 
used cannot legitimately conceal a lie or, if under oath, 
perjury.
    Professor McDowell concludes with a quote from Paley which 
accurately provides, I believe, the essence of a lie or 
perjurious statement:

    It is willful deceit that makes the lie; and we willfully 
deceive, where our expressions are not true in the sense in 
which we believe the hearer apprehends them.

    Neither has this U.S. Senate been silent on the issue of 
perjury. You have rightfully recognized through previous 
impeachment proceedings the unacceptable nature of a high 
government official lying under oath, even in matters initially 
arising from what some would argue here are merely personal. In 
1989, many of you present today, using the very same standard, 
which is section 4 of the Constitution, which is set forth 
there, for impeaching a Federal judge or the President, 
actually voted in support of a conviction and the removal of a 
U.S. district judge.
    Indeed, truth-telling is the most important judicial 
precept underpinning our great system of justice, a system 
which permits the courthouse doors to be open to all people, 
from the most powerful man in America to a young woman from 
Arkansas.
    On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones attempted to open that 
courthouse door when she filed a Federal sexual harassment 
lawsuit against President Clinton. The case arose from a 1991 
incident when she was a State employee and he was the Governor. 
Further details of the underlying allegations are not important 
to us today, but Ms. Jones' pursuit for the truth is worth a 
careful study.
    The parties first litigated the question of whether Ms. 
Jones' lawsuit would have to be deferred until after the 
President left office. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
the President's contention and allowed the case to proceed 
without further delay.
    Ms. Jones sought and appropriately won ``her day in 
court.'' Incumbent with this victory, however, was the 
reasonable expectation that President Clinton would tell the 
truth.
    After all, this was the most important case in the whole 
world to Paula Corbin Jones.
    Notwithstanding this, the fact didn't happen that the 
President told the truth. Even after the President was ordered 
to stand trial, pursuing the truth for Ms. Jones remained an 
elusive task. The evidence will indicate that President Clinton 
committed perjury and orchestrated a variety of efforts to 
obstruct justice, all of which--all of which--had the effect of 
preventing the discovery of the truth in the Paula Jones case.
    During the discovery phase, Judge Susan Webber Wright of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of 
Arkansas ordered the President to answer certain historical 
questions about his sexual relations with either State or 
Federal employees.
    In part, Judge Wright said:

    The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled 
to information regarding any individuals with whom the 
President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have 
sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame 
state or federal employees.

    Judge Wright validated Ms. Jones' right to use this 
accepted line of questioning in sexual harassment litigation. 
More often than not, these cases involve situations where ``he 
said/she said,'' and they produce issues of credibility and are 
often done in private. Because of this, they are really 
difficult for a victim to prove.
    Such standard questions are essential in establishing 
whether the defendant has committed the same kind of acts 
before or since--in other words, a pattern or practice of 
harassing conduct. The existence of such corroborative evidence 
or the lack thereof is likely to be critical in these types of 
cases. Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
guidelines and the Federal Rules of Evidence permit this type 
of evidence. In short, a defendant's sexual history, at least 
with respect to other employees, is ordinarily discoverable in 
a sexual harassment lawsuit.
    To not expect a defendant in this type of litigation to 
speak the truth creates, in its worst case, a very real danger 
to the entire area of sexual harassment law which would be 
irreparably damaged and, in its best case, sends out a very 
wrong message. As such, the will and intent of Congress with 
regard to providing protection against sexual harassment in the 
workplace would be effectively undermined.
    The ``pattern and practice'' witnesses whom Paula Corbin 
Jones was entitled to discover should have included the name of 
Monica Lewinsky. But before I discuss the Ms. Lewinsky matter, 
I want to offer three matters of cause to each of you as jurors 
in this very important matter.
    No. 1, I do not intend to discuss the specific details of 
the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky. However, I do not 
want to give the Senate the impression that those encounters 
are irrelevant or lack serious legal implications. In fact, 
every day in the courtrooms all across America, victims of 
sexual harassment, of rape, assault, and abuse must testify in 
many public cases in order to vindicate their personal rights 
and society's right to be free of these intolerable acts.
    The President's lies about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky in 
the Oval Office also make these unseemly details highly 
relevant. If you are to accept the President's version about 
the relationship, you must in effect say to Ms. Lewinsky that 
she is the one who is disregarding the truth. But beyond this, 
his denials also directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, 
not only directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony but also 
contradict eight of her friends and the statements by two 
professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared 
details of her relationship. By law, their testimony may serve 
as proper and admissible evidence to corroborate her side of 
this important story.
    No. 2, the evidence and testimony in this proceeding must 
be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. Please do 
not be misled into considering each event in isolation and then 
treating it separately. Remember, events and words that may 
seem innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on 
a sinister or even criminal connotation when observed in the 
context of the whole plot.
    For example, we all agree that Ms. Lewinsky testified, ``No 
one ever told me to lie . . .'' When considered alone, this 
statement would seem exculpatory. In the context of other 
evidence, however, we see that this one statement gives a 
misleading inference. Of course no one said, ``Now, Monica, you 
go down there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Based upon their 
previous spoken and even unspoken words, Ms. Lewinsky knew what 
was expected of her. Surely, if the President were to come to 
the Senate floor and give testimony during this proceeding, he 
would not tell you that he honestly expected her to tell the 
truth about their personal relationship. After all, the purpose 
of her filing the false affidavit was to avoid testifying in 
the Jones case and discussing the nature of their relationship. 
If she had told the truth in that affidavit instead of lying, 
she would have been invited to testify immediately, if not 
sooner.
    No. 3, throughout our presentation of the facts, especially 
as it relates to the various illegal acts, I ask you to pay 
particular attention to what I call the big picture. Look at 
the results of those various acts as well as who benefited. 
Please make a mental note now, if you can, and ask yourself 
always as you look at each one of these illegal acts that are 
presented to you: A. What was the result of that illegal act? 
B. Who benefited from that illegal act?
    I believe you will find that the evidence will show that 
while the President's ``fingerprints'' may not be directly on 
the evidence proving these illegal acts, the result of the acts 
usually inures to the benefit of the President and the 
President alone. Subordinates and friends alike are drawn into 
this web of deceit. The President is insulated. Crimes are 
committed. Justice is denied. The rule of law is suspended. And 
this President is the beneficiary.
    Some examples:
    No. 1, subpoenaed evidence disappears from Ms. Lewinsky's 
apartment and reappears under Ms. Currie's bed. What was the 
result of that? Who had the benefit of that?
    No. 2, Ms. Lewinsky files a false affidavit in the Jones 
case. What is the result of filing that false affidavit and who 
benefited from that?
    No. 3, the President's attorney files the Lewinsky 
affidavit, not knowing it was false, representing to the Court 
that ``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape, or form,'' while the President sits in the deposition 
and does not object to that--very silently sits in the 
deposition. What was the result of that? And who benefited from 
that filing of the affidavit?
    No. 4, and finally, Ms. Lewinsky, after months of job 
searching in New York City, is offered a job with a Fortune 500 
company in New York City within 48 hours of her signing this 
false affidavit. Who shared the results of that with Ms. 
Lewinsky? And who obtained the benefit of that?
    Another example occurred in a meeting between the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky in July--on July 4, 1997, to be specific--
when, as a part of their conversation, she mentioned she heard 
someone from Newsweek was working on a story about Kathleen 
Willey. The President has Ms. Lewinsky back for a visit on July 
14, some 10 days later, following his return from an overseas 
trip. She was questioned about the Willey story and 
specifically if Linda Tripp had been her source.
    Important to this point--important to this point--the 
President then asked Ms. Lewinsky to try to persuade Ms. Tripp 
to call White House Legal Counsel Bruce Lindsey. The President 
told her to notify Ms. Currie the following day, ``without 
getting into the details with her, even mentioning names with 
her,'' whether Ms. Lewinsky had ``mission accomplished'' with 
Linda. And as you will learn from Mr. Hutchinson, who will 
follow me with his presentation, this is very similar to the 
method of operation with another job the President requested be 
done, which in that case succeeded with a ``mission 
accomplished.'' I ask you to watch for that in Mr. Hutchinson's 
presentation.
    I want to now rewind the clock back to November of 1995. We 
are here in Washington where Ms. Lewinsky has been working at 
the White House since July of 1995.
    As you continue to listen to the evidence, from this point 
on November 15 forward, remember that Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President were alone in the Oval Office workplace area at least 
21 times. And I have a list of these, in chart form, beginning 
in November of 1995 and going through 1996 and into the early 
part of 1997, continuing through the year. During that time, 
they had at least 11 of the so-called salacious encounters 
there in the workplace at various times during the day and 
night: Three in 1995, five in 1996, and three in 1997.
    They also had in excess of 50 telephone conversations, most 
of which appear to have been telephone calls to and from Ms. 
Lewinsky's home. And I have a schedule of all these telephone 
calls to show you, the 50-plus telephone calls. Also, they 
exchanged some 64 gifts, with the President receiving 40 of 
these gifts and Ms. Lewinsky receiving 24 of these gifts. And 
again we have charts that reflect the receipt of both sets of 
gifts. And again these charts will be here in the front, always 
available for your inspection.
    We also note that their affair began on November 15. 
Interestingly, there is even a conflict here with the 
President. According to Ms. Lewinsky, they had never spoken to 
each other up to that point. Yet he asked an unknown intern 
into the Oval Office and kissed her and then invited her back 
to return later that day, when the two engaged in the first of 
the 11 acts of misconduct.
    The contradiction is in the statement that the President 
relied upon in his grand jury testimony that has been 
referenced earlier--very carefully worded--and that statement 
the President gave in testimony before the grand jury about 
meeting in this relationship. And he says, ``I regret that what 
began as a friendship came to include this conduct . . .'' 
Almost as if it had evolved over a period of time. So there is 
very clearly a conflict there.
    As Ms. Lewinsky's internship was ending that year, she did 
apply and receive a paying job with the White House Office of 
Legislative Affairs. This position allowed her even more access 
to the Oval Office area. She remained a White House employee 
until April 1996 when she was reassigned to the Pentagon. The 
proof will show that Ms. Evelyn Lieberman, Deputy Chief of 
Staff at the time, believed that the transfer was necessary 
because Ms. Lewinsky was so persistent in her efforts to be 
near the President. Although Ms. Lieberman could not recall 
hearing any rumors linking her and the President, she 
acknowledged the President was vulnerable to these kinds of 
rumors. While Ms. Lewinsky tried to return to work in the White 
House, her absence was appreciated by those on the President's 
staff who wanted to protect him.
    After she began her job at the Pentagon in April, there was 
no further physical contact with the President through the 1996 
election and the remainder of that year. The two communicated 
by telephone and on occasion saw each other at public events. 
Their only attempt at a private visit in the Oval Office was 
thwarted because Ms. Lieberman was nearby. On December 17, she 
attended a holiday celebration at the White House and had a 
photograph made shaking hands with the President.
    However, the evidence establishes that in 1997, Ms. 
Lewinsky was more successful in arranging visits to the White 
House. This was because she used the discreet assistance of Ms. 
Currie, the President's secretary, to avoid the likes of Ms. 
Lieberman. Ms. Currie indicated she did not want to know the 
details of this relationship. Ms. Currie testified on one 
occasion when Ms. Lewinksy told her, ``As long as no one saw 
us--and no one did--then nothing happened.'' Ms. Currie 
responded, ``I don't want to hear it. Don't say any more. I 
don't want to hear any more.''
    Early on during their secret liaisons, the two concocted a 
cover story to use if discovered. Ms. Lewinksy was to say she 
was bringing papers to the President. The evidence will show 
that statement to be false. The only papers that she ever 
brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her 
duties or the President's. The cover story plays an important 
role in the later perjuries and the obstruction of justice.
    Ms. Lewinksy stated that the President did not expressly 
instruct her to lie. He did, however, suggest, indeed, the 
``misleading'' cover story. When she assured him that she 
planned to lie about the relationship, he responded 
approvingly. On the frequent occasions that she promised that 
she would ``always deny'' the relationship and ``always protect 
him,'' for example, the President responded, in her 
recollection, ``That's good,'' or something affirmative, not 
``Don't deny it.''
    The evidence will establish further that the two of them 
had, in her words, ``a mutual understanding'' that they would 
``keep this private, so that meant deny it and . . . take 
whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken.'' When she and 
the President both were subpoenaed in the Jones case, Ms. 
Lewinksy anticipated that ``as we had on every other occasion 
and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny 
it.''
    In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton acknowledged 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do 
in a nonlegal context'' to hide their relationship and that he 
``might well have said'' that Ms. Lewinsky should tell people 
she was bringing letters to him or coming to visit Ms. Currie. 
He always stated that ``I never asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
    But neither did the President ever say that they must now 
tell the truth under oath; to the contrary, as Ms. Lewinsky 
stated: ``It wasn't as if the President called me and said, 
`You know, Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to 
be really hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth 
and be humiliated in front of the entire world about what we've 
done,' which I would have fought him on probably,'' she said. 
``That was different. By not calling me and saying that, you 
know, I knew what that meant,'' according to Monica Lewinsky.
    In a related but later incident that Mr. Hutchinson may 
refer to, Monica Lewinsky testified that President Clinton 
telephoned her at home around 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock in the 
morning on December 17, 1997--2:00 or 2:30 a.m. He told her 
that her name was on the list of possible witnesses to be 
called in the Paula Jones lawsuit. When asked what to do if she 
was subpoenaed, the President suggested that she could sign an 
affidavit. Ms. Lewinsky indicated that she was 100 percent sure 
that he had suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit. 
She understood his advice to mean that she might be able to 
execute an affidavit that would not disclose the true nature of 
their relationship.
    When Ms. Lewinsky agreed to that false affidavit, she told 
the President by telephone that she would be signing it and 
asked if he wanted to see it before she signed it. According to 
Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded that he did not, as he 
had already seen about 15 others.
    Concurrent with these events I just described, the evidence 
will further demonstrate that as Ms. Lewinsky attempted to 
return to work at the White House after the 1996 elections, she 
spoke with the President. According to Betty Currie, the 
President instructed Betty Currie and Marsha Scott, Deputy 
Director of Personnel, to assist in her return to the White 
House. In the spring of 1997, she met with Ms. Scott. She 
complained in subsequent notes to Ms. Scott and the President 
about no progress being made with her getting back to the White 
House. On July 3 of that year, she dispatched a more formal 
letter to the President--in fact, using the salutation, ``Dear 
Sir''--and raising a possible threat that she might have to 
tell her parents about why she no longer had a job at the White 
House if they did not get her another job. She also indicated a 
possible interest in a job in New York at the United Nations. 
The President and Ms. Lewinsky met the next day in what Ms. 
Lewinsky characterized as a ``very emotional'' visit, including 
the President scolding her, that it was illegal to threaten the 
President of the United States. Their conversation eventually 
moved on to other topics, though primarily her complaining 
about his failure to get her a job at the White House.
    Continuing with Ms. Lewinsky's effort to return to work 
near the President, there was a July 16 meeting and September 3 
telephone call with Ms. Scott. On the evening of September 30, 
the President advised Ms. Lewinsky that he would have Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles help with a job search, and Bowles later 
passed this on to John Podesta, although each recalled their 
involvement occurring earlier in the year.
    A few days later, however, her hopes of a job at the White 
House quickly ended. On October 6, she had a conversation with 
Linda Tripp, who told her that she would never return to the 
White House, according to a friend of hers on the staff. 
Learning this ``secondhand'' was, according to Ms. Lewinsky, 
the ``straw that broke the camel's back.'' She decided to ask 
the President for a job in New York with the United Nations and 
sent him a letter to that effect on October 7.
    During an October 11 meeting with the President, he 
suggested that she give him a list of New York companies which 
interested her. She asked if Vernon Jordan might also help. 
Five days later, she provided the President with her ``wish 
list'' and indicated that she was no longer interested in the 
U.N. position, although she did receive an offer on November 24 
and declined it on January 5, 1998.
    After this meeting with the President, arrangements were 
made through the President and Ms. Currie for Ms. Lewinsky to 
meet with Mr. Jordan. On the morning of November 5, 1997, Mr. 
Jordan spoke by telephone with the President about 5 minutes 
and later met with Ms. Lewinsky for the first time for about 20 
minutes. According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan told her he had 
spoken with the President, that she came highly recommended, 
and that ``We're in business.''
    However, the evidence reflects that Mr. Jordan took no 
steps to help Ms. Lewinsky until early December of that year 
after she appeared on the witness list in the Jones case. 
Actually, Mr. Jordan testified in his grand jury testimony that 
he had no recollection of even having met Ms. Lewinsky on 
November 5.
    When he was shown documentary evidence demonstrating that 
his first meeting with Ms. Lewinsky occurred in early November, 
he acknowledged that such meeting ``was entirely possible.'' 
You can see that was not to be a high priority for Mr. Jordan 
at that time, until December.
    For many months, Ms. Lewinsky had not been able to find a 
job to her satisfaction--even without the perceived ``help'' of 
various people. Then in December of 1997, something happened 
which caused those interested in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in 
New York to intensify their search. Within 48 hours of her 
signing this false affidavit in the Paula Jones case, Ms. 
Lewinsky had landed a job with a prestigious Fortune 500 
Company.
    It is anticipated that attorneys for the President will 
present arguments which will contest much of the relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. The President has maintained throughout 
the last several months that while there was no sexual 
relationship or sexual affair, in fact, there was some type of 
inappropriate, intimate contact with her. What has now been 
dubbed as ``legal gymnastics'' on the part of the President has 
made its appearance.
    Other examples followed. Within his definition of the word 
``alone,'' he denies being alone with Ms. Lewinsky at any time 
in the Oval Office. He also questions the definition of the 
word ``is''--it depends on what the word ``is'' means in how 
you answer a particular question. Further, we would expect the 
President to continue to disavow knowledge of why evidence 
detrimental to his defense in the Jones case was removed from 
Ms. Lewinsky's apartment and hidden beneath Ms. Currie's bed or 
knowledge of how Ms. Lewinsky found herself with an employment 
offer in New York virtually at the same time she finally 
executed an affidavit in the Jones case.
    Unfortunately, for your search for the truth in these 
proceedings, the President continues today to parse his words 
and use ``legal hairsplitting'' in his defense. I cite for your 
consideration his Answer filed with this body just days ago. 
For instance:
    One. Responding in part to the impeachment article I, the 
President persists in a wrongheaded fashion with his legal 
hairsplitting of the term ``sexual relations,'' which permits 
him to define that term in such a way that in the particular 
salacious act we are talking about here, one person has sex and 
the other person does not. As a graduate of one of the finest 
law schools in America and as a former law professor and 
attorney general for the State of Arkansas, the President knows 
better. I have this statement here extracted out of the 
President's Answer to this proceeding.
    Two. Responding to both articles of impeachment, the 
President now would have you believe that he ``was not 
focusing'' when his attorney, Bob Bennett, was objecting during 
the deposition and attempting to cut off a very important line 
of questioning of the President by representing to Judge Wright 
that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit proved that there is no need to 
go into this testimony about the President's life. He said that 
this affidavit proves that ``there is absolutely no sex of any 
kind, in any manner, shape or form.'' Remember that this is the 
same President who now pleads that he lost his focus during 
this very important part of this deposition. This is the very 
same President who is renowned for his intelligence and his 
ability ``to compartmentalize,'' to concentrate and focus on 
whatever matter is at hand. And now he comes before this 
Senate, to each one of you, in his Answer, by and through his 
attorneys, and pleads that he simply wasn't paying attention at 
this very important point during his own deposition. In 
Tennessee, we have a saying for situations like that: ``That 
dog won't hunt.''
    Three. In his further response to article I, the President 
effectively admits guilt to obstruction. As I read this, his 
pleadings refer to the President himself, and he states that 
he, the President, ``truthfully explained to the grand jury his 
efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition without 
disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.'' So he said he 
did answer the questions in the Jones deposition in a way so as 
not to disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. At the 
bottom of the same page, he denies that he attempted ``to 
impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case.'' Think 
about this with me for a minute. Basically, the purpose of the 
Jones deposition of the President was to secure truthful 
testimony about these kinds of ``pattern and practice'' 
witnesses, and therein discover the likes of Monica Lewinsky. 
That is the purpose of being there. The President admitted in 
his Answer that he purposely answered questions so as not to 
disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Said another way, 
he intentionally answered questions to avoid the discovery of 
one of these female employees with whom he was sexually 
involved. That is precisely, folks, what impeding the discovery 
of evidence is.
    I ask you, if you get an opportunity, to look at this very 
closely.
    Four. In his answer to article II, the President ``denies 
that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit 
in the Jones case.'' When everything is said and done, Ms. 
Lewinsky had no motivation, no reason whatsoever to want to 
commit a crime by willfully submitting a false affidavit with a 
court of law. She really did not need to do this at that point 
in her life, but this 20-something-year-old young lady was 
listening to the most powerful man in the United States, whom 
she greatly admired, hearing him effectively instruct her to 
file a false affidavit to avoid having to testify about their 
relationship. And in order to do that, she had to lie about the 
physical aspects of their relationship. According to her, the 
President didn't even want to see that actual affidavit because 
he had seen 15 more just like it and as such he knew what it 
would be.
    Five. In an additional response to article II, the 
President answers and asserts that ``he believed that Ms. 
Lewinsky could have filed a limited and truthful affidavit that 
might have enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones 
case.'' That is an incredible statement. That is an incredible 
statement given the fact that the President knew firsthand of 
the extent of their sexual relationship, and he also knew that 
the Jones discovery efforts were specifically after that type 
of conduct. Even with the best of the legal hairsplitting, it 
is still difficult to envision a truthful affidavit from Ms. 
Lewinsky that could have skirted this issue enough to avoid 
testifying.
    And if you really think the President had this belief, 
don't you think he would have accepted Ms. Lewinsky's offer to 
review her affidavit and perhaps share this bit of wisdom he 
had with her before she signed it and lied? After all, in this 
answer he just filed, he says he had an out for her, a way for 
her to have the best of both worlds--not to have to lie and 
still avoid testifying in the Jones case. Why didn't he share 
that with her when she gave him the opportunity if he in fact 
had such an idea? I suggest that perhaps that is a recent idea.
    Even if, for some reason, you don't believe Ms. Lewinsky 
offered to share that affidavit with him, don't you think it 
still would have been in the President's best interest to give 
Ms. Lewinsky his thoughts before she violated the law with a 
completely false affidavit?
    Now, indeed, is the time to stop the legal gymnastics and 
hairsplitting and deal with these charges and facts 
appropriately.
    As a House manager, I believe I can speak for all of us out 
of a sense of fairness, and again request that we and the 
President be permitted to call witnesses. I submit that the 
state of the evidence is such that unless and until the 
President has the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to testify if he 
desires, there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the 
facts. A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it 
presently exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.
    While it has been the consistent defense of the White House 
to be inconsistent, it still comes as something of a surprise 
that the President has not made a stronger case for the calling 
of witnesses. Before now, he has aggressively sought the 
opportunity to challenge the truth and veracity of witnesses in 
these impeachment proceedings. During the hearings in the 
House, which many believe are analogous to a grand jury 
proceeding, the President's defenders and his attorneys 
consistently complained of the failure to call witnesses and 
the lack of fairness and due process. Almost every day, there 
were partisan attacks from the White House and its emissaries 
who were dispatched throughout the media talk shows with the 
same complaints of no witnesses.
    And always, our measured response was a calm assurance that 
there would be witnesses called during the trial phase in the 
Senate. Is there any doubt that our forefathers intended a two-
step impeachment proceeding?
    The House would function as the grand jury and determine 
whether to charge--to impeach. Then you, as the trier of fact, 
would function as the jury to try the case and weigh the 
testimony of the fact witnesses. In recent days, some have 
publically asserted that the House is hypocritical because it 
didn't call some of the fact witnesses it now asks to call in 
the Senate. For the record, it must be noted that the House 
Judiciary Committee, out of an abundance of fairness, did allow 
the President's defense team 30 hours in which to present any 
witnesses that they could have chosen and they could have 
examined.
    But any allegation of hypocrisy certainly appears to miss 
the point that the writers of our Constitution never 
contemplated two separate trials for an impeachment proceeding. 
But now we would respectfully suggest is the time for 
witnesses.
    All Americans, including the President, are entitled to 
enjoy a private family life, free from public or governmental 
scrutiny. But the privacy concerns raised in this case are 
subject to limits, three of which I will briefly discuss here.
    The first limit was imposed when the President was sued in 
Federal court for alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in 
such litigation is often personal. At times, that evidence is 
highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge 
Wright noted at the President's January 1998 deposition, ``I 
have never had a sexual harassment case where there was not 
some embarrassment.'' Nevertheless, Congress and the Supreme 
Court have concluded that embarrassment-related concerns must 
give way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties 
to pursue their claims. Courts have long recognized the 
difficulties of proving sexual harassment in the work place, 
inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in 
private. To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on 
the ground that the evidence covered only ``personal'' or 
``private'' behavior would frustrate the goals that Congress 
and the courts have sought to achieve in enacting and 
interpreting the Nations's sexual harassment laws. That is 
particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed--
sexual relations in the workplace between a high official and a 
young subordinate employee--itself conflicts with those goals.
    The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required 
disclosure of the precise information that is in part the 
subject of this hearing today. A Federal judge specifically 
ordered the President, on more than one occasion, to provide 
the requested information about relationships with other women, 
including Ms. Lewinsky. The fact that Judge Wright later 
determined that the evidence would not be admissible at trial, 
and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, does 
not change the President's legal duty at the time he testified. 
Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to 
the discovery questions and to seek guidance from the court if 
he thought those questions were improper. But having failed to 
convince the court that his objections were well founded, the 
President was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully. 
Perjury and attempts to obstruct the gathering of evidence can 
never be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless of 
the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.
    The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and 
other forms of obstruction of justice: ``In this constitutional 
process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no 
place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant 
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 
Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are 
therefore imperative.''
    The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is 
civil or criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court 
considered a false statement made in a civil administrative 
proceeding: ``False testimony in a formal proceeding is 
intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a 
`flagrant affront' to truth-seeking function of adversary 
proceedings . . . Perjury should be severely sanctioned in 
appropriate cases.'' Stated more simply, ``perjury is an 
obstruction of justice.''
    The third limit is unique to the President. ``The 
Presidency is more than an executive responsibility. It is the 
inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and 
ideals.'' As the head of the Executive Branch, the President 
has the constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.'' The President gave his testimony in the 
Jones case under oath and in the presence of a Federal judge, a 
member of a co-equal branch of government; he then testified 
before a Federal grand jury, a body of citizens who had 
themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of the 
enormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office, 
the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct at 
all times complies with the law of the land.
    In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by any 
citizen--whether in a criminal case, a grand jury 
investigation, a congressional hearing, a civil trial or civil 
discovery--are profoundly serious matters. When such acts are 
committed by the President of the United States, those acts are 
grounds for conviction and removal from his Office.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess of the proceedings for 15 minutes.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have just about 1 
minute and I will conclude.
    Mr. LOTT. I withhold my request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you.
    As I reach the conclusion of my presentation, the time line 
is now in December of 1997. Following her November 5 meeting 
with Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky had no communication with him or 
the President for a month. Then in early December, the parties 
in the Jones case exchanged witness lists and Ms. Lewinsky was 
scheduled as a potential witness by the Jones attorneys. On or 
about that same day, Ms. Lewinsky attempted to make an 
uninvited visit to the White House and later that day was 
allowed in by the President. But it was during this time, in 
December of 1997, that some of the seams began to unravel for 
the President.
    I will conclude my remarks at this point and thank the 
Chief Justice and the Members of the Senate for their careful 
attention. My colleague from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson, will 
follow me now or at the end of any recess as may be necessary.

                                 RECESS

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, my apologies to the manager 
for the interruption at the end of his remarks.
    I renew my request of unanimous consent to take a 15-minute 
recess.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so 
ordered.
    [Thereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, recessed until 3:30 p.m.]
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are prepared now 
to go forward with the next manager's presentation.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I am 
Asa Hutchinson, a Member of Congress from the Third 
Congressional District of Arkansas. I am grateful for this 
opportunity, although it comes with deep regret, to be before 
you. I do want to tell you in advance that we have presented to 
you, on your tables, a selection of charts that I will be 
referring to here so everyone will have the advantage of being 
able to see at least in some fashion the charts to which I will 
be referring. And we will have the charts here as well.
    This is certainly a humbling experience for a smalltown 
lawyer. I learned to love and to respect the law trying cases 
in the courtrooms of rural Arkansas. The scene is different in 
this setting, in this historic Chamber with the Chief Justice 
presiding and Senators sitting as jurors. But what is at stake 
remains the same.
    In every case heard in every courtroom across this great 
country, it is the truth, it is justice, it is the law that is 
at stake. In this journey on Earth, there is nothing of greater 
consequence to devote our energies to than the search for the 
truth, to pursue equal justice, and to uphold the law. It is 
for those reasons that I serve as a manager. And as you, I hope 
that I can help in some way to bring this matter to a 
conclusion for our country. This afternoon I will be discussing 
the evidence and the testimony from witnesses that we do hope 
to call, and during my presentation I will be focusing on the 
evidence that demonstrates obstruction of justice under article 
II.
    You might wonder, well, why are we going to article II 
before we have covered article I on perjury? And the answer is 
that in a chronological flow, article II, the obstruction 
facts, precedes much of the perjury allegations. And so, 
following my presentation, Manager Rogan will present article I 
on perjury.
    The presentation I make will be based upon the record, the 
evidence, and the facts that have been accumulated. I want you 
to know that I am going to be presenting those facts, and from 
time to time I will argue those facts. I believe they are well 
supported in the record, but I urge each of you, if you ever 
find anything that you question, to search the record and 
verify the facts because I do not intend to misrepresent 
anything to this body. In fact, we will be submitting to each 
of your offices my presentation with annotations to the record, 
to the grand jury transcripts which will tie in the facts that 
I present to you. Again, I believe and trust you will find they 
are well supported.
    So let's start with obstruction of justice. Later on, there 
will be a full discussion of the law on obstruction of justice, 
but for our purposes, it is simply any corrupt act or attempt 
to influence or impede the proper functioning of our system of 
justice. It is a criminal offense, a felony, and it has 
historically been an impeachable offense.
    Let me first say, it is not a crime nor an impeachable 
offense to engage in inappropriate personal conduct, nor is it 
a crime to obstruct or conceal personal embarrassing facts or 
relationships. It might be offensive, but there are no 
constitutional consequences. But as we go through the facts of 
the case, the evidence will show in this case that there was a 
scheme that was developed to obstruct the administration of 
justice, and that is illegal. And the obstruction of justice is 
of great consequence and significance to the integrity of our 
Nation when committed by anyone but particularly by the Chief 
Executive of our land, the President of the United States.
    Mr. Bryant took us factually up to a certain point 
pertaining to the job search. This is chart No. 1 that you have 
before you. This puts it in perspective a little bit. Just for 
a brief review, go back in the calendar, back into October. 
That is when Ms. Lewinsky sends the President her wish list of 
jobs. And then shortly after that, Ms. Currie faxes Lewinsky 
the resume to Ambassador Richardson, and Ambassador Richardson 
gets involved in the job search.
    October 30, the President promised to arrange a meeting 
between Lewinsky and Jordan. This was set up in November. It 
was actually November 5. But preceding that, there was a job 
offer at the United Nations extended to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. 
Lewinsky decided that she was not interested in a job at the 
United Nations; she wanted to go into the private sector. And 
so that was the purpose on November 5 of the meeting between 
Jordan and Lewinsky. That is when Mr. Jordan says, ``We're in 
business.'' But the facts will show that there was nothing 
really done in November, and that is when I will get a little 
bit more into my presentation, and then I will get into 
December when some things happened there that picked up speed 
on this issue.
    The obstruction, for our purposes, started on December 5, 
1997, and that is when the witness list from the Paula Jones 
case was faxed to the President's lawyers. At that point, the 
wheels of obstruction started rolling, and they did not stop 
until the President successfully blocked the truth from coming 
out in the civil rights case.
    These acts of obstruction included attempts to improperly 
influence a witness in a civil rights case--that is, Monica 
Lewinsky--the procurement and filing of a false affidavit in 
the case; unlawful attempts to influence the testimony of a key 
witness, Betty Currie; the willful concealment of evidence 
under subpoena in that case, which are the gifts of December 
28; and illegally influencing the testimony of witnesses--that 
is, the aides who testified before the grand jury--before the 
grand jury of the United States. Each of these areas of 
obstruction will be covered in my presentation today.
    As I said, it began on Friday, December 5, when the witness 
list came from the Paula Jones case. Shortly thereafter, the 
President learned that the list included Monica Lewinsky. This 
had to be startling news to the President because if the truth 
about his relationship with a subordinate employee was known, 
the civil rights case against him would be strengthened and it 
might have totally changed the outcome.
    But to compound the problem, less than a week later, Judge 
Wright, a Federal district judge in Arkansas, on December 11, 
issued an order, and that order directed that the President had 
to answer questions concerning other relationships that he 
might have had during a particular timeframe with any State or 
Federal employee. And when I say ``relationships,'' I am 
speaking of sexual relationships. So Judge Wright entered the 
order that is not in your stack, but I have it here. It was 
filed on December 11 in the district court in Arkansas and 
directs the President that he has to answer those questions 
within a timeframe, as Mr. Bryant said, which is typical in a 
civil rights case of this nature.
    The White House knew that Monica was on the witness list. 
The President knew it was likely she would be subpoenaed as a 
witness and that her truthful testimony would hurt his case.
    What did the President do? What he had to do was to make 
sure Monica Lewinsky was on his team and under control. And 
then on December 17, the President finally called Ms. Lewinsky 
to let her know she was on the list. This was a call between 2 
a.m. and 2:30 a.m. in the morning.
    Now, what happened in the time between the President 
learning Monica Lewinsky was on the list and when he notified 
her of that fact on December 17 is very important. The 
President, during that timeframe, talked to his friend, his 
confidante, and his problem-solver, Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan 
had come to the President's rescue on previous occasions. He 
was instrumental in securing consulting contracts for Mr. Webb 
Hubbell while Mr. Hubbell was under investigation by the 
independent counsel.
    Let me parenthetically go to that point, right before Mr. 
Hubbell announced his resignation from the Justice Department.
    During that timeframe, there was a meeting at the White 
House in which the President, the First Lady, and others were 
present. After that meeting, Vernon Jordan agreed to help 
obtain financial assistance for Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan then 
introduced Mr. Hubbell to the ``right people.'' The 
introduction was successful and Mr. Hubbell obtained a $100,000 
contract. The ``right people'' that Mr. Jordan contacted 
happened to be the same ``right people'' for both Mr. Hubbell 
and ultimately for Monica Lewinsky, which is the parent company 
of Revlon. So the President was aware that Mr. Jordan had the 
contacts and the track record to be of assistance to the 
President in delicate matters.
    Now let's go back a little. Monica Lewinsky had been 
looking for a good-paying and high-profile job in New York, 
since the previous July, as I pointed out.
    She had been offered a job at the United Nations, but she 
wanted to work in the private sector. She was not having much 
success, and then in early November it was Betty Currie who 
arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan, which was ultimately on 
November 5. At this meeting, Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan 
for about 20 minutes.
    Now, let's refer to Mr. Vernon Jordan's grand jury 
testimony on that meeting that occurred on November 5. And you 
have that, and it should be your chart No. 2, or exhibit 2.
    As Mr. Jordan testified before the Federal grand jury on 
March 3, 1998, in reference to the November 5 meeting, he said:

    I have no recollection of an early November meeting with 
Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of it 
and I have no record of it.

    He goes on to testify, at page 76 of the grand jury 
testimony.
    Question:

    Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica 
Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?

    His answer:

    I think that's fair to say.

    Now, let's stop there for a moment. What happened as a 
result of this meeting? No action followed whatsoever. No job 
interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts 
with Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan made no effort to find a job for 
Ms. Lewinsky for over a month. Indeed, it was so unimportant to 
him that he ``had no recollection of an early November 
meeting,'' and, in fact, he testified finding her a job was not 
a priority. And then you will see that during this timeframe 
the President's attitude was exactly the same.
    And so look at the same exhibit 2, the last item on that 
chart, where it refers to Monica Lewinsky's grand jury 
testimony. And there she is referring to a December 6 meeting 
with the President:

    I think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch 
with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work 
out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job 
front].

    And the question was:

    Did the President say what he was going to do?

    The answer:

    I think he said he would--you know, this was sort of 
typical of him, to sort of say, ``Oh I'll talk to him. I'll get 
on it.''

    So you can see from that that it was not a high priority 
for the President either. It was: Sure, I'll get to that. I 
will do that.
    It was clear from Monica Lewinsky that nothing was 
happening.
    But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What 
started out as a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed 
after Ms. Lewinsky became a witness; the judge's order was 
issued, again, on December 11. And at that time, the President 
talked personally--personally--to Mr. Jordan and requested his 
help in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job. And that would be, again, 
back on exhibit 2 on that chart, the third item of testimony 
there. Back to Mr. Jordan, his grand jury testimony, May 5, 
1998.
    The question is:

    But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 
11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a decision 
that you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.

    His answer:

    There is no question about that.

    Let's look at the chain of events. The witness list came 
in. The judge's order came in. That triggered the President to 
action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into action. 
That chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.
    Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--I hope to 
be able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his 
loyalties lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his 
eyes and determine the truthfulness of his statements. You must 
decide whether he is telling the truth or withholding 
information.
    And so let's go to exhibit 3 in your booklet. Again, 
recalling Mr. Jordan, he testifies about that meeting. He 
testifies, in his March 3, 1998, grand jury testimony:

    I am certain after the 11th that I had a conversation with 
the President and as a part of that conversation I said to him 
that Betty Currie had called me about Monica Lewinsky. And the 
conversation was that he knew about her situation which was 
that she was pushed out of the White House, that she wanted to 
go to New York and he thanked me for helping her.

    Remember what else happened on that day, again, the same 
day that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other 
relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.
    Now, let's go back again to Mr. Jordan's testimony. What 
does he say about the involvement of the President of the 
United States in regard to these jobs? You look at exhibit 4. 
That is in your booklet. This is, again, Vernon Jordan's grand 
jury transcript of June 9, 1998.
    Now, the question is on a different issue. The question is 
about why did he tell the White House that Frank Carter--Frank 
Carter was the attorney for Monica Lewinsky that Vernon Jordan 
arranged and introduced to Monica Lewinsky. He was hired. And 
at whatever point he was terminated, then Vernon Jordan 
notified the President. So the question relates to that:

    Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that 
this has happened, [Carter had been fired]?

    Answer:

    Thought they had a right to know.

    Question:

    Why?

    And here is the answer that is critical for my point:

    The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got 
her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new counsel. 
I thought that was information that they ought to have. . . .

    ``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.'' 
Clear, straightforward testimony; no doubt about it.
    Then go on down to page 58 of his grand jury testimony of 
June 9.
    The question:

    Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank 
Carter had been replaced?

    Answer:

    Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew 
that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was interested 
in this matter. He is the source of it coming to my attention 
in the first place.

    ``He is the source of it coming to my attention in the 
first place.'' Remember, he had already met with Betty Currie. 
Nothing was happening in the November timeframe. Nothing was 
happening. Vernon Jordan--it was not a priority. Then the 
President of the United States called him and it became a 
priority. And that is who he was acting for in trying to get 
Monica Lewinsky a job.
    At this point we do not know all that the President was 
telling Vernon Jordan, but we do know that there were numerous 
calls back and forth between Mr. Jordan and the President. 
There were numerous calls being made by Mr. Jordan on behalf of 
Monica Lewinsky searching for a job, and that despite the fact 
that Monica Lewinsky did not know that she was witnessed--she 
did not know she was a witness--the President knew that she was 
a witness during his intensified efforts to get her a job.
    Now, the President's counselors have made a defense that 
the job search started before Monica Lewinsky was a witness and 
there was nothing wrong with that. My response to that is, it 
is true there is nothing wrong with a public official, under 
the right circumstances, helping someone get a job. And what 
might have started out being innocent, if you accept that 
argument, crossed the line whenever it was tied and 
interconnected with the President's desire to get a false 
affidavit from Monica Lewinsky, and whenever the job is out 
there and preparing the false affidavit, you will see that they 
are totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated; and that 
is where the line has crossed into obstruction.
    For example, when the President was waiting on Ms. Lewinsky 
to sign the false affidavit in the Jones case during the 
critical time in January, a problem developed. The job 
interviews were unproductive, despite the numerous calls by Mr. 
Jordan. On one particular day, Monica called Mr. Jordan and 
said the interview with Revlon did not go well. Mr. Jordan, 
what did he do? He picked up the phone to the CEO of--the 
president of the company, Mr. Perelman, to, as Vernon Jordan 
testified, ``make things happen--if they could happen.'' That 
is the request from Mr. Jordan to the CEO of a company, after a 
job interview with Monica Lewinsky did not go well.
    What happened? Things happened. He made things happen. 
Monica Lewinsky got a job. The affidavit was signed and the 
President was informed by Mr. Jordan, through Betty Currie, 
that the mission was accomplished.
    The question here is not why did the President do a favor 
for an ex-intern, but why did he use the influence of his 
office to make sure it happened? The answer is that he was 
willing to obstruct, impede justice by improperly influencing a 
witness in order to protect himself in a civil rights case.
    The next step in the obstruction is the false affidavit. 
This is directly related to the job mission. The President 
needed the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit, 
and that was assured by the efforts to secure her a job. Again, 
the President brought Ms. Lewinsky into the loop on December 
17. Over 10 days after the witness list was received by the 
President, the President was ready to tell Monica the news.
    That timeframe is important. He gets the witness list. He 
could have called Monica Lewinsky immediately, but he needed 7 
days because he needed to make sure the job situation was in 
gear. And in fact, the day after, if you look back on exhibit 
1, you will see that the day after the December 17 timeframe 
that she was informed that she was on the witness list, the 
next day she already had lined up job interviews for her. So 
she felt confident. But she was notified on December 17. 
Between 2 and 2:30 a.m., her phone rang. It was the President 
of the United States. The President said that he had seen the 
witness list in the case and her name was on it. Ms. Lewinsky 
asked what she should do if subpoenaed, and the President 
responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.''
    Well, how would this work? Both parties knew that the 
affidavit would need to be false and misleading in order to 
accomplish the desired result. Clearly, truthful testimony by 
Monica Lewinsky would make her a witness, would not keep her 
away from testifying. Only a false affidavit would avoid the 
deposition.
    So look at what I have marked as exhibit 4.1, which is just 
a review of the key dates on this job search. Again, November 5 
was the first meeting between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. In 
November nothing happened. According to Jordan, ``not a high 
priority.'' On December 5, the President receives the witness 
list. On the 11th, things intensify with Judge Wright's order. 
The 11th, the President talks to Mr. Jordan about the job for 
Monica. He gets into action. On the 17th, they are ready to 
tell Monica that she is on the witness list. And then, on the 
19th, she is actually served with a subpoena. Again, remember, 
after she was finally notified, it was the next day that she 
had the job interviews.
    Now we will spend some time on the December 17 
conversation, the day that Monica Lewinsky was notified that 
she was on the witness list. During that conversation, the 
President had a very pointed suggestion for Ms. Lewinsky that 
left no doubt about his purpose and the intended consequences. 
He did not say specifically, ``Go in and lie.'' This is 
something that you will hear, and Monica Lewinsky testified in 
her grand jury testimony: ``The President never told me to 
lie.''
    How do you tell people to lie? You can tell them the facts 
that they can use that would, in substance, be a false 
statement or you can say, ``Go in and lie and make up your own 
false testimony.'' The President chose to give her the ideas as 
to what she could testify to that would be false, but he never 
said the words, ``You need to go in and lie.'' So what he did 
say to her was, ``You know, you can always say you were coming 
to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
    That, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is a false 
representation, is a false statement that he is telling Ms. 
Lewinsky to utter. Remember, at this point the President knows 
she is a witness, and what does he do? As evidenced by the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky, he encourages her to lie: ``You 
can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were 
bringing me letters.''
    It should also be remembered that the President, when 
questioned about encouraging Monica Lewinsky to lie, has denied 
these allegations and therefore there is certainly a conflict 
in the testimony. It is our belief that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony is credible and she has the motive to tell the truth 
because of her immunity agreement with the independent counsel, 
where she gets in trouble only if she lies, whereas the 
President has the motive to cover up and to testify falsely.
    In order to understand the significance of this statement 
made by the President, it is necessary to recall the cover 
stories that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously 
concocted in order to deceive those people who might inquire. 
It was to deceive those people that they worked with. The 
difference in the initial cover stories, though, to protect the 
President and Monica from an embarrassing personal 
relationship, from friends and coworkers and the media, now is 
in a different arena, with the pending civil rights case and 
Ms. Lewinsky being on the witness list.
    Despite the legal responsibilities, the President made the 
decision to continue the pattern of lying which ultimately 
became an obstruction of the administration of justice. We are 
still on December 17, when the President called Monica at 2 
a.m. on that particular day to tell her she was on the witness 
list, to remind her of the cover stories. Monica Lewinsky 
testified, when the President brought up the cover story, she 
understood that the two of them would continue their 
preexisting pattern of deception, and it became clear that the 
President had no intention of making his relationship with a 
subordinate Federal employee an issue in that civil rights 
case, no matter what the Federal courts told him he needed to 
answer. And he used lies, deceit, and deception to carry out 
that purpose.
    It is interesting to note that the President, when he was 
asked by the grand jury whether he remembered calling Monica 
Lewinsky at 2 a.m. on December 17, responded, ``No, sir, I 
don't, but it is quite possible that that happened.'' When he 
was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the 
cover stories of coming to see Betty or bringing letters, he 
answered, ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that 
night.''
    This is not a denial, and therefore I believe you should 
accept the testimony of Monica Lewinsky. If you say in your 
mind, well, I'm not going to believe her, then you should first 
give us the opportunity to present this witness so that you as 
jurors can fairly and honestly determine her credibility.
    As expected, 2 days later, on December 19, Ms. Lewinsky 
received a subpoena to testify in the Jones case. This sets 
about an immediate flurry of activity. There are a series of 
telephone calls between Ms. Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, the 
President, and his staff. You will see this pattern of 
telephone calls repeated and generated at any point in time 
when it appears that the truth may be told in the civil rights 
case.
    Now, let's look at exhibit 5, which is the activity on 
Friday, December 19. This is the day that Monica Lewinsky is 
served with a subpoena. Now, after Mr. Jordan is notified that 
Monica Lewinsky is served with a subpoena, what does he do? In 
the 3:51-3:52 notation, Jordan telephones the President and 
talks to Debra Schiff, his assistant. The subpoena is issued. 
Monica calls Jordan and Jordan immediately calls the President. 
``Lewinsky meets with Jordan and requests that Jordan notify 
the President about her subpoena.'' This is at 4:47 p.m.
    Presumably, in the middle of that meeting, at 5:01 p.m., 
the President of the United States telephones Mr. Jordan and 
Jordan notifies the President about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena.
    Then that is whenever he arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's 
attorney--``Jordan telephones attorney Carter''--for 
representation, and that night Vernon Jordan goes to the White 
House to meet privately with the President on these particular 
issues.
    Now, in that meeting--and I am speaking of the meeting that 
happened late that night at the White House--Mr. Jordan told 
the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and 
related to the President the substance and details of his 
meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. It wasn't a casual consideration; 
the details were discussed, including her fascination with the 
President and other such issues.
    This led Mr. Jordan to ask the President about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and the response by the 
President of the United States was the first of many denials to 
his friends and aides. The President stated in his deposition 
that he did not recall that meeting. But you should remind 
yourselves of the testimony and the description provided by 
Vernon Jordan when he said, ``The President has an 
extraordinary memory.'' In fact, we all know that he is world 
famous for that memory.
    Now, the subpoena had been delivered, but the testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky was not scheduled until January 23, and the 
President's deposition, which was even more critical, was not 
scheduled until January 17. So the President and his team had 
some time to work. The work was not the business of the Nation; 
it was the distraction and self-preservation in the civil 
rights case.
    Under the plan, Mr. Jordan would be the buffer; he would 
obtain an attorney--Mr. Carter--and that attorney would keep 
Mr. Jordan informed on the progress of the representation, 
including reviewing any copy of the affidavit, knowing about 
the motion to quash, and the general progress of the 
representation. All along the way, when Mr. Jordan gets 
information, what does he do with that? Mr. Jordan keeps the 
President informed both about the affidavit and the prospects 
of the job in New York, for which Ms. Lewinsky was totally 
dependent on the help of her friends in high places.
    Let me go back again. There is nothing wrong with helping 
somebody get a job. But we all know there is one thing 
forbidden in public office: We must avoid quid pro quo, which 
is: This is for that. But Vernon Jordan testified he kept the 
President informed on the status of the false affidavit, the 
job search, and the status of Ms. Lewinsky's representation. 
Why? Is this just idle chatter with the President of the United 
States or are these matters the President is vitally interested 
in and, in fact, coordinated? Mr. Jordan answers this question 
himself on page 25 of his grand jury testimony, where he 
testified, ``I knew the President was concerned about the 
affidavit and whether or not it was signed.'' That was his 
March 5, 1998, grand jury testimony. The President was 
concerned not just about the affidavit but specifically about 
whether it was signed.
    The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to make a 
false affidavit. He was so certain of the contents that when 
Monica Lewinsky asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, 
that he had seen 15 of them. Besides, the President had 
suggested the affidavit himself, and he trusted Mr. Jordan to 
be certain to keep things under control. In fact, that was one 
of the main purposes of Mr. Jordan's continued communication 
with Monica Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter.
    Even though Mr. Jordan testifies at one point he never had 
any substantive discussions on the representation with Mr. 
Carter, he contradicts himself in his March 3 grand jury 
testimony where he states:

    Mr. Carter at some point told me--this is after January--
that she had signed the affidavit, that he had filed a motion 
to quash her subpoena and that--I mean, there was no reason for 
accountability, but he reassured me that he had things under 
control.

    Mr. Jordan was aware of the substance of the drafting of 
the affidavit, the representation, the motion to quash, and 
even had a part in the redrafting. This was clearly important 
to Mr. Jordan and clearly important to the President.
    Now, let's go to the time when the false affidavit was 
actually signed, January 5, 1998. These will be exhibits 7, 8, 
and 9 in front of you. Let's go to January 5. This is sort of a 
summary of what happened on that day. Ms. Lewinsky meets with 
her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an hour. Carter drafts the 
affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky on the deposition. In the second 
paragraph, Ms. Lewinsky telephones Betty Currie, stating that 
she needs to speak to the President, that this is about an 
important matter; specifically, that she was anxious about 
something she needed to sign--an affidavit. Frank Carter drafts 
the affidavit she is concerned about. She calls the President. 
The President returns Ms. Lewinsky's call.
    Big question: Should the President return Ms. Lewinsky's 
call? He does, that day, quickly. Ms. Lewinsky mentions the 
affidavit she is signing and offers to show it to the 
President. That is where he says no, he had seen 15 others.
    Let's go to the next day. The next exhibit is January 6. On 
this particular day, Ms. Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit. 
At 2:08 to 2:10 p.m., she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr. 
Jordan. That is after she got it. She delivers it to Jordan. 
And then, at 3:26 p.m., Mr. Jordan telephones Mr. Carter. At 
3:38, Mr. Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich of the White House. 
At 3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about the draft affidavit, 
and, at 3:49, you will see in red that both agree to delete a 
portion of the affidavit that created some implication that 
maybe she had been alone with the President.
    So Mr. Jordan was very involved in drafting the affidavit 
and the contents of that.
    And then at 4:19, presumably in response to some of the 
calls by Jordan earlier in the day, the President telephones 
Mr. Jordan and they have a discussion. And then Mr. Jordan 
telephones Carter and the conversations go back and forth. At 
the end of the day, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. So 
the affidavit is still in the drafting process.
    Let's go to the next day, exhibit 9. Monica signs the 
affidavit here. At 10 a.m., Ms. Lewinsky signs a false 
affidavit in Mr. Carter's office. Then she delivers the signed 
affidavit to Mr. Jordan. And then what does he do? The usual. 
At 11:58, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. At 5:46, Mr. 
Jordan telephones the White House. At 6:50, Mr. Jordan 
telephones the White House and tells the President that Ms. 
Lewinsky signed the affidavit.
    Is this important information for the President, to know he 
was vitally interested in it?
    The next day--exhibit 10--January 8. After it is signed, 
what is important? It was the other part of the arrangement, 
that she has the job interview with MacAndrews in New York. She 
had that job interview. The only problem was that it went 
poorly, very poorly. So at 4:48 p.m. on this particular day, 
Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New York 
interview went ``very poorly.''
    What does Mr. Jordan do? He telephones Ron Perelman, the 
CEO of Revlon, the subsidiary of MFH, to make things happen, if 
they could happen. What does he do next? Jordan telephones Ms. 
Lewinsky, saying, ``I'm doing the best I can to help you out.'' 
And they set up another interview for the next day. Jordan 
telephones the White House Counsel's Office, and, in the 
evening, Revlon in New York telephones Ms. Lewinsky to set up a 
follow-up interview. They said the first interview didn't go 
well, but because Mr. Jordan intercedes--and why? Because the 
false affidavit has been signed and he wants to make sure this 
is carried out. At 9:02 p.m., Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan 
about the Revlon interview in New York, and presumably it went 
better on that particular day.
    Then on January 9--exhibit 11--it is confirmed that she has 
the job. Lewinsky is offered the Revlon job in New York and 
accepts.
    Lewinsky telephones Jordan. And then, at 4:14, Jordan 
notifies Currie, calls Betty Currie, and says ``Mission 
accomplished'' and requests that she tell the President. Jordan 
notifies the President of Lewinsky's job offer and says, 
``Thank you, very much, Mr. President.'' And then that evening 
the President telephones Currie, and so on. But the President 
is notified that the job has been secured--``mission 
accomplished.''
    Let me ask you a question, after I have gone through these 
exhibits. Would Mr. Jordan have pushed for a second interview 
without cooperation on the affidavit? Would Monica Lewinsky 
have received the support and secured the job if she had said, 
``I don't want to sign an affidavit; I am just going to go in 
there and tell the truth; whatever they ask me, I am going to 
answer; I am going to tell the truth.'' Does anyone in this 
room believe that she would have been granted the job if Mr. 
Jordan had not made that call to get that second interview, if 
she had not had help from her friends in high places?
    Now the affidavit has been signed. The job is secure. 
Monica Lewinsky is on the team, and the President of the United 
States is armed for the deposition.
    So let's move there.
    Just how important was Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit to 
the President's deposition? Let's look. What did the 
President's attorney, Robert Bennett, say about that affidavit 
to the Federal judge during the deposition? That false 
affidavit allowed Mr. Bennett, the attorney for Mr. Clinton, 
when talking about the question of the relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky, to assert that `` . . . there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with 
President Clinton. . . .''
    That is a statement of Robert Bennett--his representation 
to the court about that relationship. It is a representation 
that he had to later, probably based upon his own professional 
embarrassment, withdraw and to correct that inaccurate part of 
the record.
    When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the 
President stated specifically the key paragraph of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit was ``absolutely true.''
    Paragraph 8 of her affidavit states:

    I have never had a sexual relationship with the President. 
. . .

    If it enters your mind at this point as to what was meant 
by ``sexual relationship,'' please remember that this affidavit 
was drafted upon a common understanding of that phrase at that 
point and not based upon any definition used in the deposition 
of the President.
    I am sure it was the President's hope and belief that the 
false affidavit used in the deposition to bolster his own 
testimony would be the end of the matter, but that was not the 
case. We know in life that one lie leads to another. And so it 
is when we attempt to thwart the administration of justice--one 
obstruction leads to another.
    Now we move to another key witness, Betty Currie.
    By the time the President concluded his deposition, he knew 
there were too many details out about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He knew that the only person who would probably be 
talking was Ms. Lewinsky herself. He knew the cover story that 
he had carefully created and that was converted into false 
statements in the affidavit was now in jeopardy and had to be 
backed at this point by the key witnesses, Monica Lewinsky and 
Betty Currie. After the deposition, the President needed to do 
two things: He had to contact Ms. Lewinsky to see if she was 
still on the team, but he also had to make sure that his 
secretary, Betty Currie, was lying to protect him. So let's 
look at how the concern became a frenzied and concerted effort 
to keep the holes plugged in the dike.
    Let's look at exhibits 12 and 13.
    What happened on the day the deposition--really the night 
of the deposition--on January 17. The President finishes 
testifying in the deposition around 4 p.m. At 5:38 p.m., the 
President telephones Mr. Jordan at home. And then, at 7:13, the 
President telephones Ms. Currie at home. At 7:02, the President 
places a call to Mr. Jordan's office. And then, at 7:13, he 
gets Ms. Currie at home, finally, and asks her to meet with him 
on Sunday. It is vitally important that he meet with Ms. Currie 
at this point because he knows his whole operation is coming 
unglued.
    So the next day, on January 18, which is exhibit 13, there 
is a whole flurry of activity.
    I am not going to go through all of them. You can see the 
frantic pace at the White House because at 6:11 in the morning, 
the President had some more bad news. The Drudge Report was 
released. And that created a greater flurry. Then between 11:49 
and 2:55 p.m., two phone calls were made between Mr. Jordan and 
the President.
    Then, at 5 p.m., we see the meetings. That is on the second 
page. At 5 p.m., Ms. Currie meets with the President. And the 
President then tells Ms. Currie to find Monica Lewinsky. The 
telephone calls were generated, and there was no success in 
that.
    Then, that evening the President calls Ms. Currie at home 
to try once again to see if she had found Monica.
    But it was on that day that there was that critical 
meeting--on that Sunday--in the Oval Office between Betty 
Currie and the President of the United States.
    For that reason, we need next to hear from Betty Currie, 
the President's personal secretary, as to what occurred during 
that most unusual meeting on Sunday following the deposition.
    Betty Currie testified in the grand jury that the President 
said that he had just been deposed and that the attorneys had 
asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. This is a 
violation of the judge's gag order. And the President made some 
comments that were not in line. But he had some choices to 
make, and he made the wrong choices.
    But let's look at exhibit 14, which covers the series of 
statements made to Ms. Currie. At this point there is the 
testimony of Betty Currie. She is reciting to the grand jury 
each of the statements the President made to her after his 
grand jury testimony.
    The first: ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
    Second: ``You were always there when Monica was there, 
right?''
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
    I am not going to read each one of those. You can read 
them. You have heard those as well.
    But the President is making those simple declaratory 
statements to her.
    There are three areas that are covered.
    First of all, the President makes a case that he was never 
alone with Monica Lewinsky.
    Second, he is making a point to her that ``she was the 
aggressor, not me.''
    The third point he is making, ``I did nothing wrong.''
    Those are the basic three points of those five statements 
that the President made to Betty Currie.
    During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony she was asked 
whether she believed that the President wished her to agree to 
the statements.
    Let's look at Betty Currie for a second. She is the 
classical reluctant witness. Where are her loyalties? How would 
you examine her testimony? Where is she uncomfortable in her 
testimony when she is asked the question? How does she shift in 
the chair? Those are the kind of ways you have to evaluate the 
truthfulness of the testimony, where their loyalties lie, and 
their demeanor.
    During the questioning she was clearly reluctant.
    She was asked a series of questions, and she finally 
acknowledges that the President was intending for her to agree 
with the statements that were made. She says, ``That is 
correct.'' And that is page 74 of Betty Currie's grand jury 
testimony.
    When the President testified in the August 17 grand jury, 
he was questioned about his intentions when he made those five 
statements to Ms. Currie in his office on that Sunday. And the 
President's explanation is as follows to the grand jury:
    The President:

    . . . I thought we were going to be deluged by the press 
comments. And I was trying to refresh my memory about what the 
facts were.

    Then he goes on to testify:

    So, I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something 
that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as 
quickly as I could.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have to determine 
what the purpose of those five statements to Betty Currie were. 
Were they to get information or were they to get her to falsely 
testify when she was called as a witness? Logic tells us that 
the President's argument is that he was just trying to refresh 
his memory. Well, so much of a novel legal defense argument.
    First, consider the President's options after he left the 
deposition.
    He could have abided by the judge's gag order and not said 
anything.
    Second, he could have called Betty Currie in and asked her 
an open-ended question: Ms. Currie, or Betty, what do you 
remember happened?
    The third option was to call her in and to make these 
declaratory statements, violate the judge's order, and tamper 
with the anticipated testimony of Betty Currie.
    That is the course that the President chose. He made sure 
it was a face-to-face meeting, not a telephone call. He made 
sure that no one else was present. He made sure that the 
meeting was on his territory and in his office where he could 
feel comfortable and he could utilize the power and prestige of 
his office to have the greatest influence on her future 
testimony.
    After Ms. Currie was in the President's office, he made 
short, clear, understandable, declarative statements telling 
Ms. Currie what the story was. He was not interested in what 
she knew. Why? Because he knew the truth, but he did not want 
Ms. Currie to tell the truth. The only way to ensure that was 
by telling her what to say, not asking her what she remembered. 
You do not refresh someone's memory by telling that person what 
he or she remembers, and you certainly do not make the 
declarative statements to someone regarding factual scenarios 
of which the listener was unaware.
    From the statements that were made to her, Betty Currie 
could not have had any possible knowledge about whether they 
were ever alone, as to whether she came on to him. No. This was 
not any attempt for the President to refresh his recollection. 
It was witness tampering, pure and simple.
    Understanding the seriousness of the President's attempting 
to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie, his attorneys have 
tried to argue that those statements could not constitute 
obstruction of justice because she had not been subpoenaed and 
the President did not know that she was a potential witness at 
this time. Well, the argument is refuted by both the law and 
the facts.
    The law is clear that a person may be convicted of 
obstructing justice if he corruptly influenced the testimony of 
a prospective witness. The witness does not actually have to 
give testimony. The witness does not have to be under any 
subpoena. The witness does not have to be on any witness list. 
And so the law is clear.
    Secondly, let's examine the defense in light of the facts. 
The President himself brought Ms. Currie into the civil rights 
case as a corroborating witness when he repeatedly used her 
name in the deposition, and just as significantly the President 
had to be concerned about a looming perjury charge against him 
in light of his false testimony in the deposition. At least six 
times in that deposition the President challenged the 
plaintiff's attorneys to question Ms. Currie about the 
particular issue.
    You don't have it in front of you, but you will see it when 
we distribute the copies of my remarks. I will go through those 
six times.
    At page 58 of the deposition, the President, when asked 
whether he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, said that he was not 
alone with her or that Betty Currie was there with Monica.
    At page 70, when asked about the last time the President 
saw Ms. Lewinsky, he falsely testified he only recalled that 
she was there to see Betty.
    At page 64, he told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' 
whether Lewinsky was alone with him in the White House or not 
or with Betty in the White House between the late hours.
    At page 65 of the deposition, the President was asked 
whether Ms. Lewinsky sent packages to him, and he stated that 
Betty handled the packages.
    At page 72, the President was asked whether he may have 
assisted in any way with a job search. He said he thought Betty 
suggested Vernon Jordan talk to her.
    At page 74, he said Monica asked Betty to ask someone to 
talk to Ambassador Richardson. He asserted Betty as a 
corroborating witness at least six times in the deposition.
    There is no question that Ms. Currie was a prospective 
witness, and the President clearly wanted her to be deposed as 
a witness as his ``ask Betty'' testimony demonstrates.
    But there is another fact that, thus far, has been 
overlooked, and let me draw your attention to this.
    Two days before the President's deposition, Betty Currie 
receives a call from Michael Isikoff, a reporter with Newsweek 
magazine, inquiring about the records, the courier records of 
gifts going from Ms. Lewinsky to the President.
    You've got a news reporter for a national publication two 
days before the President's deposition talking to the 
President's secretary, saying, ``I need to see the courier 
records at the White House.'' What does Betty Currie do? She 
testified that she probably told the President this. Then she 
tells Bruce Lindsey, but she also goes to see Vernon Jordan. 
Why? Why would the secretary go see Vernon Jordan because she 
had a press inquiry? The reason is, as we see later on, 
remember, this is January 15. What happened on December 28 that 
we will get to a little bit later? On December 28 Betty Currie 
went and put those gifts under her bed. Why is she nervous? 
Because Mike Isikoff is calling about the gifts that are 
presently under her bed, and she is nervous. I would be 
nervous. And so she goes to see Bruce Lindsey. She goes to see 
Vernon Jordan: I need help. What do I do? And she probably told 
the President.
    It is all breaking loose, the house of cards is falling 
down, and she is either going to report to Mr. Jordan or to 
seek advice from him. Either way, she knows it is serious; it 
all has legal consequences. And she is a witness to it all.
    Not only does Betty Currie's testimony talk about this call 
from Michael Isikoff and going to see Vernon Jordan, but Vernon 
Jordan's testimony confirms the visit as well.
    The President claims he called Ms. Currie in to work on 
that Sunday night only to find out what she knew, but the 
President knew the truth about the relationship, and if he told 
the truth in deposition the day before, he would have had no 
reason to be refreshed by Betty Currie.
    More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's 
reaction, and the suggested lies clearly prove that the 
President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he 
was looking for corroboration for his false coverup, and that 
is why he coached her. He needed a witness for him, not against 
him.
    Now, let's go to exhibit 5, Betty Currie's testimony--
excuse me, exhibit 15.
    This is Betty Currie's testimony before the grand jury on 
January 27, 1998. And Betty Currie is asked about this. Now, 
remember, it was on a Sunday that Betty Currie was first called 
into the White House to go through these five statements, this 
coaching by the President. And then she testified to the grand 
jury:

    Question: Did there come a time after that that you had 
another conversation with the President about some other news 
about what was going on? That would have been Tuesday or 
Wednesday--when he called you into the Oval Office?

    Betty Currie's answer:

    It was Tuesday or Wednesday. I don't remember which one this was, 
either. But the best I remember, when he called me in the Oval Office, 
it was sort of a recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--
you know, ``I was never alone with her''--that sort of thing.
    Question: Did he pretty much list the same----
    Answer: To my recollection, sir, yes.
    Question: And did he say it in sort of the same tone and demeanor 
that he used the first time he told you on Sunday?
    Answer: The best I remember, yes, sir.

    And this needs to be emphasized. Not only was that witness 
coaching taking place on Sunday but it took place a couple days 
later. It was twice repeated by the President to Betty Currie. 
He needed to have her good and in line.
    This is more than witness tampering. It is witness 
compulsion of false testimony by an employer to a subordinate 
employee. This has nothing to do with facts, nothing to do with 
media inquiries. It has to do with keeping his team on board, 
keeping the ship from sinking, and hiding the facts that are 
important. At this point we are not talking about hiding 
personal facts from inquiring minds but an effort to impede the 
legitimate and necessary functioning of our court system.
    And now let's go to the Martin Luther King holiday, almost 
exactly a year ago, Monday, January 19. Again, you will see the 
example of the frantic search for Monica Lewinsky did continue.
    Exhibit 16. I am not going to go through all of this, but I 
just want to briefly show the frantic activity on this 
particular day.
    First of all, you will see Betty Currie is trying to 
fulfill her responsibility to get ahold of Ms. Lewinsky. She 
uses the pager system, and she says, ``Please call Kay at 
home.'' Now ``Kay'' is the code name that is used for Betty 
Currie. That is the agreed upon signal. And she uses three 
messages: ``Please call Kay. Please call Kay. Please call 
Kay.''
    Then she starts using different techniques to get her 
attention. ``It's a social call.'' And then she later uses it's 
a ``family emergency.'' Then she later uses it's ``good news.'' 
She is using every means possible to get the attention of 
Monica Lewinsky. And then at 8:50 a.m. the President telephones 
Currie at home. At 8:56 a.m. the President telephones Jordan at 
home.
    Go on down to 10:56 a.m. ``The President telephones Jordan 
at his office.'' And so what is going on here? They are 
nervous; they are afraid; it is all breaking loose. They are 
trying to get ahold of Monica Lewinsky to find out what is 
going on, who she is talking to.
    Later that day things continued to destabilize for the 
President. At 4:54 p.m. Mr. Jordan learned from the attorney, 
Frank Carter, that he no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky, and 
so Mr. Jordan's link had been cut off. Mr. Jordan continued to 
attempt to reach the President or someone at the White House. 
Between 4:58 and 5:22 p.m., he made six calls trying to get 
ahold of someone at the White House, the President.
    When Mr. Jordan was asked about why he was urgently trying 
to get ahold of the White House, he responded, ``Because the 
President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job'' and he 
thought it was ``information they ought to have.'' Jordan 
finally reaches the President about 6 p.m. and tells him that 
Carter had been fired.
    Why this flurry of activity? It shows how important it was 
for the President of the United States to find Ms. Lewinsky. 
Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Monica, and it could 
not happen, it did not happen. Ms. Lewinsky was a co-
conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Federal court 
and he was losing control over her. In fact, she ultimately 
agreed to testify truthfully, under penalty of perjury, in this 
matter. This was trouble for the President.
    Let's continue exploring the web of obstruction. But to do 
this we have to backtrack to what I have already referred to, 
and that was the incident on December 28, the episode with the 
gifts.
    On December 28, another brick in the wall of obstruction 
was laid. It was the concealment of evidence. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she discussed with the President the fact that 
she had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to 
produce gifts. And this is what Ms. Lewinsky was telling the 
President at the meeting with him on December 28. She testified 
before the grand jury that she recalled telling the President 
that the subpoena in question had requested a hatpin and other 
items, and this concerned her--the specificity of it. And the 
President responded it ``bothered'' him, too.
    Well, let's look at the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, which is 
exhibit 17. This is Lewinsky testifying about the meeting.

    And then at some point I said to him [the President], 
``Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
Betty.'' And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't 
know,'' or, ``Let me think about that,'' and left that topic.

    Not exactly the response you would hope for or expect from 
the President. But the answer led to action. Later that day Ms. 
Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said, ``I understand 
you have something to give to me,'' or, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, ``The President said you have something to give me.'' 
She wasn't exactly sure of the phrase but it was either, ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' what Betty Currie 
said, or Betty Currie said, ``The President said you have 
something to give to me.''
    And so, ladies and gentlemen, if you accept the testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky on that point, you must conclude that the 
directive to retrieve the gifts came from the President. I will 
concede that there is a conflict in the testimony on this point 
with the testimony of Betty Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand 
jury testimony, had a fuzzy memory, a little different 
recollection. She testified that ``the best she can remember'' 
Ms. Lewinsky called her. But whenever she was asked further, 
she said that maybe Ms. Lewinsky's memory is better than hers 
on that issue. But there is helpful evidence to clear up this 
discrepancy, or this inconsistency. Monica, you will recall, in 
her deposition said she thought that Betty had called her and 
she thought that the call came from her cell phone number.
    Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of 
Monica Lewinsky, but since then the cell phone record was 
retrieved. And you don't have it in front of you, but it will 
be available. The cell phone record was retrieved that showed, 
on Betty Currie's cell phone calls, a call was made at 3:32 
from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky. And this confirms the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the followup to get the gifts 
came from Betty Currie. The only way she would know about it is 
if the President directed her to go retrieve the gifts, as was 
discussed with Monica earlier.
    Now, the President will argue that Monica's timeline does 
not fit with the time of the cell phone call. But remember, the 
cell phone record was retrieved subsequent to both the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie before the grand 
jury, and therefore the record was not available to refresh the 
recollection or to make inquiry with him about that. Monica 
Lewinsky's time estimates as to when Betty Currie arrived to 
pick up the gifts was based upon her memory without the benefit 
of records.
    The questions raised by the President on this issue are 
legitimate and demonstrate the need to call the key witnesses 
to a trial of this case and to assess which version of the 
events is believable and substantiated by the corroborating 
evidence. This is certainly an area of testimony where the 
juror needs to hear from Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky and 
to examine all of the circumstantial evidence and documentary 
evidence to determine the truth. It is my belief, based upon 
common sense and based upon the documentary evidence, that the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky is supported in the record and it 
leads to the conclusion that it was the President who initiated 
this retrieval of the gifts and the concealment of the 
evidence.
    There are many lawyers in this room, and you know that in 
Federal cases all across this country judges instruct juries on 
circumstantial evidence. We have presented to you a great 
amount of direct evidence, grand jury testimony, eyewitness 
testimony, documentary evidence. But juries can use 
circumstantial evidence as well. There is a typical line from 
the instruction that is given in Federal courts to Federal 
juries all across the land:

    The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight 
or value to be given either to direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of 
circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.

    So I think it is incumbent upon you to evaluate the 
circumstances very carefully in addition to the testimony.
    Now, let's examine the key question for a moment. Why did 
Betty Currie pick up the gifts from Monica Lewinsky? Monica 
Lewinsky states that she did not request this and the retrieval 
was initiated by the call from Betty Currie. This was after the 
meeting with the President. Monica Lewinsky's version is 
corroborated by the cell phone record and the pattern of 
conduct on the part of Betty Currie. What do I mean by that? As 
a loyal secretary to the President, it is inconceivable that 
she would go to retrieve gifts that she knows the President is 
very concerned about and could bring down the whole house. 
Betty Currie, a subordinate employee, would not engage in such 
activity on such a sensitive matter without the approval and 
direction of the President himself.
    In addition, let's look further to the actions of Betty 
Currie. It becomes clear that she understands the significance 
of these gifts, their evidentiary value in a civil rights case, 
and the fact that they are under subpoena. She retrieves these 
items, and where does she place them? She hides them under her 
bed--significantly, a place of concealment.
    Now, let's look at the President's defense. The President 
stated in his response to questions 24 and 25, which were 
submitted from the House to the President, he was not concerned 
about the gifts. In fact, he recalled telling Monica that if 
the Jones lawyers request the gifts, she should just turn them 
over to them. The President testified he was ``not sure'' if he 
knew the subpoena asked for gifts.
    Now, why in the world would Monica and the President 
discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyer if Ms. Lewinsky 
had not told him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the 
other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would 
he give Monica more gifts on December 28? This seems odd. But 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she 
never questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but 
keep this private,'' and that means to take ``whatever 
appropriate steps need to be taken.'' That is from Monica's 
grand jury testimony of August 6.
    Why would the President even meet with Monica Lewinsky on 
December 28 when their relationship was in question and he had 
a deposition coming up? Certainly he knew he would be 
questioned about it. Certainly if Monica became a witness she 
would be questioned about the relationship, that she would be 
asked when was the last time you met with the President, and 
now they have to say December 28, if they were going to tell 
the truth.
    The answer is, the President knew that he had to keep 
Monica Lewinsky on the team and he was willing to take more 
risks so that she would continue to be a part of the conspiracy 
to obstruct the legitimate functions of the Federal court in a 
civil rights case.
    It should be remembered that the President has denied each 
and every allegation of the two articles of impeachment; he has 
denied each element of the obstruction of justice charges, 
including this allegation that he encouraged a scheme to 
conceal evidence in a civil rights case. This straightforward 
denial illustrates the dispute in the evidence and testimony. 
It sets the credibility of Monica Lewinsky, the credibility of 
Betty Currie, the credibility of Vernon Jordan, and others 
against the credibility of the President of the United States.
    How can you, as jurors, determine who is telling the truth? 
I have pointed to the corroborating evidence, the 
circumstantial evidence, as well as common sense supporting the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky. But let me ask you two questions: 
Can you convict the President of the United States without 
hearing personally the testimony of one of the key witnesses? 
The second question is: Can you dismiss the charges under this 
strong set of facts and circumstances without hearing and 
evaluating the credibility of key witnesses?
    Let me take this a step further and evaluate the 
credibility of the President. Let's first look back at his 
testimony on the December 28 meeting that he gave in his 
deposition. In that case, he seriously misrepresented the 
nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, and that was the gift 
exchange. First he was asked: ``Did she tell you that she had 
been served with a subpoena in this case?'' The President 
answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had been.''
    Again, this is his testimony in the deposition. He was also 
asked in the deposition if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky 
about the possibility of her testifying.'' His answer: ``I'm 
not sure,'' he said. He then added that he may have joked that 
the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever spoken 
to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation 
than that about it. . .''
    Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict his 
testimony but the President later had to answer questions in 
the grand jury about this same set of circumstances and the 
President directly contradicted himself. Speaking of this 
December 28 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course, 
that she had gotten a subpoena'' and they had a ``conversation 
about the possibility of her testifying.''
    I submit to this body that the inconsistencies of the 
President's own testimony, as well as common sense, seriously 
diminish his credibility on this issue.
    Now let's go forward, once again, to the time period in 
which the President gave his deposition in the Paula Jones 
case. The President testified under oath on January 17, and 
immediately thereafter, remember, he brought Betty Currie in to 
present a set of false facts to her, seeking her agreement and 
coaching her.
    But the President is fully convinced that he can get by 
with his false denials because no one will be able to prove 
what did or did not happen in the Oval Office. There were no 
witnesses, and it boils down to a ``he said, she said'' 
scenario, and as long as that is the case, he believes he can 
win. If the President can simply destroy Monica Lewinsky's 
credibility in public and before the grand jury, then he will 
escape the consequences for his false statements under oath and 
obstruction in the civil rights case. Now, remember, this 
viewpoint, though, is all before the DNA tests were performed 
on the blue dress, forcing the President to acknowledge certain 
items.
    In order to carry out this coverup and obstruction, the 
President needed to go further. He needed not only Betty Currie 
to repeat his false statements but also other witnesses who 
would assuredly be called before the Federal grand jury and who 
would be questioned by the news media in public forums. And 
this brings us to the false statements that the President made 
to his White House staff and Presidential aides.
    Let's call Sydney Blumenthal and John Podesta to the 
witness stand. I concede they would be adverse witnesses. This 
is referred to in exhibit 18 that you have in front of you.
    First, the testimony of Sydney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal, 
to put this in perspective, is testifying about his 
conversations when the President called him in to go through 
these facts of what happened. So Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
``it was at that point that he''--referring to the President--
``gave his account as to what happened to me and he said that 
Monica--and it came very fast. He said, `Monica Lewinsky came 
at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He rebuffed her. He 
said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a 
lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.' ''
    Look at this next line. ``She threatened him. She said that 
she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known 
as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if 
she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't 
be the stalker any more.''
    He talks about this character in a novel, and I haven't 
read that book. But the last line: ``And I said to him, I said, 
``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?' He 
said, `Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.' ''
    Let's go to John Podesta's testimony where he was called in 
the same fashion. The President talked to him about what is 
happening:

    Question: Okay. Share that with us.
    Answer: Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some 
spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said 
that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever.
    Question: Okay.
    Answer: --that they had not had oral sex.

    Very briefly, Dick Morris. You have heard this. I will 
refer to the last line: `` `They're just not ready for it,' 
meaning the voters. And he--the President--said, `Well, we just 
have to win, then.' ''
    As the President testified before the grand jury, he knew 
these witnesses would be called before the grand jury. At page 
106 of the President's testimony before the grand jury--I just 
want to confirm this point because it is important--he 
testified--the question was: ``You know that they''--and this 
is referring to John Podesta, Sydney Blumenthal and his aides--
``might be witnesses, you knew they might be called into the 
grand jury, didn't you?''
    His answer: ``That's right.''
    So there is no question these were witnesses going to 
testify before the grand jury. He was giving them false 
information, and he did not limit it to that. The false 
statements to them constitute witness tampering and obstruction 
of justice.
    I think there are two significant points in the statements 
the President made to his aides.
    First of all, the President, who wants to do away with the 
politics of personal destruction, indicates a willingness to 
destroy the credibility and reputation of a young person who 
worked in his office for what reason? In order to preserve not 
only his Presidency but, more significantly, to defeat the 
civil rights case against him. It is not a matter of saying he 
didn't do it because he could have simply uttered a denial, but 
he engaged in character assassination that he knew would be 
repeated to the Federal grand jury and throughout the public--
she was a stalker, she threatened me, she came on to me--and it 
was repeated.
    Secondly, he makes it clear in his statements to John 
Podesta that he denies any sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, including oral sex. There is no quibbling about 
definitions in this statement. It clearly reflects an attempt 
to deceive, lie, and obstruct our system of justice.
    In this case, at every turn, he used whatever means 
available to evade the truth, destroy evidence, tamper with 
witnesses, and took any other action required to prevent 
evidence from coming forward in a civil rights case that would 
prove a truth contrary to the President's interest. He had 
obstructed the administration of justice before the U.S. 
district court in a civil rights case and before the Federal 
grand jury. But as we move toward a conclusion, let's not focus 
just on the supporting cast we talked about, but we need to 
look at the direct and personal actions of the President.
    I want to look at exhibit 20. This just summarizes the 
seven pillars of obstruction. What did the President do that 
constitutes evidence of obstruction?
    No. 1, he personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky, 
to provide false testimony.
    No. 2, the President had direct involvement in assuring a 
job for a witness--underlining ``direct involvement.'' He made 
the calls, Vernon Jordan did, and it is connected with the 
filing of the false affidavit by that witness.
    No. 3, the President personally, with corrupt intentions, 
tampered with the testimony of a prospective witness, Betty 
Currie.
    No. 4, the President personally provided false statements 
under oath before a Federal grand jury.
    No. 5, by direct and circumstantial evidence the President 
personally directed the concealment of evidence under subpoena 
in a judicial proceeding.
    No. 6, the President personally allowed false 
representations to be made by his attorney, Robert Bennett, to 
a Federal district judge on January 17.
    No. 7, the President intentionally provided false 
information to witnesses before a Federal grand jury knowing 
that those statements would be repeated with the intent to 
obstruct the proceedings before that grand jury and that is the 
statements that he made to the aides.
    The seven pillars of this obstruction case were personally 
constructed by the President of the United States. It was done 
with the intent that the truth and evidence would be suppressed 
in a civil rights case pending against him. The goal was to 
win, and he was not going to let the judicial system stand in 
his way.
    At the beginning of my presentation, I tried to put this 
case into perspective for myself by saying that this proceeding 
is the same as to what takes place in every courtroom in 
America--the pursuit of truth, seeking equal justice, and 
upholding the law. All of that is true. But we know there is 
even more at stake in this trial. What happens here affects the 
workings of our Constitution, it will affect the Presidency in 
future decades, and it will have an impact on a whole 
generation of Americans. What is at stake is our Constitution 
and the principle of equal justice for all.
    I have faith in the Constitution of the United States, but 
the checks and balances of the Constitution are carried out by 
individuals--individuals who are entrusted under oath with 
upholding the trust given to us by the people of this great 
land. If I believe in the Constitution, that it will work, then 
I must believe in you.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I trust the 
Constitution of the United States. But today it is most 
important that I believe in you. I have faith in the U.S. 
Senate. You have earned the trust of the American people, and I 
trust each of you to make the right decision for our country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take another 15-minute break in the proceedings. And I urge 
the Senators to return promptly to the Chamber so we can begin 
after the 15-minute break.
    There being no objection, at 4:51 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 5:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to 
resume final presentation of the afternoon. Several Senators 
have inquired what will happen the balance of the day. I 
believe the presentation by Congressman Rogan will be the last 
of the day. It is anticipated we will complete today's 
presentation around 6:30 or 6:45.
    I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the 
President, Members of the United States Senate, my name is 
Congressman James E. Rogan. I represent the 27th District of 
California.
    May I say at the outset that some of the facts and evidence 
you will hear in my presentation may sound familiar in light of 
the last presentation. Although at times the facts may appear 
to be a crossover, the relevance will be presented in a 
different light.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation offered the evidence 
as it relates to the obstruction of justice charge against the 
President in article II. I will be inviting this body to view 
the evidence within the framework of article I, perjury before 
the grand jury.
    On behalf of the House of Representatives and in the name 
of the people of the United States, I will be presenting to the 
Senate evidence against the President to demonstrate he 
committed perjury before a Federal grand jury as set forth in 
article I of the articles of impeachment.
    Article I of the impeachment resolution against President 
Clinton alleges that he committed perjury before the grand 
jury.
    On August 17, 1998, President Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence 
shows that contrary to that oath, the President willfully 
provided perjurious, false, and misleading statements to the 
grand jury in four general areas:
    First, he perjured himself when he gave a false accounting 
to the grand jury about the nature and details of his 
relationship with a 21-year-old intern, Ms. Monica Lewinsky, 
who was a subordinate Federal Government employee.
    Second, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
repeated previous perjured answers he gave under oath in a 
sexual harassment suit, which was a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him by Paula Jones.
    Third, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
repeated previous perjured answers to justify his attorney's 
false representations to a Federal judge in the Paula Jones 
sexual harassment lawsuit against him.
    Finally, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
testified falsely about his attempts to get other potential 
grand jury witnesses to tell false stories to the grand jury, 
and to prevent the discovery of evidence in Paula Jones' sexual 
harassment lawsuit against him.
    In a judicial proceeding, a witness has a very solemn 
obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth. Perjury is a serious crime because our judicial 
system can only succeed if citizens are required to tell the 
truth in court proceedings. If witnesses may lie with impunity 
for personal or political reasons, ``justice'' is no longer the 
product of the court system and we descend into chaos. That is 
why the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a premium on truthful 
testimony and shows no tolerance for perjury.
    More than 20 years ago, the Supreme Court addressed this 
very concept of perjury and its dangerous effect on our system 
of law. Listen to the words of the U.S. Supreme Court:

    In this constitutional process of securing a witness' 
testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured 
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic 
concepts of judicial proceedings. . . . Congress has made the 
giving of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe 
penalties; in no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into 
the open where the law can deal with it.

    That is the framework under which the House of 
Representatives acted in impeaching the President of the United 
States and now respectfully urges this body to call the 
President to constitutional accountability.
    The key to understanding the facts of this case is to 
understand why the President was asked, under oath, questions 
about his private life in the first place.
    Despite the popular spin, it wasn't because Members of 
Congress, or lawyers from the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, or a gaggle of reporters suddenly decided to invade 
the President's privacy. No. This all came about because of a 
claim against the President from when he was the Governor of 
Arkansas.
    During the discovery phase of the Paula Jones sexual 
harassment case against the President, Federal Judge Susan 
Webber Wright ordered him to answer questions under oath 
relating to any sexual relationship he may have had while 
Governor and President with subordinate female Government 
employees. These orders are common in similar cases, and the 
questions posed to President Clinton are questions routinely 
posed to defendants in civil rights sexual harassment cases 
every single day in courthouses throughout the land.
    During the President's deposition in the Paula Jones case, 
he was asked questions about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. The judge allowed these questions because they 
possibly could lead Ms. Jones to discover if there was any 
pattern of conduct to help prove her case. The President 
repeatedly denied that he had a sexual relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky.
    A few days later, the story about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky broke in the press. A criminal investigation began to 
determine whether the President perjured himself in the Paula 
Jones sexual harassment case and obstructed justice by trying 
to defeat her claim against him by corrupt means.
    On the afternoon of August 17, 1998, President Clinton 
raised his right hand and took an oath before the grand jury in 
their criminal investigation.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God?

    Note the incredibly solemn obligation of the oath the 
President took:

    Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth?

    When the President made that solemn pledge, he was not 
obliging himself to tell the grand jury the partial truth; he 
was not obliging himself to tell the ``I didn't want to be 
particularly helpful'' truth; he was not obliging himself to 
tell the ``this is embarrassing so I think I'll fudge on it a 
little bit'' truth. He was required to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and he made that pledge 
in the name of God.
    The attorneys for the Office of the Independent Counsel 
showed great deference to the President when they questioned 
him that day. The President's attorneys were allowed to be 
there with him during the entire proceeding so that he could 
confer with them at his leisure if he was unsure of how to 
respond to a question. As a matter of fact, the attorney who 
questioned the President encouraged him to confer with his 
lawyers if there arose in the President's mind any reason to 
hesitate before answering a question.
    The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the 
President's testimony. The President was told:

    Normally, grand jury witnesses, while not allowed to have 
attorneys in the grand jury room with them, can stop and 
consult with their attorneys. Under our arrangement today, your 
attorneys are here and present for consultation and you can 
break to consult them as necessary. . . . Do you understand 
that, sir?

    The President responded: ``I do understand that.''
    As a practical matter, the President had three options as 
he appeared before the grand jury to testify.
    First, the President could tell the truth about his true 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    However, the evidence will clearly show that the President 
rejected the option of telling the truth.
    Second, the President knew he could invoke his fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
    The independent counsel's attorney explicitly reminded the 
President about his right to refuse to answer any question that 
might tend to incriminate him.
    The President was asked:

    You have a privilege against self-incrimination. If a 
truthful answer to any question would tend to incriminate you, 
you can invoke the privilege and that invocation will not be 
used against you. Do you understand that?

    The President's response was: ``I do.''
    The President knew he had the right to refuse to answer any 
incriminating questions and that no legal harm would have come 
to him for doing so.
    But he rejected this option, just as he rejected the option 
of telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth.
    Instead, he selected a third path.
    He continued to lie about corrupt efforts to destroy Paula 
Jones' civil rights lawsuit against him.
    If a trial is permitted before this body where live 
witnesses can be called and where their credibility can be 
scrutinized, the evidence will show this distinguished body 
that the course the President charted was a course of perjury.
    Despite the President's unique level of judicial 
sophistication and expertise, the attorneys at the grand jury 
were careful to make sure the President understood his 
responsibilities to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth.
    They did this at the outset of his testimony, before any 
questions were asked that might tempt the President to lie 
under oath.
    And they specifically warned him that if he were to lie or 
intentionally mislead the grand jury, he could face perjury and 
obstruction of justice charges, both of which are felonies 
under Federal law.
    This exchange occurred before the President's testimony:

    Q: Mr. President, you understand that your testimony here 
today is under oath?
    A: I do.
    Q: And you understand that because you have sworn to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that if 
you were to lie or intentionally mislead the grand jury, you 
could be prosecuted for perjury and/or obstruction of justice?
    A: I believe that's correct.
    Q: Is there anything that . . . I've stated to you 
regarding your rights and responsibilities that you would like 
me to clarify or that you don't understand?
    A: No, sir.

    Despite this ominous warning, the prosecutors continued 
emphasizing the need for the President to resist lying to the 
grand jury.
    Still intent on making sure the President understood his 
obligations, the attorneys further advised him:

    Q: Mr. President, I would like to read for you a portion of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 603, which discusses the important 
function the oath has in our judicial system.
    It says that the purpose of the oath is . . . calculated to 
awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind 
with the duty to tell the truth.
    Could you please tell the grand jury what that oath means 
to you for today's testimony?
    A: I have sworn an oath to tell the grand jury the truth, 
and that's what I intend to do.

    When the President said in that very last answer I just 
read that he swore an oath to tell the grand jury ``the 
truth,'' the prosecutor immediately followed up with this 
question. Here is what he was told.
    Question to the President:

    Q: You understand that [the oath] requires you to give the 
whole truth, that is, a complete answer to each question, sir?
    A: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I 
can.

    One would think these repetitive explanations would be 
enough to warn even the most legally unsophisticated witness 
about the need to treat a grand jury criminal investigation 
seriously, and the need to tell the whole truth at any cost.
    No reasonable person could believe at this point that the 
President did not understand his obligations.
    Yet, just to be sure, the attorneys again impressed on the 
President his solemn duty to tell the truth:
    Question to the President:

    Q: Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
    A: I did take an oath then.
    Q: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
you then as it does today?
    A: I believed then that I had to answer the questions 
truthfully. That is correct.  . . .
    Q: And it meant the same to you then as it does today?
    A: Well, no one read me a definition then and we didn't go 
through this exercise then.
    I swore an oath to tell the truth, and I believed I was 
bound to be truthful and I tried to be.

    Having just received his ``refresher course'' on either 
``taking the fifth'' and remaining silent, or telling the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, the President acknowledged he 
was required to tell the truth when he gave answers to 
questions 8 months earlier in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
civil rights lawsuit.
    Question to the President:

    Q: At the Paula Jones deposition, you were represented by 
Mr. Robert Bennett, your counsel, is that correct?
    A: That is correct.
    Q: He was authorized by you to be your representative 
there, your attorney, is that correct?
    A: That is correct.
    Q: Your counsel, Mr. Bennett, indicated . . . and I'm 
quoting, ``The President intends to give full and complete 
answers as Ms. Jones is entitled to have.''
    My question to you is, do you agree with your counsel that 
a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is, to use his words, 
entitled to have the truth?
    A: I believe that I was bound to give truthful answers, 
yes, sir.
    Q: But the question is, sir, do you agree with your counsel 
that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is entitled to 
have the truth?
    A. I believe when a witness is under oath in a civil case, 
or otherwise under oath, the witness should do everything 
possible to answer the questions truthfully.

    Thus, the groundwork was laid for the President to testify 
under oath.
    He knew how the rules worked respecting testimony before 
the grand jury.
    If a question was vague or ambiguous, the President could 
ask for a clarification.
    If he was unsure how to answer, or indeed whether to answer 
a question, he could stop the questioning, take a break, and 
consult privately with his attorneys who were present with him.
    If giving an answer would tend to incriminate him, he could 
refuse to answer the question by claiming his fifth amendment 
rights.
    But if, after all of this, he decided to give an answer, 
the answer he gave was required to be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. And it was no different than 
the obligation when he testified in the Paula Jones 
deposition--the same oath, the same obligation.
    Let's look at how the President chose to meet his 
obligation.
    As noted in my opening remarks, the President's grand jury 
perjury is the basis for article I of the impeachment 
resolution. The evidence shows, and live witnesses clearly will 
demonstrate, that the President repeatedly committed perjury 
before the grand jury when he testified as a defendant in a 
sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit against him.
    He intentionally failed in his lawful obligation to tell 
the truth in four general areas. First, the President committed 
perjury before the grand jury when he testified about the 
nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, a 21-year-old 
White House intern who, by definition, was a subordinate 
Government employee.
    On December 5, 1995, Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the 
Paula Jones witness list. Later, the President was ordered by 
Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright to answer questions about 
Monica Lewinsky because the President was a defendant in a 
sexual harassment case.
    At his deposition in the Paula Jones case, the President 
was shown a definition approved by Judge Wright of what 
constitutes sexual relations. I am going to read the definition 
that was presented to the President.
    And let me say at the outset that I am going to slightly 
sanitize it. You have in your materials, Members of this body, 
a copy of the actual definition that was given to you, so you 
will be able to understand precisely what was put before the 
President.
    Definition of sexual relations:

    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or causes 
contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any person 
with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person.

    Members of the Senate, just for clarification, I did not 
feel the need to actually relate to this body what those 
enumerated body parts are.
    After reviewing the deposition, the President then denied 
that he ever had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. As 
we have already seen, from the day in January when the 
President testified in the Jones deposition until the day he 
appeared in August for his grand jury testimony, he vehemently 
denied ever having a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    Listen to the President addressing the American people on 
the subject of his credibility. The date is January 26, 1998, 5 
days after the Lewinsky story broke in the press.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    ``But I want to say one thing to the American people. I 
want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again.
    ``I did not have sexual relations with that woman--Miss 
Lewinsky.
    ``I never told anybody to lie--not a single time. Never. 
These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for 
the American people.
    ``Thank you.''

    Beginning in January 1998, the President went on an 8-month 
campaign, both under oath and in the press, denying any sexual 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky in any way, shape, or form. 
But 8 months after his deposition testimony and these 
passionate denials, the tide had turned against his story. By 
August, Monica Lewinsky was now cooperating with the office of 
the independent counsel. If she was telling the truth in her 
sworn testimony, then the President's January denial in the 
Paula Jones case would have been a clear case of him committing 
perjury and obstructing justice.
    Why? Because she was describing, in very graphic detail, 
conduct occurring between her and the President that clearly 
fit the definition of ``sexual relations'' as used in the Paula 
Jones deposition--conduct that he repeatedly denied under oath.
    So by the time the President sat down for his grand jury 
testimony to answer these questions under oath, he had put 
himself in a huge box. He could not continue the outright lie 
because Ms. Lewinsky had turned over her blue dress for DNA 
testing, and at the time of his grand jury testimony he didn't 
know what the results of that FBI test were. Under such 
circumstances, continuing the lie was too risky of a strategy 
even for the most accomplished of gamblers. But if he told the 
truth, his earlier perjury and obstruction of justice would 
have ended his Presidency. He was sure he would have been 
driven from office.
    Remember that the President had actually authorized that a 
poll be taken for him by Dick Morris, and the poll wasn't just 
taken on whether the American people would forgive him for 
adultery; the President asked Dick Morris to poll in two other 
areas. He asked Dick Morris to poll whether the American people 
would forgive him for perjury and obstruction of justice. When 
he got the poll results back, he learned that the American 
people would forgive him for the adultery but they would not 
forgive him for perjury or for obstruction of justice.
    Once he got the bad news from Dick Morris that his 
political career was over if he perjured himself, he told Dick 
Morris, ``We'll just have to win.'' So at his grand jury 
testimony, once the first question was asked about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the President produced a 
prepared statement and read from it. This prepared statement he 
read to the grand jury on August 17, 1998, was the linchpin in 
his plan to ``win.''
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, were you physically intimate with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. Mr. Bittman, I think maybe I can save you and the grand 
jurors a lot of time if I read a statement, which I think will 
make it clear what the nature of my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky was and how it related to the testimony I gave, what I 
was trying to do in that testimony. And I think it will perhaps 
make it possible for you to ask even more relevant questions 
from your point of view. And, with your permission, I'd like to 
read that statement.
    Q. Absolutely. Please, Mr. President.
    A. When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that 
was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in 
early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with 
Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include 
this conduct. I take full responsibility for my actions. While 
I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can, 
because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, 
and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the 
office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of 
these particular matters.
    I will try to answer to the best of my ability other 
questions, including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term of 
sexual relations, as I understood it to be defined at my 
January 17th, 1998, deposition, and questions concerning 
alleged subordination of perjury, obstruction of justice and 
intimidation of witnesses.
    That . . . is my statement.

    Beyond that statement, the President generally refused to 
answer specific questions about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. The President used that prepared statement as a 
substitute answer for specific questions about his conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky 19 separate times during his testimony before the 
grand jury. The purpose of the prepared statement was to avoid 
answering the types of specific harassment lawsuit questions 
for which the U.S. Supreme Court and Judge Susan Webber Wright 
had earlier cleared the way. The evidence shows the President 
used this prepared statement in order to justify the perjurious 
answers he gave at his deposition which were intended to affect 
the outcome of the Paula Jones case. The fact that this 
statement was prepared in advance shows his intent to mislead 
the grand jury in this very area. Ironically, this prepared 
statement was supposed to inoculate the President from perjury. 
Instead, it opened him up to 19 more examples of giving 
perjurious, false, and misleading answers under oath.
    For example, in that prepared statement, the President said 
his sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky began in 1996, and not in 
1995, as Ms. Lewinsky had testified. This was not a mere slip 
of memory over a meaningless timeframe; there is a discrepancy 
in the dates for a reason. You see, under the President's 
version, in 1996 Monica Lewinsky was a paid White House 
employee. Under the facts as testified to by Ms. Lewinsky, when 
the relationship really began in 1995, she was not a paid 
employee at the White House; she was a young, 21-year-old White 
House intern.
    The concept of a President having a sexual relationship in 
the White House with a young intern less than half his age was 
a public relations disaster for the President, as everyone 
vividly remembers. It is clear that the President somehow 
viewed the concept as less combustible if he could take the 
``young intern'' phrase out of the public lexicon. Yet in his 
deposition testimony, the President admitted he met her and saw 
her when she was an intern working in the White House in 
November 1995, during the Government shutdown. Monica Lewinsky 
confirmed this. In fact, she testified that the first time she 
ever spoke to the President was on November 15, 1995, during 
the Government shutdown. And she also said that the very first 
time that she ever spoke to the President was the same day he 
invited her back to the Oval Office and began a sexual 
relationship with her.
    It is obvious that the reference in the President's 
prepared statement to the grand jury that this relationship 
began in 1996 was intentionally false.
    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain 
occasions. Actually, they were alone in the White House at 
least 20 times and had at least 11 sexual encounters at the 
White House. The President attempted to use language that 
subtly minimized the number of times they were alone.
    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky 
as ``occasional.'' In fact, there are at least 55 documented 
telephone conversations between the President of the United 
States and the young intern. And without going into further 
graphic detail, the evidence shows that, at least on 17 of 
those occasions, those conversations included much more than 
mere sexual banter, as the President described it.
    The most unsettling part of that statement was uttered near 
the close. Listen to what the President said: ``I regret that 
what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' 
``Friendship.'' The very day the President met and spoke with a 
young White House intern for the first time was the day he 
invited her back to the Oval Office to perform sex acts on him.
    In fact, Monica Lewinsky said that after their sexual 
relationship was over a month old, she didn't even think the 
President knew her name. The President's statement about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky beginning as a friendship is 
a callous and deceptive mischaracterization of how his 
relationship with this young woman really began.
    Thus, the President began his deposition testimony by 
reading a false and misleading statement to the grand jury. He 
then used that statement as an excuse not to answer specific 
questions that were directly relevant to allowing the grand 
jury to complete its criminal investigation. Had he given 
specific answers to specific questions about the true nature of 
his relationship, the grand jury would have been able to learn 
the whole truth about whether the President perjured himself 
and obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
civil rights lawsuit.
    Paula Jones had a legal and constitutional right to learn 
if the President, while as President or Governor, used his 
position of power and influence to get sexual favors from 
subordinate female employees in the workplace or to reward 
subordinate female employees for granting such favors to him. 
Instead, the President intentionally provided on 19 separate 
occasions a misleading statement instead of giving a true 
characterization of his conduct, as required by his oath.
    He had no legal or constitutional right to refuse to answer 
such questions without claiming a fifth amendment privilege and 
then allowing Judge Wright to make a determination as to 
whether the privilege applied. The President's preliminary 
statement delivered 19 times was an initial shot across the 
perjury bow offered by the President throughout his grand jury 
testimony. It showed a premeditated effort to thwart the grand 
jury's criminal investigation, to justify his prior wrongdoing, 
and to deny Paula Jones her constitutional right to bring 
forward her claim in a court of law.
    The President gave further perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. One of the ways the 
President tried to justify his perjurious answers in the Jones 
deposition about his relationship was to deconstruct the 
English language. Remember, the President was shown a copy of 
the definition of ``sexual relations'' that Judge Wright 
approved in his January deposition. This definition was 
directed by Judge Wright to be used as the guide under which 
the President was to answer questions about his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. After carefully reviewing that 
definition, the President said under oath that it did not apply 
to his relationship with her.
    It is important to remember that at the time the President 
testified that he never had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, this was not a risky perjury strategy. After all, he 
had successfully used Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a 
good job in New York, despite her questionable qualifications. 
She had filed a false affidavit in the Jones case denying a 
sexual relationship with the President. She and the President 
had previously agreed to comprehensive cover stories to deny 
the truth of their relationship if anyone ever confronted them 
about it. And the bevy of gifts the President had given to 
Monica were now nestled safely under Betty Currie's bed so that 
they would never be produced to or discovered by Mrs. Jones' 
attorneys in compliance with their subpoena to have those gifts 
produced.
    The perjury strategy was a safe bet in January at his 
deposition, but it soon turned upside down for the President. 
By the time of his grand jury testimony in August, the 
President knew things had changed drastically but not in his 
favor. In light of Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation with the 
independent counsel, the impending FBI report on the DNA 
testing on the blue dress, and the President's decision not to 
confess to his crime, the President needed to come up with some 
excuse. Here is how the President, at his August grand jury 
appearance, tried to explain away his January deposition denial 
of engaging in sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did you understand the words in the first portion of the 
[Jones deposition] exhibit, Mr. President, that is, ``For the 
purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual 
relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes . . 
.''?
    Did you understand, do you understand the words there in 
that phrase?
    A. Yes . . . I can tell you what my understanding of the 
definition is, if you want . . . My understanding of this 
definition is it covers contact by the person being deposed 
with the enumerated areas, if the contact is done with an 
intent to arouse or gratify. That's my understanding of the 
definition.
    Q. What did you believe the definition to include and 
exclude? What kinds of activities?
    A. I thought the definition included any activity by the 
person being deposed, where the person was the actor and came 
into contact with those parts of the bodies with the purpose or 
intent of gratification, and excluded any other activity. For 
example, kissing's not covered by that, I don't think.
    Q. Did you understand the definition to be limited to 
sexual activity?
    A. Yes, I understood the definition to be limited to 
physical contact with those areas of the body with the specific 
intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I understood it to be.
    Q. What specific acts did the definition include, as you 
understood the definition on January 17th, 1998?
    A. Any contact with the areas that are mentioned, sir. If 
you contacted those parts of the body with an intent to arouse 
or gratify, that is covered.
    Q. What did you understand . . .
    A. The person being deposed. If the person being deposed 
contacted those parts of another person's body with an intent 
to arouse or gratify, that was covered.

    If that answer sounds confusing to you, there is a reason 
for that. It was meant to be.
    What the President now was saying to the grand jury is that 
during their intimate relationship in the Oval Office, Monica 
Lewinsky had sexual relations with him; he didn't have sexual 
relations with her.
    Consider that for a minute.
    The President is asking everyone to believe that between 
the years 1995 and 1997, while Monica Lewinsky was engaged in a 
pattern of explicit availability for him as she described in 
her testimony, the President carefully avoided having any 
intimate contact with her as described in Judge Wright's very 
detailed definition.
    According to the President, since he never intimately 
touched her as described in the definition--she only touched 
him--then he was under no obligation to answer questions in the 
harassment suit about Monica Lewinsky as Federal Judge Susan 
Webber Wright ordered him to do under oath.
    Not only does the President's claim strain all boundaries 
of common sense; it is directly in conflict with Monica 
Lewinsky's detailed and corroborated accounts of their 
relationship.
    As if this ridiculous expansion of Judge Wright's 
definition of what constituted sexual relations wasn't enough, 
the President then decided to take his interpretation of the 
judge's definition one step further. He added a new element as 
to why he claimed the definition didn't apply to him.
    When asked again, at his grand jury testimony, what he 
thought the definition of sexual relations meant, here is the 
new twist that the President came up with.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. As I remember from the previous discussion this was some 
kind of definition that had something to do with sexual 
harassment. So, that implies it's forcing to me. And I--there 
was never any issue of forcing in the case involving--well, any 
of these questions they were asking me. They made it clear in 
this discussion I just reviewed that what they were referring 
to was intentional sexual conduct, not some sort of forcible 
abusive behavior.
    So I basically--I don't think I paid any attention to it 
because it appeared to me that that was something that had no 
reference to the facts that they admitted they were asking me 
about.

    The President now took the position that the definition 
didn't apply to him because it would only have applied if he 
forced himself on Monica Lewinsky. Remember the definition. And 
I will read it again:

    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or 
causes--
    (1) contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any 
person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of 
any person[.]

    As you can see, this straightforward definition did not 
include the subject of force or harassment.
    Yet when the independent counsel's attorney tried to 
clarify the President's newfound position, the President gave 
no ground. He simply plowed ahead with his new interpretation.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. I'm just trying to understand, Mr. President. You 
indicated that you put the definition in the context of a 
sexual harassment case . . .
    A. No, no, I think it was not in the context of sexual 
harassment. I just re-read those four pages, which obviously 
the grand jury doesn't have. But there was some reference to 
the fact that this definition apparently bore some--had some 
connection to some definition in another context and that this 
was being used not in that context, not necessarily in the 
context of sexual harassment.
    So I would think that this causes would be--means to force 
someone to do something. That's what I read it. That's the only 
point I'm trying to make. Therefore, I did not believe that any 
one had ever suggested that I had forced anyone to do anything 
and I did not do that. And so, that could not have had any 
bearing on any questions relating to Ms. Lewinsky.

    The evidence clearly shows from Monica Lewinsky's sworn 
testimony that the President deconstructed the English language 
to deny Paula Jones the opportunity to find out if other 
witnesses were out there who would help bolster her case 
against the President, and she was legally entitled to do that 
under our sexual harassment laws.
    No reasonable interpretation of the President's testimony 
could be made that he fulfilled his legal obligation to testify 
to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    His statements were perjurious. They were designed to 
defeat Paula Jones' right to pursue her sexual harassment civil 
rights lawsuit against this President.
    And by the way, in his testimony, the President conceded 
that if Monica Lewinsky's recitation of the facts was true, he 
would have perjured himself both in his deposition testimony 
and in repeating his denials before the grand jury. Listen to 
this.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations 
with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition under that 
definition, correct?
    A. That's correct, sir.
    Q. If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of 
another person, would that be in--with the intent to arouse the 
sexual desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in definition one, 
would that be, under your understanding, then and now, sexual 
relations?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Yes, it would?
    A. Yes, it would if you had a direct contact with any of 
these places in the body, if you had direct contact with intent 
to arouse or gratify, that would fall within the definition.
    Q. So you didn't do any of those three things with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did 
not have sexual relations as I understood this term to be 
defined.

    So, who is telling the truth? The only way to really know 
is to bring forth the witnesses, put them under oath and give 
each juror, each Member of this body, the opportunity to make 
that determination of credibility because the record shows that 
Monica Lewinsky delivered consistent and detailed testimony 
under oath regarding many specific encounters with the 
President that clearly fell within the definition of sexual 
relations in the Jones deposition.
    Monica Lewinsky's memory and accounts of these incidents 
are amazingly corroborated by her recollection of dates, places 
and phone calls which correspond with the official White House 
entrance logs and phone records.
    Monica Lewinsky's testimony is further corroborated through 
DNA testing and the testimony of her friends and family 
members, to whom she made near contemporaneous statements about 
the relationship.
    Most importantly, Monica Lewinsky had every reason to tell 
the truth to the grand jury. She was under a threat of 
prosecution for perjury, not only for her grand jury testimony 
but also for the false affidavit she filed on behalf of the 
President in the Jones case.
    She knew then and she knows today that her immunity 
agreement could be revoked at any time if she lies under oath 
or if she lied under oath in the past. Truthful testimony was 
and remains a condition for her immunity from prosecution.
    By way of contrast, the President was under obligation to 
give complete answers. Instead, he offered false answers that 
violated his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth. And incidentally, during his grand jury 
testimony, the President actually suggested that he had a right 
to give less than complete answers. Why? Because he questioned 
the motives of Ms. Jones in bringing her lawsuit.
    If this standard is acceptable, what does that do to the 
search for the truth when an oath is administered in a 
courtroom to one who claims to question the ``motives'' of 
their opponent in a trial? This suggestion has no basis in law. 
And it is destructive to the truth-seeking function of the 
courts.
    The President's perjurious legal hairsplitting used to 
bypass the requirement of telling the complete truth denied 
Paula Jones her constitutional right to have her day in court 
and an orderly disposition of her claim in the sexual 
harassment case against the President.
    To dismiss this conduct with a shrug because it is ``just 
about sex'' is to say that the sexual harassment laws 
protecting women in the workplace do not apply to powerful 
employers or others in high places of privilege. As one wag 
recently noted, if this case is ``just about sex,'' then 
robbery is just a disagreement over money.
    Next, the President perjured himself before the grand jury 
when he repeated previous perjured answers he gave in the 
deposition of the Paula Jones case. In his grand jury testimony 
in August, the President admitted he had to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth when he testified in the 
Paula Jones deposition.
    The question to the President:

    Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
    A. I did take an oath then.
    Q. Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
you then as it does today?
    A. I believe then that I had to answer the questions 
truthfully; that is correct.

    When the President testified in his January deposition, he 
knew full well that Monica Lewinsky's affidavit filed in the 
case stating that they never had sexual relations was false. 
Yet when this affidavit was shown to him at the deposition, he 
testified that her false claim was, in his words, ``absolutely 
true.''
    He knew that the definition of ``sexual relations'' used in 
the earlier Jones deposition was meant to cover the same 
activity that was mentioned in Monica Lewinsky's false 
affidavit. Rather than tell the complete truth, the President 
lied about the relationship, the cover stories, the affidavit, 
the subpoena for gifts, and the search for a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Later he denied to the grand jury in August that he 
committed any perjury during his January deposition. This 
assertion before the grand jury that he testified truthfully in 
the Jones case is in and of itself perjurious testimony because 
the record is clear he did not testify truthfully in January in 
the Paula Jones case. He perjured himself.
    Thus, when the President testified before the grand jury in 
August, he knew he had given perjurious answers in the January 
deposition. If the President really thought, as he testified, 
that he had told the truth in his January deposition testimony, 
he would not have related a false account of events to his 
secretary, Betty Currie, whom he knew, by his own admission, 
might be called as a witness in the Jones case; he would not 
have repeatedly denied he was unable to recall being alone with 
Monica Lewinsky; and he would not have told false accounts to 
his aides whom he knew, by his own admission, were potential 
witnesses in later proceedings.
    The evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice is 
overwhelming in this case. He continued to use illegal means to 
defeat Ms. Jones' constitutional right to bring her harassment 
case against him.
    Next, the President committed perjury before the grand jury 
when he testified that he did not allow his attorney to make 
false representations while referring to Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit before the judge in the Jones case, an affidavit that 
he knew was false.
    Remember, at the Jones deposition in January 1998, Monica 
Lewinsky previously had filed a false affidavit that said, ``I 
have never had a sexual relationship with the President'' and 
that she had no relevant information to provide on the subject 
to Ms. Jones.
    When Ms. Jones' attorneys attempted to question the 
President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, objected to him even being 
questioned about the relationship.
    Mr. Bennett claimed that in light of Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit saying that there was no sexual relationship between 
the two, and there never had been, that Paula Jones' lawyer had 
no good faith belief even to question the President about a 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    Listen to what Mr. Bennett told Judge Wright in the 
deposition.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object 
to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I 
don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith 
of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully 
aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in 
the questions----
    Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
do not know whether counsel is basing this question on any 
affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on 
other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably 
coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, Mr. Fisher is an 
officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good 
faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good 
faith basis for asking this question, he could later be 
sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in 
camera any good faith basis he might have.
    Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness 
is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's) 
affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's 
sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least 
have a good faith proffer.
    Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
good faith basis for asking the question.
    Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
    Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal 
it to counsel.
    Mr. Bennett. Fine.
    Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
    Judge Wright. All right.
    Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is 
substantial basis.
    Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis 
can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the 
deponent, and the other party.

    May I say as an aside that by presenting that, I am in no 
way questioning the quality or the integrity of the President's 
attorney, Mr. Bennett, on that day. Mr. Bennett was doing his 
job as the President's lawyer. He had an affidavit from Monica 
Lewinsky that said none of this ever happened. And so I hope 
that none of you will assume that by my showing this deposition 
tape today I am trying to draw any unfair inference against the 
President's attorney on that date. But you can tell from what 
you have just observed that Mr. Bennett was using Monica 
Lewinsky's false affidavit in an attempt to stop questioning of 
the President about Ms. Lewinsky.
    What did the President do during that exchange? He sat 
mute. He did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even 
though the President knew that the affidavit upon which Mr. 
Bennett was relying was utterly false.
    Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection and allowed 
the questioning about Monica Lewinsky to proceed.
    Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read to the President 
the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied 
having a sexual relationship with the President. Mr. Bennett 
then asked the President, who was under oath, if Ms. Lewinsky's 
statement that they never had a sexual relationship was true 
and accurate.
    Listen to the President as he responds.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q: In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says this, ``I 
have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not 
offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual 
relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits 
for reflecting a sexual relationship.''
    Is this a true and accurate statement as far as you know 
it?
    A: That is absolutely true.

    The President's answer: ``That is absolutely true.''
    When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury 
testimony 8 months later how he could have sat silently at his 
earlier deposition while his attorney made the false statement 
that ``there is no sex of any kind,'' in any manner, shape, or 
form, to Judge Wright, the President first said that he was not 
paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. Bennett's comments.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, I want to--before I go into a new subject 
area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. 
Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the 
Paula Jones deposition--counsel is fully aware--it's page 54, 
line 5. ``Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky is filing, 
has an affidavit, which they were in possession of, saying that 
there was absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or 
form with President Clinton.'' That statement was made by your 
attorney in front of Judge Susan Webber Wright.
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Your--that statement is a completely false statement. 
Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in 
any manner, shape or form with President Clinton'' was an 
utterly false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends upon what the meaning of the word ``is'' 
means. If ``is'' means is, and never has been, that's one 
thing. If it means, there is none, that was a completely true 
statement. But as I have testified--I'd like to testify again--
this is--it is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about 
his lawyer's statements instead of the other way around. I was 
not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
focusing on my own testimony.

    The President added to this explanation he was giving to 
the attorney questioning him. This is what the President said:

    And I'm not sure . . . as I sit here today that I sat there 
and followed all these interchanges between the lawyers. I'm 
quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges between 
the lawyers all that carefully. And I don't really believe, 
therefore, that I can say Mr. Bennett's testimony or statement 
is testimony and is imputable to me. I didn't--I don't know 
that I was really paying attention, paying that much attention 
to him.

    This denial of the President while his attorney was 
proffering a false statement to Judge Wright in an effort to 
keep the Paula Jones lawyers from even questioning the 
President about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky simply 
does not withstand the test of truth. The videotape of the 
President's January deposition shows the President paying very 
close attention to Mr. Bennett when Mr. Bennett was making the 
statement about ``no sex of any kind.''
    View again the video clip of the President during Mr. 
Bennett's argument that the Jones lawyers have no right to ask 
questions about Monica Lewinsky, only this time watch the 
President as he focuses on his lawyer speaking about one of the 
most important subjects he has ever faced in his entire life--
the survival of his Presidency.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object 
to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I 
don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith 
of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully 
aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in 
the questions----
    Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
do not know whether counsel is basing this question an any 
affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on 
other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably 
coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, I Mr. Fisher is as 
officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good 
faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good 
faith basis for asking this question, he could later be 
sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in 
camera any good faith basis he might have.
    Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness 
is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's) 
affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's 
sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least 
have a good faith proffer.
    Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
good faith basis for asking the question.
    Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
    Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal 
it to counsel.
    Mr. Bennett. Fine.
    Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
    Judge Wright. All right.
    Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is 
substantial basis.
    Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis 
can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the 
deponent, and the other party.

    By the way, lest there be any doubt in the minds of any 
Member of this body as to whom the President was looking at and 
focusing at, we are fully prepared to bring in a witness for 
you who was present at the deposition and who will draw a map 
for every Member of this body and show the location of the 
President and every other person around the table.
    Just in case the President's ``I wasn't paying any 
attention'' excuse didn't fly, the President, in his grand jury 
testimony, decided to try another argument on for size. He 
suggested that when Mr. Bennett made his statement about 
``there is no sex of any kind,'' the President was focusing on 
the meaning of the word ``is.''
    He then said that when Mr. Bennett made the assertion that 
``there is no sex of any kind,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only 
in the present tense, as if the President understood that to 
mean ``there is no sex'' because there was no sex occurring at 
the time Mr. Bennett's remark was made.
    The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning of 
the word `is' is.''
    And that if it means there is none, that was a completely 
true statement. Listen and watch again to the same video clip 
from the President's grand jury testimony that we saw a few 
moments ago. Only this time, pay close attention to the 
President's excuse as to why he did not have to comply with the 
truth, because in his mind there is some question as to what 
the meaning of the word ``is'' is.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, I want to, before I go into a new subject 
area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. 
Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the 
Paula Jones deposition ``counsel is fully aware''--it's page 54 
line 5.--``counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, 
has an affidavit which they were in possession of saying that 
there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with 
President Clinton?'' That statement is made by your attorney in 
front of Judge Susan Webber Wright, correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. That statement is a completely false statement. Whether 
or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,'' was an utterly 
false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If 
``is'' means is, and never has been, that is one thing. If it 
means there is none, that was a completely true statement. But, 
as I have testified, and I'd like to testify again, this is--it 
is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about his lawyer's 
statements, instead of the other way around. I was not paying a 
great deal of attention to this exchange. I was focusing on my 
own testimony.

    In essence, here is what the President says in his own 
defense: I wasn't paying any attention to what my lawyer was 
saying when he offered the false affidavit on my behalf to the 
judge. However, if I was paying attention, I was focusing on 
the very narrow definition of what the word ``is'' is and the 
tense in which that was presented.
    Now, I am a former prosecutor, and that is like the 
murderer who says: I have an ironclad alibi. I wasn't at the 
crime scene; I was home with my mother eating apple pie; but if 
I was there, it is a clear case of self-defense.
    The President now asks this body of lawmakers to give 
acceptance to these ludicrous definitions of ordinary words and 
phrases. He asks you to believe this is what he really thought 
when he was asked if he ever had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, and when he was asked about her false affidavit.
    By the way, as to the President's ``tense'' argument that 
he presented about what the meaning of the word ``is'' is, this 
fails to take into account another important fact. The false 
affidavit of Monica Lewinsky that Mr. Bennett was waiving that 
day before the judge made no such distinction. Her affidavit 
never said in the present tense, ``I am not now having a sexual 
relationship with the President.'' Her affidavit said, ``I have 
never had a sexual relationship with the President.''
    The President perjured himself when he said that Mr. 
Bennett's statement that there was no sex of any kind was 
``absolutely true,'' depending on what the meaning of the word 
``is'' is.
    The President did not admit to the grand jury that Mr. 
Bennett's statement was false because to do so would have been 
to admit that the term ``sexual relations'' as used in Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit meant ``no sex of any kind.'' Admitting 
that would be to admit that he perjured himself previously in 
his grand jury testimony and in his deposition.
    Now, interestingly, Ms. Lewinsky doesn't bother attempting 
to match the President's linguistic deconstructions of the 
English language. After she was granted immunity, Monica 
Lewinsky testified under oath that the part of her affidavit 
denying a sexual relationship with the President was a lie.
    I read from page 204 of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony:

    Q. Let me ask you a straightforward question. Paragraph 8--

    Referring to her affidavit--

at the start says, ``I have never had a sexual relationship 
with the President.'' Is that true?
    A. No.

    Thus, the President engaged in an evolving series of lies 
during his sworn testimony in order to cover previous lies he 
told in sworn testimony, and to conceal his conduct that 
obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit 
against him. He did this to deny Paula Jones her constitutional 
right to bring a case of sexual harassment against him and to 
sidetrack the investigation of the Office of Independent 
Counsel into his misconduct.
    Finally, the President committed perjury before the grand 
jury when he testified falsely about his blatant attempts to 
influence the testimony of potential witnesses and his 
involvement in a plan to hide evidence that had lawfully been 
subpoenaed in the civil rights action brought against him.
    This perjurious testimony breaks down into four categories:
    First, he made false and misleading statements to the grand 
jury concerning his knowledge of Monica Lewinsky's false 
affidavit.
    Second, he made false and misleading statements to the 
grand jury when he related a false account of his interaction 
with his secretary, Betty Currie, when he reasonably knew she 
might later be called before the grand jury to testify.
    Third, he made perjurious and misleading statements to the 
grand jury when he denied engaging in a plan to hide evidence 
that had been subpoenaed in the Jones civil rights case against 
him.
    Finally, he made perjurious and misleading statements to 
the grand jury concerning statements he made to his aides about 
Monica Lewinsky when he reasonably knew these aides might be 
called later to testify.
    Let's look briefly at the first area.
    The President made false and misleading statements before 
the grand jury regarding his knowledge of the contents of 
Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
    As we now know conclusively, Monica Lewinsky filed an 
affidavit in the Jones case in which she denied ever having a 
sexual relationship with the President, and that was a lie when 
it was filed.
    Remember, during his deposition in the Jones case, the 
President said that Ms. Lewinsky's denial of ever having a 
sexual relationship was ``absolutely true.''
    Monica Lewinsky later testified that she is ``100 percent 
sure'' that the President suggested she might want to sign an 
affidavit to avoid testifying in the case of Jones versus 
Clinton. In fact, the President gave the following testimony 
before the grand jury:

    And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an 
affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false 
affidavit? No, I did not.

    This testimony is false because it could not be possible 
that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit in 
the Jones case, an affidavit acknowledging a sexual 
relationship with the President, that would have helped her to 
avoid having to appear as a witness in the Paula Jones case.
    The attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking evidence of 
sexual relationships with the President and ones that the 
President might have had with other State or Federal employees.
    This information was legally obliged to be produced by the 
President to Paula Jones in her sexual harassment lawsuit 
against him to help prove her claim.
    Judge Susan Webber Wright had already ruled that Paula 
Jones was entitled to this information from the President for 
purposes of discovery.
    If Monica Lewinsky had filed a truthful affidavit that 
acknowledged a sexual relationship with the President, then she 
certainly could not have avoided having to testify in a 
deposition.
    The President knew this.
    His grand jury testimony on this subject is perjury.
    Next, the President provided false testimony concerning his 
conversations with his personal secretary, Betty Currie, about 
Monica after he testified in the Jones deposition.
    Recall Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation a short time 
ago. The President had just testified on January 17, 1998, in 
the Paula Jones deposition. He said he could not recall being 
alone with Monica Lewinsky and that he did not have a sexual 
relationship with her.
    After his testimony, on the very next day and in a separate 
conversation with her a few days later, President Clinton made 
statements to Ms. Currie that he knew were false.
    He made them to coach Ms. Currie and to influence her 
potential future testimony.
    He coached her by reciting inaccurate answers to possible 
questions that she might be asked if she were called to testify 
in the Paula Jones case.
    By the way, the President discussed his deposition 
testimony with Ms. Currie in direct violation of Judge Wright's 
order that he not discuss his testimony with anyone. Judge 
Wright warned the President at the deposition:

    Before he leaves, I want to remind him, as the witness in 
this matter, . . . that this case is subject to a Protective 
Order regarding all discovery, . . . [A]ll parties present, 
including . . . the witness are not to say anything whatsoever 
about the questions they were asked, the substance of the 
deposition, . . ., any details . . .

    After he coached her, the President wanted Betty Currie to 
be a witness.
    During his deposition testimony, the President did 
everything he could to suggest to the Jones lawyers they needed 
to depose Betty Currie. He did this by referring to her over 
and over again as the one with the information they needed for 
information about him and Monica Lewinsky.
    He stated to the Jones lawyer in his deposition, for 
example, that:

. . . the last time he had seen Ms. Lewinsky was when she had 
come to the White House to see Ms. Currie; that Ms. Currie was 
present when the President had made a joking reference about 
the Jones case to Ms. Lewinsky; that Ms. Currie was his source 
of information about Vernon Jordan's assistance to Ms. 
Lewinsky; and that Ms. Currie had helped set up the meetings 
between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan regarding her move to New 
York.

    Because the President referred so often to Ms. Currie, it 
is obvious he wanted her to become a witness in the Jones 
matter, particularly if specific allegations of the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky came to light.
    According to Ms. Currie, President Clinton even told her at 
some point that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky.
    Two and a half hours after he returned from the Paula Jones 
deposition, President Clinton called Ms. Currie at home and 
asked her to come to the White House the next day, a Sunday.
    Ms. Currie testified that it was rare for the President to 
ask her to come in on a Sunday.
    At about 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, January 18, Ms. Currie went 
to meet with President Clinton at the White House.
    Listen to what Betty Currie told the grand jury:

    He said that he had had his deposition yesterday, and they 
had asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. And I was a 
little shocked by that or--(shrugging). And he said--I don't 
know if he said--I think he may have said, ``There are several 
things you may want to know,'' or ``There are things--'' He 
asked me some questions.

    According to Ms. Currie, the President then said to her in 
rapid succession:

    You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
never really alone.
    You could see and hear everything.
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.

    Ms. Currie indicated that these remarks were ``more like 
statements than questions.''
    Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree 
with him.
    Ms. Currie also said that she felt the President made these 
remarks to see her reaction.
    Ms. Currie said that she indicated her agreement with each 
of the President's statements, although she knew that the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky had in fact been alone in the Oval 
Office and in the President's study.
    Ms. Currie also knew that she could not and did not hear or 
see the President and Ms. Lewinsky while they were alone.
    Ms. Currie testified that two or three days after her 
conversation with the President at the White House, he again 
called her into the Oval Office to discuss this.
    She described their conversation as ``sort of a 
recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--you know, 
I was never alone with her--that sort of thing.''

    Q: [To Ms. Currie] Did he pretty much list the same?
    A: To my recollection, sir, yes.

    In his grand jury testimony, the President was asked why he 
might have said to Ms. Currie in their meeting on that Sunday: 
We were never alone together, right? You could see and hear 
everything.
    Here is how the President testified:

    [W]hat I was trying to determine was whether my 
recollection was right and that she was always in the office 
complex when Monica was there, and whether she thought she 
could hear any conversations we had, or did she hear any--I was 
trying to--I knew . . . to a reasonable certainty that I was 
going to be asked more questions about this. I didn't really 
expect you to be in the Jones case at the time. I thought what 
would happen is that it would break in the press, and I was 
trying to get the facts down. I was trying to understand what 
the facts were.

    The President told the grand jury that he was putting those 
questions to Betty Currie on that Sunday to refresh his 
recollection and trying to pin down what the facts were.
    Later, the President stated that he was referring to a 
larger area than simply the room where he and Ms. Lewinsky were 
located. He also testified that his statements to Ms. Currie 
were intended to cover a limited range of dates.
    Listen to the President's answer.

    A: [W]hen I said, we were never alone, right, I think I 
also asked her a number of other questions, because there were 
several times, as I'm sure she would acknowledge, when I either 
asked her to be around. I remember once in particular when I 
was talking with Ms. Lewinsky when I asked Betty to be in the, 
actually, in the next room in the dining room, and, as I 
testified earlier, once in her own office. But I meant that she 
was always in the Oval Office complex, in that complex, while 
Monica was there. And I believe that this was part of a series 
of questions I asked her to try to quickly refresh my memory. 
So, I wasn't trying to get her to say something that wasn't so. 
And, in fact, I think she would recall that I told her to just 
relax, go in the grand jury and tell the truth when she had 
been called as a witness.

    Now the President was treating the grand jury to his 
construction of what the word ``alone'' means to him.
    When asked he answered:

    It depends on how you define alone, and there were a lot of 
times when we were alone, but I never really thought we were.

    The President also was asked about his specific statement 
to Betty Currie that ``you could see and hear everything.'' He 
testified that he was uncertain what he intended by that 
comment:
    Question to the President:

    Q: When you said to Mrs. Currie, you could see and hear 
everything, that wasn't true either, was it, as far as you 
knew. . . .
    A: My memory of that was that, that she had the ability to 
hear what was going on if she came in the Oval Office from her 
office. And a lot of times, you know, when I was in the Oval 
Office, she just had the door open to her office. Then there 
was--the door was never completely closed to the hall. So I 
think there was--I'm not entirely sure what I meant by that, 
but I could have meant that she generally would be able to hear 
conversations, even if she couldn't see them. And I think 
that's what I meant.

    The President also was asked about his comment to Ms. 
Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had ``come on'' to him, but that he 
had ``never touched her.''
    Question to the President:

    Q: [I]f [Ms. Currie] testified that you told her, Monica 
came on to me and I never touched her, you did, in fact, of 
course, touch Ms. Lewinsky, isn't that right, in a physically 
intimate way?
    A: Now, I've testified about that. And that's one of those 
questions that I believe is answered by the statement that I 
made.
    Q: What was your purpose in making these statements to Mrs. 
Currie, if it weren't for the purpose to try to suggest to her 
what she should say if ever asked?
    A: Now, Mr. Bittman, I told you, the only thing I remember 
is when all this stuff blew up, I was trying to figure out what 
the facts were. I was trying to remember. I was trying to 
remember every time I had seen Ms. Lewinsky. . . . I knew this 
was all going to come out. . . . I did not know [at the time] 
that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved. And I was 
trying to get the facts and try to think of the best defense we 
could construct in the face of what I thought was going to be a 
media onslaught.

    Finally, the President was asked why he would have called 
Ms. Currie into his office a few days after the Sunday meeting 
and repeated the statements about Ms. Lewinsky to her.
    The President testified that although he would not dispute 
Ms. Currie's testimony to the contrary, he did not remember 
having a second conversation with her along these lines.
    Thus, the President referred to Ms. Currie many times in 
his deposition when describing his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    He himself admitted that a large number of questions about 
Ms. Lewinsky were likely to be asked in the very near future.
    The President reasonably could foresee that Ms. Currie 
either might be deposed or questioned or might need to prepare 
an affidavit.
    When he testified he was only making statements to Ms. 
Currie to ``ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain 
what Betty's perception was,'' this statement was false, and it 
was perjurious.
    We know it was perjury because the President called Ms. 
Currie into the White House the day after his deposition to 
tell her--not ask her, to tell her--that:

    he was never alone with Ms. Lewinsky;
    to tell her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them;
    and to tell her that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky.

    These were false statements, and he knew that the 
statements were false at the time he made them to Betty Currie.
    The President's suggestion that he was simply trying to 
refresh his memory when talking to Betty Currie is nonsense.
    What if Ms. Currie had confirmed these statements, 
statements the President knew were false? It could not in any 
way remind the President of what really happened in the Oval 
Office with Monica Lewinsky because the President already knew 
he was alone with Monica Lewinsky. The President already knew 
that obviously Ms. Currie could not always see him back in the 
Oval Office area with Monica Lewinsky. And the President 
already knew that he had an intimate sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
    There is no logical way to justify his claim that he made 
these statements to Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection.
    The only reasonable inference from the President's conduct 
is that he tried to enlist a potential witness to back up his 
perjury from the day before at the deposition.
    The circumstances surrounding the President's statements 
clearly show, clearly show that he improperly sought to 
influence Ms. Currie's potential future testimony.
    His actions were an obstruction of justice and a blatant 
attempt to illegally influence the truthful testimony of a 
potential witness.
    And his later denials about it under oath were perjurious.
    Next, the President gave perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony before the grand jury when he denied he was engaged 
in a plot to hide evidence that had been subpoenaed in the 
Paula Jones case.
    On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
    The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in 
January, and the subpoena required her to produce each and 
every gift President Clinton had given her.
    Nine days after she received this subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky 
met with the President for about 45 minutes in the Oval Office.
    By this time, President Clinton knew that she had been 
subpoenaed in the case.
    At this meeting they discussed the fact that the gifts that 
he had given Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, including a 
hat pin--the first gift the President had ever given Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this 
meeting she said to the President,

    Well, you know, I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
Betty.
    And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't know'' 
or ``Let me think about that.'' And left that topic.

    President Clinton provided the following explanation to the 
grand jury and to the House Judiciary Committee regarding this 
conversation:

    Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, ``what if they ask 
me about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know whether 
that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or earlier.
    Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told 
her ``that if they [the Jones Lawyers] asked her for gifts, 
she'd have to give them whatever she had. . . .''
    I simply was not concerned about the fact that I had given 
her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional gifts on December 28, 
1997.

    The President's statement that he told Ms. Lewinsky that if 
the attorneys for Paula Jones asked for the gifts, then she had 
to provide them, is perjurious.
    It strains all logic to believe the President would 
encourage Monica Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do so 
would have raised questions about their relationship and would 
go against all of their other efforts to conceal the 
relationship, including filing a false affidavit about their 
relationship. The fact that the President gave Monica Lewinsky 
additional gifts on December 28, 1998, doesn't exonerate the 
President. It demonstrates that the President never believed 
that Monica Lewinsky in light of all of their relationship, all 
of the cover stories, all of the plans that they had put 
forward, her willingness to subject herself to a perjury 
prosecution by filing a false affidavit, all of that was 
because he knew that Monica Lewinsky would never turn those 
gifts over pursuant to the subpoena. And as Ms. Lewinsky 
testified, she never questioned, as she said, ``that we were 
ever going to do anything but keep this quiet.''
    This meant that they would take, in her words, ``whatever 
steps needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet.
    By giving more gifts to Monica Lewinsky after she received 
a subpoena to appear in the Jones case, the President believed 
that Monica Lewinsky would never testify truthfully about their 
relationship.
    Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky said she could not answer why 
the President would give her more gifts on the 28th when he 
knew she had to produce gifts in response to the subpoena. She 
did testify, however, that----

    To me it was never a question in my mind and I--from 
everything he said to me, I never questioned him, that we were 
never going to do anything but keep this private, so that meant 
deny it and that meant do--take whatever appropriate steps 
needed to be taken, you know, for that to happen. . . . So by 
turning over these gifts, it would at least prompt [the Jones 
attorneys] to question me about what kind of friendship I had 
with the President. . . .

    After this meeting on the morning of December 28, Betty 
Currie called Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up 
gifts the President had given to Ms. Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury 
that a few hours after meeting with the President on December 
28, 1997, where they discussed what to do about the gifts he 
gave to her, Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky explained it to the grand jury as follows:

    Q. What did [Betty Currie] say?
    A. She said, ``I understand you have something to give 
me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give me.'' 
Along those lines. . . .
    Q. When she said something along the lines of ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The President 
says you have something for me,'' what did you understand her 
to mean?
    A. The gifts.

    Later in the day on December 28, Ms. Currie drove to Monica 
Lewinsky's home.
    Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained 
several gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President, 
including the hatpin that was specifically named in the Jones 
subpoena.
    As further corroboration, Monica Lewinsky had told the FBI 
earlier that when Betty Currie called her about these gifts, it 
sounded like Betty Currie was calling on her cell phone. Ms. 
Lewinsky gave her best guess on the time of day the call came 
on December 28.
    Although Ms. Lewinsky's guess on the hour the call came was 
a bit off, phone records were later produced revealing that 
Betty Currie in fact called Monica Lewinsky on her cell phone, 
just as Ms. Lewinsky had described it. The only logical 
conclusion is that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky about 
retrieving the President's gifts. There would have been no 
reason for Betty Currie, out of the blue, to return gifts 
unless instructed to do so by the President. Betty Currie 
didn't know about the gift issue ahead of time. Only the 
President and Monica Lewinsky had discussed it. There is no 
other way Ms. Currie could have known to call Monica Lewinsky 
about the gifts unless the President told her to do it.
    President Clinton perjured himself when he testified before 
the grand jury on this issue and reiterated to the House 
Judiciary Committee that he did not recall any conversation 
with Ms. Currie around December 28. He also perjured himself 
when he testified before the grand jury that he did not tell 
Betty Currie to take possession of the gifts that he had given 
Ms. Lewinsky.
    Question to the President:

    After you gave her the gifts on December 28th, did you 
speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up a 
box of gifts that were some compilation of gifts that Ms. 
Lewinsky would have----
    A. No, sir, I didn't do that.
    Q. --to give to Ms. Currie?
    A. I did not do that.

    The President had a motive to conceal the gifts because 
both he and Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts might 
raise questions about their relationship. By confirming that 
the gifts would not be produced, the President ensured that 
these questions would never arise. The concealment of these 
gifts from Paula Jones' attorneys allowed the President to 
provide perjurious statements about the gifts at his deposition 
in the Jones case.
    Finally, the President gave perjurious testimony to the 
grand jury concerning statements he gave to his top aides 
regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Here is a 
portion of his grand jury transcript, when the President 
testified about his conversation with key aides, once the 
Monica Lewinsky story became public.
    Question to the President:

    Q. Did you deny to them or not, Mr. President?
    A. . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I want 
to define language where I can say that. I also, frankly, do 
not want to turn any of them into witnesses because I--and sure 
enough, they all became witnesses.
    Q. Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't you?
    A. And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, 
there is nothing go[ing] on between us. That was true. I said, 
I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And 
did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day 
giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do 
anything to complicate this matter further. So, I said things 
that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they 
were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.

    The President's testimony that day that he said things that 
were true to his aides is clearly perjurious. Just as the 
President predicted, several of the President's top aides were 
later called to testify before the grand jury as to what the 
President told them. And when they testified before the grand 
jury they passed along the President's false account, just as 
the President intended them to do.
    I will not belabor the point any further with the Members 
of this body because I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson ably 
presented that testimony.
    But we know from the evidence that Erskine Bowles, John 
Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, all came before the grand jury. 
They all provided testimony to the grand jury establishing that 
the President's comments to them were the truth. The President 
had them go in. The President gave them that information so 
false information would be shared with the grand jury so that 
the grand jury would never be armed with the truth. And when 
witnesses are called to come before this body, you will have an 
opportunity to make that determination.
    Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the United States Senate, 
posterity looks to this body to defend in a courageous way the 
public trust and take care that the basis of our Government is 
not undermined. On January 17, 1998, President Clinton, while a 
defendant in a civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit, gave 
sworn testimony in a deposition presided over by a Federal 
judge. In this deposition he raised his hand and he swore to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    On August 17, President Clinton testified before a Federal 
grand jury in a criminal investigation. At this appearance he 
raised his hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence conclusively 
shows that the President rejected his obligations under oath on 
both occasions. He engaged in a serial pattern of perjury and 
obstruction of justice. These corrupt acts were done so he 
could deny a U.S. citizen, Ms. Paula Jones, her constitutional 
right to bring her claim against him in a court of law. In so 
doing, he intentionally violated his oath of office, his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, and his solemn obligation to respect Ms. Jones' 
rights by providing truthful testimony under oath.
    The evidence reviewed by the House of Representatives and 
relied upon by our body in bringing articles of impeachment 
against the President was not political. It was overwhelming. 
He has denied all allegations set forth in these articles. Who 
is telling the truth? There is only one way to find out.
    On behalf of the House of Representatives, we urge this 
body to bring forth the witnesses and place them under oath. If 
the witnesses can make the case against the President, if the 
witnesses that make the case against the President--who, 
incidentally, are his employees, his top aides, his former 
interns, and his close friends--if all of these people in the 
President's universe are lying, then the President has been 
done a grave disservice. He deserves not just an acquittal; he 
deserves the most profound of apologies.
    But if they are not lying, if the evidence is true, if the 
Chief Executive Officer of our Nation used his power and his 
influence to corruptly destroy a lone woman's right to bring 
forth her case in a court of law, then there must be 
constitutional accountability, and by that I mean the kind of 
accountability the framers of the Constitution intended for 
such conduct and not the type of accountability that satisfies 
the temporary mood of the moment.
    Our Founders bequeathed to us a Nation of laws, not of 
polls, not of focus groups, and not of talk show habitues. 
America is strong enough to absorb the truth about their 
leaders when those leaders act in a manner destructive to their 
oath of office. God help our country's future if we ever decide 
otherwise.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the court stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and that 
all Members remain standing at their desks as the Chief Justice 
departs the Chamber. I further ask that after the court 
adjourns in a moment, the Senate will, while in legislative 
session, stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Thereupon, at 6:59 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned.


                                ------                                


                        Friday, January 15, 1999

                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:02 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                

                                 prayer
    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Holy God, with awe and wonder we accept our 
responsibilities and our accountability to You. You are 
Sovereign of this land. When we commit our complexities to You, 
really seek Your guidance, You direct us. Make us attentive 
listeners, dedicated to the search for absolute truth. In the 
cacophony of voices, help us to hear Your voice.
    Dear Father, Your faithfulness never fails. You are 
consistent, reliable, and true. You expect nothing less from us 
for Your glory and for the good of America. To that end, fill 
this Chamber with Your presence and the minds of the Senators 
with Your gift of discernment. You are our Lord and Saviour. 
Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States 
is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by 
the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there have been a number of 
inquiries from Senators and others about some clarification 
with regard to the approximate times or the times we would be 
meeting on Saturday and Tuesday, and also how the afternoon 
would proceed, so I will make some unanimous consent requests 
to clarify that and give you a brief rundown on what I think 
the schedule will be this afternoon.
  orders for saturday, january 16, 1999 and tuesday, january 19, 1999
    Mr. Chief Justice, as in legislative session, I ask 
unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business 
today it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m., on Saturday, 
January 16. I further ask that when the Senate reconvenes on 
Saturday, immediately following the prayer, the Senate resume 
consideration of the articles of impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. I further ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate completes its business on Saturday, it then adjourn over 
until Tuesday, January 19, at 9:30 a.m. I ask unanimous consent 
that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal 
of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed 
to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved 
for their use. I further ask consent that there then be a 
period for morning business until the hour of 11:30 a.m., with 
60 minutes under the control of the majority leader or his 
designee and 60 minutes under the control of the minority 
leader or his designee.
    I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday the Senate recess 
then from the hours of 11:30 a.m. until 1 p.m. for the weekly 
policy conferences. And I further ask consent that at 1 p.m., 
on Tuesday, the Senate resume consideration of the articles of 
impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
on Tuesday, following the conclusion of the presentation during 
the Court of Impeachment, the Senate recess until the hour of 
8:35 p.m., on Tuesday evening. And I ask consent that upon 
reconvening Tuesday evening the Senate proceed to the Hall of 
the House of Representatives in order to hear an address by the 
President regarding the State of the Union.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                           order of procedure
    Mr. LOTT. For the information of all my colleagues, then, I 
understand today's presentation is expected to continue until 
approximately 6 p.m., and there will be periodic breaks during 
the day to allow all Members to stand and stretch. I want to 
remind Senators to promptly return to their desks at the 
expiration of those 15-minute breaks in order that we can 
continue and complete at the earliest possible hour. I thank 
all Members for their cooperation.
    This afternoon we will hear from Congressman McCollum, take 
a 15-minute break, then hear from Congressmen Gekas, Chabot, 
and Cannon, and then take a break, and then Congressman Barr 
would complete the afternoon's presentations.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.
                              the journal
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
managers for the House of Representatives have 18 hours 56 
minutes remaining to make the presentation of their case. The 
Senate will now hear you.
    The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum to 
resume the presentation of the case for the House of 
Representatives.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, and my colleagues in the Senate, I drove 
in this morning to this Capitol. I drove up the George 
Washington Parkway, and I looked at the magnificent display of 
ice that was all over the trees, all over the grass, all over 
the foliage--a beautiful panorama.
    And just before I got to the 14th Street Bridge, I saw this 
incredible number of geese--I guess in the hundreds--that were 
lined up together between the highway and the Potomac River. It 
looked like they were an invading army. I thought of the awe of 
this, the awe of the beauty of it, the awe of Mother Nature, 
the awe of God. And I thought, also, of the awe of the 
responsibility we have to our children and our grandchildren 
about what we are commencing today. This is an awesome 
undertaking for all of us.
    I am here today to summarize for you what you heard 
yesterday. I do not want to bore you. I do not intend to do 
that. I am going to be as brief as I can. I am also here to 
help you digest the voluminous quantities of material that you 
have before you. There is a huge record out there. And I am 
also here to prepare you for the law discussion that is going 
to come after me about the law of the crimes of perjury and 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering.
    First of all, I want you to know I bear no personal 
animosity toward our President. But I happen to believe that if 
the President--if any President--commits the crimes of perjury, 
obstruction of justice, and witness tampering, he should not be 
allowed to remain in office, for if he is allowed to do so, it 
would undermine our courts and our system of justice.
    But that is for you to determine in the end, really, not 
me. That is my opinion. But you will have to weigh the 
evidence, you are going to have to hear the arguments, and 
ultimately make that decision. In fact, the first thing you 
have to determine is whether or not the President committed 
crimes. It is only if you determine he committed the crimes of 
perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering that you 
will move on to the question of whether he is removed from 
office. In fact, no one, none of us, would argue to you that 
the President should be removed from office unless you conclude 
he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed--
not every one of them necessarily, but certainly a good 
quantity, and there are a whole bunch of them that have been 
charged.
    I would like to call your attention to a couple of things. 
First of all, I don't want to be a schoolteacher; I just want 
to relate my own experience to you so you can understand it. I 
have been involved with this a lot longer than most of you have 
probably been dealing with the details. I constantly have to 
refer back to things. Every time I read something, there is so 
much detail here, I learn something new.
    While I go over the evidence with you, we will summarize 
the evidence one more time. As you are deliberating, as you are 
thinking about it, I want to call a couple of places to your 
attention that are the easiest places to refer back to, to find 
the facts and evidence. First of all, there is the official 
report that is in the record of the House's consideration of 
this, the Judiciary Committee report. In that report, right in 
the first couple of pages, there is a table of contents. While 
a couple of the articles did not come over to you that are 
listed in here, there are detailed discussions you can get from 
this table of contents as to every single count and every 
single part of these articles so you can figure out what we are 
talking about today.
    Secondly, I would like to bring to your attention that 
there is a Starr Report, and I know that has been maligned by 
some people. This thing is so dogeared--I have underlined it, 
torn it apart, done all kinds of things with it. It is a good 
reference source. You can find from the footnotes where else to 
check it out. There are two parts. These are the appendices. In 
the first part, you can find the transcript of all the key 
depositions, all the key testimony, all of the evidence that we 
are talking about, and read it for yourselves.
    I don't want to leave here today having summarized this 
evidence, as long as I may take--and I don't want to take a 
long time, but I will take a little while--and have you go away 
and think, gosh, what all did McCollum or Hutchinson or Rogan 
or Bryant say yesterday? You can find and refresh yourself 
through that and through whatever information you have--trial 
briefs and all that you have.
    Let's look at what the record shows. President Clinton was 
sued by Paula Jones in a sexual harassment civil rights 
lawsuit. To bolster her case, she was trying to show that the 
President engaged in a pattern of illicit relations with women 
in his employment, where he rewarded those who became involved 
with him and disadvantaged those who rejected him, as Paula 
Jones did.
    Whatever the merits of that approach, on May 27, 1997, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision that ``like 
every other citizen''--and that is a quote--``like every other 
citizen, Paula Jones has a right to an orderly disposition of 
her claims.'' Then on December 11 of 1997, Judge Susan Webber 
Wright issued an order that said Paula Jones was entitled to 
information regarding any State or Federal employee with whom 
the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, 
or sought to have sexual relations.
    The record shows that President Clinton was determined to 
hide his relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the Jones 
court. His lawyers will argue to you next week, I am sure, that 
he did everything to keep the relationship hidden and he did it 
in a legal way. They will say that he may have split a few 
hairs and evaded answers and given misleading answers but that 
it was all within the framework of responses and actions that 
any good lawyer would advise his client to do.
    They will also say if he crossed the line technically 
somewhere, he didn't do it knowingly or intentionally. Oh, how 
I wish that were true. We wouldn't be here today. But, alas, 
that is not so.
    If you believe the sworn testimony of Monica Lewinsky, if 
you believe her testimony that is in the record--and she is 
very credible--the President knowingly, intentionally, and 
willfully set out on a course of conduct in December 1997 to 
lie to the Jones court, to hide his relationship, and to 
encourage others to lie and hide evidence and to conceal the 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court. He engaged in 
a pattern of obstruction of justice, perjury, and witness 
tampering designed to deny the court what Susan Webber Wright, 
the judge in that court, had determined Paula Jones had the 
right to discover in order to prove her claim. If you believe 
the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, you cannot believe the 
President or accept the argument of his lawyers. You simply 
can't.
    The record is so clear on this that if you have any 
significant doubt about Monica Lewinsky's credibility or 
testimony, you should bring her in here and let us examine her 
face to face so you can judge her credibility for yourself.
    As you will hear explained later this afternoon, the same 
acts can constitute both the crimes of obstruction of justice 
and perjury, and the same acts can constitute the crimes of 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering. They are all cut 
from the same cloth. They are all crimes that obstruct the 
administration of justice and keep our courts from being able 
to get the evidence that they need to decide cases. Such 
obstruction is so detrimental to our system of justice that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a greater punishment 
for perjury and obstruction of justice than they do for 
bribery.
    I want to show that to you. I know everybody can't see the 
chart. I think you have a handout of them. I will not show many 
charts today, but this is one about the sentencing guidelines. 
The guidelines rate these, in fact, in sequence. The most 
serious sentencing is a higher number; the lower number is the 
lower sentencing: Plain old vanilla bribery rights at a 10; 
other things are 8, 7, 4. Murder is way up there, much higher 
in the numbers. You will see that witness tampering is a 12, 
not a 10. Obstruction of justice is a 12, not a 10. Perjury is 
a 12, not a 10. All of them are the same. Interestingly enough, 
although I didn't put it on this chart, bribing a witness is 
different from plain vanilla bribery. If you try to bribe 
somebody in a business deal, that is one kind; if you go out 
and bribe a witness, that is another. Bribing a witness is also 
a 12.
    Now, I want to point that out right up front because the 
most important point that makes is that when you read the 
phrase in the Constitution that what is impeachable is treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors, bribery is not 
considered by our court system. Pure bribery, plain old 
bribery, is not considered as serious in sentencing as perjury, 
witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and of course 
bribing a witness. They are all of the same cloth. Why? Because 
that interferes with the administration of justice. Because we 
can't have justice if people block the courts from getting at 
the truth. And if you go about doing it intentionally, you have 
committed these crimes.
    It should be pointed out that lies under oath in a court 
proceeding, whether or not they rise to the level of crimes of 
perjury, can be obstruction of justice. So when the President 
lied in the Jones deposition, this was part of the obstruction 
of justice charged under article II that is before you today, 
even though there is no separate count. And he lied a lot in 
that deposition. We will talk about that a little later. The 
fact that the House did not send you the article of impeachment 
for perjury in the Jones deposition does not keep you from 
considering the lies in that deposition as an obstruction of 
justice crime under article II that is before you. And you know 
that it is also incorporated in article I, because it is one of 
the four items specifically listed as the perjury that he lied 
about lying in the deposition.
    Now, having said that, think about all of this as one big 
obstruction, because perjury can be obstruction. Just plain 
lying can be obstruction. Witness tampering, by the way, is a 
separate crime because it is titled that way, but it is one of 
two separate obstruction of justice sections in the United 
States Criminal Code. It is just another version of obstruction 
of justice. So don't be confused. Witness tampering is 
obstruction of justice--literally, figuratively, and in every 
other way. But people think about it separately because it has 
a separate element, a lesser element of proof actually than 
obstruction of justice. But it is all part of the same fabric, 
again.
    To put the essence of all of this in a nutshell for you, 
think back on the evidence presented yesterday. I would suggest 
that President Clinton thought his scheme out well. He resented 
the Jones lawsuit. He was alarmed when Monica Lewinsky's name 
appeared on the witness list, and he was more alarmed when 
Judge Wright issued her orders signaling that the court would 
hear the evidence of other relationships. To keep his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court, once Judge 
Wright issued her ruling, he knew he would have to lie to the 
court. To succeed at this, he decided that he had to get Monica 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, to try to avoid having her 
testify. And he needed to get her a job to make her happy, to 
make sure she executed that false affidavit, and then stick 
with her lies when she was questioned about it.
    Then the gifts were subpoenaed and he had to have her hide 
the gifts--the only tangible evidence of his relationship with 
her that would trigger questions. She came up with the idea of 
giving them to Betty Currie, and the President seized on it. 
Who would think Betty Currie should be called to produce the 
gifts? Nobody would. Then he would be free to lie in his 
deposition, and that is, of course, what he did. But after he 
did this, he realized that he had to make sure that Betty would 
lie and cover for him.
    He got his aides convinced to repeat the lies to the grand 
jury and to the public, and all of this worked--until the dress 
showed up. Then he lied to the grand jury to try to cover up 
and explain away his prior crimes.
    That is the case in a nutshell. That is why we are here 
today. That is what this evidence in the record shows, I 
believe, in an exceptionally compelling way.
    Now, let's review what happened and, as we do, I ask you to 
think back to what Mr. Bryant said to you yesterday. Always ask 
yourself, what are the results of the act and who benefited. I 
think you will find each time that it is the President who 
benefited. Now we are going to go over the facts.
    On December 5, 1997, a year ago, about a week before Judge 
Wright issued her order making it clear that the President's 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky was relevant to the Jones 
case, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the Jones witness list. 
The President learned this fact the next day, December 6. The 
President telephoned Monica Lewinsky at about 2 a.m. on 
December 17 and informed her about her name being on the 
witness list. That was about 10 days after he learned about it 
and about 5 days after Judge Wright's order. It was the order 
that made it clear that his relationship with Monica was 
discoverable by the Jones attorneys in that case.
    Long before this, though, long before the President was 
called to give a deposition or Monica Lewinsky was named on the 
witness list in the Jones case, the evidence shows she and the 
President had concocted cover stories. They had an 
understanding that she would lie about the relationship, and so 
would he, if anybody asked about it.
    During a telephone conversation on the 17th of December, 
the President told Monica she might be called as a witness, and 
he at that time suggested that she might file an affidavit to 
avoid being called as a witness to testify in person in that 
case. In the same conversation, they reviewed these cover 
stories that they had concocted to conceal their relationship. 
He brought them up. They went over them again.
    Why do you think they did that? In her grand jury 
testimony, Monica said the President didn't tell her to lie, 
but because of their previous understanding she assumed that 
they both expected that she would lie in that affidavit. In 
this context, the evidence is compelling that the President 
committed both the crimes of obstruction of justice and witness 
tampering right then and there on December 17.
    Now, Monica Lewinsky's testimony is so clear about this 
that the President's lawyers probably won't spend a lot of time 
with you on this; they didn't in the Judiciary Committee. I 
could be wrong, and they probably will just to show me I am 
wrong.
    I want us to look at this and specifically look at her 
testimony together because it is so compelling. On pages 123 
and 124 of her testimony--you can find it in Part 1 of the 
Starr Report. I know you can't see all of this that well back 
there, but you should have the charts. I point out in red on 
this chart the most important part of it. This is where she 
described the December 17 telephone conversation. I am going to 
read you part of it.
    She said here in red:

    At some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it was 
before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, he sort of said, 
``You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you 
were bringing me letters,'' which I understood was really a reminder of 
things that we had discussed before.
    Question: So when you say things you had discussed, sort of ruses 
that you developed?
    Answer: Right. I mean, this was--this was something that--that was 
instantly familiar to me.
    Question: Right.
    Answer: And I knew exactly what he meant.
    Question: Had you talked with him earlier about these false 
explanations about what you were doing visiting him on several 
occasions?
    Answer: Several occasions throughout the entire relationship. Yes. 
It was the pattern of the relationship, to sort of conceal it.

    Now, let's look at another chart. Monica Lewinsky's August 
6 grand jury testimony, on pages 233 and 234. Both are from the 
August 6 grand jury testimony, where in the context of the 
affidavit she makes the now famous statement, ``No one asked or 
encouraged me to lie.'' She did say that, but let's look at how 
she said that:

    For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened was, you 
know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me 
either.

    ``. . . but no one discouraged me either.'' I don't know 
how many times anybody said that to you when they made their 
arguments, but that is what she said and the context.
    Later on, she says in her testimony on the same pages:

. . . it wasn't as if the President called me and said, ``You know, 
Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to be really hard for 
us, we're going to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of 
the entire world about what we've done,'' which I would have fought him 
on probably. That was different. And by him not calling me and saying 
that, you know, I knew what that meant. . . .
    Question: Did you understand all along that he would deny the 
relationship, also?
    Answer: Mm-hmm. Yes.
    Question: And when you say you understood what it meant when he 
didn't say, ``Oh, you know, you must tell the truth,'' what did you 
understand that to mean?
    Answer: That--that--as we had on every other occasion and every 
other instance of this relationship, we would deny it.

    After reading this, if you believe Monica Lewinsky, can 
there be any doubt that the President was suggesting that she 
file an affidavit that contains lies and falsehoods that might 
keep her from ever having to testify in the Jones case and give 
the President the kind of protection he needed when he 
testified?
    And, of course, in that same December 17 conversation, the 
President encouraged Monica to use cover stories and tell the 
same lies as he expected her to do in the affidavit if and when 
she was called to testify live and in person. Both of those 
would be obstruction of justice and witness tampering. Taken 
together--encouraging her to file this false affidavit that she 
clearly describes here, and the encouraging of her to lie if 
she is ever called as a witness--both of these are counts 1 and 
2 of the obstruction of justice charge.
    If I don't leave you with any other impression walking away 
from here today, I want you to think about this. This is the 
clearest, boldest, most significant obstruction of justice 
charge. I don't see how anybody can walk away from it and 
explain it away. It is a pattern. It should not be looked at in 
isolation. Think about it. It is the kickoff to what really 
happened. It is why we got involved in this in the first place. 
The President had a scheme and he went through this process. 
And it all ties together with the rest of it.
    Two days later, Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed and 
contacted Vernon Jordan who put her in touch with Attorney 
Frank Carter. That is the attorney he picked out. As we all 
know, this very false affidavit that Frank Carter prepared--
and, of course, knowing it was false when he prepared it, but 
Monica knew it and the President knew it--was filed just before 
the President's deposition in the Jones case January 17. The 
record shows that the President was kept abreast of the 
participation by Vernon Jordan and all of its contents, and 
Jordan advised the President when Monica signed the affidavit 
on January 7. He advised the President of that fact. Two days 
before Monica says in a conversation she asked the President if 
he wanted to see the draft affidavit, he replied--you recall 
from yesterday--he replied that he didn't need to see it 
because he had already seen ``15 others.''
    I doubt seriously he was talking about 15 other affidavits 
of somebody else and didn't like looking at affidavits anymore. 
I suspect and I would suggest to you that he was talking about 
15 other drafts of this proposed affidavit since it had been 
around the horn a lot of rounds.
    The circumstantial evidence makes it clear the President 
knew the context of the Lewinsky affidavit and he knew it was 
false.
    During the President's deposition in the Jones case on 
January 17, his attorney, Robert Bennett, at one point tried to 
stop the Jones lawyers from asking the President about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky by pointing out the affidavit 
she had signed.
    I think we all remember that because there was a lot of 
that on TV up here yesterday. Mr. Bennett asserted at the time 
that the affidavit indicated ``there is no sex of any kind, 
manner, shape or form.'' That is what he said. After a warning 
from Judge Wright, Mr. Bennett stated, ``I'm not coaching the 
witness. In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the 
witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have 
not told him a single thing he doesn't know.'' The President 
did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even though he 
knew the affidavit was false. The judge allowed the questioning 
to proceed and later Mr. Bennett read to the President a 
portion of paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit in which 
she denied having a ``sexual relationship'' with the President 
and asked him if Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and 
accurate, to which the President responded, ``That is 
absolutely true.''
    I am not going back over and putting that on the screen 
again. But I do want to put up here before you what you have in 
front of you, paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
    Paragraph 8 of her affidavit was absolutely false, and the 
President knew it.
    I want to go over that a little bit. What it says up here 
at the beginning of it is, ``I have never had a sexual 
relationship with the President. He did not propose that we 
have a sexual relationship,'' and so on. And we have a lot 
about that. But look at what it says down at the end of this. 
What is down at the end of this--you have it in front of you. 
It says down here, ``The occasions that I saw the President 
after I left my employment at the White House in April 1996 
were official receptions, formal functions, or events related 
to the United States Department of Defense, where I was working 
at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.''
    I just want to point out to you that paragraph 8, which was 
the subject of a lot of discussions, which the President 
certainly was fully aware of--which you watched where he was 
intensely responding, with regard to Mr. Bennett yesterday in 
that deposition--didn't just contain a lie about a sexual 
relationship where you quibble over a word, it is a full-
fledged lie and a cover story about this. None of that is true. 
Monica Lewinsky saw him a lot of other times, and the President 
certainly knew that. They weren't all official events or 
anything else. This is a complete falsehood, paragraph 8, and 
the President knew it.
    At that point in time when he allowed his attorney on the 
day of the deposition to make a false and misleading statement 
to the judge--and the attorney didn't know that--but it was a 
false and misleading statement to the judge characterizing this 
affidavit, he knew better. And the President at that point in 
time committed the crime of obstruction of justice. And that is 
count 5 of article II.
    Now, the President's lawyers are going to argue that he sat 
silent because he wasn't paying attention, and he didn't hear 
or appreciate what Mr. Bennett was saying. We have already seen 
the video. And you know that he was looking so intently. 
Remember he was intensely following the conversation with his 
eyes. I don't know if you watched it on TV yesterday and 
observed that. It was played twice. I don't know how anybody 
can say this man wasn't paying attention. He certainly wasn't 
thinking about anything else. That was very obvious from 
looking at the video.
    The President's other defense also falls apart on its face. 
During his grand jury testimony, the President argued that when 
Mr. Bennett characterized the Lewinsky affidavit as indicating 
``there is no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape or form'' 
that it was a completely true statement because at that 
particular time, at that moment, when the statement was being 
made on January 17, 1998, there was no sex going on. That was 
when the President made his famous utterings to the jury, ``It 
depends on what the meaning of the word `is' is.'' That is when 
he said that. Of course the President knew perfectly well that 
the context of Mr. Bennett's discussions with the judge and 
characterization of the Lewinsky affidavit was referring to the 
denial in paragraph 8 of the affidavit that there had never 
been any sexual relationship at any time, not that there was no 
sex or sexual relationship going on on January 17, the day of 
the deposition.
    I implore you not to get hung up on some of the details. It 
is absurd, some of the arguments that are being made and have 
been made by the President and his attorneys to try to explain 
this.
    This is a perfect example of that. When we start looking 
around at this, you can't see the forest sometimes for the 
trees. The big picture is what you need to keep in mind, not 
the compartmentalized portion. There will be a lot of effort, I 
am sure, to try to go and pick at one thing or another. But 
this is an extraordinarily good example of how the argument 
failed when put in that situation. And we shouldn't play word 
games.
    When Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify, she was 
also subpoenaed to produce any gifts that the President had 
given her. When she met with Vernon Jordan the day she received 
the subpoena, she told him of her concerns about the gifts and 
she asked him to tell the President about the subpoena.
    Early in the morning on December 28, near the end of the 
year, they met, the President and Monica, in his office, and 
they exchanged gifts and discussed the gifts being subpoenaed. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, she suggested that maybe she should 
put the gifts away outside of her house somewhere or give them 
to somebody like Betty Currie. She says he responded--the 
President responded--with an ``I don't know,'' or ``let me 
think about that.'' She was very clear that at no point did he 
ever give her the impression that she should turn the gifts 
over to the Jones attorneys.
    That is consistent with their cover stories--the one later 
and later in the perjury where the count discusses his lying to 
the grand jury. Consistent with their cover stories and all the 
plans for denying the relationship, her testimony in this 
regard is very believable.
    On the other hand, the President's testimony in front of 
the grand jury that encouraged her to turn all of the gifts 
over to the Jones attorneys is not believable. How can nobody 
believe that? When he said that to the grand jury, he committed 
perjury. When a few hours later, according to Monica Lewinsky, 
Betty Currie called her on the telephone and said, ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' or maybe she said, 
``the President said you have something to give me,'' and Betty 
Currie came over and got the gifts and took them back and hid 
them under her bed, at that moment, the President's crime of 
obstruction of justice, as described in count 3 of article II, 
was complete.
    Remember, by its nature, obstruction of justice charges in 
crimes are most frequently proven by circumstantial evidence. 
As somebody said here the other day, we don't tell people we 
are going to go out under the elm tree and lie and obstruct 
things. Usually it is a lot more circuitous than that. In the 
context of all that was going on at the time and the general 
truthfulness of Monica Lewinsky's testimony, and other 
respects, how can anyone come to any other conclusion than that 
the President collaborated with Monica and Betty to hide these 
gifts on December 28? How can they? The sequence is there.
    The President's lawyers may spend a lot of time attacking 
this particular obstruction of justice charge. They may 
question why the President would have given Monica Lewinsky 
more gifts on December 28 if he was expecting her to hide the 
gifts. Monica's explanation and her testimony is ``from 
everything he said to me,'' he expected her to conceal the 
gifts, including the ones being given that day. When Ms. 
Currie's call came, wasn't it the logical thing for Monica to 
conclude that this was the result of the President having 
thought about what to do with the gifts, which he said he was 
going to do, according to her, and deciding to have Ms. Currie 
hide them?
    That is the logical thing.
    The President's attorneys will no doubt also question the 
veracity of Ms. Lewinsky with regard to who made the phone 
call, since Ms. Currie's recollection isn't very good. And at 
first she says she recalls Monica made it. Of course, the phone 
records indicate that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky. That is 
the much more logical sequence.
    Also it doesn't make sense that the President's secretary, 
who is so close to him--think about it--that she would have 
taken the gifts and would have hidden them under her bed and 
never talked with the President about doing so before or after 
she did so. That doesn't make sense.
    It is also noteworthy that the President did everything he 
could in his January 17 deposition to conceal the true nature 
of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This is consistent 
with the arguments that he never intended the gifts be kept 
from the Jones attorneys. He never intended them to be given to 
the Jones attorneys. If he had intended to give these gifts to 
the Jones attorneys, or have them given, why would he have gone 
through this elaborate series of lies in that deposition? 
Common sense tells us if he knew these gifts were revealed, 
questions would be raised and his relationship revealed.
    So all the logic is there. I don't know how you refute it.
    Another obstruction count the President's attorneys are 
likely to spend time on is one concerning the job search. There 
is no question that Monica Lewinsky was looking for a job in 
New York a long time before we get to December of 1997 and when 
the affidavit and all of this took place, long before the 
President had reason to be concerned that she would have to 
testify or he would have to testify in the case. There is no 
question about that. That is not the issue. The question is 
whether or not the President intensified his efforts to get her 
a job and make sure she got one after it became clear to him 
that he would need her to lie, sign a false affidavit, and 
stick with her lies in any questioning. That is what counts. 
That is what is important. Did he intensify his efforts and 
really go after it? Was it part of that pattern I described to 
you earlier which Mr. Hutchinson described yesterday? That is 
what is important.
    In other words, as count 34 of article II alleges, did she 
make sure she was rewarded with sticking with him in a scheme 
of concealment in anticipation that this reward would keep her 
happy and keep her from turning on him? Did the President make 
sure Monica Lewinsky signed a false affidavit by getting her a 
job?
    The record shows that while she did give some interviews 
from earlier contacts, including one involving the job with the 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, no one of real influence 
around the President put on a full court press to get her a job 
and she had not had any success as of December 6.
    She had not been able to get in touch with Vernon Jordan in 
her recent efforts. He had met with her once in November, but 
as you recall from yesterday's discussions, something he didn't 
even have a good memory of. He certainly wasn't very focused on 
it, and she wasn't getting where she wanted to get.
    And so on December 6 she mentioned that fact to the 
President. Remember, that is one day after she was named on a 
witness list. In fact, that is the day that he learned or may 
have learned--we know he learned of her being on that witness 
list. The President met with Vernon Jordan the next day, but he 
apparently didn't mention Ms. Lewinsky, according to Jordan's 
testimony. The record shows that not only on December 11 did 
Mr. Jordan act to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job when he met with 
her and gave her a list of contact names on December 11, Mr. 
Jordan that same day made calls to contacts at MacAndrews & 
Forbes, the parent corporation of Revlon, and two other New 
York companies. He also telephoned the President to keep him 
informed of his efforts.
    Keep in mind that on this day, this very same day, December 
11, Judge Wright issued her order in the Jones case entitling 
Jones' lawyers to discover the President's sexual relations. Is 
that a mere coincidence?
    Later in December, Monica Lewinsky interviewed with New 
York-based companies that had been contacted by Mr. Jordan. She 
discussed her move to New York with the President during that 
meeting on December 28. On January 5, she declined a United 
Nations offer. On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit. The next day, on January 8, she interviewed in New 
York with MacAndrews & Forbes, but the interview went very 
poorly. Learning of this, Vernon Jordan, that very day, called 
Ronald Perelman, the chairman of the board of MacAndrews & 
Forbes. She was interviewed the next morning again, and a few 
hours later she received an informal offer. She told Jordan 
about it. He immediately told Betty Currie about it, and he 
personally told the President about it later.
    On January 13, her job offer at Revlon was formalized, and 
within a day or so President Clinton told Erskine Bowles that 
Ms. Lewinsky had found a job in the private sector. It was a 
big relief to him.
    Then her false affidavit was filed, and on January 17 the 
President gave a deposition relying on the false affidavit and 
using their cover stories to conceal their relationship.
    Was this full court press in December and early January to 
assure Monica Lewinsky had a job just a coincidence? Logical 
common sense says no; the President needed her to continue to 
cooperate in his scheme to hide their relationship, keeping her 
happy so he could control her and he would be assured that she 
had filed this false affidavit and testifying untruthfully if 
she was called. It is the only plausible rationale for this 
stepped-up job assistance effort at this particular time. In 
doing so, the President committed the crimes of obstruction of 
justice and witness tampering as set forth in count 4 of 
article II.
    Well, we have gone through quite a few of these, and I am 
trying to be brief with you, but I think each one of them is 
important. Each one of them entangles the President further in 
a web that fits together, and it is kind of sticky just like 
the one the spider weaves.
    During his deposition in the Jones case, the President 
referred to Betty Currie several times and suggested that she 
might have answers to some of the questions. He used the cover 
stories, the same ones he and Monica talked about, and he 
talked about Betty Currie a good deal because she was a part of 
those cover stories. When he finished the deposition, he 
telephoned Ms. Currie, and he asked her to come to his office 
the next day and talk with him. Betty Currie told the grand 
jury when she came in the next day the President raised his 
deposition with her and said there were several things he 
wanted to know, then rattled off what you heard yesterday in 
succession: You were always there when she was there, right? We 
never were really alone. You can see and hear everything. 
Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She 
wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.
    All of those weren't true. They were all falsehoods. They 
were all declaratory statements. They weren't questions. It is 
clear from the record that Ms. Currie always tried her best to 
be loyal to the President, her boss. That is normal. That is 
natural.
    In answering the questions in her testimony, she tried to 
portray the events and the President's assertions in the light 
most favorable to him, even though she acknowledges that she 
could not hear and see everything that went on between Monica 
and the President and that she wasn't actually present in the 
same room with them on any number of occasions, so they were 
alone. And she could not say what they might have been doing or 
saying.
    On January 20 or 21, the President again met with Ms. 
Currie and, according to her, recapitulated what he said on 
Sunday, a day or two before, right after the deposition. In the 
context of everything, it seems abundantly clear that the 
President was trying to make sure that Betty Currie 
corroborated his lies and cover stories from the deposition if 
she was ever called to testify in the Jones case or grand jury 
or any other court proceeding. That is what he was doing. In 
doing so, the President committed the crimes of witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice.
    Later, the President testified, rather disingenuously, in 
my judgment, that he was simply trying to refresh his memory 
when he was talking to Ms. Currie. Ms. Currie's confirmation of 
false statements that the President made in his deposition 
could not in any way remind him of the facts. They were 
patently untrue. The idea that he was trying to refresh his 
recollection is implausible.
    Recognizing the weakness of their client's case on this, 
the President's attorneys have suggested that he was worried 
about what Ms. Currie might say if the press really got after 
her. That is what we heard, at least over in the Judiciary 
Committee. Of course, it is possible the President was worried 
about the press. I would suspect so. But common sense says he 
was much more worried about what Betty Currie might say to a 
court, after he had just named her several times and talked 
about her, if she were called as a witness.
    As those who follow me will tell you, the arguments by the 
President's lawyers that Betty Currie wasn't on the Jones 
witness list at the time and the window of opportunity to call 
her as a witness in that case closed shortly thereafter is 
irrelevant. They are going to argue--they argued to us that 
Betty Currie's name wasn't on the witness list. That is a big 
deal, they say. They say. But it is irrelevant. It doesn't 
matter. Witness tampering law doesn't even require that a 
pending judicial proceeding be going on for it to be a crime. 
So whether her name was on the witness list or not makes no 
difference.
    There are two types of obstruction of justice. One does 
require a pending proceeding. I submit--and you will hear more 
about this later in the law--that in this instance the 
President committed both of them. He certainly should have 
anticipated that she would be called in the pending proceeding 
that was going on in the Jones case, but even if there was no 
pending proceeding--and you will, again, hear more about this 
later--for the witness tampering part of the obstruction of 
justice, it doesn't require there to have been an ongoing 
judicial proceeding.
    Within 4 or 5 days of his Jones deposition, the President 
not only explicitly denied the true nature of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky to key White House aides, he also 
embellished the story when he talked with Sidney Blumenthal. To 
Sidney Blumenthal, he portrayed Monica Lewinsky as the 
aggressor, attacked her reputation by portraying her as a 
stalker and presented himself as the innocent victim being 
attacked by the forces of evil. Certainly he wanted his denial 
and his assertions to be spread to the public by these aides, 
but at the same time he knew that the Office of Independent 
Counsel had recently been appointed to investigate the Monica 
Lewinsky matter. He knew that at the time.
    In the context of everything else that he was doing to hide 
his relationship, it seems readily apparent that his false and 
misleading statements to his staff members, whom he knew were 
potential witnesses before any grand jury proceeding, were 
designed in part to corruptly influence their testimony as 
witnesses. In fact, the President actually acknowledged this in 
his grand jury testimony, that he knew his aides might be 
called before the grand jury. And one of the aides testified he 
expected to be called. Sure enough, they were, and they 
repeated the false and misleading information he had given 
them. In this, the President committed the crimes of witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice as set forth in count 7 of 
article II.
    Now, that is the obstruction of justice. Let's briefly 
review the grand jury perjury for a minute.
    If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the 
grand jury and committed perjury. If you believe her--and I 
think this one is very important, not that they all aren't. 
There was the web of the obstruction that I just described and 
then there is the grand jury perjury on top of it. I told you 
earlier, perjury and just plain lying can all be obstruction of 
justice as well. But the grand jury part is much later. It is 
after the President had time to really reflect on all of this, 
a long time later.
    If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the 
grand jury and committed perjury in denying he had sexual 
relations with Monica Lewinsky even if you accept his 
interpretation of the Jones court's definition of sexual 
relations. That is really important. There isn't anything 
clearer in the whole darned matter than that. Just look at the 
President's grand jury testimony. And I am not going to go over 
all of that, but it is on pages 93 and 96 of his grand jury 
testimony. It is laid out in this chart which you have in front 
of you, and I encourage you to read every page of it carefully. 
Specifically, I call your attention to the fact--again, I am 
not going to read all of this--but they asked him about 
touching certain parts of the body that are defined in the 
definition that you have had repeated many times, publicly and 
otherwise. And two of those body parts he acknowledges, the 
breast and genitalia, were in fact part of the definition. And 
at the end of this--and I think this is very important; and I 
am going to read it because it is part of his testimony--he 
answers the question that is the compelling bottom line crime. 
This is where he perjured himself above all else:

    You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did not 
have sexual relations, as I understood this term to be defined.
    Q. Including touching her breasts, kissing her breasts, or 
touching her genitalia?
    A. That's correct.

    In her sworn testimony, Monica Lewinsky described nine 
incidents of which the President touched and kissed her breasts 
and four incidents involving contact with her genitalia. On 
these matters, Lewinsky's testimony is corroborated by the 
sworn testimony of at least six friends and counselors to whom 
she related these incidents contemporaneously.
    Again, if you believe the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, and 
it certainly is credible here--I think it is credible 
throughout but it is certainly credible, with all the 
corroboration you have in the record--there is nothing clearer 
in all of this, in all of this you have before you, than that 
the President committed the crime of perjury in testifying 
before the grand jury regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    On the other hand, there is plenty here to indicate the 
President cleverly created his own narrow definition of sexual 
relations to include only sexual intercourse, absent the 
explicit definition of the court, after he had already lied in 
responding to the interrogatories and other pleadings and 
perhaps even in the depositions themselves in the Jones case. 
In other words, you are free to deduce that he knew full well 
what most people would include as sexual relations, oral sex, 
and the other intimate activities that he was engaged in with 
Ms. Lewinsky, before he contrived his own definition. In that 
case, you don't even have to rely on Monica Lewinsky's 
testimony to conclude that he committed the crime of perjury in 
testifying before the grand jury on the nature of his 
relationship with her.
    There are other perjurious lies the President's grand jury 
testimony contains regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with her. I am not going to outline all of those. 
I want to call your attention to one. The President's prepared 
statement, given under oath, said, ``I regret that what began 
as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' You may 
remember that from Mr. Rogan, I think, yesterday. ``I regret 
that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' 
That is what he said in the grand jury. The evidence indicates 
that he lied. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship with 
the President began with flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky 
showing the President her underwear, and just a couple of hours 
later they were kissing and engaging in intimacies. That is a 
little bit more than friendship. He lied when he said that to 
the grand jury.
    Before the grand jury, the President swore that he 
testified truthfully at his deposition. Remember, I told you I 
was going to come back to this. It is important because the 
Paula Jones deposition testimony is relevant to obstruction of 
justice but it is also relevant to the perjury here, because 
one of the portions of the perjury article that we have before 
us includes this issue of lying in the deposition. The perjury 
in this case is not the lying in the deposition, it is the 
lying to the grand jury about whether he lied in the 
deposition. He didn't have to have committed perjury. We didn't 
send you the perjury count over from the deposition. But if he 
lied--lying can be less than perjury. If he lied in the 
deposition, and then he told the grand jury that he didn't lie, 
he committed perjury in front of the grand jury.
    The evidence indicates that he did lie. He testified before 
the grand jury that ``my goal in this deposition was to be 
truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined 
to walk through the minefield of this deposition without 
violating the law and I believe I did.''
    Contrary to this testimony, the President was alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, which he even 
conceded in his grand jury statement. So he lied in the 
deposition then when he said he wasn't alone with her.
    In the deposition, the President swore he could never 
recall being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky 
except when she was perhaps delivering pizza. The evidence 
indicates that he lied.
    The President swore, in the Jones deposition, that he could 
not recall gifts exchanged between Monica Lewinsky and himself. 
The evidence indicates that he lied.
    He swore, in the deposition, that he did not know whether 
Monica Lewinsky had been served a subpoena to testify in the 
Jones case at the last time that he saw her in December 1997. 
The evidence indicates that he lied.
    In his deposition, the President swore that the last time 
he spoke to Monica Lewinsky was when she stopped by before 
Christmas 1997 to see Betty Currie at a Christmas party. The 
evidence indicates that he lied.
    In his deposition in the Jones case, the President swore 
that he didn't know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan, 
had met with Monica Lewinsky and talked about the case. The 
evidence indicates that he lied.
    The President, in his Paula Jones deposition, indicated 
that he was ``not sure'' whether he had ever talked to Monica 
Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to 
testify in the Jones case. Can anybody doubt the evidence 
indicates that he lied?
    The President, in his deposition, swore that the contents 
of the affidavit executed by Monica Lewinsky in the Jones case, 
in which she denied they had a sexual relationship, were 
``absolutely true.'' The evidence indicates that he lied.
    In other words, when the President swore in the grand jury 
testimony that his goal in the Jones deposition was to be 
truthful but not particularly helpful, the evidence is clear 
that he lied and committed the crime of perjury, inasmuch as he 
had quite intentionally lied on numerous occasions in his 
deposition testimony in the Jones case. His intention, in that 
deposition, was to be untruthful. That is what it was all 
about, to be untruthful. So he committed the crime of perjury 
in front of the grand jury--big time.
    The third part of article I concerning grand jury perjury 
relates to his not telling the truth about false and misleading 
statements his attorney, Robert Bennett--unintentionally, Mr. 
Bennett, by the way, but nonetheless false and misleading 
statements--Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright during the 
President's Jones case deposition. We have been on that a lot. 
I don't want to bore you with going over all those details 
again, but this is the third part of the perjury count as well 
as an obstruction of justice count.
    During the President's deposition in the Jones case, Mr. 
Bennett, however unintentional on his part, misled the court 
when he said, ``Counsel [counsel for Ms. Jones] is fully aware 
that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in 
possession of saying that there is no sex of any kind, of any 
manner shape or form, with President Clinton . . .'' Judge 
Wright, as you recall again, interrupted Mr. Bennett and 
expressed her concern that he might be coaching the President, 
to which Mr. Bennett responded, ``in preparation of the witness 
for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he 
doesn't know . . .''
    In his grand jury testimony about these statements by Mr. 
Bennett to the judge in the Jones case, the President 
testified:

    I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he was saying. . 
. . I didn't pay much attention to this conversation which is 
why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the 
deposition . . . I don't believe I ever even focused on what 
Mr. Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started 
reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That 
moment, the whole argument just passed me by.

    In so testifying before the grand jury, the President lied 
and committed the crime of perjury. As you saw yesterday in the 
video, during this portion of that deposition when Mr. Bennett 
was discussing this matter with Judge Wright, the President 
directly looked at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his 
argument to Judge Wright. He lied about that to the grand jury. 
He committed perjury when he said that he wasn't paying 
attention and he didn't know what Mr. Bennett was saying.
    Several of the most blatant examples of grand jury perjury 
are found in that portion of his testimony cited in the fourth 
part, the last part of article I which goes to his efforts, the 
President's efforts, to influence the testimony of witnesses 
and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. The 
President swore during the grand jury testimony that he told 
Ms. Lewinsky that if the Jones lawyers requested the gifts 
exchanged between them, she should provide them. If you believe 
Monica Lewinsky's testimony, the President lied and committed 
perjury.
    In her grand jury testimony, Ms. Lewinsky discussed in 
detail the December 28 meeting where gifts were discussed which 
preceded by a couple of hours Ms. Currie coming to her 
apartment and taking the gifts and hiding them under a bed. As 
you recall, she said she raised with the President the idea of 
removing her gifts from her house and giving them to somebody 
like Betty Currie and that his response was something to the 
effect of, ``Let me think about that.''
    She went on to say that from everything he said to her, 
they were not going to do anything but keep these gifts 
private. In a separate sworn statement, she testified she was 
never under the impression from anything the President said 
that she should turn over the gifts to the Jones attorneys, and 
obviously she didn't have the idea that she should do that 
because she gave them all to Betty Currie to hide under the 
bed.
    When the President told the grand jurors that he was simply 
trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made a series of 
statements to Betty Currie the day after his deposition, he 
lied and committed perjury. As I have already pointed out to 
you today, the evidence is compelling that those statements, 
such as ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' were 
made to try to influence Betty Currie's possible testimony, so 
that she would corroborate his cover stories and other false 
statements and lies that he had given the previous day in the 
Jones deposition, if she was called as a witness.
    If you conclude that these series of statements constitute 
witness tampering and obstruction of justice, then you must 
also conclude that the President committed perjury when he 
asserted that the sole purpose of these statements to Betty 
Currie was to ``refresh'' his recollection. You have to. Even 
if you were to buy the President's counsel's suggestion these 
statements might have been made to influence her in order for 
her to corroborate him, not in actual testimony in a court case 
but with the press, which they have said again to us--I don't 
know if they will say it to you--you would still conclude he 
was lying when he said that this was simply only to refresh his 
own recollection.
    In the context of all of this, the idea that he was 
refreshing his recollection by firing off these declarative 
statements doesn't make sense. It just doesn't make sense. If 
you read the statements and think about them on their face, 
they are inherently inconsistent with refreshing his 
recollection.
    Also, the President told the grand jury that the things he 
told his top aides about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky 
may have been misleading but they were true. If you believe the 
aides testified truthfully to the grand jury about what the 
President told them about his relationship, the President told 
them many falsehoods, absolute falsehoods. So when the 
President described them under oath to the grand jury as 
truths, he lied and committed the crime of perjury.
    One example of this comes from Deputy Chief John Podesta in 
his testimony before the grand jury on January 23 that the 
President explicitly told him that he and Monica Lewinsky had 
not had oral sex. Another is Sidney Blumenthal. His testimony 
was that on January 23 the President told him that Monica 
Lewinsky ``came at me and made a sexual demand on me'' and that 
he rebuffed her. And also Blumenthal's testimony that the 
President told him that Lewinsky threatened him and said that 
she would tell people that they had had an affair and that she 
was known as a stalker among her peers.
    In short, the President lied numerous times before the 
grand jury, my colleagues. He lied numerous times under oath 
last August 17. He committed perjury numerous times under oath. 
He certainly wasn't caught by surprise by any of this, by any 
of the questions that were asked him during the grand jury 
appearance, and he was given a lot of latitude. He was given 
latitude normally that grand jury witnesses don't have--to give 
a prepared statement, to have his counsel present, to refuse to 
answer questions without taking the fifth amendment.
    It is hard to imagine a case where it is clear that the 
lies meet the threshold of the crime of perjury. But I will 
leave the discussion of the elements and the law to the next 
group that is going to come up here.
    The facts are clear that the President lied about having 
sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky even under his 
understanding of the definition of the Jones case if you 
believe Monica.
    He lied when he said he gave truthful testimony in his 
Jones deposition.
    He lied when he said he wasn't paying attention to his 
attorney's discussion of Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit 
during his deposition in the Jones case.
    He lied when he said he told Monica Lewinsky she should 
turn over the gifts to the Jones lawyers if they asked for 
them.
    He lied when he told the grand jury that he made the 
declaratory statements to Betty Currie to refresh his 
recollection.
    And he lied when he told the grand jury that he only told 
the truth to his White House aides, such as John Podesta who 
testified the President told him he had not had oral sex with 
Lewinsky, and to Sidney Blumenthal who testified he told him 
very exaggerated and highly untrue characterizations of Monica 
Lewinsky's role in all of this.
    These impeachment proceedings aren't before you because of 
one or two lies about a sexual relationship. This is not about 
sex. This is about obstruction of justice. This is about a 
pattern. This is about a scheme. This is about a lot of lies. 
This is about a lot of perjury. They are before you because the 
President lied again and again in a perjurious fashion to a 
grand jury and tried to get a number of people, other people, 
to lie under oath in the Jones lawsuit and to the grand jury 
and encouraged the concealment of evidence.
    In a couple of days the President's lawyers are going to 
have their chance to talk to you, and I suspect they will try 
to get you to focus on 10, 15, or 20, or 30, maybe even 100 
specific little details. They are going to argue that these 
details don't square with some of the facts about this 
presentation. But I would encourage you never to lose sight of 
the totality of this scheme to lie and obstruct justice; never 
lose sight of the big picture. Don't lose sight of the forest 
for the trees. It is easy to do because there are a lot of 
facts in this case.
    I suggest you avoid considering any of this stuff in 
isolation and treating it separately. The evidence and the 
testimony needs to be viewed as a whole. The weight, we call it 
in law--and you are going to hear that in a few minutes--the 
weight of the evidence in this case is very great, it is huge 
in its volume, that the President engaged in a scheme, starting 
in December 1997, to conceal from the court in the Jones case 
his true relationship with Monica Lewinsky and then cover up 
his acts of concealment which he had to know by that time were 
serious crimes.
    The case against the President rests to a great extent on 
whether or not you believe Monica Lewinsky. But it is also 
based on the sworn testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie, 
Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and corroborating witnesses. 
Time and again, the President says one thing and they say 
something entirely different. Time and again, somebody is not 
telling the truth. And time and again, an analysis of the 
context, the motivation, and all of the testimony taken 
together with common sense says it is the President who is not 
telling the truth. But if you have serious doubts about the 
truthfulness of any of these witnesses, I, again, as all my 
colleagues do, encourage you to bring them in here. Let's 
examine Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie and the 
other key witnesses, let you examine the testimony, invite the 
President to come, and judge for yourself their credibility.
    But on the record, the weight of the evidence, taken from 
what we have given you today, what you can read in all of these 
books back here, everything taken together is huge that the 
President lied. It is refutable, but it is not refutable if 
somebody doesn't come in here besides just making an argument.
    I don't know what the witnesses will say, but I assume if 
they are consistent, they'll say the same that's in here. But 
you have a chance to determine whether they are telling the 
truth. The only way you will ever know that, other than just 
accepting it if you think the evidence and the weight is that 
huge--and it may be--is by looking them in the eye and 
determining their credibility.
    I believe that when you finish hearing and weighing all of 
the evidence, you will conclude, as I have, that William 
Jefferson Clinton committed the crimes of obstruction of 
justice, witness tampering, and perjury, that these in this 
case are high crimes and misdemeanors, that he has done grave 
damage to our system of justice, and leaving him in office 
would do more, and that he should be removed from office as 
President of the United States.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess in the proceedings for 15 minutes. Please 
return to your positions within 15 minutes.
    There being no objection, at 2:11 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:30 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as all Senators return to the 
Chamber, I believe now we are going to go to a segment where we 
will hear from three of the managers, including Congressmen 
Gekas, Chabot, and Cannon, and then we will take another break 
shortly after 3:30.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
    Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the 
President, my colleagues from the House, and Members of the 
Senate, up to now you have been fully informed of the state of 
the record in this case in many different ways, in very many 
different tonalities uttered by the managers, who so 
magnificently, in my judgment, have woven the story that began 
in 1997 and has not ended yet.
    But the narrative that the managers were able to produce 
for you and put on the record has met, even as we speak, with 
commentary in the public that ``we have all known all of this 
before.'' The big difference is that now it is part of the 
history of the country. It is lodged in the records of the 
Senate of the United States. And together with the 
Congressional Record of the proceedings that preceded these in 
the House, we now have the dawning of the final chapters of 
this particular incident involving the President, in which you 
will have the final word. But that is what the importance is of 
what you have heard up until now--the complete record woven 
together, step by step, so that no one in this Chamber at this 
juncture does not know all the facts that are pertinent to this 
case. That is a magnificent accomplishment on the part of the 
managers.
    But the record is not yet complete, and that is where I and 
Representative Chabot, Representative Cannon, and 
Representative Barr come in, so that now we can take the next 
step in fulfillment of the record, and that is, to try to apply 
the statutory laws, the laws of our Nation as they pertain to 
the facts that you now have well ingrained into your 
consciences. To do that, we have to repeat some of the facts. 
Some of these matters overlap, and just as you have given your 
attention to the matters at hand up until now, your undivided 
attention is needed continuously.
    For instance, we cannot discuss even the application of 
these statutes to the facts unless we repeat the series of 
events that catapulted us to this moment in history. And we 
must begin, as you have heard countless times now on and off 
this floor, in my judgment, with the Supreme Court of the 
United States, with all due deference to the Chief Justice, 
because the Supreme Court at one point in this saga determined 
in a suit brought by Paula Jones that indeed an average, day-
to-day, ordinary citizen of our Nation would have the right to 
have a day in court, as it were, even against the President of 
the United States. It is there that all of this began.
    That fellow American, Paula Jones--no matter how she may 
have been described by commentators and pundits and talking 
heads, et cetera--did have a bundle of rights at her command. 
Those rights went into the core of our system of justice to 
bring the President into the case as a defendant. That is an 
awesome and grand result of the Supreme Court decision at that 
juncture. This is what is being overlooked, in my judgment, as 
we pursue what we believe. If perjury indeed was committed--and 
the record is replete that it in fact was--and if indeed 
obstruction of justice was finally committed by the President 
of the United States--as the evidence abundantly demonstrates--
then we must apply the rights of Paula Jones to what has 
transpired.
    We are not saying that the President--even though the 
weight of the evidence demonstrates it amply--should be 
convicted of the impeachment which has brought us to this floor 
just because he committed perjury or obstructed justice, but 
because as a result of his actions both in rendering falsehoods 
under oath, as the evidence demonstrates amply, or in 
obstructing justice, that because of his conduct, he attempted 
to, or succeeded in, or almost succeeded in--it doesn't matter 
which of these results finally emerges--and attempted to 
destroy the rights of a fellow American citizen. That is what 
the gravamen of all that has occurred up to now really is.
    In attempting to obstruct justice, we mean by that 
obstructing the justice of whom? It was an attempt, a bold 
attempt, one that succeeded in some respects, to obstruct the 
justice sought by a fellow American citizen. That is heavy. 
That is soul searching in its quality. That goes beyond those 
who would say, ``He committed perjury about sex. So what?'' 
That goes beyond saying that, ``This is just about sex. So 
what? Everybody lies about sex.'' But when you combine all the 
features of the actions of the President of the United States 
and you see that they are funneled and tunneled and aimed and 
targeted toward obliterating from the landscape the rights of 
Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen, then you must take a 
second look at your own assertion that, ``So what? It's just a 
question of fact about sex.''
    Many of the Members of this Chamber and others have already 
acknowledged that the President has lied under oath. But then 
they are quick to add, ``So what?'' which is so disturbing in 
view of the results of what has happened in this case.
    Before the House of Representatives, as part of our record, 
we had a group of academicians, professors, testifying. 
Professor Higgenbotham--who, sadly I must relate, has passed 
away since his appearance--was trying to show how futile it was 
for us to even attempt to append perjury to an indictable, 
prosecutable offense, and that nowhere in the country is it 
prosecuted regularly, and that it is so trivial because it is 
based on sex. He went on to give an example of how trivial it 
is. I am paraphrasing it, but he said: Would you expect to 
indict the President of the United States for perjury if he 
lied about a 55-mile-an-hour speed limit, even though he was 
going 56? If he would say, ``I was only going 51,'' would you 
indict him on that?
    In the repartee that I had with him, at that juncture, I 
asked him, would he feel the same if, as a result of that 
perjurious testimony about only going 51 miles an hour, there 
was a victim in the case, that this might be a tort case, an 
``involuntarily'' case, a negligence case in which someone died 
as a result of an automobile accident, and the issue at hand 
would be the speed limit, would he feel the same way if, as a 
result of the perjury committed as to the rate of speed, that 
someone's rights were erased in the case by virtue of that 
perjury, and the gentleman acknowledged that that made a 
difference.
    That is what the difference is here. The perjury per se, 
that being a phrase that we lawyers can adopt, the perjury per 
se is almost a given pursuant to the commentaries that we have 
heard from the people in and out of that Chamber. But when you 
add to it the terrible consequences of seeing a fellow citizen 
pursuing justice thwarted, stopped in her tracks, as it were, 
by reason of the actions of the President, that is what the 
core issue here is.
    To take it, then, from the status of what consequence it 
had to that fellow American citizen to the next step is, in my 
judgment, an issue to go to the determination of whether or not 
there was an impeachable offense. My colleagues will show you 
how the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of justice 
relates to this pattern of factual circumstance that we bring 
to you. But in the meantime we must recount, even at the risk 
of overlapping some of the testimony, that following the 
initial recognition by the President that there was going to be 
a witness list and that Monica Lewinsky would eventually 
appear, as she did, on that witness list, this occurred, which 
is little examined thus far in the world of the scandal in 
which we are all participants, and that is this: The first item 
of business on the part of the Jones lawyers in pursuing the 
rights of Paula Jones was to issue a set of interrogatories, a 
discovery procedure that is well recognized in our courts all 
over the land, and that a set of interrogatories arrived at the 
President's desk.
    At this juncture--this is way before the President appeared 
at the deposition about which you know everything now. The 
facts have been related to you in a hundred different ways, and 
you know that pretty well. I know you do. But did you know, can 
you fasten your attention for a moment knowing that this 
happened at the deposition a month before, on December 23, 
1997, when the President had in front of him interrogatories 
that asked, did he ever have sexual relations with anyone other 
than his spouse during the time that he was Governor of 
Arkansas or President of the United States? And there the 
President answered--or I think that the interrogatory stated: 
Name any persons with whom you have had sexual relations other 
than your wife. And the answer that the President rendered in 
those interrogatories under oath was none.
    I say to the ladies and gentlemen of the Senate that this 
was the first falsehood stated under oath which became a chain 
reaction of falsehoods under oath, and even without the oath, 
all the way to the nuclear explosion of falsehoods that were 
uttered in the grand jury in August of 1998.
    This little innocuous piece of paper called interrogatories 
was placed before the President presumably with or without 
counsel. Let's even presume with counsel. And it was a straight 
question, not with any definitions, no confusing colloquy 
between a judge and a gaggle of lawyers, no interpretation 
being put on any particular word in the interrogatories, but 
whether or not sexual relations had been urged or participated 
in by the President of the United States, and the answer was 
none in naming those persons.
    What does that mean to you? What does that not mean to you? 
That when confronted right at the outset with the phrase 
``sexual relations'' that the President adopted and determined 
the common usage, well-understood definition of sexual 
relations that everybody in America recognizes as being the 
true meaning of sexual relations, meaning sex of any kind. Did 
not the President answer that under the common understanding 
that all of us entertain when we discuss, more so in the last 
year than ever before in our lives, the phrase ``sexual 
relations''? To me that is a telling feature of this case 
because when you leap over that and get to the depositions and 
everything that the President might have said in those 
depositions, as his counsel have repeatedly asserted to us were 
true, that he did not lie, that he did not commit perjury, that 
he did not evade the truth, that some of it was puzzling to 
them even, but it did not amount to perjury, what can they say 
about the statement one month before on December 23 in 
interrogatories?
    That is extremely important. That is my recollection. Yours 
is the one that will have to predominate, of course.
    But the weight that I put on it, I urge you to at least 
evaluate as you begin to level your weight on the evidence that 
has been presented.
    If that were not enough, on January 15, again before the 
deposition, another interrogatory--this one a request for 
documents--was submitted to the President, and again the 
question there was--you will see it in the record; it is in the 
record--the request of documents says to submit anything that 
pertained to Monica Lewinsky, the intern or employee, Monica 
Lewinsky, of whatever description--notes, gifts, whatever, and 
the President in that particular instance again said none. I am 
willing to give the President a reasonable doubt on that and 
even ask you, if you do not place as much weight on it as I do, 
to forget all about that. But the point is that these 
assertions under oath were made before the Jones deposition was 
ever even conceived, let alone undertaken on January 17.
    So he cannot, the President cannot use the lawyer talk and 
judge banter and the descriptions and definitions of sexual 
relations to cloud the answers that he gave at that time, and 
all of this in the continuous effort to destroy the rights of 
Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen.
    That brings up the question. If someone, a member of your 
family, or someone who is a witness to these proceedings has a 
serious case in which one's self, one's property, one's family 
has been severely damaged, would you suffer, without a whimper, 
perjurious testimony given against you? Would you, knowing down 
deep that at the end of the day it had caused you to lose your 
chance at retribution and a chance to be compensated for 
damages, to restore your family life?
    Isn't that what our system is all about? Isn't that what 
the adverse consequence is of the attempt to obliterate the 
Paula Jones civil suit?
    That is what it is, not that he committed perjury. So what? 
It is what the end result of that perjury might be that you 
should weigh. Skip over the fact that he committed perjury. We 
all acknowledge that it is said. But now tell me what that does 
to Paula Jones, or potentially could do to Paula Jones, or to 
one of you, or to one of your spouses, or to one of the members 
of your community who wants to have justice done in the courts.
    Obstruction of justice is obstruction of justice to an 
individual, to a family. You can take it from Paula Jones and 
telescope it upward to every community, in every courthouse, 
and every State and every community in our land, and there is a 
Paula Jones eager to assert certain rights and then confronted 
with someone who would tear them down by false testimony, by 
lies under oath.
    That is what the gravamen of all this really is.
    One more thing. The counsel for the President have 
repeatedly and very authoritatively, professionally asserted, 
as many of you have, that this is not an impeachable offense, 
for, after all, they say, an impeachable offense is one in 
which there is a direct attack on the system of government; not 
perjury, not obstruction of justice.
    So what, on those, they imply. They say it does not--
perjury, especially about sex--attack the system of government. 
I must tell you that as an 8- or 9- or 10-year-old, I would 
accompany my mother to naturalization school three or four 
nights a week where my mother was intent on learning the 
English language and learning about the history of the United 
States, as the teachers for naturalization were preparing these 
prospective citizens. And she was so proud that she learned 
that the first President of the United States was George 
Washington, and was prepared to answer that question if it was 
posed to her in naturalization court. And she was so proud when 
I was testing her, preparing her. Each time I would say, ``Mom, 
what are the three branches of Government?'' And she would say, 
``The `Exec' and the `legislate' and the `judish,' '' in her 
wonderful, lovable accent. She knew the system of government. 
And she did have to answer that in naturalization court. And 
she knew that one wall of the creed that protects our rights is 
the ``judish.'' She knew that the courthouse and the rights of 
citizens which are advanced in that courthouse are the system 
of government. Can anyone say that purposely attempting to 
destroy someone's case in the courthouse is not an attack on 
the system of government of our country?
    Mr. Chabot will elucidate on perjury.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Chabot.
    Mr. Manager CHABOT. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, 
distinguished counsel for the President, I am Steve Chabot. I 
represent the First District of Ohio. Prior to my election to 
Congress, I practiced law in Cincinnati for about 15 years. As 
I stand before you today, I must admit that I feel a long way 
away from that small neighborhood law practice that I had. 
Though, while this arena may be somewhat foreign to me, the law 
remains the same. As one of the managers who represents the 
House, I am here to summarize the law of perjury. While today's 
discussion of the law may not be as captivating as yesterday's 
discussion of the facts, it is nevertheless essential that we 
thoroughly review the law as we move forward in this historic 
process. I will try to lay out the law of perjury as succinctly 
as I can without using an extraordinary amount of the Senate's 
time but beg you to indulge me.
    In the United States Criminal Code, there are two perjury 
offenses. The offenses are found in sections 1621 and 1623 of 
title 18 of the United States Criminal Code. Section 1621 is 
the broad perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to 
knowingly and willfully make a false statement about a material 
matter while under oath. Section 1623 is the more specific 
perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to knowingly 
make a false statement about a material matter while under oath 
before a Federal court or before a Federal grand jury.
    It is a well-settled rule that when two criminal statutes 
overlap, the Government may charge a defendant under either 
one. As you know, the President's false statements covered in 
the first impeachment article were made before a Federal grand 
jury. Therefore, section 1623 is the most relevant statute. 
However, section 1621 is applicable as well.
    The elements of perjury. There are four general elements of 
perjury. They are: An oath, an intent, falsity, and 
materiality. I would like to walk you through each of those 
elements at this time.
    First, the oath.
    The oath need not be administered in a particular form, but 
it must be administered by a person or body legally authorized 
to do so. In this case, there has been no serious challenge 
made about the legitimacy of the oath administered to the 
President either in his civil deposition in the Jones v. 
Clinton case or before the Federal grand jury. Let's, once 
again, witness President Clinton swearing to tell the truth 
before a Federal grand jury.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God?

    The oath element has clearly been satisfied in this case.
    The next element is intent. To this day, the President has 
refused to acknowledge what the vast majority of Americans know 
to be true--that he knowingly lied under oath. The President's 
continued inability to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth has forced this body, this jury, to 
determine the President's true intent.
    The intent element requires that the false testimony was 
knowingly stated and described. This requirement is generally 
satisfied by proof that the defendant knew his testimony was 
false at the time it was provided. As with almost all perjury 
cases, you will have to make a decision regarding the 
President's knowledge of his own false statements based on the 
surrounding facts and, yes, by circumstantial evidence. This 
does not in any way weaken the case against the President. In 
the absence of an admission by the defendant, relying on 
circumstantial evidence is virtually the only way to prove the 
crime of perjury.
    The Federal jury instructions which Federal courts use in 
perjury cases can provide helpful guidance in understanding 
what is meant by the requirement that the false statement must 
be made knowingly. Let me quote from the Federal jury 
instructions:

    When the word ``knowingly'' is used, it means that the 
defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the 
nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, 
mistake or accident.

    So as you reflect on the President's carefully calculated 
statements, remember the Federal jury instructions and ask a 
few simple questions: Did the President realize what he was 
doing, what he was saying? Was he aware of the nature of his 
conduct or did the President simply act through ignorance, 
mistake or accident?
    The answers to these questions are undeniably clear even to 
the President's own attorneys. In fact, Mr. Ruff and Mr. Craig 
testified before the Judiciary Committee that the President 
willfully misled the court. Let's listen to Mr. Ruff.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Ruff. I'm going to respond to your question. I have no 
doubt that he walked up to a line that he thought he understood 
reasonable people--and you maybe have reached this conclusion--
could determine that he crossed over that line and that what 
for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive and 
misleading or evasive was in fact false.

    In an extraordinary admission, the President's own attorney 
has acknowledged the care, the intention, the will of the 
President to say precisely what he said.
    The President's actions speak volumes about his intent to 
make false statements under oath. For example, the President 
called his secretary, Betty Currie, within hours of concluding 
his civil deposition and asked her to come to the White House 
the following day. President Clinton then recited false 
characterizations to her about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. As you have already heard, Ms. Currie testified that 
the President made the following statements to her:

    You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
never really alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica 
came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She wanted to 
have sex with me, and I can't do that.

    This is not the conduct of someone who believed he had 
testified truthfully. It is not the conduct of someone who 
acted through ignorance, mistake or accident. Rather, it is the 
conduct of someone who lied, knew he had lied, and needed 
others to modify their stories accordingly.
    Finally, it is painstakingly clear during the President's 
grand jury testimony that he, again, knows exactly what he is 
doing. Let's again watch the following excerpt from that 
testimony.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    . . . was an utterly false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.

    In this instance, and in many others that have been 
presented to you over the last 2 days, the facts and the law 
speak plainly.
    The President's actions and demeanor make the case that 
President Clinton knowingly and willfully lied under oath in a 
grand jury proceeding and in a civil deposition. The compelling 
evidence in this case satisfies the intent element required 
under both sections 1621 and 1623 of the Federal Criminal Code.
    The next element, falsity. The next element of perjury is 
falsity. In order for perjury to occur in this case, the 
President must have made one or more false statements. 
Yesterday my colleagues went through the evidence on this 
matter in great detail and clearly demonstrated that the 
President did, in fact, make false statements while under oath. 
Because of the evidence that was presented to date, without 
question the President's falsity and his false statements have 
been shown, so I am going to move forward to the final element 
of perjury, which is materiality.
    The test for whether a statement is material, as stated by 
the Supreme Court in Kungys v. United States, is simply whether 
it had a ``natural tendency to influence'' or was ``capable of 
influencing'' the official proceeding. The law also makes clear 
that the false statement does not have to actually impede the 
grand jury's investigation for the statement to be material.
    The law regarding the materiality of false statements 
before a grand jury is very straightforward. Because a grand 
jury's authority to investigate is broad, the realm of 
declarations regarded as material is broad. The President's 
false statements to the grand jury were material because the 
grand jury was investigating whether the President had 
obstructed justice and committed perjury in a civil deposition.
    Now let's look at potential legal smokescreens. The 
President's attorneys will try to distract you from the 
relevant law and facts in this case. To help you stay focused 
on the law, I would like to preview some of the arguments that 
may be made by the President's attorneys.
    Legal smokescreen No. 1, the Bronston case. You will 
probably hear opposing counsel argue that the President did not 
technically commit perjury, and appeal to the case of Bronston 
v. United States. This is a legal smokescreen. In the Bronston 
case, the Supreme Court held that statements that are literally 
truthful and nonresponsive cannot by themselves form the basis 
for a perjury conviction. This is the cornerstone of the 
President's defense. However, the Court also held that the 
unresponsive statements must be technically true in order to 
prevent a perjury conviction; such statements must not be 
capable of being conclusively proven false.
    As we have seen, none of the President's perjurious 
statements before the grand jury, covered in the first 
impeachment article, are technically true. So, when the 
President's counsel cites the Bronston case, remember the 
facts. Ask yourselves, are the President's answers literally 
true? And remember, to be literally true they must actually be 
true.
    It is also important to note that, consistent with the 
Bronston case, the response, ``I don't recall,'' is not 
technically true if the President actually could recall. The 
factual record in the case, consisting of multiple sworn 
statements contradicting the President's testimony and highly 
specific corroborating evidence, demonstrates that the 
President's statements were not literally true or legally 
accurate. On the contrary, the record establishes that the 
President repeatedly lied, he repeatedly deceived, he 
repeatedly feigned forgetfulness.
    There are other clear and important limitations on the 
Bronston case's scope. In United States v. DeZarn, handed down 
just 3 months ago by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
court made an important ruling that is directly on point in 
this case. The court of appeals stated:

    Because we believe that the crime of perjury depends not 
only upon the clarity of the questioning itself, but also upon 
the knowledge and reasonable understanding of the testifier 
[President Clinton] as to what is meant by the questioning, we 
hold that a defendant may be found guilty of perjury if a jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence 
presented that the defendant knew what the question meant and 
gave knowingly untruthful and materially misleading answers in 
response.

    The Bronston case has further limitations. For example, in 
United States v. Swindall, the court held that the jury can 
convict for perjury even if the questions or statements 
involved are capable of multiple interpretations where only one 
interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances 
surrounding their utterances.
    In United States v. Doherty, the court held that the 
prosecution for perjury is not barred under Bronston, 
``whenever some ambiguity can be found by an implausibly 
strained reading of the question'' posed. I would submit to 
this body that ``implausibly strained reading of the question'' 
posed is precisely what confronts us time and again in the case 
of the President before the grand jury.
    Legal smokescreen No. 2, the two-witness rule. In the 
coming days you may hear opposing counsel argue that the 
President did not commit perjury by appealing to the so-called 
two-witness rule. Again, this is nothing but a legal 
smokescreen. This common law rule requires that there be either 
two witnesses to a perjurious statement or, in the alternative, 
that there be one witness and corroborating evidence of the 
perjury. Opposing counsel may suggest that, because there were 
not two witnesses present for some of the President's false 
statements, he did not technically commit perjury. Such an 
appeal to the two-witness rule is wrong for several reasons.
    First, the two-witness rule is not applicable under section 
1623, only under 1621. The language of 1623 expressly provides, 
``it shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any 
particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type 
of evidence.''
    Congress passed section 1623 back in 1970 to eliminate the 
two-witness requirement and to facilitate the prosecution of 
perjury and enhance the reliability of testimony before Federal 
courts and Federal grand juries. The legislative history 
establishes this as the fundamental purpose of the statute.
    Additionally, substantial evidence has been presented over 
the last 2 days to satisfy the requirements of the two-witness 
rule under section 1621. Remember, when the two-witness rule 
applies, it does not actually require two witnesses. Indeed, it 
requires either two witnesses or one witness and corroborating 
evidence. As you know, there is a witness to each and every one 
of the President's false statements and there is voluminous 
evidence which corroborates the falsehood of his statements.
    Finally, case law tells us that the two-witness rule is not 
applicable under certain circumstances, when the defendant 
falsely claims an inability to recall a material matter.
    Another possible legal smokescreen, the drafting of article 
I, article I being the first article of impeachment.
    As you know, impeachment article I says:

    Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully 
provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury . . .

    You may hear opposing counsel argue that section 1621 is 
the only applicable statute because the article of impeachment 
accuses the President of willfully committing perjury. This is 
another legal smokescreen.
    Following that reasoning, one could just as easily make the 
argument that 1623 was contemplated here because the term 
``false'' does not appear in 1621 but does appear in 1623. 
However, that is not the point. The point is that the language 
of the impeachment article did not use these terms as terms of 
art as they are defined and used in various criminal statutes.
    While the article of impeachment does not draw a 
distinction between the standards, evidence has been presented 
over the last 2 days that demonstrates that the President did 
knowingly and willfully lie under oath regarding material 
matters before a grand jury, and that satisfies both 1623 and 
1621.
    Again, in the context of perjury law, the distinction 
between a knowing falsehood and a willful falsehood is almost a 
distinction without a difference. In American Surety Company v. 
Sullivan, the Second Circuit stated that ``the word `willful,' 
even in a criminal statute, means no more than the person 
charged with the duty knows what he is doing.''
    So that, in essence, is the law of perjury.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, throughout this 
long and difficult process, apologists for the President have 
maintained that his actions might well have been reprehensible 
but are not necessarily worthy of impeachment and removal from 
office. I submit, however, that telling the truth under oath is 
critically important to our judicial system and that perjury, 
of which I believe a compelling case is being made, strikes a 
terrible blow against the machinery of justice in this country.
    The President of the United States, the chief law 
enforcement officer of this land, lied under oath. He raised 
his right hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, and then he lied, pure and simple.
    Why is perjury such a serious offense? Under the American 
system of justice, our courts are charged with seeking the 
truth. Every day, American citizens raise their right hand in 
courtrooms across the country and take an oath to tell the 
truth. Breaking that oath cripples our justice system. By lying 
under oath, the President did not just commit perjury, an 
offense punishable under our criminal code, but he chipped away 
at the very cornerstone of our judicial system.
    The first Chief Justice of the United States of the Supreme 
Court, John Jay, eloquently stated why perjury is so dangerous 
over 200 years ago. On June 25, 1792, in a charge to the grand 
jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Vermont, the 
Chief Justice said:

    Independent of the abominable Insult which Perjury offers 
to the divine Being, there is no Crime more extensively 
pernicious to Society. It discolours and poisons Streams of 
Justice, and by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the 
Foundations of personal and public Rights--Controversies of 
various kinds exist at all Times, and in all Communities. To 
decide them, Courts of Justice are instituted--their Decisions 
must be regulated by Evidence, and the greater part of Evidence 
will always consist of the Testimony of witnesses. This 
Testimony is given under those solemn obligations which an 
appeal to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to 
be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would 
become insecure.

    Why has the President been impeached by the U.S. House of 
Representatives? Why is he on trial here today in the U.S. 
Senate? Because he lied under oath. Because he committed 
perjury. Because if the oaths cease to be held sacred, our 
dearest and most valuable rights will become insecure.
    During the course of this trial, Members of this 
distinguished body, the jurors in this case, will have to 
consider the law and the facts very carefully. It is a daunting 
task and an awesome responsibility, one that cannot be taken 
lightly. I humbly suggest to those sitting in judgment of the 
President that we must all weigh the impact of our actions, not 
only on our beloved Nation today, but on American history. It 
is my belief that if the actions of the President are 
ultimately disregarded or minimized, we will be sending a sorry 
message to the American people that the President of the United 
States is above the law. We will be sending a message to our 
children, to my children, that telling the truth doesn't really 
matter if you have a good lawyer or you are an exceptionally 
skilled liar. That would be tragic.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, let us instead send a message 
to the American people and to the boys and girls who will be 
studying American history in the years to come that no person 
is above the law and that this great Nation remains an entity 
governed by the rule of law. Let us do what is right. Let us do 
what is just. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Cannon.
    Mr. Manager CANNON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, 
distinguished counsel of the President, my name is Chris 
Cannon. I represent Utah's Third Congressional District.
    John Locke once said, ``Wherever law ends, tyranny 
begins.'' And speaking to our American experience, Teddy 
Roosevelt added, ``No man is above the law and no man is below 
it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to 
obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not as a 
favor.''
    This case is about the violation of law. My task is to 
clarify what the law states pertaining to obstruction of 
justice and what legal precedent is applicable to the charges 
against William Jefferson Clinton.
    While both the laws and the violations in this case are 
clear and direct, the presentation I am about to make will not 
be simple. I ask your indulgence and attention as I walk you 
through case history and statutory elements. I promise to be 
brief--probably less than a half-hour--and direct.
    I will present the legal underpinnings of the law of 
obstruction of justice. You should have before you the full 
text of this speech, including full citations to cases and 
copies of the charts I will use in this presentation.
    Article II of the articles of impeachment alleges that the 
President prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration 
of justice, both personally and through his subordinates and 
agents, and that he did so as part of a pattern designed to 
delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence 
and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him.
    Article II specifies seven separate instances in which the 
President acted to obstruct justice. The House believes the 
evidence in this case proves that each of the seven separate 
acts which comprise the President's scheme constitutes 
obstruction of justice.
    I would like to draw your attention at this time to the 
chart on my right, and the first page in your packet, which 
depicts elements of section 1503:

    (a) Whoever . . . corruptly . . . influences, obstructs or impedes; 
or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration 
of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
    (b) The punishment for an offense under this section is . . .
    (3) . . . imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under 
this title, or both.

    Section 1503 is often referred to as the general 
obstruction statute. It describes obstruction simply as an 
impact on the due administration of justice.
    Section 1503 deems it criminal to use force or threats, or 
to otherwise act corruptly, in order to influence, obstruct, or 
impede the due administration of justice.
    Federal court rulings clarify that it is not necessary for 
a defendant to succeed in obstructing justice. Again, I direct 
your attention to the chart, or the accompanying chart, in your 
package.
    Russell and Aguilar each ruled that it is not necessary 
that a defendant's endeavor succeed for him to have violated 
the law. Rather, simply attempting to influence, obstruct, or 
impede the due administration of justice violates the statute.
    Maggitt clearly stated, ``it is the endeavor to bring about 
a forbidden result and not the success in actually achieving 
the result, that is forbidden.''
    For the Government to prove a section 1503 crime, it must 
demonstrate that the defendant acted with intent. This can be 
shown through use of force, threats by the defendant, or by 
simply showing that the defendant acted ``corruptly.'' The 
following chart gives three case histories regarding the term 
``acting corruptly.''
    Haldeman and Sprecher held that a defendant acts corruptly 
by having an evil or improper purpose or intent.
    Barfield defined ``acting corruptly'' as knowingly and 
intentionally acting in order to encourage obstruction.
    Sprecher also ruled the Government need not prove the 
actual intent of the defendant, but, rather, the intent to act 
corruptly can be inferred from that proof that the defendant 
knew corrupt actions would obstruct the justice being 
administered.
    Under section 1503, the Government must also prove that the 
defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due 
administration of justice. The statute is broadly applicable to 
all phases of judicial proceedings.
    Brenson described due administration of justice as 
``providing a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings, 
regardless of the stage in which the improper activity 
occurs.''
    Section 1503 is also intended to protect the discovery 
phase of a judicial proceeding, stating that the phrase ``due 
administration of justice'' is intended to provide a ``free and 
fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending case in Federal 
court to learn what he may learn . . . concerning the material 
facts and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony of 
such facts.''
    The House believes that the facts of this case make it very 
clear that the President did, corruptly, impair the ability of 
a litigant in Federal court to learn all of the facts that she 
was entitled to learn. In doing so, the President committed 
obstruction of justice under section 1503.
    The other Federal crime which the President committed was 
witness tampering under section 1512 of title 18. Again, I 
refer you to the chart on my right, and to the second page in 
the package, which depicts the elements of the section.

    (b) Whoever knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person, or 
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to--
    (1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an 
official proceeding; or
    (2) cause or induce any person to--
    (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a . . . document . . . or an 
object . . . from an official proceeding;
    . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more 
than ten years or both.

    Sections 1503 and 1512 differ in an important way. There 
does not need to be a case pending at the time the defendant 
acts to violate the law under section 1512. The statute 
specifically states that ``for the purpose of this section, an 
official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense . . .'' for the crime to 
be committed.
    Putting it another way, a person may attempt to tamper with 
a witness and commit the crime of witness tampering before such 
a person is called as a witness and even before there is a case 
underway in which that person might be called to testify.
    For the Government to prove the crime of witness tampering, 
it must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause 
one of several results. The defendant can be convicted if he 
acted to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding; or the defendant can be 
convicted if he acted to cause another person to withhold an 
object from an official proceeding.
    In the case before us, the evidence proves that the 
President endeavored to cause both of these results on several 
occasions. And the Government may show intent on the part of 
the defendant in several ways. It may prove the use of 
intimidation, physical force or threats; or it may prove intent 
by showing the use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct.
    In this case, the evidence shows that on several occasions 
the President acted corruptly to persuade some witnesses, and 
engaged in misleading conduct toward others, in order to 
influence their testimony and cause them to withhold evidence 
or give wrongful testimony. In each instance, the President 
violated the witness tampering statute.
    How does acting corruptly to persuade a witness differ from 
engaging in misleading conduct? Section 1515 in title 18 
states:

    (a) as used in section 1512 [the witness tampering section] . . . 
of this title and this section--
    (3) the term ``misleading conduct'' means--
    (A) knowingly making a false statement; or
    (B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby 
causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally 
concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by 
such statement; or
    (C) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting 
reliance on a writing or recording that is false, forged, altered or 
otherwise lacking in authenticity;

    The difference between corruptly persuading a witness and 
engaging in misleading conduct toward the witness depends on 
the witness' level of knowledge about the truth of the 
defendant's statement.
    Rodolitz held that misleading conduct involves a situation 
``where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as 
if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the 
story and testify to it before the grand jury.''
    Let me clarify this detail: If a defendant simply asks a 
witness to lie and the witness knows that he is being asked to 
lie, then the defendant is corruptly persuading the witness. In 
contrast, if a defendant lies to a witness, hoping the witness 
will believe his story, this is misleading conduct. They are 
different, but they are both criminal.
    Some may ask if it is necessary that the witness who is 
influenced or tampered with know that he or she might be called 
to testify? The answer is no.
    And both sections 1503 and 1512 answer this question:
    The witness tampering statute can be violated even if the 
victim has not been subpoenaed or listed as a potential witness 
in an ongoing proceeding.
    In Shannon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reviewed the conviction of a defendant under section 
1503 who had attempted to influence the testimony of a person 
who had not yet been subpoenaed or placed on a witness list. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that because the target of the 
obstruction had not yet become an official witness in the case, 
it was impossible for the defendant to have engaged in 
obstruction toward her. The court of appeals rejected that 
assertion. In affirming the conviction, the court held 
``neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time 
of the offense nor must he or she actually give testimony at a 
later time. It is only necessary that there is a possibility 
that the target of the defendant's activities be called on to 
testify in an official proceeding.''
    The witness tampering statute can be violated even when no 
case is pending.
    Therefore, it will not always be clear to whom the 
defendant intended the individual to testify--and the statute 
does not require proof of this.
    In Morrison, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia explained that section 1512 is violated if 
the defendant asks a person to lie ``to anyone who asks.'' The 
court held that it is not necessary that the defendant even use 
the words ``testify'' or ``trial'' when he tries to influence 
the testimony of the other person. In such a case, there are no 
subpoenas, there are no witness lists.
    The mere attempt to influence the person to lie, if asked, 
is the crime.
    So, under either section 1503 or 1512, the fact that the 
target of a defendant's actions is not named as a witness, or 
whether the person is not ever called to be a witness, is 
immaterial.
    The focus of both statutes is on what the defendant 
believed.
    If the defendant believes that it is possible that some 
person might some day be called to testify at some later 
proceeding and then acted to influence, delay or prevent his or 
her testimony, the defendant commits the crime.
    Now, some have asserted that an obstruction of justice 
charge cannot, or should not, be made against the President 
because some of his acts occurred in the context of a civil 
trial. There is simply no merit to this view.
    There is no question that the obstruction and witness 
tampering statutes can be violated by acts that occur in civil 
proceedings. And, case law is consistent in upholding that any 
attempt to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration 
of justice in a civil proceeding violates section 1503.
    Lundwall, which I referred to earlier, is a perfect 
example, as it began as a civil case.
    The actual language of the witness tampering statute makes 
it clear that it also applies to civil cases.
    The statute provides for enhanced penalties in criminal 
proceedings--a provision that would be unnecessary if the law 
were only to apply to criminal cases.
    In short, the fact that some instances of the President's 
misconduct occurred in the course of a civil proceeding does 
not absolve him of criminal liability.
    As Mr. Barr will demonstrate, the President of the United 
States endeavored and did obstruct justice and tamper with 
witnesses in violation of the law of the United States.
    On numerous occasions he acted with an improper purpose 
with the intent to interfere with the due administration of 
justice in the Federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Paula 
Jones.
    President Clinton corruptly endeavored to persuade 
witnesses to lie. In some cases, he succeeded. In every case, 
he violated the law.
    President Clinton engaged in misleading conduct in order to 
influence the testimony of witnesses in judicial proceedings. 
He succeeded. In each case, he violated the law.
    President Clinton acted with an improper purpose to 
persuade a person to withhold objects from a judicial 
proceeding in which that person was required to produce them. 
He succeeded, and in so doing he violated the law.
    President Clinton made misleading statements for the 
purpose of deterring a litigant from further discovery that 
would lead to facts which the judge ordered relevant in a 
Federal civil rights case. In so doing, he obstructed the due 
administration of justice in that case and violated the law.
    Whether attempting to persuade a person to testify falsely, 
or to ignore court orders to produce objects; whether 
suggesting to an innocent person a false story in hopes that he 
or she will repeat it in a judicial proceeding; or testifying 
falsely in the hopes of blocking another party's pursuit of the 
truth--all these acts obstruct justice; all these acts are 
Federal felony crimes; all these acts were committed by William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess again of the proceedings for 15 minutes. 
Please return promptly to the Chamber.
    There being no objection, at 3:29 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 3:47 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready for the 
final subject today, from Manager Barr.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Barr.
    Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, learned counsel for the 
President, and fellow managers on behalf of the House of 
Representatives, I thank the Senate for the opportunity to 
appear today and to present this argument. The House, and I, 
especially, greatly appreciate the time and effort the Senate 
has taken on this most important and notable matter.
    You have heard the facts summarized by my colleagues. They 
have described for you the law of perjury and the law of 
obstruction. I will discuss several of the specific instances 
in which William Jefferson Clinton violated these laws as set 
forth in the articles of impeachment presented to you.
    The process facing you as jurors, of fitting the Federal 
law of obstruction of justice and of witness tampering and of 
perjury into the facts of the case against President William 
Jefferson Clinton, is not a case in which there is nor should 
be a great deal of difficulty. It is not a problem of fitting a 
round peg into a square hole. Quite the contrary. We have a 
case here, you have a case here, for consideration in which the 
fit between fact and law is as precise as the finely tuned 
mechanism of a Swiss watch or as seamless a process as the 
convergence and confluence of two great rivers such as flow 
through many of the cities which you represent. The evidence 
that President William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice is overwhelming. These are pattern 
offenses.
    I beg your attention to the following exposition of facts 
and law. But before commencing, I would like to address three 
issues that have come up during the course of the proceedings, 
which I believe might be helpful for all of us to keep in mind 
as we proceed not only through today's final presentations but 
tomorrow's and those that will be made by learned counsel for 
the President.
    First, by way of background on the process--that is, the 
process that brings us, the House managers, to the well of this 
great body and the trial of the President of the United States 
of America--as has been indicated previously by one of my 
colleague House managers, and as everyone here knows full well, 
the responsibilities, the jurisdiction, and the process between 
the House of Representatives and the Senate is very different 
in all three of those respects. Therefore, while coming as no 
surprise to all of you, all of us in this room, but perhaps to 
some in America, the steps that each body takes, and should 
take and must take, are very different.
    Just as one example, one might ask, ``Why were no witnesses 
called in the House of Representatives?'' A valid question. It 
deserves a valid answer. That valid answer can be found not 
simply in impeachment proceedings and the history thereof, but 
also in the day-in/day-out proceedings in our Federal courts 
and in our State courts. It can be found in the difference 
between the body which has responsibility and jurisdiction for 
charging a crime and the jurisdiction and responsibility of the 
body that has responsibility for trying a crime, or an alleged 
crime. The House of Representatives, though it is not in every 
respect like a grand jury, operates much more like a grand jury 
than a petit jury. As something akin to a grand jury, we had in 
mind--and I know you have in mind--being very mindful and 
knowledgeable about the difference in procedure between the 
House and Senate on matters of impeachment, that frequently in 
court cases presented to Federal grand juries--and I suspect 
similarly to State grand juries--the evidence to the grand 
jurors themselves is not presented through a long array, a 
repetitive array of witnesses themselves--witnesses, that is, 
with firsthand knowledge of each and every fact, which would 
later be proved at trial. Rather, it is the more standard 
procedure--certainly in Federal courts, with which I am more 
familiar--for the Government to present its case to the grand 
jury by way of summary witnesses. Normally, that would mean 
case agents that have been working with the assistant U.S. 
attorneys, or with the U.S. attorney, in gathering and 
evaluating the evidence that will eventually be brought to bear 
in the trial of the case.
    If one were to be a fly on the wall of a Federal grand 
jury, one would normally see witnesses for the Government that 
would come in and discuss the general parameters and the 
specific evidence of the case that they would present in court, 
frequently summarizing the actual evidence that would be 
presented in court by the witnesses themselves. That is the 
standard operating procedure. That is not to say that there is 
also not presented voluminous written evidence, documentary 
evidence. That is frequently the case as well. Nor is that to 
say that there are not, from time to time, cases presented to 
Federal grand juries in which there are actual witnesses with 
firsthand knowledge.
    I will simply make a point of which we are all aware. I 
think as we begin, or in anticipation of your process of 
sifting through all of this procedure, this evidence, all of 
this law, we should keep in mind that our job in the House was 
to approach it necessarily very different from the way you 
approach your job as jurors, as triers of fact. We, in fact, 
presented to the House of Representatives, through the work on 
our Judiciary Committee, a large volume of evidence presented 
to us and through us to the House of Representatives as the 
charging body, not the trier of fact body; that is, to 
essentially summarize and discuss through the words, through 
the opinions of the independent counsel, as akin to the chief 
investigative officer in a grand jury in Federal district 
court, through the words of many expert witnesses, as it were, 
who placed all of that in context.
    We did not want to usurp your duty, your responsibility 
given to you by the Constitution as the trier of fact. We are 
not that presumptuous. It is your responsibility, it is your 
solemn duty to be the trier of fact. That is very different 
from our solemn duty, which I believe the House performed 
admirably in essentially reaching the conclusion that there is 
probable cause to convict the President of perjury and 
obstruction of justice. And we did so in a way that is mindful 
and respectful of your responsibilities, that carried out our 
responsibilities, and that is familiar to citizens all across 
this land, because it is essentially the same process that 
operates in Federal courts where you see also, as here, a very 
clear distinction between the body that charges the crime, the 
grand jury, and the body that tries the crime--that is, the 
jury, and in this case it is the Senate of the United States of 
America.
    A second point that may very well come up, perhaps, in the 
presentation of the defense by the President's learned counsel, 
which although very familiar to those of us, as there are many 
in this Chamber with a legal background, but which I think also 
is important to keep in mind as you reflect on and later 
deliberate on the evidence itself in this case, is that there 
are, indeed, two types of evidence. In virtually every case, 
whichever finds its way to a court of law and results in a 
trial, both types of evidence are found, used, considered, and 
form the basis, legitimately, for the eventual rendering of a 
decision by a jury. Those two types of evidence are direct and 
circumstantial.
    Frequently--and I know this from actual experience--defense 
lawyers will attack the Government's case, and one of the 
standard attacks that they level against the Government's case 
is that it is based on circumstantial evidence. You even hear 
that by the folks out there today--not in this room--that are 
saying, ``Oh, all we are seeing is circumstantial evidence, and 
that is not as good as direct evidence.''
    Now, to the layperson who is unfamiliar with the ways of 
our laws, our courts, and the work of this great body, that may 
have some currency, it may have some surface appeal. They may 
say, ``Well, that commentator was right, and that White House 
spokesman was right. If all they are doing is talking about 
circumstantial evidence, they can't have a very strong case, 
because if they had a strong case, they would have direct 
evidence.''
    Well, the fact of the matter is, it is a principle of long 
and consistent standing in every Federal court in our land, and 
I suspect every State court in our land, and as directed by 
every Federal judge to every Federal jury taking evidence that 
circumstantial evidence is to be, and shall not be afforded any 
less weight than direct evidence. And triers of fact are 
directed by judges in every case not to accord less weight to 
one type of evidence as opposed to the other. That is, in the 
words of one of my fellow managers, a smokescreen, a red 
herring if somebody raises as a defense in a case--this case or 
other cases--that the case is weakened somehow because there is 
a reliance on circumstantial evidence and it is not found 
solely on direct evidence.
    That is a very important principle. I would appreciate your 
indulgence in that small foray into some basic precepts that I 
think all of us, certainly most of you included, need to keep 
in mind.
    Finally, there is one other sort of process argument that 
one hears sort of floating around in the ether out there that I 
think also is important for all of us to keep in mind; that is, 
facts and the law do bear repeating--not endless, not 
pointless, but appropriate repetition. Even today, even 
yesterday in the first round of presentations to this body, 
there was in fact repetition of certain facts, certain aspects 
of the law. That is not presented to you simply to emphasize a 
point, simply to make it appear stronger because we say it five 
times instead of two. There is a very important reason for 
appropriate repetition.
    For example, in a case such as this where you have two sets 
of laws alleged to have been violated--perjury laws and 
obstruction of justice laws--each one of those has several 
different elements. And, in addition to that, it is legitimate, 
as presenters of facts in the law, for managers, for 
prosecutors, or plaintiffs' attorneys to take a particular 
fact, a particular note, and use it to illustrate several 
different points. For example, one particular fact may provide 
evidence of motive. It may also provide one of the substantive 
elements of perjury or obstruction of justice, or it may go to 
the state of mind of a declarant, a witness. It may provide 
important evidence with regard to a course of conduct, prior 
knowledge, and the list goes on.
    That is why, Senators, frequently in the course of these 
particular presentations--and, again, no different from the 
course of presentation in Federal and, I suspect, State courts 
throughout the land--in trials there necessarily is and should 
be, in order to responsibly present all of the evidence in all 
of its elements, certain repetition. Our job as managers is to 
make sure we do not abuse that necessity and that we do not in 
fact offer repetitive notion, repetitive references, without 
having a very clear and specific purpose, such as I mentioned, 
for that process.
    Finally, before turning to that merger of the law and the 
facts, which I believe will illustrate conclusively that this 
President has committed and ought to be convicted on perjury 
and obstruction of justice, I would respectfully ask that you 
remember that, under the law of impeachment based on our 
Constitution, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
President committed each and every element of one or more 
violations of provisions of the Federal Criminal Code has never 
been required to sustain a conviction in any prior impeachment 
trial in the Senate. However, I can say confidently that I 
speak for all House managers in relating to you our belief that 
the record and the law applicable to these two articles of 
impeachment clearly establish that President William Jefferson 
Clinton did in fact violate several provisions of title 18 of 
the United States Code--that is the criminal code--including 
perjury, obstruction, and tampering with witnesses.
    At this point, a lawyer would face, a fortiori--I will say 
at this point that it therefore goes without saying that indeed 
exists under every historical standard, every historical 
benchmark which this Chamber has used--that there is more than 
sufficient grounds on which you might face a conviction as to 
both articles.
    Beginning then in looking at the facts and the law, both of 
which you have heard through the words and exhibits of my 
colleagues and the evidence that you already have, let us look 
first at the submission of the false affidavit in the Jones 
case.
    We believe the evidence presented clearly establishes that 
on December 17, 1997, the President encouraged a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him, that witness 
being Monica Lewinsky, to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
proceeding which he knew to be perjurious, false, and 
misleading. As other managers have outlined, Monica Lewinsky 
filed a sworn affidavit in the Jones case that denied the 
relationship between her and the President. That affidavit was 
false.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury 
that the scheme to file this false affidavit was devised or 
hatched during a telephone conversation with the President on 
December 17, 1997, a call the President initiated to Ms. 
Lewinsky at 2 or 2:30 a.m. ostensibly to give her the bad news 
that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident 
but apparently, since it consumed the vast majority of the time 
of that conversation, more importantly, for the President to 
tell Ms. Lewinsky her name was on the witness list filed in the 
Jones case and to thereafter discuss during that conversation 
the President's suggestion to her that she could file an 
affidavit in the Jones case in order for the purpose of 
avoiding having to testify in that case--not to cover up but in 
order to avoid having to testify in an ongoing legal proceeding 
in U.S. district court.
    She testified that both she and the President understood 
from their conversation they would continue their pattern of 
covering up. She testified she knew that if she filed a 
truthful affidavit the Jones lawyers would certainly have 
deposed her in that case.
    The testimony of Mr. Vernon Jordan confirms the President 
knew Ms. Lewinsky planned to file a false affidavit. He stated 
that, based on his conversations with the President, that the 
President knew in advance that Ms. Lewinsky planned to execute 
an affidavit denying their relationship and that he later 
informed the President Ms. Lewinsky had signed in fact that 
false affidavit.
    For his part, the President denies asking Ms. Lewinsky to 
execute a false affidavit. Instead, as he asserted in his 
response to the House Judiciary Committee's request for 
admission, he seeks to have you now believe he sought simply to 
have Ms. Lewinsky execute an affidavit that will ``get her out 
of having to testify.''
    While being factually correct, this statement reflects a 
legal impossibility. The President has admitted Ms. Lewinsky 
was the woman with whom he indeed had an improper intimate 
relationship while President. And he has admitted he was very 
concerned over the great personal embarrassment and humiliation 
he feared would have occurred if that relationship had been 
revealed in the Jones case. Yet, he would have you believe he 
cannot remember a call he made to that woman about that case 
which occurred at 2 o'clock in the morning. His statement is 
not credible, and the reason it is not credible is because it 
is not true.
    As Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony corroborates, the 
President knew what Ms. Lewinsky planned to allege in her 
affidavit, yet the President took no action to stop her from 
filing it. As you have heard in earlier presentations, the 
President's lawyer, Mr. Robert Bennett, stated in court 
directly to Judge Wright, when he presented the false 
affidavit, ``There is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form,'' and that the President was ``fully 
aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.'' The President took no 
action to correct his lawyer's misstatement.
    As you have also heard, the President, in his grand jury 
testimony, tried to disingenuously dissect the words of his 
attorney to remove his conduct from further examination, even 
though obviously, and by any reasonable interpretation or 
inference of the definition given the President, his conduct 
with Ms. Lewinsky was covered. And he disavowed knowledge of 
his lawyer's representations by claiming he was not paying 
attention. That canard has been most ably disposed of in prior 
presentations both through the words of the managers and the 
videotape presentations.
    Later in the deposition, when Mr. Bennett read to the 
President the portion of the affidavit in which Ms. Lewinsky 
denies their relationship and asked him ``is that a true and 
accurate statement as far as you know it,'' the President 
answered, ``That is absolutely true.'' This statement is 
neither credible nor true. It is perjury.
    The inescapable conclusion from this evidence is that the 
President has lied, and continues to lie, about the affidavit. 
His continued false statements and denials about the affidavit 
bolster the conclusion of our managers that, in fact, he was 
part of the scheme to file the false affidavit. The evidence 
supports Ms. Lewinsky's account that such a scheme did in fact 
exist between them. The evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom do not support the President's denial--
inferences, I respectfully add, that in your deliberations, as 
in the deliberations of any jury, are to be and should be based 
on common sense and deliberated in terms of the light of your 
experiences in judging human behavior.
    Moreover, in engaging in this course of conduct, referring 
here to the words of the obstruction statute found at section 
1503 of the Criminal Code, the President's actions constituted 
an endeavor to influence or impede the due administration of 
justice in that he was attempting to prevent the plaintiff in 
the Jones case from having a ``free and fair opportunity to 
learn what she may learn concerning the material facts 
surrounding her claim.'' These acts by the President also 
constituted an endeavor to ``corruptly persuade another person 
with the intent to influence the testimony they might give in 
an official proceeding.'' Such are the elements of tampering 
with witnesses found at section 1512 of the Federal Criminal 
Code.
    Ms. Lewinsky knew full well her only hope of not having to 
testify was to file an affidavit that did not truthfully 
reflect her relationship with the President. The President also 
knew that if she had filed a true affidavit, without any doubt, 
it would have caused the Jones lawyers to seek her further 
testimony--something both coconspirators desperately sought to 
avoid.
    In encouraging her to file an affidavit that would prevent 
her from having to testify, President Clinton was, of 
necessity, asking her to testify falsely in an official 
proceeding. He was attempting to prevent, and in fact did 
prevent, the plaintiff in that case from discovering facts 
which may have had a bearing on her claim against the 
President. His motive was improper in the language of the law, 
that is, corrupt. And his actions did influence the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky as a witness in the pending official proceeding 
in U.S. district court.
    Under both sections of the Federal Criminal Code, that is, 
1503, obstruction, and 1512, obstruction in the form of witness 
tampering, the President's conduct constituted a Federal crime 
and satisfies the elements of those statutes.
    With regard to the issue of perjury before the grand jury 
concerning the affidavit, we as managers would show that when 
asked before the grand jury whether he had instructed Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a truthful affidavit, President Clinton 
testified, ``Did I hope she would be able to get out of 
testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to 
execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.''
    The evidence, however, clearly establishes that the 
President's statement constitutes perjury, in violation of 
section 1623 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code for the simple 
reason the only realistic way Ms. Lewinsky could get out of 
having to testify based on her affidavit would be to execute a 
false affidavit. There was no other way it could have happened. 
The President knew this. Ms. Lewinsky knew this. And the 
President's testimony on this point is perjury within the clear 
meaning of the Federal perjury statute. It was willful, it was 
knowing, it was material, and it was false.
    Let us reflect and see also, members of the jury, how the 
use of cover stories and the development thereof ties in the 
facts and the law that constitute a basis on which you might 
properly find a conviction on perjury and obstruction of 
justice.
    We, as managers, believe that the evidence presented to you 
also establishes that on December 17 the President encouraged a 
witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to 
give perjurious, false and misleading testimony when called to 
testify personally in that proceeding. This was, in essence, 
the conspiracy--18 U.S.C. 371--to commit both obstruction and 
perjury.
    Throughout their relationship, the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky, understandably, wished to keep it secret, and they 
took steps to do that, steps that ultimately turned out to be 
and constitute criminal acts. For some time, in fact until Ms. 
Lewinsky testified under oath and under a grant of immunity, 
their efforts were remarkably successful, all things 
considered--all circumstances considered. Associates and 
employees testified in support of the President's stories, and 
even several Secret Service officers testified to the grand 
jury that they understood Ms. Lewinsky to be in the Oval Office 
to ``pick up papers.'' Yet, as Ms. Lewinsky testified, her 
White House job never required her to deliver papers or obtain 
the President's signature on any documents. It was all a sham. 
It was all a cover story. It was all a conspiracy to obstruct.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified later, after she left the White 
House job to work at the Pentagon, that phase 2 of the coverup 
went into effect. The two coconspirators began to use Ms. 
Currie as a source of clearance into the White House. This was 
so even though the purpose of Ms. Lewinsky's visits were almost 
always to simply see the President. As my colleagues have told 
you, on December 17, during that 2 a.m., or perhaps it was 
2:30, telephone conversation placed by the President to Ms. 
Lewinsky, he told her her name appeared on the witness list in 
the Jones case. She testified that at some point in the 
conversation the President told her, ``You know, you can always 
say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that she understood this to 
be ``really a reminder of things that they had discussed 
before.'' She said it was instantly familiar to her. He knew, 
or, ``I knew,'' she says--that is, Ms. Lewinsky knew--``exactly 
what he meant.'' And so, I respectfully submit, do all of us 
here know exactly what the President meant.
    When the President, then, was questioned before the Federal 
grand jury if he ever had said something like that to Ms. 
Lewinsky, he admitted that, well, ``I might . . . have said 
that. Because I certainly didn't want this to come out, if I 
could help it. And I was concerned about that.''
    A cover story--which this was--between two teenagers trying 
to steal a date without their parents' knowledge is one thing. 
Such would not constitute a crime. It would be something we 
might even wink at, as long as it didn't happen too often. 
However, we are not here dealing with two love-struck teenagers 
trying to circumvent their parents' watchful eyes. We are 
dealing here with the President of the United States of America 
and a subservient employee concocting and implementing a scheme 
that, while perhaps not illegal in its inception--simply trying 
to keep the relationship private--did in fact deteriorate into 
illegality once it left the realm of private life and entered 
that of public obstruction.
    However--and this is critical in terms of establishing the 
illegality or convictability of the President's actions--the 
situation at the time of that early morning phone call from the 
President to Ms. Lewinsky was very different from that facing 
the President during any earlier discussions of a cover story.
    Now, in early December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had been 
officially named as a witness in a pending judicial proceeding. 
She was now under an obligation to give complete and truthful 
testimony and he, the President, was under a legal obligation 
at that time not to tamper with her or her possible testimony. 
This is precisely where private lies become public obstruction. 
This is, in fact, the bright line between childlike pranks and 
deadly serious obstruction of our legal system. The President 
and Ms. Lewinsky at that point entered the big leagues, and the 
President, a highly skilled lawyer, knew it, which is why he 
went to such lengths to continue the coverup for so many 
months.
    The President knew that if Ms. Lewinsky were to testify 
that she only brought papers to the President or to see the 
President's secretary, her testimony would have been neither 
complete nor truthful. Yet, the President encouraged her to 
give that untruthful testimony and, in so doing, he broke the 
law of obstruction of justice. And, in lying about it, he 
compounded the problem by breaking the law of perjury.
    As Mr. Cannon made clear, with regard to section 1503, the 
general Federal obstruction statute of the criminal code, a 
person commits the crime of obstruction of justice when he 
attempts to influence the due administration of justice, which 
includes all aspects of any civil or criminal case, including 
pretrial discovery.
    Mr. Clinton's encouragement to Ms. Lewinsky to tell 
something other than the truth certainly would have influenced 
the discovery process in the Jones case. Courts have 
consistently held that civil discovery is every bit a part of 
the due administration of justice, protected by the obstruction 
statutes, as any other aspect of any other civil or criminal 
case. And, as Mr. Cannon also made clear with regard to section 
1512 of the Federal Criminal Code, a person commits witness 
tampering when he attempts to influence another person to give 
false testimony in an official proceeding.
    Mr. Clinton did encourage Ms. Lewinsky to give false 
testimony about her reasons for being in the White House with 
the President. By encouraging her to lie, the President 
committed the crime of obstruction of justice under section 
1503 and the crime of witness tampering under section 1512 of 
the Federal Criminal Code.
    You have also, Members of the Senate, heard about the 
President's statements to Ms. Currie on January 18, and then 
again on the 20th or 21st. The President spoke with her in what 
was clearly, demonstrably, unavoidably, another potential 
witness to be influenced in the civil rights case. The 
President did this in this case by relating to Ms. Currie false 
and misleading accounts of events about that case as to which 
he was going to testify, had testified, and, again, with the 
intent that his recitation of the so-called facts would in fact 
corruptly influence her testimony.
    As the managers have previously described to you, the 
evidence in this case shows that on that Saturday, January 17, 
only 2\1/2\ hours after the President had been deposed in the 
Jones case, he called his secretary at home and asked her to 
come to the White House the next day, a Sunday. She testified--
Ms. Currie, that is--testified this was very unusual. It was 
rare for the President to call and ask her to come in on a 
weekend, but of course she did--the next day, Sunday, January 
18, 1998, at about 5 p.m.
    She testified to the grand jury that during her meeting 
with the President he said to her, ``There are several things 
you may want to know.'' He then proceeded to ask her a number 
of questions in succession. You were presented evidence of 
these five statements by other managers. I will only emphasize 
that it was at that time and in that way, in that manner, that 
the President led Ms. Currie through a series of statements and 
determinate questions to establish a set of facts describing 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House that 
supported his false testimony.
    As you have heard, Ms. Currie stated under oath she 
indicated her agreement with each of the President's 
statements, even though she knew that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had, in fact, been alone in the Oval Office and in the 
President's study. Prosecutors frequently see this pattern. It 
is not unknown to prosecutors, Federal or State. You frequently 
see this pattern of agreeing to things that the person knows 
are not true, where you have a dominant person suggesting 
testimony to another person who is in a subordinate 
relationship. This, I submit, is yet another bright line 
between a private lie and public obstruction.
    During the President's grand jury testimony he was asked 
about his statements to Ms. Currie. He testified he was trying 
to determine whether his recollection was accurate. As he put 
it, ``I was trying to get the facts down. I was trying to 
understand what the facts were.'' This fits the same pattern of 
a classic obstruction of prosecution, in which a defendant 
suggests a story to someone in the hopes that they will later 
testify consistent with that earlier suggestion. Indeed, when 
defendants in Federal courts defend against obstruction 
prosecutions in those type cases, they frequently rely on the 
very same defense the President raises here--that he was merely 
and oh-so-innocently encouraging the other person to tell the 
truth.
    You may want to see, as an example of an unsuccessful 
effort at such a defense, the case of United States v. O'Keefe, 
a Fifth Circuit case from 1983. In that case, Mr. O'Keefe did 
not ask someone to lie. He did not even say, ``I suggest you 
lie.'' Rather, as is almost always the case in white-collar 
obstruction prosecutions, his words, along with their setting 
and their context, suggested a certain story--in that case as 
well as this, a false story. Just as Mr. O'Keefe did not 
expressly ask someone to lie, Mr. Clinton never asked someone 
to lie. He didn't have to. He was too smart for that, and he 
had witnesses who, at that time at least, were willing, ready, 
and able to do his bidding. The President lied to the grand 
jury when he made these statements mischaracterizing his 
earlier statements to Ms. Currie, just as he tampered with her 
as a likely witness 9 months earlier, in January.
    The President's assertion--that he simply was trying to 
understand what the facts were--lacks even colorable 
credibility, when one considers that he had already testified. 
It was obviously too late to try to recollect what the 
``facts'' were. If in fact one accepts that, then he is 
admitting he didn't testify to what the facts were under oath 
at the deposition, because he didn't say, ``I don't know; I 
have to ask Ms. Currie.'' He testified under oath as to what 
the facts purportedly were. Then he would have us believe that 
he had to, after the fact of the deposition, go back and find 
out what the facts were from somebody else.
    That is an argument that cannot be made with a straight 
face.
    In any event, Ms. Currie could not have told him what the 
true facts were, because he alone knew what they were.
    The defenses and explanations the President's defenders 
raise to justify why the President would make factual 
assertions to Ms. Currie about the circumstances of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, right after his testimony, are 
many. For example, one administration witness who appeared 
before the House Judiciary Committee actually suggested that 
such ``coaching'' is proper as a method whereby an attorney 
``prepares'' a client or witness for testimony.
    Of course, such a suggestion in this case would be 
ludicrous. President Clinton obviously did not and could not 
represent Ms. Currie as her attorney. Yet, it is this sort of 
explanation, straining credulity, that illustrates the lengths 
to which the President's defenders have gone to try to explain 
away the obvious--that there was no legitimate reason why the 
President made the statements to Ms. Currie after his grand 
jury testimony, other than to ``suggest'' to her what her 
testimony should be. In Federal criminal trials, defendants go 
to jail for such obstruction. In the case before you, we submit 
this clearly forms a proper basis on which to convict this 
President of obstruction of justice for witness tampering and 
subsequent perjury.
    Please keep in mind also, it is not required that the 
target of the defendant's actions actually testify falsely. In 
fact, the witness tampering statute can be violated even when 
there is no proceeding pending at the time the defendant acted 
in suggesting testimony. As the cases discussed by Manager 
Cannon demonstrate, for a conviction under either section 1503, 
obstruction, or 1512, obstruction by witness tampering, it is 
necessary only to show it was possible the target of the 
defendant's actions might be called as a witness. That element 
has been more than met under the facts of this case.
    It was not only likely Ms. Currie would be called, the 
President's own testimony, deliberate testimony to the grand 
jury, pretty much guaranteed that she would be called. He 
wanted her called so she could then buttress his false 
testimony. His actions clearly, we believe, violated both the 
general obstruction statute and the witness tampering statute 
in these particulars in this regard.
    With regard to the obstruction regarding the subpoena for 
the President's gifts to Ms. Lewinsky, let us look at the 
merger of the facts and the law, as has been discussed. While 
the witness tampering statute makes it a crime to attempt to 
influence the testimony of a person, it also makes it a crime 
to influence a person to withhold an object from an official 
proceeding; in other words, to tamper with evidence. The facts 
of this case, we as House managers believe, clearly show the 
President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
scheme with Monica Lewinsky and possibly others to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed lawfully in the Jones case.
    On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena in the Jones case requiring her to produce each and 
every gift given to her by the President. Then, on December 28, 
Ms. Lewinsky again met with the President in the Oval Office, 
at which time they exchanged gifts. They also discussed the 
fact that the lawyers in the Jones case had subpoenaed all the 
President's gifts to Ms. Lewinsky and especially a hatpin. The 
hatpin apparently had sentimental significance to both of them, 
in that it was the very first gift the President gave to Ms. 
Lewinsky. During that conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the 
President whether she should put the gifts away outside her 
house or give them to someone, maybe Betty.
    At that time, according to Ms. Lewinsky's sworn testimony, 
the President responded, ``Let me think about that.'' 
Apparently he did, because later that day, that very same day, 
only a few hours after Ms. Lewinsky and the President had met 
to discuss what to do with the gifts, Ms. Currie called Ms. 
Lewinsky, setting in motion the great gift exchange.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie said, ``I understand 
that you have something to give me,'' or ``[t]he President said 
you have something to give me.'' In her earlier proffer, or 
offer of evidence, to the independent counsel, prior to her 
testimony before the grand jury, Ms. Lewinsky said Ms. Currie 
had said the President had told her--that is, Ms. Currie--that 
Ms. Lewinsky wanted her to hold on to something for her.
    After their conversation at the Oval Office, Ms. Currie 
drove to Ms. Lewinsky's apartment for only the second time in 
her life. There she picked up a box sealed with tape and on 
which was written ``Please, do not throw away.'' Ms. Currie 
then took the box, drove to her home, and placed the box under 
her bed.
    In her grand jury testimony, Ms. Currie testified that she 
and Ms. Lewinsky did not discuss the content of the box, nor 
did she open it when she got it to her home, but she knew--she 
``understood'' what was in the box--that it contained the gifts 
from the President to Ms. Lewinsky. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky 
testified Ms. Currie was not at all confused, surprised, or 
even interested when she handed the box over to her.
    The legal impact, the legal import, of this is that there 
is no question that if the gifts had actually been produced to 
the Jones lawyers, they would have established a significant 
relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Knowledge 
of the gifts, at a minimum, would have caused the Jones lawyers 
to inquire further as to the nature of the relationship between 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky.
    Her failure to turn over the gifts as required by the 
lawful subpoena served on her was, in the words of the witness 
tampering statute, the withholding of an object from an 
official proceeding. We believe the evidence shows, clearly 
establishes, that the President corruptly persuaded Ms. 
Lewinsky to withhold these objects from the lawful proceedings 
in the Jones case.
    In his grand jury testimony, the President asserted he 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony directly contradicts that. Importantly, all other 
evidence of subsequent acts corroborates her testimony, not the 
President's. For one thing, the gifts were never turned over. 
In fact, Ms. Lewinsky testified she was never under any 
impression, from anything the President said, that she should 
turn over the gifts to the attorneys for Ms. Jones. Quite the 
opposite.
    While the President asserts he never spoke about this 
matter with Betty Currie, he would have us believe that his 
personal and confidential secretary would, on a Sunday, drive 
to the home of the woman with whom he was having an 
inappropriate intimate relationship, take possession of a 
sealed box which she believed to contain gifts given by the 
President, hide the box under the bed in her home, never 
question the person giving her the box, and never even mention 
to the President she had received the box of gifts.
    The President's position, as he would have you believe, is 
not credible. It defies the evidence. It defies any reasonable 
interpretation or inference from the evidence. It defies common 
sense. And it stands in defiance of Federal law.
    The only reasonable interpretation of the facts is that, 
following the discussion between the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
earlier in the day on December 28, the President decided Ms. 
Lewinsky had actually come up with a pretty good suggestion: 
The gifts should be put away outside of her home.
    As jurors, you may reasonably presume, based on the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, along with 
common sense, that it was the President who directed Ms. Currie 
to call Ms. Lewinsky to tell her she understood she ``had 
something for her.'' And that happened to be evidence under 
lawful subpoena in a civil proceeding in a U.S. district court.
    Ms. Currie would have no independent reason to even 
consider such a course of action on her own. She had never, 
other than one time in her life, ever driven to Ms. Lewinsky's 
home. She did so on this Sunday not because she developed a 
sudden hankering to do so or because she routinely visited 
interns at their homes--she didn't--or because she had a 
vision; she did it because the President would have asked her 
to do it.
    Now, the President further points out that Ms. Currie has 
testified that Ms. Lewinsky called her to arrange to pick up 
the gifts, rather than the other way around. In fact, although 
Ms. Currie has testified inconsistently as to whether Ms. 
Lewinsky called her or she called Ms. Lewinsky, she actually 
deferred to Ms. Lewinsky's superior knowledge of the facts.
    However, even if one were to accept, for purposes of 
argument, that it was Ms. Lewinsky who initiated the call, the 
President's avowal that he had no knowledge of or involvement 
with the hiding or the transfer of the gifts is still not 
plausible. It is totally unreasonable to presume that the 
private secretary to the President of the United States would 
drop what she was doing, travel to the home of a former intern, 
pick up a box, and hide it in her home simply because the 
former intern demanded that she do so. All of this had to have 
been done--reasonably, plausibly, credibly was done--because of 
communication directed and an understanding between the 
President and his personal secretary.
    There is one more point on this. Ms. Lewinsky testified she 
met with the President for 45 minutes on December 28, at which 
time they discussed the fact that she had been subpoenaed, 
along with the need to conceal the gifts. The President's 
testimony directly conflicts with hers on this point.
    First, the evidence, however, establishes that his 
professed inability to remember whether she and the gifts had 
been subpoenaed is unbelievable and false.
    Please keep in mind when evaluating the circumstantial 
evidence to determine whether a false statement was made 
intentionally, the most important evidence to consider is the 
existence of a motive to lie. It is the calculated falsehood, 
combined with a clear motive to lie, that leads, day in and day 
out in Federal court proceedings, to the conclusion that false 
statements were intentional.
    Also, we urge you to bear in mind that the law will not 
allow a person to testify, ``I don't recall,'' or, ``I'm not 
sure,'' when such answers are unreasonable under the 
circumstances.
    Former U.S. Representative Patrick Swindall attempted this 
course of action when he appeared before a Federal grand jury 
in the Northern District of Georgia in 1988. His evasive and 
false answers to the grand jury provided the basis for his 
subsequent conviction.
    Feigned forgetfulness or feigned assertions that grand jury 
questions are ambiguous and therefore cannot be answered 
cannot, and in fact in Federal proceedings do not, shield 
defendants from criminal liability for perjury or impeding the 
conduct of a Federal grand jury; nor should such efforts be 
allowed to shield President Clinton from conviction on these 
two articles of impeachment as to these facts.
    The President, a man of considerable intelligence and 
gifted with an exceptional memory--as somebody described, ``a 
prodigious memory''--can and should be inferred to have clearly 
understood what he was doing, as well as the logical and 
reasonable consequences of his actions, as well as the 
questions put to him by the independent counsel in the grand 
jury questioning.
    And he had a clear motive to falsely state to the grand 
jury that he could not recall that he knew on December 28 that 
Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called 
for her to produce the gifts, for to have acknowledged such 
would have helped establish a motive on his part for 
orchestrating the concealment of the gifts.
    And as we have also seen and understand, there is no doubt 
the President's statement of feigned forgetfulness was material 
not only to the matters before the Jones case but to matters 
subsequently before the grand jury.
    Now, the President's counsel may very well argue the fact 
that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on that 
same day--that is, December 28--as proof of the President's 
assertions that he didn't know there was anything wrong going 
on here. Their argument, if they make it, cannot be sustained 
in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The evidence 
in fact points to a much more plausible explanation. The 
additional gifts given that day demonstrate the President's 
continued confidence that Ms. Lewinsky would keep to their 
earlier agreement to conceal their relationship.
    It is also plausible that the additional gifts were 
intended as a further gesture of affection by the President to 
Ms. Lewinsky to help ensure she would not testify against him. 
Such a fact pattern also finds its way to those of us who have 
a prosecutorial background in Federal courts on a regular 
basis.
    We have heard about the job search and its relationship to 
perjury and obstruction. Let me tie the facts related to job 
search and the law applicable thereto together. We believe, as 
managers, that the evidence shows that, beginning on or about 
December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 
14 of last year, the President intensified and succeeded in an 
effort to secure job assistance for a witness in a Federal 
civil rights case brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that 
proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that 
witness would have been harmful to him.
    Monica Lewinsky is, if nothing else, a persistent witness. 
After she was transferred out of the White House, and after 
being rebuffed repeatedly by others to secure assistance from 
the President in gaining a job that met her expectations and 
wishes, she decided to change tack. She wrote directly to the 
President, asked for, and received a meeting in which she asked 
him to find her a job in New York.
    The day before the President filed his answers to the 
interrogatories in the Jones case, as Manager Gekas discussed, 
the President asked Ms. Currie to set up a meeting for Ms. 
Lewinsky with Mr. Vernon Jordan. Two days after he filed his 
answers, in which he refused to answer whether he had ever had 
any extramarital relationships in the context of his public 
jobs, that meeting in fact occurred. But Mr. Jordan made no 
particular effort to assist Ms. Lewinsky at that time. In fact, 
as he later testified, he had no recollection of the meeting. 
There was, of course, at that early stage, no urgency.
    The situation, however, changed dramatically in early 
December, 1997. On December 6, the President became aware that 
Ms. Lewinsky had been named as a witness in the Jones case. 
Early that day, she had thrown a tantrum at the White House 
northwest gate when she was unable to meet with the President 
when she wanted. Despite the President's initial anger over Ms. 
Lewinsky's behavior and over the acts of some of the Secret 
Service officers a mere 5 days later, Ms. Lewinsky, in fact, 
secured a second meeting with Mr. Vernon Jordan. But this time, 
unlike previously, this powerful Washington lawyer jumped for 
the former intern. He immediately placed calls to three major 
corporations on her behalf.
    On December 11, Judge Wright ordered the President to 
answer Paula Jones' interrogatories. On December 17, the 
President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky she file the affidavit and 
continue to use their cover stories in the event she was asked 
about her relationship with the President. The next day she had 
two interviews in New York City arranged by Mr. Jordan. On 
December 22, Ms. Lewinsky met with an attorney at a meeting 
arranged by Mr. Jordan. The following day she had another job 
interview arranged by Mr. Jordan.
    On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false affidavit and 
proudly showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan. The next day, 
Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan with 
MacAndrews & Forbes in New York City, an interview that 
apparently went poorly. To remedy this, she called Mr. Jordan 
and so informed him. Mr. Jordan then called the CEO of 
MacAndrews & Forbes, Mr. Ron Perelman to, in Mr. Jordan's 
words, ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' After Mr. 
Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman, Ms. Lewinsky was called and told 
that she would be interviewed again the very next morning. That 
following day she was reinterviewed and immediately offered a 
job. She then called Mr. Jordan to tell him and he passed the 
information on to Ms. Currie. ``Tell the President, mission 
accomplished.''
    Now, what are you as jurors entitled to conclude from all 
of this as a matter of law and of fact? Until it became clear 
that Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the Jones case, little 
was done to help her with her job search. Once she was listed 
as a witness, things changed dramatically and rapidly. Just 
days after she is listed on the Jones witness list, she gets a 
second meeting with one of the most influential men in 
Washington. But, unlike their first meeting, Mr. Jordan now 
makes three calls on her behalf to get her a job interview. A 
week later the President proposed the affidavit. The next day, 
Ms. Lewinsky has two job interviews in New York. A few days 
later, Mr. Jordan arranges for an attorney to represent her. 
The next day she has another job interview. Two weeks later she 
signed the affidavit. The next day she has another interview.
    ``Mission accomplished.'' Obstruction accomplished. Another 
potentially embarrassing witness in the bag.
    Were Ms. Lewinsky to get a job and move to New York, this 
would help the President substantially in two very important 
ways. First, it would presumably create a happy and probably 
compliant witness, one willing, if not eager, to support the 
President's false testimony. Second, it would make Ms. Lewinsky 
much more difficult, if not impossible, to reach as a witness 
in the Jones case. In fact, this is precisely what the 
President himself suggested to Ms. Lewinsky during their 
December 28 meeting, according to her sworn testimony.
    To put it plainly, but respectfully, if that is not 
obstruction by witness tampering, one would be hard pressed to 
find a fact pattern that was.
    This aspect of the case against the President is extremely 
important. She gets the job. And what did the President get? 
The key affidavit to throw the Jones lawyers off the trail and 
possibly a witness outside the practical reach of the 
attorneys, much like the absent witnesses we have seen in large 
numbers in the campaign financing investigations.
    The President's efforts were designed to and did obstruct 
justice and tamper with a witness. And his actions, we submit, 
were criminal under both sections 1503 and 1512 of the Federal 
Criminal Code.
    The President's false statements to his senior aides. Here, 
too, the facts and the law come together and would form the 
basis, we respectfully submit, for a conviction on articles of 
impeachment. All that needs to be shown to prove a violation of 
the statute is that the defendant engaged in misleading conduct 
with another person to influence their testimony. Misleading 
conduct is not a term of art for which there is no definition. 
It is specifically defined in the Federal Criminal Code as 
section 1515. When you, as jurors, properly apply these 
definitions to the terms of section 1512, the tampering 
statute, and then turn your attention to the facts in this case 
wherein the President repeatedly and deliberately gave false 
explanations to aides he knew or should reasonably have known 
would be witnesses in Federal judicial proceedings, the 
conclusion he violated this statute is, we respectfully submit, 
unavoidable. I point to one case previously mentioned, the 
O'Keefe case as particularly, perhaps, applicable to 
deliberations on this matter.
    Finally, statements by the President and his lawyer 
concerning the affidavit during the Jones deposition. The 
obstruction statute may also be violated, as you know, by a 
person who gives false testimony. In the Jones case, the 
President allowed his attorney to make false and misleading 
statements to a Federal judge. This part of the obstruction 
scheme was accomplished by characterizing as true the false 
affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in order to prevent questioning 
by the Jones lawyers, testimony which had already been deemed 
relevant by the judge in that case. The President's lawyer, as 
you have heard, objected to the innuendo of certain questions 
asked of the President, and at that point during the deposition 
pointed out that Ms. Lewinsky had signed an affidavit denying 
the relationship with the President. He then made the famous 
statement about there being no relationship in any way, shape 
or form or kind.
    Following this statement, Judge Wright warned Mr. Bennett 
about making an assertion of fact in front of the witness--that 
is, in front of the President--in which he replied:

    I am not coaching the witness. In preparation of the 
witness for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of 
[the] affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he 
doesn't know.

    The President's lawyer did not know what an understatement 
that was.
    Later, on September 30, 1998, long after the deposition and 
after the full evidence of Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the 
President became public, Mr. Bennett wrote to Judge Wright to 
inform her that she should not rely upon the statements he made 
during the President's deposition because parts of the 
affidavit were ``misleading and not true.'' ``Misleading and 
not true.'' Sounds like perjury. Sounds like obstruction.
    Which brings us full circle, full circle from a false 
affidavit confirming earlier concocted cover stories, through a 
web of obstruction, to a letter from a distinguished lawyer 
forced to do what no lawyer wants to do, but every honorable 
lawyer must do when confronted with clear evidence their client 
has misled a court, and that is to correct a record of falsity 
even to the detriment of their client.
    What we have before us, Senators and Mr. Chief Justice, is 
really not complex. Critically important, yes, but not 
essentially complex. Virtually every Federal or State 
prosecutor--and there are many such distinguished persons on 
this jury--has prosecuted such cases of obstruction before in 
their careers--perhaps repeatedly--involving patterns of 
obstruction, compounded by subsequent coverup perjury. The 
President's lawyers may very well try to weave a spell of 
complexity over the facts of this case. They may nitpick over 
the time of a call or parse a specific word or phrase of 
testimony, much as the President has done. We urge you, the 
distinguished jurors in this case, not to be fooled.
    Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I object to the use and the 
continued use of the word ``jurors'' when referring to the 
Senate sitting as triers in a trial of the impeachment of the 
President of the United States.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the following:
    First, article I, section 3, of the Constitution says the 
Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments--not 
the courts, but the Senate.
    Article III of the Constitution says the trial of all 
crimes, except in the cases of impeachment, shall be by jury--a 
tremendous exculpatory clause when it comes to impeachments.
    Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the 
writings in ``The Federalist Papers,'' especially No. 65 by 
Alexander Hamilton, in which he is outlining the reasons why 
the framers of the Constitution gave the Senate the sole power 
to try impeachments. I won't read it all, but I will read this 
pertinent sentence:

    There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are 
to pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to 
receive or suffer it.

    Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the 26 
rules of the Senate, adopted by the Senate, governing 
impeachments. Nowhere in any of those 26 rules is the word 
``juror'' or ``jury'' ever used.
    Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the 
tremendous differences between regular jurors and Senators 
sitting as triers of an impeachment. Regular jurors, of course, 
are chosen, to the maximum extent possible, with no knowledge 
of the case. Not so when we try impeachments. Regular jurors 
are not supposed to know each other. Not so here. Regular 
jurors cannot overrule the judge. Not so here. Regular jurors 
do not decide what evidence should be heard, the standards of 
evidence, nor do they decide what witnesses shall be called. 
Not so here. Regular jurors do not decide when a trial is to be 
ended. Not so here.
    Now, Mr. Chief Justice, it may seem a small point, but I 
think a very important point. I think the framers of the 
Constitution meant us, the Senate, to be something other than a 
jury and not jurors. What we do here today does not just decide 
the fate of one man. Since the Senate sits on impeachment so 
rarely, and even more rarely on the impeachment of a President 
of the United States, what we do here sets precedence. Future 
generations will look back on this trial not just to find out 
what happened, but to try to decide what principles governed 
our actions. To leave the impression for future generations 
that we somehow are jurors and acting as a jury----
    Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, I call for the regular order 
and I ask, as a parliamentary point, whether it is appropriate 
to argue what I understand is a statement as to the proper 
reference relative to Members of the Senate. This is not a 
motion. And if it is a motion, it is nondebatable, as I 
understand it.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I think you may state your 
objection, certainly, but not argue. The Chair is of the view 
that you may state the objection and some reason for it, but 
not argue it on ad infinitum.
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I was stating the reason 
because of the precedents that we set, and I do not believe it 
would be a valid precedent to leave future generations that we 
would be looked upon merely as jurors, but something other than 
being a juror. That is why I raise the objection.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair is of the view that the 
objection of the Senator from Iowa is well taken, that the 
Senate is not simply a jury; it is a court in this case. 
Therefore, counsel should refrain from referring to the 
Senators as jurors.
    Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Chair.
    Mr. Manager BARR. I thank the Court for his ruling. We urge 
the distinguished Senators who are sitting as triers of fact in 
this case not to be fooled. We urge you to use your common 
sense, your reasoning, your varied and successful career 
experiences, just as any trier of fact and law anywhere in 
America might do. Just as other triers of fact and law do, so, 
too, have each of you sworn to decide these momentous matters 
impartially. Your oath to look to the law and to our 
Constitution demands this of you. As this great body has done 
on so many occasions in the course of our Nation's history, I 
and all managers are confident you will neither shrink from nor 
cast aside that duty.
    Rather, I urge and fully anticipate that you will look to 
the volume of facts and to the clear and fully applicable 
statutes and conclude that William Jefferson Clinton, in fact 
and under the law, violated his oath and violated the laws of 
this land and convict him on both articles of impeachment. Even 
though such a high burden--that is, proof of criminal 
violations--is not strictly required of you under the law of 
impeachment, in fact, such evidence is here. That higher burden 
is met.
    Perjury is here; obstruction is here in the facts and the 
law which forms the basis for the articles of impeachment in 
the House which we believe properly would form the basis for 
conviction in the Senate. Perjury and obstruction, we 
respectfully ask you to strike down these insidious cancers 
that eat at the heart of our system of Government and laws. 
Strike them down with the Constitution so they might not fester 
as a gaping wound poisoning future generations of children, 
poisoning our court system, and perhaps even future generations 
of political leaders.
    Just as Members of both Houses of Congress have 
unfortunately over the years been convicted and removed from 
office for perjury and obstruction, and just as Federal judges 
have been removed from life tenure for perjury and obstruction, 
so must a President; so sadly should this President.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and thank you, Members of the 
U.S. Senate sitting here as jurors of fact and law in the trial 
of President William Jefferson Clinton.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
                                ------                                


                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I remind all who are 
participants in these proceedings that we will begin at 10 a.m. 
on Saturday, January 16, and we are expected to conclude 
sometime between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. I had earlier indicated 
concluding as late as 5 p.m. I understand that we will conclude 
between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. Therefore, pursuant to the 
previous consent agreement, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.
    There being no objection at 5:10 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday, January 
16, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                ------                                


                       Saturday, January 16, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 10:01 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Gracious God, You have given us magnificent promises to 
claim for today. You have told us that if we wait on You, we 
will renew our strength. You have assured us that You will use 
our minds to think clearly in response to Your inspiration. 
Courage is offered, patience provided, and wisdom engendered.
    In this quiet moment, grant the Senators Your power to 
persevere, Your peace for equipoise, Your judgment for the 
evaluation of the facts presented, and Your will to guide their 
decisions. As You have blessed us with this day, we praise You 
that You will show the way. Through our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that 
the House managers intend to extend their presentation until 
approximately 3 p.m., with a lunch break at approximately 12:40 
or 12:45.
    I remind all Senators to remain standing at their desks 
each time the Chief Justice enters and departs the Chamber. We 
want to maintain the very best decorum.
    One other point. We had been scheduled to go from 10:05 
straight through until 12:40, but we will probably take a very 
short 10-minute break after the presentation by Manager Graham. 
It will be very important that Members tend to business and 
return promptly to the Chamber so that we can complete activity 
as early as possible this afternoon.
    I yield the floor, Mr. Chief Justice.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
managers for the House of Representatives have 15 hours 37 
minutes remaining to make the presentation of their case. The 
Senate will now hear you. The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. 
Manager Buyer.
    Mr. Manager BUYER. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I thank 
the Senators, and the counsel for the President.
    I am Steve Buyer, the House manager from the Fifth District 
of Indiana. I thank all of you for your attention the past 
several days. It has not been easy for the House managers to 
argue from a dry record. I ask for your patience. The House 
managers are prepared to call witnesses and offer to develop 
the evidence as the trial proceeds.
    This morning, the managers on the part of the House are 
going to present why the offenses you have been hearing over 
the course of the last several days require the President's 
removal from office. I will discuss why the offenses attack the 
judicial system which is a core function of the Government, and 
how perjury and obstruction of justice are not private acts. 
These are public crimes and therefore quintessential 
impeachable offenses, for the President's premeditated assault 
on the administration of justice must be interpreted as a 
threat to our system of government.
    I will be followed by Mr. Manager Graham of South Carolina 
who will discuss the precedents in impeachment cases, and then 
he will be followed by Mr. Manager Canady. He will discuss how 
the felonies constitute high crimes and misdemeanors as 
envisioned by the Founding Fathers and why they warrant his 
removal from office.
    While this is day 3 of our presentation, it is important 
for the Senate to be fully informed as to the facts, the law 
and the consequences. Please indulge me for a quick reiteration 
of the facts.
    On May 27, 1997, nine Justices of the Supreme Court of the 
United States unanimously ruled that Ms. Jones could pursue her 
Federal civil rights actions against William Jefferson Clinton. 
On December 11, 1997, U.S. District Court Judge Susan Webber 
Wright ordered President Clinton to provide Ms. Jones with 
answers to certain routine questions relevant to the lawsuit.
    Acting under the authority of these court orders, Ms. Jones 
exercised her rights, rights every litigant has under our 
system of justice. She sought answers from President Clinton to 
help prove her case against him, just as President Clinton 
sought and received answers from her. President Clinton used 
numerous means, then, to prevent her from getting truthful 
answers.
    On December 17, 1997, President Clinton encouraged a 
witness to file a false affidavit in the case and to testify 
falsely if she were called to testify in this case. Why? 
Because her truthful testimony would have helped Ms. Jones and 
hurt his case.
    On December 23, 1997, he provided under oath false written 
answers to Ms. Jones' questions. On December 18, 1997, 
President Clinton began an effort to get the witnesses to 
conceal evidence that would have helped Ms. Jones. Throughout 
this period, he intensified efforts to provide the witness with 
help in getting a job to ensure that she carried out his 
designs.
    On January 17, 1998, President Clinton provided under oath 
numerous false answers to Ms. Jones' questions during that 
deposition in the civil case. In the days immediately following 
the deposition, President Clinton provided a false and 
misleading account to another witness, his secretary, Betty 
Currie, in hopes that she would substantiate the false 
testimony he gave in the deposition.
    All of these unlawful actions denied Ms. Jones her rights 
as a litigant, subverted the fundamental truth-seeking function 
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas, and violated President Clinton's constitutional oath 
to ``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.'' And, further, it violated his constitutional 
duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    Beginning shortly after his deposition, President Clinton 
became aware that the Federal grand jury empaneled by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia was investigating 
his unlawful actions before and during his civil deposition. 
President Clinton made numerous false statements to potential 
grand jury witnesses in hopes that they would repeat these 
statements to the grand jury.
    On August 17, 1998, President Clinton appeared before the 
grand jury by video under oath and he provided numerous false 
answers to questions asked. These actions impeded the grand 
jury's investigation; it subverted the fundamental truth-
seeking function of the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, and they also violated President Clinton's 
constitutional oath to ``preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution of the United States'' and his constitutional duty 
as the Chief Executive Officer to ``take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.''
    You will hear next week, perhaps, from the President's 
lawyers that the offenses charged by the House are not 
impeachable; in other words, that even if the allegations as 
set forth in the articles of impeachment are true, so what? 
See, the House managers have begun to refer to this as the ``so 
what'' defense. I am not offended by the ``so what'' defense, 
because if that is all you have, then try it. You see, there 
are only a few basic ways that you can actually defend a case. 
You can defend a case on the facts, you can defend a case on 
the law, you can defend a case on the facts and the law.
    We hear in this case--we hear very often--that the facts 
are indefensible. And you also hear that if you are not going 
to call witnesses on the facts, then I guess you better argue 
on the law. So, then, what is the argument on the law? What you 
do, then, in the defending of a case, is you argue procedure, 
you attack the prosecutor, you attempt to confuse those who sit 
in judgment on the laws so you don't follow your precedent. You 
go out and obtain, from your political allies and friends in 
the academic world, signatures on a letter saying that the 
offenses as alleged in the articles of impeachment do not rise 
to the level of an impeachable offense. This ``rise to the 
level'' has somehow become the legal cliche of this case. You 
have all so often heard it and some have even spoken it.
    The House managers chose not to go out into the academic 
world and obtain signatures on our own letter that would have 
said why the offenses are impeachable. We then would have had 
this war of dueling academics. They have a letter of 400 
signatures. We get a letter of 400 signatures. They add 500 to 
it; now they have 900. We go out and get 1,000. We chose not to 
do that. Do you know why? Because the House managers have the 
precedents of the Senate on our side. We have the precedents of 
the Senate. Mr. Manager Graham will discuss those precedents.
    If I am prosecuting a defendant for perjury and obstruction 
of justice in White County Superior Court before Judge Bob 
Mrzlack in Monticello, IN, and I have this perjury and 
obstruction of justice case on a Thursday, and I know that the 
judge has three other cases--he has a case on Monday, he has a 
case on Tuesday, and he has a case on Wednesday--I am going to 
watch what the judge is going to do because I am curious with 
regard to the precedent.
    So, on Monday of that week Judge Mrzlack tries a case of a 
public official for perjury, and I watch what he does. He 
convicts him for perjury. On Tuesday, he tries a public 
official for obstruction of justice, and he convicts him. On 
Wednesday, Judge Mrzlack tries a public official for grand jury 
perjury, and he convicts him. My case now comes up on Thursday 
for a public official for obstruction of justice and grand jury 
perjury and perjury on top of perjury. I would say, based on 
the precedents, it is not looking good for the defendant whom I 
am about to prosecute.
    The White House lawyers are hoping that those of you in 
this Chamber who have voted to remove Federal judges for 
similar offenses in the past have a feigned memory. And if you 
don't have a feigned memory, then we will try to confuse you--
they will attempt to confuse you on the law.
    So, when I hear the ``so what,'' it is the position of the 
House that what the President did does matter; that by his 
actions, the President did commit high crimes and misdemeanors. 
The House is prepared to establish that the President, William 
Jefferson Clinton, willfully and repeatedly violated the rule 
of law and abused the trust placed upon him by the American 
people.
    Now let me address how the offenses charged in the articles 
of impeachment attack the judicial system. The offenses as 
charged in the articles of impeachment against our system of 
government are the core of the concept of high crimes and 
misdemeanors. Perjury and obstruction of justice are, 
therefore, quintessential impeachable offenses. Indeed, it is 
precisely their public nature that makes them offenses. Acts 
that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm 
become crimes when they enter the judicial realm. Lying to 
one's spouse about an extramarital affair is not a crime; it is 
a private matter. But telling that same lie under oath before a 
Federal judge, as a defendant in a civil rights sexual 
harassment lawsuit, is a crime against the state and is 
therefore a public matter.
    Hiding gifts given to conceal the affair is not a crime; it 
is a private matter. But when those gifts are the subject of a 
court-ordered subpoena in a sexual harassment lawsuit, the act 
of hiding the gifts becomes a crime against the state called 
obstruction of justice and is, therefore, a public matter. Our 
law has consistently recognized that perjury subverts the 
judicial process. It strikes at our Nation's most fundamental 
value--the rule of law.
    In ``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' Sir William 
Blackstone differentiated between crimes that ``more directly 
infringe the rights of a public or commonwealth taken in its 
collective capacity, and those which, in a more peculiar 
manner, injure individuals or private subjects.'' This book was 
widely recognized by the Founding Fathers, such as James 
Madison. He described Blackstone's work at the time as ``a book 
which is in every man's hand.'' Blackstone's private category 
contained crimes such as murder, burglary, and arson. In the 
public category, however, he cataloged crimes that could be 
understood as an assault upon the state. Within a subcategory 
denominated ``offenses against public justice,'' Blackstone 
included the crimes of perjury and bribery. In fact, in his 
catalog of public justice offenses, Blackstone placed perjury 
and bribery side by side.
    When you read the impeachment clause in the Constitution, 
article II, section 4, ``The President, Vice President and all 
Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' what did they mean 
when they thought ``other high crimes''? I submit to you that 
perjury and obstruction of justice fits in this category of 
``other high crimes.'' Perjury and bribery are side by side.
    If, when William Jefferson Clinton sat at the table in the 
civil deposition in the Jones v. Clinton case and, as alleged 
in the record, perjured himself, speaking hypothetically, if he 
had then offered Judge Susan Webber Wright a cash bribe, there 
would be no question in this body what you must do. But what I 
am saying unto all of you is that there is no difference here, 
and that is the pain of this case. There is no difference 
between a cash bribe or sitting before a Federal judge and 
perjuring one's self, whether it be in the underlying civil 
deposition or, in fact, in the grand jury perjury. Perjury and 
bribery are side by side. Mr. Manager Canady will develop that 
further.
    The Constitution also recognizes that truth-telling under 
oath is central to the maintenance of our Republic.
    We are all familiar with the Constitution. This is in its 
handwritten glory. The founders took such pride in the oath 
that it is mentioned in the Constitution on five separate 
occasions, not the least of which is the President's own oath 
to defend the Constitution. Article I, section 3, sets forth 
the requirement that the Senate be under oath when trying cases 
of impeachment, and I witnessed as that occurred. Article II, 
section 1, specifically prescribes the oath which must be taken 
before our President enters on the execution of his office.
    The right against self-incrimination under the Constitution 
derives in some measure from the Republic's interest in 
preserving the truth-telling oath. Forced testimony is 
forbidden because it might lead many to violate their most 
solemn obligations and, over time, weaken the essential civic 
norm of the fidelity to that oath--fidelity.
    The framers took the significance of the oath very, very 
seriously. The crime of perjury was among the few offenses that 
the first Congress outlawed by statute as they met, and that 
affirms the framers' view of the seriousness. In 1790, in a 
statute entitled ``An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes 
Against the United States,'' Congress made the crime of perjury 
punishable by imprisonment of up to 3 years, a fine of up to 
$800, disqualification from giving future testimony and 
``stand[ing] in the pillory for one hour.'' Today, we don't 
force individuals convicted of perjury to stand in the pillory 
for up to 1 hour.
    Today, perjury is punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment 
in a Federal penitentiary if you perjure yourself in a Federal 
jurisdiction. Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted 
the extent to which perjury subverts the judicial process and, 
thus, the rule of law. For example, in 1976, in a case of 
United States v. Mandujano, the Supreme Court emphasized:

    Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to 
the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective 
restraints against this type of egregious offense are, 
therefore, imperative. Hence, Congress has made the giving of 
false answers a criminal act punishable by severe penalties. In 
no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open 
where law can deal with it.

    Moreover, it is obvious that any testimony given to a grand 
jury must be truthful, for the grand jury process is, in fact, 
the truth-seeking process of our criminal justice system. As 
the Supreme Court stated in 1911 in the case of Glickstein v. 
the United States:

    It cannot be conceived that there is power to compel the 
giving of testimony where no right exists to require that the 
testimony shall be given under such circumstances and 
safeguards as to compel it to be truthful.

    Indeed, giving false material testimony to a grand jury, 
perjuring one's self, totally destroys the value of one's 
testimony and interferes with the ability of a grand jury to 
accomplish its mission which, again, is to find the truth. 
Perjury before a grand jury is a crime against our system of 
Government and the American people, and in the case before us, 
this is a case of perjury upon perjury.
    Before the grand jury, President Clinton testified that the 
testimony that he gave in the underlying civil case of Jones v. 
Clinton in a civil deposition, that it was truthful. We submit 
that that is a lie. So what we have is perjury on perjury.
    You may hear the President's lawyers remark that the view 
of the founders is quaint, not really applicable to these 
settings today. Let's look at a few very recent examples to see 
if the view of the seriousness of telling the truth under oath, 
as envisioned by the Founding Fathers, has changed any here 
today.
    In the case of the United States v. Landi in the Eastern 
District of Virginia in 1997, the defendant was convicted on 
two counts of perjury: one for lying in a declaration she made 
during a civil forfeiture case, and the other for lying to the 
grand jury in a related criminal investigation. Here is what 
the judge said in this case:

    . . . the defendant committed perjury on two separate 
occasions. There can be no question of it being done by 
mistake, and perjury is perhaps one of the most serious 
offenses that can be committed against the court itself. And 
the court does not believe that it's appropriate to consider 
probation in the case of somebody who's been convicted of 
perjury.

    In a second case, United States v. Vincent Bono in the 
District of New Hampshire in 1998, the defendant was found 
guilty of lying before a grand jury in trying to cover his 
stepson's involvement in a robbery that the grand jury was 
investigating. Here is what the judge had to say about lying 
before a grand jury:

    As a [matter of policy], they--

    Meaning Congress--

they don't want people lying to grand juries. They particularly 
don't want people lying to grand juries about criminal 
offenses. They particularly don't want people lying to grand 
juries about criminal offenses that are being investigated. 
They don't like that. And Congress has said we as a people are 
going to tell you if you do that, you're going to jail and 
you're going to jail for a long time. And if you don't get the 
message, we'll send you to jail again. Maybe others will. But 
we're not going to have people coming to grand juries and 
telling lies because of their children or their mothers or 
fathers or themselves. It's just not acceptable. The system 
can't work that way.

    In another case in United States v. Ronald Blackley in the 
District of Columbia in 1998, the defendant was the former 
chief of staff to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. The defendant was found guilty at trial on three 
counts of making false statements to the grand jury in 
connection with his official duties. Here is what the judge had 
to say in this case:

    In my view, providing a false statement under oath is a 
serious offense. The fact that the proceeding is civil or 
administrative does not make the crime less serious. We cannot 
fairly administer any kind of system of justice in this country 
if we do not penalize those who lie under oath.
    The defendant stands before me as a high-ranking Government 
official convicted of making false statements under oath. This 
is such a serious crime that it demands an even longer term of 
imprisonment in this court's view. This court has a duty to 
send a message to other high-level Government officials that 
there is a severe penalty to be paid for providing false 
information under oath. There is a strong reason to deter such 
conduct and to dispel all of the nonsense that's being publicly 
discussed and debated about the seriousness of lying under oath 
by Government officials. A democracy like ours depends on 
people having trust in our Government and its officials.

    There are many other cases, and you can go to your Lexis 
and Westlaw and research them. These three cases make it very 
clear that lying under oath is as serious today in the 106th 
Congress as it was in 1790 in the First Congress when it 
enacted the perjury statute. The First Congress recognized the 
seriousness of perjury and its attack on the judicial system.
    Now I would like to discuss article II, which is the 
obstruction of justice, and how it is an attack on our judicial 
system. In either a criminal or a civil case, obstruction 
undermines the judicial system's ability to vindicate legal 
rights. If it is allowed to go unchecked, then the system will 
become a farce and ultimately a test of which side is better at 
using underhanded methods. Accordingly, Federal courts have 
called the Federal obstruction of justice statute ``one of the 
most important laws ever adopted'' in that it prevents the 
``miscarriage of justice.''
    This is ``Black's Law Dictionary.'' ``Black's Law 
Dictionary'' defines ``obstruction of justice'' as ``[i]mpeding 
or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who 
have duties or powers of administering justice therein.'' It is 
very clear. Not only is obstruction of justice, on its own, a 
crime in the Federal Code, but, in addition, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines--the Federal Sentencing Guidelines--
increase the sentence of a convicted defendant who has 
``willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or 
impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, 
prosecution, or sentencing'' of his offense. The commentary on 
the Guidelines specifically lists as examples of obstruction 
actions the House alleges that President Clinton has committed, 
including ``committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn 
perjury'' and ``destroying or concealing or directing or 
procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is 
material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding. . 
. .''
    Yesterday, you learned from Mr. Manager McCollum of 
Florida, when he discussed that that perjury and obstruction of 
justice is punished more severely in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines than bribery. As I stated earlier, Blackstone put 
bribery and perjury side by side.
    At a hearing on the background and history of impeachment 
as part of the House impeachment inquiry, we were privileged to 
have the testimony of Judge Griffin Bell, an individual who has 
highly distinguished himself in public service. Judge Bell was 
appointed to the Federal bench by President John Kennedy, and 
he served as the U.S. Attorney General under President Carter. 
Judge Bell said that, ``I have thought about this a great deal. 
This is a serious matter. Trifling with the Federal courts is 
serious. And I guess I am biased because I used to be a Federal 
judge. But I cannot imagine that it wouldn't be a serious crime 
to lie in a Federal grand jury or to lie before a Federal 
judge, and that is where I come down.''
    Judge Bell went on to say, ``And all the civil rights cases 
that I was in in the South depended on the integrity of the 
Federal court and the Federal court orders and people telling 
the truth and fairness. Truth and fairness are the two 
essential elements in a justice system, and all of these 
statutes I mentioned, perjury, tampering with a witness, 
obstruction of justice, all deal in the interests of truth. If 
we don't have truth in the judicial process and in the court 
system in our country, we don't have anything. We don't have a 
system.''
    As you can see, according to Judge Bell, ``truth and 
fairness'' are the two cornerstones of our judicial system. 
President Clinton violated both of these bedrock principles.
    Finally, Judge Bell spoke to the issue, if a President ever 
was convicted of a felony. Judge Bell stated:

    If the President were indicted and convicted of a felony, 
such as perjury or obstruction of justice or witness tampering, 
before impeachment proceedings began, would anyone argue that 
he should continue to be President? I don't think so. If the 
President were subsequently indicted and convicted of a felony, 
which [Judge Bell believes] the Constitution clearly allows, 
[he went on to say] would anyone argue that he should continue 
to be President? I don't think so.

    He stated this:

    A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if he 
himself is breaking them.

    Judge Bell hit it right on the head. Judge Bell said:

    A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if he 
himself is breaking them. The statutes against perjury, 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering rest on 
vouchsafing the element of truth in judicial proceedings--civil 
and criminal--and particularly in the grand jury. Allegations 
of this kind are grave indeed.

    To borrow the words of constitutional scholar Charles J. 
Cooper:

    The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the 
crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses 
against our system of government, visiting injury immediately 
on society itself, whether or not committed in connection with 
the exercise of official government powers.

    I believe all of you should have these charts at your 
table.

    In a society governed by the rule of law, perjury and 
obstruction of justice simply cannot be tolerated because these 
crimes subvert the very judicial processes on which the rule of 
law so vitally depends.

    It is no exaggeration to say that our Constitution and the 
American people entrust to the President singular 
responsibility for the enforcing of the rule of law. Perjury 
and obstruction of justice strike at the heart of the rule of 
law. A President who has committed these crimes has plainly and 
directly violated the most important executive duty. The core 
of the President's constitutional responsibilities is his duty 
to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' And 
because perjury and obstruction of justice strike at the rule 
of law itself, it is difficult to imagine crimes that more 
clearly or directly violate this core Presidential 
constitutional duty.
    When President Clinton had the opportunity to personally 
uphold the rule of law, to uphold the truth-seeking function of 
the courts, to uphold the fairness in a judicial proceeding, he 
failed. Far from taking care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, if a President is guilty of perjury and obstruction 
of justice, he has himself faithlessly subverted the very law 
that the rest of us are called upon to obey.
    You may hear arguments that perjury and obstruction don't 
really have much consequence in this case because it was a 
private matter and, therefore, not really a serious offense. I 
would like to arm you with the facts. The courts do not 
trivialize perjury and obstruction of justice.
    According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in 1997, 182 
Americans were sentenced in Federal court for committing 
perjury. Also in 1997, 144 Americans were sentenced in Federal 
court for obstruction and witness tampering.
    In State jurisdictions all across the country take the 
matter very seriously. I have chosen one State, the State of 
California, which brought 4,318 perjury prosecutions in 1997. 
There are now at least 115 persons serving sentences for 
perjury in Federal prisons. Where is the fairness to these 
Americans if they stay in jail and the President stays in the 
Oval Office?
    If the allegations in the independent counsel's referral 
were made against a sitting Federal judge, would not the Senate 
convict? If William Jefferson Clinton were a sitting judge 
instead of the President, would not the Senate convict? While 
my colleague, Mr. Manager Graham, will look into this further, 
let's look briefly at precedent for the moment. When we bring 
up the issues regarding the impeachment of former Federal 
judges Mr. Claiborne and Mr. Nixon, one standard was used: high 
crimes and misdemeanors. The Senate said the one standard that 
applies to the President and Vice President will also apply to 
these Federal judges and other civil officers.
    In the defense of Judges Claiborne and Nixon, the defense 
lawyers at the time in the trial in the Senate argued that 
Federal judges should be treated differently from the 
President, that they could not be impeached for private 
misbehavior because it was extrajudicial. The Senate rejected 
that proposition as incompatible with common sense and the 
orderly conduct of government. You rejected that argument, the 
very same argument that we are about to hear, perhaps, from the 
White House defense team. And I believe this Senate will uphold 
its precedent, the precedent that Federal judges and the 
President should be treated by the same standard--impeachment 
for high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Also, do not be tempted to believe the argument that lying 
under oath about sex doesn't matter, that it is private. I 
covered that earlier, but I want to bring it to your attention 
as some of the House managers did yesterday regarding American 
law. It makes rape a crime, domestic violence a crime, sexual 
harassment a civil rights violation, libel, a compensable 
offense. Without the protections of perjury and obstruction, 
none of the rights of the victims of such cases could be 
vindicated. That is why the courts take these matters so 
seriously.
    If the President's lawyers try to tell you that this case 
is simply about an illicit affair, I believe that it demeans 
our civil rights laws. If, indeed, the President is successful 
in trying to make everyone believe that this case is only about 
an illicit affair, what will the message be from those in this 
hallowed body who have in the past been passionate advocates of 
our civil rights laws, whether it be by race, gender, religion, 
or disability? If the evidence-gathering process is unimportant 
in Federal civil rights sexual harassment lawsuits--remember, 
that was the underlying basis of this case--what message does 
that send to women in America?
    There are some important questions we need to ask. Are 
sexual harassment lawsuits, which were designed to vindicate 
legitimate and serious civil rights grievances of women across 
America, now somewhat less important than other civil rights? 
Which of our civil rights laws will fall next? Will we soon 
decide that the evidence-gathering process is unimportant with 
respect to vindicating the rights of the disabled under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act? Will the evidence-gathering 
process become unimportant with respect to vindicating the 
voting rights of those discriminated against based on race or 
national origin? Who will tell the hundreds of Federal judges 
across the Nation that the evidence-gathering process in these 
cases is now unimportant?
    Consider postal worker Diane Parker who was convicted of 
perjury and sentenced to 13 months in prison for making a false 
material declaration during the discovery deposition in a 
sexual harassment lawsuit. Judge Lacey Collier said: ``One of 
the most troubling things in our society today is people who 
raise their hand, take the oath to tell the truth, and then 
fail to do that. . . . This, I hope, is sufficient punishment 
for you,'' the judge stated. The judge went on to say, ``But 
more importantly, I hope that it is a deterrence to others. So 
your story can be taken far and wide to demonstrate to others 
the seriousness of the responsibility of telling the truth in 
court proceedings.''
    The Senate must now determine whether it is acceptable or 
whether it is appropriate to set a precedent to have an 
individual serve as President of the United States when that 
individual has committed, is alleged to have committed, serious 
offenses against our system of government while holding that 
office.
    While we have been discussing how perjury and obstruction 
of justice are attacks on our judicial system, we must 
recognize how the judicial system is a core function of the 
government. When Mr. Manager Henry Hyde speaks of the rule of 
law protecting us from the knock on the door at 3 a.m., what, 
exactly, was he referring to? In totalitarian societies, rulers 
may drag the ruled off to prison at any time for any reason. 
Our system differs because we require our leaders to go through 
a judicial procedure before they put someone in prison or 
otherwise violate their individual rights. The President's 
offenses assault the administration of this judicial procedure. 
As such, they constitute an assault on the core function of the 
government and repudiate our most basic social contract. A core 
function of the government derives its role from the social 
contract that our civilized society has under which the 
fundamental exchange of rights takes place between those of us 
as individuals and unto the government.
    We give up our individual rights to exercise brute force to 
settle our personal disputes. That is a situation where chaos 
reigns and the strongest most often prevails. Instead, we 
submit to the power delegated to the State under which the 
individual then submits to the governmental processes as part 
of the social contract. Indeed, when conflict arises in our 
society, we as individuals are compelled via the social 
contract to take disputes to our third branch of government--
the courts. The judicial branch then peacefully decides which 
party is entitled to judgment in their favor after a full 
presentation of the truthful evidence.
    Implicit in the social contract that we enter as a 
civilized society is the principle that the weak are equally 
entitled as the strong to equal justice under the law. Despite 
the tumbling tides of politics, ours is a government of laws, 
not of men. It was the inspired vision of our Founding Fathers 
that the judicial, legislative, and executive branch of 
Government would work together to preserve the rule of law. The 
U.S. Constitution requires the judicial branch to apply the law 
equally and fairly to both the weak and the strong.
    Once we as a society--and particularly our leaders--no 
longer submit to the social contract and no longer pay 
deference to the third branch of Government, which is equally 
as important as the legislative and executive branches of 
Government, we then begin to erode the rule of law and begin to 
erode the social contract of the great American experiment.
    That, I believe, is why Judge Bell stated, ``A President 
cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is breaking 
them.''
    The administration of justice is a core function of the 
Government precisely because of the importance we place on the 
fair resolution of disputes and on whom and for how long a 
person will be denied liberty for violating our criminal laws. 
Any assault on the administration of justice must be 
interpreted as a threat to our system of Government. Our 
President, who is our chief executive and chief law enforcement 
officer, and who alone is delegated the task under our 
Constitution to ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,'' cannot and must not be permitted to engage in such 
an assault on the administration of justice.
    The articles of impeachment adopted by the House of 
Representatives establish an abuse of public trust and a 
betrayal of the social contract in that the President is 
alleged to have repeatedly placed his personal interests above 
the public interest and violated his constitutional duties. For 
if he is allowed to escape conviction by the Senate, we would 
allow the President to set the example for lawlessness. We 
would allow our President to serve as an example of the erosion 
of the concept of the social contract embraced and embodied in 
our Constitution. I don't believe the Senate will allow that to 
happen.
    As you undertake your examination of the facts, the law, 
and your precedents, the Senate must weigh carefully its 
judgment, for the consequences are deeply profound, not for the 
moment but for the ages. Should the Senate choose to acquit, it 
must be prepared to accept a lower standard, a bad precedent, 
and a double standard. However, should the Senate choose to 
convict, it would be reinforcing high standards for high 
office, maintaining existing precedents, and upholding the 
principle of equal justice under the law.
    I think it is important to pause here and reflect upon the 
constitutional duties of the President of the United States. I 
agree with the defense argument that this has not been alleged 
as a dereliction of the President's exercise of executive 
powers. So let me talk about his executive duties.
    The President is reposed with a special trust by the 
American people. The President is a physical embodiment of 
America and the hope and freedom for which she stands. When the 
President goes abroad, he is honored as the head of a sovereign 
nation; our Nation is acknowledged, not just the individual who 
occupies the Office of the Presidency. When he walks into a 
room and receives a standing ovation, the ovation is not that 
of the individual, it is for the Nation he represents.
    The President has a constitutional role as Commander in 
Chief. The President plays a unique and indispensable role in 
the chain of command. In Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton 
stated:

    Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction 
of war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which 
distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.

    It is universally agreed that the President, in his role as 
Commander in Chief, is not an actual member of the military. 
However, as the ``single hand'' that guides the actions of the 
armed services, it is incumbent that the President exhibit 
sound, responsible leadership and set a proper example when 
acting as Commander in Chief.
    That leadership is also at the core of the issue before us. 
In order to be an effective leader, an effective military 
leader, the President must exhibit the traits that inspire 
those who must risk their lives at his command. These traits 
include honor, integrity, and accountability.
    Admiral Thomas Moorer, a former Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, submitted testimony to the House impeachment 
inquiry. Admiral Moorer stated it this way:

    Military leaders also serve as role models for honorable 
and virtuous conduct.

    Veracity and truthfulness are important components of a 
leader's character. In order to have the trust of their 
subordinates, military leaders must have honor and be truthful 
in all things. That trust, that bond between the leaders and 
the led, is an essential element of any successful military 
organization.
    The President's own self-inflicted wounds have called his 
credibility into question. While a President's decisions are 
always critiqued, a President receives the benefit of the doubt 
in the decisionmaking process that he always places the 
interests of the Nation above his own. But by William Jefferson 
Clinton's present diminished veracity, he has now forfeited 
that benefit and has invited doubt into the decisionmaking 
process.
    The lack of trust in the President's motives, his veracity 
and his judgment is inherently corrosive and can only have a 
detrimental effect on our military credibility overseas. This 
corrosion is difficult to measure, for it cannot be quantified 
easily in a readiness report or training exercise. But in 
squadbays and wardrooms around the world, and at bases in the 
United States, there can be heard whispers and conversations of 
those who know that had they merely been accused of the same 
offense, their careers would have ended long ago.
    This is the intangible effect that the President's actions 
have had on our military. We cannot ignore the fact that the 
Commander in Chief's conduct sets a poor example for the men 
and women in the military. Worse, we cannot ignore the idea 
that to acquit the President would create a double standard.
    The Constitution directs this body to provide advice and 
consent to the President's nominations for military officers. 
It is your singular responsibility to set high standards of 
conduct for these officers, and you have done that. The Senate 
has in the past--and you will likely again do so in the 
future--rejected those whose moral and legal misconduct makes 
them unsuitable to be officers in the military.
    Let me indulge in a hypothetical. An officer is nominated 
by the President for promotion to the rank of major. After the 
list is submitted, but before the Senate's confirmation, an 
investigation of the individual's background results in a 
report that mirrors the allegations in the Office of 
Independent Counsel's referral. After a very careful review of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, this captain, after 
having committed similar offenses as are in the Office of 
Independent Counsel's referral, could be charged with article 
105, false swearing, and face up to 3 years; he could be 
charged in article 107, false official statement, facing up to 
5 years; he could be charged with article 131, perjury--
probably several times--and face up to 5 years; he could be 
charged with article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer; he 
could be charged with article 134, prevent seizure of property, 
and face up to 1 year imprisonment; he could be charged with 
article 134, soliciting another to commit an offense, with a 
penalty of up to 5 years; he could be charged with article 134, 
subornation of perjury, and face confinement up to 5 years; he 
could be charged with article 134 again, obstructing justice, 
and face 5 years. I could probably come up with about four 
others, but I won't get into the salacious details.
    Needless to say, the Senate would insist on this 
hypothetical officer's removal from the promotion list. You 
would do that. The Service would certainly relieve him of his 
duties.
    In every warship, every squadbay, and every headquarters 
building throughout the U.S. military, those of you who have 
traveled to military bases have seen the picture of the 
Commander in Chief that hangs in the apex of the pyramid that 
is the military chain of command.
    You should also know that all over the world military 
personnel look at the current picture and know that, if accused 
of the same offenses as their Commander in Chief, they would no 
longer be deserving of the privilege of serving in the 
military.
    Some would say that what I just talked about doesn't 
matter--that in the military they live under different 
standards--they live under these high standards. They say words 
like ``duty,'' ``honor,'' ``country.'' They are instilled with 
core values and core virtues--that really doesn't matter in 
this case--that the President really doesn't have to follow 
those types of high standards--that it elevates some form of 
high standards, if he stands accused of high crimes--it really 
is not high crimes; it was about a private matter--that they 
don't rise to the level needed to remove the President from 
office.
    I remind you of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In his farewell 
address at West Point, Gen. Douglas MacArthur stated, when he 
referenced the words I spoke of, ``duty'' and ``honor'' and 
``country,'' and the high principles:

    The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan, 
but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every 
cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and I am sorry to 
say, some others of an entirely different character, will try 
to downgrade them to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

    The ideal object must be held high even though we recognize 
that as humans we are not perfect. No matter how great we 
aspire, we are human and we will occasionally fail. But there 
must be the pursuit of such high ideals. We cannot degrade our 
standards as a people. By a conviction in the Senate of the 
President of the United States you will be upholding a high and 
lofty standard, not only for America, but in particular for 
those military leaders, rather than setting low standards for 
the President and a high lofty standard for military leaders.
    Let me turn to the President's responsibility to see that 
``the laws are faithfully executed.'' According to scholar 
Philip B. Kurland, it was probably George Washington rather 
than the Constitution who is responsible for our hierarchy of 
Cabinet officers that has been taken for granted over the 
years. And we have heard of the President as the chief law 
enforcement officer of the land, and we can find it in the 
Constitution. So we have to give credit to George Washington 
and how he put together the Cabinet. And we have accepted it 
over time. It has been accepted by custom, practice, and 
legislation that the executive branch is an entity for which 
the President is responsible both to Congress and to the 
public.
    Mr. Kurland stated:

    The whole of the executive branch acts subordinately to the 
command of the President in the administration of Federal laws, 
so long as they act within the terms of those laws. Their 
offices confer no right to violate the laws, whether they take 
the form of constitution, statute, or treaty.

    The President's Departments of Treasury and Justice seek to 
bring to account those who disturb our ``domestic 
tranquility,'' those who seek to disturb our ``domestic 
tranquility,'' whether they be the drugpushers or unabombers, 
gangsters, mobsters, church arsonists, violators of individual 
rights. Dedicated men and women of the FBI, DEA, Customs, 
Secret Service, BATF, INS, and the U.S. Marshals Office pursue 
them methodically, thoughtfully, firmly, doggedly, applying the 
law while risking their lives to uphold the rule of law for our 
peace and security. They seek to ensure equal justice under the 
law for everyone.
    In the book, ``The Imperial Presidency,'' Professor Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. states:

    The continuation of a lawbreaker as chief magistrate would 
be a strange way to exemplify law and order at home or to 
demonstrate American probity before the world.

    By a conviction, the Senate will be upholding the high 
calling of law enforcement in protecting the rule of law and 
equal justice under the law.
    ``Equal justice under law''--that principle so embodies the 
American constitutional order that we have carved it in stone 
on the front of the Supreme Court building right across the 
street. The carving across the street shines like a beacon from 
the highest sanctum on those of us in the Capitol, the home of 
the legislative branch, and it shines right down Pennsylvania 
Avenue to the White House, the home of the executive branch. It 
illuminates our national life and reminds those other branches 
that despite the tumbling tides of politics, ours is a 
government of laws and not of men. It was the inspired vision 
of our founders and framers, again, that the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches would work together to 
preserve the rule of law.
    But ``equal justice under law'' amounts for much more than 
a stone carving. Although we can't see it or hear it, this 
living, breathing force has very real consequences in the lives 
of every citizen every day in America. It allows Americans to 
claim the assistance of the government when someone has wronged 
us--even if the person is stronger or wealthier or more popular 
than we are. In America, unlike other countries, when an 
average citizen sues the Chief Executive of our Nation, they 
stand equal before the bar of justice. The Constitution 
requires the judicial branch of our Government to apply the law 
equally to both. That is the living consequence of ``equal 
justice under law'' that shines brightly across our country.
    The President of the United States must work with the 
judicial and the legislative branches to sustain that force. He 
is the temporary trustee of that office. But, unfortunately and 
sadly, William Jefferson Clinton worked to defeat it and to 
bring darkness upon that grand illumination. When he stood 
before the bar of justice, he acted without authority to award 
himself. Even if he believed in his heart that the case against 
him was politically motivated, he simply assumed unto himself 
that he had by virtue of his power special privileges that he 
could be clever, create his own definitions of words in his own 
mind--create what C.S. Lewis called ``verbicide.'' He murdered 
the plain spoken English language so he could come up with 
these definitions in his own mind, state them, and then say, 
``Well, I never committed perjury because this is what I meant 
by this word,'' even though it fails the reasonableness test, 
and it is absurd that no one would believe his own definitions. 
He assumed these special privileges, and then lied and 
obstructed justice to gain advantage in a Federal civil rights 
action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas. And he did so then again when a Federal grand jury 
began to investigate that lawlessness. And he did it before the 
grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia. His resistance brings us to this most unfortunate 
juncture for which you sit in judgment.
    So ``equal justice under law'' lies at the heart of this 
matter. It rests on three essential pillars: an impartial 
judiciary, an ethical bar, and a sacred oath. If litigants 
profane the sanctity of the oath, ``equal justice under law'' 
loses its protective force.
    The House, as does the Senate, has the responsibility to 
uphold the Constitution. We have all taken our oaths to defend 
the Constitution. The Founding Fathers created a system of 
checks and balances, a system of accountability between the 
functions of Government. I believe, as I am sure you do, that 
the Founding Fathers knew the nature of the human heart. 
Sometimes, as much as we try, we fail, in that the human heart 
does in fact struggle at times between good and evil. We 
recognize that no person has perfect virtue and that we each 
have our human failings. And the founders could foresee a time 
when corruption could invade the institutions of Government, 
and they provided the means to address it. The impeachment 
proceeding is one such means. We are seeking to defend the rule 
of law.
    America, again, is a government of laws, not of men. What 
protects us from that knock on the door in the middle of the 
night is the law. What ensures the rights of the weak and the 
powerless against the powerful is the law. What provides the 
rights to the poor against the rich is the law. What upholds 
the rightness of the minority view against the popular but 
wrong is the law. As former President Andrew Jackson wrote, 
``The great can protect themselves, but the poor and the humble 
require the arm and shield of the law.''
    When our Nation began its journey in history over 200 years 
ago, the United States was nearly unique in depending on the 
rule of law as opposed to, at that time, the rule of kings and 
czars and chieftains and monarchs. Now that our unique, grand 
American experiment has proved unto the rest of the world a 
success, others now seek to follow us. They seek to follow. And 
we have seen in the crumbling of the Soviet Union that the 
former Soviet nations, now infant republics, look and turn to 
us. They turn to us, a government ruled by law.
    For the sake of ourselves and the sake of generations yet 
unborn, we, and in particular you who sit in judgment in the 
Senate, must preserve the rule of law.
    I will leave you with the words of the first President of 
the Senate and the second President of our Nation, John Adams. 
He said:

    Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, 
our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot 
alter the state of facts and evidence.

    I believe John Adams was right. Facts and evidence. Facts 
are stubborn things. You can color the facts. You can shade the 
facts. You can misrepresent the facts. You can hide the facts. 
But the truthful facts are stubborn; they won't go away. Like 
the telltale heart, they keep pounding, and they keep coming, 
and they won't go away. What is also stubborn are the 
precedents of the Senate.
    I will now yield the floor for Manager Graham of South 
Carolina to discuss the precedents of the Senate.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. I sense the need for a 10-minute break, but, I 
say to my colleagues, please tend to your business and return 
promptly so that we can get started with the proper decorum.
    There being no objection, at 11:15 a.m., the Senate 
recessed until 11:29 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to 
begin with Manager Graham. I have been asked about any changes 
in the schedule. It depends on how things move forward. I will 
ask for consent to change it, depending on how things developed 
from this point, Mr. Chief Justice.
    I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I think I 
broke the code there. When I hear stomachs growling, I know it 
will be time to wrap this up.
    This is an unbelievable occasion for all of us. I am 
Lindsey Graham from South Carolina. We talk about civil rights. 
I am a child of the South and I will give you my views on civil 
rights and how we progressed in this country, but I am going to 
talk to you a bit about some decisions this body has made 
regarding the crime of perjury and obstruction of justice and 
the impeachment clause in the Constitution as it applies to 
Federal judges. I am not so presumptuous to tell you I know 
more about what you did than you did. I am going to try to 
highlight some of the things that you did that I think served 
this country well in this area. But before we get there, a 
couple of observations.
    As I was walking over through the Rotunda today, there was 
a group of Japanese tourists there, and I stopped and talked. 
My dad, who is now deceased, was a World War II veteran, and it 
struck me, 50 years plus, how resilient this world is. My dad's 
generation I don't think would have ever envisioned 50 years 
ago that his son, one, would be a Congressman, which is a great 
thing about this country, and two, would be stopping and 
talking to Japanese tourists in the Capitol of the United 
States.
    So when we talk about the consequences of this case, no 
matter what you decide, in my opinion, this country will 
survive. If you acquit the President, we will survive. If you 
convict him, it will be traumatic, and if you remove him, it 
will be traumatic, but we will survive.
    This has been billed as a constitutional drama, by some of 
the pundits, that is called a snoozer. I can understand that a 
little bit. I am the 12th lawyer you have had to listen to, and 
I think my colleagues have done a very good job. But it is a 
very long and tedious process in many ways. It is hard to sit 
here and listen to 12 lawyers talk to you. But you have done a 
wonderful job, I think. I am very proud of the U.S. Senate. You 
have paid great attention.
    But the fact that people call this boring is not a bad 
thing to me. I think it shows the confidence we have achieved 
in 200 years as a Republic that people can go on about their 
business, and they are upset. I know my phone rings a lot, and 
your phone rings a lot, about what to do. But there is a 
calmness in this country in the midst of something so important 
like this that tells me we have done it right for a long time.
    How many countries would love the chance to be bored when 
their government is in action? How many countries fear that the 
government won't work for them; that to get it right, you have 
to pick up a gun? That happens every day throughout this world. 
And the fact that we can come together and talk about something 
so important and the country can go on and people not be so 
anxious about their personal lives and their freedoms and their 
properties and their jobs is a compliment to every generation 
that has ever served this Republic.
    Tom Brokaw has a book out called ``The Greatest 
Generation,'' and I recommend you read it because we will be 
talking about that in a moment. But let's talk about some of 
this country's imperfections. Mr. Buyer talked very eloquently 
about the rule of law and how it makes us so different and how 
it is something that people literally do die for and have died 
for.
    But let me tell you, as a lawyer, it is not a perfect legal 
system. If you are a poor person and you are charged with a 
crime, you are likely to get a public defender right out of law 
school and, hopefully, that public defender will do the best he 
can or she can. But it is not a perfect system. Don't ever 
think it is.
    Civil rights have been advanced a lot in my lifetime, but 
we have a long way to go in South Carolina. I think we have a 
long way to go in this Nation. In my lifetime, I started school 
with no black person in my class. By the sixth grade--I think 
it was the sixth grade--integration hit in my area, and I can 
remember my mom and dad being scared to death about what it 
would do and what it would mean. But we made it, and we are 
better off as a country.
    We are here to judge our President. We are here to say 
whether or not he is guilty, to begin with, of some serious 
offenses that are colored by sex, and there is absolutely no 
way to get around that, and I know it is uncomfortable to 
listen to.
    My father and mother owned a restaurant, a beer joint, I 
guess is what we would say in South Carolina. I can remember 
that if you were black, you came and you had to buy the beer 
and you had to go because you couldn't drink it there. That is 
just the way it was, is what my dad said. I always never quite 
understood that. My dad and mom were good people, but that is 
just the way it was. That is not the way it is now, and we are 
better off for that.
    Sexual harassment cases are always uncomfortable to listen 
to. That is just the way it is. It used to be in this country, 
not long ago, there was really no recourse if you were sexually 
harassed. We have changed things for the better.
    The reason we are here today is not because somebody wanted 
to look into the personal life of the President for no good 
reason. We are here today because somebody accused him when he 
was Governor of picking her out of a crowd, asking her to come 
to a hotel room, and, if you believe her, did something very 
crude and rude that you wouldn't want to happen to anybody in 
your family. Only God knows what happened there. That case has 
been settled. The parties know and God knows. We will never 
know.
    Let me just say this. I am proud of my country where a low-
level employee can sue the Governor of their State and, if that 
Governor becomes President, they can still sue.
    The Supreme Court said 9 to 0--a shutout legally--``Mr. 
President, you will stand subject to this suit.'' We are going 
to talk about, is this private or public conduct, does this go 
to the heart of being President, or is this just some private 
matter for which he could be prosecuted after he gets out of 
office? Is this really a big deal about being President?
    I contend, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, it became a 
big deal about being President when he raised the defense: 
``You can't sue me now because I am the President, I am a busy 
man, I have a lot going on.'' He used his office, or tried to, 
to avoid the day in court, but the Supreme Court said, ``No, 
sir, you will stand subject to suit under some reasonable 
accommodation.'' And we are here today.
    If I had been on the Supreme Court, I don't know if I would 
have ruled that way. There is not much chance of that happening 
any time soon, if you are worried about that. I don't think 
that is going to be in my future. [Laughter.]
    I may not have ruled that way, and we in Congress, if we 
don't like the way all this has come out, can change that law, 
we can change that ruling by law. But it is the law of the 
land, because the Chief Justice and his colleagues said so.
    What did our President do? He tried to say, ``You can't sue 
me because I am President.'' He participated in that lawsuit 
because he was told to, and I would argue, ladies and 
gentlemen, that we all assumed he would play fair. Now isn't 
there a lot of doubt about that?
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, what if he had not 
shown up? What if he refused to answer any court order? What if 
he had said, ``I am not going to play, that is it; I am not 
going to listen to you, judicial branch''? You know the remedy 
to resolve problems like that when Presidential conduct gets 
out of bounds. Do you know where that remedy lies? It lies with 
us, the U.S. Congress. When a President gets out of bounds and 
doesn't do as he or she should do constitutionally--and I would 
argue that every President and every citizen has a 
constitutional duty not to cheat another citizen, especially 
the President--and they get out of bounds, it is up to us to 
put them back in bounds or declare it illegal.
    And how do we do that? How do we regulate Presidential 
misconduct when it is done in a Presidential fashion? Through 
the laws and powers of impeachment. That is why we are here 
today.
    It is going to take team work on our part to get this 
right, because I will argue to you in a moment that the 
President of the United States, through his conduct, flouted 
judicial authority and decisionmaking over him. When he chose 
to lie, when he chose to manipulate the evidence to witnesses 
against him and get his friends to lie for him, he, in fact, I 
think, vetoed that decision.
    It's worse than if he had not shown up at all. Is that out 
of bounds? That is what we are going to be talking about today. 
And we have some guidance as to what really is in or out of 
bounds for high Government officials. What is a high crime? How 
about if an important person hurts somebody of low means? It is 
not very scholarly, but I think it is the truth. I think that 
is what they meant by ``high crimes.'' It doesn't have to be a 
crime. It is just when you start using your office and you are 
acting in a way that hurts people, you have committed a high 
crime.
    When you decide that a course of conduct meets the high 
crimes standard under our Constitution for the President, what 
are we doing to the Presidency? I think we are putting a burden 
on the Presidency. And you should consider it that way, that if 
you determine the conduct and the crimes in this case are high 
crimes, you need to do so knowing that you are placing a burden 
on every future occupant of that office and the office itself. 
So do so cautiously, because one branch of the Government 
should never put a burden on another branch of the Government 
that is not fair and they can't bear.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you decide from the 
conduct of this President that henceforth any officeholder who 
occupies the office of President will have this burden to 
bear--let me tell you what it is: don't lie under oath to a 
Federal grand jury when many in the country are begging you not 
to--can the occupant bear that burden?
    I voted against article 2 in the House, which was the 
deposition perjury allegations against the President standing 
alone. I think many of us may have thought that he didn't know 
about the tapes, that he and Ms. Lewinsky thought they had a 
story that was going to work, and he got caught off guard, and 
he started telling a bunch of lies that maybe I would have lied 
about, maybe you would have lied about, because it is personal 
to have to talk about intimate things; and our human nature is 
to protect ourselves, our family; that is just human nature.
    But, ladies and gentlemen, what he stands charged of in 
this Senate happened 8 months later, after some Members of this 
body said, ``Mr. President, square yourself by the law. Mr. 
President, if you go into that Federal grand jury and you lie 
again, you're risking your Presidency.'' People in this body 
said that. Legal commentators said that. Professor Dershowitz 
and I probably don't agree on a lot. I think he would probably 
agree with that statement. That would be one thing on which we 
would agree. He said--and he is a very smart, passionate man; 
and I like passionate people even if I don't agree with them--
even he said that if you go to a grand jury and you lie as 
President, that ought to be a high crime.
    So within the context in which you are going to decide this 
case, you have to understand human failings, because if you 
don't do that, you are not being fair. And I know you want to 
be fair.
    Human failings exist in all of us. Only when it gets to be 
so premeditated, so calculated, so much ``my interest over 
anybody else'' or ``the public be damned,'' should you really, 
really start getting serious about what to do. That happened in 
August, in my opinion, ladies and gentlemen. After being begged 
not to lie to the grand jury and end this matter, he chose to 
lie.
    That is the burden you will be placing on the next 
President: ``Don't do that. Don't lie under oath when you are a 
defendant in a lawsuit against an average citizen. Have the 
courage to apply the law in a fair manner to yourself.''
    Mr. Buyer talked about values and courage. Let me say 
something about President Clinton that I believe. I believe he 
does embrace civil rights for our citizens. I believe he has 
been an articulate spokesman for the civil rights for our 
citizens. I believe that may be one of the hallmarks of his 
Presidency. And I am not here to tell you that he doesn't. I am 
here to tell you that when it was his case, when those rights 
had to be applied to him, he failed miserably.
    It is always easy to talk about what other people ought to 
do. The test of character is the way you judge people with whom 
you disagree: Don't cheat in a lawsuit by manipulating the 
testimony of others. Don't send public officials and friends to 
tell your lies before a Federal grand jury to avoid your legal 
responsibilities. Don't put your legal and political interests 
ahead of the rule of law and common decency.
    If you find that these are high crimes, that is the burden 
you are placing on the next officeholder. If they can't meet 
that burden, this country has a serious problem. I don't want 
my country to be the country of great equivocators and 
compartmentalizers for the next century. And that is what this 
case is about, equivocation and compartmentalizing.
    What I have described to you as the conduct of the 
President being a high crime I think is just his job 
description. We are asking no more of him than to be the chief 
law enforcement officer of the land--follow your job 
description. A determination that this conduct is a high crime 
is no burden that cannot be borne in a reasonable fashion by 
future occupants.
    Why did I talk about constitutional teamwork? I am a child 
of the South. The civil rights litigation in matters that came 
about in the sixties was threefold: There was legislation 
passed in Congress, there were judicial decisions that were 
rendered, and the executive branch came in to help out. 
Remember when Governor Wallace was standing in the door of the 
University of Alabama? Remember how he was told to step aside?
    What went on? It was a constitutional dance of magnificent 
proportions. You had litigation that was resolved for the 
individual citizen so they could go in and acquire the rights, 
full benefits, of a citizen of that State; you had legislation 
coming out of this body; and you had defiance against the 
Federal Government from the State level; and you had the 
President and the executive branch federalizing the National 
Guard. And, ``Governor Wallace, step aside.''
    It was 9-0 that Bill Clinton had to be a participant in the 
lawsuit, and he chose to cheat in every manner you can cheat in 
a lawsuit. His conduct needs to be regulated, and it needs to 
be brought to bear under the Constitution. If you put him in 
jail after his office, that would not solve the constitutional 
problem he created. The constitutional conduct exhibited by the 
Executive, when he was told by the judicial branch, ``You've 
got to participate in a lawsuit,'' was so far afield of what is 
fair, what is decent, that it became a high crime, and it 
happened to be against a little person.
    The Senate has spoken before about perjury and obstruction 
of justice and how it applies to high Government officials. And 
those Government officials were judges.
    Before we start this analysis, it is important to know--and 
some of you know this better than I will ever hope to know the 
history of this Senate, the history of this body and how it 
works and why it works--that when a judge is impeached in the 
United States of America, the same legal standard--treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors--is applied to 
that judge's conduct as it is to any high official, just like 
the President. So we are comparing apples to apples.
    In Judge Claiborne's trial, they seized upon the language, 
``Judges shall hold their office during good behavior.'' And 
the defense was trying to say, unlike the President and other 
Government officials, high Government officials, the 
impeachment standard for judges is ``good behavior.'' That is 
the term. It's a different impeachment standard. You know these 
cases better than I know these cases, and you said, ``Wrong.'' 
The good behavior standard doesn't apply to why you will be 
removed. It is just a reference to how long you will have your 
job.
    Our President can serve for two terms. A judge serves for 
life, conditioned on good behavior. What gets you out of office 
is whether or not you violate the constitutional standard for 
impeachment, which is treason, bribery, or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.
    So as I talk to you about these cases and what you as a 
body did, understand we are using the same legal standard, not 
because I said so, but because you said so. Judge Claiborne was 
convicted and removed from office by the Senate 90-7. For what? 
Filing a false income tax return under penalties of perjury. 
One thing they said in that case was, ``I'm a judge and filing 
false income tax returns has nothing to do with me being a 
judge and I ought not lose my job unless you can show me or 
prove that I did something wrong as a judge.'' They were saying 
cheating on taxes has nothing to do with being a judge.
    Do you know what the Senate said? It has everything to do 
with being a judge. And the reason you said that is because you 
didn't buy into this idea that the only way you can lose your 
job as a high Government official under the Constitution is to 
engage in some type of public conduct directly related to what 
you do every day. You took a little broader view, and I am 
certainly glad you did, because this is not a country of high 
officials who are technicians. This is a country based on 
character, this is a country based on having to set a standard 
that others will follow.
    This is Manager Fish:

    Judge Claiborne's actions raise fundamental questions about 
public confidence in, and the public's perception of, the 
Federal court system. They serve to undermine the confidence of 
the American people in our judicial system . . . Judge 
Claiborne is more than a mere embarrassment. He is a disgrace--
an affront--to the judicial office and to the judicial branch 
he was appointed to serve.

    That is very strong language. Apparently, you agreed with 
that concept because 90 of you voted to throw him out. What did 
he do? He cheated on his taxes by making false statements under 
oath.
    Now we will talk more about public versus private. Senator 
Mathias, about this idea of public versus private:

    It is my opinion . . . that the impeachment power is not as 
narrow as Judge Claiborne suggests. There is neither historical 
nor logical reason to believe that Framers of the Constitution 
sought to prohibit the House from impeaching . . . an officer 
of the United States who had committed treason or bribery or 
any other high crime or misdemeanor which is a serious offense 
against the government of the United States and which indicates 
that the official is unfit to exercise public responsibilities, 
but which is an offense which is technically unrelated to the 
officer's particular job responsibilities.''

    This hits it head on:

    Impeachable conduct does not have to occur in the course of 
the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence of 
misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be 
justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise 
of public office. That, of course, is the situation in this 
case.
    It would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had 
committed murder, mayhem, rape or perhaps espionage in his 
private life, could not be removed from office by the U.S. 
Senate.

    The point you made so well was that we are not buying this. 
If you are a Federal judge and you cheat on your taxes and you 
lie under oath--it is true that it had nothing to do with your 
courtroom in a technical sense, but you are going to be judging 
others and they are going to come before you with their fate in 
your hands, and we don't want somebody like you running a 
courtroom because people won't trust the results.
    Judge Walter Nixon, convicted and removed from office for 
what? Perjury before a grand jury. What was that about? He 
tried to fix a case for a business partner's son in State 
court. He went to the prosecutor who was in State court and 
tried to fix the case. When they investigated the matter, he 
lied about meeting with the prosecutor. He lied about doing 
anything related to trying to manipulate the results. He was 
convicted and he was thrown out of office by the U.S. Senate.
    I guess you could say, what has that got to do with being a 
Federal judge? It wasn't even in his court. It has everything 
to do with being a high public official because if he stays in 
office, what signal are you sending to anybody else sent to his 
courtroom or anybody else's courtroom?
    The question becomes, if a Federal judge can be thrown out 
of office for lying and trying to fix a friend's son's case, 
can the President of the United States be removed from office 
for trying to fix his case? That is not a scholarly work but 
that is what happened. He tried to fix his case. He tried to 
turn the judicial system upside down, every way but loose. He 
sent his friends to lie for him. He lied for himself. Any time 
any relevant question came up, instead of taking the honorable 
way out, he lied and dug a hole, and we are all here today 
because of that.
    I am not going to go over the facts again because you have 
been bombarded with the facts. If you believe he committed 
perjury and if you believe he obstructed justice, the reason he 
did it was to fix his case. And you have some records to rely 
upon to see what you should do with somebody like that.
    Judge Hastings: This Federal judge was convicted and 
removed from office by the U.S. Senate. But do you know what is 
interesting about this case to me? He was acquitted before he 
got here. He was accused of conspiring with another person to 
take money to fix results in his own court. He gave testimony 
on his own behavior. The conspirator was convicted but he was 
acquitted.
    Do you know what the U.S. Senate and House said? We believe 
your conduct is out of bounds and we are not bound by that 
acquittal. We want to get to the truth, and we don't want 
Federal judges about whom we have a strong suspicion or 
reasonable belief are trying to fix cases in their court.
    The point I am trying to make is you don't even have to be 
convicted of a crime to lose your job in this constitutional 
Republic if this body determines that your conduct as a public 
official is clearly out of bounds in your role. Thank God you 
did that, because impeachment is not about punishment. 
Impeachment is about cleansing the office. Impeachment is about 
restoring honor and integrity to the office. The remedy of 
prosecuting William Jefferson Clinton has no effect on the 
problem you are facing here today, in my opinion.
    Every case was tried before it got here with different 
results. Two of them were convicted; one of them was acquitted. 
You had a factual record to go upon. I urge you, ladies and 
gentlemen of the U.S. Senate, that cannot happen in this case 
unless we have a trial in the true sense of the word. The 
evidence is compelling and overwhelming, but it has only been 
half told. The learned counsel for the President will have 
their chance, and they are excellent lawyers.
    If this were a football game, we would be almost at half 
time. Please, please wait, because I have sat where they are 
sitting, dying to say something. I know there are things they 
want to tell you about what we have said that may put this in a 
different light. That is coming, and it ought to come.
    But there is another thing that you will have to decide: 
Has the factual record been developed enough that I can acquit 
with good conscience or that I can convict and remove with good 
conscience? In these judge cases, there was a full-blown trial. 
Because we can't prosecute the President criminally, we can't 
do the things that happened in the judge cases, so we don't 
have that record. I just submit that to you for your wisdom. 
None of this matters unless you believe he committed the 
offense. And I am not going to go over that again.
    You know the facts pretty well. If there is any doubt, 
let's call witnesses and let's develop them fully and leave no 
doubt on the table, and make sure that history will judge us 
well. Everybody--the House and the President--will have a fair 
shot at proving their case, that these high crimes occurred.
    I don't believe, ladies and gentlemen, that when you look 
at the totality of what the President did and prior precedents 
of the Senate, the fact that he was told by the Supreme Court 
to go into this litigation matter and he cheated so badly, that 
you would consider these not to be high crimes. Because you are 
not placing a burden on this office that the office can't bear, 
I think that will be resolved, I hope and pray, in a bipartisan 
fashion.
    If we can do nothing else for this country, let us state 
clearly that this conduct is unacceptable by any President. 
These are, in fact, high crimes. They go to the core of why we 
are all here as a Nation and to the rule of law, the rules of 
litigation. He cheated, and you have to put him back in bounds, 
remove him. Determining this as a high crime puts it back into 
bounds.
    This is a hard question. I am not going to tell you it is 
not. I do not want to be where you are sitting. I think the 
evidence will be persuasive that he is guilty. The logic of 
your past rulings and just fundamental fairness and decency, 
and helping the Supreme Court enforce their rules, if nothing 
else, will lead you to a high-crime determination.
    But we are asking you to remove a popular President. I 
don't know why all this occurred. And we have a popular 
President. I know this. The American people are fundamentally 
fair, and they have an impression about this case from just 
tons and tons and tons of talk, tons and tons and tons of 
speaking. One in five, they tell me, are paying close attention 
to this. The question you must ask is: If every American were 
required to do what I have to do, sit in silence and listen to 
the evidence, would it be different? You are their 
representatives; they will trust you. This is a cynical age, 
but I am optimistic that whatever you do, this country will get 
up and go to work the next day, and they will feel good, no 
matter what it is.
    To set aside an election is a very scary thought in a 
democracy. I do not agree with this President on most major 
policy initiatives. I did not vote for this President. But he 
won; he won twice. To undo that election is tough.
    Let me give you some of my thoughts. How many times have 
you had to go to a child, a grandchild, or somebody who works 
for you, and give them a lecture that goes along the lines: 
Don't do as I do, do as I say. Isn't that a miserable 
experience? The problem with keeping this President in office, 
in my opinion, is that these crimes can't be ignored by anybody 
who looks at the evidence. They can be explained away, they can 
be excused; but they have far-reaching consequences for the 
law. And in his role as chief law enforcement officer of the 
land, how can we say to our fellow citizens that this will not 
be 20 months of ``don't do as I do, do as I say.'' What effect 
will that have? I think it would be devastating.
    This case is the butt of a thousand jokes. This case is 
requiring parents and teachers to sit down and explain what 
lying is all about. This case is creating confusion. This case 
is hitting America far harder than America knows it has been 
hit. It is tempting to let the clock tick, but I suggest to 
you, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you believe he is a 
perjurer, that he obstructed justice in a civil rights lawsuit, 
the question is not, Should he stay? It is, what if he stays? 
If you believe this President committed perjury before a grand 
jury when he was begged not to, and people in this body told 
him, ``Don't do it, because your political career is at 
stake,'' and if you believe he obstructed justice in a civil 
rights lawsuit, don't move the bar anymore. We have moved the 
bar for this case a thousand times.
    Remember how you felt when you knew you had a perjurer as a 
judge, when you knew you had somebody who had fundamentally run 
over the law they were responsible for upholding. Remember how 
you felt when you knew that judge was so out of bounds that you 
could not put him back in court, even though it was unrelated 
to his court, because you would be doing a disservice to the 
citizens who would come before him. A judge has a duty to take 
care of the individuals fairly who come before the court. The 
President, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, has a duty to 
see that the law applies to everyone fairly--a higher duty in 
the Constitution. You could not live with yourself, knowing 
that you were going to leave a perjurer as a judge on the 
bench.
    Ladies and gentlemen, as hard as it may be, for the same 
reasons, cleanse this office. The Vice President will be 
waiting outside the doors of this Chamber. Our constitutional 
system is simple and it is genius all at the same time. If that 
Vice President is asked to come in and assume the mantle of 
Chief Executive Officer of the land and chief law enforcement 
officer of the land, it will be tough, it will be painful, but 
we will survive and we will be better for it.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Canady.
    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I am 
Representative Charles Canady of the 12th District of Florida, 
and I rise now to conclude the argument that my two fellow 
managers have begun and to address the fundamental question now 
before the Senate: Do the offenses charged against the 
President rise to the level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
under the Constitution?
    Are these crimes--perjury before a federal grand jury and 
obstruction of justice--offenses for which the President has 
properly been impeached by the House of Representatives and for 
which he may now properly be convicted by the Senate? Or are 
these serious felony offenses for which a Chief Executive may 
not constitutionally be called to account by either the House 
or the Senate?
    To properly answer these questions, it must be understood, 
as my fellow manager Mr. Buyer has argued, that perjury and 
obstruction of justice are serious offenses against the system 
of justice. To properly answer these questions, it must also be 
understood--as my fellow manager Mr. Graham has discussed--that 
the Senate has already determined that as a serious offense 
against the system of justice, perjury is proper grounds for 
removal from office.
    There are several additional points that I now ask you to 
consider as you deliberate on the momentous issue you must 
decide.
    First, I will argue that restricting the impeachment 
process to crimes involving the abuse of Presidential power is 
contrary to common sense. This is a key point in this case. The 
President's defense hinges to a large extent on his claim that 
the offenses charged against him do not involve official 
misconduct.
    I will then review the history and purpose of the 
impeachment process to show that its fundamental object is to 
maintain the supremacy of law against the misconduct of public 
officials. After reviewing the background of the impeachment 
process, I will briefly discuss the prevailing views on the 
seriousness of perjury at the time the Constitution was 
adopted, and show that perjury and obstruction of justice are 
akin to bribery in their purpose and effect.
    To conclude, I will discuss the proper role of the Senate 
in exercising the removal power--emphasizing three essential 
points:
    First, that the removal power is designed to preserve, 
protect, and strengthen our Constitution by setting a standard 
of conduct for public officers.
    Second, that the Senate should not establish a lower 
standard of integrity for the President than the standard it 
has already established for Federal judges.
    Third, that the Senate should not allow a President who has 
violated his constitutional duty and oath of office, and made 
himself a notorious example of lawlessness, to remain in 
office.
    The President's lawyers have argued that the ``Constitution 
requires proof of official misconduct'' for impeachment and 
conviction, and that removal from office is not proper for 
crimes that do not involve an abuse of the power of office. 
This view is endorsed by various academics who have signed a 
letter in support of the President. The Senate must now decide 
if this is a proper interpretation of the Constitution.
    In deciding this question, you should be guided by common 
sense and good judgment. It is by no means an abstruse and 
mysterious matter of constitutional law.
    Nor is it a new question before the Senate. It has been 
decided in the recent judicial impeachments which Mr. Graham 
has discussed. And it is a question which arose 200 years ago 
in the course of the first impeachment trial conducted by the 
Senate.
    At that trial in January of 1799, as the Senate met in 
Philadelphia, an argument was made by counsel for the 
respondent, Senator Blount of Tennessee, that the impeachment 
power was properly exercised only with respect to ``official 
offenses.'' Although Senator Blount escaped conviction on other 
grounds, the response to his claim that only official 
misconduct could justify impeachment and removal remains 
noteworthy. Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, one of the 
House managers--and who, incidentally, subsequently served as a 
Member of this Senate representing the State of Maryland--
refuted that claim by asking a simple question:
    ``Suppose a Judge of the United States were to commit a 
theft or perjury; would the learned counsel say that he should 
not be impeached for it? If so, he must remain in office with 
all his infamy. . . .''
    Two hundred years to the month after Robert Goodloe Harper 
posed that question to the Senate, a very similar question is 
before the Senate today. Shall a President--if found guilty of 
perjury and obstruction of justice--be removed, or must he 
``remain in office with all his infamy'' ?
    Although a judge who commits crimes may be subjected to 
criminal penalties and prevented from discharging judicial 
functions, he can be divested of his office only by impeachment 
and removal. The tenure of a President will necessarily expire 
with the passage of time, but most scholars of constitutional 
law agree that while he remains in office he is immune from the 
processes of the criminal law. So long as he is President, the 
only mechanism available to hold him accountable for his crimes 
is the power of impeachment and removal. Unless that power is 
exercised, no matter what crime he has committed, he must 
``remain in office with all his infamy.''
    The argument of the President's lawyers that no criminal 
act by the President subjects him to removal from office unless 
the crime involves the abuse of his power is an argument 
entailing consequences which--upon a moment's reflection--this 
body should be unwilling to accept.
    Would a President guilty of murder be immune from the 
constitutional process of impeachment and removal so long as 
his crime involved no misuse of official power? Would a 
President guilty of sexual assault or child molesting remain 
secure in office because his crime did not involve an abuse of 
office?
    In support of their position, the President's lawyers have 
vigorously argued that a President who committed tax fraud--a 
felony offense not involving official misconduct--would not be 
subject to impeachment and removal. They erroneously cite the 
decision of the House Judiciary Committee rejecting an article 
of impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud. The 
record of the House proceedings establishes that the tax fraud 
article against President Nixon was rejected due to 
insufficient evidence that he was in fact guilty of tax fraud. 
The House Judiciary Committee never determined that tax fraud 
by a President would not be grounds for impeachment.
    But, leaving aside the inaccurate characterization of the 
House Judiciary Committee's action, the claim of the 
President's lawyers that a President could commit tax fraud and 
remain immune from impeachment and removal is quite telling. It 
reveals a great deal about the sort of standard they would set 
for the conduct of the President of the United States.
    The claim that tax fraud--a felony--does not rise to the 
level of a high crime or misdemeanor was, as you have heard, 
unequivocally rejected by the Senate in 1986 in the case of 
Judge Harry Claiborne, who was removed from office for filing 
false income tax returns.
    Then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr., summarized the judgment of 
the Senate that Judge Claiborne should be removed from office. 
The comments of Senator Gore bear repeating:

    It is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. 
An individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no 
business receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of 
honest citizens.

    Of course, the rationale expressed by Senator Gore for the 
conviction of Judge Claiborne for his criminal tax offenses 
applies with equal--if not greater--force to similar offenses 
committed by the President of the United States. Professor 
Charles Black, Jr., in his essay on the law of impeachment, 
recognized the appropriate application of these principles to 
the office of the Presidency. Professor Black said, ``A large-
scale tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.''
    I respectfully submit to the Senate that the argument of 
the President's lawyers concerning tax fraud by a President is 
not a viable argument.
    Who can seriously argue that our Constitution requires that 
a President guilty of crimes such as murder, sexual assault, or 
tax fraud remain in his office undisturbed? Who is willing to 
set such a standard for the conduct of the President of the 
United States? Who can in good conscience accept the 
consequences for our system of government that would 
necessarily follow? Could our Constitution possibly contemplate 
such a result? What other crimes of a President will we be told 
do not rise to the level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors?'' 
These are grave questions that must be addressed by this 
Senate. The President's defense requires that these questions 
be asked and answered.
    Contrary to the claims of the President's lawyers, there is 
not a bright line separating official misconduct by a President 
from other misconduct of which the President is guilty. Some 
offenses will involve the direct and affirmative misuse of 
governmental power. Other offenses may involve a more subtle 
use of the prestige, status and position of the President to 
further a course of wrongdoing. There are still other offenses 
in which a President may not misuse the power of his office, 
but in which he violates a duty imposed on him under the 
Constitution.
    Such a breach of constitutional duty--even though it does 
not constitute an affirmative misuse of governmental power--may 
be a very serious matter. It does violence to the English 
language to assert that a President who has violated a duty 
entrusted to him by the Constitution is not guilty of official 
misconduct. Common sense indicates that official misconduct has 
indeed occurred whenever a President breaches any of the duties 
of his office.
    As we have been reminded repeatedly, the Constitution 
imposes on the President the duty to ``take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.'' The charges against the President 
involve multiple violations of that duty. A President who 
commits a calculated and sustained series of criminal offenses 
has--by his personal violations of the law--failed in the most 
immediate, direct, and culpable manner to do his duty under the 
Constitution.
    In their defense of the President, his lawyers, in essence, 
contend that a President may be removed for misusing 
governmental power, but not for corruptly interfering with the 
proper exercise of governmental power. This argument exalts 
form over substance. It unduly focuses on the manner in which 
wrongdoing is carried out and neglects to consider the actual 
impact of that wrongdoing on our system of government. Whether 
the President misuses the power vested in him as President or 
wrongfully interferes with the proper exercise of the power 
vested in other parts of the Government, the result is the 
same: the due functioning of our system of government is in 
some respect hindered or defeated.
    There is no principled basis for contending that a 
President who interferes with the proper exercise of 
governmental power--as he clearly does when he commits perjury 
and obstruction of justice--is constitutionally less 
blameworthy than a President who misuses the power of his 
office. A President who lies to a Federal grand jury in order 
to impede the investigation of crimes is no less culpable than 
a President who wrongfully orders a prosecutor to suspend an 
investigation of crimes that have been committed. The purpose 
and effect of the personal perjury and of the wrongful official 
command are the same: the laws of the United States are not 
properly enforced.
    Although neither the Senate nor the House has ever adopted 
a fixed definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' there 
is much in the background and history of the impeachment 
process that contradicts the narrow view of the removal power 
advanced by the President's lawyers.
    There is no convincing evidence that those who framed and 
ratified our Constitution intended to limit the impeachment and 
removal power to acts involving the abuse of official power.
    The key phrase defining the offenses for which the 
President, Vice President and other civil officers of the 
United States may be removed--``treason, bribery or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors''--simply does not limit the removal 
power in the way suggested by the President's lawyers.
    The truth is as we have heard already today, that treason 
and bribery may be committed by an official who does not abuse 
the power of his office in the commission of the offense. A 
President might, for example, pay a bribe to a judge presiding 
over a case to which the President is an individual party. Or a 
judge might commit an act of treason without exercising any of 
the powers of his office in doing so. By the express terms of 
the Constitution those offenses would be impeachable. And there 
is no reason to impose a restriction on the scope of ``other 
high crimes and misdemeanors'' that is not imposed on treason 
and bribery.
    Although having a means for the removal of officials guilty 
of abusing their power was no doubt very much in the minds of 
the framers, the purpose of the removal power was not 
restricted to that object.
    To properly understand the purpose of the impeachment 
process under our Constitution, consideration must be given to 
use of impeachment by the English Parliament. Impeachment in 
the English system did not require an indictable crime, but the 
proceeding was nevertheless of a criminal nature: punishment 
upon conviction could extend to imprisonment and even death. It 
was a mechanism used by the Parliament to check absolutism and 
to establish the supremacy of the Parliament. Through 
impeachment, Parliament acted to curb the abuses of exalted 
persons who would otherwise have free reign. Impeachment was 
used by the Parliament to punish a wide range of offenses: 
misapplication of funds; abuse of official power; neglect of 
duty; corruption; encroachment on the prerogatives of the 
Parliament; and giving harmful advice to the Crown. In the 
English practice, ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' included all 
of these.
    During the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield in 
1725, Serjeant Pengelly summed up the purpose of impeachment. 
It was, he said, for the ``punishment of offenses of a public 
nature which may affect the nation.'' He went on to say that 
impeachment was also for use in ``instances where the inferior 
courts have no power to punish the crimes committed by ordinary 
rules of justice . . . or in cases . . . where the person 
offending is by his degree raised above the apprehension of 
danger from a prosecution carried on in the usual course of 
justice; and whose exalted station requires the united 
accusation of all the Commons.''
    In the case of Warren Hastings--which was proceeding at the 
time the Constitution was framed--Edmund Burke described the 
impeachment process as ``. . . a grave and important proceeding 
essential to the establishment of the national character for 
justice and equity.''
    As the British legal historian Holdsworth has written, the 
impeachment process was a mechanism in service of the ``ideal . 
. . [of] government in accordance with law.'' It was a means by 
which ``the greatest ministers of state could be made 
responsible, like humble officials, to the law.'' According to 
Holdsworth:
    ``. . . [T]he greatest services rendered by this procedure 
to the cause of constitutional government have been, firstly, 
the establishment of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
to the law, secondly, its application to all ministers of the 
crown, and thirdly and consequently the maintenance of the 
supremacy of the law over all.''
    Thus the fundamental purpose of the impeachment process in 
England was ``the maintenance of the supremacy of the law over 
all.'' Those who were impeached and called to account for 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' were those who by their 
conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law.
    This English understanding of the purpose of impeachment 
serves as a backdrop for the work of the Framers of our 
Constitution. Despite some important differences in the 
functioning of impeachment in England and the United States, 
the fundamental purpose of impeachment remained the same: 
defending the rule of law.
    The records of the proceedings of the Constitutional 
Convention also shed light on the meaning of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' and the underlying purpose of the impeachment 
mechanism. The primary focus of the relevant discussions at the 
Convention was on the need for some means of removing the 
President. Early in the proceedings with respect to 
impeachment, the Committee of the Whole agreed to make the 
President removable ``on impeachment and conviction of 
malpractice or neglect of duty,'' although concerns were 
expressed that impeachment would give the legislative branch 
undue control over the executive, and violate the separation of 
powers.
    In the course of the proceedings, James Madison stated that 
``some provision was needed to defend the community against the 
President if he became corrupt, incapacitated, or perverted his 
administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression.''
    Arguing for a means of removing the President, George Mason 
said, ``No point is of more importance than that the right of 
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above 
Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit 
the most extensive injustice?''
    Before the Convention settled on the language that was 
ultimately adopted, a proposal was considered that would have 
limited impeachable offenses to treason and bribery. An effort 
was made to broaden this proposal by including 
``maladministration'' as an impeachable offense. Madison 
objected. He objected that the inclusion of a term as ``vague'' 
as maladministration would result in the President having 
tenure during the pleasure of the Senate. As a compromise, the 
term ``maladministration'' was dropped and ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' was substituted. From this course of proceedings 
it can reasonably be concluded that poor administration--at 
least if it does not involve corrupt motives--is not a 
sufficient ground for impeachment.
    In the debate concerning the Constitution in the various 
state ratification conventions, the grounds for impeachment 
were with some frequency said to include abuse or betrayal of 
trust and abuse of power. ``Making a bad treaty'' was also 
frequently mentioned as justifying impeachment. At the Virginia 
Convention, Governor Randolph spoke of ``misbehavior'' and 
``dishonesty,'' and James Madison gave two examples of 
impeachable conduct: pardoning a criminal with whom the 
President was in collusion, and summoning only a few Senators 
to approve a treaty.
    One of the most extensive recorded discussions of 
impeachment occurred at the North Carolina ratification 
convention in remarks made by James Iredell. Iredell, who later 
served as a Justice of the Supreme Court, spoke of the 
supremacy of the law under the system of government proposed by 
the Constitution. He said:

    No man has an authority to injure another with impunity. No 
man is better than his fellow-citizens, nor can pretend to any 
superiority over the meanest man in the country. If the 
President does a single act, by which the people are 
prejudiced, he is punishable himself. . . . If he commits any 
misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable . . .

    Iredell also expressed the view that impeachment may be 
used only in cases where there is some corrupt motive. He said:

    . . . [W]hen any man is impeached, it must be for an error 
of the heart, and not of the head. . . . Whatever mistake a man 
may make, he ought not to be punished for it, nor his posterity 
rendered infamous. But if a man be a villain, and wilfully 
abuse his trust, he is to be held up as a public offender, and 
ignominiously punished. . . . According to these principles, I 
suppose the only instances in which the President would be 
liable to impeachment, would be where he had received a bribe, 
or acted from some corrupt motive or other.

    Iredell's comments buttress the view that impeachment is 
not to be used as a political weapon to resolve differences of 
policy between the legislative branch and the executive branch. 
Impeachment is not an appropriate remedy for errors--even 
serious errors--in the administration of government.
    To justify impeachment, there must be ``some corrupt 
motive,'' a willful ``abuse of trust,'' an ``error of the 
heart.'' You will note there is nothing in Iredell's comments 
to suggest that a President who engaged in a corrupt course of 
conduct by obstructing justice and committing perjury would be 
immune from impeachment and removal.
    Another major discussion of impeachment during the debate 
over ratification occurs in the Federalist No. 65, to which 
reference has already been made in those proceedings, where 
Alexander Hamilton describes the impeachment process as ``a 
method of national inquest into the conduct of public men'' and 
discusses the powers of the Senate ``in their judicial 
character as a court for the trial of impeachments.''
    Now, before I discuss his views of impeachment, I would 
like to say a word in defense of Alexander Hamilton--who is a 
widely acknowledged champion of our Constitution, widely 
acknowledged as one of the most eloquent expositors and 
defenders of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the reputation of 
Hamilton has in recent days been traduced. It is unjust to the 
memory of this great man to compare his personal sins with the 
crimes of President Clinton. When Hamilton was questioned about 
his affair he told the truth. He took responsibility for his 
conduct. There is no evidence that he ever engaged in acts of 
corruption. He never lied under oath. He never obstructed 
justice. Notwithstanding the efforts of his lawyers, President 
Clinton by no means benefits from a comparison with Hamilton.
    In ``The Federalist,'' Hamilton writes of the Senate:

    The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself.

    Hamilton recognized that the focus of the impeachment power 
is on the ``misconduct of public men'' or the ``abuse or 
violation of some public trust.'' Impeachment is a remedy 
against officials for ``injuries done . . . to the society 
itself.''
    Despite the claims of the President's lawyers, the comments 
of Hamilton do not support the view that a President can be 
impeached and removed only for an abuse of power. The 
``misconduct of public men,'' and ``the abuse or violation of 
some public trust'' to which Hamilton refers are not restricted 
to offenses involving the misuse of official power. The 
``misconduct of public men'' encompasses a whole range of 
wrongful deeds committed by those who hold office when those 
offenses are committed. The ``public trust'' is violated 
whenever a public officer breaches any duty he has to the 
public. ``Injuries done . . . to the society itself'' similarly 
may occur as the result of misconduct that does not involve the 
misuse of the powers of office.
    I submit to the Senate that the English precedents, the 
records of the Constitutional Convention debates, and the 
general principles set forth by Hamilton, Iredell, and others 
in the debate over ratification do not provide a definitive 
list of high crimes and misdemeanors. But they do provide broad 
guidance concerning the scope of the impeachment power. The 
theme running through all these background sources is that the 
impeachment process is designed to provide a remedy for the 
corrupt and lawless acts of public officials.
    Not surprisingly, those who have been on the receiving end 
of impeachment proceedings have been quick to argue for a 
restrictive meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' 
President Clinton's lawyers follow in that well-established 
tradition.
    They attempt to minimize the significance of the charges of 
perjury and obstruction of justice against the President. In 
essence, they argue that treason and bribery are the 
prototypical high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the crimes 
charged against the President are insufficiently similar in 
both their nature and seriousness to treason and bribery.
    But, as the comments of my fellow manager, Mr. Buyer, have 
made clear, the crimes set forth in the articles of impeachment 
are indeed serious offenses against our system of justice. They 
were certainly viewed as serious offenses by those who drafted 
and ratified the Constitution.
    As Mr. Buyer has mentioned, in his discussion of ``offenses 
against the public justice,'' Sir William Blackstone--whose 
work James Madison said was in ``every man's hand'' during the 
creation of the Constitution--listed the offenses of perjury 
and bribery side-by-side, immediately after he listed treason. 
In 1790, the First Congress adopted a statute entitled ``An Act 
for the punishment of certain crimes against the United 
States'' making perjury a crime punishable as a felony. Nothing 
could be clearer: perjury is a crime against the United States; 
it is not a private matter.
    As Mr. Chabot noted yesterday, John Jay, the first Chief 
Justice of the United States, said that ``there is no crime 
more extensively pernicious to Society'' than perjury. 
According to Jay, perjury ``discolors and poisons the Streams 
of Justice, and by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the 
Foundations of personal and public Rights. . . . [I]f oaths 
should cease to be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable 
Rights would become insecure.'' Given this understanding that 
was current at the time the Constitution was adopted, it is 
impossible to support the conclusion that perjury and the 
related offense of obstruction of justice are somehow trivial 
offenses that do not rise to the same level as the offense of 
bribery which is enumerated in the Constitution.
    Moreover, perjury and obstruction of justice are by their 
very nature akin to bribery. When the crime of bribery is 
committed, money is given and received to corruptly alter the 
course of official action. When justice is obstructed, action 
is undertaken to corruptly thwart the due administration of 
justice. When perjury occurs, false testimony is given in order 
to deceive judges and juries and to prevent the just 
determination of causes pending in the courts. The fundamental 
purpose and the fundamental effect of each of these offenses--
perjury, obstruction of justice and bribery alike--is to defeat 
the proper administration of government. They all are crimes of 
corruption aimed at substituting private advantage for the 
public interest. They all undermine the integrity of the 
functions of government.
    The use of the impeachment process against misconduct which 
undermines the integrity of government is a central focus of 
two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of 
impeachment, and I would humbly bring these reports to your 
attention. I commend them to you for your consideration. One of 
the reports was prepared by the staff of the Nixon impeachment 
inquiry. The other was produced by the Bar of the City of New 
York. Both of these reports have gained bipartisan respect over 
the last 25 years for their balanced and judicious approach. 
They provide a well-informed analysis of the key issues related 
to impeachments. In doing so they stand in stark contrast to 
the recent pronouncements by some academics which substitute 
political opinion for scholarly analysis.
    A review of these two important documents from 1974 
supports the conclusion that the articles before the Senate set 
forth compelling grounds for the conviction and removal of 
President Clinton.
    There has been a great deal of comment on the report on 
``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment'' 
prepared in February 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment 
inquiry. Those who assert that the charges against the 
President do not rise to the level of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' have pulled some phrases from that report out of 
context to support their position. In fact, the general 
principles concerning grounds for impeachment and removal set 
forth in that report indicate that perjury and obstruction of 
justice are high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Consider this key language from the staff report describing 
the type of conduct which gives rise to the proper use of the 
impeachment and removal power:
    In the report, they said:

    The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the 
conduct--undermining the integrity of office, disregard of 
constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of power, 
abuse of the governmental process, adverse impact on the system 
of government.

    The report goes on to state:

    Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the 
nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles 
of our government or the proper performance of constitutional 
duties of the presidential office.

    Perjury and obstruction of justice, I submit to you, 
clearly ``undermine the integrity of office.'' I ask you, if 
these offenses do not undermine the integrity of office, what 
offenses would?
    Their unavoidable consequence is to erode respect for the 
office of the President and to interfere with the integrity of 
the administration of justice. Such offenses are ``seriously 
incompatible'' with the President's ``constitutional duties and 
oath of office,'' and with the principles of our government 
establishing the rule of law. Moreover, they are offenses which 
have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system of 
government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an 
assault on the due administration of justice--which is a core 
function of our system of government. Perjury has the same 
purpose and effect.
    The second report, to which I have referred, the thoughtful 
report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment'' prepared by 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in January 
of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive 
impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of 
government. The report summarizes the proper basis for 
impeachment and removal in this way. It says:

    It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for 
impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes. . . . 
Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of 
government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen 
to constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our 
view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of 
government may be found in acts which constitute corruption in, 
or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may 
also be found in acts which, without directly affecting 
governmental processes, undermine that degree of public 
confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers 
that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
society.

    Perjury and obstruction of justice--serious felony offenses 
against the United States--by a President are acts of 
corruption which without doubt ``undermine that degree of 
public confidence in the probity of the [the President] that is 
essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
society.'' Such acts are ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
because they inevitably subvert the respect for law which is 
essential to the well-being of our constitutional system.
    A similar point is made by a contemporary commentator who 
has argued:

    . . . [T]here are certain statutory crimes that, if 
committed by public officials, reflect such lapses of judgment, 
such disregard for the welfare of the state, and such lack of 
respect for the law and the office held that the occupants may 
be impeached and removed, for lacking the minimal level of 
integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the 
responsibilities of office.

    Such a lack of the minimal level of integrity necessary for 
the proper discharge of the duties of the Presidency is 
evidenced by the commission of the statutory crimes of perjury 
and obstruction of justice.
    Contrary to the claim that has been made by some, the issue 
before the Senate is not whether the offenses of this President 
will destroy our Constitution. We all know that our system of 
government will not come tumbling down because of the corrupt 
conduct of William Jefferson Clinton. Our Republic will survive 
the crimes of this President. No one doubts that. Of course, 
the same could be said of all the other Federal officials who 
have been impeached and removed from office. And the same might 
be said of the crimes--serious as they were--of President 
Richard Nixon.
    But the removal power is not restricted to offenses that 
would directly destroy our Constitution or system of 
government. The removal power is not so limited that it can be 
brought into play only when the immediate destruction of our 
institutions is threatened.
    On the contrary, the removal power should be understood as 
a positive grant of authority to the Senate to preserve, 
protect and strengthen our constitutional system against the 
misconduct of federal officials when that misconduct would 
subvert, undermine, or weaken the institutions of our 
government. It is a power that has the positive purpose of 
maintaining the health and well-being of our system of 
government.
    This power--the awesome power of removal vested in the 
Senate--carries with it an awesome responsibility. This power 
imposes on the Senate the responsibility to exercise its 
judgment in establishing the standards of conduct that are 
necessary to preserve, protect, and strengthen the Constitution 
which has served the people of the United States so well for 
more than two centuries.
    Thus, the crucial issue before the Senate is what standard 
will be set for the conduct of the President of the United 
States. In this case, the Senate necessarily will establish 
such a standard. And make no mistake about it: the choice the 
Senate makes in this case will have consequences reverberating 
far into the future of our Republic. Will a President who has 
committed serious offenses against the system of justice be 
called to account for his crimes, or will his offenses be 
regarded as of no constitutional consequence? Will a standard 
be established that such crimes by a President will not be 
tolerated, or will the standard be that--at least in some 
cases--a President may ``remain in office with all his infamy'' 
after lying under oath and obstructing justice?
    Regardless of the choice the Senate makes--whether it 
acquits or convicts the President--a standard will be 
established, and that standard will become an important part of 
our constitutional law of this Nation. The institutions of our 
Government will either be strengthened or weakened as a result. 
And if the Senate acquits this President, the conduct of future 
Presidents will inevitably be affected in ways that we cannot 
now confidently predict.
    I would now like to take a very few minutes to examine some 
of the other specific arguments that have been made that this 
is not a proper case for use of the removal power.
    Some have suggested that in setting a standard in this case 
the Senate should be guided by the popularity of the President. 
It is urged that a popular President--regardless of the 
offenses he may have committed--should not be removed from 
office. Such a view finds no support however, in our 
Constitution. On the contrary, the framers understood that a 
popular President might be guilty of crimes requiring his 
removal from office.
    That is why they included the power of impeachment and 
removal in the Constitution. And that, no doubt, is why they 
specifically provided that an impeached official who was 
convicted and removed might also be perpetually disqualified 
``to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under 
the United States.''
    The potential threat posed to our institutions by 
Presidential misconduct would, in fact, be heightened by the 
popularity of the offending President. The harmful influence 
and example of a popular President would pose a far greater 
danger to the well-being of our Government than the influence 
and example of an unpopular President.
    Moreover, the very framework of our Constitution 
establishing a representative democracy is at odds with the 
notion that the institutions of our Government should respond 
mechanically to the changing tides of public opinion. The 
Senate, in particular, was designed to act on the basis of the 
long-term best interests of the Nation rather than short-term 
political considerations.
    When he was tried by the Senate 130 years ago, President 
Andrew Johnson was overwhelmingly unpopular. If the Senate had 
used Presidential popularity as a guide in the Johnson case, 
there is no doubt that he would have been convicted and removed 
from office. Yet today there is widespread agreement that such 
action by the Senate would have been an abuse of the 
constitutional process, and those who refused to use 
Presidential popularity as their guide are hailed as great 
statesmen and heroes. Those Senators who then stood against the 
tide of public sentiment today are revered as champions of 
constitutional government.
    A popular President guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors 
should no more remain in office than an unpopular President 
innocent of wrongdoing should be removed from office. Under the 
standards of the Constitution, popularity is not a sufficient 
guide.
    Nor should the Senate be swayed by the claims that setting 
a standard adverse to this President will weaken the 
institution of the Presidency. Describing the role of 
impeachment under our Constitution, Arthur M. Schlesinger, 
Jr.--who I will candidly admit takes a different view of the 
matter today--wisely observed that:

    The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could 
punish the man without punishing the office. For, in the 
Presidency as elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to do 
good meant also the power to do harm, the power to serve the 
republic also the power to demean and defile it.

    Rather than weakening the Presidency, the removal from 
office of a President who has violated his constitutional duty 
and oath of office will reestablish the integrity of the 
Presidency. Setting a standard against the acts of perjury and 
obstruction of justice committed by President Clinton will 
reaffirm the dignity and the honor of the Office of Chief 
Executive under our Constitution. That will strengthen--not 
weaken--the institution of the Presidency.
    It has even been argued that the impeachment and removal of 
President Clinton would result in the virtual alteration of our 
system of government. It is contended that following the 
constitutional process in this case would move us toward a 
transformation of our Constitution: a quasi-parliamentary 
system, with the President serving at the pleasure of the 
legislative branch, would replace the framework based on the 
separation of powers.
    I am, frankly, reluctant to dignify this argument by 
responding to it. President Nixon was driven from office for 
his crimes under threat of impeachment and removal. The 
disruption of the framework of our Government did not ensue. 
President Clinton may be removed from office for his crimes. 
The constitutional system will remain sound.
    Who has so little confidence in the durability of the 
institutions of our Government that he would allow a President 
guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice to remain in 
office simply on the basis of a fanciful and irrational fear of 
the supposed consequences of his removal?
    The Constitution contains wise safeguards against the 
misuse of the impeachment and removal power. As a practical 
matter, as we all know, the requirement of a two-thirds vote 
for conviction virtually ensures that a President will only be 
removed when a compelling case for removal has been made. And 
the periodic accountability to the people of Members of both 
the House and the Senate serves as a check on the improvident 
use of the impeachment power for unworthy or insubstantial 
reasons. Those who would abuse the power of impeachment and 
removal will be deterred by the certain knowledge that they 
ultimately must answer to the people.
    But, of course, the ultimate safeguard against the abuse of 
this power is in the sober deliberation and sound judgment of 
the Senate itself. The framers of the Constitution vested the 
removal power and responsibility in the Senate because, as 
Hamilton observed, they ``thought the Senate the most fit 
depositary of this important trust.'' The Senate was, in the 
view of the framers, uniquely qualified to exercise the ``awful 
discretion, which a court of impeachment must necessarily 
have.'' As Hamilton explained:

    Where else, than in the Senate could have been found a 
tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? 
What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in 
its own situation, to preserve unawed and uninfluenced the 
necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the 
representatives of the people, his accusers.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, this is the great trust 
which the Constitution has reposed in you. It is a trust you 
exercise not only for those who elected you but for all other 
Americans, including generations yet unborn.
    As you carry out this trust, we do not suggest that you 
hold this President or any President to a standard of 
perfection. We do not assert that this President or any 
President be called to account before the Senate for his 
personal failings or his sins. We will leave the President's 
sins to his family and to God. Nor do we suggest that this 
President or any President should be removed from office for 
offenses that are not serious and grave.
    But we do submit that when this President, or any 
President, has committed serious offenses against the system of 
justice--offenses involving the stubborn and calculated choice 
to place personal interest ahead of the public interest--he 
must not be allowed to act with impunity.
    Mr. Manager Graham has reviewed the recent precedents of 
the Senate, establishing that offenses such as those committed 
by this President are grounds for removal from office. Those 
precedents, which were set in the impeachment trials of Federal 
judges, are rejected as totally irrelevant by the President's 
lawyers. They urge that a lower standard of integrity be 
established in this case for the President of the United States 
than the standard which the Senate has already established for 
Federal judges.
    But the Constitution contains a single standard for the 
exercise of the impeachment and removal power. You have heard 
it before, but I will repeat. Article II, section 4, provides:

    The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.

    And there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting that 
criminal offenses which constitute high crimes and misdemeanors 
if committed by one Federal official will not be high crimes 
and misdemeanors if committed by another Federal official. 
There is nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the 
President should be especially insulated from the just 
consequences of his criminal conduct.
    Justice Joseph Story warned long ago against countenancing 
``so absolute a despotism of opinion and practice, which might 
make that a crime at one time, or in one person, which would be 
deemed innocent at another time, or in another person.''
    The Senate should heed the warning of Justice Story and 
refuse to arbitrarily establish a different standard for 
judging William Jefferson Clinton than the standard it has 
imposed already on others brought before the bar of the Senate 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
    The Senate has never accepted the view that a separate 
standard applies to the impeachment and removal of Federal 
judges. Indeed, the Senate has specifically rejected attempts 
to establish such a separate standard for judicial officers. 
Every judge who has been impeached and removed from office has 
been found guilty of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    Contrary to the argument advanced by some, the 
constitutional provision that judges ``shall hold their offices 
during good Behaviour'' does not establish any authority to 
remove a judge for misconduct other than for those offenses 
involving treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. Rather than establishing a standard for removal, 
the ``good behavior'' clause simply provides for life tenure 
for all article III judges. To accept the ``good behavior'' 
clause, I would caution you to accept it as a separate basis 
for the removal of Federal judges would pose a serious threat 
to the independence of the judiciary under our Constitution.
    Members of the Senate, the integrity of the administration 
of justice depends not only on the integrity of judges, but 
also on the integrity of the President. A President who has 
committed perjury and obstruction of justice is hardly fit to 
oversee the enforcement of the laws of the United States. As 
Professor Jonathan Turley has pointed out:

    As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate 
authority over the Justice Department and the Administration's 
enforcement policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can 
legitimately threaten, let alone prosecute, citizens who have 
committed perjury or obstruction of justice under circumstances 
nearly identical to the President's. Such inherent conflict 
will be even greater in the military cases and the President's 
role as Commander-in-Chief.

    It would indeed be anomalous for the Senate to now hold the 
President of the United States to a lower standard of integrity 
than the standard applied to members of the judiciary. There is 
no sensible constitutional rationale for such a lower standard.
    Who could successfully defend the view that in the 
framework established by our Constitution the integrity of the 
Chief Executive is of less importance than the integrity of any 
one of the hundreds of Federal judicial officers? It is the 
President who appoints Justices of the Supreme Court and all 
other Federal judges. It is the President who appoints the 
Attorney General. It is the President who appoints the Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the President who 
has the unreviewable power to grant pardons.
    The power of the President far surpasses the power of any 
other individual under our Constitution. The authority and 
discretion vested in him under the Constitution and laws is 
great and wide-ranging. The requirement that he act with 
integrity and that he be a person of integrity is essential to 
the integrity of our system of government.
    Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that ``an inviolable respect for the 
Constitution and the Laws'' is the ``most sacred duty and the 
greatest source of security in a Republic.'' Hamilton 
understood that respect for the Constitution itself grows out 
of a general respect for the law. And he understood the 
essential connection between respect for the law and the 
maintenance of liberty in a Republic. Without respect for the 
law, the foundation of our Constitution is not secure. Without 
respect for the law, our freedom is at risk. Thus, according to 
Hamilton, those who ``set examples which undermine or subvert 
the authority of the laws lead us from freedom to slavery. . . 
.''
    Early in this century, Justice Brandeis spoke of the harm 
to our system of Government which occurs when officials of the 
Government act in a lawless manner. Justice Brandeis said:

    Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that 
are commands to the citizens. In a government of laws, 
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the 
omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole 
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government 
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

    To conclude, I would observe in the case before it now, the 
Senate must decide if William Jefferson Clinton as President 
will be ``subjected to the same rules of conduct that are 
commands to the citizens.'' It is no answer that he may one day 
after leaving office perhaps be called to account in a criminal 
court proceeding somewhere. Justice delayed is justice denied. 
Because he has taken and violated the oath as President, 
William Jefferson Clinton is answerable for his crimes to the 
Senate here and now.
    Will he as President be vindicated by the Senate in the 
face of crimes for which other citizens are adjudicated felons 
and sent to prison? Or will this Senate, acting in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution, bring him as President 
into submission to the commands of the law? Will the Senate 
give force to the constitutional provision for impeachment and 
removal which Justice Story said ``compels the chief 
magistrate, as well as the humblest citizen, to bend to the 
majesty of the laws''?
    ``For good or ill'' William Jefferson Clinton ``teaches the 
whole people by [his] example'' as President. The President is 
not only the head of Government but also the head of State. As 
President he has a unique ability to command the attention of 
the whole Nation. In his words and his deeds he represents the 
American people and the system of government in a way that no 
other American can. Great honor and respect accrue to him by 
virtue of the high office he holds. The influence of his 
example is far-reaching and profound.
    By his conduct, President William Jefferson Clinton has set 
an example the Senate cannot ignore. By his example he has set 
a dangerous and subversive standard of conduct. His calculated 
and stubbornly persistent misconduct while serving as President 
of the United States has set a pernicious example of 
lawlessness--an example which by its very nature subverts 
respect for the law. His perverse example has the inevitable 
effect of undermining the integrity of both the office of 
President and the administration of justice.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I humbly submit to you 
that his harmful example as President must not stand. The 
maintenance in office of a President guilty of perjury and 
obstruction of justice is inconsistent with the maintenance of 
the rule of law.
    In light of the historic purpose of impeachment, the 
offenses charged against the President demand that the Senate 
convict and remove him. He must not ``remain in office with all 
his infamy.'' Our Constitution requires that this President who 
has shown such disrespect for the truth, such disrespect for 
the law, and such disrespect for the dignity of his high office 
be brought to justice for his high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if there is no objection, I 
ask unanimous consent that the court of impeachment proceedings 
stand in recess for one hour. We will return at 2:10 p.m.
    There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:11 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to 
proceed now with the next manager. I believe it is Mr. Manager 
Gekas.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
    Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, the President's 
counsel, Members of the House who form our group of managers, 
and Members of the Senate, we bring you to what now may be the 
culmination of the work and effort of the managers and of the 
House of Representatives for, and what is fast closing in to 
be, your final consideration. And that is true--the moment of 
truth is fast approaching.
    That moment of truth will swoop down on you at some point 
in the near future, at which time the millions of words that 
have been spoken thus far, the thousands of pages of documents, 
hundreds of exhibits, and dozens of individuals who have been 
involved in the preparation, annotation, and accumulation of 
all the data and evidence--all of that will be funneled into 
that last moment you will have right before you cast that final 
vote. That is an awesome moment in the history of this Chamber, 
in the personal history of your own careers in public service, 
and of your own life, as well, your personal life, your 
surroundings, your family, all that means anything and 
everything to you. That moment of truth encompasses all of that 
in one fell swoop at that final time that is upon us.
    We would not have even had to contemplate this, nor would 
you have had to, if very early on in the factual situation that 
arose in this case President Clinton had faced his moment of 
truth. As I pointed out yesterday, that first moment of truth 
that faced the President in the legal proceedings that were to 
engulf him at a later point was his answers, the answers that 
affixed to that first set of interrogatories under oath. The 
moment of truth was staring him right in the face, and if he 
would have acknowledged it at that moment, had paid faith and 
allegiance to that moment, we would not be arguing here today, 
nor would we have even heard of a possible impeachment inquiry. 
But the President chose to sweep away that moment of truth that 
was at hand and proceeded down the course that has led us to 
this moment.
    In the words of our colleagues who made magnificent 
presentations of the facts and law to you, the words ``truth'' 
and ``fairness'' were some of the strongest and most profound 
that we heard in various degrees in touching upon various 
subjects that were important to our presentation. When I heard 
my colleagues emphasize those words, it dawned on me that the 
element of fairness is something which I submit to you and 
certify to you that these managers, the members of the 
committee who prepared this case, exalted in making certain 
would apply to their endeavors and to all that we would present 
to you--fairness.
    When the record of the independent counsel, the referral, 
reached our doorsteps back in September of 1997 and we first 
read the details and allegations contained therein, we did not, 
as some people began to accuse and to orate, adopt 100 percent 
of what the independent counsel said were the allegations and 
accept them as fact, and then move on and skip from September 
to this moment, not having used our intellect, our sympathies, 
our sense of right, our sense of wrong, our sense of fairness, 
our elements of truth, our experience, our own intellect, and 
our own consciences. We didn't set all of those aside and take 
the referral of Kenneth Starr and make that the final moment 
that precedes your moment of truth. Everyone should know that. 
But it is not recognized. We have been pilloried many times 
over the course of these proceedings on the notion that we 
simply adopted that referral and walked with it into the Senate 
Chamber.
    One thing has to be said right at the outset. When I saw 
one allegation of the independent counsel that was encompassed 
around the question of executive privilege, an allegation that 
the assertion by President Clinton of executive privilege in 
the context of all that had transpired in this case constituted 
an abuse of power, I must tell you that that hit me right 
between the eyes. I could not, by even just reading it, accept 
it at face value. From that moment until this, I had serious, 
grave doubts that we should embark upon a course in which we 
would somehow denigrate the issue and privilege known as 
``executive privilege.''
    As I worried about this and as I moved on through the 
process, trying to do my duty, along with everyone else, there 
came a time in the deliberations of our committee, our managers 
group, that we felt--and we acted on that feeling--that 
executive privilege is something that is owed to the President, 
and that we cannot fairly strip that away from him or in any 
way diminish the power and the usability of executive 
privilege. We felt that that was a trapping and a power of the 
Executive, of the President of the United States, which, no 
matter how it is exerted, or thereafter possibly set aside by 
the court, which is always a possibility, and history has shown 
that it has occurred.
    Nevertheless, the exertion of it, the assertion of it, the 
use of it, the feel for it that the President of the United 
States must have and should have in the first instance, to 
assert it, should not be a part of our criticism, our 
projection of this case.
    We felt pretty strongly about it, and we took action on 
that front by deciding among ourselves that one of the proposed 
articles--and that was bound to reach you if we had not acted 
as we did--we decided that we were going to remove that from 
the allegations in any of the articles of impeachment and not 
refer to it, except in the context in which I am referring to 
it, which is reporting to you what happened with that 
particular issue.
    We did that in the face of the knowledge that in all our 
readings, in all our literature, we noted that when President 
Nixon attempted to use executive privilege, it was soundly 
criticized, and part of the impeachment process carried his 
alleged abuse of executive privilege as one of the tenets of 
that proceeding. And the report shows executive privilege as 
being ill-used by President Nixon.
    But here is the point. The managers and I and every Member 
of the Senate, every individual who is with us here today 
reveres the Office of the Presidency. We respect the Office of 
the Presidency. The Presidency is we. The Presidency is 
America. The Presidency is the banner under which we all work 
and live and strive in this Nation. We revere the Presidency. 
Any innuendo, or any kind of impulse that anyone has to 
attribute any kind of motivation on the part of these men of 
honor who have prepared this case for you today on any whim on 
their part other than to do their constitutional duty should be 
rebuffed at every conversation, at every meeting, at every 
writing that will ultimately flow from the proceedings upon 
which we have embarked. We revere the Presidency. As a matter 
of fact, when next week we face the prospect of the President 
of the United States entering the House of Representatives to 
deliver his State of the Union message, we will greet the 
President. We will accord him the respect for the office which 
he holds. He is our President. He occupies the Presidency. And 
we will honor that. And so should we all.
    But we are capable of and must, in the face of the solemn 
duty that we have, compartmentalize in the purest sense in 
greeting the President and applauding his entrance into the 
State of the Union message. As we will accord him that 
privilege, we do not set aside the impeachment inquiry. We do 
not set aside the serious charges that are hoisted against him 
at that juncture, because we will resume the consideration of 
them in due course. But in the meantime, we compartmentalize 
ourselves as Americans recognizing that he holds the most 
powerful, most respected, and most admired office on the face 
of the globe. That is part of our duty, as it is our duty to 
impart our knowledge and our work, our theories, and our 
analysis to the impeachment proceedings which are at hand.
    ``These are times that try men's souls,'' someone said. It 
was not my mother. And it is true. But anyone who can feel that 
the final votes that will take place on the part of each 
individual Member of the Senate, that a vote for conviction is 
based on a distaste for Bill Clinton, hatred of Bill Clinton--
that kind of vote for conviction should never be recognized or 
countenanced, and history will condemn any individual who does 
that. And if the votes at the last moment, at this moment of 
truth, are based on an admiration of President Clinton, of 
friendship with President Clinton, a deep tie to and with the 
President, on family and community and national matters, a vote 
of acquittal should not be based on that. But only the Senate 
and each individual conscience will determine how that final 
vote is cast.
    We cannot account for the friendship or enmity that might 
exist with and for President Clinton. All we can do is to do 
the job that was thrust upon us, that was placed in our hands 
by a statute that this Congress created--that independent 
counsel statute. The Congress said that we had to listen to the 
referral, to accept the referral. The Congress said that we 
must look towards whatever recommendations might be contained 
in that. It was the Congress, our Congress--many of you who 
voted for that statute--which mandated that we consider all of 
this. We did not simply walk around one day and seize upon a 
moment of deep thought and say: Let's impeach the President; 
let's find something upon which we can base a full 6 months' 
inquiry into the President's actions in front of a court.
    This was a duty, much as it is your duty to stay here and 
listen to what I am saying. The duty I have of presenting it to 
you and speaking to you is born of the same statute and of the 
same process and of the same constitutional background that we 
all share.
    So it worries me and us that any awkward motivation would 
be attributed to any one of us or collectively to us. And once 
you render your vote, I am not going to question whether it was 
done out of blind loyalty or enmity or friendship with the 
President; I am going to judge it as an American citizen, a 
Member of the House of Representatives, a Member of Congress, 
an interested community leader, and, last but not least, as a 
pure American citizen eager to do one's duty.
    As the moment of truth approaches, there is only one 
speaker left for us in the Senate Chamber here to contemplate, 
and that is the summation to be given by the esteemed chairman 
of our committee. You should know, as we all feel, that the 
most stringent duty that he ever performed, the gentleman from 
Illinois, was to manage the managers. But he did that just as 
well and as profoundly as he has approached every single facet 
of this case. For as he sums up, know for a certainty that he 
brings to the podium our collective thoughts, our collective 
emotions, our passions for our work and our duty, and with an 
eye towards serving you, as we serve our constituents, as we 
serve the Congress, as we serve America. We are 20 minutes 
closer now to that moment of truth. Keep in mind your own 
histories, the history of your relationship with your 
colleagues in the Congress, and above all, the duty to the 
United States.
    Mr. Hyde.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the 
President, distinguished Members of the Senate, 136 years ago, 
at a small military cemetery in Pennsylvania, one of Illinois' 
most illustrious sons asked a haunting question--whether a 
nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition 
that all men are created equal can long endure. America is an 
experiment never finished. It is a work in progress. And so 
that question has to be answered by each generation for itself, 
just as we will have to answer whether this Nation can long 
endure.
    This controversy began with the fact that the President of 
the United States took an oath to tell the truth in his 
testimony before the grand jury, just as he had on two prior 
occasions sworn a solemn oath to preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution and to faithfully execute the laws of the 
United States.
    One of the most memorable aspects of this proceeding was 
the solemn occasion wherein every Senator in this Chamber took 
an oath to do impartial justice under the Constitution.
    But I must say, despite massive and relentless efforts to 
change the subject, the case before you Senators is not about 
sexual misconduct, infidelity or adultery--those are private 
acts and none of our business. It is not even a question of 
lying about sex. The matter before this body is a question of 
lying under oath. This is a public act.
    The matter before you is a question of the willful, 
premeditated, deliberate corruption of the Nation's system of 
justice, through perjury and obstruction of justice. These are 
public acts, and when committed by the chief law enforcement 
officer of the land, the one who appoints every United States 
district attorney, every Federal judge, every member of the 
Supreme Court, the Attorney General--they do become the concern 
of Congress.
    That is why your judgment, respectfully, should rise above 
politics, above partisanship, above polling data. This case is 
a test of whether what the Founding Fathers described as 
``sacred honor'' still has meaning in our time: two hundred 
twenty-two years after those two words--``sacred honor''--were 
inscribed in our country's birth certificate, our national 
charter of freedom, our Declaration of Independence.
    Every school child in the United States has an intuitive 
sense of the ``sacred honor'' that is one of the foundation 
stones of the American house of freedom. For every day, in 
every classroom in America, our children and grandchildren 
pledge allegiance to a nation ``under God.'' That statement is 
not a prideful or arrogant claim. It is a statement of 
humility: all of us, as individuals, stand under the judgment 
of God, or the transcendent truths by which we hope, finally, 
to be judged.
    So does our country.
    The Presidency is an office of trust. Every public office 
is a public trust, but the Office of President is a very 
special public trust. The President is the trustee of the 
national conscience. No one owns the Office of President, the 
people do. The President is elected by the people and their 
representatives in the electoral college. And in accepting the 
burdens of that great office, the President, in his inaugural 
oath, enters into a covenant--a binding agreement of mutual 
trust and obligation--with the American people.
    Shortly after his election and during his first months in 
office, President Clinton spoke with some frequency about a 
``new covenant'' in America. In this instance, let us take the 
President at his word: that his office is a covenant--a solemn 
pact of mutual trust and obligation--with the American people. 
Let us take the President seriously when he speaks of 
covenants: because a covenant is about promise-making and 
promise-keeping. For it is because the President has defaulted 
on the promises he made--it is because he has violated the 
oaths he has sworn--that he has been impeached.
    The debate about impeachment during the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 makes it clear that the Framers of the 
Constitution regarded impeachment and removal from office on 
conviction as a remedy for a fundamental betrayal of trust by 
the President. The framers had vested the Presidential office 
with great powers. They knew that those powers could be--and 
would be--abused if any President were to violate, in a 
fundamental way, the oath he had sworn to faithfully execute 
the Nation's laws.
    For if the President did so violate his oath of office, the 
covenant of trust between himself and the American people would 
be broken.
    Today, we see something else: that the fundamental trust 
between America and the world can be broken, if a Presidential 
Perjurer represents our country in world affairs. If the 
President calculatedly and repeatedly violates his oath, if the 
President breaks the covenant of trust he has made with the 
American people, he can no longer be trusted. And, because the 
Executive plays so large a role in representing the country to 
the world, America can no longer be trusted.
    It is often said that we live in an age of increasing 
interdependence. If that is true, and the evidence for it is 
all around us, then the future will require an even stronger 
bond of trust between the President and the Nation because with 
increasing interdependence comes an increased necessity of 
trust.
    This is one of the basic lessons of life. Parents and 
children know this. Husbands and wives know it. Teachers and 
students know it, as do doctors and patients, suppliers and 
customers, lawyers and clients, clergy and parishioners: the 
greater the interdependence, the greater the necessity of 
trust; the greater the interdependence, the greater the 
imperative of promise-keeping.
    Trust, not what James Madison called the ``parchment 
barriers'' of laws, is the fundamental bond between the people 
and their elected representatives, between those who govern and 
those who are governed. Trust is the mortar that secures the 
foundations of the American house of freedom. And the Senate of 
the United States, sitting in judgment in this impeachment 
trial, should not ignore, or minimize, or dismiss the fact that 
the bond of trust has been broken, because the President has 
violated both his oaths of office and the oath he took before 
his grand jury testimony.
    In recent months, it has often been asked--so what? What is 
the harm done by this lying under oath, by this perjury? Well, 
what is an oath? An oath is an asking almighty God to witness 
to the truth of what you are saying. Truth telling--truth 
telling is the heart and soul of our justice system.
    I think the answer would have been clear to those who once 
pledged their sacred honor to the cause of liberty. The answer 
would have been clear to those who crafted the world's most 
enduring written constitution.
    No greater harm can be done than breaking the covenant of 
trust between the President and the people; among the three 
branches of our Government; and between the country and the 
world.
    For to break that covenant of trust is to dissolve the 
mortar that binds the foundation stones of our freedom into a 
secure and solid edifice. And to break that covenant of trust 
by violating one's oath is to do grave damage to the rule of 
law among us.
    That none of us is above the law is a bedrock principle of 
democracy. To erode that bedrock is to risk even further 
injustice. To erode that bedrock is to subscribe, to a ``divine 
right of kings'' theory of governance, in which those who 
govern are absolved from adhering to the basic moral standards 
to which the governed are accountable. We must never tolerate 
one law for the ruler and another for the ruled. If we do, we 
break faith with our ancestors from Bunker Hill, Lexington and 
Concord to Flanders Field, Normandy, Iwo Jima, Panmunjom, 
Saigon and Desert Storm.
    Let us be clear: The vote that you are asked to cast is, in 
the final analysis, a vote about the rule of law.
    The rule of law is one of the great achievements of our 
civilization. For the alternative to the rule of law is the 
rule of raw power. We here today are the heirs of 3,000 years 
of history in which humanity slowly, painfully and at great 
cost, evolved a form of politics in which law, not brute force, 
is the arbiter of our public destinies.
    We are the heirs of the Ten Commandments and the Mosaic 
law: a moral code for a free people who, having been liberated 
from bondage, saw in law a means to avoid falling back into the 
habit of slaves. We are the heirs of Roman law: the first legal 
system by which peoples of different cultures, languages, 
races, and religions came to live together in a form of 
political community. We are the heirs of the Magna Carta, by 
which the freeman of England began to break the arbitrary and 
unchecked power of royal absolutism. We are the heirs of a long 
tradition of parliamentary development, in which the rule of 
law gradually came to replace royal prerogative as the means 
for governing a society of free men and women. Yes, we are the 
heirs of 1776, and of an epic moment in human affairs when the 
founders of this Republic pledged their lives, fortunes and, 
yes, their sacred honor, to the defense of the rule of law. We 
are the heirs of a tragic civil war, which vindicated the rule 
of law over the appetites of some for owning others. We are the 
heirs of the 20th century's great struggles against 
totalitarianism, in which the rule of law was defended at 
immense cost against the worst tyrannies in human history. The 
``rule of law'' is no pious aspiration from a civics textbook. 
The rule of law is what stands between all of us and the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the state. The rule of law is 
the safeguard of our liberties. The rule of law is what allows 
us to live our freedom in ways that honor the freedom of others 
while strengthening the common good.
    Lying under oath is an abuse of freedom. Obstruction of 
justice is a degradation of law. There are people in prison for 
just such offenses. What in the world do we say to them about 
equal justice if we overlook this conduct in the President?
    Some may say, as many have said in recent months, that this 
is to pitch the matter too high. The President's lie, it is 
said, was about a ``trivial matter;'' it was a lie to spare 
embarrassment about misconduct on a ``private occasion.''
    The confusing of what is essentially a private matter, and 
none of our business, with lying under oath to a court and a 
grand jury has been only one of the distractions with which we 
have had to deal.
    Senators, as men and women with a serious experience of 
public affairs, we can all imagine a situation in which a 
President might shade the truth when a great issue of the 
national interest or the national security was at stake. We 
have all been over that terrain. We know the thin ice on which 
any of us skates when blurring the edges of the truth for what 
we consider a compelling, demanding public purpose.
    Morally serious men and women can imagine circumstances, at 
the far edge of the morally permissible, when, with the gravest 
matters of national interest at stake, a President could shade 
the truth in order to serve the common good. But under oath, 
for a private pleasure?
    In doing this, the Office of President of the United States 
has been debased and the justice system jeopardized.
    In doing this, he has broken his covenant of trust with the 
American people.
    The framers also knew that the Office of President of the 
United States could be gravely damaged if it continued to be 
unworthily occupied. That is why they devised the process of 
impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate. It is, in 
truth, a direct process. If, on impeachment, the President is 
convicted, he is removed from office--and the office itself 
suffers no permanent damage. If, on impeachment, the President 
is acquitted, the issue is resolved once and for all, and the 
office is similarly protected from permanent damage.
    But if, on impeachment, the President is not convicted and 
removed from office despite the fact that numerous Senators are 
convinced that he has, in the words of one proposed resolution 
of censure, ``egregiously failed'' the test of his oath of 
office, ``violated the trust of the American people,'' and 
``dishonored the office which they entrusted to him,'' then the 
Office of the Presidency has been deeply and perhaps 
permanently damaged.
    And that is a further reason why President Clinton must be 
convicted of the charges brought before you by the House and 
removed from office. To fail to do so, while conceding that the 
President has engaged in egregious and dishonorable behavior 
that has broken the covenant of trust between himself and the 
American people, is to diminish the Office of President of the 
United States in an unprecedented and unacceptable way.
    Senators, please permit me a word on my own behalf and on 
behalf of my colleagues of the House. It is necessary to 
clarify an important point.
    None of us comes to this Chamber today without a profound 
sense of our own responsibilities in life, and of the many ways 
in which we have failed to meet those responsibilities, to one 
degree or another. None of us comes before you claiming to be a 
perfect man or a perfect citizen, just as none of you imagines 
yourself perfect. All of us, Members of the House and Senate, 
know that we come to this difficult task as flawed human 
beings, under judgment.
    That is the way of this world: flawed human beings must, 
according to the rule of law, judge other flawed human beings.
    But the issue before the Senate of the United States is not 
the question of its own Members' personal moral condition. Nor 
is the issue before the Senate the question of the personal 
moral condition of the Members of the House of Representatives. 
The issue here is whether the President has violated the rule 
of law and thereby broken his covenant of trust with the 
American people. This is a public issue, involving the gravest 
matter of the public interest. And it is not affected, one way 
or another, by the personal moral condition of any Member of 
either House of Congress, or by whatever expressions of 
personal chagrin the President has managed to express.
    Senators, we of the House do not come before you today 
lightly. And, if you will permit me, it is a disservice to the 
House to suggest that it has brought these articles of 
impeachment before you in a mean-spirited or irresponsible way. 
That is not true.
    We have brought these articles of impeachment because we 
are convinced, in conscience, that the President of the United 
States lied under oath; that the President committed perjury on 
several occasions before a Federal grand jury. We have brought 
these articles of impeachment because we are convinced, in 
conscience, that the President willfully obstructed justice and 
thereby threatened the legal system he swore a solemn oath to 
protect and defend.
    These are not trivial matters. These are not partisan 
matters. These are matters of justice, the justice that each of 
you has taken a solemn oath to serve in this trial.
    Some of us have been called ``Clinton-haters.'' I must tell 
you, distinguished Senators, that this impeachment is not, for 
those of us from the House, a question of hating anyone. This 
is not a question of whom we hate. It is a question of what we 
love. And among the things we love is the rule of law, equal 
justice before the law, and honor in our public life. All of us 
are trying as hard as we can to do our duty as we see it--no 
more and no less.
    Senators, this trial is being watched around the world. 
Some of those watching, thinking themselves superior in their 
cynicism, wonder what it is all about. But others know.
    Political prisoners know that this is about the rule of 
law--the great alternative to arbitrary and unchecked state 
power.
    The families of executed dissidents know that this is about 
the rule of law--the great alternative to the lethal abuse of 
power by the state.
    Those yearning for freedom know that this is about the rule 
of law--the hard-won structure by which men and women can live 
by their God-given dignity and secure their God-given rights in 
ways that serve the common good.
    If they know this, can we not know it?
    If, across the river in Arlington Cemetery, there are 
American heroes who died in defense of the rule of law, can we 
give less than the full measure of our devotion to that great 
cause?
    I wish to read you a letter I recently received that 
expresses my feelings far better than my poor words:

    Dear Chairman Hyde: My name is William Preston Summers. How are you 
doing? I am a third grader in room 504 at Chase Elementary School in 
Chicago. I am writing this letter because I have something to tell you. 
I have thought of a punishment for the president of the United States 
of America. The punishment should be that he should write a 100 word 
essay by hand. I have to write an essay when I lie. It is bad to lie 
because it just gets you in more trouble. I hate getting in trouble.
    It is just like the boy who cried wolf, and the wolf ate the boy. 
It is important to tell the truth. I like to tell the truth because it 
gets you in less trouble. If you do not tell the truth people do not 
believe you.
    It is important to believe the president because he is a important 
person. If you can not believe the president who can you believe. If 
you have no one to believe in then how do you run your life. I do not 
believe the president tells the truth anymore right now. After he 
writes the essay and tells the truth, I will believe him again.
                                                   William Summers.

    Then there is a P.S. from his dad:

    Dear Representative Hyde: I made my son William either write you a 
letter or an essay as a punishment for lying. Part of his defense for 
his lying was the President lied. He is still having difficulty 
understanding why the President can lie and not be punished.
                                                     Bobby Summers.

    Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, on June 6, 1994, it was the 
50th anniversary of the Americans landing at Normandy. I went 
ashore at Normandy, walked up to the cemetery area, where as 
far as the eye could see there were white crosses, Stars of 
David. And the British had a bagpipe band scattered among the 
crucifixes, the crosses, playing ``Amazing Grace'' with that 
peaceful, mournful sound that only the bagpipe can make. If you 
could keep your eyes dry you were better than I.
    But I walked to one of these crosses marking a grave 
because I wanted to personalize the experience. I was looking 
for a name but there was no name. It said, ``Here lies in 
Honored Glory a Comrade in Arms Known but to God.''
    How do we keep faith with that comrade in arms? Go to the 
Vietnam Memorial on the National Mall and press your hands 
against a few of the 58,000 names carved into that wall, and 
ask yourself, How can we redeem the debt we owe all those who 
purchased our freedom with their lives? How do we keep faith 
with them? I think I know. We work to make this country the 
kind of America they were willing to die for. That is an 
America where the idea of sacred honor still has the power to 
stir men's souls.
    My solitary--solitary--hope is that 100 years from today 
people will look back at what we have done and say, ``They kept 
the faith.''
    I am done.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
                                ------                                


         ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, pursuant to the previous 
consent agreement, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
stand in adjournment under that order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senate, under the previous order, stands adjourned until 9:30 
a.m., Tuesday, January 19, at which time it will reconvene in 
legislative session. Under that same order, the Senate will 
next convene as a Court of Impeachment on Tuesday, January 19, 
at 1 p.m. The Senate stands adjourned.
    Thereupon, at 2:53 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned to reconvene in legislative session on 
Tuesday, January 19, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.
                                ------                                


                       Tuesday, January 19, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate reconvened sitting as a Court of Impeachment at 
1 p.m.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the Articles of 
Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that 
the White House presentation today will last approximately 2\1/
2\ hours--maybe a little more, maybe a little less. I therefore 
suggest that a short recess be taken in approximately an hour, 
around 2 o'clock, to allow the Chief Justice and all Members to 
have a brief break.
    I remind all Senators to remain standing at their desk each 
time the Chief Justice enters or departs the Chamber. If there 
is a need for another break, I will keep an eye on the White 
House counsel to see if they need a break, and we will act 
accordingly.
    Of course, I remind Senators again, tonight please be in 
the Chamber at 8:35 so we can proceed to the joint session.
    I thank my colleagues and yield the floor. I believe we are 
ready to begin.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
counsel for the President have 24 hours to make the 
presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you. The 
Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Ruff to begin the presentation of 
the case for the President.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, 
distinguished managers, William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty 
of the charges that have been preferred against him. He did not 
commit perjury; he did not obstruct justice; he must not be 
removed from office.
    Now, merely to say those words brings into sharp relief 
that I and my colleagues are here today in this great Chamber 
defending the President of the United States. For only the 
second time in our Nation's history, the Senate has convened to 
try the President of the United States on articles of 
impeachment.
    There is no one who does not feel the weight of this 
moment. Nonetheless, our role as lawyers is much as it would be 
in any other forum. We will not be able to match the eloquence 
of the 13 managers who spoke to you last week. We will try, 
however, to respond to the charges leveled against the 
President as directly and candidly as possible, and to present 
his defense as clearly and as cogently as we are able. We seek 
on his behalf no more than we know you will give us--a fair 
opportunity to be heard, a fair assessment of the facts and the 
law, and a fair judgment. We will defend the President on the 
facts and on the law and on the constitutional principles that 
must guide your deliberations. Some have suggested that we fear 
to do so. We do not.
    I begin with a recitation of some of the events that have 
brought us here today. Although many of them may be familiar, 
they merit some discussion because they form the backdrop 
against which you must assess the evidence.
    I will then move to a discussion of the constitutional 
principles that, we submit, should guide your consideration of 
these matters and, finally, to an overview of the allegations 
contained in the articles, with a view toward focusing your 
attention on what we believe to be the principal legal and 
factual flaws in the case presented by the managers.
    My colleagues will follow tomorrow and the following day 
with a more detailed analysis of the facts underlying the 
articles. At the end of our presentation, we will have 
demonstrated beyond any doubt that there is no basis on which 
the Senate can or should convict the President of any of the 
charges brought against him.
    Let me begin with a brief recital of the essential events 
in the Paula Jones litigation which underlie so much of what we 
have been discussing for the last week.
    On May 6, 1994, Paula Jones sued President Clinton in the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. She 
claimed that then-Governor Clinton had made, in 1991, some 
unwelcomed overture to her in an Arkansas hotel room and that 
she suffered adverse employment consequences and was 
subsequently defamed.
    After the Supreme Court decided in May 1997 that civil 
litigation against the President could go forward while he was 
in office, the case was remanded to the district court, and 
over the fall and winter of 1997, the Jones lawyers deposed 
numerous witnesses. And inevitably, despite the strict 
protective order entered by Judge Wright, and continuing 
exhortation to counsel not to discuss any aspect of the case 
with the press, information flowed from those depositions into 
the public forum clearly with only one purpose--to embarrass 
the President.
    The principal focus of the discovery being conducted by the 
Jones lawyers during this period was not on the merits of their 
client's case. They devoted most of their time and their energy 
to attempt to pry into the personal life of the President. Mr. 
Bennett, the President's counsel, objected to those efforts on 
the grounds they had no relevance to Ms. Jones' claims and 
intended to do nothing other than to advance the agenda of 
those who were supporting the Jones lawsuit. The Jones lawyers, 
however, pursued their efforts to inquire into the President's 
relations with other women, and on December 11, 1997, Judge 
Wright issued an order allowing questioning regarding only 
``any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations 
or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were 
during the relevant timeframe a State or Federal employee.''
    Then on December 5, 1997, the Jones lawyers placed on their 
witness list the name of Monica Lewinsky. And on December 19, 
she was served with a subpoena for her deposition to be 
scheduled in January.
    Consistent with rulings issued by Judge Wright in 
connection with the Jones lawyers' efforts to secure the 
testimony of a number of other women, some have sought to avoid 
testifying by submitting affidavits to the effect that they had 
no knowledge relevant to Ms. Jones' lawsuit, or that they 
otherwise do not meet the test that Judge Wright had 
established before permitting this invasive discovery to go 
forward.
    On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky did execute such an 
affidavit, and her lawyer provided copies to the lawyers for 
Ms. Jones and for the President on January 15.
    The Jones lawyers deposed the President on January 17, 
1998. They began the deposition by proffering to him a 
multiparagraph definition of the term ``sexual relations'' that 
they intended to use in questioning him. There followed an 
extended debate among counsel and the court concerning the 
propriety and the clarity of that definition. Mr. Bennett 
objected to its use, arguing that it was unclear, that it would 
encompass conduct wholly irrelevant to the case, and that it 
was unfair to require the President to apply a definition that 
he had never seen before to each question he was asked. Indeed, 
Mr. Bennett urged the lawyers for Ms. Jones to ask the 
President specific questions about the conduct, but they 
declined to do so.
    Judge Wright acknowledged the overbreadth of the 
definition, but she ultimately determined that the Jones 
lawyers could use the heavily edited version of the definition 
that left in place only the two lines of paragraph 1, of which 
you are already familiar. Immediately after the extended legal 
skirmishing, the Jones lawyers began asking him about Monica 
Lewinsky.
    Mr. Bennett objected, questioning whether counsel had a 
legitimate basis for their inquiry in light of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit denying a relationship with the President. Judge 
Wright overruled that objection and permitted the Jones lawyers 
to pursue their inquiry. Four days later, the independent 
counsel's investigation became a public matter.
    On January 29, responding to a request by independent 
counsel to bar further inquiry related to Ms. Lewinsky, Judge 
Wright ruled that evidence relating to her relationship with 
the President would be excluded from the trial. She reaffirmed 
this ruling on March 9, stating that the evidence was not 
``essential to the core issues in this case of whether the 
plaintiff herself was the victim of sexual harassment, hostile 
work environment, or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.'' On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright--
    I apologize for the logistical problem. Why don't I just 
hold it.
    On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted summary judgment in 
favor of President Clinton dismissing the Jones suit in its 
entirety. She ruled that no evidence that Ms. Jones had offered 
or that her lawyers had discovered made out any viable claim of 
sexual harassment or intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Importantly, Judge Wright ruled that evidence of any 
pattern or practice of comparable conduct by the President was 
not important to the case.
    I want to take just a moment to read the relevant portions 
of Judge Wright's opinion, not to demean in any sense 
plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment or to suggest that we 
must be other than vigilant to protect the rights of all 
citizens, but simply to bring into slightly sharper focus the 
role that the President's deposition played in the real Jones 
litigation. Judge Wright wrote:

    Whatever relevance such evidence may have to prove other 
elements of plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do 
with the issue presented by the President's and Ferguson's 
motions for summary judgment--i.e. whether plaintiff herself 
was the victim of alleged quid pro quo or a hostile work 
environment or sexual harassment; whether the President and 
Ferguson conspired to deprive her of her civil rights or 
whether she suffered emotional distress so severe in nature 
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. 
Whether other women may have been subjected to workplace 
harassment and whether such evidence has allegedly been 
suppressed does not change the fact that plaintiff has failed 
to demonstrate that she has a case worthy of submitting to a 
jury.

    Ms. Jones appealed Judge Wright's decision to the Eighth 
Circuit. Arguments were heard on October 20, 1998, and on 
November 13, 1998, before the decision was rendered, Ms. Jones 
and the President settled the case.
    Briefly then, to what was happening on the front of the 
independent counsel's office. In mid-January 1998, Linda Tripp 
had brought to the independent counsel information that she had 
been gathering surreptitiously for months about Ms. Lewinsky's 
relationship with the President and her involvement in the 
Jones case. And thus, began the penultimate chapter.
    As you will see, Ms. Tripp's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
and her role in these matters was more than merely a backdrop 
to the succeeding events. Independent counsel met with Ms. 
Tripp and formally granted her immunity from Federal 
prosecution and promised to assist her in securing immunity 
from State prosecution where she had been illegally taping the 
telephone calls with Ms. Lewinsky. On January 13, Ms. Tripp 
agreed to tape a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky under FBI 
auspices. And on January 15, armed with that tape, the 
independent counsel's office first contacted the Department of 
Justice to seek permission from the Attorney General to expand 
its jurisdiction to cover the investigation that had already 
begun. On January 16, that permission was granted by the 
special division of the court of appeals.
    Now, the President's deposition was scheduled to take place 
the very next day--Saturday, January 17. On the 16th, Ms. Tripp 
invited Ms. Lewinsky to have lunch with her at the Pentagon 
City Mall. There she was greeted by four FBI agents and 
independent counsel lawyers and taken to a hotel room where she 
spent the next several hours. Ms. Tripp was in the room next 
door for much of that time. When she left that evening, she 
went home to meet with the Jones lawyers with whom we know she 
had been in contact for many months in order to brief them 
about her knowledge of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky 
and the President so that they, in turn, could question the 
President the next morning.
    As the independent counsel himself has acknowledged, Ms. 
Tripp was able to play this oddly multifaceted role. Because it 
was part of her immunity agreement, the OIC could have 
prevented her from talking about Ms. Lewinsky. They 
inexplicably chose not to.
    The existence of the OIC investigation was made public on 
January 21 in an edition of the Washington Post with the all-
consuming focus of media coverage for the ensuing 8 months.
    On August 17, the President's deposition was taken by the 
independent counsel for use by the grand jury, and on September 
9, there was delivered to the House of Representatives a 
referral of Independent Counsel Starr containing what purported 
to be the information concerning acts ``that may constitute 
grounds for impeachment.'' The referral was accompanied by some 
19 boxes of documents, grand jury transcripts, and a videotape 
of the grand jury testimony.
    The referral was made public by the House on September 11. 
On September 21, additional materials were released, along with 
the President's grand jury videotape that was then played 
virtually nonstop on every television station in the country 
during that day.
    The committee held a total of 4 days of hearings, one for 
preliminary presentations by the majority and minority counsel, 
one for testimony by Independent Counsel Starr, and two in 
which the President was permitted to call witnesses and present 
his defense.
    In addition, the constitutional subcommittee held the one 
hearing on the standards for impeachment, and the committee 
convened in its oversight capacity to hear witnesses on the 
meaning of perjury. The committee called no fact witnesses.
    Despite numerous efforts to extract from the committee some 
description of the specific charges against which the President 
would have to defend himself, it was not until approximately 
4:30 on December 9, as I was completing my testimony before the 
committee, that any such notice was provided, and then it came 
in the form of four draft articles of impeachment.
    Three days later, the committee reported out those 
articles, and on December 9 the House completed its action, 
referring to the Senate article I, the charge of perjury in the 
grand jury; defeated article II, which alleged perjury in the 
Jones deposition; exhibited article III, which charged 
obstruction of justice; and defeating article IV, which alleged 
false statements to the House of Representatives.
    And so we are here. But before moving on, let me pause on 
an important procedural point. Although the Senate has asked 
that the parties address the issue of witnesses only after 
these presentations are completed, the managers spent much of 
their time last week explaining to you why, if only witnesses 
could be called, you would be able to resolve all of the 
supposed conflicts in the evidence. Tell me, then, how is it 
that the managers can be so certain of the strength of their 
case? They didn't hear any of these witnesses. The only witness 
they called, the independent counsel himself, acknowledged that 
he had not even met any of the witnesses who testified before 
the grand jury. Yet, they appeared before you to tell you that 
they are convinced of the President's guilt and that they are 
prepared to demand his removal from office.
    Well, the managers would have you believe that the 
Judiciary Committee of the House were really nothing more than 
grand jurors, serving as some routine screening device to sort 
out impeachment chaff from impeachment wheat. Thus, as they 
would have it, there was no need for anything more than a 
review of the cold record prepared by the independent counsel; 
no need for them to make judgments about credibility or 
conflicts. Indeed, they offered you a short lesson in grand 
jury practice, telling you that U.S. attorneys do this thing 
all the time, that calling real, live witnesses before a grand 
jury is the exception to the rule. Well, it has been a few 
years since I served as U.S. attorney for the District of 
Columbia, so there may have been a change in the way 
prosecutors go about their business, but I don't think so.
    And so what lesson can be learned from the process followed 
by the House? I suggest that what you have before you is not 
the product of the Judiciary Committee's well-considered, 
judicious assessment of their constitutional role. No, what you 
have before you is the product of nothing more than a rush to 
judgment.
    And so how should you respond to the managers' belated plea 
that more is needed to do justice? You should reject it. You 
have before you all that you need to reach this conclusion: 
There was no basis for the House to impeach, and there is no, 
and never will be any, basis for the Senate to convict.
    Now, the managers have not shown, and could not on this 
record or any record prove, that the President committed any of 
the offenses alleged in any of the articles. But even if they 
could, these offenses would not warrant your deciding to remove 
the President from office.
    In this regard, an impeachment trial is unlike any other. 
You are the judges of the law and the facts and the appropriate 
sanctions. Before casting a vote of guilty or not guilty, you 
must decide not only whether the President committed the acts 
with which he is charged but whether those acts so seriously 
undermined the integrity of our governmental structure that he 
must be removed from office.
    I want to deal here for just a moment with an argument that 
was advanced in the press by one of the managers, and that is 
that the question whether the offenses described in the 
articles are impeachable is not really before you, that it has 
already been decided by the House. As the manager put it in a 
press interview, ``Are these impeachable offenses, which I 
think has already been resolved by the House? I think 
constitutionally that's our job to do.''
    Now, I trust, in light of last week's extended discussion, 
that the managers no longer press that notion, for it was 
remarkable in at least three respects. First, it is entirely 
inconsistent with the ``don't worry about it; this is just a 
routine procedural process; leave the difficult decisions to 
the Senate'' argument so frequently heard during the 
proceedings in the House. Second, it is an argument that rings 
hollow coming from those who did not even debate the 
constitutional standards or seek any consensus on what those 
standards should be. And third, and most importantly, it 
arrogates to the House the critical constitutional judgment 
which is yours alone.
    Far be it for me, or indeed anyone else, to instruct this 
body on its constitutional role, but I do think it would help 
us all to be reminded of the words of Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 65, because impeachment necessarily deals with 
injuries done immediately to society. Alexander Hamilton wrote:

    The prosecution of them for this reason will seldom fail to 
agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it 
into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. 
In many cases it will connect itself with the preexisting 
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in 
such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the 
decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of 
the parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or 
guilt.
    The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply 
concerns the political reputation and existence of every man 
engaged in the administration of public affairs speak for 
themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightfully in a 
government resting entirely on the basis of periodical 
elections will as readily be perceived, when it is considered 
that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that 
circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most 
cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account can 
hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards 
those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

    And then:

    The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit 
depositary of this important trust.

    Now, the President may be removed from office only upon 
impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors. The offenses charged here, even 
if supported by the evidence, do not meet that lofty standard, 
a standard that the framers intentionally set at this 
extraordinarily high level to ensure that only the most serious 
offenses and in particular those that subverted our system of 
government would justify overturning a popular election. 
Impeachment is not a remedy for private wrongs. It is a method 
of removing someone whose continued presence in office would 
cause grave danger to the Nation. Listen to the words of 10 
Republican Members of the 1974 Judiciary Committee, one of whom 
now sits in this body.
    After President Nixon's resignation, in an effort to 
articulate a measured and a careful assessment of the issues 
they had confronted, they reviewed the historical origins of 
the impeachment clause and wrote:

    It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, 
that the framers of the United States Constitution intended 
that the President should be removable by the legislative 
branch only for serious misconduct, dangerous to the system of 
government established by the Constitution. Absent the element 
of danger to the State, we believe the delegates to the Federal 
convention of 1787, in providing that the President should 
serve for a fixed elective term rather than during good 
behavior or popularity, struck the balance in favor of 
stability in the executive branch.

    Where did this lesson in constitutional history come from? 
It came directly from the words of the framers in 1787. 
Impeachment was no strange, arcane concept to them. It was 
familiar to them as part of English constitutional practice and 
was part of many State constitutions. It is therefore not 
surprising that whether to make provision for impeachment of 
the President became the focus of contention, especially in the 
context of concern whether in our new republican form of 
government the legislature ought to be entrusted with such a 
power. On this latter point, perhaps foretelling the notion 
that impeachment ought to be a matter of constitutional last 
resort, Benjamin Franklin noted that it at least had the merit 
of being a peaceful alternative to revolution.
    Governor Morris, one of the principal moving forces behind 
the language that ultimately emerged from the convention, 
believed that provision for impeachment should be made but that 
the offenses must be limited and carefully defined. His concern 
was very clearly for the corrupt President who may be bribed by 
a greater interest to betray his trust, as he wrote, and ``no 
one ought to say that we ought to expose ourselves to the 
danger of seeing the first magistrate in foreign pay without 
being able to guard against it by displacing him.''
    Drafts as they emerged from the convention moved through 
one that authorized impeachment for treason or bribery or 
corruption, and then the more limited treason or bribery, until 
the critical debate of December 8, 1787, when, pointing to 
their then-current example of the impeachment of Warren 
Hastings, George Mason moved to add the word 
``maladministration'' to that definition. It was in the face of 
objections from James Madison and Morris, however, that this 
term was too vague and would be the equivalent to tenure during 
the pleasure of the Senate, that Mason withdraw his proposal 
and the convention then adopted the language ``other high 
crimes and misdemeanors against the State.'' As Morris put it, 
``an election every 4 years will prevent maladministration.''
    There is no question that the framers viewed this language 
as responsive to Morris' concerns that the impeachment be 
limited and well defined. To argue, then, as the managers do, 
that the phrase ``other crimes and misdemeanors'' was really 
meant to encompass a wide range of offenses that one might find 
in a compendium of English criminal law simply flies in the 
face of the clear intent of the framers who carefully chose 
their language, knew exactly what those words meant, and knew 
exactly what risks they intended to protect against.
    Looking back on this drafting history, the 1974 minority 
report described the purpose of the framers in these words:

    They were concerned with preserving the Government from 
being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man.

    Now, the managers have made fun of the notion that hundreds 
of distinguished scholars and historians expressed their 
opinion that the offenses with which the President has been 
charged are not high crimes or misdemeanors. Indeed they 
suggested--not too subtly--that they must have signed those 
letters because they were political supporters of the 
President. To quote them, ``You go out and obtain from your 
political allies and friends in the academic world--to sign a 
letter saying the offenses alleged in the articles of 
impeachment do not rise to the level of impeachable offenses.''
    Well, as I understand the managers' position, it is that 
Garry Wills sold his intellectual soul because he is a 
political supporter of the President; Stephen Ambrose sold his 
political soul--his intellectual soul--because he is a 
political supporter of the President; C. Vann Woodward sold his 
intellectual soul because he is a political supporter of the 
President.
    Is it possible, instead, that distinguished scholars of all 
political persuasions thought it important to offer their 
professional opinion on a matter of the greatest historical and 
legal import because they cared about our country? Because they 
cared that the constitutional process not be debased?
    Perhaps, if the majority members of the full Judiciary 
Committee had paused for even a moment to consider these 
issues, if they had taken even a few hours to debate the 
question of what constitutional standards apply, one might now 
give greater credence to the belated constitutional exposition 
that they have offered here. Instead, perhaps the majority was 
convinced by their own rhetoric, by the oft-repeated mantra 
that impeachment is merely a preliminary step in the process 
and that the House need not be concerned with its weighty 
constitutional duty and saw little reason to explore the 
constitutional underpinning of that duty. Or perhaps they 
understood that a full and candid explanation would reveal that 
the proposed articles had no constitutional underpinning at 
all.
    Now, the central premise of the managers' argument appears 
to be this: Perjury is an impeachable offense no matter the 
forum or the circumstances in which it is committed. Second, 
judges have recently been convicted and removed on the basis of 
articles charging that they committed perjury. The President 
committed perjury, therefore the President must be removed as 
well.
    That premise is simple but wrong. The first leg on which it 
rests was removed by the House itself when it voted to defeat 
article II, alleging perjury in a civil deposition, and the 
House thus rejected the committee's core argument that perjury 
in a civil deposition warrants impeachment as much as perjury 
in any other setting. Thus, as to the committee's view that the 
constitutional standard for impeachment requires that all 
perjury be treated alike, the House concluded no, and properly 
so.
    And as to the committee's view that it makes no difference 
whether perjury occurs in one forum or another, in a private or 
an official proceeding, again the House said no, and properly 
so.
    What, then, of the managers' argument that the Senate's 
recent conviction of three judges requires a conviction on the 
articles before you today? Again, they simply have it wrong, 
both as a matter of Senate precedent and as a matter of 
constitutional analysis. They argue that because a judge is 
obliged to faithfully carry out the law just as the President 
is, each must be removed if he commits perjury or obstructs 
justice. Judges and Presidents, and one would presume, all 
other civil officers if you follow their argument to its 
logical conclusion, including Assistant Secretaries and others, 
must in their view be removed from office if the Senate finds 
that they committed either offense--removed without a second 
thought. But judges are different. Indeed, every civil officer 
other than the President of the United States is different. 
They are different because before deciding whether to impose 
the ultimate sanction of removal the Senate must weigh in the 
balance dramatically different considerations.
    First, the answer to the ultimate impeachment question--
that is, whether the conduct charged so undermines the 
official's capacity to perform his constitutional duties that 
removal is required despite the institutional trauma it may 
cause--must be very different for one of 900 or 1,000 judges 
with lifetime tenure who can only be removed by impeachment 
than it is for one person elected every 4 years by the people 
to serve as the head of the executive branch. Surely the 
managers recognize that the Senate here faces a far different 
question, a far different constitutional issue than it did, for 
example, when it asked whether Judge Nixon, convicted and 
imprisoned for perjury, should be permitted to retain his 
office; or whether Judge Hastings, who lied about taking a 
bribe to fix a case before him, should remain on the bench.
    Indeed, a telling rejoinder to the House managers' argument 
comes from President Ford. On many occasions, we have all seen 
cited his statement in 1970, in connection with the proposal to 
impeach Associate Justice William O. Douglas, that impeachment 
is, in essence, whatever the majority of the House of 
Representatives considers it to be. But no one really notes the 
more important part of President Ford's statement 29 years ago. 
I am going to read it to you:

    I think it is fair to come to one conclusion, however, from 
our history of impeachments. A higher standard is expected of 
Federal judges than of any other civil officers of the United 
States. The President and the Vice President and all persons 
holding office at the pleasure can be thrown out of office by 
the voters at least every 4 years. To remove them in midterm--
it has been tried only twice and never done--would, indeed, 
require crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery.

    The Senate must ask here whether the conduct charged 
against President Clinton would, in its nature, be inconsistent 
with a decision to allow him to continue to perform the duties 
of his office, just as you would ask, if you had a judge before 
you or another civil officer before you, whether the charges 
are similarly inconsistent with the notion that he or she 
should be allowed to continue to perform those duties.
    As former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, 
who surely understood the difference between impeaching a 
President and impeaching a judge, explained during the 
Claiborne proceedings before this body:

    The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position 
of trust and responsibility in our government. They are the 
only members of any branch that hold their office for life. 
They are purposely insulated from the immediate pressures and 
shifting currents of the body politic. But [he said] with the 
special prerogative of judicial independence comes a most 
exacting standard of public and private conduct.

    A similar theme can be found running through the debate in 
very recent years over a proposal to establish a process other 
than impeachment for the removal of judges who fail to live up 
to the good behavior standard. Both the proponents of the 
proposal and the legal opinion offered in support of it 
emphasize that the standard to which judges must adhere is 
stricter than the impeachment standard, noting that ``the terms 
treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors are 
narrower than the malfeasance in office and failure to perform 
the duties of the office which may be grounds for forfeiture of 
office held during good behavior.''
    Thus, whether weighing the constitutional or governmental 
implications of removal or asking whether the accused can be 
expected to perform his duties, the Senate has always 
recognized that the test will be different depending on the 
office that the accused holds.
    This analysis is wholly consistent with the framers' intent 
in drafting the impeachment clause that removal of a President 
by the legislature must be an act of last resort when the 
political process can no longer protect the Nation. Nothing in 
the cases brought before the Senate in the last 210 years 
suggests a different result.
    The managers also attribute to the President the argument 
that impeachment can never reach personal conduct. That is not 
our position. As I told the Judiciary Committee on December 9 
when I testified before them, not all serious misconduct 
flowing from one of the President's official roles is 
impeachable; neither is all serious misconduct flowing from his 
personal conduct immune from impeachment. Judgments must be 
made and they must be based on the core principles that inform 
the framers' decision.
    But the managers would, in effect, ask you to eschew making 
these judgments. They speak of perjury and obstruction of 
justice in general terms and they argue that they are offenses 
inimical to the system of justice.
    No one here would dispute that simplistic proposition. But 
the managers will not walk with you down the difficult path. 
They will not speak of facts, of differing circumstances and 
differing societal interests. They will not because they do not 
appear to recognize that those questions must be asked.
    Perhaps the one exception to this was in the very last 
moment of Chairman Hyde's closing when he suggested, with what 
might to many seem almost an inverted logic, that a lie to 
spare embarrassment about misconduct on a private occasion is 
more deserving of removal than a lie about, as he described it, 
important matters of state.
    Although I submit that conclusion might have struck the 
framers as somewhat odd, one can certainly conceive of acts 
arising out of personal conduct that would warrant conviction 
and removal, but you cannot ignore the circumstances in which 
the conduct occurs or abandon the core principle that 
impeachment should be reserved for those cases in which the 
President's very capacity to govern is called into question.
    Perjury about some official act may indeed be a 
constitutionally acceptable basis for impeachment. Perjury 
about a purely private matter should, at the very least, lead 
this body to question whether, no matter how seriously we take 
the person's violation, for example, of the witness' oath, the 
drastic remedy of removal from office is the proper response. 
Indeed, in a sense, that is the message sent by the House when 
it defeated article II.
    The principle that guides your deliberations, I suggest, 
must not only be faithful to the intent of the framers, it must 
be consistent with the governmental structure that they gave us 
and the delicate relationship between the legislative branch 
and the executive branch that is the hallmark of that 
structure. It must, above all, reflect the recognition that 
removal from office is an act of extraordinary proportions, to 
be taken only when no other response is adequate to preserve 
the integrity and viability of our democracy.
    On this point--and here I will fend off the wrath or maybe 
the scorn of the managers by quoting not a scholar or a 
professor but, rather, a witness called by the majority members 
of the Judiciary Committee to testify as an expert on the issue 
of perjury, a witness who had served on the Judiciary Committee 
in 1974. Judge Charles Wiggins told the members of the 
committee this:

    When you are called upon, as I think you will be called 
upon, to vote as a Member of the House of Representatives, your 
standard should be the public interest. And I confess to you 
[said Judge Wiggins] that I would recommend that you not vote 
to impeach the President.

    Beyond the impression of what constitutes an impeachable 
offense, each Senator must also confront the question of what 
standard the evidence must meet to justify a vote of guilty.
    We recognize that the Senate has chosen in the Claiborne 
proceedings, and elsewhere, not to impose on itself any single 
standard of proof, but rather to leave that judgment to the 
conscience of the individual Senator. Many of you were present 
for debate on that issue and chose a standard for yourselves. 
Many of you come to the issue afresh. And none of you, 
thankfully, has had to face the issue in the setting of a 
Presidential impeachment.
    Now, we argued before the Judiciary Committee that it must 
treat a vote to impeach as a vote to remove and that that 
judgment ought not be based on anything less than a clear and 
convincing standard, a standard, indeed, adopted by the 
Watergate committee 25 years ago. Surely no lesser standard 
should be applied here. Indeed, we submit to you that given the 
gravity of the decision you must reach, each of you should go 
further and ask whether the House has established guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. And this submission is made even more 
compelling by the managers' own position in which they made 
clear to you last week that proof of criminal conduct, in their 
view, was required to justify conviction.
    Now, lawyers and laymen too often, I think, treat the 
standard of proof as meaningless legal jargon, with no real 
application to the world of difficult decisions. But I suggest 
to you that it is much more than that. It is the guidepost that 
shows you the way through the labyrinth of conflicting 
evidence. It tells you to look within yourself and ask, Would I 
make the most important decisions of my life based on the level 
of certainty I have about these facts, and in the unique legal 
political setting of an impeachment setting that protects 
against partisan overreaching and it assures the public that a 
grave decision is being made with due care? It is the 
disciplining force I think that you will carry with you into 
your deliberations.
    And let me say that even if the clear and convincing 
standard is that which you apply for judicial impeachments, it 
does not follow that it should be applied where the Presidency 
itself is at stake. With judges, the Senate must weigh and 
balance its concern for the independence of the judiciary 
against the recognition that, because a judge is appointed for 
life, impeachment is the only available method for removing 
from office those who are corrupt.
    On the other hand, when a President is on trial, the 
balance is very different. Here you are asking, in effect, to 
overturn the will of the electorate, to overturn the results of 
an election held 2 years ago in which the American people 
selected the head of one of the three coordinate branches of 
Government.
    Moreover, you have been asked to take this action in 
circumstances where, even taking the darkest view of the 
managers' position, there is no suggestion of corruption or 
misuse of office or any other conduct that places our system of 
Government at risk in the 2 remaining years of this President's 
term, when once again the people will get the chance to decide 
who should lead them. In this setting, we submit, you should 
test the evidence by the strictest standard you know.
    I want to talk for a few minutes about what we see as the 
constitutional deficiency of the articles you have before you. 
When the framers took from English practice the parliamentary 
weapon of impeachment, they recognized that the form of the 
Government that they had created, with its finely tuned balance 
among the branches, was inconsistent with the parliamentary 
dominance inherent in the English model. They chose, therefore, 
to build a quasi-judicial impeachment process, one that had, 
admittedly, political overtones but that carried with it the 
basic principles of due process embodied in the Constitution 
they had written.
    Among those principles is the sixth amendment's guarantee 
that the accused shall have the right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him. That right has 
been recognized to have special force in perjury cases, where 
it is the rule uniformly enforced by the courts that an 
indictment must inform the defendant specifically what false 
statement he is alleged to have made.
    This is not some mere technicality; it is the law. It is 
the law because our courts have recognized that if a criminal 
charge is to be based on the words uttered by a fallible human 
being, he must be allowed to defend the truthfulness of the 
specific words he used and not be convicted on the basis merely 
of some prosecutor's summary or interpretation. This is not 
some legal nicety that the House of Representatives can ignore, 
as it has many other elements of due process. This is not an 
argument we raise with this body merely in passing as a 
lawyer's gambit. This is an important principle of our 
jurisprudence. And I suggest that it is one that this body must 
honor. There is not a court anywhere--from highest to lowest--
that would hesitate, if they were confronted with an indictment 
written like these articles, to throw it out.
    Indeed, if you want some evidence of how others have 
perceived this issue, look to the Hastings and Nixon cases, in 
both of which, the articles charging impeachment specifically 
stated the false statements that they were accused of having 
made.
    Why, if the House understood the importance of specificity 
in those cases, did it not understand the, if anything, greater 
importance of telling the President of the United States what 
he was charged with? If you compare the closing argument of 
majority counsel and the majority report filed by the committee 
and the trial brief filed by the House and the presentation of 
the managers last week, you will begin to understand what has 
happened here.
    I challenge any Member of the Senate--indeed, any manager--
to identify the charges that the House authorized them to 
bring. Just to take one example, we do not know to a certainty 
that the House decided--or we do know with certainty that the 
House decided not to charge perjury in the civil deposition. 
Yet, to listen to the managers' presentation last week, one 
would be hard put to conclude that they understood that. They 
have, in essence, treated these articles as empty vessels, to 
be filled with some witch's brew of charges considered, charges 
considered and abandoned, and charges never considered at all.
    Both article I and article II are constitutionally 
deficient for other reasons as well. In particular, each 
charge's multiple offenses is therefore void, in the criminal 
justice vernacular, for duplicity because in a criminal case, 
and here as well, lumping multiple offenses together in one 
charging document creates a risk that a verdict may be based 
not on a unanimous finding of guilt as to any particular charge 
but, instead, may be composed of multiple individual judgments. 
And that risk is in direct violation of the requirement of the 
Constitution that this body agree by a two-thirds majority 
before the President may be removed.
    Now, the House responds to the President's concerns in this 
regard by arguing that, well, the amendment of Senate rule 23, 
which prohibits division of the articles, somehow addresses 
this concern and that our argument would undermine the Senate's 
own rules. But that is not so. Rule 23 was approved to permit 
the most judicious and effective handling of the questions 
presented to the Senate. It cannot be that the Senate, in 
passing that rule--and you know surely better than I--decided 
to purchase efficiency in impeachment proceedings at the price 
of violating the Constitution, the mandate to ensure a two-
thirds vote for removal.
    Now, 3 years after the revision of rule 23, in the trial of 
Judge Nixon, this very issue was presented. And Senator Kohl 
captured that problem. Although the first and second articles 
of impeachment alleged that Judge Nixon had committed specific 
violations of the perjury statute, the third article was a 
catchall, alleging that he made ``one or more'' of 14 different 
false statements. And I would note for you that that language, 
``one or more,'' was identical to the language specifically 
inserted into article I at the request of Congressman Rogan 
during the Judiciary Committee proceedings.
    In addressing the propriety of such a charging device, 
Senator Kohl said:

    The managers should not be allowed to use a shotgun or 
blunderbuss. We should send a message to the House. Please do 
not bunch up your allegations. Charge each act of wrongdoing in 
a separate count. Such a change would clarify things and allow 
for a cleaner vote on guilt or innocence.

    Senator Dole, who surely knew something about Senate rules 
and precedent, certainly didn't think that rule 23 bound the 
result in that Nixon case. He first voted to dismiss article 
III and then later voted to acquit Judge Nixon because it was 
redundant, complex, and confusing. Thirty-three Senators joined 
Senator Dole in voting to dismiss the article, and a total of 
40 voted to acquit when it came to a judgment of guilt or 
innocence.
    Senators Kohl, Biden, and Murkowski each spoke about the 
danger posed by this formulation. And I will look once more to 
Senator Kohl:

    This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all, 
it means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two-thirds 
of the Senate does not agree in which his political statements 
were false. The House is telling us that it is OK to convict 
Judge Nixon on article III even if we have different visions of 
what he did wrong. But that is not fair to Judge Nixon, to the 
Senate, or to the American people.

    Those Senators were not acting in derogation of Senate 
Rules or precedents. They were acting in the spirit of fairness 
to the accused and in the very best tradition of American due 
process.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that counsel has 
indicated he is ready to take a break, so I ask unanimous 
consent that we take a brief 15-minute recess.
    There being no objection, at 2:02 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:21 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we will continue now 
with a further statement from Counsel Ruff.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Ruff to 
continue his presentation.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    My first question is: Is it working?
    Thank you, very much. I apologize for the mechanical 
difficulties earlier. I could quickly go back over the first 
hour. [Laughter.]
    I want now to move to an overview of the articles of 
impeachment themselves. As I said, as I came to the end of the 
first hour, these articles are constitutionally defective. They 
are also unsupported by the evidence. As we have noted, both 
articles are framed in the broadest generalities and pose 
multiple different defenses. Nothing contained in the Judiciary 
Committee's majority report, or in the trial brief, or in the 
presentation of the managers, cures the constitutional 
infirmity that infects these articles. Nonetheless, in framing 
our defense, they provide the only way through this uncharted 
landscape.
    We have divided our substantive response to the articles 
into three parts.
    Tomorrow, Mr. Craig will address the charges in Article I--
that the President committed perjury before the grand jury.
    Second, Ms. Mills will address those parts of Article II 
that charge the President with obstructing justice by causing 
concealment of gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and that he 
engaged in witness tampering in his conversations with Ms. 
Currie.
    Third, Mr. Kendall will address the remaining allegations 
of obstruction on Thursday, and then we will close by hearing 
from Senator Bumpers.
    Before I move to an overview of the articles and the 
response that you will hear over the next couple of days, I 
want to suggest to you an approach to one of the most difficult 
questions that you face: How does one sitting in judgment on a 
case like this test the reliability of what he or she hears in 
the proceedings? Let me offer one test.
    Those of you who have practiced on one side or the other in 
the criminal justice system know that the system places a 
special responsibility on a prosecutor--a burden to be open, 
candid, and forthcoming in his arguments, and most importantly, 
in representing the facts so that when a prosecutor recites the 
facts he is not expected to ignore the unfavorable ones. He is 
expected to be open with judge and jury. Of course, he can make 
an argument as to why a particular fact is really not so 
important, but he can neither conceal it nor misrepresent it. 
When you hear a prosecutor, or a team of prosecutors, misstate 
a fact or not tell you the whole story, you should wonder why. 
You should ask yourself whether the misstatement is an error, 
or whether it signals some underlying flaw in the prosecution's 
case, or some problem that they are trying to conceal. And you 
ought to be particularly skeptical when the fact that is 
concealed or isn't fully revealed is claimed by the prosecutors 
themselves to be crucial to their case.
    We all sometimes speak with less than complete care, and we 
are justly criticized when we make mistakes. If I tell you 
something inadvertently that proves to be wrong, I expect to be 
held to account for that. And similarly, we must hold the 
managers accountable for their mistakes.
    Last week, for example, you will recall that Mr. Manager 
Sensenbrenner told you that during my coming before the 
Judiciary Committee, in his words,

    Charles Ruff was asked directly: Did the President lie 
during his sworn grand jury testimony? And Mr. Ruff could have 
answered that question directly. He did not, and his failure to 
do so speaks 1,000 words.

    Just to be certain that the record is straight, let me read 
to you from the transcript of that Judiciary hearing.

    Representative Sensenbrenner: The oath that witnesses take 
require them to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth. I seem to recall that there were a lot of 
people, myself included, when asked by the press what advice 
would we give to the President when he went to the grand jury, 
was to just tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth.
    Mr. Ruff: He surely did.
    Representative Sensenbrenner: Did he tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth when he was in the grand 
jury?
    Mr. Ruff. He surely did.

    I am certain that Mr. Sensenbrenner would not intentionally 
mislead the Senate. But his error was one of inadvertence. But, 
in any event, now the record is clear.
    Of considerably more importance than this momentary lapse 
are the many substantive flaws that we will point out to you in 
the coming days--sometimes pure errors of fact, sometimes 
errors of interpretation, sometimes unfound speculation. My 
colleagues will deal with many of these flaws at greater length 
as they discuss the specific charges against the President. But 
I will give you some examples as I read appropriate points in 
my overview today, because I want you to have in mind 
throughout our presentation, and indeed throughout the rest of 
the proceedings, this one principle: Beware of the prosecutor 
who feels it necessary to deceive the court.
    Let me begin with article I.
    Our system of justice recognizes the difficulties inherent 
in testifying under oath, and it affords important protections 
for the witness who may be charged with perjury, and thus the 
Judiciary Committee's dissatisfaction with the President's 
answers because they thought they were narrow, or even 
hairsplitting, in some sense reflect the dissatisfaction with 
the rules that have been applied for centuries in prosecuting 
this offense.
    Further, it requires proof that a defendant knowingly made 
a false statement about a material fact. The defendant must 
have had a subjective intent to lie. The testimony that is 
provided as a result of confusion, mistake, faulty memory, or 
carelessness, or misunderstanding is not perjury. The mere fact 
that the recollection of two witnesses may differ does not mean 
that one is committing perjury. Common sense and the stringent 
requirements of the law dictate what law is required. As the 
Supreme Court has noted,

    Equally honest witnesses may well have different 
recollections of the same event, and thus, a conviction for 
perjury ought not to rest entirely upon an oath against an 
oath.

    This is the rationale for the common practice of 
prosecutors to require significant corroborating evidence 
before they bring a perjury case. Indeed, the Department of 
Justice urges that its prosecutors seek independent 
corroboration, either through witnesses or corroborating 
evidence of a quality to assure that a guilty verdict is really 
well founded.
    This isn't merely the argument we make as we are acting for 
the President. The bipartisan and former Federal prosecutors 
from whom you will hear will testify that neither they nor any 
reasonable prosecutor could charge perjury based upon the facts 
in this case.
    Tom Sullivan, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern 
District of Illinois, told the committee that the evidence set 
out would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a responsible 
Federal prosecutor.
    Richard Davis, a former colleague of mine on the Watergate 
special prosecution force, testified that no prosecutor would 
bring this case of perjury because the President acknowledged 
to the grand jury the existence of an improper relationship and 
argued with prosecutors questioning him that his acknowledged 
conduct was not a sexual relationship as he understood the 
definition of that term used in the Jones deposition. And that 
is where you need to begin your focus as you look at the charge 
that the President perjured himself in the grand jury in August 
of last year.
    Any assessment of that testimony must begin with one 
immutable fact. He admitted that he had, in his words, 
inappropriate, intimate contact with Monica Lewinsky. No one 
who was present for that testimony, has read the transcript, or 
watched the videotape could come away believing anything other 
than that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual 
conduct. Indeed, even the prosecutors, who surely cannot be 
accused of being reluctant to find Presidential misconduct, 
contended not that the President had lied about the nature of 
his relationship but only about the details. Yet, the managers, 
in their eagerness to find misconduct where none had found it 
before, have searched every nook and cranny of the grand jury 
transcript and sent forward to you a shopping list of alleged 
misstatements, obviously in the hope that among them you will 
find one with which you disagree. But they hope in vain. The 
record simply will not support a finding that the President 
perjured himself before the grand jury.
    Now, much of the questioning by the prosecutors and much of 
the grand jury testimony about which the House now complains so 
vociferously dealt with the President's efforts to explain why 
his answers in the Jones deposition, certainly not pretty, 
were, in his mind, truthful, albeit narrowly and artfully 
constructed.
    We are not here to talk to you today about the President's 
testimony in the Jones deposition. We do seek to convince you 
that before the grand jury the President was open, candid, 
truthful.
    Now, the managers begin by asking you to look at the 
prepared statement that the President offered at the very 
beginning of his grand jury appearance. Before the President 
actually began his testimony, his lawyer, Mr. Kendall, spoke to 
Mr. Starr and told him that at the first moment at which there 
was an inquiry concerning the detailed nature of the 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he wished to make a prepared 
statement, and he was permitted to do so. That statement 
acknowledged the existence of an intimate relationship, but it 
did not discuss the specific physical details in what I think 
we will all understand to have been an effort to preserve the 
dignity of the office.
    Now, the House has charged that this statement was somehow 
a ``premeditated effort to thwart the OIC's investigation.'' 
That is errant nonsense. Even independent counsel saw no such 
dark motive in this statement.
    Now, first, the managers advance the baseless charge that 
the President intentionally placed the beginning of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in 1996 rather than 1995 as she 
testified. Interestingly, they don't even purport to offer any 
support for this charge other than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, 
and they offer not even the somewhat odd explanation originally 
offered by the independent counsel to explain why the 
President, having admitted the very worst things a father and 
husband can conceivably admit, would have shifted the time by 3 
months.
    Next, the managers assert that the President's admission 
that he engaged in wrongful conduct ``on certain occasions'' 
was false because the President actually engaged in such 
conduct some 11 times, and they assert as well that when the 
President admitted he had occasional telephone conversations 
that included inappropriate discussions, that was false because 
they had actually had 17 such phone conversations.
    Now, the President gave his best recollection of the 
frequency of those contacts. Ms. Lewinsky gave hers. Assuming 
that the majority is correct in its assumption that there were 
11 or 17, can anyone imagine a trial in this court or in any 
other court in which the issue of whether ``certain occasions'' 
by definition could not mean 17 and ``occasionally'' could not 
refer to 11 would be the issue being litigated?
    Even the independent counsel, again, who could, of course, 
have pressed the President for specific numbers had they 
thought it important, did not take issue with this testimony.
    Thus, the perjury charge in article I again comes down to 
the same allegations contained in the independent counsel's 
referral, that the President lied to the grand jury about two 
things--his subjective, his personal subjective understanding 
of the definition used in the Jones deposition and, second, he 
lied when he denied that he engaged in certain details of 
inappropriate conduct.
    Now, to conclude that the President lied to the grand jury 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, you must determine--
forgive me--that he touched certain parts of her body, but for 
proof you have only her oath against his oath.
    Those among you who have been prosecutors or criminal 
defense lawyers know that perjury prosecutions, as rare as they 
are, would never be pursued under evidence available here. And 
those among you who could not bring that special experience at 
least bring your common sense and are equally able to assess 
the weakness of the case that would rest on such a foundation.
    Common sense also is enough to tell you that there cannot 
be any basis for charging a witness with perjury on the ground 
that you disbelieve his testimony about his own subjective 
belief in a definition of a term used in a civil deposition. 
Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge here, it 
is difficult to contemplate what evidence the managers might 
hope to rely on to meet that burden.
    Now, it is worth noting that Mr. Bennett, at the time of 
the deposition, pressed the Jones lawyers to ask the President 
specific questions about his conduct rather than rely on this 
confusing definition that they proffered. In fact, when the 
President was asked in the grand jury whether he would have 
answered those questions, he said, of course, if the judge had 
ruled them appropriate, he would have answered truthfully. But 
the Jones lawyers persisted in their somewhat strange cause, 
strange unless one asked whether, armed with Ms. Tripp's 
intelligence, they purposely sought in some fashion to present 
the independent counsel a record that would permit just the 
sort of dark interpretation both he and the managers have 
proffered.
    I point you to one thing. If you seek evidence that the 
President took the definition he was given seriously, and he 
responded carefully to the questions put to him, even if they 
required the most embarrassing answers, one need only look to 
the painful admission that he did have relations with another 
woman and he testified to the grand jury the definition 
required that he make that admission. Here is what he said to 
the grand jurors:

    I read this carefully, and I thought about it. And I 
thought about what ``contact'' meant, and I thought about 
[other phrases] and I had to admit under this definition that I 
had actually had relations with Gennifer Flowers.

    Now, undeterred in its search for some ground on which to 
base the charge that the President lied to the grand jury, 
article I abandons even the modest level of specificity found 
in the independent counsel's referral and advances the claim:

    The President gave perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony regarding prior statements of the same nature he made 
in his deposition.

    There can be no stronger evidence of the constitutional 
deficiency of this article than this strangely amorphous charge 
as a deficiency that becomes even more obvious when you finally 
stumble across the theory on which the managers rely. To the 
extent one can determine what the Judiciary Committee had in 
mind when it drafted this clause, it appears that they intended 
to charge the President with perjury before the grand jury 
because he testified that he believed--believed--that he had, 
in his words, ``worked through the minefield of the Jones 
deposition without violating the law.'' And that they hoped to 
support that charge by reference to various allegedly false 
statements in his deposition as charged in article II. 
Unhappily for the managers, however, the House rejected article 
II and it is not before you in any form. Moreover, there is not 
a single suggestion in the committee debate--or, more 
importantly, in the House debate--that those voting to impeach 
the President believed that this one line that I have quoted to 
you from the President's grand jury testimony, somehow absorbed 
into article I his entire deposition testimony.
    If there is to be any regard for constitutional process, 
the managers cannot be allowed to rely on what the Judiciary 
Committee thought were false statements encompassed in a 
rejected article II to flesh out the unconstitutionally 
nonspecific charges of article I. The House vote on article II 
foreclosed that option for all time.
    Now, article I next alleges that the President lied to the 
grand jury about the events surrounding certain statements made 
by Mr. Bennett during the Jones deposition. Specifically, the 
managers charge that the President was silent when Mr. Bennett 
characterized the Lewinsky affidavit as meaning there was no 
sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form with President 
Clinton, and that the President then gave a false explanation 
to the grand jury when he testified that he wasn't really 
paying attention when his lawyer said that.
    Now, as we noted earlier, Mr. Bennett argued to Judge 
Wright that, in light of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a 
relationship, the Jones lawyers had no good-faith basis for 
questioning the President about her. The President was not 
involved in the lengthy back and forth among the judge, the 
Jones lawyers, and Mr. Bennett. He said nothing. When he was 
asked in the grand jury about Mr. Bennett's statement, he said, 
``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what Mr. Bennett 
was saying.''
    Now, the managers assert that this is false because the 
videotape shows that the President was in fact paying 
attention. But a fairer view of the videotape, I suggest to 
you, shows the President looking, indeed, in Mr. Bennett's 
direction, and in the direction of the judge, but giving no 
sign that he was following the discussion. He didn't nod his 
head. He didn't make facial expressions. There was nothing to 
reflect an awareness of the substance of what was happening, 
much less what was said in Mr. Bennett's statement.
    Now, I don't know how large a group this would be, but any 
of you who has ever represented a witness or been a witness in 
a deposition will readily understand the President's mindset, 
that the lawyers and the judge debated these issues, and you 
will understand, too, that to charge him with perjury for 
having testified falsely about his own state of mind with 
nothing more to rely on than a picture would strain credulity 
in any prosecutor's office and flies past the bounds of 
constitutional reason in this Chamber.
    I move, now, to the allegations in Article II charging the 
President with obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit and 
in the grand jury investigation. I want to talk first about 
what has become known as the concealment of gifts theory. The 
allegation that the President participated in some scheme to 
conceal certain gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky centers on 
two events allegedly occurring on December 28, 1997: First, 
conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in the 
White House in which the two discussed the gifts, at least 
briefly, that he had given to Ms. Lewinsky; and, B, Ms. 
Currie's picking up a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and 
storing them under her bed.
    The managers, as was true of the majority report--and the 
independent counsel role before that--build their theory in 
this case not on seven pillars of obstruction but on seven 
shifting sand castles of speculation. Monica Lewinsky met with 
the President on December 28, 1997, sometime shortly before 8 
a.m., to exchange Christmas presents. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, they briefly discussed the subject of gifts she had 
received from the President in connection with her receipt some 
days earlier of the subpoena in the Jones case, and this was 
the first and the only time, she says, in which the subject was 
ever discussed.
    Now, the managers quote one conversation of Ms. Lewinsky's 
description of that December 28 version as follows:

    At some point I said to him, well, you know, should--maybe 
I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give 
them to someone, maybe Betty. And he sort of said--I think he 
responded ``I don't know,'' or ``let me think about that,'' and 
left that topic.

    But the Senate should know that in fact Ms. Lewinsky has 
discussed this very exchange on at least 10 different occasions 
and that the very most she alleges in any of them is that the 
President said, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think about it,'' 
when she raised the issue of the gifts. Indeed, in many of her 
versions she said, among other things, there really was no 
response, that the President did not respond, that she didn't 
have a clear image in her mind what to do next. She also 
testified that Ms. Currie's name did not come up because the 
President really didn't say anything. And, most importantly, in 
not a single one of her multiple versions of this event did she 
say that the President ever initiated any discussion about the 
gifts, nor did he ever suggest to her that she conceal them.
    Now, there being no evidence of obstruction in that 
conversation, the managers would have you believe that after 
Ms. Lewinsky left the White House that day, the President must 
have told Betty Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. 
But there is absolutely no evidence that that discussion ever 
occurred. The only two parties who would have knowledge of it, 
the President and Ms. Currie, both denied it ever took place.
    Now, in the absence of any such evidence, the managers have 
relied on Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that Ms. Currie placed a 
call to her and told her--depending on Ms. Lewinsky's version--
either that the President had said to Betty Ms. Lewinsky had 
something for her or merely that she, Ms. Currie, understood 
that Ms. Lewinsky had something for her.
    In this regard, it is important to remember that Ms. 
Lewinsky herself testified that she was the one who first 
raised with the President the notion that Ms. Currie could hold 
the gifts. And it is important to recognize that, contrary to 
the managers' suggestion to you that Ms. Lewinsky's memory of 
this event has always been consistent and--``unequivocal,'' I 
think was their word--she herself acknowledged at her last 
grand jury appearance that her memory of the crucial 
conversation is less than crystal clear. To wit:

    A Juror: Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the 
President had told her to call?
    Ms. Lewinsky: Right now, I don't remember.

    And now we come to the first example I promised you of 
prosecutorial--what shall we call it?--fudge. Starting from the 
premise that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky and told her 
that she understood she had something for her and then went to 
pick up a sealed box containing some of the gifts she had 
received, Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President, first 
the independent counsel concluded, and then the majority report 
concluded, and now the managers have concluded, that the 
President must have instructed Ms. Currie to go pick up these 
gifts--to call Ms. Lewinsky and make the arrangements. So that 
they determined that when Ms. Currie said it was Ms. Lewinsky 
who called her, Ms. Currie was mistaken or, if you listen 
carefully, maybe worse. And when the President testified that 
he didn't tell Ms. Currie to call Ms. Lewinsky, he was--well, 
just worse. And this surmise is made absolutely certain, in the 
view of the managers, because a newly discovered, unknown even 
to independent counsel, cell phone record shows that Ms. Currie 
called Ms. Lewinsky at 3:32 p.m. on December 28 and that must 
be the call that Ms. Lewinsky remembered.
    Let's look now at how the majority counsel for the 
committee put it in his closing argument to the Judiciary 
Committee. I have put his words up on the chart, and you all 
should have it in front of you as well:

    There is key evidence [said majority counsel] that Ms. 
Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong. Monica said that she 
thought Betty called from her cell phone. Well, look at this 
record. [Show it to you later.] This is Betty's cell phone 
record. It corroborates Monica Lewinsky and proves conclusively 
that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several hours 
after she had left the White House. Why did Betty Currie pick 
up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky? The facts strongly suggest the 
President directed her to do so.

    There is a slight problem with the majority counsel's 
epiphany, as it has been passed down to the managers and then 
to you. For you see--and here is the cell phone record--it 
reflects that at 3:32 p.m. on December 28, from Arlington, VA, 
to Washington, DC--that is Ms. Lewinsky's number--there was a 
call of a minute, it says here. And then we have to ask, Does 
this timing fit with the rest of the testimony?
    Well, the answer is, no, it doesn't, because on three 
separate occasions, Ms. Lewinsky testified that Ms. Currie came 
over to pick up the gifts at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, an 
hour and a half before the phone call. It is not as though we 
have been hiding the ball on this, Senators. We discussed this 
issue at length in our trial brief, and the managers do seem to 
have recognized at least some of the problem, because they have 
told you, albeit without the slightest evidentiary support, 
that maybe Ms. Lewinsky just miscalculated a little bit. Well, 
maybe she just miscalculated a little bit three times. Look at 
the record:
    FBI interview, July 27: ``Lewinsky met Currie on 28th 
Street outside Lewinsky's apartment at about 2 p.m. and gave 
Currie the box of gifts.''
    FBI interview, August 1: ``Lewinsky gave the box to Betty 
Currie when Currie came by the Watergate about 2 p.m.''
    Grand jury testimony, 3 weeks later: ``I think it was 
around 2 p.m. or so, around 2:00 in the afternoon.''
    The managers speculate that if only the independent counsel 
had had this phone record when they were interviewing Ms. 
Lewinsky, they could have refreshed her recollection. Having 
been one, I can tell you, that's prosecutor speak for ``if we'd 
only known about that darn record, we could have gotten her to 
change her testimony.''
    But the managers have one other problem that they didn't 
address. The phone record--if we can go back to that for a 
moment--the phone record shows a call lasting 1 minute. All of 
us who have cell phones know that really means it lasted well 
short of a minute, because the phone company rounds things up 
to the nearest minute, just to help us all with our 
bookkeeping. [Laughter.]
    So now it will be necessary not only for Ms. Lewinsky's 
memory to be refreshed about the hour of the pickup, but to 
explain how the arrangements for it could have been made 
between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie in somewhere between 1 and 
60 seconds.
    Putting these factual difficulties aside, this charge must 
fail for another reason. As you all know from presentations 
earlier, the President gave Ms. Lewinsky several gifts on the 
very day that they met, December 28. Faced with having to 
explain why on the day that the President and Monica Lewinsky 
were conspiring to conceal gifts from the Jones' lawyers the 
President gave her additional ones, the managers surmised that 
the real purpose was because it was part of a subtle effort to 
keep Ms. Lewinsky on the team, but in truth the only reasonable 
explanation for these events is the one the President gave to 
the grand jury. He was simply not concerned about gifts. He 
gave a lot, he got a lot, and he saw no need to engage in any 
effort to conceal them.
    The President did not urge Ms. Lewinsky to conceal the 
gifts he had given her and, of course, he did not lie to the 
grand jury about that subject.
    The next point I want to discuss with you is the statements 
the President made to Betty Currie on the day after the Jones 
deposition, January 18 of last year. There is no disputing the 
record, no conflict in testimony that the President did meet 
with his secretary, Betty Currie, on the day after the Jones 
deposition and they discussed Monica Lewinsky.
    The managers cast this conversation, this recitation, this 
series of statements and questions put by the President to Ms. 
Currie in the most sinister light possible and allege that the 
President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness'' 
by pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of 
the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    President Clinton has adamantly denied that he had any such 
intention, and that denial is fortified by the undisputable 
factual record establishing that Betty Currie neither was an 
actual or a contemplated witness in the Jones litigation, nor 
did she perceive that she was being pressured in any respect by 
the President to agree with what he was saying.
    First, Ms. Currie's status as a witness in the only 
proceeding the President knew about at that moment, the Jones 
case, Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor a prospective 
witness. As to the only proceeding in which she ultimately 
became a witness, no one would suggest, managers, no one else 
would suggest the President knew that the independent counsel 
was conducting an investigation into his activities.
    In the entire history of the Jones case, Ms. Currie's name 
had not appeared on any of the witness lists, nor was there any 
reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play a role in the Jones 
case. Discovery was down to its final days. The managers 
speculate that the President's own references to Ms. Currie 
during his deposition meant she was sure to be called by the 
Jones lawyers. Yet, in the days, weeks following the 
deposition, the Jones lawyers never listed her, never contacted 
her, never added her to any witness list. They never deposed 
her; they never noticed the deposition.
    Indeed, when the independent counsel interviewed the Jones 
lawyers, they apparently neglected to ask whether they had ever 
intended to call Betty Currie as a witness. One can be sure 
that if such an intent existed, they would have asked and it 
would have been included in the referral.
    Moreover, it is a sure bet that the Jones lawyers already 
knew about Betty Currie and her relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. Why? Because we know from her own recorded telephone 
conversations that Ms. Tripp had been in contact with the Jones 
lawyers for months, and we know that she spent the evening 
before the President's deposition telling them everything she 
knew.
    It didn't take a few references to his secretary by the 
President to trigger a subpoena for Betty Currie if they had 
ever wanted to do that, and they never did. Nor did the 
President ever pressure Ms. Currie to alter her recollection. 
Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into 
saying she was pressured to agree with the President, Ms. 
Currie adamantly denied it.
    Let me quote just briefly a few lines of her grand jury 
testimony:

    Question: Now, back again to the four statements that you 
testified the President made to you that were presented as 
statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those 
statements?
    Answer: None whatsoever.
    Question: That was your impression, that he wanted you to 
say--because he would end each of the statements with 
``Right?'', with a question.
    Answer: I do not remember that he wanted me to say 
``Right.'' He would say ``Right'' and I could have said, 
``Wrong.''
    Question: But he would end each of those questions with a 
``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not 
true?
    Answer: Correct.
    Question: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your 
boss?
    Answer: None [whatsoever].

    Now, to understand on a human level why the President 
reached out to Betty Currie on the day after his deposition, 
you need only to understand that he had just faced unexpected 
detailed questions about his worst nightmare. As he candidly 
admitted to the grand jury, he had long feared that his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would ultimately become public. 
Now, with questioning about her in the Jones case, publication 
of the first Internet article, the day of reckoning had 
arrived. The President knew that a media storm was about to 
erupt. And it did.
    Now, if you are looking for evidence on which to base an 
inference about the President's intentions with respect to Ms. 
Currie's testimony, look what he said to her when he knew that 
she was going before the grand jury.

    And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to 
testify to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she 
had been through this loss of her sister, this horrible 
accident Christmas that killed her brother, and her mother was 
in the hospital. I was trying to do--to make her understand 
that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the grand jury. 
And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine, just go 
in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I 
remember.

    The President of the United States did not tamper with a 
witness.
    Now next, the managers argue that Mr. Clinton corruptly 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to submit a false affidavit to the 
Jones lawyers and to lie if she were ever deposed. But the 
uncontroverted evidence refutes that charge. Indeed, Ms. 
Lewinsky herself has repeatedly and forcefully denied that 
anyone ever asked her to lie. There is no way to get around 
that flat denial, even with the independent counsel's addition 
of the word ``explicitly.'' There was no explicit, implicit, or 
any other direction to Ms. Lewinsky to lie. Indeed, the only 
person to whom Ms. Lewinsky said anything inconsistent with her 
denial was the ubiquitous Ms. Tripp. And, as Ms. Lewinsky later 
told the grand jury:

    I think I told her that, you know, at various times the 
President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't 
true.

    Left with this record, the managers resort to arguing that 
Ms. Lewinsky understood that the President wanted her to lie, 
that he could not have wanted her to file an affidavit 
detailing their relationship. But the only factual support for 
this theory recited by the majority is the testimony of Ms. 
Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie, 
he remained silent about what she should have to say or do, and 
by such silence she said, ``I knew what he meant.''
    The very idea that the President of the United States 
should face removal from office, not because he told Monica 
Lewinsky to lie or anything of this sort, but because he was 
silent and Ms. Lewinsky ``knew what he meant,'' is, I suggest, 
more than troubling.
    So to bolster their flawed ``I knew what he meant'' theory, 
the managers assert that the President knew the affidavit would 
have to be false in order for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying. 
But the evidence here, too, is that the President repeatedly 
testified that Ms. Lewinsky could and would file a truthful 
affidavit. And, of course, Ms. Lewinsky herself has made it 
clear that her definition of the critical term that might be 
used in such an affidavit was consistent with the President's.
    Further testimony from Ms. Lewinsky herself repudiates any 
suggestion that she was ever encouraged by anyone to lie if she 
were deposed in the Jones case. In a colloquy with a grand 
juror, she explicitly and unequivocally rejected the notion 
that President Clinton encouraged her to deny the relationship 
after she learned she was a witness. Referring to discussions 
about the so-called cover stories that the managers allege were 
to be used in her testimony, a grand juror asked her:

    It is possible that you had these discussions after you 
learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    Answer: I don't believe so, no.
    Question: Can you exclude that possibility?
    Answer: I pretty much can.

    The managers would have you conclude the contrary from a 
brief snippet of the conversation on December 17 in which Ms. 
Lewinsky said that at some point, ``I don't know if it was 
before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, the 
President sort of said, `Well, you know, you can always say you 
were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.' 
''
    But Ms. Lewinsky told the FBI when she was interviewed, 
``To the best''--this is the FBI talking--``To the best of Miss 
Lewinsky's memory, she does not believe they discussed''--in 
this December 17 conversation--``the content of any deposition 
that Miss Lewinsky might be involved in at a later date.'' And 
she told the grand jury the same thing. Describing the very 
same December 17 conversation, she testified that she and the 
President did not discuss the idea of her denying their 
relationship.

    Ms. Lewinsky: I really don't remember it. I mean, it would 
be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that 
would show me different, but it was 2:30, and, I mean, the 
conversation I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 
17, which was--
    A juror interjects: The telephone call?
    Ms. Lewinsky: Right. And it was, you know, 2, 2:30 in the 
morning. And I remember the gist of it, and I really don't 
think so.

    And it is on that basis that the managers suggest that the 
President obstructed justice.
    Fourth, article II alleges that the President obstructed 
justice by denying to his closest aides he had a sexual 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the very same denial he made 
to his family and his friends and to the American people. These 
allegedly impeachable denials took place in the immediate 
aftermath of the public revelation of the Lewinsky matter, at 
the very time that the President was denying that relationship 
to the entire country on national television. Having made the 
announcement to the whole country, it is simply absurd, I 
suggest to you, to believe that he was somehow attempting 
corruptly to influence his senior staff when he told them 
virtually the same thing at the same time.
    Now, the managers do not allege--as they could not--that 
the President attempted to influence the aides' testimony about 
what they themselves knew concerning his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky--had they seen her in a particular place; had they 
talked to her; had they talked to the President about it before 
all of this broke.
    Indeed, the only evidence these aides had was the very same 
denial that the entire American people had. Indeed, every 
member of the grand jury had probably seen this denial by the 
President on their own television sets. Under the theory 
proffered by the managers, in essence, every person who heard 
the President's denial could have been called to the grand jury 
and ordered to create still an additional charge of obstruction 
of justice.
    The point here was not that the President believed that his 
staff would be witnesses and somehow wanted to influence their 
testimony. As he explained to the grand jury, what he was 
trying to do was avoid being a witness. But, of course, he had 
to say something to them. He had to say, in the aftermath of 
January 21, something to reassure them. And he told them 
exactly what he told every one of you, everyone in the gallery, 
and everyone who watched television in those days following 
January 21.
    And let me just make this one point. There is absolutely no 
conflict in the evidence here, despite the managers' somewhat 
puzzling suggestion that the Senate's deliberations would 
somehow be aided if two of the senior staff members could be 
called as witnesses. Not only is there no conflict in the 
evidence, there is absolutely no basis for the charge that the 
President was in any way seeking to influence the testimony of 
his staff before the grand jury.
    Now we come to the last of the obstruction charges. The 
managers ask you to find that the President of the United 
States employed his friend, Vernon Jordan, to get Monica 
Lewinsky a job in New York, to influence her testimony, or 
perhaps in a somewhat forlorn effort to escape the reach of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to hide from the Jones 
lawyers and the 8 million people who live in that city.
    There is, of course, absolutely no evidence to support this 
conclusion, and so the managers have constructed out of sealing 
wax and string and spiders' webs a theory that would lend to a 
series of otherwise innocuous and, indeed, exculpatory events, 
a dark and sinister past.
    The undisputed record establishes the following: one, that 
Lewinsky's job search began on her own initiative; two, the 
search began long before her involvement in the Jones case; 
three, the search had no connection to the Jones case; four, 
Vernon Jordan agreed to help her, not at the direction of the 
President but at the request of Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-
time friend; five, the idea to solicit Mr. Jordan's assistance 
again came not from the President but from Ms. Tripp.
    As I thought about this aspect of it, I have to say I was 
reminded of Iago and Desdemona's handkerchief. But we will pass 
on that.
    Both Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified 
that there was never an agreement, a suggestion, an 
implication, that Ms. Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for 
her silence or her false testimony. As Mr. Jordan succinctly 
put it, ``Unequivocally, indubitable, no.''
    It was only to appease Ms. Tripp that Ms. Lewinsky 
ultimately told her that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't 
sign the affidavit until she had a job. But as she told the 
grand jury, ``That was definitely a line based on something 
that Linda had made me promise on January 9.''
    Now while the managers dismiss as irrelevant Ms. Lewinsky's 
job search before December, the fact is, Ms. Lewinsky 
contemplated looking for a job in New York as early as July 
1997, and her interest was strengthened in early October when 
Ms. Tripp told her it was unlikely she would ever get another 
job in the White House. It was then Ms. Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky 
discussed the prospect of having Vernon Jordan help her get a 
job in New York and Ms. Lewinsky mentioned that idea to the 
President.
    Later in October, as part of this ongoing search, 
Ambassador Richardson agreed to interview Ms. Lewinsky at the 
suggestion of then-Deputy Chief of Staff Podesta who had been 
asked to help by Ms. Currie. And Ambassador Richardson offered 
her a job and she had that job in hand throughout the 
supposedly critical December timeframe, didn't actually turn it 
down until early January. And, further, in late October or 
early November, she actually went to her boss at the Pentagon 
and asked for his help to find a job.
    Meanwhile, now we come to what, for the managers, is the 
very heart of the case. On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky had a 
preliminary meeting with Mr. Jordan and they discussed a list 
of potential employers. And although the managers then contend 
that nothing happened from November 5, that first meeting, 
until December 11, signifying, as they see it, that it must 
have been Ms. Lewinsky's appearance on the witness list that 
galvanized Mr. Jordan into action, that is simply false.
    Ms. Lewinsky had a followup telephone conversation with Mr. 
Jordan around Thanksgiving in which he told her he was working 
on the job search and he asked her to call him in the first 
week of December. The President learned Ms. Lewinsky was on the 
Jones witness list sometime on December 6. He met with Mr. 
Jordan the very next day, December 7. But oddly, if one adopts 
the managers' view, there was no discussion of Ms. Lewinsky or 
the Jones case, much less job searches. Then on December 8, Ms. 
Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan's office and made her appointment to 
meet with him on December 11.
    Now the President absolutely had nothing to do with that 
call or that appointment and Mr. Jordan denies that there was 
any intensified effort to find Ms. Lewinsky a job. He said, 
``Oh, no, I do not recall any heightened sense of urgency in 
December, but what I do recall is that I dealt with it when I 
had time to do it.''
    Now for my second example of prosecutorial fudging. The 
managers have devoted much attention to the magic date of 
December 11, arguing vigorously that it was on that day that 
getting the job for Ms. Lewinsky suddenly became a matter of 
high priority for the President and hence to Mr. Jordan. Why is 
that so? Well, again, I will let the majority counsel for the 
Judiciary Committee tell you in his own words during his 
closing argument.
    Again, you should have this before you if you can't see the 
chart.

    But why the sudden interest, why the total change in focus 
and effort? Nobody but Bettie Currie really cared about helping 
Ms. Lewinsky throughout November, even after the President 
learned that her name was on the prospective witness list. Did 
something happen to move the job search from a low to a high 
priority on that day? Oh, yes, something happened. On the 
morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered 
that Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any 
State or Federal employee with whom the President had sexual 
relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations. To 
keep Monica on the team was now of critical importance. 
Remember, they already knew that she was on the witness list, 
although nobody bothered to tell her.

    That same theme was picked up last week by Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson, both in his recitation of events of that day and in 
the exhibits he showed you. If I am lucky, we will place on the 
easel to my right the exhibit that Manager Hutchinson used.
    You will see the order that this exhibit places on the 
critical events of November and December. November 5 meeting, 
the no-job-search action; the President receives a witness 
list. And then of special interest, December 11, first event, 
``Judge Wright order permitting questions about Lewinsky.'' 
Too, on December 11, the ``President and Jordan talk about job 
for Monica.''
    Now, let me ask you to focus on what Mr. Hutchinson told 
you about the events of December 11. Sounding somewhat like 
majority counsel, he asks:

    And so, what triggered--let's look at the chain of events. 
The judge--the witness list came in, the judge's order came in, 
that triggered the President into action and the President 
triggered Vernon Jordan into action. That chain reaction here 
is what moved the job search along . . . remember what else 
happened on that day [December 11] again. That was the same day 
that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other 
relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.

    Now, it appears to me that the manager was suggesting--
again, with not a great deal of subtlety--that Vernon Jordan, 
one of this country's great lawyers and great citizens, was 
prepared to perjure himself to save the President.
    So let's just imagine the managers' examination of Mr. 
Jordan in this Chamber that would let you make your own 
judgment about his truthfulness.
    Question: Mr. Jordan, isn't it a fact that you met with Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 11 to help get her a job?
    Answer: Yes.
    Question: And isn't it a fact that before and after you met 
with her, you made calls to potential employers in New York?
    Answer: Yes.
    Question: Isn't it true that the reason for all of this 
activity on December 11 was that Judge Wright had on that very 
day issued an order authorizing the Jones lawyers to depose 
certain women like Miss Lewinsky?
    Answer: No.
    Question: What do you mean ``no''? Isn't it true that the 
judge had issued an order before you met with Ms. Lewinsky and 
before you made the calls?
    Answer: I had no knowledge of any such order. The fact that 
Ms. Lewinsky was a potential witness had nothing to do with my 
helping. I made an appointment to see her 3 days earlier.
    Question: Well, isn't it a fact that Judge Wright filed her 
order on December 11 before you met with Ms. Lewinsky?
    Answer: Well, actually no.
    Let me show you the official report of the judge's 
discussion with the lawyers in the Jones case on that date. You 
have this before you as well. There's a conference call between 
the judge and the lawyers, which is memorialized in a formal 
document prepared by a clerk and on file in the case in 
Arkansas. It notes that the conference call began at 5:33 p.m. 
central standard time. If I have my calculations right, that is 
6:33 p.m. in Washington.
    I want to stop here for a second so that you know where Mr. 
Jordan was when that happened. Let me see the next chart.
    By the way, this is Mr. Jordan testifying:

    I was actually on a plane for Amsterdam by the time the 
judge issued her order.

    So he testified in the grand jury.

    I left on United flight 946 at 5:55 from Dulles Airport and 
landed in Amsterdam the next morning.

    So the conference call begins at 6:33 eastern standard 
time. The court takes up another variety of matters, and the 
judge didn't even tell the lawyers that she was going to issue 
an order on the motion to compel these various depositions 
until the very end of the call, around 7:45 eastern standard 
time, and the clerk would actually fax them a copy at that 
point.
    So we return to Mr. Jordan's mythical testimony. To 
summarize, let me show you something that tells you what the 
real sequence of events was on December 11. Vernon Jordan makes 
a possible job call at 9:45, and another at 12:49, and another 
at 1:07; he meets with Ms. Lewinsky from 1:15 to 1:45; he gets 
on his plane at 5:55 in the afternoon, and an hour or so later 
the lawyers are informed that the judge had issued her order.
    In fact--just as a little filler--the President is out of 
town and returns to Washington at 1:10 a.m. And actually, Judge 
Wright's order is filed not on the 11th, but on the 12th.

    Question: Oh, I see. Well, never mind.

    Now, do any of you think that you need to look Mr. Jordan 
in the eye and hear his tone of voice to understand that the 
prosecutors have it wrong and have had, at least since the 
majority counsels' closing argument?
    You will also learn from us--but not from the managers--
that Mr. Jordan placed no pressure on any company to give Ms. 
Lewinsky a job. Indeed, two other companies he called didn't 
even offer her a job.
    Just as the managers dramatically mistake the record 
relating to Mr. Jordan's efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky find a 
job, so, too, do they invent a nonexistent link between a call 
Mr. Jordan made ultimately to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of 
MacAndrews and Forbes, Revlon's parent, and the offer Ms. 
Lewinsky finally received from Revlon with her signing of the 
affidavit in the Jones case. We will demonstrate beyond any 
question, once again, that conclusions the managers have drawn 
are simply false.
    Again, I'll begin with the fact that both Mr. Jordan and 
Ms. Lewinsky testified that there was no such link between the 
job and the affidavit, and the only person to ever suggest such 
a link was, once again, Ms. Tripp. Now, I presume that it is 
not the managers' intention to suggest that we bring Ms. Tripp 
before you to explore her motivation for making that 
suggestion.
    Next, take Ms. Lewinsky's interview with a MacAndrews 
official, which she described as ``having gone poorly''--a 
characterization adopted by the managers for obvious reasons--
because it suggests that there was a desire on their part to 
heighten the supposed relevance of the call Mr. Jordan made to 
Mr. Perelman. In other words, under their theory, Ms. 
Lewinsky's job prospects at MacAndrews and Forbes, or Revlon, 
were caput until Vernon Jordan made the call and resurrected 
her chances.
    Unfortunately, like so much of the obstruction case, the 
facts do not bear out this convenient theory. In fact, the man 
who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at MacAndrews was impressed with 
her, and because there was nothing available in his area, he 
sent her resume to Revlon where she was hired by someone who 
did not know about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman.
    So much for obstruction by job search.
    That, then, is an overview of the charges contained in 
these articles. You will hear about them in greater detail than 
I could offer you today when my colleagues speak in the next 
two days. I want to bring my presentation to a close.
    We are not here to defend William Clinton, the man. He, 
like all of us, will find his judges elsewhere. We are here to 
defend William Clinton, the President of the United States, for 
whom you are the only judges. You are free to criticize him, to 
find his personal conduct distasteful; but ask whether this is 
the moment when, for the first time in our history, the actions 
of a President have so put at risk the Government the framers 
created that there is only one solution. You must find not 
merely that removal is an acceptable option, that we will be OK 
the day after you vote; you must find that it's the only 
solution, that our democracy should not be made to sustain two 
more years of this President's service. You must put that 
question because the one thing that our form of Government 
cannot abide is the notion that impeachment is merely one more 
weapon a Congress can use in the process between the 
legislative and executive branches.
    Let me be very clear. We do not believe that President 
Clinton committed any of the offenses charged by the managers. 
And for the reasons we will set out at length over the next two 
days, we believe the managers have misstated the record, have 
constructed their case out of tenuous extrapolations, without 
foundation, and have at every turn assumed the worst without 
the evidence to support this speculation.
    You put these lawyers in a courtroom and they win 10 times 
out of 10.
    But suppose we are wrong. Suppose that you find that the 
President committed one or more of the offenses charged. Then 
there remains only one issue before you. Whatever your feelings 
may be about William Clinton, the man, or William Clinton, the 
political ally or opponent, or William Clinton, the father and 
husband, ask only this: Should William Clinton, the President, 
be removed from office? Are we at that horrific moment in our 
history when our Union could be preserved only by taking the 
step that the framers saw as the last resort? I am never 
certain how to respond when an advocate on the other side of a 
case calls up images of patriots over the centuries sacrificing 
themselves to preserve our democracy. I have no personal 
experience with war. I have only visited Normandy as a tourist. 
I do know this: My father was on the beach 55 years ago, and I 
know how he would feel if he were here. He didn't fight, no one 
fought, for one side of this case or the other. He fought, as 
all those did, for our country and our Constitution. As long as 
each of us--the managers, the President's counsel, the 
Senators--does his or her constitutional duty, those who fought 
for the country will be proud.
    We, the people of the United States, have formed a more 
perfect Union. We formed it. We nurtured it. We have seen it 
grow. We have not been perfect. And it is perhaps the most 
extraordinary thing about our Constitution--that it thrives 
despite our human imperfections.
    When the American people hear the President talk to 
Congress tonight, they will know the answer to the question, 
``How stands the Union?'' It stands strong, vibrant, and free.
    I close as I opened 2 hours ago, or 2\1/2\ hours ago. 
William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of the charges that 
have been brought against him of committing perjury. He didn't 
obstruct justice. He must not be removed from office.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
                                ------                                


                                 RECESS

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a moment the Senate will 
recess until 8:35 this evening, at which time the Senate will 
proceed as a body over to the House of Representatives as a 
joint session to receive a message from the President. 
Following the joint session, the Senate will adjourn until 11 
o'clock tomorrow morning.
    The Leader's Lecture Series is scheduled for tomorrow 
evening at 6 o'clock in the Old Senate Chamber with former 
President George Bush as guest speaker.
    I now ask that the Senate stand in recess under the 
previous order.
    There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:33 p.m., 
recessed until 8:35 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Crapo).
                                ------                                


                   OPENNESS ON THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise today in strong 
support of opening Senate deliberations to the public during 
the course of the impeachment trial against President Clinton. 
I will therefore support the motion to be offered by Senators 
Harkin and Wellstone to suspend the rules in order to open 
these proceedings to public scrutiny.
    In this trial, the U.S. Senate is charged by the 
Constitution with deciding whether to remove from office a 
President twice elected by the American people. Although I am 
certain that every member of the Senate will undertake this 
Constitutional responsibility with the utmost gravity and 
perform ``impartial justice'' as our oath commands, I am 
concerned that the American people will be shut out of this 
process at some of its most crucial moments.
    America's great experiment in democracy trusts the people 
to elect a President in a process that consists of months of 
public discussion, primaries, caucuses, debates, and finally an 
election open to everyone who chooses to participate. In stark 
contrast, the Senate's rules preclude the public from seeing 
its deliberations on whether an impeachment case will be 
dismissed, whether witnesses will be called or further evidence 
introduced, and even the ultimate debate regarding the guilt or 
innocence of the President. In short, Mr. Chief Justice, the 
Constitution trusts the people to elect a President, but our 
current Senate impeachment rules do not trust them to have even 
the most passive involvement in our deliberative process, even 
when the debate might result in overturning the people's 
judgment in a national election.
    Let me take a moment to describe again for my colleagues 
how our current impeachment rules work. The Senate is not only 
the trier of fact in this case, but it also acts as the 
ultimate arbiter of law. It can overturn the Chief Justice's 
rulings on evidentiary questions and make decisions, which 
cannot be appealed to any court, on motions. But the Senate's 
impeachment rules, which were first drafted in connection with 
the Andrew Johnson impeachment and most recently revisited in 
1986, do not permit the Senate to debate any of the decisions 
that it must make, except in closed session. In fact, the rules 
provide that decisions on evidentiary rulings are to be made 
with no debate whatsoever.
    Other motions can be debated, but only in private. So, for 
example, we expect that after the presentations are made on 
both sides, a motion will be made to dismiss the case against 
the President. Under our current rules, the House managers and 
the President's lawyers will argue that motion, but the Senate 
cannot debate it in open session. In fact, if a majority of the 
Senate wants to preclude debate entirely, it can do that by 
simply voting against a motion to take the Senate into private 
session for deliberations. Thus, before we vote on what could 
be a dispositive motion in this case, our only options are to 
discuss it behind closed doors or not discuss it at all.
    I think this is wrong. We need a chance to debate this 
motion as Senators. I want to hear from my colleagues before I 
vote, not just afterward on television. I intend to carefully 
and respectfully entertain my colleagues' arguments, and I 
refuse to rule out the possibility that a well-reasoned 
argument offering a different perspective will influence my 
decision. But the American people also deserve to hear what we 
say to each other as we debate this motion. I see little to be 
gained from closing these deliberations and much to be lost. We 
must do everything we can to ensure public confidence in our 
fairness and impartiality. How can we expect the public to have 
faith in us if we close the doors at the very moment when we 
finally will speak on the dispositive questions of this 
historic trial?
    Opponents of openness argue that in the only Presidential 
impeachment trial in our Nation's history, that of Andrew 
Johnson, the Senate's deliberations were closed. While it may 
be tempting to rely on the precedent of the one previous 
Presidential impeachment trial, which occurred one hundred and 
thirty years ago, I believe we should take a fresh look at this 
issue. In particular, we should consider how drastically the 
rules of the Senate and the composition of the Senate have 
changed.
    The Senators who presided over President Johnson's 
impeachment were not elected by the American people directly, 
but were chosen by the various State legislatures, and thus 
were not directly responsive to the popular will. Today, we as 
Senators represent the citizens of our state directly and we 
are accountable to them at the ballot box. Furthermore, until 
1929, the Senate debated nominations and treaties in closed 
sessions; and until 1975, many committee sessions took place in 
private. Today, all of our proceedings are open to the public, 
except in rare cases involving national security. The rules 
governing membership in the Senate as well as the openness of 
Senate proceedings have consistently evolved throughout our 
history toward greater public involvement. The rules governing 
impeachment trial deliberations must move in that direction as 
well.
    Opening these proceedings as Senators Harkin and Wellstone 
have proposed will make the American public feel more involved 
in the process. With the percentage of voters who cast their 
ballot on election day declining in each succeeding election 
and polls showing that the public feels increasingly alienated 
from the political process; and with people openly questioning 
the relevance of their elected representatives and the Congress 
as a whole to their daily lives, we must lay open to the 
American people our deliberations on the most crucial decision 
short of declaring war that the Constitution ultimately 
entrusts to us. Democracy can only flourish when the people 
feel that they have a stake in the process. Conducting our 
impeachment deliberations in private sends the message that 
when the really important decisions need to be made, the 
American public is not welcome to observe. This is precisely 
the wrong message to send.
    Thus far in the impeachment process, there has been little 
to celebrate. Most Americans have concluded that the House of 
Representative's inquiry was plagued by partisanship. Many fear 
that the Senate will do the same. With the eyes of the country 
upon it, the Senate has an opportunity to restore America's 
trust in the constitutional process. Open deliberations will 
enhance the public's understanding and discussion of this case. 
It may even serve to chip away some of the pervasive cynicism 
in our country as Americans watch how their elected 
representatives conduct themselves during consideration of the 
articles. I trust that my colleagues will reach their decisions 
on the merits after careful, reasoned and informed 
consideration of the evidence and the arguments presented. If 
my trust in my colleagues is justified, our deliberations will 
be thoughtful, high-minded, vigorous, and non-partisan. And if 
we have that deliberation in the open, it will be remembered as 
one of the Senate's finest hours.
                                ------                                


                      Wednesday, January 20, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

                       OPEN SENATE DELIBERATIONS

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I take the floor today with 
my colleague and friend from Minnesota, Senator Wellstone, to 
speak about an issue that is going to be coming up here in the 
next several days that is going to have an importance to all of 
the American people and, indeed, to future generations. That is 
the issue of whether or not the Senate, in its deliberations on 
the impeachment of President Clinton, will do it in secret or 
will do it in public; will do it behind closed doors, behind a 
curtain of secrecy, or do it openly so that the American people 
know what we are doing. I want to take just a few minutes to 
lay out the case for why I believe it should be open.
    Last week, Mr. Chief Justice, I raised an objection during 
the trial to the continued use of the word ``jurors,'' as it 
pertains to Senators sitting in a Court of Impeachment. I did 
that for a number of reasons, because we are not jurors. We are 
more than that. We are not just simply triers of fact. We are 
not just simply finders of law. But sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, we have a broad mandate, an expansive role to 
play. We have to take everything into account, everything from 
facts--yes, we have to take facts into account--we have to take 
law into account, but we also have to take into account a broad 
variety of things: how the case got here; what it is about; how 
important it is; how important is this piece of evidence 
weighed against that; what is the public will; how do the 
people feel about this; what will happen to the public good if 
one course of action is taken over another. These are all 
things we have to weigh, and that is why I felt strongly that 
Senators, in our own minds and in the public minds, should not 
be put in the box of simply being a juror.
    One other aspect of that is if, in fact, we are jurors, the 
argument went, then juries deliberate in secret and, therefore, 
if we are a jury, we should deliberate in secret. Now that we 
know we are not jurors, I believe that argument has gone away. 
I believe that we are, in fact, mandated by the Constitution to 
be more than that.
    I paraphrase an article that appeared in the Chicago 
Tribune by Professor Steven Lubet--he is a professor of law at 
Northwestern University--in which he pointed out that the 
Constitution does not allow us the luxury of being simply 
jurors. We have to decide; we have to judge.
    I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Lubet's article be printed 
in the Record.
    There being no objection, the article was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

               [From the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1999]

                        Stop Calling Them Jurors

                           (By Steven Lubet)

    Some day soon, the actual impeachment trial of William Jefferson 
Clinton will begin, with 100 United States senators sitting in 
judgment. The senators, in anticipation of the event, keep referring to 
themselves as a jury. On a recent edition of ``Larry King Live,'' for 
example, no fewer than six of them (three Republicans and three 
Democrats) virtually chanted the mantra that it was their duty to act 
as ``impartial jurors.'' It is tempting to agree.
    After all, they have been sworn to do justice, they are going to 
consider evidence and the resulting verdict must be either conviction 
or acquittal.
    But in fact, the senators are not jurors, and the repeated use of 
that term is dangerously misleading.
    In an ordinarily trial, the decision-making responsibility is 
divided between judge and jury. The judge makes rulings of law, while 
the jury's function is severely limited to determination of facts. In 
other words, the jury only decides ``what happened'' while the judge 
decides almost everything else. That is not the case with impeachment. 
Article I of the Constitution confers on the Senate the ``sole power to 
try all impeachments.'' That power is comprehensive--including law, 
facts and procedure--and it is to be exercised in its entirety by the 
Senate itself.
    (It is true that the chief justice is called upon to ``preside'' 
over presidential impeachments, but only because the vice president--
who is ordinarily the Senate's presiding officer--is disqualified by an 
obvious conflict of interest. The chief justice does not sit as a judge 
in any ordinary sense, but more as a moderator or chair. He holds no 
binding legal or decisional power.)
    And if there were any doubt, Article III of the Constitution 
actually makes this explicit, providing that ``the trial of all crimes, 
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.'' So, what are the 
senators, if not jurors? In fact, they are all judges, or if you 
prefer, members of the court of impeachment, each one delegated full 
power to decide every issue involved in the case.
    This distinction is crucial. President Clinton's most fervent 
detractors have argued that the House of Representatives, in exercise 
of its own constitutional power, has conclusively determined the 
``impeachability'' of the alleged offenses, leaving the senatorial jury 
the limited task of deciding whether the charges are true. But that is 
wrong. The Senate's role is not at all confined to the ascertainment of 
facts. Under the Constitution, the senators need not--they may not--
defer to the House of Representatives on the critical question of 
``impeachability.''
    Thus, the Senators must decide not only whether Clinton lied to the 
grand jury, but also whether so-called ``perjury about sex'' 
constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor of sufficient gravity to 
justify removing this president from office.
    It is easy to understand why a senator would want to be a juror. 
The persona is so engaging: modest, contemplative, nearly anonymous--
the humble citizen called to civic duty. But the constant references to 
senators-as-jurors can only serve to diminish their role and distract 
them from the expansive nature of their duty. It is not their job, as 
it would be a jury's, simply to decide some facts and then move on. The 
Constitution does not allow them that luxury.
    The senators are not determining just one case; their concern must 
be far greater than the fate of a single man. Rather, they are setting 
a legal and political precedent that may well guide our Republic for 
the next 130 years. Future generations will look back upon this Senate 
for direction whenever potential impeachments arise. Our descendants 
will not want to know only what happened, but also what principles 
govern the removal of the president. And so, the senators cannot merely 
decide--they have to judge.

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, a couple of other things 
regarding openness. The hallmark of our Republic and of our 
system of government is openness and transparency. The history 
of this Senate has been one of opening the doors. The first 
three sessions of the U.S. Senate were held in secret behind 
closed doors, the whole sessions. Up until 1929, all 
nominations and treaties were debated behind closed doors. In 
1972, 40 percent of all the committee meetings were done behind 
closed doors. In fact, up until 1975, many conference 
committees, and still committee meetings, were held behind 
closed doors.
    We have washed all that away. We have found through the 
years that the best political disinfectant is sunshine. I 
believe we are a better Senate, a better Congress and a better 
country for opening the doors and letting people see what we do 
and how we reach the decisions we reach.
    Mr. Chief Justice, there has been a spate of editorials 
recently regarding opening up the trial. I quote one from the 
Washington Post dated January 14. It says:

    It seems only right . . . that the Senate should be 
expected to debate in public any charge for which it is 
demanding of the president a public accounting.
    This is not to prevent senators from caucusing in private 
or even meeting unofficially, as senators did last week in 
crafting the procedural compromise that will govern the trial. 
Confidential contacts of this sort can certainly be 
constructive. But when the Senate meets as the Senate and 
considers arguments in its official trial proceedings, it 
should not do so behind closed doors. Absent the most unusual 
of circumstances, it should conduct its deliberations openly, 
thereby ensuring that the final adjudication of Mr. Clinton's 
case is as transparently accountable as possible.

    The New York Times basically said the same thing. The Los 
Angeles Times, the Des Moines Register and Roll Call. I think 
Roll Call basically said it best when they said:

    . . . this is not a court trial. . . . It is inherently a 
political proceeding. . . . Their constituents [our 
constituents], the citizens of America, have a right to see how 
they perform and to fully understand why they decided to retain 
or remove their elected President.

    I ask unanimous consent that all of these editorials be 
printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1999]

                             An Open Trial

    Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) have 
announced that they will move to suspend certain portions of the 
Senate's impeachment rules to permit the full Senate trial of President 
Clinton to be conducted in the public's view. As the more than 100-
year-old rules stand now, testimony can be taken with the cameras on 
and the doors open unless a majority votes to close the session, but 
any time the senators debate a motion and, for that matter, when they 
consider the final articles, they will do so in secret. This is exactly 
the wrong way to conduct a trial whose purpose is to pass public 
judgment on the conduct of the president. The Harkin-Wellstone proposal 
to do the whole trial in public offers a far better approach.
    The desire to avoid public argument is understandable, particularly 
in a case as filled with salacious material as the Clinton trial must 
necessarily be. But it is not the job of the Senate to protect citizens 
from the rationale for the Senate's actions, nor are senators entitled 
to be shielded from the embarrassment of discussing out loud the tawdry 
evidence at issue in this case.
    The often drawn analogy between senators and jurors, whose 
deliberations are kept secret, also fails to offer a persuasive reason 
to conduct secret debates. Jurors, after all, did not seek public 
office and are not permitted, as their trials are progressing, to go on 
talk shows to discuss their own consideration of the evidence. The 
senators are, in this proceeding, acting as far more than simple 
jurors, and it makes little sense for this most solemn obligation of 
the Senate to face less sunshine than does a routine legislative 
matter. It seems only right, rather, that the Senate should be expected 
to debate in public any charge for which it is demanding of the 
president a public accounting.
    This is not to prevent senators from caucusing in private or even 
from meeting unofficially, as senators did last week in crafting the 
procedural compromise that will govern the trial. Confidential contacts 
of this sort can certainly be constructive. But when the Senate meets 
as the Senate and considers arguments in its official trial 
proceedings, it should not do so behind closed doors. Absent the most 
unusual of circumstances, it should conduct its deliberations openly, 
thereby ensuring that the final adjudication of Mr. Clinton's case is 
as transparently accountable as possible.
                                 ______
                                 

                [From the New York Times, Jan. 13, 1999]

                            Open the Senate

    Since the trial of President Andrew Johnson in 1868, the Senate has 
conducted its debates on procedures and even the final verdict of 
impeachments in closed session. The time has come for that tradition to 
be altered, at least for the trial of President Clinton. Two Democratic 
Senators, Tom Harkin and Paul Wellstone, have announced that they will 
seek to change the rule on closed debates after the opening 
presentations begin tomorrow. Whatever would be gained by allowing 
senators to deliberate privately, the overriding requirements is for 
the American public to see and judge firsthand whether justice is being 
done.
    Some senators argue that the closed session last Friday, at which 
Democrats and Republicans worked out a compromise on trial procedures, 
showed that privacy can serve a constructive purpose. But the Harkin-
Wellstone proposal would not preclude the Senate's adjourning and 
meeting outside the chamber at caucuses like the one last week. The 
principle that should prevail is simply that proceedings that could 
lead to the removal of a President should be conducted in open session, 
especially since many Americans have questions about the fairness of 
the House impeachment proceedings. Closing the Senate's deliberations 
on so grave a matter would undermine public confidence and be an 
affront to citizens' rights to observe the operations of government.
    Senators love their customs and ceremonies, but their institution's 
commanding trend has been toward openness. At the time of the nation's 
founding, all Senate sessions were closed. Until 1929, the Senate 
debated nominations and treaties in closed sessions. Until the reforms 
of the 1970's, many Congressional hearings and meetings were in closed 
session. No one would seriously argue that these old practices should 
have been preserved. As for impeachment trials, it is worth noting that 
they were open most of the 19th century. Privacy was adopted only for 
the trial of President Johnson.
    Some senators seem to believe that they should be regarded as 
jurors in a trial, and therefore allowed a measure of confidentiality. 
But the senators have privileges not available to regular juries. They 
may ask questions, speak publicly about the process and make motions. 
It is within their power to change the rules on closing the session, 
which would take a two-thirds majority to be adopted. If openness 
drives senators toward partisanship or prolixity, as some fear, let 
public scrutiny serve as the governor on their excesses.
                                 ______
                                 

              [From the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1999]

                         Keep Trial Fully Open

    Unless the Senate changes one of its rules for conducting President 
Clinton's impeachment trial, the public will not be allowed to witness 
crucial parts, including a possible climactic debate on whether to 
convict Clinton on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. The 
Senate should change this archaic rule; the trial's inestimable 
national importance demands that the proceedings be completely open.
    For guidance in the trial, which opens Thursday, the Senate is 
relying on rules adopted in 1868, when Andrew Johnson became the first 
and until now the only president to be tried for alleged high crimes 
and misdemeanors. One of those rules compels ``the doors to be closed'' 
whenever senators debate among themselves, something they are allowed 
to do only when deciding procedural issues--such as whether witnesses 
should be called--or when they reach a verdict. Otherwise, by the rules 
of 1868, the senators must sit in silence as House prosecutors present 
the case against Clinton and White House lawyers defend him. Any 
questions the senators have must be submitted in writing to the chief 
justice, who may or may not choose to ask them.
    The precedents embedded in the Johnson trial rules should not be 
put aside lightly. Without them the Senate could find itself mired in 
prolonged and divisive arguments over how to proceed. But no precedent 
is sacred. Times change and rules must change with them. Congress has 
many times discarded procedures and traditions that came to be seen as 
inimical to the need for free discussion in an open society. For 
example, as Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) 
note, in the earliest days of the republic all of Congress' proceedings 
were secret. Until 1929 nomination hearings were conducted behind 
closed doors. Until 1975 many committee sessions similarly took place 
outside public scrutiny.
    The Senate of Andrew Johnson's day was a far different place from 
the Senate of today. Its members were not chosen by the electorate--
that did not come until 1913--but rather were appointed by state 
legislatures and so were not directly answerable to the popular will. 
And much of the Senate's business was routinely conducted in secret.
    Today, except when matters of national security are being 
discussed, Congress' sessions are open--in the sunshine, as they say in 
the Capital. If ever there was an occasion when the sun should be 
allowed fully to shine in, it is in the Clinton impeachment trial.
    A two-thirds vote is needed to change Senate rules. Harkin and 
Wellstone, the major proponents of full openness, know the difficulty 
of getting 65 colleagues to agree with them. But they are leading a 
fair and just cause. Put simply, Americans have a right to witness this 
process in all its facets. The people's representatives in the Senate 
now have the responsibility to assure that right.
                                 ______
                                 

                    [From Roll Call, Jan. 14, 1999]

                            No Secret Trial

    Imagine the spectacle. On, say, March 5, cameras are turned on in 
the Senate and the roll is called on the articles of impeachment 
against President Clinton. The votes are taken, the decision is made--
and then there is a mad rush for Senators to explain why they voted as 
they did. But their actual deliberations prior to the voting remain 
secret.
    There is not even an official record kept, so reconstructing one of 
the most portentous debates in American history depends on the memories 
and notes of Senators and staffers.
    This secrecy scenario is exactly what's in store unless the Senate 
changes its rules, as proposed by Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul 
Wellstone (D-Minn.), to open the impeachment trial to the media and the 
public.
    In fact, it will take strong action from Senate leaders to open the 
trial, since changing Senate rules requires a two-thirds vote. We urge 
Democratic and Republican leaders to exercise their influence to 
prevent their institution from being accused of conducting a ``secret 
trial.''
    The allegation could turn out to be true. Senate rules call not 
only for final deliberations on impeachment to be conducted in secret, 
but any deliberations. This means that motions to dismiss the case and 
consideration of whether to call witnesses might be done in secret and 
with no subsequent printing of the proceedings in the Congressional 
Record. All but arguments by House managers and the President's 
lawyers, witness testimony, if any, and the actual vote could take 
place behind a shroud.
    Some Senators say they would not have been able to reach their 
bipartisan agreement on procedure last Friday if the session had been 
open. If statesmanship requires secrecy--which we doubt--then 
arrangements can be made for informal closed discussions. But all 
substantive discussions should be open. We have some sympathy for the 
view that some subject matter conceivably could be so sexually explicit 
that Senators will be ashamed to be seen discussing it in public. But 
it's not worth closing off almost the entire Clinton trial over this 
possibility.
    Conceivably--if this is what it takes to sway skittish Senators--
the rules could be altered to permit some discussion to be held in 
closed session with a record kept. But the House debate on impeachment 
could have been rated PG-13, and let's face it: The Clinton case record 
is already so raunchy that there's little that schoolchildren haven't 
already heard. So the proceedings ought to be open.
    It will be argued: In court trials, jury deliberations are 
conducted in secret. But this is not a court trial. It is inherently a 
political proceeding. The ``jurors'' are not ordinary citizens unused 
to the glare of publicity. They will be up for reelection and judged 
partly on the basis of how they handle this case. Their constituents, 
the citizens of America, have a right to see how they perform and to 
fully understand why they decided to retain or remove their elected 
President.

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, let me take off a little bit 
on one aspect of this. Some people say, ``Well, there is a 
benefit to Senators meeting quietly, privately to discuss 
these.'' I believe that, and I would not, in any way, want to 
close, for example, some of the caucuses that we have--the 
occupant of the Chair remembers we had the closed caucus 
between the two parties to reach an agreement under which we 
are operating. I think there is a benefit to that, as the 
Washington Post article pointed out. That is fine, as we meet 
unofficially off the floor amongst ourselves to discuss things. 
But when the Senate meets as the Senate, as soon as that 
opening prayer is given by the Chaplain, this place should be 
open, and the trial should be open.
    Next, I believe that unless we open this trial up, we are 
going to sow the seeds of confusion, misinformation, suspicion 
and unnecessary conflict. Here is why I say that. As some wag 
once said, there is nothing secret about any secret meeting 
held here in Washington.
    Think, if you will, of a closed session of the Senate. The 
galleries are cleared, the cameras are shut off, reporters are 
gone, and we engage in debate on whatever issue we are going to 
debate. The debate is over. We open the galleries again, and 
100 Senators rush out of here and they see all the reporters 
standing out here.
    What happens? ``Well, what happened, Senator?''
    ``Well, don't quote me, not for attribution, but guess what 
this Senator said; guess what that Senator said?''
    And so you get 100 different versions of what happened here 
on the Senate floor.
    I believe that will sow a lot of confusion, misinformation 
and unnecessary conflict. If the doors are open and if we 
debate in the open, there is no filter, it is unfiltered, and 
the public can see how and why we reached the decisions we 
reached.
    The press, quite frankly, obviously, as perhaps is their 
nature, is quick to pick up on conflict and rumor. I believe if 
we follow the rules to close the doors of this trial it will 
turn it more into a circus than anything else. If we open the 
debate, I don't believe we will have any problems.
    I was interested in an op-ed piece that was in the New York 
Times by former Senator Dale Bumpers. I read it, and there is a 
part in there I think really hits home. Former Senator Bumpers 
said:

    In a visit with Harry Truman in his home in Missouri in 
1971, he admonished me to always put my trust in the people. 
``They can handle it,'' he said.

    ``They can handle it.'' I believe the American people can 
handle it, too. I believe they can handle any debate, any 
discussion, any deliberation that we have on the Senate floor. 
Not only can they handle it, I believe they have a right to it.
    So Senator Wellstone and I will, at the first opportunity, 
when the first motion is made to dismiss the case, if that 
motion is made--obviously the debate about that under the rules 
would be held in secret--we intend at that point to offer a 
preferential motion that the debate, the discussion in the 
Senate on the motion to dismiss be held openly, to suspend the 
rules.
    Obviously, that is a hurdle. To suspend the rules requires 
a two-thirds vote. It means that two-thirds of the Senate would 
have to vote to suspend the rules. As a further kind of 
anomaly, the motion to open up the Senate, to open up our 
debate and deliberation, the debate on that has to be held in 
private under the rules, strange as it may seem. And so we will 
at that point ask unanimous consent that the debate and 
discussion on whether we will open up the debate on the motion 
to dismiss be held openly. Of course, one Senator can object, 
and then we would have to go into a secret debate on our motion 
to open up the deliberation and the debate. And so that will 
happen sometime soon.
    Another issue has been raised, Mr. Chief Justice--I would 
just like to cover it and then I am going to yield the floor to 
Senator Wellstone. The point has been raised, well, you know, 
if Senators start debating this and it gets in the open, then 
they get in front of the cameras, and, why, then this thing can 
go on and on and on because Senators--you know, we Senators 
like to talk, we can talk forever. Under the rules of the 
Senate, when we go into debate and deliberation on any motion, 
each Senator can be recognized only for 10 minutes--only for 10 
minutes. And I think a lot of people are forgetting about that.
    Lastly, I remember in January of 1991 when I sat at the 
desk on that side over there and Senators had just been sworn 
in; housekeeping motions were being made. One motion was being 
made by the majority leader at that time that the Senate recess 
or adjourn--I forget--adjourn to a date certain--I think it was 
for the State of the Union--but during that period of time, 
that we would not have been in session, and the time would have 
run out on whether or not we would use force to get the Iraqis 
out of Kuwait, the gulf war.
    I stood at that time and raised an objection to the Senate 
recessing or adjourning over to that point. And I raised an 
objection that enabled us to have an open and public debate on 
whether or not we would authorize the President of the United 
States to conduct military operations in the gulf. We had that 
debate. And I think it was one of the Senate's finest hours. 
Even those with whom I disagreed I thought were eloquent and 
forceful in their arguments. We had the debate, we had the 
vote, and then we moved on. And I think the American people 
were better for that debate because it was held in the open.
    Mr. Chief Justice, if we in the Senate can debate whether 
or not to send our sons and daughters off to distant lands to 
fight and die in a war--something that touches every single 
American citizen--if we can debate that in open and in public, 
then in the name of all that is right about our Republic and 
our country and our openness and our system of government, why 
can we not debate and deliberate in the open something else 
that touches every American citizen? And that is, why or if the 
President of the United States should or should not be removed 
from office. If we can debate it openly, the issue of war, then 
certainly we can debate an issue in the open, the issue of 
whether or not the President would be removed from office.
    I yield the floor.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, let me, first of all, 
thank my colleague, Senator Harkin. We have been working very 
hard on this. There are other Senators who support this 
motion--Senator Leahy, Senator Feingold, Senator Boxer, and 
Senator Lieberman. And I know Senator Hutchison has indicated 
interest in this question. This will be a very important vote 
coming up next week.
    First, let me just, if I could, say that I feel very 
honored to be speaking from Dale Bumpers' desk. I don't think 
there is anybody who could match his oratory, but I am sure 
lucky to have this desk and this long cord. And Dale Bumpers, 
wherever you are, I will do my very best to try to carry on in 
your tradition, or at least give it everything that I have.
    Mr. Chief Justice, next week before the Senate goes into 
its own deliberations on this question of whether to dismiss 
charges, we will take this one step at a time. We most 
definitely will try to move forward with a motion to suspend 
the rules so that the Senate deliberations will not be in 
closed session. We also would like to make sure that the very 
debate as to whether our deliberations are in closed session or 
secret session be open to the public. And we will, on the floor 
of the Senate, make every effort possible to keep that debate 
in the open.
    I am going to be very brief and just make the following 
arguments because there are some very, very good people who do 
a lot of work when it comes to interpretation of the rules. I 
will say, since the Parliamentarian is here, that Bob Dove has 
been eminently fair. He has treated all of us from both 
political parties with the utmost respect.
    My own feeling about this is that this trial has been 
momentous. I personally wish that it had not come over from the 
House. I have always made my point that I believe the House 
overreached on the impeachment charges. But they are here in 
the Senate.
    I think here are the following questions: If in fact we as 
a Senate are going to go into deliberations over whether to 
dismiss the charges against the President, or later on whether 
we will have witnesses, or later on whether the President shall 
be removed, I cannot imagine that the U.S. Senate would go into 
closed session. I cannot imagine that our deliberations and our 
debate and the arguments we make would not be open to the 
public.
    The public isn't going to believe in this political process 
if we go into secret or closed session. The public is not going 
to have trust in what we are doing if they don't get a chance 
to evaluate our debate and what we are saying and why we 
reached the conclusions we reached.
    I really do believe that if there is to be healing in our 
country--and I certainly pray that there will be--it would be a 
terrible mistake for the U.S. Senators, Democrats or 
Republicans, to cut the public out. The part of the public that 
is looking at the proceedings right now, that is evaluating the 
arguments that are being made--and there are people who have 
made very good arguments on both sides of the question--to then 
say to them, ``Listen, when it comes to now the Senate, the 
U.S. Senate, going into our own deliberations and making our 
own decisions, you, the public, you're cut out of it,'' this 
goes against the very essence of accountability. It goes 
against the very essence of what a representative democracy is 
about.
    Some of these rules go back to 1868. That was a time when 
the U.S. Senators were not even directly elected. They were 
elected by State legislatures. The 17th amendment changed all 
that in 1913 as part of the Progressive movement and the 
progressive change in the country. The idea was that the U.S. 
Senators would be a part of representative democracy, directly 
elected by the people, accountable to the people.
    This is a huge decision we are going to be making in the 
U.S. Senate. And I think it will be a terrible mistake for the 
U.S. Senate to go into closed session, to cut the public out, 
to not let people have the opportunity to hear what we are 
saying in the debate.
    It is really quite amazing, if you think about it. People 
will know what our votes are--dismissal of charges, witnesses, 
whether the President should be removed from office--and 
somewhere there will be a transcript of the proceedings, but I 
don't think they will even be published. There will not even be 
a public record of what U.S. Senators--the Senator from 
Arkansas or the Senator from Minnesota or the Senator from 
Iowa--had to say in this debate.
    I just say to all of my colleagues, I hope that, No. 1, you 
will agree to a unanimous-consent agreement that in our 
discussion or our debate whether or not we go into closed 
session, that it be open to the public. What an irony it would 
be if, in the very debate about whether or not our 
deliberations will be open or closed, our deliberations were 
closed. It seems to me that debate ought to be open to the 
public.
    Second, I certainly hope that we will have the two-thirds 
vote that it will take to suspend the current rule that says we 
must be in closed session.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I think it is important for the public 
right now to be engaged in this process. I hope people will be 
calling their Senators, because I really do believe that part 
of our deliberations, part of our modus operandi as Senators, 
whatever States we represent, should be to stay in touch with 
people. Of course, we reach our own independent judgment. We 
reach our own independent judgment about the facts, about the 
charges.
    Then there is another question, the threshold question, 
about whether or not these charges rise to the level of 
removing a President from office.
    I think part of what we are about as Senators is to try to 
stay in close touch with the public, with people in our States, 
whatever decision we make. It can be a matter of individual 
conscience, but I think it is terribly important that we 
operate as a representative body, as the U.S. Senate, as a part 
of representative democracy of the United States of America. We 
can't on this question, we can't on these questions, if we go 
into closed session.

                                 recess

    Thereupon, the Senate, in legislative session, recessed 
until 1:05 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, reassembled when called to order by the Chief 
Justice.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Senators may be seated, and the Deputy 
Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
    The Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Loretta Symms, made 
proclamation as follows:
    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that 
the White House counsel presentation today will last until 
sometime between 5 and 6 o'clock.
    I have been informed that Mr. Greg Craig and Ms. Cheryl 
Mills will be making today's presentations. As we have done 
over the past week, we will take a couple of short breaks 
during the proceedings. I am not exactly sure how we will do 
that. We will keep an eye on everybody, the Chief Justice, and 
counsel. I assume that after about an hour, hour and 15 
minutes, we will take a break; then we will take another one in 
the afternoon at some point so we will have an opportunity to 
stretch.
    I remind all Senators, again, to remain standing at your 
desks each time the Chief Justice enters and departs the 
Chamber.
    As a further reminder, on a different subject, the Leader's 
Lecture Series continues tonight, to be held at 6 p.m. in the 
Old Senate Chamber. Former President George Bush will be our 
guest speaker.
    I yield the floor, and I understand that Counsel Greg Craig 
is going to be the first presenter.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Journal of the proceedings of the 
trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, counsel 
for the President have 21 hours 45 minutes remaining to make 
the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Craig.
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen 
of the Senate, distinguished managers from the House, good 
afternoon. My name is Greg Craig and I am special counsel to 
the President. I am here today on behalf of President Clinton. 
I am here to argue that he is not guilty of the allegations of 
grand jury perjury set forth in article I.
    I welcome this opportunity to speak for President Clinton. 
He has a strong and compelling case, one that is based on the 
facts in the record, on the law, and on the Constitution. But 
first and foremost, the President's defense is based on the 
grand jury transcript itself. I urge you to read that 
transcript and watch the videotape. You will see this President 
make painful, difficult admissions, beginning with his 
acknowledgment of an improper and wrongful relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
    You will see that the President was truthful. And after 
reading, seeing, hearing, and studying the evidence for 
yourselves, not relying on what someone else says it is, not 
relying on someone else's description, characterization, or 
paraphrase of the President's testimony, we believe that you 
will conclude that what the President did and said in the grand 
jury was not unlawful, and that you must not remove him from 
office.
    I plan to divide my presentation into three parts:
    First, to tell you how really bad this article is, legally, 
structurally, and constitutionally, and to argue that it falls 
well below the most basic, minimal standards and should not be 
used to impeach and remove this President or any President from 
office; second, to address the various allegations directly; 
and third, to give you a few larger thoughts in response to 
some of the arguments from last week.
    At the conclusion you will have had much more than 100 
percent of your minimum daily requirements for lawyering, for 
which I apologize.
    Article I accuses the President of having given perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning 
one or more of four different subject areas:
    First, when he testified about the nature and details of 
the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky;
    Second, when he testified about his testimony in the Jones 
deposition;
    Third, when he testified about what happened during the 
Jones deposition when the President's lawyer, Robert Bennett, 
made certain representations about Monica Lewinsky's affidavit;
    And, fourth, when he testified about alleged efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and impede the discovery 
of evidence.
    It is noteworthy that the second and third subject areas 
are attempts to revisit the President's deposition testimony in 
the Jones case. There was an article that was proposed alleging 
that the President also committed perjury in the Jones case in 
the Jones deposition. That article was rejected by the House of 
Representatives, and there were very many good reasons for the 
House to take that action. Those allegations have been 
dismissed, and you must not allow the managers to revive them. 
Last week they tried to do that. The managers mixed up and 
merged two sets of issues--allegations of perjury in the grand 
jury and allegations of perjury in the Jones case. These are 
very different matters. And I think the result was confusing 
and also unfair to the President.
    You will notice that the third and the fourth subject areas 
correspond to, coincide, and overlap with many of the 
allegations of obstruction of justice in article II. This 
represents a kind of double charging that you might be familiar 
with if you have either been a prosecutor or a defense lawyer. 
One is, the defendant is charged with the core offense; second, 
the defendant is charged with denying the core offense under 
oath. This gives the managers two bites at the apple, and it is 
a dubious prosecutorial practice that is frowned upon by most 
courts.
    The upshot, though, of this with respect to subparts 3 and 
4 of this first article is that if you conclude, as I trust you 
will, that the evidence that the President engaged in 
obstruction of justice is insufficient to support that charge, 
it would follow logically that the President's denial that he 
engaged in any such activity would be respected, and he would 
be acquitted on the perjury charge. Simply put, if the 
President didn't obstruct justice, he didn't commit perjury 
when he denied it.
    But the most striking thing about article I is what it does 
not say. It alleges the perjury generally. But it does not 
allege a single perjurious statement specifically. The majority 
drafted the article in this way despite pleas from other 
members of the committee and from counsel for the President 
that the article take care to be precise when it makes its 
allegations. Such specificity, as many of you know, is the 
standard practice of Federal prosecutors all across America. 
And that is the practice recommended by the Department of 
Justice in the manual distributed to the U.S. attorneys who 
enforce the criminal code in Federal courts throughout the 
Nation.
    Take a look at the standard form. It is exhibit 5 in the 
exhibits that we handed to you. This is given to Federal 
prosecutors. This is the model that they are told to use to 
allege perjury in a criminal indictment in Federal court. There 
is a very simple reason why prosecutors identify the specific 
quotation that is alleged to be perjury, and why it is included 
in a perjury indictment. If they don't quote the specific 
statement that is alleged to be perjurious, courts will dismiss 
the indictment, concluding that the charge of perjury is too 
vague and that the defendant is not able to determine what 
precisely he is being charged with.
    The requirement that a defendant be given adequate notice 
of what he is charged with carries constitutional dimensions, 
and the failure to provide that notice violates due process of 
law. This is something that applies to all criminal defendant 
offenses when they are charged. And you can understand why that 
kind of notice is required. Imagine a robbery indictment that 
failed to indicate who or what was robbed and what property was 
stolen. How could you possibly defend against the charge that 
you just stole something but you don't know what it is and it 
is nothing specific? Imagine a murder indictment without 
identifying a victim.
    But this requirement is even more stringent for perjury 
prosecution. Description, paraphrase, or summary of testimony 
that is alleged to be perjurious are not acceptable. The 
quotation must be there, or the definition should be so close 
that there can be no doubt as to what is intended. In the past, 
when the House returned articles of impeachment alleging 
perjury with respect to Federal judges, you will see that the 
House has followed this practice. And if you go back to 
American history and review the articles that allege perjury 
and that have been approved by the House and the Senate, you 
will find that the statements that are alleged to be perjurious 
are specifically identified in the article.
    Let me read from article I from the resolution of 
impeachment against Judge Walter Nixon. ``The false or 
misleading statement was in substance that the Forest County 
District Attorney never discussed this case with Judge Nixon.'' 
There is no doubt about that. That is very clear. From the 
Alcee Hastings articles of impeachment, the false statement 
was, in substance, that Judge Hastings and William Borders 
never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in 
United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings.
    Why is it that in this case--surely the most serious 
perjury trial in American history--the House decided that 
specific allegations just aren't necessary? The failure of the 
House to be specific in its charge of perjury in fact violated 
the President's right to due process and fundamental fairness. 
And, as you will see as I go through the procedural history of 
these allegations, it puts us and the President at a 
significant disadvantage when we try to respond to the 
allegations that are now set forth in this article.
    But there is yet another reason why this vagueness and lack 
of specificity is so very dangerous, and it raises a 
constitutional question that only this body can resolve.
    Article I, section 2, clause 5, of the Constitution states, 
``The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of 
impeachment''--``the sole power of impeachment.''
    By failing to be specific in this article as to what it is 
precisely that the President said that should cause him to be 
removed from office, the House has effectively and 
unconstitutionally ceded its authority under this provision of 
the Constitution to the managers, who are not authorized to 
exercise that authority. By bringing general charges in this 
article, the House Judiciary Committee, and then the House of 
Representatives generally, gave enormous discretion, power, and 
authority to the floor managers and their lawyers to decide 
what precisely the President was going to be charged with. They 
didn't have that authority under the Constitution. Only the 
House of Representatives has that authority. They have been 
allowed to pick and to choose what allegations will be leveled 
against the President of the United States.
    It would be extremely dangerous to the integrity of the 
process if the House leveled such general charges against the 
President, creating ``empty vessels,'' to use Mr. Ruff's term, 
to be filled by lawyers and floor managers. And this article, I 
think, will take on more importance as we take a closer look at 
the charges themselves and we see what kind of ``witches' 
brew''--to use Mr. Ruff again--what kind of content was poured 
into these vessels, and find out where they came from and why 
and when.
    I would like to talk about how these charges have been a 
moving target for us throughout this entire process. On 
September 9, when Kenneth Starr submitted his referral to the 
House of Representatives, he claimed that there was substantial 
and credible information to suggest that the President 
committed perjury in the grand jury on three separate 
occasions. To his credit, the Starr referral was moderately 
specific. We could understand what they were talking about in 
those allegations.
    On October 5, when House majority counsel David Schippers 
first made his representation to the House Judiciary Committee, 
he discarded two of Mr. Starr's theories and invented a new one 
of his own. And he included only two counts in his presentation 
alleging perjury in the grand jury. Those two counts were 
unbelievably broad and included no specifics whatsoever.
    On November 19, Mr. Starr appeared before the House 
Judiciary Committee and gave a 2-hour opening statement. In 
that statement he delivered one or two sentences on the subject 
of grand jury perjury.
    Then, on December 9, when the committee majority released 
its four proposed articles of impeachment, the article that 
alleged perjury in the grand jury, which is the one we have 
before us today, failed to tell us or the American people what 
words the President actually used that should cause the 
Congress to remove him from office.
    As you know, these proposed articles were released just as 
Mr. Ruff and the President's defense were being completed. In 
fact, it may have been 2 or 3 minutes before he completed his 
final argument before the committee. So we had no advance 
notice and no chance to discuss these articles, to respond to 
them, or in any way to react. In truth, I must say that because 
of the vagueness of the articles that were ultimately returned, 
had we been given such advance notice, it would not have made 
much difference because, simply put, there is a stunning lack 
of specificity in article I.
    So where do we look for guidance? How do we know what to 
defend against in this case? After the Judiciary Committee had 
completed its deliberations, after the Members had voted to 
send four articles of impeachment to the full House, the 
majority issued its report on December 16th, only 3 days before 
the House took its final vote. It was never debated by, let 
alone approved by, the House of Representatives, and thus this 
report has no formal standing in these proceedings. But until 
the managers filed their trial brief and made their 
presentations just last week, the majority report, written by 
Mr. Schippers and his staff, was our only place to go to look 
for guidance as to what those four subparts of this first 
article really meant.
    Now, when it comes to perjury before the grand jury, the 
majority report argued that the President had not made two, not 
three, but a whole host of perjurious statements before the 
grand jury, some statements that were not contained in the 
Starr referral and had never been identified, charged, 
discussed, or debated by the Members during the impeachment 
inquiry.
    For example, the majority report alleged that the prepared 
statement that the President made and delivered to the grand 
jury at the start of his testimony admitting his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky was ``perjurious, false, and misleading,'' an 
astonishing allegation that went far beyond anything that 
Kenneth Starr had claimed, and a claim that no member of the 
Judiciary Committee had ever made in the course of the 
committee's deliberations.
    Obviously, we had no opportunity whatsoever to respond to 
this allegation before the committee or before the House; the 
allegation was never debated or discussed by members of the 
committee, nor was it discussed during the debate in the 
Chamber of the House.
    The majority report also alleged that the President 
committed perjury in the grand jury when he testified that his 
``goal in the [Jones] deposition was to be truthful,'' and when 
he said that he believed he had managed to complete his 
testimony in that deposition ``without violating the law.''
    Again, this allegation was brand new to us, never before 
made by Starr, not included in the Schippers closing argument, 
never mentioned by Chairman Hyde or by anyone else in the 
committee, never addressed by the President's counsel, never 
debated by members of the committee, never discussed on the 
floor.
    The majority report made many other new allegations of the 
same kind and pedigree--all new, undiscussed, untested. They 
had not come, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, these 
allegations did not come from Starr's referral, nor did they 
come from any evidence that had been gathered in the course of 
the impeachment inquiry, nor had they ever been unveiled during 
the impeachment inquiry to allow the President's counsel to 
respond, or the members of the Judiciary Committee to debate 
them. To our knowledge, many of these allegations were never 
discussed or debated by the members of the committee. And if 
you read the closing arguments of the members of the House 
Judiciary Committee, you will search in vain for any specific 
reference to any of these new allegations, the terms of which 
are the subject of article I.
    Then we found ourselves in the Senate, our only guide being 
the articles themselves, which, as you know, are general, and 
the majority report, which has no formal standing but which was 
filled with allegations and theories, and which had never been 
discussed much less adopted.
    As the trial in the Senate began--just 3 days before the 
managers were scheduled to open their case, on January 11th--
the House managers filed their trial brief. We discovered that 
the allegations of grand jury perjury against the President 
were still changing, still expanding, still increasing in 
number.
    The trial brief made eight proffers, incredibly presented 
``merely as examples'' that still in general terms describe 
instances where the President allegedly provided ``perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony'' to the grand jury.
    But, we were warned, these proffers were only ``salient 
examples'' of grand jury perjury. The House managers said, 
``The [examples set forth in the trial brief] are merely 
highlights of the grand jury perjury. There are numerous 
additional examples.'' And when we heard Mr. Manager Rogan's 
presentation, we realized that the trial brief was absolutely 
right; Mr. Rogan unveiled allegations that had not been 
included even in the trial brief.
    The uncertainty, fluidity, the vagueness of the charges in 
this case and the unwillingness of the prosecutors ever to 
specify and be bound by the statements that are at issue has 
been an aspect of this process that, I submit, has been 
profoundly unfair to this President. It is also 
unconstitutional, from the arguments I gave you.
    The articles had come to include specific allegations of 
grand jury perjury that did not come from the Starr referral 
and that never would have been approved by the House had the 
House been required to review them.
    There is one other element of unfairness that Mr. Ruff 
referred to. Even as the House managers have consistently tried 
to stretch the scope of article I to cover allegations never 
considered by the House, they have tried to twist the scope of 
article I to cover allegations specifically rejected by the 
House.
    Now, let me be clear here. I am not charging the managers 
with going beyond the record of the case. These new allegations 
come from the record in the case. They are not beyond the 
record. They are in the record. But the Starr referral did not 
find it suitable to make these allegations, and they were not 
made in a timely way before the House Judiciary Committee and, 
I would submit, in a timely way before the House of 
Representatives.
    I go back to this second element of unfairness that has to 
do with the Jones article. When that Jones article was 
rejected, we would argue that rejection should have been 
recognized for what it was, a clear instruction from the House 
of Representatives not to argue that the President should be 
impeached and removed because of his testimony in the Jones 
deposition. But the managers have sought to merge the Jones 
testimony with the grand jury testimony, to confuse these two 
events, to blend and blur them together.
    The Senate must understand that these two events were 
different in every way. In the President's testimony in the 
Jones case, the President was evasive, misleading, incomplete 
in his answers, and, as I said to the House Judiciary 
Committee, maddening. But in the Federal grand jury, President 
Clinton was forthright and forthcoming. He told the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth for 4 long hours, and the 
American people saw that testimony and they know that President 
Clinton, when he appeared before the grand jury, did not deny a 
sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--he admitted to one.
    They know that he did not deny that he was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky; he repeatedly acknowledged that he had been alone 
with her on many occasions.
    The managers argued that the Jones testimony is relevant 
because, they say, the President perjured himself when he told 
the grand jury that his testimony in the Jones case was 
truthful, and it wasn't, say the managers. That 
characterization of the President's testimony, they say, is 
simply not accurate. What he said was, ``My goal in this 
deposition was to be truthful but not particularly helpful . . 
. I was determined to walk through the minefield of this 
deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.'' 
These are opinions. He is characterizing his state of mind.
    The House managers, on the basis of this testimony, must 
not be allowed to do what the House of Representatives told 
them they could not do, which is to argue about the President's 
testimony in the Jones case. Even if you believe that the 
President crossed the line in his Jones deposition, you cannot 
conclude that he should be removed for it.
    He was not impeached for it. This case is about the grand 
jury and the grand jury alone.
    Now, in fact, the vagueness and uncertainty as to the 
specific allegations of perjury, whether in the grand jury or 
in the Paula Jones deposition, have created enormous confusion 
in the public about the President's conduct and about his 
testimony. This confusion, I think, has done enormous damage to 
the President, because out of this confusion has emerged a 
wholly inaccurate conventional wisdom about what President 
Clinton said when he testified in the grand jury. And that 
conventional wisdom is based on certain common 
mischaracterizations of the President's testimony.
    Last December 8, I gave an opening statement in the 
President's defense before the committee. And when it came time 
for me to talk about the charges of perjury, I urged the 
members of the committee to open their minds, and because of 
widespread misinformation about the facts, to focus on the 
record. I make the same plea to you again today. Keep an open 
mind and look at the real record. Read the transcript. Watch 
the videotape. Do not rely upon anyone else's version.
    We speak from some disappointing experience on this issue. 
Over and over again, inaccurate descriptions of the President's 
grand jury testimony have been launched into the public 
debate--sometimes innocently, sometimes negligently. But the 
result has been the same. The President's critics have created 
a conventional wisdom about the President's grand jury that is 
based on myth and not reality. There has been a merging of the 
President's testimony in the Jones deposition with that of his 
testimony in the grand jury, and this dynamic has been unfair 
to the President.
    We are at No. 6 with the exhibits. Let me just cite a few 
examples. There are many more available, but they are from 
people and sources that are familiar with the case and close to 
the evidence, and some coming from the presentations of just 
last week.
    At the conclusion of the impeachment inquiry conducted by 
the Judiciary Committee, the final arguments before the votes 
were taken in front of the committee, Congressman McCollum 
stated:

    The President gave sworn testimony in the Jones case in 
which he swore he could not recall being alone with Monica 
Lewinsky and that he had not had sexual relations with her.
    He repeated those assertions a few months later to the 
grand jury, and the evidence shows he lied about both.

    That is not an accurate characterization of the President's 
testimony before the grand jury. In the majority report, 
written by the majority counsel, the author stated repeatedly 
that President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he 
did not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. Members of the 
Senate, those descriptions of the President's grand jury 
testimony are absolutely false. When he appeared before the 
grand jury, the President admitted--he did not deny--an 
inappropriate, intimate, wrongful, personal relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky. When he made this admission there was no doubt in 
anyone's mind what he meant. It meant, and the whole world knew 
that it meant that the President of the United States had 
engaged in some form of sexual activity or sexual contact with 
Ms. Lewinsky.
    In his appearance on a national news program on CNN 
television, this is another example: Over the New Year's 
weekend Mr. Manager Graham was asked for the most glaring 
example of the President's alleged perjury before the grand 
jury. And he said:

    I think when the President said he wasn't alone with her, 
he lied.

    That characterization of the President's grand jury 
testimony is not true. There can be absolutely no doubt that 
during his grand jury testimony, the President acknowledged--he 
did not deny, he repeatedly acknowledged--that he had been, on 
certain occasions, alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He acknowledged 
that fact in the opening sentence of his prepared statement to 
the grand jury. Let me read it. Let me read you the first words 
in the President's opening statement to the grand jury:

    When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in 
early 1996, and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that 
was wrong.

    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky,'' that is what the 
President of the United States said. That is what the 
transcript says. And no amount of eloquence or lawyerly skill 
from the managers can change that fact. Facts are stubborn.
    He also engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the prosecutors 
about how many times he thought he had been alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky. And there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that he 
answered that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky on frequent 
occasions. He was asked, and he answered, and he said yes, and 
he made clear what he meant. He went on to say:

    I did what people do when they do the wrong thing. I tried 
to do it where nobody else was looking at it. I'd have to be an 
exhibitionist, not to have tried to exclude everyone else.

    These are not the words of someone who is trying to hide 
the fact of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. And it is 
difficult to understand how reading these words, as well as the 
long and detailed testimony in front of the grand jury, how one 
can think or contend that the President repeated or ratified in 
his deposition before the grand jury about not ever being 
alone.
    In the managers' trial brief issued just 3 days before they 
made their presentation, the brief makes the following 
statement. This is mischaracterization No. 4.

    [The President] falsely testified that he answered 
questions truthfully at his deposition concerning, among other 
subjects, whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky.

    Members of the Senate, as I just outlined in connection 
with Manager Graham's statement, this characterization of the 
President's grand jury testimony is misleading. The lawyers for 
the Office of the Independent Counsel asked many questions and 
engaged in extensive colloquy with the President about being 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky. But they never asked him to explain, 
affirm, defend, or justify his testimony about that same topic 
in the Jones deposition. And he did not do so.
    Members of the Senate, if justice is to be done, these 
misstatements and mischaracterizations must not be allowed to 
stand and must not be allowed to influence your judgment as you 
look at the evidence. So, please look at the real record. It is 
the record of the President's testimony, not the Jones 
deposition--his testimony before the grand jury that should be 
the Senate's sole concern.
    Now, it is timely, I think, to talk a little bit about 
legalisms and technicalities and hairsplitting because those 
who have engaged in this process over the past months in this 
enterprise of defending the President have also been the 
subject of much criticism. The majority counsel accused us of 
``legal hairsplitting, prevarication and dissembling,'' and 
urged the Members of the Senate and the House to pay no 
attention to the ``obfuscations and legalistic pyrotechnics of 
the President's defenders.'' And during his presentation just 
last week on January 15, Congressman McCollum implored you 
``not to get hung up on some of the absurd and contorted 
explanations of the President and his attorneys.''
    To the extent that we have relied on overly legal or 
technical arguments to defend the President from his attackers, 
we apologize to him, to you, and to the American public. We do 
the President no earthly good if, in the course of defending 
him, we offend both the judges, the jurors, and the American 
public. And Mr. Ruff had it just right when he expressed his 
concern to the members of the Judiciary Committee that our 
irresistible urge to practice our profession should not get in 
the way of securing a just result in this very grave proceeding 
for this very specific client.
    But, when an individual--any individual--is accused of 
committing a crime such as perjury, the prosecutors must be put 
to their full proof. Every element of the crime must be proven. 
And if a criminal standard is going to be used here it must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Now, the managers have taken it upon themselves directly 
and aggressively to accuse this President of criminal activity. 
They say that this criminal activity is at the heart of the 
effort to remove him from office. As Congressman McCollum said 
to you last week:

    The first thing you have to determine is whether or not the 
President committed crimes. If he didn't obstruct justice or 
witness tamper or commit perjury, no one believes [no one 
believes] he should be removed from office.

    Allegations of legal crimes invite, indeed they call out 
for legal defenses. And you will not be surprised to learn that 
in defending the President of the United States, we intend and 
we will use all the legal defenses that are available to us, as 
they would be available to any other citizen of this country.
    Teddy Roosevelt, quoted earlier in this proceeding, said it 
best: ``No man is above the law and no man is below the law 
either.'' In fact, the mere act of alleging perjury, as those 
of you in this body know who have tried perjury cases, the mere 
act of alleging perjury invites precisely the kind of 
hairsplitting everyone seems to deplore. If it is the will of 
the Congress to change the crime of perjury, to modify it, to 
eliminate certain judicially created defenses to that offense, 
so be it. But the crime of perjury has developed the way it has 
for some very good reasons, and it has a long and distinguished 
pedigree.
    Its essential elements are well and clearly established, 
and Manager Chabot's presentation was clear on those points, 
although you will not be surprised to learn that I disagree 
with his conclusions. Courts have concluded that no one should 
be convicted of perjury without demonstrating that the 
testimony in question was, in fact, false; that the person 
testifying knew it to be false; and that the testimony involved 
an issue that is material to the case, one that could influence 
the outcome of the matter one way or another.
    In addition, courts and prosecutors are in general 
agreement that prosecutions for perjury should not be brought 
on the basis of an oath against an oath. The Supreme Court has 
spoken on this issue, holding that a conviction for perjury 
``ought not to rest entirely upon an oath against an oath.''
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, when we presented our 
case to the Judiciary Committee last December, we invited five 
experienced prosecutors to examine the record of this case and 
to give us their views as to whether they would bring charges 
of perjury and obstruction of justice against the President 
based on that record. These five attorneys are five of the 
best, the most experienced, the most tested prosecutors the 
country has ever seen. Three served as high officials in 
Republican Departments of Justice; two served during Democratic 
administrations. All were in agreement that no responsible 
prosecutor would bring this case against President Clinton.
    I would like to run the tape recordings of testimony from 
two of the individuals who testified, Tom Sullivan, former U.S. 
attorney from the Northern District of Illinois, as he 
describes the law of perjury, and Richard Davis, an experienced 
trial lawyer with prosecutorial experience in the Department of 
Justice and the Department of the Treasury.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Sullivan. . . . The law of perjury can be particularly 
arcane, including the requirements that the government prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony 
to be false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged 
false testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or 
uncertainty about what the question or answer meant must be 
construed in favor of the defendant.
    Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known 
as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the 
prosecutor to establish the defendant's state of mind. 
Furthermore, because perjury and obstruction charges often 
arise from private dealings with few observers, the courts have 
required either two witnesses who testified directly to the 
facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies 
to the facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be 
substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt. Responsible 
prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly.

    The next testimony you will hear is from Richard Davis, who 
is Acting Deputy Attorney General--excuse me, he was assistant 
from the Southern District of New York, task force leader for a 
Watergate special prosecution force and Assistant Secretary of 
Treasury for Enforcement and Operations from 1977 to 1981.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Davis. . . . In the context of perjury prosecutions, 
there are some specific considerations which are present when 
deciding whether such a case can be won. First, it is virtually 
unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the 
conflicting testimony of two people. The inherent problems in 
bringing such a case are compounded to the extent that any 
credibility issues exist as to the government's sole witness.
    Second, questions and answers are often imprecise. 
Questions sometimes are vague, or used too narrowly to define 
terms, and interrogators frequently ask compound or 
inarticulate questions, and fail to follow up imprecise 
answerers. Witnesses often meander through an answer, wandering 
around a question, but never really answering it. In a perjury 
case, where the precise language of a question and answer are 
so relevant, this makes perjury prosecutions difficult, because 
the prosecutor must establish that the witness understood the 
question, intended to give a false, not simply an evasive 
answer, and in fact did so. The problem of establishing such 
intentional falsity is compounded, in civil cases, by the 
reality that lawyers routinely counsel their clients to answer 
only the question asked, not to volunteer, and not to help out 
an inarticulate questioner.

    Legalistic though some of these legal defenses may be, 
these are the respectable and respected, acceptable and 
expected defenses available to anyone charged with this kind of 
a crime. So to accuse us of using legalisms to defend the 
President when he is being accused of perjury is only to accuse 
us of defending the President. We plead guilty to that charge, 
and the truth is that an attorney who failed to raise these 
defenses might well be guilty of malpractice.
    But putting the legal defenses aside, it is not a 
legalistic issue to point out that the President did not say 
much of what he is accused of having said. It is not legalistic 
to point out that a witness did not say what some rely on her 
testimony to establish. And it is not too legalistic to point 
out that a President of the United States should not be 
convicted of perjury and removed from office over an argument, 
a dispute about what is and what is not the commonly accepted 
meaning of words in his testimony.
    I would like to make one additional point about the Office 
of the Independent Counsel and the Starr prosecutors. They, as 
you know, have had a long and difficult relationship with the 
White House. It has been intense, adverse, frequently hostile. 
They were the ones who conducted the interrogation of the 
President before the grand jury. These attorneys from the 
Office of Independent Counsel were identified by Mr. Starr as 
being experienced and seasoned and professional.
    In the referral that they sent over to the House of 
Representatives, they make three allegations of grand jury 
perjury, and the managers, based on my analysis of Mr. Rogan's 
speech, appear to have adopted two of those allegations.
    What is most remarkable is the fact that the managers make 
many, many allegations of grand jury perjury that the 
independent counsel declined to make, that were not included in 
the referral.
    Think about it for a moment. The lawyers working for the 
Office of the Independent Counsel, they were in charge of this 
investigation. They were the ones who called the President. 
They were the ones running the grand jury. It was their grand 
jury. They conducted the questioning of the President. They 
picked the topics. They asked the follow-up questions.
    You should remember one additional fact. Their standard for 
making a referral is presumably much lower than the standard 
you would expect from the managers in making a case for the 
removal of the President in an article of impeachment. The 
Independent Counsel Act calls upon the independent counsel to 
make a referral when there is credible and substantial 
information of potential impeachable offenses.
    They looked at the record, the same record that the 
managers had, and they did make a referral and they did send 
recommendations to the House of Representatives.
    But these lawyers, Mr. Starr and his fellow prosecutors, 
did not see fit to allege most of the charges that we are 
discussing today. It is fair for us to assume that the Office 
of Independent Counsel considered and declined to make the very 
allegations of perjury that the House managers presented to you 
last week. Apparently, the managers believe that Ken Starr and 
his prosecutors have been simply too soft on the President.
    This should cause the Members of the Senate some concern 
and some additional reason to give very careful scrutiny to 
these charges. When you do, you will find the following: The 
allegations are frequently trivial, almost always technical, 
often immaterial and always insubstantial. Certainly not a good 
or justifiable basis for removing any President from office.
    Finally, as we go through the allegations and the evidence 
that I will be discussing, please ask yourself, What witness do 
I want to hear about this issue? Will live witnesses really 
make a difference in the way that I think about this? Are they 
necessary for this case and this article to be understood and 
resolved?
    Subpart 1 has to do with testimony about the nature and 
details of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. And, once 
again, because article I does not identify with any specificity 
what the President said in the grand jury that is allegedly 
perjurious, the House managers have been free to include 
whatever specific allegations they--not the House of 
Representatives--have seen fit to level against the President.
    And we have been left to guess--so this is my guesswork--we 
have been left to guess what the specific allegations are. And 
we have done so. And we have tried to identify the precise 
testimony at issue based on the managers' trial brief and on 
Mr. Manager Rogan's presentation.
    Now, as you will see in these allegations of subpart 1, it 
is the managers who resort to legalisms, who use convoluted 
definitions and word games to attack the President. It is the 
managers who employ technicalities and legal mumbo jumbo, who 
distort the true meaning of words and phrases in an effort to 
convict the President. And we are the ones who must cry 
``Foul.'' We are the ones who must point out what the managers 
are trying to do here. They seek to convict the President and 
remove him from office for perjury before a grand jury by 
transforming wholly innocent statements about immaterial issues 
into what are alleged to be ``perjurious, false and 
misleading'' testimony.
    I begin with what is identified in the majority report as 
``direct lies.'' First, the managers claim that the President 
perjured himself before the grand jury, that he told a direct 
lie and should be removed from office because in his prepared 
statement he acknowledged having inappropriate contact with Ms. 
Lewinsky on ``certain occasions.'' This was a ``direct lie,'' 
say the managers, because, according to Ms. Lewinsky, between 
November 15, 1995, and December 28, 1997, they were alone at 
least 20 times and had, she says, 11 sexual encounters. To use 
the words ``on certain occasions'' in this context is, 
according to the managers, ``perjurious, false and 
misleading.''
    Now, this particular chart was not included in Mr. Starr's 
referral, and it was not debated by the members of the 
Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives.
    The managers also say that the President lied to the grand 
jury and should be removed from office because the President 
acknowledged that ``on occasion'' he had telephone 
conversations that included sexual banter--this is also in the 
prepared statement--when the managers say the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had 17 such telephone conversations over a 2-year 
period of time. To use the words ``on occasion'' in this 
context, it is, according to the managers, a ``direct lie'' to 
the grand jury for which the President should be removed from 
office. Now, this charge was not included in Mr. Starr's 
referral. It was not debated by the members of the House 
Judiciary Committee. And it was not debated on the floor of the 
House.
    In responding to these two charges, it may make some sense 
to begin with the dictionary definition of ``occasional'' to 
satisfy ourselves that the President's statement is, in fact, a 
more than reasonable and actually an accurate use of that word 
under the circumstances.
    Now, there are 774 days in the time span between November 
1995 and December 1997. I submit that it is not a distortion, 
it is not dishonest to describe their activity, which Ms. 
Lewinsky claims occurred on 11 different days--from our 
examination of her testimony, we can only locate 10, but she 
says 11--as having occurred ``on certain occasions.'' Look at 
the calendar.
    Now, that phrase, ``on certain occasions,'' carries no 
inference of frequency or numerosity. It sort of means it 
happened every now and then. And the same could be said for the 
use of the words ``on occasion'' when they were talking about 
telephone conversations to describe 17 telephone conversations 
that included explicit sexual language.
    Now, as you consider the second allegation having to do 
with the phone calls, you might also read the grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky herself on August 20, 1998, at page 
1111. There a grand juror asks her, how much of the time, and 
how often--when she was on the phone with the President--did 
they engage in these kinds of graphic conversations. Ms. 
Lewinsky answered, ``Not always. On a few occasions.'' The 
managers are trying to remove the President from office when he 
used the words ``on occasions,'' when Ms. Lewinsky described 
that frequency or that event precisely the same way.
    There is simply no way that the President's use of the 
words ``on certain occasions'' or ``on occasion'' can be used 
as an effort to mislead or deceive the members of the grand 
jury or to conceal anything. There is simply no way that a 
reasonable person can look at this testimony and conclude--or 
agree with the managers--that it is a ``direct lie.'' What 
message do the managers send to America and to the rest of the 
world when they include these kinds of allegations as reasons 
to remove this President from office?
    It is hard to take the charges seriously when in each case 
they boil down to arguments of semantics. Does anyone here 
really believe that Members of the House of Representatives 
would have voted to approve these allegations as the basis for 
impeaching and removing this President if they had been given 
the chance with specific, identified perjurious testimony in a 
proposed article of impeachment? But here we are in the well of 
the Senate defending the President of the United States against 
allegations that the managers believe and have seriously argued 
should cause the President to be removed from office and even 
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal court.
    The President is also accused of lying before the grand 
jury--and the managers have asked you to convict him and remove 
him from office--because, in the prepared statement that he 
read to the grand jury in August, he acknowledged that he 
engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain 
occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' The managers call 
this a ``direct lie'' because the President did not mention 
1995. And in their trial memorandum they write: ``Notice [the 
President] did not mention 1995. There was a reason: On three 
`occasions' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual 
contact with the President.''
    Now, this was one allegation that the Office of the 
Independent Counsel did include in its referral to the House. 
And this charge was, in fact, discussed and debated by the 
members of the Judiciary Committee when they conducted their 
impeachment inquiry. Let me show you what two members of that 
committee--now managers for the House in this trial--thought 
about this particular charge of perjury when Congressman Barney 
Frank ridiculed it during the debate.
    The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Hyde--we are 
missing an exhibit here; I think it is No. 10--said, ``It 
doesn't strike me as a--as a terribly serious count.'' 
Congressman Canady, in his closing argument in the final stage 
of that proceeding, said, ``I freely acknowledge that 
reasonable people can disagree about the weight of the evidence 
on certain of the charges. For example, I think there is doubt 
about the allegations that the President willfully lied 
concerning the date his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began.''
    This allegation involves an utterly meaningless disparity 
in testimony about dates that are of absolutely no consequence 
whatsoever. The most likely explanation here is that there was 
an honest difference in recollection. There is no dispute about 
the critical facts that Ms. Lewinsky was young, very young, too 
young, when she got involved with President Clinton. But her 
age didn't change between November 1995 and January 1996. Her 
birthday is in July. She was 22 years old in November and 22 
years old in January, despite the fact that every manager 
persists in stating, erroneously--not perjuriously, 
erroneously--that she was 21 years old when she first became 
involved with the President. Nothing of any importance in the 
case took place between December 1995 and January 1996. She was 
an intern in the early stage of that period, and she became a 
Government employee. So it did not change the relationship that 
she had with the President. It modified her title. Any dispute 
over this immaterial issue is silly.
    It is unreasonable to argue, as we heard from the House 
managers last week, that if you believe Ms. Lewinsky and 
disbelieve the President on this issue as to which date was the 
date that they began the relationship and had the inappropriate 
contact, that you must convict the President and remove him 
from office.
    I confess, I find myself in agreement with Congressman Hyde 
when he says this allegation is not serious, not ``terribly 
serious.'' And I agree with Congressman Canady when he suggests 
``there is'' room for ``doubt'' as to whether the President had 
any real reason or motive to lie about these things.
    I truly wonder if the House of Representatives, had it been 
identified as a specific statement for them to consider, would 
have made and included this allegation in the articles of 
impeachment aimed at removing President Clinton from office.
    Is this conflict in testimony really such a serious issue 
that, if you find the President is mistaken, he should be 
removed from office? And is it important enough to require the 
testimony of live witnesses? Is it material of anything of 
interest to the grand jury at the time this testimony was 
given? I don't think so.
    Now, between the time of the vote in the House and the time 
that the managers filed their trial brief, the managers came up 
with another allegation of perjury and put it into the mix. 
They argue that this element of the President's grand jury 
testimony should also cause him to be removed from office. This 
allegation involves the President's statement that there was 
some period of friendship with Ms. Lewinsky that led to 
inappropriate contact. But it is immaterial, unimportant, and 
fundamentally frivolous as an allegation. And it was not, 
needless to say, included in the Starr referral. I am sure the 
attorneys in the Office of Independent Counsel knew about this 
statement and chose not to include it. It was never discussed 
by the members of the Judiciary Committee during the 
impeachment inquiry. We never heard about it, never saw it, 
never had a chance to deal with it. It was never mentioned on 
the floor of the House of Representatives.
    According to my examination--which may be flawed--my 
thinking is that it made its first appearance in the matter 
only after the House of Representatives voted on the articles 
of impeachment when the managers filed their trial brief. Does 
anyone really believe that the House of Representatives would 
have voted to approve this allegation as a basis for convicting 
and removing this President from office?
    Then the managers turn to what, in the majority report, 
they call ``the heart of the perjury''; that is, the 
President's grand jury testimony that his encounters with Ms. 
Lewinsky did not constitute ``sexual relations'' as defined by 
the Jones lawyers in the Jones deposition.
    Before dealing with this allegation, however, it is 
important to understand that in the course of his testimony the 
President was required to deploy two different definitions of 
``sexual relations.'' One was his own and the other was the 
definition supplied to him by the Jones lawyers and modified by 
Judge Susan Webber Wright during his deposition.
    First, if you turn to exhibit No. 11, you will find the 
President's definition, his own personal definition, as 
reported to the grand jury.
    Next, let me direct your attention to the transcript of the 
telephone conversation between Monica Lewinsky--I am talking 
here about exhibit 12--Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, where 
Ms. Lewinsky explained her definition of ``sexual relations.'' 
This conversation occurred, incidentally, many weeks before Ms. 
Lewinsky executed her affidavit for the Jones case.
    Finally, look at the dictionaries and read their 
definitions. You can see that in exhibit 13.
    By the way, exhibit 12, which includes Ms. Lewinsky's 
definition, is confirmed by other parts of the record where she 
talks to other individuals, FBI agents. She refers to this 
understanding and this definition in her proffer. So it is not 
just the one telephone conversation to establish what Monica 
Lewinsky says she thought at that time the definition was.
    Although some might think that the President's definition 
is unduly limited and that both of them are splitting hairs, 
there is some reasonable basis and there is reputable authority 
to support their view. It seems clear that Ms. Lewinsky could 
think, and probably did think and reassure herself at the time 
she wrote and executed her affidavit, that the affidavit she 
submitted in the Jones case was, in fact, accurate. And thus, 
knowing Ms. Lewinsky's view of that situation and sharing her 
definition, the President could reasonably say, ``Absolutely, 
yes,'' when Mr. Bennett asked the President if Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit stating she had never had sexual relations with the 
President was true.
    How can you accept the argument of the House managers that 
the President should be removed from office because his 
definition, which is the dictionary definition, does not 
comport with theirs?
    We are going to play the videotape. We are going to talk 
about the definition that was the second definition that was 
given to the President in the Jones deposition, which is also 
the subject of grand jury testimony, and we are going to play 
14 minutes of that videotape at the beginning of the 
President's appearance, or at the time he was first handed the 
definition and sits at the table.
    This may be a good time to take a break because it will be 
a 14-minute span of time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take a 10-minute recess at this time. I urge the Senators to 
relax a moment but come right back to the Chamber so we can 
proceed.
    There being no objection, at 2:06 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:24 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we will be 
proceeding with Mr. Counsel Craig's video perhaps, or do you 
have something before that?
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. I have a little bit of production.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Craig.
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Exhibit No. 14 in your collection of exhibits is the 
definition that the President was handed when he went into his 
deposition testimony--to give his deposition testimony. There 
are two or three things I would like to say about this exhibit 
before we go to the videotape.
    The first is this: Many of the President's critics have 
accused the President of himself coming up with this tortured 
and convoluted definition so that he could get away with 
denying having sex with Ms. Lewinsky; that he was the one that 
came up with a bizarre and surreal definition that would give 
him some plausible deniability and allow him to conceal his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from the Jones lawyers. But in 
truth this definition was not his idea, not his work product, 
not his own definition. And it is unfair and inaccurate to 
saddle him with inventing such a silly and truncated 
definition, and the event that flows from that.
    My second point is this: The mere fact that the lawyers in 
Jones felt the need to use a definition for sexual relations 
is, by itself, standing alone, evidence to support the notion 
that at least they recognized that the precise meaning of the 
term can and does differ from person to person. It is precisely 
then, when there is some uncertainty or ambiguity about the 
meaning and common usage of words, that lawyers turn to create 
a definition in an effort to have clarity, uniformity and 
common understanding. And the very fact that the lawyers in 
Jones seem to think that a definition was needed means that 
without such a definition there is no commonly accepted, no 
universally agreed upon meaning of this phrase. And what is or 
is not included within the ambit of that definition becomes an 
argument and nothing more--certainly not perjury.
    The third point to remember before we watch the President 
as he first sees this piece of paper is this:
    To understand what is going on in the President's mind at 
the time he testified about this definition during the Jones 
deposition, you must look at what was deleted as well as 
looking at that part of the definition that was left behind.
    You will see that in the third paragraph of the definition 
there is the description which, in fact, more closely 
approximates what went on between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President within the first paragraph. And this part of the 
definition was deleted by the judge.
    There is an additional point. On the tape you will hear the 
President's lawyer, Mr. Bennett--and Mr. Ruff referred to this 
yesterday--urging the Jones lawyers to abandon this definition, 
to leave it behind, and ask direct questions of the President 
as to what he did. The record would certainly have been clearer 
for all of us if he had followed Mr. Bennett's advice. And 
there is another voice that you will hear in addition to Mr. 
Bennett--Mr. Fisher, who was the Jones lawyer, the judge, Judge 
Wright, and the voice of the lawyer of the President's 
codefendant in the case of Danny Ferguson.
    Let me just briefly tell you what to look for. The 
President first saw this definition when he entered the room 
and sat down to testify--not before. You will see him as he 
sits there and he is handed a piece of paper with the 
definition typed on it. Neither he nor his lawyer had ever seen 
that definition before. He was then required to sit down to 
study it, and to understand it.
    And if you look at the next exhibit, this is what he says 
about what he thought and did later in the grand jury. I think 
this is the definition, exhibit No. 15. You will watch him as 
he says this.

    I might also note that when I was given this and began to 
ask questions about it, I actually circled number one. This is 
my circle here. I remember doing that so I could focus only on 
those two lines, which is what I did.

    This was the actual deposition exhibit with his circle 
around No. 1.
    Let us remember finally what his testimony is about his 
intentions in this deposition. ``My goal is to be truthful, but 
I didn't want to help them.''
    Let's watch what happened.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. Good morning.
    Q. My name is Jim Fisher, sir, and I'm an attorney from Dallas, 
Texas, and I represent the Plaintiff, Paula Jones, in this case. Do you 
understand who I am and who I'm representing today?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And do you understand, sir, that your answers to my questions 
today are testimony that is being given under oath?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And your testimony is subject to the penalty of perjury; do you 
understand that, sir?
    A. I do.
    Q. Sir, I'd like to hand you what has been marked Deposition 
Exhibit 1. So that the record is clear today, and that we know that we 
are communicating, this is a definition of a term that will be used in 
the course of my questioning, and the term is ``sexual relations.'' I 
will inform the Court that the wording of this definition is patterned 
after Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Would you please take whatever time 
you need to read this definition because when I use the term ``sexual 
relations,'' this is what I mean today.
    Mr. Bennett. Is there a copy for the Court?
    Mr. Fisher. Would you pass that, please?
    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, as an introductory matter, I think this 
could really lead to confusion, and I think it's important that the 
record be clear. For example, it says, the last line, ``contact means 
intentional touching, directly or through clothing,'' I mean just for 
example, one could have a completely innocent shake of the hand, and I 
don't want this record to reflect--I think we're here today for Counsel 
for the Plaintiff to ask the President what he knows about various 
things, what he did, what he didn't do, but I, I have a real problem 
with this definition which means all things to all people in this 
particular context, Your Honor.
    Mr. Bristow. Your Honor, I think the wording of that is extremely 
erroneous. What this, what the deposing attorney should be looking at 
is exactly what occurred, and he can ask the witness to describe as 
exactly as possible what occurred, but to use this as an antecedent to 
his questions, it would put him in a position, if the President 
admitted shaking hands with someone, then under this truncate 
deposition--or definition, he could say or somehow construe that to 
mean that that involves some sort of sexual relations, and I think it's 
very unfair. Frankly I think it's a political trick, and I've told you 
before how I feel about the political character of what this lawsuit is 
about.
    Mr. Fisher. Your Honor, may I respond?
    Judge Wright. You may.
    Mr. Fisher. The purpose of this is to avoid everything that they 
have expressed concern about. It is to allow us to be discreet and to 
make the record crystal clear. There is absolutely no way that this 
could ever be construed to include a shaking of the hand.
    Mr. Bennett. Well, Mr. Fisher, let me refer you to paragraph two. 
It says ``contact between any part of the person's body or an object 
and the genitals or anus of another person.''
    What if the President patted me and said I had to lose ten pounds 
off my bottom? I--you could be arguing that I had sexual relations with 
him. Your Honor, this is going to lead to confusion. Why don't they ask 
the President what he did, what he didn't do, and then we can argue in 
Court later about what it means.
    Judge Wright. All right, let me make a ruling on this. It appears 
that this really is not the definition of contact under Rule 413 
because Rule 413 deals with nonconsensual contact. This definition 
would encompass contact that is consensual, and of course the Court has 
ruled that some consensual contact is relevant in this case, and so let 
the record reflect that the Court disagrees with counsel that this is 
not, about it being the definition under Rule 413. It's not. It is more 
in keeping with, however, the Court's previous rules, but I certainly 
agree with the President's Counsel that this, the definition number two 
is too encompassing, it's too broad, and so is definition number three. 
Definition number one encompasses intent, and so that would be, but 
numbers two and three is just, are just too broad.
    Mr. Fisher. All right, Your Honor.
    Judge Wright. And number one is not too broad, however, so I'll let 
you use that definition as long as we understand that that's not Rule 
413, it's just the rule that would apply in this case to intentional 
sexual contact.
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, Your Honor, and had I been allowed to develop this 
further, everyone would have seen that Deposition Exhibit 2 is actually 
the definition of sexual assault or offensive sexual assault, which is 
the term in Rule 413.
    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, I object to this record being filled with 
these kinds of things. This is going to leak. Why don't they ask--they 
have got the President of the United States in this room for several 
hours. Why don't they ask him questions about what happened or didn't 
happen?
    Judge Wright. I will permit him to refer to definition number one, 
which encompasses knowing and intentional sexual contact for the 
purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. I'll permit that. Go 
ahead.
    Q. All right, Mr. President, in light of the Court's ruling, you 
may consider subparts two and three of Deposition Exhibit 1 to be 
stricken, and so when in my questions I use the term ``sexual 
relations,'' sir, I'm talking only about part one in the definition of 
the body. Do you understand that, sir?
    A. I do.
    Q. I'm now handing you what has been marked Deposition Exhibit 2. 
Please take whatever time you need to read Deposition Exhibit 2.
    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, again, what I am very worried about, Your 
Honor, is first of all, this, this, this appears to be a--I mean what I 
don't want to do is have him being asked questions and then we don't, 
we're all ships passing in the night. They're thinking of one thing, 
he's thinking of another. Are we talking criminal assault? I mean this 
is not what a deposition is for, Your Honor. He can ask the President, 
what did you do? He can ask him specifically in certain instances what 
he did, and isn't that what this deposition is for? It's not to sort of 
lay a trap for him, and I'm going to object, to the President answering 
and having to remember what's on this whole sheet of paper, and I just 
don't think it's fair. It's going to lend to confusion.
    Judge Wright. All right, do you agree with Mr. Bennett?
    Mr. Bristow. I had one other point to add Your Honor.
    Judge Wright. All right.
    Mr. Bristow. This is almost like in a typical automobile accident 
where the plaintiff's counsel wants to ask the defendant were you 
negligent. That's not factual.
    Judge Wright. Mr. Fisher, do you have a----
    Mr. Fisher. Yes, Your Honor. What I'm trying to do is avoid having 
to ask the President a number of very salacious questions and to make 
this as discreet as possible. This definition, I think the Court will 
find, is taken directly from Rule 413 which I believe President Clinton 
signed into law, with the exception that I have narrowed subpart one to 
a particular section, which would be covered by Rule 413, and I have 
that section here to give the President so that there is no question 
what is intended. This will eliminate confusion, not cause it.
    Mr. Bennett. Your honor, I have no objection where the appropriate 
predicates are made for them to ask the President , did you know X, yes 
or no, what happened, what did you do, what didn't you do. We are--
acknowledge that some embarrassing questions will be asked, but then we 
will know what we're talking about, but I do not want my client 
answering questions not understanding exactly what these folks are 
talking about.
    Now, Your Honor, I told you that the President has a meeting at 
four o'clock, and we've already wasted twenty minutes, and Mr. Fisher 
has yet to ask his first factual question.
    Judge Wright. Well, I'm prepared to rule, and I will not permit 
this definition to be understood. Quite frankly there's several 
reasons. One is that the Court heretofore has not proceeded using these 
definitions. We have used, we've made numerous rulings or the Court has 
made numerous rulings in this case without specific reference to these 
definitions, and so if you want to know the truth, I don't know them 
very well. I would find it difficult to make rulings, and Mr. Bennett 
has made clear that he acknowledges that embarrassing questions will be 
asked, and if this is in fact an effort on, on the part of Plaintiff's 
Counsel to avoid using sexual terms and avoid going into great detail 
about what might or might not have occurred, then there's no need to 
worry about that, you may go into the detail.
    Mr. Bennett. If the predicates are met, have no objection to the 
detail.
    Mr. Fisher. Thank you, Your Honor.
    Judge Wright. It's just going to make it very difficult for me to 
rule, if you want to know the truth, and I'm not sure Mr. Clinton knows 
all these definitions, anyway.

    Did you hear that last statement from the judge? ``I'm not 
sure Mr. Clinton knows all these definitions, anyway.''
    Now, before the grand jury the President discussed at some 
length and in great detail his interpretation of the definition 
that he was asked to apply during that deposition--the 
definition that he was asked to apply. And he gave lengthy and 
sustained answers. And when you read the grand jury testimony, 
as I urge you to do, you will see that they are consistent and 
they are logical and there is reason behind his conclusion that 
his activities with Ms. Lewinsky simply did not fall within 
that definition.
    There is no mystery, no deception, no lying, no effort to 
conceal his view. His view is there for all to see. It is also 
reported from these limited excerpts from the grand jury 
testimony. It is a plain statement of his understanding. And to 
argue that the President, when he conveyed his understanding of 
that definition, doesn't really believe his argument, and to 
contend that he is committing perjury when he told the grand 
jury that he genuinely believed his interpretation of the 
definition--that is just speculation about what is in his mind 
and it is not the stuff or fuel of a perjury prosecution.
    Now, I would like to return very briefly to the group of 
experienced prosecutors who gave their opinion about the 
President's testimony before the grand jury on this issue. They 
said that the President's interpretation was a reasonable one 
under the circumstances, but the managers claim that the 
President's explanation of the Jones definition, his 
interpretation, his understanding, and his argument with the 
lawyers from the Office of Independent Counsel, are the heart 
of the perjury.
    Let's hear what the prosecutors said about this and read 
the transcript of their testimony when they testified before 
the House Judiciary Committee. And first we will listen to Tom 
Sullivan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Hyde. It's clear to 
me that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one, 
especially because the words which seem to describe oral sex--
the words which seem to describe directly oral sex were 
stricken from the definition by the judge. In a perjury 
prosecution, the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the defendant knew when he gave the testimony, he 
was telling a falsehood. The lying must be knowing and 
deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to evade or 
obfuscate or answer nonresponsively. The evidence simply does 
not support the conclusion that the president knowingly 
committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and weak that a 
responsible prosecutor would not present it to the grand jury.

    We have one more excerpt from his testimony.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Sullivan. . . . In perjury cases, you must prove that 
the person who made the statement made a knowingly false 
statement. Now, where I think the defect in this prosecution 
is, among others--and I don't think it would be brought, 
because it's ancillary to a civil deposition--is to establish 
that the president knew what he said was false. When he 
testified in his grand jury testimony, he explained what his 
mental process was in the Jones deposition, and he said the two 
definitions that would describe oral sex had been deleted by 
the trial judge from the definition of sexual relations and I 
understood the definition to mean sleeping with somebody. I 
don't want to get to particular here.
    Rep. Lofgren. Thank you.
    Mr. Sullivan. But that is where this case, in my opinion, 
wouldn't go forward even if you found an errant prosecutor who 
would want to prosecute somebody for being a peripheral witness 
in a civil case that had been settled. That's my answer to 
that.

    The managers place great emphasis and weight on the 
conflict in the testimony between President Clinton and Ms. 
Lewinsky over some specific intimate details related to their 
activity. There is a variance between the President's testimony 
and Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about the details of what they 
did. What do they disagree about? Not about whether the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky had a wrongful relationship--the 
President admitted that before the grand jury. Not about 
whether the President and Ms. Lewinsky were alone together--the 
President admitted that before the grand jury. Not about 
whether, when they were alone together, their relationship 
included inappropriate, intimate contact--the President 
admitted that before the grand jury. Not about whether they 
engaged in telephone conversations that included sexual 
banter--the President admitted that before the grand jury. Not 
about whether the President and Ms. Lewinsky wanted to keep 
their wrongful relationship a secret--the President admitted 
that before the grand jury.
    The difference in their testimony about their relationship 
is limited to some very specific, very intimate details. And 
this is the heart of the entire matter, this disparity in their 
testimony. The true nub of the managers' allegation that the 
President committed perjury is that he described some of the 
contact one way and she describes it another.
    Not surprisingly, the managers choose to believe Ms. 
Lewinsky's description of these events. And so, even in the 
absence of any evidence to the contrary, other than Ms. 
Lewinsky's own recollection of these events, the managers have 
concluded that the President lied under oath about the details 
of his sexual activity, that he somehow shortchanged the grand 
jury, and should be removed from office.
    The possibility that the question of whether the President 
of the United States should be removed from his office--the 
fact that that might hinge on whether you believe him or her on 
this issue is a staggering thought. Ordinarily when dealing 
with disparity in testimony such as this, prosecutors will have 
nothing to do with it. Only two people were there. And, in 
truth, the real importance of the disparity in their testimony 
is questionable. Not all disparities or discrepancies in 
testimony are necessarily appropriate subjects for perjury 
prosecutions.
    According to those experienced prosecutors who testified 
before the Judiciary Committee, there are two more points to be 
made about this. First, this is a classic oath on oath--he 
says, she says--swearing match, that, under ordinary custom and 
practice at the Department of Justice, never would be 
prosecuted without substantial corroborative proof. Such proof, 
say these experienced prosecutors, does not consist of 
testimony of friends and associates of Ms. Lewinsky who tell 
the FBI that Ms. Lewinsky contemporaneously told them about the 
activity, if it was going on. But the managers claim that these 
contemporaneous statements corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony.
    That claim is specious. Statements that Ms. Lewinsky makes 
to other people are not viewed as independent corroborative 
evidence. They come from the same source. They come from Ms. 
Lewinsky, as the source that gave that testimony to the grand 
jury. And no court and no prosecutor would accept the notion 
that such statements, standing alone, satisfy the requirement 
of substantial corroborative proof when there is a swearing 
match.
    Now, let's see what the experienced prosecutors have to say 
about this issue and that claim.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Rep. Wexler. . . . What is the false statement?
    Mr. Sullivan. Well, if you--it could be one of two. It 
could be when he denied having sexual relations and I've 
already addressed that, because he said, ``I was defining the 
term as the judge told me to define it and as I understood 
it,'' which I think is a reasonable explanation. The other is 
whether or not he touched her--touched her breast or some other 
part of her body, not through her clothing, but directly. And 
he says, ``I didn't,'' and she said, ``I (sic) did,'' so it's 
who-shot-John. It's, it's, you know, it's a one on one. The 
corroborative evidence that the prosecutor would have to have 
there, which is required in a perjury case--you can't do it one 
on one, and no good prosecutor would bring a case with, you 
know, I say black, you say white--would be the fact that they 
were together alone and she performed oral sex on him. I think 
that is not sufficient under the circumstances of this case to 
demonstrate that there was any other touching by the president 
and therefore he committed this--you know, he violated this--
and committed perjury.

    Now the testimony from Richard Davis on this same point, 
and then we will move to subpart 2.
    [The text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Davis. . . . I will now turn to the issue of whether, 
from the perspective of a prosecutor, there exists a 
prosecutable case for perjury in front of the grand jury. The 
answer to me is clearly no. The president acknowledged to the 
grand jury the existence of an improper intimate relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky, but argued with the prosecutors 
questioning him, that his acknowledged conduct was not a sexual 
relationship as he understood the definition of that term being 
used in the Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate, 
whether wise or unwise politically, simply does not form the 
basis for a perjury prosecution. Indeed, in the end, the entire 
basis for a grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica 
Lewinsky's assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to 
their relationship, and that the president touched her private 
parts with the intent to arouse or gratify her, and the 
president's denial that he did so. Putting aside whether this 
is the type of difference of testimony which should justify an 
impeachment of a president, I do not believe that a case 
involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would be 
brought by a prosecutor, since it would not be won at trial.
    A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the 
fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie--the 
president to avoid acknowledging a false statement at his civil 
deposition, and Miss Lewinsky to avoid the demeaning nature of 
providing wholly unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this incentive 
existed when Miss Lewinsky described the relationship to the 
confidantes described in the independent counsel's referral. 
Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself questioned 
the veracity of one witness, Miss Lewinsky, by questioning her 
testimony that his office suggested she tape record Ms. Currie, 
Mr. Jordan, and potentially the president. And in any trial, 
the independent counsel would also be arguing that other key 
points in Miss Lewinsky's testimony are false, including where 
she explicitly rejects the notion that she was asked to lie and 
that assistance in her job search was an inducement for her to 
do so.

    The conclusion is clear: To make this case in any courtroom 
would be very difficult for a prosecutor. They point out that 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to put on a successful 
prosecution if the chief witness is deemed by the prosecutors 
to be unreliable on some issues, but presented as totally 
truthful on others.
    Now let's move to subpart 2, and it is exhibit No. 18. The 
allegations of perjury here have to do with testimony that he 
gave at the grand jury about his deposition in the Jones case. 
And I begin by repeating a point that I made a little earlier, 
that the House of Representatives did not vote to approve the 
article that alleged that President Clinton committed perjury 
during his deposition in the Jones case. As I said before, 
there was good reason for that.
    What are the reasons? There are many reasons. The 
President's testimony in the Jones deposition involved his 
relationship with a witness who was ancillary to the core 
issues of the Jones case. She was a witness in the case. She 
wasn't the plaintiff in the case, and she was ancillary to the 
core issues in the case, someone whose testimony was thereafter 
held to be unnecessary and perhaps inadmissible by Judge Susan 
Webber Wright, someone whose truthful testimony would have 
been, in any event, of marginal relevance since her 
relationship with the President was entirely consensual. And, 
as you know, this was a case that ultimately was found to have 
no legal or factual merit. It was dismissed by the judge, and 
it is now being settled by the parties.
    Moreover, the President was caught by surprise in that 
deposition and asked questions about matters that the Jones 
lawyers already knew the answers to. As you heard yesterday, 
the Jones lawyers had been briefed the night before by Linda 
Tripp. So they were asking questions of President Clinton in 
the course of this deposition about the relationship to which 
they already had the answers. That kind of ambush is profoundly 
unfair, and it is one reason that Congressman Graham said that 
he voted against this article in committee--the surprise. He 
was the only Republican to do so. He was the only Republican to 
vote against any article, and the decision of the House to 
follow Congressman Graham's leadership and to reject this 
article showed great wisdom and judgment.
    But apparently that is not to be the end of the matter when 
it comes to allegations of perjury in the Jones deposition. In 
subpart 2 of article I, the managers seek to reintroduce the 
issue of the President's testimony in the case by alleging that 
when the President testified before the grand jury, he 
testified falsely when he said that he tried to testify 
truthfully in the Jones deposition. Congressman Rogan, Mr. 
Manager Rogan has claimed that the President's answers ratified 
and reaffirmed and put into issue all of his answers in the 
Jones deposition when he testified that he believed he did not 
violate the law in the Jones deposition.
    ``This is perjurious testimony,'' said Manager Rogan, 
``because the record is clear''--I am quoting--that he did not 
testify truthfully in the deposition, and by that bootstrapping 
mechanism, we are now in a litigation about whether every 
single statement that the President made in the Jones 
deposition was or was not truthful to determine whether or not 
the President's testimony that he was truthful is or is not 
truthful.
    But, in fact, President Clinton did not ratify, he did not 
reaffirm his Jones testimony when he testified before the grand 
jury, and you will see that when you read the transcript of his 
testimony. Quite the contrary is true. If you look at that 
transcript carefully, you will find that without admitting 
wrongdoing, the President elaborated, he modified, he amended 
and he clarified his testimony in Jones. And when Mr. Schippers 
made his closing argument to the House Judiciary Committee, I 
think he used the truthfulness, on one occasion, of the 
President's testimony before the grand jury to support his 
argument that the President lied in Jones.
    But actually the specific wording of subpart 2 gives us no 
specific information and is not illuminating, and we turn to 
the managers' trial brief to ascertain precisely what the 
argument is. There the managers allege that the President 
falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully at his 
deposition concerning, among other things, whether he had been 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky. I begin by saying, again, this 
allegation was not included in the Starr referral. Why? Because 
it is based on a total misconception of the President's grand 
jury testimony.
    As I referred to earlier, this is exhibit No. 7, I believe, 
and it shows you some evidence--this is not the complete 
evidence of his testimony about being alone. The prosecutors 
asked the President many questions about being alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky, but they never asked him about the Jones testimony. 
They asked him about whether he was alone; he never was asked 
about the Jones testimony:
    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain 
occasions,'' it says right there--``When I was alone . . .''

    Let me ask you, Mr. President, you indicate in your 
statement that you were alone with Ms. Lewinsky. Is that right?
    Yes, sir.
    How many times were you alone with Ms. Lewinsky?
    Let me begin with the correct answer. I don't know for 
sure. But if you would like me to give an educated guess, I 
will do that. . . .

    And then you will see over two or three pages of testimony 
he tries to recall times and incidents when he was alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky.
    And so the prosecutor says, ``So if I could summarize your 
testimony, approximately 5 times you saw her before she left 
the White House, approximately 9 times after she left the 
employment?'' ``I know there were several times in '97,'' the 
President said. ``I would think that would sound about right.''
    This is not a man denying that he was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky, but he was not asked about his testimony on that 
topic when he testified in the Jones case.
    Now, the managers further allege that the President's 
testimony before the grand jury that he testified truthfully at 
his deposition was a lie. In fact, his testimony there that 
they quote as being false was this: ``My goal in this 
deposition was to be truthful but not particularly helpful.'' 
``My goal in this deposition to be truthful,'' they say, is 
false. ``I was determined to walk through the minefield of this 
deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.'' 
His statement that ``I believe I did,'' they say, means that 
everything that he said in the Jones deposition was true. The 
President's statement that he set a goal and believes--
believes--he has met it is, according to the managers, 
perjurious for which he should be removed from office.
    And it is through this device that the managers seek to 
achieve, by indirection, what they were specifically forbidden 
to do by the direct vote of the House of Representatives. By 
claiming that the President's assertions in the grand jury were 
false when he described his state of mind--``I believed,'' ``I 
tried,'' ``I was determined,'' ``my goal was''--the managers 
seek to put all of the President's evasive and misleading 
testimony in the Jones deposition in issue. That effort, I 
submit, should be rejected.
    Let me cite one rather painful example in support of the 
President's testimony that he, in fact, tried to answer 
accurately when he testified in the grand jury. He was asked 
whether or not he ever had sexual relations with Gennifer 
Flowers, and he answered, ``Yes,'' that he had, under the 
definition of sexual relations being used in the Jones case. He 
later said that he would rather have taken a whipping in public 
than to acknowledge that relation because he knew it would be 
leaked to the public, which it was.
    Now, if he didn't care about telling the truth in that 
deposition, if he went into that deposition with the intention 
of denying anything and everything that was embarrassing, if he 
really had decided in his own mind that whatever the Jones 
lawyers asked him, he was not going to be truthful about it, he 
never would have testified the way he did about Gennifer 
Flowers.
    Now, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, the President does 
not claim--and he never was asked in front of the grand jury, 
and he never asserts in front of the grand jury--that all his 
testimony in the Jones deposition was truthful. His statement 
was that he tried to be accurate, that his goal was to be 
truthful, but that statement is not a broad reaffirmation of 
the accuracy of all his testimony, despite the House managers' 
desire to characterize it as such. Those were accurate 
descriptions of the President's state of mind at the time he 
testified.
    The real issue here is not the truth of the underlying 
statements made by the President in the Jones deposition but 
the President's explanation of those statements, whether his 
description of his efforts to walk this fine line that he gave 
to the grand jury was accurate. Whether you agree or disagree 
with the President's view that he was or was not successful in 
his undertaking not to break the law and to be lawful, that 
argument is an argument. And it is not a secret argument. He 
has that out there open for everybody to see. That argument is 
hardly a proper subject for a perjury claim. And his simple 
restatement of his legal position to the members of the grand 
jury is hardly the stuff of a perjury prosecution.
    Actually, if you look at the President's grand jury 
testimony, you will see that he provided much more complete, 
much more accurate, much more reliable testimony about many of 
the topics covered in Jones. And the notion that he reaffirmed, 
confirmed, or ratified his Jones testimony is just unsupported 
by the evidence.
    It would be astonishing to think that the Senate would 
conclude that the President should be removed from office 
because in the grand jury he gave voice to a legal opinion and 
stated his own personal belief that his testimony in the Jones 
deposition did not break the law.
    I submit to you that if that was the case, the Office of 
the Independent Counsel would have included that in the 
referral, and they did not. In fact, let me just say right now 
none of the rest of the allegations that we are going to be 
discussing in the article that we are talking about today are 
included in the Starr referral. The rest are entirely the 
product of the managers.
    Subpart 3, which is the exhibit No. 19. This has to do with 
the President's testimony about statements he allowed his 
attorney to make to a Federal judge in the Jones case. And you 
saw the tape of that testimony last week.
    According to the trial memorandum, the President remained 
silent during the Jones deposition at a time when his counsel, 
Mr. Bennett, made false and misleading representations to the 
court about Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Pointing to the Lewinsky 
affidavit, Bennett stated that Ms. Lewinsky had filed an 
affidavit ``saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind 
in any manner, shape or form with President Clinton.'' And when 
asked by the Independent Counsel about this moments before the 
grand jury, the President testified that he hadn't paid much 
attention, that he was thinking about his testimony. And he 
says this four or five times. This is not just once; he says 
this four or five times. He is emphatic that he didn't pay 
attention and the words went by him.
    Now, in support of their claim that the President lied when 
he said he was not paying attention, the House managers point 
to the videotape record of the President's testimony which 
shows, they argue, that the President was ``looking directly at 
Mr. Bennett, [and] paying close attention to his argument to 
Judge Wright.''
    This allegation, not included in the Starr Report, is even 
more curious than the previous one because it is based on a 
novel legal theory which jeopardizes all lawyers in this 
building, which is that a client has an enforceable obligation 
to correct his attorney's alleged misstatements. And if he 
doesn't make those corrections, he--the client--will be held 
liable to charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.
    The charge is that the President misled the grand jury when 
he said that he was not paying attention. While the videotape 
shows that the President was looking in Bennett's direction, 
there is nothing that can be read in his face or in his body 
language to show that he is listening to, understanding, or 
affirming Mr. Bennett's statement--no nod of the head, no 
movement at all, no comment, nothing.
    What happens is this: Mr. Bennett makes his comment and is 
interrupted by the judge. She says, ``No, just a minute, let me 
make my ruling,'' before Mr. Bennett has a chance to complete 
his argument. And after interrupting Mr. Bennett, the judge 
makes a lengthy observation, followed by an intensive exchange 
among all counsel and the judge. The moment is fleeting. It 
goes by very, very quickly.
    The moment occurs not at the beginning of the deposition, 
but well into it, after President Clinton has in fact been 
subjected to questions about Monica Lewinsky. Mr. Clinton, as 
you know, has been surprised by the direction the case has 
taken and the fact that the exclusive focus of these questions 
is on Lewinsky. He did not know this was coming. He did not 
expect it. As he put it in his grand jury testimony, ``I had no 
way of knowing that they would ask me all these detailed 
questions. I did the best I could to answer them.''
    At that moment, because the questions had focused on Ms. 
Lewinsky--to the exclusion of everything and everybody else, 
including the Jones case--questions about the Jones case didn't 
occur until much, much later and near the end of the 
deposition. The President must have realized that the Jones 
attorneys probably knew about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. He obviously had not taken any steps to prepare to 
answer questions about that relationship and he was clearly 
caught off guard.
    It is not farfetched to think at that moment his mind was 
flooded with thoughts about how to get through the deposition. 
It is not implausible to think at that moment the President was 
preoccupied, watching his lawyer do his job, and not listening 
carefully and not tracking word by word the substance of the 
exchange.
    Those of you who have practiced law and have represented 
individuals under stress at depositions know that this can 
happen. Is it really reasonable to think that you can tell 
beyond a reasonable doubt what is going on in the President's 
mind by looking at the videotape? And if you can and you are 
convinced he has heard, does he have any obligation to say 
anything? If he doesn't, then this case, this allegation, 
amounts to nothing.
    It is hard to believe that the House managers--if it did, I 
think the Starr people would have brought it--it is hard to 
believe that the House managers believe that the Senate should 
conclude that the President committed perjury and should be 
removed from his office on the basis of his silence, his 
failure to speak.
    Now, there is a second allegation associated with this 
incident, one that Congressman Rogan asserted in his 
presentation, but is not discussed in the trial memorandum. 
This has to do with the President's now famous testimony about 
Mr. Bennett's statement about Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. It 
depends upon what the meaning of ``is'' is. Let's talk about 
that just a minute.
    While raising questions about the good faith of the Jones 
attorney in asking questions about Ms. Lewinsky--this is in the 
Jones deposition--while raising questions about the good faith 
of the Jones attorneys and asking questions about Ms. Lewinsky 
and not knowing if these same lawyers actually know the answers 
to the questions, Mr. Bennett said, referring to the Jones 
lawyers, ``Counsel is fully aware that [Ms. Lewinsky] has filed 
an affidavit . . . saying that there is absolutely no sex.'' 
``There is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
or form with President Clinton.''
    Now, during his grand jury testimony, the independent 
counsel reads that statement to the President. He gets 
President Clinton to agree that the statement was made by the 
President's attorney in front of Judge Wright. And here is what 
the independent counsel says to President Clinton in the grand 
jury after reading Mr. Bennett's words:

    That statement is a completely false statement. Whether or 
not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
the statement that there is ``no sex of any kind, manner shape 
or form with President Clinton'' was an utterly false 
statement.

    And he asks the President, ``Is that correct?'' At that 
point, pausing just a moment for reflection, President Clinton 
gives his opinion and explains that opinion.
    To understand the President's argument, you must know first 
that there has been no inappropriate contact with Ms. Lewinsky 
at the time of that deposition for, according to his 
recollection, almost a year; according to hers, 10 months. So 
it is not in dispute at that moment in time and for previous 
months there has been. And there is no sexual relationship 
currently, even though there had been one in 1995, 1996, and in 
the early part of 1997, some months back.
    Now, the President makes a political mistake here and gives 
in to his instinct to play his own lawyer, to be his own 
advocate. You may find it frustrating, you may find it 
irritating, when you watch him do this, but he is not 
committing perjury; he is committing the offense of nit-picking 
and arguing with the prosecutors. He is arguing a point, and so 
he says that whether Mr. Bennett's statement is false depends 
on what the meaning of ``is'' is. Mr. Bennett's statement is 
true if ``is'' means an ongoing relationship, but Mr. Bennett's 
statement is false if ``is'' means at any time ever in time.
    Now the President's answer to Mr. Bennett's question and 
the statements that follow it amount to an annoying argument 
over the interpretation of what Mr. Bennett said, focused on 
the tense of the verb. And the President is being his own 
lawyer. The grounds he has argued are fully stated, fully 
explained. There is no mystery. He is not concealing anything. 
Making this argument is not perjury.
    There is one final point to make about this incident 
because, again, I think there was a mischaracterization of what 
the President actually said in the grand jury. He didn't say 
that at the time Mr. Bennett made that statement in the Jones 
deposition, he caught the word ``is'' and recognized, ``Ah-ha, 
I've got an exit. That makes it accurate.'' Quite to the 
contrary. He is clear in front of the grand jury when he says 
that he didn't even notice this issue until he was reviewing 
the transcript in preparation for his grand jury testimony. He 
is clear in pointing out the argument that he is making is one 
that he just discovered.
    Let me quote from that portion of his testimony which 
appears on pages 512 and 513 which make it clear that he wasn't 
ever claiming that he spotted that verb tense at the time in 
the Jones deposition and his silence or his answer was based on 
spotting the verb tense then. This is something he discovered, 
noticed, and, as a lawyer, argued in the grand jury. ``I never 
even focused on that''--meaning that issue of a verb tense--
``until I read it in this transcript in preparation for this 
testimony . . .'' ``I wasn't trying to give you a cute answer 
that I obviously wasn't involved in anything improper in the 
deposition. I was trying to tell you generally speaking in the 
present tense if someone said that, that would be true. But I 
don't know what Mr. Bennett had in mind. I don't know.''
    Now, the President was open and honest and obvious in what 
he was arguing, and that is precisely what he was doing on this 
occasion. He was arguing a point that, as a technical matter, 
Bennett's statement could be read as being accurate.
    I point out again that this particular allegation was not 
included in Mr. Starr's referral. An argument that is 
identified as an argument, the grounds of which are clear to 
all, is not the basis for a perjury prosecution.
    Subpart 4 of this article has to do with false and 
misleading testimony about the President's efforts, allegedly, 
to influence witnesses and to impede discovery in Jones. Now, 
as I have said before, at the beginning of my presentation, the 
fourth category of allegedly perjurious, false, and misleading 
grand jury testimony overlaps with article II of allegations of 
obstruction of justice.
    I will say right now that Cheryl Mills will be appearing 
here when I have completed and David Kendall tomorrow to 
present the arguments on article II, why the President should 
not be found guilty and is not guilty of the allegations of 
obstruction of justice in article II.
    According to the managers' trial brief, making this 
argument that he also perjured himself about these matters, 
they claim these lies are the most troubling as the President 
used them in an attempt to conceal his criminal actions. One 
begins with a self-evident proposition--at least, to us--that 
the President did not obstruct justice, and we hope you agree 
with us by the end of the day tomorrow when we explain the 
evidence. But his explanation, if that is so, of what he did or 
didn't do to the grand jury were always truthful. Put another 
way, if the President didn't obstruct justice, he also didn't 
commit perjury when he denied it.
    According to the managers, the general language of this 
provision of subpart 4 is supposed to include a wide range of 
allegations, so we have some subparts of the subpart. But none 
of these allegations, let me say, ladies and gentlemen of the 
Senate, none of these was included or thought sufficiently 
credible to be included in the OIC referral, nor were these 
allegations included in Mr. Schippers' initial presentation to 
the Judiciary Committee. They are nothing more than an effort 
to inflate the number of perjury allegations by converting 
every answer that the President gave to the grand jury about 
the subject matter of article II into a new count of perjury, 
the double billing, if you will. All of these allegations are 
more properly part of our defense on the obstruction of justice 
allegation. But I will try to respond briefly to the allegation 
of perjury, his testimony about Monica Lewinsky's false 
affidavit. This grows out of the President's conversation with 
Ms. Lewinsky, allegedly, on December 17, in which he is said to 
have corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to execute a sworn 
affidavit that he knew to be perjurious, false, and misleading.
    In that famous late-night telephone conversation, Ms. 
Lewinsky asked the President what she could do if she were 
subpoenaed in the Jones case. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' 
That is what Ms. Lewinsky's recollection is.
    Now, in the grand jury, the President was repeatedly 
questioned about this conversation and he repeatedly answered 
emphatically. This is another example where it is not once or 
twice, it is three or four times. He truly thought he said that 
she could have sworn out an honest affidavit. The managers 
claim that when he said that--that he thought that she could 
swear out an honest affidavit--the President perjured himself.
    Now, the President's testimony in the grand jury on this 
point is not in any way cautious or qualified. He makes similar 
statements on four different occasions during that testimony, 
concluding with this tape:

    I have already told you that I felt strongly that she could 
issue--that she could execute an affidavit that would be 
factually truthful, that might get her out of having to 
testify. And did I hope she would be able to get out of 
testifying on the affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to 
execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.

    Now, the heart of the managers' argument is that there was 
no way that an honest affidavit can achieve what the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky both wanted to have achieved, which was to 
avoid her having to testify. And so the managers claim the 
President's statement that he thought she could make out an 
honest affidavit and avoid testifying in the Jones case about 
her relationship with the President is perjury.
    Once again, the managers claim that the President is guilty 
of perjury because he is testifying falsely about his state of 
mind. It wasn't true, they argued, that he really thought she 
could make out and sign and execute an honest affidavit; he 
could not have thought that; he wanted and expected her to lie 
in that affidavit, and that is why he suggested, ``Well, you 
can always file an affidavit.''
    Now, Ms. Lewinsky's inappropriate contact with the 
President was consensual. An affidavit being sought in a case 
involving allegations of sexual harassment that says there was 
no harassment, no effort to impose unwanted sexual overtures, 
would have been an affidavit that Ms. Lewinsky could honestly 
execute--an affidavit stating that she had never been on the 
receiving end of any unwanted sexual overtures from the 
President and that she had never been harassed.
    Second, both Ms. Lewinsky and the President had a 
definition of ``sexual relations'' that would have allowed Ms. 
Lewinsky, in her own mind, honestly and accurately, in their 
view, to swear an affidavit that she had never had sexual 
relations--meaning what she meant in the exhibits we 
distributed--with the President. She would have thought that 
was a factual and accurate affidavit, and so would the 
President at that time.
    Third, it is clear that Ms. Lewinsky understood that it was 
not necessary to volunteer information in an affidavit, but, on 
the contrary, she would try to give only that small but true 
portion of the whole story. She talks about this at some length 
in her telephone conversation with Linda Tripp. In her words, 
the goal of an affidavit is to be as benign as possible, to 
avoid being deposed. She is her own operator; she knows what 
she is doing.
    Please recognize what the managers are trying to do here. 
In article II, they accuse the President of obstructing justice 
by suggesting that Ms. Lewinsky should file an affidavit, 
knowing full well that the affidavit would have to be false. 
And when the President, under oath in the grand jury, denies 
that he believed that the affidavit would have to be false, 
they accuse him of perjury.
    The two allegations are inextricably intermingled, and if 
you conclude, as you should, that there is no evidence to 
support the underlying allegation, that the underlying offense 
is based on nothing but pure conjecture, you will conclude that 
the perjury charge is nothing more than an attempt to get two 
bites at the same apple.
    The second element is the President's testimony about the 
gifts. The managers' trial brief says that the President 
committed perjury when he testified that he told Ms. Lewinsky 
that if the Jones lawyers requested the gifts that he had given 
to her, she should provide them. Atypically, the brief quotes 
the President's precise language which is at issue in this 
particular allegation:

    And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she would 
have to give them whatever she had. That's what the law was.

    This testimony, the managers claim, is false. They say he 
never said that, and that when he said it in the grand jury, he 
is guilty of perjury.
    Now, the only evidence offered to support the allegation 
that the President testified falsely before the grand jury on 
this topic is, A, that Ms. Lewinsky raised a question with the 
President as to what she should do with the gifts. You have 
heard a lot of testimony about that, which only establishes one 
thing--that the topic came up. That is totally consistent with 
the President's testimony and has no bearing whatsoever on 
whether the President did or did not say what he claims to have 
said.
    The second piece of evidence is that Ms. Currie ended up 
picking up the gifts and taking them home with her, which, no 
matter how you might try to spin that, simply cannot be 
construed as evidence showing that the President perjured 
himself when he told the grand jury that he had given this 
advice to Ms. Lewinsky. ``Tinkers to Evers to Chance.''
    This allegation is all conjecture and there is no evidence. 
It is really astonishing that the managers would seriously 
include it in their case. Kenneth Starr did not, and it was not 
discussed or debated by the House Judiciary Committee.
    The majority's report makes another entirely different 
allegation about this matter. There, the House Republicans cite 
the President's denial--this is a denial, not an affirmation. 
The first has to do with testimony in front of the grand jury 
that he said something to Monica Lewinsky. The second has to do 
with a denial that he ever instructed Ms. Currie to pick up the 
gifts. From the transcript of the President's grand jury 
testimony, I quote:
    Question: After you gave Monica Lewinsky the gifts on 
December 28, did you speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and 
ask her to pick up a box of gifts that were some compilation of 
gifts that Ms. Lewinsky would have----
    Answer: No, sir, I didn't do that.
    Question: --to give to Ms. Currie?
    Answer: I did not do that.

    According to the majority's report, this testimony was 
perjurious, false, and misleading. The problem is, this 
allegation is similar to the problem with the previous one, 
only greater. In the first allegation, there is no one who 
testified that the President did not say what he testified 
under oath he said, and in this allegation there is no one who 
testified that the President said what he testified under oath 
he did not say.
    In other words, the House managers offer you this argument: 
Nobody says the President made this statement; we just think he 
did; so we are charging him with perjury for denying it, and 
you should remove him from office, despite the absence of 
evidence.
    Again, this was not included in the Starr referral, and we 
wonder how this kind of an allegation can seriously be brought 
against the President of the United States.
    The President's testimony about his January 18 conversation 
with Ms. Currie: The President's meeting and conversation with 
Betty Currie on Sunday, January 18, is an essential element in 
the allegation of obstruction as set forth in article II, and 
you will learn more about that from Cheryl Mills today. Because 
the Office of Independent Counsel spent so much time on this 
matter during President Clinton's grand jury testimony--they 
examined the President on this topic on four separate occasions 
during that 4-hour session--it was inevitable that the managers 
would find some way, somehow to include his testimony about 
this matter in article I. Just parenthetically, this too is an 
allegation that the Office of Independent Counsel did not see 
fit to make in its Referral to the House.
    And so, once again, we begin with a question: What is it 
precisely that the President said that is at the heart of this 
allegation of perjury? In his presentation last Thursday, 
Congressman Rogan quoted lengthy passages from a number of 
President Clinton's answers on the subject but failed to 
identify anything specific. Finally Congressman Rogan said 
this:

    When [the President] testified he was only making 
statements to Ms. Currie to ascertain what the facts were, 
trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was, this statement 
was false, and it was perjurious. We know it was perjury 
because the president called Ms. Currie into the White House 
the day after his deposition to tell her--not to ask her, to 
tell her--that he was never alone with Monica Lewinsky. To tell 
her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them, and to tell 
her that he never touched Monica Lewinsky. These were false 
statements, and he knew that the statements were false at the 
time he made them to Betty Currie.

    But that is not true; the President clearly asked her 
questions as well as made declarative statements.
    I confess to some confusion about what perjury Congressman 
Rogan is really alleging here.
    It seems to me that he has moved from the world of perjury 
in article I to the world of obstruction, which is Cheryl and 
David's article II.
    The trial brief is more specific. They claim that the 
testimony was false when the President went in and said that he 
was ``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts 
were;'' when he said that he wanted to ``know what Betty's 
memory was about what she heard;'' and when he said he was 
``trying to get as much information as he could.'' The purpose 
of the meeting and the conversation, according to the trial 
brief, was to influence Betty Currie's testimony, not to gather 
information.
    In truth, the President gave a number of different reasons 
to the grand jury for seeking out Betty Currie and talking to 
her about Monica Lewinsky, and it is totally plausible to 
conclude that the last thing on the President's mind at that 
particular moment was Betty Currie's potential role as a 
witness in a Federal court.
    More simply, the facts are that in making this particular 
allegation, the managers have come up with two, three, or four 
different statements by the President that they claim are 
perjurious which makes it a total distortion of the President's 
answer. There were many questions, and many answers, and then 
the reasons he gave for seeking out Betty Currie. Kenneth Starr 
made no such claim in his referral.
    Finally, the President's testimony about allegations that 
he influenced his aides; to influence; that he lied to his 
aide--let me get it right. The allegation is that when the 
President testified in front of the grand jury and denied that 
he misled his aides or told them false things, that it was 
``perjurious, false and misleading testimony'' because he was 
really trying to use them to obstruct justice and influence the 
grand jury. The President testified in much greater detail on 
this topic about the details about his conversation with his 
aides than the managers suggest. And he never said that he only 
told them ``true things.''
    In fact, if you look at that testimony--and I urge you to 
do so; it is another topic that will take up some time--the 
President acknowledged that he misled an aide and he apologized 
for it. And he testified that actually he couldn't remember 
much of what he told his aide. He never challenged or denied 
what John Podesta said that he told him. He told the grand 
jury. He told them. And he never challenged Sidney Blumenthal's 
version of what he said to Mr. Blumenthal. There is absolutely 
no evidence to suggest that the President intended to deceive 
the grand jury on this matter because he never denied saying 
what they said he told them about his relationship. And that is 
what he told them. It was not just true things. He told them 
inaccurate things. He did not give the testimony that 
Congressman Rogan claims that he gave. He did not say that he 
did not mislead his aides. He said that he had, in fact, misled 
his aide. He does say that he tried to tell true things, but he 
does not conceal the nature of the true things he is talking 
about.
    So you can make up your own mind whether you agree with his 
characterization that there are true things. He described them 
for all to see and understand. For example, he says that he 
told his aides, ``I never had sex with her,'' as it was defined 
in his mind. You may disagree with his characterization of what 
he told them as being a true thing, but he certainly doesn't 
conceal the basis of his belief that it is true. He also said 
that he was not involved with Ms. Lewinsky in any sexual way. 
And he explains by use of the present tense he thought that was 
a true thing.
    But the materiality of this alleged perjury is really a 
mystery. That the President misled his aide is not an issue. 
That his aides became witnesses before the grand jury and that 
the President knew they would probably be called, it is simply 
not in dispute. Nor does the President dispute the testimony of 
Podesta and Blumenthal. The only issue here is whether the 
President, when he discussed Monica Lewinsky with these aides, 
was seeking to influence the grand jury's proceedings by giving 
his aides false information. This is not a perjury challenge. 
This is a subject to be dealt with in the context of article II 
and obstruction of justice.
    What does it all add up to? Mr. Ruff had it right. Beneath 
the surface of this article, this first article, there is 
really a witches' brew of allegations pulled from all corners 
of Bill Clinton's grand jury testimony. He is alleged to have 
lied to the grand jury when he used innocent words to tell 
about his improper contacts with Ms. Lewinsky. Truly, these are 
frivolous allegations. He is alleged to have lied about the 
date his improper activity with Ms. Lewinsky began, and whether 
it was preceded by any period of friendship. These, too, are 
frivolous allegations. The President didn't claim he said that, 
but even if he did, the allegations are of no import. He is 
alleged to have lied when he explained his understanding of the 
Jones definition and testified that his genuine belief was that 
the definition did not include the activity that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky had engaged in.
    Experienced prosecutors say that his interpretation was 
reasonable. He is alleged to have lied about the intimate 
details of his activity with Ms. Lewinsky. She says one thing; 
he says another. This is precisely the kind of oath against 
oath swearing match that is never prosecuted in the real world. 
Given the President's overall testimony before the grand jury, 
of what real significance is this disagreement? He is accused 
of ratifying his every sentence in the Jones deposition. And by 
saying that his goal was to be truthful, he is said to have 
lied. But no one should be charged with perjury for asserting 
innocence or proclaiming that he was trying to be truthful, 
particularly when all the evidence supports his claim.
    And finally, he is accused of lying about a variety of 
actions aimed at concealing his improper and embarrassing 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky when each one of those actions 
was motivated by nothing more than his desire to protect 
himself and his family from embarrassment, if not destruction.
    Think just for a moment and ask yourself whether these 
allegations about this testimony is really an effort to 
vindicate the rule of law, or is it something else? Ask 
yourself what coming generations will think about these 
charges. If you convict and remove President Clinton on the 
basis of these allegations, no President of the United States 
will ever be safe from impeachment again--and it will happen--
and people will look back at us, and they will say we should 
have stopped it then before it was too late. Don't let this 
happen to our country.
    Before I conclude, I would like to respond to one specific 
argument that we heard last week. One of the arguments most 
frequently employed to urge the President's removal is that in 
the United States of America no one is above the law; that if 
the Senate does not take action against the President and 
convict him and remove him from office, we will not be keeping 
faith with that principle.
    Members of the Senate, I could not disagree more with that 
formulation of this issue. The principle that ``No one is above 
the law'' is sacred. The idea that the wealthy or the powerful 
or the famous should receive preferential treatment under the 
law--treatment that is different from that accorded to the poor 
and the weak--is anathema to everything that is great and good 
and special about the United States. It is anathema to our 
values and to our national ideals.
    I agree with Mr. Hyde. Our fathers and grandfathers--going 
back to the American Revolution--fought and died to defend the 
principle of ``equal justice under law.'' This principle is not 
only at the core of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, it is part of 
the very foundation of our civic society.
    But the framers, in their genius, did not design or intend 
the awesome power of impeachment and removal for the purpose of 
vindicating the rule of law. They believed that the power of 
impeachment and removal should be used for a different 
purpose--to protect the body politic, to protect the Government 
itself from a President whose conduct was so abusive as to 
constitute an assault on, a threat to the entire system.
    We are all rereading the Constitution. We are all looking 
at ``The Federalist Papers'' again. And when we do that, we 
realize that the framers of the Constitution considered the 
question of what to do when the highest officials of 
Government, the President or the Vice President, are charged 
with misconduct. And back then they made an important 
distinction that we should recognize and respect today between 
conduct in official capacity and conduct in private capacity. 
They created two different ways of dealing with these two very 
different kinds of conduct. Impeachment was to protect the 
country from abuse of official power by an out-of-control 
President or by someone who was so abusive and assaultive on 
the system of Government that he had to be removed to protect 
the Government.
    The criminal justice system was to vindicate the rule of 
law, and the clearest indication that one is not meant to be a 
substitute for the other can be found in article I, section 3, 
clause 7 of the Constitution:

    Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable 
and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, 
according to Law.

    If the President's conduct in his official capacity is so 
grave as to be a serious assault upon the system of Government, 
so serious as to subvert our constitutional order, so serious 
as to require the Nation to be protected from the damage that 
he would do if he were to continue in office, the remedy is 
impeachment and removal by a political process.
    If, however, the President's conduct does not implicate the 
office or the powers of the Presidency, the remedy is a legal 
process involving prosecution, conviction, and punishment in 
the courts. In this fashion the principle is vindicated that 
``no man is above the law,'' for in the criminal justice system 
the President will be treated like any other citizen and 
accountable to the rule of law.
    The great scholar and justice, James Wilson, said it best 
when he wrote:

    Far from being above the laws, [the President] is amenable 
to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his 
public character by impeachment.

    And more recently, just last November, Senator Specter made 
the same point with equal eloquence when he proposed:

    . . . abandoning Impeachment and, after the President 
leaves office, holding him accountable in the same way any 
other person would be; through indictment and prosecution for 
any Federal crimes established by the evidence.

    President Clinton should not be above the law, he is not 
above the law, and he will not be above the law. As Senator 
Specter rightly stated, the criminal justice system stands 
ready to perform that function and to hold the President 
accountable at some later date. And like any other citizen, 
William Jefferson Clinton can be prosecuted for any crimes he 
is alleged to have committed throughout his term of office.
    It would be a profound mistake with lasting consequences 
for the Members of this body, in the throes of a highly charged 
impeachment trial, to conclude that only the Senate rather than 
the criminal justice system should be the chosen instrument of 
the Constitution to fulfill that principle. It is not up to the 
Senate to remove the President from office for private conduct 
that does not involve abuse of Presidential power and does not 
seriously disrupt the President's capacity to function as Chief 
Executive of the United States. And it would be folly to think 
that to vindicate the rule of law in the United States the 
Senate is obliged to reverse a national election and remove a 
President from office before the completion of his term. If 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal prosecution, 
this President, when he returns to private life, can be 
indicted, prosecuted, and tried and, if convicted, punished 
like any other citizen.
    I end by making a point that should never be far from our 
thoughts as we continue through this trial. There is no moment 
in our national public life more sacred than the ritual of 
casting one's vote in a Presidential election. It is amazing, 
almost miraculous, that so powerful and transforming an event 
can occur so quietly in a great and populous nation. The act is 
invisible to outside eyes. On one designated day, millions of 
Americans go to their local polling places--to schools, 
firehouses, police stations, and municipal buildings throughout 
the Nation--to cast their vote for President. It is a moment of 
high purpose, the only political act that we perform together 
as a nation.
    And so it is that we believe, short of a declaration of 
war, there is nothing more serious for our elected 
representatives to contemplate than, through the process of 
impeachment, to undo the results of a national election and to 
remove the man chosen by the American people to be their 
President.
    Over the past week, we have heard many speeches about the 
Constitution and the rule of law and the many sacrifices that 
the American people have made throughout their history to 
defend their rights and their freedoms. Surely, among the most 
important of those rights and freedoms is the right--freely, 
fairly, and openly--to cast one's vote in a Presidential 
election and have the results of that election respected and 
obeyed.
    Can anyone imagine anything more damaging to the 
Constitution of the United States than for a Presidential 
election to be reversed for conduct that the vast majority of 
the American people does not believe warrants the President's 
removal from office?
    In the entire history of the United States, we have never 
been at this juncture before. We have never come so close to 
the final act of removing an elected President than we are at 
this moment in time.
    William Jefferson Clinton was elected freely, fairly, and 
openly by the American people to be President. We dare not 
reverse that decision without good and just cause. And we dare 
not take that step unless the people who spoke agree that such 
drastic action is justified. The damage to our political 
discourse for years, decades, would be terrible to contemplate.
    In the course of this impeachment process, we have also 
devoted a good deal of time and attention to a discussion of 
precedents that involve the impeachment and removal of Federal 
judges. For the President, we have argued that when it comes to 
applying constitutional standards for impeachment, judges are 
different. We think that the Constitution implicitly recognizes 
that distinction.
    I would like to change the focus for a moment and look at 
the way we think the legislative branch of our Government also 
recognizes that distinction. History shows, I think, that it 
has been easier for Congress to impeach and remove a Federal 
judge from office than to discharge a Member of the House or 
Senate, and maybe that is as it should be. When confronted with 
misconduct by one of its Members, Congress has rarely been 
willing to negate the popular will as expressed in 
congressional elections. In truth, the Congress has, for the 
most part, simply declined to take that step.
    Perhaps rightly so, because of the greater deference paid 
to elected, as opposed to appointed, officials or judges. 
Perhaps because Presidents and Senators and Representatives are 
periodically elected to defined terms, as opposed to life 
terms, the Congress has chosen to rely upon the public to work 
its will through the electoral system. That deference is 
warranted, I submit, and it should be a factor in your 
deliberations.
    In 210 years of history and throughout 105 Congresses, only 
4 Members of the House have ever been expelled by that body. As 
for the Senate, 15 Senators--the first in 1797, the remaining 
14 during the Civil War.
    My point is a simple one. Because of the sanctity of 
elections and the regularity of elections, and because of the 
heavy burden that must be carried before reversing the will of 
the people, decisions to remove elected officeholders have been 
and should be, at least in some degree, based on factors that 
are different than the ones used for judges appointed for life 
and who serve for good behavior. By its own conduct throughout 
its own history, Congress seems to agree with this point.
    I come from the State of Vermont, and if you have been to 
Vermont, you know that wherever you go across that State, from 
the smallest squares in the smallest towns to the larger parks, 
and what we like to think of as our cities, you come across 
monuments celebrating the American Union. One of the things 
that Vermont children learn first is that we were and are the 
14th State of the Union and that our forebears fought to create 
this Nation and to preserve it.
    So we in our history have shown that there are two things 
that we care about: We care about our American Union and we 
care about equal rights for all citizens under the law. And one 
of the rights that is most precious to every American is the 
right to choose our leaders in free elections. That right, the 
equal right to vote with confidence that the outcome will be 
respected, is fundamental to our values, to our national unity 
and identity.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you must do your duty 
as you see it, as you see the law and facts and the evidence. 
But, truly, these articles do not justify the nullification of 
the American people's free choice in a national election. I 
appeal to you, do not turn your back on those millions of 
Americans who cast their votes in the belief that they, and 
they alone, decide who will lead this country as President. Do 
not throw our politics into the darkness of endless 
recrimination. Do not inject a poison of bitter partisanship 
into the body politic which, like a virus, can move through our 
national bloodstream for years to come with results none can 
know or calculate.
    Do not let this case and these charges, as flawed and as 
unfair as they are, destroy a fundamental underpinning of 
American democracy, the right of the people, and no one else, 
to select the President of the United States.
    William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of obstruction of 
justice. He is not guilty of perjury. He must not be removed.
    Thank you very much.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 RECESS

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we recess the proceedings now. We will begin promptly at 5 
minutes after 4.
    There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:53 p.m., 
recessed until 4:07 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe we are 
ready to resume with the presentation of Counsel Cheryl Mills.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Ms. Counsel Mills.
    Ms. Counsel MILLS. Mr. Chief Justice, managers from the 
House of Representatives, Members of the Senate, good 
afternoon. My name is Cheryl Mills, and I am deputy counsel to 
the President. I am honored to be here today on behalf of the 
President to address you.
    Today, incidentally, marks my 6-year anniversary in the 
White House. I am very proud to have had the opportunity to 
serve our country and this President.
    It is a particular honor for me to stand on the Senate 
floor today. I am an Army brat. My father served in the Army 
for 27 years. I grew up in the military world, where 
opportunity was a reality and not just a slogan. The very fact 
that the daughter of an Army officer from Richmond, VA, the 
very fact that I can represent the President of the United 
States on the floor of the Senate of the United States, is 
powerful proof that the American dream lives.
    I am going to take some time to address two of the 
allegations of obstruction of justice against President Clinton 
in article II: First, the allegation related to the box of 
gifts that Ms. Lewinsky asked Ms. Currie to hold for her; 
second, the allegation related to the President's conversation 
with Ms. Currie after his deposition in the Jones case. 
Tomorrow my colleague, Mr. Kendall, will address the remaining 
allegations of obstruction of justice.
    Over the course of the House managers' presentation last 
week, I confess I was struck by how often they referred to the 
significance of the rule of law. House Manager Sensenbrenner, 
for example, quoted President Theodore Roosevelt stating, ``No 
man is above the law and no man is below it. . . .'' As a 
lawyer, as an American, and as an African American, it is a 
principle in which I believe to the very core of my being. It 
is what many have struggled and died for, the right to be equal 
before the law without regard to race or gender or ethnicity, 
disability, privilege, or station in life. The rule of law 
applies to the weak and the strong, the rich and the poor, the 
powerful and the powerless.
    If you love the rule of law, you must love it in all of its 
applications. You cannot only love it when it provides the 
verdict you seek. You must love it when the verdict goes 
against you as well. We cannot uphold the rule of law only when 
it is consistent with our beliefs. We must uphold it even when 
it protects behavior that we don't like or is unattractive or 
is not admirable or that might even be hurtful. And we cannot 
say we love the rule of law but dismiss arguments that appeal 
to the rule of law as legalisms or legal hairsplitting.
    I say all of this because not only the facts but the law of 
obstruction of justice protects the President. It does not 
condemn him. And the managers cannot deny the President the 
protection that is provided by the law and still insist that 
they are acting to uphold the law. His conduct, while clearly 
not attractive, or admirable, is not criminal. That is the rule 
of law in this case.
    So as my colleagues and I discuss obstruction of justice 
against the President, we ask only that the rule of law be 
applied equally, neutrally, fairly, not emotionally or 
personally or politically. If it is applied equally, the rule 
of law exonerates Bill Clinton.
    That said, I want to begin where Manager Hutchinson left 
off this weekend during a television program. The evidence does 
not support conviction of the President on any of the 
allegations of obstruction of justice. On the record now before 
the Senate, and that which was before the House, Manager 
Hutchinson said, ``I don't think you could obtain a conviction 
or that I could fairly ask for a conviction.'' We agree. We 
agree. There are good reasons for Manager Hutchinson's 
judgment. And the most important, the evidence in the record 
and the law on the books, does not support the conclusion that 
the President obstructed justice.
    Now, I know that Manager McCollum begged you in his 
presentation to not pay attention to details when the 
President's case was put forward. He went so far as to implore 
you not to get hung up on some of the details when the 
President and his attorneys try to explain this stuff--``The 
big picture is what you need to keep in mind, not the 
compartmentalization.'' Manager McCollum was telling you, in 
effect, not to pay attention to the evidence that exonerates 
the President--``Don't pay attention to the details that take 
this case out of the realm of activities that are prohibited by 
the law.''
    But the rule of law depends upon the details because it 
depends upon the facts and it depends upon the fairness of the 
persons called to judge the facts. I want to walk through the 
big picture and I want to walk through the facts.
    I first want to discuss the real story, and then I want to 
focus on all those inconvenient details, or what Manager Buyer 
called those stubborn facts that didn't fit the big picture 
that the House managers want you to see.
    Manager Barr suggested the fit between the facts and the 
law against the President in this case is as precise as the 
finely tuned mechanism of a Swiss watch. But when you put the 
facts together, they don't quite make out a Swiss watch; in 
fact, they might not even make good sausage.
    So what is the big picture? The big picture is this: The 
President had a relationship with a young woman. His conduct 
was inappropriate. But it was not obstruction of justice. 
During the course of their relationship, the President and the 
young woman pledged not to talk about it with others. That is 
not obstruction of justice. The President ended their 
relationship before anyone knew about it. He ended it not 
because he thought it would place him in legal jeopardy; he 
ended it because he knew it was wrong. That is not obstruction 
of justice.
    The President hoped that no one would find out about his 
indiscretion, about his lapse in judgment. That is not 
obstruction of justice, either. One day, however, long after he 
had ended the relationship, he was asked about it in an 
unrelated lawsuit, a lawsuit whose intent, at least as 
proclaimed by those who were pursuing it, was to politically 
damage him. That was their publicly announced goal. So he knew, 
the President knew that his secret would soon be exposed. And 
he was right.
    It was revealed for public consumption, written large all 
over the world against his best efforts to have ended the 
relationship and to have put right what he had done wrong. That 
is the real big picture. That is the truth. And that is not 
obstruction of justice.
    So let's talk about the allegation of obstruction of 
justice, about the box of gifts that Ms. Currie received from 
Ms. Lewinsky. I want to begin by telling you another true 
story, the real story of the now famous gifts.
    It takes place on December 28, 1997. On that day the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky holiday gifts. During her visit 
with the President, Ms. Lewinsky has said that she raised the 
subpoena that she had received from the Jones lawyers on the 
19th and asked him, what should she do about the gifts. The 
President has said he told her, whenever it was that they 
discussed it, that she would have to give over whatever she 
had. He was not concerned about the gifts because he gives so 
many gifts to so many people. Unbeknownst to the President, 
however, Ms. Lewinsky had been worrying about what to do with 
the gifts ever since she got the subpoena. She was concerned 
that the Jones lawyers might even search her apartment so she 
wanted to get the gifts out of her home.
    After Ms. Lewinsky's visit with the President, Ms. Currie 
walked her from the building. Then or later, either in person 
or on the phone, Ms. Lewinsky told Ms. Currie that she had a 
box of gifts that the President had given her that she wanted 
Ms. Currie to hold because people were asking questions. In the 
course of that conversation, they discussed other things as 
well. Ms. Currie agreed to hold the box of gifts. After their 
discussion, Ms. Lewinsky packed up some but not all of the 
gifts that the President had given her over time. She kept out 
presents of particular sentimental value as well as virtually 
all of the gifts he had given her that very day on the 28th.
    Ms. Currie went by Ms. Lewinsky's home after leaving work, 
picked up the box that had a note on it that said, ``Do not 
throw away,'' and she took it home. Ms. Currie did not raise 
Ms. Lewinsky's request with the President because she saw 
herself as doing a favor for a friend. Ms. Currie had no idea 
the gifts were under subpoena.
    So Ms. Lewinsky's request hardly struck her as criminal.
    This story that I just told you is obviously very different 
from the story presented by the House managers. How can I tell 
such a story that is so at odds with that which has been 
presented by the House managers? The answer lies in the 
selective reading of the record by the House managers. But 
theirs is not the only version of the facts that needs to be 
told. So what details did they downplay or discard or disregard 
in their presentation to create allegations of obstruction of 
justice?
    To be fair, the House managers acknowledged up front that 
their case is largely circumstantial. They are right. Let's 
walk through the House managers' presentation of the key events 
which they gave to you last week. Let's look at exhibit 1 which 
is in the packet that has been handed out to you.
    First key fact: On December 19, Monica Lewinsky was served 
with a subpoena in the Paula Jones case. The subpoena required 
that she testify at that deposition in January 1998 and also to 
produce each and every gift given to her by President Clinton.
    Second event: On December 28, Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President met in the Oval Office to exchange Christmas gifts, 
at which time they discussed the fact that the lawyers in the 
Jones case had subpoenaed all of the President's gifts.
    Third key fact: During the conversation on the 28th, Ms. 
Lewinsky asked the question whether she should put away outside 
her home or give to someone--maybe Betty--the gifts. At that 
time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded, ``Let 
me think about it.''
    Fourth fact they presented to you: That answer led to 
action. Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call at 3:32 p.m. 
from Ms. Currie who said, ``I understand you have something to 
give me or that the President has said you have something for 
me.'' It was the President who initiated the retrieval of the 
gifts and the concealment of the evidence.
    Fifth event they presented: Without asking any questions, 
Ms. Currie picked up the box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, drove 
to her home, and placed the box under her bed.
    That is what the House managers told you last week. Now, 
let's go through their story piece by piece. On December 19, 
Monica Lewinsky was served with a subpoena in the Jones case. 
The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in January 
1998, and also to produce each and every gift given to her by 
the President. This statement is factually accurate. It does 
not, however, convey the entire state of affairs. Ms. Lewinsky 
told the FBI that when she got the subpoena she wanted the 
gifts out of her apartment. Why? Because she suspected that 
lawyers for Jones would break into her apartment looking for 
gifts. She was also concerned that the Jones people might tap 
her phone. Therefore, she wanted to put the gifts out of reach 
of the Jones lawyers, out of harms way. The managers entirely 
disregarded Ms. Lewinsky's own independent motivations for 
wanting to move the gifts.
    Let's continue. On December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President met in the Oval Office to exchange Christmas gifts, 
at which time they discussed the fact that the lawyers in the 
Jones case had subpoenaed all of the gifts from the President 
to Ms. Lewinsky. During conversation on December 28, Ms. 
Lewinsky asked the President whether she should put away the 
gifts out of her house some place, or give them to someone, 
maybe Betty. At that time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President said, ``Let me think about it.''
    The House managers have consistently described the December 
28 meeting exactly this way, as did the majority counsel for 
the House Judiciary, as did the Office of Independent Counsel. 
It has been said so often that it has become conventional 
wisdom. But it is not the whole truth. It is not the full 
record. Ms. Lewinsky actually gave 10 renditions of her 
conversation with the President. All of them have been outlined 
in our chart. Invariably, the one most cited is the one least 
favorable to the President. But even in that version, the one 
that is least favorable to the President, no one claims he 
ordered, suggested, or even hinted that anyone obstruct 
justice. At most, the President says, ``Let me think about 
it.'' That is not obstruction of justice.
    But what about the nine other versions? Some of the other 
versions which I have never heard offered by the House 
managers, versions that maybe you, too, have never heard, are 
the ones that put the lie to the obstruction of justice 
elevation.
    Let's look at exhibit 2 which is in your material. You may 
have never heard, for example, this version of their 
conversation. This is Ms. Lewinsky speaking:

    It was December 28th and I was there to get my Christmas 
gifts from him . . . and we spent maybe about 5 minutes or so, 
not very long, talking about the case. And I said to him, 
``Well, do you think'' . . . and I don't think I said get rid 
of, but I said, ``Do you think I should put away or maybe give 
to Betty or give someone the gifts?'' And he--I don't remember 
his response. It was something like, ``I don't know,'' or 
``hmm'' or there was really no response.

    You also may not have heard this version. This is a juror 
speaking, a grand juror speaking to Ms. Lewinsky:

    The Juror: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the 
President bring up Betty's name?

    And this is at the meeting on the 28th:

    Ms. Lewinsky: I think I brought it up. The President 
wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he really 
didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . . .

    And you probably have not heard this version:

    Lewinsky advised that Clinton was sitting in a rocking 
chair in the study. Lewinsky asked Clinton what she should do 
with the gifts Clinton had given her and he either did not 
respond or responded ``I don't know''. Lewinsky is not sure 
exactly what was said, but she is certain that whatever Clinton 
said, she had no clear image in her mind of what to do next.

    Why haven't we heard these versions? Because they weaken an 
already fragile circumstantial case. If Ms. Lewinsky says that 
the President doesn't respond at all, then there is absolutely 
no evidence for the House managers' obstruction of justice 
theory, even under their version of events. So these versions 
get disregarded to ensure that the House managers' big picture 
doesn't get cluttered by all those details. It is those facts, 
those stubborn facts, that just don't fit.
    But the most significant detail the managers disregard 
because it doesn't fit is the President's testimony. The 
President testified that he told Ms. Lewinsky that she had to 
give the Jones lawyers whatever gifts she had. Why? As the 
House managers predicted we would ask, because it is a question 
that begs to be asked, why would the President give Ms. 
Lewinsky gifts if he wanted her to give them right back? The 
only real explanation is he truly was, as he testified, 
unconcerned about the gifts. The House managers want you to 
believe that this gift giving was a show of confidence; that he 
knew Ms. Lewinsky would conceal them. But then why, under their 
theory, ask Ms. Currie to go pick them up? Why not know that 
Ms. Lewinsky is just going to conceal them? Better still, why 
not just show her the gifts and tell her to come by after the 
subpoena date has passed?
    It simply doesn't make sense. The President's actions 
entirely undermine the House managers' theory of obstruction of 
justice.
    But let's continue with their version of events. That 
answer, the ``Let-me-think-about-it'' answer, that answer led 
to action. Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call at 3:32 p.m. 
from Ms. Currie who said, ``I understand you have something to 
give me or the President said you have something to give me.'' 
It was the President who initiated the retrieval of the gifts 
and the concealment of the evidence.
    Here is where the House managers have dramatically 
shortchanged the truth because the whole truth demands that Ms. 
Currie's testimony be presented fairly.
    In telling their story, the managers do concede that there 
is a conflict in the testimony between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. 
Currie, but they strive mightily to get you to disregard Ms. 
Currie's testimony by telling you that her memory on the issue 
of how she came to pick up the gifts was ``fuzzy''--fuzzy. In 
particular, Manager Hutchinson told you:

    I will concede there is a conflict in the testimony on this 
point with Ms. Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand jury testimony, 
had a fuzzy memory, a little different recollection. She 
testified that, the best she can remember, Ms. Lewinsky called 
her, but when she was asked further, she said that maybe Ms. 
Lewinsky's memory is better than hers on that issue.

    That is what the House managers want you to believe about 
Ms. Currie. That is not playing fair by Ms. Currie. It is not 
playing fair by the facts. Why? Because Ms. Currie was asked 
about who initiated the gift pick-up five times. Her answer 
each time was unequivocal--5 times. From the first FBI 
interview just days after the story broke in the media, to her 
last grand jury appearance, Ms. Currie repeatedly and 
unwaveringly testified that it was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted 
her about the gifts.
    Her memory on this issue is clear. What does she say? Let's 
look at exhibit 3, the first time she is asked:

    Lewinsky called Currie and advised she had returned all 
gifts Clinton had given to Lewinsky, as there was talk going 
around about the gifts.

    The second time:

    Monica said she was getting concerned and she wanted to 
give me the stuff the President had given her, or give me a box 
of stuff. It was a box of stuff.

    Third time, and this was a prosecutor asking Ms. Currie the 
question:

    Just tell us for a moment how this issue first arose, and 
what you did about it, and what Ms. Lewinsky told you.
    Ms. Currie: The best I remember, it first arose with 
conversation. I don't know if it was over the phone or in 
person; I don't know. She asked me if I would pick up a box. 
She said Isikoff had been inquiring about the gifts.

    The fourth time:

    The best I remember, she said she wanted me to hold these 
gifts--hold this--I'm sure she said gifts, a box of gifts--I 
don't remember--because people were asking questions, and I 
said fine.

    The fifth time:

    The best I remember is, Monica called me and asked me if 
she can give me some gifts, if I would pick up some gifts for 
her.

    The last time, the fifth time, when a grand juror 
completely misstated Ms. Currie's testimony regarding how the 
gift exchange was initiated by suggesting that the President 
had directed her to pick up the gifts, Ms. Currie was quick to 
correct the juror:

    Question. Ms. Currie, I want to come back for a second to the box 
of gifts and how they came to be in your possession. As I recall your 
earlier testimony the other day, you testified that the President asked 
you to telephone Ms. Lewinsky, is that correct?
    Answer. Pardon? The President asked me to telephone Ms. Lewinsky?
    Juror. Is that correct?
    Ms. Currie. About?
    Juror. About the box of gifts. I am trying to recall and understand 
exactly how the box of gifts came to be in your possession.
    Ms. Currie. I don't recall the President asking me to call about a 
box of gifts.
    Juror. How did you come to be in possession of the box of gifts?
    Ms. Currie. The best I remember, Ms. Lewinsky called me and asked 
me if she can give me the gifts--if I would pick up some gifts for her.

    The record reflects that Ms. Currie's testimony on this 
issue was clear--five times--every time she was asked.
    What, then, are the managers talking about when they say 
that Ms. Currie concedes that Ms. Lewinsky might have a better 
memory than herself on this issue? They are talking about 
something a little different; that was whether she, Ms. Currie, 
had told the President that she had picked up the box of gifts 
from Ms. Lewinsky. Let's put it in context. After being asked 
the same question for the fourth time and reiterating for the 
fourth time that Ms. Lewinsky contacted her about the gifts, 
the prosecutor asked Ms. Currie:

    Well, what if Ms. Lewinsky said that Ms. Currie spoke to 
the President about receiving the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky?

    Ms. Currie responds:

    Then she may remember better than I. I don't remember.

    Not once did Ms. Currie equivocate on the central fact Ms. 
Lewinsky asked her to retrieve the gifts. The President 
testified, consistent with Ms. Currie's testimony, that he 
never asked Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. 
So why is Ms. Currie's testimony distorted and discounted by 
the House managers?
    They are asking you to make one of the most awesome 
decisions the Constitution contemplates. They owe you, they owe 
the President, they owe the Constitution, and they owe Betty 
Currie an accurate presentation of the facts.
    But what about that supposedly corroborating cell phone 
call from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky on December 28? The 
managers highlighted this call, which they claim is the call in 
which Ms. Currie told Ms. Lewinsky that she understood she had 
something for her, the gifts. This, they say, is the linchpin 
that closes the deal on their version of the facts.
    What the managers downplay, as Mr. Ruff discussed 
yesterday, is the fact that this call to arrange the pickup of 
the gifts comes after the time Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly 
testified that the gifts were picked up by Ms. Currie. In 
citing the cell phone record as corroboration, they also 
disregard Ms. Currie's testimony that she picked up the gifts 
leaving from work on her way home; that would have been from 
Washington to Arlington. That is inconsistent with the call 
from Arlington.
    Most significantly, the managers purposely avoided telling 
you about the length of the call. As Mr. Ruff pointed out 
yesterday, the call is for 1 minute, or less. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky's own testimony, when she spoke to Ms. Currie to 
arrange the gift pickup, they talked about other matters, as 
well as the box. They had a conversation. That is a lot of 
talk: I have a box. When can you come pick it up? Where do you 
want me to meet you? And other chitchat. That is a lot of talk 
for a call that lasts 1 minute, or less. It is all but 
inconceivable that all this took place in the call. Since Ms. 
Currie placed a call to Ms. Lewinsky, though, the House 
managers want you to believe that.
    What next? The House managers told you, without asking any 
questions, Ms. Currie picked up the box of gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky, drove to her home, which, incidentally, is 
inconsistent with their theory because she is going in the 
wrong direction. She is supposed to be going to the hospital--
if she picked up the gifts, on their theory--and she placed the 
box under her bed. Then they posit this question: Why would Ms. 
Currie pick up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky? Why on earth would 
she do such a thing? Their answer: She must have been ordered 
to pick up the gifts by the President. They conclude, without 
any testimonial report, that there would be no reason for Betty 
Currie, out of the blue, to retrieve the gifts, unless 
instructed to do so by the President. Why else would she do it?
    Well, the record before you offers the answer. As Ms. 
Currie told the FBI during her first interview in January of 
1998, Ms. Lewinsky was a friend. She had been helpful and 
supportive when she was dealing with some very painful personal 
tragedies. Ms. Currie enjoyed what she saw as a motherly 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. They would often talk about 
each other's families, about their own activities, and other 
chitchat. Why does she agree to hold the box of gifts for Ms. 
Lewinsky? Because she is a friend. And that is not obstruction 
of justice.
    Now, think about the story as I told it to you, and about 
the different story the managers presented. Ms. Lewinsky was 
concerned about the gifts after receiving a subpoena from the 
Jones lawyers. She was worried they might search her apartment 
and she wanted to get the gifts out of her home. She met with 
the President, and what does he do? He gives her more gifts--
more gifts.
    When she asked what to do about the gifts, at most she 
says, ``Let me think about it.'' Those are the words that 
Lewinsky has acknowledged on several occasions, that he may 
have said nothing.
    Ms. Lewinsky is still concerned about the gifts. She 
decides to put them away, keeping the gifts that have 
sentimental value, and giving to her lawyer the gifts she 
thinks the Jones lawyers are looking for, and giving to Ms. 
Currie those items that she really would like back but that she 
can live without. She tells Ms. Currie that she has some gifts 
from the President that she wants her to hold because there is 
talk going around about the gifts. Ms. Currie picks them up 
after work on her way home.
    This story is consistent with the President's lack of 
concern about the gifts. The managers have tried to deflect the 
inexplicable contradiction created by their own theory. They 
want you to believe the President would really give Ms. 
Lewinsky gifts only to take them back on the very same day. Of 
course he wouldn't. No one would.
    The only explanation they can conjure is torture: The 
President gave her gifts which he intended to take back that 
same afternoon to show his confidence that she would conceal 
the relationship. The facts clearly do not support their 
version of events. To believe the managers' version of events, 
you must not only disbelieve the President, you must also 
disbelieve Ms. Currie.
    Ms. Currie has said that the President did not ask her to 
pick up the gifts. Ms. Currie has said that Ms. Lewinsky asked 
her to pick up the gifts. The managers have downplayed Ms. 
Currie's credibility in this incident. They have urged you to 
think of her as acting as ``a loyal secretary to the 
President.''
    Of course she is loyal. But it is, may I say, an insult to 
Betty Currie and to millions of other loyal Americans to 
suggest that loyalty breeds dishonesty. If Ms. Currie was 
dishonest, why would she have told the counsel about the 
conversation between the President and her that the managers 
have recounted as being so damaging? Why would she have said 
anything at all about that conversation? Why? Because she is 
honest. And loyalty and honesty are not mutually exclusive. 
Betty Currie is a loyal person, and Betty Currie is an honest 
person.
    These are the facts. That is not obstruction of justice.
    I believe I can best sum up by using the words of Manager 
Buyer who quoted President John Adams. ``Facts are stubborn 
things. Whatever may be our issues, or inclinations, or the 
dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of the 
facts and the evidence.''
    Those stubborn facts. Manager Buyer went on to say, ``I 
believe John Adams was right.'' Facts and evidence. Facts are 
stubborn things. You can color the facts, like calling Ms. 
Currie's memory fuzzy. You can shade the facts by not telling 
you the length of that supposed corroborating phone call. You 
can misrepresent the facts by giving only 1 of 10 versions of 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about the President's response to her 
question about the gifts. You can hide the facts, like not 
telling you of Ms. Lewinsky's personal motivation for wanting 
the gifts. But the truthful facts are stubborn; they won't go 
away. Like the telltale heart, they keep pounding. And they 
keep coming. They won't go away. Those stubborn, stubborn 
facts. They show that this was not obstruction of justice.
    I now will talk about the President's conversation with Ms. 
Currie on January 18. It is not difficult to understand these 
events if you have lived a life in which you are the subject of 
extraordinary media attention and extraordinary media scrutiny. 
Most American lives are not like that. Our jobs and our 
personal lives are not usually the subject for daily media 
consumption. As Senators, you obviously know well what that 
life is like.
    On January 18, the President talked to Ms. Currie about the 
Jones deposition and in particular about his surprise at some 
of the questions the Jones lawyers had asked about Ms. 
Lewinsky. In the course of their conversation, the President 
asked Ms. Currie a series of questions and made some statements 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, all of which seemed 
to seek her concurrence, or reaction, or her input.
    The managers' theory is that the President, by his 
comments, corruptly tried to influence Ms. Currie's potential 
testimony in the Jones case in violation of the obstruction of 
justice law. They acknowledge that the President knew nothing 
about the independent counsel's investigation. So they have 
focused on the Jones case as the place to lodge their 
obstruction of justice allegation. Ms. Currie was not scheduled 
to be a witness in that case. And, as you will see, the 
President had other things on his mind.
    Before I go into the facts surrounding these conversations, 
I want to first focus briefly on the law, as the managers did 
in their presentation. There are two relevant obstruction of 
justice statutes: 18 U.S.C. 1503, which is the general 
obstruction of justice statute; and 18 U.S.C. 1512, the more 
specific statute which prohibits witness tampering.
    There are differences between these two statutes, but for 
our purpose their essential elements are similar. Both require 
the Government to prove that the person being accused, one, 
acted knowingly; two, with specific intent; three, to corruptly 
affect and influence, in 1503, and corruptly persuade, in 1512, 
either the due administration of justice, under 1503, or the 
testimony of a person in an official proceeding, under 1512, to 
try to persuade the testimony of a person in an official 
proceeding. For conviction, each and every element must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to 
prove even one element, the jury is obliged to acquit. In this 
case, none of the elements is present.
    First, a little more about the law. You have to do more 
than make false statements to someone who might or might not 
testify in a judicial proceeding to obstruct justice. In United 
States v. Aguilar, an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
quoted by the House managers, the Supreme Court addressed the 
Government's requirement and showed that the defendant knew his 
actions were likely to affect a judicial proceeding. There, the 
U.S. district court judge was accused and convicted of lying to 
an FBI agent about a conversation with another judge and about 
what he said about his knowledge of some wiretapping. The 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction under 1502, the general 
obstruction of justice statute, holding that the facts were 
insufficient to make the case. They said in this material:

    We do not believe that uttering false statements to an 
investigative agent--and that seems to be all that was proved 
here--who might or might not testify before a grand jury is 
sufficient to make out a violation of the catch-all provision 
of 1503.  . . . But what use will be made of false testimony 
given to an investigative agent who has not been subpoenaed or 
otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury is far more 
speculative. We think it cannot be said to have the ``natural 
and probable effect'' of interfering with the due 
administration of justice.

    In responding to the defendant's criticism of the Court's 
holding, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, under the defense 
theory:

    A man could be found guilty of violating 1503 if he knew of 
a pending investigation and lied to his wife about his 
whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI 
agent might interview her and that she might in turn be 
influencing her statements to that agent about her husband's 
false accounts of where he was.

    The intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but the 
man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute 
than we would usually require in order to impose criminal 
liability.
    So I want to begin by focusing on the ``corruptly 
persuade'' elements of witness tampering. What does it mean to 
corruptly persuade? The term is vague, and the legislative 
history on the specific point is not very clear. We do know it 
means more than harassing, which is described as badgering or 
pestering conduct, since 1512 makes intentional harassment a 
misdemeanor a lesser offense of ``corruptly persuade,'' which 
is a felony. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual gives some guidance. A 
prosecution under 1512 would require the Government to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt, one, an effort to threaten, force or 
intimidate another person and; two, an intent to influence the 
person's testimony. Thus, ``corruptly persuade'' for career 
prosecutors requires some element of threat or intimidation or 
pressure.
    Keeping that overview in mind, let's look at the facts. On 
January 17, 1998, the President called Ms. Currie after his 
deposition and asked her to meet with him the following day. On 
January 18, the President and Ms. Currie met, and the President 
told her about some of those surprising questions he had been 
asked in his deposition about Ms. Lewinsky. In the course of 
their conversation, according to Ms. Currie, the President 
posed a series of questions and made statements including: You 
were always there when she was there, right? We were never 
really alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica came on 
to me, and I never touched her, right? And she wanted to have 
sex with me, and I can't do that.
    Our analysis of this issue could stop here. There is no 
case for obstruction of justice. Why? There is no evidence 
whatsoever of any kind of threat or intimidation. And as we 
discussed, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual indicates that without a 
threat or intimidation, there is no corrupt influence. Without 
corrupt influence, there is no obstruction of justice. But the 
evidence reveals much more. Not only does the record lack any 
evidence of threat or intimidation, the record specifically 
contains Ms. Currie's undisputed testimony which exonerates the 
President of this charge. This is Ms. Currie's testimony and is 
the fourth exhibit in the materials.
    Question to Ms. Currie:

    Now, back again to the four statements that you testified 
the President made to you that were presented as statements, 
did you feel you were pressured when he told you those 
statements?
    None whatsoever.
    Question: What did you think, or what was going through 
your mind about what he was doing?

    Ms. Currie:

    At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word 
shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just 
talking.
    Question: That was your impression, that he wanted you to 
say--because he would end each of the statements with 
``Right?,'' with a question.

    Ms. Currie:

    I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He 
would say, ``Right?'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
    Question: But he would end each of these questions with a 
``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not 
true.
    Correct.
    Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    None.

    The evidence on this issue is clear. There was no effort to 
intimidate or pressure Ms. Currie, and she testified that she 
did not feel pressured. Betty Currie's testimony unequivocally 
establishes that the managers' case lacks any element of threat 
or intimidation. There is no evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, that refutes this testimony. This is not 
obstruction of justice.
    But let's not stop there. Let's look at the intent element 
of the obstruction of justice laws--in other words, whether the 
President had the intent to influence Ms. Currie's supposed 
testimony, or potential testimony.
    In an attempt to satisfy this element of the law, the 
managers overreached in their presentation to create the 
appearance that the President had the necessary specific 
intent. They argue that, based upon the way he answered the 
questions in the Jones deposition, he purposely referred to Ms. 
Currie in the hopes that the Jones lawyers would call her as a 
corroborating witness. Therefore, according to their theory, he 
had the specific intent.
    The facts belie their overreaching. The House managers 
suggested to you that the President increased the likelihood 
that Ms. Currie would be called as a witness by challenging the 
plaintiff's attorney to question Ms. Currie. A review of the 
transcript, however, shows that the President's few references 
to Ms. Currie were neither forced nor needlessly interposed. 
They were natural, appropriate; they were responsive. Indeed, 
the only occasion when he suggested the Jones lawyers speak to 
Ms. Currie is when they asked if it was typical for Ms. Currie 
to be in the White House after midnight. He understandably 
said, ``You have to ask her.'' Hardly a challenge. It is a 
reasonable response to an inquiry about someone else's 
activities.
    The managers' conjecture about the President's state of 
mind, however, fails on an even more basic level. If you 
believe the managers' theory, if you believe that the President 
went to great lengths to hide his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, then why on Earth would he want Ms. Currie to be a 
witness in the Jones case? If there was one person who knew the 
extent of his contact with Ms. Lewinsky, it was Ms. Currie. 
While she did not know the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, Ms. Currie did know and would have testified to Ms. 
Lewinsky's visits in 1997, the notes and messages that Ms. 
Lewinsky sent the President, the gifts that Ms. Lewinsky sent 
the President, and the President's support of the efforts to 
get Ms. Lewinsky a job. With just that information, it would 
have only been a matter of time before the Jones lawyers 
discovered the relationship--not that they needed Ms. Currie's 
testimony; they didn't need it for any of this. Ms. Tripp was 
already on the December 5, 1997, witness list, and she was 
already scheduled for a deposition.
    So why would the President want her to testify? The answer 
is simple. He didn't. The President was not thinking about Ms. 
Currie becoming a witness in the Jones case. Indeed, she is the 
last person the President would have wanted the Jones lawyers 
to question. And even if the Jones lawyers had wanted to 
question Ms. Currie, it is highly unlikely they would have been 
allowed to do so, given the posture of the case at that time.
    Judge Wright ordered the parties in August of 1997 to 
exchange names and addresses of all witnesses no later than 
December 5, 1997. Ms. Currie was not on their final witness 
list. Moreover, the cutoff date for all discovery was January 
30. By the time the President's deposition was over, it was 
really too late to call Ms. Currie as a witness.
    Finally, you need to remember that in the context of the 
Jones case Ms. Currie was, at best, a peripheral witness on a 
collateral matter that the court ultimately determined was not 
essential to the core issues in the case. She had only 
knowledge of a small aspect of a much larger case--all the more 
reason not to view her as a potential witness.
    The President was not thinking about Ms. Currie becoming a 
witness in the Jones case. So what was the President thinking? 
The President explained to the grand jury why he spoke to Ms. 
Currie after the deposition. It had nothing to do with Ms. 
Currie being a potential witness. That was not his concern. The 
President was concerned that his secret was going to be exposed 
and the media would relentlessly inquire until the entire story 
and every shameful detail was public. The President's concern 
was heightened by an Internet report that morning that he spoke 
to Betty which alluded to Ms. Lewinsky and to Ms. Currie and to 
issues that the Jones lawyers had raised. The President was 
understandably concerned about media inquiries, a concern 
everyone who lives and serves in the public eye likely can 
understand.
    In trying to prepare for what he saw as the inevitable 
media attention, he talked to Ms. Currie to see what her 
perceptions were and what she recalled. He talked to her to see 
what she knew.
    Remember, some of the questions that the Jones lawyer asked 
the President were so off base. For example, they asked him 
about visits from Ms. Lewinsky between midnight and 6 a.m. 
where Ms. Currie supposedly cleared her in. The President 
wanted to know whether or not Ms. Currie agreed with this 
perception or whether she had a different view, whether she 
agreed that Ms. Lewinsky was cleared in when he was present or 
had there been other occasions that he didn't know about. He 
also wanted to assess Ms. Currie's perception of the 
relationship. He knew the first person who would be questioned 
about media accounts, particularly given that she was in the 
Internet report, was going to be Ms. Currie.
    The House managers did the President a disservice in 
suggesting in the end that his five pages of testimony about 
why he spoke to Ms. Currie ultimately amounts to a four-word 
sound bite to refresh his recollection. He obviously said a lot 
more.
    Why did they say that? Because they needed to establish 
intent, and the testimony and the facts do not show intent. 
That is the truth. That is all of the facts.
    The President's intent was never to obstruct justice in the 
Jones case. It was to manage a looming media firestorm, which 
he correctly foresaw. As the President told the grand jury, ``I 
was trying to get the facts and trying to think of the best 
defense we could construct in the face of what I thought was 
going to be a media onslaught.''
    He was thinking about the media. That is the big picture. 
That is not obstruction of justice.
    In the end, of course, you must make your own judgments 
about whether the managers have made a case for convicting the 
President of obstructing justice on either of these 
allegations. We believe they have not, because the facts, those 
stubborn facts, don't support the allegations. Neither does the 
rule of law. We are not alone in that conclusion.
    We want to share with you some of the remarks from a 
bipartisan panel of prosecutors who spoke to the House 
Judiciary panel, some of which you saw earlier with Mr. Craig. 
I have taken a very brief clip of their testimony that dealt 
with allegations of obstruction of justice against the 
President for, as you will see, then Representative and now 
Senator Schumer focused in on one of the two allegations that I 
address today.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Sullivan. Mrs. Currie testified that she did not feel 
that the president came and asked her some questions in a 
leading fashion--``Was this right? Is this right? Is this 
right?''--after his deposition was taken in the Jones case. And 
she testified that she did not feel pressured to agree with him 
and that she believed his statements were correct----
    Rep. Schumer. Correct, right.
    Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And agreed with him. He--the quote is, 
``He would say, `Right,' and I could have said, `Wrong,' '' Now that is 
not a case for obstruction of justice. It is very common for lawyers, 
before the witness gets on the stand, to say, ``Now you're going to say 
this, you're going to say this, you're going to say this.''
    Rep. Schumer. Right.
    Mr. Sullivan. Now it doesn't make a difference if you've got two 
participants to an event and you try to nail it down, so to say.
    Rep. Schumer. Do all of you agree with that, with the Currie--the 
Currie----
    Mr. Weld. Yeah.
    Rep. Schumer. And on the other two, the Lewinsky parts of this, is 
there----
    Mr. Davis. I think to some----
    Rep. Schumer. I mean, I don't even understand how they could--how 
Starr could think that he would have a case, not with the president of 
the United States, but with anybody here, when it seems so natural and 
so obvious that there would be an overriding desire not to have this 
public and to have everybody--have the two of them coordinate their 
stories--that is, the president and Miss Lewinsky--if there were not 
the faintest scintilla of any legal proceeding coming about. It just 
strikes me as an overwhelming stretch. Am I wrong to characterize it 
that way? You gentlemen all have greater experience than I do.
    Mr. Davis. I think you're right. And also, the problem a prosecutor 
would face would be that in these cases, there is relationship between 
these people unrelated to the existence of the Paula Jones case--the 
relationship. And that's the motivation----
    Rep. Schumer. Correct.
    And Mr. Weld, do you disagree with--do you agree with that?
    Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time--the gentleman's time----
    Rep. Schumer. Could I just ask Mr. Weld for a yes or no----
    Rep. Sensenbrenner. I'm sorry, Mr. Schumer. Mr. Schumer----
    Rep. Schumer [continuing]. For a yes or no answer to that?
    Can you answer that yes or no, Governor?
    Mr. Weld. I think it's a little thin, Mr. Congressman.
    Rep. Schumer. Thank you.
    Mr. Noble. Again, it's a specific-intent crime, and the question 
is, what was the President thinking when he said this? We can look at 
his words and try and analyze his words. But Ms. Currie says that she 
didn't believe he was trying to influence her and that if she'd said 
something different from him, if she believed something different from 
him, she would have felt free to say it. So for that reason, I believe, 
you just don't have the specific intent necessary to prove obstruction 
of justice with regard to the comment that you just asked me.

    Manager Hutchinson is keeping very good company. He, like 
the other prosecutors, does not believe the record before you 
establishes obstruction of justice. We agree.
    Before I close, I do want to take a moment to address a 
theme that the House managers sounded throughout their 
presentation last week--civil rights. They suggested that by 
not removing the President from office, the entire house of 
civil rights might well fall. While acknowledging that the 
President is a good advocate for civil rights, they suggested 
that they had grave concerns because of the President's conduct 
in the Paula Jones case.
    Some managers suggested that we all should be concerned 
should the Senate fail to convict the President, because it 
would send a message that our civil rights laws and our sexual 
harassment laws are unimportant.
    I can't let their comments go unchallenged. I speak as but 
one woman, but I know I speak for others as well. I know I 
speak for the President.
    Bill Clinton's grandfather owned a store. His store catered 
primarily to African Americans. Apparently, his grandfather was 
one of only four white people in town who would do business 
with African Americans. He taught his grandson that the African 
Americans who came into his store were good people and they 
worked hard and they deserved a better deal in life.
    The President has taken his grandfather's teachings to 
heart, and he has worked every day to give all of us a better 
deal, an equal deal.
    I am not worried about the future of civil rights. I am not 
worried because Ms. Jones had her day in court and Judge Wright 
determined that all of the matters we are discussing here today 
were not material to her case and ultimately decided that Ms. 
Jones, based on the facts and the law in that case, did not 
have a case against the President.
    I am not worried, because we have had imperfect leaders in 
the past and will have imperfect leaders in the future, but 
their imperfections did not roll back, nor did they stop, the 
march for civil rights and equal opportunity for all of our 
citizens.
    Thomas Jefferson, Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, John 
F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr.--we revere these men. We 
should. But they were not perfect men. They made human errors, 
but they struggled to do humanity good. I am not worried about 
civil rights because this President's record on civil rights, 
on women's rights, on all of our rights is unimpeachable.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have an enormous 
decision to make. And in truth, there is little more I can do 
to lighten that burden. But I can do this: I can assure you 
that your decision to follow the facts and the law and the 
Constitution and acquit this President will not shake the 
foundation of the house of civil rights. The house of civil 
rights is strong because its foundation is strong.
    And with all due respect, the foundation of the house of 
civil rights was never at the core of the Jones case. It was 
never at the heart of the Jones case. The foundation of the 
house of civil rights is in the voices of all the great civil 
rights leaders and the soul of every person who heard them. It 
is in the hands of every person who folded a leaflet for 
change. And it is in the courage of every person who changed. 
It is here in the Senate where men and women of courage and 
conviction stood for progress, where Senators--some of them 
still in this chamber; some of them who lost their careers--
looked to the Constitution, listened to their conscience, and 
then did the right thing.
    The foundation of the house of civil rights is in all of us 
who gathered up our will to raise it up and keep on building. I 
stand here before you today because others before me decided to 
take a stand, or as one of my law professors so eloquently 
says, ``because someone claimed my opportunities for me, by 
fighting for my right to have the education I have, by fighting 
for my right to seek the employment I choose, by fighting for 
my right to be a lawyer,'' by sitting in and carrying signs and 
walking on long marches, riding freedom rides and putting their 
bodies on the line for civil rights.
    I stand here before you today because America decided that 
the way things were was not how they were going to be. We, the 
people, decided that we all deserved a better deal. I stand 
here before you today because President Bill Clinton believed I 
could stand here for him.
    Your decision whether to remove President Clinton from 
office, based on the articles of impeachment, I know, will be 
based on the law and the facts and the Constitution. It would 
be wrong to convict him on this record. You should acquit him 
on this record. And you must not let imagined harms to the 
house of civil rights persuade you otherwise. The President did 
not obstruct justice. The President did not commit perjury. The 
President must not be removed from office.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                        Leader's Lecture Series

    Mr. LOTT. Once again, I invite all Senators to attend the 
Leader's Lecture Series this evening at 6 p.m. in the Old 
Senate Chamber. I have already announced former President 
George Bush will be the speaker.
                                ------                                


                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate now stand in adjournment under the previous order.
    There being no objection, the Senate, at 5:14 p.m. sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, January 
21, 1999, at 1 p.m.
                                ------                                


                       Thursday, January 21, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:01 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Dear God, You know what we need before we ask You but, in 
the asking, our minds and hearts are prepared to receive Your 
answer. In this impeachment trial, we have learned again that 
really listening over a prolonged period of time is hard work. 
Often it is difficult to hear what is being said because of 
differing convictions. Dissonance causes discordant static. 
Sometimes our preconceptions about what we think will be said 
keep us from hearing what actually is said. Thank You for the 
commitment of the men and women of this Senate to serve You and 
our Nation by accepting the demanding responsibility of 
listening for and evaluating truth. Grant them renewed energy, 
sensitive audio nerves, and discerning minds. For Your glory 
and the good of America. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Today, we will conclude the presentation of the 
White House counsel. I understand that the presentation will 
last approximately 4\1/2\ hours. As we have done previously, we 
will take periodic breaks throughout the proceedings, with the 
first one coming in approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. I 
believe that will be approximately midway in the presentation 
of Mr. Counsel Kendall. Then we would probably take at least 
one more break so that the Senators and Chief Justice would 
have a chance to stretch and so we will have some logical break 
in the presentations. As a reminder, we will convene tomorrow 
at 1 p.m. to resume consideration of the articles.
    At this point, I ask the indulgence of the Chief Justice 
and all Senators as we take up some routine matters before we 
resume consideration of the articles. These have been 
precleared.
                                ------                                


                      UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent, notwithstanding the 
consideration of the articles, that it be in order at this time 
to conduct several routine legislative matters.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                ------                                


         MEASURES READ FOR THE FIRST TIME--S. 269, 270, AND 271

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there are three bills at the 
desk. I ask unanimous consent the bills be considered read the 
first time. I further ask consent the bills be read a second 
time en bloc, and I object to my own request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. The bills will be read a second time on the next 
legislative date, as I understand it.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The leader is correct.
    The bills read the first time are as follows:

    S. 269, a bill to state the policy of the United States 
regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of 
defending the territory of the United States against limited 
ballistic missile attack;
    S. 270, a bill to improve pay and retirement equity for 
members of the Armed Forces; and for other purposes;
    S. 271, a bill to provide for education flexibility 
partnerships.
                                ------                                


                 amending paragraph 1(m)(1) of rule xxv

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed 
to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 28 which changes the 
words ``Handicapped individuals'' to ``Individuals with 
disabilities'' in Rule XXV.
    I further ask consent the resolution be agreed to and the 
motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The resolution (S. Res. 28) was agreed to, as follows:

                               S. Res. 28

    Resolved, That paragraph 1(m)(1) of Rule XXV is amended as 
follows:
    Strike ``Committee on Labor and Human Resources'' and 
insert in lieu thereof ``Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 
and Pensions''.
    Strike ``Handicapped individuals'' and insert in lieu 
thereof ``Individuals with disabilities''.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    Mr. LOTT. I believe we are prepared for the concluding 
presentation by the White House counsel.
    I yield the floor, Mr. Chief Justice.

                              THE JOURNAL

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date. Under the 
provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the counsel for the 
President have 18 hours and 9 minutes remaining to make their 
presentation of their case.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Counsel Kendall.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, managers from the House of Representatives, good 
afternoon. I am David Kendall of the law firm of Williams & 
Connolly. Since 1993 it has been my privilege to represent the 
President in the tortuous and meandering Whitewater 
investigation which, approximately a year ago, was transformed 
in a remarkable way into the Lewinsky investigation.
    I want to address this afternoon certain allegations of 
obstruction of justice contained in article II of the articles 
of impeachment. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner remarked that no 
prior article allegation of obstruction of justice has ever 
reached this Chamber. So this is a case of first impression.
    Deputy Counsel Cheryl Mills yesterday addressed the parts 
of article II pertaining to gifts and the President's 
conversations with Ms. Currie. I will cover, this afternoon, 
the remaining five subparts of article II. The evidence plainly 
shows that the President did not obstruct justice in any way 
and there is nothing in this article which would warrant his 
removal from office.
    As I begin, I want to thank you for your open minds, for 
your attention, for your withholding judgment until you have 
heard all of our evidentiary presentation. There are a lot of 
myths about what the evidence is in this case. Some of them are 
misunderstandings based upon erroneous media reports, some 
spring from confusion in the evidence itself, and some are the 
result of concerted partisan distortion.
    I want to talk to you this afternoon about what the record 
is and what the evidence actually shows. I apologize to you in 
advance if the process is tedious. What I think I have to 
request from you is your common sense and some uncommon 
patience. But the evidence--those stubborn facts--is critically 
important to inform your ultimate vote on these articles. I 
will do my best to avoid repetition and lawyer talk--although I 
am a lawyer.
    In our trial memorandum, we gave you the citations to the 
evidence I am going to be referencing, so you can check the 
facts there. I want to say that I welcome your scrutiny.
    My presentation this morning consists of six parts. I would 
like, if I could, to give you those as milestones. I want to 
make some remarks generally about evidence, and then I want to 
consider the specific evidence which is relevant to each of the 
five subparts I am going to be talking about. I am going to do 
them out of numerical order but what I hope is in a logical 
order. I am going to cover article 1 first, then article 2, 
then article 5, article 7, and article 4. Ms. Mills, yesterday, 
has already covered 3 and 6.
    First of all, a few words about evidence. We have heard a 
great deal about the rule of law in the various presentations 
of the House managers. But what is at issue here--and I think 
Mr. Manager Graham made this point very well--it is a solemn 
obligation, which is constitutionally committed to this body. 
Your decision, whatever it is, is not going to have some kind 
of domino effect that ineluctably leads to that midnight knock 
at the door. The rule of law is more than rhetoric. It means 
that in proceedings like these, where important rights are 
being adjudicated, that evidence matters, fairness matters, 
rules of procedural regularity matter, the presumption of 
innocence matters, and proportionality matters. The rule of law 
is not the monopoly of the House managers, and it ought to be 
practiced in these proceedings, as well as talked about in 
speeches.
    We have heard a lot of pejorative rhetoric about legal 
hairsplitting that the President and his legal team have 
engaged in. As a member of that legal team, I paid attention to 
that rhetoric. But as I sat there listening to the various 
presentations, they struck me as somewhat odd, because one of 
the hallmarks of the rule of law is careful procedures and 
explicit laws which try to define rights for every citizen.
    It is not legal hairsplitting to raise available defenses, 
or to point out gaps in the evidence, or to make legal 
arguments based upon precedent, however technical and 
politically unpopular some of those arguments may be. And I 
think it is particularly important in a proceeding like this 
where the charge is an accusation of a crime. Mr. Manager 
McCollum was quite explicit in his argument that the first 
thing you have to determine here is whether the President 
committed any crimes.
    I am going to try to focus on the facts and the evidence 
concerning obstruction of justice. I don't think there is a 
need for me to go into the law; we have set forth the relevant 
legal principles in our trial memorandum. Mr. Ruff and Ms. 
Mills very ably covered some of the governing principles, and 
Ms. Mills played some videotape excerpts of experts, and the 
law on obstruction of justice is relatively settled. Indeed, 
our primary disagreement with the very able House managers 
concerns the evidence and what it shows.
    Now, in December the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives reported four articles of impeachment to the 
floor. Two of those--one alleging perjury in the President's 
January 17, 1998, deposition in the Paula Jones case, and one 
alleging abuse of power--were specifically considered by the 
House and just as specifically rejected, although the House 
managers had very cleverly attempted to weave into their 
discussion of the two articles that were adopted some of the 
rejected allegations.
    Now, on the chart, article II alleges that the President 
has, in some way, impeded or covered up the existence of 
evidence relevant to the Paula Jones case. That is the whole 
focus of this article. It focuses on the alleged impact on the 
Paula Jones case. It is important because when we get to 
subpart (7), we will see that there is no way the allegations 
there could be a part of this article or impact the Paula Jones 
case.
    The President supposedly accomplished this obstruction of 
justice through--and here I quote--``one or more of the 
following acts . . .''
    Here, I think I should observe that this ``one or more'' 
menu, as it were, is plainly defective in a constitutional 
sense because, as we have pointed out in our answer and in our 
trial memorandum, and as Mr. Ruff has made clear in his 
presentation, such a format makes it impossible to assure that 
the constitutionally required two-thirds of Senators voting 
concur on any particular ground that is alleged. Since the 
Senate rules provide that you can't split up this menu--you 
have to cover all seven allegations together--it would be 
possible for the President to be convicted without that 
requisite two-thirds majority, because you might get 9 or 10 
votes in favor of the article based on each of the 7 different 
grounds.
    The Constitution, of course, gives the House of 
Representatives the sole power of impeachment and has exercised 
that power to adopt article II. However, several of the 
allegations about what the President did to obstruct justice, 
supposedly in the House managers' presentation, are nowhere 
contained in these seven subparts; they are simply not there.
    For example, you heard repeatedly about the President's use 
in his deposition of the term ``alone''--was he ever alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky. The managers claim that that somehow obstructed 
justice. The allegation that this consisted of an impeachable 
offense, however, was rejected when the House of 
Representatives voted down one of the four articles alleging 
deposition perjury.
    You have also heard reference to the President's allegedly 
false and misleading answers to the 81 interrogatories sent to 
the President in November by the House Judiciary Committee. 
Again, an article based upon those interrogatory answers was 
voted down in the House of Representatives.
    I would like you to bear in mind an image which Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson and Counsel Ruff share in some way. You will see 
that they didn't share it entirely. Mr. Manager Hutchinson 
referred to the ``seven pillars of obstruction.'' Mr. White 
House Counsel Ruff referred to the seven ``shifting sand 
castles of speculation.'' It won't surprise you that I agree 
with Mr. Ruff's characterization. But the important point is 
that there are 7 grounds in this article; there are not 8, 
there are not 19, there are 7 charges. That is what the House 
enacted and that is what we are going to address and rebut.
    Before considering the five subparts of article II that I 
am going to be addressing, I would like to say a few words 
about the different kinds of evidence you are going to have to 
consider. There is, first, direct evidence. Now, this isn't the 
most probative kind of evidence, because it is the least 
ambiguous. It comes directly from the five senses of the 
witness. For example, when the witness testifies about 
something the witness did, that is direct evidence.
    From the House managers' very skillful presentation, you 
would not be aware of the large amount of direct evidence which 
is in the record which refutes and contradicts the allegations 
of obstruction of justice. I am going to cover that in detail 
this afternoon.
    The second kind of evidence is what the law calls 
circumstantial, and this describes any evidence which is 
probative only if a certain conclusion or inference is drawn 
from the evidence. Circumstantial evidence is admissible, but, 
by its definition, it is to some degree ambiguous because it is 
not direct. Its probative power--or its value--depends upon the 
strength of the inference you can logically draw from it.
    Let me give you an example. You walk out of your house in 
the morning and you see the sidewalk is completely wet. You 
might conclude that it has rained the night before and you 
might be reasonably confident in that conclusion. However, were 
your sharp eyes to focus further and observe your neighbor's 
sprinkler sitting right by the sidewalk, dripping from the 
sprinkler head, you might want to revise your conclusion.
    Circumstantial evidence is often subject to several 
different interpretations, and for this reason it has to be 
viewed very carefully. As one court has stated, 
``Circumstantial evidence presents a danger that the trier of 
fact may leave logical gaps in the proof offered and draw 
unwarranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree.''
    If a criminal charge is to be based on conclusions drawn 
from circumstantial evidence rather than on direct evidence, 
those conclusions have to be virtually unavoidable. Most of the 
obstruction case presented--and they have recognized this, and 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson recognized it on Saturday--is based on 
circumstantial evidence, and that evidence is, at best, 
profoundly ambiguous. They told you that they have painted a 
picture with circumstantial evidence. I think what they have in 
fact done is given you a Rorschach test.
    I would like to now turn to the five subparts of article I 
which I intend to cover. And I want to describe, as to each, 
the relevant direct evidence in the record, the circumstantial 
evidence, and the portions of the managers' presentation which 
do not in fact constitute either kind of evidence but in fact 
represent speculation, theorizing, and hypothesis. What I 
believe you will find is that the direct evidence disproves the 
charges of obstruction and the managers have had to rely on 
contradictory and unpersuasive circumstantial evidence to try 
to make their case.
    Subpart (1) of article II alleges that the President 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to execute an affidavit in the Paula 
Jones case ``that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
misleading.'' The House managers allege that during a December 
17 telephone conversation Ms. Lewinsky asked the President what 
she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones case and the 
President responded, ``Well, maybe you could sign an 
affidavit.'' And that is a statement the President does not 
dispute making.
    It is hard to believe, but this statement of the President 
to Ms. Lewinsky, advising her of the possibility of totally 
lawful conduct, is the House managers' entire factual basis for 
supporting the first allegation in subpart (1). The managers 
don't claim that the President advised her to file a false 
affidavit. That is not what subpart (1) alleges. And there is 
no evidence in the record anywhere to support such an 
allegation. Nor do the managers allege he even told her, 
advised her, urged her, or suggested to her what to put in her 
affidavit. The charge which the managers have spun out of this 
single statement by the President is refuted by the direct 
evidence.
    First of all, Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and forcefully 
denied any and all suggestion that the President ever asked her 
to lie. In her proffer--and a proffer, of course, is an offer 
made to a prosecutor to try to get immunity--she made in her 
own handwriting on February 1, 1998, she stated explicitly 
that, ``Neither the President nor anyone on his behalf asked or 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
    In an FBI interview conducted on July 27, she made two 
similar statements. And you see them up here on the chart: 
``Neither the President or Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she 
had to lie.''
    ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie.''
    And it was the FBI agent who transcribed those two 
comments.
    I would like to focus upon the fact that she told the FBI 
the President never directed her ``to say anything or to lie.''
    I think that is particularly telling as the direct evidence 
in the context of this allegation that the President supposedly 
urged her to file an affidavit that he knew would be false.
    Finally, in Ms. Lewinsky's August 20 grand jury testimony, 
she stated--and she had to volunteer to do it--``No one ever 
asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my 
silence.''
    ``No one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.''
    Is there something difficult to understand here?
    It is interesting to see how the House managers try to 
establish that somehow the President asked Ms. Lewinsky to file 
a false affidavit. But their argument essentially begs the 
question. They argue that the President in fact somehow 
encouraged her to lie because both parties knew the affidavit 
would have to be false and misleading to accomplish the desired 
result.
    But again there is no evidence to support this conjecture, 
and in fact the opposite is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President have testified repeatedly that, given the particular 
claims being made in the Jones case, they both honestly believe 
that a truthful, albeit limited, affidavit might--``might''--
establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to offer in 
the way of testimony in the Jones case.
    The President explained in his grand jury testimony on at 
least five occasions in response to the prosecutor's question 
that he believed Ms. Lewinsky could execute a truthful but 
limited affidavit that would have established there was no 
basis for calling her as a witness to testify in the Jones 
case.
    For example, the President told the grand jury:

    But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what she 
says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no 
benefit in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual 
harassment. And if she defined sexual relationship in the way I 
think most Americans do . . . then she told the truth.

    Or again, the President told the grand jury:

    I've already told you that I felt strongly that she could 
issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be 
factually truthful, that might get her out of having to 
testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able to get out of 
testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to 
execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.

    It is important to bear in mind that the Paula Jones case 
was a sexual harassment case, although it turned out to be 
legally groundless, and it involved allegations of 
nonconsensual sexual solicitations. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship 
to the President had been consensual. She knew nothing 
whatsoever about the allegations in the Jones case. There is no 
evidence in the record that she had ever been in Arkansas in 
her life. And in any event, the Jones case arose out of factual 
allegations dating from May of 1991 when the President was 
Governor of Arkansas, long before Ms. Lewinsky had even met the 
President.
    Now, it is not simply the President who believed that in 
the circumstances here Ms. Lewinsky could have filed an 
affidavit which could have been truthful and which might have 
gotten her released from testifying in a Jones case deposition. 
Ms. Lewinsky also has testified that she might have been able 
to file a truthful affidavit which would have accomplished that 
purpose. For example, she told the FBI in an interview after 
she obtained immunity on July 29 that she had told Linda Tripp 
that the purpose of an affidavit was to avoid being deposed, 
and that she thought one could do this by giving only a portion 
of the whole story so the Jones lawyers would not think the 
person giving the affidavit added anything of relevance to 
their case.
    Again, in the same interview with the FBI, Ms. Lewinsky 
stated that the goal of such an affidavit was to be as benign 
as possible so as to avoid being deposed.
    Again, in her grand jury testimony on August 6, Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that:

    I thought that signing an affidavit could range from 
anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me 
from being deposed and so that there could range from anywhere 
between maybe just somehow somehow mentioning, you know, 
innocuous things.

    It is not disputed that the President showed no interest in 
viewing a draft of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, did not review it, 
and, according to Ms. Lewinsky, said he did not need to see it. 
This fact is obviously exculpatory. If the President were truly 
concerned about what was going into Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, 
surely he would have wanted to review it prior to his 
summation.
    Now, to counter this inference, the House managers offer 
speculation. Mr. Manager McCollum tried to downplay the 
significance of this fact by asking you to engage in sheer 
surmise. He said on Friday:

    I doubt seriously [the President] was talking about 15 
other affidavits of somebody else and didn't like looking at 
affidavits anymore. I suspect and I would suggest to you that 
he was talking about 15 other drafts of this proposed affidavit 
since it had been around the Horn a lot of rounds.

    Well, as the able House manager himself stated, this 
suggestion is mere suspicion, speculation; it flies in the face 
of Ms. Lewinsky's direct testimony. There is evidence of only a 
few drafts, and there is no evidence that the President ever 
saw any draft.
    Now, Ms. Lewinsky was under no obligation to volunteer to 
the Paula Jones lawyers every last detail about her 
relationship with the President, and the fact that the 
President did not advise her or instruct her to do so is 
neither wrong nor an obstruction of justice. The fact is that 
the limited truthful affidavit might have established that Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony was simply not relevant to the Jones case.
    The President knew and had told Ms. Lewinsky that a great 
many other women he knew who had been subpoenaed by the Paula 
Jones lawyers had tried to avoid the burden, the expense, and 
the humiliation of a deposition by filing an affidavit in 
support of a motion to quash the deposition subpoena and by 
arguing in the affidavit that the subpoenaed woman had no 
relevant evidence for the Jones case. The Jones lawyers were 
casting a very wide net for evidence that they could use to 
embarrass the President. The discovery cutoff in the case was 
fast approaching--that is the point at which you can't take any 
more discovery--and there was some chance both Ms. Lewinsky and 
the President felt that she could escape deposition through an 
accurate but limited affidavit.
    Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that 
at the time she executed her affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly 
could believe, honestly believed that she could deny a sexual 
relationship given what she believed to be the definition of 
that term. In an audiotape conversation which Linda Tripp, 
secretly recorded, Ms. Lewinsky declared:

    I never even came close to sleeping with the President. We 
didn't have sex.

    Again, I would remind you of Mr. Craig's presentation 
yesterday concerning Ms. Lewinsky's understanding of the term 
``sexual relations,'' which was the same as the President's.
    There is another part of the chronology here--and a 
circumstantial evidence case often rests heavily on 
chronology--that the House managers simply ignore in their 
attempt to fit some of the facts into a sinister pattern. Ms. 
Lewinsky's name appeared on the Paula Jones witness list which, 
the managers tell us accurately, the President's lawyers 
reviewed with him on Saturday, December 6. She was one of a 
great many people named on the witness list.
    Now, if the President's concern was so intense about the 
appearance of her name on the list, would he have waited until 
December 17 to talk to her? There is no explanation for this 
delay, which is consistent with intense concern on the 
President's part, except that her appearance with a lot of 
others was not particularly troubling to him. The main reason 
for his phone call on December 17 to Ms. Lewinsky, the 
unrebutted evidence shows, is that he wanted to tell Ms. 
Lewinsky that Betty Currie's brother had died. Indeed, 3 days 
after that telephone call, Ms. Lewinsky attended the funeral of 
Ms. Currie's brother on December 20.
    Now, insofar as you want to draw inferences from the 
chronology of events in December, this long delay is 
circumstantial evidence that the President felt no particular 
urgency either to alert Ms. Lewinsky that her name was on the 
witness list or make any suggestions to her about an affidavit. 
Remember her repeated testimony, which is direct evidence: No 
one ever asked her to lie.
    Now, subpart (2) of article II alleges that the President 
obstructed justice by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky, in that same 
late night telephone call--two of these articles rest on that 
same telephone call--to give perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony if and when she was called to testify personally in 
the Jones litigation.
    Now, it was interesting to me that a couple of days ago the 
House managers released a response to our presentation, and 
they concede here that the President and Ms. Lewinsky did not 
discuss the deposition that evening of December 17 because 
Monica--they call her Monica--had not been subpoenaed.
    Well, that is true. There was no deposition subpoena 
received by Ms. Lewinsky until 2 days later. Now, the lawyers 
in the room know something about what witness lists are and 
what they contain that the civilian part of the world may not 
know. As lawyers get ready to go to trial, and the judge 
requires them to put their witnesses on the witness list, you 
put every witness you can think of who might conceivably be 
relevant--from Mr. Aardvark to Ms. Zanzibar. All of them go on 
the witness list. And that is what had happened here. It wasn't 
until you get something like a subpoena for a deposition that 
you know a witness is really going to be a significant player 
in the trial.
    Well, let's look at the allegations here. And remember, 
these allegations focus on December 17, 2 days before Ms. 
Lewinsky is going to receive her subpoena. I think you 
logically begin with the direct evidence, and the direct 
evidence is the testimony of the two people involved in the 
telephone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky and the President. Ms. 
Lewinsky has repeatedly stated that no one ever urged her to 
lie and that this plainly applies to this December 17 
conversation. She said, in her handwritten proffer that I had 
on the chart earlier, that the President did not ask her or 
encourage her to lie. She made that statement when talking to 
the independent counsel, when her fate was in the hands of the 
independent counsel, when her immunity agreement could be 
broken and she could be prosecuted. She has, nevertheless, 
continued to maintain that nobody asked her ever to lie. She 
said in the July 27 FBI interview neither the President nor Mr. 
Jordan ever told her she had to lie, and she said that in her 
grand jury testimony.
    It is interesting to hear all the ways that the House 
managers--and they are very skillful--try to minimize the 
importance of this direct evidence. You would think Ms. 
Lewinsky's statements under oath were irrelevant to this case. 
She gave this testimony, for the most part, when she was 
subject to prosecution for perjury. It simply cannot be blandly 
dismissed because it was given under this threat. Indeed, Mr. 
Manager Hutchinson--and I would like to quote him--shares this 
same belief with me. He told you, standing right here, ``that 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is credible and she has the motive to 
tell the truth because of her immunity agreement with the 
independent counsel, where she gets in trouble only if she 
lies.''
    Likewise, the President has consistently insisted he never 
asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie. In his grand jury testimony last 
August, he said that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked 
about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in the 
past,'' if anybody inquired about their relationship, although 
he had no specific memory of such a conversation. And he 
testified that they did not talk about this in connection with 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case.
    He was asked by one of the prosecutors:

    In that conversation, [on December 17] or in any 
conversation in which you informed her she was on the witness 
list, did you tell her, you know, you can always say that you 
were coming to see Betty or bringing me letters? Did you tell 
her anything like that?
    [The President:] I don't remember. She was coming to see 
Betty. I can tell you this. I absolutely never asked her to 
lie.

    There is, thus, no direct testimony from anybody that on 
December 17 the President asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie if called 
to testify in the Jones case. Here the House managers don't 
really even rely on circumstantial evidence to refute the 
direct testimony of the two relevant witnesses. They rely, 
instead, on what they assert is logic. They claim that while 
the President maybe didn't specifically tell her to lie, he 
somehow suggested that she give a false account of their 
relationship. What you should infer, according to them, is 
based upon what they may have said about their relations at 
other times, previous times to this late night December 17 
phone call, the President somehow suggested that she say the 
same thing at her deposition, something like, ``You know, you 
can always say you were coming to see Betty, or that you were 
bringing me letters.''
    Their claim boils down, however, to the inferences to be 
drawn from the uncontested fact that in the past, before this 
time, before this December 17 phone call, the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had discussions about what she should say if asked 
about the visits to the Oval Office.
    Both have acknowledged that. Not surprisingly, at the time 
these conversations occurred they were both concerned to 
conceal their improper relationship from others while it was 
going on. Cover stories are an almost inevitable part of every 
improper relationship between two human beings. By its very 
nature, the relationship is one that has to be concealed; and, 
therefore, misleading cover stories inevitably accompanied that 
relationship.
    Now, to say that is not to excuse it or to exonerate it or 
justify it; but, rather, to emphasize that the testimony about 
``visiting Betty'' or ``bringing me letters'' is in the record, 
but it is not linked in any way to the December 17 phone call 
or to any testimony or affidavit with regard to the Jones case. 
Here again, I want to go to the direct evidence that is 
relevant on count 2, because it undercuts the managers' 
suggestion that this discussion of the cover stories actually 
occurred in the context of discussion about the Paula Jones 
case.
    Now, here on a chart we have a blowup of part of Ms. 
Lewinsky's handwritten proffer to the independent counsel on 
February 1, which makes it clear that she does recall having a 
discussion with the President in which he said that if anyone 
questioned her about visiting him, she should say she was 
either bringing him letters or visiting Betty Currie. But Ms. 
Lewinsky states, ``there is truth to both of these 
statements.'' It was a cover story but there was some truth in 
it.
    She also went out of her way in this proffer to emphasize 
that, while she did not recall precisely when the discussions 
about cover stories occurred, they occurred ``prior to the 
subpoena in the Paula Jones case.'' That is what you see in her 
paragraph 11. Her paragraph 11 refers back to paragraph 2. And 
her point is that, while she and the President did have these 
discussions, it was not in the context of her testimony.
    In paragraph 4 also, as you see from the chart or from your 
handout, as to the contents of any possible testimony, Ms. 
Lewinsky wrote that to the best of her recollection she did not 
believe she discussed the content of any deposition during the 
December 17 conversation with the President.
    Now, in an FBI interview on July 31, after she had received 
immunity from the independent counsel, the FBI agent noted what 
Ms. Lewinsky had told him:

    Lewinsky advised, though they did not discuss the issue in 
specific relation[ship] to the Jones matter, she and Clinton 
had discussed what to say when asked about Lewinsky's visits to 
the White House.

    This is direct evidence. Nobody denies that there was 
discussion of cover stories early in the relationship, but 
there is no evidence that it occurred in connection in any way 
with the Jones case.
    Again, despite Ms. Lewinsky's direct and unrefuted 
testimony about the December 17 telephone call, the House 
managers asked you to conclude that the President must have 
asked her to testify falsely, because she had, by her own 
account, on prior occasions, assured the President that she 
would deny the relationship.
    Think for a moment about that: They ask you to accept their 
speculation, in the face of contradictory evidence from both 
parties, and use that as a basis on which to remove the 
President. Again, Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the 
President anything about denying their relationship on December 
17, or at any other time, after she had been identified as a 
witness. Indeed, she testified in the grand jury that that 
discussion did not take place after she learned she was a 
witness in the Jones case. And, again, we have her grand jury 
testimony displayed on the chart. A grand juror is asking a 
question.
    Question:

    Is it possible that you also had these discussions [about 
cover stories denying the relationship] after you learned that 
you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    [Ms. Lewinsky]: I don't believe so.

    A juror--and these jurors were very good at questioning 
witnesses throughout this proceeding:

    Can you exclude that possibility?
    [Ms. Lewinsky]: I pretty much can. I really don't remember 
it.

    Direct testimony given when Ms. Lewinsky was covered by an 
immunity agreement that can only be divested by her perjuring 
herself.
    There is another thing that I think is relevant here, and 
that is that Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that while 
these were cover stories, they were not untrue. In her 
handwritten proffer, as you have seen, she stated that she 
asked the President what to say if anyone asked her about her 
visits. He said you could mention Betty Currie or bringing me 
letters. And she added there was truth to both of these 
statements and that ``[n]either of those statements [was] 
untrue.'' Indeed, she testified to the grand jury that she did, 
in fact, bring papers to the President and that on some 
occasions, she visited the Oval Office only to see Ms. Currie.
    Question by a grand juror:

    Did you actually bring the President papers at all?
    Yes.
    All right. Tell us a little bit about that.
    It varied. Sometimes it was just actually copies of letters 
. . .

    Again, in her August 6, 1998, grand jury appearance, Ms. 
Lewinsky testified:

    I saw Betty every time that I was there . . . most of the 
time my purpose was to see the President, but there were some 
times when I did just go see Betty but the President wasn't in 
the office.

    Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie were friends, and they did have 
a separate social relationship.
    The managers assert that these stories were misleading, and 
the House committee report on the articles of impeachment 
declared that these stories about Ms. Currie and delivering 
papers was a ``ruse that had no legitimate business purpose.'' 
In other words, while the so-called stories were literally 
true, the explanations might have been misleading. But the 
literal truth here, while it may appear legalistic and 
hairsplitting, is, in fact, a defense to both the perjury and 
the obstruction of justice charges under the rule of law. While 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky had discussed cover stories 
while their improper relationship was in progress, there is 
simply no evidence that they discussed this at any time when 
Ms. Lewinsky was a witness in the Jones case.
    The next subpart I want to consider is subpart (5). Subpart 
(5) alleges that at the deposition, the President allowed his 
attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal 
judge characterizing an affidavit in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge.
    It alleges obstruction solely because the President did not 
say anything when his attorney, Mr. Bennett, cited Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit in an unsuccessful argument to Judge 
Wright that evidence concerning Ms. Lewinsky should not be 
admitted at that point because it was irrelevant to the Jones 
case. At one point, Mr. Bennett, the President's lawyer, states 
that, according to the affidavit, ``there is no sex of any kind 
in any manner, shape or form.''
    This claim, which also is presented in the perjury section, 
as Mr. Craig pointed out, is deficient as an allegation of 
obstruction, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
    But I will say one thing. The direct evidence on this point 
is uniquely available because there is only one witness who can 
testify about what was in his thoughts at a given moment, and 
the President has testified at great length in his grand jury 
testimony about what he was thinking at this point.
    The President told the grand jury that he was simply not 
focusing closely on the exchange between the lawyers, but was 
instead concentrating on his own testimony.
    He said:

    I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he [Mr. 
Bennett] was saying. I was thinking. I was ready to get on with 
my testimony here and they were having these constant 
discussions all through the deposition.

    And again the President testifies:

    I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on. I 
was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I 
was worried about my own testimony.

    I think Mr. Craig provided you with a background yesterday 
that I won't repeat here, but I would refer you to about what 
was on the President's mind at the time.
    Mr. Manager McCollum made a very polished and articulate 
presentation to you, and he predicted that the President's 
lawyers were going to argue that the President sat in silence 
because he wasn't paying attention. We have, indeed, argued 
this, and it is the truth based upon what the President has 
testified he was thinking about. But Mr. McCollum went on to 
argue that there was circumstantial evidence available from the 
videotape of the President at this deposition.
    He stated:

    We've already seen the video. And you know that he was 
looking so intently. Remember, he was intensely following the 
conversation with his eyes. I don't know how anybody can say 
this man wasn't paying attention. He certainly wasn't thinking 
about anything else. That was very obvious from looking at the 
video.

    We all saw the video during the House managers' 
presentations, and we saw a lot of the President at the 
deposition yesterday when Mr. Craig played the first part of 
it. If you observe the President throughout the time you have 
seen him on the video in the deposition, you will conclude that 
the look on his face was no different from what it was during 
other discussions or arguments of counsel about evidentiary or 
procedural matters. The videotape does not, fairly considered, 
indicate that the President was, in fact, focusing on the 
lengthy colloquy among the lawyers or that he knowingly made a 
decision not to correct his own lawyer.
    The President has received a great deal of criticism, 
because at one point in his grand jury testimony, when asked 
about Mr. Bennett's statement, the President responds to the 
prosecutor that whether Mr. Bennett's statement is true depends 
on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. That is, ``there is 
no sex of any kind.''
    That has gotten its share of laughs. But when you read the 
President's grand jury transcript in context, this was a 
serious matter, and it is apparent that the President was not 
in any way describing what was in his own mind at the time of 
the deposition, but he rather was discussing Mr. Bennett's 
statement from the vantage point of the President's later grand 
jury testimony. He is interpreting what his own lawyer was 
saying. Mr. Craig pointed this out yesterday.
    That interpretation is not perjury in article I, and it is 
not obstruction of justice in article II. What the exchange was 
was that the President, in response to one of the prosecutors, 
explains why, on one reading Mr. Bennett's statement, it may 
not be false.
    Now, it may be hairsplitting and it may be professorial and 
it may be technical, but the important thing is it is a 
retrospective assessment. The President is not talking about 
himself. He is talking about how to construe Mr. Bennett's 
statement. And what he says is, there is a way in which Mr. 
Bennett's statement at the deposition is accurate; that is, if 
Mr. Bennett was referring to the relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky on that date, it was an accurate 
statement because the improper relationship was over a long 
time earlier.
    Now, the relevant point here is that the President's 
disquisition on the word ``is'' and its meaning was not an 
attempt to explain his own thinking at the time of the 
deposition, but was rather his later interpretation of what Mr. 
Bennett had said at the deposition.
    In light of the President's direct unequivocal testimony, 
this speculation about what was in his mind is simply baseless, 
and there is, in fact, no evidence to support the charge 
leveled in subpart (5) of article II.
    There is another reason to reject the charge; and that is, 
that the law imposes no obligation on the client to monitor his 
or her lawyer's every statement and representation. 
Particularly in a civil deposition, in which the client is 
being questioned, clients are routinely advised to focus on the 
questions posed, think carefully about the answer, answer only 
the question asked and ignore distractions. And sometimes, sad 
to say, the statements of one's own lawyer can be a 
distraction. And those of you who are lawyers and have defended 
people in depositions know that that is the advice you give the 
client.
    There was good reason for the President to be thinking 
about his own testimony and leave the legal fencing to the 
lawyers, because whatever else may be said about him, there can 
be no doubt that the Jones case itself was a vehicle for 
partisan attack on the President and that he was going to be 
facing a series of hostile and difficult questions at the 
deposition.
    Now, Judge Wright ultimately ruled that, giving Ms. Jones 
every benefit of the doubt, she had failed both legally and 
factually to present allegations that merited going to trial. 
But while it was legally meritless, while it was going on, the 
case did impose a significant toll on the President both 
personally and politically.
    And let's be clear about one other thing while we are 
looking at this deposition and while you review the 
significance of the President listening in silence to Mr. 
Bennett's conduct. As Mr. Craig described yesterday, Judge 
Wright, in fact, interrupted Mr. Bennett in mid sentence as he 
was describing Ms. Jones' affidavit. She didn't allow him to 
complete his objection in which he cited the Lewinsky 
affidavit. She quickly interjected--and this is sometimes what 
judges do to the most learned of lawyers--she quickly 
interjected and said, ``No, just a moment, let me make my 
ruling.'' And then she proceeded to allow the very line of 
questioning that Mr. Bennett was trying to prevent. So the 
President's silence, whatever motivated it, had absolutely no 
impact on the conduct of the Jones deposition.
    And also let's be clear about one other thing: Nothing 
about this interchange between Mr. Bennett and Judge Wright 
blocked the ability of the Jones lawyers to obtain information 
about the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky because 
the Jones lawyers had been briefed the night before in great 
detail by Ms. Linda Tripp. Ms. Tripp had already gotten her own 
immunity agreement from the Office of Independent Counsel and 
had set up a lunch with Ms. Lewinsky at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel 
the day before the deposition, Friday, January 16. And at that 
lunch, of course, Ms. Lewinsky was apprehended by the Office of 
Independent Counsel and held for the next 12 hours. In the 
meantime, however, Ms. Tripp goes back to her home where she 
meets with the Jones lawyers that Friday night before the 
deposition and loads them up with all the information she has 
obtained from her illegal, secret audiotaping of Ms. Lewinsky. 
That is why they were able to ask the questions they did with 
such specificity and conviction.
    Indeed, there is one point in the examination of the 
President where he says to the Jones lawyer who is examining 
him, Mr. Fisher--he asked the question. And Fisher says, ``Sir, 
I think this will come''--he asked a question about ``Can you 
tell me why you are asking these specific questions?'' and 
Fisher replies, ``Sir, I think this will come to light shortly, 
and you'll understand.''
    Well, how ironic that I am making a presentation today on 
January 21 because it did come to light--just as Mr. Fisher 
knew it would; just as Ms. Tripp knew it would--it came to 
light 1 year ago exactly when the story broke in the Washington 
Post. This fleeting exchange between Mr. Bennett and Judge 
Wright before she overruled his objection could not and didn't 
have any impact on the Jones lawyers' conduct.
    Now, I want to look briefly at one other part of subpart 
(5) because it continues to make one other allegation: Such 
false and misleading statements at the deposition by Mr. 
Bennett allegedly were subsequently acknowledged by Mr. Bennett 
in a communication with the judge.
    Now, if you look at Mr. Bennett's letter, however, that is 
not at all what the letter says. Mr. Bennett wrote to the judge 
on September 30 of last year. This is after the referral had 
come to Congress and after the House of Representatives had 
seen fit to release Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony. Mr. 
Bennett does not, as the article alleges, acknowledge that he 
himself made false and misleading statements or that the 
President, either by his word or silence, made such statements. 
What Mr. Bennett does do in this letter, as you can see, is 
call the court's attention to the fact that Ms. Lewinsky 
herself had testified before a Federal grand jury in August. 
And--contrary to her earlier statements--she stated that 
portions of her affidavit were, according to her, false and 
misleading. Mr. Bennett's letter, bringing this to the judge's 
attention, was a matter of professional obligation and 
responsibility. It in no way is evidence supporting subpart 
(5).
    Take a break?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Kendall, indicating that 
he is about halfway through his presentation----
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. LOTT. I would, then, ask unanimous consent we have a 
temporary recess for 15 minutes.
    There being no objection, at 2:09 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:30 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the Senate is ready 
to proceed now with the presentation by Counsel Kendall.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Counsel Kendall.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Subpart (7)--we have two more subparts to go. I will take 
them out of order. Subpart (7) of article II alleges that the 
President obstructed justice when he relayed or told certain 
White House officials things about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky that were false and misleading. This is another 
example of double billing in the two articles. This charge is 
leveled in article I, and it appears here in article II. 
Yesterday, Mr. Craig explained why these statements didn't 
constitute perjury, and I would like to take just a few minutes 
this afternoon to explain why they don't constitute an 
obstruction of justice, either.
    First of all, and most obviously, there is no way--I said 
this in the beginning--there is no way that the statements of 
the aides could be in any way part of a scheme to deny Ms. 
Jones evidence. I think on this ground alone subpart (7) fails, 
because if you look at what is alleged in article II, it is 
that the President obstructed justice in order to delay, 
impede, et cetera, existence of testimony related to Ms. Jones' 
lawsuit. There is no way here that whatever the President said 
to an aide could have done that.
    The statements, which this subpart (7) addresses, were 
statements that the President made very shortly after the 
Lewinsky publicity had broken to Mr. Bowles, Mr. Podesta, Mr. 
Blumenthal and Mr. Ickes, none of whom were witnesses in the 
Paula Jones case. They were on none of the witness lists, and 
they had no evidence at all relevant to the Paula Jones case 
since they had been working for the President. They weren't 
working for the President when he was Governor of Arkansas in 
May of 1991, and they weren't individuals subject to discovery. 
So these four aides just had no evidence whatsoever that they 
could contribute to the Paula Jones case.
    But there is another more fundamental reason why this 
article is flawed as a matter both of the evidence and the law. 
The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff, 
and the Nation about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky. And he has 
expressed profound regret for that conduct. Subpart (7), 
however, alleges that he should be impeached and removed from 
office simply because he failed to be candid with these 
particular four White House aides and misled them about the 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    These allegedly impeachable denials to the four aides 
occurred, as I said, right after the publicity broke. And one 
of them occurred on January 21, last year, and then also on the 
23rd and the 26th. This was at the very time the President 
denied he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky in nearly 
identical terms on national television to whoever throughout 
the United States happened to be watching at that time.
    Having made this denial to the entire country, it simply is 
absurd to regard it any differently when made to four aides in 
the White House directly and person-to-person rather than 
through the medium of television. The President talked to these 
individuals about the Lewinsky matter because of his personal 
relationship and his direct professional exposure to them on a 
daily basis. He spoke to them, however, misleadingly in an 
attempt to allay their concern once the allegations about Ms. 
Lewinsky become public.
    No discovery here--never yet found a place in which 
discovery would benefit the case for either side--but no 
discovery here is going to illuminate the record in any way. 
These four witnesses have testified before the independent 
counsel's grand jury on several occasions.
    I think it is important to observe also that there is no 
way this interchange between the President and his aides could 
have affected evidence because his statements to them were 
hearsay which they would have reported accurately to the grand 
jury when asked. And by ``hearsay,'' all they can testify to is 
what the President told them, and they could do that 
accurately. But their own testimony, based on whatever 
knowledge or observation or direct sensory evidence they might 
have, was not affected in any way by the President's statement. 
None of these aides had any independent knowledge of the 
relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky and, 
therefore, the only evidence they do offer would be a hearsay 
repetition of what the President had told them. And that was 
the same public denial that he had told everyone, including, 
presumably, any member of the grand jury who had his or her 
television set on on that Monday, January 26.
    But under the strained theory--you really have to focus on 
this--under this theory, any citizen of the United States who 
heard that denial could form the basis for an allegation of 
impeachable conduct and removal of the President from office.
    I think this subpart (7) of article II fails for a number 
of reasons not related to the Paula Jones case, and it violates 
common sense.
    Let me turn to subpart (4). This subpart alleges that the 
President obstructed justice when he intensified and succeeded 
in an effort to secure job assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order 
to corruptly prevent her truthful testimony. The claim here is 
of a quid pro quo, a ``this for that.'' His job assistance was 
allegedly in order to prevent her truthful testimony.
    I want to note a couple of things here. First of all, this 
word ``intensified'' is a pretty slippery word. It doesn't say 
``originated'' or ``began.'' It says ``intensified.'' And that 
allegation implicitly tries to avoid the thrust of its own 
logic. It recognizes that the job search Ms. Lewinsky was 
conducting had begun long before there was any connection to 
the Paula Jones case. And the undisputed facts are going to 
reveal that Vernon Jordan and others were trying to help her 
long before she appeared on the list of witnesses Ms. Jones was 
considering calling.
    The second thing I want to emphasize is the quid pro quo 
nature of the allegation. Quid pro quo is a good Latin term 
meaning ``this for that.'' ``In order to'' is the allegation of 
subpart (4). The job assistance was ``in order to'' prevent Ms. 
Lewinsky's truthful testimony.
    Well, I want to review the evidence a bit because there is 
not only no evidence in the record; there is a lot of 
contradictory evidence, both direct and circumstantial. We have 
heard a great deal in the various presentations about Mr. 
Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. But I was surprised to sit 
right over there through 11 hours 52 minutes, by my watch, of 
the House managers' very able presentation, and I heard almost 
nothing about what actually happened in New York City as a 
result of Mr. Jordan's efforts. But when we review the 
evidence--and it is all right here. Don't worry, I am not going 
to review every page of it. But it is all here. When we review 
this evidence which is available--all you have to do is read 
it--we get a very different picture from what we got from the 
able House managers. There is no secret about it, nor is there 
any conflict in the testimony of these witnesses. There is no 
need for further discovery here, as I will show, because the 
testimony is consistent.
    Now, the proof that is in the record is that there was no 
corrupt linkage, no assistance whatsoever which was designed 
and focused to get Ms. Lewinsky to do anything--nothing which 
tied the job assistance to what was going on in the Jones case. 
Mr. Jordan did help open doors, and Ms. Lewinsky went through 
those doors, and she either succeeded or failed on her own 
merits. Two of the companies declined to offer her a job, and 
at the third she did get an entry-level job, which she received 
on her own merits.
    There was no fix, no quid pro quo, no link to the Jones 
case. And also there was no urgency to Mr. Jordan's assistance 
to her. He started assisting her well before she showed up on 
the Jones witness list, and he helped her whenever he could, 
consistent with his own heavy travel schedule. There is the 
allegation of a quid pro quo, but there is nothing in the 
evidence to support the ``pro'' part of it.
    What the House managers have tried to do--and they are 
skillful prosecutors, they are able, they are experienced, they 
are polished, and they know what they are doing--they have 
tried to juxtapose unrelated events and, by a selective 
chronology, tried to establish causation between two wholly 
unrelated sets of events. And there an old logical fallacy--you 
have had enough Latin today--that just because something comes 
after something, it was caused by the preceding event. It is 
like the rooster crowing and taking credit for the sun coming 
up. When you look at the House managers' case, there is a lot 
of that going on, because we will see there is no real 
existence of causal connection and we will also see that a lot 
of the chronology you have been given is erroneous.
    As I said earlier, there is no evidence, either direct or 
circumstantial, to support this quid pro quo allegation.
    Now, let's start with the direct evidence, the most logical 
place to begin. It could not be more unequivocal. Let's start 
with Ms. Lewinsky. First of all, her New York job search began 
on her own initiative long before any involvement in the Jones 
case. Moving to New York was her own idea, and it was one she 
raised in July of 1997. This geographical move did not affect 
in any way her exposure to a subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
    Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, a 
witness can be subpoenaed in any Federal district, no matter 
where the case is pending. And, indeed, a great many of the 
depositions in the Paula Jones case took place outside the 
State of Arkansas. For this reason, Mr. Manager Barr's 
assertion that the President wanted Ms. Lewinsky to go to New 
York because it would ``make her much more difficult, if not 
impossible, to reach as a witness in the Jones case'' is 
entirely untenable; she was just as vulnerable to subpoena in 
New York as she was in Washington. And, indeed, she was already 
under subpoena in January when she was finalizing her move. 
This contention just does not withstand scrutiny.
    Now, Ms. Lewinsky testified:

    I was never promised a job for my silence.

    You can't get any plainer than that. She testified that her 
job search had no relation to anything that she might do in the 
Jones case. In her July 27 interview with the FBI, the FBI 
agent recorded her statement that there was no agreement with 
the President, with Mr. Jordan, or anyone else that she had to 
sign a Jones affidavit before getting a job in New York. She 
told the FBI agent explicitly that she had never demanded from 
Mr. Jordan a job in exchange for a favorable affidavit and 
neither the President nor Mr. Jordan nor anyone else had ever 
made this proposition to her.
    Now, Mr. Jordan, who is an eloquent and exceedingly 
articulate man, took care of that claim in his own grand jury 
testimony. He was asked about any connection between the job 
search and the affidavit. He said there was absolutely none. He 
said, on March 5, as far as he was concerned these were two 
entirely separate matters. And in his grand jury appearance on 
May 5 he was asked whether the two were connected, and Mr. 
Jordan said, ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no.''
    The President has likewise testified that there was no 
connection between the Jones case and Ms. Lewinsky's job 
search. He told the grand jury:

    I was not trying to buy her silence or get Vernon Jordan to 
buy her silence. I thought she was a good person. She had not 
been involved with me for a long time in any improper way, 
several months, and I wanted to help her get on with her life. 
It is just as simple as that.

    Quid pro quo? No. The uncontested facts bear out these 
categorical denials of the three most involved people. Ms. 
Lewinsky began looking for a job in July of 1997, and the event 
which hardened her resolve to move to New York was a report by 
her ostensible good friend, Ms. Linda Tripp, on or about 
October 6 that one of Ms. Tripp's friends at the National 
Security Council said that Ms. Lewinsky would never ever get a 
job in the White House again.
    Now, it turns out that this disclosure, like so much else 
Ms. Tripp said, is false. Ms. Tripp's NSC friend said no such 
thing. But it did have a profound impact on Ms. Lewinsky, who 
described it as the straw that broke the camel's back. It was 
plain to her then that she was never going to be able to get 
another White House job.
    Mr. Jordan's assistance of Ms. Lewinsky began about a month 
before Ms. Lewinsky learned--about 6 weeks before she learned 
she was a possible witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she had discussed with Linda Tripp sometime in 
late September or early October the idea of asking for Mr. 
Jordan's assistance, and Ms. Lewinsky indicated she could not 
recall if it were her idea or Linda Tripp's idea, but in any 
event Mr. Jordan became involved sometime later at the 
direction not of the President but of Ms. Currie, who was a 
long-time friend of Mr. Jordan and who had discussed with Ms. 
Lewinsky her job search. Now, Ms. Currie had previously 
assisted Ms. Lewinsky in making contact with Ambassador Bill 
Richardson at the U.N. Ms. Lewinsky's first meeting was with 
Mr. Jordan on November 5, and Ms. Lewinsky testified that the 
meeting lasted about 20 minutes and that they had discussed a 
list of possible employers she was interested in. She never 
told Mr. Jordan that there was any time constraint on his 
assistance, and both she and Mr. Jordan traveled a great deal 
out of the country and in the country in that November-December 
period.
    Now, Mr. Jordan testified unequivocally that he never, at 
any time, felt any particular pressure to get Ms. Lewinsky a 
job. This is plain and powerful and unrebutted testimony. He 
was asked in the grand jury if you recall any ``kind of a 
heightened sense of urgency by Ms. Currie or anyone at the 
White House'' about helping Ms. Lewinsky during the first half 
of December?
    And he replied, ``Oh, no, I do not recall any heightened 
sense of urgency. What I do recall is that I dealt with it as I 
had time to do it.''
    Now, let me just pause here and observe that if there had 
been any improper motive or any sinister effort to silence Ms. 
Lewinsky, it would have been extremely easy for the President 
to have arranged for her to be hired at the White House. If 
there were some corrupt intent to silence her, that was an 
obvious solution because she very much wanted to go back to 
work at the White House. It mattered to her a great deal. But, 
while she was interviewed a couple of times by White House 
officials in the summer of 1997, those interviews never 
resulted in a job offer. The fix was not in. There was no 
corrupt effort to bring Ms. Lewinsky back, give her a White 
House job or, indeed, transfer her in any way from her Pentagon 
job.
    Now, she continued her job search efforts with the 
assistance of some of the White House people. In late October 
or early November, she told her boss at the Pentagon, Mr. 
Kenneth Bacon, that she wanted to leave and move to New York 
City. She enlisted his assistance in trying to help her get a 
private sector job, and he helped her because she had done good 
work for him. He had a positive impression and testified that 
he wanted to do whatever he could for her.
    In November of 1997, her supervisor at the Pentagon 
indicated that Ms. Lewinsky gave notice of an intention to quit 
her Pentagon job at the year end.
    Now, before we get to the private sector firms that Ms. 
Lewinsky went to, I want to pause and make the point that she 
had a United Nations delegation job in her back pocket. Back 
pocket is a male image--perhaps in her purse. She had it in her 
hand and available, all during this period.
    In early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, Mr. 
Podesta--John Podesta, who was then the White House Deputy 
Chief of Staff--had asked Ambassador Bill Richardson to 
consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. The Ambassador 
testified that he did not take this as a ``pressure call.'' He 
said ``there was no pressure anywhere by anybody'' to hire Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, without 
contradiction, that she was acting on her own, as Ms. 
Lewinsky's friend, in trying to help her.
    Now, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for the U.N. position on 
October 31 with Ambassador Richardson. And he, through his 
staff, offered her a job on November 3. Ambassador Richardson 
testified to the grand jury that he never spoke to the 
President or Mr. Jordan about Ms. Lewinsky, that he was 
impressed by her, that he made the offer on the merits, and 
that no one had pressured him to hire her.
    He testified specifically to the grand jury on April 30:

    This was my decision to hire her. I did not do it under any 
pressure or anything. I felt that she would be suitable for the 
job, and I didn't feel I had to report to anybody. It's not in 
my nature. I don't take pressure well on personnel matters. I'm 
a Cabinet member. I don't have to account for anything. This 
was mine, my choice, my decision. And I stand behind it.

    He also declared:

    What I did was routine.

    This fact was highly significant, because although this job 
was not precisely the job Ms. Lewinsky wanted, it was a job in 
New York, and she kept this open until January 5 when she 
finally turned it down. Now, it was Mr. Manager Bryant who 
referred to this in passing--just kind of walked around it. He 
disparaged it in the way a good trial lawyer does--recognize it 
is there, but then move around and away from it. But it is an 
important fact and it tears a very large hole in their 
circumstantial evidence case. Because she had in her hand, I 
will say, this job offer all through this period of November 
and December and into January. It wasn't precisely what she 
wanted but it was a good job. It was in New York City. And 
there was no urgent necessity for her, connected with her 
private sector job search. Once again, quid pro quo? No.
    Now, there is a lot of further direct evidence concerning 
her job search. And this is contained in a great many 
interviews in grand jury transcript from the people at the 
various New York firms Mr. Jordan contacted on Ms. Lewinsky's 
behalf. Again, there is simply no direct evidence whatsoever 
from any of these people of any kind of quid pro quo treatment. 
While Mr. Jordan made the contacts on her behalf, there was no 
urgency about them. There was no pressure, and they were wholly 
unrelated to the Jones case.
    Let's recognize the obvious here. The President's relation, 
improper relation with Ms. Lewinsky, had been over for many 
months. He continued to see her from time to time. He did what 
he could to be of assistance to her as she sought employment in 
New York because, as he testified, she was a good person, and 
he was trying to help her get on with her life.
    Mr. Jordan was able to open some doors, but once open, 
there was no inappropriate pressure. He really opened three 
doors for her: at American Express, at Young & Rubicam, and at 
Revlon. And she batted one for three. And actually in job 
searches, as in baseball, I, at least, will take that batting 
average any day of the week. But she succeeded on her own once 
she was through the door. And her getting through the door had 
no relation to the Paula Jones case.
    Let's, first of all, take a look at what happened with 
American Express and see whether in direct or circumstantial 
evidence there is any evidence of a quid pro quo here. The 
independent counsel conducted a very large number of interviews 
and also summoned a great many witnesses from each of these 
three sets of companies. Mr. Jordan was a member of the 
American Express board of directors, and he telephoned a Ms. 
Ursula Fairbairn, the executive vice president of human 
resources at American Express on December 10 or 11. And he told 
Ms. Fairbairn that he wanted to send her the resume of a 
talented young woman in Washington, to see whether she matched 
up to any openings at American Express.
    Ms. Fairbairn told the FBI that it was not at all unusual 
for American Express board members or other company officers to 
recommend young people for employment. Ms. Fairbairn said Mr. 
Jordan did not, in fact, mention any White House connection 
that the applicant had, and he exerted no pressure at all on 
her to hire the applicant. Ms. Fairbairn recalled that Mr. 
Jordan made another employment recommendation about 2 months 
earlier and indicated this was simply not an unusual request.
    Now, the Office of Independent Counsel also--you see it on 
the chart--interviewed Thomas Schick at American Express. He is 
the executive vice president for corporate affairs and 
communications.
    Ms. Fairbairn had sent the name and resume to Mr. Schick 
because she thought that is where Ms. Lewinsky might fit in, 
and he interviewed Ms. Lewinsky on December 23 in Washington. 
He decided after this interview not to hire Ms. Lewinsky 
because he felt she was lacking in experience and he also 
thought that American Express was probably not the right kind 
of company for her, given what she had told him she was 
interested in at the interview, and that she probably would be 
better off going to a public relations firm.
    The decision not to hire, he told the FBI, was entirely his 
own. He felt no pressure to either hire or not hire Ms. 
Lewinsky and never talked to Mr. Jordan at any time during this 
process. Once again, quid pro quo? No.
    The second company--actually two companies. It is Young & 
Rubicam and Burson-Marsteller. Mr. Jordan called Peter 
Georgescu, the chairman and CEO of Young & Rubicam, the large 
New York advertising agency. Mr. Jordan had no formal 
connection with the company, but he had been a friend of Mr. 
Georgescu's for over 20 years.
    Mr. Georgescu was interviewed by investigators of the 
Office of Independent Counsel and said that sometime in 
December 1997, Mr. Jordan had telephoned him and had asked him 
to take a look at a young person from the White House for 
possible work in the New York area.
    Mr. Georgescu had responded, ``We'll take a look at her in 
the usual way.'' And he stated that that was a kind of a code 
between him and Mr. Jordan, and it meant that if there was an 
opening for which she was qualified, she would be interviewed 
and hired, but there would be no special treatment. He 
testified that Mr. Jordan understood that, and he also said 
that Mr. Jordan did not engage in any kind of sales pitch about 
Lewinsky.
    Mr. Georgescu said that he then initiated an interview on 
behalf of Ms. Lewinsky, but his own involvement was arm's 
length, and that she succeeded or failed totally on her own 
merits.
    He recalled that Mr. Jordan had made another similar 
request on a previous occasion, and he said that he and Mr. 
Jordan frequently exchanged opinions about people in the 
advertising business on an informal basis.
    As a result of this telephone call, Ms. Lewinsky was 
interviewed by another person, a Ms. Celia Berk, who was the 
managing director of human resources at Burson-Marsteller, a 
public relations firm that was a division of Young & Rubicam. 
According to Ms. Berk, this interview was handled ``by the 
book,'' and while Ms. Lewinsky's interviews were a little bit 
accelerated, they went through the normal steps.
    Ms. Berk testified that nobody put any pressure on her. She 
said that while both she and the director of corporate practice 
at Burson-Marsteller, Erin Mills, and another corporate 
practice associate, Ziad Toubassy, had all liked Ms. Lewinsky 
and felt she was well qualified, the chairman of the corporate 
practice group, Mr. Gus Weill, had decided not to hire 
Lewinsky.
    Ms. Mills testified that the procedure under which Ms. 
Lewinsky was considered involved nothing out of the ordinary. 
Not a single one of these witnesses testified there was any 
urgency connected with Mr. Jordan's request.
    Ms. Mills also told the FBI that despite the fact that Ms. 
Lewinsky had been referred by the chairman of Young & Rubicam, 
their consideration of her was entirely objective. She thought 
that Ms. Lewinsky was poised and qualified for an entry-level 
position, but Mr. Weill decided to take a pass. Once again, 
quid pro quo? No.
    Mr. Jordan was a member of the board of directors of 
Revlon, a company wholly owned by MacAndrews & Forbes Holding 
company, and Mr. Jordan's law firm had done legal work for both 
of these companies.
    The corporate structure here is complicated, but I will be 
talking basically about two firms: Revlon--I think we all know 
what Revlon does--and its parent company, MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holding.
    Mr. Jordan telephoned his old friend, Mr. Richard Halperin, 
at the holding company on December 11 and said that he had an 
interviewee or he had an applicant that he wanted to recommend, 
and he gave Mr. Halperin some information about her. Mr. 
Halperin testified to the grand jury that it wasn't unusual for 
Mr. Jordan to call him with an employment recommendation. He 
had done so at least three other times that Mr. Halperin could 
recall.
    On this occasion, Mr. Jordan told Mr. Halperin on the 
telephone that Ms. Lewinsky was bright, energetic, 
enthusiastic, and he encouraged Mr. Halperin to meet with her. 
Mr. Halperin didn't think there was anything unusual about Mr. 
Jordan's request, and he testified that in the telephone call 
Mr. Jordan did not ask him to consider Ms. Lewinsky on any 
particular timetable, no acceleration of any kind. Indeed, far 
from there being some heightened sense of urgency, Mr. Halperin 
explicitly told the FBI that there was no implied time 
constraint or requirement for fast action.
    Ms. Lewinsky came up to New York City and she interviewed 
with Mr. Halperin on December 18, 1997. Mr. Halperin described 
her as follows: As a ``typical young, capable, enthusiastic 
Washington, DC-type individual.'' I don't know if that is 
pejorative or not----
    [Laughter.]
    Who described her primary interest as being in public 
relations. He and Ms. Lewinsky talked about the various 
companies that MacAndrews & Forbes controlled, and Ms. Lewinsky 
identified Revlon as a company that she would like to be 
considered at, and Mr. Halperin decided to send her there for 
an interview.
    Mr. Halperin sent her resume to another person at the 
holding company--not at Revlon, at the holding company--to a 
Mr. Jaymie Durnan who was a senior vice president there. He got 
the resume in mid-December, and he decided to interview her in 
early January.
    You have at the holding company two sets of interviews of 
Ms. Lewinsky going on. When he returned in early January, Mr. 
Durnan also scheduled an interview. He met with Ms. Lewinsky on 
January 8. His decision was made entirely independently of Mr. 
Halperin's decision, and he wasn't even aware Mr. Halperin had 
seen Ms. Lewinsky when he met with her on January 8.
    Mr. Durnan met with Ms. Lewinsky in the morning and he 
thought--now there is his view; and you are going to get two 
views of this interview--Mr. Durnan thought she was an 
impressive applicant for entry-level work. He was impressed 
with her, particularly by her work experience at the Pentagon, 
he told the FBI. He felt she would fit in with the parent 
company, but there were not any openings there.
    Based upon what she had said her interests were, he decided 
to send her resume over to Revlon, because he thought it 
matched up well with her interests. He sent the resume over, 
and he left a message--and now we are going to come to a Revlon 
person--he left a message with Ms. Allyn Seidman, who was the 
senior vice president of corporate communications at Revlon.
    Now cut to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky had had a very good 
interview with Mr. Halperin, both she and Mr. Halperin thought. 
However, for reasons the record doesn't make clear, Ms. 
Lewinsky's impression of the Durnan interview was dismal. She 
thought the interview had not gone well. She thought it had 
gone poorly. She described herself as being upset and 
distressed. She had no idea of his positive reaction to her. 
And this is not just a late analysis. He had already sent the 
resume. He sent the resume over to Revlon immediately after 
their interview. But in any event, Ms. Lewinsky was afraid it 
had gone poorly, that she had embarrassed Mr. Jordan. So she 
called up Mr. Jordan.
    And on that same day--later--January 8, Mr. Jordan spoke, 
by telephone, to the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, his friend, 
Mr. Ronald Perelman. He mentioned to Mr. Perelman that Ms. 
Lewinsky had interviewed at MacAndrews & Forbes, but he made no 
specific request and he did not ask Mr. Perelman to 
specifically intervene in any way.
    Later that day--and I know this is complicated--Mr. Durnan 
happened to speak--Mr. Durnan is the second interviewer that 
Ms. Lewinsky happened to speak to--happened to speak to Mr. 
Perelman, and Perelman mentioned he had a call from Mr. Jordan 
about a job candidate. Perelman then said to Durnan, ``Let's 
see what we can do.'' And Durnan indicated he already, on his 
own initiative, had been working on this, had talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky, had sent her resume over to Revlon.
    Mr. Perelman, later that day, phoned Mr. Jordan back to say 
everything is all right, she appeared to be doing a good job, 
the resume was over at Revlon. Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency, 
no time constraints. Mr. Perelman didn't say anything out of 
the ordinary had happened, because it had not.
    Now, later that same day, after speaking to Mr. Perelman, 
Mr. Durnan phoned Ms. Seidman at Revlon, and sent the resume 
over earlier in the day. He didn't say that Mr. Perelman had 
mentioned Ms. Lewinsky to him. He simply said to Ms. Seidman: 
Look, I sent you a resume. I have met with the young woman. If 
you think she is good, you should hire her.
    According to Mr. Durnan, Mr. Perelman never said or implied 
that Ms. Lewinsky had to be hired. And indeed, Mr. Durnan had 
already interviewed her and formed a positive impression. 
According to Ms. Seidman, who is at Revlon, Mr. Durnan gave her 
a similar account that he gave to the grand jury. He said she 
ought to interview Ms. Lewinsky, make her own decision, hire 
her if she thought she was a good candidate only.
    The record is crystal clear that Ms. Seidman over at Revlon 
had no knowledge that Mr. Perelman had ever spoken to anyone 
about Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Seidman testified that she made an 
independent assessment of Ms. Lewinsky. She interviewed her the 
next day. She told the grand jury that she found Ms. Lewinsky 
to be ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman who was 
very eager. I liked that in my department.''
    At the conclusion of the interview, she intended to make an 
offer to Ms. Lewinsky, but it was contingent on the opinion of 
two other people--a Ms. Jenna Sheldon, who is the manager of 
human resources at Revlon, and Ms. Nancy Risdon, who is the 
manager of public relations for corporate affairs. Ms. Seidman 
testified that after they both interviewed Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. 
Risdon told her that she found her very impressive, and Ms. 
Sheldon had also been very impressed. Ms. Risdon told the FBI 
that she had been impressed with Ms. Lewinsky who, although she 
had no public relations experience, was ``bright and 
articulate.'' On the basis of all this, Ms. Seidman decided to 
offer Ms. Lewinsky an entry-level job as public relations 
administrator. The offer was made, and Ms. Lewinsky accepted. 
And, I repeat, the record evidence is uncontradicted that the 
fix was not on at all in this process.
    This was the third company Ms. Lewinsky had interviewed 
with, and on this series of interviews she was successful. 
Nobody in any of these companies suggested there was any quid 
pro quo link. The only person--the only person--in this record 
who talked about trying to have Ms. Lewinsky use signing of the 
affidavit as leverage to get a job was none other than Linda 
Tripp, that paragon of fateful friendship.
    On the audiotapes, it is Ms. Tripp who frequently urges Ms. 
Lewinsky not to sign an affidavit until she has a job in New 
York. It is not clear if Ms. Tripp knew about the U.N. job that 
Ms. Lewinsky had. On the audiotape, Ms. Lewinsky sometimes 
professes agreement with Ms. Tripp's advice, saying she will 
not sign an affidavit until she has a job. But, as Ms. Lewinsky 
testified to the grand jury--and, again, Ms. Lewinsky is 
testifying under the threat of perjury, which will blow away 
her immunity agreement--she was lying to Ms. Tripp when she 
said she would wait to sign the affidavit until she got a job.
    As Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand jury, her statement 
to Ms. Tripp about Mr. Jordan assisting her in a quid pro quo 
sense was not true. She said it only because Ms. Tripp was 
insisting that she promise her not to do this. But, in fact, 
the affidavit was already signed when Ms. Lewinsky made that 
promise. Once again, quid pro quo? No. That is some of the 
direct evidence.
    Let's look at the circumstantial evidence, the alleged 
circumstantial evidence. The quid pro quo theory rests on 
assumptions about why things happened and, on the facts, about 
when things happened. The former requires logic, but the second 
is a matter of fact.
    I mentioned previously that article II of the subpart (4) 
here uses the word ``intensified.'' It didn't say that the job 
search began as an effort to silence Ms. Lewinsky. It only says 
that it ``intensified'' as a result of that process.
    The original charge made by the independent counsel--and it 
is there in the independent counsel's referral at page 181--was 
an allegation that the President helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a 
job in New York at a time when she would have been a witness 
against him. However, the House committee looked at the 
evidence I think in the five volumes and, even though they have 
not referred to it here very much, decided that that theory 
would not get off the runway. So they revised their claim and 
gave us a kind of wimpified version, alleging not initiation 
but intensification.
    Now, under the right circumstances, it is plain that 
helping somebody find a job is a perfectly acceptable thing to 
do. There is nothing wrong with it. Mr. Manager Hutchinson told 
you that--and I quote here--``There is nothing wrong with 
helping somebody get a job. But we all know there is one thing 
forbidden in public office: we must avoid quid pro quo, which 
is: This for that.''
    Now, he went on to assert that the President's conduct 
``crossed the line,'' as he put it, when the job search 
assistance became ``tied and interconnected''--those are his 
words--with the President's desire to get a false affidavit. 
And then he went on to say, ``You will see''--that is a 
prediction that Mr. Manager Hutchinson made to you--``You will 
see that they are totally interconnected, intertwined, 
interrelated; and that is where the line has crossed into 
obstruction.''
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson pointed to a critical event for 
their quid pro quo theory, and that is the entry on December 
11, 1997, by Judge Wright, the judge in the Paula Jones case, 
of an order pertaining to discovery in the Paula Jones case. 
This is the critical event, according to the managers. But 
let's look closely at this so-called ``critical event'' because 
it's the only claim--only factual claim--the managers make of 
some causal relationship between the job search and the Jones 
case. And that claim is dead wrong; and it is demonstrably dead 
wrong.
    The managers have argued that what brought Mr. Jordan into 
action to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job, what really jump-
started the process, was Judge Wright's December 11 order. And 
that order concerned discovery of relationships the President 
had--allegedly had--during the search period of time with women 
who were State or Federal employees.
    In the House, Chief Counsel Schippers powerfully made the 
point about how important this December 11 order was. ``. . . 
why the sudden interest,'' he asked, ``why the total change in 
focus and effort?'' Nobody but Betty Currie really cared about 
helping Ms. Lewinsky throughout November, even after the 
President learned that her name was on the prospective witness 
list. Did something happen [that moved] the job search from a 
low to a high priority on that day?
    Oh, yes, something happened. On the morning of December 11, 
1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that Paula Jones was 
entitled to information regarding these other women.
    Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson, again, emphasized the impact 
of this December 11 order was dramatic. He stood here and told 
you that the President's attitude suddenly changed, and what 
started out as a favor for Betty Currie in finding Ms. Lewinsky 
a job dramatically changed into something sinister after Ms. 
Lewinsky became a witness.

    And so what triggers [this is Manager Hutchinson]--let's 
look at the chain of events: The judge--the witness list came 
in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the President 
into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan into 
action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job search 
along . . . remember what else happened on that [December 11] 
again. That was the same day that Judge Wright ruled that the 
questions about other relationships could be asked by the Jones 
attorneys.

    Mr. Manager Hutchinson presented in his very polished and 
able presentation a chart. It was exhibit 1. I have taken the 
liberty of borrowing it for our own purposes. You see the key 
is outlined in detail what happened on December 11. The very 
first item is that ``Judge Susan Webber issues order allowing 
testimony on Lewinsky.'' The second meeting between Lewinsky 
and Jordan, ``leads provided/recommendation calls placed,'' and 
then, later, the ``President and Jordan talk about a job for 
Lewinsky.''
    That is what the chart says. But when you look at the 
uncontested facts, this isn't even smoke and mirrors. It is 
worse.
    First of all, Ms. Lewinsky entered Mr. Jordan's building 
for their meeting at 12:57 on December 11. As we see here from 
the chart, the entry chart of Mr. Jordan's law firm, Ms. 
Lewinsky's name is misspelled, and she identified this as her 
entry into the law firm. But this did not spring from, 
magically, the entry of the judge's order. It was scheduled 3 
days earlier, on December 8. And even that telephone call was 
pursuant to an agreement made between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. 
Jordan two weekends before then. It had nothing, whatever, to 
do with the judge's order.
    Indeed, after her first meeting with Mr. Jordan on November 
5, Ms. Lewinsky testified that she had a follow-up conversation 
by telephone with Mr. Jordan around Thanksgiving, and he 
advised her he was working on the job search as he had time for 
it. He asked her to call him back in early December. Mr. Jordan 
testified he was out of the country from the day after 
Thanksgiving until December 4. He also testified that on 
December 5--this is before the witness list--Ms. Currie called 
and reminded him that Ms. Lewinsky was expecting his call. He 
asked Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call him. She does so on 
December 8 and they agreed to meet at Mr. Jordan's office on 
December 11.
    So this meeting, this sinister meeting, was arranged by 
three people who had no knowledge whatever about the Paula 
Jones witness list at the time they acted. Now, Ms. Lewinsky 
herself was also out of Washington for most of the period from 
Thanksgiving to December 4, first in Los Angeles and then 
overseas.
    Inexplicably, but I think significantly, because it says 
something about the strength of the case, the House managers 
ignore this key piece of testimony that when the meeting was 
set up it is uncontradicted. The point is that the contact 
between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky resumed in December not 
because of something having to do with the order, but because 
they had agreed it would. The gap is attributable--the gap in 
timing--to Mr. Jordan's travel schedule.
    Let's look at when this discovery order was entered. It 
was, in fact, entered late in the day of December 11 after the 
conclusion of a conference call among all the counsel in the 
Paula Jones case. We have here on the chart a blowup of the 
clerk's minutes.
    It is a great accommodation to lawyers when in a case a 
judge will have conference telephone calls because it means you 
don't have to travel to a different city. There were a number 
of these held in the Jones case. This was a conference call 
that began, as the clerk's minutes indicate, at 5:33 p.m. 
Little Rock time, in the afternoon. That would be 6:33 in 
Washington, DC. It ended at 6:50 p.m. in Little Rock, or 7:50 
in Washington, DC.
    Quite late in the conference call Judge Wright took up 
other matters and advised counsel that an order on the 
plaintiff's motion to compel testimony had been filed and 
Barry--Barry Ward, the judge's clerk--will fax a copy of the 
order on that motion to compel counsel. So, some time after 
7:50 p.m. counsel get the witness list. Notice that this 
proceeding is so late in the day, I don't know if you can see 
it, but when the clerk's minutes are filed, they are filed not 
on December 11, but on December 12.
    Finally, while we don't even have evidence of a telephone 
call between the President and Mr. Jordan--we are back now to 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart No. 1--we don't have any 
evidence that the President, in fact, ever placed a call to Mr. 
Jordan on this date. The President was out of the city. But if 
the call occurred, it must have occurred by 5:55 p.m.
    Let's, again, look at this chart. December 11 is so 
important that the managers have put it on the chart twice. It 
is the only date on the chart that appears twice. ``The 
President and Jordan talk about a job for Lewinsky.'' Clearly 
what they are telling you is that first you get the order. That 
energizes, that jump starts the process, and then the President 
talks to Vernon Jordan. As I said, if a call occurred on that 
day, the earliest you could have had any knowledge of the order 
would have been 7:50 p.m.
    There is a problem, though, when you think that maybe the 
President and Vernon Jordan talked on this date, even if we 
don't have evidence of it. And the problem is that at 7:50 
p.m., Mr. Vernon Jordan was high over the Atlantic Ocean in an 
airplane. He was on his way to Amsterdam. He testified that ``I 
left on United Flight 946 at 5:55 from Dulles Airport.'' That 
is where Mr. Jordan was on the evening of December 11. He had 
taken off even before the conference call.
    This makes no sense. The managers' theory just makes no 
sense. His meeting with Ms. Lewinsky and his calls on her 
behalf had taken place earlier in the day. The President could 
not have spoken to him about the entry of Judge Wright's 
discovery order. The entry of that order had nothing whatever 
to do with Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. This claim 
of a causal relation totally collapses when you look at the 
evidence.
    The charts purporting to show causation are also riddled 
with errors. I only want to show a few of them. Again, we 
borrowed the chart from Mr. Manager Hutchinson, his chart No. 
7. Now he showed you this chart and it purports to be an 
account of what happened on January 5, 1998. You see how the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky appear to be conferring about the 
affidavit that she is going to be filing in the Jones case. But 
when you look at the real facts, the chart becomes a fiction.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you:

    Let's go to January 5th. This is a sort of summary of what 
happened on that day.
    Ms. Lewinsky meets with her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an 
hour. Carter drafts the affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky just a few 
minutes later . . .

    And Mr. Manager Hutchinson continued:

    Frank Carter drafts the affidavit. She is so concerned 
about it, she calls the President. The President returns Ms. 
Lewinsky's phone call.

    Now, the suggestion here--and this is our old 
circumstantial evidence problem--the suggestion from this fact 
pattern is that Ms. Lewinsky obtained a draft affidavit from 
her lawyer, Mr. Carter, on January 5, and then in a call with 
the President later that day she offered it to him for his 
review.
    Possible? Yes. True? No. The facts here simply do not bear 
out this chart. Why is that? Well, it is because Mr. Carter's 
grand jury testimony is very clear that he drafted the 
affidavit on the morning of January 6, and he even billed for 
it on that morning. He did not draft it, and Ms. Lewinsky did 
not have it, on January 5. There is no causation here, no 
linkage. The theory on this chart doesn't stand up. And if I 
may take something else from the House managers--not simply 
their chart, but to borrow Mr. Manager Bryant's expression--
``that dog won't hunt.''
    Ms. Lewinsky could not have offered to show the President a 
draft affidavit she herself could not have had on January 5. 
The idea that the telephone call on that day is about that 
affidavit is sheer, unsupported speculation and, even worse, it 
is speculation demolished by fact.
    Let's kick the tires of another exhibit. Chart No. 8, which 
was shown to you by Mr. Manager Hutchinson, purports to 
describe the events of January 6. Again, it sets forth a chain 
of events which makes it look as though Mr. Jordan was himself 
intimately involved in drafting Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Mr. 
Manager Hutchinson told you, when he showed you this chart--and 
I want to quote his exact words:

    The next exhibit is January 6. On this particular day, Ms. 
Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit. At 2:08 to 2:10 p.m., 
she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr. Jordan. . . . At 
3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about the draft affidavit, and 
at 3:49--you will see in red--both agree to delete a portion of 
the affidavit that created some implication that maybe she had 
been alone with the President.
    So Mr. Jordan was very involved in the drafting of the 
affidavit and the contents of that.

    That is the theory proposed by the chart. That is the 
hypothesis they offer on the basis of the circumstantial 
evidence. But there are problems that absolutely destroy that 
because when we look beyond the suggestive juxtaposition and 
consider material overlooked by the managers, a very different 
picture emerges.
    The key ``fact'' that chart 8 tries to establish is the 
statement that at 3:49 Mr. Jordan telephoned Ms. Lewinsky to 
discuss the draft affidavit, and they allegedly agreed ``to 
delete an implication that she had been alone with the 
President.''
    There is a very serious difficulty with this ``theory.'' 
The chart blithely states that ``both agree[d] to delete [the] 
implications that she had been alone with the President.'' But 
that is not what the evidence shows.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that she spoke to Mr. Jordan because 
she had concerns about the draft affidavit. According to her 
testimony, when asked whether Mr. Jordan agreed with what were 
clearly Ms. Lewinsky's ideas about changes in the affidavit, 
Ms. Lewinsky said, ``Yes, I believe so.''
    Mr. Jordan recalled the conversation in which Ms. Lewinsky 
raised the subject of her draft affidavit. He remembered her 
saying that she ``had some questions about the draft of the 
affidavit.'' But his testimony was emphatic that he was ``not 
interested in the details,'' that the ``problems she had with 
what had been drafted for her signature [were] for her to work 
out with her counsel,'' and that ``you [Ms. Lewinsky] have to 
talk to your lawyer about it.'' And Ms. Lewinsky did talk to 
her lawyer about it.
    The record is perfectly clear about that. Indeed, it could 
not be clearer, although you would not know this from chart 8, 
that the idea of deleting the reference to her being alone with 
the President came from her own lawyer, Mr. Carter. He 
testified to the grand jury--this is the lawyer who actually 
drafted the affidavit. He was referring to a passage about Ms. 
Lewinsky being alone with the President, and he said:

    Paragraph 6 has in its [draft] form as the last part of the 
last sentence ``and would not have been a `private meeting, 
that is not behind closed doors'. . . .''

    According to Mr. Carter:

    This paragraph was modified when we sat down in my office 
[on January 7], the day after the events described on chart 8.

    Mr. Carter further testified that ``before the meeting on 
the 7th, it was my opinion that I did not want to give Paula 
Jones' attorney any kind of a hint of a one-on-one meeting. 
What I told Monica was, `If they ask you about it, you will 
tell them about it. But I'm not putting it in the affidavit. I 
am not going to give them that lead to go after in the 
affidavit, because my objective is not to have you be deposed.' 
''
    It is clearly Mr. Carter who deleted the reference to being 
alone with the President. The bottom line is that the 
insinuations on that chart just don't survive scrutiny.
    I want to say a final thing about all the charts involving 
circumstantial evidence. You remember how many telephone calls 
were up on these charts. I am going to let you in on a little 
secret--a secret that a lot of you who are lawyers know. It is 
pretty easy to get telephone call records and to identify 
telephone calls. But it is a common trick to put them up, even 
though you don't know what is going on in the telephone calls, 
and ask people to assume some insidious relationship between 
events and the telephone call. No matter how many telephone 
calls are listed on the chart, you don't know, without 
testimony, what was happening in that phone call, unless the 
mere existence--and there are cases where the mere existence of 
a phone call is probative, but not in these cases. Here they 
are trying to weave a web, and no particular call is of 
significant importance.
    The incontrovertible evidence shows that, in fact, Mr. 
Jordan spoke to the President on many, many, many occasions. He 
was a friend; he has been a friend of the President since 1973, 
and a call between them was a common occurrence. When asked in 
the grand jury if Mr. Jordan believed that the pattern of 
telephone calls to the President was ``striking,'' Mr. Jordan 
replied, ``It depends on your point of view. I talk to the 
President of the United States all the time, and so it's not 
striking to me.''
    Mr. Jordan also testified that he never had a telephone 
conversation with the President in which Ms. Lewinsky was the 
only topic.
    The House managers ask you to believe, simply on faith, 
that if two things happen on the same day, they are related. 
This relation may be logical, but it is not necessarily 
factual. I just want to make this point with a couple of 
telephone calls. Take Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart for 
January 17, 1998, the day of the President's deposition in the 
Jones case.
    This chart suggests that there are two calls between Mr. 
Jordan and the President after the President had concluded his 
deposition. One call is at 5:38, and the other is at 7:02. The 
chart does not tell you several important things. First, these 
two calls each lasted 2 minutes. Second, and more 
significantly, Mr. Jordan testified to the grand jury as to 
both telephone conversations:

    On Saturday, the 17th, in the two conversations I had with 
the President of the United States, we did not talk about 
Monica Lewinsky or his testimony in the deposition.

    Mr. Jordan was asked:

    Or [about] the questions asked of him in the deposition?

    And he replied:

    That is correct.

    In another exchange, the prosecutors asked Mr. Jordan:

    Did the President ever indicate to you [in the January 17 
telephone conversations] that Monica Lewinsky was one of the 
topics that had come up?

    Jordan replied:

    He did not.

    The prosecutors asked:

    Did the President ever indicate to you [in these two 
conversations] that your name had come up in the deposition as 
it related to Monica Lewinsky?

    And Mr. Jordan answered:

    He did not.

    The managers, in the absence of evidence that anyone 
endeavored to obtain Ms. Lewinsky a job in exchange for her 
silence, indeed, in the face of direct testimony of all of 
those involved that this did not happen, ask you to simply 
speculate. They ask you to speculate that since they have 
thrown a lot of telephone calls up there, they must have some 
sinister meaning. And they ask you to speculate that a lot of 
those phone calls must have been about Ms. Lewinsky, and they 
ask you to speculate further that in one of those unidentified, 
unknown phone calls, somebody must have said, ``Let's get Ms. 
Lewinsky a job in exchange for her silence.''
    There is no evidence for that. It is not there. It is just 
a theory.
    With regard to all this evidence about the job search, when 
you look at these dates, when you have the right chronology in 
mind, and when you look at the relevant and uncontested facts, 
these facts are there; they don't have to be discovered: There 
is no--no--evidence of wrongdoing of any kind in connection 
with Ms. Lewinsky's job search effort in New York City. This is 
not a case of the managers' presentation resting on even 
circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence. They don't even 
have circumstantial evidence here. All they have is a theory 
about what happened, which isn't based on any evidence either 
direct or circumstantial.
    Nothing in this evidence is really contested when you get 
right down to it; strictly as a matter of who said what to whom 
when. When lawyers ask you to ``keep your eye on the big 
picture,'' when they ask you, ``don't lose the forest for the 
trees,'' or ``don't get lost in the details,'' that is usually 
because the details--the stubborn facts--refute and contradict 
the big picture.
    So it is here. You can keep adding zero to zero to zero for 
a very long time, and indeed forever, and you will still have 
zero. The big picture here just doesn't exist. And no matter 
how many times the House managers keep making the assertion, 
there is just no evidence of any kind.
    I realize that it has taken us a good bit of time and 
painstaking--perhaps even painful--attention for each one of 
you to walk through these facts in a lawyerly manner. I am also 
keenly aware of the old saying that when all is said and done 
with a lawyer, there is more said than done. But we needed to 
take a look carefully and specifically at this evidentiary 
material with regard to these five grounds in the same way that 
Ms. Mills took you through very specifically yesterday with 
regard to the other two grounds to try and dispel the popular 
misconception that we were either unwilling or unable to rebut 
the facts. We have rebutted the facts.
    The simple fact is that there is no evidence indirectly to 
support the allegation that the President obstructed justice in 
his December 17 telephone call with Ms. Lewinsky, in his 
statements to his aides, in his statements to Betty Currie with 
relation to gifts, or the job search. It sometimes has been 
claimed by the managers that we have adopted a ``so what'' 
defense trying to take lightly or to justify the improper 
actions that are at the root of this case. Well, Senators, with 
all respect, that argument is easy to assert, but it is false, 
a straw man asserted, only to be knocked down.
    We have tried in our presentations the last few days and 
today to treat the evidence in a fair and a candid and a 
realistic way about the facts as the record reveals them. We 
have tried to show you that the core charges of obstruction of 
justice and perjury cannot be proven. We are not saying that 
the alleged conduct doesn't matter. We are saying that perjury 
didn't occur, and obstruction of justice didn't happen.
    We haven't tried to sugar-coat or excuse conduct that is 
wrong. I think that Mr. Manager Buyer used the right phrase 
when he referred to ``self-inflicted wounds.'' There is no 
doubt that there are self-inflicted wounds here, wounds that 
are very real and very painful and very troubling. There is 
just no question about that. The question before you is whether 
these self-inflicted wounds rise to such a level of lawless and 
unconstitutional conduct that they leave you no alternative, no 
choice but to assume the awesome responsibility for reversing 
the results of two national elections.
    On that question, what the situation demands is not 
eloquence, which the very able managers have in abundance, but 
rather a relentless focus on the facts, the law, and the 
Constitution, all of which are on the side of the President.
    It is a great honor for me to stand here. This body has 
been called ``the anchor of the Republic.'' And it is that 
constitutional ability, that political sanity, that is needed 
now. There is a story, which is perhaps apocryphal, that when 
Thomas Jefferson returned from France where he served as 
Ambassador while his colleagues were writing the Constitution, 
that he met with George Washington, and he asked Washington why 
they had found it necessary to create the Senate. Washington is 
said to have silently removed the saucer from his teacup and 
poured the tea into the saucer and told Jefferson that like the 
act he had just performed, the Senate would be designed to cool 
the passion of the moment. Historically, this place has been 
really a haven of sanity, balance, wisdom in debating 
controversial issues which have been passionately felt, with 
candor, with courage, and civility.
    So once again, I think it is your responsibility, and yours 
alone, committed to you by the Constitution, to make a very 
somber judgment. The President has spoken powerfully and 
personally of his remorse for what he has done.
    Others have pointed out the poisonous partisanship that led 
the other body to argue for impeachment on the most narrowly 
partisan vote in its history.
    I think that the bipartisan manner, however, in which you 
have conducted this impeachment trial is a welcome change from 
the events of the last year.
    We ask only that you give this case and give this country 
constitutional stability and the political sanity which this 
country deserves. The President did not commit perjury, he did 
not obstruct justice, and there are no grounds to remove him 
from office.
    Thank you.

                                 recess

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we recess the proceedings for 15 minutes, but that Senators be 
prepared to resume at 5 minutes after 4, because we have to 
hear the eloquence of one of our former colleagues.
    There being no objection, at 3:49 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 4:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe the 
Senate is prepared now to hear the final presentation to be 
made by White House counsel, and at the conclusion of that, I 
will have a brief wrapup, a statement to make about how we hope 
to proceed on Friday and generally on Saturday. I will do that 
at the close of this presentation. I yield the floor, Mr. Chief 
Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Bumpers 
to continue the presentation in the case of the President.
    Mr. Counsel BUMPERS. Mr. Chief Justice, my distinguished 
House managers from the House of Representatives, colleagues, I 
have seen the look of disappointment on many faces, because I 
know a lot of people really thought they would be rid of me 
once and for all.
    [Laughter.]
    I have taken a lot of ribbing this afternoon. But I have 
seriously negotiated with some people, particularly on this 
side, about an offer to walk out and not deliver this speech in 
exchange for a few votes.
    [Laughter.]
    I understand three have it under active consideration.
    [Laughter.]
    It is a great joy to see you, and it is especially pleasant 
to see an audience which represents about the size of the 
cumulative audience I had over a period of 24 years.
    [Laughter.]
    I came here today for a lot of reasons. One was that I was 
promised a 40-foot cord. I have been shorted 28 feet. Chris 
Dodd said he didn't want me in his lap. I assume he arranged 
for the cord to be shortened.
    I want to especially thank some of you for your kind 
comments in the press when it received some publicity that I 
would be here to close the debate on behalf of the White House 
counsel and the President.
    I was a little dismayed by Senator Bennett's remark. He 
said, ``Yes, Senator Bumpers is a great speaker, but he was 
never persuasive with me because I never agreed with him.''
    [Laughter.]
    I thought he could have done better than that.
    [Laughter.]
    You can take some comfort, colleagues, in the fact that I 
am not being paid, and when I finish, you will probably think 
the White House got their money's worth.
    [Laughter.]
    I have told audiences that over 24 years, I went home 
almost every weekend and returned usually about dusk on Sunday 
evening. And you know the plane ride into National Airport, 
when you can see the magnificent Washington Monument and this 
building from the window of the airplane--I have told these 
students at the university, a small liberal arts school at 
home, Hendrix--after 24 years of that, literally hundreds of 
times, I never failed to get goose bumps.
    The same thing is true about this Chamber. I can still 
remember as though it was yesterday the awe I felt when I first 
stepped into this magnificent Chamber so full of history, so 
beautiful. And last Tuesday, as I returned, after only a short 
3-week absence, I still felt that same sense of awe that I did 
the first time I walked in this Chamber.
    Colleagues, I come here with some sense of reluctance. The 
President and I have been close friends for 25 years. We fought 
so many battles back home together in our beloved Arkansas. We 
tried mightily all of my years as Governor, and his, and all of 
my years in the Senate when he was Governor, to raise the 
living standard in the delta area of Mississippi, Arkansas and 
Louisiana, where poverty is unspeakable, with some measure of 
success; not nearly enough.
    We tried to provide health care for the lesser among us, 
for those who are well off enough they can't get on welfare, 
but not making enough to buy health insurance. We have fought 
about everything else to improve the educational standards for 
a State that for so many years was at the bottom of the list, 
or near the bottom of the list, of income, and we have stood 
side by side to save beautiful pristine areas in our State from 
environmental degradation.
    We even crashed a twin engine Beech Bonanza trying to get 
to the Gillett coon supper, a political event that one misses 
at his own risk. We crashed this plane on a snowy evening at a 
rural airport off the runway, sailing out across the snow, 
jumped out--jumped out--and ran away unscathed, to the dismay 
of every politician in Arkansas.
    [Laughter.]
    The President and I have been together hundreds of times at 
parades, dedications, political events, social events and in 
all of those years and all of those hundreds of times we have 
been together, both in public and in private, I have never one 
time seen the President conduct himself in a way that did not 
reflect the highest credit on him, his family, his State and 
his beloved Nation.
    The reason I came here today with some reluctance--please 
don't misconstrue that, it has nothing to do with my feelings 
about the President, as I have already said--but it is because 
we are from the same State, and we are long friends. I know 
that necessarily diminishes to some extent the effectiveness of 
my words. So if Bill Clinton, the man, Bill Clinton, the 
friend, were the issue here, I am quite sure I would not be 
doing this. But it is the weight of history on all of us, and 
it is my reverence for that great document--you have heard me 
rail about it for 24 years--that we call our Constitution, the 
most sacred document to me next to the Holy Bible.
    These proceedings go right to the heart of our Constitution 
where it deals with impeachment, the part that provides the 
gravest punishment for just about anybody--the President--even 
though the framers said we are putting this in to protect the 
public, not to punish the President.
    Ah, colleagues, you have such an awesome responsibility. My 
good friend, the senior Senator from New York, has said it 
well. He says a decision to convict holds the potential for 
destabilizing the Office of the Presidency. And those 400 
historians--and I know some have made light about those 
historians, are they just friends of Bill?
    Last evening, I went over that list of historians, many of 
whom I know, among them C. Vann Woodward. In the South we love 
him. He is the preeminent southern historian in the Nation. I 
promise you--he may be a Democrat, he may even be a friend of 
the President, but when you talk about integrity, he is the 
walking personification, exemplification of integrity.
    Well, colleagues, I have heard so many adjectives to 
describe this gallery and these proceedings--historic, 
memorable, unprecedented, awesome. All of those words, all of 
those descriptions are apt. And to those, I would add the word 
``dangerous,'' dangerous not only for the reasons I just 
stated, but because it is dangerous to the political process. 
And it is dangerous to the unique mix of pure democracy and 
republican government Madison and his colleagues so brilliantly 
crafted and which has sustained us for 210 years.
    Mr. Chief Justice, this is what we lawyers call ``dicta''--
this costs you nothing. It is extra. But the more I study that 
document, and those 4 months at Philadelphia in 1787, the more 
awed I am. And you know what Madison did--the brilliance was in 
its simplicity--he simply said: Man's nature is to get other 
people to dance to their tune. Man's nature is to abuse his 
fellow man sometimes. And he said: The way to make sure that 
the majorities don't abuse the minorities, and the way to make 
sure that the bullies don't run over the weaklings, is to 
provide the same rights for everybody. And I had to think about 
that a long time before I delivered my first lecture at the 
University of Arkansas last week. And it made so much sense to 
me.
    But the danger, as I say, is to the political process, and 
dangerous for reasons feared by the framers about legislative 
control of the Executive. That single issue and how to deal 
with impeachment was debated off and on for the entire 4 months 
of the Constitutional Convention. But the word ``dangerous'' is 
not mine. It is Alexander Hamilton's--brilliant, good-looking 
guy--Mr. Ruff quoted extensively on Tuesday afternoon in his 
brilliant statement here. He quoted Alexander Hamilton 
precisely, and it is a little arcane. It isn't easy to 
understand.
    So if I may, at the expense of being slightly repetitious, 
let me paraphrase what Hamilton said. He said: The Senate had a 
unique role in participating with the executive branch in 
appointments; and, two, it had a role--it had a role--in 
participating with the executive in the character of a court 
for the trial of impeachments. But he said--and I must say 
this; and you all know it--he said it would be difficult to get 
a, what he called, well-constituted court from wholly elected 
Members. He said: Passions would agitate the whole community 
and divide it between those who were friendly and those who had 
inimical interests to the accused; namely, the President. Then 
he said--and these are his words: The greatest danger was that 
the decision would be based on the comparative strength of the 
parties rather than the innocence or guilt of the President.
    You have a solemn oath, you have taken a solemn oath, to be 
fair and impartial. I know you all. I know you as friends, and 
I know you as honorable men. And I am perfectly satisfied to 
put that in your hands, under your oath.
    This is the only caustic thing I will say in these remarks 
this afternoon, but the question is, How do we come to be here? 
We are here because of a 5-year, relentless, unending 
investigation of the President, $50 million, hundreds of FBI 
agents fanning across the Nation, examining in detail the 
microscopic lives of people--maybe the most intense 
investigation not only of a President, but of anybody ever.
    I feel strongly about this because of my State and what we 
have endured. So you will have to excuse me, but that 
investigation has also shown that the judicial system in this 
country can and does get out of kilter unless it is controlled. 
Because there are innocent people--innocent people--who have 
been financially and mentally bankrupt.
    One woman told me 2 years ago that her legal fees were 
$95,000. She said, ``I don't have $95,000. And the only asset I 
have is the equity in my home, which just happens to correspond 
to my legal fees of $95,000.'' And she said, ``The only thing I 
can think of to do is to deed my home.'' This woman was 
innocent, never charged, testified before a grand jury a number 
of times. And since that time she has accumulated an additional 
$200,000 in attorney fees.
    Javert's pursuit of Jean Valjean in Les Miserables pales by 
comparison. I doubt there are few people--maybe nobody in this 
body--who could withstand such scrutiny. And in this case those 
summoned were terrified, not because of their guilt, but 
because they felt guilt or innocence was not really relevant. 
But after all of those years, and $50 million of Whitewater, 
Travelgate, Filegate--you name it--nothing, nothing. The 
President was found guilty of nothing--official or personal.
    We are here today because the President suffered a terrible 
moral lapse of marital infidelity--not a breach of the public 
trust, not a crime against society, the two things Hamilton 
talked about in Federalist Paper No. 65--I recommend it to you 
before you vote--but it was a breach of his marriage vows. It 
was a breach of his family trust. It is a sex scandal. H.L. 
Mencken one time said, ``When you hear somebody say, `This is 
not about money,' it's about money.''
    [Laughter.]
    And when you hear somebody say, ``This is not about sex,'' 
it's about sex.
    You pick your own adjective to describe the President's 
conduct. Here are some that I would use: indefensible, 
outrageous, unforgivable, shameless. I promise you the 
President would not contest any of those or any others.
    But there is a human element in this case that has not even 
been mentioned. That is, the President and Hillary and Chelsea 
are human beings. This is intended only as a mild criticism of 
our distinguished friends from the House. But as I listened to 
the presenters, to the managers, make their opening statements, 
they were remarkably well prepared and they spoke eloquently--
more eloquently than I really had hoped.
    But when I talk about the human element, I talk about what 
I thought was, on occasion, an unnecessarily harsh, pejorative 
description of the President. I thought that the language 
should have been tempered somewhat to acknowledge that he is 
the President. To say constantly that the President lied about 
this and lied about that--as I say, I thought that was too much 
for a family that has already been about as decimated as a 
family can get. The relationship between husband and wife, 
father and child, has been incredibly strained, if not 
destroyed. There has been nothing but sleepless nights, mental 
agony, for this family, for almost 5 years, day after day, from 
accusations of having Vince Foster assassinated, on down. It 
has been bizarre.
    I didn't sense any compassion. And perhaps none is 
deserved. The President has said for all to hear that he 
misled, he deceived, he did not want to be helpful to the 
prosecution. And he did all of those things to his family, to 
his friends, to his staff, to his Cabinet, and to the American 
people. Why would he do that? Well, he knew this whole affair 
was about to bring unspeakable embarrassment and humiliation on 
himself, his wife whom he adored, and a child that he 
worshipped with every fiber of his body and for whom he would 
happily have died to spare her or to ameliorate her shame and 
her grief.
    The House managers have said shame, an embarrassment is no 
excuse for lying. The question about lying--that is your 
decision. But I can tell you, put yourself in his position--and 
you have already had this big moral lapse--as to what you would 
do. We are, none of us, perfect. Sure, you say, he should have 
thought of all that beforehand. And indeed he should have, just 
as Adam and Eve should have, just as you and you and you and 
you and millions of other people who have been caught in 
similar circumstances should have thought of it before. As I 
say, none of us is perfect.
    I remember, Chaplain--the Chaplain is not here; too bad, he 
ought to hear this story. This evangelist was holding this 
great revival meeting and in the close of one of his meetings 
he said, ``Is there anybody in this audience who has ever known 
anybody who even comes close to the perfection of our Lord and 
Saviour, Jesus Christ?'' Nothing. He repeated the challenge 
and, finally, a little-bitty guy in the back held up his hand. 
``Are you saying you have known such a person? Stand up.'' He 
stood up. ``Tell us, who was it?'' He said, ``My wife's first 
husband.''
    Make no mistake about it: Removal from office is 
punishment. It is unbelievable punishment, even though the 
framers didn't quite see it that way. Again, they said--and it 
bears repeating over and over again--they said they wanted to 
protect the people. But I can tell you this: The punishment of 
removing Bill Clinton from office would pale compared to the 
punishment he has already inflicted on himself. There is a 
feeling in this country that somehow or another Bill Clinton 
has gotten away with something. Mr. Leader, I can tell you, he 
hasn't gotten away with anything. And the people are saying: 
``Please don't protect us from this man.'' Seventy-six percent 
of us think he is doing a fine job; 65 to 70 percent of us 
don't want him removed from office.
    Some have said we are not respected on the world scene. The 
truth of the matter is, this Nation has never enjoyed greater 
prestige in the world than we do right now. I saw Carlos Menem, 
President of Argentina, a guest here recently, who said to the 
President, ``Mr. President, the world needs you.'' The war in 
Bosnia is under control; the President has been as tenacious as 
anybody could be about Middle East peace; and in Ireland, 
actual peace; and maybe the Middle East will make it; and he 
has the Indians and the Pakistanis talking to each other as 
they have never talked to each other in recent times.
    Vaclav Havel said, ``Mr. President, for the enlargement of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there is no doubt in my 
mind that it was your personal leadership that made this 
historic development possible.'' King Hussein: ``Mr. President, 
I've had the privilege of being a friend of the United States 
and Presidents since the late President Eisenhower, and 
throughout all the years in the past I have kept in touch, but 
on the subject of peace, the peace we are seeking, I have 
never, with all due respect and all the affection I held for 
your predecessors, known someone with your dedication, clear-
headedness, focus, and determination to help resolve this issue 
in the best way possible.''
    I have Nelson Mandela and other world leaders who have said 
similar things in the last 6 months. Our prestige, I promise 
you, in the world, is as high as it has ever been.
    When it comes to the question of perjury, you know, there 
is perjury and then there is perjury. Let me ask you if you 
think this is perjury: On November 23, 1997, President Clinton 
went to Vancouver, BC. And when he returned, Monica Lewinsky 
was at the White House at some point, and he gave her a carved 
marble bear. I don't know how big it was. The question before 
the grand jury, August 6, 1998:

    What was the Christmas present or presents that he got for 
you?
    Answer: Everything was packaged in the Big Black Dog or big 
canvas bag from the Black Dog store in Martha's Vineyard and he 
got me a marble bear's head carving. Sort of, you know, a 
little sculpture, I guess you would call, maybe.
    Was that the item from Vancouver?
    Yes.

    Question, on the same day of the same grand jury:

    When the President gave you the Vancouver bear on the 28th, 
did he say anything about what it means?
    Answer: Hmm.
    Question: Well, what did he say?
    Answer: I think he--I believe he said that the bear is 
the--maybe an Indian symbol for strength--you know, to be 
strong like a bear.
    Question: And did you interpret that to be strong in your 
decision to continue to conceal the relationship?
    Answer: No.

    The House Judiciary Committee report to the full House, on 
the other hand, knowing the subpoena requested gifts, is that 
giving Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28 seems odd. But 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals why he did so. She said that 
she ``never questioned that we would not ever do anything but 
keep this private, and that meant to take whatever appropriate 
steps needed to be taken to keep it quiet.''
    They say:

    The only logical inference is that the gifts, including the 
bear symbolizing strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms. 
Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship, even in the 
face of a Federal subpoena.

    She just got through saying ``no.'' Yet, this report says 
that is the only logical inference. And then the brief that 
came over here accompanying the articles of impeachment said, 
``On the other hand, more gifts on December 28th . . .'' Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony reveals her answer. She said that she 
``never questioned that we were ever going to do anything but 
keep this private, and that meant to take whatever appropriate 
steps needed to be taken to keep it quiet.''
    Again, they say in their brief:

    The only logical inference is that the gifts, including the 
bear symbolizing strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms. 
Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship even in the face 
of a Federal subpoena.

    Is it perjury to say the only logical inference is 
something when the only shred of testimony in the record is, 
``No, that was not my interpretation. I didn't infer that''? 
Yet, here you have it in the committee report and you have it 
in the brief. Of course, that is not perjury.
    First of all, it is not under oath. But I am a trial lawyer 
and I will tell you what it is; it is wanting to win too badly. 
I have tried 300, 400, maybe 500 divorce cases. Incidentally, 
you are being addressed by the entire South Franklin County, 
Arkansas Bar Association. I can't believe there were that many 
cases in that little town, but I had a practice in surrounding 
communities, too. In all those divorce cases, I would guess 
that in 80 percent of the contested cases perjury was 
committed. Do you know what it was about? Sex. Extramarital 
affairs. But there is a very big difference in perjury about a 
marital infidelity in a divorce case and perjury about whether 
I bought the murder weapon, or whether I concealed the murder 
weapon or not. And to charge somebody with the first and punish 
them as though it were the second stands our sense of justice 
on its head.
    There is a total lack of proportionality, a total lack of 
balance in this thing. The charge and the punishment are 
totally out of sync. All of you have heard or read the 
testimony of the five prosecutors who testified before the 
House Judiciary Committee--five seasoned prosecutors. Each one 
of them, veterans, said that under the identical circumstances 
of this case, they would never charge anybody because they 
would know they couldn't get a conviction. In this case, the 
charges brought and the punishment sought are totally out of 
sync. There is no balance; there is no proportionality.
    But even stranger--you think about it--even if this case 
had originated in the courthouse rather than the Capitol, you 
would never have heard of it. How do you reconcile what the 
prosecutors said with what we are doing here? Impeachment was 
debated off and on in Philadelphia for the entire 4 months, as 
I said. The key players were Gouverneur Morris, a brilliant 
Pennsylvanian; George Mason, the only man reputedly to be so 
brilliant that Thomas Jefferson actually deferred to him--he 
refused to sign the Constitution, incidentally, even though he 
was a delegate because they didn't deal with slavery and he was 
a strict abolitionist. Then there was Charles Pinckney from 
South Carolina, a youngster at 29 years old; Edmund Randolph 
from Virginia, who had a big role in the Constitution in the 
beginning; and then, of course, James Madison, the craftsman. 
They were all key players in drafting this impeachment 
provision.
    Uppermost in their minds during the entire time they were 
composing it was that they did not want any kings. They had 
lived under despots, under kings, and under autocrats, and they 
didn't want anymore of that. And they succeeded very admirably. 
We have had 42 Presidents and no kings. But they kept talking 
about corruption. Maybe that ought to be the reason for 
impeachment, because they feared some President would corrupt 
the political process. That is what the debate was about--
corrupting the political process and ensconcing one's self 
through a phony election; maybe that is something close to a 
king.
    They followed the British rule on impeachment, because the 
British said the House of Commons may impeach and the House of 
Lords must convict. And every one of the colonies had the same 
procedure--the House and the Senate. In all fairness, Alexander 
Hamilton was not very keen on the House participating. But here 
were the sequence of events in Philadelphia that brought us 
here today. They started out with maladministration and Madison 
said, ``That is too vague; what does that mean?'' So they 
dropped that. They went from that to corruption, and they 
dropped that. Then they went to malpractice, and they decided 
that was not definitive enough. And they went to treason, 
bribery, and corruption. They decided that still didn't suit 
them.
    Bear in mind one thing: During this entire process, they 
are narrowing the things you can impeach a President for. They 
were making it tougher. Madison said, ``If we aren't careful, 
the President will serve at the pleasure of the Senate.'' And 
then they went to treason and bribery. Somebody said that still 
is not quite enough, so they went to treason and bribery. And 
George Mason added, ``or other high crimes and misdemeanors 
against the United States.'' They voted on it, and on September 
10 they sent the entire Constitution to a committee they called 
the Committee on Style and Arrangement, which was the committee 
that would draft the language in a way that everybody would 
understand--that is, well crafted from a grammatical 
standpoint. But that committee, which was dominated by Madison 
and Hamilton, dropped ``against the United States.'' And the 
historians will tell you that the reason they did that was 
because they were redundant, because that committee had no 
right to change the substance of anything, and they would not 
have dropped it if they had not felt that it was redundant. 
Then they put it in for good measure. And we can always be 
grateful for the two-thirds majority.
    This is one of the most important points of this entire 
presentation. First of all, the term ``treason and bribery''--
nobody quarrels with that. We are not debating treason and 
bribery here in this Chamber. We are talking about other high 
crimes and misdemeanors. And where did ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' come from? It came from the English law. And 
they found it in English law under a category which said 
distinctly ``political'' offenses against the state.
    Let me repeat that. They said ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' was to be because they took it from English law 
where they found it in the category that said offenses 
distinctly ``political'' against the state.
    So, colleagues, please, for just one moment, forget the 
complexities of the facts and the tortured legalisms--and we 
have heard them all brilliantly presented on both sides. And I 
am not getting into that.
    But ponder this: If high crimes and misdemeanors was taken 
from English law by George Madison, which listed high crimes 
and misdemeanors as ``political'' offenses against the state, 
what are we doing here? If, as Hamilton said, it had to be a 
crime against society or a breach of the public trust, what are 
we doing here? Even perjury, concealing, or deceiving an 
unfaithful relationship does not even come close to being an 
impeachable offense. Nobody has suggested that Bill Clinton 
committed a political crime against the state.
    So, colleagues, if you are to honor the Constitution, you 
must look at the history of the Constitution and how we got to 
the impeachment clause. And, if you do that, and you do that 
honestly, according to the oath you took, you cannot--you can 
censor Bill Clinton, you can hand him over to the prosecutor 
for him to be prosecuted, but you cannot convict him. You 
cannot indulge yourselves the luxury or the right to ignore 
this history.
    There has been a suggestion that a vote to acquit would be 
something of a breach of faith with those who lie in Flanders 
field, Anzio, Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and wherever. I did not 
hear that. I read about it. But I want to say, and, 
incidentally, I think it was Chairman Hyde who alluded to this 
and said those men fought and died for the rule of law.
    I can remember a cold November 3 morning in my little 
hometown of Charleston, AR. I was 18 years old. I had just 
gotten one semester in at the university when I went into the 
Marine Corps. So I was to report to Little Rock to be inducted. 
My, it was cold. The drugstore was the bus stop. I had to be 
there by 8 o'clock to be sworn in. And I had to catch the bus 
down at the drugstore at 3 o'clock in the morning. So my mother 
and father and I got up at 2 o'clock, got dressed, and went 
down there. I am not sure I can tell you this story. And the 
bus came over the hill. I was rather frightened anyway about 
going. I was quite sure I was going to be killed, only slightly 
less frightened that Betty would find somebody else when I was 
gone.
    The bus came over the schoolhouse hill and my parents 
started crying. I had never seen my father cry. I knew I was in 
some difficulty. Now, as a parent, at my age, I know he thought 
he was giving not his only begotten son, but one of his 
begotten sons. Can you imagine? You know that scene. It was 
repeated across this Nation millions of times. Then, happily, I 
survived that war, saw no combat, was on my way to Japan when 
it all ended. I had never had a terrible problem with dropping 
the bomb, though that has been a terrible moral dilemma for me 
because the estimates were that we would lose as many as a 
million men in that invasion.
    But I came home to a generous government which provided me, 
under the GI bill, an education in a fairly prestigious law 
school, which my father could never have afforded. I practiced 
law in this little town for 18 years, loved every minute of it. 
But I didn't practice constitutional law. And I knew very 
little about the Constitution. But when I went into law school, 
I did study constitutional law, Mr. Chief Justice. It was very 
arcane to me. And trying to read ``The Federalist Papers,'' de 
Tocqueville, all of those things that law students are expected 
to do, that was tough for me, I confess.
    So after 18 years of law practice, I jumped up and ran for 
Governor. I served as Governor for 4 years. I guess I knew what 
the rule of law was, but I still didn't really have much 
reverence for the Constitution. I just did not understand any 
of the things I am discussing and telling you. No. My love for 
that document came day after day and debate after debate right 
here in this Chamber.
    Some of you read an op-ed piece I did a couple of weeks ago 
when I said I was perfectly happy for my legacy, that during my 
24 years here I never voted for a constitutional amendment. And 
it isn't that I wouldn't. I think they were mistaken not giving 
you fellows 4 years.
    [Laughter.]
    You are about to cause me to rethink that one.
    [Laughter.]
    The reason I developed this love of it is because I saw 
Madison's magic working time and time again, keeping bullies 
from running over weak people, keeping majorities from running 
over minorities, and I thought about all of the unfettered 
freedoms we had. The oldest organic law in existence made us 
the envy of the world.
    We have also learned that the rule of law includes 
Presidential elections. That is a part of the rule of law in 
this country. We have an event, a quadrennial event, in this 
country which we call a Presidential election, and that is the 
day when we reach across this aisle and hold hands, Democrats 
and Republicans, and we say, win or lose, we will abide by the 
decision. It is a solemn event, a Presidential election, and it 
should not be undone lightly or just because one side has the 
clout and the other one doesn't.
    And if you want to know what men fought for in World War 
II, for example, in Vietnam, ask Senator Inouye. He left an arm 
in Italy. He and I were with the Presidents at Normandy, on the 
50th anniversary, but we started off in Anzio. Senator 
Domenici, were you with us? It was one of the most awesome 
experiences I have ever had in my life. Certified war hero. I 
think his relatives were in an internment camp. So ask him, 
what was he fighting for? Or ask Bob Kerrey, certified Medal of 
Honor winner, what was he fighting for? Probably get a quite 
different answer. Or Senator Chafee, one of the finest men ever 
to grace this body and certified Marine hero of Guadalcanal, 
ask him. And Senator McCain, a genuine hero, ask him. You don't 
have to guess; they are with us, and they are living, and they 
can tell you. And one who is not with us in the Senate anymore, 
Robert Dole, ask Senator Dole what he was fighting for. Senator 
Dole had what I thought was a very reasonable solution to this 
whole thing that would handle it fairly and expeditiously.
    The American people are now and for some time have been 
asking to be allowed a good night's sleep. They are asking for 
an end to this nightmare. It is a legitimate request. I am not 
suggesting that you vote for or against the polls. I understand 
that. Nobody should vote against the polls just to show their 
mettle and their courage. I have cast plenty of votes against 
the polls, and it has cost me politically a lot of times. This 
has been going on for a year, though.
    In that same op-ed piece, I talked about meeting Harry 
Truman my first year as Governor of Arkansas. I spent an hour 
with him--an indelible experience. People at home kid me about 
this because I very seldom make a speech that I don't mention 
this meeting. But I will never forget what he said: ``Put your 
faith in the people. Trust the people. They can handle it.'' 
They have shown conclusively time and time again that they can 
handle it.
    Colleagues, this is easily the most important vote you will 
ever cast. If you have difficulty because of an intense dislike 
of the President--and that is understandable--rise above it. He 
is not the issue. He will be gone. You won't. So don't leave a 
precedent from which we may never recover and almost surely 
will regret.
    If you vote to acquit, Mr. Leader, you know exactly what is 
going to happen. You are going to go back to your committees. 
You are going to get on with this legislative agenda. You are 
going to start dealing with Medicare, Social Security, tax 
cuts, and all those things which the people of this country 
have a nonnegotiable demand that you do. If you vote to acquit, 
you go immediately to the people's agenda. But if you vote to 
convict, you can't be sure what is going to happen.
    James G. Blaine was a Member of the House when Andrew 
Johnson was tried in 1868, and 20 years later he recanted. He 
said, ``I made a bad mistake.'' And he said, ``As I reflect 
back on it, all I can think about is that having convicted 
Andrew Johnson would have caused much more chaos and confusion 
in this country than Andrew Johnson could ever conceivably have 
created.''
    And so it is with William Jefferson Clinton. If you vote to 
convict, in my opinion, you are going to be creating more havoc 
than he could ever possibly create. After all, he has only 2 
years left. So don't, for God's sake, heighten the people's 
alienation, which is at an all-time high, toward their 
Government. The people have a right, and they are calling on 
you to rise above politics, rise above partisanship. They are 
calling on you to do your solemn duty, and I pray you will.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                           order of procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that concludes the 
White House presentation. I remind all Senators we will 
reconvene tomorrow beginning at 1 p.m. On Friday, under the 
provisions of Senate Resolution 16, we will begin the question-
and-answer period for not to exceed 16 hours. The majority will 
begin the questioning, and as we go forward in that process, we 
will alternate back and forth across the aisle. I have 
discussed this proposition, obviously, with Senator Daschle, 
and we have discussed it in our conferences. We looked at a 
number of alternatives, but we thought this would be a fair way 
to proceed, that we would begin from this side with a Senator 
who will be named and go to the other side, back and forth.
    We think this provides fairness. I hope all Members will 
entrust the Chief Justice to be fair during this portion of the 
deliberations and for the managers and counsel to, of course, 
be succinct in their answers and respond to the question that 
is actually asked.
    At this time, I anticipate approximately 5 hours of 
questions and answers being used tomorrow, Friday. We will then 
reconvene on Saturday at 10 a.m. and again resume questioning, 
alternating back and forth. We have not set any definite time 
for Saturday. We will need to see how the questions go. We 
don't really know whether we will need 5 hours or 10 hours or 
the full 16. But if we reach a point on Saturday where we need 
to conclude the day's proceedings and we feel there are still 
more questions that will need to be asked, then after 
communication on both sides of the aisle we will decide how to 
go forward.
    It is my hope that we can complete this questioning period 
during the day Friday and Saturday and conclude it Saturday. I 
hope the Senators will be thoughtful in their questions. They 
must be in writing. Please be brief with your written 
presentation. Dissertations will not be appreciated in writing 
at this point. We will do our best, Mr. Chief Justice, to deal 
with the question of repetition or redundancy and try to have 
some process that Senator Daschle and I will use to get the 
Senators' questions to the Chief Justice.
    I thank all Senators for their attention during the past 2 
weeks, both in the presentation of the case by the House 
managers and the presentation by the White House counsel. 
Obviously, the Senators have been here, attentive. We have 
listened. I think we have learned a great deal, and I 
appreciate the way the Senate has conducted itself.
    [The following notice of intent was received on Wednesday, 
January 20, 1999:]

Notice of Intent To Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin 
                             and Wellstone

    In accordance to Rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I (for 
myself and for Mr. Wellstone) hereby give notice in writing that it is 
my intention to move to suspend the following portions of the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials 
in regard to debate by Senators on any motion to dismiss, any motion to 
subpoena witnesses and/or to present any evidence not in the record 
during the trial of President William Jefferson Clinton:
    (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
    (2) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate shall 
direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions. A 
motion to close the doors may be acted upon without objection, or, if 
objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by the 
yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record''; and
    (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except when the 
doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case'' and ``, to 
be had without debate''.

                                 ______
                                 

                   adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow
    Mr. LOTT. I move the Senate stand in adjournment under the 
previous order.
    The motion was agreed to and, at 5:10 p.m., the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Friday, 
January 22, 1999, at 1 p.m.

                                ------                                


                        Friday, January 22, 1999

                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:03 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                ------                                


                                 prayer
    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Spirit of the living God, fall afresh on us. We need Your 
strength. The wells of our own resources run dry. We need Your 
strength to fill up our diminished reserves--silent strength 
that flows into us with artesian resourcefulness, quietly 
filling us with renewed power. You alone can provide strength 
to think clearly and to decide decisively.
    Bless the Senators today as they trust You as Lord in the 
inner tribunal of their own hearts. You are Sovereign of this 
land, but You are also Sovereign of the inner person inside 
each Senator. May these hours of questions bring exposure of 
truth and resolution of uncertainties. O God of righteousness 
and grace, guide this Senate at this decisive hour. You are our 
Lord and Saviour. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators may be seated. The Sergeant at 
Arms will make the proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States 
is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by 
the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States.
                              the journal
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
Senate is provided up to 16 hours during which Senators may 
submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on 
the part of the House of Representatives, or counsel for the 
President. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                           order of procedure
    Mr. LOTT. This afternoon, the Senate will begin the 
question-and-answer period for not to exceed 16 hours, as 
provided in Senate Resolution 16. I have consulted several 
times about this procedure with Senator Daschle and others, and 
we have determined that the majority will begin the questioning 
process with the first question, and we will then alternate 
back and forth.
    As I noted yesterday, this has not been done in quite a 
while, so we will just have to go forward in a way that we feel 
is fair and comfortable. We ask that you give the benefit of 
the doubt to us in how we send the questions up to the Chief 
Justice. Senator Daschle and I will try to make sure that the 
time stays pretty close to even as we go through the day. Of 
course, the Chief Justice, I am sure, will make sure the 
deliberations and the answers are fair. We hope the answers 
will be succinct and that they will respond to the questions.
    One question that has arisen from Senators on both sides 
is, can we direct a question to both sides, the White House 
counsel and the House managers, simultaneously, and the answer 
is no. Under our rules, we will direct the question to one side 
or the other, and our questions for either side may go to 
either one of the parties, but only one can answer that 
question.
    Of course, there is the possibility for a followup question 
that might be directed to one side or the other. We will just 
deal with that as we go forward.
    I expect, for the information of all Senators, that we will 
go approximately 5 hours today. I don't know how many questions 
we can get done in an hour, but I suspect by 6 o'clock on 
Friday we will have exhausted a series of questions that will 
entitle us to a break at that point. But, again, we will just 
have to see how we feel about it. We would not stop, obviously, 
in the middle of a question.
    We will resume again on Saturday at 10 a.m., alternating 
between both sides. The schedule at this point is undecided. We 
need to see how many questions are left that Senators really 
feel need to be asked and, again, we will have to see how the 
day progresses.
    I did have Senators come up to me yesterday and talk to me 
about we need some reasonable limit on that. But I am thinking 
in general terms of not going beyond 4 o'clock on Saturday. We 
will converse and make those announcements after consultation 
as we go forward today or during the day even tomorrow.
    I hope we can complete our questioning period by the close 
of business tomorrow, but if we go with the times I basically 
mentioned, we are talking about 10 hours, not 16. So we will 
have to consult and determine if we ask the basic questions or 
if we want to continue it later or even over on Monday.
    I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, that completes the 
explanation I wanted to give at this time.
    I do have the first question prepared to send to the Chief 
Justice, but I thought perhaps he has some further business he 
might want to address before I do that.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I would like to advise counsel on 
both sides that the Chair will operate on a rebuttable 
presumption that each question can be fully and fairly answered 
in 5 minutes or less.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I do send the first question 
to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Allard, Bunning, Coverdell and 
Craig ask the House managers:

    Is it the opinion of the House Managers that the President's 
defense team, in the presentation, mischaracterized any factual or 
legal issue in this case? If so, please explain.

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
colleagues, and Members of the Senate, first of all, let me 
thank you for the opportunity to respond to questions. We hope 
we can do that in a succinct manner today.
    There are a number of mischaracterizations in statements 
that we disagree with that the President's defense team made. I 
will not attempt to cover all of these. I would like to 
highlight just a few of these, and perhaps might, in a short 
manner, exceed the rebuttal presumption of 5 minutes.
    Mr. Craig made the argument on behalf of the President that 
this is a lot about an oath versus oath perjury case. Article I 
is the perjury allegation--one word against another person's 
word, ``he said, she said.'' However, we submit that there was 
not discussed in their presentation the fact that there is 
ample corroboration which is provided for under the law as it 
being necessary.
    But we believe factually there was much corroboration; that 
is, another person or other evidence to support the fact that 
the President did commit the perjury, and particularly those 
aspects of the perjury charge that deal with the personal 
relationship that Ms. Lewinsky and the President had.
    Very clearly, White House records and phone logs, along 
with Ms. Lewinsky's incredible recollection of particular names 
and events, and the circumstances surrounding these particular 
occasions, that have already been highlighted in the past--and 
we all know about those types of telephone conversations. And 
she was very clear in the facts. The people have all 
corroborated her on her presence in the White House at certain 
times.
    No. 2, the Secret Service testimony that placed her inside 
the Oval Office, on occasion alone; the fact that there have 
been contemporaneous statements made by Ms. Lewinsky describing 
the details of this relationship--and as we all know, the law 
permits this contemporaneous statement--to, in this case, at 
least eight friends and two professional counselors detailing 
the particular relationship while it was ongoing.
    The blue dress is very clearly corroboration, and the DNA 
testing that resulted from that. Also, the transfer of Ms. 
Lewinsky from the White House, and the later surreptitious 
efforts with Ms. Currie to sneak her back into the White House, 
again, indication that efforts had been made to move her, to 
relocate her, away from the President to protect him from those 
circumstances.
    Also, the President's prepared statement in the grand jury 
is another example that was not mentioned. And in particular, I 
highlight the statement that he made that would lead you to 
believe this relationship evolved over a period of time, and 
being that he was sorry that what had started out as a 
friendship turned into this type of relationship, where, in 
fact, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is very clear that that 
relationship began immediately, the very first day that he 
actually spoke to her.
    Mr. Ruff's statement that the managers' case was misleading 
is also incorrect, I believe. He used words like ``fudging the 
facts,'' ``a witches' brew,'' and ``be wary of a prosecutor who 
feels like he must deceive the court.'' This comes as somewhat 
of a surprise to many of us at this table who know that Mr. 
Ruff is familiar with the facts of this case.
    Just last month, when he testified before the Judiciary 
Committee, he said: I have no doubt that the President walked 
up to that line that he thought he understood. Reasonable 
people--reasonable people--and you may have reached that 
conclusion that he could have crossed over that line and that 
what for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive or 
misleading and evasive was in fact false.
    He didn't tell you in his presentation that just a month 
ago he took the position that reasonable people can disagree, 
and yet before this Senate, and the audience that we have 
watching, he asserts that anyone who would accuse his client of 
perjury is guilty of ``fudging the facts,'' ``brewing a 
witches' brew,'' and ``deception.'' And even Mr. Craig, 
unfortunately, borrowed many of those same words in that 
characterization. It may be good theater, but it is simply not 
the case that these managers are engaged in that type of 
practice before the Senate and the American people.
    White House Counsel Cheryl Mills spoke in a similar manner 
and tone to this House about inconvenient and stubborn facts--
oh, those stubborn facts. In her meticulous presentation, she 
passed over--she completely missed--the second occasion wherein 
President Clinton attempted to coach Ms. Currie.
    Did anyone hear about the second event? As carefully as she 
tried to make innocent the wrongful effort of the President to 
tamper with the potential witness, she just as carefully 
skirted the entire similar episode 2 or 3 days after the first 
one where he again tampered with her testimony. According to 
Ms. Currie, spoke with her, just recapitulating. Remember that 
in our presentation?
    Likewise, in her review of witness tampering, she 
mischaracterized the law stating that an actual threat was 
required. 18 U.S.C. 1503 states that obstruction of justice 
occurs when a person corruptly endeavors to influence the 
testimony of another person. And ``corruptly'' has been 
interpreted by the District Court in the District of Columbia 
to mean acting for an improper purpose.
    Clearly, this was an improper purpose when the President 
was trying to get her to testify falsely, but a threat is not a 
part of the law and not needed.
    I will quickly mention two more.
    Mr. Ruff stated the President gave the same denial to his 
aides that he gave to his country and family. You recall him 
specifically saying that he said nothing different to the 
American public and his family than he told the aides whom we 
talked about--John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal.
    That's not right. ``He told''--the President told Mr. 
Podesta--and this is Mr. Podesta talking--``He told me that he 
never had sex with her and that he never asked--you know, he 
repeated the denial. But he was extremely explicit in saying he 
never had sex with her in any way whatsoever, that they had not 
had oral sex.''
    He told Mr. Blumenthal an entirely different story, that 
``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me. 
[And I, the President,] rebuffed her.'' He said that ``I've 
gone down that road before [and] . . . caused pain for a lot of 
people and I'm not going to do that again.''
    ``She threatened him.'' Ms. Lewinsky threatened the 
President. And ``[s]he said that she would tell [other] people 
[that she] had an affair, that she was known as a stalker among 
her peers, and that she hated [that], and if she had an affair 
. . . [with the President] she wouldn't be . . . anymore.''
    That is not the story that he told the American people and 
his family. These are embellishments that are very important 
because he anticipated that they would go into the grand jury 
and repeat those misstatements.
    And finally, the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky. White House 
defense lawyers spoke so eloquently about the procurement of 
this affidavit--as he glided through how the President believed 
that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit 
while still skirting their sexual relationship sufficiently to 
avoid testifying in the Paula Jones case.
    This is an important issue. As it was specifically raised 
in the answer before this Senate, the President's lawyers 
brought this statement into this Senate as part of their answer 
that he could have advised her that she could have filed an 
affidavit that would have been truthful while still at the same 
time denying a sexual relationship sufficiently that she would 
not be called as a witness.
    I know opposing counsel makes light of the hairsplitting 
and the legal gymnastics that people have talked about here, 
but that is an incredible statement that you can do the twister 
enough to go into a deposition where the purpose of being there 
is to discover this type of information, who you might have had 
an affair with, and have her tell a truthful affidavit and 
still not to be able to testify.
    Had she told a truthful affidavit, she would have been 
immediately called. Plus, the President was given an 
opportunity by Ms. Lewinsky to review the affidavit.
    Remember the statement that he didn't need to, he had seen 
15 just like it? If he had that ``out'' for her where she could 
have told the truth and still not been able to testify, don't 
you think he owed it to her to cause her not to have to commit 
perjury in that affidavit--which she did--not to have to commit 
a crime? Wouldn't he have shared that with her if he had that 
information at that time?
    I suggest that he didn't. I have others that I would like 
to talk to, but in the interest of time and fairness, I will 
stop my presentation at this point.
    I thank the Senate.
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I recognize the minority leader.
    Mr. DASCHLE. Can I inquire as to the length of time that 
response took.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Approximately 9 minutes.
    Senator Sarbanes asks:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question from 
Senators Allard, Bunning, Coverdell, and Craig?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    It may be that I will need to call on some of my colleagues 
to be of assistance here, but let me begin, and we will strive 
mightily to stay within the rebuttal of 5 minutes.
    Mr. Manager Bryant began by suggesting that there really is 
corroboration on the key issue that he focussed on, which as 
you know, is the nature of the specific details of the 
relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. And he 
suggested that among the corroborating matters that he would 
point to were her recollection of events, which is alleged to 
be detailed; records reflecting that she was, indeed, in the 
White House on particular days; Secret Service records; DNA 
testing. None of those have anything to do with the essential 
issue that Congressman Bryant raised, because nobody disputes 
the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was in the White House engaged in 
inappropriate conduct with the President on a particular day.
    The only point that I think the manager raises that is new 
and needs to be addressed is this notion that contemporary, 
consistent statements made to third parties about these events 
are somehow corroborative of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in this 
regard. And as all of you who had the pain of suffering through 
an evidence course will know, or have had the pain of trying 
lawsuits in which this issue arises, so-called prior consistent 
statements are not, in fact, viewed as some corroborating 
evidence that can be introduced by the prosecutors in this 
Senate; for they know, and I am sure those of you who suffered 
through these pangs know, as well, that the law rejects the 
notion that merely because you tell the same story many times 
it is corroborative of the underlying credibility of the 
witness' version, and that there are only certain very limited 
areas in which prior consistent statements are, in fact, 
admissible.
    A couple of others and I will turn this briefly over to Ms. 
Mills.
    Manager Bryant suggests that I have somehow gone too far in 
suggesting that the prosecutors here have, in my words, 
``engaged in fudging.'' I have never suggested that the entire 
presentation is so, and I made very clear in my comments to the 
Senate the other day the specific examples which I think we 
documented quite fully. But beyond that, let me go back to his 
reference to my earlier testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee in which I did, indeed, in response to questions, 
comment that the President may well have walked up to the line 
believing he didn't cross it, but that reasonable people might 
conclude otherwise.
    The only problem with that example, as broached by Mr. 
Manager Bryant, is that I was talking there--and the record is 
very clear--I was talking about his testimony in the Jones 
deposition which, as everyone in this room will fully 
understand, is not before you because the House of 
Representatives specifically decided that the President's 
testimony in the Jones deposition was not a basis for 
impeachment.
    With that, without having used, I hope, all of my time, Mr. 
Chief Justice, I will allow Ms. Mills, if she would, to come 
forward and respond specifically to the point raised with 
respect to her presentation.
    Ms. Counsel MILLS. Thank you.
    I just want to address briefly two issues that the House 
managers raised. With regard to the statute on obstruction of 
justice, with respect to witness tampering, the House managers 
focused on 1512, with respect to Ms. Currie which does require 
a threat or intimidation and, indeed, specifically addressed 
that--they wanted to focus on 1512--when they were addressing 
her and the situation where the President spoke with her.
    With regard to 1503, though, to the extent the House 
managers suggest that the President's actions and his 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky violated 1503, I think probably 
you all might recall from my presentation that we discussed the 
Aguilar case in which it is clearly necessary that you have a 
nexus between the actual conduct and the official proceeding 
that would be going forward. In that case, we had a judge who 
lied to an FBI agent who indicated that this might come up in a 
grand jury proceeding, and Mr. Chief Justice, in his opinion, 
indicated that was insufficient to find the nexus that was 
necessary to violate 1503.
    If you all have my package, you can look back. I provided 
you with a specific quotation. So in this instance, we clearly 
wouldn't have the nexus between the President's conversation 
with Ms. Currie, who was not yet a witness. There was no 
suggestion that she was going to be a witness in the Jones 
case; indeed, no one even mentioned that fact to him, as you 
actually did have in Aguilar.
    In addition, with regard to both statutes, the specific 
intent is not fulfilled. That is something we spoke about when 
I gave my presentation before.
    With regard to the President's conversation with Ms. 
Currie, which happened on the 18th and again on a subsequent 
day, in that instance it also happened prior to all of the 
media attention and other matters that came out. So in effect, 
all of the same issues apply because there was no--at that 
point--no indication that the independent counsel was involved 
in this matter, and the President still was concerned about the 
Jones proceeding; indeed, he was concerned that the media 
attention would be significant, and he was accurate as it began 
to grow and grow.
    Thank you.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, we send our next question to 
the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Enzi and Coverdell ask the 
House managers:

    Please elaborate on whether the President's defense team failed to 
respond to any allegations made by the House managers.

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, as to the areas that were not covered 
by the President's defense team, I think that my fellow Manager 
Bryant already mentioned one, but I thought it was significant 
that in the questioning of Ms. Currie, or the statements made 
to Betty Currie after the President's deposition on January 17 
where he brought her into the office and he went through that 
series of questions--``I was never alone, right,'' and that 
series of questions everybody is so familiar with, they 
discussed that primarily in the terms that she was not a 
witness. But during 3 days of presentation they never discussed 
the fact that it was 2 days later that the same series of 
questions or statements or coaching were addressed to Ms. 
Currie.
    So the President's defense that, ``Well, I was just trying 
to refresh my recollection on the facts so I could respond to 
media inquiries,'' does not make sense in light of the fact 
that it was done on one day--the series of questions. But Betty 
Currie testified that 2 days later she was called into the 
office, the same series of statements, declarations, coaching 
was made to her, and the only possible explanation for that is 
that the President was trying to make a very clear statement to 
her--``This is what I remember; this is what I want you to 
do,'' and for 3 days, for 3 days of presentations, the 
President's defense lawyers never, never mentioned that.
    I want to come back to what Ms. Mills just said because 
this was a big issue in the presentation of Mr. Ruff. In fact, 
I have the quotes here. I hope that will be turned over to you. 
But whenever Betty Currie was questioned, they say, well, she 
wasn't a witness. There was never any clue she was going to be 
a witness, that the Jones lawyers never anticipated she was 
going to be a witness, and that it was never put at all on the 
witness list. That's very significant.
    I just want to drive this point home. This is Mr. Ruff--
talk about prosecutorial fudging; how about defense fudging? 
Mr. Ruff said this:

    Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor prospective witness.
    In the entire history of the Jones case, Ms. Currie's name had not 
appeared on any witness list, nor was there any reason to suspect that 
Ms. Currie would play a role in the Jones case.
    Discovery was down to its final days.

    That was Counsel Ruff.

    Yet, in the days and weeks following the deposition, the Jones 
lawyers never listed her, never contacted her, never added her to any 
witness list.

    That was the presentation of Mr. Ruff, and it was also that 
of Ms. Mills. Yet, if you look at the facts in the Jones case, 
the deposition was concluded on January 17. There was a holiday 
on the 18th. In fact, on January 22, within 5 days of the 
deposition, a subpoena was issued for Betty Currie. Within 5 
days, a subpoena was issued for Betty Currie, and, in fact, on 
the 23rd, there was a supplement to the witness list by the 
Jones lawyers, which included Betty Currie's name as 163. This 
was served on Mr. Bennett and the other lawyers for the 
President.
    In addition, I have--which I will distribute to you--the 
actual subpoena that was issued for Betty Currie, as I 
indicated, on January 22, and the proof of service in which 
Betty Currie was served as a witness in that case on January 
27--the proof of service. So the statements by Mr. Ruff that 
there was never any indication that the Jones people knew she 
was going to be a witness is totally not within the record. In 
fact, it is clear that the subpoena was issued; it was served.
    Whenever that deposition of the President was over, both 
the President left there and the Jones lawyers left there 
knowing immediately that Betty Currie was going to be a 
witness. She had to be a witness, with the President asserting, 
``ask Betty, ask Betty, ask Betty,'' so many times during that 
deposition. That is why the President came back and had to deal 
with Betty Currie being a witness, and the Jones lawyer went 
out and immediately amended the witness list so as to do that, 
and then issued a subpoena, which was served on Betty Currie. 
That is the record. Those are the facts. We will distribute 
this to you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Levin asks White House counsel:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Let me 
respond very briefly to Manager Hutchinson's last remarks, 
because I owe him indeed an explanation and he is correct in 
one respect. I did not accurately reflect the fact that after 
the January 21 story in the Washington Post, the Jones lawyers 
did, in fact, attempt to track the entire independent counsel 
investigation. And I think Mr. Hutchinson will tell you, they 
indeed issued a long list of subpoenas. For that misleading 
statement, I apologize, and I trust we will hear equally candid 
assessments from the managers. But more importantly, let me 
return to the substance of that issue because it is important 
to note, without the chart being up there, that indeed, at the 
moment, which is the critical moment, when the President was 
talking about Betty Currie, whether it be on the 18th or on the 
20th or 21st--the 21st, you remember, is when the story breaks. 
The answer is the same. He had no reason to believe at that 
stage--and that is the critical stage because that is what's in 
his mind and that is what you have to ask if you are talking 
about obstruction of justice or witness tampering--at that 
stage, he had no more reason to know that Ms. Currie was going 
to be a witness than he did, as we explained it, both I and Ms. 
Mills, in our earlier presentations.
    The fact that the Jones lawyers, once this story became a 
matter of public knowledge, which it did on the 21st, 
thereafter dumped a series of subpoenas and deposition notices 
literally in the closing days of discovery does not bear on the 
question of what was in the President's mind, which is the 
critical moment for testing his intent, at the moment when he 
first had his conversations with Betty Currie.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Thurmond, Grassley, Chafee and 
Craig direct to the House managers:

    President Clinton has raised concerns about whether the articles of 
impeachment are overly vague and whether they charge more than one 
offense in the same article. How do you respond to this concern?

    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the 
Senate, I will be pleased to do my best to address this 
question.
    The President has made two claims against the forum in 
which the articles of impeachment have been drafted. I submit 
to you that neither of these claims has any merit, and I will 
be pleased to address both claims as briefly as I can.
    First, the President claims that the two articles of 
impeachment are vague and lack specificity and, therefore, 
prevent him from knowing with what he has been charged.
    Second, the President asserts that the articles are flawed 
because they charge multiple offenses in a single article. With 
respect to the first claim, it is clear in the President's 
trial memorandum and his presentation here that President 
Clinton and his counsel know exactly what he is being charged 
with. And I submit to you that if President Clinton had 
suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles, he could 
have filed a motion for a bill of particulars. He did not 
choose to do so.
    Moreover, articles of impeachment have never been required 
to be drafted with the specificity of indictments. After all, 
this proceeding is not a criminal trial. If it were, then we, 
as the prosecutors, would not only be entitled to call 
witnesses, but would be required to call them to prove our 
case. We would certainly not be put in the position of 
defending the appropriateness of witnesses.
    President Clinton wants all the benefits of a criminal 
trial without bearing any of its burdens. Impeachment is a 
political and not a criminal proceeding. That has been clear 
from the institution of this proceeding in our Constitution. As 
recognized by Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest 
interpreter during the 19th century, ``Impeachment is designed 
not to punish an offender by threatening deprivation of his 
life, liberty, or property, but to secure the State by 
divesting him of his political capacity.'' Justice Story thus 
found the analogy of articles of impeachment to an indictment 
to be invalid. I quote what Justice Story had to say, which is 
directly pertinent to this question:

    The articles need not and indeed do not pursue the strict form and 
accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in the form 
of the allegations, but ought to contain certainty as to enable the 
party to put himself upon the proper defense, and also in the case of 
acquittal, to avail himself of it as a bar to another impeachment.

    Indeed Alexander Hamilton had commented on the same point 
in ``The Federalist.'' We have heard many references to 
Federalist No. 65, and in this trial today I will refer once 
again to what Alexander Hamilton said in ``The Federalist'' on 
this particular point. There Alexander Hamilton stated that 
impeachment proceedings:

    . . . can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the 
delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction 
of it by the judges, as in common cases served to limit the discretion 
of courts in favor of personal security.

    By that, he means in criminal cases. I think this statement 
from Alexander Hamilton refutes the argument of the President's 
counsel directly.
    I also point out that unlike the judicial impeachments in 
the 1980s, President Clinton has not committed a handful of 
specific misdeeds that can be easily listed in separate 
articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the whole 
assortment of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives 
to impeach the President, the Judiciary Committee looked to the 
more analogous case, that of President Nixon. In 1974, in the 
proceedings with respect to President Nixon, the committee also 
was faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable 
length against a President who had committed a series of 
improper acts designed to achieve an illicit end.
    The first article against President Nixon charged that in 
order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of 
the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and 
obstruct the consequent investigation and for certain other 
purposes, he engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or 
causing to be made false or misleading statements to lawfully 
authorized investigative officers, endeavoring to misuse the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and endeavoring to cause 
prospective defendants and individuals, duly tried and 
convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in 
return for their silence or false testimony.
    The articles did not--I repeat ``did not''--list each false 
or misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, 
and did not list each respective defendant and what they were 
promised. That is the record. Anyone who is familiar with the 
Nixon case--President Nixon case--is familiar with those facts.
    In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton charged him with providing perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony concerning four subjects, such as 
sexual relations with a subordinate government employee, 
engaging in a course of conduct designed to prevent, obstruct, 
impede the administration of justice, which of course included 
four general acts, such as an effort to secure job assistance 
for that employee.
    I submit to you that an argument can be made that the 
articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted 
with more specificity than the articles that were drafted 
against President Nixon.
    I will do my best to briefly address the second claim which 
has been asserted by the President's lawyers against the form 
of the articles of impeachment; that is, that they are invalid, 
charging multiple offenses in one article. The articles of 
impeachment allege that President Clinton made one or more 
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury 
and committed one or more acts in which he obstructed justice.
    Once again, these articles are modeled after the articles 
adopted by the House Committee on the Judiciary against 
President Nixon and were drafted with the rules of the Senate. 
Specifically in mind, the Senate rules explicitly contemplate 
that the House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner 
and prior rules of the Senate have held that such drafting is 
not sufficient and will not support a motion to dismiss.
    Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the 
Senate When Sitting On Impeachment Trials now states that an 
article of impeachment ``shall not be divisible for the purpose 
of voting thereon at any time during trial.'' When the Senate 
Committee on Rules and Administration amended rule XXIII in 
1986, it explained that. And I quote this at length. And this 
goes right to the heart of the matter. This is what the Rules 
Committee in its report said. It said:

    The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the division of 
an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the most 
judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a 
general matter and, in particular, with respect to the form of the 
articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon. 
The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an 
impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the 
first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges 
alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of 
transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of 
Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had 
thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the enumerated 
specifications. . . . [I]t was agreed to write into the proposed rules 
language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either 
the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person 
impeached was `guilty' of one or more of the enumerated 
specifications.''

    The Senate rules themselves, thus, specifically contemplate 
that an article of impeachment may include multiple 
specifications of impeachable conduct as in the case of 
President Nixon. The Senate itself has recognized the articles 
against President Nixon as an appropriate model to be followed. 
The House has, in the articles now before the Senate, simply 
followed that model.
    Moreover, I point out in conclusion that the Senate has 
convicted a number of judges on such omnibus articles, 
including Judges Archibald, Louderback and Claiborne.
    I submit to the Members of the Senate that the articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton present his offenses and 
their consequences in an appropriately transparent and 
understandable manner. They are not constitutionally deficient.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is sent by Senators Dodd 
and Leahy:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question by 
Senators Thurmond, Grassley, Chafee, and Craig; particularly what would 
have stopped or limited the House in specifying precisely the 
statements on which the articles were based?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. In our case, we are talking about an 
allegation of perjury. In the Nixon case--in the 1974 Nixon 
case--he was not charged with perjury. I think our argument was 
that perjury is a different kind of thing. You have to be very 
specific in what you charge, and you have to be very clear as 
to what the statement is when you are charging perjury. And 
that is the tradition of our criminal justice system and of our 
jurisprudence.
    The danger here is that if you do not, if you are overly 
broad, as we contend in article I, that at any given moment you 
can fill the vessel with what your meaning is.
    Let me give you a little history of these allegations of 
grand jury perjury against the President.
    The Starr referral had three allegations. The Starr 
referral was September 9. Mr. Schippers, when he made his 
presentation to the Judiciary Committee, had two allegations. 
One was different. He incorporated one of Starr's. When Starr 
appeared and testified on November 19 in front of the Judiciary 
Committee, he almost spent no time on this at all--one or two 
sentences. But he added a new charge, which was that the 
President was not truthful when he testified that he had been 
truthful in the deposition.
    Then, we appeared and made our representations and our 
defense on behalf of the President on the basis of what Mr. 
Starr had written in his referral and what Mr. Schippers had 
presented to the Judiciary Committee and in addition to what 
Mr. Starr had said when he appeared. But then when Mr. 
Schippers gave his closing argument the following day, we saw 
the new articles. We had, by my count, 10 allegations from Mr. 
Schippers. Two had to do with the definition of sexual 
relations. Three had to do with the prepared statement. Two had 
to do with things that were never alleged again and never 
surfaced again in the course of the case. And they had to do 
with Mr. Bennett and his proffer of the Lewinsky affidavit.
    Then, on December 16 we had a whole new additional 
collection of reports of allegations. And on January 11, the 
file brief here set forth eight examples.
    Just to highlight the danger of not being specific, of not 
tying yourself to a definition, let me compare, for example, 
the trial brief that was submitted by the House managers 3 days 
before Mr. Rogan made his presentation.
    The precise statement that the President is accused of 
testifying falsely in front of a grand jury was that he was 
lying when he said that the reason he was seeing Betty Currie 
was to refresh his recollection. In the trial brief--they make 
that reference one, two, three, four times--that the statement 
that is specific here in the trial brief is he lied when he 
said he was going to refresh his recollection. That is not even 
mentioned in Mr. Rogan's presentation. He changes it. And he 
says he lied when he said he wanted to ascertain what the facts 
were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was--a very 
different statement requiring a very different defense. And 2 
days before, 3 days before we even hear the allegations on the 
floor of the Senate, we still don't know precisely what they 
are.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, if I may absorb 
whatever rebuttal time is still available to us, may I for just 
a moment, sir?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Sure.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you.
    I want to talk briefly about two aspects of Manager 
Canady's presentation.
    First of all, he asks why didn't we seek a bill of 
particulars. Let me remind all the Senators, although I don't 
think any of you were here at the time of the trial of Judge 
Louderback who also saw a bill of particulars, and the House of 
Representatives at the time made it clear that the managers do 
not have the authority to rewrite the articles, though they 
certainly have, I suggest, attempted to do so on the fly, but 
that it would have required a remand to the House of 
Representatives in order to have a bill of particulars to judge 
what they themselves meant when they had passed these articles.
    Second, just very briefly, I spoke to the issue of 
multiplicity, duplicity, the other day, and the question of 
whether the rule XXIII revision makes any difference. As I 
pointed out--and I won't embarrass him any further--one Member 
of this body spoke at length about the importance of not 
loading up multiple offenses into one count well after the 
revision of rule XXIII, clearly with no sense that this body 
had been precluded from dealing with the critical issue of 
whether a two-thirds vote can sensibly be taken on an article 
that contains multiple and, particularly as my colleague, Mr. 
Craig, indicated, multiple nonspecific violations.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Thompson and Grassley, 
Thurmond, Allard, Frist, Burns, and Inhofe direct this question 
to the President's counsel:

    If the President were a Federal judge accused of committing the 
same acts of perjury and obstruction of justice and the Senate found 
sufficient evidence that the acts alleged were committed, should the 
Senate vote to convict?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. This will sound halfhearted, but it is 
not. I am glad you asked that question. This really goes right 
to the heart of the managers' argument here, which is that 
there is no difference in the consideration of the impeachment 
process between an allegation against a Federal judge and an 
allegation against the President of the United States.
    I will not repeat the extended discussion of this subject 
of a few days ago, but let me try to summarize very briefly. It 
is absolutely crystal clear from the history of the drafting of 
the impeachment clause that the concern of the framers was, Is 
there such action as to subvert our Government that we can no 
longer persist in permitting, in their case, the President of 
the United States to remain in office? That question must be 
dramatically different when you ask it about the conduct of 1 
of 1,000 judges.
    Beyond that, it is also clear that there has been extended 
debate in many forums and at many times in the past 210 years 
about, indeed, just what the standard is for the impeachment of 
judges.
    I hesitate to do this, and I do it apologetically, Mr. 
Chief Justice, but the Chief Justice himself in an earlier time 
and an earlier guise spoke to this issue and made it clear--
this during his tenure as assistant attorney general for the 
Office of Legal Counsel--when the issue was being debated 
whether there was a nonconstitutional, nonimpeachment device 
for disposing of judges alleged to have engaged in misconduct 
that may not fall within the high crimes and misdemeanors 
provision of the impeachment clause, that, indeed, the good 
behavior standard for judges was something far broader than the 
standard to be applied under the high crimes and misdemeanors 
standard. And, indeed, that debate was resumed many years later 
in the context of a further effort to establish a 
nonconstitutional device for removing judges.
    That history, and just the core question, do you ask the 
same questions about the trauma the Nation suffers when you are 
removing a judge and you are removing a President, the answer 
must be no. You must ask, What is the nature of the perjury 
that has been committed? What is the nature of the offense that 
has been committed? What is the factual setting in which it 
occurs? And, ultimately, does it so subvert the accused's 
ability to perform the duties of his office that you must 
remove him?
    That question for Judge Nixon, convicted and imprisoned, 
has to be different from--``different'' is much too mild a 
word--stunningly different from the question you ask against 
the backdrop of our history when you ask whether the President 
of the United States should be removed and the will of the 
electorate overturned.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Dorgan and Baucus and Schumer 
to the President's counsel:

    In Counselor Ruff's presentation, he set forth a time line that 
undermined the managers' theory that Judge Wright's December 11 
discovery letter triggered an intensification of the President's and 
Jordan's efforts to assist Lewinsky in finding a job. In response to 
Mr. Ruff's presentation, the managers handed out a press release 
outside the Senate Chamber asserting that it was the December 5 
issuance of the witness list in the Jones case and not the judge's 
discovery order on the 11th that triggered the intensification of the 
job search. It does not appear consistent with assertions made by the 
House managers in their trial brief and oral presentations. Please 
comment.

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. It was the assertion very clearly 
voiced in Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation and very 
clearly made in the trial brief of the House managers that it 
was, indeed, the December 11 order that--I used the word 
``jump-started'' yesterday--that catalyzed, that pushed 
forward, the job search.
    If you look at page 21 of the House managers' brief, you 
see them say this sudden interest was inspired by a court order 
entered on December 11, 1997. Now, their position could not 
have been clearer until we began our presentations, and then, 
all of a sudden, it wasn't the December 11 order; it was, 
instead, the December 5 witness list.
    There are a number of things to be said about that. One of 
them is that they have very clearly said that there was no 
urgency at all after the witness list arrived to help Ms. 
Lewinsky. They have said that Mr. Jordan met with the President 
on December 5 but that meeting had nothing to do with Ms. 
Lewinsky. This was in the majority report at page 11. They said 
that very clearly.
    Because it has been clear that the December 11 order was 
entered at a time when Mr. Jordan was flying to Europe, he 
could not have known about it. He had met with Ms. Lewinsky 
earlier that day. And, indeed, that December 11 meeting had 
sprung from actions taken by Ms. Lewinsky in a phone call with 
Mr. Jordan in November. They agreed that when Mr. Jordan 
returned to the country, they would set up a meeting. They did 
that on December 5, or she tried to get in touch on December 5. 
They finally succeeded in getting in touch on December 8, and 
that was not at a time she knew she was on the witness list.
    So the point is these were two entirely separate chains of 
events going forward--the job search and the witness list. And 
nothing supports the intensification theory presented by the 
managers, certainly not this new, ``Well, it wasn't the 
December 11th order; it was the December 5th order.''
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Ashcroft and Hatch--is there 
anyone on the floor who can't hear me? This is for the House 
managers:

    The White House makes much of the fact that Vernon Jordan was on a 
flight to Holland on December 11 before Judge Wright ruled that 
afternoon that other women who may have had relationships while in 
President Clinton's employ were relevant to the Jones suit. However, 
the President was faxed a witness list on December 5 and actually 
reviewed it no later than the 8th. Thus, isn't the White House argument 
that the President had no incentive to assist Ms. Lewinsky's job search 
until December 11 just a red herring?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And I 
appreciate the opportunity to respond here.
    Just let me say, by way of preface, that we are lawyers. We 
are trying to do three things at once. Usually you have an 
opening statement where you outline where you want to go in a 
case, then you have a presentation of the evidence, then you 
have a closing argument. And we are trying to do it all at the 
same time.
    It is for that reason, as I said at the very beginning of 
my presentation, that you need to pay attention to the record 
and to the facts. That is what you depend upon. And I get 
carried away in my argument. I am arguing, just as they are 
arguing their theory of the case. We are both arguing a point 
of view here, and it is up to you to make the determination.
    I have great respect for these counselors. They are 
admirable. They are doing a great job for their client, and 
they are presenting their theory of the case. We are arguing 
our point of view, and it is the facts that make the 
determination.
    Let me go back to--and you have it in front of you--my 
presentation, exhibit C, which I guess is the third exhibit, 
which is really the White House exhibit that Mr. Ruff had up 
here for a number of days, because they were really trying to 
hammer home this statement that I made in my presentation. I 
hope you all have that.
    Mr. GRAMM. Just tell us.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I will tell it to you then. Thank 
you.
    Exhibit C--which I hope you have; we asked them to 
distribute that--is a statement that Mr. Ruff portrayed, from 
me, which in my presentation I said: ``The judge--the witness 
list came in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the 
President into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan 
into action.''
    There are two things that I am pointing to as the trigger 
mechanisms for the job search intensification. One of them is 
the witness list that comes in on December 5, that the 
President knows about, at the latest, on December 6. The other 
thing that intensified that effort was the judge's order on 
December 11.
    They went through this long circumstance of Mr. Jordan 
being in Holland and the time of the phone call with the judge 
and all of that, showing that the judge's order of December 11 
could not have triggered any action on the 11th. There is no 
question about that. That is obvious from the facts, as it was 
obvious when I made my presentation. The meetings on the 11th, 
with Vernon Jordan and Monica Lewinsky, were triggered by the 
witness list coming on the 5th, that the President knew about 
on the 6th, that he discussed with Vernon Jordan as well.
    We say that the judge's order of the 11th, which was filed 
that day--the only thing that was filed on the 12th was their 
memorandum of that telephone conversation--that triggered 
additional action down the road. The job search was not over; 
the activity continued into January. And, so, that all put 
pressure on the ultimate fact, in January when the job was 
obtained, the false affidavit was filed.
    Now let me just point to a couple of other things along 
that line. We need to look at this because they basically make 
the point that there is not any connection between the false 
affidavit--and that is my characterization--that was filed, and 
the job search. But if you look at the testimony of Vernon 
Jordan, and that is exhibit--I think they are giving them out 
now--F, that I am presenting to you, the sworn testimony of 
Vernon Jordan which was on March 3 of 1998, he testifies in 
answer to a question:

    Counselor, the lady comes to me with a subpoena in the Paula Jones 
case that I know, as I have testified here today was about sexual 
harassment. . . . you didn't have to be an Einstein to know that that 
was a question that had to be asked by me at that particular time 
because heretofore this discussion was about a job.

    And then he says, ``The subpoena changed the 
circumstances.'' And I think this is important, that Mr. 
Jordan, who is filled with common sense, says you don't have to 
be an Einstein. You don't have to be learned, like Mr. Ruff or 
any of the other White House counsel, to apply common sense. 
Common sense tells you that whenever he knew about the 
subpoena, it escalated to a new arena and obviously the witness 
list would have the same impact.
    And, so, Mr. Jordan himself makes the connection, the job 
search was one thing but whenever she became a witness in the 
Jones case, that changed everything. That changed the 
circumstances. Let me tell you, that is a friend of the 
President who is making that statement.
    We have to take this picture, that they were related as 
they were going two tracks, they became interconnected and 
became one track.
    The final point--and this was raised on the job search 
issue--that the call by Mr. Jordan to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of 
the parent company of Revlon, really had no impact on Monica 
Lewinsky getting a job because there is a misinterpretation as 
to how well she did on the interview. But if you look back to 
the testimony, the grand jury testimony, there was a 
connection, because Mr. Jordan calls Mr. Perelman and, as he 
characterized it: Make it happen if it can happen. Mr. Perelman 
then calls Mr. Durnan, and then Mr. Durnan calls Ms. Seidman, 
who was actually doing the interview the next day with Monica 
Lewinsky.
    So the person who was going to make the decision whether to 
hire Monica Lewinsky got the word down through the channel 
before that interview took place and before the decision was 
made. And of course the important thing is: What was the 
intent? Not the result, but the intent. I think you can see 
that there was an intent to make sure that Monica Lewinsky was 
taken care of. Again she was on board, part of the team, before 
she actually would have to give testimony or the President 
would have to give testimony.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Boxer, and it 
is to counsel for the President:

    In light of the concession of Manager Hutchinson that Judge 
Wright's order had no bearing on the ``intensity'' of the job search, 
can you comment on the balance of his claim on the previous question?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, can I object to 
the form of the question? That was not properly characterizing 
what I just stated.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Can the managers object to a question?
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I withdraw my objection.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Parliamentarian says they 
can only object to an answer, not to a question, which is kind 
of an unusual thing but----
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I was going to remark 
that they can if they have the courage.
    I want to link up my response to Manager Hutchinson's most 
recent comments with the previous discussion about vagueness. 
If there was ever a moving target, we have just seen it in 
motion: Well, it really wasn't December 11, because now we know 
it didn't happen on December 11, so let's go to December 19, or 
maybe January 8, and somewhere in there we are going to find 
the right answer.
    I suggest to you that is reflective of both the difficulty 
we have had in coming to grips with these charges and, 
candidly, the difficulty that the House might have had figuring 
out what those charges really were.
    Let me just respond briefly to Mr. Manager Hutchinson's 
argument. And let me focus, first, on another portion of his 
presentation in which he states, and there--and he is referring 
now to Ms. Lewinsky--she is referring to a December 6 meeting 
with the President in which, as you will recall, she has 
testified that there was a brief discussion about her efforts 
to get a job through Mr. Jordan and the President sort of 
vaguely said, ``Yes, I'll do something about that.'' This is 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson's characterization of that moment. 
December 6, you will recall, is the day after the witness list 
comes out and the day on which she learns of it:

    So you can see from that that it was not a high priority for the 
President either. It was, ``Sure, I'll get to that, I will do that.'' 
But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What started out as 
a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed after Ms. Lewinsky became 
a witness and the judge's order was issued again on December 11.

    But to the extent the managers now seek to drag the 
intensification process back into the December 5 or 6 period, 
which is when Ms. Lewinsky went onto the witness list, you must 
look at what they say.
    Page 11, majority brief, Mr. Jordan met President Clinton 
the next day, December 7, but they didn't discuss the job at 
all. It is absolutely clear that the President knew that Ms. 
Lewinsky was on the witness list when he met with Mr. Jordan on 
December 7, and yet the issue of Monica Lewinsky didn't even 
surface.
    I am getting some help here.
    ``The first''--``the first,'' their words, page 11, 
majority brief, majority report--``The first activity 
calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually get a job took place 
on December 11. There was no urgency.''
    It is possible, of course, as their trial brief reflects, 
to bob and weave and dodge around the facts here, but their 
trial brief says:

    There was obviously--

    Referring to the period after she appears on the witness 
list--

    There was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky.

    And even they acknowledge that the December 7 meeting with 
Mr. Jordan was unrelated to Ms. Lewinsky.
    But let me point, because I think this really goes to the 
heart of it, to what the managers ask you to think about in 
this context in which now, whether we call it a confession or 
simply an acknowledgment, what they asked you to do when you 
heard the recitation about the December 11 events. We now know 
Mr. Jordan is flying over the Atlantic at the critical moment, 
and here is what Mr. Manager Hutchinson asks you to do with 
Vernon Jordan, distinguished citizen, distinguished lawyer:

    Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--which I hope to be 
able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his loyalties 
lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his eyes and determine 
the truthfulness of his statements. You must decide whether he is 
telling the truth or withholding information.

    There is only one message there: Vernon Jordan must have 
been lying or at least there is enough question about his 
credibility and his honesty and his decency to explore whether 
he was lying. If you predicate that question on the, shall we 
say, erroneous recitation of events on December 11, you need to 
know nothing more about what the time line and the chronology 
and the managers' theory of this case is all about.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Sessions, 
Gramm of Texas, Smith of New Hampshire, Inhofe, Allard, and 
Roberts. It is directed to the House managers:

    In defense of the President, Ms. Mills has repeatedly stated, and 
has just reiterated, that the crime of witness tampering requires some 
element of threat, intimidation or pressure. Isn't it true that section 
1512(b) criminalizes anyone who corruptly persuades or engages in 
misleading conduct with the intent to influence the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding? Please explain.

    Mr. Manager BARR. Mr. Chief Justice, we appreciate the 
question from the Senators, since it bears on a number of 
different questions and a great deal of the evidence that you 
all have heard in this case.
    One can talk around the law, one can talk about the law, 
one can ignore the law and, as we have seen, one can break the 
law, but one has to deal with the law in court and in these 
proceedings. And that is why throughout these proceedings the 
Senators have heard us, as the House managers on behalf of the 
House of Representatives, and as the presenters of this case 
against the President, refer repeatedly and explicitly to the 
actual language of the statutes which form the basis for the 
articles of impeachment against President William Jefferson 
Clinton.
    Counsel Mills has, in fact, misrepresented the law of 
tampering with witnesses as set forth very explicitly in 
section 1512 of title 18 of the United States Code. In her 
arguments 2 days ago, Ms. Mills quite expressly stated that one 
of the elements that a prosecutor must charge and that must be 
found here, if, indeed, article II, which is obstruction of 
justice, should lie as the basis for a conviction thereon, one 
must find that tampering under 1512 requires threats or 
coercion. Nothing could be further from the truth.
    Now, if, in fact, Ms. Mills had stated to this body that 
one of the bases, one of several bases on which a prosecutor or 
we, as House managers, could, indeed, show this body that 
tampering with a witness would lie, includes, as an 
alternative, as an option, threats or coercion, she would have, 
instead of being misleading, been absolutely correct. That was 
not her position.
    Section 1512 of the United States Code expressly does not 
require threats of force, intimidation or coercion. It may be 
based on the person corruptly persuading another person or 
engaging in misleading conduct toward another person, both of 
which are terms, the definitions for which are not found in the 
ether, but are found, yet further reading, in title 18. Neither 
of them requires threats, intimidation or coercion.
    Moreover, in considering whether or not section 1512 or, 
indeed, its companion section, 1503, also obstruction of 
justice under the U.S. Criminal Code, which also does not 
require for a conviction to lie thereon threats of force, 
intimidation or coercion, but also may be and is based on 
corruptly influencing, those terms are expressly defined and 
dealt with not only in the definitional provisions of title 18, 
and including specifically definitions that apply to these 
provisions, these sections, but also in the case law.
    We respectfully direct the attention of the Senators in 
reviewing the law of obstruction of justice and the law of 
tampering with witnesses to some of the very cases cited by the 
attorneys for the President in their effort to deflect 
attention away from these particular provisions of the law as 
they apply to the conduct of the President.
    For example, in her presentation, Presidential Counsel 
Mills relied on the Supreme Court case of United States v. 
Aguilar in her statements. In that case, the Court held that a 
lie told to a criminal investigator was insufficient to prove 
witness tampering.
    What Ms. Mills failed to disclose, however, was that the 
Court's decision in that case, in that Aguilar case, was based 
on a specific finding not applicable to the facts of this case 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant 
could have even thought that the investigator was a potential 
witness at the time that he lied to him.
    The overwhelming body of evidence in this case, as we have 
heard yet this morning, most recently in response to questions, 
is that not only could the President, and the President did in 
fact reasonably presume, indeed almost invite, the lawyers in 
the Jones case to subpoena Ms. Currie as a witness, but we have 
found, contrary to the prior misleading statements of Counsel 
Ruff, she was, in fact, subpoenaed and called as a witness.
    Therefore, we believe that on both arguments raised by 
counsel for the President seeking to deflect attention away 
from and render inapplicable both obstruction provisions, 1503 
and 1512, because they, one, require--as we have shown they do 
not--but they would argue they require coercion, threats, 
intimidation or force or, two, they are inapplicable because 
the President could not have reasonably believed or did not 
know that Ms. Currie was a witness, could reasonably be 
expected to be a witness at the time the coercion took place.
    I yield for 1 minute to House Manager Graham.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I believe the House managers' time has 
expired.
    Mr. Manager BARR. I will not yield to House Manager Graham.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Byrd, to the President's 
counsel:

    Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist essay No. 65, states that ``The 
subjects of impeachment are ``those offenses which proceed from the 
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust.'' Putting aside the specific legal 
questions concerning perjury and obstruction of justice, how does the 
President defend against the charge that, by giving false and 
misleading statements under oath, such ``misconduct'' abused or 
violated ``some public trust''?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this, too, goes to the 
very heart of the deliberations in which you must engage at the 
end of these proceedings. As I have tried to make clear in my 
earlier arguments, it is not enough simply, I think, to ask 
does a particular generic form of misconduct, however serious 
it may be, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the President 
of the United States has committed an impeachable offense?
    As the framers made clear, and I think the history that lay 
behind their deliberations and the history that has followed 
make clear, when we speak of the kind of political--in caps, 
which is what it was in Federalist 65--offenses against the man 
in his public role, we speak of offenses which this body must 
ultimately judge as being so violative of his public 
responsibilities that our system cannot abide his continuing in 
office.
    Let us assume for a moment--and we will disagree with each 
and every element of the accusation--but let us assume for a 
moment that this body were to conclude that the President lied 
in the grand jury about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. 
That in and of itself does not lead to the judgment, and in our 
view must not lead to the judgment, that he needs to be removed 
from office. It must give you pause. You must think carefully 
about it.
    But ultimately you must ask, despite our rejection of any 
such conduct--whether it be a judge or a President or any other 
civil officer--have the framers instructed us to remove from 
his office, and overturn the will of the electorate, a 
President who, admittedly, if you conclude that he did violate 
the law in this regard, has violated a public trust in the 
broadest sense, as each of us does who serves the public, if we 
do anything other than that which are our properly assigned 
responsibilities, and do them with the utmost of integrity? 
Each of us violates that trust if we don't meet that standard.
    But the one thing we can be certain of is that the framers 
understood the frailties with which they were dealing. They 
understood the nature of the offense that had been the 
background of impeachment proceedings in England. And certainly 
the framers, in their debate, made it clear that it has to be 
at the highest level of public trust--the breach of the public 
trust that is embodied in the words ``treason,'' ``bribery,'' 
``selling your office'' and similar other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    And so all I ask the Senators in this regard is not to 
simply leap, as the managers would have you do it, from the 
definition of the offense or the statute governing their 
conduct, but to ask the constitutional question, as I know you 
will, the framers' question. If we have not convinced you on 
the facts, I hope we will convince you that the framers would 
have asked: Is our system so endangered that we must not only 
turn the President over to the same rule of law that any other 
citizen would be put under, after he leaves office, but must we 
cut short his term and overturn the will of the Nation? And in 
our view, in the worst case scenario, you can find the answer 
to that question must still be no.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Lott asks the House managers:

    Do the managers wish to respond to the answer just given by the 
President's counsel?

    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, we will briefly respond to the response just given by 
counsel for the President. We believe that the response and the 
position taken by the counsel for the President here really 
involves two great errors. One error is in establishing a 
standard of conduct for the Presidency that is too low. The 
other error is in attempting to minimize the significance of 
the offenses that this President has been charged with and 
which we submit to you the evidence supports the charges.
    Now, we do not submit that any President--this President, 
whoever it may be--should be impeached and removed from office 
for trivial or insubstantial offenses. We believe that an 
essential part of the focus of your inquiry must be on whether 
there was a serious, corrupt intent involved in the underlying 
conduct.
    A President should not be impeached and removed from office 
for a mistake of judgment. He should not be impeached and 
removed for a momentary lapse. Instead, he should be impeached 
and removed if he engages in a conscious and deliberate and 
settled choice to do wrong, a conscious and deliberate and 
settled choice to violate the laws of this land.
    We submit that he must be impeached and removed if he does 
that, because in doing so he has violated his oath of office 
and in doing so he has turned away from the unique role which 
he has under our Constitution, as the Chief Executive, charged 
with ensuring that the laws be faithfully executed. He steps 
aside from that role and takes on the role of one who attacks 
the rule of law. And it is for that reason that we believe this 
President should be removed. And we further submit the attempt 
to minimize the significance of the conduct of this President 
does a disservice to the laws of this land.
    The attempt to minimize this course of conduct, which 
started out as an effort to deprive a plaintiff in a civil 
rights case of her just day in court, is a serious course of 
conduct, a course of conduct which brings disrespect on the 
Office of the Presidency and, indeed, undermines the integrity 
of the Office of the Presidency, the integrity of the judicial 
system. And it is for all of those reasons that we submit to 
you the President's counsels' efforts to persuade you that this 
course of conduct is not impeachable are not persuasive and 
should not be accepted by the Senate in this case.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Torricelli and Rockefeller ask, 
to the President's counsel:

    The House managers have made the overly broad argument that 
``[n]othing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution 
suggests officials are subject to impeachment only for official 
conduct.'' Can this unbending argument be reconciled with the following 
statement from Justice James Wilson: ``Our President . . . is amenable 
to [the laws] in his private character as a citizen, and in his public 
character by impeachment''--and with the standard adopted by a 
bipartisan majority in the Watergate proceedings?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I could 
probably simply say no, given the articulate framing of that 
question, and I would have said as much as needed to be said.
    I think the managers have, in their strawman-building role, 
tried to suggest that our position somehow is so distant from 
constitutional realities and the realities of the operations of 
our Government that we could not conceive of a situation in 
which private conduct, no matter how egregious, would lead to 
removal. Of course, that is not the case. None of us could 
contemplate a setting in which even personal conduct--and I 
need not go through any examples--was so egregious that the 
people simply could not contemplate the notion of a President 
remaining in office.
    But other than that, if there is one message that comes 
out, not only of Judge Wilson but of the entire debate of 1787 
and all of the commentary since then, it is that, indeed, the 
focus of attention must be--and this goes back to, in large 
measure to Senator Byrd's question--must be on the public 
character of the man; the political, in a broader sense, 
character of the man; and of his acts.
    And if you look back at the 1974 writings of the House 
Judiciary Committee, both majority and minority, this is not a 
partisan view. They make it absolutely clear that the House 
then believed something which they must either not believe 
today or have ignored as they engaged in their discussions, 
which is that the test to be applied is whether the President 
in this case has so abused the public trust, so abused the 
powers of his office, that he goes to the very heart of what 
the framers had in mind in 1787 when they carefully confined 
and carefully limited the range of activity that could lead to 
contemplation of removal, and that is not a range of activity 
that, with all due respect, touches anywhere near the conduct 
that you have before you today.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Nickles asks the House managers:

    President's counsel stated the President did not commit perjury. 
Please respond.

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I trust that the 
presumption of 5 minutes is a rebuttable one, correct? I will 
do my best not to have to go beyond the time. I thank the 
Senator for the question.
    First, just as a predicate, obviously in 5 minutes I could 
not do a comprehensive review on the perjury aspects of this 
case, so let me just start with a preliminary issue and we can 
move on with different questions and revisit the issue at 
another time. If anybody wants a lesson in legal schizophrenia, 
please read the President's trial brief on this very subject. 
They skirt the issue by saying nowhere in the President's grand 
jury deposition did he ever affirm the truth of his civil 
deposition testimony. But they won't come out and say he lied, 
they won't come out and say he perjured himself, and they try 
to ignore the actual fact of when the President was asked 
questions about his oath that he took during the grand jury.
    I read, therefrom:
    Question to the President:

    You understand the oath required you to give the whole truth that 
is a complete answer to each question, sir.
    Answer: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I 
can.

    Question to the President:

    Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, on January 17, 1998, in a deposition in the 
Paula Jones litigation, is that correct, sir?
    Answer: I did take an oath there.
    Question: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
you then as it does today?
    Answer: I believed then that I had to answer the questions 
truthfully, that's correct.

    The colloquy goes on. It is in your materials.
    They attempt to say that that somehow inoculates the 
President from having to admit that he perjured himself during 
the Paula Jones deposition.
    But let's take a quick look at some of the answers he gave 
during the Paula Jones deposition that he affirmed in his grand 
jury testimony that we now know is false.
    Question to the President:

    If she [Monica Lewinsky] told someone she had a sexual affair with 
you beginning in November 1995, would that be a lie?
    Answer: It certainly would not be the truth.
    Question: I think I used the term ``sexual affair;'' and so the 
record is completely clear, have you ever had sexual relations with 
Monica Lewinsky as that term is defined in deposition exhibit No. 1?
    Answer: I have never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. 
I've never had an affair with her.

    Then they go on to ask:

    Is it true that when Monica Lewinsky worked at the White House, she 
met with you several times?
    Answer: I don't know about ``several times.'' There was a period 
when the Republican Congress shut the government down. The whole White 
House staff was being run by interns. She was assigned to work back in 
the Chief of Staff's Office. We were all working there. I saw her on 
two or three occasions then. And then when she worked at the White 
House I think there were one or two times when she brought some 
documents down to me.
    Question: At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky in the hallway 
between the oval office and the kitchen area?
    Answer: I don't believe so unless we were walking back to the 
dining room with pizzas. I just don't remember. I don't believe we were 
in the hallway, no.

    This colloquy goes on and on. I invite the Senate to review 
the President's deposition testimony.
    He clearly was giving answers that were false. They were 
not part of the record. He wasn't doing it to protect himself 
from embarrassment; he was doing it to defeat Paula Jones' 
sexual harassment case. When the President testified in August 
before the grand jury, he never denied the truth of those 
testimonies. He refused to admit he lied during the deposition. 
He reiterated the truth of those because he knew he would be 
subject to perjury.
    The question for the President's counsel is this, and it is 
a simple question: Did the President lie under oath on January 
17 when he was asked questions about the nature of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky? Did he lie when the U.S. 
Supreme Court had said Paula Jones had a right to proceed in a 
sexual harassment case? Did he lie when Judge Susan Webber 
Wright ordered him to answer those basic questions under oath? 
And if the answer to that question is yes, then we have an 
incredible admission; if the answer is no, I invite them to 
point to the record where that is demonstrated.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. To the President's counsel from Senators 
Conrad and Torricelli:

    The House of Representatives rejected two proposed articles of 
impeachment, including an article of alleged perjury in the Jones 
deposition. Do you believe that the Senate may, consistent with its 
constitutional role, convict and remove the President based on the 
allegations under the rejected articles, including the allegations of 
perjury?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, article II was 
defeated. But more importantly, article I specifically 
incorporates by reference, or tries to incorporate by 
reference, all the elements of article II. And the House of 
Representatives, when they voted to reject article II, I think, 
voted also to eliminate these issues about which you have just 
heard.
    We predicted--and our prediction has come true--that the 
managers would like to argue this case. If you look at the 
majority point that comes out before the vote occurs on all 
four articles and you go to article I and try to find out where 
in article I they define those perjurious statements that 
compose subpart (2), the civil deposition, you will see in the 
majority report they say go look at article II--which is the 
argument about the civil deposition--and the House of 
Representatives specifically voted to take out all those 
accusations and allegations of misconduct with respect to the 
civil deposition.
    I have testified, as did Mr. Ruff, before the Judiciary 
Committee on this issue. I said that the President's responses 
in the Jones deposition were surely evasive, that they surely 
were incomplete, that they surely were intended to mislead; and 
it was wrong for him to do all that. But they were not 
perjurious.
    If you want to try a perjury case about all of the things 
and the statements that the House of Representatives did not 
want to accuse him of, that would be inconsistent, I think, 
with your duty as members of this court. You cannot impeach the 
President on the issues that are included in article II. He was 
not impeached; you cannot remove.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we have had an equal 
number of questions, although the timing may not be exactly 
equal.
    I ask unanimous consent that we take a 15-minute recess at 
this point.
    There being no objection, at 2:41 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 3:01 p.m.; whereupon the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to 
resume the questions, and I believe this will be question No. 
16. We send the question to the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Santorum, Smith of Oregon, and Thomas to the House managers:

    Please respond to the presentation made by counsel to the 
President, including the argument made by Mr. Craig, to the effect that 
the rejection of article II had the effect of eliminating that portion 
of article I. Did the House conclude that lying in a civil deposition 
is not impeachable, but that lying to the grand jury about whether the 
witness lied in a civil deposition is impeachable?

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators 
for the question and for the opportunity to rebut the 
presentation a few minutes ago by counsel for the President, 
Mr. Craig.
    In his response he asks the Senate to do specifically what 
none of the attorneys can do in their presentations, and that 
is go beyond the record. Specifically, Mr. Craig is asking the 
Senate to make assumptions as to why the House of 
Representatives defeated what was then known as article II, a 
stand-alone article of impeachment that the President lied 
during the civil deposition. And he goes so far in his 
presentation to say because the House of Representatives 
defeated what was then article II, the Senate should not 
consider any of the language relating to the President's 
perjury during the civil deposition.
    First, I ask the Senate not to make those assumptions 
because if there was any reasonable inference to be drawn, it 
would be that it was cumulative. Why is it cumulative? Why did 
the House not want this to be a stand-alone article? It is 
cumulative because, if Mr. Craig would read article I, he would 
see that one of the allegations of perjury is that the 
President committed perjury in the grand jury when he 
referenced his civil deposition answers and reiterated those to 
the grand jury. And so the House made a decision not to use a 
separate stand-alone article. But I respectfully submit to this 
body that that is the only inference that can be drawn.
    The other thing I want to mention briefly about Mr. Craig's 
presentation on that issue is what I found to be a startling 
admission on his part. Assuming, of course, that the Senate is 
going to look at article I as it was drafted and passed by the 
House and is presented to you dealing with civil deposition 
perjury, Mr. Craig said that the President's testimony in the 
Jones case was evasive and incomplete.
    He goes even further in his testimony, or statement to the 
Senate a couple days ago, and I am quoting. He said, ``The 
President's testimony in the Jones case, the President was 
evasive, misleading, incomplete in his answers.''
    That begs the question. What kind of oath did the President 
take in the civil deposition? Did he take an oath, did he raise 
his hand and swear to tell the truth, the evasive truth, and 
nothing but the evasive truth? Did he take an oath to tell the 
truth, the misleading truth, and nothing but the misleading 
truth? Did he take an oath to tell the truth, the incomplete 
truth, and nothing but the incomplete truth? Because, if he 
did, if that was the language that the President used when he 
took his oath and testified, then perhaps Mr. Craig's position 
is well taken. But a brief review of the oath that the 
President took clearly states that he took an oath and was 
obliged under the law to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth--not the incomplete or misleading truth, 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    And so this body has to make a determination when they 
review that testimony, both given during the civil deposition 
and reiterated during the grand jury, whether the President 
fulfilled his legal obligation in a sexual harassment lawsuit. 
And if he did, then clearly that should be stricken, and you 
should not consider that. But if he did not, if you find that 
in fact he testified, as Mr. Craig says he testified, 
incompletely, evasively, and misleadingly, then I believe this 
body has an obligation to cast a vote accordingly.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Reed of Rhode Island asks the 
White House counsel:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question.

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Manager Rogan asked you not to make assumptions about 
what the actions of the House mean, and then proceeded to make 
a series of assumptions about what the House might have meant.
    The problem with Mr. Manager Rogan's analysis is twofold: 
One, he and his colleagues in the House on the Judiciary 
Committee drafted these four articles. They believed, at least 
20 of the majority believed, that it should be an impeachable 
offense, as he now puts it: did the President fulfill his 
obligation in the Jones deposition? You don't need to make a 
lot of assumptions to understand merely on the face of the 
action that was taken that the full House said, no, it is not, 
even if we were to conclude, as the House Judiciary majority 
wishes us to conclude, an impeachable offense.
    And so the managers have had to find a way to drag back 
into article I all of the problems that they see in the 
President's testimony in the Jones deposition. The problem is 
that--and you can listen to it in the language that Mr. Manager 
Rogan has used not only today but earlier and that is used in 
the brief filed by the House managers--that the President, in 
his words, referenced and reiterated his testimony in the Jones 
case. Senators, that is not so.
    They try to hook onto a statement, as best we are able to 
tell in searching their position and their writings on the 
subject, the managers hook onto a statement in which the 
President said, I tried to walk through the minefield of the 
Jones deposition without violating the law and think I did. 
And, on that frail hook--which is clearly a statement of the 
President's state of mind about whether he succeeded or didn't 
succeed in testifying without violating the law in the Jones 
case--on that hook they hang every single item. They didn't 
tell us what they were--but they hang every single item that 
the House rejected out of hand in article II.
    Wholly apart from the inadequacy of the predicate that they 
lay, if there was ever an example of a situation that Mr. Craig 
talked about earlier and that I talked about on Tuesday, in 
which I challenge anybody in this room to tell me how you would 
have known coming into this Chamber what it was that the 
managers were alleging with respect to the Jones deposition, 
this is it.
    Look at the trial brief. If you look at Manager Rogan's 
presentation of the other day, if you listened to his 
presentation today, where, amongst all that, do we pick and 
choose to find the statements? Even if you agree with Mr. 
Manager Canady that it is all right just to sort of generally 
charge, as a constitutional proposition--and I firmly disagree 
with that. I don't care under what level you are operating--the 
lowest trial court in the country--nobody would ever say: Now, 
Mr. Defendant, I want you to understand that you are being 
charged with what you'll find at page, whatever it is, of the 
majority report where we refer you over to this list of other 
things that was rejected by--just let us say the grand jury--
and somewhere in there you are going to find the charges to 
which we ask you to respond.
    The bottom line is, you can go down that list. Some of them 
you will never hear mentioned in this Chamber--haven't heard 
them mentioned yet. I defy anybody in this Chamber, including 
the managers, to justify asking the President of the United 
States to defend against a reference from one page of a brief 
to another in order to tell the charges of which he stands 
accused.
    If you read his grand jury testimony, you see he addressed 
a number of issues that he addressed in the Jones deposition. 
He clarified. He elaborated. He told the truth in the grand 
jury. Not once was he ever asked by the independent counsel and 
all his lawyers there who had been pursuing this investigation 
for 7 months when they had him in the grand jury--not once did 
they ask him this simple question: Is everything you testified 
to in the Jones deposition true? Or, go down the list and say: 
Is what you testified to on page 6, or page 8, or page 87 true?
    And when they got through with that deposition, 4 hours, 
professional prosecutors, and they went back and spent from 
August 18 to September 9, when they sent their referral up, 
looking back, using a fine-tooth comb on that transcript, and 
they went back and said--where are the violations? Even they 
don't say that there is some sort of wholesale importation of 
the Jones deposition into the grand jury. And, yet, not the 
House but the Judiciary Committee majority report and the 
managers, with that big, vacant, empty spot in the middle, the 
rejection of article II by the House of Representatives, would 
have you believe that, indeed, what the independent counsel's 
office didn't believe happened and didn't force to make happen, 
did happen. And they are asking you to remove the President 
from office on that kind of logic.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Shelby and Snowe 
to the House managers.

    There has been much debate regarding the nature of the offenses 
that fit within the definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' 
When employing this phrase in the Constitution, the framers relied on 
precedents supplied by Colonial and English common law to provide 
context and meaning. Please explain whether or not the offenses charged 
in the two Articles fit within the types of impeachable offenses 
contemplated by the framers as they interpreted Colonial and English 
common law precedent.

    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the 
Senate, I will be happy to respond to this question because it 
is a question that goes to the heart of the matter that is 
before us.
    On Saturday I made a presentation which focused on the 
history of the impeachment process in Great Britain and the way 
in which that serves as a backdrop for the work of the framers. 
I would like to refer you, again, to a document to which I made 
reference during the course of the proceedings on Saturday. 
This is a document which has also been referred to repeatedly 
by counsel for the President. It is the report prepared by the 
staff of the impeachment inquiry in the case of President Nixon 
entitled ``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential 
Impeachment.''
    I believe that in that report they grapple with the very 
issue that you have now raised. And in characterizing the 
background of impeachment and characterizing the things that 
the framers focused on both in the course of the Constitutional 
Convention and in the ratification debates and also--it goes a 
little beyond your question--the course of impeachment 
proceedings over the last 200 years in the House of 
Representatives and in the Senate, they came to this 
conclusion, and this is what they said. They said:

    The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--
undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties 
and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental 
process, adverse impact on the system of government.

    They went on to say:

    Impeachment was evolved by Parliament to cope with both the 
inadequacy of criminal standards''--and one of the issues that they 
were concerned with was whether there had to be a criminal violation in 
order for there to be a high crime or misdemeanor, and they concluded, 
I believe rightly, that there need not be a criminal offense, but they 
said, ``Impeachment was evolved by Parliament to cope with both the 
inadequacy of criminal standards and the impotence of courts to deal 
with the conduct of great public figures.

    They concluded, then, by saying:

    Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation--
which all of us in this Chamber concede--it is to be predicated only 
upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form 
and principles of our government or the proper performance of 
constitutional duties of the Presidential office.

    That is the standard which they set forth, which I believe 
encapsulates the whole history of the experience of the English 
Parliament, as well as the discussions in the Constitutional 
Convention and the ratification debates as well as anything I 
have seen.
    Let me point out that this was a product of the staff of 
the Rodino committee. This is not something that the House 
managers here today have come up with to support our case; it 
is there as part of the record.
    Let me refer to another part of that particular report, 
which I think gets to the essence of the matter here. They 
said, ``Each of the thirteen American impeachments''--of 
course, there have been more impeachments since the time this 
was written--``involved charges of misconduct incompatible with 
the official position of the officeholder. This conduct falls 
into three broad categories.''
    I think that this is a very sensible division of the types 
of conduct that may fall--the types of conduct that constitute 
high crimes and misdemeanors.

    (1) exceeding the constitutional bounds of the powers of the office 
in derogation of the powers of another branch of government; (2) 
behaving in a manner grossly incompatible with the proper function and 
purpose of the office; and (3) employing the power of the office for an 
improper purpose or for personal gain.

    I submit to you, in conclusion, that what we have before 
the Senate in this case is conduct that clearly falls within 
the scope of category 2, which I just read, which I will 
repeat--``behaving in a manner grossly incompatible with the 
proper function and purpose of the office''--for the very 
reasons I explained a few moments ago. When the President of 
the United States, who has taken an oath of office to support 
and defend the Constitution, who has a constitutional duty to 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, engages in a 
calculated course of criminal conduct, he has, in the most 
direct, immediate, and culpable manner, violated his oath of 
office, breached his duty under the Constitution, and for that 
reason has behaved in a way that is grossly incompatible with 
the proper function and role of the high office to which he has 
been entrusted--which has been entrusted to him by the people 
of the United States.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Bingaman to 
White House counsel:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the Managers in their response to the previous question?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, let me make 
a couple of points, if I might. The question that was put to 
the managers started by asking what we can learn from looking 
back into English roots of impeachment and how that might bear 
on the decisions that you face in the coming days.
    I will not, in any sense, hold myself out as a scholar or 
at least enough of one to be able to answer the question with 
any specificity, but I do know enough about the parliamentary 
form of government and its experience with impeachment to know 
that a couple of lessons can be drawn from it.
    First, that impeachment was a developing tool over the 
course of the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th centuries as a weapon 
in the battle between the Parliament and the Crown. It was one 
of the ways--indeed, one of the very few ways--the Parliament 
could reach out and remove the King's ministers or the Queen's 
ministers, and that was really where the battleground was.
    Even in that setting, when it was an avowed political tool, 
history, I think, will tell us that Parliament did ask itself, 
Was the conduct of the minister at issue--whoever that minister 
might be--so subversive of the constitutional form of 
government that removal of the minister, or in some cases even 
more severe sanctions, was necessary?
    If you transport that into the experience of the framers, 
it does two things, I believe: One, it tells you what the 
framers knew of the seriousness of the offenses that had to be 
addressed through impeachment and what the need for impeachment 
was as the ultimate solution to the ultimate problem.
    But it also tells you very clearly that the framers did not 
want to bring that English experience in wholesale because they 
recognized it for what it was, which was, indeed, a weapon in 
the battle between the Parliament and the Crown, and the 
government that they had created needed balance among the 
legislature and the executive and the judicial branch. The use 
of impeachment, as it was reflected over the four or five 
centuries that had been developed, was not consistent with what 
these framers were creating. And so they very carefully chose, 
and the debates reflect that, to limit the scope of impeachment 
and to use it as they viewed it: only as a matter of 
constitutional last resort.
    In doing so, they foretold, I think, the positions staked 
out both by the majority and the minority at the time of 
Watergate. And let me pause here just for a moment to say that 
I will not go into detail respecting the conduct engaged in by 
former President Nixon, except to say and suggest to you that 
it is so far distant from anything that has been charged here 
that it doesn't belong in the same sentence, paragraph, or 
certainly article.
    But if you look at what came out of the House Judiciary 
Committee in 1974, I agree entirely with the theme of the 
majority staff report at the time, as did the minority. Their 
theme was the theme that I hope I have sounded, probably too 
often, over the last few days. And I am going to read to you 
again--I apologize to you--something I read to you earlier, 
which is the minority view on the meaning of impeachment:

    It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that 
the framers of the United States Constitution intended that the 
President should be removable but by the legislative branch only for 
serious misconduct dangerous to the system of Government established by 
this Constitution. Absent the element of danger to the State, we 
believe the delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787--

    I will skip over a little language here--

struck the balance in favor of stability in the executive branch.

    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Grassley, Smith of New 
Hampshire, Bunning and Craig ask the House managers:

    In your presentation, you made the case that the Senate should call 
witnesses. In light of the White House's response to this argument, do 
you still hold this position? Please elaborate.

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, the 
House definitely holds to the position that we should call 
witnesses. But I think the issue here is what has been related 
to us in anything we have heard in the past few days by the 
White House counsel that would say we don't need them, or I 
think just the contrary, what have we heard that says we are 
more likely to need them, or you are more likely to need them. 
First of all, I would like to point out to you that the White 
House counsel is trying to have it both ways.
    They have been arguing to you on a lot of technicalities of 
the law, the criminal law, for the last few days, and that is 
understandable.
    As I said to you a few days ago, I think this is a two-
stage process. We, the managers, do. You have to determine if 
the President committed crimes, and if he did, should he be 
removed from office: two separate questions. They have argued 
to you that you should use the standard, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which is a criminal standard, and I might add that 
standard is only for facts, it is not for whether you remove; 
it isn't to determine law.
    You wear the hat as finders of fact as well as the judges, 
finders of the law, and so forth. But if you choose to use that 
standard, you need to know that it doesn't mean it excludes any 
doubt. You probably need to hear a jury instruction, which we 
can provide at some reasonable point for you, about how a 
Federal court would charge a jury about that.
    The point I am making is that they have claimed that, and 
they claim there is a lack of specificity in the charges. We 
are not in court in the sense of a real trial here. We don't 
have to be specific like that. The whole history of the 
articles of impeachment that have come over here in the past on 
judges have never gotten down into the technical specificity of 
a courtroom and been thrown out because they were not exactly 
right.
    My point is they have built up a whole case about we ought 
to follow these rules and have a criminal proceeding and judge 
the crimes on that basis, and yet they have said you wouldn't 
have witnesses or we shouldn't call witnesses.
    In any criminal trial, you are going to call witnesses; you 
need to judge their credibility. I want to walk through what 
else they have said to you in the last couple of days that 
makes that point very clear with regard to testimony, with 
regard to judging who you believe or who you don't believe and 
how important that is.
    First of all, let's just take a few glimpses, but as we do 
this, remember the big picture is the scheme the President has 
engaged in. The whole basis for our discussion today in each of 
these two articles of impeachment involves the questions of the 
President trying to thwart the Jones court will, trying to hide 
evidence from the court and planning not to tell the truth in 
that deposition in January. Whether that is over here on a 
perjury count or not is irrelevant. It is critical to this case 
for both obstruction of justice and perjury that you accept and 
understand, as I think clearly you do from listening to all of 
this, that the President lied many times in that deposition in 
the Jones case because he didn't want them to get the facts, 
the true facts of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    In that process of looking at that, he needed Monica, if 
you recall, to file a false affidavit. He needed to obscure the 
fact that there were gifts there. He needed to obscure the 
trail that led to him in any detailed relationship with her.
    So let's take, for example, the gift-exchange discussion 
counsel had out here a couple of days ago with us. They were 
pointing out to you--the White House counsel--that on December 
28, that Monica Lewinsky, in her grand jury testimony, 
testified that the President said to her--with respect to what 
she should do about those gifts, and she raised giving them to 
maybe Betty Currie--I don't know or let me think about that.
    The counsel said, well, let's go back and look at 10 
different times where she said about that subject all kinds of 
different ways. I submit to you that her grand jury testimony, 
after she got the immunity to testify, is clearly the most 
credible. We presented that to you, and that is what the 
President said.
    It is significant what he said, because that is part of 
your chain you have to lead down the road to figure out whether 
or not he had the requisite intent to influence the outcome of 
what was done with the gifts.
    The reality of this is that when you look at it, you have 
to question her testimony; you have to question her 
believability. You ought to bring her out here. She should be 
brought out here, if they are going to challenge her like this, 
and give an opportunity for us to examine her on both sides and 
determine what is her best testimony about that, if that is 
important to you, and apparently it is to White House counsel.
    The same thing is true of the questions with regard to Ms. 
Currie and the phone call dealing with the question of coming 
over to get the gifts. There White House counsel is saying, in 
essence, Ms. Lewinsky is not telling the truth; Ms. Currie is. 
If you don't have them here to listen to, who are you going to 
believe? I suspect if Ms. Lewinsky came out here, that 1-minute 
phone conversation, which was not part of the Starr referral--
we discovered that subsequent to that--would be something she 
could comment on and explain, and maybe Ms. Currie could, too. 
But we do not have that. And they made a big to-do over that in 
the last couple days.
    Last, but not least, what I put up on the chart here is 
dealing with this affidavit. This affidavit is very important. 
It is a central part of the obstruction of justice. It is the 
very first obstruction of justice and the question of 
truthfulness. And who you believe in this pattern is very, very 
important.
    The White House counsel have been arguing the last few days 
that, indeed, with regard to the cover stories, that there was 
no discussion of cover stories in a timely way during the 
December 17 phone conversation when the President suggested 
Monica Lewinsky file an affidavit, and that the cover story 
idea somehow isn't tied into the issue of putting into her head 
that she should tell a lie.
    I call your attention to what I read to you the other day. 
It is up here on this board. And I refer it back to you on the 
chart. This is one of the charts where she testified before the 
grand jury--Monica Lewinsky did:

    At some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it was 
before or after the subject of the affidavit came up--

    I don't know if it was before or after, but it was during 
that conversation on December 17 when the affidavit did come 
up--

    he sort of said, ``You know, you can always say you were coming to 
see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' Which I understood 
was really a reminder of things that we had discussed before.

    And she went on to say the famous quote: ``And I knew 
exactly what he meant [by this].''
    And if you remember--I read that to you the other day--she 
also said: ``It was the pattern of the relationship, to sort of 
conceal it.''
    I am not going to put the other board up here, but in the 
same context they have been saying, with respect to this 
affidavit issue again, ``No one asked me to lie.'' Remember 
that was repeated over and over and over again. And I, again, 
point out to you that you need to bring her in here, I think, 
based on what they are saying and arguing, to find out for 
yourself if she is going to corroborate this.
    She said in the grand jury testimony:

    For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened was, you 
know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me 
either.

    And she went on to say: ``And by him not calling me and 
saying that''--that she shouldn't lie; I didn't read the whole 
paragraph--``I knew what [he] meant.''
    ``Did you understand all along that he would deny the 
relationship also?''
    She says: ``Mm-hmmm. Yes.''
    The question: ``And when you say you understood what it 
meant when he didn't say, `Oh, you know, you must tell the 
truth,' what did you understand that to mean?''
    She says: ``That--that--as we had on every other occasion 
and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny 
it.''
    If you believe her, then the President is not telling the 
truth. The affidavit clearly is something he was trying to get 
her to file falsely. It makes sense that he would, because he 
relied on it in the deposition. He patterned it after the cover 
stories in the affidavit--what he had to say--the lies he told 
about the relationship. It makes common sense to me.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. McCollum, I think you have answered 
the question.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you very much.
    My point is, you ought to bring the witnesses.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question from Senator Bryan to the 
White House counsel:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question, 
focusing on the need for witnesses and the time likely required to 
prepare for and conduct discovery?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, the first question 
to ask about the need to call witnesses is, What would the 
witnesses add? That has not been described. What you have heard 
are vague expressions of credibility and hope. You have not 
heard specifically what these witnesses would add. And the 
answer to that is, they would add nothing to what is not 
already there.
    Yesterday, I held up the five volumes of testimony, 
thousands and thousands of pages. You have it before you. Now, 
those five volumes represent 8 or 9 months of activity by the 
independent counsel. The independent counsel called many, many, 
many witnesses, many, many, many times. They proceeded with no 
limitation on their budget, on their resources. They turned 
things upside down. And they repeatedly--I think abusively--but 
they repeatedly called witnesses--like Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan, 
Ms. Lewinsky--back to the grand jury for repeated interviews. 
It is all right there. And the managers have really told you 
nothing that could be added to this record.
    Second, they have not made a representation about what the 
witnesses would really say that is different. And the reason 
they have not is that they themselves don't know. They 
themselves have done no investigation. They don't know what 
these witnesses would say. They are hoping that maybe something 
will turn up.
    What they have done is they have taken those five volumes, 
and more, from the independent counsel. And I am reminded of 
the old bureau that many newspapers had called ``Rewrite.'' 
That was not a bureau which did independent reporting. When an 
editor read something that was incomprehensible, he or she 
would say, ``Get me Rewrite.'' So what the House has done is 
gotten ``Rewrite'' to write up its own report. They cannot tell 
you--they can tell you what they hope--they cannot make a 
representation or a proffer to you about what any witnesses 
would say.
    Their third, and really their only argument, is the 
credibility argument--got to see these witnesses. In point of 
fact, in the real world, when you have witnesses, their stories 
often differ in some ways. They differ not because anybody is 
lying; they differ only because people don't always have 
precisely the same recollection of things. That doesn't mean 
that looking at them will add anything other than getting for 
you the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th account of what some witnesses 
said.
    For example, in our trial brief, we quote--and Mr. McCollum 
referred to this--at pages 66 to 67, 11 accounts that Ms. 
Lewinsky has given on the gift exchange. I do not think you are 
going to learn anything from a 12th account. And by the way, 
with respect to the question of she might have testified 
differently after she got immunity, 9 out of 11 of these 
accounts were given, as you will see from the dates and the 
testimony, after she got immunity. Calling witnesses will add 
nothing to the record now before you. All the major witnesses 
have testified, and their testimony is right there.
    In response to the question of how long it will take, I 
must tell you, we have never had a chance to call witnesses 
ourselves, to examine them, to cross-examine them, to subpoena 
documentary evidence--at no point in this process. It would be 
malpractice for any lawyer to try even a small civil case, let 
alone represent the President of the United States when the 
issue is his removal from office, without an adequate 
opportunity for discovery.
    I think if they are going to begin calling witnesses, and 
going outside the record, which we have right now--I think the 
record is complete; and we are dealing with it as best we can 
without having had an ability ourselves to subpoena people and 
cross-examine them and depose them--but I think you are looking 
realistically at a process of many months to have a fair 
discovery process.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Chafee. It 
is to the House managers:

    The White House defense team makes a lot out of Monica Lewinsky's 
statement that she delivered the presents to Betty Currie around 2:00 
or 2:30 and about the fact that the phone call came from Betty Currie 
at 3:32. Isn't it reasonable to assume that Ms. Currie meant that she 
delivered the presents to Ms. Currie in the afternoon?
    If the President was unconcerned about the presents, as he said in 
his grand jury testimony, why didn't he simply tell Ms. Lewinsky not to 
worry about it?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Let me just broadly review the whole gift issue and the 
discrepancy in the testimony.
    First of all, I want to go back to Mr. Ruff's presentation 
during the last 3 days.
    He argued that I unfairly characterized Betty Currie as 
having a fuzzy memory whenever she was unclear. And she was 
clear that it was her memory that Monica Lewinsky called to 
initiate the retrieval of the gifts. And, of course, that is in 
conflict with the testimony of Monica Lewinsky.
    Further, they argue that Monica Lewinsky's time sequence as 
to when she went to pick up the gifts, when Betty Currie went 
to pick up the gifts, destroys her credibility. Her time 
sequence does not fit. Let's look at her testimony on this 
particular point. This is what Betty Currie has testified to, 
and this is exhibit H-A in your folder on my presentation; 
exhibit A. These are statements of Betty Currie in her 
deposition testimony about when she picked up the gifts.
    The first one is her testimony on January 27, 1998. She was 
asked when she picked up the gifts, and she said, ``Sometime in 
the last 6 months;''
    In May she was asked when she picked up the gifts, and she 
said, ``A couple of weeks'' [after the December 28 meeting]; in 
the May 6 testimony, it was after the 28th meeting; and then in 
her last testimony, July 22, in the ``fall maybe.''
    That is Betty Currie's testimony. Contrast that to that of 
Monica Lewinsky.
    This is her recollection as to when Betty Currie came to 
pick up the gifts. You will see that she has testified in her 
proffer of February 1, ``Later that afternoon''; July 27, she 
said Currie called ``several hours after leaving the White 
House;'' ``about 2 o'clock''; ``Later in the day''; and August 
6, called ``several hours'' after Lewinsky left the White 
House. Her memory is fairly good about this.
    The question is, the cell phone call, which really 
corroborates what Monica Lewinsky said, that it was Betty 
Currie who called to retrieve the gifts, and said the President 
said, ``You have something for me,'' or something to that 
effect. That came about 3:30. The cell phone record was 
retrieved after Monica Lewinsky's testimony.
    Does this destroy her credibility, particularly in contrast 
to that of Betty Currie? I think it reflects that you are 
trying to remember--you remember that it was a call 
specifically from Betty Currie to retrieve the gifts. At the 
time, she said it was in the afternoon. I think it corroborates 
her because she has never had an opportunity to look at the 
cell phone record--neither has Betty Currie--to refresh her 
recollection and trigger it and see what that produces.
    That is on the gift issue.
    They say, What would it add to call witnesses? How are you 
going to determine the truthfulness of this issue? Juries 
across the country do it by calling witnesses.
    In this particular case, it should be noted that all other 
testimony of Betty Currie--I think her last one was about July 
27 before the grand jury--all of it preceded the testimony of 
William Jefferson Clinton which was in August before the grand 
jury. The point is, because of the rush, the push, the 
independent counsel didn't call anybody back to the grand jury 
to re-question them after the information received from William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    So there are a lot of unanswered questions, perhaps, that 
were generated by his testimony. The 1-minute call was raised: 
How in the world could this be expressed in 1 minute--the 
conversation that Betty Currie called to retrieve the gifts? If 
you look at Monica Lewinsky's description of that call--excuse 
me, let me read from her grand jury transcript. She was asked 
about the call, and her answer was:

    What I was reminded a little bit, jumping back to the July 14th 
incident where I was supposed to call back Betty the next day, but not 
getting into the details with her that this was along the same lines:

    Question to Monica Lewinsky:

    Did you feel any need to explain to her what was going to happen?

    Her answer:

    No.

    In other words, this was a cell phone call. It was a 
cryptic call. It was about retrieving gifts that were under 
subpoena. It was a short conversation. It doesn't take a minute 
to say, ``The President indicated you had something for me''--
Monica knows what she is talking about--``Come over,'' and that 
is the end of the conversation--certainly it would not take 1 
minute.
    So all of the evidence is consistent with Monica's 
testimony.
    But let's look at the big picture on the gifts. The 
evidence was concealed under the bed. It was evidence that was 
concealed in a civil rights case; secondly, it was under 
subpoena; thirdly, the President knew it was under subpoena; 
and fourthly, Monica Lewinsky's testimony indicates that it 
was, the call from Betty Currie, at the direction of the 
President--and I am arguing there, a little; please understand 
that--which initiated the retrieval of the evidence that was 
under subpoena.
    That is the big picture on this. I believe we have made our 
case on that, and I believe it is strong, and I think it also 
justifies the hearing of the testimony to resolve the remaining 
conflict.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is to the President's counsel from 
Senators Leahy, Schumer, and Wyden:

    Notwithstanding the previous response by the House manager, does 
not the evidence show:
    (a) Ms. Lewinsky's testimony; it was her idea to give the gifts to 
Betty Currie?
    (b) the President's testimony; that he never told Betty Currie to 
retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky?
    (c) Betty Currie's testimony; that it was Ms. Lewinsky, not the 
President, who asked her to pick up the gifts? And,
    (d) the fact that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts 
on the very morning that he is alleged to have asked for them back?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I am not sure I 
managed to capture all four subpoints of that question but I 
will do my best.
    It is interesting that the managers now suggest that the 
great discovery of the 3:32 phone call that was so much the 
heart and soul of Mr. Schippers' presentation and ultimately of 
theirs is really just a slight glitch in the timetable.
    Yes, it is perfectly possible, I suppose, that Ms. Lewinsky 
could have just missed by an hour and a half, but she did say, 
three times, once under oath, and twice to the FBI, which is 
almost the same, that it was 2 o'clock, not 3:30.
    So if you are going to ask, consistency, good memory, as 
Ms. Lewinsky is supposed to have on this matter, she was 
consistent, but you have to ask, if it really happened at 2 
o'clock as she recalled, what is the meaning of the 3:32 call?
    Putting aside that dispute, the question itself reflects 
the essence of our position on this. First of all, there are 
only two people present at the moment in which, theoretically, 
the managers would have that the President urged Betty Currie 
to go off and pick up the gifts. The President of the United 
States and Betty Currie, they both testified, flatly, that such 
a conversation did not occur. Do the managers really anticipate 
if Ms. Currie were brought into the well of the Senate and 
looked straight in the eye by one of the prosecutors on this 
team, she would say, ``You got me, I had it wrong. The 
President really did tell me to do something but I have 
testified straightforwardly and honestly''?
    He didn't say, as my colleague Mr. Kendall indicated--that 
is wish and hope, and it has no basis in the allegation.
    And, of course, the managers have thought up a good excuse 
for why it is that the President is giving Ms. Lewinsky more 
gifts on the very day when he is conspiring with her to hide 
them: That somehow it is a gesture, a message being sent, that 
because of these gifts she is someone who is being roped into a 
conspiracy of silence.
    Aside from the fact that there is not one single--not one 
single--iota of evidence to support that wishful thinking, is 
it really likely, even given the managers' perception of this 
matter, that by giving Ms. Lewinsky the bear that my brief but 
important colleague Senator Bumpers referred to yesterday, and 
a pin of the New York skyline, and a couple of other things, 
including a Radio City Music Hall scarf--I may have missed 
some--that some great message was being sent to Ms. Lewinsky, 
that this collection of ``valuable'' items was a message to 
keep the faith, stay inside a conspiracy? I don't think so.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire about the time 
that has been used on each side?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I will ask the Parliamentarian.
    The counsel for the White House has consumed 57 minutes. 
The counsel for the managers have consumed 54 minutes.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe we have a question at the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers, proposed by Senators Snowe, Ashcroft, Enzi, Burns, 
Smith of New Hampshire, and Craig:

    At the end of the Jones deposition, Judge Wright admonished the 
parties that, ``This case is subject to a protective order regarding 
all discovery, and all parties present, including the witness, are not 
to say anything whatsoever about the questions they were asked, the 
substance of the deposition . . . any details, and this is extremely 
important to this court.'' Within hours of Judge Wright's admonition to 
all parties not to discuss details of the deposition, didn't the 
President telephone Betty Currie to ask her to make a rare Sunday visit 
to the Oval Office?

    Before answering, the Chair wishes to make a correction in 
response to the inquiry from the majority leader. The time used 
by the House managers is 64 minutes, rather than 54 minutes.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. I trust that doesn't mean I have to sit 
down, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. It is not retroactive.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Maybe I should quit while I am ahead.
    I thank the Senators for their question. That is absolutely 
true, and we know that because Betty Currie testified to that. 
She said it was very rare to receive a phone call from the 
President to ask her to come down to the White House on Sunday. 
A day after the President testified in a deposition, when he 
was specifically admonished by the judge that he was not to 
discuss the deposition, he was not to detail it with anybody, 
he was not to go into any of those factors, the President 
called Betty Currie down to the White House and he made some 
specific statements to her. He said to her:

    I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

    When the President was asked 8 months later:

    Why did you call Betty Currie down to the White House and pose not 
questions, but statements to her?

    When he was asked why he called Betty Currie down to the 
White House and said that to her, this is how the President 
responded:

    I was trying to figure out what the facts were. I was trying to 
remember.

    That is patently false because in August when the President 
testified, embarrassment was no longer on the table. The 
President was admitting that he had, as he called it, an 
improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. So why did he call 
Betty Currie down there? He called her down there that day 
after the deposition, in violation of the judge's order, 
because throughout his deposition he kept referring to Betty 
Currie as the fountain of information. If you read the 
deposition testimony, you see the President reiterating over 
and over, ``Monica came to see Betty,'' and, ``You would have 
to ask Betty.'' He made innumerable references to Betty Currie.
    That was his invitation to the Jones lawyers to depose 
Betty Currie, and we know from Mr. Manager Hutchinson's 
presentation earlier that that is what happened. Betty Currie 
ended up with a subpoena from the Jones lawyers, and the 
President could not waste any time; he had to make sure, with 
discovery closing, that he got to Betty Currie right away, to 
make sure that the story was straight.
    How can one possibly say that he was posing the statements 
to Betty Currie to remember, when the President knew that in 
fact he was alone with Monica, that Betty wasn't always there 
with him when Monica was in the Oval Office with him? She would 
not be able to tell him that Monica came on to him and not the 
other way around. This is patently ludicrous. There is no 
reasonable explanation.
    Mr. Chief Justice, if I have a minute left, I would like to 
yield to Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you. Just a quick point on 
that, because there was a question raised that the testimony of 
Betty Currie in that circumstance was that she, I believe, did 
not feel pressured. The President's counsel makes a big issue 
of that, as if this is a fatal defect. It is not a fatal 
defect.
    In fact, it is really irrelevant because the issue is 
witness tampering, obstruction of justice. The question is the 
President's intent, not how Betty Currie felt under that 
circumstance. She can characterize what she wishes. To me, it 
is an example like, if you as a lawmaker are presented a bribe 
of $100,000 to cast your vote in a particular way, you might 
not be tempted in the slightest. You might say, ``Go your own 
way.'' But it is still attempted bribery, attempted obstruction 
of justice. So that is a critical question. This is one element 
of obstruction of justice where each element has been met. The 
proof is clear, without any question of a doubt, as well as the 
rest of it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to White House 
counsel from Senator Kennedy:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions 
made by the managers in their response to the previous question?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Let me 
start by actually responding briefly to the question that was 
asked, which is whether in fact the President violated the gag 
order. I think it is important that we be very direct and 
candid on this so the record is clear.
    There is no question that a gag order was issued, that it 
had been in existence for some 3 months, and it applied to the 
parties and lawyers. It is important, I think, to understand 
the purpose for which it was entered.
    During the months of litigation in the Jones case, we have 
seen a veritable flood of leakage out of the deposition, all of 
which was adverse to the President. The judge made very clear 
that her concerns were revelations to the press.
    I think it is fair to say that even if one might argue that 
the President talking to his secretary on the day after a 
deposition was somehow talking to a person that he should not 
after his deposition, I suggest that any person covered by--
certainly a party covered by a gag order, particularly the 
President of the United States, is free to speak with those 
from whom he needs assistance in the preparation of his 
defense. That, of course, is at least in part what the 
President has said here.
    But let me be very clear that, to the extent the President 
overstepped his bounds in terms of this gag order, that is a 
matter of concern that the judge could take up, or the parties 
could take up. And as far as I know--probably because their 
sense of shame would not permit it--the parties on the other 
side of the Jones case have never suggested that this was a 
problem. Indeed, it was not a problem until we heard about it 
recently in this Chamber.
    More specifically, with respect to the substance of Mr. 
Manager Rogan's response, and Manager Hutchinson's response, my 
colleague, Ms. Mills, told you what the essential human dynamic 
was that was going on with the President, who had just gone 
through a deposition in which his worst fears were being 
realized--his life, in terms of his relations with his family, 
was beginning to unravel. He could see it coming. He could see 
the press coming at him. They were already on the Internet. 
There was no question in his mind that his worst fears of 
public disclosure were about to be realized.
    Put yourselves in a comparably traumatic human situation 
and ask whether you wouldn't reach out to have this kind of 
conversation with the one person you knew who was the most 
familiar with the facts that Monica Lewinsky had, indeed, been 
in and out of the White House, exchanged gifts, and done all 
the other things that Betty knew about, even though she didn't 
know about the primary extent of their relationship. But ask 
yourself also whether, in fact, under any circumstances, either 
on the 18th of January when the first conversation occurred, or 
on the 20th of January when we believe the second conversation 
occurred, if there is really any reason to believe that the 
President had somehow invited Jones lawyers to make Betty 
Currie a witness, because, as my colleague, Ms. Mills, put it 
most sharply and most clearly, the last thing in the world the 
President of the United States wanted to do was to invite 
anybody to depose or have testify the one woman who knew that, 
indeed, there had been gifts exchanged, and visits, and 
letters. It simply doesn't make sense.
    Lastly, let me, I suppose, just ask as the question has 
been put to you on a couple of occasions, what is it that would 
come from calling witnesses in the case? Ms. Currie has 
testified not just once, but a multiple of occasions about the 
events, no new facts had come out, and the only thing that you 
would hear would be a repetition of the bottom-line assessment. 
I could have said wrong when he said right and I was under no 
pressure whatsoever.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Gramm of Texas and 
Smith of New Hampshire to White House counsel:

    If you said that our oath to impartial justice required us 
to allow the President to have a handful of witnesses to defend 
himself, don't you believe that all 100 Senators would say 
``yes''? How can we do impartial justice by turning around and 
denying the House that same right?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Senators, the answer to that question, I think, is really 
very straightforward and easy and the fog of some of the 
discussion which has been had on the subject over the last days 
and weeks ought not to get in the way of this.
    The House of Representatives, at least as they are 
described by the managers they sent to you--I don't know how to 
put this gently--violated their constitutional responsibility 
in the handling of this matter. They characterized themselves 
as nothing more than a grand jury, nothing more than a 
screening device between the allegations transported to them by 
the independent counsel, and the ultimate vote a month and 3 
days ago. They felt, as they have reiterated constantly during 
that process, that they knew everything they needed to know not 
to make the judgment; that it was worth sending on to the 
Senate for them to think about. But they knew everything they 
needed to know, as you heard them say so eloquently and so 
forcefully here, to remove the President of the United States 
from office. Now they are saying to you, ``Well, maybe not. 
There really isn't enough here to make that important critical 
judgment.''
    So having abandoned--not to put it too sharply--what I view 
and I think most would view as their obligation to do the right 
constitutional thing a month ago, they turn to us and say, 
``Well, protect our managers rights to just add a little bit 
and see if we can make it, and then we will turn to you and see 
if you want to call witnesses in response.''
    Senators, I really think they should have done it right the 
first time. And they have told you--not back then, but they 
have told you now--that they have done it right, because 
otherwise they wouldn't, as a matter of their responsibility, 
be able to stand in the well of this Senate and urge you to 
remove the President of the United States. How could they make 
that recommendation if they had any uncertainty? If they didn't 
believe what was in those five volumes was sufficient under the 
day, they couldn't. They couldn't.
    Our rights are these for the President of the United 
States: He is entitled to ask you whether, when the House of 
Representatives voted to impeach him, they had enough evidence 
to make one of the most serious constitutional judgments that 
is entrusted to them. And it can't be that because they didn't 
do it right then, that you and we are now asked to extend this 
process just so that maybe if they go to the right person and 
ask the right question, or find the right document something 
will emerge that translates those five volumes into something 
that really is a constitutional basis for the removal of the 
President.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Feingold to the 
House managers.

    In light of the allegations in the articles of impeachment 
that the President is guilty of providing ``perjurious'' 
statements to a grand jury and has ``obstructed . . . the 
administration of justice,'' is the appropriate burden of proof 
for these particular articles ``beyond the reasonable doubt,'' 
as it would be in an ordinary criminal proceeding? Should a 
Senator vote to convict the President based on his allegedly 
committing these Federal statutory crimes if each of the 
elements of the crimes have not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt?

    Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And I say 
to Mr. Ruff, I violated no oath nor the Constitution, and I 
think the House managers, in fact, followed the Constitution 
when we served the articles of impeachment. I also note, for 
historical note as well, Mr. Ruff, you know that in the 
impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the House didn't even hold 
a single hearing.
    So I just want to be very up front and fair here.
    With regard to the question that was asked by the 
gentleman, the Constitution does not discuss the standard of 
proof for impeachment trials. It simply states that the Senate 
shall have the power to try all impeachments. Because the 
Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to look 
at past practice of the Senate.
    Historically, the Senate has never set a standard of proof 
for impeachment trials. In the final analysis to the question, 
one which historically has been answered by individual Senators 
guided by your individual conscience. You will note that 
earlier one of the White House counsel stood up--and they like 
to talk to you about criminal statutes and cite that it 
requires the proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That is not so. 
This argument has been rejected by the Senate historically.
    For instance, in the impeachment trial of Judge Harry 
Claiborne, at that time the counsel for Judge Claiborne moved 
to designate beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard of proof 
for conviction. The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion 
by a vote of 17 to 75. You rejected that as a standard of 
proof.
    In the floor debate on the motion, the House managers 
emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each Member 
to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. And during 
the impeachment of Judge Hastings, Senator Rudman, in response 
to a question about the historical practice regarding this 
standard of proof that there has been no specific standard, 
``You are not going to find it. It is what is in the mind of 
every Senator, and I think it is what everybody decides for 
themselves.''
    The criminal standard of proof again is inappropriate for 
impeachment trials. The result of conviction in an impeachment 
trial is removal from office, not punishment. As the House 
argued in the trial of Judge Claiborne, the reasonable doubt 
standard was designed to protect criminal defendants who risked 
forfeitures of life, liberty, and property. This standard is 
inappropriate here because the Constitution limits the 
consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from 
office and disqualification from holding office in the future, 
explicitly preserving in the Constitution the option for a 
subsequent trial in the courts.
    In addition, the House argued in the Claiborne trial the 
criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by 
its nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more 
heavily than the interest of the individual. Again, the 
criminal standard of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, is 
inappropriate in an impeachment trial and, Senators, you are to 
be guided by your own conscience in your decision.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The President's counsel are asked by 
Senators Thompson, Snowe, Enzi, Frist, Craig, DeWine, and 
Hatch:

    Four days after the President's Paula Jones testimony, 
wherein he testified under oath about Ms. Lewinsky, why would 
Dick Morris conduct a poll on whether the American people would 
forgive the President for committing perjury and obstruction of 
justice?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I couldn't find any volunteers.
    [Laughter.]
    You know, I think the honest answer has two pieces to it. I 
don't have a clue, and it ultimately--although I know it rings 
all sorts of bells and the use of that name conjures up all 
sorts of images, and that is why I am sure it finds its way 
into this process from the managers' side. But if you look at 
the record, other than the value that may come to the managers 
of making reference to that conversation--and I have no idea 
whether the conversation ever occurred or not--it seems to me 
of absolutely no relevance whatsoever because, as far as I am 
able to represent to you, and if the conversation occurred, 
there is nothing in this record that suggests that it had any 
impact on the conduct of the President or any other person. We 
know that he did wrong. We know that he misled the American 
people when he said that he had not had relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    I am not sure what a conversation with Mr. Morris, if it 
occurred, or a poll, if it was asked for, or what the 
motivation behind that poll means once you come to grips with 
the fact that the President of the United States was deceiving 
his family, his child, his wife, his colleagues, and the 
American people in that period in January.
    Beyond that puzzlement about relevance, other than the 
surmise that there must be some dark linkage between the poll 
and some legal issue before you--and I haven't seen it--I am 
really otherwise unable to answer your question.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Lieberman asks the House 
managers:

    The House managers argue that the President should be 
removed from office because of the inconsistency between his 
actions and the President's duty to faithfully execute the 
laws. Given that any criminal act would arguably be at odds 
with the President's duty to execute the law, is it your 
position that the President may be impeached and removed for 
committing any criminal act, regardless of the type of crime it 
is? If the President were convicted of driving while 
intoxicated, would that be grounds for removal? What if he were 
convicted of assault?

    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Excellent 
question.
    The answer is no, I would not want my President removed for 
any criminal wrongdoing. I would want my President removed only 
when there was a clear case that points to the right decision 
for the future of the country. Just remember this. Our past is 
America's future in terms of the law. I would not want my 
President removed for trivial offenses, and that is the heart 
of the matter here.
    I think I know why he took a poll. I think I know very well 
what he was up to: That his political and legal interests were 
so paramount in his mind, the law be damned and anybody who got 
in his way be damned.
    Those are strong statements, but I think they are borne out 
by the facts in this case, and that is what I would look for. I 
would look for a violation of the law that is the dark side of 
politics. I would look for something like Richard Nixon did. 
Richard Nixon lost faith with the American electoral process. 
He believed his enemies justified being cheated; that when his 
people broke into the other side's office, when confronted with 
that wrongdoing, he legitimized it. He didn't trust the 
American people to get it right, and he went out in shame.
    My belief is that this President did not trust the American 
legal system to vindicate his interest without cheating. My 
belief is that when he went back to his secretary, it is not 
reasonable that he was trying to refresh his memory and get his 
thoughts together. My belief is that he tried to set up a 
scenario that was going to make a young lady pay a price if she 
ever decided to cooperate with the other side. I believe he did 
not need to refresh his memory whether or not Monica Lewinsky 
wanted to have sex with him and he couldn't. I don't believe he 
was refreshing his memory when he asked his secretary: I never 
touched her, did I?
    I believe that you should only remove a President who, in a 
calculated fashion, puts the legal and political interests of 
himself over the good of the Nation in a selfish way, that you 
only should remove a President who, after being begged by 
everybody in the country, don't go into a grand jury and lie, 
and he in fact lied. Nothing trivial should remove my 
President. We need to try this case, ladies and gentlemen, 
because you need to know who your President is.
    Thank you.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I would like to note that in the response to the 
previous question, question probably No. 28, that it was not 
filed by the managers; it was filed by a group of Senators.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. With that, I ask unanimous consent that we take 
another brief recess of 15 minutes.
    There being no objection, at 4:18 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 4:40 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief Justice, 
I had indicated that we will probably go 5 hours today, which 
would take us to approximately 6 o'clock. But I think we will 
certainly go for at least another hour or so, perhaps not quite 
all the way to 6 o'clock, but we will talk to each other and 
look for a signal from the Chief Justice about exactly when to 
end the day's proceedings.
    At this point, Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready 
for the next question. I believe the previous question came 
from Senator Lieberman; therefore, I send the next question to 
the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Thompson 
and Snowe, to the House managers:

    Do the managers wish to respond to the answer given by the 
President's counsel with regard to the poll taken by Dick 
Morris?

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Just before we recessed, there was a question directed to 
the President's defense attorneys regarding the Dick Morris 
poll. One of the responses to it was that it was basically 
irrelevant. I think it is one of the more important things that 
has occurred in this case, because--and I think it is very 
important--because we get a look inside that window that is 
blocked for the most part throughout these proceedings. We 
really get an eye into the minds that are working here. Not 
only does it say volumes about a person who has to take a poll 
and decide whether or not to tell the truth, it also provides a 
great deal of information toward the actual state of mind, the 
actual willfulness, the actual intent of the actor in this case 
who has had the poll taken.
    Let me just read briefly from the referral regarding this 
incident. It talks about how Mr. Morris tells the President 
that this country has a great capacity for forgiveness and we 
should consider tapping into it. The President responds, 
``Well, what about that legal thing, you know, the legal thing, 
you know, Starr and the perjury and all?'' And they go on and 
have a discussion and decide to take a poll that night. Now 
this is January 21.
    And in all fairness to the President, it is not clear from 
the record that I have that he had had a conversation with 
Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta that day, before this 
effort--the poll was taken, and the results reported that same 
day, late that evening--or whether the conversation with Mr. 
Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal occurred afterwards. Those are the 
ones, in essence, where he questioned what went on, and also 
with Mr. Blumenthal fairly well attempted to discredit Ms. 
Lewinsky, too. And you will see how that may or may not tie in, 
again, depending on the chronology. But certainly all those 
events happened the same day.
    Mr. Morris takes the poll and reports later that day, later 
that evening, the same evening, the 21st, the results of that, 
and basically says the voters are willing to forgive the 
President for adultery but not for the perjury or the 
obstruction of justice. And then according to Mr. Morris, the 
President answers, ``Well, we['ll] just have to win, then.'' 
And later the next day the President has a followup 
conversation with Mr. Morris, in the evening, and says that he 
is considering holding a press conference to blast Monica 
Lewinsky out of the water. But Mr. Morris urges caution. He 
says, ``Be careful.'' According to Mr. Morris, he warned the 
President not to be too hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there's 
some slight chance that she may not be cooperating with Starr, 
and we don't want to alienate her by anything we're going to 
put out.''
    That is chilling. It truly is chilling that our chief law 
enforcement officer, the person who sends our soldiers off as 
Commander in Chief, to possibly die, the person who appoints 
the Federal judges, nominates Supreme Court Justices, appoints 
U.S. attorneys around the country who try 50,000 cases a year, 
has that mentality. And it goes to the state of mind here. And 
the willfulness and the intentions, from that point forward, 
certainly are reflected in the perjury and the efforts to 
continue the obstruction, the pattern, the overall pattern--not 
just one little incident.
    I urge you, Senators, as you consider this, to consider it 
carefully. As I said in my opening remarks, do not isolate 
little facts here and there and take the spins. But in every--
every--alleged act, ask yourselves the two questions--whether 
it is the hiding of the gifts, the filing of the false 
affidavit, letting Bob Bennett use that false affidavit while 
sitting still, talking to Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta 
about what did not really happen, the job search--ask them, 
every one of those, What was the result, what was the result of 
those actions?
    I think in every case you will see that something occurs to 
block the Paula Jones case, the discovery of evidence, the 
receipt of truthful testimony. Ask yourselves the second 
question: Who benefits from that? And I will guarantee you 
every time, in every one of those instances, it is the 
President who benefits, who derives the effect of that. He is 
either the luckiest man in the world because of this and having 
people willing to commit crimes for him or he is somewhere in 
the background orchestrating this.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Leahy, Harkin, 
Dorgan, and Reid of Nevada, to the President's counsel:

    In his opening remarks to the Senate, Manager McCollum 
stated, ``I don't know what the witnesses will say, but I 
assume if they are consistent, they'll say the same thing 
that's in here,'' referring to the 60,000 page record currently 
before the Senate. I see no reason to call witnesses to provide 
redundant testimony.
    Could you comment on Mr. McCollum's statement and clarify 
also the timetable which might have to be considered for 
discovery if witnesses are called?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, I think, as I said 
in an earlier question, that the answers the witnesses would 
provide are already contained in the five volumes of testimony. 
As I am sure you are aware, when I say five volumes, that is 
not really five volumes, because on many of the pages the grand 
jury transcript is shrunk, called a miniscript, so you get 6 
pages of testimony per page. Your eyesight may fail you before 
you get through. The witness testimony is there. I don't think 
calling the witnesses again will add anything to that.
    In terms of a discovery schedule, it is hard to say, 
because we have had no opportunity to shape the record. We 
don't know what we will need. We would need documents. We would 
need testimony. One deposition could lead to another. I think 
we are talking a matter of a few months to finally get through 
it.
    But I think the real question is, What questions are there 
that have not been asked? I think if you ask that question, 
What questions are there that have not been asked, you will 
find there are no questions. In fact, there are questions that 
have been asked a number of times.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you that the independent 
counsel didn't have a chance to ask questions after the 
President's testimony. Indeed he did. You will see that Ms. 
Lewinsky was examined after the President testified, both in 
the grand jury and in FBI interviews. I don't think that 
witness interviews or further evidentiary proceedings will add 
in any measurable way to the record before you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers by Senators Hatch, Thompson, DeWine, and Warner:

    The unanimous consent agreement pending before the Senate 
permits the filing of a motion to dismiss next week. What legal 
standard should the Senate apply, and applying that standard to 
this case, what specific acts of Presidential misconduct would 
a Senator deem unworthy of impeachment by voting for a motion 
to dismiss?

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, 
the President wants all of the protections of the criminal 
trial beyond a reasonable doubt, standard of proof, strict 
pleadings, but yet deny us the right to call any witnesses.
    In the House we did not call witnesses and there is a 
reason. There are several reasons for that. First of all, we 
were operating under time constraints which were self-imposed 
but I promised my colleagues to finish it before the end of the 
year. I didn't want it to drag out. We had an election 
intervene, we had Christmas, but we did--because we had 60,000 
pages of sworn testimony, transcripts, depositions, grand jury 
testimony, and we had a lower threshold.
    The threshold in the House was for impeachment, which is to 
seek a trial in the Senate. We could not try the case in the 
House. The Constitution gives the Senate the exclusive right to 
try the case. All we could do was present evidence sufficient 
to convince our colleagues that there ought to be a trial over 
here in the Senate. And we did that.
    But now that we are over here--by the way, we were roundly 
criticized for not producing any witnesses. And I might add, 
Mr. Kendall has said repeatedly they did not have a fair 
discovery process; they didn't have any witnesses and weren't 
permitted to cross-examine.
    I want to tell you, repeatedly--repeatedly--I invited the 
President's lawyers, the staff of the Democrats on the House 
Judiciary Committee: Any witnesses you want, call them; give me 
their names and we will bring them in and you can cross-examine 
them to your heart's content.
    No, they never did. Finally, they brought in some 
professors and Mr. Ruff testified, Mr. Craig testified. But 
they didn't want, in fact, any witnesses. That is the last 
thing they wanted. They had full opportunity to call them, and 
I really, really, bristle when they say, ``You were unfair.'' 
We wanted to be fair. We tried to be fair because we understand 
you need a two-thirds vote to remove the President. We needed 
Democratic support. So far we had none. That is OK. Let the 
process play itself out. But we were fair.
    And when Mr. Kendall says they had no opportunity, he means 
they didn't avail themselves of an abundant opportunity to call 
witnesses.
    A motion in lieu of a trial should provide that all 
inferences, all fact, questions, be resolved in favor of the 
respondent, the House managers. I don't think that is going to 
happen. I think by dismissing the articles of impeachment 
before you have a complete trial, you are sending a terrible 
message to the people of the country. You are saying, I guess 
perjury is OK, if it is about sex; obstruction is OK, even 
though it is an effort to deny a citizen her right to a fair 
trial. You are going to say that even when judges have been 
impeached for perjury--and, by the way, the different standards 
between judges and the President: This country can survive with 
a few bad judges, a few corrupt judges; we can make it; but a 
corrupt President, survival is a little tougher there. So there 
is a difference, and the standard ought to be better and more 
sensitive for the President because the President is such an 
important person.
    Look, the consequences of cavalier treatment of our 
articles of impeachment, your articles of impeachment: You 
throw out the window the fact that the President's lies and 
stonewalling have cost millions of dollars that could have been 
obviated. The damage to sexual harassment laws--you think they 
are not going to be damaged? They are, seriously, making it 
more difficult to prosecute people in the military or elsewhere 
for perjury who lie under oath. Those are serious consequences.
    I know--oh, do I know--what an annoyance we are in the 
bosom of this great body, but we are a constitutional 
annoyance, and I remind you of that fact.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Durbin to 
counsel for the President:

    Can you comment on Manager Hyde's contention that the 
President was free to call witnesses before the House, but that 
the House did not have the time to do so, or to call any 
witnesses?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think it is 
important to understand the reality of what is going on in the 
House. Most of you know something of it by simply the virtue of 
press coverage. But let me tell you what it was like from the 
perspective of the President.
    From the very first moment when we began to speak with 
representatives of the Judiciary Committee--whether senior 
staff or the chairman, who is always gracious--the one thing we 
said was, ``Please tell us what we are charged with, please.'' 
And we went from Mr. Schippers' extensive opening discussion of 
15 possible violations of law to an ever-shifting body.
    It wasn't until I was within literally a few minutes of 
completing my testimony on December 9 that we were ever honored 
with anything that looked like a description of the violations 
that the President was charged with, and those came in the form 
of hard draft articles of impeachment.
    I think, indeed, if you will all remember back--if any of 
you were watching that day--I was actually given a draft copy 
of those articles just as I was completing my testimony, and 
then they were snatched back because it was premature for the 
President's counsel at 4:30 in the afternoon on December 9 to 
know what the President was charged with.
    One thing you generally like to know as a litigator in any 
forum, before you start thinking about producing exculpatory 
evidence, as we were asked to do, or thinking about calling 
witnesses, is to sort of know what you have to defend against. 
In any forum, whether it is criminal or civil or legislative, 
the accused generally has that right.
    Beyond that, as you all know--indeed, as Mr. Manager Hyde 
has indicated--we were operating on a very fast track. We 
asked, for example, when the issue arose as to whether or not 
the staff of the committee would take depositions, whether we 
would be entitled to be present, because we knew that none of 
them was on the calendar to be called in any open hearing, and 
we were denied that opportunity, theoretically because under 
the policies of the committee it was not appropriate for the 
President's counsel to be present at the only opportunity that 
certain witnesses would ever have to testify under oath.
    It seems odd to me, when you come right down to it, that we 
should be accused of failing in our duty, with the burden on 
the House Judiciary Committee to make its case and our right to 
respond, that the House, having determined never to call a 
witness who knew anything firsthand, we should somehow be 
charged with having to fit into this discovery process. 
Discovery is very different, as all of you understand, from 
calling a witness--whoever it may be--in public, before the 
full Judiciary Committee, and having the opportunity to 
examine. We were excluded from whatever true discovery process 
might have been involved, and left only with this notion that, 
in the absence of any specific charges, we were to call 
witnesses to defend ourselves. I suggest to you that in any 
setting that we are used to, whether those of you who are 
litigators or those of you who are simple observers of the 
justice system, that is a very long process, indeed.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Nickles to 
the House managers:

    Which of the President's statements not already discussed 
today do you believe to be of particular importance to the 
perjury charge?

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I thank 
the Senator for the question. I will keep one eye on the clock 
and stay within the 5-minute rule, so obviously I won't be able 
to give a comprehensive list of that which we submit to the 
Senate is perjurious. Let me try to get through at least one or 
two.
    One example that I invite the Senate's attention to is the 
answers the President gave in the grand jury about his attorney 
using Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit. Bear in mind, again, 
the predicate facts for this. Judge Susan Webber Wright, in the 
deposition, had ordered the President to answer questions 
relating to whether he ever had sexual relationships with 
subordinate female employees in the workplace as Governor or as 
President, because that is fair game in any sexual harassment 
suit. Victims of harassment in the workplace are entitled to 
discover that information.
    The President was able to get Monica Lewinsky to file a 
false affidavit in the Jones deposition. And when that 
affidavit was in hand and filed, as soon as the attorney for 
Paula Jones asked the first question about Monica Lewinsky, the 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, put forth that affidavit and 
objected to the attorneys even asking the question. He said, 
``There is no good-faith belief that this question should be 
asked because of the affidavit.'' And the President did 
absolutely nothing to correct the record.
    When this came up in the grand jury, the President was 
asked about the affidavit and the statement that Mr. Bennett 
made to Judge Wright that ``there was no sex of any kind, in 
any manner, shape or form.'' And the attorney, Mr. Bittman, at 
the grand jury, referred to that and said to the President, 
``That statement is a completely false statement,'' and asked 
the President to explain. This was the President's answer:

    It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If 
the--if he--if ``is'' means is and never has been, that is 
not--that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a 
completely true statement.

    Then the President went on to say:

    I was not paying a great deal of attention to this 
exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.

    Rather than simply give a truthful and complete answer to 
the grand jury in their criminal investigation, the President 
gave a bifurcated answer that essentially invited the grand 
jury to accept one of two explanations.
    Explanation No. 1: I wasn't paying attention to my attorney 
when he said that. I was busy thinking of other things.
    Or, if you don't like that explanation: I was paying such 
specific attention to what my attorney was saying that I 
focused on the tense of what the word ``is'' meant--as if to 
suggest when Mr. Bennett said that there is no sex of any kind, 
he meant there was no sex that day because he was there being 
deposed before Judge Wright. Under either scenario, the 
President absolutely failed in his obligation to provide the 
grand jury conducting a criminal investigation into possible 
obstruction in the Paula Jones case--he failed in his 
obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth.
    You have seen the evidence just from the initial 
presentation. No. 1, when the President said he wasn't paying 
attention, that was negated by watching the videotape. The 
President was paying very close attention. Why was he paying 
such close attention? Because the fate of his Presidency hung 
on the answer to that question. This is the most important 
question in the President's political life. Is he going to have 
to disclose information that he thought would help destroy his 
Presidency?
    You don't even have to accept the representation from the 
videotape to know the President testified falsely, because Mr. 
Bennett did us the favor of not asking us simply to rely on 
watching the President pay attention to the testimony. Mr. 
Bennett then read the President the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit in which she denied having a sexual relationship with 
the President, and he asked the President if Ms. Lewinsky's 
statement was true and accurate. The President said, ``That is 
absolutely true.''
    On August 6, Monica Lewinsky, incidentally, testified 
before the grand jury, and she didn't play these games with the 
grand jury, like ``it all depends what `is' means,'' or ``I 
wasn't paying attention.'' She was asked a straightforward 
question:

    Paragraph 8 of the affidavit says, ``I have never had a 
sexual relationship with the President.'' Is that true?

    Answer by Monica Lewinsky:

    No.

    Mr. Chief Justice, I see my time has expired. I will be 
happy to invite additional questions relating to additional 
specific examples.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is to the President's counsel from 
Senator Schumer and Senator Kerrey of Nebraska:

    Isn't it true that the alleged perjurious statements have 
changed in number and substance since the OIC first delivered 
its referral to the House, and that the referral, Mr. 
Schippers' presentation before the House, the majority report, 
the trial brief, and the managers' statements before this body 
contain different allegations of what constitutes the alleged 
perjurious statements?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. The answer 
to that question is, yes. They were changing right up until the 
time we met, the very first day of this trial when Mr. Manager 
Rogan made his presentation. What he said when he described 
perjurious statements alleged against the President was 
different from what was appearing in the trial brief before. 
And that was the end of a long period of time where every time 
we heard what the allegations were, at least when it came to 
the issue of perjury, they changed.
    There were allegations added; there were allegations 
subtracted. Two of the allegations that Mr. Schippers presented 
when he made his statement to the Judiciary Committee were 
withdrawn. So it was a process where we never had a chance to 
sit down, as you should in a very serious and fair and 
evenhanded exercise, and focus on what precisely it was that 
the President said in the grand jury that was perjurious.
    As to the specifics of the allegation that we have been 
discussing just now, when I first opened this discussion, I 
said it is very important to look at the record. Do not allow 
anyone to misrepresent the record because you are setting up 
the President's statement and saying that is perjurious, when 
the President's statement may well be something very different 
in the record.
    When Mr. Rogan first made his argument on this issue, he 
misrepresented the record as to what the President said in this 
case. I tried to correct him about what the President actually 
said. He never claimed, at the moment these questions were 
being asked back and forth, that he thought about the current 
tense. Even as I was speaking, Mr. Rogan was out talking to the 
television cameras, saying precisely the same thing. Now we 
have this same misrepresentation the third time.
    I will say it one more time. He answered the question. He 
wasn't focusing on it. He answered that four times the same 
way. It was not a bifurcated answer; it was one answer. He was 
not paying attention at that particular moment. It moved very 
quickly; the moment was passed and they were into the judge 
talking and debating with the lawyers. That was his answer. 
There was no other answer.
    Then, at the grand jury some 7 months later, he was read 
that statement by the special prosecutor. The question was, 
``And this statement was false, isn't that true?'' The answer 
the President gave was that, well, in fact, it depends on the 
meaning of the word ``is.''
    He didn't claim that that was what he was thinking at the 
time in the Jones deposition. He said very clearly, ``I never 
even focused on that issue until I read it in this transcript 
in preparation for this testimony.'' It is on page 512, Mr. 
Rogan. ``I never focused on that issue until I read it in this 
transcript in preparation for this testimony.'' There was not a 
bifurcated answer. He answered directly. He wasn't focusing on 
it.
    That is a problem we have had throughout this case when it 
comes to the perjury allegation. It was a problem we had with 
the earlier one. If you don't have the specific statement 
quoted, it is impossible to defend it. It is unfair.
    Thank you very much.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Lott to the 
House managers:

    Do you wish to respond to the answers just given by the 
President's counsel?

    Mr. Counsel ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I am not sure if I 
wish to respond or I feel the need to respond. But in either 
event I will take advantage of the opportunity. I thank the 
Senator for posing the question.
    Try as they might, the facts are clear. The President, in 
his August deposition, attempted to justify away, attempted to 
explain away his perjurious conduct on January 17 when he was 
deposed. And I am not going to stand and quibble with Mr. Craig 
over this beyond what was already noted.
    What I prefer to respond to is the bigger question that the 
White House attorneys have raised on a number of occasions--the 
idea that the President has been treated unfairly because he 
hasn't had sufficient notice as to what the allegations are 
against him.
    Contemplate that for just one moment. Because, were that to 
be true, the President of the United States would have to be 
not a human. He would be an ostrich with his neck so far down 
in the sand--that which every schoolchild now in America knows, 
that which every person in America with a television or a radio 
or Internet access knows, and is obvious to everybody which 
they claim is not obvious to the President.
    When the President of the United States testified at the 
deposition and before the grand jury--that brought us into late 
August of 1998, about a month after that--the Office of 
Independent Counsel filed a report. The binder was about 445 
pages. The written document was a little more than 200 pages. 
But within the four corners of that report are all of the 
allegations, are all of the facts, and all of the circumstances 
that were forwarded to the House of Representatives for review. 
The House Judiciary Committee, specifically at the request of 
the White House and at the request of our Democrat caucus, did 
not go beyond the four corners of Judge Starr's report. Not 
only did the President have the benefit of Judge Starr's 
report, he also had the benefit of the written report from the 
House Judiciary Committee--same facts, same circumstances, 
nothing changed.
    And, by the time we came to the Senate to try this case, 
the President had the benefit of the resolution passed by this 
body that said at the initial presentations ``we will not go 
beyond the record already established''--the record that was 
established in the Office of Independent Counsel report, in the 
committee's report, and in our hearings. For a party to be 
aggrieved, as the White House counsel suggests, to have been 
given no notice, it is amazing to me how within minutes of 
Judge Starr's report being filed they had already filed a 
response. I believe there were two supplemental responses 
within 48 or 72 hours. They have always beaten us to the punch 
on the response. They have an army of lawyers here able to 
stand up on a moment's notice and respond. I just do not 
understand how they can make the case fairly that this is all 
now a product of a surprise; that they have not been given a 
proper opportunity to review the facts. They have seen these 
facts since Judge Starr submitted his report to Congress some 5 
months ago. The facts haven't changed. The circumstances 
haven't changed. The quotations haven't changed. The 
transcripts haven't changed. Nothing has changed except their 
attempt to wiggle out from under the truth.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Boxer, 
Schumer and Kohl to the President's counsel:

    To the best of your knowledge, has the United States 
Department of Justice ever brought a perjury prosecution where 
the alleged perjury was inferred from the direction in which 
the defendant was looking?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, the answer is, not to 
my knowledge. I will not go further than that because somebody 
in the army of people on the other side might dodge one up, but 
I doubt it very much.
    If I may impose on the kindness of the authors of that last 
question, I will take just a moment to comment briefly on Mr. 
Manager Rogan's rejoinder to our response to whatever--
particularly because Mr. Manager Rogan has been a judge, 
prosecutor, and others have as well, it does seem mildly odd to 
me that the answer to the question your charges aren't known or 
are vague is, look at that pile. You will find them right in 
there. You fellows, you guys did a good job responding to what 
you could. So you must be perfectly well prepared to defend 
against whatever charges we bring. I don't think there is a 
judge anywhere in the United States, from the highest court or 
the lowest court, who would accept either explanation from a 
prosecutor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers by Senators Hatch and Burns:

    The President's lawyers cite in their brief Professor 
Michael Gerhardt for the proposition that for an act to be 
impeachable there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an 
impeachable official and the latter's official duties. But 
isn't it true that Professor Gerhardt also stated that 
impeachment may lie for conduct unrelated to official duties if 
such conduct is outrageous and harms the reputation of the 
office?

    And this citation is to the testimony of Mr. Gerhardt.

    Would the House managers care to respond to this?

    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, I do appreciate the opportunity to respond to this 
point. I think this is a very important point.
    I have a great deal of respect for Professor Gerhardt. He 
has said a number of different things on this subject. But the 
point in the question is directly on point.
    I would also like to quote something else that Professor 
Gerhardt has said that I made reference to without specifically 
naming him as the source in this statement which I gave to the 
Senate on Saturday.
    He said in a law review article, which he wrote a few years 
back:

    There are certain statutory crimes that if committed by 
public officials reflect such lapses of judgments with such 
disregard for the welfare of the state, and such lack of 
respect for the law and the office held that the occupants may 
be impeached and removed for lacking the minimal level of 
integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the 
responsibilities of office.

    I believe that what Professor Gerhardt makes reference to 
there is exactly what we have before the Senate in this case. 
What we have before the Senate in this case is a case where the 
President of the United States has engaged in a course of 
conduct involving violations of the criminal law. By doing so, 
he has evidenced a lack of respect for the law, that 
demonstrates a lack of the minimal level of integrity that we 
are entitled to expect of the Chief Executive of the United 
States, of the person who, under our system, is given the 
preeminent responsibility to take care that the laws will be 
faithfully executed.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Dodd to 
the counsel for the President:

    Given the election of a President of the United States is 
the most important and solemn political act in which we as 
citizens engage, how much weight should the Senate give to the 
fact that conviction and removal by the Senate of the President 
would undo that decision?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. That question, of course, goes right to 
the heart of what the framers were thinking, and the standards 
that I suggest every sensible analyst of this problem has 
arrived at, whether they might be called supporters or 
opponents of the President. There is one critical issue that 
everyone has to address, which is that removal and undoing the 
will of the people.
    Mr. Manager Graham acknowledged that that's what we were 
all about here, whether we should undo an election. But if you 
go back to the very basic debates of the framers in 1787, and 
you recall both Mr. Manager Canady and I talked about the 
moment in time in which it was suggested by Mr. Mason that 
perhaps the scope of the standard for impeachment could be 
broadened, and the response made then and clearly the principle 
underlying everything that the framers spoke about in 1787 was: 
We cure almost all our problems with an elected official 
through the electoral process.
    And even if you look at what President Ford had to say 29 
years ago on the subject, which I also cited to you as he spoke 
about the difference between judges and Presidents, he said for 
the House to impeach and the Senate to remove the President or 
Vice President as opposed to a judge in midterm would require 
proof of the most serious offenses, and we know that those most 
serious offenses, the only ones the framers contemplated as a 
basis for overturning the will of the people, were those that, 
as the minority said in 1974 in its report on the subject, were 
a danger to the state--a danger to the state. That is all that 
can justify overturning the voice of the people.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Lott. It 
is addressed to the House managers:

    Didn't the framers of the Constitution understand in 1787 
that the conviction and removal from office of a President 
would, under the system they devised, reverse the result of a 
national election by elevating, not a President's Vice 
Presidential running mate, as we would do today, but the person 
who had received the second highest number of electoral votes?

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, the statement has been 
made with some fervor that if the President were removed upon a 
finding of conviction of the articles or an article of 
impeachment, it would reverse a national election. I just 
respectfully say that is not true. The election is provided for 
in the Constitution and so is impeachment. They are processes 
of equal constitutional validity. And should the Senate remove 
the President, Bob Dole will not become President, Jack Kemp 
will not become Vice President, but Mr. Gore will move up to be 
President, and the same party, the same programs, I dare say, 
will continue. It will not reverse an election; it will fulfill 
a constitutional process that our Founding Fathers were wise 
enough to provide for.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Edwards asks the House managers:

    Are there any statements contained in the exhibits used 
during the managers' presentations or omissions from those 
exhibits that you believe, in the interest of fairness or 
justice, should be corrected at this time? If so, please do so 
now.

    Mr. Manager BUYER. Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to our 
own exhibits?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Perhaps I should ask Senator Edwards.
    Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to their 
exhibits.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, I would be happy 
to take advantage of the 5 minutes, but I have talked to the 
other managers and we are not aware of any corrections that 
need to be made on any of our exhibits we have offered to the 
Senate.
    Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
    Mr. KERRY. I simply ask whether or not that answer was in 
fact fully responsive to the question. I believe the question 
also asked whether or not there were any omissions.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian advises me this is a 
nondebatable period and the inquiry is out of order, and I so 
rule.
    This is from Senator Roberts. It is directed to the House 
managers.

    Given the fact that the White House characterizes the 
assistance that Monica Lewinsky received as ``routine,'' does 
the record reflect that any other White House interns other 
than Monica Lewinsky received the same level of job assistance 
from Vernon Jordan, John Podesta, Betty Currie, and then-
Ambassador Richardson?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, if I might, as far 
as we know as House managers, in the record the only comments 
about assisting anybody else other than Monica Lewinsky, of any 
nature, were made in testimony by Vernon Jordan. He did assist 
other people. But I don't believe there is anything, to the 
best of our knowledge and recollection--of course, we have a 
lot of paperwork here--that he referred to assisting another 
intern or anyone in a like position. And certainly there was no 
indication that the kind of intensity of that assistance 
occurred in the kind of manner in which the proceedings did 
with developing her job opportunities, that is, somebody in 
this direct involvement with the President, or certainly nobody 
with a close relationship and interest on the part of the 
President. There certainly was nothing in the record to show 
that, and that is, of course, central to this entire case as 
far as the job search part of this obstruction of justice is 
concerned.
    Thank you.
    Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Kansas.
    Mr. ROBERTS. I had directed that question, sir, to the 
White House counsel. It was my intent to direct it to White 
House counsel. I do not know what the proper procedure would be 
at this time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection to the White 
House counsel answering the question at this time?
    Without objection, the White House counsel may answer.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. This may be 
a moment worth noting in the proceedings because in essence I 
think we are in agreement with Mr. Manager McCollum.
    I would perhaps only do this, and that is, to note with 
some greater emphasis Mr. Jordan's testimony, which we will be 
glad to highlight if we have another opportunity here, that 
indeed he has regularly and frequently assisted young people, 
and not-so-young people, in finding jobs.
    Again, I couldn't tell you whether any of them had been an 
intern at any time. I would only note that, of course, Ms. 
Lewinsky was not an intern at the time Mr. Jordan was helping 
her, but rather was an employee of the Pentagon.
    But beyond that, and perhaps with somewhat greater emphasis 
on Mr. Jordan's emphasis on behalf of young people in the city, 
I am in essential agreement with Manager McCollum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Dodd 
and Levin to the House managers:

    On page 11 of House committee report accompanying H. Res. 
611, the report states that Judge Susan Webber Wright issued 
her order ``on the morning of December 11th.'' Will the 
managers now acknowledge that the report was factually 
incorrect? Yes or no?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. If I 
look back at the facts of this--of course, I have explained 
earlier today that the action on the 11th was initiated or 
triggered by the witness list that came in on December 5, that 
the President knew about it at the latest on December 6.
    On the 11th, Judge Wright entered an order in that case 
which allowed the Jones lawyers an opportunity to ask questions 
about the prior relationships with other Federal employees or 
State employees.
    Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Connecticut.
    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, as one of the authors of the 
question, a yes or no answer was requested and I object to the 
answer.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair has not tried to police the 
responsiveness of the answers to the questions, so I am going 
to overrule that objection.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I am not trying to be evasive at 
all to the Senator, but I did want to lay the groundwork for 
this and also to get my thoughts so that I would be as accurate 
as possible.
    The order that Judge Wright entered was on December 11. I 
do not know the precise time. I believe it was in the afternoon 
that it was entered, and it was followed by the telephone call 
with the participants. So I believe that it was entered in the 
afternoon of the 11th, and not in the morning of the 11th.
    And, of course, that was not in my presentation. My 
presentation referred to the order being entered on December 
11, and that the action on the 11th, of course, was triggered 
by the witness list on December 5.
    I think that completely answers that question. If there is 
some other--I would be happy to respond to anything more 
specific on that issue.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers from Senators Domenici, Frist, McCain and Warner.

    What is the historical significance and legal import of 
taking an oath for performance in public office? What is the 
historical significance and legal import of taking an oath to 
tell the truth in a legal proceeding? Please discuss whether 
oath-taking in such circumstances is a public matter.

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, 
the taking of an oath is a formalization, a solemnization of 
truth. You call upon God to witness to the truth of what you 
are saying. In the long march of civilization, the oath has 
taken the place of trial by fire, trial by combat, trial by 
ordeal. It says, in the most sober way: You can trust me. You 
can believe in me. It is verbal honesty. Our legal system 
depends on it and our justice system depends on it. The oath 
underscores our humanity. The oath is an aspect of our sacred 
honor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Kerry of 
Massachusetts to the counsel for the President:

    Is it fair to say that the articles and manager 
presentations stress the Jones perjury allegations rejected by 
the House, because they cannot credibly, on the law, satisfy 
the elements and argue perjury in the grand jury investigation?

    Mr. Manager RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I am a little bit 
troubled at answering that question, not because I don't feel 
strongly about what the answer is but I do not want to suggest 
in any way that the motivation of the managers is less than 
professional and appropriate. But I do think that, indeed, they 
know, as they think through the proof that they have or that 
they even might ever contemplate, that the President of the 
United States, when he began his grand jury testimony by making 
the most painful admission a human being could ever make, and 
thereafter did his best--albeit in the face of tough and 
probing and repetitive questioning for 4 hours--did his best to 
tell the truth.
    That they had a very difficult, indeed virtually 
impossible, task to persuade any dispassionate trier of fact 
and law that he had intentionally given false testimony, and 
you can see that evidenced, I think most clearly, if you look 
at some of the first allegations made as to what constitutes 
perjury--things like the use of the words ``on certain 
occasions'' or ``occasionally'' to describe a battle over 
whether 11 or 20 or 17 fit within that description. It does 
seem fair to say that they would not be fighting those battles 
in this Chamber if they had any real confidence in their cause 
on article I, and thus they do seek, for whatever tactical or 
other purpose, to try to bring in those things which so many of 
their colleagues rejected out of hand in the House of 
Representatives.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers from Senators Hatch, Thompson and DeWine:

    In her presentation to the Senate, Ms. Mills emphasized 
that Ms. Lewinsky testified on ten different times about the 
subject of gifts. Did she ever testify that the President told 
her that she must turn over the gifts because that is what the 
law requires?
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, in response to 
that question the answer is no, she did not. As a matter of 
fact, that was and is the central point on the part of the gift 
question. At no time, she says, did the President instruct her 
to turn those gifts over. I think that is a telling point. In 
fact, it is a telling point throughout the entire process of 
the scheme and all the things that happened and why you have to 
follow, in my judgment, Senators, the issue of this whole 
process through the scheme that was devised at the beginning, 
all the way to the end.
    The President was going to ultimately lie to conceal from 
that court in the Jones case, the truth of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky and, therefore, he had to set it up for 
the affidavit, the gifts, et cetera. At no point in time, she 
says in her testimony, did he ever ask her to come clean. Until 
the time the affidavit was discussed, on the night of December 
17, he never suggested she tell the truth there. If you 
remember we put that up here several times to you. Even though 
he may not have directly told her to lie, he certainly gave her 
every indication, she said, from the standpoint of the 
background that they had had before and what he said that night 
about the cover stories.
    And with regard to the gifts, the same thing is true. She 
gave him an opportunity on the day of December 28. Whether 
there are 10 statements or however many there might be--and 
they say there are 10; I trust the judgment of the White House 
counsel--there were 10 different statements, the most 
significant of which, of course, is the grand jury testimony 
she gave on the subject of what happened that day when she 
discussed the gifts with the President because that is when her 
recollection had been best refreshed. She had been over it a 
lot of times. She had much preparation for that, and I submit 
to you that barring bringing her in--which we of course suggest 
you do, and let us ask her to confirm all of this again--you 
must assume the logical thing to do is to assume the grand jury 
testimony, the most perfected testimony you have, is the most 
accurate and most reliable, and on that occasion particularly 
she emphasizes the fact that with regard to the gifts there 
certainly was no request by the President that she reveal those 
gifts.
    Now, of course he says he did. He says he did later. But 
that is absolutely contradicted by her testimony.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Reid of Nevada sends this 
question for White House counsel:

    Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual 
assertions made by the managers in their response to the 
previous question?

    Ms. Counsel MILLS. There is, obviously, a conflict in the 
testimony between the President, who said he directed Ms. 
Lewinsky to turn over whatever she had, and Ms. Lewinsky's 
statements. I would just like to read to you, given the House 
managers' reference that we must credit her grand jury 
testimony, the version of her grand jury testimony, which you 
all will no doubt remember it as one of the ones I read to you 
that was never presented by the House managers, and that is on 
August 20, 1998, after the President had testified:
    It was December 28th. I was there to get my Christmas gifts 
from him, and we spent about 5 minutes or so, not very long, 
talking about the case. And I said, ``Well, do you think''--and 
at one point I said, ``Well, do you think I should?'' And I 
don't think I said, ``Get rid of, but do you think I should put 
away, give to Betty or someone the gifts''--and he--I don't 
remember his response. I think it was something like ``I don't 
know'' or hmm or there was really no response.

    On that same day when she was asked that same question, if 
it is her grand jury testimony that is to be addressed, she 
also said:

    A Juror. Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the 
President bring up Betty's name?
    The Witness. I think I brought it up. The President 
wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he didn't--he 
didn't really discuss it.

    All of those are in her grand jury testimony. So her grand 
jury testimony is the testimony that states he might not have 
given any response. So, to the extent the House managers' 
theory is that ``Let me think about it'' leads to obstruction 
of justice, her grand jury testimony does not state that.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Specter, Helms, Abraham, 
Ashcroft, and Stevens direct this question to the President's 
counsel:

    President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he 
was merely trying to ``refresh'' his memory when he made these 
statements to Betty Currie. How can someone ``refresh'' their 
recollection by making statements they know are false?

    Ms. Counsel MILLS. I think one of the things I tried to 
address in addressing what the President's testimony was with 
respect to his conversation with Ms. Currie was obviously he 
was understandably concerned about the media attention that he 
knew was impending. And in particular, as he walked through the 
questions, he was thinking about his own thoughts and seeking, 
as I think I talked about, concurrence or input or some type of 
reaction from Ms. Currie.
    I think in making those statements, he was asking questions 
to see what her understanding was based on some of the 
questions that had been posed to him by the Jones lawyers, 
because some of them were so off base. And so he was asking 
from Ms. Currie essentially what her perception was, what her 
thoughts were.
    I think as you walk through each one of those questions, he 
was expressing what his own thoughts and feelings were with 
regard to this and was seeking some concurrence or affirmation 
from her. I think he was agitated. I think he was concerned. He 
knew what was going to happen, and I think that is why he posed 
the question in the way that he did.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. A question from Senator Bayh to counsel 
for the President:

    Can you comment on the importance of ``proportionality'' to 
the rule of law?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. How much time do we have? Thank you, 
Senator.
    I think proportionality, in all its many guises, is an 
issue that has given us some pause, going well back into the 
investigative phase of this matter, and I think many who have 
watched and who have made their lives and careers as 
professional prosecutors, indeed many who have been criminal 
defense lawyers or just plain sensible citizens watching, have 
asked whether the resources and

the energy and the time devoted to this matter and the manner 
in which it has been treated at every stage before it ever got 
to the House of Representatives does, in fact, reflect an 
appropriate assessment of the conduct being investigated and 
the seriousness of the conduct, which is not ever to suggest 
that we condone perjury or obstruction of justice.
    We all recognize, if those offenses have been committed, 
they are worth pursuing. But one only need look at the 
testimony and the professional prosecutors who testified before 
the Judiciary Committee to get a sense of what the world of 
professional prosecutors would do faced with these kinds of 
allegations in this kind of setting, and that really is the 
key: How many prosecutors would ever reach into the middle of 
an ongoing civil litigation and bring these kinds of charges?
    The proportionality, obviously, has other implications and 
certainly goes right to the heart of the role played by this 
body. That is, what is the proportional response to whatever 
you think of the President as a man, whatever you think of his 
conduct. Even if you should conclude--although we do not 
believe you should--that he violated the law in some respect, 
what is the constitutionally proportional response to your 
judgment. And there you go right back to the essence of what 
the framers were talking about, which is responding with the 
ultimate sanction only when the ultimate problem is posed to 
you.
    I suggest, as I have on too many occasions, I fear, that if 
that is the proportionality question you are asking--and all 
must at some point ask that question--the answer has to be 
clear, that no one ever thought in 1787 and, I suggest to you, 
in the intervening 212 years that it would be a proportional 
response to the conduct alleged here to remove a President.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we have reached a 
point where we can take a break. I think we have had responses 
to approximately 50 questions today. Now we will have a chance 
to assess, on all sides, what additional questions might be 
needed to be asked tomorrow. I remind my colleagues that we are 
scheduled to resume at 10 a.m. on Saturday.
    notice of intent to suspend the rules of the senate by senator 
 hutchison, senator specter, senator lieberman, senator hagel, senator 
                       collins, and senator snowe
    In accordance with Rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I 
(for myself and for Mr. Specter, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Hagel, Ms. Collins, 
and Ms. Snowe) hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to 
move to suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials for the final 
deliberation on the articles of impeachment of the trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton:
    (1) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate shall 
direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions. A 
motion to close the doors may be acted upon without objection, or, if 
objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by the 
yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the Record''; and
    (2) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except when the 
doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case'' and ``, to 
be had without debate''.

                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. If there is nothing further, I move we adjourn, 
Mr. Chief Justice.
    The motion was agreed to and, at 5:49 p.m., the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday, 
January 23, 1999, at 10 a.m.


                       Saturday, January 23, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 10:05 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Almighty God, You have taught us to seek and maintain 
unity. You've also taught us that this unity is so precious 
that we should be willing to sacrifice anything in order to 
maintain it--except the truth. Help us to affirm the great 
undeniable truths that twine the bond of oneness: We are one 
Nation under Your sovereignty; our patriotism binds us together 
inseparably; our commitment to the Constitution is unswerving. 
In these bonds that cannot be broken, this Senate has been able 
to deal with the arguments, issues, and opinions of this 
impeachment trial. Continue to inspire the Senators with 
civility as they work through answers to the questions raised 
today.
    Refresh and rejuvenate those who may be weary or burdened. 
Dear God, preserve the unity of this Senate for its future 
leadership of our beloved Nation. In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Deputy Sergeant at Arms will make 
the proclamation.
    The Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Loretta Symms, made 
proclamation as follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, there 
are 11 hours 54 minutes remaining during which Senators may 
submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on 
the part of the House of Representatives, or the counsel for 
the President.
    The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    And thank you, Chaplain, for your opening prayer. I know we 
all listened and appreciated the admonitions that were given in 
that prayer.

                           Order Of Procedure

    I want to say, again, I appreciate the participation of all 
the Senators yesterday. Fifty questions were asked, I think a 
lot of good questions, and obviously good responses. We have a 
considerable amount of time left for questions. But, again, it 
is our intent to go today as long as the Senators feel that 
they have a need for further questions. It is up to 16 hours; 
it doesn't require 16 hours. So I think we should go forward 
and try to ask the needed questions, and then get a sense of 
where we are as we go through the day.
    But at any rate, it would be our intent not to go later 
than 4 p.m. We hope to take a 1-hour lunch break sometime 
around 12 or 12:30, but it will depend on how the questions are 
going. We will also take a break here in an hour, hour and a 
half, something like that.
    Following today's session, the Senate will reconvene on 
Monday at 1 p.m. and resume consideration of the articles of 
impeachment. All Members will be notified of the details of 
Monday's schedule, and beyond that, once we have had an 
opportunity for a consultation between Senator Daschle and 
myself and we get a feel for exactly what Senate Resolution 16 
provides in terms of activities on Monday and Tuesday. In a 
continuing effort to make this as bipartisan and as fair as 
possible, you will note yesterday while we alternated back and 
forth, some of the questions were directed from this side to 
the President's counsel and the reverse. I am sure that will 
happen again some today. We began the first question yesterday 
and you concluded; so today we would reverse that. Senator 
Daschle will ask the first question and then we will go through 
the process until we complete those questions, with us ending 
with the last question sometime today.
    With that, Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House 
managers from Senator Reid of Nevada.

    Would you please tell us whether you provided notice to 
counsel for the President, or to any official of the United 
States Senate, of the managers' discussions with the Office of 
Independent Counsel regarding an informal interview of Ms. 
Lewinsky, and the intention of the Office of Independent 
Counsel to file a motion in court to compel Ms. Lewinsky to 
meet with the managers? If you provided no such notice to 
counsel for the President or the Senate, please tell us why 
not.

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, 
distinguished colleagues, no, the answer to your question. I am 
not aware of any such notice that was provided as described in 
the question.
    I would like to make some clarification on this in terms of 
the witness, Monica Lewinsky--potential witness. As we have 
been in an evolving discussion over the last few weeks in terms 
of if we are allowed to call witnesses by the Senate, who those 
witnesses might be, what our list might look like, obviously, 
the name of Monica Lewinsky comes up as a potentially very 
important witness to these proceedings.
    As many of us in this Chamber have had experience in the 
law, we very much would like to talk to some of these 
witnesses. The core group that we have considered, however, 
are, in essence, in the White House control; they are either 
employed by the White House or close friends and associates of 
the White House. I am sure the White House, with the attorneys, 
would be very willing to cooperate with us in making those 
people available.
    However, Ms. Lewinsky presents a very unique situation in 
that she is geographically some other place. I am not sure 
where she is--Los Angeles, New York, maybe Washington. But she 
has attorneys we have to deal with. It would be very critical, 
as any attorney in this body knows, that before you actually 
call a witness, and a witness of that importance to this 
proceeding, that before you produce her for that testimony, 
that you talk to her. It was intended to be a conversation to 
discuss it with her.
    I have personally not seen the immunity agreement that she 
has, but we understand there is a cooperation proceeding and 
that that agreement is between her, her attorneys, and the 
independent counsel, the OIC--not Congress, not the managers, 
not the Senate. So we have no duty, no legal standing, as I 
understand it, to go in and enforce that agreement, were she 
not to want to meet with us and cooperate pursuant to the terms 
of those agreements, to the agreement.
    We did contact the OIC to arrange that meeting, and once we 
understood that the attorneys did not want to cooperate and 
furnish their client to meet with us, we asked the OIC to 
pursue, further, the effort to have Ms. Lewinsky come in and 
meet with us on an informal basis as, again, anyone would do in 
preparation for calling a witness at a trial.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Fitzgerald, Hatch, Mr. Smith of Oregon, and Senator Thurmond, 
directed to the House managers.

    How do you address the White House's argument that removal 
is a disproportionate remedy for the alleged acts of perjury 
and obstruction of justice and should there be any particular 
concern about establishing a precedent that a President can 
commit felonies while in office and remain President of the 
United States?

    Mr. Manager BUYER. I think the proportionality question 
yesterday was very good in that there is a psychology to be 
used in judicial decisions. I think there are different factors 
that will influence that decisionmaking process and the ideals 
that you, as a sitting judge and juror, will use to strive to 
attain them. It is important, I think, also, to have 
reasonableness and just solutions if you are going to 
individualize the case, as some may hope to do.
    I think as a society, if you take a step backward, we are 
kind of caught in two diverse trends at the moment. You have 
one trend whereby judges like to seek individualized solutions 
to particularized cases; and the other trend is we will apply 
the law to individualized cases.
    So, let me give you two best examples of both of those. 
With regard to the best example of individualized solutions to 
a particular case would be our juvenile justice system. That is 
where the court would come in and use a variety of means 
because reformation is, in fact, the goal, and that is what we 
do in the juvenile court system.
    As a side note of that, I think in society, with regard 
to--it could be an act of a firing, it could be an 
administrative hearing for removal, it could even be a Governor 
who had an employee who had an illicit affair and it was a 
political appointee and that Governor decided, maybe he decided 
applying the proportionality that he remove his own political 
appointee for having an affair. So the individualization can 
occur out there.
    The other example I will comment on is the justice 
according to law, and that other trend out there caught in our 
society--a legislature is not only here in Washington but 
across in our State jurisdictions; you have legislatures that 
are beginning to take some of the decisionmaking processes away 
from judges and they are saying, specifically, in Federal 
sentencing guidelines, as an example, that if in fact a person 
is convicted of a particular crime or possession of cocaine, 
the legislature is now telling these judges exactly: This is, 
in fact, what your sentence will be.
    So, we are kind of caught, I want you to know, as you are 
sitting as judges and jurors, in this diverse trend that is 
occurring in our society. I know as you listen to lectures even 
from the Supreme Court Justices, they are well aware of these 
trends, and so you are sitting and you have to come in your own 
conscience on how best to make that particular decision. I will 
note, though, that we have stressed the latter. We have 
stressed that the rule of law and its importance to our society 
not only to serve the public and social interests, but you are 
the guardian. When, in fact, there are crimes against the 
State, who is there to serve the public interest? Especially 
if, in fact, it is the President, the Vice President, a 
judicial officer, or other civil officers. Here where you have 
the President of the United States who has been accused of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, which are crimes against 
the State, and as Blackstone said, ``are side by side with 
bribery,'' who is the guardian, then, of the public interest? 
So in the question of proportionality, it is you; it is you.
    So when Mr. Craig began by arguing that this trial is not 
about vindicating the rule of law, that only criminal courts 
are charged with that duty, I would respectfully submit that 
the President's counsel is confusing the punishment of a 
particular criminal case or controversy in a court with your 
duty as Congress to ensure that future officers entrusted with 
power granted by the people may not, by their offices, 
eviscerate the proper administration of justice which is a 
cornerstone of our Republic.
    I now yield to Mr. Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I know I have a minute. Great minds can 
differ on this one: Can you have a high crime, and for the good 
of the nation removal is not appropriate? I was asked that 
yesterday, and I kind of wanted to make a case about why I 
think this is not true. This is a great question.
    The problem we have here is that you run into the judge 
cases. When you find that a judge perjured himself, you remove 
the judge. The President is different than the judge; I will 
certainly concede that. But we don't want, I think, in the use 
of proportionality, to create a standard that doesn't make any 
sense, that confuses people. The law loves repentance. Baptists 
love repentance. I am a Baptist. In my church, everybody gets 
saved about every other week. The idea that if you will come 
forward and admit you are wrong, you will get a different 
result, is loved in the law.
    Another thing to consider about proportionality is the 
impact on society. I think you should consider that. I think 
very much you should consider, even if this is a high crime, 
the impact on our society, if you decided to make the ultimate 
punishment. The death penalty of a political crime is removal 
from office. I started that train of thought 3 months ago. 
Impeachment is equivalent to the political death penalty. Every 
felony doesn't allow you to have a death penalty. What I hope 
you will be able to do, as a wise body, is not leave this 
confusion behind--whether or not it is a crime.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, it can be a high crime, 
and you then have to decide the impact on society. But if you 
leave us confused about whether or not this is a crime, the 
impact on society is far greater than if you make the decision 
that it is a crime, but proportionally it is not what the death 
penalty would call for. It would not be a political death 
penalty case. Thank you very much.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Leahy to 
the House managers:

    Did any of the managers consult with any Member of the 
Senate before seeking aid from Kenneth Starr to speak with Ms. 
Lewinsky? Did you discuss whether this violated the Senate's 
100-0 vote on trial procedure?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. The 
question is a valid question to ask. We did not consult with 
any Senators about this. We don't think that what we wanted to 
do, to talk to Ms. Lewinsky, has anything to do with the rule 
you passed. We don't want to violate those rules and we don't 
think we have.
    As anybody who knows, if you have a witness that you are 
going to produce, you have a right to prepare that witness. It 
is as plain and simple as that.
    I have practiced a lot of trial law before I came to 
Congress, and a number of you have. If you are going to have a 
deposition given, it is going to be your witness. You are going 
to go down and try to talk to that witness and prepare that 
witness. You have a right and obligation to do that. It has 
nothing to do with the formal proceeding of taking the 
deposition, which is covered by the rules that you have passed, 
as to how and when depositions will be taken, and it has 
nothing to do with the issue of her testimony actually here, 
where the opposing counsel would have a right to be present. It 
has everything to do with the right of anyone to prepare their 
witness, to get to know their witness, to shake hands, say 
hello, to put a face on that. It is normal practice to do this.
    We see in no way how that abrogates this rule, or in any 
way violates what you have set forth. As a matter of fact, we 
think we would have been incompetent and derelict as presenters 
of the witnesses, if we get a chance to present them, if we 
couldn't talk to her. We tried to do this some time ago. We 
suggested to her attorneys that it would be appropriate to 
quietly have this discussion, to meet her, as you normally 
would. I think they were apprehensive. They wanted a court 
order, I guess, to force this to occur, and that is why we 
eventually have gone to do that.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Lott and 
Thurmond to the House managers:

    Please give specific examples of conflicting testimony or 
an incomplete record where the calling of witnesses would prove 
beneficial to the Senate.

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Good 
morning, everyone. I want to echo what my colleagues have 
said--that we are trying to be prepared. We are trying to move 
through this process expeditiously. But we do believe that we 
need to call witnesses; and secondly, that we should be 
prepared, without any delay, to proceed forward in the event we 
are granted that opportunity.
    One of the reasons that the calling of witnesses is 
important is because there exist conflicts in the testimony. 
The White House counselors, the President of the United States, 
has denied each and every allegation under the two articles 
that have been submitted to this body. I focused on the 
obstruction of justice, and each of the seven elements of the 
obstruction of justice has been denied by the President. This 
puts it all in issue.
    For example, let's start with the issue of lying to the 
aides. The President said he was truthful with his aides, Mr. 
Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal. Yet, if you look at the 
testimony of John Podesta, where he says the President came in 
and denied having sex of any kind with Ms. Lewinsky and goes 
into the details of that, that is in direct conflict with the 
testimony of the President of the United States. The same thing 
is true of the testimony of Mr. Blumenthal versus the testimony 
of the President of the United States.
    Another conflict in the testimony is between the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky--in a number of different areas. First of all, 
in regard to the gifts, the President said, ``And I told her 
that if they asked for gifts, she had to give them.'' That is 
the President's testimony. Yet, Ms. Lewinsky says that in that 
conversation the President said, when asked about the gifts, 
``Give them to Betty.'' Then he says, ``I don't know,'' or 
``Let me think about it.'' Again, that is a direct conflict 
between Monica Lewinsky and the President.
    In regard to Monica Lewinsky, he was coaching her testimony 
or suggesting to her that ``Maybe you can sign an affidavit,'' 
or ``You can always say you were coming to see Betty, or that 
you were bringing me letters.'' This is the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky. What does the President say regarding that? He said 
that he never talked to her about a cover story in a legal 
context. In other words, it is a denial of obstruction of 
witness tampering, in contrast to the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky. Obviously, there is a conflict in the details of the 
relationship.
    There is a conflict between the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan in three different areas. Ms. 
Lewinsky said she shared with Mr. Jordan some details of the 
relationship. Mr. Jordan says that was not accurate. Ms. 
Lewinsky says in a particular meeting that Mr. Jordan--where 
they discussed about notes she had been keeping, Mr. Jordan 
said, ``Go home and make sure they're not there.'' But Mr. 
Jordan denies that.
    In another area, on the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky says that 
she brought to Mr. Jordan the affidavit, and he assisted in 
making some corrections. Mr. Jordan does not recall that. So 
there are conflicts between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan.
    There are conflicts between Ms. Currie and the President in 
regard to the coaching incident. Ms. Currie said the statements 
were made and taken in the sense that ``the President wished me 
to agree with the statement.'' The President says, ``I was 
trying to get as much information as quickly as I could.'' 
Obviously, Betty Currie testified before the grand jury before 
the President did, and there were never any follow-up 
questions. I would want to ask her: What did you say in 
response? Did you provide any information that the President 
was soliciting at that particular moment, according to the 
defense he has asserted? So there is conflict there.
    There is a conflict between the President and a witness 
that we would offer from the deposition. The President denies 
that he focused on what Attorney Bennett was stating in 
reference to the false affidavit. I believe that we can offer a 
witness--it could be in the form of an affidavit or 
deposition--that would testify that he was focusing, paying 
attention.
    So there is clear conflict in the record that can only be 
established through the presenting of additional questions or 
additional witnesses.
    The need for witnesses is so basic and fundamental to our 
truth-seeking system of justice in this country that words fail 
me in making the case that we should call witnesses and then 
you should permit it in this proceeding.
    We are sympathetic totally with the timeframe and the time 
constraint of the U.S. Senate, and for that reason we will 
prepare our witness list, we will accommodate a quick session. 
The White House counselor said this is going to drag on for 
months. If it drags on for months, it is because they want it 
to drag on for months. We will do all that we can to end this 
in a timely fashion, and the American people and the U.S. 
Senate need to understand that.
    Why are the White House counselors so concerned about 
witnesses? Many of these witnesses are friendly to them. We are 
in a truth-seeking endeavor, and I would respectfully submit 
that the calling of witnesses would help resolve the conflicts 
that I have recited.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Dodd to 
the counsel for the President:

    Do you believe that a fundamental question of fairness and 
due process has been raised by the failure of the House 
managers to notify you of the proposed Lewinsky interview or by 
your exclusion from that interview? And do you wish also to 
respond to Mr. Hutchinson's comments?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I will use 
most of my time on the first part of that question and try to 
perhaps weave in a few comments on the second part.
    I am not going to seek here this morning to vindicate the 
interests of this body; that is for others. But I do think it 
useful to speak for a bit about the interests of the accused, 
the President of the United States.
    It is odd as I think we listen to the managers explain what 
they were seeking to do to put that in the context of what we 
know was actually happening here. It was suggested that they 
wanted to just have a conversation like any lawyer getting 
ready for a trial would want to have a conversation with a 
witness before he or she put the witness into a deposition or 
on trial--that it was sort of normal for a trial lawyer to do 
this.
    I think one of the managers suggested they just wanted to 
say ``hello'' to put a face on it. And they even suggested that 
counsel for Ms. Lewinsky wanted a court order to force their 
client to testify. Well, as we will all see once the record is 
made available to everyone, that last point is sheer nonsense.
    But I suggest that earlier suggestions that just a friendly 
little chat was all they were looking for is belied by the 
notion of what we have here is the managers using their 
``institutional role'' to get the independent counsel to join 
with them and use the authority that he has under the immunity 
agreement to threaten Ms. Lewinsky with jail, to threaten her 
with violation of her immunity agreement, and opening up the 
prospect of prosecution if they do not meet in a friendly 
little conversation, just say hello, just like to meet you, 
gathering with the managers.
    Can you imagine what that little conversation is going to 
look like, held in the independent counsel's office, with the 
people there who have the capacity to put Ms. Lewinsky in jail, 
while there is this friendly little conversation, just say 
``hello,'' normal everyday discussion between the trial lawyer 
and the witness he would like to get to know?
    From the perspective of my client for the moment, putting 
aside the rules which you all agreed on as to how we ought to 
proceed, can we really say that is just normal, just OK, to 
have one side using the might and majesty of the independent 
counsel's office, threatening a witness with violation of an 
immunity agreement if she doesn't agree to fly across the 
country and meet for this friendly little chat? I think not.
    I don't know whether I have a minute or two left. But on 
the issue of conflicts, this is, of course, something that has 
been the subject of much discourse over the last few days. Let 
me just take a couple of examples put to you by Manager 
Hutchinson.
    On the issue of the statements made by the President, Mr. 
Podesta, and Mr. Blumenthal, there is no conflict in the 
testimony here. The President indeed said that he was trying to 
keep his aides from becoming witnesses. He even said that he 
didn't even remember his conversation with Mr. Podesta but he 
took as true--this is what he said to the grand jury--he 
accepted as true that Mr. Blumenthal said this is what that 
conversation sounded like. Mr. Podesta said that is what the 
conversation was. There was no conflict. The President indeed 
adopted in the grand jury what those people would say. And of 
course he didn't put them into the grand jury in order to 
repeat something or to mislead the grand jury as to their 
knowledge of what they told him. They testified truthfully in 
the grand jury when they recited their conversations with the 
President.
    But I want to move just a second to something you have 
never heard before in the entire days that we have been sitting 
here. We heard little hints about how Vernon Jordan might be a 
liar because of what he said about December 11. All of a sudden 
just 5 minutes ago, this body heard for the first time he not 
only may be a liar about the job search, he may be a liar about 
destroying evidence. Words fail me.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Abraham 
to the President's counsel:

    Is it your position that Ms. Lewinsky was lying in her 
grand jury testimony, her grand jury deposition, and her FBI 
interviews when she said that the President engaged in conduct 
with her that constituted ``sexual relations'' even under his 
narrow interpretation of the term in the Jones deposition? Is 
it your position that she was also lying when she gave 
essentially the same account contemporaneously with the 
occurrence of the events to her friends and counselors?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Senator, our position is not that she is 
lying. Our position is that there are two different versions of 
what happened, and there is a discrepancy.
    In my presentation to the Senate, I acknowledged that there 
was a disparity between what the President had recounted and 
what Ms. Lewinsky said happened when it came to recalling and 
reporting these specific rather graphic and intimate details 
concerning their activities. I pointed out that, with respect 
to other essential elements of the relationship, there was no 
disagreement that they acknowledge that there was a 
relationship, that they tried to conceal it. But I also 
suggested--and I suggest to you today--that not every 
disagreement, not every discrepancy, is the foodstuff or the 
subject of a perjury charge.
    I also made the observation that perhaps this kind of 
conflict of testimony as to who touched who, when, where, and 
why, was not the kind of conflict that this institution would 
want to resolve through testimony on the floor. If you have any 
doubts about that point, I would suggest you read Ms. 
Lewinsky's August 20 testimony before the grand jury which is 
very complete and entirely and vigorously dedicated to 
eliciting every single gritty detail of what went on between 
them. I said also that I thought that this disagreement, this 
disparity, was of questionable materiality. Let me explain why.
    On January 29, Judge Wright ruled that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony about her relationship with President Clinton was 
unnecessary and maybe even inadmissible; that she had had no 
information relating to the core issues of the case. She made 
that ruling after all the allegations about that relationship 
had been made public. And the judge knew what had been reported 
in the newspapers and what was generally understood about it at 
that point. She had been there when the President testified 
about this. And she concluded that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony was 
not required, at least for the Paula Jones case. In truth, Ms. 
Lewinsky was an ancillary or peripheral witness in the Paula 
Jones case. She had absolutely no firsthand knowledge about 
what happened in the Excelsior Hotel when Ms. Jones claimed 
that then-Governor Clinton made an unwelcome sexual overture to 
her. Ms. Lewinsky had nothing to add or subtract, no ability to 
testify about that issue.
    So on the issue of the materiality to the Jones case as to 
the truth of what actually happened between them, it is clear 
it is of questionable, if any, materiality whatsoever. She was 
a peripheral witness on issues not having to do with the core 
issues of the case, and the case had no legal merit.
    Please recall that the judge concluded that the case had no 
legal or evidentiary merit. Please also remember that the Jones 
lawyers, when they were asking these questions of President 
Clinton, presumably knew the answers to these questions about 
the relationship because they had been fully briefed the night 
before.
    Now, as to the question of the materiality of this 
testimony and this issue of who touched whom, when, where and 
why, to the grand jury, let me just say this: The House 
managers claim that one or the other must be lying because both 
cannot be correct. They argue that if you believe Monica 
Lewinsky on this issue, you must disbelieve Bill Clinton, and 
if you disbelieve Bill Clinton, you must conclude that he 
knowingly perjured himself when he denied under oath having 
this kind of contact with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now, this direct issue was addressed by the panel of expert 
prosecutors that we brought to testify before the Judiciary 
Committee, and they all agreed that this kind of issue would 
never be the subject of a perjury prosecution. I would urge you 
to go back and look at some of the testimony that they gave to 
the Judiciary Committee. They talked about the oath-on-oath 
issue, they talked about what is independent corroborative 
evidence and what is not, and they concluded that no 
reasonable, though responsible, prosecutor would bring this 
kind of case based on that kind of an issue.
    We are not arguing with the managers about the law. We are 
not arguing with the managers about the disparity. We are 
talking about prosecutorial practices, what in reality would be 
a criminal prosecution, and I submit to you that no reasonable, 
no responsible prosecutor would bring this kind of a case based 
on that kind of evidence.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Daschle 
addressed to counsel for the President:

    Do you believe that it is a requirement of due process and 
fairness that you be allowed to participate in the Lewinsky 
witness debriefing sought by the managers, and do you believe 
that the House would have asked for the same right if the White 
House had attempted to interview Ms. Lewinsky?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, that question raises 
an interesting mix of issues, because I think in one respect 
the House managers are correct, that once the Senate determines 
that it is prepared to go forward--I trust it will not--but if 
it does determine that it is prepared to go forward in some way 
with respect to the depositions of witnesses, at that point, 
with the Senate having made that decision, it would be 
appropriate for both sides to seek a voluntary, consensual, 
typical opportunity to meet with any witness in a setting that 
doesn't involve having the prosecutor with life and death 
authority over that witness doing the debriefing or being 
present while you talk to the witness.
    Thus, although I will take the opportunity of offering to 
sit in on any meeting between the managers and the independent 
counsel and any witness, because I would certainly like to know 
what the mood and the atmosphere of that process really sounded 
like, the issue here, I think, is not so much whether it would 
be nice to sit in on that meeting but whether there can be any 
hope for due process, fairness and opportunity for both sides, 
or certainly my side--I won't speak for the managers--to have 
an opportunity for a reasonable, fair and open discussion 
voluntarily with any witness who will talk with us, not--not to 
be too rhetorical about this--with the looming presence of the 
prosecutors sitting in the room with us.
    As everyone who practices in this district knows, indeed, 
it is a matter of law that a prosecutor may never interfere 
with the access of any witness to defense counsel. I can't 
think of much more interference than being required to sit in 
the room with the prosecutor and with another prosecutor while 
that kind of discussion goes on.
    So the answer is, fairness, no. But if it is my only 
opportunity to meet with Ms. Lewinsky, I will take it. But I 
trust that as a matter of due process it will not be.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators DeWine, 
Collins and Murkowski to the House managers:

    With all of the conflicting testimony that exists on the 
record between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie, for example, 
how are we to resolve the questions of perjury and obstruction 
of justice without observing the demeanor of witnesses?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I do not think there is any way to 
resolve the conflicts in their testimony without calling 
witnesses. You can read the transcripts and you can look at 
those and you can try to determine whether there is any 
corroborating evidence, how you can believe it, make some of 
those kinds of evaluations. But particularly whoever you are 
looking at, whether it is Monica Lewinsky or Betty Currie, 
there are followup questions and there is the demeanor that 
allows you to determine who is telling the truth and who you 
believe.
    And in contrast, Mr. Ruff tries to make the point that 
somebody is lying here, and maybe somebody is lying, but a 
jury--in this case the Senators--can look at this and say, 
well, someone is not recalling the same way, someone is more 
believable because their recollection is better, it is 
corroborated, or you could conclude that someone is lying. It 
doesn't always break down that simply, but you have to evaluate 
that. And that is how you resolve it.
    But let me just come back--I think what we see here today 
is the White House counsel do not want to talk about the facts. 
They do not want to talk about this case. They do not want to 
talk about obstruction of justice; just like in the House, they 
want to talk about the process. They want to talk about 
everything that is going on except for the case of obstruction 
of justice. And it probably will be the news story later on 
today, the questions that they have raised about this.
    But the fact is, it is very simple that they have access to 
Betty Currie. Every time the President has talked to and tried 
to coach Betty Currie, I don't think the President invited the 
independent counsel in when this was under investigation, or 
the Paula Jones lawyers. I don't think that happened. I don't 
think that--at least from the news clips, when I saw Betty 
Currie hugging the President, I don't think he invited the 
House managers in. I didn't necessarily expect him to. But we 
have to be prepared.
    And I will just tell you right now, so nobody is surprised, 
if we get to call Vernon Jordan, I don't want to delay the U.S. 
Senate in order to be prepared for that, so I confess today 
that I called up William Hundley, the lawyer for Vernon Jordan, 
to visit with him.
    Now, I hope that if you talk to any witnesses, that if you 
feel it is fair, that you will give us a chance to join with 
you in that. But, obviously, this is an adversary process we 
are engaged in, and I think that we today in this question and 
answer session that you all so graciously extended to us should 
focus on the obstruction of justice charges because that is 
what you have to determine--on the perjury allegation, because 
that is what we have to determine today.
    I thank the Chief Justice and the Senators.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Kohl and 
Edwards to the House managers:

    Throughout this trial both sides have spoken in 
``absolutes''; that is, if the President engaged in this 
conduct, prosecutors claim he must be convicted and removed 
from office, while the President's lawyers argue that such 
conduct does not in any way rise to an impeachable offense. It 
strikes many of us as a closer call. So let me ask you this: 
Even if the President engaged in the alleged conduct, can 
reasonable people disagree with the conclusion that, as a 
matter of law, he must be convicted and removed from office--
yes or no?

    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Absolutely. And this is a hard case in 
a couple of areas, and I think it is an easy case in many 
areas.
    The Constitution reads that upon conviction, the person 
shall be removed. You have to put it in the context of the 
judge cases, because that is where it gets to be hard for this 
body. Because of the precedents of the body when you apply the 
same legal standard of high crimes and misdemeanors to the fact 
that a judge who was convicted of perjury was removed by the 
body, and you conclude in your mind that the President 
committed perjury, you have a dynamic you have to work through.
    Mr. Bumpers says there is perjury, then there is perjury. I 
would suggest to you that the allegations of perjury and 
obstruction of justice in this case are not trivial. It is not 
about a speeding ticket or a trivial matter. It is about the 
activity of the President when he was defendant in a lawsuit, a 
sexual harassment lawsuit, when he was told by the Supreme 
Court you have to play and you have to play fairly.
    If you determine that he committed the crime of perjury and 
you determine that he committed the crime of obstruction of 
justice, based on the precedents of the Senate I think you 
would have a hard time saying under the situation of this case 
that that is not a high crime. But I would be the first to 
admit that the Constitution is silent on this question about 
whether or not every high crime has to result in removal.
    If I was sitting where you are, I would probably get down 
on my knees before I made that decision. Because the impact on 
society is going to be real either way. If you find this 
President guilty in your mind, from the facts, that he is a 
perjurer and that he obstructed justice, you have to somehow 
reconcile continued service in light of that event.
    I think it is important for this body to not have a 
disposition plan that doesn't take in consideration the good of 
this Nation. I have argued to you that when you found that a 
judge was a perjurer, you couldn't in good conscience send him 
back in the courtroom because everybody that came in that 
courtroom thereafter would have a real serious doubt.
    I will argue to you that when you find this President 
guilty of perjury, if you do, that he has violated his oath and 
that by a consequence of that, some public trust has been lost. 
And I would show to you the body of evidence from this 
question, ``Do you trust William Jefferson Clinton?''--the 
American people will tell you--three out of four say no. But 
the American people will also tell you that I understand what 
happened here and some want him removed and some don't. And you 
have to consider what is best for this Nation.
    I will yield to Mr. Buyer in a second, but the point that I 
am trying to make, not as articulately as I can, is that I know 
how hard that decision is. It has also been hard for me.
    It has never been hard to find out whether Bill Clinton 
committed perjury or whether he obstructed justice. That 
``ain't'' a hard one for me. But when you take the good of this 
Nation, the upside and the downside, reasonable people can 
disagree on what we should do.
    Mr. Manager BUYER. I would just like to remind all of you 
that the impeachment process is intended to cleanse the 
executive or the judicial office when it is plagued with such a 
cancer as perjury or obstruction of justice, which violates the 
oath required to hold those high offices.
    Now, what may be turning in the gut of some of you are the 
precedents of the Senate, when in fact you have turned out of 
office, you have exercised your judgments of proportionality 
when these judges violated their oaths and had committed 
perjury, you said they shall be removed from office.
    Now there are some that are going, well, I am uneasy in 
this case with the President. That is what may create a little 
problem here. I would suggest to you that you actually have 
findings of fact; that the Senate has findings of fact that the 
President, in fact--he lied or he did not lie or he committed 
an obstruction; that you actually have findings of fact. And 
then you can move beyond to the questions of application of the 
law.
    But when the Senate has performed such a cleansing and 
removed Judges Nixon, Claiborne and Hastings, all three of them 
impeached for perjury in some form--and in Judge Hastings' case 
even though he had been acquitted of the criminal case--the 
Congress, in particular the Senate, you have a duty to preserve 
the integrity of public office, and that is what impeachment 
was precisely designed to do.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Voinovich, Jeffords and Chafee to the House managers:

    In her interviews with the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, Ms. Lewinsky stated that on January 5, 1998, the 
President told her not to worry about the affidavit because he 
had seen 15 others. Did the President mean that he had seen 
previous drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, or did the 
President mean that he had seen drafts of other affidavits that 
were in some way connected to the Paula Jones matter?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. You can 
take that either way. But I believe in the context--and I 
presented this to you the other day--in which the President 
uttered those words, that the most logical conclusion is that 
he had seen 15 other drafts of hers. If you remember, she was 
discussing with him the issue of whether he wanted to see this 
particular draft of her affidavit. And at that particular 
moment he said, ``No, I don't want to. I have seen 15 others.''
    Technically speaking, he could have seen 15 other 
affidavits in his life somewhere back in Arkansas, who knows? 
But it strikes me that the logical conclusion, the commonsense 
conclusion in the context of everything else that you see this 
President was intent on and had in his mind, and the interest 
that he had already shown from all the conversations that he 
had had with Vernon Jordan and others to make sure that this 
affidavit was on track, and knowing that he was going to 
testify in a few days himself in the Jones case, and rely on it 
and in fact did go in and tell the same cover stories that were 
in this affidavit to the court, untruthfully, that the 
probabilities are pretty good, that common sense says that he 
was saying he had seen 15 other drafts of this version of this 
affidavit. But that is for you to decide. That is a judgment 
call for the triers of fact. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Leahy to 
counsel for the President:

    Could you reply to the statement just made by Manager 
McCollum?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, on Thursday 
afternoon I went over, in perhaps tedious detail, the facts 
relating to the affidavits. I pointed out that there was no way 
in which--there was no evidence that the President saw any 
affidavit draft. Mr. Manager McCollum just now, I think, 
admitted that he has only a speculation. He doesn't have any 
record evidence. The President denied seeing any affidavit 
draft. I pointed out in the managers' chart 7 that their theory 
about when Ms. Lewinsky could have gotten an affidavit was 
simply wrong because their theory was she got it on January 5. 
This is a single affidavit draft. The evidence plainly shows 
that she could not have gotten it until January 6. There is 
simply nothing in the record--and the independent counsel 
interviewed Ms. Lewinsky extensively, both in interviews and 
before the grand jury--and there is simply no evidence 
whatsoever that the President saw any drafts or, indeed, that 
there were 15 drafts.
    Let me say a word about whether or not we are addressing 
the facts. I am not going to frighten you. I am not going to go 
back through the obstruction of justice evidence. But I think 
if you will remember the presentation--first by Mr. Craig who 
addressed in detail the evidence with regard to perjury, then 
if you will recall what Ms. Mills said addressing two of the 
seven allegations of obstruction of justice, and with what I 
said to you on Thursday afternoon for almost 3 hours--and I 
thank you for your uncommon patience; you were attentive all 
the way through that exercise--you know that we have addressed 
the facts. What we had yesterday, what Mr. Ruff has already 
addressed, is a, again, I will use the word ``remarkable'' 
occurrence involving the independent counsel.
    We have addressed the facts, and there is simply nothing to 
support in all this record, this heavy, long record, that the 
President had any review of any affidavit or, indeed, that 
there were more than one or two drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators DeWine, 
Santorum, and Fitzgerald to the President's counsel:

    If we are to assume that the various allegations as to 
obstruction of justice are in fact true, is it your contention 
that if the President tampered with witnesses, encouraged the 
hiding of evidence, and corruptly influenced the filing of a 
false affidavit by a witness, that these acts do not rise to 
the level of an impeachable offense?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this is something I 
won't have an opportunity to say very often, but I believe that 
Mr. Manager Graham has, in fact, stated for you the essential 
of the role that this body must play. We will probably differ 
as to what the right answer to the question is, but as to the 
process and as to the question that must be asked, I think he 
stated it well.
    I believe that the facts do not support the conclusions 
that are embodied in the question. But not only can reasonable 
people differ on the facts, but reasonable people may differ on 
the outcome. And if, indeed, reasonable people can differ, 
doesn't that mean, by the very statement of that proposition, 
that this body cannot meet its constitutional heavy mandate, 
which is to determine whether or not, whatever conduct you 
believe the President committed, as outlined by these managers 
over the last many days--can you legitimately determine that he 
ought to be removed from office.
    And all I can do, I suppose, is to remind you, as I have 
too frequently, I am sure, that if you try to put yourself in 
the minds and the hearts of the men who created our system of 
Government, they wanted to know only really one answer to one 
question, as framed in many different ways, but the essence 
remains the same: Is there a sufficient danger to the state--
danger to the state--to warrant what my colleagues across the 
aisle here have called the political death penalty. And I think 
the answer to that is no.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator 
Wellstone to counsel for the President:

    To what extent should the views of the American people be 
taken into account in considering whether a President should be 
removed from office?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think that the 
answer to that question is not the polls that you read in the 
newspapers or that you see on your evening news, whatever those 
numbers may be; that is only one clue as to what the American 
people are thinking. And each of you knows the people in your 
jurisdiction far better than any polltaker does and that 
certainly I do.
    But surely one way to test the ultimate question that I 
just described in response to the last inquiry from the 
Republican side of the House, is to ask yourself, on the basis 
of experience over the last year, on the basis of your 
experience in the political--and by that I mean political in 
the very best constitutional sense of the term as used by 
Alexander Hamilton--as to your sense of the political structure 
of this country and what the people are saying to you and what 
your sense of their needs is: Do they need the kind of 
cleansing that Manager Buyer spoke about?
    I think the answer to that, if you look within the body of 
people you are most familiar with, must be no. This isn't to 
say that it is a popularity contest, that we ought to go out 
and have a referendum or another poll before you all decide on 
this. But surely the sense of the people, the will of the 
people, the belief of the people in this President's ability to 
govern must educate each of you, not mandate a result, but 
surely guide the result that you reach in this proceeding.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Collins 
to the House managers:

    The President's counsel has made much of Ms. Lewinsky's 
statement that no one ``promised'' her a job for her silence. 
She did not testify, however, that no one promised her a job in 
return for a false affidavit--or, for that matter, that no one 
implied that she would get a job for her cooperation. Can you 
think of any reason why we should not call Ms. Lewinsky to help 
clarify such ambiguous testimony?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. That 
is an excellent question and really goes to the heart of some 
of the disputes.
    I think as you read the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, as you 
read some of the other areas of testimony, questions come to 
your mind. You would like to follow up, you would like to ask 
her a question, and that one comes out and flags you that that 
is a question that would like to be asked: No one promised her 
a job for her silence, and that is the testimony that she gave 
in response to a question in the grand jury.
    But I believe this is a case in which actions speak louder 
than words. I think that actions and what took place and the 
commonsense understanding of what is happening here demonstrate 
the case that there was a false affidavit that was obtained and 
that was in conjunction with the obtaining of a job for Monica 
Lewinsky.
    So I think that is a natural question, and I think that 
also if you read, if you look at the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky, I think it is clear that the case is made that she 
was encouraged to lie and she was also encouraged to sign a 
false affidavit and she was also provided a job coincidentally 
at the same time.
    I would like to take the opportunity, if I might, Mr. Chief 
Justice, in further answering a question that was raised 
earlier; it was on the false affidavit. That is, I think, 
related to the question as well.
    During Mr. Kendall's presentation a few days ago, he made 
this statement:

    The idea that the telephone call [between Lewinsky and 
Clinton on January 5] is about that affidavit is sheer, 
unsupported speculation and, even worse, it is speculation 
demolished by fact.

    This is the statement that Mr. Kendall gave the other day 
on this floor, as cited in the Congressional Record, 
summarizing his presentation that the idea that Clinton and 
Lewinsky talked about the affidavit ``is sheer, unsupported 
speculation and . . . demolished by fact.''
    Well, the record demonstrates that Monica Lewinsky's 
testimony is that she had a conversation with the President on 
the telephone in which she asked questions about the affidavit. 
She was concerned about signing that affidavit. And according 
to Ms. Lewinsky, the President said, ``Well, you could always 
say the people in Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped 
you get it.'' And that is in reference to a paragraph in the 
particular affidavit.
    Now, my question to Mr. Kendall is, Would you agree, Mr. 
Kendall, that your assertion that there is no support for it in 
the Record is that you are totally rejecting the testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky as totally unbelievable? And once again you 
have a conflict that is presented in the testimony, and there 
is only one way to resolve it, and that is to hear from the key 
witnesses.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator 
Lautenberg to counsel for the President:

    Could you reply to the question put by the manager?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, let me address the 
first part of Mr. Manager Hutchinson's response; and that is, 
whether the statement by Ms. Lewinsky that ``Nobody ever 
promised me a job for my silence'' covered other possible 
promises to her. And it is quite clear, when you read all the 
interviews that were done of her by the independent counsel, 
all the grand jury testimony, that she unequivocally testified 
there were no promises made to her, there were no assistances 
given to her, that were in any way conditioned upon her 
testifying a certain way or giving a certain kind of affidavit. 
And she is unequivocal about that.
    Now, in the statement that she made that I quoted, she does 
not say nobody ever did these other things, but she said that 
in her previous testimony. She uses the offer of a job as 
simply a proxy for anything that would connect the assistance 
she would receive with testifying in a certain way. There is 
simply no evidence anywhere in the record. And the independent 
counsel covered that with her in detail. She felt compelled to 
volunteer her statement at the end of the process because they 
had left some innuendo in the record that she had been provided 
assistance. But her testimony is unequivocal. I have quoted it.
    Now, the only testimony in the record about linking the job 
to some assistance in the Jones case comes from the Linda Tripp 
audiotapes. And, again, Ms. Lewinsky could not be clearer in 
her grand jury testimony what she told Linda Tripp was false. 
There was no connection there whatsoever. Her proffer, which I 
put up on the board, was quite unconditional. And this you have 
in your materials. This is in her own handwriting: Neither the 
President nor Mr. Jordan nor anyone on their behalf asked or 
encouraged her to lie.
    So with regard to the first part of Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson's question, there is simply no evidence, again, that 
any kind of assistance to Ms. Lewinsky was conditioned on her 
performance in any way in the Jones case.
    Now, with regard to the affidavit, I stand on what I said 
before you on Thursday. And I want to be very clear about what 
Mr. Hutchinson's presentation was in chart No. 7 that I was 
responding to. And I think it is quite important to recall 
yesterday that a question was addressed to the House managers 
whether there were any statements contained in their exhibits 
which contained misrepresentations or omissions that, in the 
interest of fairness to justice, they would like to correct; 
and Mr. Manager Hutchinson said, ``We are not aware of any 
corrections that need to be made on any of our exhibits offered 
to the Senate.''
    I would simply rest on the presentation. I am not going to 
take you through, again, the many errors in the charts. Those 
were not refuted in any way. They rested on their charts. I 
leave that to your judgment.
    But with regard to chart 7, what Mr. Manager Hutchinson 
told you almost a week ago was that chart 7 was a summary of 
what happened on January 5: Ms. Lewinsky meets with her 
attorney, Mr. Carter, for an hour; Carter drafts the affidavit 
for Ms. Lewinsky; she calls the President; the President 
returns Ms. Lewinsky's call; and then they had a discussion 
about this draft affidavit.
    The point of my demonstration through Mr. Carter's 
testimony and through his billing records was in fact that the 
affidavit had been drafted the next day. They could not have 
had a discussion about the affidavit on that date. And I think 
the record is quite clear on that.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Lott to 
the House managers:

    Do you have any comment on the answer given by the 
President's counsel with regard to the views of the American 
people?

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
Senators, this is a fascinating question. Edmund Burke was 
asked that once, and he said that a member of Parliament owes 
the highest degree of fidelity to his constituents, but he 
doesn't owe his conscience to anybody.
    We have, or we have not, a representative democracy. We are 
not delegates who are sent here to weigh our mail every day and 
then to vote accordingly. Our work here is not an ongoing 
plebiscite. We are elected to bring our judgment, our 
experience, and our consciences with us here.
    I have always believed--and I believe more firmly than 
ever; and this experience confirms me in that belief--there are 
issues of transcendent importance that you have to be willing 
to lose your office over. I can think of several that I am 
willing to lose my office over--abortion is one; national 
defense is another; strengthening, not emasculating, the 
concept of equal justice under the law. My life is devoted, as 
a lawyer--I have been on the Judiciary Committee; this is my 
25th year--and equal justice under the law is what moves me and 
animates me and consumes me. And I am willing to lose my seat 
any day in the week rather than sell out on those issues.
    Despite all the polls and all the hostile editorials, 
America is hungry for people who believe in something. You may 
disagree with us, but we believe in something.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we recess the proceedings for 15 minutes.
    There being no objection, at 11:19 a.m., the Senate 
recessed until 11:36 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. We will go 
approximately another hour, if questions are still available--
and I assume they will be--and then we will break for about an 
hour for lunch.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Biden to 
the House managers:

    If a Senator believes that the President may have lied to 
the American people, his family and his aides, and that some of 
his answers before the grand jury were misleading or half-
truths, but that he could not be convicted in a court of law 
for either perjury or obstruction of justice, is it the opinion 
of the House managers that his actions still justify removing 
the President from office?

    Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I have 
taken two public oaths in my career in the service of the 
people of this great land. One was as a Member of Congress; the 
other was as a U.S. attorney. As a U.S. attorney, it was my job 
on behalf of the people of the United States to prosecute cases 
against individuals and other entities that violated the 
Criminal Code of the United States of America. That Criminal 
Code, as you are well aware, includes the offenses of perjury 
and obstruction of justice.
    That Criminal Code does not include the offenses of lying 
to one's family. That is not what brings us here today. What 
brings us here today is the belief by the House of 
Representatives in lawful public vote that this President 
violated, in numerous respects, his oath of office and the 
Criminal Code of the United States of America--in particular, 
that he committed perjury and obstruction of justice.
    I can tell you, as a U.S. attorney serving under two 
Presidents, that I would prosecute these cases, because I did 
prosecute such cases. I prosecuted cases against people, 
including members of the body from which we as managers come, 
who appeared before grand juries and lied, who appeared before 
grand juries and misled grand juries, people who obstructed 
justice, people who tampered with witnesses in precisely the 
same way that this President has committed perjury, tampered 
with witnesses and obstructed justice.
    We respectfully submit to the Senators of the United States 
of America assembled here today that these are prosecutable 
cases, that they are cases that have been prosecuted, and that 
the question before this body, we respectfully submit, in the 
House of Representatives' articles of impeachment, is not that 
the President lied to his family. What is before this body, we 
respectfully submit, as contained in the two articles of 
impeachment passed by the House of Representatives, is that 
this President violated his oath of office and committed the 
offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice, which we firmly 
believe on behalf of the people of the United States of America 
provide a sufficient basis on which this body, exercising its 
deliberative power and its legitimate jurisdiction, may find 
that this President, as people in courts of law similarly but 
not identically situated are indeed found guilty and removed 
from positions of trust, as this President ought to be for 
committing the perjury and obstruction of justice--not lying to 
his family.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Snowe, 
Mack, Chafee, Burns, and Craig to the House managers:

    Before Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed in the Jones case, the 
President refused on five separate occasions--November 3, 
November 10, November 12, November 17, and December 6--to 
produce information about gifts from Lewinsky. The President's 
counsel argued the President was unconcerned about these gifts. 
If that is the case, why didn't he produce these gifts in 
November and December?

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators 
for the question. This case needs to be looked at for the 
mosaic that it is.
    There is a reason why the President never produced gifts. 
There is a reason why the President continued to give Ms. 
Lewinsky gifts. It is because he believed that she would never 
produce them. We know that from her testimony.
    In my presentation to the Senate a week ago, I quoted from 
the transcript where she said, ``Nobody ever asked me to lie.'' 
But then she also said there was never any doubt but that 
``we'' would deny the relationship if asked.
    We see that throughout the entire proceeding. We see that 
before Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the list--on December 
5--on the witness list. And we especially see it after. In 
fact, Monica Lewinsky went to the President and said, ``I've 
been subpoenaed. They are asking for gifts. What should I do? 
Maybe I should give them to Betty.'' And the President said, 
``Let me think about that.'' And we all know by now that within 
a few hours Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky and came and 
retrieved the gifts, not to give them to the Jones lawyers 
pursuant to the subpoena, not to cooperate with the sexual 
harassment lawsuit; she took the gifts and she put them under 
her bed.
    Members of this body, it begs common sense for any 
interpretation of that conduct to be somehow cooperative with 
the legal proceedings in the sexual harassment case. Every 
piece of this puzzle, when put together, demonstrates a very 
clear pattern of obstructing justice, not to cover up personal 
affairs, not to cover up an indiscretion, but to destroy Paula 
Jones' rights under the sexual harassment laws of this country 
to have her day in court. That is the ultimate question that 
this body is going to have to address.
    Yes, reasonable minds can differ on this case as to whether 
the President should be removed office. But reasonable minds 
can only differ if those reasonable minds come to the 
conclusion that enforcement of the sexual harassment laws in 
this country are less important than the preservation of this 
man in the office of the Presidency. And that is the ultimate 
question that this body is going to have to answer. What is 
more important--the survival of Bill Clinton's Presidency in 
the face of perjury and obstruction of justice, or the 
protection of the sexual harassment laws in this country?
    And imagine, every victim in the workplace will be waiting 
for your answer.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Daschle to the 
House managers:

    Will you agree to arrange to have prepared a verbatim, 
unedited transcript of any debriefing which may occur with Ms. 
Lewinsky for immediate distribution to the Senate? And will you 
agree also to provide for the inclusion of any such debriefing 
of representatives of the Senate, one selected by the majority 
and one by the minority?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the 
Senate, it is not our intent to be doing a deposition, a formal 
presentation, a preparation for the Senate, if we talk to Ms. 
Lewinsky. It is our intent to do what any good attorney would 
do in preparing to go to trial, presuming--we don't know that 
you are going to allow us to have witnesses--but presuming we 
are going to be able to depose and have witnesses, and that is 
to meet with the witness, talk with the witness, and prepare 
the witness. And any good attorney who does that is going to 
meet his or her witness in their own confidences, in their own 
quiet respite. We discover things that way. We are not 
prepared. No. The answer to your question is no, we are not 
prepared to say we are going to give you our work product, 
which is what that would be.
    ``Work product'' is a technical term of law which, for 
anybody who is out in the public, is what lawyers do all the 
time. And they work on their case, and they prepare what they 
are going to do, and then they present it. That is the system 
we have.
    Somebody said--I think it was Mr. Hutchinson who said 
earlier--this is an adversarial position. The White House 
counsel will have their chance to talk to witnesses that they 
are going to present; we will have our chance to talk to ours. 
Then there is the opportunity for the depositions, which is 
what comes next, which is the formal proceedings when we both 
have a chance to talk with them. Then, of course, if you let us 
call them as witnesses here, they will be here, and they will 
get cross-examined, and examined, and all the questions you can 
imagine will be asked. That is the traditional American system 
of justice.
    So, no, we would not give you our work product notes. We 
have no idea what would be in them. We don't think that is 
appropriate. We think that a lot is being made out of this. We 
attempted to do this a couple of weeks ago. We would have liked 
to have talked to her earlier. It has not worked, that we have 
been permitted to, for reasons that we are not sure. But the 
reality is, this is the normal process. We would talk to any 
other witness despite however the White House counsel wants to 
argue about it. They do the same thing.
    I yield what time I have left to Mr. Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I would like to echo the work product 
analogy.
    But let me just say this as directly as I know how to say 
it--that if this body as a whole believes we are going to do 
anything improper, then whatever rule you need to fashion to 
make sure we don't, you do it, because nobody should ever doubt 
whether a witness comes into this body in this case with 
anything other than testimony that was truthful. If you want to 
go down the road of the atmosphere that people were approached 
and how they were treated about being witnesses, let's go down 
that road together. Let's bring in people in this body and 
let's see how they were approached when they were asked to 
participate in this trial, what the atmosphere and the mood 
was, when it comes to their time to be identified as witnesses.
    So I would just say as strongly as I know how that if you 
have any doubt about us and what we are up to, you fashion 
rules so we do not create an unfairness in this body; but 
please, when we ask for witnesses and we raise doubt about how 
people may have been treated, that you give us the same 
opportunity to explore the moods and atmosphere of those 
witnesses.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is to the House managers 
from Senators Murkowski, Gregg, Grams, Thomas, Crapo, Thompson 
and Hatch:

    The President's counsel rely upon the President's 
statements in many instances. Therefore, the President's 
credibility is at issue. Is the President's credibility 
affected by the fact that, until the DNA evidence surfaced, the 
President denied any improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators.
    First, I don't think it was a compliment to me from my 
colleagues that as soon as the issue of DNA came up, they all 
pointed to me and told me to come up and answer the question. I 
will do my best.
    Obviously, as the triers of fact, Members of this body 
individually will have to make determinations respecting 
credibility of the President as well as the other witnesses. It 
is indisputable, however, that from January 1998, when he spoke 
at the deposition, until August 17, when he made a quasi-
admission before the grand jury, there were intervening factors 
that required him to change his position.
    We saw from the moment the story first broke in the press 
about Monica Lewinsky the President making denials in the most 
emphatic of ways, and not only doing it repeatedly himself but 
sending out his Cabinet and his aides and his friends to do it 
on his behalf. That continued up until the eve of the 
deposition. Was it because the President suddenly had a change 
of heart? Was it because his conscience was suddenly bearing 
down upon him? Or were there other reasons? Well, let's see.
    Just before his deposition testimony, Monica Lewinsky 
decided to cooperate with the Office of Independent Counsel. 
Monica Lewinsky suddenly turned over a blue dress. And that is 
fascinating because, as you know from the record and you have 
heard from the presentations, the President was prepared to 
take Monica Lewinsky and trash her in a very public way until 
the dress was turned over to the FBI. Remember what he said to 
Sidney Blumenthal. He called her a stalker. He said that she 
was threatening him. But he no longer could make these 
presentations publicly or privately once he knew there was 
potential physical evidence.
    So I think there are a number of factors Members of this 
body can look at with respect to credibility just from the cold 
record. But if that is not enough, if Members of this body are 
not satisfied that they are able to resolve these issues of 
credibility, then the way to handle this is to follow the 
dictates of the Constitution and our Framers who understood the 
value of trial and bringing witnesses forward, placing them 
under oath and giving the triers of fact the opportunity to see 
the witnesses, to hear their testimony, to gauge their 
credibility.
    That is what the purpose of a trial is for. And the House 
managers entrust this body to make sure that at the end of the 
day this is more than a proceeding; this is an arena where the 
truth will be determined not just for our time but for history.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Murray to 
counsel for the President:

    Could you reply to the comments of Manager Rogan?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. The existence of DNA or any other 
evidence or any other events before the President's grand jury 
testimony had no bearing whatsoever on his determination which 
he carried out on that day in the middle of August to answer 
the grand jurors' questions truthfully. He did so. It may be 
that the managers can speculate about, well, there must have 
been some reason why in the middle of August, after some months 
of denying to the Nation and his family any misconduct, he 
changed his mind and told the truth. But there was one reason 
why he did that. Because he went before the grand jury for the 
United States District Court of the District of Columbia and 
told the truth.
    Now, it has been suggested by many of the managers over the 
last day that the President was somehow anxious to--or 
contemplated the prospect of, as they put it, trashing Ms. 
Lewinsky. This issue was raised yesterday and has been raised 
again by Mr. Manager Rogan. I think it is time to set that 
record straight.
    Mr. Manager Bryant yesterday, as he was discussing the Dick 
Morris issue, purported to recite from the independent 
counsel's referral and purported to describe a conversation 
between the President and Mr. Morris in which, to quote from 
Mr. Manager Bryant, ``According to Morris, the President warned 
him''--that is, Mr. Morris, he warned the President--excuse me. 
Let me start before that.

    Later the next day, the President has a followup 
conversation with Mr. Morris, in the evening, and says that 
he--

    That is, the President--

is considering holding a press conference to blast Monica 
Lewinsky out of the water. But Mr. Morris urges caution. He 
says, ``Be careful.''

    And that he warned the President not to be too hard on her.
    Well, 180 degrees off from that description, let me read 
you what, in fact, the independent counsel's office referral 
says, and I am sure it was just a slip of the read that you 
heard yesterday.

    The President had a followup conversation with Mr. Morris 
during the evening of January 22nd, 1998--

    This is page 127 of the independent counsel's referral--

when Mr. Morris was considering holding a press conference to 
``blast Monica Lewinsky `out of the water.' '' The President 
told Mr. Morris to ``be careful.'' According to Mr. Morris, the 
President warned him not to ``be too hard on [Ms. Lewinsky]''. 
. .

    Close. Close. One hundred eighty degrees off. Beyond that, 
let me be very clear about one proposition which has been a 
subtheme running through some of the comments of the managers 
over the last many days. The White House, the President, the 
President's agents, the President's spokespersons, no one has 
ever trashed, threatened, maligned or done anything else to 
Monica Lewinsky--no one.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Hutchison of Texas, Snowe, Allard, Collins and Hatch to the 
House managers:

    The counsel for the President have said that the heart of 
this case is private consensual sex. A tenet of sexual 
harassment law, however, is that the implied power relationship 
between a supervisor (in this case, the President), and a 
subordinate (in this case an intern), is enough to constitute 
sexual harassment.
    This is well settled in military law and is developing 
along this line in the civilian sector. In your view, how might 
acquittal of this case affect laws regarding sexual harassment?

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, the law of sexual 
harassment is a relatively new genre. If somebody wanted to 
make a case before the Congress had stepped in and improved 
upon the law, it essentially reduced women in the workplace, 
for instance, who had been harassed into what has been referred 
to as a ``he said-she said'' type of argument, and so the law 
has improved upon that type of argument because the law 
recognizes today that sometimes there can be evidence of a 
pattern of conduct, and that conduct is relevant to prove how 
somebody may have behaved.
    Consider what would happen if victims of the workplace get 
a message from the Congress of the United States that what the 
President did with Paula Jones, or allegedly did with Paula 
Jones, is of no constitutional significance here. It would send 
a message to every woman in the workplace that if they have a 
complaint against an employer who is attempting to use a 
position of power and authority to pursue improper advancement, 
the message would be that you might as well just keep quiet 
about it because the person can lie in court and suffer no 
recrimination. First, they will probably never be discovered, 
because most of the time DNA evidence doesn't suddenly appear, 
but even if DNA evidence does appear to corroborate the victim, 
the message is that as long as he is appropriately apologetic 
and the lie was, after all, only about sex, it is of no import 
with respect to removing them from their job or having them 
suffer any legal consequences. I think that would be a horrible 
message.
    The reason the law allows this pattern-of-conduct evidence 
is because sexual harassers operate in a unique way. They get 
their victims alone. They typically don't commit these crimes 
under the glare of klieg lights or in front of television 
cameras or where witnesses can testify. They get their victims 
alone for one reason--because they know through intimidation 
and fear one of two things will happen. Through intimidation or 
fear, the victim will submit; or through intimidation or fear, 
the victim will not submit but will keep their mouth shut about 
it.
    What is the message to these victims who do brave losing 
their job, being destroyed publicly, having their reputations 
destroyed? What is the message to them if, when they come 
forward and they want to pursue their case, we take the legal 
view that somebody can perjure himself, somebody can lie, 
somebody can obstruct justice, somebody in the greatest 
position of power in our country can take whatever steps are 
necessary to destroy that woman's claim in a court of law where 
she is entitled to pursue it if at the end of all of this we 
say: Well, you know, he was embarrassed, he did lie but it was 
only about sex? Lies in sexual harassment cases, Members of the 
Senate, are always only about sex.
    The question before this body is, what type of validity are 
we going to give these laws and what sort of message are we 
going to send to victims in the workplace? I pray that we can 
put personal relationships aside with respect to how people 
individually feel about this President personally and how they 
feel about his administration and focus on what is the ultimate 
conclusion legally and what is the precedent that would be set 
if we turned a blind eye to this sort of conduct.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Boxer, 
Feinstein, Landrieu, Mikulski and Murray to counsel for the 
President.

    Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed the relationship was other 
than consensual and was not Ms. Jones' case dismissed as having 
no claim recognized by law?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. No. And yes. Indeed, as Mr. Manager Rogan 
has told you, and others before him on the managers' side, our 
sexual harassment laws and our civil rights laws are of 
critical importance to all of us. My colleague, Ms. Mills, 
spoke eloquently on that subject a couple of days ago.
    But it is important to understand, I believe, with no sense 
at all that we are in any way diminishing the importance of 
those laws and of the rights of every American citizen to seek 
justice under those laws, that we are talking about a case in 
which the trial judge determined that on all the evidence that 
had been gathered and all the claims that plaintiff had made 
and all the discovery that had been taken, there was no case. 
That is justice. That is the way the system works. The 
plaintiff brings the claim, the process moves ahead, and a 
judge ultimately makes the decision. And this didn't have 
anything to do with what President Clinton said in his 
deposition on January 17. What the judge ruled was, first, that 
that evidence was irrelevant to her consideration; and then 
ultimately, in April of last year, that there simply was no 
case.
    We accept the results of the justice system whether they go 
against us or whether they go for us. In either event, it is 
justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Thompson 
to the House managers:

    Is there any reason to believe that there is any 
relationship between the President telling Mr. Blumenthal that 
Ms. Lewinsky was a stalker and expressing his frustration about 
not being able to get his story out with the fact that shortly 
thereafter negative stories about Ms. Lewinsky, including the 
allegation that she was a stalker, began to appear in news 
articles quoting sources at the White House?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Well, I appreciate that question. 
And thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Because I made a note of Mr. 
Ruff's statement that no one--and I believe he specified the 
President, his aides, or no one has ever trashed or spoken 
ill--used some other words--of Monica Lewinsky. It really 
caught me as striking, in light of the sworn grand jury 
testimony of Sidney Blumenthal. And, of course, he is 
testifying as to what the President told him. And, of course, 
in that conversation the President told Sidney Blumenthal, as 
described by Mr. Blumenthal, that: Monica Lewinsky came at me 
and made a sexual demand on me. I rebuffed her. The President 
said: I have gone down that road before, I have caused pain for 
a lot of people. I am not going to do that again. She, 
referring to Monica Lewinsky, threatened the President. This is 
the President's statement. It goes on and describes it; she was 
known as a stalker.
    In my understanding that is trashing, that is speaking ill, 
that is being very critical and doing everything you can to 
basically destroy her reputation.
    Now, why was he telling Sidney Blumenthal that? Was he 
trying to use Sidney Blumenthal to get the message out to the 
public and to the grand jury, who might hear this, that she is 
not a believable person? That the whole idea is that she came 
on to him, that threatened the President of the United States? 
I think--I don't understand Mr. Ruff's representation to the 
Senators that no one, including the President or aides, has 
ever trashed Monica Lewinsky.
    Now, I think it is important also, at that particular point 
in time, the President knew that Sidney Blumenthal and John 
Podesta would be a witness before the grand jury. That was his 
testimony. That is what the President of the United States 
admitted to. He said he knew that they were going to be 
witnesses. And, clearly, that constitutes obstruction of 
justice; when he knows that they are going to be a witness, he 
gives them false information knowing they are going to repeat 
it to the grand jury, and that is an element of one of the 
pillars of obstruction.
    I want to come back to some things that have been said 
about the Jones case. First of all, it has been characterized 
as a ``no win'' case--that Judge Susan Webber Wright issued 
that order.
    Well, if the truth had been known, what we know now about 
the relationship, about the pattern of conduct, would that have 
made a difference? And, of course, when those facts came out it 
was right before a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that might have reversed Judge Wright's order that the 
President of the United States made a decision he could settle 
this case for eight hundred and something thousand dollars.
    What would have happened? Maybe Paula Jones would not have 
had to have gone through that many years of litigation if the 
truth had just come out.
    But there was a pattern of obstruction of justice, of 
lying, of coaching witnesses, of tampering with witnesses, 
which ultimately led to a defeat of that case and the truth not 
coming out. But when it came out, it made a difference; it made 
a difference for that plaintiff in that civil rights case.
    Senator Hutchison asked a question about whether the power 
of the position makes the difference in sexual harassment 
cases. Let me assure you, if there is any chief executive 
officer of any company, whether it was consensual or not, with 
an intern or a young person half of the officer's age and 
whether it was--whatever they termed it at that point, whether 
it was a subordinate employee--and that is the key language, 
``subordinate employee,'' then, yes, Senator, it does make a 
difference, and that is the crux of many cases that are brought 
into court to protect women against sexual harassment in the 
workplace. I think it is a linchpin of this act that this 
Congress passed. So I think that when you look at the overall 
picture, there is that pattern of obstruction of justice.
    Senator Biden asked a question, Would any prosecutor bring 
this case forward? Let me tell you, it would be easier--and I 
say this with great deference to the Senate--but it would be 
easier to win a conviction beyond any reasonable doubt, and I 
could win a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in a court in 
this country on obstruction of justice because I know that 
common sense permeates a jury panel whenever they hear this 
case and the perjury--they are not going to buy, they are not 
going to accept what ``is'' is. They understand what these 
words mean, and common sense will apply. And I know that common 
sense exists in the Senate of the United States.
    But let me assure you that this is a case that I would 
bring forth without any hesitation, and I believe the proof 
would demonstrate a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Kennedy to 
the counsel for the President:

    Could you reply to Mr. Hutchinson's allegations?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I think it important, because the 
question put to the House managers, Mr. Chief Justice, was 
whether there was some effort or some relationship between Ms. 
Lewinsky and a series of articles or stories that supposedly 
appeared in the early days following the revelation of this 
investigation--I think it is important to recognize what the 
real facts are here.
    This was the point made at the very end of my testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee on December 9. One of the 
members of that committee spoke at great length and quite 
heatedly about what he believed to have been a plan to 
disseminate unfavorable information in the press, and he 
submitted for the record a number of newspaper articles.
    The articles that he submitted, which were largely spun off 
of one Associated Press story, did not contain two--at least 
two--statements that made it very clear that the accusation 
that there was some effort on the part of the White House to 
disseminate disparaging information were simply false.
    In an Associated Press story of January 31, which was used 
by a member of the House Judiciary Committee as one of his 
examples of how the White House was supposedly coordinating 
such an attack, there was omitted the following portion. This 
is a statement by Ann Lewis, who is the White House 
communications director:

    To anyone who was saying such things about Ms. Lewinsky, 
either it reflected a lack of coordination or thought or adult 
judgment. We are not going down that road. It is not the issue. 
A discussion of other people is not appropriate.

    That is on January 31. Retrospectively, when Ms. Lewinsky 
had already begun to cooperate with the independent counsel, 
the Los Angeles Times wrote the following:

    From the beginning, the White House has been careful about 
what it has said of Ms. Lewinsky. The week the Lewinsky story 
broke in January, Clinton's press secretary, Mike McCurry, 
signaled the tone the White House would take by deflecting 
questions about whether the 24-year-old intern was less than 
stable.

    Mr. McCurry:

    ``I can't imagine anyone in a responsible position at the 
White House would be making such an assertion. I've heard some 
expressions of sympathy for what clearly someone who is a young 
person would be going through at a moment like this.'' And 
McCurry quickly signaled that the marching orders had not 
changed once Lewinsky made a deal with the independent counsel, 
Kenneth Starr, for immunity from prosecution.

    I think it is important that the record be clear that the 
stories about which the managers were asked in their last 
question simply never reflected any plan, coordinated or 
uncoordinated, to do anything other than treat Ms. Lewinsky 
with respect.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question doesn't show which 
Senators are submitting it.
    Mr. LOTT. Senator Hatch.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Hatch:

    Isn't it true that Chief Federal District Judge Johnson 
ruled today--in an order that she authorized to be released to 
the public--that Ms. Lewinsky's immunity agreement, which 
requires her ``to make herself available for any interviews 
upon reasonable requests,'' compels her to submit to an 
interview with the House? What light does this shed on the 
earlier debate on this matter?

    I am sorry, it is addressed to the House managers.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I think certainly 
having come from an experience of practicing law and learned so 
much over the years and trying cases and putting together cases 
in an ethical and appropriate fashion, to come into a political 
proceeding, and as we have dealt with this, and I think as the 
lawyers to my left had to deal with the same type of situation, 
in a political realm, not just in the Senate, but months and 
weeks before we came in to here, is very difficult.
    What we have seen this morning is a completely innocent 
standard practice of sitting down with a potential witness 
before you have to list your witnesses Monday and deciding 
whether or not you want to use her.
    They have talked about lawyers committing malpractice by 
not taking depositions. I submit it would be close to that if 
you don't talk to a witness before you call that witness. 
Certainly, while the OIC has had communication with her over 
some time, we have not. We have not had contact with any of 
these witnesses.
    I alluded earlier to the White House and the other 
witnesses that work for the White House that we might be 
looking at calling. I must presume by this conversation in this 
area of questioning that they have not had any contact about 
this case with Ms. Currie and Mr. Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal, 
and even a friend of the White House, Mr. Vernon Jordan. We are 
not asking we be privy to every time they say hello in the 
hallway to these people or may sit down and talk with them. We 
understand the realities of life. We simply just wanted that 
crazy idea that maybe we ought to talk to a witness before we 
decide whether or not we want to list that witness.
    I think to answer that question--and I will sit down--Judge 
Johnson clearly vindicated this right to do that, to accomplish 
that through the immunity agreement. I apologize if we have 
offended the Senators. We certainly didn't intend to do that. 
We certainly didn't intend to break any rules about this, and 
we don't think we did.
    Certainly, if we are going to go down that road, and if you 
see it is appropriate that we have a rule you can agree on, we 
would be happy to abide by that, but we would simply like equal 
treatment with the other witnesses, also with the White House 
and their attorneys. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is to the House managers 
from Senators Collins and Feingold:

    On the basis of the President's and Betty Currie's 
testimony concerning their conversation on Sunday, January 18, 
1998, have each of the elements of obstruction of justice under 
18 U.S.C., section 1503, or witness tampering under 18 U.S.C., 
section 1512, been met? We are particularly interested in your 
analysis of whether the Senate can infer that President Clinton 
intended to corruptly influence or persuade Ms. Currie to 
testify falsely and the weight to be given Ms. Currie's 
testimony in that regard.

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. The answer is that, under 18 U.S.C. 
section 1503, there is a case for witness tampering in the 
conversation between President Clinton and Betty Currie.
    I want to refer you to a case, United States v. Shannon, 
which is an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided 
October 12, 1987. And for you lawyers here, it has been 
Shepardized. It is good law, and it really puts this into 
perspective.
    In the case, the defendant contended that the evidence did 
not support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. section 1503 because 
the Government did not prove that the witness in this case, 
Gray, was ever a witness before the grand jury or that the 
defendant knew that that person was going to be a witness 
before the grand jury. And this is what the court said:

    This argument is . . . without merit. A conviction under 
section 1503 for attempting to influence a witness is 
appropriate so long as there is a possibility that the target 
of the defendant's activities will be called upon to testify in 
an official proceeding.

    Now, this gentleman, this defendant, Mr. Shannon, went to 
jail. He made the defense that, ``Well, I didn't--you know, 
that person was never called as a witness, it was never an 
official proceeding,'' and it didn't fly. He was convicted. It 
was affirmed by the court and, presumably, he went to jail. 
Now, that is the law of the land in the criminal courts of our 
country. And so there would be a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
section 1503.
    In this case you have much more because, as I pointed out 
yesterday in reference to Betty Currie, Betty Currie was 
clearly a witness. They left that deposition knowing she would 
be a witness. The Jones attorneys went back and immediately 
worked on issuing a subpoena for her because they had to have 
her because the President asserted her name continually through 
that. The President knew she was going to be a witness. He came 
back and engaged in one conversation where he coached her 
testimony. He tampered with her testimony. It wasn't enough, so 
2 days later he brought her back in again and did the exact 
same thing. The legal question is, As a prospective witness, is 
she covered under the obstruction of justice statute? The 
answer is, yes, because other people go to jail for exactly the 
same thing.
    But I think we need to take a step back a moment. This U.S. 
Senate is not bound by the strictures of the U.S. Criminal 
Code. If I came in here today and said, ``Well, under the 
criminal procedures of the land, I'm entitled to bring 
witnesses and I'm entitled to cross-examine, and I'm entitled 
to do this, and we need to follow the criminal procedure 
code,'' you would say, ``No. This is the Senate of the United 
States.'' And you would rightfully say that. You set your own 
rules in this.
    And the same thing is true with the criminal law of the 
land. I think that we make a criminal case for obstruction of 
justice that can be prosecuted, as other people are in every 
courtroom in this land. But that is not the burden here. The 
issue is, Is this an impeachable offense? And something that is 
much higher is at stake, and that is the public trust, the 
integrity of our Government, much more than in United States v. 
Shannon. And that is what you are dealing with.
    So we can debate the criminal code all day--and we win all 
that--but we have to talk about the public trust, the integrity 
of our system. And that is what our country needs you to win 
for them.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Thurmond 
and Bunning to the counsel for the President:

    If there was no case and the White House accepted the 
results of the justice system, why then did the President pay 
nearly $1 million to Paula Jones?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I say this with all due respect, truly. 
As I think everyone knows in this Chamber, and outside this 
Chamber, who has practiced law, litigated difficult cases, the 
judgment of a defendant to settle a case, to pay whatever sum 
may be required to settle it, is, in all candor, I think, for 
all of us, not reflective of any belief that he was wrong, that 
the other side was right. It reflects in this case, very 
candidly, a judgment by the President, which he has stated 
publicly, that in the midst of the many matters that he is 
responsible for, including, I must say, this matter, as well as 
all those matters of state on which he spends his time and to 
which he devotes his energy, he could no longer spend any of 
that time and any of that energy on the Jones case.
    I am so hesitant to say this, but I really believe--please 
take it in the spirit it is meant--that to ask whether the 
settlement of this case reflects substantively on the merits of 
Ms. Jones' claim is not fair. The merits of Ms. Jones' claim 
were decided by Judge Wright. She concluded that there were 
none. And I really do believe that to ask whether the 
President's decision to settle is somehow a reflection on the 
merits, contrary to those reached by Judge Wright, is simply 
not the case.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the White House 
counsel from Senators Johnson and Leahy:

    A few minutes ago, Manager Hutchinson stated that he would 
be more confident of obtaining a conviction for obstruction of 
justice in a court than he is in the Senate. Can that statement 
be reconciled with the following exchange that occurred on the 
Sunday program ``This Week'' on January 17, 1999, in which 
Manager Hutchinson was asked, ``On the case that you have 
against the President on obstruction of justice, not the 
perjury, would you be confident of a conviction in a criminal 
court,'' and Manager Hutchinson said, ``No, I would not''?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice----
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. It's addressed to the President's--is it 
the President's counsel? It is addressed to the President's 
counsel.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I believe under your ruling 
yesterday I can't object to questions.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. That is correct.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I would----
    Mr. LEVIN. Objection.
    Mr. REID. Objection.
    Mr. LEVIN. I object to this, if he is unable to object, to 
make an objection in any other form.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian advises me that the 
manager may make an objection to the question being answered.
    Mr. REID. Nothing being answered.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I have second thoughts, frankly. That 
ruling is based on a very Delphic, almost incomprehensible 
statement that Salmon Chase made during the trial of Andrew 
Johnson. And I think the correct response is that the managers 
do not have a right to object to a question by the Senator. So 
I rule the objection out of order.
    Mrs. BOXER. Regular order.
    Ms. Counsel MILLS. I just wanted to address, for a second, 
Manager Hutchinson's comments with regard to 1503. And he cited 
a 1987 case. In 1995, I think, as we talked a little bit about, 
and the House managers had discussed, Aguilar came down. And in 
that case the issue was, Was there sufficient nexus between the 
actual conduct of the person involved and the proceeding? And 
in particular, I am just going to read to you for 1 minute from 
the case law.

    The Government argues that respondent ``understood that his 
false statements would be provided to the grand jury'' and that 
he made [these] statements . . . to thwart the grand jury 
investigation and not just the FBI investigation. . . . The 
Government supports its argument with . . . the transcript . . 


    They go through the discussion that was between the judge 
and the agent in which the judge specifically asked whether or 
not he was a target for the grand jury investigation, and the 
agent responded:

    There is a grand jury meeting. Convening I guess that's the 
correct word. . . . [E]vidence will be heard . . . I'm sure on 
this issue.

    So, in other words, the person making the statement knew at 
that point that there was potentially the possibility that his 
testimony would be presented to the grand jury, and the court 
ruled, as I talked to you a little bit about during my 
presentation before, that that was an insufficient nexus for 
there to prove a violation of 1503.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Helms and 
Stevens to the House managers.

    Do you have any comment upon the answer just given by the 
President's counsel?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    First, I want to thank Ms. Mills for the courtesy she 
extended to me just a moment ago. And in our exchange, and Mr. 
Chief Justice, what I started to state my objection was, was 
really not to the question at that point, but I was just going 
to make the reference to the anticipated answer that the 
statement on ``This Week with Sam and Cokie'' was not exactly a 
part of this record. We are to be debating the facts of this 
case, and Ms. Mills was kind enough not to go into that. I 
think she was going to make the point that the answer I made 
was in reference to the need to call witnesses; that how 
confident can you be in any case without calling a witness so 
the jury can hear it?
    Let me go back to what Ms. Mills said. She did cite the 
United States v. Aguilar, and I wish the Chief Justice--since 
he wrote the opinion--could give us a lecture on that 
particular decision. I feel maybe we should not be talking 
about this. But I read that opinion as totally consistent with 
the United States v. Shannon and that the law is clear, that if 
this body were to apply 18 U.S.C., section 1503, that a 
conviction would obtain, but again this is a body gathered for 
the purpose of consideration of an impeachable offense.
    I also yield to Mr. Graham on that point.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. This is Saturday at 12:30 and a lot of 
people are probably watching with interest what is going on. 
Let's talk about the law just for a moment in a way that we all 
can understand when this thing is over with.
    It is a long time since I have been in law school, but I 
liked the exchange between the professor and the students 
because you kind of understood what the law was about at the 
end of the day. Witness tampering is designed--the statute is 
designed to do what? As Senator Bumpers and I would say in 
Arkansas and South Carolina, ``messin' with people.'' We can 
elevate that a little bit and say that the witness tampering 
statutes that we are talking about here are designed to make 
sure we get to the truth. Section 1512 is in the conjunctive, 
part (b): ``Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical 
force.''
    That is one thing you don't want to happen here. You never 
want anybody to go up to a potential witness and threaten 
through force or intimidation to tell something that is not 
true. So that is out of bounds. That is illegal.
    Or ``corruptly persuades''--now, what does that mean? There 
are some cases that talk about what that means. That means if 
the person has an intent, an evil intent or an improper purpose 
to persuade somebody without force or intimidation, that that 
is a crime.
    Or listen to this: ``Engages in misleading conduct toward 
another person with the intent to influence or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding.''
    What are we getting to there, ladies and gentlemen? What 
the law says, if you go to a person who likes you, who is your 
friend, who trusts you, and you try to get them to tell a 
story--through misleading them--that is not true, that is a 
crime.
    The marvelous thing about the law is that it is based in 
common sense. It is very obvious to us we don't want somebody 
to tell a story that is not true. It is also obvious to us that 
we don't want to take personal relationships and misuse them to 
get false testimony out into a courtroom.
    So if you go back to your secretary--who trusts you, who 
likes you, who admires you--and you try to mislead them by 
telling a scenario that is not true, and you believe that they 
may appear in court one day, what you have done is very wrong, 
because what you have done is you have planted the seed of a 
lie in a way that we say is illegal.
    So, if you believe the President of the United States was 
not refreshing his memory when he told Betty Currie, ``She 
wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that. I never 
touched her, did I, Betty?'' If you believe that is not to 
refresh his memory, if you believe that was misleading, and you 
believe that he had reason to believe she was going to be a 
witness because of his own conduct, then he is guilty.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Kerrey of 
Nebraska to the counsel for the President.

    Could you elaborate on your comments about the settlement 
of the Jones case, focusing on the reality, for example, that 
corporations in this country routinely settle cases they regard 
as utterly without merit, simply to spare the costs of defense, 
public embarrassment, and for other reasons?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think far better 
than I did, the Senator from Nebraska has already elaborated on 
my answer. I think all of us who have been involved, either as 
lawyers or as parties, unhappily, in litigation know the burden 
that it imposes, and one can only imagine--I am barely able 
to--a special burden that it places on a President to be 
immersed in this kind of litigation.
    We take, I think, as a basic understanding in our 
jurisprudence that, as a matter of law, the settlement of a 
case is not probative of any belief on either side about the 
strengths or weaknesses, but what it is, as a matter of law, is 
probably less relevant than what it is to this body or to the 
American public's perception.
    But underlying the law about what one can do in litigation 
in using a decision to settle is, I think, a commonsense 
judgment that everybody, whether it be a large corporation or 
individual or the President of the United States, makes a 
judgment about where his or her resources should be expended--
and I don't mean simply resources in terms of dollars, although 
they are secondly important--but resources in terms of energy, 
time, worry, interference with the day-to-day business that all 
of us have to conduct.
    And I think it is fair to say that it is those factors, 
those very commonsense factors, the ones we would all weigh, in 
different circumstances at different settings if we were caught 
up in litigation, that inform your judgment about what you 
should or, in my judgment, should not take from the fact that 
the President settled this case.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Nickles, 
Warner, Helms, Inhofe, and Thurmond to counsel for the 
President.

    Members of the armed services are presently removed from 
service for improper sexual conduct and/or for perjury. If the 
President is acquitted by the Senate, would not it result in a 
lower standard of conduct for the Commander in Chief than the 
other 1.3 million members of the armed services?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this, of course, is a 
question legitimately asked but I also think legitimately 
answered no. We all understand entirely what rules are imposed 
on members of the armed services. Indeed, every member of the 
Federal civil service, every member of a private company, when 
they engage in certain conduct, may be sanctioned for it.
    In the military, I understand--as do the Senators who have 
much greater personal and institutional experience with our 
Armed Forces than I--the importance of maintaining due order 
and discipline in the armed services, and also the importance 
of believing that nothing that the Commander in Chief does or 
says should ever undermine the strength of our Armed Forces, 
their cohesiveness, or their belief in the rules and integrity 
of the rules that govern them.
    But, that said, I do not believe, as a matter of what will 
flow from an acquittal of the President, who is, indeed, 
Commander in Chief, that that will in fact undermine the good 
order and discipline of the Army. But if I am wrong in some 
fashion about that, if my understanding of the process is 
flawed--and it may well be--we, nonetheless, have to ask the 
question which I think is implicit in the question that was put 
to me: Because of the rules that apply to members of the Armed 
Forces, does it follow that because a sergeant, or a 
lieutenant, or a general, or an admiral will suffer in his 
career, that we must go back to the framers who wrote the 
impeachment clause and say they must have expected that the 
Commander in Chief, the President, would be removed for the 
same conduct? They had an Armed Forces then. Indeed, they were 
probably more intimately involved with that, having just come 
through the Revolution, than Presidents and leaders of the 
country have been in the following 210 years. They surely 
understood that there was a constitutional and societal 
difference between the President in his role as Commander in 
Chief and the President in his role as the leader of the 
country, on the one hand, and those to whom rules of discipline 
had to apply in order to secure the strongest and best Armed 
Forces that we could secure.
    It is, in a sense, I suppose, not an easy answer to give, 
because members of the Armed Forces put their lives on the 
line, and we want them to feel that they are being treated 
fairly. But at the end of the day, it cannot be that the 
President of the United States is removable for conduct that 
would adversely affect a career of a member of the military.
    There may be occasions on which the President engages in 
such horrific conduct that he ought to be removed, and the same 
would happen to an admiral, or a general, or the Chief of Staff 
of the Joint Chiefs, or the highest military member that you 
can contemplate. But that doesn't mean that this conduct is 
transposed from the world of the military into the world of the 
Constitution in such a way that the President, even if he is 
our Commander in Chief, should be removed from office, because 
I think that judgment would be inconsistent with the judgment 
made by the framers.

                                 RECESS

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest that this would be 
an excellent time to take a 1-hour break for lunch.
    There being no objection, at 12:44 p.m., the Senate 
recessed until 1:45 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, we are ready momentarily to begin with 
the questioning period again. I believe the first question will 
come through Senator Daschle.
    I do want to say to our colleagues that any Senator is 
entitled to propound a question on both sides, and so we will 
give you every opportunity to do that. Again, it is our intent 
to go today not later than 4 o'clock, and if additional time is 
needed for questions, it will have to go over until Monday. We 
have some questions that have already been propounded that we 
would like to put to one side or the other, but at some point I 
think we will have a sense that maybe the basic questions have 
been asked.
    So if any Senator on either side feels strongly about a 
particular question, he or she may want to be thinking about 
how and when they insist that it be offered. But I think a lot 
of ground has been covered. I hope that within a reasonable 
period of time the questions that Senators have will be given 
and we will have a response, and then we will make a decision 
on how to proceed from there.
    I yield, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Bingaman 
to counsel for the President.

    When Samuel Dash resigned as adviser to the independent 
counsel, he wrote in the letter of resignation that he was 
doing so because the independent counsel had become an advocate 
and had ``unlawfully intruded on the power of impeachment which 
the Constitution gives solely to the House.''
    In using his power to assist one party to the pending 
impeachment trial before the Senate, do you believe he has 
unlawfully intruded on the power of the Senate to try 
impeachments?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, the 
independent counsel statute gives the independent counsel in 
some sense almost unbounded power to investigate the President 
and other high officials of Government. It does not give him 
and has never given him unbounded power even to the extent that 
he has become immersed in the impeachment proceedings in the 
House. For the statute itself says not you shall become the 
436th Member of the House, not that impeachment is vested in 
the independent counsel, but that impeachment is vested in the 
House and trial in the Senate.
    We were, obviously, dismayed at the role that the 
independent counsel chose to follow rather than simply sending 
information to the House that might bear on possible 
impeachable offenses but, rather, to drive his van up to the 
building and unload unscreened, undiluted boxes of information 
which thereafter made their way, at least in part, into the 
public domain.
    But surely it was a shock to all of us, at least on this 
side, to learn yesterday evening that playing a role in the 
House proceedings had now become a role in this Chamber, that 
the independent counsel was using not only his powers of 
coercion but calling on the U.S. district court to assist him 
and, in turn, enabling the managers not simply, as they would 
have it, to do a little work product, to do a little meeting 
and greeting, to do a little saying hello and a little chatting 
with someone who may be a witness before this body but, rather, 
saying to this witness: I hold your life in my hands and I'm 
going to transfer that power to the managers for the House of 
Representatives.
    The managers have said we are engaged in an adversary 
process here, and they themselves have talked long and loud 
today about letting them play out the process that any lawyer 
would play out preparing for trial. Well, no other lawyer that 
I know of gets to have a prosecutor sitting in a room with him 
and saying to the witness: Talk to these people or your 
immunity deal is gone and you may go to jail.
    Now, we have been accused by Manager Hutchinson and others 
of always talking about process, of always falling back on 
process. Well, I suggest, Senators, that process is what our 
justice system is all about. Process is what we have always 
relied on to protect everyone against the vaunted power of the 
state in this case; not just the managers, but the state 
embodied in the independent counsel.
    But in this case it is more than just a call for due 
process, for fairness, because it is going to have a direct and 
immediate impact on the facts as we learn them, as they learn 
them, and most importantly as you learn them. Can you imagine--
can you imagine what it is going to be like for Monica Lewinsky 
to be sitting in a room with the 13 managers, or however many 
there are, and the independent counsel, and his lawyers, 
knowing the threat that she is under, knowing how she got into 
that room? Can we have any reason to believe that what comes 
out of that process will be the fair, unvarnished truth? Or 
will she, of necessity, be looking over her shoulder and saying 
I better not put one foot wrong because the independent counsel 
is sitting there watching, and he has already told me that this 
deal is gone if I don't cooperate with the House managers.
    Process and truth, they are inextricably linked, but not--
not if the independent counsel moves to that side of the room 
and becomes the moving force in the development of the truth 
and the facts as this body is entitled to know them.
    Accuse us of talking about process if you will; accuse us, 
if you will, of falling back on process. We do it proudly 
because process is what this is all about, because process 
leads to truth. But not that way.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Specter, Frist, Smith of New Hampshire, Inhofe, Lugar, 
Brownback, Roth, and Crapo to counsel for the President:

    In arguing that an impeachable offense involves only a 
public duty, what is your best argument that a public duty is 
not involved in the President's constitutional duty to execute 
the laws? At a minimum, doesn't the President have a duty not 
to violate the laws under the constitutional responsibility to 
execute the laws?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. It can't be. It can't be that if the 
President violates the law and thus violates his duty 
faithfully to carry out the laws, he is removed from office. 
Because that would literally encompass virtually every law, 
every regulation, every policy, every guideline that you could 
imagine that he is responsible for carrying out in the 
executive branch. If that were so, it would have been very 
simple for the framers to say the President shall be impeached 
for treason, bribery and failure to carry out his oath 
faithfully to execute the laws. They wrote that. They could 
have incorporated it into the impeachment clause if they had 
wished, and they chose not to.
    So that if, in fact, you suggest that a failure to 
faithfully execute the laws inevitably leads to a decision that 
an impeachable and removable offense has been committed, I 
suggest with all respect that you have simply eliminated the 
impact of the words ``treason, bribery and other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    Now, you may well judge within that setting--that is, 
within that constitutional standard ``other high crimes and 
misdemeanors''--that some particular violation of law warrants 
removal. But it surely can't be, just looking back at what the 
framers did and what the words themselves mean, that any 
violation, even if you were to find one, must lead you to 
conclude that having therefore violated his responsibility to 
faithfully execute the laws, removal must follow.
    The framers knew what the other parts of the Constitution 
said, and they specifically chose the words they chose, 
intending that they cover only the most egregious violations of 
the public law and public trust that they could conceive of.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Graham to counsel 
for President Clinton:

    In the event the Senate determines the removal of the 
President is not warranted, are there any constitutional 
impediments to the following action: (1) a formal motion of 
censure; (2) a motion other than censure incorporating the 
Senate's acknowledgement and disapproval of the President's 
conduct; (3) a motion requiring a formal Presidential apology 
or any other statement accepting the judgment of the Senate; or 
(4) a motion requiring the President to state that he will not 
accept a pardon for any previous criminal activities.
    Assuming that one or more of the above actions are 
constitutional, are there any other serious policy concerns 
about the advisability of the Senate formally adopting a 
legislative sanction of the President that falls outside the 
scope of the constitutional sanction of removal from office?

    Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Texas.
    Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I would like the record to show 
that that was Senator Graham of Florida. [Laughter.]
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The record may so show.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Senator Gramm, my apologies. I assumed 
since Senator Daschle sent it up it was probably from this 
side, but I am glad you clarified the record.
    That question probably requires much more constitutional 
learning to answer in great detail than I possess, but let me 
give it a try. And the easiest one for me to answer is the 
fourth part: Would it be appropriate, in some fashion, for the 
President formally to state that he would not accept a pardon?
    I have stated formally on behalf of the President in 
response to a very specific question by the House Judiciary 
Committee that he would not, and, indeed, we have said in this 
Chamber, and we have said in other places, that the President 
is subject to the rule of law like any other citizen and would 
continue to be on January 21, 2001, and that he would submit 
himself to whatever law and whatever sanction or whatever 
prosecution the law would impose on him. He is prepared to 
defend himself in that forum at any time following the end of 
his tenure. And I committed on his behalf, and I have no doubt 
that he would so state himself, that he would not seek or 
accept a pardon.
    I will not even begin to tread on the territory that is the 
Senate's jurisdiction and the issues that it takes unto itself, 
much less give it advice about what it is possible or not 
possible to do, except to venture this. I see no constitutional 
barrier, certainly, to the Senate's passing a censure motion in 
whatever form it chooses--whether adopting language from the 
articles or creating language of its own. We might at the end 
of the day disagree with you about whether the language is 
justified or whether it accurately reflects the facts, but 
there is nothing in the Constitution, I believe, that prevents 
this body from undertaking that task.
    With respect to a formal acknowledgment, there I suppose 
the interplay between the legislative and the executive branch 
becomes more tenuous. But to the extent that whatever the 
Senate chooses to say in such a document needs to be 
acknowledged or recognized by the President, that can be done 
without entrenching on the separation of powers in that special 
uncertain area between the legislative and executive branches. 
I have no doubt that some process can be worked out that meets 
the Senate's needs. I say this all in the sort of vast limbo of 
hypothesis, because obviously I am answering both somewhat off 
the cuff and without knowing what language we are talking 
about.
    But the core position, as we see it, is that nothing stands 
in the way of this body from voicing its sentiments. Indeed, I 
have said in the House of Representatives that I thought a 
censure was an appropriate response, and the President has said 
he is prepared to accept the censure. I have no doubt, although 
that was said in the context of the proceedings in the House, 
it surely is applicable as well to anything that this body 
chooses to do.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Thompson 
to the House managers:

    Do you have any comment on the answer given by the 
President's counsel with regard to the Office of Independent 
Counsel?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, thank 
you for that question. It is our judgment--and I think a fair 
judgment--that we should be allowed and are permitted, under 
any of the rules normal to this, to request of the Office of 
Independent Counsel the opportunity to talk to Monica Lewinsky, 
which we otherwise apparently were not going to be able to have 
as a normal course of preparation.
    It makes me wonder--with all of the complaints that are 
going on here from the White House attorneys about this and 
their desire not to have witnesses--what they are afraid of. 
Are they afraid of our talking to Monica Lewinsky? Are they 
afraid of the deposition of Monica Lewinsky? Are they afraid of 
what she might say out here? I don't think they should be, but 
they appear to be.
    We are not doing anything abnormal. We are exercising our 
privileges, our rights. If it were a prosecutor and you had a 
prosecutorial arm, which you do in the case of the Independent 
Counsel Office, that had an immunity agreement, as there is in 
this case, you certainly would not hesitate if you had a 
recalcitrant witness who you needed to call to utilize that 
immunity agreement and have the opportunity to discuss the 
matter with that witness, and you certainly would not hesitate 
if you needed to use that immunity agreement to assure truthful 
testimony in any proceeding that was going on.
    After all, that is the purpose of the immunity agreement. 
It means that the witness is probably much more likely to be 
telling the truth than under any other circumstances, which is 
why counsels frequently argue immunity agreements as a reason 
why a particular witness is more credible than he or she might 
otherwise be if it were not for that agreement.
    So I think there is an awful lot being said today about our 
meeting that we want to have with Ms. Lewinsky to prepare her 
as a witness. I want to tell you all it is being done, in my 
judgment, with all due respect to those who are doing it, 
principally because of the concerns they don't want us to have 
that opportunity or they want to cast some aspersion or doubt, 
or whatever.
    We are not about to do anything improper. We can assure you 
of that. We would never do that. We are going to follow regular 
order and do this as good counsels would do in good faith, and 
in no way would we wish to do it otherwise, nor have we. Thank 
you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question of Senator Baucus to 
the House managers:

    In view of the direct election of the President, his 
popularity, and short duration of his term, and in view of the 
fact that, as House Manager Graham stated, ``reasonable people 
can differ in this case,'' please explain, precisely, how 
acquitting the President will result in an immediate threat to 
the stability of our Government.

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen 
of the Senate, I don't think anyone contends that if the 
President is acquitted that suddenly it is apocalypse now or 
the Republic will be threatened from without or from within. I 
think erosion can happen very slowly and very deliberately. The 
problem that I have is with this office being fulfilled by 
someone who has a double responsibility.
    The first responsibility is to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. He is the only person in the country, in 
the world, who has that compact with the American people. The 
other, of course, is his oath to preserve, protect and defend 
the Constitution. He is the national role model, he is the man, 
he is the flagbearer in front of our country. He is the person, 
his office is the person every parent says to their little 
child, ``I hope you grow up and be President of the United 
States some day.'' We do nothing as important as raising our 
kids, and the President is the role model for every kid in the 
country.
    When you have a President who lies and lies and lies under 
oath--and that is the key phrase, ``under oath.'' I don't care 
about his private life or matters that are not public. But when 
he takes an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing 
but the truth and then lies and lies and lies, what kind of a 
lesson is that for our kids and our grandkids? What does it do 
to the rule of law?
    Injustice is a terrible thing. The longer you live, the 
more you can encounter it. Injustice, abuse, oppression, and 
the law is what protects you; the law, having resort to an 
objective standard of morality in action. And when you are 
sworn to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, how 
do you reconcile the conduct of perjury and obstruction of 
justice with that obligation?
    I have a suggestion. Let's just tear it out of the 
Constitution. Tear out that ``take care to see that the laws 
are faithfully executed.'' It is wrong. It is an example we are 
setting for millions of kids that if the President can do it, 
you can do it. What do you say to master sergeants who have 
their careers destroyed because they hit on an inferior member 
of the military? We are setting the parameters of permissible 
Presidential conduct for the one office that ought to gleam in 
the sunlight. And the kids, that is what moves me, the kids.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Nickles, 
Warner, Crapo, Helms, Inhofe, and Thurmond to the House 
managers:

    Would you like to comment on the remarks of Counsel Ruff 
concerning the impact of an acquittal of the President accused 
of improper sexual conduct and/or perjury and obstruction on 
the Armed Forces?

    Mr. Manager BUYER. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to thank 
the Senators for the question, because I believe it is also 
insightful.
    The question of double standards or establishing lower 
standards, I believe, is extraordinarily important. The defense 
asserted--and it is hard for me to believe--but they are asking 
you to set a higher standard for judges and a lower standard 
for a President who nominates them to you, asking you--they 
think that we can set a higher standard for law enforcement, 
yet establish a lower standard for the Chief Executive or the 
chief law enforcement officer who has the duty to faithfully 
see that the laws are executed; set a higher standard for 
military personnel, and then a lower standard for the Commander 
in Chief who must make the painful decisions to send them into 
battle.
    Now, the precedents in impeachment trials here in the 
Senate, the judgment of the Armed Services Committee and the 
Senate regarding the standards for promotion, have been 
otherwise than that which Mr. Ruff has asserted.
    We must confront the fact that the President is the 
Commander in Chief. And I believe that it is perfectly 
acceptable of the American people to demand of the military the 
highest standard, which also means that those who find 
themselves in positions of responsibility in the Pentagon who 
are in civilian leadership must also live by such exemplary 
conduct and standards. The high character of military officers 
is a safeguard of the character of a nation.
    The Senate, which must ratify the officers' promotion list, 
has repeatedly found that anything less than exemplary conduct 
is therefore unworthy of a commission or further promotion. I 
recall when I first came to Congress in 1992, there were many 
making a big to-do over Tailhook. Remember? And it was serious. 
There are still remnants around of Tailhook because there are 
still those who are screening the officers' promotion. If you 
were within 100 miles of Tailhook, look out for your career. 
That needs to be put to bed.
    Then I was given a duty to ensure that after Aberdeen broke 
and the sexual misconduct in the military--whether it was at 
Fort Jackson, Aberdeen, or at other places--I spent 18 months 
out on the road to ensure that the policies of the military 
were fair and the treatment of equal dignity in the workplace 
among men and women. We cannot forget that.
    You see, we also must recognize and must be candid with the 
harsh reality that the officers and NCOs are human and not 
without fault, folly, and failings. I believe, though, it is 
the aspirations of high ideals that are important for each of 
us, but more so to the military in order to keep the trust and 
the public faith in the military. You see, a soldier, a sailor, 
an airman or marine is prepared to lay down his or her life to 
defend the Constitution. And it is the devotion and the 
fidelity to the oath without mental reservation that is the 
epitome of character.
    Now, the President is not and should not be subject to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice. And I concur with Mr. Ruff 
when he made that point. And the President is not an actual 
member of the military. But we have a unique system in the 
world. We have that civilian control of the military, and it 
works. But we also must recognize and be cognizant that the 
President, however, is at the pinnacle, he is at the top of the 
chain of command. And that is what I learned about, being on 
the road for 18 months, and How do we make corrections? and How 
do you set the proper dignity in the workplace?
    It doesn't matter if it is your own office or, in fact, if 
you are the President as Commander in Chief. Whoever leads you 
sets the tenor of those who must follow. You see, the message 
is that the military personnel do look to the Commander in 
Chief to set the high standard of moral and ethical behavior. 
The military personnel are required to set a high standard of 
conduct in order to set the example to those they lead. 
Adherence to high standards is the fabric of good order and 
discipline. When military leaders fall short of this ideal, 
then there is confusion and disruption in the ranks. And today 
many do see a double standard. There is a double standard 
because the Commander in Chief has allegedly conducted himself 
in a manner that would be a court-martial offense for military 
personnel having been accused of the very same thing.
    The President's actions have had an intangible and coercive 
impact upon military personnel. To turn a blind eye and a deaf 
ear to it would be shame on us. The question soldiers and 
sailors ask is: I took an oath to swear to tell the truth. And 
I also took an oath to uphold the Constitution. How can this 
President take the same oath and not be truthful and remain in 
office? If I were to have done what the President did, I would 
be court-martialed.
    You see, we also have to recognize that each of the 
services are recruiting young people all across the Nation. At 
boot camp they infuse these young people with the moral values 
of honor, courage and commitment, and they're teaching self-
restraint, discipline and self-sacrifice. Military leaders are 
required to provide a good example to those young recruits, yet 
when they look up the chain of command, all the way to the 
Commander in Chief, they see a double standard at the top. 
Again, it is the President who sets the tone and tenor in the 
military, just as he does for law enforcement.
    I believe the President has violated this sacred trust 
between the leaders and those he was entrusted to lead. I also 
spoke in my presentation that it was the President's self-
inflicted wounds that have called his own credibility into 
question not only in his decisionmaking process, but with 
regard to security policies.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair has the view that you have 
answered the question.
    Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Torricelli and Kohl to the President's counsel:

    At the outset of the House proceedings, a member of the 
majority, now a manager, stated: ``The solemn duty that 
confronts us requires that we attain a heroic level of 
bipartisanship and that we conduct our deliberations in a fair, 
full and independent manner. . . . The American people deserve 
a competent, independent, and bipartisan review of the 
Independent Counsel's report. They must have confidence in the 
process. Politics must be checked at the door.''
    In evaluating the case against the President, should the 
Senate take into account: (a) the partisan nature of the 
proceedings in the House, or (b) the public's ``lack of 
confidence'' in the proceedings thus far?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, I think that this 
body has to take into consideration what brought these articles 
here, and that is the action both of the independent counsel 
and the House of Representatives. I think when fairly 
considered, when you look at the actions of both, you find an 
absence of fairness and bipartisanship.
    The independent counsel investigated this case for 8 
months. It developed every bit of evidence it could that was 
negative, derogatory, or prejudicial, and it put them into 
those five volumes. It did not pursue exculpatory leads. It did 
not follow up evidence that might lead to evidence of 
innocence. And it downplayed, when it came to write the 
referral, significant testimony which was exculpatory or 
helpful.
    I think the independent counsel's process was really 
epitomized by Ms. Lewinsky's statement that nobody asked her to 
lie or had promised her a job for silence. You see, the 
independent counsel didn't bring out that testimony. In fact, 
it came out when the independent counsel was through examining 
Ms. Lewinsky in the grand jury. I want to read you a very short 
part of that, page 1161 of the appendix.
    Independent counsel prosecutor says, ``We don't have any 
further questions,'' and a grand juror pipes up, ``Could I ask 
one?''

    Monica, is there anything that you would like to add to 
your prior testimony, either today or the last time you were 
here, or anything that you think needs to be amplified on or 
clarified? I just want to give you the fullest opportunity.

    Here is what Ms. Lewinsky says:

    I would. I think because of the public nature of how this 
investigation has been and what the charges aired, that I would 
just like to say that no one ever asked me to lie and I was 
never promised a job for my silence. And that I'm sorry. I'm 
really sorry for everything that's happened.

    Now, we requested the independent counsel, before he sent 
the referral to the House of Representatives, for an 
opportunity to review that. We were denied this.
    I think if you compare what happened here with what 
happened in 1974 when Special Prosecutor Jaworski sent a 
transmission of evidence to the House Judiciary Committee, the 
comparison is very revealing. Then Special Prosecutor Jaworski 
sent only a road map of the evidence, a description of what was 
in the record. Judge Sirica reviewed that at a hearing where 
White House counsel were present. Judge Sirica then said it was 
a fair, impartial summary and transmitted it on to the House 
Judiciary Committee. Here, without review either by the 
presiding judge or the grand jury, a referral was sent to the 
House that was a one-sided, unfair prosecutorial summary.
    When the House managers speak of the need for discovery, 
they have no such need. Everything prejudicial that could be 
found through an unlimited budget and seemingly endless 
investigation has been found and put there, tied up with a red 
ribbon for you.
    In terms of bipartisanship in the House, I think that 
speaks for itself. I don't think this was a bipartisan process. 
I don't think it was a bipartisan result. I think, though, it 
rests with this body to try the case. It is clear under the 
Constitution that this body has the power, the sole power, to 
try impeachment. The Chief Justice in the Nixon case made that 
very clear.
    I am not going to comment on the independent counsel's 
assistance to the House manager with Ms. Lewinsky. I think that 
is for you to decide whether that is consonant with how you 
decide the case ought to be tried. But I think that the 
presentation of the articles to this body has been neither fair 
nor bipartisan.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Lott to 
the House managers:

    Do you have any comment on the answer just given by the 
President's counsel?

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, 
I welcome this opportunity to fill in a considerable gap in the 
record.
    Mr. Counsel Kendall said earlier today or perhaps 
yesterday--it was yesterday--``We never had a chance to call 
witnesses ourselves, to examine them, to cross-examine them, to 
subpoena documentary evidence, at no point in this process.''
    On October 5, 1998, the House Judiciary Committee passed 
House Resolution 581 by voice vote, the impeachment inquiry 
procedure, which included the right to call witnesses for the 
President.
    On October 21, the House Judiciary Committee staff met with 
Mr. Ruff, Mr. Kendall, and Mr. Craig. At that time, the 
Judiciary Committee staff asked the White House to provide any 
exculpatory information, provide a list of any witnesses they 
wanted to call, without result.
    On November 9, the House Judiciary Committee wrote to 
Messrs. Ruff, Kendall, and Craig and again informed them of the 
President's right to call witnesses.
    On November 19, Independent Counsel Starr testified 12 
hours before the House Committee on the Judiciary. President's 
counsel was given the opportunity to question the independent 
counsel. He did not ask a single question relating to the facts 
of the independent counsel's allegations against the President. 
Now, the Democrats have Mr. Kendall, they had Abbe Lowell; we 
had Dave Schippers. That is not an invidious comparison.
    On November 25, I wrote a letter to the President asking 
the President, among other things, to provide any exculpatory 
information and inform the committee of any witnesses it wanted 
to call, without success.
    On December 4, two working days before the presentation of 
the President to the Judiciary Committee, counsel for the 
President requested to put on 15 witnesses. The White House was 
allowed to present all 15 witnesses. Not a single one of those 
was a fact witness.
    Lastly, I quote from a letter from Mr. Kendall to Mr. 
Bittman. It is in volume III, part 2 of 2, page 2326:

    That you now request we submit exculpatory evidence is 
perfectly consonant with the occasionally ``Alice in 
Wonderland'' nature of this whole enterprise. I am not aware of 
anything that the President needs to exculpate.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Leahy to 
the White House counsel:

    The managers argued in response to a previous question that 
would set a bad example for the military to acquit the 
President. Given that argument, how could you reconcile the 
statement by Manager Hyde after Caspar Weinberger was pardoned 
by President Bush of multiple criminal violations, including 
perjury, that, ``I'm glad the President had the chutzpa to do 
it. The prosecution of Weinberger was political in nature, an 
effort to get at Ronald Reagan. I just wish us out of this 
mess, the 6 years and this $30 or $40 million that has been 
spent by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh''?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. The question, in virtually every respect, 
speaks for itself.
    But I would make this point because I think it fleshes out 
a bit my earlier answer and responds in some fashion to the 
argument made by the managers on this very issue. I was 
probably too lawyerly, as is my wont, in responding to the 
earlier question on this issue by Senators Warner and Thurmond, 
because I think the one point that needs to be made in the 
context of Senator Leahy's question which goes to the 
leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the issue of what it 
means to undertake the removal of a President, the distinction 
that I think we all need to hold on to that I probably glided 
over too rapidly in my earlier answer, is that the President of 
the United States is elected by the people of the United 
States.
    He appoints the Secretary of Defense; he appoints the 
officers in the military; he appoints the judges. And the 
Senate plays a role in that process by approving his choices, 
or occasionally not approving his choices. But there is only 
one person who is put in his job with the voice of the people, 
and however we may be concerned, as rightly we should, if that 
person oversteps the bounds either of his office or his 
personal conduct, to say that there is some one-to-one, or any 
other number you can think of, comparison between the impact of 
enforcing the law on those civilian and military personnel who 
serve our country and the very different question of whether 
the voice of the people will be stilled by removing the 
President is the point on which I think this body needs to 
focus.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Kyl and 
Mack to counsel for the President:

    Mr. Ruff said President Clinton was never asked in the 
grand jury whether everything he testified to in the Jones 
deposition was true. If he were asked, would he say it was all 
true? Would the President be willing to answer an interrogatory 
from the Senate asking that question?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Senator, it is true that he testified 
that he tried to be truthful in the Jones deposition, that it 
was his purpose to be accurate in the Jones deposition. He 
tried to navigate his way through a minefield without violating 
the law, and believes that he did. There is no statement in 
that testimony in the grand jury that reaffirms, ratifies, and 
confirms all of his testimony in the Jones deposition.
    Now, we would be happy to take questions and get responses 
to you, consult the President, if you would like to submit 
them.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Murray 
to the White House counsel:

    Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed that she was sexually 
harassed by the President?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, Ms. Lewinsky has 
made no such claim. What happened between the President and her 
was improper, but it was consensual. To say that does not 
excuse it or sugarcoat it or justify it, but it does, I think, 
put it in the proper context. She has never claimed that she 
has any evidence at all relevant to sexual harassment by the 
President. When the President--and I went through this on 
Thursday in respect to the obstruction of justice allegation, 
about the President stating that she could file an affidavit. 
The President and Ms. Lewinsky reasonably believe that she 
could have filed a limited but truthful affidavit.
    And I think you have to look to the fact that the Jones 
case was not a class action. It was a suit only about what Ms. 
Jones claimed happened in May 1991 in a Little Rock hotel room. 
The December 11 ruling on discovery was a ruling not only on 
admissibility, but discovery. The President believed that an 
affidavit--a truthful affidavit--might be successful--not that 
it would, but that it might be.
    Now, in filing such an affidavit, in preparing it, no 
particular form was necessary. There was nothing to dictate 
what had to go in and what had to go out of it. There were many 
witnesses on the witness list. The end of discovery was 
approaching, and there was at least some chance, they thought, 
that a factual affidavit, which was limited, might accomplish 
the purpose. And I think this is confirmed by the fact that 
when Judge Wright considered whether to order Ms. Lewinsky's 
deposition, she issued a ruling on January 29 saying that the 
deposition would not go forward because evidence from Ms. 
Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Paula Jones trial 
because it was both irrelevant to the court allegations and it 
was inadmissible as extrinsic evidence of other facts.
    So I think that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing whatsoever to 
offer on the critical issue in the Paula Jones case, which was 
an issue of sexual harassment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question by Senator Shelby to 
the House managers:

    Would a verdict of not guilty be a stronger message of 
vindication for the President than a motion to dismiss, or, in 
the alternative, a motion to adjourn? And what are the 
constitutional implications, if any, if a motion to dismiss 
prevailed, short of concluding the trial?

    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, 
there are various options. It is really a misdirected question, 
if I may say, to ask us to suggest the consequences of 
solutions to this dilemma that we are in. I think the beauty--
and that is not the word--I think the advantage of proceeding 
with the articles of impeachment is it is consonant with the 
Constitution. It is simple; it is clean: either guilty or not 
guilty.
    The consequences of that verdict, of course, are up to any 
individual who casts a vote. Now, I have heard the word 
``censure'' sometime before. You gentlemen and ladies do 
anything you want to do. It is your power, it is your 
authority, it is in your yard, but you have to deal with the 
Constitution, no matter what you do.
    You have a problem of a bill of attainder, a problem of the 
separation of powers, and you have a problem that any censure, 
to be meaningful, has to at least damage the President's 
reputation; and that becomes, in my judgment, a bill of 
attainder, but that, again, is up to you. The consequences, I 
don't think, will harm us, whatever you do. We have done our 
best. We have lived up to our responsibility under the 
Constitution, and all we ask is that you live up to your 
responsibilities under the Constitution and give us a trial. I 
am sure you will.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the President's 
counsel from Senator Levin:

    Monica Lewinsky has explicitly said in her handwritten 
proffer that ``no one encouraged'' her to lie. Yet, House 
Manager Asa Hutchinson claimed to the Senate, using inferences, 
that Ms. Lewinsky was ``encouraged'' to lie. Do the House 
managers argue that such inferences are as credible as Ms. 
Lewinsky's direct testimony to the contrary?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I think Senator Levin's question goes to 
the heart of much of what we have been saying for the last few 
days. If, in fact, you look at the five volumes stacked up in 
front of my colleague, Mr. Kendall, you will see Ms. Lewinsky 
say not just once, but many times, in essence: I was never told 
to, never encouraged to lie, never traded an affidavit for a 
job, never did any of the things that lie at the very heart of 
the managers' case. And so what do we have, then? We have the 
managers trying to snatch a bit of evidence here, a bit of 
speculation there, or a bit of extrapolation over there, and 
say, well, she really didn't mean it when she said several 
times quite directly, ``Nobody ever told me or encouraged me to 
lie.''
    It is possible, of course, whenever one deals with 
circumstantial evidence, to make reasonable leaps from that 
evidence to some viable conclusion. But I think most courts 
that we are familiar with--and those of you who practice law 
are familiar with--would have a good deal of difficulty in 
concluding that if I take a little bit here and a little bit 
there and a little bit over there, pull them all together into 
some vast speculation about what was really in someone's mind, 
and on the other side I have the person saying what is in her 
mind and saying the opposite, I don't think that case would 
ever get to the jury.
    And maybe it is one of the things that worries me just a 
little bit about the normal, everyday--we do it all the time in 
conference between the managers and the independent counsel and 
Ms. Lewinsky--that maybe in that setting, to the independent 
counsel gently patting Ms. Lewinsky on the back and telling her 
it is time to cooperate, maybe the message will become closer 
to their side and their speculation, don't stay where you were, 
which is what you told the grand jury, the FBI, and us under 
oath and not under oath on multiple occasions, which is, 
indeed, ``Nobody told me to, nobody encouraged me to lie.''
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Bond to 
the House managers:

    When Ms. Mills described the President's testimony before 
the Jones grand jury, she said the President was ``surprised'' 
by questions about Ms. Lewinsky. What evidence is there of the 
President's knowledge that Lewinsky questions would be asked? 
Is there evidence that he knew in advance the details of the 
Lewinsky affidavit which his counsel presented at the Jones 
deposition?

    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    There are numerous evidences in the record to show that the 
President was not surprised about the questions pertaining to 
Monica Lewinsky at the January 17 deposition. First of all, in 
regard to the affidavit testimony of Monica Lewinsky--I believe 
it was January 6--5th or 6th--it is that she discussed that 
with the President, signing that affidavit, and the content of 
the affidavit. That is whenever he made his statement, ``I 
don't need to see it. I have seen 15 of them.''
    Again, we don't know what he is referring to in reference 
to that ``15.'' But clearly, according to Monica Lewinsky's 
testimony, she went over the contents of that, even though she 
might not have had it in hand, with the President.
    Also, circumstantially, there is a conversation between Mr. 
Jordan and the President during this time.
    But in addition, let me just recall something I made 
reference to in my presentation--that a few days before the 
President's deposition testimony, that it was Michael Isikoff 
of a national publication who called Betty Currie and asked 
about courier records on the gifts. This startled Betty Currie, 
obviously, because the gifts at that point were under her bed. 
As she recalled, she probably told the President that. And then 
second, she went to see Vernon Jordan about that issue.
    All of that leads you to believe, clearly, that the 
President fully knew that when he went into the deposition on 
January 17, that he would be asked time and time again about 
the specifics of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    So I think that addresses part of that question.
    Let me remark on what Mr. Ruff just said--I am just 
constantly amazed--about our effort to interview witnesses, 
because yesterday Mr. Ruff--I believe it was; it might have 
been Mr. Kendall; excuse me if I have the attribution wrong--
but criticized us, saying they want to call witnesses but they 
have no clue what these witnesses would say. Do you recall 
that? That was the argument yesterday. And so, if we make an 
effort to determine what these witnesses would say, then we are 
criticized for trying to find out what they would say.
    So I think that again it is more convenient to talk about 
what the managers are doing, what the process is, rather than 
the facts of obstruction.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the White House 
counsel from Senator Kennedy:

    Would you please respond to Manager Hyde's suggestion that 
an acquittal would send a bad message to the children of the 
country, and to Manager Hyde's statements regarding the 
fairness of the process in the House of Representatives?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you for that 
question.
    Children--what do we tell the children? Well, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, that is not an academic question for 
me and for my wife. I assume that is the case for many, many 
families all over this country. We happen to have quite a few 
children, and they are very young; they are under 12. And we 
talk about what is going on here. We talk about how important 
it is to tell the truth, and we talk about how wrong it was for 
the President of the United States not to tell the truth. And 
we think that we have learned a lot by going through that 
process. We have talked about what President Clinton did and 
why it was wrong.
    With all due respect to the chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, I and my wife--and I don't think many parents when 
they raise their children rely every day on messages or 
resolutions from the Congress of the United States to tell them 
that it is important to teach children the importance of truth 
telling.
    I am a little bit disappointed in the inference of the 
argument that those of us who oppose impeachment, for the 
reasons that you understand, somehow are sending a message to 
kids that it is OK not to tell the truth. I am a little bit 
disappointed in that argument, because I don't think that is 
the way the parents of this country feel. That is certainly not 
the way I feel. And I don't believe that impeachment is a 
question of what you tell your children about truth telling. Of 
course you tell your children to tell the truth. Of course you 
tell your children the difference between right and wrong. I am 
surprised that it is an issue here.
    The second part of your question, Senator: I went through 
that House of Representatives experience, and I must say that I 
was disappointed in it, because we had been promised 
bipartisanship. When the Office of Independent Counsel sent its 
referral to the House of Representatives, White House counsel 
did not have access to that document before it was released to 
the world. When the Office of Independent Counsel sent its 
60,000 pages, 19 boxes of evidence, to the House of 
Representatives, we were not given access, the way Members of 
the Judiciary Committee were, to all that material. We were 
given access to a very limited amount of material in the course 
of that process. In fact, much of that material we never had 
access to on behalf of the President.
    We were disappointed that there was no actual discussion of 
the constitutional standards for impeachment before they went 
forward to vote on an impeachment inquiry. We thought that was 
the cart before the horse.
    We were disappointed and we regretted that grand jury 
materials provided with promises of confidentiality were dumped 
into the public with salacious material, unfiltered by the 
House of Representatives and the Judiciary Committee, and we 
saw party line vote after party line vote after party line vote 
over and over and over again in the Judiciary Committee. We 
were disappointed that the depositions went forward without our 
participation. We were disappointed there was no definition of 
the scope of the inquiry. We were disappointed that there was 
no term of time, no limitation on either the scope or the time 
of this inquiry. And we were disappointed that there was no 
adequate notice of the charges.
    There were two events that happened near the end of this 
process that I think were particularly disappointing to us. One 
was that while the debate was underway on the House floor, 
Members of the House of Representatives were taken into the 
evidence room and shown evidence that was not in this record, 
that had not been included in the discussion in the House 
Judiciary Committee, that had never been shown to counsel for 
the President, that was not in the referral and became a factor 
in the decisionmaking at least of some Members of the House--
unfairly so, I think.
    And finally, we were disappointed that the Members of the 
House of Representatives were denied the right and the 
opportunity to vote for censure. They were promised the right 
to vote their conscience. They were told they could vote their 
conscience. And if they had been given that right to vote their 
conscience, we might not be here today. We might have had the 
resolution of censure and this thing might have been resolved, 
and that was the greatest disappointment of all.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Bennett, Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Roth, Specter and 
McConnell to the House managers:

    Would each of the managers who have been prosecutors prior 
to being elected to the House of Representatives please state 
briefly whether he believes he would have sought an indictment 
and obtained a conviction of an individual who had engaged in 
the conduct of which the President is accused?

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I know there are 
several, probably not only at our table, but all across this 
Senate, who have had some experience somewhere in prosecution 
of cases. I would just briefly say that--and I think it has 
probably been said very well today more eloquently than I will 
say it, not only from some of the people on our side, but even 
some of the people on the President's side have talked about 
this same concept of justice and the rule of law--it is so 
important in our system of justice that the American people 
have confidence in that.
    And one of the ways that I found in my experience that 
confidence sometimes suffered were phone calls that 
occasionally you would receive where there had been an 
allegation that someone in an elected office or some public 
official in particular had, allegedly again, committed a crime 
or perhaps been charged with a crime with allegations of 
coverup because of who that person was--there was not equal 
justice out there, people were being treated differently and 
specially. And that happens, that comes with our territory. We 
are very visible people. Certainly the President of the United 
States is the most visible of us.
    As I said in my opening remarks, he is a role model for 
many people. And certainly when these kinds of allegations come 
up against the President, people raise these kinds of thoughts 
and complaints.
    As a prosecutor, I would find this type of charge 
particularly of concern not only because of the perjury, which 
is so important because, as I said earlier, too, truth 
underpins our whole system, but I find it equally compelling as 
a prosecutor that a person of this visibility, of this 
responsibility not only commits a crime himself, but he brings 
someone else into that. He ensnares another person, actually 
other people into this, the coverup, the obstruction part--
Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan, all the White 
House people that we have talked about. He brings other people 
into this and causes other people to commit crimes. I would 
view that even more seriously because of the fact that he made 
other people commit types of crimes. And because of that, I 
think as a prosecutor, were this another person, a John Doe of 
some visibility, a local district attorney, a local mayor or 
someone like that, there would be no doubt that the allegations 
would have to go to court.
    And I might add in line with this that we have heard of 
this selecting the President out of this process by saying, 
well, we should not consider him like we would a Federal judge 
or like a general that we are talking about maybe promoting to 
head the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a captain for promotion to 
major or really anyone else here. It almost seems that--yes, he 
is different, but it almost seems that we want to treat him 
like a king because he is the only person we have got here, and 
because he is the only one, we can't look at him like a 
thousand judges or 200 generals or other public officials.
    I think that is a fallacious argument. If the facts are 
there, no matter if this man is the President, to me that is 
what the Constitution is about. I think they set up this 
process to avoid a king and a kingdom.
    I will yield time to Mr. McCollum. 
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. I will be much briefer in answering 
that question, Mr. Chief Justice.
    I served as a military judge advocate for 4 years on active 
duty, 20 more years in the Reserves. I was a prosecutor, 
defense attorney and military judge. I think this is a very 
compelling case on the evidence. I would never hesitate to take 
this to trial if I were prosecuting the crimes of perjury, 
obstruction of justice, or any of the military offenses that 
might be included in here. But just on the criminal charges 
which are in the UCMJ, I would certainly do so if given the 
opportunity for all the reasons and then some that Mr. Bryant 
gave.
    Mr. Manager BARR. Mr. Chief Justice, to me this is not a 
hypothetical question in any sense of the word. As a United 
States attorney under two Presidents, I had the opportunity not 
only to contemplate bringing such cases based on the evidence 
and the law but actually having the responsibility of carrying 
those cases out and prosecuting them, including a case that 
probably cost me a primary election in the Republican Party for 
prosecuting a Member of Congress for precisely the activity 
which brings us here today; that is, perjury, misleading a 
grand jury.
    So the answer to the question, Mr. Majority Leader, is not 
only yes but absolutely yes.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I know we have run out of time. The 
facts and law support it, and the answer is yes. And may I add 
that Mr. Rogan who has certainly prosecuted, Mr. Lindsey 
Graham, and Mr. Gekas, all would--if you would like to join in 
that. Otherwise, we all would affirm that the answer is yes.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the President's 
counsel from Senators Boxer and Johnson.

    The managers repeatedly assert that if the Senate acquits 
President Clinton, the Senate will be making the statement that 
the President of the United States should be held above the 
law. If, as the managers concede, President Clinton may be held 
accountable in court for the charges alleged in the House 
articles regardless of the outcome of the Senate trial, how 
could a Senate vote to acquit the President be characterized as 
a vote to place him above the law?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. I suppose the one quote that has been 
heard most often throughout these proceedings in the House and 
in this body is Theodore Roosevelt's, and I won't repeat it 
except to go to the heart of this question. The fact that we 
are having this trial in this Chamber, the fact that we had an 
impeachment proceeding in the House, is itself part of our rule 
of law. The President is immersed in the application of the 
rule of law at this very moment. And the rule of law, as I 
think my colleague, Ms. Mills, said, is neither a sword nor a 
shield, depending on your perspective. We are all subject to it 
and we live with its outcome, if it is fair and is consistent 
with the system of justice that we have developed in the last 
210 years.
    And, so, the verdict here, if it is ``not guilty'' as I 
trust it will be, or if this trial is ended appropriately 
through some other legal motion or mechanism, as long as it is 
done within the rule of law, will have met all of our 
obligations. And most importantly, it will have ensured that 
the President is treated neither above nor below.
    But certainly the one issue that is raised in this question 
is important to focus on, because this is not a situation in 
which the President walks away scot-free no matter what 
happens, not to mention the personal pain and the pain that has 
been suffered in going through this process. The President has 
said, and I have said on his behalf, that he will not use his 
powers, or ask anyone else to use their powers, to protect him 
against the application of the rule of law. Moreover, just in 
case it has slipped anyone's mind--and it has occasionally been 
misstated in other forums--the statute that has allowed the 
independent counsel to pursue the President for the last 4-plus 
years specifically provides that he retains jurisdiction over 
the President for a year after the President has left office.
    So there can be no argument that, oh, this will just fall 
into the cracks, or this will disappear into the ether 
somewhere. The President will be at risk. We trust that 
reasonable judgments will be made and a determination will be 
reached that it is not appropriate to pursue him. But that, 
too, will be pursued under the rule of law to which he is 
subject.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Campbell, Hagel and Specter to the House managers:

    White House counsel have several times asserted that the 
grand jury perjury charge is just a ``he says, she says'' case 
and that we cannot consider corroborating witnesses you cite. 
What is it about the President's grand jury testimony that 
convinces you he should be removed from office?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, that question goes 
to the heart of what we are here about today. We have had a 
great deal of discussion about a lot of peripheral questions 
and issues, but the fact of the matter is, the simplest portion 
of this deals with grand jury perjury, and I assume the 
question principally is directed to the first of four points 
under the grand jury perjury article, because, for example, the 
second point with respect to the President having the goal or 
the intent of being truthful--which he said he did in the grand 
jury in the Jones deposition--there isn't a ``he says, she 
says'' question.
    That is just very simple. The President lied multiple times 
in that civil deposition, and if he said in the grand jury to 
the grand jurors, ``My goal was to be truthful,'' it is pretty 
self-evident that that was a lie and he perjured himself. So 
that is not a ``he says, she says.''
    But the question that the counsel over here has tried to 
bring up several times, saying the part with respect 
particularly to Monica Lewinsky saying that the President 
touched her in certain parts of her body which would have been 
covered by the Jones definition of sexual relations, and the 
President who said explicitly in his grand jury testimony, ``I 
didn't touch those parts,'' and, ``Yes, I agree that would have 
been and is part of the definition of sexual relations in the 
Jones case''--that is, whether you believe her or him, and they 
say that is a ``he says, she says,'' and it is not.
    But even if it were, you could listen to it and accept it. 
I think there is some confusion about the law. The law of grand 
jury perjury does not require two witnesses. Nor does it 
require the corroborating testimony of anybody else. It does 
not. That is why, in 1970, it was changed, and most 
prosecutions today for perjury, including people who are in 
Federal prison today for perjury in civil cases for lying about 
matters related to sex--and there are several, a couple of whom 
testified before us in the Judiciary Committee during our 
process and hearings--are based upon that 1970 law that does 
not require any corroboration.
    In this case, you have Monica Lewinsky, who is a very 
credible witness by other reasons, so that you don't even have 
to get to those corroborating witnesses on those points. No. 1, 
she was under immunity under the threat of prosecution when she 
testified that way. No. 2, she has consistent statements 
throughout, many times over. She didn't say she had sexual 
intercourse with him. She could have made that up, but she 
didn't. Everything she says is believable about that portion of 
it. And third, and not last in all of this, is that she did 
make very contemporaneous statements to at least six other 
people who were her friends and counselors, describing in 
detail exactly the same thing she testified to under oath 
before the grand jury in this respect.
    Now they say, the counselors here, you can't consider that 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence because that is, 
presumably, hearsay. Well, there are at least three exceptions 
to that hearsay rule which could be brought out in a courtroom. 
They have gone about trying to carefully say we have never said 
that Monica Lewinsky lied.
    I remember, I think it was Mr. Kendall or maybe it was Mr. 
Craig up there a little earlier, saying when asked that 
question, ``Did she lie in this instance or in any other?'' and 
they say it is just a different version of the truth. If she is 
saying it as explicitly as she is about this nine times or four 
times or whatever, and the President is saying I never did 
that, I don't see how they can fudge around, challenging her 
truthfulness and credibility.
    That is what they have been doing. And in any courtroom I 
have ever been in, once that has occurred you can certainly 
bring in her prior consistent statements, and you don't even 
have to go with the rules of evidence on this. You are not 
bound by those rules of evidence. And common sense says she had 
no motive to be lying to her friends in those numerous 
telephone conversations or her meetings with her counselors 
when she described in detail these things the President says he 
didn't do, because all of those statements occurred, all of 
those discussions occurred before she ever was knowingly on a 
witness list or likely to have to testify in any other way.
    She is very credible. Those prior consistent statements are 
very believable, and I submit to you they would be admissible 
in a court in the kind of contest that would be involved in a 
situation like this. It goes to the very heart of what we are 
here about--grand jury perjury, the simplest, clearest one. The 
President lied. Monica Lewinsky told the truth about it. And it 
is profound and it is important and it is critical to this 
case. And that is the principal one of the perjuries that we 
have been drawing your attention to because it is so clear. 
Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Dorgan 
to counsel for the President:

    How can the House claim that its function is accusatory 
only, when the articles it voted call for the President's 
removal?

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. This, of course, takes us back to the 
very heart of the argument that raged for a small time here 
yesterday and on previous days, the notion that the House of 
Representatives viewed itself during the month of December as 
merely--I won't even say that it rose in their mind to the 
level of an accusatory body that we would think of when we 
think of the grand jury, but to a body whose job it was, as one 
of the managers said at one point, simply to find probable 
cause to believe that the President had committed these acts.
    Perhaps there has been some extraordinary transposition 
from the mood and the tenor of the comments made during those 
days when the Judiciary Committee was doing its work to the 
days when these managers have appeared in the well of the 
Senate, something that has transformed the mere probable cause 
screening finding that they allegedly viewed as the role of the 
House and the Judiciary Committee into the certainty that you 
hear today.
    It is a good question, as to how, then, given the role they 
saw for themselves, they could go so far, not only to seek the 
removal of the President but, indeed, to add in all their 
prosecutorial vigor something that has never been sought 
before, a bar against holding any future office, at the level 
of certainty that they must have achieved given the standard 
that they held themselves to. What happened between December 19 
and today that allows these managers to come before you not 
saying, ``Well, we were certain then and we're more certain 
now,'' or ``We only found probable cause back in 1998, but in 
1999 we are sufficiently certain that we ought to shut down the 
public will as expressed in the elections of 1996.''
    I haven't yet found an answer to that question.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Bond, 
Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Lugar, Hutchison of Texas, Roth and 
Stevens. It is directed to the House managers:

    After everything you have heard over the last several weeks 
from the President's counsel, do you still believe that the 
facts support the charges of obstruction of justice alleged in 
the articles of impeachment? Specifically, what allegations of 
improper conduct has the President's counsel failed to 
undermine?

    The question is also from Senators Specter and McConnell.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. First 
of all, why is obstruction of justice important to begin with? 
I think back on an opportunity I had at a hearing once to 
question a member of the Colombian drug cartel. I asked him: 
``What is the greatest weapon that law enforcement has that you 
fear?''
    His answer was very quickly, ``Extradition.''
    I said, ``Explain. Why is extradition feared?''
    He said, ``Because in Colombia, you can fix the system, but 
in America you can't.''
    That is why I think the obstruction of justice charge is so 
important to the administration of justice. Money, position, 
power does not corrupt, should not corrupt the administration 
of justice.
    The question is, Where has the President attacked, 
counselors attacked credibly the allegations of obstruction? 
The first one is that the President personally encouraged a 
witness, Monica Lewinsky, to lie. This is on December 17 at 2 
a.m. in the morning when the President calls Monica to tell her 
that she is a witness on the list--2 a.m. in the morning. At 
that time, of course, she is nervous, she is a witness and 
asked, ``Well, what am I going to say?'' And the President 
offers, according to Monica Lewinsky, you can always say you 
came to see Betty or you came to deliver papers.
    The President's counselor attacked this by saying, ``Well, 
remember what Monica said, `I was never told to lie.' '' I 
refer you to a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Tranakos, 
1990. The law is that the request to lie need not be a direct 
statement. As the court held:

    The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as much as it 
does direct commands.

    That is common sense. That is logic. That is what a jury 
applies--common sense. And here, of course, in this case, 
Monica Lewinsky testified that she was told, in essence, to 
lie. The President didn't say, ``Monica, I need you to go in 
and lie for me.'' He told her the cover story in a legal 
context that she could use that would cover for him that, in 
essence, would be a lie. We all know that is what it is.
    Of course, the President says--well, he denies that. Of 
course, he said, I never told her to use the cover stories in a 
legal context, directly in conflict, but clearly the 
President's counselors have not attacked that obstruction of 
justice.
    The second one is the jobs and the false affidavit. They 
say there is absolutely no connection in these two, none 
whatsoever. Of course, I pointed out the testimony of Vernon 
Jordan who testified it doesn't take an Einstein to know that 
whenever he found out she was a witness, she was under 
subpoena, that the subpoena changed the circumstances. That is 
the testimony of Vernon Jordan. They say there is no 
connection. Vernon Jordan, the President's friend, says the 
circumstances change whenever you are talking about getting a 
job with somebody who is also under subpoena in a case that is 
very important to the President of the United States.
    Of course, Vernon Jordan also indicated the President's 
personal involvement when he testified before the grand jury in 
June. He said he was interested in this matter: ``He''--
referring to the President--``was the source of it coming to my 
attention in the first place.''
    He further testified: ``The President asked me to get 
Monica Lewinsky a job.''
    The President was personally involved in the obtaining of a 
job. He was personally concerned about the false affidavit, and 
Vernon Jordan acknowledges that when those are combined, the 
circumstances are different.
    The third area of obstruction is tampering with the 
witness, Betty Currie, on January 18 and January 20 when the 
questions were posed after the deposition. The President's 
counselor challenged this and said, well, she wasn't a witness. 
Even the Jones lawyers never had any clue that she was going to 
be a witness in this case. The President couldn't know that she 
was going to be a witness.
    They hoped that we would never find the subpoena, because 
Mr. Ruff made that statement early on, which he very 
professionally expressed regret that he made that 
misrepresentation, but we found the subpoena. We found the 
subpoena that was actually issued a few days after the 
deposition for Betty Currie. She was a witness; she was not 
just a prospective witness. She was there, she had to be ready 
to go and the President knew this and the Jones lawyer knew it. 
So that stands. The pillar of obstruction stands.
    The false statements to the grand jury--that has been 
covered. There have never been any holes that have been poked 
into that, but it was to continue the coverup of the false 
statements that were made in the civil rights case.
    Another area of obstruction was December 28 when the gifts 
were retrieved, and this has been challenged. I will admit, as 
I always have, that there is a dispute in the testimony. But I 
believe the case is made through the circumstances, the 
motivation, the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as to what Betty 
Currie said when she called and the corroborating evidence. I 
don't believe they have poked a hole in that. I believe it 
stands. We would like to hear the witnesses to make you feel 
more comfortable in resolving that conflict and determine the 
credibility of those witnesses.
    But the gifts that were subpoenaed were evidence in a 
trial; they were needed in a civil rights case. The President 
knew they were under subpoena; he had the most to gain, and 
they were retrieved. And I believe the testimony indicates that 
it was based upon the actions of Betty Currie that would have 
been directed by the President.
    There are other areas of obstruction, including the 
President allowing his attorney, Robert Bennett, to make false 
representations to the Federal district judge in the 
deposition. The President's defense is that there is no proof 
whatsoever that he was paying any attention. We offered the 
videotape that shows he is believed to be looking at the 
attorney, but we would offer a witness in that regard to show 
that he was attentive. That is simply something that can be 
substantiated.
    We believe that you can evaluate that, that he was paying 
attention, but that is an element of obstruction because he was 
allowing his attorney to make a false representation to the 
court that was totally untrue, that would aid in the coverup 
and that was presented.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Hutchinson, I think you have 
answered the question.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I thank the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Levin to 
counsel for the White House:

    In their brief to the Senate, the House managers said that 
there was ``no urgency'' to help Ms. Lewinsky until December 
11, 1997, and that on that day ``sudden interest was inspired'' 
by a court order, which the House managers had represented was 
issued in the morning of December 11, before the Vernon Jordan/
Monica Lewinsky meeting that afternoon.
    It took some doing yesterday to get the House managers to 
finally acknowledge that the court order was not issued in the 
morning, but in the afternoon of December 11. Why were the 
House managers so reluctant to make that acknowledgment?

    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, well, I think they 
were reluctant to make the acknowledgement because they were in 
cement due to their trial brief, which at page 20, as the 
question indicates, said, as to this particular time period 
after the December 6 meeting, ``There was obviously''--there 
was obviously--``still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky.'' They 
thought that they had a chronology that was consistent with the 
inference of causation. But when you look at the true time of 
the events, that dissolves.
    Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson used a word repeatedly, a 
phrase I would like to call your attention to, as he was 
summarizing the evidence. He used the phrase: ``In essence.'' 
Now, that is another phrase that is kind of a weasel word. When 
you hear that, it means that the evidence isn't really quite 
there, but if you look at the big picture maybe you can see 
what is there ``in essence.'' It doesn't work here. It doesn't 
work because of the evidence.
    Just a week ago, Mr. Manager Hutchinson, on this 
obstruction of justice question, was asked very clearly: ``On 
the case that you have against the President on obstruction of 
justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a 
conviction in a criminal court?'' And he said, ``No, I would 
not.''
    Now, I am not going to walk through each and every element 
that he identified. I think we have repeatedly dealt with them. 
And I am not going to step on your patience to do that again 
each time.
    I would like to make two points. That is, in terms of 
encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, were these cover stories an 
attempt to encourage her to lie? As I tried to indicate, there 
is testimony in the record that at a certain time in the 
relationship these cover stories were discussed. There is not 
any evidence, however, from Ms. Lewinsky, the President, or 
anyone else, that these were discussed in connection with the 
testimony, in connection with the affidavit. You remember Ms. 
Lewinsky, when asked if she could exclude that possibility, 
said, ``I pretty much can.''
    Now, the testimony that Mr. Hutchinson mentioned with Mr. 
Jordan on December 19, you remember he quoted Mr. Jordan. He 
said the discovery of the subpoena at that point changed the 
circumstances. Well, it did, but just in the opposite way that 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson would have you infer, because when Mr. 
Jordan discovered, on December 19, that Ms. Lewinsky had a 
subpoena, was going to testify in the Jones case as a witness, 
unless she could get it quashed, he went to her and went to the 
President to seek assurance that the job assistance he was 
engaging in could not at any time be said to be improper 
because of the presence of an improper relationship. Both 
parties assured him there was no such relationship. This 
observation by Mr. Jordan cuts just the opposite way.
    Thank you.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                           Order Of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I do have another question I 
will send to the desk momentarily, but I would like the 
Senators to know that we have had some 104 or 105 questions now 
that have been asked. I believe that is correct--104. Senator 
Daschle and I conferred. We want to thank the Senators for 
their participation and their questions. We do want to make it 
clear we are not seeking questions.
    [Laughter.]
    So don't feel like you need to help us by sending them 
down. But under your rights as Senators, under the Senate 
Resolution 16 and the rules we are proceeding under, every and 
each Senator is entitled to submit a question if he or she 
feels it is important, but I hope that it will be one that you 
think really is essential that has not been touched on 
somewhere already in the answers to the questions and also 
would hope--and that the Record be made clear--that we, in a 
bipartisan way, have tried very hard to make sure that this 
proceeding here and the question period, and all we have done, 
has been fair both to the President's counsel and the House 
managers. And we will continue to work in that vein.
    With that observation, and if we do need to continue going 
forward with questions, we would have to give some 
consideration to taking a break and going longer, although I 
had indicated I hoped we could quit at 4. Maybe after this 
question and, if necessary, one or two more, we could end for 
the day and then get together and see if we need more time on 
Monday for additional questions.
    I send the next question to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators 
Cochran, Roth, Campbell and Frist to the House managers:

    The President's counsel has suggested that the Senate has 
considered a ``good behavior'' standard in impeachment cases 
involving Federal judges. The removal of judges seems to have 
been based by the Senate on the impeachment power whose 
standard for removal is the same for both Federal judges and 
executive branch officials. Is the counsel for the President 
asking us to use a different test for removal of this President 
than we did in the case of Judge Walter Nixon? Please explain.

    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, I appreciate the opportunity to answer this question. 
It is an important question. It is true that counsel for the 
President are asking that you use a different standard in this 
case than the standard you have already established, not in 
just one case but, in fact, in a series of cases involving 
Federal judges who were before the Senate in the 1980s. There 
was a succession of three cases in the Senate, all dealing with 
the question of whether a Federal judge who had lied under oath 
should be removed from office because the Federal judge had 
lied under oath. In all three cases, the Senate decided that 
the Federal judge should be convicted and removed.
    The President's counsel have the burden of establishing 
that those recent and very clear precedents of the Senate 
should not apply to this case where the President is charged 
with lying under oath, and they attempt to do that in a number 
of ways. But I suggest, as you evaluate their attempt to 
distinguish away those precedents, that you look first and last 
to the Constitution.
    The Constitution should be your guide. And I suggest to you 
that there is nothing in the Constitution which establishes a 
different standard for the President--for any reason. There is 
not something in the Constitution that says he is subject to a 
different standard because he is elected. That argument had 
been advanced. If you look in the Constitution, you simply will 
not find that. And to argue for a different standard because 
the President is elected, I submit to you, is to impose 
something on the Constitution that is entirely alien to the 
document itself.
    The Constitution contains a single standard for the 
application of the impeachment and removal power. I have read 
it before, but I will read it again. Article II, section 4 
provides:

    The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.

    Now, reference was made in the question, and reference has 
been made by the President's counsel, to the good behavior 
clause. That is found in article III, section 1. That clause 
does not alter the standard I have just read to you, however. 
Rather than creating an altered standard for removal of Federal 
judges, the good behavior clause merely establishes that the 
term of office for judicial officers is life.
    I wouldn't ask you to take my word for this. Let me refer 
again to the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment 
inquiry. There they asked the question: ``Does Article III, 
Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that judges `shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the relevance 
of the . . . impeachments of judges with respect to 
presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by 
some?'' That is essentially the question before the Senate now. 
Their answer was: ``It does not.'' It does not. ``. . .  the 
only impeachment provision''--they go on to say--``discussed in 
the [Constitutional] Convention and [indeed] . . . in the 
Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its expressed 
terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges. . . .''
    I would go on to note, it is very interesting that at the 
Constitutional Convention, on August 27, 1787, an attempt was 
made to amend the good behavior clause by adding a provision 
for the removal of judges by the executive on the application 
by the Senate and House of Representatives. Now, this proposal, 
which was offered by John Dickinson, was based on the English 
parliamentary practice of removal of judges by address, a 
practice also utilized by several American States. And under 
this process, judges could be removed for misconduct, falling 
short of the level of seriousness that would justify 
impeachment.
    Now, the proposal offered by Dickinson was overwhelmingly 
rejected. It was overwhelmingly rejected by the Convention. 
Thus, the sole provision for removal and the sole standard for 
removal is that which I have referred to in article II, section 
4.
    Now, mention has been made, and I want to respond to this, 
because mention has been made of efforts of Congress to 
establish a separate procedure for the removal of Federal 
judges, a procedure separate and apart from the impeachment and 
removal process.
    Specific mention has also been made of testimony given in 
1970 by the Chief Justice, who was then an assistant attorney 
general, regarding a proposal to establish a separate removal 
procedure. The testimony given by the Chief Justice at that 
time related to the constitutionality of the provisions of the 
bill relating to the removal of judges by methods other than 
impeachment.
    Now, my own view, quite candidly, is that such a removal 
procedure raises serious constitutional questions--serious 
questions about maintaining the independence of the judiciary. 
Putting that question aside, and regardless of the standards 
that might be applied in such a separate removal procedure, it 
is clear that the single constitutional standard for 
impeachment and removal would remain the same. That is what is 
in the Constitution. That can't be changed by any statute or 
anything set up apart from the constitutional procedures.
    One thing I want to say as I move toward concluding my 
response: It should be recognized that some specific acts might 
be a breach of duty if done by a judge but not a breach of duty 
if done by the President of the United States. That is an 
important distinction that we all should bear in mind. For 
example, it would be serious misconduct for a judge to engage 
in repeated ex parte meetings with parties who have an interest 
in a matter pending before that judge; but it is typical for 
the President to engage in such ex parte meetings with persons 
who have an interest in matters on which he will decide. For a 
judge, such conduct constitutes a breach of duty; for the 
President, it does not constitute a breach of duty.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Canady, I think you have answered 
the question.
    This question from Senator Harkin is to counsel for the 
President:

    There are three contradictions in the record: One, who 
touched whom on what parts of the body; two, when the 
relationship began; three, who called whom to get the gifts, 
Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky.
    How will these witnesses clear up the contradiction?

    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, Senator Harkin, it is 
difficult for me to explain how, after you have gotten 19 
interviews, 2 grand jury appearances, and 1 deposition to cover 
that precise territory, any further kind of inquiry along those 
lines would be of any help.
    The House managers have argued that they need to call 
witnesses for the purposes of resolving inconsistencies, 
conflicts, and discrepancies in testimony. And they have, in 
fact, identified Monica Lewinsky in particular as having given 
testimony in conflict with the testimony of the President, with 
Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan.
    But it would be well to remember that the lawyers for the 
Office of Independent Counsel certainly are not seeking to 
elicit testimony that is favorable to the President, that those 
lawyers have already done a great deal of this precise kind of 
inquiry at some great length. Those lawyers--no friends of the 
President--have already explored inconsistencies, they have 
already tested memory, they have already laboriously and at 
great length subjected these witnesses to searching scrutiny, 
and their work is available for all to see in the record of 
this case before the Senate today.
    Let me be very specific and very concrete. Monica Lewinsky 
was interviewed by the lawyers for the Office of Independent 
Counsel or testified before the grand jury on 20 different 
occasions after Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan had given their 
testimony before the grand jury. And contrary to the assertions 
of the House managers, Monica Lewinsky was interviewed six 
times and testified twice--one time before the grand jury and 
once in a sworn deposition after the President had given his 
testimony before the grand jury on August 17.
    On August 19, she was interviewed by the FBI and by lawyers 
for the special counsel. She testified before the grand jury--
Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury on August 20. She 
was interviewed by lawyers and FBI agents for the independent 
counsel on August 24. She was interviewed on August 26. She 
appeared for a deposition held in the conference room of the 
Office of Independent Counsel on August 26. She was interviewed 
pursuant to her immunity agreement with independent counsel and 
FBI agents on September 5. She was also interviewed--excuse me; 
that was September 3. She appeared and listened to tapes with 
the FBI present on many occasions during the period September 3 
through September 6. She appeared and was interviewed by 
special counsel, independent counsel, on September 7 and 
September 5 and September 6.
    So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire to 
interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve 
conflicts that she has with other people, because certainly 
these occasions gave the lawyers for the independent counsel an 
opportunity to do so.
    I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical 
behavior, I am sure, because I respect the professionalism of 
the House managers, but I would suspect that one of the reasons 
they want to inquire of Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve 
discrepancies and disputes, it is to perhaps challenge her 
testimony when it is helpful to the President and perhaps 
bolster her testimony when it is not helpful to the President. 
The House managers are not neutral investigators, neutral 
interrogators.
    It raises questions about what the managers' true purpose 
is in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie forward as 
witnesses, what they want to inquire about if they conduct an 
interview of them. I suggest that this is also a bit of a 
fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging 
to the President.
    We are not afraid of witnesses, but we do want fairness, 
and we don't think it is fair in this process. If you are going 
to have a real trial, then we want to have a real defense, and 
to have a real defense requires real discovery and real 
opportunity to have access to documents and witnesses and 
evidence that has been in the custody and the control of the 
House of Representatives, that has never been made available to 
us, that is in the custody and control of the Office of 
Independent Counsel, that has not been made available to us.
    I suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the 
managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan 
suggesting--actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth 
when he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which 
is an outrageous suggestion, and suggesting, which happened 
today--implying that he destroyed evidence, which not even the 
independent counsel had suggested, they seek to do nothing more 
than to attack, attack, attack the best friend of the President 
of the United States, and his personal secretary.
    That is the reason they want to talk to these people. I 
think it is an improper reason. It is wanting to win too much. 
I don't think the U.S. Senate should be part of it.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Hagel, 
Abraham, and Hatch to the House managers:

    White House counsel has indicated their opposition to 
calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not 
shed light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the 
proceedings. But it is the responsibility of the Senate to find 
the truth. And if any Senators reasonably believe that hearing 
witnesses would assist in finding the truth, why shouldn't they 
be called?

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    ``Methinks thou doth protest too much.'' I think that is 
what White House counsel has been doing. I don't know why, but 
they, frankly, don't want witnesses. They don't want what you 
normally have in a trial. We can paint this with any kinds of 
colors you want to have, but a trial without witnesses, when it 
involves a criminal accusation, a criminal matter, is not a 
true trial; it really isn't. It is not what I think of, and I 
guarantee it is not what any of my friends sitting over here 
who have been counsel, prosecutors and defense lawyers, think 
of. It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you 
have had the inferences and the conclusions that we draw 
logically from the entire sequence of events that are painted 
from the very day when the President got word of Monica 
Lewinsky being on the witness list, and all the way through his 
testimony in the Jones case, all the way through the grand jury 
testimony, when they challenge every inference that you should 
logically draw from the record, and then suggest that, oh, but 
we should not have anybody in here; so you who are going to 
judge ultimately whether our representations are persuasive or 
not about those inferences, whether you should be able to 
judge--and I think you should--what the witnesses actually are 
saying.
    I will give you one illustration. I don't know how many 
times--two or three times--I put up here on the board, or I 
have said to you--and I know a couple of my colleagues said to 
you--that during the discussion with regard to the affidavit 
that Monica Lewinsky had in front of the grand jury, she 
explicitly said: No, the President didn't tell me to lie, but 
he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me or 
discourage me.
    You need to have her say that to you. They have even been 
whacking away at that, confusing everything they can, talking 
about the job searches at the same time they are talking about 
the affidavit, what she said here, there, or anywhere else. 
Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts 
that are here.
    When we get to the point--which we presume we will get that 
opportunity to do--to argue our case on why we should have 
witnesses, maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday--I think that even 
though you have a motion to dismiss, we will get that chance--
we will lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot of them 
out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the 
witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges about any one 
of these.
    I would be happy to yield to Mr. Graham or Mr. Rogan if 
they wish--neither one. That is fair enough.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour 
that we had indicated we would conclude our work on Saturday. 
There may still be some questions that Senators would like to 
have offered. I have talked to Senator Daschle.
    One suggestion made is that maybe on Monday we would ask 
that questions could be submitted for the Record in writing. I 
think that is a common practice. We don't want to cut it off. 
At this point, I would not be prepared to do that. But I would 
like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business 
today, and if there is a need by a Senator on either side to 
have another question, or two or three, we will certainly 
consult with each other and see how we can handle that, perhaps 
on Monday, and even see if it would be appropriate to prepare a 
motion with regard to being able to submit questions for the 
Record, which would be answered. We would not want to abuse 
that and cause that to be a protracted process.
    In view of the time spent here--in fact, we have had around 
106 questions, and we are about 10 hours into this now--I think 
we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at 1 p.m. 
on Monday and continue in accordance with the provisions of S. 
Res. 16. I will update all Members as to the specific schedule 
when it becomes clear.

                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that in the Record 
following today's proceedings there appear a period of morning 
business to accommodate bills and statements that have been 
submitted during the day by Senators. I thank my colleagues for 
their attentiveness during the proceedings.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                ------                                


           ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that the Senate stand in 
adjournment under the previous order.
    Mr. HARKIN. I object.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate stand 
in adjournment under the previous order.
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I seek recognition.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion to 
adjourn.
    The motion was agreed to and, at 3:55 p.m., the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment adjourned until Monday, 
January 25, 1999, at 1 p.m.


                        Monday, January 25, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Dear God, we are moved by Your accessibility to us and our 
accountability to You. We hear Your promise sounding in our 
souls, ``Be not afraid, I am with you.'' We place our trust in 
Your problem-solving power, Your conflict-resolving presence, 
and Your anxiety-dissolving peace. So we report in to You for 
duty. What You desire, You inspire. What You guide, You 
provide.
    This is Your Nation; we are here to serve You. Just as 
Daniel Webster said that the greatest conviction of his life 
was that he was accountable to You, we press on with a 
heightened awareness that You are the unseen Lord of this 
Chamber, the silent Listener to every word that is spoken, and 
the Judge of our deliberations and decisions.
    Bless the Senators with the assurance that Your work, done 
with total trust in You and respect for each other, will not 
lack Your resources. Surpass any impasse with divinely inspired 
solutions. You are our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, there 
are 6 hours 33 minutes remaining during which Senators may 
submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on 
the part of the House of Representatives, or the counsel for 
the President.
    The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           order of procedure

    Mr. LOTT. As is obvious by the absence of the managers and 
counsel, and a number of the Senators, the two parties are 
still meeting in conference at this time. I believe we are 
close to reaching an agreement which would outline today's 
impeachment proceedings. It will probably be an hour or so 
before we can complete that because we need to explain it in 
detail to our respective conferences, and also make sure that 
we reduce it to writing so we understand exactly what we are 
agreeing to.
    I will in a moment ask that the Senate stand in recess 
until 2 p.m. I apologize for any inconvenience to Senators and 
the Chief Justice. But I think that what we are discussing in 
the long run would save some time and lead us to a fair 
procedure through the balance of the day and how we begin 
tomorrow.

                                 recess

    Therefore, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate 
stand in recess until 2 p.m.
    Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to 
object----
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from New Hampshire.
    Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a parliamentary 
inquiry that I would like to share.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian says it takes 
unanimous consent.
    Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent to----
    Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object, I believe that if 
it is going to be made, Mr. Chief Justice, if it requires 
unanimous consent, that it would be wise if it can be done at a 
time when both leaders are on the floor.
    Mr. GREGG. I withdraw the unanimous consent.
    There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:06 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that 
the question and answer period is now completed. In a moment I 
will propound a unanimous consent agreement that will outline 
the next steps in this process.

                      unanimous-consent agreement

    Mr. LOTT. In the meantime, I would ask unanimous consent 
that Senators be allowed to submit statements and introduce 
legislation at the desk today. I further ask unanimous consent 
that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in 
adjournment until 1 p.m. on Tuesday to resume the articles of 
impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Ms. MIKULSKI. Reserving the right to object, I note that 
the Democratic leader is not in the Chamber.
    May I inquire, has this been cleared?
    Mr. LOTT. I just want to observe, Mr. Chief Justice, that 
there are still some discussions underway. You will note that 
Senator Daschle is not here, and unless there is objection to 
what I just did, I am prepared to note the absence of a quorum 
so that we can have time for Senators to return to the Chamber.
    Ms. MIKULSKI. Point of clarification for the majority 
leader. Did the Senator say that we would come in tomorrow at 1 
p.m.?
    Mr. LOTT. I did. If I might respond, Mr. Chief Justice, 
there had been some discussion about coming in earlier, but 
because of a number of conflicts, I understand, from the House 
managers and concerns that we would need that time to continue 
to have discussions, we thought we would go ahead and come in 
at 1. But let me add that if during the process of the day 
there is a decision that we need to change that to either 
earlier or later, we could revise that request. This is just to 
move the process forward, as we have announced each day we 
would come in at 1 except on Saturday. But if there is a need 
to change the time, we will certainly be prepared to consider 
that request.
    Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I had earlier asked a couple 
of unanimous consent requests, but the Democratic leader was 
not on the floor, and it was not officially objected to or 
officially ruled as not having been objected to. So I am going 
to assume that is all null and void, and we are going to start 
over again.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The requests are withdrawn.
    Mr. LOTT. Now, to repeat what we had earlier discussed and 
to make sure Members understand it, it is our understanding and 
our agreement that the question and answer period is now 
completed.

   order for submission of statements and introduction of legislation

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that Senators be allowed 
to submit statements and introduce legislation at the desk 
today.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                           order of procedure

    Mr. LOTT. With regard to the time that will be involved 
today and the time that we will come in on Tuesday, we will 
have further discussions on that, and we will have a consent 
request on that later in the day or at the close of business.
    Now I have a unanimous-consent request that will allow us 
to have a clear understanding and an orderly procedure for the 
balance of the day. I have discussed this with my counterpart 
on the other side of the aisle, both conferences have had a 
chance to talk about it, and I think it is a fair way to 
proceed, where we would have a chance to discuss the issues 
that are before us and get us to a conclusion of this part of 
the impeachment proceedings in a logical way.

                       unanimous-consent request

    Mr. LOTT. First, Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent 
that today, following the conclusion of the arguments by the 
managers and the counsel on the motion to dismiss--and I note 
that the next order of business is 2 hours equally divided, 1 
hour on each side, on a motion to dismiss when and if it is 
filed by any Senator--it be in order for Senator Harkin to make 
a motion to open all debate pursuant to his motion timely filed 
and that the Senate proceed immediately to the vote pursuant to 
the impeachment rules.
    I further ask that following that vote, if defeated, it be 
in order to move to close the session for deliberations on the 
motion to dismiss, as provided under the impeachment rules, and 
the Senate proceed to an immediate vote.
    I further ask that if the Senate votes to proceed to closed 
session, those deliberations must conclude by the close of 
business today, notwithstanding the 10-minute rule allocated 
under the impeachment rule.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. HARKIN. I object.
    Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
    Mr. HARKIN. Reserving the right to object.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, does he reserve the right to 
object or did he object?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me the Senator 
does not have the right to reserve the right to object.
    Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
    Mr. HARKIN. I just have a modification that I would like to 
discuss with the leader, a brief modification of that, that 
would not engender an objection.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, so we can proceed with this in 
an appropriate manner, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                      unanimous-consent agreement

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request as 
previously outlined, with one change; that is, that it say in 
the first sentence ``unanimous consent that following the 
conclusion of the arguments by the managers and the counsel 
today on the motion to dismiss, that it be in order for Senator 
Harkin to make a motion to open that debate.'' Instead of 
``all,'' the word is ``that'' debate.
    With that and no other changes, I renew that request.
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I reserve the right to 
object.
    OK, I don't have any----
    Mr. LOTT. The reservation is withdrawn, I believe.
    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, welcome to the operations of 
the U.S. Senate.
    I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, was the unanimous consent 
agreement agreed to?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Not yet.
    Mr. LOTT. I renew my request.
    Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I and Senator Collins, the 
junior Senator from Maine, ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate considers the anticipated motion to dismiss, that it 
shall vote on two separate questions: First, whether to dismiss 
article I of the articles of impeachment; and, second, whether 
to dismiss article II.
    Mr. GRAMM. I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. There is a pending request for unanimous 
consent by the majority leader, who has not surrendered the 
floor.
    Mr. LOTT. Under his reservation, if the Senator would yield 
to me, I believe if we can get this agreed to, he can make his 
request and then it can be ruled on.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor if the Senator would 
like to proceed in that fashion.
    I renew my request, again, for the unanimous consent as 
outlined earlier.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? In the absence of an 
objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request, along 
with the junior Senator from Maine--the unanimous consent 
request that when the Senate proceeds to vote on the 
anticipated motion to dismiss, that the question be divided 
into a separate vote on article I of the articles of 
impeachment, and then a separate vote on article II of the 
articles of impeachment.
    Mr. GRAMM. I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, now, if I could, I will 
outline the result of our efforts there. I thank Senator 
Daschle and my colleagues on his side of the aisle and this 
side of the aisle for trying to come up with a process that is 
fair and that would give us an opportunity today to debate this 
important issue. It is never easy to get 100 Senators to agree 
on a method to proceed, so I think this was a good 
accomplishment. I thank one and all.
    I understand that now Senator Byrd will offer the motion to 
dismiss. For the information of all Members, once that motion 
is offered, there will then be 2 hours for debate. The House 
managers will be recognized to open the debate, and following 
that will be the White House arguments. Then the House managers 
will be recognized again for closing remarks. At that point, 
the consent agreement would apply.
    I anticipate taking our first break at the conclusion of 
the first 2 hours of arguments by the managers and White House 
counsel, unless there is an urgent need to do so earlier. Then 
we will go forward with this agreement, which will require a 
vote on the Harkin motion to open the debate, the vote on the 
amendment to close debate on the motion to dismiss, and then 
the debate which would go on, the 10-minute rule 
notwithstanding, until the close of business today.
    I yield the floor.
    Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
West Virginia.

                           motion to dismiss

    Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chief Justice, I send a motion in writing to 
the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, moves that the 
impeachment proceedings against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, be, and the same are, duly 
dismissed.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to Rule XXI of the Senate Rules 
on Impeachment, the managers on the part of the House of 
Representatives and the counsel for the President each have up 
to 1 hour to argue the motion.
    The Chair recognizes the House managers.
    Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, on behalf of the House of Representatives, I rise to 
speak in opposition to the motion to dismiss. During the hour 
allotted to the managers, I will offer a few introductory 
comments concerning why adoption of the motion would be 
inconsistent with constitutional standards and harmful to the 
institutions of our Government. Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Graham, and 
Mr. Gekas will present arguments concerning the facts and the 
law, and then Mr. Hyde will close.
    At the outset, I must urge you to consider the fact that 
this motion to dismiss is without precedent. The Senate has 
never--not once in the more than 200-year history of our 
Constitution--dismissed a proceeding against an official who 
remained in office after impeachment by the House of 
Representatives. I humbly urge you not to depart from the 
Senate's well-established practice of fully considering cases 
of impeachment and rendering a judgment of either conviction or 
acquittal.
    In the midst of the great differences between the 
President's counsel and the House managers, there actually is 
at least a little common ground. Both sides agree that the 
impeachment and removal power is designed to protect the well-
being of the institutions of our Government. But there is a 
critical difference that divides us, as is obvious from the 
argument that has gone before.
    The managers have argued that this power--the power of 
impeachment and removal--is a positive power granted by the 
Constitution to maintain the integrity of Government, a power 
to preserve, protect, and strengthen our constitutional system 
against the misconduct of officials that would subvert, 
undermine, or weaken the institutions of our Government.
    The President's lawyers, on the other hand, advance a much 
narrower view of the role of the impeachment power in 
protecting our institutions. Their case rests on the argument 
that it is a power to be used only in response to conduct 
threatening devastating harm to the system of Government--at 
least when it is used against a President.
    But I submit to you that Alexander Hamilton did not 
contemplate that the impeachment process would be so restricted 
when he spoke of it as a ``method of national inquest into the 
conduct of public men.'' And James Iredell did not have such a 
narrow view in mind when he spoke of the accountability through 
impeachment of anyone who ``willfully abuses his trust.'' 
Iredell did not have such a limited view when he spoke of the 
impeachment of a President who, as he said, ``acted from some 
corrupt motive or other.''
    Under the standards urged by the President's lawyers, the 
misdeeds of Richard Nixon would not be the threshold for 
impeachment and removal. What he did was corrupt. The legal 
rights of citizens were treated with contempt. President Nixon 
showed an egregious lack of respect for the law. But all these 
misdeeds did not threaten the sort of ruinous harm to the 
system of Government that the President's lawyers argue would 
be required to justify conviction and removal. After all, the 
core charges against President Nixon related to the coverup of 
a third-rate burglary.
    Members of the Senate, as you consider the motion to 
dismiss, I ask you to pause and reflect on the consequences of 
the standard advocated by the President's lawyers. Consider the 
consequences for the system of justice of allowing the 
President's dangerous example of lawlessness to stand. Consider 
the consequences for the Presidency itself.
    I respectfully submit to you that the standard advocated by 
President Clinton's lawyers will debase and degrade the 
institution of the Presidency. I know that is not the intention 
of the President's lawyers, but it is the necessary consequence 
of their position.
    Only 42 men have held the office of President of the United 
States. Some of them have been ordinary men of limited talent. 
A handful of our Presidents have been great men. Most have been 
capable men who brought special skills to the office. No matter 
what our individual judgments may be concerning President 
Clinton, it is clear that he is one of the most intellectually 
gifted and politically skilled men to hold the office of 
President.
    He was raised to this great eminence--the most powerful 
office in the greatest Nation in the history of the world--an 
unparalleled opportunity, honor and privilege. And in this 
position of eminence and honor, and in this position of trust, 
what did he do? He made a series of choices that has brought us 
to this day. He made the choice to violate the law--and he made 
that choice repeatedly. He knew what he was doing. He reflected 
on it. Perhaps he struggled with his conscience. But when the 
time came to decide, he deliberately and willfully chose to 
violate the laws of this land. He chose to turn his back on the 
very law he was sworn to uphold. He chose to turn his back on 
his solemn oath of office. He chose to turn his back on his 
constitutional duty.
    As you deliberate on this motion, I ask you to consider 
what William Jefferson Clinton has done to the integrity of the 
great office he holds as a trust. I ask you to consider the 
harm he has caused, the indignity he has brought to the 
institution of the Presidency.
    Some have asked of us, ``Where is the compassion and where 
is the spirit of forgiveness?'' Let me say that I, for one, 
believe in forgiveness. Without forgiveness, what hope would 
there be for any of us? But forgiveness requires repentance; it 
requires contrition. And so I must ask, where is the 
repentance? Where is the contrition?
    It is true that the President has expressed regret for his 
personal misconduct. But he has never--he has never--accepted 
responsibility for breaking the law. He has never taken that 
essential step, as the argument advanced so vigorously by his 
counsel makes clear. He has refused to accept responsibility 
for breaking the law. He has stubbornly resisted any effort to 
be held accountable for his violations of the law, for his 
violations of his constitutional oath, and his violation of his 
duty as President. To this day, he remains adamantly 
unrepentant. And, of course, under our system of justice, even 
sincere repentance, which is so lacking here, does not 
eliminate all accountability.
    In the discussion thus far, the debate has brought the 
concept of proportionality to the fore from time to time. You 
have been urged to reject your own precedents--the clear 
precedents establishing that crimes such as lying under oath 
justify conviction and removal. The principle of 
proportionality, it has been urged, requires that the rule you 
have applied to Federal judges not be applied to the President 
of the United States.
    I will be the first to concede that removing a President of 
the United States is, without doubt, a more momentous decision 
than removing one of the hundreds of Federal judges who hold 
office in this country. When the Chief Executive is removed, 
the gravity of the matter undeniably reaches a higher level. 
But it is also true--and it must not be forgotten--that when 
the President engages in a calculated and sustained course of 
conduct involving obstruction of justice and perjury, the 
gravity of the consequences for the Nation also reaches a far 
higher level. Such lawless conduct by the President does 
immeasurably more to subvert public respect for the law than 
does the misconduct of any Federal judge or any other Federal 
official.
    As has been pointed out more than once, the Constitution 
contains a single standard for impeachment and removal of all 
civil officers; there is not one standard for the President and 
another standard for everyone else. There is nothing in the 
Constitution that requires you--or allows you--to set a lower 
standard of integrity for the President than the standard you 
have set for other officials who have been convicted and 
removed by your solemn action.
    Although they can point to nothing in the Constitution, the 
President's lawyers assert that the President is simply 
different because he is elected. So let me say this. The Senate 
itself has established a standard of integrity for its own 
elected Members that President Clinton could not meet. As 
recently as 1995, an elected Senator resigned under imminent 
threat of expulsion for offenses that included acts similar to 
the acts of obstruction of justice committed by President 
Clinton.
    Senator Robert Packwood was elected, yet he was on his way 
to certain expulsion. Listen to what the Senate Select 
Committee on Ethics had to say about Senator Packwood's 
conduct. He was guilty, the committee found, of:

. . . withholding, altering and destroying relevant evidence . 
. . conduct which is expressly prohibited by 18 United States 
Code, section 1505. . . . Senator Packwood's illegal acts 
constitute a violation of his duty of trust to the Senate and 
an abuse of his position as a United States Senator, reflecting 
discredit upon the United States Senate.

    The statute referred to by the committee in the Packwood 
case is closely analogous to the obstruction of justice statute 
the President has violated. Senator Packwood unlawfully sought 
to impede the discovery of evidence. President Clinton has done 
the same thing. For his violation of the law, Senator Packwood, 
an elected Senator, was judged worthy of expulsion from the 
Senate.
    But the President's lawyers argue the President should be 
held to a lower standard of integrity than the standard you 
have set for yourselves as Members of the Senate. According to 
them, the Constitution establishes a lower standard of 
integrity for the President than the standard for Senators, a 
lower standard than the standard for Federal judges, and a 
lower standard than the standard for members of the Armed 
Forces of the United States.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I submit to you that 
the President's lawyers, honorable as they are, are simply 
wrong. They advocate an arbitrary standard that would insulate 
the President from the proper accountability for his misconduct 
under our Constitution. Our Constitution does not establish a 
lower standard of integrity for the President of the United 
States.
    The Senate, I respectfully submit to you, should follow the 
well established precedents. The Senate should reject the 
motion to dismiss.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, how much time 
has expired?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Twelve minutes.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, in my former life, when I tried cases, 
the defense counsel would routinely offer a motion to dismiss, 
and my clients would always ask me how they could argue to 
dismiss a case before we had a chance to put on our evidence. I 
would always explain that there was more than sufficient 
evidence to get this case to a jury and they didn't have to 
worry.
    We all know that granting a motion to dismiss is a weapon 
that is rarely used in court. It is a severe remedy that cuts 
off an individual's right to seek justice in court. For that 
reason, a motion to dismiss must fail if there is any 
substantial evidence to support the case. In addition, as you 
evaluate evidence under a motion to dismiss, the facts are to 
be considered in a way that is most favorable to the 
respondent--in this case the House managers.
    For example, if there is a dispute between the testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky and the President in consideration of this, I 
would urge you to--and believe that under proper rules you 
should--consider that in the favor of the theory of the 
articles of impeachment.
    It has been explained to me many times that standard 
courtroom rules do not apply in the U.S. Senate. But, still, 
granting a motion to dismiss by the Senate has the same 
effect--to cut short the trial and avoid the development of the 
facts--as it would in any State court case. In this case of 
impeachment, the House of Representatives found that there was 
substantial evidence to support these articles. And the Senate 
should not summarily dismiss the charges.
    I might add that, despite Mr. Ruff's references, the House 
standard for the articles of impeachment was not simply 
probable cause. My colleagues on the Judiciary Committee looked 
at a much higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
    But, coming back to the Senate, to dismiss the case would 
be unprecedented from a historical standpoint, because it has 
never been done before; it would be damaging to the 
Constitution, because the Senate would fail to try the case; it 
would be harmful to the body politic, because there is no 
resolution of the issues of the case; but, most importantly, it 
would show willful blindness to the evidentiary record that has 
thus far been presented.
    An appropriate question, you might ask, is: How should you 
decide whether this motion should be granted? I would contend 
that you should decide this issue based upon the facts that you 
have before you in the record and not on any other criteria. A 
motion to dismiss should not be granted because you do not 
think there are presently enough votes for conviction.
    Let me assure you that I want this over. As Bruce Lindsey, 
sitting over here, will probably attest, this is bad for me 
politically. I am from Arkansas, the State Bill Clinton 
dominated politically for years, and certainly its most 
influential politician. But we do have our responsibilities, 
and I happen to believe that we should follow the process which 
is dictated by the Constitution and the facts.
    I know I am making legal arguments to this Court of 
Impeachment, in which I understand you make your own rules, and 
I respect that. But, as opposing counsel pointed out on many 
occasions, there are reasons for these rules of procedure and 
they have relevance to your deliberations today. Again, your 
decision should be based upon the facts, and so let's discuss 
the facts.
    Does the record support the charges of obstruction of 
justice and perjury? To look at this from a different angle, 
because we talked about it at length, let's examine how the 
President responded to critical developments in the Federal 
civil rights case in which he was a defendant.
    First, how did he handle those people he knew to be 
witnesses? The President did not want them to testify, and, if 
they did testify, he did not want them to testify truthfully. 
Two of those witnesses were Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie.
    Clearly, he did not want them to testify in the Federal 
civil rights case and, likewise, his lawyers today do not want 
those witnesses to testify before this body.
    Now, let's look at what happened when the President learned 
that Monica Lewinsky was on the witness list. Very quickly, it 
was December 5 that the witness list came in. He learned about 
it probably the next day, December 6. Monica Lewinsky visited 
with him and said Vernon Jordan was not doing very much on the 
job front. The President's response is, okay, I will talk to 
him. I will get on it.
    Now, Ms. Lewinsky assumed that was a brushoff, but he was 
serious about it because he later learned that day that at the 
latest--he learned later that day that Monica was on the 
witness list when he met with the lawyers.
    After that, the next day, he meets with Vernon Jordan at 
the White House. And even though Mr. Jordan says he thinks it 
was unlikely that the job situation was discussed, Mr. Jordan 
makes it clear that he ultimately went to work to get Ms. 
Lewinsky a job at the direction of the President. According to 
Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony on June 9, he testified, 
``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.'' That 
is undisputed. He had testified to the same grand jury, ``He,'' 
referring to the President, ``is the source of it coming to my 
attention in the first place.''
    And so as the result of the President's request, Vernon 
Jordan got to work, met with Ms. Lewinsky, assisted her in 
securing key job interviews, and kept the President informed. 
The job search became critical when she was put on the witness 
list on December 5, and the December 11 order of Judge Wright 
served to reinforce the urgency of the matter.
    Now, all of this was happening when the President knew she 
was a witness in the civil rights case, but the individuals 
affected by the President's unlawful scheme of obstruction may 
not have been privy to his plans. He kept Ms. Lewinsky in the 
dark about her being a witness until he had the job search well 
underway. And Mr. Jordan indicates that he was simply trying to 
get Ms. Lewinsky a job at the direction of the President 
without any clue that she was a witness until she got the 
subpoena on December 19.
    Now, the President kept his information about Ms. Lewinsky 
being on the list away from her until he called her at 2 a.m. 
in the morning on December 17 to let her know the news.
    So how does the President handle witnesses in the judicial 
system that are a danger to him? He wanted to make sure that 
they were taken care of and cooperative in concealing the truth 
from the courts.
    The next critical step for the President to assure that Ms. 
Lewinsky sticks with her predesigned cover stories was that she 
would not deviate from that even though they were now in the 
court system. Vernon Jordan testified in the grand jury that 
``it didn't take an Einstein to know when she was under 
subpoena the circumstances changed,'' and, of course, that is 
clear.
    When Ms. Lewinsky was placed on the witness list, the truth 
became a threat to the President. He tried to avoid the truth 
at all costs and was willing to obstruct the legal processes of 
the judicial system in order to protect himself. The 
obstruction started with the job favors and then continued 
through the December 17 conversation with the President when 
the President encouraged her to keep using the cover stories 
even though she would be under oath as a witness, encouraged 
her to sign a false affidavit, and then on December 28, 
according to the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the President sent 
Betty Currie to retrieve items of evidence for the purpose of 
concealment and with the obvious effect of obstructing the 
truth.
    Despite the concerted effort of the President in keeping 
Monica Lewinsky from being a truthful witness, the President 
was not yet home free. He still had to go through the hurdle of 
his own deposition on January 17. And even though he knew there 
were going to be questions about Monica Lewinsky, he was 
hopeful that the false affidavit, the representations of his 
attorney, Robert Bennett, and the President's own affirmation 
of the false affidavit would be sufficient to prevent 
questioning about Ms. Lewinsky. But it didn't work. Despite 
this effort, the Federal district court judge ordered the 
President to respond to the questions. At that point he had a 
choice. He could tell the truth under oath, or he could provide 
false statements. He chose the latter, and that decision forced 
a continued pattern of obstruction.
    During the deposition, he asserted the name of Betty Currie 
at least six times, and by doing so he dared the plaintiff's 
lawyers to question Ms. Currie as a witness. They knew it, and 
he knew it. When the Jones lawyers returned from the 
deposition, they immediately set about issuing a subpoena for 
Betty Currie. And what did the President do? He immediately set 
about attempting to assure that Betty Currie would not state 
the truth when called as a witness.
    They defended that she wasn't a witness, she wasn't a 
prospective witness, but yet we produced the subpoena that she 
was a prospective witness, and they wanted her to testify, and 
everyone knew it. The President called her at home, arranged 
for her to come in the next day, and put her through the 
questioning: He was never alone with Monica, trying to 
establish that; that Monica was the aggressor and that the 
President did nothing wrong. That is what he was trying to 
accomplish through his questioning of Betty Currie.
    Can you imagine how uncomfortable Betty Currie was, must 
have felt on that occasion, being called in to see her boss, 
then having the President recreate a fictional account in order 
to prevent the truth from coming out in a court of law? But 
once was not enough, and 2 days later Ms. Betty Currie was 
brought in for the same series of questions. The message was 
clear. You have to cover for the President even though the 
purpose was unlawful.
    And so we see a pattern developing. When it comes to a 
witness, whether it is Monica Lewinsky or Betty Currie, the 
choice is made. The President encouraged the witness to lie, 
and the President chose to impede the administration of justice 
rather than assuring that the laws be faithfully executed.
    But the President had one final choice, and that was in his 
grand jury testimony in August. At this point, the 
embarrassment of the relationship was public, and that could no 
longer serve as an excuse not to tell the truth. But, once 
again, the President chose not to abide by his oath but to 
evade the truth and provide false statements; not to protect 
his family, not to preserve the dignity of the Presidency, but 
to prevent the grand jury from knowing the truth in their 
investigation and to continue the coverup began during the 
truth-seeking process in the civil rights case.
    I do not have time to cover all the facts, but they are 
more than substantial, they are compelling, and they are 
convicting.
    Let me leave you with some questions. First of all, who 
asked Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job? The answer? 
It was the President.
    Secondly, who suggested that Monica Lewinsky sign an 
affidavit to avoid testifying in the civil rights case, which 
by its nature had to be false? The answer? It was the 
President. Who obstructed the truth when Monica Lewinsky was 
subpoenaed as a witness? It was the President. Who impeded the 
gathering of evidence when the Federal court subpoena called 
for the production of gifts? The answer? It was the President. 
Who tampered with the testimony of Betty Currie when it was 
clear she was a witness in the case? It was the President. Who 
took an oath and failed to tell the truth before the courts of 
our land? It was the President.
    I state these facts with sadness, but these facts are true. 
The motion should be defeated.
    I thank the Senate. On behalf of the managers, Mr. Chief 
Justice, I reserve the remainder of the time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes counsel 
for the President.
    Ms. Counsel SELIGMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, distinguished House managers, good 
afternoon. My name is Nicole Seligman. I am a member of the law 
firm of Williams & Connolly here in Washington, DC. I have been 
privileged to represent President Clinton as personal counsel 
since 1994.
    I am honored to stand before you today to argue in support 
of the motion to dismiss the impeachment proceedings that has 
been offered by the senior Senator from West Virginia, Senator 
Byrd.
    The Constitution reposes in this body and nowhere else the 
sole authority to try impeachments. It has placed in your hands 
alone the decision whether to dismiss now or to go forward. 
There is no judicial review. There is no judicial guidance 
other than that which each of you, in your wisdom, may choose 
to apply by analogy from judicial experience. There are no 
particular rules of civil or criminal procedure that you must 
follow. The Constitution has freed you from that. It has wisely 
placed in your hands alone the ability to make a sound judgment 
in the manner you think best for the reasons you think best, 
based on your wisdom and experience, as to what is best for 
this Nation at this moment in the proceedings.
    We submit to you that the moment has arrived where the best 
interests of the Nation, the wise prescription of the framers, 
and the failure of the managers' proof, all point to dismissal. 
You have listened. You have heard. The case cannot be made. It 
is time to end it.
    Without presuming to infringe on the constitutional 
authority that is yours alone, and without repeating at undue 
length the arguments that you heard over the past few weeks, I 
do want to set out briefly the reasons that we believe to be 
some of the grounds on which an early and fair disposition of 
this difficult matter might rest. There are at least four such 
grounds. Each one stands by itself as sufficient reason to vote 
for the motion of Senator Byrd.
    The first ground is the core constitutional issue before 
you, the failure of the articles to charge impeachable 
offenses. They do not do so. They do not allege conduct that, 
if proven, violated the public trust in the manner the framers 
intended when they wrote the words ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' For absent an element of 
immediate danger to the state, a danger of such magnitude that 
it cannot await resolution by the electorate in the normal 
cycle, the framers intended restraint. There is no such danger 
to the state here. No one has made that claim, or could, or 
would. A vote for the motion is a vote for constitutional 
stability.
    Impeachment was never meant to be just another weapon in 
the arsenal of partisanship. By definition, a partisan split 
like that which accompanied these articles from the House of 
Representatives creates doubt that makes plain a constitutional 
error of the course that we are on. As Senator William Pitt 
Fessenden wrote 130 years ago on a great and decisive 
historical occasion, the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson:

    Conviction upon impeachment should be free from the taint 
of party and leave no ground for suspicion upon the motives of 
those who inflict the penalty.

    His words echoed those of Alexander Hamilton who, in the 
much quoted Federalist 65, had warned, in his words, of ``the 
greatest danger that the decision''--that is the decision by 
the Senate--``will be regulated more by the comparative 
strength of the parties than by the real demonstrations of 
innocence or guilt.''
    Now, Mr. Manager Graham has candidly acknowledged that 
reasonable people could disagree about the propriety of 
removal. He said they absolutely could. We suggest to you that 
there can be no removal when even the prosecutor agrees that 
such reasonable doubts exist. If reasonable people can 
disagree, we suggest to you that reasonable Senators should 
dismiss. The constitutional standard for impeachment is not met 
here.
    The second and third grounds we offer to you relate to the 
deeply flawed drafting of the articles by the House of 
Representatives. They have left the House managers free to fill 
what Mr. Ruff described as ``an empty vessel,'' to define for 
the House of Representatives what it really had in mind when it 
impeached the President. But that is not a role that the 
Constitution allows to be delegated to the House managers. It 
is not a role that the Constitution allows them to fill. It is 
a role that is explicitly and uniquely reserved to the full 
House of Representatives which, under our Constitution, has the 
sole power to impeach.
    The articles also are unconstitutionally defective for yet 
another reason, because each article combines a menu of 
charges, and the managers invite the Members of this body to 
convict on one or more of the charges they list. The result is 
the deeply troubling prospect that the President might be 
convicted and removed from office without two-thirds of the 
Senate agreeing on what the President actually did. Such a 
result would be in conflict with the requirement that the 
President cannot be convicted unless two-thirds of this body 
concurs. The requirement of a two-thirds supermajority is at 
the core of the constitutional protection afforded the 
President and the American people. The Founding Fathers were 
wise to guarantee that protection, and it has protected the 
Presidency for more than two centuries. The House must not be 
allowed to erode that protection today. The articles, as 
drafted, are unconstitutional.
    The fourth ground for the motion is based on the facts. Mr. 
Manager McCollum has twice asserted that this body must first 
determine whether the President committed crimes, and then move 
on to the question of removal from office. Recognizing that 
each Senator is free to choose the standard of proof that his 
or her conscience dictates, we submit that if the question is, 
as the managers would have it, whether the President has 
committed a crime, that standard should be proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. And it is clear that such a standard, that 
is, proof to the level of certainty necessary to make the most 
significant decisions you face in life, cannot possibly be met 
here. The presentations last week demonstrated that the record 
is full of exculpatory facts and deeply ambiguous 
circumstantial evidence that will make it impossible for the 
managers to meet this standard or, in fact, any standard that 
you might in good conscience choose to apply here.
    The managers have, with great ingenuity, spun out theories 
of wrongdoing that they have advanced repeatedly, persistently, 
passionately. But mere repetition, no matter how dogged, cannot 
create a reality where there is none. The factual record is 
before you. We submit that it does not approach the kind of 
case that you would need to justify the conviction and removal 
of the President from office. And calling witnesses is not the 
answer. All the evidence you need to make your decision is 
before you, documented in thousands of pages of testimony given 
under oath or to the FBI agents and Mr. Starr's prosecutors 
under penalty of law.
    These, then, are the four grounds for the motion to 
dismiss. I know many of these arguments are not new to you, and 
I will try to be brief as I review them.
    The question before this body requires solemnity on all of 
our parts. It inevitably creates no small measure of 
apprehension. In our Nation's political history, in our legal 
history, it is fair to say that few decisions of such 
overwhelming magnitude have been confronted by this body. There 
could be no matter more clearly placed in your hands alone by 
the Constitution, and on its resolution rests more than the 
political fate of William Clinton; there rests the course of 
our democracy in the coming years of the new century and for 
untold years thereafter.
    Constitutional history confirms that the decision before 
you was meant to be significant and difficult to make. It 
demonstrates that only the most extraordinary of charges 
warrants the most extraordinary of outcomes. Any question, any 
doubt, must be resolved in favor of the electoral will, for it 
is the will of the people, the people who have all sovereignty 
in our law, that in the end is the foundation of our democracy. 
And we submit that the doubt here is pervasive: Doubt about 
whether the charged conduct, efforts to conceal a private 
personal embarrassment, could reasonably be deemed a violation 
against the state at all, let alone a violation so severe as to 
compel removal; doubt about the constitutionality of the 
articles as drafted; doubt about the sufficiency of the 
managers' case; and that doubt upon doubt upon doubt makes a 
vote to dismiss the only fair choice.
    Let me turn then to the fundamental constitutional 
argument.
    The impeachment power was meant to remove the President of 
the United States from office only for the most serious abuses 
of official power or for misbehavior of such magnitude that the 
collective wisdom of the people would compel immediate 
discharge. One of America's leading professors of 
constitutional law, Professor Akhil Amar of the Yale Law 
School, has framed the problem poignantly and concisely, 
stating:

    The question to ask is whether [President Clinton's] 
misconduct is so serious and malignant as to justify undoing a 
national election [and] canceling the votes of millions.

    We know the answer. It was provided by Charles Black in his 
classic book on impeachment when he wrote that:

    Impeachment and removal should be reserved only for 
offenses that so seriously threaten the order of political 
society as to make pestilent and dangerous the continuance in 
power of their perpetrator.

    James Madison made much the same point two centuries 
earlier, stating that an impeachment provision of some kind was 
``indispensable'' because a President's ``loss of capacity or 
corruption . . . might be fatal to the Republic.''
    The statements and writings of the framers of our 
Constitution and centuries of scholarship and the meaning of 
that brief but so significant phrase, ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' enable us to establish with solid assurance 
that the conduct charged against the President does not amount 
to an impeachable offense.
    Our argument today is a simple one: Ordinary civil and 
criminal wrongs may be addressed through ordinary civil and 
criminal processes, and ordinary political wrongs may be 
addressed at the ballot box or by public opinion. Only the most 
serious public misconduct, aggravated abuse of Executive power, 
is meant to be addressed through exercise of the Presidential 
impeachment power.
    The conduct here arises out of a private lawsuit. Let me 
talk for a moment about that lawsuit which is the backdrop for 
these proceedings.
    The Jones case arose out of an alleged incident that 
predated the President's first term as President. The charges 
at issue here arise out of the President's conduct in that 
lawsuit. No charge relates to his official conduct as 
President. Indeed, as we know, the Supreme Court told President 
Clinton that he could not delay defending the Jones lawsuit 
until he was out of office. And when it ruled that way, the 
Court emphasized just this very point. It made clear that he 
might have been able to delay or avoid the lawsuit if it had 
related to his official conduct, because the law provides 
various immunities for such lawsuits; but precisely because it 
related to his private actions, it would be allowed to go 
forward.
    In drawing that conclusion, interestingly, the Supreme 
Court actually looked to the wisdom of James Wilson, a framer, 
a Supreme Court Justice, and a constitutional commentator, and 
cited the distinction he drew between a President's acts 
performed in his ``public character,'' for which he might be 
impeached, according to Justice Wilson, and acts performed in 
his private character, to which the President is answerable, as 
any other citizen, in court.
    We agree that there might be extreme cases where private 
conduct would so paralyze the President's ability to govern 
that the impeachment power must be exercised, where the 
certainty of guilt and the gravity of the charge would leave no 
choice. But charges arising out of the President's efforts to 
keep an admittedly wrongful relationship secret are, by no 
analysis, of that caliber.
    Some have suggested that making this argument is the same 
as arguing that the President is above the law. That simply is 
not so. The often repeated statement that no man--or woman, I 
should add--is above the law is, of course, true. Once he 
leaves office, the President is as amenable to the law as any 
citizen, including for private conduct during his term of 
office. As my colleagues, Mr. Ruff and Mr. Craig, argued to you 
last week, if a grand jury should choose to consider charges 
against this President, his status as a former President will 
not prevent that consideration.
    But here is the point: Impeachment is not meant to punish 
an individual; it is a protection for the people; in Alexander 
Hamilton's words, a remedy for great ``injuries done to the 
society itself.'' It is, as your 19th century predecessor, 
Senator Garrett Davis, pointed out in the Andrew Johnson 
proceedings, ``the extreme remedy . . . intended for the worst 
political disorders of the executive department.''
    The House managers appear to argue that the President must 
be removed nonetheless, because to do otherwise places him 
above the law. But there is one thing that can be said with 
certainty about the impeachment power. Although it may have 
that result, it is not meant to punish the man, to set an 
example, or to provide a ``cleansing'' of the political 
process; it is meant to protect the state. If it is punishment 
the House managers seek, they are in the wrong place, in the 
wrong job, at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.
    A question has arisen whether, as a general matter, any 
violation of law demands removal because it would be a 
violation of the President's duty to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed or a breach of the public trust. But, 
again, the history of the clause makes clear that the framers 
intentionally chose not to make all crimes or even all felonies 
impeachable.
    I suggest we would all agree that, in the broadest possible 
sense, a proven violation of criminal law is a violation of a 
public trust. But the framers consciously elected not to make 
impeachment the remedy for ``all crimes and misdemeanors.'' 
When the framers wished to address all crimes, they knew how to 
do it, and they did it. In article IV, section 2, the 
Constitution states that, ``A Person charged in any State with 
Treason, Felony, or other Crime'' is susceptible to 
extradition--``or other crime.'' The framers knew how to say 
it, but they didn't say it about impeachment, because that is 
not what they meant.
    Some also have argued that the experience of judicial 
impeachments in this body undermines this argument. They claim 
that judges have been removed for purely private conduct and 
that a President should be treated no differently. This 
argument completely misses the mark as well.
    By constitutional design, judges are very different from a 
President. Presidents are elected for a fixed term, while 
Federal judges serve with life tenure. Presidents are elected 
by the people in one of the great periodic exercises of 
national will, and their tenure is blessed as the choice of the 
people.
    Judges, on the other hand, are appointed and confirmed by 
the representatives of the people, but their selection does not 
represent a direct expression of the will of the people. 
Judges' tenure is conditioned on good behavior, while that of a 
President is not. And there is an obvious reason for this 
distinction. Life tenure, which was designed to assure judicial 
independence, plainly becomes a problem in the event of a judge 
who is not fit to serve. A President may be voted out by the 
people, a judge may not; hence the good behavior requirement 
and the duty upon the Congress to enforce it in those 
exceptional cases where it must be enforced.
    It is possible to debate forever whether the good behavior 
clause represents an independent basis for impeachment or 
whether, in the case of judges, it is a factor to be weighed 
when this body exercises its sound judgment to decide what 
constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor. But there is no need 
to resolve that dispute here. Either way, it is clear, as the 
Watergate impeachment inquiry report established, that the term 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is given content by the 
context of the charge and the office at issue. Because of 
issues of legitimacy, accountability, and tenure, the framers 
decided that Federal judges needed the additional check of the 
good behavior clause--language they left out of the articles 
creating Congress and the Presidency.
    And the Presidency is, of course, different. Alexander 
Hamilton said, in Federalist 79, that a judge could be 
impeached for malconduct. But in the words of the Watergate 
Impeachment Inquiry Report--a report I remind you that Mr. 
Manager Canady has commended to your consideration--
Presidential impeachment is distinctive. The report stated--and 
I quote, because it is an important quote--``Because 
impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, it 
is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible 
with either the constitutional form and principles of our 
government or the proper performance of the constitutional 
duties of the presidential office. . . . The facts must be 
considered as a whole in the context of the office,'' the 
report concludes. The office matters. For judges, the good 
behavior standard comes in one way or the other. For the 
President, the standard is different.
    As I mentioned, Mr. Manager Graham candidly acknowledged 
last Saturday that reasonable people could disagree as to 
whether this President should be removed from office, even if 
they believe he acted as charged--reasonable people could 
disagree. In this connection, consider, if you will, the words 
of Senator William Pitt Fessenden, written 130 years ago. 
Senator Fessenden was one of the seven brave Republicans who 
crossed party lines to vote against the conviction of President 
Johnson in his 1868 impeachment trial. He wrote--and I quote--
``the offense for which a Chief Magistrate is removed from 
office . . . should be of such a character as to commend itself 
at once to the minds of all right thinking men as, beyond all 
question, an adequate cause.'' Think about that phrase--
``beyond all question.'' Where there is room for reasonable 
disagreement, there is no place for conviction.
    If many in this Chamber and in this Nation believe that 
these charges do not meet the bar of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, then the question must be asked, Why prolong this 
process?
    I would like to turn briefly now to two grounds for 
dismissal based on the manner in which the House drafted these 
articles. The first is that each of the articles contain 
several quite different charges. The House compounded its 
charges. It is tempting to ask how, in a matter of such 
importance, we can urge what might appear to be a procedural, 
highly technical argument like this one.
    There are several answers to that. The first is that it is 
neither ``procedural'' nor ``highly technical.'' It goes to the 
very heart of our constitutional protections and raises 
concerns about fairness and the appearance of fairness in this 
proceeding as so many Senators have so eloquently noted in the 
past when the issue has arisen.
    As Senator Kohl stated in the Judge Nixon impeachment 
matter, in which a similar omnibus article was defeated--and I 
quote:

    The House is telling us it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on 
Article III even if we have different visions of what he did 
wrong. But that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to 
the American people. Let's say we do convict on Article III. 
The American people--to say nothing of history--would never 
know exactly which of Judge Nixon's statements we regarded as 
untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, this ambiguity would 
prevent us from being totally accountable to the voters for our 
decision.

    As the Senator said, that is an unacceptable outcome, one 
that was ``not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the 
American people.''
    Judge Nixon was acquitted on this article. We suggest to 
you that the House is now asking this Senate to convict 
President Clinton on just such articles. And that is not fair 
either to President Clinton, to this Senate, or to the American 
people.
    The second response is that--even if this troubling problem 
were procedural--fair, constitutional procedures go to the 
heart of the rule of law. As the Supreme Court has stated, 
``The history of liberty has largely been the history of 
observance of procedural safeguards.'' It would, indeed, be 
ironic if, in the course of this proceeding in which the 
vindication of the rule of law has so often been invoked, this 
body were to ignore an important procedural flaw.
    The legal basis for this argument is by now well known. 
Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that on 
articles of impeachment ``no Person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.'' This 
requirement is plain. There must be, in the language of the 
Constitution, ``Concurrence,'' which is to say, genuine, 
reliably manifested agreement among those voting to convict.
    Without clarity on exactly what the President would be 
convicted for, there can be no concurrence. These requirements 
of concurrence and a two-thirds vote are the twin safeguards of 
the framers' plain intent to assure that conviction not come 
easily.
    And let there be no doubt, these articles present textbook 
examples of a prosecutorial grab bag. Look at article II, 
which, by its terms, charges obstruction of the Jones 
litigation. It presents six topics related to the Jones 
litigation and one related to the very separate issue of grand 
jury obstruction. The first six acts alleged are unrelated in 
time or alleged intent to the seventh. Under no conceivable 
theory are they part of the same scheme, and no one ever has 
claimed them to be. But as it is drafted, and as it must be 
voted on by this body, under the Senate rules, the article 
would allow certain Senators to convict on obstruction of the 
Jones case and others on grand jury obstruction. That is not 
concurrence in a vote on an article, as the Constitution 
demands it. An indictment against any American drafted like 
these articles could not go near the jury. It would be 
dismissed. And no lesser standard should apply here.
    A second fatal flaw in the drafting is their complete lack 
of specificity, which makes it impossible to know precisely 
what the President is alleged to have done wrong. This defect 
is most troublesome in the article I perjury charges, which 
never simply state what the President said that was allegedly 
perjurious. The defect is a plain and obvious constitutional 
one: The House of Representatives has unconstitutionally 
neglected its ``sole'' power to impeach and delegated to the 
House managers that which cannot constitutionally be 
delegated--the power to decide what the House meant. The result 
has been what can charitably be described as a fluid approach 
to the identification of charges against the President. The 
House majority and its managers have sought to add, delete, 
amend, expand and contract the list as this matter has 
proceeded from Mr. Starr, to the committee, to the full House, 
to this body.
    They also, mystifyingly, have insisted on couching their 
charges as examples. How on Earth can an accused defend against 
examples? Where is the notice? Where is the due process? And no 
sooner was this very concern raised here by Mr. Ruff than they 
did it again. This is quite extraordinary.
    In response to Mr. Ruff's challenge, the managers put out a 
press release, on January 19, purporting to list allegedly 
perjurious statements on which you are to vote. And what did 
they say? They offered more examples. They said in response--
and I quote--``Here are four examples of perjurious statements 
made to the grand jury:''
    Ladies and gentlemen, almost 40 years ago, the Supreme 
Court made clear that this kind of charging is unacceptable. 
When an indictment leaves so much to the imagination of 
individuals, other than the constitutionally designated 
charging body, it must be dismissed. Again, no lesser standard 
should apply here.
    Our fourth ground for dismissal is based on the facts. The 
evidence, in the tens of thousands of pages before you, 
establishes that the case against the President cannot be 
proven with any acceptable degree of certainty. The record is 
filled with too much that is exculpatory, too much that is 
ambiguous, too much from the managers that requires unfounded 
speculation.
    A very brief look at the articles and the facts makes clear 
that in light of the uncontested exculpatory facts, such as the 
direct denials from Ms. Currie, from Mr. Jordan, and from Ms. 
Lewinsky of various alleged misconduct, the managers cannot 
possibly meet their burden of proof here. Look briefly at 
article I. Much of it challenges the President's assertions of 
his own state of mind, his understanding of the definition 
given to him, his understanding of the meaning of a word, his 
legal opinion of his Jones testimony, his mindset during 
statements of his lawyer, Robert Bennett. The managers offer 
speculation and theories about these matters, but you are not 
here to try speculation and theories. You are here to try 
facts. And the facts do not support their theories.
    Other claims in article I are so insubstantial as to be 
frivolous and unworthy of the time and attention of this 
historic body. Certain answers about the particulars of the 
admitted intimate relationship between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky--whether their admitted inappropriate encounters were 
properly characterized as occurring on ``certain occasions'' is 
but one example--could not possibly have had any bearing on the 
Starr investigation. These answers were even irrelevant, 
immaterial, to Mr. Starr.
    Remember, in the grand jury the President admitted to the 
relationship, admitted it was improper, admitted it occurred 
over time, admitted he had sought to hide it, admitted he had 
misled his wife, his staff, his friends, the country. But how 
it began, exactly when it began, how many intimate encounters 
there were, whether there were 11 or 17 or some other number, 
and with what frequency, these are details irrelevant to the 
Starr investigation, and I must say, irrelevant to your 
decision whether to remove the freely elected President of the 
United States.
    There has been much discussion about the Jones deposition 
here and whether it, too, is a part of article I. The point is 
a simple one. The House of Representatives exercised its 
constitutional authority, and in a bipartisan vote defeated an 
article of impeachment based on the answers in the Jones 
deposition. Those answers are not before you and the managers' 
sleight of hand cannot now put them back into article I. The 
article charges only the statements made in the grand jury 
about that deposition. The managers ask you to look at one 
response: The President's lawyerly assertion that the Jones 
deposition was not legally perjurious, however frustrating or 
misleading, and to read that as an affirmation of every answer 
he gave. But the grand jury testimony must be read as a whole.
    What did the President convey during that testimony? 
Certainly not that he was standing behind every word in the 
Jones deposition as the whole truth. He spent 4 hours in the 
grand jury explaining that testimony--adding to it, clarifying 
it, discussing the confusing deposition questions and answers, 
and pointing out his efforts to be literally truthful, if not 
forthcoming, explaining what he had tried to do, the line he 
had tried to walk, however successfully or unsuccessfully. He 
laid it all out. He was not asked by Mr. Starr to reaffirm or 
adopt the earlier testimony, and he did not reaffirm or adopt 
it.
    This brings us to the last issue in article I, the so-
called touching issue. My colleague, Mr. Craig, has talked at 
length about the legal and practical obstacles to a case based 
on an oath against an oath. Whether compelled by law or 
practice, the rule reflects the commonsense proposition that 
there will always be a reasonable doubt as to the truth when 
the case rests merely on an oath against an oath. That is why 
seasoned prosecutors said in the House of Representatives that 
they would never bring such a case. That is why you need no 
more information to conclude that conviction on that basis will 
not be possible.
    The evidence also undermines the allegations of article II. 
My colleagues, Ms. Mills and Mr. Kendall, made a detailed 
review of the allegations in each of the seven subparts of 
article II. They went over the evidence in great detail, and I 
am certainly not going to repeat that here. They pointed to the 
significant amount of direct evidence in the record that 
controverts the claims made in this article, most notably the 
consistent statements by Ms. Lewinsky that no one ever asked, 
suggested, or encouraged her to lie, and that no one ever 
promised her a job for her silence.
    They demonstrated that with regard to the transfer of 
gifts, the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie has 
consistently been inconsistent, but that even Ms. Lewinsky has 
acknowledged it was she who was concerned about the gifts and 
who raised the issue with the President. And the fact that the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28 simply 
cannot be reconciled with any theory of the managers' case.
    Ms. Mills reviewed the evidence concerning the President's 
conversation with Ms. Currie on the Sunday after the Paula 
Jones deposition. However ill-advised that conversation might 
have been under the circumstances, it was not criminal. The 
President was motivated by his own anxieties and by a desire to 
find out what Ms. Currie knew in anticipation of the media 
storm he feared would break, as it surely did. Contrary to the 
suggestion of Mr. Manager Hutchinson, Ms. Currie had not yet 
been subpoenaed at the time of that conversation. Ms. Currie 
was not on any Jones case witness list at the time of the 
conversation. She testified that she felt absolutely no 
pressure to change her account during that conversation. She 
never testified that she felt uncomfortable--again, contrary to 
the suggestion of Mr. Manager Hutchinson. She was not a 
witness. There was no pressure. There is a completely 
reasonable explanation.
    Let me be clear here: There is no evidence that the 
President ever asked Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit or 
told her to give false testimony if she appeared as a witness. 
Both believed Ms. Lewinsky could file a limited but true 
affidavit that might--might--avoid a deposition in the Jones 
case. While the two had discussed cover stories to explain Ms. 
Lewinsky's visits, Ms. Lewinsky never testified that they 
discussed the cover stories in the context of the possibility 
of her testifying personally, as article II alleges.
    Now you have heard in detail from Mr. Craig and Mr. Kendall 
about the fleeting moment in the Jones deposition when Mr. 
Bennett tried unsuccessfully to prevent the President being 
questioned about Ms. Lewinsky by citing her affidavit. The 
judge immediately overruled the objection. It did not obstruct 
in any way the Jones lawyers' ability to question the 
President.
    The statement had no effect. And the tape of the President 
cannot disprove the President's testimony that he wasn't paying 
attention. He doesn't comment, concur, or even nod. With a weak 
case at hand, the managers have tried to turn a blank stare 
into a high crime.
    The last subpart of article II is flawed in many respects: 
The article alleges obstruction of the Jones case, but the 
President's misleading statements to his White House aides 
about Ms. Lewinsky had no effect on that case at all. In any 
event, the effect of the President's statements on his aides 
was no different than on the millions of Americans who had 
heard and seen the President make similar denials on 
television.
    And finally, the subpart claims obstruction of the grand 
jury, whereas the whole point of article II is alleged 
obstruction of the Jones case. As I asked before, what is it 
doing here?
    As to Ms. Lewinsky's job search, all the managers have 
presented is a theory, a hypothesis in search of factual 
support.
    The direct evidence is clear and uncontradicted. Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, the President, and people at the New York 
City companies Ms. Lewinsky contacted all testified that there 
was no relation of any of the job search activity to the Jones 
case--none. Not a single witness supports the managers' theory. 
As we demonstrated, their core theory that the job assistance 
intensified after the Court's December 11 order was based on 
plain and simple error. And without that support, the theory 
collapsed.
    No doubt, the managers' response will be that that is why 
witnesses are needed, to help the managers make their case. But 
witnesses will not fill the void in the evidence:
    First, because the evidence, as we have shown, is 
overwhelmingly uncontested. If there is no dispute, why do 
witnesses have to be questioned at all? House Majority Counsel 
Schippers himself made this point when speaking of the very 
same transcripts and FBI interviews that you all have before 
you. He stated to the Judiciary Committee: ``As it stands, all 
of the factual witnesses are uncontradicted and amply 
corroborated.''
    Second, because the actual disagreements--for example, what 
was in the President's mind in his deposition?--are about 
conclusions that must be drawn from the undisputed evidence, 
not disputes in the evidence itself. More evidence will not 
inform a judgment on the President's state of mind.
    Third, because those witnesses with testimony pertinent to 
the charges have already repeated their testimony again and 
again and again--in some instances, 5 or 10 times--over and 
over and over to FBI agents, to prosecutors, to grand jurors. 
Experienced career prosecutors, trying to make their best case 
against the President, questioned scores of witnesses. They 
compiled tens of thousands of pages of evidence. They 
questioned Ms. Lewinsky on at least 22 separate occasions. They 
questioned Mr. Jordan on at least five occasions. They 
questioned Ms. Currie on at least eight occasions. On one day 
alone--July 22, 1998--prosecutors asked Ms. Currie more than 
850 questions, and that was only 1 of her 5 appearances before 
the grand jury or FBI agents. And they did, in fact--contrary 
to the suggestion of the managers--question witnesses, 
including Ms. Lewinsky, after the President's testimony to the 
grand jury.
    These witnesses whom I have mentioned, who were questioned 
repeatedly, are not alone. They could not possibly add to their 
testimony, or amend it, in any significant way that could alter 
the judgment you could make today. Yet, it is the hope that 
these witnesses will be forced to change their testimony, to 
provide evidence where there now is none, that drives the 
current desire to question them.
    Let me make a few final points about this witness issue. 
``Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already 
concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no 
purpose at all.'' That is our argument, but those are not my 
words, they are the words of Mr. Manager Gekas, spoken just 
last fall, talking about this same factual record you have 
before you. And Mr. Manager Gekas was correct.
    ``We had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand jury, 
from depositions, from statements under oath. That is testimony 
that we can believe and accept. Why re-interview Betty Currie 
to take another statement when we already have her statement? 
Why interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under 
oath, and with a grant of immunity that, if she lied, she would 
forfeit?'' Again, that is our argument, but, again, those are 
not my words, those are the words of Chairman Hyde. He, too, 
was correct. Those words apply with equal force today. The 
witnesses are on the record. Their testimony is known. There is 
no need to put them through the ordeal of testimony again.
    The House managers, no doubt, will answer that that was 
then, this is now. But that is not good enough. The House had a 
constitutional duty to gather and assess evidence and testimony 
and come to a judgment as to whether it believed the President 
should be removed from office--not to casually and passively 
serve as a conveyor belt between Ken Starr and the U.S. Senate, 
not to ask this body to do the work the House failed to do.
    The actual power to remove the President resides here, of 
course. But the power to take that first step rests with the 
House. And the House exercised it: The articles explicitly find 
that certain conduct occurred and that that conduct warrants 
``removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy 
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.'' If there was any doubt about the testimony on which 
they based their judgment in reaching that conclusion, such 
doubt should have been resolved before any Member rose to say 
``aye'' to an article of impeachment calling, for the first 
time in 130 years, for the Senate to decide on the removal of 
the President.
    The President did not obstruct justice. The President did 
not commit perjury. The President must not be removed. The 
facts do not permit it.
    Now, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I hope I have 
outlined clearly for you some of the many valid grounds on 
which you might base a decision to vote for the motion offered 
by Senator Byrd.
    On constitutional grounds, the matters simply don't meet 
the test of high crimes and misdemeanors, as specified by the 
framers or interpreted by hundreds of historians. As a matter 
of law, these articles are defective. In a court, they would be 
dismissed in a heartbeat for vagueness and for being 
prosecutorial grab bags.
    The evidence itself, after being gathered in what may be 
one of the largest criminal investigations in this country's 
history, fails to offer a compelling case and is based largely 
on weak inferences from circumstantial evidence. Each of these 
is reason enough to end this trial now, without further 
proceedings.
    As Senator Bumpers said more personally and eloquently than 
I could hope to, the President has been punished; he is being 
punished still--as a man, as a husband, as a father, as a 
public figure. Beyond his family, you have been reminded that 
the criminal law will still have jurisdiction over Bill Clinton 
the day he leaves office. And while I am confident the case 
would have no merit in a court of law, that is the venue in 
which justice may be sought against an individual.
    So the sole question you are faced with is the most 
important one: Do you, for the first time in 210 years of our 
freedom, set aside the ultimate expression of a free people and 
exercise your power to remove the one national leader selected 
by all of us?
    If you don't believe this body should remove the President, 
or if you believe that no amount of requestioning of witnesses 
or torturing facts will change enough minds to garner the two-
thirds majority necessary to remove the President, or if you 
simply have heard enough to make up your mind, then the time to 
end this is now.
    The President has expressed many times how very sorry he is 
for what he did and for what he said. He knows full well that 
his failings have landed us in this place, and he is doing all 
he can to set right what he has done wrong.
    The entire Nation--indeed the world--is now looking to this 
body, to this Chamber, to this floor, for sound judgment; and 
we are asking you not to answer a serious personal wrong with a 
grievous constitutional wrong. When we ask you to vote for 
Senator Byrd's motion to dismiss, we do not mean that nothing 
ever happened, that this is no big deal--and that is where we 
lawyers have done a disservice to the language--because this is 
a big deal. It is a very big deal. Punishment will be found 
elsewhere. Judgment will be found elsewhere. Legacies will be 
written elsewhere. None of that will be dismissed. None of that 
can ever be dismissed.
    We ask you to end this case now so that a sense of 
proportionality can be put back into a process that seems long 
ago to have lost all sense of proportionality. We also ask you 
to end the case now so that the family members and others who 
did no wrong can be spared further public embarrassment.
    We also ask you to end this case now so that the poisonous 
arrows of partisanship can be buried and the will of the people 
can be done--allowing all of you to spend your full days on the 
most pressing issues of the country.
    You have heard the charges in full; heard the defense. Now 
is the time to define how the national interests can best be 
served--by extending this matter indefinitely or ending it now. 
We submit that it is truly in the best interest of this Nation 
to end this ordeal in this Chamber at this time and in this 
way.
    Thank you.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire? Is there further presentation 
from the White House counsel, or will the time be used for 
concluding remarks by the House managers?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The White House counsel has 6 minutes 
remaining; the managers have reserved 36 minutes.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. There will be no further presentation, 
Mr. Chief Justice.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. In view of that, Mr. Chief Justice, I understand 
the White House counsel will have no further presentation to 
make, so what is left would be the concluding remarks by the 
House managers. I would like for us, when that is concluded, to 
go right into the votes.
    In view of that, I think it would be a good idea to take a 
15-minute break at this point. And I ask unanimous consent for 
that.
    There being no objection, at 4:12 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 4:38 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready now for 
the closing part of the argument by the House managers on the 
motion to dismiss.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the House managers. 
Mr. Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 
Senators. My fellow Manager Graham has extended me a few 
minutes before he comes up here just to allow me to respond to 
a couple of factual assertions by the White House counselors 
during the recent presentation. I know that there was a 
reference made to the impeachment proceedings of former 
President Nixon, and there were various articles that were 
considered. But one of them that I don't believe was talked 
about was obstruction of justice. And I believe that the 
Senators in this Chamber would agree that obstruction of 
justice has historically been a basis for impeachment of public 
officials because of the impact that it has on the 
administration of justice. And that was historically true 
during the time of the impeachment of President Nixon. It was 
an issue during that time and it should be no less of a concern 
this year, in 1999.
    Now, when I listen to a defense attorney make a 
presentation, oftentimes I will listen to what they didn't 
cover as much as what they did cover. And you always have to go 
back to that because many times that points to a big gap of 
something they just can't explain. As I listened to the 
presentation, of course they addressed the assertion that Ms. 
Betty Currie was, in fact, not a witness at the time the 
President called her in and went through the questioning of her 
after his deposition on January 17. But, yet, it has been 
clearly established that she was a known witness at the time. 
Now, they hoped, they prayed, they wished, they counted for the 
fact that that subpoena would never be uncovered. But the 
subpoena was uncovered. The fact was established that she was 
put on the witness list and that she was a known witness at the 
time. But the fact is, it does not matter. She was a 
prospective witness, and that was what the President did when 
he came back and talked to her.
    But what has never been addressed--has never been 
addressed--is why in the world did the President believe he 
needed to talk to her a second time. It was one time the 
questioning, but 2 days later she was brought in and taken 
through the same paces. The answer was, ``Well, he explained 
it.'' Well, he tried to explain why he did it the first time; 
he was trying to get information. There could be no explanation 
for the second instance of which she was called in and 
questioned. She was a witness, she was a known witness and she 
had to be talked to, and it was done twice.
    Another thing that I do not recall ever being mentioned--
they argue that, ``Well, there is no evidence of favors on a 
job search,'' and I believe that is not supported by the 
record. How many times has the President's attorneys discussed 
the description and the report by Mr. Vernon Jordan to the 
President, ``Mission accomplished''? I do not believe they have 
ever discussed that particular terminology. I do not believe 
they have ever discussed the terminology, the call from Mr. 
Vernon Jordan to Mr. Perelman saying, ``Make it happen if it 
can happen.''
    So I think there are some gaps in their defense; and, 
clearly, you understand that the facts have supported each of 
the allegations of obstruction that we have set forth.
    They argue that, ``Well, there was no evidence of any false 
affidavit.'' Whether it is evidence that an affidavit was 
encouraged by the President of the United States, he suggested 
the affidavit and, as of necessity, it would have to be false 
if it was going to be accomplishing the intended purpose.
    They are asking you in this motion to dismiss to ignore the 
evidence that we have presented, to ignore the testimony, the 
documentary evidence, to ignore common sense and simply to 
accept the denials of the President of the United States. That 
is not what a motion to dismiss is about. We ask that we move 
forward to consider the full development of these facts.
    I yield to Mr. Graham.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. How much 
time do we have left?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers have 32 minutes 
remaining.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. To my 
colleagues, my chairman wants 11 minutes. So, for my own sake, 
please let me know when we get close.
    [Laughter.]
    We meet again to discuss a very, very important event in 
our Nation's history. To dismiss an impeachment trial under 
these facts and under these circumstances would be 
unbelievable, in my opinion, and do a lot of damage to the law 
and to the ultimate decision this body has to make: whether or 
not Bill Clinton should be our President.
    As I understand the general nature of the law, the facts 
and the law break our way for this motion. What I would like to 
discuss with you is whether or not a reasonable person could 
believe that Bill Clinton should not be our President and the 
facts that have been presented rise to the level of creating 
serious doubts about whether he is a criminal, not just a bad 
man who did bad things. For he is a good man in some ways, as 
all of us are, and he has done some things that everybody in 
this body will condemn roundly.
    America needs no more lectures about Bill Clinton's 
misconduct, about his inappropriate relationship. We need no 
more lectures about his sins. We all have those. We need to 
resolve, Is our President a criminal? That is harsh, but the 
facts bear out those statements.
    When you dismissed the judges for perjury and filing 
statements under oath, some of you said some very harsh things 
about those judges, not because you are harsh people, but 
because their conduct warranted it.
    One thing I am not going to do--and I will quit this job 
before I do this--I am not going to run over anybody's 
conscience when they are exercising it as they deem appropriate 
for the good of this Nation. My name has been brought up a 
couple of times about whether or not reasonable people can 
disagree with me and still be reasonable about what we should 
do in this case. I have told you the best I can that there is 
no doubt these are high crimes, in my opinion. This is a hard 
decision for our country, but when I first spoke to you, I 
thought we would be better off if Bill Clinton left office, and 
I want the chance to prove to you why. Give me a chance to 
prove to you why I believe that, why my colleagues voted our 
conscience to get this case to where it should be, not swept 
under a rug, but in a trial to a disposition.
    I have lost no sleep worrying about the fact that Bill 
Clinton may have to be removed from office because of his 
conduct. I have lost tons of sleep thinking he may get away 
with what he did. But the question was: Could you disagree with 
Lindsey Graham and be a good American, in essence? Absolutely. 
You can disagree with me on abortion, and Mr. Hyde, and I am 
not going to trample on who you are, because I know that the 
liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the moderate wing of 
the Republican Party have different views than I do.
    But I didn't come up here to run you down. I came up here 
to build my country up the way I think it needs to be built up.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you will listen to 
our case, if you will let us explain why we have lost no sleep 
asking for this President to be removed and why we voted to get 
it here and you disagree with me at the end of the day, I will 
never ever say you don't love your country as much as I do. 
That is what that statement was meant to convey, and it will 
convey that until I am dead and gone.
    The idea that 130 years ago a Senator took a vote and made 
a statement that the only way you can remove a President is it 
has to be unquestionable in anybody's mind tells me he sure 
thought a lot of himself. I am glad to see that stopped in the 
Senate. One hundred thirty years later, we don't have people 
like that anymore. What that conveyed to me was that a person 
made a hard decision and tried to create a standard that slams 
somebody else who came out differently.
    I hope that is not what this is all about. He goes down in 
history, but I wouldn't want that as part of my epitaph, that 
when I voted my conscience, I reached a level that if you 
didn't go where I was, there is something wrong with you.
    What did Bill Clinton do, and why are we all here? Are we 
here because of Ken Starr, because of Lindsey Graham, because 
of--why are we here? We are here because William Jefferson 
Clinton, in my opinion--we are here because on our watch in the 
House, the President of the United States, when he was a 
defendant in a lawsuit, instead of trusting the legal system to 
get it right, did everything possible, in my opinion, to 
undermine the rule of law, including going to a grand jury in 
August of last year and committing perjury after people in this 
body and prominent Americans said, ``Stop it.'' And now we are 
here to say, ``Well, we really didn't mean it. The motion to 
dismiss means we're sort of just kidding, Mr. President.''
    If you believe he is not guilty of these offenses based on 
this stage of the trial, then you ought to grant the motion to 
dismiss, but you will be changing the law as we know it today. 
We haven't had a chance to present our case, really, and all 
the facts should break our way. You can believe this if you 
would like. They stood up here and argued that the conversation 
between President Clinton and his secretary, Betty Currie, was 
to find out what she knew to refresh his memory. If you think 
that when the President goes to Betty Currie and makes the 
following statement, ``Monica wanted to have sex with me and I 
couldn't do that,'' that he is trying to figure out what she 
knew and is trying to refresh his memory, you can do that. I 
would suggest that ``ain't'' reasonable. If you believe that he 
wanted to figure out whether he was alone or not with her and 
he had to ask Betty, that is not reasonable. That is a crime.
    Let me tell you the subtleties of this case, things that 
really tell you a lot about why we are here--William Jefferson 
Clinton. Before we get into the subtleties of this case, 
Senator Bumpers made a very eloquent speech about the ups and 
the downs of this case and about his relationship with the 
President and how close it was, and the human nature of what is 
going on here. But here is what he said:

    You pick your own adjective to describe the President's 
conduct. Here are some that I would use: indefensible, 
outrageous, unforgivable, shameless.

    How about illegal?
    And he says:

    I promise you the President would not contest any of those 
or any others.

    When you put in the word ``illegal,'' everything is a big 
misunderstanding.
    Take this case to a conclusion, so America will not be 
confused as to whether or not their President committed crimes. 
There will be people watching what we do here, and they will be 
confused as to whether or not the conversation between 
President Clinton and Ms. Currie was illegal or not. Let us 
know. That is so important.
    Let us know--when he went to Monica Lewinsky and talked 
about a cover story--if that is what we want to go on here 
every day. And a trial 20 months from now does us no good, 
because this happened when he was President, ladies and 
gentlemen. This happened when he raised the defense, ``You 
can't sue me because I'm President.''
    And what did he do after that defense was taken away from 
him by the Supreme Court? He went back to somebody who is very 
loyal to him, somebody who admires him, somebody whom you and I 
pay her salary--his secretary. And he put her in a situation, 
through misleading her, that she was going to pass on his lies. 
That is not what we pay her to do. He put her in a situation 
where she was going to incur legal costs because he cared more 
about himself than he did his secretary. He put his Cabinet 
members, he put the people who work for him, in a horrible 
spot.
    The subtleties of this case. Let me tell you one of the 
subtleties of this case. And this was read by the defense in 
this case:

    The President had a followup conversation with Mr. Morris 
during the evening of January 22, 1998, when Mr. Morris was 
considering holding a press conference to blast Monica Lewinsky 
out of the water. The President told Mr. Morris to be careful. 
According to Mr. Morris, the President warned him not to be too 
hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there's some slight chance that 
she may not be cooperating with Starr and we don't want to 
alienate her by anything we're going to put out.''

    And they were trying to tell you that ``ain't'' bad, that 
is a good thing. The best you can get from that statement is 
the President, when approached with the idea of blasting her, 
said, ``Let's wait.''
    The subtleties in this case. Who is this young lady? His 
consensual lover. But this case started not about consensual 
loving. This case started about something far from consensual 
loving. This case started about something like a Senator who 
ran into problems with you all. And if you will let us develop 
our case, you may have a hard time reconciling those two 
decisions. But that is up to you.
    Please don't dismiss this case. For the good of this 
country, for the good of the law, let us get to what happened 
here.
    John Podesta--the subtleties of this case--he talked to him 
about what happened, and he said, ``I had no relationship with 
her whatever.'' Everybody who went into that grand jury, who 
talked to Bill Clinton, was lied to. And they passed those lies 
on to a Federal grand jury. You know what? In America that is a 
crime, even if you are President. And you need to address 
whether that happened or not. Don't dismiss this case.
    But you know what is even more subtle is that John Podesta, 
somebody who is very close to him, once he said nothing 
happened, felt the need to ask one more question--and pardon me 
for saying this--``Does that include oral sex?'' That says a 
lot about what Mr. Podesta thinks about Mr. Clinton, because he 
felt he had to go one step further, and in his grand jury 
testimony he tells us the President took that behavior off the 
table.
    Some of you are worried about the perjury charge in this 
case. Let me tell you right now, you should have no worries, 
because you have a dilemma on your hands that is easy to 
resolve in terms of whether or not the President committed 
perjury in the grand jury. If you believe that he was truthful 
when he said, ``I never lied,'' or, ``I was always truthful to 
my subordinates, to the people that work for me, to my aides,'' 
then when he told John Podesta, ``Our relationship did not 
include oral sex,'' he was being truthful. If he was being 
truthful to John Podesta, he lied through his teeth about 
everything else in the grand jury when he approached the grand 
jury with the idea that, ``Our relationship was of one kind of 
sex but not the other.'' He told John Podesta it wasn't there 
at all.
    You pick the lie, but it is there. And if you can reconcile 
that, you are better than I am. That is up to you all. And does 
it really matter? So what? I think it matters a great deal if 
you are suing for sexually harassing somebody, and they are on 
to the fact that you can't control yourself enough to stop it 4 
or 5 years after you are sued, and you are doing it in the 
White House with somebody half your age. I think that would 
matter. Maybe that is the difference between getting bamboozled 
in court and having to pay $850,000.
    People are going to be confused if we don't bring this case 
to a conclusion. I suggest to you, it matters a great deal, 
that any major CEO, any low-level employee of any business in 
the country, would have been tossed out for something like 
that. But I know he is the President. Electing somebody should 
not distance them from common decency and the rule of law to 
the point that, when it is all over with, you don't know what 
you have left in this country.
    Is that what you want to do in this case? Just to save this 
man, to ignore the facts, to have a different legal standard, 
to make excuses that are bleeding this country dry?
    The effect of this case is hurting us more than we will 
ever know. Do not dismiss this case. Find out who our President 
is. Come to the conclusion, not that it was just bad behavior, 
it was illegal behavior. Tell us what is right. Tell us what is 
wrong. Give us some guidance. Under our Constitution, you don't 
impeach people at the ballot box, you trust the U.S. Senate. 
And I am willing to do that. Rise to the occasion for the good 
of the Nation.
    Thank you very much.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Do the House managers have any 
additional presentation?
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Yes. I am sorry. Mr. Chief Justice, I 
now yield to Manager Hyde.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Ruff, and counsel, and distinguished Senators, I want 
to be very candid with you, and that may involve diplomatic 
breaches because I am parliamentarily illiterate. But 
nonetheless, I looked at this motion to dismiss and I was 
astounded, really. If the Senate had said something similar to 
the House, it would certainly have received such treatment as 
comports with comity, and I don't know enough about comity to 
wave that flag, but I don't want to waive my rights to raise 
that issue, anyway.
    I know Black's Law Dictionary is a resource book for all of 
us, but I looked in the Thesaurus about ``dismiss'' and I came 
up with ``disregard, ignore, brush off.'' I just am surprised 
that this motion is here now before we conclude the case.
    Some years ago when I was trying lawsuits, I appeared 
before a judge in Chicago. My opponent was an oldtimer who was 
just mean--a good lawyer, but he was mean--and the judge 
interrupted him in one tirade, and he said, ``Counsel, I have a 
lot of respect for you. I wish you had a little respect for 
this court.'' I sort of feel that way. I sort of feel that we 
have fallen short in the respect side because of the fact that 
we represent the House, the other body, kind of blue-collar 
people, and we are over here trying to survive with our 
impeachment articles.
    The most salient reason for defeating this motion is 
article I, section 3 of the Constitution which says that the 
Senate shall have the sole power to try--to try--all 
impeachments. Now, a trial, as I understand it, is a search for 
truth, and it should not be trumped by a search for an exit 
strategy.
    It seems to me this motion elevates convenience over 
constitutional process and by implication ratifies an unusual 
extension of sovereign immunity. If these articles are 
dismissed, all inferences in support of the respondents, in 
support of us, the managers, should be allowed; and if you 
allow all reasonable inferences in our favor, what kind of a 
message does it send to America to dismiss the articles of 
impeachment? Charges of perjury, obstruction of justice are 
summarily dismissed--disregarded, ignored, brushed off. These 
are charges that send ordinary folk to jail every day of the 
week and remove Federal judges. But I can see this President is 
different. But if the double standard is to flourish on Capitol 
Hill, I don't think we have accomplished a great deal.
    Yes, it is cumbersome. These proceedings are archaic in 
many ways. The question period was something out of the Old 
Bailey, I guess. I don't know. But democracy is untidy. I will 
stipulate that. It is untidy. But it is also a blessing. 
Impeachment and trial by the Senate were devised by our framers 
to make this difficult process as definitive as possible.
    ``Let's get the matter behind us.'' That is a mantra. That 
is a cliche. We all say it. You won't get it behind you if you 
dismiss this without voting on the articles. You guarantee 
contention. You will never get it behind us. Vote these 
articles up or down. That is the only way we really get it 
behind us.
    What this is--this motion--is a legal way of saying, ``so 
what'' to the charges that we levied here. Now, look at what 
these charges are. So what that the President violated his oath 
of office and willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial 
process for his personal gain and exoneration. So what that 
President Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury on several topics. So 
what that the President corruptly encouraged a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a 
sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
perjurious, false, and misleading. So what that the President 
encouraged a witness to lie to the grand jury and conceal 
evidence. So what that the President has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive to the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    That is an awful lot to dismiss with a brushoff, to ignore 
with a mere ``so what.''
    No, it may be routine. We certainly don't have enough 
experience in these impeachment matters, and thank God for 
that. It may be routine to file a motion to dismiss. But I take 
very seriously a motion to dismiss, especially when it is 
offered by the very distinguished Senator who did that. But, in 
a bipartisan way, I hope some Democrats will support the 
rejection of this motion, as difficult as it is, because I 
don't think this whole sad, sad, drama will end--we will never 
get it behind us until you vote up or down on the articles. And 
when you do, however you vote, we will all collect our papers, 
bow from the waist, thank you for your courtesy, and leave and 
go gently into the night. But let us finish our job.
    Thank you.
    Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
    Mr. LOTT. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe, under the agreement we entered into, 
the next order of business, then, would be the vote on the 
motion by Senator Harkin to go into open session; is that 
correct?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The managers have used their time. The 
Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Harkin.

                      motion to suspend the rules

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, in accordance with rule V of 
the Senate Standing Rules, Mr. Wellstone and I filed a notice 
of intent to move to suspend the rules solely regarding the 
debate by Senators on the motion to dismiss, so Senators can 
have open rather than a closed debate on this issue.
    This motion is offered on behalf of myself and Senators 
Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye, 
Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb, 
Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer, 
Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski.
    My motion is at the desk. However, Mr. Chief Justice, I 
send a corrected copy of my motion to the desk. There were two 
typos in it; I want to have it corrected.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. If it is appropriate at this point, I ask the 
Senators if they would remain at their desks so we can go 
through this vote, and I ask unanimous consent, since we are 
all here, to reduce the time for the vote from 15 minutes to 10 
minutes.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Is there objection to the Senator from Iowa modifying his 
motion?
    Without objection, it is modified.
    The clerk will report the motion.
    The legislative clerk read the motion, as modified, as 
follows:

    I move to suspend the following portions of the Rules and 
Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials in regard to debate by Senators on a motion 
to dismiss during the trial of President William Jefferson 
Clinton:
    (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
    (2) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate 
shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its 
decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon 
without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall 
be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be 
entered on the record''; and
    (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except 
when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that 
case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask for the yeas and nays.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there a sufficient second?
    There is a sufficient second.
    The yeas and nays were ordered.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on agreeing to the 
motion. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 43, nays 57, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 2]

             [Subject: Harkin motion to suspend the rules]

                                YEAS--43

Akaka
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Schumer
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--57

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Are there any other Senators wishing to 
vote or change their vote? If not, on this vote the yeas are 
43, and the nays are 57. Two-thirds of the Senators voting, and 
a quorum being present, not having voted in the affirmative, 
the motion is rejected.
    Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Nevada.
    Mr. REID. May we have order in the Chamber, please?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                        order for closed session

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move that we now go into closed 
session for the purpose of Senators debating the motion to 
dismiss.
    The motion was agreed to.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair, pursuant to rule XXXV, now 
directs the Sergeant at Arms to clear the galleries, close the 
doors of the Chamber, and exclude all the officials of the 
Senate not sworn to secrecy.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take a 10-minute break for the purposes of closing the doors 
and preparing for the debate.
    There being no objection, at 5:23 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 5:50 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.

                             closed session

    [At 5:50 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The 
proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until 
9:51 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                              open session

    Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now 
return to open session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                         order for adjournment

    Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate 
adjourns, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 12 noon on 
Tuesday, and I further ask consent that during the remainder of 
the trial it be in order for Members to submit unanswered 
questions to the Chair.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
    Without objection, it is so ordered.

                                program

    Mr. NICKLES. On tomorrow, we will resume and begin debate 
on the motion to subpoena. I now ask unanimous consent that the 
time for argument be reduced to 4 hours, equally divided, as 
provided for under Senate Resolution 16.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? It is so ordered.
    Mr. NICKLES. Mr. Chief Justice, for the information of all 
colleagues, tomorrow we will begin the debate at 12 noon 
instead of 1 o'clock.
                                ------                                


                       adjournment until tomorrow

    Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand 
in adjournment as under the previous order.
    There being no objection, at 9:51 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Tuesday, January 26, 
1999, at 12 noon.

          SUPPORT OF THE WELLSTONE-HARKIN ``SUNSHINE'' MOTION

    Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise today in strong 
support of the Wellstone-Harkin motion. This motion would allow 
open Senate debate during the impeachment trial. Mr. Chief 
Justice, the American people should not be excluded from one of 
the most important Senate deliberations in United States 
history.
    The result of the debates and discussions over the next 
days or weeks could require the removal of the President of the 
United States for the first time in our Nation's 222 year 
history. In our deliberations, my colleagues and I will 
contemplate no less than reversing the outcome of an election 
in which nearly 100 million Americans cast their vote. Such a 
significant decision, a decision with such profound 
consequences, should not be reached behind closed doors.
    I believe my constituents and all Americans deserve to hear 
Senate deliberations from Senators--not leakers and speculators 
and commentators.
    From my earliest days as a Baltimore social worker to my 
tenure as a United States Senator, I have lived by the 
principle that the public has a right to know and a right to be 
heard. This principle is no less important when a Presidential 
Impeachment trial is underway. It is more important than ever.
    Now, some of my colleagues have said that these 
deliberations should be closed because we are jurors and 
jurors' deliberations are kept secret in a court of law. But 
let me tell you that this Senate tribunal cannot be compared to 
a simple court of law. Of course, the law is the foundation for 
our work in the Senate. But as my colleague from Iowa, Senator 
Harkin, noted during the trial, we are more than jurors.
    We are representatives of our Nation. We are given 
responsibilities to deliberate on matters of public importance 
and vote in the public interest. Never was that more true than 
in the Senate trial in which we are now engaged.
    The U.S. Senate is, ultimately, the public's institution--
not ours. It is for them we work and it is to them we owe our 
continued service. I hope and believe we serve the institution 
well and that our stewardship gives credit and credence to the 
wisdom of our Founding Fathers. By keeping our deliberations 
open, we will do service to the American public we serve, this 
institution we cherish, and those Founding Fathers we revere.
    I absolutely will not support closing the doors to the 
public and hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting 
the sunshine motion.


                       Tuesday, January 26, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 12:02 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Gracious God, You not only guide our steps, You order our 
stops for quiet times of prayer. We hear Your words spoken 
through the psalmist. ``Be still and know that I am God; I will 
be exalted among the nations, I will be exalted in the 
earth''--Psalm 46:10. Help us absorb the true meaning of these 
words translating the original Hebrew. You call us to let up, 
leave off, let go, and truly know that You are God. You are in 
control. We cannot be still inside until we reaffirm that You 
are in control of us, this Nation, and this Senate. We exalt 
You El Shaddai, all-sufficient one; Adonai, our Lord; Jehovah-
raah, our Shepherd who guides; Jehovah-rapha, who heals our 
bodies and our relationships; Jehovah-shammah, God who is here. 
Strengthen the Senators as they seek to exalt You, as these 
pages of American history are written during this trial. You 
bless the Nation that exalts You! Through Him who taught us to 
seek first Your kingdom and Your righteousness. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, we are now 
prepared to hear arguments regarding the subpoenaing of 
witnesses and the taking of their depositions. I understand the 
House managers will submit the list and begin their argument; 
the White House counsel will then state their arguments, with 
the House managers making the final closing statement. This 
period has been limited to 4 hours instead of the 6 hours that 
had been earlier indicated.
    I also expect a motion may be offered again to close the 
session with regard to deliberations by the Senators. I need 
some further consultation with Senator Daschle to confirm that. 
It could be that we could work it out without having to do the 
recorded vote. Therefore, votes could occur this evening--
probably between 4:30 and 5 o'clock.
    As always, we expect to take a break after about an hour 
and a half in the proceedings, and it may be a little bit 
longer than usual, so that if Senators are not able to grab a 
quick bite, they might be able to grab a little something in 
the cloakroom during that first break. So it might be a little 
longer than ordinary. I expect that will occur sometime around 
1:30, approximately.
    Before we begin, since I see that there are still a few 
Senators not in the Chamber, I suggest the absence of a quorum, 
Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. If all Senators, counsel, and managers would 
return to their desks, I believe we are ready to begin.
    Mr. Chief Justice, again, just for the information of all 
Senators, what happens next is I believe that a manager will be 
recognized on behalf of the House to present a motion with 
regard to subpoenaing witnesses and then the presentations will 
begin first by the House managers and then by the White House 
counsel and then closed by the House managers to be spread over 
4 hours, but that at approximately 1:30 we will take a break so 
that we can assess how to proceed the remainder of the day and 
perhaps even get a bite to eat if Senators hadn't had that 
opportunity. It won't be an extended break but it will be 
longer than normal.
    I believe we are ready to proceed, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant 
on behalf of the House managers.

      Motion for Appearance of Witnesses and Admission of Evidence

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a motion to 
present.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The manager will send the motion to the 
desk. The clerk will read the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    Motion of the United States House of Representatives for 
the appearance of witnesses at a deposition and to admit 
evidence not in the Record.
    Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by 
and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully 
submits to the United States Senate its motion for the 
appearance of witnesses at a deposition and to admit evidence 
not in the record in connection with the Impeachment Trial of 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.
    The House moves that the Senate authorize and issue 
subpoenas for the appearance of the following witnesses at a 
deposition for the purpose of providing testimony related to 
the Impeachment Trial:
    1. Monica S. Lewinsky;
    2. Vernon Jordan; and
    3. Sidney Blumenthal.
    Further, the House moves that the Senate admit into 
evidence the following material not currently in the record:
    1. the affidavit of Barry Ward, Law Clerk to the Honorable 
Susan Webber Wright, U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern 
District of Arkansas;
    2. the sworn declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, and 
attachments thereto; and
    3. certain telephone records which document conversations 
between Monica S. Lewinsky and William Jefferson Clinton, 
including a 56-minute exchange on December 6, 1997.
    Additionally, the House petitions the Senate to request the 
appearance of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, at a deposition, for the purpose of providing 
testimony related to the Impeachment Trial.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 16, as 
modified by the order of January 25, the managers on the part 
of the House of Representatives and counsel for the President 
each have 2 hours to present their arguments on this motion.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Senate, we are here 
today to argue for the presentation of witnesses, and I want to 
state at the outset a couple of observations of mine regarding 
this.
    The House managers have always understood the Senate's 
sense of the rules on these matters, and we don't question that 
fact. But I think it is important, to set the record clear here 
today, to say at the outset that we have always believed, and 
we still do believe, that 10 or 12 witnesses are what we should 
have and should have been permitted to call to prove our case. 
We have estimated that this could be done in a matter of 2 
weeks at the outside, including all cross-examination. That is 
what we think the normal order would have been; it is what we 
think it should have been. But we have been told again and 
again, and we believe it is true, that if we made such a 
request it would not be approved. And a few weeks ago we 
thought--maybe even a few days ago--that we could submit a list 
of maybe five or six witnesses and there would be a reasonable 
chance that for deposition they would be approved and maybe two 
or three of them actually could be presented live in the 
Chamber.
    Now we have been led to believe--and we think it is an 
accurate assessment--that in order to get a vote to approve the 
opportunity to take depositions alone, whether or not anyone is 
called, we cannot submit more than two or three witnesses to 
you.
    That is what we have done today. We have submitted a motion 
for simply three witnesses: Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and 
Sidney Blumenthal.
    The two people who know the most about this are Monica 
Lewinsky and President William Jefferson Clinton, and while we 
have not submitted to you today the name of President Clinton 
in our motion, we strongly urge, if you allow us to have 
witnesses, which we believe you should, that you, in addition--
or even if you don't--on your own call President Clinton here 
to testify. We think that it is exceedingly important that you 
have an opportunity, we have an opportunity for you to examine 
him and these other witnesses to get at the truth of this 
matter and to end all the speculation that would resolve this 
matter and let you draw the proper inferences and conclusions.
    I will simply say that I am going to make a brief outline 
of the matter of why we should have witnesses for you, the 
three we are asking for, and I will be followed in order, so 
you can get some sequence to this, by Manager Bryant, who will 
discuss in detail the reason why we think it is appropriate to 
call specifically Monica Lewinsky; Manager Hutchinson, who will 
discuss Mr. Jordan as a witness; and Manager Rogan, who will 
discuss Mr. Blumenthal.
    If our motion is granted--I want to make this very, very 
clear--at no point will we ask any questions of Monica Lewinsky 
about her explicit sexual relations with the President, either 
in deposition or, if we are permitted, on the floor of the 
Senate. They will not be asked. That, of course, assumes that 
White House counsel does not enter into that discussion, and we 
doubt that they would.
    Secondly, we do not see why the entire process of deposing 
and calling all of these witnesses right here live would have 
to take more than just a very few days, 2, 3, 4, 5, maybe early 
next week at the latest. There is no reason why it has to be 
longer than that. We absolutely reject the argument that some 
were making--and I do not know why they were making it--that 
somehow, if we have a single witness out here, it is going to 
mean weeks and weeks of protracted delay in this trial.
    That is not so, and certainly not so with the three 
witnesses we are asking you today to permit us to present.
    I also want to address the argument that has been made by 
some that witnesses should only be permitted if there is new 
evidence.
    Now, the managers believe that we will present to you new 
evidence with the witnesses that we have asked you to let us 
depose. Think through this with me for one moment. Under the 
rules you have set up, if we take depositions, which we are 
required to do, of every one of these witnesses, at the end of 
the day when those depositions are completed, all the new 
evidence that we could imagine certainly will be--from those 
three witnesses--in those depositions, and the argument will be 
made, I am sure, that there is no reason to have a live witness 
out here at all.
    That had to be a preconceived notion by somebody who 
thought of that in the first place. If that is the argument, 
that should not be the standard. It should be one of the 
standards but not the standard, not the sole standard. There is 
a lot more to a witness, and the reason why you need to have a 
witness out here, than simply new evidence.
    In real criminal trials, virtually all witnesses are 
deposed before they are brought to trial, and then the counsel 
on each side decide which witnesses they will call. They are 
called. They are examined. They are cross-examined. And unless 
a witness is deceased or laid up or there is some other 
extraordinary reason why that witness isn't there, especially a 
key witness, then the witness normally is here live.
    It is especially true in a case such as this where much of 
the evidence, not necessarily all of it--there is quite a bit 
of direct evidence--is circumstantial and requires you to draw, 
as many finders of fact do all across this country every day, 
inferences and conclusions that involve the credibility of the 
witness, that involve the way it is said, that involve 
inflections and spontaneity of the witness, the exchange of the 
counsel asking the question and the witness, and a description 
and flavor of which you simply can't get without having the 
person here to observe.
    That is what jurors do all the time. I think it is 
especially important, as well, because there is conflicting 
testimony.
    I do not suppose we have a stand here today, but you have 
in front of you a credibility of witness instruction I think we 
passed out. We would like for you to keep it. It is a 
credibility of witness instruction that is longer than that. I 
just excerpted a part of it and put it up here on this board. I 
know you can't all see that but you should have this sheet. If 
you don't, please ask for it. This is a jury instruction that 
is given in the District of Columbia. It is something that is 
given as a part of our Federal system. And it is important, I 
think, for this particular paragraph, to read it, to understand 
it, because you wouldn't even write this jury instruction if 
you didn't expect to have live witnesses:

    In reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of any 
witness, you may consider any matter that may have a bearing on 
the subject.

    That is part of the instruction.

    You may consider the demeanor and behavior of the witness.

    I think that is important. It is the third paragraph you 
look at, the bottom paragraph.

    You may consider the demeanor and the behavior of the 
witness on the witness stand; the witness' manner of 
testifying; whether the witness impresses you as a truthful 
person; whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate 
memory and recollection; whether the witness has any motive for 
not telling the truth; whether the witness had a full 
opportunity to observe the matters about which he or she has 
testified; whether the witness has any interest in the outcome 
of this case or friendship or hostility toward other people 
concerned with this case.

    Demeanor, manner, truthfulness, how the witness impresses 
you. If you don't have that witness here, and it is a critical 
witness, there is no way as a trier of fact you can make those 
judgments fairly. There just isn't any way. We think that it is 
terribly critical, not only that we are permitted to depose 
these witnesses, but with respect particularly to Monica 
Lewinsky and perhaps all three of them, that we be permitted to 
bring those witnesses here at the end of the day and examine 
them and let the President's counsel examine them.
    The arguments of the President's counsel have been, to some 
extent, to you and to me--and I have heard it repeated several 
times--that somehow circumstantial evidence is not that 
important, that it is somehow inferior to direct evidence. I am 
not going to pass out a jury instruction on that again. You 
have already heard us talk about that. The reality is the jury 
instruction, if we passed one out to you today, would say 
exactly what we said before: Circumstantial evidence is given 
the same weight, the same weight as direct evidence. Inferences 
have to be drawn.
    I don't know any case in this country in a criminal 
matter--or rarely; I should not say ``any.'' I suppose there is 
a confession that always you get once in a while and you read 
about it in the paper. But in almost every criminal case, you 
have to draw inferences; there has to be circumstantial 
evidence of some sort. There is nothing wrong with that. The 
President's counsel has said that somehow the nature of the 
evidence means that you should automatically acquit him. I just 
don't buy that at all.
    What are inferences? Let's put inferences up for a second 
so you can look at that. Inferences are on this side. This is 
another jury instruction. I don't know if you have this one, 
but we will give it to you. This is another one that is given 
out:

    An inference is a deduction or a conclusion which you . . . 
as finders of facts--are permitted to draw . . . from the facts 
which have been established by either direct or circumstantial 
evidence. In drawing inferences you should exercise your common 
sense. . . . You are permitted to draw from the facts which you 
find to be proven, such reasonable inferences as would be 
justified in light of your experience.

    A few days ago, one of the White House counsel, Mr. 
Kendall, attempted to make you think it was very difficult to 
prove a crime by circumstantial evidence. You may remember Mr. 
Kendall told the story about a fellow who came out of his house 
one morning and he saw his driveway was wet and he immediately 
thought it must have rained last night. But, Mr. Kendall said, 
this man noticed right after that that his neighbor's water 
sprinkler was dripping and he thought, well, maybe the water 
sprinkler caused it to be wet. And he used that illustration--
ended the story right there--of how difficult circumstantial 
evidence is and how likely you might draw the wrong conclusion 
from inferences.
    Mr. Kendall didn't allow you to proceed with the next 
commonsense step that shows how powerful circumstantial 
evidence can be. Let's suppose the man got up in the morning, 
he walked out of his house, he saw that his driveway was wet, 
and he thought maybe it had rained. He immediately observed the 
water sprinkler was dripping. He thought, well, maybe the water 
sprinkler caused it and he looked down the street then and 
looked at not only his neighbor's sidewalk where it was wet as 
well as his, and the driveway, but he looked at his neighbor's. 
And he looked at several others all around his neighborhood and 
they were dry.
    The obvious conclusion from circumstantial evidence is the 
neighbor's water sprinkler caused his sidewalk or his driveway 
to be wet and it didn't rain. It is a kind of a reasonable, 
commonsense, inferential, circumstantial conclusion you are 
allowed to draw. You are the finders of fact. I think that that 
suggestion was wrong.
    But this is why we need witnesses. You need to be able to 
see the temperament; you need to be able to have the 
background; you need to be able to have the feel or the flavor 
to draw those inferences properly.
    In the impeachment case before you, you have both direct 
and circumstantial evidence that the President engaged in a 
pattern of obstruction, perjury, and witness tampering designed 
to deny the court in the Jones case what Judge Wright had 
determined Ms. Jones had a right to discover in order to prove 
her claim. You have to use your common sense to get at this. 
Seeing, hearing, and observing those live witnesses is 
important.
    If you remember, at the outset of this case, at the outset 
of these proceedings, I tried to draw your attention to what 
this was about in a nutshell. Some have said it is a theory of 
the case. The White House wants to call it speculation. It is 
not speculation. From all the evidence--especially once you 
have heard Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan and Sidney 
Blumenthal, I think adding the flavor that you need to have, 
adding the body language you need to observe, adding the 
credibility that you need to establish in this--I think that is 
the proper inference and the proper conclusion you need to 
draw.
    What was that nutshell? I won't bore you with going into 
every detail again, but I want to remind you what the record, 
we think, shows and that this additional witness presentation 
would augment and thus be very important. It shows the 
President had a well-thought-out scheme. He resented the Jones 
lawsuit. He was alarmed when Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on 
the witness list and even more alarmed when Judge Wright issued 
her order signaling the court would hear the evidence of the 
relationship.
    To keep his relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the 
court once it was apparent to him he was going to have to 
testify, he knew he would have to lie to the court. To succeed 
at this, he decided he had to get Monica Lewinsky to file a 
false affidavit to try to avoid her testifying. He needed to 
get her a job to make her happy, to make sure she executed the 
affidavit and then stick with her lies if questioned.
    Then the gifts were subpoenaed. He had to have her hide the 
gifts, the only tangible evidence that could link him to her. 
She came up with the idea of giving them to Betty Currie and 
the President seized on that. Who would think to ask Betty? 
Then he would be free to lie to the court in the deposition. 
But after this, he realized he had to make sure Betty would lie 
and cover for him. He got his aides convinced to repeat his 
lies to the grand jury and the public, and all this worked 
until the dress showed up. Then he lied to the grand jury to 
try to cover up and explain away his prior crimes.
    The President knowingly, intentionally, and willfully set 
out on a course of conduct in December 1997 to lie to the Jones 
court, to hide his relationship, and to encourage others to lie 
and hide evidence to conceal the relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky from the court.
    That is the straightforward case that we presented. It is 
there. But it is very important that you recognize this is not 
speculation but it is supported by the evidence. But it needs 
to have the witnesses here.
    I am not going to go into every one of the articles. I am 
not going to go over all that again. You have them in front of 
you. But you know there are four provisions, four different 
provisions of the perjury article, and there are seven counts 
in the obstruction article. In addition to the seven counts, we 
believe you have the right to consider the lies the President 
made in the Paula Jones civil deposition as a part of his 
obstruction of justice, as written in the body of that article.
    Why do I raise what is there on the table? Well, you can 
find the President guilty of any one of the perjury or 
obstruction of justice charges. In our judgment, if you find 
him guilty of any one, you can convict him and you can remove 
him from office. We think that is appropriate. We think that 
you should, that every one of them rises to that level.
    I want to make a point to you, too, for example, about the 
first perjury, about the nature and details of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. Let's just say for a minute, so you will 
get this one clear, if I could beg your indulgence, there were 
a lot of questions raised out here about particular statements 
that might be perjurious, some of which may have sounded a 
little bit more stretched to you than others did. But the body 
and the gravamen of that is that they are all grand jury 
perjury about that relationship. Cumulatively, that is what you 
are voting on. You are not voting on each and every one of 
these, particularly ``the'' singular lie that hangs the 
President of the United States. And there are four--there are 
three more in addition to that to look at. So, please, look at 
all of them.
    We also strongly believe that each of these constitutes 
high crimes and misdemeanors. It is very hard for us to 
conceive that there is a different standard for impeaching the 
President and impeaching a judge. We know that has been argued 
to you out here, but it is very hard for us to conceive of 
this. On the other hand, I am aware that many of you believe, 
and I am sure some of you at least do--I hope it is not many, 
but I said many--that no matter whether or not the President is 
guilty of the perjury and obstruction of justice, everything 
that is in here in great detail, everything we have told you, 
that none of that rises to the level of a high crime and 
misdemeanor and that the President should not be removed from 
office.
    On the other hand, I think that the majority of you do 
believe that, if the President committed all of this, surely it 
would rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors. How 
can you leave in office a man who is President of the United 
States who has so intentionally, through his scheme that he has 
concocted to deny the court justice, denied information to a 
person who is trying to plead their case, gone through it 
systematically and lied again and again and again and then 
intentionally and calculatingly, lied to the grand jury about 
it again?
    It is very hard to conceive of that. But I also suspect 
that most of you at the end of the day will question some of 
these, and as I said earlier, you don't have to conclude that 
he commited all of them to convict him, certainly not to find 
him guilty of the charges but somewhere in between. Is it 50 
percent of them? Is it seven-eighths of them? How many of them 
does it take? What is the weight for some of you? Each one of 
you will be judging this differently.
    But in that process, there is no doubt in my mind that you 
need to go through the process of looking and hearing from 
these witnesses to make that decision. If you have a doubt, not 
in your own mind--maybe some of you have no doubt at all that 
he is guilty of any and all of these crimes, but if you think 
one of your colleagues does have that doubt at this moment, for 
gosh sakes, let's let the witnesses come here and let us have 
the chance to erase that doubt in the way you normally do in a 
trial.
    For a few of the criminal charges under the articles of 
impeachment, under both of them, it is our judgment that the 
President's guilt is so clear and convincing and compelling 
that we don't think any witnesses are needed to be called in 
deposition or in person.
    First, contrary to the impressions that the White House 
counsel would like to leave you, it should be clear to anybody 
reading the record that the President committed perjury before 
the grand jury when he said that he never touched certain body 
parts of Ms. Lewinsky, which touching, the President admitted, 
would clearly be within the definition of sexual relations in 
the Jones case.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that he touched these parts on a 
number of different occasions in a manner clearly within the 
President's understanding of that definition. The record 
contains testimony from at least six different friends and 
counselors with whom Ms. Lewinsky spoke and described these 
details contemporaneously as they occurred.
    White House counsel has repeatedly tried to dismiss this 
absolutely clear perjury by claiming that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony is uncorroborated and, therefore, you couldn't prove 
perjury to the court. They say again and again and again that 
it is a ``he says-she says'' situation.
    This is a gross misstatement of the law. Even if there were 
no corroborating witnesses--and there are in this case--a 
person could be and would be convicted of perjury before any 
court in this country based on the evidence that is in this 
record now. We don't have to bring anything else in here, and 
we are not planning to do so to prove that.
    The law covering grand jury perjury, which has been on the 
books since 1970, does not require a corroborating witness and 
does not require corroborating evidence. There are more than 
100 people serving in Federal prison today who have been 
convicted under this 1970 grand jury statute for perjury where 
it is one person's word against another, several of them for 
lies about sexual relations.
    All you need to convict is to accept that Monica Lewinsky 
had no motive to lie about this, the President did, and you 
have to draw the inferences you logically can from the chain of 
events that are in this record. But even though you don't need 
any corroborating testimony, there is corroborating testimony. 
There are the six people--friends and counselors--with whom she 
talked contemporaneously about this. Again, the White House 
counselors have tried to persuade you, wrongly, that you should 
not consider this, that this would not be admissible--these 
corroborating witnesses--in any courtroom in the country, they 
say, and that is not true.
    There are at least three exceptions to the hearsay rule 
which would, in all probability, permit those prior consistent 
statements to come in and corroborate that testimony.
    The bottom line is the perjury of the President in this 
case is as plain as day on the record, and we don't need to 
call any witnesses on this matter. And we also believe there 
are a number of other perjuries in that grand jury, that I am 
not going to go into detail about, that are just as plain on 
the record. We don't need to call witnesses that he perjured 
himself when he told the grand jury it was his goal to be 
truthful in the Jones deposition. That is what he told the 
grand jury--it was his goal to be truthful.
    The record is replete with many lies that he told in that 
deposition and, in the face of telling the grand jury that his 
goal was to be truthful, he committed perjury.
    Nor do we believe that any witness needs to be called to 
further establish the President's guilt of the crime of 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering in the case where 
he met Betty Currie on the day after his Jones deposition and 
suggested to her all those false declaratory statements that we 
have been over so many times in here.
    Betty Currie's testimony in this matter is undisputed on 
the record. The White House counsel's argument that the 
President was just refreshing his memory is absurd on its face.
    The same is true of the obstruction of justice and perjury 
charges related to allowing his attorney during the Jones 
deposition to make false and misleading statements with regard 
to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and then lying about not even 
paying attention to the attorneys' exchange with the judge on 
this matter. The record is clear. You watched the videotape on 
it. Inferences are perfectly appropriate to be drawn from body 
language. You saw it on the videotape. You saw it. No more 
witnesses are needed. The President committed these crimes.
    On the other hand, we believe we need to bring in witnesses 
to resolve conflicting testimony to give you a true picture of 
the President's scheme to lie and conceal evidence for the 
other obstruction of justice charges and certainly for the last 
perjury charge. They are more complex. They are more dependent 
on circumstantial evidence and inferences you logically have to 
draw. And that is why you need to hear from Monica Lewinsky, 
Vernon Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, to tell you about these 
things themselves.
    When you do, you are just plain going to get a different 
flavor; you are going to feel the sense of this. We believe you 
will find at the end of the day, once you have done that, even 
though you don't need to use this standard, that the President 
is guilty of the entire scheme we presented to you in every 
detail beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Remember, you don't need to convict him to find him guilty 
of all of the crimes we have suggested by any stretch of the 
imagination. You don't need to use the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. That is not required of you. But we can 
understand why many of you or some of you might.
    The reality is that you are in a position where you need to 
make these determinations, and to make them you need to have 
the witnesses. In any courtroom where you are going to 
certainly judge something beyond a reasonable doubt, you need 
to assess the credibility of the witnesses where you have 
conflicting testimony.
    One point in that regard, too, is, we have heard White 
House counsel say a number of times that somehow the fact that 
there is so much conflicting testimony makes our case weaker. 
That is not so. Again, unless the bad guy admits he is guilty, 
when you go to trial in a criminal case, you always have 
conflicting testimony, at least you certainly have the accused 
denying it, and very, very frequently, most often, you have a 
lot of other people who are conflicting.
    The fact that there is conflict is something for the triers 
of fact to resolve but, again, resolve by listening to the 
witnesses, checking their demeanor, watching their body 
language, determining their credibility, feeling the case-flow, 
seeing how it fits together, and watching.
    I am not going to be the one describing what Monica 
Lewinsky is going to show you if she comes in here. I am going 
to tell you, even if we depose her, having had the opportunity 
to talk with this intelligent and very impressionable young 
woman the other day, she will convey this story to you in a way 
that it cannot be conveyed off a piece of paper. It just cannot 
be done.
    I suppose that is why the White House counselors are so 
afraid of our calling any witnesses. They don't want you to 
have the opportunity to get the full flavor if not only you let 
us take the depositions but you at least let us call her live 
here on the floor, preferably with our other two witnesses as 
well.
    They know that the written record conceals this. There is 
no way to lift that out. There is no way for you to see the 
relationship, how she responds to the questions, how she 
answers, how she conducts herself in making very apparent what 
the President's true meaning and intent was.
    If you remember, a lot of this is his state of mind. In the 
not too distant future, Monica Lewinsky is going to be free of 
the gag order and is going to go out and talk to people freely. 
She should. At that point in time, she is going to have the 
public judging her, and they are going to be judging this case, 
as will history, and I suggest that the public at that point in 
history as well will be judging you and not judging the Senate 
well if it doesn't let her come here and testify.
    Let me briefly turn to the last thing I want to do. I want 
to describe the three additional pieces of new evidence we 
would like admitted in this motion.
    First is the affidavit of Barry W. Ward who had been a law 
clerk to Judge Wright during the consideration of the Jones 
case. None of this, I think, should be controversial, but we do 
have it, and I want to cover it briefly. In his affidavit, he 
attests to the fact that at President Clinton's deposition in 
the Jones case, he, Mr. Ward, was sitting at the conference 
table next to Judge Wright; that he was able to observe the 
colloquy between the judge and Mr. Bennett.
    You recall, Mr. Bennett was engaged in this colloquy about 
the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky. And that is what you saw, the 
film footage of the President and the questions. Was the 
President observant? Was he watching? Was he keen? That 
affidavit goes to that point. It is the testimony of Mr. Ward 
with regard to the fact that the President was observant.
    Secondly, we have a piece of new evidence, and that is the 
declaration of the Jones attorney, T. Wesley Holmes, and the 
attached copies of the subpoena in that case, the subpoena in 
that case to Betty Currie, dated January 22, 1998, along with 
proof of service, dated January 27, 1998.
    Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Vermont.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, parliamentary inquiry. It is 
my understanding that Senate Resolution 16 says----
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont is advised it 
takes unanimous consent to allow a parliamentary inquiry in the 
proceeding.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I object to the references 
the manager is making to new information. It is my 
understanding that from Senate Resolution 16, the material 
outside the record may only be presented in connection with a 
motion to expand the record. This new information--we have 
skirted it already with the Lewinsky interview this weekend, 
but now the latest that Mr. Manager McCollum states, I would 
say respectfully, expands that record and, indeed, we are not 
at that point.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I think the motion that the 
managers have made is a motion to authorize the presentation of 
evidence that is not in the record. And so I think that is a 
fair comment. I overrule the objection.
    Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Chief Justice.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The attachments to Mr. Holmes' declaration is the proof of 
the subpoena being issued to Betty Currie on January 22, 1998, 
along with service in the Jones case on January 27, 1998, and a 
copy of the supplemental witness list, including the name of 
Betty Currie, which was served on January 23, 1998. And in his 
declaration, Mr. Holmes explains that Ms. Currie was subpoenaed 
because of testimony given by President Clinton in his 
deposition and because of reliable information which the 
attorneys had received to this effect--that Ms. Currie was an 
instrumental person in facilitating Monica Lewinsky's meetings 
with the President and central to their ``cover story,'' as Mr. 
Holmes refers to it. He explicitly denies that any ``Washington 
Post'' article played any part in the decision of the Jones 
attorneys to subpoena Ms. Currie.
    The third and final piece of new evidence that we ask you 
to take in and accept is a declaration and accompanying 
documents with regard to a telephone conversation showing that 
a conversation occurred on December 6 for 56 minutes between 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky, which we believe is what it 
shows. Obviously, the phone records show the phone records. And 
they state what they are. But we suggest to you that that is 
relevant information because it confirms what we think the 
testimony in the record otherwise would lead you to believe.
    At this point in time, having given you an overview and 
having given you this amount of new evidence, I want to turn 
the microphone over and yield to my colleague, Mr. Bryant, the 
rest of the time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire as to 
our time remaining?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Just under 90 minutes.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Distinguished Senators, a recent letter from Manager Hyde 
to Senator Daschle stated that it has always been the position 
of the House managers that a trial with the benefit of relevant 
witnesses is in the best interest of the Senate and the 
American people. The defense attorneys for the President, as 
well as others in this body, have publicly stated that they do 
not want witnesses.
    Through the question-and-answer session that we have just 
participated in over the last few days, some in this body have 
made it clear that they would prefer a few sharply focused 
witnesses limited only to the most relevant evidence. We heard 
this. And as a result of our submission this morning, you will 
see that we have proposed three witnesses.
    Now, as background, we have brought this down from some 15 
witnesses that we initially thought we would like to call. We 
eliminated, obviously, many witnesses that we would still like 
to call. But with respect for this body, and certainly the 
sensitivity that we feel, we heard that three witnesses would 
be probably the best situation.
    I think from, again, the tone of the questions, the 
directness of many of the questions, we did get that message 
clearly. And from these three witnesses we believe we have the 
broadest coverage of the two articles of impeachment.
    Within the obstruction article, there are in essence seven 
so-called counts, seven instances that we allege. With these 
three witnesses, we manage to cover six of those seven, with 
the one that we don't quite cover being the tampering with 
Betty Currie. As you will note, she is not on that list. But, 
again, bringing this down to three, we had to eliminate some 
witnesses we would have preferred to call.
    Also, based on what we have read and what we have heard, it 
is clear that a very few have already determined that even 
assuming the truth of the articles of impeachment--the perjury 
and obstruction of justice--they are insufficient to convict 
this President of high crimes and misdemeanors. Since each of 
you, as Senators, must consider this matter and vote your own 
conscience with impartial justice, that is apparently your 
individual decision, although, with all due respect, I would 
suggest a premature decision before all the proof and all the 
arguments are made.
    One example of not having heard a complete case is Ms. 
Lewinsky. She is probably the most relevant witness, that is, 
aside from the President himself, who so far has indicated 
through his counsel that he will not testify; and I might add 
also has not answered the questions that at least some Senators 
sent to the White House for his answering, based on his 
attorney's statement that he would be willing to answer 
questions.
    So with that aside, Ms. Lewinsky is probably the most 
important witness left. Wouldn't you at least want to see and 
hear from her on this? As the triers of fact, wouldn't you want 
to observe the demeanor of Ms. Lewinsky and test her 
credibility--as I say, look into the eyes and test the 
credibility of these witnesses? Compare her version of the 
testimony to the contested events. Remember, the President's 
attorneys, in numerous ways, in their vigorous defense of the 
President, have challenged Ms. Lewinsky's version of the facts.
    I believe the majority of other Senators have not yet 
reached a final determination, and it is to you now that I make 
this further proposition. If there is one witness you and the 
American people honestly do need to hear, it is Ms. Lewinsky. 
As you probably read in the newspapers, her lawyers don't want 
her to testify. They are good lawyers, and they don't want to 
have her out here.
    Despite the protestations of the White House and their 
attorneys during the House hearings that they wanted to hear 
fact witnesses, we now know absolutely and without a doubt the 
White House does not want to hear Ms. Lewinsky--does not want 
you to hear Ms. Lewinsky, and Ms. Lewinsky, if the truth be 
known, probably does not want to come in here and testify.
    These are not our witnesses. We didn't get this case in a 
brown envelope. We sort of didn't have any choice in selecting 
the witnesses. The witnesses are all out there--basically White 
House employees, friends of the White House, or former 
employees. These are not going to be our friends if they come 
in and testify. They are not going to be sympathetic to us, 
although we can anticipate that they would tell the truth. And 
that certainly would be our belief with Ms. Lewinsky if she 
were called.
    We believe she understands her responsibility, despite any 
feelings that she might have about the President or the job 
that he is doing as President; that she understands the 
responsibility to tell the truth.
    Senators, she does have a story to tell. Given the link 
that she has, that common thread that she has in most of the 
charges of these articles of impeachment, I suggest that she 
should be permitted to testify.
    A closure of this case is necessary, and without the direct 
presentation by Ms. Lewinsky, we all--political and public--
would be denied the complete picture that she should be able to 
give us to better sort this out. As Manager Graham said 
yesterday, please don't leave us all hanging for the answers we 
so dearly need.
    Is this good, is it bad, or is it ugly? We managers believe 
that it is bad, ugly, and illegal. We all like to talk about 
the Constitution, and it is a great document. The opportunity 
to confront witnesses is present in that Constitution, and it 
can be argued that this principle of confrontation of witnesses 
against you should apply to these proceedings. While we realize 
that confrontational right is one that belongs to the criminal 
defendant in the Constitution, in this case apparently any 
right to confront Ms. Lewinsky and other witnesses is being 
waived by the President and his lawyers since they don't want 
to call witnesses in these proceedings.
    Isn't it time, though, for the rest of us to make that 
choice that we do want to see and hear some witnesses? Her 
testimony, in particular, would be extraordinarily enlightening 
in resolving factual disputes about the very felonies of which 
we ask you to convict the President of the United States--
perjury and obstruction of justice. These particular charges go 
to the very heart of our co-equal branch of government, the 
Judiciary. Members of the Senate, in terms of the impact on our 
judicial system in the search for truth, there is no difference 
between a person lying, which is perjury, and a person paying 
another person to lie, which is bribery. The bribery is in the 
Constitution and the perjury is not specifically mentioned.
    In terms of this proposition of proportionality, is the 
106th Senate prepared to have as its record of sexual 
harassment laws that perjury about sex is not illegal? After 
all, that is what this whole proportionality argument is about, 
that if it is about sex it is OK to lie. Because Senator 
Bumpers said that upwards of 80 percent of his divorce cases 
from his Arkansas practice of law involve lying, that does not 
legitimize perjury, nor should it provide any authority for 
this Senate to somehow legitimize perjury if it is just about 
sex.
    We allege that the President, in a reasoned and in a 
calculated manner, prevented Paula Jones from obtaining 
truthful testimony and evidence that might have helped her 
lawsuit. At the time the President attempted his coverup 
efforts, he, obviously, felt the disclosure of that information 
in the Paula Jones case would be material and helpful to her. 
The President not only committed himself to illegal actions but 
he enlisted others to assist, some knowingly and others perhaps 
unknowingly.
    Ms. Lewinsky is one of these who, interestingly enough, 
might fit into both categories of knowing and unknowingly at 
different times. She would be able to share with this Senate 
the so-called tone and tenor of her conversations with the 
President. Who else can do that but she or the President?
    This tone and tenor and observing her demeanor and 
listening to her talk about that filing of the affidavit and 
those things, how the President talked to her and how she read 
what he said and exactly what he did say, are all very 
important because, as we know in Washington and so many other 
places where there is a lot of power and prestige, and so 
forth, there are actions that can be prompted without even a 
direct specific order. Things can get done without it being 
said but just by the tone and tenor, the gestures, the 
appearance, and so forth, of certain things. Often these direct 
words, as I said, are not necessary. And Ms. Lewinsky can tell 
you about some of these occasions.
    An appropriate examination--and an appropriate cross-
examination, I might add; let's don't limit the White House 
attorneys here--of Ms. Lewinsky on the factual disputes of the 
affidavit and their cover story, wouldn't that be nice to hear? 
The concealment of gifts--what really happened there and the 
job search--why did she get the job within 48 hours of the 
affidavit, after months of unsuccess?--wouldn't it be nice to 
hear Ms. Lewinsky's version of this when it is so important to 
the overall case of obstruction of justice?
    These are just a few examples where the Senate could be 
helped by her testimony, and it very well could be dispositive. 
It is even possible that she could help the President in some 
ways. But I assure you that she is an impressive young lady, 
and I suspect that she still very much does admire the 
President and the work that he is doing for this country. Yet 
she would be a person who in all likelihood would be 
forthcoming.
    If you have not made up your mind and, indeed, if you have 
further interest in resolving many of the facts here, I do 
commend Ms. Lewinsky for your consideration. It would be my 
intent to lead her through direct examination, the perjury 
charge, as it is alleged with the President, by having her 
simply affirm those provisions of her written testimony which 
are the ones that are generally referred to as salacious, 
without specifically mentioning those words.
    On the more complicated obstruction of justice, the pattern 
of obstruction of justice which does not involve these 
salacious details and matters, they will be addressed more 
specifically. It would be my intent for immediate clarification 
and to dissolve discrepancies and different inferences that 
have been drawn by House managers and defense counsel for the 
President to ask her about the December 28 transfer of Ms. 
Lewinsky's gifts from the President--transfer to Ms. Currie, 
particularly the cellular telephone call that has been put into 
issue by the defense team, about her conversation with the 
President and her offer to allow him to review this false 
affidavit before she submitted it to her lawyer and eventually 
to the court, and his comment that he didn't need to review it 
because he had seen 15 others just like it. Wouldn't you like 
to know what are we talking about--15 others? Fifteen drafts or 
15 other types of affidavits in other cases?
    She would also be asked about her job interviews and her 
discussions with the President about these job interviews over 
a period of time, which are very important, her discussions 
with Vernon Jordan, and specifically why she felt that the 
interview she did with Revlon the day after she signed the 
affidavit, her impression that it went poorly, whereas we 
heard--not testimony but statements in the presentation of 
White House lawyers that, in fact, it didn't go poorly, it went 
very well, but she felt it went so poorly that she went 
immediately out to call Vernon Jordan. Why? Why not have her 
come in and tell us why she did that.
    There will, of course, be other matters of record that she 
can clarify. Being available to the White House defense team, 
certainly she will be vigorously cross-examined. I am sure that 
might also clarify other matters.
    It is my feeling that a fair and comprehensive examination 
without interruption could be conducted of Ms. Lewinsky in 2 to 
4 hours, and depending on the length of cross-examination by 
White House attorneys, we may not need any redirect 
examination.
    While defense counsel for the President and others for the 
President--I heard it so many times, I am not sure exactly who 
said this so I don't want to attribute it to defense counsel, 
and maybe they haven't even said it, but there has been word 
out of the White House that if we call one witness, we might as 
well settle into a siege here in the Senate; we will be here 
for months and months and months. I suggest it is an outrageous 
statement that we will need that amount of time to pursue this 
case if witnesses are called.
    We are confident that, basically, in its best case is an 
attempt to discourage you from calling witnesses, and in its 
worst case, unfortunately, is a veiled threat that they will be 
dilatory and drag this out for months and months if the Senate 
would so allow.
    The House managers are establishing a good-faith effort to 
cut our witnesses, as I said, down to three people, and to 
commit to reasonable times of examination with the assurance 
that we will finish this as quickly as we can and we will hope 
and perhaps the Senate their defense team.
    Witnesses can be called and a fair trial could be 
accomplished if all concerned would agree. Would the Senate 
consider requesting the President's defense team to also select 
three or fewer witnesses in an effort to move this process 
along? As to the depositions, while they are important, if they 
are solely for the purpose of discovery, I ask, why would the 
White House need to discover what Vernon Jordan has to say, 
what Betty Currie has to say, or Sidney Blumenthal, or John 
Podesta--any of these witnesses? They would have to take Monica 
Lewinsky's deposition, but any other discovery deposition, it 
seems to me, they have complete access to already.
    As I close, I want to leave you with some words that have 
been of some comfort to me, and I think we have all needed some 
comfort at times during these proceedings. It is a very short 
quote of the opening remarks of Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Peter Rodino in 1974. Again, in part, he said:

    We know that the very real security of this Nation lies in 
the integrity of its institutions and the informed confidence 
of its people.

    He talked about the Nixon hearings.

    We will conduct our deliberations in that spirit. It has 
been said that our country, troubled by too many crises in 
recent years, is too tired to consider this one. In the first 
year of the Republic, Thomas Paine wrote, ``Those who expect to 
reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the 
fatigue of supporting it.''

    Back to Rodino:

    Now for almost 200 years, Americans have undergone the 
stress of preserving their freedom and the Constitution that 
protects it. It is now our turn.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I respectfully ask you 
to permit the House managers to call these three named 
witnesses and add this additional evidence.
    I thank you. I yield to Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, my responsibility is to address the 
testimony of Vernon Jordan and the need to call him as a 
witness in this case.
    Before I go into the details, let me just reflect for a 
moment on the Senate trial process. I said many days ago that I 
had confidence in the U.S. Senate, and I thought that at this 
particular juncture it might be good if I reassure you that I 
still have confidence in the U.S. Senate. When I think about 
the trial process that we are going through, I have to 
compliment you on the fact that you have structured a 
bipartisan process. I think that is important because you gave 
this process credibility. So you did the right thing, and I, 
for one, am pleased with what you were able to accomplish in 
that endeavor.
    Now, whenever you achieve a bipartisan process, you have to 
make compromises along the way. And the result is a format that 
is not particularly helpful to the trial managers, the House 
managers, who wish to call witnesses. We have struggled through 
that. But notwithstanding the present difficulty, I still 
compliment you and thank you for what you have done in 
achieving that bipartisan consensus. I think back to that 
meeting that I and some other managers had early on with the 
bipartisan group of Senators from this body--and I now look at 
some from both sides of the aisle--and I went in there with 
this high-minded thought that we could make a case for 
witnesses because of what the other managers have described as 
the tone and demeanor of witnesses. Well, that was quickly 
brushed aside by them saying, ``No, no, no, we want to hear 
about what conflicts exist in the testimony; just tell us what 
the conflicts are because that is a strong case for calling 
witnesses.'' Well, that threw me back on my heels. So I went 
back and, as you know, in the question and answer session I 
addressed the question of conflicts. I think we did a good job 
of outlining the conflicts between various witnesses.
    Well, then I was informed that, ``We really are not as 
interested in the conflicts because the conflicts exist in the 
current transcript. Therefore, really, we want to know what new 
information and what dynamic these witnesses can add.'' That 
threw me a curve. So we looked at this again and we tried to 
make a case.
    I'm going to show you what new dynamics and questions can 
be asked. Ultimately, when you take the depositions, many of 
those questions are going to be answered. So you come back full 
circle to where we started in the beginning--that ultimately I 
hope witnesses are called so you can evaluate their 
credibility, determine their demeanor, and assess the truth in 
this case. I think that is important. I know people talk about 
me as being a former Federal prosecutor. Actually, at one time, 
I confess, I represented a defendant in a murder case. This 
gentleman was charged with murder, and the prosecution in Logan 
County, Arkansas--near Senator Bumpers' hometown--decided they 
wanted to handle one of the key witnesses by deposition, as 
that person was out of State. I objected and objected because I 
thought that witness ought to be in the courtroom. The judge 
overruled me and said, ``You can go take the deposition and the 
defense counsel will be there to cross-examine.'' So we 
traipsed off to the other State and took this witness' 
deposition, and she made a lousy witness. I said she would not 
be believed for anything because of the way she appeared. Well, 
we brought the transcript back to the courtroom. The 
prosecution, over my objection, put the transcript into the 
record and, all of a sudden, that cold transcript was 
believable--particularly when they had it read by another 
witness that didn't look anything like the original lady. My 
client was convicted, but that case was reversed in the 
Arkansas supreme court because the court said it was important 
that the jury look into the eyes of the witness, see the 
demeanor of that witness, and determine the credibility.
    So ultimately, we come back to that same point--that 
somehow you are going to have to resolve the conflicts. I know 
of only one way to do it. We have tried to be extraordinarily 
helpful and cooperative with the U.S. Senate. I came in with 
this idea that we were going to present this case with 14 or 15 
witnesses. Clearly, that is off the table. We narrowed it down 
to three witnesses. That was tough to decide. But we believe 
that represents the basic heart of the obstruction of justice 
case and gets to at least six of the seven elements so that you 
can evaluate them. But we want to assist you, clearly, in 
getting to the truth but also to bring this matter to a 
conclusion fairly and as expeditiously as possible.
    Let's look to Mr. Vernon Jordan. Should he be called as a 
witness in this case? His testimony goes to the heart of one of 
the elements of obstruction of justice, that is, the job search 
and the false affidavit, and the interconnection between those. 
I have tried, during my presentation of this case, to present 
portions of his testimony--excerpts, if you will, from his 
testimony. But you will see that he has testified five times 
before the Federal grand jury. I have read all of this. I am 
not going to ask for a show of hands, but how many of you have 
read all of this? And so you have had to rely upon a trial by 
ordeal by lawyers--rather than a trial by witnesses because I 
have had to present the testimony of Vernon Jordan in excerpt 
fashion with limited quotes here and there--as the defense 
counsel has done. That makes it difficult because the problem 
is, one, you are hearing it from her, but, second, it is not a 
story; it is excerpts, and there is no way you can assess the 
truth because of that.
    Look at the times Mr. Jordan has testified before the grand 
jury: March 3, 1998; March 5, 1998; May 28, and June 9; the 
last time he ever testified was June 9, 1998. Let's look at 
what has happened since then, since Mr. Jordan last testified 
before the grand jury. I believe these charts are in front of 
you.
    On July 22, Ms. Currie testified before the grand jury. So 
any of the facts we gain from Ms. Currie were not utilized in 
the last examination of Vernon Jordan.
    August 6, what happened on that date? Ms. Lewinsky 
testified before the grand jury and she revealed some new facts 
during that time that Mr. Jordan never had an opportunity to 
explain, respond to, or answer. I will go into that. One of 
them is about disposing of notes. The second one is about 
drafting the affidavit. And, of course, by that time the DNA on 
the dress had been revealed.
    Then the next thing that happened was the President's 
revelation to the Nation that this relationship did exist. Then 
he testified before the grand jury. All of the facts revealed 
from those instances were not revealed at the time Vernon 
Jordan last testified before the grand jury.
    Obviously, any lawyer would understand there are naturally 
questions that arise from each of those incidents that could be 
posed to Mr. Jordan. Why has that not been done? Quite frankly, 
I have talked to, as I mentioned the other day, the attorney 
for Mr. Jordan. I have not talked to Mr. Jordan personally. I 
think that clearly the Senate does not want us to do that until 
we get past this next hurdle. But those are the things that 
need to be resolved.
    Let me address briefly three areas of conflicts in 
testimony between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky that point up 
other areas of questioning that would be appropriate and he 
should have the opportunity to explain.
    I have been accused of being harsh to Mr. Jordan, and I 
don't mean to be that way. There have been certain things that 
have been stated by witnesses in this case that ought to be 
explained, that ought to be asked of Mr. Jordan. But we need to 
have good answers to these questions. We need to know those 
answers.
    The first conflict--I will get to that--is between Mr. 
Jordan's testimony and Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about whether 
Mr. Jordan knew the true nature of the relationship with the 
President.
    In Mr. Jordan's testimony of May 28, he was asked a 
question: ``You're saying no one to your recollection ever 
suggested or alleged a sexual relationship prior to the 18th of 
January between Monica Lewinsky and the President?'' The 
answer: ``That is correct.''
    That was on May 28. Ms. Lewinsky was asked the same series 
of questions months later--in August of 1998--and she 
testified, ``And I remarked that I really didn't look at him as 
the President'' that, ``I saw him more as a man and reacted to 
him more as a man and got angry at him like a man and just a 
regular person. Mr. Jordan asked me what I got angry at the 
President about. So I told him when he doesn't call me enough 
or see me enough.''
    Another statement:

    And so after we had the conversation I was just talking 
about with Mr. Jordan, he said to me, ``Well, you know what 
your problem is,'' and I said, ``What?'' He said, ``Don't deny 
it,'' and he said, ``You're in love. That's what your problem 
is.''

    This is Monica Lewinsky referring to what Mr. Jordan had 
said.
    So clearly those are relevant questions that need to be 
readdressed to Mr. Jordan because they were raised by Ms. 
Lewinsky in subsequent testimony; they have never been asked to 
him in that fashion.
    There is a conflict in the testimony between Mr. Jordan and 
Ms. Lewinsky about whether the subpoena was discussed at the 
December 22 meeting. Mr. Jordan testified in March that ``we 
did not talk about the subpoena. She wanted to know about her 
job. That was the purpose of her coming.'' And the question 
was: ``Anything beyond that?'' The answer was: ``No.''
    And that is March 6, 1998. Ms. Lewinsky testified to the 
contrary.
    Let's turn our attention then to December 22, which is the 
day she met with Frank Carter: ``And I think you said you were 
going to meet with Mr. Jordan.'' Answer: ``So I came to see Mr. 
Jordan earlier, and I also wanted to find out if he had in fact 
told the President that I had been subpoenaed.''
    That was her testimony which is in direct conflict--that 
the subpoena was discussed on the same day that she went to see 
Mr. Carter about the representation.
    Where is the relevance in this?
    If you recall, Mr. Jordan said it didn't take an Einstein 
to figure out that, whenever you combine whenever she got the 
subpoena, it changed the circumstances.
    Here you have three problems. You have a job search, you 
have a witness in court, and if you combine that with the 
knowledge of a relationship, those are three dynamite issues 
that should cause alarm--not just one change of circumstances 
but it elevates it to a higher level of danger because of the 
correlation between each of those three separate facts, each of 
these conflicts. The testimony of Monica Lewinsky goes to those 
key fundamental issues, and Mr. Jordan has never been asked 
sufficiently about those areas.
    The third conflict--this is key--is the testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan testified that he never talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky about Linda Tripp. That is his March 5, 1998, 
testimony. But Ms. Lewinsky testifies in her August 6 testimony 
about a meeting with Mr. Jordan on December 31.
    This is the third exhibit. I will read that:

    And I met Mr. Jordan for breakfast on . . . the morning of 
[December] 31st, at the Park Hyatt Hotel. And in the course of 
the conversation I told him that I had had this friend, Linda 
Tripp . . . and I was a little bit concerned because she had 
spent the night at my home a few times and I thought--I told 
Mr. Jordan, I said, well, maybe she's heard some--you know--I 
mean, maybe she saw some notes lying around. And Mr. Jordan 
said, ``Notes from the President to you?'' And I said, ``No, 
notes from me to the President.'' And he said, ``Go home and 
make sure they're not there.''

    This is Ms. Lewinsky's testimony of August 6 before the 
grand jury.
    And before anything is said, I am not accusing anyone of 
anything, but let me tell you, it would be significant if Mr. 
Jordan is asked a question if that is a true statement and he 
says yes. It is significant to the case. If he says no, that is 
significant because there is a clear conflict in the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky. And her testimony goes to the heart of the 
issue. If he says, ``I don't remember,'' which is a third 
alternative--by the way, I hate giving these prospective 
witnesses all my questions--but if he says, ``I don't 
remember,'' that does not put the issue in dispute with Ms. 
Lewinsky and establishes really her recollection of the 
incident.
    So I could go through more, I could go through more 
conflict with Ms. Lewinsky about whether Mr. Jordan saw the 
unsigned draft copy of her affidavit, a key issue in this case. 
Ms. Lewinsky testifies one way. Mr. Jordan did not have the 
benefit of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony when he was asked earlier 
in the grand jury. So that needs to be addressed with him.
    There is a conflict with Ms. Lewinsky on whether they 
discussed the contents of the affidavit--not just whether they 
saw the signed affidavit but whether the contents were 
discussed. The question to Mr. Jordan was: ``Did you ever 
discuss with Ms. Lewinsky what she was going to include in the 
affidavit?'' Answer: ``I was not Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer. The 
answer to that is no.''
    But he goes on and elaborates on that. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she and Jordan did have a conversation about 
deleting a certain sentence in the affidavit and reworking 
that.
    That is what I just covered on the contents of the 
affidavit.
    Let me just go to one other on the conflict where the 
affidavit was discussed at their last meeting. Mr. Jordan 
testified in March that she came into the office:

    She gave me a tie. I said, ``Monica, I am really busy, 
thank you.'' And she thanked me, and she is gone.

    ``Any subsequent conversation?'' The answer: ``No.''
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is:

    I stopped in to see him for five minutes to thank him for 
giving me the job, and I gave him a tie.

    She further testified:

    I believe I showed him a copy of the affidavit.

    Clear conflict, very important, once again showing a 
connection between the job, the false affidavit, and, of 
course, if you tie in the other aspect about the relationship, 
it gets very significant and something that needs to be further 
inquired about.
    So there are some of the conflicts between the testimony 
and an area that we need to inquire of Mr. Jordan about.
    The notes to the President that Ms. Lewinsky said she had a 
conversation with him about, that has never been addressed to 
Mr. Jordan whatsoever.
    The December 19 meeting we need to explore more with Mr. 
Jordan. This is the meeting when Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed. 
She called Mr. Jordan. He says, ``Come over.'' She goes over 
there to meet with Mr. Jordan, and during that meeting, 
according to the telephone logs, Mr. Jordan received a call 
from the President of the United States. Mr. Jordan has 
testified that he told the President that Ms. Lewinsky got 
subpoenaed.
    That appears to be exactly during the meeting--the 
conversation he is having with Ms. Lewinsky.
    I think appropriate questions to Mr. Jordan are: Did you 
excuse Ms. Lewinsky from the meeting? Did you have a private 
conversation with the President about the subject that you were 
talking to Ms. Lewinsky about? And when you renewed your 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, did you in fact tell her about 
your conversation with the President? If Ms. Lewinsky was not 
told about that conversation, I think there is some 
significance there, that things were going on that people were 
compartmentalizing and not sharing with the other interested 
parties, and I think that is significant and that needs to be 
explored. His involvement with reviewing the affidavit needs to 
be developed, and the conflicts, his knowledge of the nature of 
the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    So all of these need to be further explored. There are a 
number of unanswered questions.
    One final area. I obviously have a number, but I don't want 
to belabor this point. There was testimony I mentioned about 
Mr. Isikoff and how Betty Currie felt compelled to see Mr. 
Jordan about Mr. Isikoff inquiring about the courier records on 
the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the President. There is some 
indication that that information might have been shared with 
Mr. Frank Carter because Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
received a page from Mr. Carter, her attorney, about the 
Isikoff call, the Isikoff request. How did that information get 
to Mr. Carter? I think there are some legitimate questions that 
should be asked.
    So we would respectfully ask the Senate to permit us to 
call Mr. Jordan as a witness, to depose him. But, further, we 
hope we will be able to call him so that you can evaluate the 
conflicts that I am sure exist now, that very likely will exist 
later on as well. The story needs to be told. The truth should 
be determined. Justice should be accomplished. That is done not 
through lawyers up here talking, it is not done through 
transcripts but through witnesses. Edmund Burke said that to 
fail to hear the evidence is to fail to hear the cause. I know 
that you have transcripts, but I would contend to you that to 
fail to hear these witnesses is in essence to fail to hear the 
cause.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, could I inquire about the 
balance of the time remaining for the House managers?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. The managers have 52 minutes 
remaining.
    Mr. LOTT. Do they intend to use more of their time now?
    Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that we 
take a 30-minute break at this point.
    There being no objection, at 1:22 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 1:59 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a unanimous consent 
request to propound. We have discussed this with Senator 
Daschle and it has been cleared.
    I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of 
the arguments by the managers and the White House counsel today 
on the motion to subpoena witnesses, it be in order at that 
point only for Senator Harkin or Senator Wellstone to make a 
motion to open that debate pursuant to his motion timely filed, 
and that the Senate proceed immediately to the vote, pursuant 
to the impeachment rules.
    I further ask that following that vote, if defeated, it be 
in order to move to close the session for deliberations on the 
motion to subpoena witnesses, as provided under the impeachment 
rules of the Senate, and proceed to an immediate vote.
    If we have any change in either one of these, certainly we 
would have to ask for consent on that and would notify Members 
to that effect.
    I further ask that if the Senate votes to proceed to a 
closed session, those deliberations be limited to 3 hours 
equally divided between the two leaders, notwithstanding the 5-
minute allocation of time under the impeachment rule.
    I further ask unanimous consent that when the Senate 
concludes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 1 
p.m. on Wednesday, January 27.
    Finally, I ask unanimous consent that pursuant to S. Res. 
16, the votes occur immediately upon convening on Wednesday, 
first on the motion to dismiss and, if defeated, the motion to 
subpoena witnesses without intervening action or debate.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so 
ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are ready to 
proceed with White House counsel.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel 
Kendall.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, we reserve our time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    Mr. Kendall.
    You are going to use it now? You have 52 minutes remaining. 
The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, Members of 
the Senate. When I was a trial judge back in California, there 
was something I had to do in every single case, whether it was 
a criminal or civil case, and that was to advise the triers of 
fact--in that particular case, the jury--that what the lawyers 
said was not evidence. This is a universal warning that is 
given in courtrooms throughout the country to the triers of 
fact because the law prefers that those people who have to make 
the determination as to what the facts are make that 
determination based not only on interpretation of the evidence 
but based upon what the evidence ac-

tually is. And that has been the underpinning of our argument 
before this body from the very first day as to why witnesses 
are needed--not to accommodate us but for the Senate to be able 
to make the ultimate conclusion as to what is the truth.
    A perfect example of why the evidence should come from 
witnesses rather than lawyers can be seen from the fact that 
throughout these proceedings lawyers on both sides have tried 
to characterize what is the evidence and tried to characterize 
the interpretation that this body should adopt.
    I am reminded when we were before the Judiciary Committee, 
just before we voted articles of impeachment, White House 
counsel suggested to our committee, as they do before this 
body, that the President's state of mind during his various 
statements under oath was he intended to mislead people but to 
be truthful. They say the President didn't lie. Instead, they 
say he carefully crafted these hypertechnical definitions to 
protect himself from any perjury charge.
    We believe the evidence will show that by so doing, Paula 
Jones was denied the information a Federal judge said she was 
entitled to have and, thereby, perjury and obstruction of 
justice lie.
    Before the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Ruff reaffirmed this 
was the President's strategy. This is what Mr. Ruff told our 
committee:
    Question to Mr. Ruff:

    I do want to make sure I understand your position. From the 
beginning, the President has taken the position that he never 
lied to the American people or lied while giving testimony 
under oath. Essentially claims he simply misled [them] with a 
different definition, and he was sending the same message both 
to the American people and the court.

    Answer by Mr. Ruff:

    I think that is fair, Congressman. Yes.

    Question:

    And he did that intentionally, because in his own mind he 
drew a distinction between the technical definition of ``sexual 
relations'' and the definition of ``improper relationship,'' or 
something along those lines, which is how he now characterizes 
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky?

    Answer by Mr. Ruff:

    Yes, I think that's correct.

    Question:

    You suggested earlier in your testimony this distinction is 
one he has drawn since the Jones deposition. My notes indicate 
you said the definitions are one that he held in his mind in 
January and in August and he has so testified.

    Answer by Mr. Ruff:

    Yes.

    Question:

    In determining whether the President either perjured 
himself or lied under oath in this matter, you are asking the 
committee to look to his state of mind from the beginning of 
this whole episode and make that determination?
    Answer:

    Yes.

    Members of this body, we suggest the evidence has shown, 
and the evidence will further show by the calling of the 
witnesses that we propose, that the President denied under oath 
specific facts that were relevant to the case, relevant to the 
Jones case, relevant to the perjury and obstruction 
investigation by the grand jury, and in so doing, among the 
other lies that my colleagues have pointed out, we will show 
that he lied to his aides.
    This is important, because he, the President, admitted he 
knew that his aides were potential witnesses in a criminal 
investigation before the grand jury. This is the portion of the 
grand jury transcript where the President testified about his 
conversations with key aides once the Monica Lewinsky story 
became public.
    Question to the President:

    Did you deny it to them or not, Mr. President?
    A. . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I wanted 
to find language where I could say that. I also, frankly, did 
not want to turn any of them into witnesses, because I--and, 
sure enough, they all became witnesses.
    Q. Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't you?
    A. And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, 
there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I 
have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And 
did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day 
giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do 
anything to complicate this matter further. So, I said things 
that were true. . . .

    The President's position is they were misleading, but they 
were true. No lies. That is precisely what Mr. Ruff told the 
Judiciary Committee, and that is the position that White House 
counsel takes before this body.
    Remember, the grand jury was conducting a criminal 
investigation. They were seeking evidence of possible perjury 
and obstruction of justice, and the White House contends before 
this body that the President did nothing to obstruct their 
investigation. The evidence shows that he did. One of those 
witnesses who will demonstrate that to this body is the 
President's own aide, Sidney Blumenthal. That is why we request 
this body to allow Mr. Blumenthal to be deposed. Further, we 
hope that you will allow him the opportunity to testify before 
you so that you can gauge his credibility and his demeanor as 
he presents the answers that we expect he will give.
    Mr. Blumenthal's testimony puts him in direct conflict with 
the claims of the President and shatters the myth of the 
President's truthful but misleading answers given under oath.
    Just for a quick way of background, Mr. Blumenthal, on 
January 21, 1998, was an assistant to the President. That was 
the day the Monica Lewinsky story broke in the national press 
through the Washington Post. That story broke in the morning.
    Later the same day, Mr. Blumenthal met both with the First 
Lady and then with the President to discuss these news 
revelations. One month later, Mr. Blumenthal was called to 
testify before the grand jury. His testimony was not 
particularly helpful during that time because, through most of 
the questioning that involved conversations that he had at the 
White House, Mr. Blumenthal claimed executive privilege.
    That issue was apparently litigated, and then he returned 
in June to testify before the grand jury twice, on June 4 and 
on June 25, 1998.
    When Mr. Blumenthal was free to share his recollections of 
the events, this is how Mr. Blumenthal characterized his 
meetings with President and Mrs. Clinton before the grand jury. 
It is interesting to note, by the way, that there was a dual 
lie going on here from the President. The President was lying 
to his wife, who could never be called as a witness against 
him, but he was also lying to his aides whom he admitted could 
be called.
    This is from Mr. Blumenthal's testimony on June 4.

    The First Lady said that she was distressed that the 
President was being attacked, in her view, for political 
motives, for his ministry of a troubled person. She said that 
the President ministers to troubled people all the time . . . 
and he does so out of religious conviction and personal 
temperament. . . .
    And the First Lady said he had done this dozens if not 
hundreds of times with people, the President came from a broken 
home and this was very hard to prevent him from trying to 
minister to these troubled people.
    So I related that conversation to the President. . . . And 
I said to him that I understand that you . . . want to minister 
to troubled people, that you feel compassionate, but that part 
of the problem with troubled people is that they're . . . 
troubled. . . .
    I said, ``However, you're President and these troubled 
people can just get you in incredible messes . . . you have to 
cut yourself off from them.''
    And he said, [meaning the President, he said,] ``It's very 
difficult for me to do that, given how I am. I want to help 
people.''

    Then Mr. Blumenthal testified that the President said Dick 
Morris suggested that the President go on television and admit 
in a national address whatever he may have done wrong.
    Once again Mr. Blumenthal testified:

    And I said to the President, ``What have you done wrong?'' 
And he said, ``Nothing. I haven't done anything wrong.'' [And] 
I said, ``Well, then, that's one of the stupidest ideas I've 
ever heard. Why would you do that if you've done nothing 
wrong?''
    And it was at that point that he gave his account of what 
happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. 
He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand 
on me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road 
before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going 
to do that again.''
    She threatened him. She said that she would tell people 
they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among 
her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or 
said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker 
anymore.
    And I repeated to the President that he really needed never 
to be near people who were troubled like this, that it was 
just--he needed not to be near troubled people like this. And I 
said, ``You need to find some sure footing here, some solid 
ground.''
    And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel 
like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is 
creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel 
like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.''
    And I said to him, I said, ``When this happened with Monica 
Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within 
eyesight or earshot of someone.''
    I said, ``You know, there are press reports that you made 
phone calls to her and that there's voice mail. Did you make 
phone calls to her?''
    He said that he remembered calling her when Betty Currie's 
brother died and that he left a message on her voice machine 
that Betty's brother had died and he said she was close to 
Betty and had been very kind to Betty. And that's what he 
recalled.

    And then in his June 24 deposition, Mr. Blumenthal expanded 
on this thinking. He was asked the question:

    In your conversation with the President when he stated that 
Monica Lewinsky threatened to disclose an affair, or fabricate 
an affair in a public disclosure, did you understand him to be 
saying that if the President didn't concede or didn't agree to 
have some [type] of sexual contact with her, that she would 
report an affair?
    A. My understanding was that she demanded to have sexual 
relations. He rejected her. And she said that--this is--I 
recall him saying--that, ``They called me the Stalker.'' That's 
what Lewinsky said. ``And if I can say we had an affair, then 
they won't call me that,'' something like that.
    Q. Now, you previously characterized Ms. Lewinsky's 
comments to the President as a threat, if you will?
    A. Right, yeah, I would interpret--that's my understanding.

    Then Mr. Blumenthal told the grand jury about the impact 
the President's emphatic denials had upon his state of mind--
the mind of a potential grand jury witness.

    Q. In response to my question how you responded to the 
President's story about a threat or discussion about a threat 
from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you didn't recall 
specifically. Do you recall generally the nature of your 
response to the President?

    Answer by Mr. Blumenthal:

    I was generally sympathetic to the President. And I 
certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he 
was pouring out his heart, and I believed him. . . .
    Q. Did the President explain to you what Monica Lewinsky's 
trouble was that he was helping?
    A. No.
    Q. And you never asked him?
    A. No.
    Q. Did anyone else, including the First Lady, tell you what 
Monica Lewinsky's trouble was that the President was 
ministering about?
    A. No. . . .
    Q. What did you understand the President to mean by, he had 
done nothing wrong?
    A. My understanding was that the accusation against him, 
which appeared in the press that day, was false, that he had 
not done anything wrong.
    Q. That he had not had any sort of sexual relationship?
    A. He had not had a sexual relationship with her and had 
not sought to obstruct justice or suborn perjury.

    Mr. Blumenthal then went on to say he then asked the 
President about some of these reports that there were phone 
calls between him and Monica Lewinsky.

    Q. Did the President say anything to you about telephone 
calls with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. As I testified, I had said to him that there were 
reports that his voice was on her voice mail, her tape machine 
at home to take message--message machine. And he said to me 
that he could recall that after Betty's brother died he may 
have called Monica because Monica had been very close to Betty. 
And Betty didn't have a way of relating to her that her brother 
had died, so that he had called and left a message that Betty's 
brother died.
    Q. Did he suggest to you that that was the only call he had 
ever made to Monica Lewinsky?
    A. That's the only one he told me about.
    Q. Did you ask him if there were any more calls than that?
    A. He said that's the only one he could remember.

    Well, we now know certainly from White House logs that 
``the only one the President remembered'' isn't quite true, 
that in fact I believe it was over 50 telephone conversations 
between the President and Monica Lewinsky. And it begs the 
question: Why was the President, on the day this story broke, 
pulling his aides in to relay information that the President 
knew was patently false when he knew that they were potential 
witnesses before the grand jury?
    Now, it is important to remember that this testimony from 
Mr. Blumenthal was given 1 month before Monica Lewinsky decided 
to opt to cooperate with the Office of Independent Counsel. 
Thus, these questions were asked of him in a vacuum without the 
benefit of Ms. Lewinsky's extensive testimony, as well as the 
President's own grand jury testimony. And the House managers 
agree that these and other areas need to be more fully explored 
with the gentleman under oath in light of the later revelations 
that occurred surrounding this case.
    Now, we know a couple of things. We know that the Monica 
Lewinsky story broke on January 21. We know that the President 
spoke to Sidney Blumenthal the very same day. We know that the 
President said he knew his aides could be potential witnesses 
before the grand jury. And we also know that Mr. Blumenthal was 
called three times before the grand jury--once in February, 
twice in June.
    There is an important question that was never asked Mr. 
Blumenthal during his testimony. It could not have been asked 
because at the time he testified, the revelation that the 
President shared with America in August and Monica Lewinsky's 
revelation had not yet been aired. If the President knew that 
Mr. Blumenthal was going to be a witness, a potential witness 
before the grand jury, if 6 months after this story broke the 
President presumably knew that his aide had gone down, not once 
but twice, to the grand jury, I would like to know from Mr. 
Blumenthal: Did the President ever come up to you and say 
something to you? Did he ever say to you: Do you remember that 
story I told you back in January? Well, now that you're 
actually going to be a witness, I know that you're going down 
to testify before the grand jury, I don't want you to give the 
grand jury a false impression. I don't want you to give false 
information to the grand jury. I don't want you to be a cog in 
the wheel of an obstruction of giving the grand jury the 
opportunity to hear the truth. I need to recant for you what I 
told you.
    There is no evidence of that. We would like to find that 
out. The only way we can do that is by deposing Mr. Blumenthal 
and hopefully bringing him in and sharing that information with 
this body.
    Another area we would like to inquire about is the area of 
a potential plan to destroy Monica Lewinsky if she ever decided 
to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. Mr. Blumenthal 
told the grand jury that, following the Monica Lewinsky news 
revelations, White House aides held twice-a-day staff 
briefings, at 8:30 in the morning and at 6:45 in the evening, 
every day to discuss, among other topics, the media impact of 
the Lewinsky scandal and how to deal with it in the press.
    Mr. Blumenthal testified that the primary purpose of these 
meetings was to discuss press strategy.
    In making his presentation to the Judiciary Committee last 
month, chief investigative counsel David Schippers related some 
of the quotes in the press following the Lewinsky story. I want 
to read a few paragraphs from Mr. Schippers' presentation:

    Worst of all, in order to win, it was necessary to convince 
the public, and hopefully, those grand jurors who read the 
newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the 
account given by Monica to Linda Tripp was believed, then there 
would be a tawdry affair in and near the oval office. Moreover, 
the President's own perjury and that of Monica Lewinsky would 
surface. How do you do this? Congressman Graham showed you. You 
employ the full power and credibility of the White House and 
the press corps of the White House to destroy the witness.

    Mr. Schippers then quoted from several news sources. Now, 
this is just a few days after the President told Mr. Blumenthal 
that Monica was known as ``the stalker.''

    Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best 
way to destroy ``that woman'' as President Clinton called 
Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly fanaticist 
or as a malicious stalker?

    Again, January 30:

    It's always very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this 
thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction 
and take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent 
relationship in which the President was a victim of someone, 
rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.

    From another source:

    One White House aide called reporters to offer information 
about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problem, and what the 
aide said was her nickname ``the stalker.''

    Just hours after the story broke, one White House source 
made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the troubled 
product of divorced parents.
    And the reference goes on and on. You can find the complete 
reference in the committee report.
    Now the question is, Was this a mere coincidence that the 
President's false statements to Mr. Blumenthal about Monica 
Lewinsky being a ``stalker'' quickly found their way into press 
accounts, even though those accounts are attributed by the 
press to sources inside the White House? The answer to the 
question is, yes, it is a coincidence, according to White House 
counsel. And we heard that from them just 3 days ago. Mr. Ruff 
said in his presentation, and I am quoting:

    The White House, the President, the President's agents, the 
President's spokespersons, no one has ever trashed, threatened, 
maligned, or done anything else to Monica Lewinsky. No one.

    Mr. Blumenthal needs to be questioned now under the light 
of the facts as we now know them. All we have from Mr. 
Blumenthal are the facts as he testified before the revelations 
saw the light of day, and he needs to be questioned for the 
benefit of those who must make a determination of credibility 
and the determination of guilt or innocence. This is the reason 
we have included Mr. Blumenthal on our proposed list. He is 
just one example of several aides whose testimony is already 
before you in the record. But we believe it would be beneficial 
not only for the body to hear him but certainly to question him 
in light of the revelations that occurred following his grand 
jury testimony.
    Mr. Chief Justice, with that, we reserve the balance of our 
time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Counsel Kendall for the White House.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentleman of the Senate, House managers, the purpose of the 
managers' motion, and what I am going to address, is whether 
you need to add any evidence to the record before you. And that 
is all I am going to address. Now, I am tempted--it is like 
waving a red flag at the bull--to take on the substantive 
arguments that have been presented here as to why the President 
is guilty. I am going to refrain from doing that, but my 
refraining from doing that is not because I agree with them but 
that we have already addressed them. I think here that the 
proper procedure is to just address the need for new evidence 
to add to the record before you.
    The managers' case is in no way--no way--harmed by being 
unable to call witnesses at this point. The independent counsel 
conducted a wide-ranging investigation. It was intense. It was 
comprehensive of every conceivable allegation against the 
President after the Lewinsky publicity erupted on January 21, 
1998. In the record of publicly available materials, which the 
Senate has asked the House managers to certify, the actual 
number of pages is somewhat understated because, as I mentioned 
before, frequently four or five pages of transcript are 
reproduced on a single page of the bound. But, in fact, there 
are over 10,000 pages of grand jury testimony, over 800 pages 
of other testimony such as depositions, 3,400 pages of 
documentary evidence, 1,800 pages of audio transcripts, and 
800-some pages of FBI interviews.
    The Office of Independent Counsel has an unlimited budget 
with unlimited investigative resources, ranging from the FBI to 
private investigators. Its agents interviewed people all over 
the country, used several different grand juries, conducted 
hundreds of interviews, even called people back from abroad. If 
the OIC could have turned up anything that was negative or 
prejudicial, it would be in those volumes. You can rest assured 
that they did their best to find that evidence.
    The Starr team has been fully supportive of the pro 
impeachment forces in the House of Representatives--indeed, so 
supportive that the independent counsel's ethics advisory 
professor, Sam Dash, resigned to protest Mr. Starr's zealous 
advocacy of the impeachment of the President.
    Just this week, Mr. Starr and his staff have aggressively 
continued to support the House managers during these Senate 
proceedings. Some commentators have commented that the 
independent counsel is, perhaps, the honorary 14th House 
manager.
    Now, I rehash this all not to cast aspersions at Mr. Starr 
but to remind the Senate that after 5 years and $50 million 
President Clinton may be the most investigated person in 
America. I would certainly say this for Mr. Starr: He is 
thorough. He is thorough. After all the work that has been done 
for them by the independent counsel, there is simply no way 
that the House managers are prejudiced by not being able to add 
to this record at this point.
    Now, Mr. Manager McCollum repeated this morning that we are 
afraid of witnesses. We are not. We have reviewed in detail in 
our presentations what the evidence shows about both the 
perjury and the obstruction of justice allegation. We are not 
at all afraid of what the witnesses would say. Indeed, we know 
what they are going to say because it is all right there in the 
volumes before you. We think that you have everything there for 
the basis on which you can make a fair judgment and achieve a 
fair resolution. The managers' hope to call more witnesses is 
simply a product of their desire, their hope, their prayer, 
that something will come to rescue their case.
    Let's be clear about one thing: Any delay in the process 
necessary for us to have fair discovery is on their heads. Our 
point here is that there is simply no need to go outside this 
record because what you have before you is voluminous, and it 
is a completely adequate basis for your decision.
    As I pointed out the other day in the questioning period, 
the only thing left out of this record is evidence that might 
be exculpatory or helpful to the President. And if we must, we 
will as conscientious lawyers seek out that helpful additional 
evidence through discovery.
    This body has been scrupulously fair in these proceedings, 
and I am confident it will be fair concerning our need for 
discovery; if the ``genie'' of discovery is let out of the 
bottle and live witnesses are deemed to be appropriate, then we 
are going to need a fair period of time for our own discovery.
    But, again, the point today on this motion is that the 
managers have simply identified no particular need for 
witnesses, no specific areas of testimony that might contribute 
to what is already in the record and, indeed, no material 
questions--you can always think of questions that were 
unasked--but no material questions, given the allegation in the 
two articles that are not in the record before you.
    Just recall, in the House the managers believed that this 
was an adequate record to come to you and urge removal of the 
President. They rested on that record in the House, and they 
impeached an elected President on the basis of that record. 
They cannot now complain that it is, for some reason, unfair to 
submit this same record to you for judgment at this point. We 
are not afraid of or reluctant to call witnesses, but we think 
that at the end of the day, the addition of more testimony from 
the three witnesses you have heard about won't affect any 
evidentiary judgment you have to make.
    Mr. Manager Barr declared during his presentation a week 
ago Friday, on January 15, that this was in fact a relatively 
simple case, although we, the White House lawyers, would try to 
nitpick the evidence. He told you that what we have before us, 
Senators and Mr. Chief Justice, is really not complex--
critically important, yes, but not essentially complex. The 
able House managers have kept insisting on their need for 
witnesses, but they haven't indicated what substantial, 
material, and relevant questions the witnesses would be asked 
which haven't already been asked or why such questions are 
essential or even relevant to the resolution of this 
proceeding.
    Frankly, I think this is because there just aren't that 
many more questions to ask of these witnesses. Mr. Manager 
McCollum kind of let the cat out of the bag on this one when, a 
week ago Friday, he told you, ``I don't know what the witnesses 
will say, but I assume if they are consistent, they will say 
the same thing that's in here.''
    I was surprised at some of the statements the managers made 
during the questioning period on Friday and Saturday. Mr. 
Bryant said, ``We would very much like to talk to some of these 
witnesses.'' And he added, ``It is very critical that you talk 
to the witness before having that witness testify.'' Mr. 
Manager McCollum stated, ``As a matter of fact, we think we 
would have been incompetent and derelict as presenters of the 
evidence if we hadn't talked to them first.'' Just this Sunday 
Mr. Manager Hyde, on ``Meet the Press,'' observed that the 
purpose of the court-ordered Office of Independent Counsel's 
chaperoned interview of Ms. Lewinsky last Sunday was to get a 
sense of what kind of a witness she would make.
    I say this respectfully, but I am duty-bound to observe 
that it is, in fact, a dereliction of duty to have come this 
far in the process, to have made this serious set of charges as 
have been made against the President to seek his removal and 
not to have talked to the witnesses on whom they purport to 
rely. How can they have come this far and now tell you: Oh, 
yes, we now need to meet face to face with the witnesses? We 
don't know what they sound like, how credible they will be, but 
we have rested our judgment on this. We need to see them 
personally.
    This procedure, I submit to you, is just backward. First, 
they filed the charges, which have been spoon fed by Mr. Starr. 
They don't bother to check these out; they take them at face 
value, and now they finally want to talk to the witnesses, and 
they again use Mr. Starr to threaten Ms. Lewinsky with 
imprisonment unless she cooperates with them.
    Now, it is no answer to say that the witnesses didn't want 
to talk to us. There was a way to talk to them in the House of 
Representatives, and that was through the subpoena power that 
the House could have used if they had wanted to talk to their 
witnesses, if they had fulfilled the obligation they had before 
they proffered these charges to you.
    This has been a partisan process on the part of the House 
managers. In the House, they had the votes. They didn't think 
they needed to talk to witnesses. When you have the votes and 
the independent counsel on your side, you don't need to 
independently develop the evidence. Indeed, Sunday, on CNN, Mr. 
Manager Cannon provided some insight----
    Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Arkansas.
    Mr. HUTCHINSON. I object to White House counsel's continual 
reference to comments made on television programs which are 
outside the record before the Senate.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is on a motion to call additional 
witnesses, and the argument has been very free form and kind of 
far reaching. I think this is a permissible comment, so I 
overrule the objection.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I think 
Mr. Manager Cannon's comments did provide some insight into the 
need for witnesses or the justification for witnesses here. He 
noted that the Republicans had lost five seats in the November 
election, and he went on to say that, accordingly, the 
Republicans felt a need to speedily complete impeachment in the 
lame duck session before the 106th began its session. He said, 
``Republicans on the Judiciary Committee were committed to 
being done by the time we got done,'' and that is where we got 
on that track with no witnesses.
    Now, they are trying to take a different track, and I think 
it comes from desperation. You have had the case analyzed 
before you; you have had the evidence in the case assessed. I 
think it has been demolished in an adversary proceeding.
    The House managers are like the character in ``David 
Copperfield,'' Mr. Micawber, who was always hoping that 
something would turn up. They continue to hope that something 
will turn up for them. They don't know what it is, but they 
believe they will know it when they see it and they hope if, 
for the first time in these proceedings, they actually talk to 
the witnesses on whom they have relied, they will find 
something to persuade you to overcome the evidence in the 
record.
    Now the managers have said, ``Well, we told the White House 
that they could have called witnesses in the House if they 
wanted to, and they chose not to do so, so it is really their 
fault.'' I respectfully submit to you that only in the world of 
Franz Kafka do you have to present evidence of your own 
innocence before you even hear the charges or the allegations 
against you.
    It was the burden of the House to establish, by an adequate 
evidentiary basis, a case for impeaching the President. They 
failed to do that, I respectfully submit. They are a little 
like a blackjack player who sees 20 on the table and has 19 and 
is going to try to draw that 2, hoping against the odds. Here 
they are simply gambling. And gambling may have its place as a 
recreation, but I don't think it has a place in this 
impeachment trial when the fate of the President is at stake.
    Now, I don't want to be uncharitable to the House 
managers--and they are able--but I think it is perhaps 
appropriate to remind you, as my partner Ms. Seligman did in 
her argument yesterday, that in their own Chamber the House 
managers sang a very different song about the need for 
witnesses. And to be fair, this was not just one manager; they 
sang as kind of a barbershop chorus. Most of them are on the 
record to this effect, and I think the very best witnesses you 
have about the need for witnesses are the House managers 
themselves.
    Let's listen to some of the comments of the managers on 
whether live witnesses needed to be heard to supplement the 
evidence in the many volumes already gathered by the 
independent counsel.
    For example, on November 5, Mr. Manager Hyde said:

    We believe the most relevant witnesses have already 
testified at length about the matters in issue, and in the 
interest of finishing our expeditious inquiry we will not 
require most of them to come before us to repeat their 
testimony.

    He added that, ``[Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp] have 
already testified under oath. We have their testimony. We don't 
need to reinvent the wheel.''
    The very next day, on November 6, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

    Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already 
concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no 
purpose at all.

    On December 1, during a hearing before the House Judiciary 
Committee at which the committee received testimony concerning 
the consequences of perjury and related crime, Mr. Manager 
Chabot stated:

    We could call more and more and more witnesses. We are 
trying to get this wrapped up as expeditiously as possible. I 
think both sides want to do that. If we call more witnesses and 
drag this on into next year, then they are going to scream 
because they say we are on a fishing expedition, we have 
already got enough evidence.

    At that same period, Mr. Manager Canady said, of the need 
for witnesses:

    Now, we do have a responsibility to make certain that we 
act on a solid basis. We should not move forward with articles 
of impeachment on the basis of insubstantial evidence. I think 
all of us agree on that. The fact of the matter is that we have 
a mountain of sworn testimony. . . .

    On December 9, Congressman Coble, who was a member of the 
House Judiciary Committee, told us during our presentation on 
behalf of the White House:

    Mr. Ruff, I want to address a couple of myths and one myth 
is that we have no evidence because there have been no fact 
witnesses called . . .

    Five volumes sit alongside me. These are the same five 
volumes that are at our table that contain sworn testimony 
before a criminal grand jury, FBI interviews, depositions and 
other materials.
    Mr. Manager Hyde made two statements on the floor of the 
House of Representatives during the debate over the articles of 
impeachment which I think bear quotation here.
    On December 18, Mr. Manager Hyde stated:

    We had the facts, and we had them under oath. We had Ms. 
Lewinsky's heavily corroborated testimony under a grant of 
immunity that would be revoked if she lied; we accepted that. . 
. .

    And then the next day, on Saturday, December 19, Mr. 
Manager Hyde stated:

    No fact witnesses, I have heard that repeated again and 
again. Look, we had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand 
jury, from depositions, from statements under oath. That is 
testimony that we can believe and accept. We chose to believe 
it and accept it. Why reinterview Betty Currie to take another 
statement when we already have her statement? Why interview 
Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under oath, and with 
a grant of immunity that if she lied, she would forfeit?

    ``Why interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement 
under oath, and with a grant of immunity that if she lied, she 
would forfeit.''
    After the House voted its two articles of impeachment, the 
House managers still saw no need for live witnesses. On 
December 29, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

    We are going to make the case that there is already enough 
testimony under oath, in one grand jury testimony and 
affidavits.

    Then again, a week later, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

    In my judgment, there might not be any real rationale for 
calling Linda Tripp or Betty Currie or Vernon Jordan if the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky is accepted as being what she 
offered on grand jury terms.

    Roll Call reported on January 7 that Mr. Manager Cannon 
stated, regarding calling Ms. Currie as a witness in the Senate 
trial:

    I am reluctant to call [Ms. Currie] because it's a rotten, 
nasty thing to do to a public servant.

    When confronted with this inconsistency, the managers, who 
are talented attorneys and successful Congressmen, have all 
argued, ``Oh, well. The forum has changed,'' as if it is no big 
deal for the House to impeach a President without witnesses. 
But it would be unconscionable for the Senate to acquit the 
President without first doing the ``rotten, nasty thing''--Mr. 
Manager Cannon's phrase--to some witnesses. How can you have a 
trial, they protest, without witnesses? One might ask, How can 
you have a hearing without witnesses? But the House did. How 
can you impeach a President without witnesses? The House showed 
you.
    Finally, it is instructive to note that when the managers 
were presenting their case in the House in the Judiciary 
Committee, they did not declare that they would insist on 
witnesses when they got to the Senate. They did not tell their 
colleagues, We will not need witnesses in the House because we 
will have them in the Senate. No. They rushed this through the 
House because they had the votes and now they want to delay in 
the Senate because they are afraid they don't have the votes.
    There is no reason, we respectfully submit, to delay this 
Chamber, to drag out these proceedings and defer doing the 
business of the American people.
    I would like to discuss each of the five categories. I will 
call them categories. There are three witnesses. Then there are 
the two affidavits, and then there are the telephone records. 
There are really six. I would like to discuss these in terms of 
whether they add anything, or whether the managers have made a 
proffer that they add anything to the record which is now 
before you because I think that is the question you have to 
determine.
    On this motion, you are not voting whether substantively to 
convict the President. You are simply determining, Is the 
record adequate?
    Let's first take Ms. Lewinsky. On Sunday, the House 
managers, with the gentle assistance of the independent counsel 
prosecutors, were able to interview Ms. Lewinsky after 
schlepping her across the country from California. They did so 
despite the fact that the Senate had established by a 100-to-0 
vote a procedure for the orderly calling of witnesses after 
discussion and debate. They did so after declining to interview 
Ms. Lewinsky at any time during the House proceedings when they 
could have compelled her appearance by the House subpoena 
power. And they did so without providing us here with any 
reliable record for what that ``talk-fest'' on Sunday may have 
produced.
    Newspaper reports indicate that the managers did not take 
notes. You will recall, of course, that during the questioning 
period on Saturday they explicitly rejected a request they 
received during the question period that they provide either an 
unedited transcript or a videotape of that interview to be sure 
that the interview would be open to scrutiny for fairness, and 
ascertain whether Ms. Lewinsky in that interview really did add 
anything to the record. They declined to do that. But when they 
emerged from the Mayflower Hotel on Sunday, after meeting for 
their sidewalk press conference, we heard some general 
statements generally commending Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Manager 
Bryant called her ``an impressive person.'' Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson praised her ``intelligence and poise.''
    I thought to myself, where have we heard that before about 
Ms. Lewinsky? It was deja vu all over again. Of course, we 
heard from Mr. Jordan, from Ambassador Richardson, and from the 
people who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky for a job in New York. It 
is helpful that the House managers have now at least confirmed 
those observations in the record.
    At their press conference we heard the managers make some 
abstract pronouncements about what Ms. Lewinsky was going to 
add--she would be a valuable witness; she would be a helpful 
witness; and it was a productive meeting and a benefit to our 
case.
    That is what we heard. But Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Plato 
Cacheris, threw, if I might say, some cold water on those happy 
and optimistic pronouncements. It could not have been clearer 
in his comments that, not surprisingly, nothing new whatsoever 
had emerged from that session. You really didn't hear that. I 
think the House managers were quite honest about the session 
because you heard nothing about what had emerged from that 
today.
    Mr. Cacheris told the press conference--some of you may 
have seen it: Ms. Lewinsky answered all their questions; there 
was nothing new; she added nothing to the record that is 
already sitting before the Senate. She shouldn't be called to 
the Senate to testify.
    The New York Times reported yesterday that after the 
interview, Ms. Lewinsky told a friend: It went really well; I 
feel positive about it, but I didn't have anything new to say.
    Now, according to the Washington Post, the managers were 
focused on making sure Ms. Lewinsky had no intention of 
changing her testimony. The Washington Post went on to confirm 
that she did not indicate any desire to change her testimony in 
any way. And the Post article continues that, in fact, Lewinsky 
reaffirmed her grand jury statement that no one ever asked her 
to lie or offered her a job in exchange for a false affidavit 
in the Jones case.
    Now, as you are well aware, Ms. Lewinsky was interviewed 
extensively by the Office of Independent Counsel. She testified 
twice before the grand jury. She gave a lengthy deposition to 
the prosecutors. She was extensively interviewed by the agents. 
There are over 20 interview reports.
    I should also add that a great deal of this comes after the 
President was examined in the grand jury on August 17. Ms. 
Lewinsky has given detailed and explicit testimony, 
particularly in her August 26 deposition, as to her account of 
the physical relationship she had with the President. Nothing 
at all would be added by further interrogation of her. Nothing 
could be gained by repetition in a Senate deposition or in the 
well of this body by a repetition of that testimony.
    I confess I don't fully understand--I seem to hear Mr. 
Manager Bryant and Mr. Manager McCollum say slightly different 
things about what they intend to present in the way of Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony. The record on that is what it is. But 
whenever I hear somebody tell me, as the very able Mr. Manager 
Bryant did, they don't need to cross-examine, really, I am 
reminded of what Senator Bumpers said, and he got it from H.L. 
Mencken, who probably got it from somebody else: The more they 
say they don't have to cross-examine, the more need I feel to 
cross-examine.
    I don't know what they intended to do there, but in the 
grand jury the President plainly acknowledged an improper 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He declined to answer further 
key questions about that. The Office of Independent Counsel did 
not seek either to compel him or to issue a new grand jury 
subpoena which would cause the President to come back and go 
through those explicit details.
    The testimony is what it is, and I don't think anything 
further from Ms. Lewinsky is going to in any material way 
affect it or even add to it.
    With regard to some of the conflicts that are there, I 
think we have addressed those in the question period. I am not 
going to go over them again in full. Did the improper 
relationship begin in November? Did it begin 6 or 7 weeks 
later? That conflict is utterly immaterial, I respectfully 
submit, in view of what the parties have acknowledged. Mr. 
Manager Hyde, indeed, stated in a House Judiciary Committee 
hearing on December 1 that that particular point did not strike 
him as a terribly serious count, and I agree with that.
    The managers have claimed, Mr. Manager Hutchinson claimed 
this morning, that there is a contradiction in the testimony of 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky with regard to cover stories. 
This is not true. We have gone over that again and again. There 
is nothing that links this testimony to any deposition in the 
Jones case. These were discussed, the record shows, in a 
nonlegal context.
    I don't think there is anything further to be gained from 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that is not already there in the 
record.
    Let's take Mr. Vernon Jordan. Mr. Manager Hutchinson was 
kind enough to leave up here his copies of Mr. Vernon Jordan's 
five appearances before the grand jury. He held them up on a 
chart. I think it is proper to point out that Mr. Jordan's 
testimony runs over 900 pages. On March 3, the transcript is 
196 pages; 2 days later, on March 5, with the transcript 
running to 212 pages, Mr. Jordan emerged from the grand jury, 
and he made the following statement which I would like to play 
for you:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    First of all it is a fact that I helped Monica Lewinsky 
find private employment in New York. Secondly, it is a fact 
that I took Monica Lewinsky to a very competent lawyer, Frank 
Carter, here in Washington, D.C. And thirdly, it is a fact that 
I kept the President of the United States informed about my 
activities. I want to say two further things. One is I did not 
in any way tell her, encourage her, to lie. And secondly that 
my efforts to find her a job were not a quid pro quo for the 
affidavit that she signed.

    Mr. Jordan testified a third time before the grand jury on 
May 5, and that transcript runs to 285 pages. Finally, he 
testified two more times, on May 28, for 128 pages, and he 
observed as he exited the grand jury room, if we could have the 
videotape again:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    For the fourth time I have answered every question over and 
over and over again. I suspect, however that I will have to 
answer the same questions over and over and over again.

    And guess what. Mr. Jordan was clairvoyant because he was 
called back to the grand jury for a fifth time on June 9. He 
said as he exited:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    When I came here in March, early March, I said that I 
helped Ms. Lewinsky get a lawyer. I helped her get a job. I had 
assurances that there was no sexual relationship and I did not 
tell her to lie. That was the truth then. And that is the truth 
today. And I've testified five times, over and over again to 
those truths.

    One of the justifications Mr. Manager Hutchinson offered 
for calling Mr. Jordan was to explore an alleged conflict 
between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky over whether Mr. Jordan had 
told her to go home and make sure that notes she had been 
keeping were not there. Here, I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson is 
referencing a statement that Ms. Lewinsky made in her proffer 
to the Office of Independent Counsel describing her 
recollection of a breakfast she believed she had with Mr. 
Jordan. It is in the appendix volume at page 716.
    Now, the thing to note, ladies and gentlemen, about this 
statement is its date. Ms. Lewinsky said this on February 1, 
1998. She had written then that she expressed concern about Ms. 
Tripp to Mr. Jordan and that Ms. Tripp may have seen notes when 
she was in Ms. Lewinsky's house. According to the offer, ``Mr. 
Jordan asked if the notes were from the President. Ms. Lewinsky 
said that they were notes to the President. Mr. Jordan 
suggested to Ms. Lewinsky,'' the proffer says, ``that she check 
to make sure they were not there, or something to that 
effect,'' from Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now, contrary to this supposed conflict, Mr. Jordan was 
never asked in the grand jury on any of the five occasions he 
was there--all of which, I remind you, were after this February 
1 proffer about this matter. He wasn't asked about it. It 
doesn't concern the President, in any event. And I think, most 
importantly, it is nowhere alleged, if you look in the actual 
articles--if you look at article II, nowhere is this 
conversation alleged in any way as a basis for impeachment, a 
basis for charging the President with obstruction. I think in 
fact it is a gratuitous smear of Mr. Jordan. And it certainly 
does not provide a basis for extending this proceeding to ask 
him questions about it.
    Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson also claims that there is a 
conflict between the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan 
on the issue of whether they discussed specific changes that 
were subsequently made in her affidavit. He said to you that he 
thought that was a basis for calling them as witnesses. 
However, the record is clear--it could not be clearer--that the 
idea of certain deletions in the affidavit came from Ms. 
Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Frank Carter.
    As I mentioned in my presentation on Thursday, Ms. Lewinsky 
discussed that she had talked to Mr. Jordan about some 
affidavit changes and he told her: Go talk to your lawyer.
    In any event, Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Frank Carter, 
testified unequivocally to the grand jury: I don't recall 
Vernon ever asking me the substance of what Monica told me or 
tried to talk about the substance of what Monica told me. He 
clearly never told me how I should proceed or what I should do.
    Mr. Carter further testified that paragraph 6 of the 
affidavit in its draft form, the last part of the sentence, 
``has certain words about the private meeting.''
    That paragraph, Mr. Carter--Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer--
testified, was modified when we sat down in my office on 
January 7. He further testified that it was his idea before 
that meeting to take it out because he didn't want to give Ms. 
Jones' lawyers any hint of a one-on-one meeting.
    There is simply no basis to call Mr. Vernon Jordan once 
again to have him go through the things he has testified about 
a great many times already.
    Now we come to Sidney Blumenthal. Mr. Manager Rogan very 
ably argued that there was a need to call Mr. Blumenthal 
because of Mr. Blumenthal's testimony as to what the President 
had told him, Sidney Blumenthal, in the aftermath of the 
explosion of publicity over the Lewinsky matter in January a 
year ago.
    First of all, there is no conflict here that is material 
because the President has never disputed Mr. Blumenthal or his 
aide's accounts of this conversation. Any dispute is wholly 
immaterial as to the two counts--the two articles of 
impeachment. The President was examined extensively about this 
subject in his own grand jury testimony and he testified as to 
what he tried to say. But he also added that in this period 
things were a ``blur'' is a term he used one time; ``a 
blizzard'' was a term he used another time--that he had 
discussions with a number of his aides, including Mr. 
Blumenthal, he tried to be careful in what he said, he thought 
he was technically accurate, but he would not dispute and did 
not dispute their characterizations of what they recalled of 
the conversations with him.
    Again, Mr. Blumenthal--Mr. Rogan pointed this out--
testified three times before the grand jury. His recollection 
of his conversations with the President has been analyzed in 
detail and a further round of deposition would add nothing of 
substance to that testimony. Indeed, the President's speech to 
the Nation the day of his grand jury testimony, when he spoke 
to the Nation on the evening of August 17, also represented an 
acknowledgment by the President that he had misled his aides, 
such as Sidney Blumenthal.
    As I indicated last Thursday, however, any statements to 
the White House staff could have had no impact whatsoever on 
the Paula Jones case, as article II alleges each of the seven 
grounds has, because Mr. Blumenthal had no firsthand knowledge 
of the President's relation with Ms. Lewinsky. He could only 
report to the grand jury what the President had told him, 
however misleading those statements of the President may have 
been at the time. There is no dispute here, there is no 
material reason to call Mr. Blumenthal, except to try to 
embarrass the President by the presentation of testimony from a 
member of his senior staff.
    Now, the next two things that the managers would seek to 
add to the record are not, they tell you, live witness 
testimony. But don't let that fool you. They want to put in two 
sworn declarations--like an affidavit--from two people. One of 
them is a Mr. Wesley Holmes, a lawyer for Ms. Paula Jones, and 
the other is Mr. Barry Ward.
    Now, I don't have the pleasure of knowing Mr. Wesley 
Holmes, but I do know Mr. Barry Ward. He is a very intelligent, 
very hard-working and knowledgeable young lawyer in Little 
Rock, AR, who works as a law clerk for Chief Judge Wright. He 
has got an encyclopedic knowledge of Razorback athletic lore. 
He has a lot of fine characteristics. He is very helpful as a 
law clerk and gets information to you and back very 
efficiently. But there is one thing Mr. Ward is not, and I am 
sure he would agree, a mind reader. He is not a mind reader. 
There were a number of people in the room at the deposition. 
None of them were mind readers. They could all give their 
testimony about what they thought was going through the 
President's mind. The President has addressed that a number of 
times. You have seen the videotape.
    Now, the second witness is exceedingly interesting, and 
that is Mr. Holmes. And Mr. Holmes would give a sworn 
declaration to, among other things, say what he had in mind 
when he issued the witness subpoena to Betty Currie, which was 
days after the President's conversation with her on December 
18.
    Well, he would be a very interesting witness to depose, let 
me tell you. This is one of Paula Jones' lawyers talking about 
offering a declaration about his litigation strategy. And I 
think the opportunity to depose him would provide a great deal 
of information about what really motivated the events of 
January 1998. I think we could show that there were a number of 
connections between the independent counsel, Linda Tripp, and 
the Paula Jones lawyers. But I don't think you need to get into 
that briar patch because Mr. Holmes is not a mind reader any 
more than Mr. Ward is. You simply don't need that testimony to 
illuminate the record.
    Before I leave that, let me make the point that while the 
managers would like very much to throw in a couple of sworn 
declarations, you should be assured of our need to take 
discovery and, in Mr. Holmes' case, take comprehensive 
discovery. I don't think anything in S. Res. 16--I don't know 
if you have gotten to this, but I don't read the resolution as 
authorizing simple hearsay evidence.
    We would need to depose the Paula Jones lawyers in some 
detail, and I think they have now waived significant legal 
protections that would make that possible.
    Finally, there was a category of telephone records. It is a 
little hard to address that category. Those are just documents. 
I don't think the record need be expanded by their addition, 
and I will tell you why.
    Telephone records, as I said the other day, really tell you 
nothing, unless it is very important to time, to date a 
particular call. They really are inscrutable. You have to have 
the witness testify about what they mean. I don't see anything 
in there that would justify opening the record to add certain 
telephone records.
    Finally, I want to be candid with you. I don't want to be 
alarmist. I want to be honest, though, about what opening the 
door for discovery will mean for this process. I said before 
that the Senate had been fair in these proceedings, and it has 
been fair. I think the identification of a specific record 
which the parties could agree on, have in the sunlight, talk 
about, argue about, was the fair thing to do and the right 
thing to do. I think if discovery is inevitable, we will 
anticipate and believe that you will be fair in allowing us the 
discovery we are going to need.
    I ask you, if you would, to read our trial memorandum 
because at pages 124 to 130 we have set forth there our need 
for discovery. It is not a new invention. Should the Senate 
decide to authorize the House managers to call additional 
witnesses live in this proceeding or have the depositions 
taken, we will be faced with a critical need for the discovery 
of evidence useful to our defense.
    I made the point that the discovery of evidence in the 
Office of the Independent Counsel proceeding was--not to put 
too fine a point on it--not aimed at getting us exculpatory or 
helpful evidence. We need to be able to do that. We have never 
had the kind of compulsory process, the kind of ability to 
subpoena documents and witnesses that you will have in a garden 
variety civil case. We have not had access to a great deal, 
many thousands of pages of evidence which is, first of all, in 
the hands of the House managers that they got from the Office 
of Independent Counsel, but did not put into the public record, 
did not print up. We also need discovery of those other 
documents, witness testimony transcripts, interview notes, 
other materials, which may be helpful or exculpatory that are 
in the hands of the independent counsel.
    Our dilemma is this: We do not know what we do not know. 
That is what discovery means. You have to get discovery so you 
can find out what is available. It may not necessarily prolong 
a trial, but it makes you able to defend your client in the way 
you have to be able to do so as a lawyer. It doesn't turn on 
the number of witnesses.
    The calling of these witnesses produces a need in us to be 
ready to examine them, to cross-examine them. It initiates a 
process that leaves us unprepared and exposed unless we have 
adequate discovery. This is a proceeding, I need not remind 
you--I know everyone recognizes its gravity--to remove the 
President of the United States. You have to give us, and I 
believe you will, the discovery that will enable us to 
represent the President adequately, competently, and 
effectively.
    The sequence of discovery is also important. I want to be 
clear about that. It is all very well, and I recognize how it 
happens, for one side to say, ``Well, we are going to put on 
three witnesses and they can put on three witnesses.'' Ladies 
and gentlemen of the Senate, we don't know right now how to 
make a reasoned choice because we haven't had the discovery you 
would normally have to do that. We would first need to obtain 
and review the relevant documents. I have indicated where those 
are. We would then need to be able to depose relevant 
witnesses. We need to know whether the witness depositions that 
the House managers had taken would need to lead to other 
depositions there. Only at that point when we have had 
discovery of our witnesses will we be able to identify the 
witnesses we might want to call.
    This is a logical procedure, and I think those of you who 
have tried cases will recognize it as such. It is simply 
impossible from where we now are to see how a witness 
designated by the House managers can be fairly rebutted without 
ourselves having access to all of the available evidence.
    Given what is at stake, I think fundamental fairness 
requires fair discovery. We will be expeditious, but in the 
event the genie is out of the bottle, we need time, we need 
access to defend the President in the way any client ought to 
be defended.
    I think the Senate has wisely elected to proceed on a 
voluminous record, a record that is available for public 
scrutiny that was assembled by people not favorable to the 
President. I think you have enough evidence to make your 
decision on the basis of that record.
    But in the event you decide to expand it, affording us 
adequate discovery is essential if we are really going to 
practice the rule of law as I believe the Senate would intend 
for that rule of law to be practiced in its proceedings.
    But let me conclude by saying that I don't think, and I 
respectfully submit to you, that there is a need to prolong 
this process. We hope that you will render your decision in a 
manner that is speedy, and we are confident that you will 
decide to make that decision in a manner that is fair, and that 
this body will, as so often it has done in past times of 
crisis, be able to bring to the country both the closure and 
reconciliation that the country wants so very much. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Does counsel for the President have any 
more presentation?
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I reserve 
the remainder of my time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. No, you can't reserve it. It is open, 
respond, and rebuttal.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. I will then quitclaim the rest of my 
time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire how 
much rebuttal time we have remaining?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Thirty minutes.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I will be 
brief and ask other managers to come up and follow me. I have 
four quick points to make.
    Before I get into that, I want to thank my distinguished 
colleague from DC, Mr. Kendall. Over my practice of law for 
several years, I have received a number of jabs before in the 
courtroom but never so gentle and never so eloquently, and I 
thank you.
    I think his presentation was very good but probably makes 
the best illustration of why witnesses are needed in that he 
has chosen to use selective quotes. He likes to use those 
quotes and point to the managers over there where we were 
quoted without a real context and certainly that is what this 
hearing has been about so far, both sides picking and choosing 
among quotes that best illustrate the point we want to make at 
the time.
    Really, what we need is the big picture, the entire, 
complete picture that witnesses and only witnesses can provide 
in this case.
    Let me go back to a couple of the selective quotes, and 
those are the quotes that we made back in the House when we 
were involved in the proceedings which, I remind each one of 
you involved, are the very same stacks of books that they have 
shown you very often in the past as the record here and why do 
we need to go outside the record? That very same record was 
there in the House, and it was at that time Mr. Lowell, the 
minority counsel, was representing the President's interests, 
but also Mr. Kendall was there. In fact, both together examined 
Mr. Starr. That was when they were making the request for the 
witnesses, based on this very same record. Notwithstanding 
that, we need witnesses. I simply point that out to you to show 
you that Mr. Kendall and his very talented staff do not have a 
monopoly on consistency.
    Another example of selective quoting has to do with quotes 
made about our occasion to visit Ms. Lewinsky, to talk to her. 
This was the one witness we had not been able to talk to. He 
pulled those quotes out as if we needed to talk to all the 
witnesses. We don't need to talk to all the witnesses, but we 
just needed to sit down and talk with her. I might tell you she 
was ably represented by three attorneys. She had as many 
lawyers there as we did and perhaps more. So she was not 
imposed upon.
    In terms of my statement about discovery, I think I perhaps 
was misunderstood, but I certainly conceded the White House 
might want discovery to depose Ms. Lewinsky. But I still have a 
hard time determining why they would need to discover what Ms. 
Currie might want to say; she sat right outside the President's 
office every day, or what Mr. Jordan might say; he plays golf 
with Mr. Clinton every day, or Mr. Podesta, his former Chief of 
Staff.
    I am just trying to save this Senate some time on the 
question why we would need to go through discovery of those 
types of people.
    My last point I would like to make before I bring Mr. 
Hutchinson in is Mr. Kendall's point--and I am not sure where 
they were going but perhaps trying to worse case this 
situation--in terms of taking forever and a day to conclude all 
kinds of witnesses. He indicated we needed to take all the 
lawyers of Paula Jones and question her motivation. I suggest 
to you that a real clue for her motivation for this lawsuit, we 
could say, was the 850,000--reasons motivation she received the 
other day. But let me end with that note and bring up Mr. 
Hutchinson who will continue this process.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I 
will just take a moment.
    Mr. Kendall did an outstanding job, as he always does, of 
making his case for not calling witnesses. I thought the most 
compelling example as to why we need witnesses was the fact 
that he called a live witness, Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan 
testified here in this Chamber. Why did they not present a 
transcript? Why did he want to bring a live witness? Because it 
was real. It was alive. He was more meaningful than a 
transcript. He told the story in short, concise ways that I 
have not been able to do during my presentation during the last 
week. We would like to have the same opportunity, not through 
video but to present a live witness so that he could cross-
examine, so that we could question. I think that is a fair 
proceeding.
    Mr. Kendall raised the point that the statements about the 
notes that Ms. Lewinsky testified she discussed with Mr. Jordan 
were referenced in her February 1998 proffer. When I was making 
my point, I was referencing her August grand jury testimony, 
not the February proffer, because my recollection is that the 
February proffer that was submitted by Mr. Ginsburg had 
subsequently become a subject of litigation because we were not 
able to reach an immunity agreement. So perhaps that was the 
reason that subject was not inquired into by the independent 
counsel. For whatever reason, my review of the transcripts is 
that that subject was never broached with Mr. Jordan. I do not 
profess perfect knowledge of it, but that is my understanding 
of it.
    And then finally I want to also look at the discovery that 
Mr. Bryant referenced. There was a gambling illustration that 
Mr. Kendall used about blackjack. But another part of poker is 
bluffs. And I don't know whether they are bluffing. I don't 
know whether they are serious about all the discovery that they 
need to have. But I know that lawyers do that sometimes to 
intimidate, to scare you away.
    But I think even more important is that the House managers 
have submitted to the rules of the Senate. We were not 
particularly happy about all of them, but we recognized it was 
important to have legitimacy in this process. We accept that. 
We move on.
    I hope that whatever rules of discovery, whatever 
limitations you wish to put, whatever timeframes you wish to 
put, the White House counsel will be as amenable to the desire 
of this Senate and this Nation to conclude this as we have been 
in adopting what our desires are to your schedule.
    I yield to Mr. McCollum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
McCollum.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very 
much.
    I want to make a couple of observations, and one of them 
seems pretty apparent. Mr. Kendall says they are not afraid and 
I was wrong in characterizing them as being afraid--the White 
House counsel--of calling witnesses. But I am going to tell 
you, I cannot rationalize any other way why he would be out 
here to make the pitch as hard as he is against witnesses, 
especially the sort of threat that this is going to go on and 
on and on if we open the door and we call three witnesses. You 
know, we are down from thinking we ought to have 10, 12, maybe 
15 witnesses, to 3--Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney 
Blumenthal. And we have introduced three--or proposed to 
introduce three very simple pieces of new evidence. That can't 
take a lot of discovery, the need to go further than that. If 
he wants to produce witnesses, that is fine. But I just can't 
imagine why that opens that door.
    Mr. Holmes he talks about, the attorney. What is the 
significance of that declaration or affidavit, that sworn 
declaration that we would like you to take in that says, 
``well, we have to depose Mr. Holmes.'' That was put in very 
simply because counsel on the other side--I don't accuse them 
of doing it intentionally, but the other day they misled us, I 
think unintentionally misled you, on the idea that the 
President, at the time he left the deposition in the Jones case 
and went over to talk to Betty Currie the next day, didn't and 
couldn't have had any idea that she was going to be called as a 
witness. In fact, I think they said she never was on the 
witness list and she never was subpoenaed.
    What Mr. Holmes' declaration does, as I said earlier, is 
bring into the record the subpoena that in fact was issued 
within a day or so of that time of when Betty Currie was talked 
to. Remember, she was talked to twice, the notice about it and 
her name being put on the witness list--that is what that is 
all about--and a general explanation of why they chose, as 
attorneys, to make that case, why they chose to put her name 
out there, and subpoena her, so it is clear on the record.
    Very simple. If you look at it--and I am sure you will have 
it before you--his declaration is very short. It is about three 
paragraphs. And it goes straight to the point. And it encloses 
these accompanying documents.
    I don't think you should, for one minute, think it opens 
the door to some great big, gigantic discovery period. That is 
simply an idle threat to intimidate, in my judgment--with a 
proper intimidation effort, proper tactic; I don't accuse him 
of anything improper--to try to discourage you from letting us 
have these three witnesses.
    Second, I want to point out that with respect to some of 
the things that I said, one thing I did say earlier is I don't 
know what all the witnesses would say if we called them. I 
don't know what they all would say, certainly. But I would 
expect them all to be consistent with what they have already 
said in their sworn testimony. And there is nothing 
inconsistent with my expecting them to be consistent on the 
facts.
    We already know with that sworn testimony in the case of 
Monica Lewinsky--she has immunity--if she deviates and goes off 
of it, she can get herself in trouble. But by no means does my 
expectation that the testimony you already have will remain 
true mean that I don't think there are new things to be brought 
out or that you shouldn't have live witnesses here.
    I thought it interesting that Mr. Kendall totally ignored 
the one thing that was most significant, in my mind, and that 
is the whole idea that there is a need for witnesses out here 
to determine their credibility, to check their demeanor, to see 
how they respond to questioning, to do all of those things that 
I described earlier, that any reasonable attorney in any 
courtroom setting in this country in a criminal case--and you 
do have to decide whether the crimes were committed or not--
would expect to do. So you can, as my colleagues have said, 
look them in the eye and make that determination yourself. He 
didn't even address that. And I think that that alone is 
sufficiently good reason to have a live witness here, as I said 
before to you.
    So with that in mind, I will yield to Mr. Rogan.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, Mr. Kendall made a very able and strong presentation. 
It was particularly effective when he brought up a series of 
quotations from House Members and House managers talking about 
the need for witnesses or the lack thereof. It would be more 
effective if it were presented in context, but it could not be, 
because the context of every single one of those quotations was 
in reference to the distinction between the House's function as 
the accusatory body versus the Senate's constitutional function 
of being the body where an impeachment case is tried. There he 
blurs the distinction. That is why in the Constitution a 
President is impeached solely on the majority vote. But removal 
requires at the trial a two-thirds vote.
    Now, Mr. Kendall's presentation begs the question, did the 
founders get it wrong when they designed this process? Did the 
founders simply intend for us to waste our resources rather 
than conserve them and simply do the very same thing, first in 
one body and then in the other, with the sole distinction that 
the only difference would be the ultimate vote? That was not 
their intent. That was not the procedure established by the 
Constitution. And it is not the procedure recognized throughout 
the country in court proceedings.
    There is a reason why courts of inferior jurisdiction will 
be able to hold a defendant in a criminal case to answer for 
trial at a preliminary hearing based on hearsay testimony, 
based on transcripts, based solely on police reports.
    But that defendant at a trial has a constitutional right to 
come forward. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
is supremely guaranteed in the Constitution because the framers 
understood the difference, even if White House counsel refuses 
to acknowledge the difference.
    The argument they have really isn't with the House 
managers. Their argument is with the precedence of the House. 
Their argument, in fact, is with people like the venerable 
Barbara Jordan, our late distinguished former colleague. She 
understood the difference between the House's function in an 
impeachment role versus the Senate's function. She said during 
the Rodino hearings in establishing the division between the 
two branches of the legislature, the House and the Senate:

    Assigning to one the right to accuse and to the other the 
right to judge, the Framers of the Constitution were very 
astute. They did not make the accusers and the judges the same 
person.

    Now, in the words of Yogi Berra, I fear that we are going 
through ``deja vu all over again'' with Mr. Kendall's able 
argument, because what he has accentuated in this presentation 
has been accentuated by White House counsel ever since they 
first rose to address this body at the lectern, and that is the 
complaint that no witnesses were called before the House 
Judiciary Committee, and how wrong it is for the House managers 
now to assert the need and the right to have witnesses before 
this body when, in fact, no witnesses were called before the 
Judiciary Committee.
    Once again, he mistakes the function of the two Houses. But 
I would invite the Members of this body, if that is an issue 
concerning them, to go back and review the voluminous 
transcripts during the Judiciary Committee where Chairman Hyde 
did everything but get on his knees and beg the members of the 
President's defense team, beg our colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle, to identify for us which witnesses they wished to 
dispute, what facts they wanted to challenge, to let us know 
the witnesses where there was a contention in the evidence. And 
despite their complaining and despite their griping and despite 
their anger over a supposedly unfair process, they never once 
identified in the factual record whose testimony they wished to 
challenge.
    What we heard repeatedly, day after day in the hearing and 
outside before the cameras, was an attack upon the process 
rather than an identification of the issues where there are 
factual disputes. In fact, they refused to identify, despite 
the repeated pleas of Chairman Hyde, who those witnesses were 
that they felt were appropriate because the chairman said, 
``Tell us who they are, we will call them.''
    They champion the cause of witnesses in word but they do 
not champion the cause of witnesses in deed, at least not in 
the House, because the same people who were complaining of the 
unfairness in the House for not having witnesses suddenly have 
an allergic reaction to the concept of witnesses being called 
before this body where it counts the most, where the ultimate 
decision is to be made, where the triers of fact have to make 
the constitutional decision whether the case is sufficient for 
removal of the President.
    Mr. Kendall's repeated hints and statements that somehow 
they were denied some form of due process in the House by not 
being able to call witnesses is patently unfair and does not 
withstand the test of the record. Chairman Hyde alluded to it a 
couple of days ago, and based upon Mr. Kendall's presentation, 
I feel it is worth a minute or two of this body's time. Mr. 
Kendall has stated in these proceedings, and I am quoting:

    We have never had the chance to call witnesses ourselves, 
to examine them, to cross-examine them, to subpoena documentary 
evidence--at no point in this process.

    The record is to the contrary:
    On October 5, the House passed a procedure by a voice vote 
which included the right to call witnesses. On October 21, the 
House Judiciary Committee staff met with Messrs. Ruff, Kendall, 
and Craig. At that time, Judiciary Committee staff asked the 
White House to provide any exculpatory information and provide 
a list of any witnesses the President wished to call. On 
November 9, the House Judiciary Committee staff wrote to 
Messrs. Ruff, Kendall, and Craig and again informed them of the 
President's right to call witnesses. On November 19, 
Independent Counsel Starr testified before the House Judiciary 
Committee. The President's counsel was given the opportunity to 
question the independent counsel. The President's counsel did 
not ask a question relating to the facts of the independent 
counsel's report and allegations against the President. On 
November 25, Chairman Hyde wrote a letter to the President 
asking the President, among other things, to provide any 
exculpatory information and inform the committee of any 
witnesses he wished to call. On December 4, 2 working days 
before the presentation of the President to the Judiciary 
Committee, counsel for the President requested to put on 15 
witnesses. The White House was allowed to present all 15 
witnesses, and not a single one of the 15 witnesses did they 
wish to call, that they asked to call, were factual witnesses.
    And so the complaints of unfairness are unfair.
    One other point I want to make because again I see a 
reversal in roles, is that Mr. Kendall can't seem to decide in 
what type of ``ogre'' role he wants to portray us, because he 
said in his presentation just a few minutes ago that we were 
somehow--at least he alluded to the fact we were somehow tools 
of Judge Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel. I was a 
little surprised to hear him suggest that Judge Starr spoon-fed 
us the charges, and that Judge Starr spoon-fed them to us to 
the point where he didn't know whether Judge Starr should be 
deemed an honorary member of the House management team.
    Well, that is an interesting proposition because it seemed 
to me just a day or two ago the same lawyers who are now making 
this allegation were claiming constitutional unfairness before 
this body and asking that this body dismiss the articles of 
impeachment. Why? Because the House Judiciary Committee and the 
managers didn't present the exact same charges that the 
independent counsel suggested. You can't have it both ways. You 
can't fashion the argument depending on what the result is 
being sought, and yet that is exactly what the managers with 
the White House counsel are attempting to do.
    Yesterday we were renegades who didn't follow the strict 
rules of Judge Starr and didn't give them proper notice. Now, 
of course, he is the marionette and we are the puppets doing 
his will.
    Members of this body, it is the job of the House of 
Representatives, it is the constitutional obligation of the 
House of Representatives, to act as the accusatory body in an 
impeachment proceeding. The Constitution gives the authority to 
this body to try that case. This is the place for trial. This 
is the place to determine guilt. This is the place to determine 
credibility. This is the place for witnesses.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the remainder of our time to our 
distinguished chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde. 
Mr. Manager Hyde, you have 9 minutes remaining.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. I won't use the entire 9 minutes.
    Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel and Senators, I 
will be very brief. Mr. Rogan and my colleagues have handled 
this very well, but there are just a couple of things I want to 
talk about.
    It is disturbing, it is annoying, it is irritating when I 
hear that the counsel for the President had been cut off from 
information, that we have sequestered things. I pleaded with 
them to produce witnesses, made the subpoenas available to 
them. They have a positive allergy to fact witnesses.
    Oh, they will come up with academics. We saw a parade of 
professors. You know what an intellectual is? It is someone who 
is educated beyond their intelligence. I certainly don't mean 
that of some of those Harvard professors who they paraded out, 
even though we disagreed with them, but you would get eye 
strain looking for a fact witness.
    And it is remarkable, the flexibility they have, that they 
complain we called no witnesses in the House. Now they are 
complaining that we are calling witnesses in the Senate as 
though they don't understand the difference in the threshold. 
There we had to prove we had enough to submit to the Senate for 
a trial but not try it over there. And a majority vote prevails 
over there. Here, you have an extraordinary mountain to climb: 
a two-thirds vote and the trial is here, and that is the 
difference.
    Witnesses help you. They won't help me. I know the record. 
I am satisfied a compelling case is here for removal of the 
President. But they will help you. And we aren't dragging this 
out. We have been as swift as decency will let us be throughout 
this entire situation.
    Their defense has never been on the facts. If they can come 
up with a good fact witness that has something to say, we will 
see a reenactment of the Indian rope trick, it seems to me. We 
will see professors, though, if past is prologue. I don't know. 
But the threat of prolonged hearings, I suppose, is supposed to 
make you tremble. It doesn't to me, but then different things--
different strokes, I guess, for different folks. Their defense 
has been to demonize Mr. Starr to a fare-thee-well and then 
yell about the process. That is their defense.
    I will be frank with you. I am not sure I could stand a lot 
more of that. But that is what they will do. As far as the 
information not available to them, maybe not. Maybe some of the 
stuff we got from the independent counsel was held in executive 
session, but it was available to Mr. Conyers, available to Abbe 
Lowell, available to every Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, 
and they went through it. I wrote with Mr. Conyers to Mr. Starr 
a letter saying, ``Show us what you didn't send us. Let's look 
at what you have over there. There might be some exculpatory 
material.'' Mr. Conyers sent his people over and they looked 
and they looked and they looked, and I would assume they were 
in touch with you folks. I would assume they were. If they 
weren't, they should have been. That is a breakdown in 
communication.
    We have a good case. We have an excellent case without the 
witnesses. But the witnesses help you. We have narrowed it down 
to three--a pitiful three. I should think you would want to 
proceed with that minimum testimony, and Mr. Kendall can try 
his cross-examination skills on them, and that I want to watch.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The time of both sides has now expired. 
The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in view of the time that we 
have been in without a break, the next pending business is that 
we would want to have a motion by Senator Harkin or Senator 
Wellstone. Before we do that, I suggest that, without 
objection, we take a 15-minute break.
    There being no objection, at 3:42 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 4:04 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                      unanimous-consent agreement

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
during each day the Senate sits as a Court of Impeachment, it 
be in order for Senators to submit to the desk statements and 
introduce legislation.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so 
ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Now, Mr. Chief Justice, I believe at this point 
it would be in order for a motion to be made that we go into 
open debate, if any, and then when that is dispensed with, we 
would go to the move to close and would deal with that issue, 
and then we would begin the closed session. So I believe we are 
ready for a motion to be offered, if any, at this time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Iowa, Mr. Harkin.

                      motion to suspend the rules

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, in accordance with rule V of 
the Senate's Standing Rules, I filed a motion of intent to move 
to suspend the rules to open debate on this motion to subpoena 
witnesses. The motion is at the desk. It is No. 5, I believe.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from Iowa, Mr. Harkin, for himself and Mr. 
Wellstone, moves to suspend the following portions of the Rules 
of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials in regard to debate by Senators on a motion 
to subpoena witnesses during the trial of President William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in rule VII.
    (2) The following portion of rule XX: ``, unless the Senate 
shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its 
decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon 
without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall 
be voted on without debate and by yeas and nays, which shall be 
entered on the record''; and
    (3) In rule XXIV, the phrases, ``without debate except when 
the doors shall be closed for deliberation in that case'' and 
``, to be had without debate.''

    Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
    Mr. HARKIN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
    The yeas and nays were ordered.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
    Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Ms. 
Mikulski) is absent due to illness.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 41, nays 58, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 3]

             [Subject: Harkin motion to suspend the rules]

                                YEAS--41

Akaka
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Sarbanes
Schumer
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--58

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kerry
Kyl
Landrieu
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                             NOT VOTING--1

  
Mikulski
  
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 41, the nays 
are 58. A quorum being present, two-thirds of those Senators 
voting not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not 
agreed to.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, that motion being defeated, I 
believe it is now in order to move to close the session so we 
can have debate on the question of the motion to subpoena 
witnesses.
    Mr. LOTT. I so move, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion.
    The motion was agreed to.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that Senators remain at 
their place, but I will put in a request for a quorum call just 
momentarily so the appropriate arrangements can be made for the 
closed session.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

                             closed session

    [At 4:29 p.m., the quorum was dispensed with and the doors 
of the Chamber were closed. The proceedings of the Senate were 
held in closed session until 8:01 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate 
resumed open session.]

                              open session

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate return to open session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so 
ordered.
                                ------                                


                   adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate stand in adjournment as under the previous order.
    There being no objection, at 8:02 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Wednesday, January 
27, 1999, at 1 p.m.
                                ------                                


                      Wednesday, January 27, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:07 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Dear God, leadership has its defining days in which crucial 
decisions must be made. You know that this is an important one 
of those days. In a few moments, votes must be cast. Now in the 
quiet, the Senators wait to be counted. It is a lonely time. 
Beyond party loyalties, those on both sides of the aisle long 
to do what ultimately is best for our Nation. Debate has led to 
firm convictions. Give the Senators the courage of these 
convictions and the assurance that, if they are true to 
whatever they now believe is best, You will bless them with 
peace. We intercede for them and the heavy responsibility they 
must carry. Imbue them with Your calming Spirit and strengthen 
them with Your gift of faith to trust You to maintain unity 
once the votes are tallied. We commit the results to You. Our 
times are in Your hands. Through our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows.

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The majority leader is recognized.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a moment we will begin two 
consecutive votes. The first will be on the motion to dismiss. 
That will be followed by an immediate vote on the motion to 
subpoena. Following those votes, there will be an opportunity 
to describe how we would go forward from there with the 
depositions. I have discussed this with Senator Daschle. It is 
likely that we would take a break at that point so that we 
could have further discussions with our conferences to make 
sure we understand how that subpoena and deposition process 
would go forward. I have a resolution prepared. We have some 
simpler ones that we can consider. But we would want to discuss 
those with each other during the vote, and perhaps even after 
the two votes occur, depending on what the results are.
    The idea is that we have now before us Senate Resolution 
16, which has brought us to the point to these two votes. We 
need to give some consideration to making sure we understand 
how the process will go forward to a conclusion after that.
    I thank my colleagues for their attention. I believe we are 
ready for the votes, Mr. Chief Justice.

                       Vote on Motion to Dismiss

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question occurs on the motion to 
dismiss the impeachment proceedings offered by the Senator from 
West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. The yeas and nays are required.
    The clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
    The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 56, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 4]

     [Subject: Byrd motion to dismiss the impeachment proceedings]

                                YEAS--44

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--56

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
      
    The motion was rejected.

  Vote on Motion for Appearance of Witnesses and Admission of Evidence

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Now the question occurs on the motion 
requesting the appearance of witnesses at depositions and to 
admit evidence offered by the managers on the part of the House 
of Representatives. On this question, the yeas and nays are 
required, and the clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The result was announced--yeas 56, nays 44, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 5]

    [Subject: House managers motion to subpoena witnesses and admit 
                        evidence not in record]

                                YEAS--56

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                                NAYS--44

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The motion was agreed to.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as I indicated earlier, we are 
attempting now to clarify exactly how this will proceed and to 
reach agreement with regard to the remaining procedure and the 
beginning of the deposition process.
    We are acting in good faith, but we want to make sure we 
are at least going to try to think about all contingencies, and 
we are exchanging resolutions and suggestions between Senator 
Daschle and myself at this time. We may be asked to vote later 
on today on a procedure. We will let you know if that is 
necessary today. It could happen tomorrow. But we don't want it 
to go much longer than that because we need to make sure this 
procedure is going forward.
    Of course, if we don't have a resolution, I presume we will 
begin to go forward anyway, but we would like to have some 
orderly procedure as we have had in the past. My thinking at 
this time is that we would just stand in recess subject to the 
call of the Chair while we talk this through. It may not be 
necessary to do anything further as far as a recorded vote but 
it may be. So we just wanted Senators to be on notice of that.

                Recess Subject to the Call of the Chair

    Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chief Justice, that 
the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
    There being no objection, at 1:33 p.m., the Senate recessed 
subject to the call of the Chair.
    The Senate reassembled at 4:47 p.m. when called to order by 
the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    First, I thank all the Members, all concerned, for their 
patience throughout this process. We have had a productive day, 
and I believe this recess that we have been experiencing has 
been helpful in allowing further discussions to occur and to 
clarify what the procedures will be from here through the 
subpoena and deposition process and, hopefully, even to a 
conclusion.
    Senator Daschle and I have traded proposals which outline 
those procedures for the remainder of the trial, and although I 
won't go into detail at this time, I will say that both 
proposals bring us to a final vote on the pending articles of 
impeachment in an expeditious manner. We have been narrowing 
the questions that are involved, and we are now working on what 
I hope will be the final draft. But it is not going to be 
possible to complete that this afternoon. We hope to be able to 
do it when we reconvene at 1 p.m. on Thursday.
    There will be conferences of the two parties in the morning 
so that we can go over this with all the Senators. It is not 
enough just that the leaders understand or agree; we have to 
make sure every Senator understands it and agrees with the 
procedure that we would go forward with.
                                ------                                


                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that the Court of 
Impeachment stand in adjournment until the hour of 1 p.m. on 
Thursday.
    There being no objection, at 4:47 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, January 
28, 1999, at 1 p.m.


                       SENATOR BYRD'S FINEST HOUR

    Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of myself, 
Senator Stevens and Senator Dodd: George Santayana stated, 
``Those who disregard the lessons of history are bound to 
repeat them.'' The United States Senate is too politically 
charged and it would be more so were it not for the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd. A 
couple of weeks ago the Senate was about to go over the 
precipice of partisanship. Fortunately, we agreed to have an 
off-the-record session of all Senators. That alone would not 
have prevented our reckless course, but it did give all 
Senators an opportunity to hear Senator Byrd at his finest 
hour. He commenced by thanking Senator Daniel Akaka for leading 
us in prayer, harkening the time Benjamin Franklin took to the 
floor of the Continental Convention to call on divine guidance 
for cooperation and bipartisanship. Then Senator Byrd continued 
to calm partisan zeal and give us all a sense of historic 
perspective. We started talking sense instead of politics. It 
got us together. We could have gone the way of the House, but 
Senator Byrd is the one who put us on the right path. In 
appreciation for his leadership, we think the country could 
benefit by reading Senator Byrd's comments. I ask that the full 
text of Senator Byrd's remarks be printed in the Record.
    The remarks follow:

  Remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd--Bipartisan Conference in the Old 
                       Senate Chamber, January 8

    My colleagues, I thank the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader 
for bringing us together in this joint caucus. Mr. Daschle asked me 
last evening to be prepared to speak this morning following the remarks 
of the two leaders. I am flattered and honored to do so. Having a 
proclivity to speak at length on subjects that are close to my heart 
and about which I feel deeply, I have taken the precaution this morning 
to prepare some remarks in order that I might present them in an 
organized fashion and thus avoid speaking as long as I might otherwise 
be wont to do. I shall, however, add some extemporaneous remarks as the 
spirit of the occasion leads me.
    Before proceeding with the thoughts that I have put in writing, I 
wish to remind ourselves that we do, indeed, have not only the standing 
rules of the Senate, but we also have the standing rules for our 
guidance in impeachment trials. This bound copy of rules governing 
impeachment trials that I hold in my hand was published in 1986 as a 
result of a resolution which former Senator Robert Dole and I offered 
for referral to the Rules Committee, at which time we called on that 
Committee to update and provide any proposed modifications or revisions 
to the rules that had been in existence from the year 1868 when the 
impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson took place.
    The rules which the Senate approved in 1986 were followed during 
the impeachment trials of the three Federal judges: Claiborne, 
Hastings, and Walter Nixon. In listening to some of the comments on 
television last evening, I noted that when news reporters interviewed 
tourists, those visitors to this city were under the impression that 
the Senate was proceeding into a trial without any rules for guidance. 
Some of the representatives of the news media were also under this 
mistaken impression. I am concerned about the public perception that we 
are proceeding to a trial without any rules to guide us. Therefore, I 
trust that we will all make it clear as we work with the press that the 
Senate, indeed, has a set of standing rules to guide us in this trial.
    Before I begin my prepared remarks, I wish to thank the Majority 
Leader and the Minority Leader for calling on Senator Akaka to deliver 
prayer. They chose the right Senator to lead us in prayer, and I thank 
Danny. His prayer set just the right tone and the right spirit for his 
occasion. In the midst of Danny's prayer, I recalled that day which 
came during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, when the 
Framers were encountering difficult problems, and their spirits were at 
a low ebb. There was dissension and divisiveness, and their hopes for 
success in achieving their goal were fading. Things seemed to be 
falling apart. Their dreams of fashioning a new Constitution--the 
Articles of Confederation being our first national Constitution--
appeared to be growing dim. The new Ship of State which they hoped to 
launch was floundering in troubled waters with rocks and shoals upon 
every hand. Dark clouds of despair were closing in upon them, and the 
Framers were brought face-to-face with the stark possibility of 
failure.
    It was then, at that fateful moment, that the oldest man at the 
Convention, Benjamin Franklin, stood to his feet and addressed the 
chair in which sat General George Washington: ``Sir, I have lived a 
long time, and the longer I live the more convincing proofs I see that 
God still governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall 
to the ground without our Father's notice, is it probable that we can 
build an empire without our Father's aid? We have been assured, sir, in 
the sacred writings, that, `Except the Lord build the house, they labor 
in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman 
waketh but in vain.' I firmly believe this; and I also believe that 
without our Father's aid, we shall succeed in this political building 
no better than did the builders of Babel. I, therefore, beg leave, sir, 
to move that, henceforth, prayers imploring the assistance of heaven 
and its blessings on our deliberations be held in this assembly every 
morning before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the 
clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service.''
    Franklin's motion was seconded by Mr. Sherman.
    My colleagues, let us proceed in these deliberations this morning 
in a spirit of prayerfulness and cooperation and bipartisanship, and 
see if we, too, in our generation may produce something worthy of being 
remembered.
    I speak from the viewpoint of having a long and varied experience 
in legislative bodies. I was born during the Woodrow Wilson 
Administration. I was sworn in as a new member of the House of 
Representatives during the final days of the Truman Administration. He 
is my favorite Democratic President in my lifetime. I having been sworn 
in as a new member of Congress in January 1953, I have served longer in 
Congress than has any man or woman in either House of Congress today. 
Dizzy Dean said that it is alright to brag if you've done it. Well I 
have done it! No member of Congress in either House today was here when 
I first became a member 46 years ago.
    I also try to take the long view of the history that is yet before 
us. This country has a long history ahead of it, and the things we do 
here, the service we perform, our words and our deeds will be long 
remembered and long recorded.
    As we proceed to the unpleasant task that awaits us in the days 
ahead, let us remember that this is not a trial in a court of law. It 
is not a criminal trial. It is a political trial. The Nation will be 
watching us, and I implore us all to conduct ourselves in a way that 
will bring honor to this body. I view the immediate future with 
considerable dread. There is a poison in the air, and it is not the flu 
virus, and there is no antibiotic that can be prescribed for it. It is 
a bitter political partisanship, and if we let it control us in the 
impeachment trial, we will find it to be lethal, and we will die 
together.
    From time to time there occur events which rise above the everyday, 
and sorely test the leaders of men and the institutions they create.
    This is such a time. For it is not only William Jefferson Clinton 
who is on trial. It is this August body and all of us who carry the 
title of Senator.
    The White House has sullied itself. The House of Representatives 
has fallen into the black pit of partisan self-indulgence. The Senate 
is teetering on the brink of that same black pit.
    Meanwhile, the American people look in vain for the order and 
leadership promised to them by the Constitution. Of one thing I am 
sure: the public trust in all of the institutions of government has 
severely suffered.
    Senators, this is the headline, I had so hoped we could avoid. I 
have in my hand this morning's Washington Times bearing the headline: 
``Trial Opens Amid Pomp, Partisanship.'' It is the word 
``partisanship'' that is troubling.
    Any of you who have read your mail or the phoned-in comments from 
your constituents knows that the anger and disappointment is only 
growing in intensity with each day that we prolong this painful ordeal.
    I have always believed that whatever the crisis and whatever the 
age, the Senate would always attract and produce men and women of the 
quality and character needed to step up and calm the angry and 
dangerous seas which might threaten the Ship of State, and dash it on 
the rocks and shoals.
    I still believe that. I still believe that the Senate can restore 
some order to the anger which has overtaken this country and the chaos 
which threatens this city. I believe in all of you. I believe that all 
of the courage and conviction needed to handle any crisis is present 
right in this room.
    But, at this moment, we look very bad. We appear to be dithering 
and posturing and slowly disintegrating into the political quicksand. 
And it is no fault of our leaders. Our two leaders have done their 
level best to get us started toward lancing this inflamed boil in an 
honorable and orderly way. Left alone, without all of us to contend 
with, they would have worked these arrangements out long ago.
    Of course, I am very fond and proud of my own Leader, Tom Daschle. 
But, may I say to my Republican friends that I am also very fond and 
proud of our Majority Leader, Mr. Lott. However, I have been a Majority 
Leader in this body, and I know too well who gets the blame when 
important matters flounder in the Senate. It is the Majority Leader 
and, to a lesser degree, the Minority Leader. And when that happens, 
neither party looks good.
    I feel it to be appropriate at this point to digress from my 
prepared statement and bring to your recollection Chaucer's 
``Canterbury Tales,'' and I shall refer to the ``Pardoner's Tale,'' 
which most, if not all, of you will remember having read in your school 
days. The setting took place in Flanders, where, once, there sat 
drinking in a tavern three young men who were given to folly. As they 
sat, they heard a small bell clink before a corpse being carried to the 
grave, whereupon, one of them called to his knave and ordered him to go 
and find out the name of the corpse that was passing by.
    The boy answered that he already knew, and that it was an old 
comrade of the roisterers who had been slain while drunk by an unseen 
thief called Death, who had slain others in recent days.
    Out into the road the three young ruffians went in search of this 
monster called death. They came upon an old man, and seized him and 
with rough language demanded that he tell them where they could find 
this cowardly adversary who was taking the lives of their good friends 
in the countryside.
    The old man pointed to a great oak tree on a nearby knoll, saying, 
``There, under that tree, you will find Death.'' In a drunken rage, the 
three roisterers set off in a run 'til they came to the tree, and there 
they found a pile of gold--eight basketfuls, of florins, newly minted, 
round coins. Forgotten was the monster called Death, as they pondered 
their good fortune, and they decided that they should remain with the 
gold until nightfall when they would divide it among themselves and 
take it to their homes. It would be unsafe, they thought, to attempt to 
do so in broad daylight, as they might be fallen upon by thieves who 
would take their treasure from them.
    It was proposed that they draw straws, and the person who drew the 
shortest cut would go into the nearby village and purchase some bread 
and wine which they could enjoy as they whiled away the daylight hours. 
Off towards the village the young man went. When he was out of sight, 
the remaining two decided that there was no good reason why this 
fortune should be divided among three individuals, so one of them said 
to the other: ``When he returns, you throw your arm around him as if in 
jest, and I will rive him with my dagger. And, with your dagger, you 
can do the same. Then, all of this gold will be divided just between 
you and me.''
    Meanwhile, the youngest rouge, as he made its way into the town, 
thought what a shame it was that the gold would be divided among three, 
when it could so easily belong only to the ownership of one. Therefore, 
in town, the young man went directly to an apothecary and asked to be 
sold some poison for large rats and for a polecat that had been killing 
his chickens. The apothecary quickly provided some poison, saying that 
as much as equalled only a grain of wheat would result in sudden death 
for the creature that drank the mixture.
    Having purchased the poison, the young villain crossed the street 
to a winery where he purchased three bottles--two for his friends, one 
for himself. After he left the village, he sat down, opened two bottles 
and deposited an equal portion in each, and then returned to the oak 
tree, where the two older men did as they had planned. One threw his 
arm playfully around the shoulders of the third, they buried their 
daggers in him, and he fell dead on the pile of gold. The other two 
then sat down, cut the bread and opened the wine. Each took a good, 
deep swallow, and, suffering a most excruciating pain, both fell upon 
the body of the third, across the pile of gold. All three were dead.
    Their avarice, their greed for gain had destroyed them. There is a 
lesson here. The strong temptation for political partisanship can tear 
the Senate apart, and can tear the Nation apart, and confront all of us 
with destruction.
    I ask everyone here who might be tempted, to step back from the 
brink of political gamesmanship. I ask everyone here who might harbor 
such feelings to abandon any thought of mean-spirted, destructive, 
vengeful, partisan warfare. It is easy to get caught up in the poison 
of bitter, self-consuming partisanship when faced with such situations 
as the one which confronts us now.
    Witnesses are the main sticking point. I try to put myself in the 
shoes of our GOP friends. At least 13 House members are pushing you.
    They had the opportunity to call witnesses but didn't. I watched 
all House proceedings. It seems to me that with such a mass of 
evidence, nothing new will be added. We must avoid a repetition of what 
the House has just gone through.
    I urge all of us to step back and think about it. What can possibly 
be served in this unique court of impeachment by having a repeat of 
what we have already seen?
    I implore us all to endeavor to lift our eyes to higher things. We 
can perform some much needed healing on the body politic. We can start 
by disdaining any more of the salacious muck which has already soiled 
the gowns of too many. If we can come together in a dignified way to 
orderly and expeditiously dispose of this matter, then perhaps we can 
yet salvage a bit of respect and trust from the American people for all 
of us, for the Senate, and for their institutions of government.
    There have been only 1,851 Senators from the beginning of this 
Republic, and that includes all of us. We have a duty at this critical 
time to rise above politics-as-usual, in which we eat one another and, 
in so doing, eat ourselves. Let us put the nation first. The American 
people want us to do that. In the long run, that is how we will be 
judged, and, more importantly, it is how the Senate will be judged. The 
Constitution makes no reference to political party. The constitutional 
provision concerning impeachment makes no mention of political party. 
There were no political parties at the time the Constitution was 
written.
    When this is all over and this matter is behind us--and that time 
will surely come--then we can be politically partisan if we wish, as 
various legislative matters come before us. That is all in the natural 
course of things. Republicans and Democrats can go at each others 
throats politically if that is what they desire. But this is not a time 
for political partisanship. We will be sitting in judgment of a 
President. And we should be guided by our oath that, in all things 
appertaining to the trial of William Jefferson Clinton, we shall do 
impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws.
    Let us be guided by higher motives, by what is best for the 
Republic, and by how future history will judge us. We need a surer 
foundation than political partisanship, and that sure foundation is the 
Constitution.
    The Senate was the preeminent spark of genius by the Framers. It 
was here that passions would be cooled. The Senate would be the 
stabilizing element when confronted with the storms of political frenzy 
and the silent arts of corruption.
    Let us be true to the faith of our fathers and to the expectations 
of those who founded this Republic. The coming days will test us. Let 
us go forward together, hoping that in the end, the Senate will be 
perceived as having stood the test. And may we--both Republicans and 
Democrats--when our work is done, be judged by the American people and 
by the pages of future history as having done our duty and done it 
well. Our supreme duty is not to any particular person or party, but to 
the people of the Nation and to the future of this Republic.
    It is in this spirit that we may do well to remember the words of 
Benjamin Hill, a great United States Senator from the State of Georgia, 
inscribed, as they are, upon his monument:

Who saves his country
Saves all things,
Saves himself
    and all things saved do bless him.

Who lets his country die
Let's all things die,
Dies himself ignobly,
And all things dying curse him.

    Thank you, my friends, thank you.
                                ------                                


  MOTION TO DISMISS ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON 
                                CLINTON

    Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to oppose the motion 
offered in the Court of Impeachment to dismiss the articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton. To support the motion 
would undermine the precedents and history of the impeachment 
process laid out in the Constitution. To my knowledge, the only 
instances in our history that the Senate has dismissed a 
resolution of impeachment without voting up or down on at least 
one of the articles sent over by the House was when the 
impeached officer resigned before the Senate had the 
opportunity to act. I do not think we should deviate from our 
precedents on this occasion.
    In voting on the motion to dismiss, we are supposed to 
assume that even if the President did everything the House 
claims he did, we should still dismiss the articles. So for 
purposes of this motion, we have to assume that he committed 
every act of obstruction of justice and witness tampering the 
House has claimed and every instance of perjury before the 
grand jury that the House claims. This would include perjury 
before a grand jury sitting to help the Congress determine 
whether the President committed impeachable offenses.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I have by no means decided whether 
President Clinton has done everything the House alleges. But if 
I am to assume all these allegations are correct, I cannot see 
how in good conscience I can support the motion to dismiss and 
permit the President to stay in office.
                                ------                                


 SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST 
                           PRESIDENT CLINTON

    Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, each Member of the Senate 
is obligated today to render a judgment, a profound judgment, 
about the conduct of President William Jefferson Clinton and 
the call of the House of Representatives to remove him from 
office. A motion to dismiss the two articles of impeachment 
lodged against the President has been put before us, and so we 
must now determine whether there are sufficient grounds to 
continue with the impeachment trial, or whether we know enough 
to reach a conclusion and end these proceedings.
    I know enough from the record the House forwarded to us and 
the public record to reach certain conclusions about the 
President's conduct. President Clinton had an extramarital 
sexual relationship with a young White House employee, which, 
though consensual, was reckless and immoral, and thus raised a 
series of questions about his judgment and his respect for the 
office. He then made false and misleading statements about that 
relationship to the American people, to a Federal district 
court judge in a civil deposition, and to a Federal grand jury; 
in so doing, he betrayed not only his family but the public's 
trust, and undermined his public credibility.
    But the judgment we must now make is not about the 
rightness or wrongness of the President's relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky and his efforts to conceal it. Nor is that 
judgment about whether the President is guilty of committing a 
specific crime. That may be determined by a criminal court, 
which the Senate clearly is not, after he leaves office.
    The question before us now is whether the President's 
wrongdoing--as outlined in the two articles of impeachment--was 
more than reprehensible, more than harmful, and in this case, 
more than strictly criminal. We must now decide whether the 
President's wrongdoing makes his continuance in office a threat 
to our Government, our people, and the national interest. That 
to me is the extraordinarily high bar the framers set for 
removal of a duly-elected President, and it is that standard we 
must apply to the facts to determine whether the President is 
guilty of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    This trial has now proceeded for 10 session days. Each side 
has had ample opportunity to present its case, illuminating the 
voluminous record from the House, and we Senators have been 
able to ask wide-ranging questions of both parties. I have 
listened intently throughout, and both the House managers and 
the counsel for the President have been very impressive. The 
House managers, for their part, have presented the facts and 
argued the Constitution so effectively that they impelled me 
more than once to seriously consider voting for removal.
    But after much reflection and review of the extensive 
evidence before us, of the meaning of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, and, most importantly, of what I believe to be in 
the best interests of the Nation, I have concluded that the 
facts do not meet the high standard the founders established 
and do not justify removing this President from office.
    It was for this reason that I decided today to vote in 
favor of dismissing the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton, and against the motion to allow for the 
testimony of live witnesses. I plan to submit a more detailed 
statement explaining exactly how I arrived at these decisions 
when the final votes are taken on the articles of impeachment. 
But I do think it is important at this point to summarize my 
arguments for voting to end the trial now.
    I start from the indisputable premise that the founders 
intended impeachment to be a measure of extreme last resort, 
because it would disrupt the democratic process they so 
carefully calibrated and would supersede the right of the 
people to choose their leaders, which was at the heart of their 
vision of the new democracy they were creating. That is why I 
believe that the Constitutional standard in question here--
``high crimes and misdemeanors''--demands clear and convincing 
evidence that the President committed offenses that, to borrow 
from the words of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
respectively, proceed from ``the abuse or violation of some 
public trust,'' and that demonstrate a ``loss of capacity or 
corruption.'' A review of the constitutional history convinces 
me that impeachment was not meant to supplant the criminal 
justice system but to provide a political remedy for offenses 
so egregious and damaging that the President can no longer be 
trusted to serve the national interest.
    The House managers therefore had the burden of proving in a 
clear and convincing way that the behavior on which the 
articles of impeachment are based has irreparably compromised 
the President's capacity to govern in the Nation's best 
interest. I conclude that, as unsettling as their arguments 
have been, they have not met that burden.
    I base that conclusion in part on the factual context of 
the President's actions. As the record makes abundantly clear, 
the President's false and misleading statements under oath and 
his broader deception and coverup stemmed directly from his 
private sexual misconduct, something that no other sitting 
American president to my knowledge has ever been questioned 
about in a legal setting. On each occasion when I came close to 
the brink of deciding to vote for one of the articles of 
impeachment, I invariably came back to this question of context 
and asked myself: Does this sordid story justify, for the first 
time in our Nation's history, taking out of office the person 
the American people chose to lead the country? Each time I 
answered, ``no.''
    The record shows that the President was not trying to 
conceal public malfeasance or some heinous crime, like murder. 
And I believe that distinction, while not determinative, does 
matter. The American people, according to most public surveys, 
also think that distinction matters--which helps us to 
understand why the overwhelming majority of them can 
simultaneously hold the views that the President has demeaned 
his office and yet should not be evicted from it.
    In noting this, I recognize that it would be a dereliction 
of our duty to substitute public opinion polls for our reasoned 
judgment in resolving this constitutional crisis. But it would 
also be a serious error to ignore the people's voice, because 
in exercising our authority as a Court of Impeachment we are 
standing in the place of the voters who re-elected the 
President 2 years ago.
    In this case, the prevailing public opposition to 
impeachment has particular relevance, for it provides 
substantial evidence that the President's misconduct, while 
harmful to his moral authority and his personal credibility, 
has not been so harmful as to shatter the public's faith in his 
ability to fulfill his Presidential duties and act in their 
interest. Nearly two-thirds of them say repeatedly that they 
approve of the job that President Clinton is doing and that 
they oppose his removal, which means that, though they are 
deeply disaffected by his personal behavior, they do not 
believe that he has lost his capacity to govern in the national 
interest.
    In reaching my conclusion, I first had to determine that 
the request of the House managers to bring witnesses to the 
floor would not add to the record and the arguments that have 
been made, or change my conclusion or the outcome of this 
trial, which most Senators and observers agree will not end in 
the President's removal. It is true that witnesses may add 
demeanor evidence, but they will subtract from the Senate's 
demeanor, and unnecessarily extend the trial for some time, 
preventing the Senate from returning to the other pressing 
business of the Nation.
    Am I content to have this trial end in the articles failing 
to receive the required two-thirds vote of the Senate for 
removal? The truth is that nothing about this terrible national 
experience leaves me comfortable. But an unequivocal, 
bipartisan statement of censure by Congress would, at least, 
fulfill our responsibility to our children and our posterity to 
speak to the common values the President has violated, and make 
clear what our expectations are for future Presidents. Such a 
censure would bring better closure to this demeaning and 
divisive episode, and help us begin to heal the injuries the 
President's misconduct and the impeachment process' 
partisanship have done to the American body politic, and to the 
soul of the Nation.
                                ------                                


  MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN COURT OF IMPEACHMENT OF 
                       WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

    Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, there is a lot about this 
impeachment process that is new and unfamiliar to all of us. 
That is all the more reason why we should allow ourselves to be 
guided by the Constitution and historical precedents in 
deciding how we proceed. The Constitution's requirement that 
the Senate ``shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments'' certainly suggests that the Senate will 
ordinarily do more than simply look at the record made by the 
House in deciding whether to send us articles of impeachment, 
and that has generally been the Senate's practice.
    Moreover, the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment is 
charged with seeking the truth in this trial. If any Senators 
reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in 
finding the truth, then I believe both the President and the 
House should have the opportunity to call witnesses. Based on 
the record before us and the arguments we have heard, it is 
clear that at least on some of the House's charges, there are 
factual issues in dispute that the witnesses whom this motion 
proposes to subpoena for depositions could help us resolve.
    It is for this reason, Mr. Chief Justice, that I support 
the motion to allow both sides to depose these three witnesses. 
I do not see why this limited discovery should in any way cause 
this matter to be drawn out for any extended period of time. 
Rather, I believe it can be conducted very expeditiously 
without in any way jeopardizing the Senate's ability to conduct 
other important legislative business.
                                ------                                


                       Thursday, January 28, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
prayer:
    Almighty God, thank You for the gift of vibrant confidence 
based on vital convictions. We are confident in Your unlimited 
power. Therefore, at no time are we helpless or hapless. Our 
confidence is rooted in Your Commandments. Therefore, we are 
strengthened by Your absolutes that give us enduring values. 
Our courage is based on the assurance of Your ever-present, 
guiding Spirit. Therefore, we will not fear. Our hope is rooted 
in trust in Your reliability. Therefore, we will not be 
anxious. Your interventions in trying times in the past have 
made us hopeful thinkers for the future. Therefore, we trust 
You.
    You have called us to glorify You in the work here in this 
Senate. Therefore, we give You our best for this day's 
responsibilities. You have guided our beloved Nation through 
difficult periods of discord and division in the past. 
Therefore, we ask for Your help in the present deliberations of 
the impeachment trial. Thank You for the courage that flows 
from our unshakable confidence in You. Through our Lord and 
Saviour. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators will be seated. The Sergeant at 
Arms will make the proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

                           order of procedure

    Mr. LOTT. For the information of all of our colleagues--
obviously, they have already received the word by the fact that 
they are not all present--but we are still attempting to reach 
an agreement with respect to the remaining procedures for the 
trial, particularly with regard to how and when the depositions 
will be taken.
    We have been making progress, but it is something we need 
to be careful about. Hopefully, we will be able to reach an 
agreement yet today. If agreement is reached, I expect it very 
likely that a rollcall vote would be requested on that 
agreement and, therefore, all Members should be aware of that. 
We will notify them via the hotline system as the voting 
schedule becomes clear. Certainly we will keep the Chief 
Justice informed of our deliberations and when we anticipate 
the need to reconvene.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. But in view of the continuing negotiations and 
conferences that are meeting at this time, I ask unanimous 
consent the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 2 p.m. 
today.
    There being no objection, at 1:07 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:02 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, again, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in an effort to get an 
agreement on how to proceed, it is very important that all 
parties are aware of the procedures that we are outlining and 
that those include Senators on both sides of the aisle, the 
House managers, the White House, the attorneys for the 
witnesses. So it does take time.
    Just as we were prepared to come in at 2 and move to a 
resolution, questions were raised about a couple specific 
points. We believe those questions need to be clarified for 
certainty. Rather than continue to recess hour to hour, which I 
know is not fair to the Chief Justice, I think it would be 
better at this point to make sure Senators are aware that we 
are working to get an agreement on this procedure. We need to 
get that done today so the depositions can get underway with 
the attorneys consulting with their clients Friday and 
Saturday. Hopefully, the depositions will begin on Sunday and 
Monday and be completed by Tuesday. But we are working on the 
details of that.
    This still could very well require a vote or two today or 
even tomorrow. But we will make that announcement once it is 
clear that it is going to take a recorded vote of one or more 
and exactly how that would work.
    We will keep the Chief Justice notified of the expected 
timeframe and, as information becomes available, as to exactly 
when we will come back into session, and whether or not or how 
many votes will be required. We will get that information to 
Senators.

                Recess Subject to the Call of the Chair

    Mr. LOTT. In view of all that, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
    There being no objection, at 2:03 p.m., the Senate recessed 
subject to the call of the Chair.
    The Senate reassembled at 5:31 p.m., when called to order 
by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    I thought we were ready to proceed. I see Senator Daschle 
is not on the floor. He should be back momentarily. Maybe I can 
explain a few details. He is returning now. We may still need a 
little more time.
    We thank you for your patience, and our colleagues on both 
sides for their patience, as we have tried to work through the 
details of these resolutions and how to proceed with the 
depositions. There are a lot of details to it and everybody 
needs to be relatively comfortable that they understand how it 
will work. That is why it has taken this additional time.
    I think we are to the point where we are ready to proceed. 
I believe the way it will proceed is that we will have a 
resolution which I will send to the desk, followed by a 
substitute from Senator Daschle. Then Senator Daschle has 
indicated that they may want to have a motion to go straight to 
the articles of impeachment. That would require three votes. 
Then we also, at that point, would make it clear the 
depositions would begin on Monday, the 1st. It is our intent to 
then go to those three votes. I also understand that the 
parties are willing to waive the debate time on these issues.
    With that explanation, I begin that process.

   Relating to the Procedures Concerning the Articles of Impeachment 
                   Against William Jefferson Clinton

    Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk and ask unanimous 
consent that it be read in its entirety by the clerk, and time 
for the two parties be waived.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the resolution in 
its entirety.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe there was a request for unanimous 
consent.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the request is agreed 
to.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    A resolution (S. Res. 30) relative to the procedures concerning the 
Articles of Impeachment against William Jefferson Clinton.
    Resolved,

  TITLE I--PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST 
                       WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

    Sec. 101. That the deposition time for all witnesses be determined 
by the Senate Majority Leader and Minority Leader, as outlined in 
Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, and 
title II of this resolution and that all Senators have an opportunity 
to review all deposition material, which shall be made available at the 
earliest possible time.
    Sec. 102. When the Senate reconvenes on the day after completion of 
the depositions, and the review period, it shall be in order for both 
the House Managers and the President's counsel to move to resolve any 
objections made during any deposition. After resolution of any such 
motions, it shall be in order for the House Managers and/or White House 
counsel to make a motion or motions to admit the depositions or 
portions thereof into evidence, whether transcribed or on video tape 
provided further for a presentation employing all or portions of such 
tape, and it shall then be in order for the two Leaders jointly, only 
to make motions for additional discovery because of new relevant 
evidence discovered during the depositions. Motions may also then be 
made for orders governing the presentation of evidence and/or the 
testifying of witnesses before the Senate.
    Sec. 103. If no such motions are made, or following the completion 
of any procedures authorized as a result of the votes on any motions, 
the White House shall have up to 24 hours to make any motions dealing 
with testimony or evidence that the White House counsel deems 
appropriate, as described previously.
    Sec. 104. If no such motions are made, or no witnesses are called 
to testify in the Senate, the Senate shall proceed to final arguments 
as provided in the impeachment rules waiving the two person rule 
contained in Rule XXII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the 
Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials for not to exceed six hours, 
to be equally divided. If motions are agreed to regarding new evidence 
or calling of new witnesses, this resolution is suspended.
    Sec. 105. At the conclusion of the final arguments the parties 
shall proceed in accordance with the rules of impeachment: Provided 
however, That no motion with respect to re-opening the record in the 
case shall be in order, and: Provided further, That it shall be in 
order for a Senator to offer a motion to suspend the rules to allow for 
open final deliberations with no amendments or motions to that motion 
in order; and the Senate shall proceed to vote on the motion to suspend 
the rules to provide for open Senate deliberations.
    Sec. 106. Following that vote, and if no motions have been agreed 
to as provided in sections 102 and 103, and no motions are agreed to 
following the arguments, then the vote will occur on any pending 
motions and amendments thereto and then on the articles of impeachment 
no later than 12:00 noon on Friday, February 12, 1999.

TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, 
                     PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment 
Trials, and S. Res. 16, 106th Congress, 1st Session, the Chief Justice 
of the United States, through the Secretary of the Senate, shall issue 
subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral deposition to the 
following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S. Lewinsky, and Vernon 
E. Jordan, Jr.
    Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the 
services of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the 
United States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued 
by this resolution.
    Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken 
before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators 
appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting 
jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed 
by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers 
shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question 
arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be 
noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition, but 
the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such 
question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary 
to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, and must identify such 
privilege cited if refusing to answer a question.
    Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be 
conducted by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel, 
and by counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no 
more than two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for 
the President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of 
the examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be 
limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The 
party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18 
hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the 
deposing party intends to enter into the record during the deposition. 
No exhibits outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for 
articles and materials in the press, including electronic media. Any 
party may interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared 
adverse.
    Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of 
the proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in 
private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the 
following: the witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the 
part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President, 
and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is 
required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped 
and transcript forms, and employees of the Senate whose presence is 
required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the 
depositions, or for other purposes, as determined after consultation by 
the Majority Leader with the Democratic Leader. All present must 
maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings.
    Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the 
videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the 
Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential 
proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make 
available for review any of the videotaped or transcribed deposition 
records to Members of the Senate, one designated staff member per 
Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct the Secretary of 
the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use whichever means of 
dissemination, including printing as Senate documents, printing in the 
Congressional Record, photo- and video-duplication, and electronic 
dissemination, he determines to be appropriate to accomplish any 
distribution of the videotaped or transcribed deposition records that 
he is directed to make pursuant to this section.
    Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be 
deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, 100th 
Congress, 1st Session, 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d, 
288f, 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6002, 6005, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1365. The 
Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including 
videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 5. Such 
expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation 
Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon 
vouchers approved by the Secretary.
    Sec. 208. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of 
the House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority 
leader.

                            Amendment No. 1

    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I have an amendment that I 
send to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the amendment.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] proposes an amendment 
numbered 1.
    In the resolution strike all after the word ``that'' in the first 
line and insert the following:

``the deposition time for all witnesses to be deposed be limited to no 
later than close of business Wednesday, February 3 and that all 
Senators have an opportunity to review all deposition material, which 
shall be made available at the earliest possible time.
    ``When the Senate reconvenes the trial at 10 a.m. on Saturday, 
February 6 it shall be in order to resolve any objections that may not 
be resolved regarding the depositions; after these deposition 
objections have been disposed of, it shall be in order for the House 
managers and/or the White House counsel to make a motion, or motions to 
admit the depositions or portions thereof into evidence, such motions 
shall be limited to transcribed deposition material only;
    ``On Monday, February 8 there shall be 4 hours equally divided for 
closing arguments; with the White House using the first 2 hours and the 
House Republican managers using the final 2 hours; that
    ``Upon the completion of the closing arguments the Senate shall 
begin final deliberation on the articles; a timely filed motion to 
suspend the rules and open these deliberations shall be in order; upon 
the completion of these deliberations the Senate shall, without any 
intervening action, amendment, motion or debate, vote on the articles 
of impeachment.
    ``Provided further, That the votes on the articles shall occur no 
later than 12 noon Friday, February 12.''

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Utah, Mr. Hatch.
    Mr. HATCH. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chief Justice: Does 
the majority leader's resolution, does that also keep open the 
right of Senators to file----
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian says it takes a 
unanimous consent for a parliamentary inquiry.
    Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to ask 
one question.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. HATCH. Does the majority leader's resolution allow for 
the filing and consideration of motions that may not be 
mentioned in the resolution itself?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me it is never 
the function of the Chair to interpret a resolution.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe the regular order is that now we would 
go to a vote on the two resolutions. Just for the information 
of Senators, after that, Senator Daschle may have a motion, 
again, as I indicated earlier, just to go to a vote on the 
articles of impeachment.
    So there could be three votes now, in order, without 
intervening debate. After that, Senator Daschle and I will 
formally lock in the beginning time for the depositions.
    I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The first vote will be on the amendment 
from the minority leader, the Senator from South Dakota.
    The yeas and nays are required.
    The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. 
Allard] is necessarily absent.
    Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. 
Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
    I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator 
from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``aye.''
    The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 54, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 6]

                 [Subject: Daschle amendment No. 1 to 
                              S. Res. 30]

                                YEAS--44

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--54

Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

Allard
Mikulski
  
      
    The amendment (No. 1) was rejected.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on agreeing to S. Res. 
30, the resolution offered by Senator Lott. On this question, 
the yeas and nays are called for.
    Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority 
leader.
    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, the Senate is not in order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                            Amendment No. 2

    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I send an amendment to the 
desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] proposes an 
amendment numbered 2.
    In the resolution strike all after the word ``that'' in the 
first line and insert the following:

``the Senate now proceed to closing arguments; that there be 2 
hours for the White House counsel followed by 2 hours for the 
House managers; and that at the conclusion of this time the 
Senate proceed to vote, on each of the articles, without 
intervening action, motion or debate, except for deliberations, 
if so decided by the Senate.''

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the amendment just 
read. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the 
roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. 
Allard] is necessarily absent.
    Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. 
Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
    I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator 
from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``aye.''
    The result was announced--yeas 43, nays 55, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 7]

                   [Subject: Daschle amendment No. 2]

                                YEAS--43

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--55

Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                             NOT VOTING--2

Allard
Mikulski
  
      
    The amendment (No. 2) was rejected.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, may we have order, please?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                            Amendment No. 3

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I send an amendment to the 
desk modifying the last paragraph of page 3.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the amendment.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes an 
amendment numbered 3.
    On page 3, strike the words ``any pending motions and 
amendments thereto and then on'' and insert the following at 
the end of page 3 ``strike the period and insert, if all 
motions are disposed of and final deliberations are 
completed.''

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the amendment be agreed to and that the motion to reconsider be 
laid upon the table.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The amendment (No. 3) was agreed to.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the resolution, as 
amended. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call 
the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. 
Allard] is necessarily absent.
    Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. 
Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
    I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator 
from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``no.''
    The result was announced--yeas 54, nays 44, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 8]

                    [Subject: S. Res. 30 as amended]

                                YEAS--54

Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                                NAYS--44

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--2

Allard
Mikulski
  
      
    The resolution (S. Res. 30), as amended, was agreed to.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                        Modification To Title II

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to the beginning 
of the depositions, I ask unanimous consent that title II of S. 
Res. 30 be modified with the language I send to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The modification follows:

TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, 
                     PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, and 
Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, the 
Chief Justice of the United States, through the Secretary of the 
Senate, shall issue subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral 
deposition to the following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S. 
Lewinsky, and Vernon E. Jordon, Jr.
  Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the services 
of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the United 
States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued by this 
resolution.
  Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken 
before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators 
appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting 
jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed 
by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers 
shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question 
arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be 
noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition but 
the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such 
question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary 
to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, or constitutional right, 
and must identify such privilege cited if refusing to answer a 
question.
  Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be conducted 
by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel, and by 
counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no more than 
two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for the 
President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of the 
examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be 
limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The 
party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18 
hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the 
deposing party intends to enter into the deposition. No exhibits 
outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for articles and 
materials in the press, including electronic media. Any party may 
interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared adverse.
  Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of the 
proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in 
private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the 
following: The witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the 
part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President, 
and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is 
required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped 
and transcript forms, and Senate staff members whose presence is 
required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the 
depositions, or for other purposes, as determined by the Majority 
Leader and the Democratic Leader. All present must maintain the 
confidentiality of the proceedings.
  Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the 
videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the 
Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential 
proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make 
available for review at secure locations, any of the videotaped or 
transcribed deposition records to Members of the Senate, one designated 
staff member per Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct 
the Secretary of the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use 
whichever means of dissemination, including printing as Senate 
documents, printing in the Congressional Record, photo- and video-
duplication, and electronic dissemination, he determines to be 
appropriate to accomplish any distribution of the videotaped or 
transcribed deposition records that he is directed to make pursuant to 
this section.
  Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be 
deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, One Hundredth 
Congress, First Session, sections 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d, 288f of 
title 2, United States Code, sections 6002, 6005 of title 18, United 
States Code, and section 1365 of title 28, United States Code. The 
Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including 
videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 205. Such 
expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation 
Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon 
vouchers approved by the Secretary.
  Sec. 208. The Majority and Minority Leaders, acting jointly, may make 
other provisions for the orderly and fair conduct of these depositions 
as they seem appropriate.
  Sec. 209. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of the 
House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

    The resolution (S. Res. 30), as amended, as modified, reads 
as follows:

                               S. Res. 30

  Resolved,

  TITLE I--PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST 
                       WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

  Sec. 101. That the deposition time for all witnesses be determined by 
the Senate Majority Leader and Minority Leader, as outlined in Senate 
Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, and title II 
of this resolution and that all Senators have an opportunity to review 
all deposition material, which shall be made available at the earliest 
possible time.
  Sec. 102. When the Senate reconvenes on the day after completion of 
the depositions, and the review period, it shall be in order for both 
the House Managers and the President's counsel to move to resolve any 
objections made during any deposition. After resolution of any such 
motions, it shall be in order for the House Managers and/or White House 
counsel to make a motion or motions to admit the depositions or 
portions thereof into evidence, whether transcribed or on videotape 
provided further for a presentation employing all or portions of such 
tape, and it shall then be in order for the two Leaders jointly, only 
to make motions for additional discovery because of new relevant 
evidence discovered during the depositions. Motions may also then be 
made for orders governing the presentation of evidence and/or the 
testifying of witnesses before the Senate.
  Sec. 103. If no such motions are made, or following the completion of 
any procedures authorized as a result of the votes on any motions, the 
White House shall have up to 24 hours to make any motions dealing with 
testimony or evidence that the White House counsel deems appropriate, 
as described previously.
  Sec. 104. If no such motions are made, or no witnesses are called to 
testify in the Senate, the Senate shall proceed to final arguments as 
provided in the impeachment rules waiving the two person rule contained 
in Rule XXII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
Sitting on Impeachment Trials for not to exceed six hours, to be 
equally divided. If motions are agreed to regarding new evidence or 
calling of new witnesses, this resolution is suspended.
  Sec. 105. At the conclusion of the final arguments the parties shall 
proceed in accordance with the rules of impeachment: Provided however, 
That no motion with respect to reopening the record in the case shall 
be in order, and: Provided further, That it shall be in order for a 
Senator to offer a motion to suspend the rules to allow for open final 
deliberations with no amendments or motions to that motion in order; 
and the Senate shall proceed to vote on the motion to suspend the rules 
to provide for open Senate deliberations.
  Sec. 106. Following that vote, and if no motions have been agreed to 
as provided in sections 102 and 103, and no motions are agreed to 
following the arguments, then the vote will occur on the articles of 
impeachment no later than 12:00 noon on Friday, February 12, 1999, if 
all motions are disposed of and final deliberations are completed.

TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE 
TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, 
                     PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

  Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, and 
Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, the 
Chief Justice of the United States, through the Secretary of the 
Senate, shall issue subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral 
deposition to the following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S. 
Lewinsky, and Vernon E. Jordon, Jr.
  Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the services 
of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the United 
States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued by this 
resolution.
  Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken 
before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators 
appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting 
jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed 
by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When 
Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers 
shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question 
arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be 
noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition but 
the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such 
question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary 
to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, or constitutional right, 
and must identify such privilege cited if refusing to answer a 
question.
  Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be conducted 
by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel, and by 
counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no more than 
two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for the 
President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of the 
examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be 
limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The 
party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18 
hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the 
deposing party intends to enter into the deposition. No exhibits 
outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for articles and 
materials in the press, including electronic media. Any party may 
interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared adverse.
  Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of the 
proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in 
private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the 
following: The witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the 
part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President, 
and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is 
required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped 
and transcript forms, and Senate staff members whose presence is 
required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the 
depositions, or for other purposes, as determined by the Majority 
Leader and the Democratic Leader. All present must maintain the 
confidentiality of the proceedings.
  Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the 
videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the 
Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential 
proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make 
available for review at secure locations, any of the videotaped or 
transcribed deposition records to Members of the Senate, one designated 
staff member per Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct 
the Secretary of the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use 
whichever means of dissemination, including printing as Senate 
documents, printing in the Congressional Record, photo- and video-
duplication, and electronic dissemination, he determines to be 
appropriate to accomplish any distribution of the videotaped or 
transcribed deposition records that he is directed to make pursuant to 
this section.
  Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be 
deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, One Hundredth 
Congress, First Session, sections 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d, 288f of 
title 2, United States Code, sections 6002, 6005 of title 18, United 
States Code, and section 1365 of title 28, United States Code. The 
Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including 
videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 205. Such 
expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation 
Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon 
vouchers approved by the Secretary.
  Sec. 208. The Majority and Minority Leaders, acting jointly, may make 
other provisions for the orderly and fair conduct of these depositions 
as they seem appropriate.
  Sec. 209. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of the 
House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the unanimous consent agreement I send to the desk be agreed 
to. This all deals with the taking of depositions.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The text of the unanimous consent agreement reads as 
follows:

    I ask unanimous consent that the time and place to take 
depositions in the trial of the articles of impeachment against 
William Jefferson Clinton be decided jointly by the majority 
leader, and the Democratic leader, and shall be set forth in 
each subpoena.
    I further ask unanimous consent that the opportunity for 
taking depositions of Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney 
Blumenthal expires when the Senate convenes on Thursday, Feb. 
4, 1999.
    Finally I ask unanimous consent that each deposition may 
last no more than 8 hours, unless the majority leader, and the 
Democratic leader determine on a deposition-by-deposition 
basis, to extend the time of the deposition, and all the time 
allotted for examination shall be divided equally between the 
parties, and time consumed by objections shall not be charged 
to either objecting party.

    Mr. LOTT. Now, I understand, Mr. Chief Justice, that the 
Democratic leader is prepared to agree that the depositions 
will begin on Monday, February 1, and with this having been 
decided, and the vote we just took, we have discussed the 
schedule for the remainder of the week. In view of the fact 
that at this point the parties will begin to prepare for 
depositions and the depositions will begin on Monday, Members 
will not be expected to be here for any business before 
Wednesday, but we could be required to have a session Wednesday 
afternoon.
    I want to emphasize that as the deposition material becomes 
available, we will have the Sergeant at Arms have it in a room 
for Members to begin to review. So beginning Tuesday, for 
Senators who would like to begin reviewing the depositions, the 
material in the depositions, it will be available in 
installments as it becomes available on Tuesday. So you would 
have that opportunity Tuesday and Wednesday. Not later than 
Thursday, then, we would go to the next phase of our agreement 
that we have voted on.
    At this time, we are notifying the Members that there will 
be no further recorded votes and no further business while we 
await returning of the depositions through Friday, Saturday, 
Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, but Members should expect to be 
here on Wednesday and they would need to be here on Wednesday, 
in order to begin to make sure they have had time to review the 
documents, the deposition material, so that we can proceed, 
then, on Thursday.
    Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator yield?
    Mr. LOTT. I yield.
    Mr. HARKIN. Are Senators allowed to attend these 
depositions or not?
    Mr. LOTT. Under the agreement we just passed, Mr. Chief 
Justice, if I may proceed and respond to that question.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mr. LOTT. There will be a Senator from each side at the 
depositions who will preside over the depositions. Senator 
Daschle and I also will have certain staff there, but a Senator 
other than the two presiding Senators would not be in order to 
what we agreed to. There will be one from each side who will be 
presiding and will actually make determinations when objections 
are made.
                                ------                                


          ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that the Court of 
Impeachment stand in adjournment until the hour of 1 p.m. on 
Thursday, February 4.
    There being no objection, at 6:34 p.m. the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, February 
4, 1999, at 1 p.m.


         THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

    Mr. CLELAND. Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by saying that 
the reason we are here today, the reason the United States 
Senate is being asked to exercise what Alexander Hamilton 
termed the ``awful discretion'' of impeachment, is because of 
the wrongful, reprehensible, indefensible conduct of one 
person, the President of the United States, William Jefferson 
Clinton. Indeed, I believe it is conduct deserving of the 
censure of the Senate, and I will support such a resolution 
when it comes before us.
    The question before the Senate, however, is not whether the 
President's conduct was wrong, or immoral, or even censurable. 
We must decide solely as to whether or not he should be 
convicted of the allegations contained in the articles of 
impeachment and thus removed from office. In my opinion, the 
case for removal, presented in great detail in the massive 
60,000-page report submitted by the House, in many hours of 
very capable but often repetitive presentations to the Senate 
by the House managers and the President's defense team, and in 
many additional hours of Senators' questioning of the two 
sides, fails to meet the very high standards which we must 
demand with respect to Presidential impeachments. Therefore, I 
will vote to dismiss the impeachment case against William 
Jefferson Clinton, and to vote for the Senate resuming other 
necessary work for the American people.
    To this very point, I have reserved my judgment on this 
question because of my constitutional responsibility and oath 
to ``render impartial justice'' in this case. Most of the same 
record presented in great detail to Senators in the course of 
the last several weeks has long been before the public, and 
indeed most of that public, including editorial boards, talk 
show hosts, and so forth, long ago reached their own 
conclusions as to the impeachment of President Clinton. But I 
have now heard enough to make my decision. With respect to the 
witnesses the House managers apparently now wish to depose and 
call before the Senate, the existing record represents multiple 
interrogations by the Office of the Independent Counsel and its 
grand jury, with not only no cross-examinations by the 
President's counsel but, with the exception of the President's 
testimony, without even the presence of the witnesses' own 
counsel. It is difficult for me to see how that record would 
possibly be improved from the prosecution's standpoint. Thus, I 
will not support motions to depose or call witnesses.
    In reaching my decision on impeachment, there are a number 
of factors which have been discussed or speculated about in the 
news media which were not a part of my calculations.
    First of all, while as political creatures neither the 
Senate nor the House can or should be immune from public 
opinion, we have a very precise constitutionally-prescribed 
responsibility in this matter, and popular opinion must not be 
a controlling consideration. I believe Republican Senator 
William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said it best during the only 
previous Presidential impeachment trial in 1868:

    To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the 
conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he 
is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate . 
. . The people have not heard the evidence as we have heard it. 
The responsibility is not on them, but upon us. They have not 
taken an oath to ``do impartial justice according to the 
Constitution and the laws.'' I have taken that oath. I cannot 
render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer 
to themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should 
consider myself undeserving of the confidence of that just and 
intelligent people who imposed upon me this great 
responsibility, and unworthy of a place among honorable men, if 
for any fear of public reprobation, and for the sake of 
securing popular favor, I should disregard the convictions of 
my judgment and my conscience.

    Nor was my decision premised on the notion, suggested by 
some, that the stability of our Government would be severely 
jeopardized by the impeachment of President Clinton. I have 
full faith in the strength of our Government and its leaders 
and, more importantly, faith in the American people to cope 
successfully with whatever the Senate decides. There can be no 
doubt that the impeachment of a President would not be easy for 
the country but just in this century, about to end, we have 
endured great depressions and world wars. Today, the U.S. 
economy is strong, the will of the people to move beyond this 
national nightmare is great, and we have an experienced and 
able Vice President who is more than capable of stepping up and 
assuming the role of the President.
    Third, although we have heard much argument that the 
precedents of judicial impeachments should be controlling in 
this case, I have not been convinced and did not rely on such 
testimony in making my decision. After a review of the record, 
historical precedents, and consideration of the different roles 
of Presidents and Federal judges, I have concluded that there 
is indeed a different legal standard for impeachment of 
Presidents and Federal judges. Article 11, Section 4 of the 
Constitution provides that ``the President, Vice President, and 
all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article III, Section I 
of the Constitution indicates that judges ``shall hold their 
Offices during good Behavior.'' Presidents are elected by the 
people and serve for a fixed term of years, while Federal 
judges are appointed without public approval to serve a life 
tenure without any accountability to the public. Therefore, 
under our system, impeachment is the only way to remove a 
Federal judge from office while Presidents serve for a 
specified term and face accountability to the public through 
elections. With respect to the differing impeachment standards 
themselves, Chief Justice Rehnquist once wrote, ``the terms 
`treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors' are 
narrower than the malfeasance in office and failure to perform 
the duties of the office, which may be grounds for forfeiture 
of office held during good behavior.''
    And my conclusions with respect to impeachment were not 
based upon considerations of the proper punishment of President 
Clinton for his misdeeds. During the impeachment of President 
Nixon, the Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry 
concluded that ``impeachment is the first step in a remedial 
process--removal from office and possible disqualification from 
holding future office. The purpose of impeachment is not 
personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government.'' Regardless of the outcome of the 
Senate impeachment trial, President Clinton remains subject to 
censure by the House and Senate, and criminal prosecution for 
any crimes he may have committed. Whatever punishment President 
Clinton deserves for his misdeeds will be provided elsewhere.
    Finally, I do not believe that perjury or obstruction of 
justice could never rise to the level of threatening grievous 
harm to the Republic, and thus represent adequate grounds for 
removal of a President. However, we must approach such a 
determination with the greatest of care. Impeachment of a 
President is, perhaps with the power to declare War, the 
gravest of constitutional responsibilities bestowed upon the 
Congress. During the history of the United States, the Senate 
has only held impeachment trials for two Presidents, the 1868 
trial of President Johnson, who had not been elected to that 
office, and now President Clinton. Although the Senate can look 
to impeachment trials of other public officials, primarily 
judicial, as I have already said, I do not believe that those 
precedents are or should be controlling in impeachment trials 
of Presidents, or indeed of other elected officials.
    My decision was based on one overriding concern: the impact 
of this precedent-setting case on the future of the Presidency, 
and indeed of the Congress itself. It is not Bill Clinton who 
should occupy our only attention. He already stands rebuked by 
the House impeachment votes, and by the words of virtually 
every Member of Congress of both political parties. And even if 
we do not remove him from office, he still stands liable to 
future criminal prosecution for his actions, as well as to the 
verdict of history. No, it is Mr. Clinton's successors, 
Republican, Democrat or any other party, who should be our 
concern.
    The Republican Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who 
``looked down into my open grave'' of political oblivion when 
he cast one of the decisive votes in acquitting Andrew Johnson 
in spite of his personal dislike of the President explained his 
motivation this way:

    . . . In a large sense, the independence of the executive 
office as a coordinate branch of the government was on trial . 
. . If . . . the President must step down . . . upon 
insufficient proofs and from partisan considerations, the 
office of President would be degraded, cease to be a coordinate 
branch of government, and ever after subordinated to the 
legislative will. It would practically have revolutionized our 
splendid political fabric into a partisan Congressional 
autocracy.

    While our Government is certainly on a stronger foundation 
now than in the aftermath of the Civil War, the basic point 
remains valid. If anything, in today's world of rapidly 
emerging events and threats, we need an effective, independent 
Presidency even more than did mid-19th Century Americans.
    While in the history of the United States the U.S. Senate 
has never before considered impeachment articles against a 
sitting elected official, we do have numerous cases of each 
House exercising its constitutional right to, ``punish its 
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 
two-thirds expel a Member.'' However, since the Civil War, 
while a variety of cases involving personal and private 
misconduct have been considered, the Senate has never voted to 
expel a Member, choosing to censure instead on seven occasions, 
and the House has rarely chosen the ultimate sanction. Should 
the removal of a President be subject to greater punishment 
with lesser standards of evidence than the Congress has applied 
to itself when the Constitution appears to call for the reverse 
in limiting impeachment to cases of ``treason, bribery and 
other high crimes or misdemeanors''? In my view, the answer 
must be no.
    Thus, for me, as one Senator, the bar for impeachment and 
removal from office of a President must be a high one. I want 
the record to reflect that my vote to dismiss is based upon a 
standard of evidence equivalent to that used in criminal 
proceedings--that is, that guilt must be proven ``beyond a 
reasonable doubt''--and a standard of impeachable offense 
which, in my view, conforms to the founders' intentions that 
such an offense must be one which represents official 
misconduct threatening grievous harm to our whole system of 
government. To quote Federalist No. 65, Hamilton defined as 
impeachable:

    Those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public 
men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some 
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar 
propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to 
injuries done immediately to the society itself.

    As I have said before, I can conceive of instances in which 
both perjury and obstruction of justice would meet this test. I 
certainly believe that most, if not all, capital crimes, 
including murder, would qualify for impeachment and removal 
from office. However, in my judgment, the current case does not 
reach the necessary high standard.
    In the words of John F. Kennedy, ``with a good conscience 
our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our 
deeds,'' I believe that dismissal of the impeachment case 
against William Jefferson Clinton is the appropriate action for 
the U.S. Senate. It is the action which will best preserve the 
system of government which has served us so well for over 200 
years, a system of checks and balances, with a strong and 
independent Chief Executive.
    In closing, I wish to address those in the Senate and 
House, and among the American public, who have reached a 
different conclusion than have I in this case. I do not 
question the sincerity or legitimacy of your viewpoint. The 
process itself pushes us to make absolute judgments--yes or no 
to conviction and removal from office--and the nature of debate 
yields portraits of complex issues in stark black-and-white 
terms, but I believe it is possible for reasonable people to 
reach different conclusions on this matter. Indeed, I recognize 
that, while my decision seeks to avoid the dangers of setting 
the impeachment bar too low, setting that bar too high is not 
without risks. I believe the House managers spoke eloquently 
about the need to preserve respect for the rule of law, 
including the critical principle that no one, not even the 
President of the United States, is above that rule. However, I 
have concluded that the threat to our system of a weakened 
Presidency, made in some ways subordinate to the will of the 
legislative branch, outweighs the potential harm to the rule of 
law, because that latter risk is mitigated by:
    An intact, independent criminal justice system, which 
indeed will retain the ability to render final, legal judgment 
on the President's conduct;
    A vigorous, independent press corps which remains perfectly 
capable of exposing such conduct, and of extracting a personal, 
professional and political price; and
    An independent Congress which will presumably continue to 
have the will and means to oppose Presidents who threaten our 
system of government.
    By the very nature of this situation, where I sit in 
judgment of a Democratic President as a Democratic Senator, I 
realize that my decision cannot convey the nonpartisanship 
which is essential to achieve closure on this matter, one way 
or the other. Indeed, in words which could have been written 
today, the chief proponent among the Founding Fathers of a 
vigorous Chief Executive, Alexander Hamilton, wrote in 1788, in 
No. 65 of ``The Federalist Papers,'' that impeachments ``will 
seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and 
to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, 
to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the 
pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, 
partialities, influence and interest on one side, or on the 
other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest 
danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the 
comparative strength of the parties than by the real 
demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    I have, however, in making my decision, laid out for you 
the standards which I believe to be appropriate whenever the 
Congress considers the removal from office of an elected 
official, whether executive branch, or legislative branch. I 
will do my best to stand by those standards in all such cases 
to come before me while I have the privilege of representing 
the people of Georgia in the U.S. Senate, regardless of the 
party affiliation of the accused. I only hope and pray that no 
future President, of either party, will ever again engage in 
conduct which provides any basis, including the basis of the 
current case, for the Congress to consider the grave question 
of impeachment.
                                ------                                


              MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES

    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, during yesterday's 
impeachment trial proceedings, I voted against the motion to 
dismiss offered by the senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr. 
Byrd. I also voted in favor of allowing the House managers to 
depose a limited number of witnesses in this case. I would like 
to explain the reasons for my votes.
    Let me state first that I understand that this trial is a 
unique proceeding; it is not precisely a ``trial'' as we 
understand that term to be used in the criminal context. The 
Senate, for example, as the Chief Justice made clear in 
upholding Senator Harkin's objection early in the trial, is 
both judge and jury, with the final authority to determine not 
only the ``guilt'' or ``innocence'' of the defendant, but also 
the legal standard to apply and what kind of evidence is 
relevant to the decision.
    Nonetheless, Senator Byrd's motion was a motion to dismiss, 
which I believe gives the motion a legal connotation we must 
not ignore. I believe that in order to dismiss the case at this 
point, a Senator should be of the opinion that it is not 
possible for the House managers to show that the President has 
committed high crimes and misdemeanors, even if they are 
permitted to call the witnesses that they want to call. Even 
apart from the possibility of witness testimony, in order to 
vote for the motion, a Senator should believe that regardless 
of what occurs in the closing arguments by the parties and in 
deliberations in the Senate, that a Senator would not vote to 
convict.
    So for me, this motion to dismiss was akin to asking the 
judge in this case not to send the case to the jury. In a 
criminal trial, there is a strong presumption against taking a 
case out of the hands of the jury, and a very high degree of 
certainty on the facts of the case is demanded before a judge 
will take that step. Indeed, a judge must decide that a 
reasonable juror viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution could not vote to convict the 
defendant, before he will direct a judgment of acquittal.
    My view, as of this moment, is that to dismiss this case 
would in appearance and in fact improperly ``short circuit'' 
this trial. I simply cannot say that the House managers cannot 
prevail regardless of what witnesses might plausibly testify 
and regardless of what persuasive arguments might be offered 
either by the managers or by Senators who support conviction. 
When the history of this trial is written, I want it to be 
viewed as fair and comprehensive, not as having been shortened 
merely because the result seemed preordained.
    As Senator Collins and I indicated in a letter to Senator 
Byrd on Saturday and in a unanimous consent request we offered 
on Monday, my preference would have been to divide the motion 
to dismiss and allow separate votes on the two articles of 
impeachment to more closely approximate the separate final 
votes on the two articles contemplated by the impeachment 
rules. It would have allowed the Senate to consider the 
strength of the evidence presented on the two separate articles 
and the possibility that one of the articles comes closer to 
the core meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors than the 
other.
    I believe that many of my colleagues on the Republican side 
view the perjury article as less convincing than the 
obstruction article and might have voted to dismiss it had the 
opportunity to do that been made available. But we will never 
know. When a final vote is taken on the articles, and I now 
believe such votes will almost certainly occur, I hope that my 
colleagues who did not vote to dismiss the case today will 
carefully consider the two articles separately.
    I want to be clear that my vote not to dismiss this case 
does not mean that I would vote to convict the President and 
remove him from office or that I am leaning in that direction. 
I have not reached a decision on that question. It is my 
inclination, however, to demand a very high standard of proof 
on this question. Because the House managers have relied so 
heavily on the argument that the President has committed the 
Federal crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice as the 
reason that his conduct rises to the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, they probably should be required to prove each 
element of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the 
standard that juries in criminal proceedings must apply. In 
this case, where the ``impeachability'' question rests so much 
on a conclusion that the President's conduct was not only 
reprehensible but also criminal, I currently believe that 
standard is the most appropriate for a Senator to apply.
    It is my view at this point that the House managers' case 
has some serious problems, and I am not certain that it can be 
helped by further testimony from witnesses. But I believe it is 
possible that it can. The managers deserve the opportunity to 
take the depositions they have requested.
    In voting against the motion to dismiss and to allow 
witnesses to be subpoenaed, I have not reached the important 
question of whether, even if the House managers manage to prove 
their case beyond a reasonable doubt, the offenses charged 
would be ``impeachable'' and require the President to be 
removed from office. That is an important question that I 
decided should be addressed in the context of a final vote on 
the articles after the evidentiary record is complete. 
Therefore, I want to be clear that my vote against the motion 
does not mean I am leaning in favor of a final vote to convict 
the President. I am not.
    But I have determined, after much thought, that we must 
continue to move forward and not truncate the proceeding at 
this point. I believe that it is appropriate for the House 
managers, and if they so choose, the President's counsel, to be 
able to depose and possibly to present the live testimony of at 
least a small number of witnesses. And I want to hear final 
arguments and deliberate with my colleagues before rendering a 
final verdict on the articles.
    I reached my decision on witnesses for a number of reasons. 
First, although I recognize that this is not a typical, 
ordinary criminal trial, it is significant and in my mind 
persuasive that in almost all criminal trials witnesses are 
called by the prosecution in trying to prove its case. Because 
I have decided that the House managers probably must be held to 
the highest standard of proof--beyond a reasonable doubt--I 
believe that they should have every reasonable opportunity to 
meet that standard and prove their case.
    Furthermore, witnesses have been called every time in our 
history that the Senate has held an impeachment trial. In two 
cases, the impeachment of Senator Blount in 1797 and the 
impeachment of Judge English in 1926, articles of impeachment 
passed by the House were dismissed without a trial. I recognize 
that an unusually exhaustive factual record has been assembled 
by the Independent Counsel, including numerous interviews with, 
and grand jury testimony from, key witnesses. That 
distinguishes this case from a number of past impeachments. But 
in at least the three judicial impeachments in the 1980s, the 
record of a full criminal trial--two resulting in conviction 
and one in acquittal--was available to the Senate and still 
witnesses testified.
    In this case, the House managers strenuously argued that 
witnesses should be called. It would call the fairness of the 
process into question were we to deny the House managers the 
opportunity to depose at least those witnesses that might shed 
light on the facts in a few key areas of disagreement in this 
case. I regard this as a close case in some respects, and the 
best course to follow is to allow both sides a fair opportunity 
to make the case they wish to make.
    This does not mean that I support an unlimited number of 
witnesses or an unnecessarily extended trial. Furthermore, at 
this point, I am reserving judgment on the question of whether 
live testimony on the Senate floor should be permitted. I 
believe the Senate has the power, and should exercise the 
power, to assure that any witnesses called to deliver live 
testimony have evidence that is truly relevant to present.
    In this regard, I think we should allow somewhat greater 
latitude to the President's counsel since he is the defendant 
in this proceeding. I am inclined to give a great deal of 
deference to requests by the President's counsel to conduct 
discovery and even call additional witnesses if they believe 
that is necessary. But at least with respect to the House 
manager's case, while we must be fair in allowing them to 
depose the witnesses they say they need to prove their case, we 
need not allow them to broaden their case beyond the acts 
alleged in the articles or inordinately extend the trial with 
witnesses who cannot reasonably be expected to provide evidence 
relevant to our decision on those articles.
    Finally, let me reiterate. My vote against the motion to 
dismiss should not be interpreted as a signal that I intend to 
vote to convict the President. Nor does it mean that I would 
not support a motion to adjourn or a motion to dismiss offered 
at some later stage of this trial, although I strongly prefer 
that this trial conclude with a final vote on the articles. It 
only means that I do not believe that dismissing the case at 
this moment is the appropriate course for the Senate to follow.
                                ------                                


    MOTION OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS FOR THE APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT 
                   DEPOSITIONS AND TO ADMIT EVIDENCE

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, the House managers want to 
conduct depositions of at least four people and their requests 
to admit affidavits could very well lead to the depositions of 
at least three others and, indeed, many more witnesses. The 
three people they expressly ask be subpoenaed are Monica 
Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney Blumenthal. All three have 
previously testified before the Starr grand jury and Ms. 
Lewinsky has been interviewed or testified at least 23 times on 
these matters over the last year.
    The fourth deponent requested by the House managers is none 
other than the President of the United States. Although they 
characterize their request as a ``petition'' that the President 
be requested to appear, in their memorandum, the House 
Republican managers are less coy about their request. They note 
that ``obtaining testimony from the witness named in the 
motion, and additionally from the President himself'' is what 
they seek.
    The House managers' request is unprecedented in 
impeachments. The Senate has never formally requested or 
demanded that a respondent testify in his own impeachment 
trial. Should the President decide that he wants to speak to 
the Senate, that would be his choice. But I cannot support an 
effort that would have the Senate reject over 200 years of our 
jurisprudence and begin requiring an accused to prove his 
innocence.
    The presumption of innocence is a core concept in our rule 
of law and should not be so cavalierly abandoned. The petition 
of the House managers is a clever but destructive effort to 
stand this trial on its head. As a former prosecutor and trial 
attorney, I appreciate the temptation to turn the tables on an 
accused person to make up for a weak case, but the Senate 
should not condone it. The burden of proof is on the House to 
establish why the Senate should convict and remove from office 
the person the American people elected to serve as their 
President.
    I commend President Clinton for focusing on his duties as 
President and on moving the country forward. That the Congress 
remains immersed in this impeachment trial is distraction 
enough from the functions of our Federal Government. We have 
heard hours of argument from the House Republican managers and 
the response of the President's lawyers. Senator Byrd has, 
pursuant to our unanimous consent resolution governing these 
proceedings, offered a motion to dismiss to bring this entire 
matter to conclusion. If, on the other hand, the majority in 
the Senate wishes to continue these proceedings, that is the 
majority's prerogative.
    The House managers apparently want to excuse the weaknesses 
in their case by blaming the Senate for not calling the 
President to the stand or the President for not volunteering to 
run the gauntlet of House managers. Having had the House reject 
their proposed article of impeachment based on the President's 
deposition in the Jones case, the House managers are left to 
pursue their shifting allegations of perjury before the grand 
jury. Their allegations of perjury have devolved to semantical 
differences and the choice of such words as ``occasional'' and 
``on certain occasions.'' Their view of perjury allows them to 
take a part of a statement out of context and say that it is 
actionable for not explicating all relevant facts and 
circumstances. They view perjury by a standard that would 
condemn most presentations, even some of their own 
presentations before the Senate.
    In addition to their request that the President be deposed, 
the House Republican managers also propose to include in this 
record affidavits and other materials apparently not part of 
the record provided by Mr. Starr or considered by the House. 
Ironically, in so doing, they have chosen to proceed by 
affidavit. They must know that by proffering the declaration of 
an attorney for Paula Jones about that case and the link 
between that now settled matter and the Starr investigation, 
they are necessarily opening this area to possible extensive 
discovery that could result in the depositions of additional 
witnesses, as well.
    Does anyone think that the Senate record can fairly be 
limited to the proffered declaration of Mr. Holmes without 
giving the President an opportunity to depose him and other 
relevant witnesses after fair discovery? The links between the 
Jones case and the Starr investigation will be fair game for 
examination in the fullness of time if the Holmes declaration 
proffered by the House managers is accepted.
    The Holmes declaration is at variance with the House 
managers' proffer. The declaration suggests that the Jones 
lawyers made a collective decision, whereas the House managers 
suggest that the decision to subpoena Ms. Currie was Mr. 
Holmes' decision. Mr. Holmes declares that no Washington Post 
article played any part in his decisionmaking to subpoena Ms. 
Currie and that he ``does not recall'' any attorney in his firm 
saying anything about such an article ``in the discussions in 
which we decided to subpoena Ms. Currie.'' This could lead to 
discovery from a number of Jones lawyers.
    The Holmes declaration says that the Jones lawyers ``had 
received what [they] considered to be reliable information that 
Ms. Currie was instrumental in facilitating Monica Lewinsky's 
meetings with Mr. Clinton and that Ms. Currie was central to 
the `cover story' Mr. Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky had developed to 
use in the event their affair was discovered.'' That assertion 
was strongly omitted from the House Republican managers' 
proffer. That assertion raises questions about what the Jones 
lawyers knew, when they knew it and whether there was any link 
to the Starr investigation. If the purpose of the declaration 
is to rebut the notion that Ms. Currie was subpoenaed because 
the Jones lawyers were following the activities of the Starr 
investigation, this declaration falls far short of the mark. It 
raises more questions that it resolves.
    I am surprised to see a judicial clerk submit an affidavit 
in this case. The one thing that is clear from Mr. Ward's 
affidavit is that it does not support the conclusions drawn in 
the House managers' proffer. Mr. Ward says only that President 
Clinton was looking directly at Mr. Bennett at one moment 
during the argument by the lawyers during the deposition. He 
does not aver, as the House managers suggest he would 
competently testify, that ``he saw President Clinton listening 
attentively to Mr. Bennett's remarks.''
    While the affidavit of Barry Ward cannot convert the 
President's silence into statements, it does provide one 
perspective on the President's deposition in the Jones case. 
Accepting that proffered evidence may, however, prompt the 
President's lawyers to want to examine other perspectives to 
give the Senate a more complete picture and a fairer 
opportunity to consider what was happening during the 
discussions among Judge Wright and the lawyers. For that 
purpose, is the Senate next going to authorize the deposition 
of Judge Wright and the other lawyers who attended the 
deposition? The circumstances under which Mr. Ward came to take 
such an affidavit and what he knows about the variety of issues 
mentioned in the House managers' proffer on this item will 
undoubtedly be fair subjects of discovery by the President's 
lawyers if this is admitted.
    The House managers characterized documents as certain 
telephone records and the participants in various telephone 
calls whose identities are not revealed by the records. Indeed, 
those proffered documents are without authentification. The 
House Republican managers' brief goes even farther, suggesting 
that the telephone records will prove what happened at the 
White House gate on December 6, and asserting the identity of 
those who participated in telephone calls and the content of 
those telephone calls and concluding that they prove meetings 
and conversations that were not even by telephone. The 
documents appear to be a series of numbers. Giving them content 
and context will require more than mere authentification. Any 
such testimonial explanation can be expected to engender 
further discovery, as well.
    Now let me turn to the witnesses that the House managers 
have identified by name and for which they are expressly 
seeking subpoenas at the outset of this discovery period. I 
understand that under Senate Resolution 16 Senators must vote 
for or against the entire package of witnesses and discovery 
requested by the House.
    The House Republican managers have already interviewed 
Monica Lewinsky after Mr. Starr arranged for that interview and 
had her ordered to comply. In light of the circumstances under 
which she has already been forced to cooperate with the House 
Republican managers, any doubt as to the coercion being 
exercised through her immunity agreement could not be more 
starkly seen. I seriously question Ms. Lewinsky's freedom to 
express herself in the present circumstances and suggest that 
her immunity situation will inevitably affect the credibility 
of anything that she might ``add'' to the House's case. Mr. 
Starr has the equivalent of a loaded gun to her head, along 
with her mother's and her father's.
    Consider also the report in The Washington Post on Tuesday 
that Mr. Starr tore up her immunity agreement once before when 
she tried to clarify her February 1998 proffer to note that she 
and the President had talked about using a ``cover story'' 
before she was ever subpoenaed as a witness in the Jones case, 
not after. That is now a key point of the House managers' 
proffer but it points now in the other direction by suggesting 
that she is now willing to testify that the President 
``instructed'' her to invoke cover stories if questioned in 
connection with the Jones case. Would not such a shift in 
testimony necessarily lead to discovery into the impact of the 
immunity agreement on her testimony and the many twists and 
turns in the 7-month negotiation between Mr. Starr and Ms. 
Lewinsky's attorneys and the pressures exerted upon her over 
the last 6 months?
    Moreover, press accounts of the celebrated interview of Ms. 
Lewinsky by the House managers last weekend suggest that she 
may also have said things during that interview that were 
favorable to the President. The President's counsel are now in 
the untenable position of having to oppose the House managers' 
motion without specific knowledge of any exculpatory 
information that Ms. Lewinsky may have provided that would 
weigh against the need to call her as a witness. That is unfair 
and contrary to basic precepts of our law. The House managers 
created this circumstance and should not benefit from it.
    The House managers also insist that they must open 
discovery to take the deposition of Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan 
has been interviewed or testified under oath before Starr's 
grand jury at least five times already. The House managers' 
proffer is merely that they expect that his live testimony will 
lead to reasonable and logical inferences that might help their 
case and somehow link the job search to discouraging her 
testimony in the Jones case. That is not a proffer of anything 
new but an attempt to take another shot at eliciting testimony 
that Mr. Starr could not.
    The House managers also insist that the Senate must depose 
Sidney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal also testified before the 
Starr grand jury. The House managers' proffer notes nothing new 
that he would be expected to provide.
    If the President has been willing to forego the opportunity 
to cross-examine the witnesses whose grand jury testimony has 
been relied upon by the House managers, that removes the most 
pressing need for further discovery in this matter. After all, 
Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan, and to a lesser extent, Mr. 
Blumenthal, were interviewed for days and weeks by the FBI, 
trained investigators, Mr. Starr's lawyers and then testified, 
some repeatedly, before the Starr grand jury. That is about as 
one-sided as discovery gets--no cross-examination, no 
opportunity to compare early statements with the way things are 
reconfigured and re-expressed after numerous preparation 
sessions with Mr. Starr's office.
    These witnesses testified under threat of prosecution by 
Mr. Starr. Ms. Lewinsky remains under a very clear threat of 
prosecution, even though she has a limited grant of immunity 
from Starr. This special prosecutor has shown every willingness 
to threaten and prosecute.
    If the President has not initiated efforts to obtain more 
discovery and witnesses and is willing to have the matter 
decided on the voluminous record submitted to the House, the 
House managers carry a heavy burden to justify extending these 
proceedings further and requiring the reexamination of people 
who have already testified.
    I heard over and over from the House managers that there is 
no doubt, that the record established before the House and 
introduced into this Senate proceeding convinced the House to 
vote for articles of impeachment to require the removal of the 
President from office last month. The House managers have told 
us that they have done a magnificent job and established their 
case.
    Based on the House managers' motion and their proffer in 
justification, I do not believe that they have justified 
extending these proceedings into the future through additional 
depositions and additional evidence. Can anyone confidently 
predict how many witnesses will be needed to sort through the 
evidentiary supplement that the House proffers and the issues 
that it raises? Can anyone confidently predict how long that 
discovery will take and how long this trial will be extended? 
And for what? What is the significant and ultimate materiality 
to the fundamental issues being contested at this trial of the 
materials the House is moving now to include in the record? 
Although the House managers can say that they only sought to 
depose three witnesses, does anyone think that in fairness the 
President's lawyers and the House managers together will not 
end up deposing at least 10 people if the Senate were to grant 
the House motion?
    The Senate should not extend these proceedings by a single 
day. The Senate runs a grave risk of being drawn down into the 
mire that stained the House impeachment proceedings. 
Republicans and Democrats have all told me that they do not 
believe that there is any possibility that this trial will end 
in the conviction of the President and his removal. In that 
light, the Senate should have proceeded to conclude this matter 
rather than extend it.
                                ------                                


MOTION TO DISMISS THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON 
                                CLINTON

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, this Senate is the last of 
the 20th century. We begin this first session of the 106th 
Congress facing a challenge that no other Senate in over 100 
years has been called upon to meet; namely, whether to remove 
from office the person the American people elected to serve as 
the President of the United States.
    What we do in this impeachment of the President, in terms 
of the standards we apply and the judgments we make, will 
either follow the Constitution or alter the intent of the 
framers for all time. I have heard more than one Senator 
acknowledge that in that sense it is not just the President but 
also the Senate that is on trial in this matter.
    The Senate now has an opportunity, as provided in S. Res. 
16, to vote on a motion to conclude these proceedings by 
adopting Senator Byrd's motion to dismiss. I commend Senator 
Byrd and agree with him that such action is both appropriate 
and in the best interests of the Nation. I do not believe that 
the House managers have proven a case for conviction and 
removal of the President on the articles of impeachment sent by 
the House last year. I further suggest that those articles are 
improperly vague and duplicitous.
    We can all agree that the President's conduct with a young 
woman in the White House was inexcusable. It was deeply 
disappointing, especially to those who know the President and 
who support the many good things he has done for this country. 
His conduct in trying to keep his illicit relationship secret 
from his wife and family, his friends and associates, and from 
the glare of a politically charged lawsuit and from the 
American public, though understandable on a human level, has 
had terrible consequences for him personally and for the legacy 
of his Presidency.
    Last week, Senator Bumpers reminded us of the human costs 
that have been paid by this President and his family. The 
underlying lawsuit has now been settled and a financial 
settlement of $850,000 has been paid on a case that the 
District Court judge had dismissed for failing to state a 
claim. The President has admitted terribly embarrassing 
personal conduct before a Federal grand jury, has seen a 
videotape of that grand jury testimony broadcast to the entire 
Nation which had excerpts replayed over and over, again. 
Articles of impeachment were reported by the House of 
Representatives against a President for only the second time in 
our history.
    The question before the Senate is not whether William 
Jefferson Clinton has suffered, for surely he has as a result 
of his conduct. The question is not even whether William 
Jefferson Clinton should be punished and sent to jail on a 
criminal charge, for the Constitution does not confer that 
authority on this Court of Impeachment. The question, as framed 
by the House, is whether his conduct violated Federal criminal 
laws and, if he did, whether those crimes constitute ``other 
high crimes and misdemeanors'' warranting his removal from the 
office of President to which he was reelected by the people of 
the United States in 1996.
    Justice Robert Jackson, when he was Attorney General in 
1940, observed that the most dangerous power of the prosecutor 
is the power to ``pick people that he thinks he should get, 
rather than cases that need to be prosecuted.'' When this 
happens, he said, ``it is not a question of discovering the 
commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has 
committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then . . 
. putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.'' 
``It is here,'' he concluded, ``that law enforcement becomes 
personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular 
with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the 
wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in 
the way of the prosecutor himself.''
    In the case of President William Jefferson Clinton, things 
became personal a long time ago. I am not alone in questioning 
Mr. Starr's conduct. His own ethics advisor felt compelled to 
resign his position after Mr. Starr appeared before the House 
Judiciary Committee as the head cheerleader for impeachment.
    It now appears that Mr. Starr has gone from head 
cheerleader to the chief prosecutor for impeachment. Over the 
last week he forced Ms. Lewinsky to cooperate with the House 
Republican managers as part of her immunity agreement. She must 
``cooperate'' under the threat that Mr. Starr may decide to 
prosecute her, her mother or her father if he is not satisfied.
    It is now up to the Senate to restore sanity to this 
process, exercise judgment, do justice and act in the interests 
of the Nation. We will be judged both today and by history on 
whether we resolve this case in a way that serves the good of 
the country, not the political ends of any political party or 
particular person.
    I doubt that any Senator can impartially say that the case 
against the President has been established beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In this matter, my view is that is the appropriate 
standard of proof. Here the Senate is being asked to override 
the electoral judgment of the American people with respect to 
the person they elected to serve them as the President of the 
United States. In this matter the charges have not been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
    The inferences the House managers would draw from the facts 
are not compelled by the evidence. Indeed, the House managers 
fail to take into account Ms. Lewinsky's admitted interest in 
keeping her relationship with President Clinton from the public 
and out of the Jones case. They ignore the role of Linda Tripp 
in Ms. Lewinsky's job search and the fact that it was Ms. Tripp 
who suggested that Ms. Lewinsky involve Vernon Jordan. In light 
of these and other fundamental flaws in the House managers' 
case, I doubt whether many can vote that the articles have been 
established by clear and convincing evidence.
    I know that Republican Senators as well as Democratic 
Senators have told me that they do not believe there is any 
realistic possibility that the Senate will convict the 
President and remove him from office. I agree. Having heard the 
arguments from both sides and having considered the evidence, I 
do not believe that there is any possibility that the Senate 
will convict the President on the articles of impeachment and 
remove him from office. That being so, I believe that the 
interests of the Nation are best served by ending this matter 
now, at the earliest opportunity.
    As a consequence of the House's action, the impeachment 
process is continuing to preoccupy the Congress into this year. 
This unfinished business of constitutional dimension will 
necessarily displace the other important business facing the 
country until it is resolved. I believe this matter should be 
concluded and we should turn our attention to legislative 
matters.
    History has judged harshly the radical Republicans who 
pursued impeachment against President Andrew Johnson. I believe 
that history will likewise render a harsh judgment against 
those who have fomented this impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton on the charges brought forward by the House of 
Representatives. I do not believe those charges have been or 
can be proven. I do not believe that the House managers have 
justified the Senate overriding the 1996 presidential election 
and ordering the duly elected President of the United States 
removed from office.
    When the Chief Justice, as Presiding Officer, sustained 
objection to the House managers' mischaracterization of the 
Senate in this matter, it highlighted the House managers' 
misconceptions of the trial. Senators are not merely serving as 
petit jurors who will be instructed on the law by a judge and 
are asked to find facts. Senators have a greater role and a 
greater responsibility in this trial. As the Chief Justice 
properly observed: ``The Senate is not simply a jury; it is a 
court in this case.''
    Our job is to do justice in this matter and to protect the 
Constitution. In that process, I believe we must serve the 
interests of the Nation and fulfill our responsibilities to the 
American people. I believe that this impeachment trial should 
have been concluded now and that the articles of impeachment 
should be dismissed.


                      Wednesday, February 3, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

                    IMPEACHMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION

    Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to call the attention 
of my colleagues to a piece that was written by our 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, our colleague, 
Senator Byrd, that appeared in today's Washington Post entitled 
``Don't Tinker With Impeachment.''
    The reason I want to do that is there are discussions 
occurring now, according to some of my colleagues and accounts 
in the newspaper and on television, about trying to create a 
mechanism to require a vote in the Senate during the 
impeachment trial on the findings of fact prior to a vote on 
the articles of impeachment themselves.
    I was just looking at the Constitution in our Senate 
manual, and, of course, article I in the Constitution 
establishes the basis for impeachment, and it is simple, direct 
and provides nothing of the sort that would lead Senators to 
believe that they can bifurcate the vote in the Senate in an 
impeachment trial first to findings of fact and have a majority 
vote on findings of fact and then to move toward a vote on the 
two articles of impeachment that are currently in front of the 
Senate.
    But I think the article written by our colleague, Senator 
Byrd, provides the best description of the difficulty with 
these findings of fact. Let me read just a few comments, and I 
will ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
    The article, in part, by Senator Byrd says:

    The notion of trumping the articles of impeachment with 
even a ``broad'' findings of fact flies in the face of what the 
Framers of the Constitution intended. They deliberately set the 
bar high when it came to the vote on articles of impeachment, 
first by requiring a supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate 
to convict, and second, by fusing the penalty--[that is] 
removal from office [being the penalty]--into the question of 
guilt.
    In voting on articles of impeachment [he goes on to say] 
senators must answer not one but two questions: Is the 
president guilty or not guilty of committing high crimes and 
misdemeanors, and, if he is guilty, do his actions warrant 
removal from office?

    Continuing to quote from Senator Byrd's article:

    This was not a casual coupling on the part of the Framers. 
Their intent was to force senators to set aside their own 
passions and prejudices and focus instead on the best interests 
of the nation. To lift this burden from the shoulders of 
senators by offering them a way to convict the president 
without having to accept responsibility for removing him from 
office would, in effect, bastardize the impeachment process.
    Moreover [he says] the aftershocks would be felt long after 
this impeachment has faded into history. No longer would 
senators be confined to the articles of impeachment formulated 
by the House of Representatives. No longer would senators need 
a two-thirds majority vote to pronounce a president guilty. 
From this time forward, they could cite the precedent set by 
the Senate in the 106th Congress as giving them carte blanche 
to write, and approve by a simple majority, ersatz articles of 
impeachment cloaked as ``findings of fact.''

    Senator Byrd, as always, finds the bull's-eye in this 
debate. This is not some ordinary debate; this is a debate 
about constitutional requirements and responsibilities and what 
the provisions of the Constitution mean with respect to 
impeachment.
    The impeachment article provisions of the Constitution 
require, when impeachment articles are voted by the U.S. House 
of Representatives and sent to the Senate, that a trial must 
commence, and the vote on the articles of impeachment would be 
conducted by the Senate; and two-thirds of the Senate would 
have to vote guilty on those articles of impeachment in order 
to remove a President from office.
    But it doesn't bifurcate the vote, doesn't call for extra 
procedures, doesn't call for findings of fact, doesn't allow 
some Senators to say, ``Yes, that's what the Constitution says 
but we're going to create a new, or pretend there's a new, 
provision in the Constitution without having the difficulty of 
debating Madison and Mason and Hamilton and Franklin over our 
proposal. We'll just pretend it's in the Constitution. And 
we'll have separate votes on findings of fact. And in fact, 
doing that, we can have our own little vote and create our own 
little result with only 51 Members of the Senate voting in 
favor of our resolution.''
    That is a terrible idea and, in my judgment, stands this 
Constitution, and the article of impeachment provisions in this 
Constitution, on its head. But Senator Byrd says it much better 
than I do. I will, as I indicated, include his article at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
    This Constitution, written in a room in Philadelphia over 
200 years ago, is quite a remarkable document. It established 
the separation of powers. It established the framework for a 
new kind of Government that has worked remarkably well. If 
those who watch these proceedings and become interested in the 
Constitution would go to that room in Philadelphia, they would 
see that that room still exists. It is called the Assembly Room 
in Constitution Hall.
    That room, which is smaller than the Senate Chamber, has a 
chair in the front of the room where George Washington sat as 
he presided over that Chamber. The same chair sits there today. 
And you will see where Mason sat, Madison, Franklin, and others 
who wrote this Constitution. They wrote it on a hot 
Philadelphia summer with the curtains drawn to keep the heat 
out of that room, and they created this remarkable document 
that is printed in the Senate Manual. And that is the document 
by which we in the Senate are now conducting an impeachment 
trial.
    I come to the floor today only to say that I think there is 
great danger in believing there are things written in this 
Constitution that don't exist in the Constitution. There is 
danger, in my judgment, in suggesting ways or mechanisms by 
which some can vote and create majority votes on some 
extraordinary findings of fact that are not provided for in 
this Constitution.
    In this impeachment trial, there is one of two results, and 
that is a vote on the two articles of impeachment that have 
been sent to the U.S. Senate by the House of Representatives. 
That vote will be a vote cast by each and every Member of this 
Senate, and the vote will be either a vote to convict or a vote 
to acquit--guilty or not guilty on the two articles of 
impeachment. And my hope is that when the Senate reconvenes in 
the impeachment trial, all Senators will have read this rather 
remarkable article by the preeminent constitutional scholar in 
this Chamber and the historian of this U.S. Senate, the 
esteemed Senator Byrd.
    I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the 
Record.
    There being no objection, the article was ordered to be 
printed in the Record as follows:
                [From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1999]

                     Don't Tinker With Impeachment

                          (By Robert C. Byrd)
    While the lawyers are busy deposing witnesses in the Senate 
impeachment trial of the president, a number of senators are continuing 
to work quietly behind the scenes to chart a course that will end the 
trial with a minimum of political carnage. One route currently being 
investigated is a so-called ``findings of fact,'' an extravagant 
novelty by which a simple majority of the Senate could condemn the 
president's behavior within the framework of the impeachment process 
without being forced to remove him from office.
    This convict-but-don't-evict strategy appeals to some senators who 
have no appetite for prolonging a trial whose outcome is all but 
certain. At the same time, they are squeamish about the likelihood of 
an all-but-inevitable acquittal without having some vehicle to first 
register their condemnation of the president's actions. No doubt their 
motives are sincere, and I applaud their ingenuity, but this findings-
of-fact proposal is not the answer. While the Senate sits in the 
impeachment trial, it is not in legislative session. The insertion of 
such a legislative mutant into the impeachment proceedings would 
subject the process to some very experimental genetic engineering.
    The notion of trumping the articles of impeachment with even a 
``broad'' findings of fact flies in the face of what the Framers of the 
Constitution intended. They deliberately set the bar high when it came 
to the vote on articles of impeachment, first by requiring a 
supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate to convict, and second, by 
fusing the penalty--removal from office--into the question of guilt.
    In voting on articles of impeachment, senators must answer not one 
but two questions: Is the president guilty or not guilty of committing 
high crimes and misdemeanors, and, if he is guilty, do his actions 
warrant removal from office?
    This was not a casual coupling on the part of the Framers. Their 
intent was to force senators to set aside their own passions and 
prejudices and focus instead on the best interests of the nation. To 
lift this burden from the shoulders of senators by offering them a way 
to convict the president without having to accept responsibility for 
removing him from office would, in effect, bastardize the impeachment 
process.
    Moreover, the aftershocks would be felt long after this impeachment 
has faded into history. No longer would senators be confined to the 
articles of impeachment formulated by the House of Representatives. No 
longer would senators need a two-thirds majority vote to pronounce a 
president guilty. From this time forward, they could cite the precedent 
set by the Senate in the 106th Congress as giving them carte blanche to 
write, and approve by a simple majority, ersatz articles of impeachment 
cloaked as ``findings of fact.''
    And why stop at findings of fact? If the Senate can ignore the 
intent of the Framers to combine a guilty verdict with removal from 
office in an impeachment trial, maybe senators can find a way around 
the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, or 
legislative punishments.
    The Senate impeachment trial takes place in a quasi-judicial 
setting, and findings of fact would move the Senate headlong into an 
area reserved for the judicial system, where the Senate, under the 
separation of powers principle, dares not go.
    Findings of fact would become part of a quasi-judicial record that 
could not subsequently be amended or overturned. Could such a record of 
findings of fact be later used by an independent counsel before a 
federal grand jury in an effort to secure an indictment? If this or any 
president were to be indicted, could such findings be introduced as 
evidence in a subsequent trial in an effort to sway a jury and bring 
about a conviction? Who knows what monsters this rogue gene might spawn 
in future days?
    The impeachment process, as messy and uncomfortable as it may be, 
is working as designed. This is neither the time nor the place for 
constitutional improvisation. No matter how sincere the motivation, our 
nation and our Constitution will not be well served by this sort of 
seat-of-the-pants tinkering.
    A post-trial censure resolution that does not cross the line into 
legislative punishment is something else. It can and should be 
considered by the Senate after the court of impeachment has adjourned 
sine die. Censure is not meaningless, it will not subvert the 
Constitution, and it will be indelibly seared into the ineffaceable 
record of history for all future generations to see and to ponder. For 
those who fear that it can be expunged from the record, be assured that 
it can never be erased from the history books. Like the mark that was 
set upon Cain, it will follow even beyond the grave.

    Mr. DORGAN. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


                       Thursday, February 4, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:03 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Gracious God, these days here in the Senate are filled with 
crucial issues, differences on solutions, and eventually a 
vital vote in the impeachment trial. We begin this day's 
session with the question You asked King Solomon, ``Ask! What 
shall I give You?'' We empathize with Solomon's response. He 
asked for an ``understanding heart.'' We are moved by the more 
precise translation of the Hebrew words for ``understanding 
heart,'' meaning ``a hearing heart.''
    Solomon wanted to hear a word from You, Lord, for the 
perplexities he faced. He longed for the gift of wisdom so he 
could have answers and direction for his people. We are moved 
by Your response, ``See, I have given you a wise and listening 
heart.''
    I pray for nothing less as Your answer for the women and 
men of this Senate. Help them to listen to Your guidance and 
grant them wisdom for their decisions. All through our history 
as a Nation, You have made good men and women great when they 
humbled themselves, confessed their need for Your wisdom, and 
listened intently to You. Speak Lord; we need to hear Your 
voice. We are listening. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senators will be seated. The 
Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           order of procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could take just a moment 
to outline how the proceedings will go this afternoon, I think 
that will answer any questions that Senators may have. We will, 
of course, continue with the consideration of articles of 
impeachment. I am not aware of any objections made during the 
depositions which require motions to resolve. Therefore, I 
believe the House managers are prepared to go forward with a 
motion that has three parts. The first would allow for the 
introduction of the depositions into evidence. The second would 
call Monica Lewinsky as a witness. And the third part would 
allow for a presentation period by the parties for not to 
extend beyond 6 hours. This motion would be debated by the 
House managers and the White House counsel for not to exceed 2 
hours.
    In addition, it is my understanding that Senator Daschle 
intends to offer a motion that provides for going directly to 
the articles of impeachment for a vote.
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, will the majority leader 
yield?
    Mr. LOTT. I am glad to yield to the minority leader, 
Senator Daschle.
    Mr. DASCHLE. The motion would allow for closing arguments, 
final deliberations, and then the motions on the two articles.
    Mr. LOTT. Having said that, Mr. Chief Justice, in order for 
the managers to prepare debate for the motions, I ask unanimous 
consent that the House managers and the White House counsel be 
allowed to make reference to oral depositions during this 
debate on pending motions.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection? In the absence 
of objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Consequently, four votes, then, will occur in the 
4 p.m. timeframe today with respect to these four motions.
    We will take at least one break--maybe two--between now and 
then, and that will determine exactly when that series of votes 
occur--once we begin the process of offering and debating the 
motions. We will make a determination as to exactly when those 
provisions would occur.
    In addition, if the motion for additional presentation time 
is agreed to by the Senate, it is my intention to adjourn the 
trial after today's deliberations over until Saturday for the 
parties to make their preparations, then to present their 
presentations of evidence on Saturday, and the trial would then 
resume on Monday at 12 noon for the closing arguments of the 
parties.
    Again, I remind all of my colleagues to please remain 
standing at their desks when the Chief Justice enters the 
Chamber and leaves the Chamber.
    I thank my colleagues for their attention. I believe we are 
ready to proceed, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
McCollum.

    motion for admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
                        presentation of evidence

    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a motion to 
deliver to the Senate.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion:
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

motion of the united states house of representatives for the admission 
   of evidence, the appearance of witnesses, and the presentation of 
                                evidence

    Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by 
and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully 
submits to the United States Senate its motion for the 
admission of evidence, the appearance of witnesses, and the 
presentation of evidence in connection with the Impeachment 
Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States.
    The House moves that the transcriptions and videotapes of 
the oral depositions taken pursuant to S. Res. 30, from the 
point that each witness is sworn to testify under oath to the 
end of any direct response to the last question posed by a 
party, be admitted into evidence.
    The House further moves that the Senate authorize and issue 
a subpoena for the appearance of Monica S. Lewinsky before the 
Senate for a period of time not to exceed eight hours, and in 
connection with the examination of that witness, the House 
requests that either party be able to examine the witness as if 
that witness were declared adverse, that counsel for the 
President and counsel for the House Managers be able to 
participate in the examination of that witness, and that the 
House be entitled to reserve a portion of its examination time 
to reexamine the witness following any examination by the 
President.
    The House further moves that the parties be permitted to 
present before the Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a 
total of six hours, equally divided, all or portions of the 
parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions of Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal admitted 
into evidence, and that the House be entitled to reserve a 
portion of its presentation time.

    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I understand that the pending motion is 
divisible, and as is my right, I ask that the motion be divided 
in the following manner: The first paragraph be considered 
division I; the second paragraph be considered division II; and 
the final paragraph be considered division III.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. It will be divided in the manner 
indicated by the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I thank the Chair.
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection? In the absence 
of objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I identified this as the first 
paragraph to be considered division I. Actually, that should be 
the second paragraph would be division I, the third paragraph 
division II, and the fourth paragraph would be division III. I 
want that clarification.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. That will be the order.
    Mr. LOTT. Also, so that both sides will understand, the 
motion--there is one motion, but we have divided it into three 
parts so there will only be 2 hours equally divided, one on 
each side; not 2 hours equally divided on each one of the three 
divisions. We had one clarification. I believe we have cleared 
this up. I believe now we are ready to hear from the managers, 
Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Manager McCollum.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    As the first one up here today, I have to fiddle with the 
microphone, I guess; it is testing. I apologize.
    Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Senate, what we have 
presented to you today is a three-part motion, as Mr. Lott has 
described it, and as you have heard read to you. We would like 
very much, as we always have, to have all the witnesses we want 
presented here live, as we would normally have in a trial, as 
the House has always believed that it should have.
    We came before you a few days ago recognizing reality and 
went forward with your procedures to request not 5, not 6, not 
12, but 3 witnesses be deposed so that we might be able to, in 
the discovery process you have allowed us, gain the depositions 
of those three witnesses. Today we are before you with motions, 
first, to enter those depositions and the video recordings of 
those depositions into evidence formally for your consideration 
because they have now been accomplished; secondly, to request 
that you provide us with the opportunity to examine Monica 
Lewinsky live here as a witness on the floor of the Senate, and 
for you to allow us to present the other two depositions to you 
in some format; and, if you do not allow us the permission to 
have Ms. Lewinsky live here to examine as a witness, to allow 
us to present any or all portions of the depositions of all 
three of them.
    Now, I think that it is eminently fair that we be allowed 
to present at least one witness live to you, the central 
witness in the cast of this entire proceeding, and that is 
Monica Lewinsky. I am not here to argue all of that. My 
principal discussion with you is going to be on the part 
dealing with just admitting these into evidence, and then my 
colleagues, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hutchinson, and Mr. Rogan are going 
to present some complementary discussion about the entire 
motion as we go through this.
    But in the context of all of this I think we have to 
recognize a couple of things. One is that live witnesses are 
preferable whether you have depositions or not. These were 
discovery depositions. We would have liked to have asked for 
all of them to be live. We were recognizing reality by coming 
down to one today, and the reasons are fairly straightforward. 
Some of you have had the privilege, and I am sure you have 
availed yourself of the opportunity, to look at the videotapes 
of these depositions, and you see that they are, indeed, what 
most depositions are. They are discovery. They have long pauses 
in them. They are not at all like it would be in a trial 
itself; you don't have the opportunity to fully see or explore 
with the witness the demeanor, the temperament, the 
spontaneity, all of those things that you normally get with an 
exchange. You have the camera simply focused on the witness. 
You don't get to have the interaction you get in a courtroom.
    Remember, again, that we are dealing here first with your 
determining whether or not the President committed the crimes 
of perjury and obstruction of justice and then the question of 
whether or not he should be removed from office. So I believe 
and we believe as House managers that you should at least let 
us have Monica Lewinsky here live for both of those reasons.
    I also want to make comments specifically about just 
admitting these into evidence. There are two obvious reasons 
why, beyond the question of whether a witness should appear 
live or whether we should use portions of them in whatever 
fashion to present to you, they certainly should be part of the 
record. It seems self-evident. It is part of what you gave us 
as the procedure to do, and it would seem to me that it should 
be a mere formality for me to ask, but I cannot assume 
anything--we certainly do not--that we let these depositions 
into evidence, and there are two reasons why.
    One is the historical basis for this. There has to be a 
record, not only for you but for the public and for history, of 
the entire proceeding. There is evidence in these depositions 
that needs to be a part of the official record, and that 
evidence is not just the cold transcript, but it is also the 
videotape with all of the limited, albeit not satisfactory, 
portion of it that you can see and observe. Especially if you 
were to conclude we weren't going to have any live witness here 
or were not going to allow us to present these depositions, you 
certainly should allow the depositions to be part of the record 
and the videotape part of it. It is evidence. It is to be 
examined. It seems self-evident.
    But the second point is, as you are going to hear more from 
my colleagues in just a moment, there is new evidence in these 
depositions. There is new factual record information that needs 
to be here for you to decide the guilt or innocence question of 
the perjury and obstruction of justice charge.
    One illustration I would give you--and I am sure my 
colleagues will give you plenty more--one of them deals with 
the gift question. We have talked about it a lot out here. If 
you recall with regard to the question of the gifts, the issue 
is did the President obstruct justice? Did he decide in the 
Jones case, in the Jones Court, as a part of his course of 
conduct of trying to keep from the Court the nature of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, to keep the gifts hidden?
    There is new information in the deposition relative to what 
happened on the day those gifts were supposedly exchanged 
between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie, about the telephone 
call. Again, I am not going into the details of that. I will 
leave that for my colleagues who took the depositions. They can 
tell you about it. The point is you could enumerate--and they 
will--new evidence. There is significant relevant new evidence 
from the Vernon Jordan deposition and from the Sidney 
Blumenthal deposition. So just on the record alone, just to put 
the depositions into the record, there can be nothing complete 
about this trial if we don't at least do that. At least do 
that.
    And so with that in mind, having said that and urging you 
to do that, I will yield to Mr. Manager Bryant at this point in 
time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
colleagues and Senators, I encourage each of you to consider 
calling Monica Lewinsky as the one live witness in this 
proceeding. Ms. Lewinsky continues to be, in her own way, an 
impressive witness. As I spoke to you earlier, she does have a 
story to tell. After all, no one knows more about the majority 
of the allegations against the President other than, of course, 
the President himself.
    At her deposition, she appeared to be a different Monica 
Lewinsky than the Monica Lewinsky whom I had met a week 
earlier. Unlike before, she was not open to discussion or fully 
responsive to fair inquiry. She didn't volunteer her story. She 
didn't tell her story. Rather, she was very guarded in each 
response and almost protective. Her words were carefully chosen 
and relatively few. At times, the concepts that she discussed 
had the familiar ring of another key witness to these 
proceedings, such as ``it wasn't a lie'' or ``wasn't false,'' 
it was ``misleading or incomplete.'' ``Truth is what one 
believes it is and may be different for different people.'' 
``Truth depends on the circumstances.''
    As we progressed through her deposition Monday, I felt more 
and more like one of the characters in the classic movie 
``Witness For The Prosecution.'' I was Charles Laughton. Ms. 
Lewinsky was Marlene Dietrich. And the President was Tyrone 
Power. If you are familiar with this movie, you will 
understand, and if you aren't, you should see the movie.
    However, there was and there still remains truth in her 
testimony. Sometimes, though, just like the President, and now 
Ms. Lewinsky, it is the literal truth only, the most restricted 
and stretched definition one could reach. And we all know that 
the law frowns upon manipulations such as this to avoid telling 
the complete truth. Her testimony is clearly tinted, some might 
even say tainted, by a mixture of her continued admiration for 
the President, her desire to protect him, and her own personal 
views of right and wrong.
    And she was well represented in the deposition by some of 
Washington's finest defense attorneys who had thoroughly 
prepared her for all questions, as they should have, as well as 
being present throughout the deposition to assist her. In fact, 
the Senator in charge of this particular deposition had to warn 
these counsel not to coach and not to whisper to her while she 
was attempting to answer the questions.
    If you have seen this deposition, you have witnessed an 
effective effort by a loyal supporter of the President to 
provide the very minimum of truth in order to be consistent 
with her own grand jury testimony, which is legally necessary 
for her to fulfill the terms of her immunity agreement.
    On the perjury article of impeachment, she reaffirmed the 
specific facts which happened between her and the President on 
more than one occasion, including November 15, 1995, their 
first encounter, when the President's conduct fit squarely 
within the four corners of the term ``sexual relationship'' as 
defined in the Jones lawsuit, and this is in opposition to the 
President's own sworn testimony of denial. But this is one of 
the clearest examples of the President's guilt of this charge 
of perjury. It is not about this twisted definition the 
President assigned to the term ``sexual relations.'' Rather, it 
is his word against her word as to whether this specific 
conduct occurred. Even under his own reading of this 
definition, he agrees that that specific conduct, if it 
occurred, would make him guilty of sexual relations within that 
definition. But he simply says I did not do that; she says you 
did do that--a ``he said/she said'' case.
    But this is why it is important for you to be able to see 
Ms. Lewinsky in person. In the deposition you will observe her 
as having to affirm her prior testimony. She had to affirm her 
prior testimony because that was what was in the grand jury, 
and because of this, she could not back away at all on her 
testimony. She couldn't bend it here or there, she couldn't 
shade it in the President's favor. So what you have is a 
person, who you may well conclude is still wanting to help the 
President, having to admit to testimony that would do damage to 
the President, a very difficult situation for her. But, yet, 
this same difficulty lends this portion of her testimony great 
credibility.
    With respect to the other article of impeachment on 
obstruction of justice, her credibility is again bolstered by 
her reluctance to do legal harm to this President. In the end, 
though, she does admit that he called her early one morning in 
December of 1997--actually it was 2 o'clock in the morning--and 
told her that she was on the witness list. And he told her that 
she might be able to file an affidavit to avoid testifying. And 
he told her that she could always use the story that she was 
bringing papers to him, or coming up to see Ms. Currie.
    Now, we know that she did not carry papers to him on these 
visits other than personal, private notes from her to him. And 
Ms. Lewinsky indicated in the deposition that she didn't carry 
him official papers, although she did pass along this cover 
story--of carrying papers--to her attorney, Mr. Carter. She 
testified also that she discussed the draft affidavit with Mr. 
Jordan, changes were made, she offered the President the 
opportunity to review it, he declined, and, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, he never suggested any way that she could file a 
truthful affidavit, sufficient to skirt--avoid having to 
testify. This, in spite of his answer to this Senate where he 
told you that he might have had a way for her to file a 
truthful affidavit and still avoid testifying in the Jones 
case.
    Yes, you can parse the words and you can use legal 
gymnastics, but you cannot get around the filing of a false 
affidavit in an effort to avoid appearing in the Jones case and 
possibly providing damaging testimony against the President.
    Ms. Lewinsky confirmed positively that Ms. Currie initiated 
a telephone call to her on December 28, 1997, stating words--
and this is about the gifts--``I understand you have something 
for me.'' Then Ms. Currie drove over to Ms. Lewinsky's home and 
picked up the box of gifts.
    Now, remember, this occurred on the heels of Ms. Lewinsky's 
conversation with the President that very morning about what 
she might do with the gifts. The only explanation is that the 
President is directly involved, himself, in the obstruction of 
justice by telling Ms. Currie, who otherwise knew nothing about 
this earlier conversation, to retrieve these items from Ms. 
Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky said there was no doubt that Ms. Currie 
initiated the call to retrieve the gifts.
    Also recall that the President's testimony from his side 
was that this conversation occurred earlier in the day with Ms. 
Lewinsky but that he had told her she would have to turn over 
whatever gifts that she had. Now, with that advice from the 
President, it would be totally illogical for Ms. Lewinsky to 
have then called Ms. Currie that same day and ask her to come 
pick up and hold these gifts. By calling Ms. Currie, Ms. 
Lewinsky would have been going against the direct instruction 
of the President to surrender any and all gifts. The facts, the 
logic, and common sense tell us all that the President's 
version is not true and that he obstructed justice here.
    Ms. Lewinsky also testified at the deposition about the job 
at Revlon and obtaining a job offer within 2 days of signing 
the affidavit. She also denied that she was a stalker, as the 
President had described her in a conversation with Mr. 
Blumenthal in January of 1998. She also denied that she 
threatened the President or attempted to threaten the President 
into having an affair. She denied that he rebuffed her on the 
occasion of their first encounter on November 15, 1995. Again, 
all false statements that the President made to Mr. Blumenthal 
about her, with knowledge that Mr. Blumenthal would be 
testifying in a grand jury, thereby obstructing justice.
    Now, the former lawyers and judges among us are familiar 
with what is called the best evidence rule. Stated simply, the 
court always prefers the best available evidence to be used. 
In-person testimony is better than a video deposition, which 
itself is better than the written transcript of a deposition. 
When all three forms of testimony are available, as they are in 
this situation, the court will most often require the witness 
to testify in person over the video deposition or over the 
written transcript of the deposition.
    In closing, I know we all want to work within the Senate 
rules and we all want to ensure that these proceedings are 
concluded in a constitutional fashion by the end of next week. 
It is with this in mind that we propose that Ms. Lewinsky be 
called as a live witness, the only person called to testify in 
person, and, further, that we use the two depositions, the 
video depositions of Mr. Jordan and Mr. Blumenthal, in lieu of 
their personal attendance. In the event the Senate does not 
call Ms. Lewinsky, we also ask that we be permitted to use all 
or portions of her deposition, just as we would the other two 
depositions.
    And finally, several Senators have sent out a letter to the 
President inviting him to come here and to provide his 
testimony, if he so chooses. In the event he should accept, Ms. 
Lewinsky, likewise, should be afforded the same opportunity. 
They continue to be the two most important and essential 
witnesses for you and the American people to hear in order to 
finally--finally--resolve this matter.
    Permit us all to return to our districts, and you to your 
States, and tell our constituents that we considered the full 
and complete case, including live witnesses and, in your case, 
made your vote accordingly.
    At this time, I yield to my colleague from Arkansas, Mr. 
Hutchinson.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, in an effort to be 
helpful, I have asked the pages to distribute to you some 
exhibits that I will be referring to as I consider the 
testimony that we are presenting to you.
    There are two aspects to an impeachment trial. There is the 
truth-seeking responsibility, which is the trial, in my 
judgment, and then there is the conclusion, the judgment, the 
verdict, the conviction or the acquittal. If you look at those 
two phases of a trial, the latter is totally your 
responsibility. We leave that completely in your judgment.
    But the first responsibility of the factfinding of the 
truth-seeking endeavor, I feel some responsibility in that 
regard. Hopefully, our presentation is helpful in seeking the 
truth. I know, as Mr. Bryant mentioned, that we all want to 
bring this matter to a conclusion. We want to see the end of 
this story. We want to have a final chapter in this national 
drama. I understand that and agree with that. But let's not, 
because we are in a hurry to get to the judgment phase, let's 
not let that detract, let's not let that shortchange, nor 
diminish the importance of the presentation and consideration 
of the facts, and that is what I think is very important as we 
consider this motion that is before us.
    It is my responsibility to talk about Mr. Vernon Jordan--
and the need for your consideration of his testimony--whom we 
recently deposed. I deposed Mr. Vernon Jordan, Jr., and I 
recommend that that be received in evidence as part of the 
Senate record.
    I took this deposition under the able guidance of Senator 
Thompson and Senator Dodd. The questioning took place over 
almost 3 hours with numerous and extraneous objections on 
behalf of the President's lawyers, most of which were resolved.
    I believe that the testimony of Mr. Jordan goes to the key 
element in the obstruction of justice article, and even though 
it is just one element that we are dealing with, it is a very 
important element because it goes to the connection between the 
job search, the benefit provided to a witness, and the 
solicited false testimony from that witness.
    I believe the testimony of Mr. Jordan is dramatic in that 
it shows the control and direction of the President of the 
United States in the effort to obstruct justice. I believe the 
testimony of Mr. Jordan provides new evidence supporting the 
charges of obstruction and verifying the credibility of Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    The testimony, in addition, is the most clear discussion of 
the facts reflecting Mr. Jordan's actions in behalf of the 
President and the President's direction and control of the 
activities of Mr. Jordan, and therefore they support the 
allegations under the articles of impeachment. Let me make the 
case for you.
    If you have the President of the United States personally 
directing the effort to obtain a job for Ms. Lewinsky, which is 
a benefit to a witness, and simultaneously Ms. Lewinsky is 
under subpoena as a witness in the case, and thirdly, in 
addition, the President is suggesting means to that witness to 
avoid truthful testimony, as evidenced by the December 17 
conversation and the suggestion of the affidavit, the 
conclusion is that you have a corrupt attempt to impede the 
administration of justice and the seeking of truth and the 
facts in the civil rights case.
    Now, let me go to the testimony of Mr. Jordan. Has that 
been distributed now? Good. Let me give a caveat here, 
particularly to my colleagues, the counselors for the 
President, that this summary of the portions of the testimony 
of Mr. Jordan are based upon my handwritten notes. So, please 
don't blow it up in a chart if there is some discrepancy. I 
believe this is, in good faith, accurate, but I did not have a 
copy of the transcript. I was required to go to the Senate 
Chamber and actually take notes in order to prepare this.
    There are a number of areas that I think are relevant and 
new information and are very important for your consideration. 
Let me just touch upon five areas.
    The first one is the job search and Mr. Jordan being an 
agent of the President. In the deposition, Mr. Jordan testified 
that:

    There is no question but that through Betty Currie I was 
acting on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job.

    He goes on to say:

    I interpreted [the request, referring from Betty Currie] it 
as a request from the President.

    Then he testified:

    There was no question that he asked me to help [referring 
to the President] and that he asked others to help. I think 
that is clear from everybody's grand jury testimony.

    So the question is as to whether the information, the 
request, came from Betty Currie or whether it came directly 
from the President, there is no question but that Mr. Jordan 
was acting at the request of the President of the United States 
and no one else. In fact, he goes on to say:

    The fact is I was running the job search, not Ms. Lewinsky, 
and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were 
not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.

    This is very important. There has been a reference, ``Well, 
he was simply getting a job referral, making a referral for 
routine employment interview by this person, Ms. Lewinsky.'' 
But, in fact, it is clear that Mr. Jordan knew whom he wanted 
to contact. He was running the job search as he testified.
    Then he testified:

    Question: You're acting in behalf of the President when you 
are trying to get Ms. Lewinsky a job and you were in control of 
the job search?

    The answer is:

    Yes.

    So that is one area, and it is important to establish that 
he was an agent for the President.
    Secondly, there was a witness list that came out December 
5. The President knew about it, at the latest, on December 6, 
and yet he had two meetings with Mr. Jordan, on December 7 and 
December 11. In neither one of those meetings was it disclosed 
to Mr. Jordan that Monica Lewinsky was a witness. I am 
referring to the second page of the exhibits I have handed you 
in which Mr. Jordan testified to that effect:

    Question: And on either of these conversations that I've 
referenced, that you had with the President after the witness 
list came out, your conversation on 12/7 and your conversation 
sometime after the 11th, did the President tell you that Ms. 
Monica Lewinsky was on the witness list in the Jones case?
    Answer: He did not.
    Question: Would you have expected the President to tell you 
if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be 
called as a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    Answer: That would have been helpful.
    Question: So it would have been helpful and it was 
something you would have expected?
    Answer: Yes.

    Even though it would have been helpful, he would have 
expected the President to tell him the information, it was not 
disclosed to him. The materiality, the relevance, of that is 
that you have the President controlling a job search, knowing 
this is a witness in which we are trying to provide a benefit 
for, and yet the person he is directing to get the job for Ms. 
Lewinsky, he fails to tell Mr. Jordan the key fact that she is, 
in fact, a witness, an adverse witness in that case. I think 
that is an important area of his testimony.
    The third area, keeping the President informed--very clear 
testimony about the development of the job search, the Lewinsky 
affidavit that was being prepared, and the fact that it was 
signed. On the third page I have provided to you, Mr. Jordan's 
testimony:

    I was keeping him [the President] informed about what was 
going on and so I told him.

    He goes on further to say:

    He [referring to the President] was obviously interested in 
it.

    Then the question, I believe, was:

    What did you tell the President when the affidavit was 
signed?

    And his answer:

    Mr. President, she signed the affidavit, she signed the 
affidavit.

    So was there any connection between the job benefit that 
was provided and the affidavit that was signed in reference to 
her testimony? Clearly, it was something the President not only 
directed the job search, but he was clearly interested, 
obviously concerned, receiving regular reports about the 
affidavit.
    Then the fourth area is the information at the Park Hyatt 
that was developed. To lay the stage for this--and I will do 
this very briefly--if you look at page 4, you see the previous 
testimony of Mr. Jordan before the grand jury in March. At that 
time, the question was asked of him:

    Did you ever have breakfast or any meal, for that matter, 
with Monica Lewinsky at the Park Hyatt?

    His answer was:

    No.

    It was not equivocally, it was indubitably no.
    And he was further asked, and he testified:

    I've never had breakfast with Monica Lewinsky.

    And then on page 5 he goes on, in the May 28 grand jury 
testimony:

    Did you at any time have any kind of a meal at the Park 
Hyatt with Monica Lewinsky?

    His answer was:

    No.

    So that sets the stage, because in Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, as evidenced by page 6 of your exhibits, she 
testified in August, after the last time Mr. Jordan testified, 
very clearly about this meeting on December 31 at the Park 
Hyatt with Mr. Jordan where they had breakfast. The discussion 
was about Linda Tripp. Then the discussion went to the notes 
from the President, and she said, ``No, [it was] notes from me 
to the President.'' And Mr. Jordan told her, according to her 
testimony, ``Go home and make sure they're not there.'' That is 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony.
    It was important to ask Mr. Jordan about this. I assumed 
that we, of course, would get simply a denial, sticking with 
the previous grand jury testimony, that unequivocally, no, that 
meeting never happened: we never had breakfast at the Hyatt.
    On page 7, you will notice that Ms. Lewinsky, in her 
testimony, specifically identified even what they had for 
breakfast. And so the investigation required us to go out and 
get the receipt at the Park Hyatt, which is page 8. And the 
receipt showed that there was a charge on December 31 by Mr. 
Jordan that included every item for breakfast, that 
corroborated the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky as to her memory; 
that is, the omelette they had for breakfast.
    And so it is tightening here. The evidence is becoming more 
clear, unequivocally, that this meeting occurred. And so we had 
to ask this of Mr. Jordan. And this is page 9. And, of course, 
I presented the Park Hyatt receipt, I presented the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky, and his testimony, which is page 9:

    It is clear, based on the evidence here, that I was at the 
Park Hyatt on Dec 31st. So I do not deny, despite my testimony 
before the grand jury, that on [December] 31 that I was there 
with Ms. Lewinsky, but I did testify before the Grand Jury that 
I did not remember having a breakfast with her on that date and 
that was the truth.

    But what amazed me was, as you go through the questions 
with him, all of a sudden he remembered the breakfast but all 
of a sudden he remembered the conversation in which he before 
said it never happened at all. And his testimony was, when 
asked about the notes:

    I am certain that Ms. Lewinsky talked to me about [the] 
notes.

    And so I think there are a number of relevant points here. 
First of all, you reflect back on the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky 
in this same deposition in which she was asked the question, 
getting Mr. Jordan's approval was basically the same as getting 
the President's approval? Her answer: Yes.
    And so that is how Ms. Lewinsky viewed this. And this is 
what was told to her at this meeting at the Park Hyatt. It goes 
to credibility, it goes to what happened, it goes to the 
obstruction of justice. It is extraordinarily relevant. It is 
new information. It is what was developed because this Senate 
granted us the opportunity to take this further deposition of 
Mr. Jordan and the other witnesses.
    And there are other, you know--the fifth point is that the 
testimony goes to the interconnection between the job help and 
the testimony that was being solicited from Ms. Lewinsky.
    So why is the presentation necessary? Some of you might 
even think, ``Well, thank you very much for that explanation 
you have given to us. Now we have all the facts. Let's go on 
and vote.'' I do think there is some merit. First of all, this 
is not all. There is much more there. I just have a moment to 
develop a portion of Mr. Jordan's testimony that I believe is 
helpful, but, secondly, it tells a story that has never been 
told before.
    I went and saw the videotape and I was underwhelmed by my 
questioning, because it is just not the same. I thought we had 
a dynamic exchange. But then I saw it on videotape and I am 
nowhere to be found. You get to look at Mr. Jordan, a 
distinguished gentleman. But it is still helpful not 
withstanding the difficulty of a video presentation. I 
respectfully request this body to develop the facts fully, to 
hear the testimony of Mr. Jordan, to allow him to explain this 
that tells the story, start to finish, on this one aspect of 
obstruction of justice that is critical to your determination. 
And so I ask your concurrence in the approval of the motion 
that has been offered to you, and at this time I yield to 
Manager Rogan.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, yesterday, along with Mr. Manager Graham, I had the 
privilege of conducting the deposition of Sidney Blumenthal, 
assistant to the President. That deposition was presided over 
by the senior Senator from Pennsylvania and the junior Senator 
from North Carolina. On behalf of the House managers, and I am 
also sure the White House counsel, we thank them for the able 
job that they did.
    This deposition must be played for Members of the U.S. 
Senate, and if one Senator has failed to personally sit through 
this deposition--and every deposition--that Senator is not 
equipped to render a verdict on the impeachment trial of the 
President of the United States.
    I will address very briefly just a couple of the reasons 
why I believe Mr. Blumenthal's deposition warrants being played 
before this body. But to do it, it needs to be put in 
perspective. Remember what the President of the United States 
testified to on the day he was sworn in as a witness before the 
grand jury. He said that in dealing with his aides, he knew 
there was a potential that they could become witnesses before 
the grand jury, and that is why he told them the truth. That is 
the President's own word: the ``truth.'' Mr. Blumenthal's 
deposition paints a totally different picture and gives a 
terribly different interpretation of what the President was 
doing in passing along false stories to his aides.
    We have been treated to a number of euphemisms by the 
distinguished White House counsel during their presentation as 
to what the President was doing during his grand jury 
testimony. They described his testimony as ``maddening.'' They 
have described his testimony as ``misleading'' and 
``unfortunate.'' But the one thing they have never described it 
as is a lie.
    Mr. Blumenthal gave a totally different take on that 
because he testified under oath that, upon reflection, he 
believes the President was not maddening to him, the President 
lied to him, and he testified so for a very good reason.
    Remember, Sidney Blumenthal testified three times before 
the grand jury in 1998. He testified in February and twice in 
June. But that testimony was in a vacuum because each time he 
testified before the grand jury we were still in a national 
state of, at least presumptively, believing that the President 
had told the truth. The President had made an emphatic denial 
as to the Monica Lewinsky story. There was no physical evidence 
presented to the FBI lab at the time Mr. Blumenthal testified. 
And Monica Lewinsky was not cooperating with the grand jury. So 
we know that certain questions were not asked of him during his 
grand jury testimony because of the status of the facts as we 
thought they were. But Mr. Blumenthal shed some incredible new 
light on the testimony that we received yesterday from him.
    He said, first of all: After I was subpoenaed, but before I 
testified before the grand jury, once in February and twice in 
June--with the President knowing he was about to become a 
witness before the grand jury, a criminal grand jury 
investigation--the President never came to him and said, ``Mr. 
Blumenthal, before you go and provide information in a criminal 
grand jury investigation, I need to recant the false stories I 
told you about my relationship with Monica Lewinsky.''
    And he testified about those false stories. He corroborated 
his own testimony from earlier proceedings. You will recall 
from the record that the day the Monica Lewinsky story broke in 
the national press Mr. Blumenthal was called to the Oval Office 
by the President. The door was closed. They were alone. And 
this is what the President told Sidney Blumenthal about the 
revelations that were breaking that day on the national press 
wire:

    He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual 
demand on me.''

    The President said he rebuffed her. He said:

    I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a lot 
of people and I'm not going to do that again.

    The President said Monica Lewinsky threatened him:

    She said that she would tell people they'd had an affair, 
that she was known as the stalker among her [colleagues], and 
that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an 
affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.

    And the testimony goes on. You are all familiar with it at 
this point.
    The President of the United States allowed his aide to 
appear three times before a Federal grand jury conducting a 
criminal investigation, and never once did the President of the 
United States inform that aide before providing that 
information to the investigatory body--never once--asked or 
told the aide that that was false information. Mr. Blumenthal's 
testimony demonstrates that the President of the United States 
used a White House aide as a conduit for false information 
before the grand jury in a criminal investigation.
    I just want to make one other brief point before I close 
this presentation because I think it needs to be said. I am in 
no position to lecture any of the distinguished Members of this 
body on what the founders intended in drafting the 
Constitution. I believe all of us in this room have an abiding 
respect for that. But there are a couple of points that need to 
be made. I believe there is a reason the founders drafted a 
document that allows us the opportunity in every trial 
proceeding in America to confront and cross-examine live 
witnesses. It is because that gives the trier of fact the 
opportunity to gauge the credibility and the demeanor of the 
witnesses. We have discussed that at length during these 
proceedings.
    But one thing we haven't discussed and one thing that I 
think is important--not from the House managers' perspective, 
but from the perspective of history and the history that will 
be written on the ultimate verdict in this case--and that is 
the idea of open trials. There is a reason why the founders 
looked askance on the concept of secret trials and closed 
trials. There is a reason why in every courtroom across the 
land trials are open. They are open. It is an open process. The 
light of truth is allowed to shine in the courtroom and from 
the courtroom because we don't trust the credibility of a 
verdict if it is done in secret. What would be the verdict on 
this proceeding if the judgment of this body is based upon 
testimony and witnesses, on videotapes, locked in a room 
somewhere, available only to the triers of fact without the 
public being privy to what was made available?
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I would urge you, not 
for the sake of the managers and not for the sake of the 
presentation of the case, but for the sake of this body and for 
the verdict of history that will be written, to please allow 
this to be a public trial in the real sense. If the witnesses 
will not be brought here live before the Senate, please allow 
the doors of the Senate to be open so that the testimony upon 
which each of you must base your verdict will be made available 
not only to all 100 Senators, but will be made available to 
those who will make the ultimate judgment as to the 
appropriateness of the verdict, the American people.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I yield to Mr. Manager Graham.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, how much time?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Your colleagues have consumed 37 
minutes.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I 
do not have a whole lot to add, but I would like to recognize 
this thought: That we have learned a great deal in these 
depositions. Thank you for letting us have them. We didn't get 
everything we wanted--and I think that is a fair statement--but 
who does in life? But we do appreciate you giving us the 
opportunity to explore the testimony of these witnesses because 
I think it would be helpful in setting the historical record 
straight.
    Mr. Blumenthal, to his credit, said the President of the 
United States lied to him. The President of the United States 
did lie to him. The President of the United States, in his 
grand jury testimony, denied ever lying to me. That should be 
historically significant and should be legally significant. Mr. 
Blumenthal, to his credit, said the President of the United 
States tried to paint himself as a victim to Ms. Lewinsky. That 
would be legally and historically relevant and it will mean a 
lot in our arguments and it will be something you should 
consider.
    This has been a good exercise. Thank you very much for 
letting us depose these witnesses.
    I was not at the other two depositions, but I was at Mr. 
Blumenthal's deposition, and I can assure you we know more now 
about what the truth is than before we started this process. I 
hope at the end of the day it is our desire to get to the truth 
that guides us all. We are asking for one live witness, Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Let me tell you, I know how difficult it is to want this to 
go on given where everybody is at in the country. Trust me, I 
want this to end as much as you do. However, there is a signal 
we will send if we don't watch it. We will make the independent 
counsel report the impeachment trial, and I am not so sure that 
is what the statute was written for.
    The key difference between the House and the Senate is that 
the White House never disputed the facts over in the House. 
They never disputed the facts. They called 15 witnesses to talk 
about process and about the interpretations that you would want 
to put on those facts. In their motion to the Senate, 
everything is in dispute. It is a totally different ball game 
here. That is why we need witnesses, ladies and gentlemen, to 
clarify who said what, who is being honest, who is not, and 
what really did happen in this sordid tale.
    Ms. Lewinsky comes before us because the allegations arise 
that the President of the United States, with an intern, had an 
inappropriate workplace sexual relationship that was discovered 
in a lawsuit where he was a defendant. This was not us or 
anyone else trying to look into the President's private life 
for political reasons or any other reason. It was a defendant 
in a lawsuit asking to look at the behavior of that defendant 
in the workplace, something that goes on every day in 
courtrooms throughout the country.
    And is it uncomfortable? Yes, it is uncomfortable. If you 
have ever tried a sexual harassment case, an assault case, or a 
rape case, it is very much uncomfortable to have to listen to 
these things. But the reason that people are asked to do what 
you are asked to do by the House managers is that the folks 
that are involved represented themselves much better than 
lawyers talking about what happened. And if you find it 
uncomfortable listening to Ms. Lewinsky, think how juries feel, 
think how the victims feel, think how somebody like Ms. Jones 
must feel not to be able to tell the story of the person they 
are suing.
    That is a signal that is going to be sent here that will be 
a devastating and bad signal. If we can't stomach it, if we 
can't stomach listening to inappropriate sexual conduct, why do 
we put that burden on anyone else?
    Give us this witness. We will do it in a professional 
manner. We will focus on the obstruction. We will try to do it 
in a way not to demean the Senate. We will try to do it in a 
way not to demean Ms. Lewinsky. We will try to do it in a way 
to get to the truth. Please give us a chance to present our 
case in a persuasive fashion, because unlike the House, 
everything is in dispute here.
    Thank you very much. I reserve the remainder of my time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers reserve the remainder 
of their time.
    The Chair recognizes Counsel Craig.
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen 
of the Senate, I have divided my presentation into three parts 
that fortunately correspond to the three parts of the motion 
that is before you today.
    I would like, first, to argue against admitting videotape 
evidence into the record of this trial. Second, I would like to 
argue against calling live witnesses to this trial. And third, 
I would like to argue against the proposed presentation of 
videotape and deposition testimony for Saturday.
    I sound rather negative. I don't mean to be negative. But 
we don't find much to recommend the three proposals that the 
House managers have brought before you today.
    Let me begin by saying that we support the idea of 
admitting written transcripts of deposition testimony of these 
three witnesses into the record of this trial. But we believe 
that it would be a terrible mistake and wholly redundant to put 
the videotape testimony into that record as well, particularly 
if that means releasing any of this videotaped material to the 
public.
    We can only call the Senate's attention to section 206 of 
Senate Resolution 30, which instructs the Secretary of the 
Senate ``to maintain the videotaped and transcribed records of 
the deposition as confidential proceedings of the Senate.'' 
That was the intention of the Senate when you first passed 
Resolution 30. If this decision as proposed today will result 
in overruling that rule, if there is any risk or danger of a 
wholesale, unconditional, and unlimited release of these 
videotapes for the public through the national media, just as 
was done by the House of Representatives when it released all 
the Starr materials, we think it is a bad idea.
    In retrospect, most people believe that it was a mistake 
for the House to release those materials--and those materials 
included videotaped grand jury testimony--and we believe it 
would be a mistake for the Senate, at the request of the House 
managers, to do the same thing with these videotaped materials 
now. To release these videotapes generally to the public--which 
will happen if they are put into the record--inevitably will 
surely cause consternation among those members of the public, 
particularly parents who do not choose to spend one more 
moment, much less hours and even days, thinking about the 
President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky and explaining it 
again to the children. Placing these videotapes in the formal 
record of this trial will be one step closer to releasing the 
tapes to the public for immediate broadcast. If that release 
occurs, it will produce an avalanche of unwelcome deposition 
testimony into the public domain.
    The videotaped testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and 
Mr. Blumenthal will be forced, hour after hour, unbidden and 
uninvited, into the living rooms and family rooms of the 
Nation. Make no mistake about what would happen; we have seen 
it before. We can expect to see the networks play these tapes, 
wall-to-wall, nonstop, and without interruption, over the 
airwaves. This would be a repeat of what happened when the case 
first came to the House of Representatives. For the Senate to 
decide to include the videotapes of this deposition testimony, 
as opposed to the written transcripts in the formal record of 
this trial, would have the same effect and could result in this 
kind of release. The picture, voices, and words on these tapes 
would flow directly and irreversibly into the life of the 
Nation. In addition, these videotapes will, no doubt, be edited 
and excerpted and cut and spliced, and the materials will not 
only be overused, they will also be inevitably abused.
    To take advantage of these witnesses, I submit to you, in 
this way is wrong--whether in the context of the grand jury 
proceeding where confidentiality is promised, or whether 
testifying under subpoena in an impeachment trial in the 
Senate. It is unfair to the witnesses, unfair to the public, 
unfair to the Senate and, we submit, unfair to the President as 
well.
    We do not object to release of the written transcripts of 
this testimony; we support that release. And we believe that 
that satisfies any reasonable requirement of public access to 
the information. The public's right to know and understand what 
is happening in this impeachment trial would be respected. But 
we should learn a lesson from America's experience in the House 
of Representatives: More is not always better.
    It is not wise or right for the House or the Senate to 
perform the function of a mere conveyor belt simply and 
automatically transmitting unfiltered evidence into the public 
domain. It is not wise or right to suspend judgment and turn 
over for public viewing the videotaped testimony of private 
witnesses who are forced to appear and testify under 
compulsion. It is simply wrong to release videotapes of such 
testimony for cable news networks or for friends or foes to use 
as they want. This, I submit, is profoundly unfair to the 
witnesses.
    One can only ask, who really benefits from this kind of 
practice? Is it really in the public interest for the Senate to 
issue and serve a subpoena on private individuals like Monica 
Lewinsky, or Vernon Jordan, to summon these citizens before the 
Senate to compel their testimony before video cameras and then 
to take that videotaped testimony, without any consideration or 
thought about the legitimate personal concerns or interests of 
those witnesses, and release those videotapes of that testimony 
for the national media? Is it really in Ms. Lewinsky's interest 
to do this, or in the interest of her family or her future? Is 
it fair to Mr. Jordan or to his family to subject him to this 
kind of treatment? Is it really in the Senate's interest? Is it 
in the interest of the Constitution, or the Presidency, or of 
the American people to have a videotape of Monica Lewinsky 
readily available for all the world to see and to hear?
    What about those individuals who are, in fact, truly 
innocent but who will surely suffer if these videotapes are 
released to the public for permanent residence in the public 
domain? What about the members of the President's immediate 
family? How can the Senate contemplate releasing Ms. Lewinsky's 
videotaped testimony, discussing her relationship with the 
President, without giving at least some thought to the impact 
that this might have on the members of that family? You can be 
sure that the release of this testimony and of this videotape 
will only add to their agony, embarrassment, and humiliation.
    I only hope that those who purport to be concerned about 
the moral damage that can be attributed to the President's 
conduct and example are equally mindful of the hurt that will 
be inflicted on innocent people by the mere broadcasting of 
these videotapes and of their existence in perpetuity in the 
public record and the public domain.
    We think it is perfectly appropriate and, no doubt, helpful 
to many Senators and staffers to be able to watch the 
deposition testimony of these three witnesses on videotape as 
part of the Senate's trial proceeding, but that function has 
now been satisfied. There is no need for these tapes to be 
broadcast to the public, as the public knows better than 
anyone. It is for that precise reason, one suspects, that 
three-quarters of those polled, according to a survey reported 
in yesterday's New York Times, oppose releasing the videotaped 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan and Mr. Blumenthal to 
the public.
    I urge you to not vote to place these materials into the 
record of this trial without giving careful consideration to 
these interests and to these concerns. These are not just the 
interests and concerns of the President and the members of his 
family. They are not just the interests and concerns of these 
three witnesses and the members of their families. I think they 
are also the interests and concerns of the American people as 
well.
    The bottom line, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is 
simple: You do not need these videotapes released to do your 
constitutional duty, and the people we all work for do not want 
these videotapes released to them. Please draw the line.
    As for the issue of witnesses, we believe that there is no 
useful purpose served by calling live witnesses to testify 
before the Senate in this trial. Live witnesses will not 
advance the factual record. We have known the facts for many 
months. Nor will live witnesses give us new insight into the 
witnesses themselves. Sidney Blumenthal's fourth appearance, 
Vernon Jordan's seventh appearance, and Monica Lewinsky's 
twenty-third appearance told us really very little that was 
new. I take issue with the presentation of the managers. Why 
should we expect Mr. Blumenthal's fifth appearance, Mr. 
Jordan's eighth appearance, and Ms. Lewinsky's twenty-fourth 
appearance to add anything more? Live witnesses will simply not 
serve the interests of fairness. They will not serve the 
interests of the American people, and they will not serve the 
interests of the Senate. In fact, live testimony from these 
three individuals--or from Ms. Lewinsky alone--will be worse 
than an exercise in redundancy and will be an exercise in 
excess. It will only postpone the end of the trial that nobody 
wants anymore and that no one wants to prolong any longer. 
There is every reason, finally and at long last, to bring the 
trial to a close. And calling live witnesses, I submit, will 
not be quick, and it will not be easy. It will prevent the 
Senate from keeping its pledge to bring this trial to a 
conclusion by February 12.
    Because live witnesses are unnecessary for the resolution 
of this matter, perhaps the most important question for the 
Senate to consider and resolve itself is whether calling live 
witnesses might, in fact, tarnish the Senate as an institution. 
This is a question that only you can resolve, the Members of 
the Senate. And you certainly need not take instructions from 
me or from any of us at this table on that subject. But the 
question is worth asking: Will the public's respect for the 
Senate and for the Members of this body be enhanced by calling 
live witnesses? Does the Senate really feel a need or an 
obligation or some requirement to bring Ms. Lewinsky to sit 
here and testify in the well of this historic Chamber?
    The managers first argued that live witnesses were 
necessary to resolve conflicts of testimony, that the only way 
to reconcile disparities and differences in testimony was to 
bring in live witnesses. Today we know that is not true. You 
gave the managers an opportunity to resolve those conflicts and 
find new facts. But most of the critical conflicts that existed 
a week ago still exist today.
    Calling Monica Lewinsky to testify a 24th time is not 
likely to resolve those conflicts. Then we were told that we 
must look into the eyes of the witnesses and observe their 
demeanor to make a judgment as to credibility. But you now have 
the opportunity to observe almost every major witness as he or 
she testifies. Precious little is left to the imagination or to 
guess or to question the credibility, and you certainly have a 
better chance of observing demeanor through the videotape than 
you do with a witness here on the floor of the Senate.
    We are now given a third reason why live witnesses are 
absolutely necessary to this trial to go forward; that is to 
``validate'' the testimony of these witnesses.
    According to Mr. Manager Hyde, the depositions have been 
successful, but ``what we need now is to validate the record 
that already exists under oath about obstruction of justice and 
perjury.''
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, we on this side of the 
House have never challenged that record. We have always agreed 
that the witnesses said what the record says they said, and 
that record needs no further validation through the live 
testimony of individual witnesses.
    Those of us who have made a career of being lawyers and 
trying cases probably understand better than anyone else why 
the House managers are so adamant in their desire to call live 
witnesses. It keeps the door open if only for a few more days. 
As Mr. Kendall observed last week, like Mr. Micawber in ``David 
Copperfield,'' they hope against hope that something may turn 
up.
    As an abstract proposition, the importance of live 
witnesses cannot be disputed. They are important to prosecutors 
who are trying to make a case. They are important to defense 
lawyers who are trying to defend a case. Trial lawyers know 
better than anyone that live witnesses can make all the 
difference in a trial. There is just no disputing that point.
    But that abstract question is not the real live question 
that the Senate has before it today. The issue before the 
Senate today is different. It is more specifically whether 
these three witnesses, each one of whom has testified on 
multiple occasions under oath before the Federal grand jury, or 
have been interviewed on multiple occasions by lawyers and law 
enforcement officers, would have anything whatsoever to add to 
this trial if they were to appear before you in person. The 
answer to that question is clearly no.
    The answer is no--not because Ms. Lewinsky has already been 
interviewed so many times and has testified so many times, not 
because she was just interviewed a few weekends ago, and not 
because she appeared and answered the House managers' questions 
under oath for many hours just 4 days ago. The answer is no 
because if you watch the videotape of her testimony, and if you 
look at the videotape of the testimony of Mr. Jordan and Mr. 
Blumenthal, you realize and you know deep in your bones that 
calling these witnesses to testify personally before you in the 
Senate in detail would simply be a massive waste of this 
Senate's time.
    You already know the facts. You have already read what they 
have had to say on many different occasions. And you have 
already seen and read their most recent testimony under oath. 
It simply can no longer be credibly argued that you need 
testimony from these witnesses to ``flesh'' out the factual 
record or to resolve conflicts or to fill in the evidentiary 
gaps or to look the witnesses in the eye and assess their 
credibility. All that has been done many times before by many 
lawyers before and by many law enforcement officers many months 
ago. And then it was done just recently again by House managers 
as they took their deposition testimony last week.
    The Senate has given the managers every opportunity to 
persuade the Senate and the Nation to see this case the same 
way they see it. And the managers have run a vigorous and 
energetic campaign aimed at capturing the Senate and changing 
American public opinion. How many times do you know of where 
the prosecutors base their case on a multimillion-dollar 
criminal investigation involving multiple interrogations of 
witnesses, producing 60,000 pages of documents, generating 19 
boxes of evidence, when the prosecutors are allowed to go back 
to those witnesses again and again and again in an effort to 
maybe--somehow maybe--in some way to make their case, covering 
the same territory, presenting the same evidence, hour after 
hour? In fact, in our view, the Senate has indulged the 
managers. And despite the misgivings of many Senators, the 
Senate has leaned over backwards to accommodate the managers.
    We believe it is time for the Senate to say it is time to 
vote. Given the state of the record compiled by the Office of 
Independent Counsel, given the discovery that has already been 
given to the managers, the evidence is as it is, and it is not 
likely to change in any significant way. The moment of truth 
can no longer be avoided, and the Senate should move to make 
the decision.
    President Clinton is not guilty of having committed high 
crimes and misdemeanors. He should not be removed from office. 
The Senate must act now to end this impeachment trial finally 
and for all time.
    Finally, as to the proposed proceedings for Saturday, 
Senate Resolution 30 gives the House managers and White House 
counsel an opportunity to ``make a presentation'' to the Senate 
employing all or portions of the videotape of the deposition 
testimony. And the final portion of the motion involves a 
request that the parties be permitted to present before the 
Senate for a period of time not to exceed a total of 6 hours 
equally divided all or portions of the parts of the videotapes 
of the oral depositions of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Sidney 
Blumenthal that have been admitted into evidence.
    We are convinced that such a presentation would provide no 
new information to the Senate and would only serve to delay 
this trial and further burden the service of the Senate.
    We also believe that there is a potential for unfairness 
that lurks in the process of excerpting and presenting portions 
of individual videotape testimony out of context. We remain 
committed to the notion that to be fair to all sides, the 
videotapes, if they are used, must be shown in their entirety 
or shown not at all. And, above all, we do not believe these 
videotapes should be released to the public in any form which 
would of course occur if they were used as part of the 
presentation on Saturday.
    Senators have themselves been reviewing the videotaped 
deposition testimony of the witnesses at great length and in 
great detail over the past 4 days. It appears to us that the 
Senate has been very conscientious in carrying out this 
assignment. And within a matter of days, Senators will listen 
to final arguments from each side.
    Is there really a need for an intermediate stage involving 
the playing of videotape testimony of the very same evidence? 
After conscientiously reviewing the videotape testimony and 
reading the transcripts of that testimony, should Senators now 
be required to sit and watch and listen to more of the same? 
Such an exercise would only be cumulative and causes us to ask 
what the point would be. We just do not think that additional 
presentations of the same evidence that Senators have been 
reviewing over the past few days will be that helpful to the 
process.
    Presumably, the House managers seek to present a collection 
of snippets--the greatest hits from the deposition testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Blumenthal. This would be 
unfortunate because it would require a full response from the 
White House--presumably our own collection of snippets aimed at 
putting the managers' excerpts into some kind of context. This 
would be a dual of snippets and excerpts, and presumably each 
side in the course of the presentation would conduct a guided 
tour for the Senate through that evidence, although I must say 
that the language of the motion leaves that open to some doubt.
    The language of the motion provides no opportunity for 
argument, no opportunity for explanation, and simply talks 
about playing a total of 6 hours equally divided, all or 
portions of the parts of the videotapes.
    Is this the way your time is best used in this enterprise? 
We fully understand the House managers' desire--and even share 
it--to highlight and explain the importance of certain 
testimony that came out of the depositions over the past few 
days. But in truth, there are no bombshells in that testimony. 
There is no dynamite. There are no explosions. We believe that 
highlighting, explaining, and calling attention to those parts 
of that testimony that are important can be done with the 
transcripts, and the transcripts more than satisfy the 
requirement that we see, or the need to conduct that function, 
carry out that function. That is what ordinary lawyers do when 
they are trying cases or arguing in front of a jury.
    To the extent that the managers wish to call attention to 
various aspects of the testimony, we think they will have ample 
time to do so in the course of their final argument. 
Traditionally, that is the time to do that, during closing 
arguments, the time for advocates in a trial to marshal their 
evidence, to summarize and comment on that evidence; and to 
allow the managers to go through the deposition testimony first 
would be tantamount to giving the managers two closing 
arguments.
    In summary, Mr. Chief Justice, I have a point of 
parliamentary inquiry I would direct to the Chair having to do 
with the first paragraph, the first section of the proposed 
motion submitted by the House managers. Is there any way that 
the Senate can deal first with the question of the first 
question being bifurcated? Is there any way the Senate can 
bifurcate this first question and a separate vote be taken 
first on including the transcripts of the deposition testimony 
in the record of the trial and, second, whether the videotapes 
should also be included in the record?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. A preemptive motion to that effect could 
be made by any Senator.
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you.

                                 recess

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take a 15-minute recess. I think we can address that 
question during this recess.
    There being no objection, at 2:22 p.m. the Senate recessed 
until 2:44 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that there is time 
remaining for arguments by the White House counsel, and then at 
their conclusion, by the House managers. After that, I will 
make an attempt to explain to the Senate exactly what is in the 
motions, because there seems to be some degree of question 
about that. Then we will be prepared to have a series of votes 
at that time. I still believe we should be able to start that 
around 4 o'clock. I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Craig.
    Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, we have completed our 
presentation. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers have 19 minutes 
remaining.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I will respond 
briefly, to be followed by Mr. Manager McCollum, who will be 
followed by Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
    Let me first talk quickly about Mr. Craig's argument about 
disagreeing on the admission of the video depositions. He cited 
the House proceedings, and we want to be clear as to our belief 
of our position in the House in this process, as the accusatory 
branch of the Government in this process, and I think that is 
the case because we vote by a majority vote, we chose to bring 
forward the case that we felt established the allegations of 
impeachment.
    There was no conflict of evidence brought forward from 
those House proceedings. This evidence was not challenged until 
we came to this body, the appropriate body, for resolving the 
evidence and trying the case, as you will. That is evidenced by 
the constitutional requirement that you must vote conviction 
based on two-thirds of your body. But the actual conflict was 
not presented until we arrived here in the Senate. By allowing 
us to have this procedure of taking depositions, we have 
focused more clearly on resolving those particular conflicts.
    I might add also in response to Mr. Craig's statement that 
the Starr Report was released out to the public and, as a 
result of that, there may be danger here in releasing these 
video depositions. But let me tell you about the House vote on 
the Starr Report. Seventy percent of the Democrats supported 
the release of those documents; 100 percent of the Democratic 
leadership in the House supported the release of those 
documents. So it was not just one party over the other party 
that threw these out to the public. It was a decision that was 
a bipartisan decision on the part of the House.
    I might add, that is not our interest in doing this with 
video depositions. We are open to your process, but we must 
conclude by those who would argue that perhaps you should open 
your debate to the public, we don't see the consistency in 
trying to take a very important part of the evidence in this 
case and not opening that to the public. So we are at your 
wishes. It is our desire to make the presentation using all or 
portions of these video depositions and to use those as fully 
as we would any other evidence.
    With that said, I ask Mr. Manager McCollum to follow me.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
McCollum.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chief 
Justice.
    If you listen to the White House counsel, the simple fact 
is, they don't want a public display in any form of any 
testimony here in front of the Senate. They don't want the 
public to have an opportunity to have a public trial.
    Now, maybe an impeachment trial is not exactly the same as 
any other trial, but in the history of the Senate, it has been 
a basically open process, except for the voting. It has been an 
opportunity for witnesses to come before you. It has been an 
opportunity for people to be heard. It has been an opportunity 
for the public to hear the people who want to speak.
    White House counsel didn't just say, ``We don't want live 
witnesses here.'' They said, ``We don't want you to be able to 
admit even into evidence the videotape that might become 
public, and we don't want you to be able to show any portion, 
or all even, of the videotapes of the depositions that have 
been taken.''
    If a Republican had gotten up and said that, we would have 
probably gotten hung on some political petard for that. The 
reality is, the public has business here. This is a trial. I 
suggest and submit to you, we need--you need--the opportunity 
to hear these witnesses one way or the other--preferably Monica 
Lewinsky live. We need to bring closure in this matter.
    How can the public come to closure? How can those who feel 
so emotionally, as we know they do, around the country, come to 
closure on this--which we need for them to do as much as you 
need to resolve and we need to have you resolve the questions 
before you--how can they come to closure? How can we all come 
to closure without an opportunity for the public to 
participate, in one way or another, in seeing the credibility, 
judging the witnesses, judging the truth of this?
    Let me remind you, there is nothing in these depositions 
that is salacious material, so it has been constrained very 
delicately--nothing at all that would be offensive to anybody.
    In addition, think about this for a minute. When it comes 
to calling Monica Lewinsky live, when it comes to letting the 
deposition be presented, if you believe that the President did 
not break the law--not talking about whether he should be 
removed from office--if you believe he did not break the law, 
that he did not commit the crimes of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, that means you must have concluded that Monica 
Lewinsky was not telling the truth when she said about the 
false affidavit, ``I knew what he meant,'' when she said about 
the concealment of the gifts, ``Betty called me,'' when she 
said about the nature of their relationship, ``It began the 
night we met,'' and many other things.
    You, I would submit, my colleagues in the Senate, have a 
moral obligation to allow Monica Lewinsky to come here and be 
judged on her credibility, not just by you but by the public, 
by all of us, as a live witness. Certainly, barring that, you 
have an obligation to have the credibility on the issues of 
guilt or innocence of these crimes be judged by everybody, at 
the very least, by the presentation of these videos in a 
public, open format here in the Senate before everybody. I 
think it is a powerful question you have to resolve.
    I submit one last point. For those of you who do believe 
the President is guilty of these crimes, you have an obligation 
to let the showing of these depositions, or the presentation 
preferably of Monica Lewinsky live, so those who maybe don't 
think the same way you do have an opportunity for that 
credibility to be judged. Only if the witnesses are present can 
they be judged that way.
    The most remarkable thing about the White House 
presentation may have been, just a moment ago, the admission 
that normally in trials this is exactly what happens. And I 
present to you the suggestion, this is exactly what should 
happen here today.
    I yield to Manager Hutchinson.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Manager Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Very briefly, I was asked to respond to the last argument 
by counsel for the President in regard to their objections on 
the evidentiary presentation of 6 hours under the motion, which 
would be, I believe, on Saturday. After 6 days of opening 
statements in this trial, and after 2 days of questions and 
answers, and then we had, I believe, 2 days of motion 
arguments, you have heard from all the lawyers more than you 
ever wanted to hear. I don't think that it is too much to ask, 
for 6 hours of discussion of the evidentiary record that was 
developed from the deposition testimony. I think that is 
reasonable.
    It has been argued that it is going to be snippets, it is 
going to be a battle of snippets.
    If this motion is passed, it will be introduced into 
evidence, and each side will have an opportunity to discuss 
that evidence, to contrast it with other individuals' 
testimony, and to present it in a fashion that is most 
understandable. It is equally divided; therefore, both sides 
can present their case. That is how it is traditionally done. 
There is nothing unusual about that, and certainly the White 
House defense lawyers will be very vigilant in making sure that 
it is fairly presented.
    There was objection that was made--and this is overlapping 
a little bit--as to the public release of the video. Our motion 
really goes to introducing into evidence. It is up to you as to 
how that evidence is handled. Customarily in a trial, when 
something is entered into evidence, that is released. But there 
was concern expressed about the witnesses, about Mr. Jordan and 
the fact that he has testified and now it would be made public. 
I recall the White House defense lawyers, on this screen over 
here, put Mr. Jordan's video up there for the world to see. I 
believe they also brought in other witnesses on video that was 
put out there for the whole world to see. So I think it is a 
little bit late to come in and say that that should not be 
subject to public discussion.
    I think that the motion that is presented is reasonable. It 
is fair. They say there is nothing of dynamite or there is 
nothing explosive. Then if that is the case, there should not 
be any objection to the discussion and the fair playing of that 
evidence. But in fact much of this is due because it was not 
developed after the President made his grand jury appearance. 
Many of these witnesses testified early. They were not able to 
testify again after the President's grand jury testimony. So I 
think there are new areas that have certainly been developed.
    With that, Mr. Chief Justice, I yield back.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Will the House managers yield back?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, then all time has been yielded 
back on both sides?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
    Mr. LOTT. We had expected this would take a little bit 
longer. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Chief Justice, I believe it would be of interest to the 
Senators that we give just a brief explanation of the motions. 
I believe Senator Daschle may have an additional motion that he 
would like to offer. So that we can make sure he has had the 
time to prepare that, and how we would go into the voting 
procedure, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, very briefly, I believe that 
Senator Daschle, or one of his Senators, will have a peremptory 
motion that they will offer, and it will be read by the clerk; 
then there will be a vote on that. Then there will be a vote on 
the 3 divisions that have been identified--the 3 votes on the 
one motion--and then I believe Senator Daschle will also have a 
motion; we will go straight to debate and closing arguments and 
the vote on the articles of impeachment. Is that a correct 
recitation?
    I yield to Senator Daschle.
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I appreciate the Senator 
yielding. As I understand it, Senator Murray's motion will 
relate to the third motion, which is, as I understand it, the 
motion that allows for video excerpts to be used. Her motion 
would restrict both managers to transcripts, written 
transcripts. I am not sure in which order her motion should be 
offered, but since it relates to the third one, perhaps it 
would be in concert with that motion.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is the motion to debate and divide 
the third motion.
    Mr. DASCHLE. That's correct.
    Mr. LOTT. We would vote on the first paragraph, the second 
paragraph, and then there would be a motion at that point by 
Senator Murray and a vote on that, and a vote then on the third 
division, and then a vote on the articles of impeachment 
itself.

                           vote on division i

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on Division I. The clerk 
will read Division I.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The House moves that the transcriptions and videotapes of 
the oral depositions taken pursuant to Senate resolution 30 
from the point that each witness is sworn to testify under oath 
to the end of any direct response to the last question posed by 
a party be admitted into evidence.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are required.
    The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 9]

 [Subject: Division I of House managers motion regarding admission of 
                               evidence]

                               YEAS--100

Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Voinovich
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 100, the nays 
are 0. Division I of the motion is agreed to.

                          vote on division ii

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The next vote will be on Division II of 
the motion. The clerk will read Division II of the motion.
    The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

    Division II: The House further moves that the Senate 
authorize and issue a subpoena for the appearance of Monica S. 
Lewinsky before the Senate for a period of time not to exceed 
eight hours, and in connection with the examination of that 
witness, the House requests that either party be able to 
examine the witness as if the witness were declared adverse, 
that counsel for the President and counsel for the House 
Managers be able to participate in the examination of that 
witness, and that the House be entitled to reserve a portion of 
its examination time to reexamine the witness following any 
examination by the President.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The 
clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 30, nays 70, as follow:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 10]

[Subject: Division II of House managers motion regarding appearance of 
                               witnesses]

                                YEAS--30

Abraham
Ashcroft
Bond
Bunning
Burns
Cochran
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Santorum
Smith (NH)
Specter
Thompson

                                NAYS--70

Akaka
Allard
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Daschle
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Gorton
Graham
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thurmond
Torricelli
Voinovich
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.
    On this vote, the yeas are 30, the nays are 70. Division II 
of the motion is not agreed to.
    The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington, Mrs. 
Murray.

                   murray substitute for division iii

    Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, I send a substitute for 
Division III to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from Washington, Mrs. Murray, moves that the 
following shall be substituted for Division III:
    I move that the parties be permitted to present before the 
Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a total of six 
hours, equally divided, all or portions of the parts of the 
written transcriptions of the depositions of Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    The Parliamentarian advises me that there are 2 hours of 
argument on this motion. Who is the proponent?
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent 
that the time be yielded back.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    I think the clerk should read Division III, having read the 
proposed substitute.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The House further moves that the parties be permitted to 
present before the Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a 
total of six hours, equally divided, all or portions of the 
parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions of Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal admitted 
into evidence, and that the House be entitled to reserve a 
portion of its presentation time.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Now the clerk will read the substitute 
again.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    I move that the parties be permitted to present before the 
Senate for a period of time not to exceed a total of six hours, 
equally divided, all or portions of the parts of the written 
transcriptions of the depositions of Monica S. Lewinsky, Vernon 
E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The 
question is on the substitute. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 27, nays 73, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 11]

[Subject: Murray motion to substitute Division III of the House motion]

                                YEAS--27

Akaka
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Campbell
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Harkin
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Levin
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Snowe
Torricelli

                                NAYS--73

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Bond
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Durbin
Edwards
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Leahy
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Schumer
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 27, the nays 
are 73, and the motion is not agreed to.

                          vote on division iii

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The vote is now on the Division III of 
the motion. The clerk will read Division III.
    The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

    Division III. The House further moves that the parties be 
permitted to present before the Senate, for a period of time 
not to exceed a total of six hours, equally divided, all or 
portions of the parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions 
of Monica S. Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney 
Blumenthal admitted into evidence, and that the House be 
entitled to reserve a portion of its presentation time.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The 
clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 62, nays 38, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 12]

     [Subject: Division III of the House managers motion regarding 
                       presentation of evidence]

                                YEAS--62

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Moynihan
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--38

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lincoln
Mikulski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Snowe
Torricelli
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 62, the nays 
are 38. Division III of the motion is agreed to.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority 
leader.

                 motion to proceed to closing arguments

    Mr. DASCHLE. I send a motion to the desk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] moves that the 
Senate now proceed to closing arguments; that there be 2 hours 
for the White House Counsel followed by 2 hours for the House 
Managers; and that at the conclusion of this time the Senate 
proceed to vote, on each of the articles, without intervening 
action, motion or debate, except for deliberations, if so 
decided by the Senate.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The minority leader.
    Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that all time be 
yielded back.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so 
ordered. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call 
the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 44, nays 56, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 13]

       [Subject: Daschle motion to proceed to closing arguments]

                                YEAS--44

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--56

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Feingold
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 44, the nays 
are 56, and the motion is not agreed to.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that was the last of 
the motions that had been offered.
    I am ready to go to the closing script unless there is some 
other motion pending or to be offered.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. May I ask, Mr. Chief Justice, for 
indulgence for just a couple minutes to consult with my 
colleagues?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that it is in order 
for White House counsel to offer a motion at this point. If 
they wish to do so, then I believe they could, then we would 
vote on that motion.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. White House 
Counsel Ruff.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

              motion to provide written notice to counsel

    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Majority Leader, I want to hand up to 
the desk a brief motion dealing with the presentation of 
videotape evidence on Saturday pursuant to the motion that has 
just been voted on by the Senate. If I may, I hand it up to the 
clerk.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday, 
February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to 
counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line 
designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they 
plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday, 
or during their closing argument.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. There are 2 hours equally divided on the 
motion.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, we won't use but a 
small percentage of that. I will turn the matter over, if I 
may, to my colleague, Mr. Kendall.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel 
Kendall.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, House managers, I will 
be brief. This is simply a procedural motion which I think will 
make for a fairer hearing and a more efficient use of the 
Senate's time on Saturday.
    Fascinating though these depositions are, I don't think 
there is any need to inflict them on you repeatedly. What we 
are asking in this motion is simply a procedure that would be 
normal in a civil trial, and that is by a fair time tomorrow 
for the House managers to designate the portions of the three 
depositions that they intend to use. That will allow us not to 
repeat those portions, and it will give us some fair chance to 
organize our responsive presentation.
    The burden is on the House managers. I think this is not an 
extensive set of transcripts. I think it can be easily done. 
You have all, many of you, watched the depositions this week, 
read the transcripts. So I think if we can simply have this 
designation by 2 o'clock tomorrow, it will enable Saturday, 
perhaps, to be a shorter proceeding.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Counsel for House managers? The Chair 
recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you.
    I will imitate my colleague at the bar Mr. Kendall's 
brevity, if not his eloquence.
    I simply suggest this is somewhat a unique opportunity that 
counsel is inviting the House managers to engage in, to give 
counsel notice of page and line of transcripts for the 
presentation of evidence that we are going to make. It is our 
prerogative to put on our evidence; it is White House counsel's 
opportunity to put on their evidence. Asking us to choreograph 
that for them and with them is something that I am unfamiliar 
with, except for one time.
    I remember during my days as a judge in California that a 
similar request was made for me, and a law clerk pointed out to 
me language from one of the late great justices of the 
California Supreme Court, Otto Kaus. Apparently, a similar 
request was made to Justice Kaus to do the same thing in a 
case, and Justice Kaus looked at the lawyer making the request 
and he said, ``I believe the appropriate legal response to your 
request is that it is none of your damn business what the other 
side is going to put on.''
    With that, Mr. Chief Justice, we will yield back the 
balance of our time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Kendall.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. That philosophy might want to be 
emulated at some point by the drafters of the Federal Civil 
Rules, but it is not. In every Federal civil trial, this 
procedure is followed, the designation, the identifying, and 
designating of deposition excerpts.
    Again, I think it will make for a fairer and more efficient 
proceeding. I don't think trial by surprise has a place here.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The vote is on the motion.
    The clerk will read the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday, 
February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to 
counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line 
designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they 
plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday, 
or during their closing argument.

    Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chief Justice, may we have order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I fully agree with the Senator.
    Mr. BYRD. Would the clerk read that again.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Let the Senate remain in order and let 
the clerk read the motion again.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday, 
February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to 
counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line 
designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they 
plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday, 
or during their closing argument.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The 
clerk will call the roll.
    The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
    [Disturbance in the Visitors' Galleries.]
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will restore order 
to the gallery.
    The assistant legislative clerk continued with the call of 
the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 46, nays 54, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 14]

                [Subject: White House Counsels' motion]

                                YEAS--46

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--54

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 46, the nays 
are 54. The motion is rejected.

      orders for saturday, february 6 and monday, february 8, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that completes all 
the motions. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment 
until 10 a.m. on Saturday, February 6, and at 10 a.m. on 
Saturday, immediately following the prayer, the Senate will 
resume consideration of the articles of impeachment. I further 
ask consent that on Saturday there be 6 hours equally divided 
between the House managers and White House counsel for 
presentations. I further ask that following those presentations 
on Saturday, the Senate then adjourn until 1 p.m. on Monday, 
February 8. I finally ask consent that on Monday, immediately 
following the prayer, the Senate resume consideration of the 
articles of impeachment, and there then be 6 hours equally 
divided between the managers and White House counsel for final 
arguments.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to 
object, and I shall not, I ask the distinguished leader this. 
We have had exhibits handed out today to be printed in the 
Congressional Record, referring to depositions which, I 
understand under rule XXIX, are still confidential. Are those 
to be printed in the Record?
    Mr. LOTT. I will ask consent that the transcripts of the 
depositions be printed in the Record of today's date.
    Mr. LEAHY. The exhibits were handed out today in debate. 
Were they handed out under rule XXIX?
    Mr. LOTT. I believe we got approval that they be used in 
the oral presentations at the beginning of the session today.
    Mr. LEAHY. I withdraw any objection.
    Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection has been heard.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I withdrew any objection.
    Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Kerry, is recognized.
    Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to 
object. I ask the majority leader, is there an assumption that 
if White House counsel were to want sufficient time on Saturday 
in order to be able to present video testimony countering 
whatever surprise video--and there may or may not be a 
surprise--would they have time to be able to provide that on 
Saturday--not to carry over, but merely if they choose to, to 
do that on Saturday?
    Mr. LOTT. I am not sure I understand the question, except 
that we will come in at 10, and we will have 6 hours equally 
divided. I presume that the House would make a presentation 
first and then the White House and then close. There would be 
time during that 6-hour period for the White House to use it as 
they see fit. Are you asking that there would be some sort of 
break so they would be able to consider that?
    Mr. KERRY. Clearly, the purpose of the trial and the 
purpose of this effort is to have a fair presentation of 
evidence. The Senate now having denied notice to White House 
counsel of what areas may be the subject of video, it might be 
that the voice of the witnesses themselves is the best response 
to whatever it is that the House were to present. If they were 
to decide----
    Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chief Justice, I call for the regular 
order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The regular order has been called for. 
There is a unanimous consent request pending. Is there 
objection?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, briefly, if I could say on 
behalf of my unanimous consent, and in brief response to the 
question, we have all worked hard and bent over backward trying 
to be fair. I am sure if there is something that would be 
needed on Saturday, it would be carefully considered by both 
sides.
    Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    Mr. GRAMM. A quorum is present.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader has the floor.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe it would be 
appropriate to go ahead and get this unanimous consent 
agreement. We will continue to work with both sides to try to 
make sure there is a fair way to proceed on Saturday. We will 
have the remainder of today and tomorrow to work on that. So I 
would like to renew my unanimous consent request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to object. 
May I inquire of the majority leader if that Saturday time 
schedule gives both parties adequate time to prepare for the 
presentation of the evidence? Have both sides agreed that they 
will be prepared?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as best I can respond to that, 
I just say that hopefully both sides have had more than 
adequate time allocated on Saturday. One of the reasons we are 
doing it this way--Saturday instead of tomorrow--is so both 
sides will have an opportunity to review everything and 
hopefully communicate with each other. We will do that Friday 
during the day so that an orderly presentation can be made by 
both sides on Saturday. I believe we are seeing a problem here 
where there may not be one.
    But if one develops certainly we would take it into 
consideration.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? In the absence of 
objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
those parts of the transcripts of the depositions admitted into 
evidence be printed in the Congressional Record of today's 
date.
    I further ask consent that the deposition transcripts of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, and the 
videotapes thereof, be immediately released to the managers on 
the part of the House and the counsel to the President for the 
purpose of preparing their presentations, provided, however, 
that such copies shall remain at all times under the 
supervision of the Sergeant at Arms to ensure compliance with 
the confidentiality provisions of S. Res. 30.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so 
ordered.
    [The material follows:]

    In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the 
   Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
                                 States

           excerpts of video deposition of monica s. lewinsky
              (Monday, February 1, 1999, Washington, D.C.)


    SENATOR DeWINE: If not, I will now swear the witness.

    Ms. Lewinsky, will you raise your right hand, please?

    Whereupon, MONICA S. LEWINSKY was called as a witness and, after 
having been first duly sworn by Senator DeWine, was examined and 
testified as follows:

    SENATOR DeWINE: The House Managers may now begin your questioning.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

    Good morning to all present.
                     examination by house managers

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, welcome back to Washington, and wanted to just 
gather a few of our friends here to have this deposition now. We do 
have quite a number of people present, but we--in spite of the numbers, 
we do want you to feel as comfortable as possible because I think we--
everyone present today has an interest in getting to the truth of this 
matter, and so as best as you can, we would appreciate your answers in 
a--in a truthful and a fashion that you can recall. I know it's been a 
long time since some of these events have occurred.

    But for the record, would you state your name once again, your full 
name?

    A. Yes. Monica Samille Lewinsky.

    Q. And you're a--are you a resident of California?

    A. I'm--I'm not sure exactly where I'm a resident now, but I--
that's where I'm living right now.

    Q. Okay. You--did you grow up there in California?

    A. Yes.

    Q. I'm not going to go into all that, but I thought just a little 
bit of background here.

    You went to college where?

    A. Lewis and Clark, in Portland, Oregon.

    Q. And you majored in--majored in?

    A. Psychology.

    Q. Tell me about your work history, briefly, from the time you left 
college until, let's say, you started as an intern at the White House.

    A. Uh, I wasn't working from the time I--

    Q. Okay. Did you--

    A. I graduated college in May of '95.

    Q. Did you work part time there in--in Oregon with a--with a 
District Attorney--

    A. Uh--

    Q. --in his office somewhere?

    A. During--I had an internship or a practicum when I was in school. 
I had two practicums, and one was at the public defender's office and 
the other was at the Southeast Mental Health Network.

    Q. And those were in Portland?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. What--you received a bachelor of science in psychology?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Okay. As a part of your duties at the Southeast Health Network, 
what did you--what did you do in terms of working? Did you have direct 
contact with people there, patients?

    A. Yes, I did. Um, they referred to them as clients there and I 
worked in what was called the Phoenix Club, which was a socialization 
area for the clients to--really to just hang out and, um, sort of work 
on their social skills. So I--

    Q. Okay. After your work there, you obviously had occasion to come 
to work at the White House. How did--how did you come to decide you 
wanted to come to Washington, and in particular, work at the White 
House?

    A. There were a few different factors. My mom's side of the family 
had moved to Washington during my senior year of college and I wanted--
I wasn't ready to go to graduate school yet. So I wanted to get out of 
Portland, and a friend of our family's had a grandson who had had an 
internship at the White House and had thought it might be something I'd 
enjoy doing.

    Q. Had you ever worked around--in politics and campaigns or been 
very active?

    A. No.

    Q. You had to go through the normal application process of 
submitting a written application, references, and so forth to--to the 
White House?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you do that while you were still in Oregon, or were you 
already in D.C.?

    A. No. The application process was while I was a senior in college 
in Oregon.

    Q. Had you ever been to Washington before?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Obviously, you were accepted, and you started work when?

    A. July 10th, 1995.

    Q. Where--where were you assigned?

    A. The Chief--

    Q. Physically, where were you located?

    A. Oh, physically?

    Q. Yes.

    A. Room 93 of the Old Executive Office Building.

    Q. Were you designated in any particular manner in terms of--were 
all interns the same, I guess, would be my question?

    A. Yes and no. We were all interns, but there were a select group 
of interns who had blue passes who worked in the White House proper, 
and most of us worked in the Old Executive Office Building with a pink 
intern pass.

    Q. Now, can you explain to me the significance of a pink pass 
versus a blue pass?

    A. Sure.

    Q. Okay. Is it--is it access?

    A. Yes.

    Q. To what?

    A. A blue pass gives you access to anywhere in the White House and 
a pink intern pass gives you access to the Old Executive Office 
Building.

    Q. Did interns have blue passes?

    A. Yes, some.

    Q. Some did, and some had pink passes?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And you had the pink?

    A. Correct.

    Q. How long was your internship?

    A. It was from July 'til the end of August, and then I stayed on 
for a little while until the 2nd.

    Q. Are most interns for the summertime--you do part of the summer 
or the entire summer?

    A. I believe there are interns all year-round at the White House.

    Q. Now, you as an intern, you are unpaid.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And tell--tell me how you came to, uh, through your 
decisionmaking process, to seek a paid position and stay in Washington.

    A. Uh, there were several factors. One is I came to enjoy being at 
the White House, and I found it to be interesting. I was studying to 
take the GREs, the entrance exam for graduate school, and needed to get 
a job. So I--since I had enjoyed my internship, my supervisor at the 
time, Tracy Beckett, helped me try and secure a position.

    Q. Now, you mentioned the pink pass that you had. So you were able 
to--I don't want to presume--you were able to get into the White House 
on occasion even with a pink pass?

    A. The--do you mean the White House proper, or--

    Q. Yes, the White House--

    A. --the complex?

    Q. Yes. Let me be clear. When I--I tend to say ``White House''--I 
mean the actual building itself. And I know perhaps you think of the 
whole complex in terms of the whole--

    A. I'm sorry. Just to be clear--

    Q. Yes.

    A. --do you mean the West Wing and the residence and--

    Q. Right.

    A. --the East Wing when you say the White House?

    Q. Right. The White House where the President lives, and works, I 
guess, right.

    A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?

    Yes, yes. I mean that White House. As an intern, you had a pink 
pass that did allow you to have access to that White House where the 
President was on occasion?

    A. No.

    Q. Did not. Did you have--did you ever get in there as an intern?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And under--under what circumstances?

    A. It--

    Q. Did you have to be accompanied by someone, or--

    A. Exactly; someone with a blue pass.

    Q. So how did you--once you decided you wanted to stay in 
Washington and find a paying job, you sought out some help from friends 
there, people you knew, contacts, and you were--you did--you were 
successful?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And you were hired where--where in the White House?

    A. In Legislative Affairs.

    Q. Now, again, to educate me on this, in that group, in that 
section, department, you would have worked where, physically?

    A. Physically, in the East Wing.

    Q. Okay, and as an intern before, you worked in the Old Executive 
Office Building?

    A. Correct.

    Q. But you moved about and occasionally would go into the White 
House, if escorted?

    A. Correct.

    Q. It takes a while, but I'll get there with you; I'll catch up.

    When did you actually--what was your first day on the job with the 
Legislative Affairs, uh, group?

    A. Um, first day on the job was sometime after the furlough. I was 
hired right before the furlough, but the paperwork hadn't gone through, 
so first day on the job was some point after the furlough. I don't 
remember the exact date.

    Q. So you remained, uh, on as an intern during the furlough--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --the Government shutdown period.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And that was in November of 1995, some date during that?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Um, tell me how you, um, began--I guess the--the--we're 
going to talk about a relationship with the President. Uh, when you 
first, uh, I guess, saw him, I think there was some indication that you 
didn't speak to him maybe the first few times you saw him, but you had 
some eye contact or sort of smiles or--

    A. I--I believe I've testified to that in the grand jury pretty 
extensively.

    Q. Uh-huh.

    A. Is--is there something more specific?

    Q. Well, again, I'm wanting to know times, you know, how soon that 
occurred and sort of what happened, you know, if you can--you know, 
there are going to be occasions where you--obviously, you testified 
extensively in the grand jury, so you're going to obviously repeat 
things today. We're doing the deposition for the Senators to view, we 
believe, so it's--

    MR. CACHERIS: May I note an objection? The Senators have the 
complete record, as you know, Mr. Bryant, and she is standing on her 
testimony that she has given on the occasions that Mr. Stein alluded to 
at the introduction of this deposition.

    MR. BRYANT: Well, I appreciate that, but, uh, if this is going to 
be the case, we don't even need the deposition, because we're limited 
to the record and everything is in the record. So I think, uh, to be 
fair, we're--we're obviously going to have to talk about, uh, some 
things for 8 hours here, or else we can go home.

    THE WITNESS: Sounds good to me.

    [Laughter.]

    MR. BRYANT: I think we probably all would like to do that.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, are you objecting to the question?

    MR. CACHERIS: Yes. I'm objecting to him asking specific questions 
that are already in the record that--he has said they are limited to 
the record, and so we accept his, his designation. We're limited to the 
record.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We're going to go off the record for just a moment.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 9:37 a.m.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 9:45 a.m.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

    The objection is noted, but it's overruled, and the witness is 
instructed to answer the question.

    Senator Leahy?

    SENATOR LEAHY: And I had noted during the break that obviously, the 
witness has 48 hours to correct her deposition, and would also note 
that when somebody has testified to some of these things 20 or more 
times that it is not unusual to have some nuances different, and that 
could also be reflected in time to correct her testimony.

    And I had also noted when we were off the record Mr. Manager 
Bryant's comment on January 26th, page S992 in the Congressional 
Record, in which he said: ``If our motion is granted, I want to make 
this very, very clear. At no point will we ask any questions of Monica 
Lewinsky about her explicit sexual relationship with the President, 
either in deposition or, if we are permitted on the floor of the 
Senate, they will not be asked.''

    And I should add also, to be fair to Mr. Bryant, another sentence 
in that: ``That, of course, assumes that White House Counsel does not 
enter into that discussion, and we doubt that they would.'' Period, 
close quote.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Let me just add something that I stated to counsel 
and to Ms. Lewinsky off the record, and I think I will briefly repeat 
it, and that is that counsel is entitled to an answer to the question, 
but Ms. Lewinsky certainly can reference previous testimony if she 
wishes to do that. But counsel is entitled to a new explanation of--of 
what occurred.

    Counsel, you may--why don't you re-ask the question, and we will 
proceed.

    MR. BRYANT: May I, before I do that, ask a procedural question in 
terms of timekeeping?

    SENATOR DeWINE: The time is not counted--any of the time that you 
have--once there is an objection, none of the time is counted until we 
rule on the objection and until you then have the opportunity to ask 
the question again. So the time will start now.

    MR. BRYANT: Very good.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, again, let me--I know this is difficult, but let 
me apologize that, uh, that it is going to be necessary that I ask you 
these questions because we're limited to the record and if we--we can't 
ask you any new questions outside that record, so I have to talk about 
what's in the record. And I realize you've answered all these questions 
several times before, but it's, uh--I'm sincere that we really wouldn't 
need to take your deposition if we couldn't ask you those kinds of 
questions. So it's not motivated to cause you discomfort or to make you 
sit here in Washington when you'd rather be in California. We'll try to 
get through this as quickly as we can.

    But we were talking about when you were first assigned there at the 
White House and those initial contacts, and I mean, again, when you 
were--you would see the President. I think you've mentioned you would--
there was some mild flirting going on; you would smile or you would 
make eye contact. It was something of this nature?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And the first--was the first time you actually spoke to the 
President or he spoke to you, other than perhaps a hello in the 
hallway, was that on November the 15th, 1995?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And that was--that was the day, uh, of the first so-called 
salacious encounter, the same day?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Now, when the President gave a statement testifying before the 
grand jury, he--he described that relationship as what I considered 
sort of an evolving one. He says: ``I regret that what began as a 
friendship came to include this conduct.'' And he goes on to take full 
responsibility for his actions. But that almost sounds as if this was 
an evolving--something from a friendship evolving over time to a sexual 
relationship. That was not the case, was it?

    A. I--I can't really comment on how he perceived it. My perception 
was different.

    Q. Okay--

    A. But I--I--I mean, I don't feel comfortable saying that he 
didn't, that he didn't see it that way, or that's wrong; that's how he 
saw it. I--

    Q. But you saw it a different way?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Now, on November the 15th, had you already accepted this job 
with Legislative Affairs?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And, uh, was--that was during the shutdown, so you had no job to 
go to because the Government was shut down.

    A. No. I accepted it on the Friday before the furlough.

    Q. And that--

    A. But the paperwork hadn't gone through.

    Q. Okay. Did, uh--when you first met with the President on November 
the 15th, did he say anything to you that would indicate that he knew 
you were an intern?

    A. No.

    Q. Did he make a comment about your, your pink security badge?

    A. Can I ask my counsel a question real quickly, please?

    [Witness conferring with counsel.]

    MR. CACHERIS: Okay, Mr Bryant.

    THE WITNESS: Sorry. It was--that occurred in the second encounter 
of that evening.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. On November--

    A. So, not the first encounter.

    Q. On November the 15th, 1995?

    A. Correct.

    Q. What--do you recall what he said or what he did in regard to the 
intern pass?

    A. He tugged on my pass and said: ``This is going to be a 
problem.''

    Q. And what did, uh--did he say anything else about what he meant 
by ``problem''?

    A. No.

    Q. Tell me about your job at Legislative Affairs. Did that involve 
going into the White House itself?

    A. Yes. My job was in the White House.

    Q. You were in one wing, but did that involve going--did it give 
you access--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --pretty well throughout the White House?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did you do primarily?

    A. I worked under Jocelyn Jolly, who supervised the letters that 
came from the Hill; so the opening of those letters and reading them 
and vetting them and preparing responses for the President's 
signature--responding.

    Q. Now, you've indicated through counsel at the beginning that you 
are willing to affirm, otherwise adopt, your sworn testimony of August 
the 6th and August the 20th, I think, which would be grand jury, and 
the deposition of August the 26th, 1998.

    A. Correct.

    Q. So you're saying that that information is accurate, and it is 
truthful?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Well, thank you. That--that will save us a little bit of time, 
but certainly we will ask you some of that information also.

    At some point, you were transferred to the Pentagon, to the 
Department of Defense. When did that occur?

    A. I found out I was being transferred on April 5th, 1996.

    Q. Did you want to go--

    A. No.

    Q. --to the Department of Defense? Did you have a discussion with 
the President about this?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What was your reaction to being transferred?

    A. I started to cry.

    Q. Did you talk to anyone else at the White House other than the 
President about the transfer at that time?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And who--who was that?

    A. I spoke with several people. I--I can't--I know I--I spoke with, 
uh, Jocelyn about it. I spoke with people with whom I was friendly at 
the White House. I spoke to Betty, Nancy Hernreich, several people.

    Q. Did you--did you find out why you were being transferred?

    A. Uh, I was told why I was being transferred by Mr. Keating on 
Friday, the 5th of April.

    Q. And that was why?

    A. Uh, he said that the--the Office of Administration, I think it 
was, was not pleased with the way the correspondence was being handled, 
and they were, quote-unquote, ``blowing up'' the Correspondence Office, 
and that I was being transferred and it had nothing to do with my work.

    Q. Did you have any understanding that it might have been other 
reasons that you were being moved?

    A. Not at that point.

    Q. Did the--what did the President say about your transfer at that 
point?

    A. He thought it had something to do with our relationship.

    Q. What else did he say about--about your transfer, if anything? 
Did he give you any assurances that you might be back, or--

    A. Yes.

    Q. Back after what time period?

    A. He promised me he'd bring me back after the election.

    Q. So this was, again, in early 19--April of 1996, and he was up 
for reelection--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --in November of 1996.

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you attach any significance to being transferred away before 
the election and then him assuring you he would bring you back after 
the election? Did you attach any significance to the election and your 
having to leave?

    A. Emotional significance, yes.

    Q. Your emotion? I'm--I'm not sure I follow you. You were--

    A. Well, yes, I attached significance to it.

    Q. And that was emotional--

    A. But that was emotional.

    Q. But the reason you both felt--again, I'm not trying to put words 
in your mouth, but you both felt you were leaving until after the 
election was because of your relationship and perhaps people finding 
out?

    A. No. I--I--first, I can only speak for myself. I mean, I, uh, my 
understanding initially was that it was, um, for work-related issues, 
but not my work, and I came to understand later that it was having to 
do with my relationship with the President.

    Q. Okay. Did, uh, you have a conversation--and it may be the same 
one with the President on April the 12th--which determined that Ms. 
Lieberman maybe spearheaded your transfer because you were paying too 
much attention--you were all--you were both paying too much attention 
to each other and she was worried that it was close to election time? 
And I think you've testified to that, haven't you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay, good. You started, uh, with the Department of Defense at 
the Pentagon in mid-April, April the 17th, 1996?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did you do there?

    A. I was the confidential assistant to Mr. Bacon, who is the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

    Q. Did, uh--after the 1996 election, did you still want to go back 
to the White House?

    A. Yes.

    Q. You had not fallen in love with the job at the Pentagon that 
much?

    A. No.

    Q. Was that, in fact, a frustrating period of time?

    A. Yes. No offense to Mr. Bacon, of course.

    Q. I understand; I'm sure he would take none.

    I would like--I don't think it's been mentioned, but you helped in 
preparing a chart which we have listed as one of our exhibits, ML 
Number 2, which I assume might have a different number for now, but 
it's a chart of contacts--

    A. Right.

    Q. --that you had with the President. And do you have a copy of 
that chart? It--

    [Witness conferring with counsel.]

    MR. BRYANT: In the--yes, in the record, it's at page 1251.

    MR. BURTON: May we have an extra copy for counsel, please?

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Have you had occasion to review this document?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And very--very simply, I would like for you to, uh, if you can, 
to affirm that document as an accurate representation and a truthful 
representation of all the contacts that you had with the President from 
approximately August 9th, 1995 until January of 1998. It includes in-
person contacts, telephone calls, gifts and notes exchanged, I think 
are the categories.

    A. Yes. I believe there might have been one or two changes that 
were made and noted in the grand jury or my deposition, and I adopt 
those as well.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay, good.

    I am not going to at this point make her--the information she 
adopts and affirms exhibits to this deposition. I don't want to clutter 
it any more unless someone wants to make this an exhibit in terms of 
your deposition testimony, your grand jury testimony, and now the 
charts that you have affirmed, so I just want you to specifically 
affirm it but not make it an exhibit, because it's already a part of 
the record.

    MR. CACHERIS: We defer to the White House.

    MS. SELIGMAN: I just wanted to make clear on the record, then, what 
the app. or sub-cite is of anything we're adopting so that we all know 
what particular pages it is.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay. And that, again, was, I think, page 1251 of--
right, of the record.

    SENATOR LEAHY: I don't--I don't understand.

    MS. MILLS: Can you cite the ending page?

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, is that where this appears?

    MR. BRYANT: It appears in the record, uh--

    SENATOR DeWINE: You need to designate also if you're talking about 
the Senate record or--I think at this point we'll go off the record.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10:01 a.m.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 10:11 a.m.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Let me--we're now back on the record.

    Let me advise counsel, the Managers, that they have used 25 minutes 
so far.

    You may resume questioning, and if you could begin by identifying 
the exhibit for the record, please.

    MR. BRYANT: Tom, let me also for clarification purposes--Tom, on 
the referral to the Senate record, you're saying that the appendices 
are numbered 3, but the numbers are the same. The page numbers are the 
same.

    MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

    MR. BRYANT: And the supplemental materials are your Volume IV, but, 
again, the pages are the same.

    MR. GRIFFITH: That's our understanding.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay. For the record, then, using the Senate volumes, 
if this is an appendices, Volume III, and the chart that we just 
alluded to before the break is--appears at pages 116 through 126 of the 
Senate record, Volume III.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, did you tell a number of people in varying details 
about your relationship with the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. You tell us who did you tell?

    A. Catherine Allday Davis, Neysa Deman Erbland, Natalie Ungvari, 
Ashley Raines, Linda Tripp, Dr. Kathy Estep, Dr. Irene Kassorla, Andy 
Bleiler, my mom, my aunt. Who else has been subpoenaed?

    Q. Okay. Let me suggest Dale--did you mention Dale Young?

    A. Dale Young. I'm sorry.

    Q. Thank you.

    Now, in the floor presentation, Mr. Craig, who was one of--is one 
of the counsel for the President, adopted an argument that had been 
raised in some of the previous hearings, uh, and he adopted this 
argument in the Senate that--that you have--have or had, I think, both 
past and present, the incentive to not tell the truth about how the 
President--this relationship with him because you wanted to avoid--and 
again, I use the quote from Mr. Craig's argument--the demeaning nature 
of providing wholly un-reciprocated sex.

    Did, uh--did you lie before the grand jury and to your friends 
about the nature of that relationship with the President--

    A. No.

    Q. --so as to avoid what Mr. Craig says? Okay, and I'll break it 
down.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, do you want to just--just rephrase the 
question?

    MR. BRYANT: Okay. We'll break it down into two questions.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Did you not tell the truth before the grand jury as to how the 
President touched you because of what Mr. Craig alleges as the 
demeaning nature of the wholly un-reciprocated sex?

    MR. CACHERIS: Well, that--may I register an objection, gentlemen? 
This witness is not here to comment on what some lawyer said on the 
floor of the Senate. He can ask her direct questions. She will answer 
them, but what Mr. Craig said or didn't say would have happened after 
her grand jury testimony. So it's totally inappropriate that he's--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you--

    MR. CACHERIS: --marrying those two concepts. We object.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you just rephrase the 
question?

    MR. BRYANT: Well, we--we have had presented on behalf of the 
President a defense, an incentive, a reason why she would not tell the 
truth, and I think she should have the opportunity to respond to that--
that allegation.

    MR. CACHERIS: We--we don't, uh--

    SENATOR LEAHY: Ask her a direct question.

    MR. CACHERIS: We welcome you asking her if her testimony was 
truthful, and she will tell you that it is truthful. We don't have any 
problem with that. We don't have any brief with what the White House 
did or didn't do through their counsel. That's their business. We don't 
represent the White House.

    MS. SELIGMAN: So, for the record, I'd like to object to the 
characterization of what Mr. Craig says, which obviously speaks for 
itself, but I certainly don't want my silence to be construed as 
accepting the Manager's characterization of it.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you--why don't you ask the 
question?

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Go ahead and ask your question.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. In regard to your testimony at the grand jury about your--your 
relationship and the physical contact that you have said occurred in 
some of these, uh, visits with the President, it has been characterized 
in a way that would give you an excuse not to tell the truth. Did you 
tell the truth in the grand jury about what actually happened and how 
the President touched--the President touched you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did you likewise tell the truth to your friends in 
connection with the same matters?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did your relationship with the President involve giving gifts, 
exchanging gifts?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And you mentioned earlier that in reference to this chart that 
it was, uh, subject to certain corrections you've made in later 
testimony. It was an accurate representation or an accurate compilation 
of the gifts that, uh, you gave the President and the President gave 
you. Is that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Approximately how many gifts did you give the President?

    A. I believe I've testified to that number. I don't recall right 
now.

    Q. About 30? Would that be--

    A. If that's what I testified to, then I accept that.

    Q. That's the number I have, and do you recall how many gifts 
approximately the President gave you?

    A. It would be the same situation.

    Q. Okay, and you've previously testified in your grand jury that he 
gave you about 18 gifts.

    A. I accept that.

    Q. Okay, good. What types of gifts did you give the President?

    A. They varied. I think they're listed on this chart, and I've 
testified to them.

    Q. Okay, and--

    MR. CACHERIS: Do you want her to read the list that's on this 
chart?

    MR. BRYANT: No. I was just, again, looking for just a--I think 
maybe a little broader category, but that's--that's okay. That's an 
acceptable answer there.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. After leaving the White House and going to the Pentagon, did you 
continue to visit the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How would you--how would you be transported from the Pentagon 
over to the White House? How did you get there?

    A. I drove or took a taxi.

    Q. Do you have your own car?

    A. No.

    Q. Whose--whose car would you drive?

    A. Either my mom's or my brother's.

    Q. So you did have access to a vehicle?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Okay. How were these meetings arranged when you would want to go 
from the Pentagon to the White House? How did--how did these--how were 
they set up? Did you get an appointment?

    [The witness conferring with counsel.]

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel--if you have to ask counsel, you can stop 
and ask us--

    THE WITNESS: Okay.

    SENATOR DeWINE: --to do that.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. How were these meetings arranged?

    A. Through Ms. Currie.

    Q. Would--would you call her and set the meeting up, or would she 
call you on behalf of the President and set the meeting up?

    A. It varied.

    Q. Both--both situations occurred?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Now, Ms. Currie is the President's--that's Betty Currie, we're 
talking about, the President's secretary?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Why was this done? Why was that procedure used?

    A. It was my understanding that Ms. Currie took care of the 
President's guests who were coming to see him, making those 
arrangements.

    Q. Was, uh--was this--were these visits done sort of off the 
record, so to speak, so it wouldn't necessarily be a record?

    A. I believe so.

    Q. In other words, you wouldn't be shown on Betty Currie's calendar 
or schedule book for the President?

    A. I don't know.

    Q. Did--who suggested this type of arrangement for setting up 
meetings?

    A. I believe the President did.

    Q. During this time that you were at the Department of Defense at 
the Pentagon, uh, how--how was it working out about you being 
transferred back to the White House? How was the job situation coming?

    A. Well, I waited until after the election and then spoke with the 
President about it on several occasions.

    Q. And what would he say in response?

    A. Various things; ``I'm working on it,'' usually.

    Q. In July, uh, particularly around the--the 3rd and 4th of July, 
there--there--you wrote the President a letter, I think.

    A. Which year?

    Q. July of '90--it would have been '97 that you wrote the President 
a letter expressing some frustrations about the job situation in terms 
of--is that, uh--can you tell us about that?

    A. Yes. I had had a--well, I guess I was--I know I've testified 
about this, I mean, in the grand jury, but I was feeling at that point 
that I was getting the runaround on being brought back to the White 
House. So I sent a letter to the President that was probably the 
harshest I had sent.

    Q. Did you get a response?

    A. Sort of.

    Q. Would you explain?

    A. Um, Betty called me and told me to come to the White House the 
next morning, on July 4th, at 9:00 a.m.

    Q. And what happened when you--I assume you went to the White House 
on July the 4th. What happened?

    A. I know I--I--do you have a specific question? I know I 
testified, I mean, extensively about this whole day, that whole--

    Q. Well, in regards to--let's start with the job.

    A. Well, I started crying. We were in the back office and, um--and 
when the subject matter came up, the President was upset with me and 
then I began to cry. So--

    Q. Did he encourage you about you coming back? Did he make a 
promise or commitment to you that he would make sure you came back to 
work at the White House?

    A. I don't know that he reaffirmed his promise or commitment. I 
remember leaving that day thinking that, as usual, he was going to work 
on it and had a renewed sense of hope.

    Q. Did he comment on your letter, the tone of your letter?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did he say?

    A. He was upset with me and told me it was illegal to threaten the 
President of the United States.

    Q. Did you intend the letter to be interpreted that way?

    A. No.

    Q. Did you explain why you wrote the letter to him about reminding 
him that you were a good girl and you left the White House? Did you 
have that type of conversation?

    A. Yes. That's what made me start to cry.

    Q. Did you, uh--did you ever explain to him that you didn't intend 
to threaten him?

    A. I believe so.

    Q. What was the intent of the letter?

    A. First, I felt the letter was going to him as a man and not as 
President of the United States. Um, second, I think I could see how he 
could interpret it as a threat, but my intention was to sort of remind 
him that I had been waiting patiently and what I considered was being a 
good girl, about having been transferred.

    Q. And the threat we're talking about here would not have been 
interpreted as a threat to do physical injury or bodily injury to him. 
It was to expose your relationship to the--to your parents--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --explain to them why you were not going back to the White 
House--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --after the election?

    And certainly the President did not encourage you to expose that 
relationship, did he?

    A. I don't believe he made any comment about it at that point.

    Q. His only comment about the so-called threat was that it's a---
it's--you can't do that, it's against the law to threaten the 
President?

    A. Exactly.

    Q. That meeting turned into--I guess you've testified that that 
meeting did turn into a more positive meeting toward the end. It was 
not all emotional and accusations being made?

    A. Correct.

    Q. At some point, uh--well, let me--let me back up and ask this. 
There was a subsequent meeting on July the 14th, and I believe the 
President had been out of town and this was the follow-up meeting to 
the July 4th meeting where you had originally discussed the possibility 
of a newspaper reporter or a magazine writer, I believe, writing a 
story about Ms. Willey?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And you, uh--did you have any instructions from the President, 
from either of these meetings, about doing something for the President, 
specifically about having Ms. Tripp call White House counsel--

    A. I don't know--

    Q. --Mr. Lindsey?

    A. --that I'd call them instructions.

    Q. Okay. What did he tell you? I don't want to mischaracterize.

    A. He asked me if I would try to have Ms. Tripp contact Mr. 
Lindsey.

    Q. Okay, and if you were to be successful in doing that, what were 
you supposed to do? Were you supposed to contact Ms. Currie, his 
secretary?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what were you supposed to tell her?

    A. In an innocuous way that I had been able to convey that to Ms. 
Tripp or get her to do that.

    Q. Now, in--at some point in October of that year, 1997, did your 
job focus change?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And how was that? What were you doing?

    A. Uh, it really changed on October 6th, 1997, as a result of a 
conversation with Linda Tripp.

    Q. Uh, in that, as I understand, you sort of got secondhand 
information that you were probably never going back to work at the 
White House.

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did you understand what that meant? Did you accept that? And I 
guess why would you accept it at that point? Why would you give up on 
the White House?

    MR. CACHERIS: Those are three questions, Mr. Bryant. Will you--
would you break it down, please?

    MR. BRYANT: Well, yeah, it's true.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Do you understand? I guess I'm trying to clarify.

    A. Not really. I'm sorry.

    Q. Why would you accept at that point in October that you were 
never going back to the White House?

    A. I don't really remember, I mean, what--what--what was going 
through my mind at that point as to--to answer that question. Is that--

    Q. Okay.

    A. I'm sorry.

    Q. Certainly, if you don't remember, that's a--that's a good 
answer.

    A. Okay.

    Q. So you don't recall anything had really changed other than you 
had heard secondhand that you weren't going to go back. You have no 
independent recollection of anything else other than what somebody told 
you that would have changed--

    A. My recollection is--

    Q. --changed your focus?

    A. --that it was this--it was this conversation, what Linda Tripp 
told me from whom this information was coming, the way it was relayed 
to me that--that shifted everything that day.

    Q. And you didn't feel it was necessary to go back to the President 
and perhaps confront the President and say, ``why am I not coming back, 
I want to come back?''

    A. I mean, I had a discussion with the President, but I had made a 
decision from that based on that information, and I guess my--my 
experience of it coming up on a year from the election, having not been 
brought back, that it probably wasn't going to happen.

    Q. But you--you did call the President about that time and then--
but the focus had been changed toward perhaps a job in another 
location.

    A. Yes and no. I didn't call him, but I, um--

    Q. You called Betty--

    A. --but we did have a discussion about that.

    Q. You called Betty Currie, his secretary.

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay, and then through her, he contacted you and you had a 
discussion?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what did you tell him at that time about the job?

    A. I believe I testified to that, so that my testimony is probably 
more accurate. The gist of it was, um, that I wanted to move to New 
York and that I was accepting I wasn't going to be able to come back to 
the White House, and I asked for his help.

    Q. Did you bring up Vernon Jordan's name as perhaps somebody that 
could help you?

    A. It's possible it was in that conversation.

    Q. What was the President's comments back to you about your 
deciding to go to New York?

    A. I don't remember his exact comments. He was accepting of the 
concept.

    Q. In regards to your--your, uh, decision to search for a job in 
New York, in your comments to the President, did he ever tell you that 
that was good, that perhaps the Jones lawyers could not easily find you 
in New York?

    A. I'm sorry. I don't--I--I--

    MR. CACHERIS: Excuse me again, Mr. Bryant. That's a compound 
question. He could--she could answer it was good, and then she could 
answer maybe the Jones lawyer couldn't get her, but I think you'd want 
an answer to each question.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. Let me ask it this way. There has been some reference to 
that fact throughout the proceedings, and I recall seeing something 
somewhere in your--your testimony that you said it or he said it. Do 
you recall anything being said about you going to Washington--to New 
York and that the effect of that might be that you would be more 
difficult to find?

    A. I believe that might have been mentioned briefly on the 28th of 
December, but not as a reason to go to New York, but as a possible 
outcome of being there. Does that--does that make sense?

    Q. It does.

    A. Okay.

    Q. What, uh--what would have been the context of that? And we're 
jumping ahead to December the 28th, but what would have been the 
context of that particular conversation about the New York and being 
perhaps--the result being it might be difficult to find you, or more 
difficult? What was the context?

    A. Um, I--I--if I remember correctly, it came sort of at the tail-
end of a very short discussion we had about the Jones case.

    Q. At this November the 11th meeting, did the President ask you to 
prepare a list, sort of a wish list for jobs?

    A. I'm sorry. Which--

    Q. I'm sorry. Did I say October? We're back to the October the 11th 
meeting. Did the President ask you to prepare a wish list?

    A. Okay. We haven't gone to the October 11th meeting yet. I--I 
haven't said anything about that meeting yet.

    Q. Okay.

    A. The phone call was on the 9th.

    Q. Okay, and you subsequently had a meeting, then, with the 
President on the 11th?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Face--face-to-face meeting?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And at that meeting, did he suggest you give him a wish list or 
Betty Currie a wish list?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Again, I asked a compound question there.

    Who did he suggest you give the wish list to?

    MR. CACHERIS: We're getting used to that.

    MR. BRYANT: I'm getting good. I'm making my own objections now.

    [Laughter.]

    THE WITNESS: Um, we sustain those. No, I'm sorry.

    [Laughter.]

    MR. BRYANT: I can do that, too. I'll be doing that in a minute. 
Overruled. Okay.

    THE WITNESS: Um, I--I believe he--he said I should get him a list, 
and the implication was through Betty.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. And obviously you prepared a list of--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --the people you'd like to work for in New York City.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And you sent that list--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --to Betty Currie or to the President?

    A. I sent it to Ms. Currie.

    Q. And also during this time--and I'm probably going to speed this 
up a little bit, but, uh, you did interview for the job at the United 
Nations?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And, uh--and through a process of several months there, or weeks 
at least, you did--made an offer to take a job at the United Nations 
and eventually declined it. Is that correct?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did you in early November have the occasion to meet with Vernon 
Jordan about the job situation?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And how did you learn about that meeting?

    A. I believe I asked Ms. Currie to check on the status of--I guess 
of finding out if I could have this meeting, and then she let me--she 
let me know to call Mr. Jordan's secretary?

    Q. And you set up an appointment with Mr. Jordan, or did she, Ms. 
Currie, do that?

    A. No. I set up an appointment. I think that was after a phone--
well, I guess I don't--I don't know that, so sorry.

    Q. But that appointment was November the 5th?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Prior to going to the meeting with Vernon Jordan, did you tell 
the President that you had a meeting with Mr. Jordan?

    A. I don't think so. I don't remember.

    Q. Did you carry any documents or any papers with you to the 
meeting with Mr. Jordan?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What were those?

    A. My resume and a list of public relations firms in New York.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan ask you why you were there?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what did you say?

    A. I was hoping to move to New York and that he could assist me in 
securing a job there.

    Q. Did he ask you why you wanted to leave Washington?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what was your answer?

    A. I gave him the vanilla story of, um, that I--I think I--I don't 
remember exactly what I said. I--I believe I've testified to this. I 
think it was something about wanting to get out of Washington.

    Q. The vanilla story. You mean sort of an innocuous set of reasons, 
not really the true reasons you wanted to leave?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what were the true reasons you wanted to leave?

    A. Because I couldn't go back to the White House.

    Q. Did--did you think Mr. Jordan accepted--did you think he would 
accept that vanilla story, or did you feel like he understood the real 
story?

    A. No, I felt he accepted it.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you during this meeting that he had already 
spoken with the President?

    A. It was--I believe so.

    Q. And that you had come highly recommended, I think?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did he, Mr. Jordan, review your list of job preferences and 
suggest anything?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what did he suggest?

    A. He said the names of the--he looked at the list of public 
relations firms and I think sort of said, ``oh, I've heard of them, I 
haven't heard of these people, have you heard of so and so,'' that I 
hadn't heard of.

    Q. Your meeting lasted about 20 minutes?

    A. If that's what I've testified to, then I accept that.

    Q. It is, or close to it. I know this is an approximation, but 
thereabouts. You weren't there all day.

    A. I had--well, I don't--I don't remember how long it was right 
now. I know I've testified to that. So if I said 20 minutes, then--

    Q. Did you have a conversation with the President on--about a week 
later on November the 12th and by telephone?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did you indicate there you had spoken with Mr. Jordan about 
a job?

    A. Yes.

    Q. After you met with Mr. Jordan, did you--did you have an 
impression that you would get, uh--get a job, get favorable results in 
your job search?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did anything favorable happen to--in your job search from that 
November the 5th, 1997, meeting until Thanksgiving?

    A. No, but I believe Mr. Jordan was out of town for a week or two.

    Q. During the weeks after this November the 5th interview, did you 
try to contact Mr. Jordan?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How?

    A. First, I sent him a thank-you note for the initial meeting, and 
I believe I placed some phone calls right before Thanksgiving--maybe a 
phone call. I don't remember if it was more than one.

    Q. What--what happened with respect to the job search, uh, through 
there, through Thanksgiving? Was there anything? I mean, I know he--you 
said he was out of town, but did anything, to your knowledge, occur? 
Could you see any results up to Thanksgiving?

    A. From my meeting with Mr. Jordan?

    Q. Yes.

    A. No.

    Q. Did you contact Betty Currie after you received no response from 
Mr. Jordan?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did she page you? I think you were in Los Angeles at the 
time.

    A. Correct.

    Q. Okay. What--what did she tell you as a result of that telephone 
call?

    A. She asked me to place a call to Mr. Jordan, which I did.

    Q. And this would have been, again, around November the 26th, 
shortly--well, around Thanksgiving?

    A. It was before Thanksgiving.

    Q. And I assume you found Mr. Jordan.

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what did he tell you?

    A. That he was working on it.

    Q. Did he tell you to call him back?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you indeed call him back

    A. I didn't actually get ahold of him; he was out-of-town that day. 
I think it was December 5th.

    Q. Did you try to meet with the President during this time?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How did you do that?

    A. I was a pest. I sent a note to Ms. Currie and asked her to pass 
it along to the President, requesting that I meet with him.

    Q. Were you successful in having a meeting as a result of those 
efforts?

    A. I don't know if it was a result of those efforts, but yes, I 
ended up having a meeting with the President.

    Q. And when would that have been; what day?

    A. On the 6th of December 1997.

    Q. Again you are going through Betty Currie; is that, again, the 
standard procedure at that time?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you go--I think you spoke also perhaps to Betty Currie on 
December the 5th, the day before the meeting--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --and this was something about attending the President's speech. 
Was that when that occurred--or the radio address, or something? Does 
that ring any bells?

    A. No.

    Q. Did--you did attend the Christmas party that day--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --and the White House. And you saw the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Just socially, speak to him, and that's it?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Picture, handshaking, and that?

    A. [Nodding head.]

    Q. Okay. That's a yes?

    A. Yes. Sorry.

    Q. Prior to December 6th, 1997, had you purchased a Christmas gift 
for the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Which was?

    A. An antique standing cigar holder.

    Q. And had you purchased any other additional gifts for him?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what were those?

    A. Uh, a Starbucks mug that said ``Santa Monica''; a necktie that I 
got in London; a little box--I call it a ``chochki''--from, uh--and an 
antique book on Theodore Roosevelt.

    Q. Was it your intention to, to carry those Christmas presents to 
the President home that Saturday, December the 6th?

    A. If I were to have a meeting with him, yes.

    Q. Did you attempt to have a meeting?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you go through Betty Currie?

    A. Yes. I sent her the letter to, to give to the President.

    Q. And when you went to the White House that day, you also 
attempted to, to have the meeting through calling Betty Currie and 
telephoning her; I believe you had to go to--

    A. Which day? I'm sorry.

    Q. On the 6th.

    A. No.

    Q. The Saturday.

    A. [No response.]

    Q. No?

    A. I--I attempted to give the presents to Betty, but I didn't call 
and attempt to have a meeting there--well, I guess I called in the 
morning, so that's not true--I'm sorry. Yes, I called Ms. Currie in the 
morning trying to see if I could see the President and apologize.

    Q. And--were you--did you see the President, then, on the 6th?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Tell us about that meeting--that was a long--was that, uh--did 
you have a telephone conversation with him that day also?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And that was the long telephone conversation?

    A. It--it was.

    Q. Okay. I think there has been some indication it may have been 56 
minutes, something approximating an hour-long conversation; does that 
sound right?

    A. Right. That would--that might include some conversation time 
with Ms. Currie as well.

    Q. Okay. Was he interrupted by Ms. Currie--could you tell--did he 
have to take a break from the telephone call to talk to Ms. Currie, or 
do you recall any, any--

    A. I don't recall that.

    Q. --do you recall any breaks to talk to anybody else?

    A. I don't recall that. Doesn't mean it didn't happen; I just don't 
remember it.

    Q. What else did you--did you arrange in that telephone 
conversation, or did he invite you in that telephone conversation to 
come to the White House that day?

    A. Yes, he did.

    Q. What happened during, during that conversation in terms of--I 
understand that it was again an emotional day, some sort of a word 
fight; is that right?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Could you tell me--he was, uh--again, to perhaps save some 
time--he was angry about an earlier incident, and, uh, he felt like you 
were intruding on his lawyer time?

    A. Uh, he was upset that I hadn't accepted that he just couldn't 
see me that day.

    Q. And what was your response to that?

    A. Probably not positive. Uh, that's why it was a fight.

    Q. Again, I want to be careful that I don't put words in your 
mouth, but you were dealing with this relationship from an emotional 
standpoint of wanting to spend time with him--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --not as President, but as a man?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And this was at a point when you didn't feel like you were 
spending enough time with him?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And he obviously felt he had to do other things, too, talk to 
lawyers and do those kinds of things--be the President--is that right?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Now, was some of this discussion that we term ``the 
fight,'' was that over the telephone?

    A. Yes. It was all over the telephone.

    Q. So by the time you arrived and had the face-to-face meeting with 
him, that was over?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Was that during the time that you exchanged--exchanged some of 
the Christmas presents with him?

    A. In--in the meeting?

    Q. Yes.

    A. Yes. I gave him my Christmas presents.

    Q. Did you discuss the job search with him also at that time?

    A. I believe I mentioned it.

    Q. Did you tell him that, uh, your job search with Mr. Jordan was 
not going well?

    A. I don't know if I used those words. I don't, I don't remember 
exactly--

    Q. If your grand jury testimony said yes--I mean, words to that 
effect--that would--you could have used those words if they're in your 
grand jury--

    A. If my grand jury testimony says that--if that's what I said in 
my grand jury testimony, then I accept that.

    Q. I'm not trying to--I'm not trying to trick you.

    A. Okay.

    Q. Did he make any comment to you about what he might do to aid in 
your job search at that time, if you recall?

    A. I think he--I think he said, oh, let me see about it, let me see 
what I can do--his usual.

    Q. Did, uh, did the President say anything to you at that time 
about your name appearing on a witness list in the Paula Jones case?

    A. No.

    Q. Did you later learn that your name had appeared on such a list?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did you later learn that that witness list had been faxed to 
the White House--to the President's lawyers on December the 5th?

    A. Much later, as in last year.

    Q. Okay. Yes--that's what I mean--later.

    A. I, I mean--

    Q. Yes.

    A. --post this investigation.

    Q. Okay. All right. Let's go forward another week or so to December 
the 11th and a lunch that you had with Vernon Jordan, I believe, in his 
office.

    A. Yes.

    Q. How did--how was that meeting set up.

    A. Through his secretary.

    Q. Did you instigate that, or did he call through his secretary?

    A. I don't remember.

    Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?

    A. Uh, it was to discuss my job situation.

    Q. And what, what--how was that discussed?

    A. Uh, Mr. Jordan gave me a list of three names and suggested that 
I contact these people in a letter that I should cc him on, and that's 
what I did.

    Q. Did he ask you to copy him on the letters that you sent out?

    A. Yes.

    Q. During this meeting, did he make any comments about your status 
as a friend of the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What--what did he say?

    A. In one of his remarks, he said something about me being a friend 
of the President.

    Q. And did you respond?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How?

    A. I said that I didn't, uh--I think I--my grand jury testimony, I 
know I talked about this, so it's probably more accurate. My memory 
right now is I said something about, uh, seeing him more as, uh, a man 
than as a President, and I treated him accordingly.

    Q. Did you express your frustration to Mr. Jordan with, uh, with 
the President?

    A. I expressed that sometimes I had frustrations with him, yes.

    Q. And what was his response to you about, uh--after you talked 
about the President?

    A. Uh, he sort of jokingly said to me, You know what your problem 
is, and don't deny it--you're in love with him. But it was a sort of 
light-hearted nature.

    Q. Did you--did you have a response to that?

    A. I probably blushed or giggled or something.

    Q. Do you still have feelings for the President?

    A. I have mixed feelings.

    Q. What, uh--maybe you could tell us a little bit more about what 
those mixed feelings are.

    A. I think what you need to know is that my grand jury testimony is 
truthful irrespective of whatever those mixed feelings are in my 
testimony today.

    Q. I know in your grand jury you mentioned some of your feelings 
that you felt after he spoke publicly about the relationship, but let 
me ask you more about the positive--you said there were mixed feelings. 
What about--do you still, uh, respect the President, still admire the 
President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Do you still appreciate what he is doing for this country as the 
President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December 
the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?

    A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother 
had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was 
on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned 
the Christmas present he had for me.

    Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of 
2 o'clock to 2:30.

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?

    A. No.

    Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones 
witness list?

    A. Yes.

    Q. I realize he, he commented about some other things, but I do 
want to focus on the witness list.

    A. Okay.

    Q. Did he say anything to you about how he felt concerning this 
witness list?

    A. He said it broke his heart that, well, that my name was on the 
witness list.

    Can I take a break, please? I'm sorry.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Sure, sure. We'll take a 5-minute break at this 
point.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Videotape Number 1 in the 
deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. We are going off the record at 10:56 
a.m.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 2 in 
the deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. The time is 11:10 a.m.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

    I will advise the House Managers that they have used one hour and 8 
minutes.

    Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you.

    By MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Did--did we get your response? We were talking about the 
discussion you were having with the President over the telephone, early 
morning of the December 17th phone call, and he had, uh, mentioned that 
it broke his heart that you were on that list.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And I think you were about to comment on that further, and then 
you need a break.

    A. No.

    Q. No.

    A. I just wanted to be able to focus--I know this is an important 
date, so I felt I need a few moments to be able to focus on it.

    Q. And you're comfortable now with that, with your--you are ready 
to talk about that?

    A. Comfortable, I don't know, but I'm ready to talk about.

    Q. Well, I mean comfortable that you can focus on it.

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. Good. Now, with this discussion of the fact that your name 
appeared as a witness, had you--had you been asleep that night when the 
phone rang?

    A. Yes.

    Q. So were you wide awake by this point? It's the President calling 
you, so I guess you're--you wake up.

    A. I wouldn't say wide awake.

    Q. He expressed to you that your name--you know, again, you talked 
about some other things--but he told you your name was on the list.

    A. Correct.

    Q. What was your reaction to that?

    A. I was scared.

    Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact that 
your name was on the list? You were scared; he was disappointed, or it 
broke his heart. What other discussion did you have?

    A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not necessarily 
direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that he said something 
about that, uh, just because my name was on the list didn't necessarily 
mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some point, I asked him what I should do 
if I received a subpoena. He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie 
know. Uh--

    Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What did he say?

    A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to 
avoid being deposed.

    Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an 
affidavit?

    A. I don't think he did.

    Q. You just accepted that statement?

    A. [Nodding head.]

    Q. Yes?

    A. Yes, yes. Sorry.

    Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation to you 
about what you could say in that affidavit or--

    A. No.

    Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that affidavit to 
avoid testifying?

    A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. To the 
best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it was a range of 
things. I mean, it could either be, uh, something innocuous or could go 
as far as having to deny the relationship. Not being a lawyer nor 
having gone to law school, I thought it could be anything.

    Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other version?

    A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a further 
discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in an affidavit.

    Q. When you say, uh, it would be--it could have been something 
where the relationship was denied, what was your thinking at that 
point?

    A. I--I--I think I don't understand what you're asking me. I'm 
sorry.

    Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted 
stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there 
some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these 
stories--the cover stories?

    A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the 
affidavit.

    Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would accomplish 
preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?

    A. No.

    Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--why 
would you have wanted to avoid testifying?

    A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second of all, 
I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones or her case. 
And--I guess those two reasons.

    Q. You--you have already mentioned that you were not a lawyer and 
you had not been to law school, those kinds of things. Did, uh, did you 
understand when you--the potential legal problems that you could have 
caused yourself by allowing a false affidavit to be filed with the 
court, in a court proceeding?

    A. During what time--I mean--I--can you be--I'm sorry--

    Q. At this point, I may ask it again at later points, but the night 
of the telephone--

    A. Are you--are you still referring to December 17th?

    Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could file an 
affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of filing a false 
affidavit with the court?

    A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it would have 
to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't remember having any 
thoughts like that, so I imagine I would remember something like that, 
and I don't, but--

    Q. Did you know what an affidavit was?

    A. Sort of.

    Q. Of course, you're talking at that time by telephone to the 
President, and he's--and he is a lawyer, and he taught law school--I 
don't know--did you know that? Did you know he was a lawyer?

    A. I--I think I knew it, but it wasn't something that was present 
in my, in my thoughts, as in he's a lawyer, he's telling me, you know, 
something.

    Q. Did the, did the President ever tell you, caution you, that you 
had to tell the truth in an affidavit?

    A. Not that I recall.

    Q. It would have been against his interest in that lawsuit for you 
to have told the truth, would it not?

    A. I'm not really comfortable--I mean, I can tell you what would 
have been in my best interest, but I--

    Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did 
you?

    A. Uh, actually, I did.

    Q. To avoid testifying.

    A. Yes.

    Q. But had you testified truthfully, you would have had no--
certainly, no legal implications--it may have been embarrassing, but 
you would have not had any legal problems, would you?

    A. That's true.

    Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would 
draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that 
earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. And what was said?

    A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.

    Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that 
night. You are sure he said that that night?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?

    A. I don't believe so, no.

    Q. Why would he have told you you could always say that?

    A. I don't know.

    Mr. BURTON: Objection. You're asking her to speculate on someone 
else's testimony.

    MR. BRYANT: Let me make a point here. I've been very patient in 
trying to get along, but as I alluded to earlier, and I said I am not 
going to hold a hard line to this, but I don't think the President's--
the witness' lawyers ought to be objecting to this testimony. If 
there's an objection here, it should come from the White House side, 
nor should they be--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, why don't you rephrase the question?

    MR. BRYANT: Do we have a clear ruling on whether they can object?

    SENATOR DeWINE: We'll go off the record for a moment.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 11:20 a.m.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 11:30 a.m.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

    It's our opinion that counsel for Ms. Lewinsky do have the right to 
make objections. We would ask them to be as short and concise as 
humanly possible. So we will now proceed.

    Mr. Bryant?

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Let's kind of bring this back together again, and I'll try to 
ask sharper questions and avoid these objections.

    We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation in the 
morning with you and the President, and he has among other things 
mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has 
also mentioned to you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid 
possible testifying in that case. Is that right?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were in our 
questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he had had, that 
perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver 
papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?

    A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that story.

    Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly 
familiar to you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. You knew what he was talking about?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And why was this familiar to you?

    A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.

    Q. Had you actually had to use elements of this cover story in the 
past?

    A. I think so, yes.

    Q. Did the President ever tell you what to say if anyone asked you 
about telephone conversations that you had had with him?

    A. Are we--are we still focused on December 17th?

    Q. No, no.

    A. Okay.

    Q. It did not have to be that night. Did he ever?

    A. If I could just--I--I'm pretty date-oriented, so if you could 
just be more specific with the date. If we're staying on a date or 
leaving that date, it would just help me. I'm sorry.

    Q. Well, my question was phrased did he ever do that, but--

    A. Okay.

    Q. Well, I--I'm sorry. I'm playing guessing games with you. Was 
there a conversation on March 29th of 1997 when the President told you 
he thought perhaps his telephone conversations were being tapped or 
taped--either way, or both--by a foreign embassy?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And was there some reference to some sort of cover story there 
in the event that his line was tapped?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And what was that?

    A. That--I think, if I remember it correctly, it was that we--that 
he knew that we were sort of engaging in those types of conversations, 
uh, knowing that someone was listening, so that it was not for the 
purposes that it might have seemed.

    Q. Did you find it a little strange that he would express concern 
about possible eavesdropping and still persist in these calls to you?

    A. I don't think phone calls of that nature occurred and happened 
right after, or soon after that discussion. I think it was quite a few 
months until that resumed.

    Q. I think my question was more did you not find it a little 
strange that he felt that perhaps his phone was being tapped and 
conversations taped by a foreign embassy, and he--

    A. I--I thought it was strange, but if--I mean, I wasn't going to 
question what he was saying to me.

    Q. But that he also continued to make the calls--you're saying he 
didn't make any calls after that?

    A. No. My understanding was it was referencing a certain type of 
phone call, certain nature of phone call, uh, and those--

    Q. Let me direct your attention back to a point I did not mention a 
couple--a few days before the December--early December telephone call, 
the lengthy telephone call from the President. We had talked about how 
that was a heated conversation.

    A. Correct.

    Q. At--did at some point during that telephone conversation--did 
the tone--did the President's tone change to a more receptive, friendly 
conversation?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Do you know why that happened?

    A. No, nor do I remember whose tone changed first. I mean, we made 
up, so--

    Q. Okay. Now let me go back again to the December 11th date--I'm 
sorry--the 17th. This is the conversation in the morning. What else--
was there anything else you talked about in terms of--other than your 
name being on the list and the affidavit and the cover story?

    A. Yes. I had--I had had my own thoughts on why and how he should 
settle the case, and I expressed those thoughts to him. And at some 
point, he mentioned that he still had this Christmas present for me and 
that maybe he would ask Mrs. Currie to come in that weekend, and I said 
not to because she was obviously going to be in mourning because of her 
brother.

    Q. In--in that--in that relationship with the President, I think 
you have expressed in your testimony somewhere that you weren't 
necessarily jealous of those types of people like Kathleen Willey or 
Paula Jones, and perhaps you didn't even believe those stories occurred 
as--as they alleged.

    A. That's correct. I don't--I don't know, jealous or not jealous. I 
don't think I've testified to my feelings of jealousy, but the latter 
half of the question is true.

    Q. I--I saw it. I mean, it's not a major point. I thought I saw 
that in your testimony, that particular word.

    A. Okay. If I said that, then I--I don't.

    Q. Was it your belief that the Paula Jones case was not a valid 
lawsuit? Was that part of that discussion that night, or your strategy?

    A. Uh, can I separate that--that into two questions?

    Q. Any way, any way you want to.

    A. Okay. I don't believe it was a valid lawsuit, and I don't think 
whether I believed it was a valid lawsuit or not was the topic of the 
conversation.

    Q. Okay, that's a fair answer.

    You believe the President's version of the Paula Jones incident?

    A. Is that relevant to--

    Q. I--I just asked you the question.

    A. I don't believe Paula Jones' version of the story.

    Q. Okay, good. That's a fair answer.

    You have testified previously that you tried to maintain secrecy 
regarding this relationship--and we're talking about obviously with the 
President. Is that true?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And to preserve the secrecy and I guess advance this cover 
story, you would bring papers to the President and always use Betty 
Currie for the excuse for you to be WAVE'd in. Is that right?

    A. Papers when I was working at the White House and Mrs. Currie 
after I left the White House. So Mrs. Currie wasn't involved when I was 
working at the White House.

    Q. Were these papers you carried in to the President--were they--
were they business documents, or were they more personal papers from 
you to him?

    A. They--they weren't business documents.

    Q. So, officially, you were not carrying in official papers?

    A. Correct.

    Q. You were carrying in personal papers that would not have 
entitled you ordinarily to go see the President?

    A. Correct.

    Q. When--in this procedure where Betty Currie was always the one 
that WAVE'd you in to the White House--and I--I don't know if the 
people who may be watching this deposition, the Senators, understand 
that the WAVES process is just the--to give the guards the okay for you 
to come in. Is that a short synopsis?

    A. I'm not really versed on--

    Q. I'm not either. You know more than I do, probably, since you 
worked there, but--

    A. Well, I know you had to go, you had to type in a thing in at 
WAVES, and now you have to give a Social Security, birth date, have to 
show ID.

    Q. Is there a record kept of that?

    A. I believe so.

    Q. Was it always Betty Currie that WAVE'd you in to the--access to 
the White House? I'm talking about now after you left and went to work 
at the Pentagon.

    A. No.

    Q. Other people did that?

    A. There were other reasons that I came to the White House at 
times.

    Q. Did you ever ask the President if he would WAVE you in?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did he ever do that?

    A. No, not to my--not to my knowledge.

    Q. Was there a reason? Did he express anything to you why he would 
or would not?

    A. Yes. He said that, uh--I believe he said something about that 
there's a specific list made of people that he requests to come in 
and--and there are people who have access to that list.

    Q. So, obviously, he didn't want your name being on that list?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Now, some of those people--

    A. I think--well, that's my understanding.

    Q. Would some of those people be the people that worked outside his 
office, Ms. Lieberman and those--those folks?

    A. I--I believe so, but I'm not really sure.

    Q. Did you not want those people to know that you were inside the 
White House?

    A. I didn't.

    Q. Why is that?

    A. Because they didn't like me.

    Q. Would they have objected, do you think--if you know.

    A. I don't know.

    Q. Did you work with Betty Currie on occasions to--to get in to see 
the President, perhaps bypass some of these people?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And that would be another way that you would conceal the meeting 
with the President, by using Betty Currie to get you in?

    A. I--I think, yes, be cautious of it.

    Q. Did--well, I think we've covered that, about some papers, and I 
think we've covered that after you left your job inside the White House 
with Legislative Affairs and went to the Pentagon, you developed a 
story, a cover story to the effect that you were going to see Betty, 
that's how you would come in officially?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And during that time that you were at the Pentagon, you would 
more likely visit him on weekends or during the week? Which would--
which would--

    A. Weekends.

    Q. Weekends. And why--why the weekends?

    A. First, I think he had less work, and second of all, there were--
I believe there were less people around.

    Q. Now, whose idea was it for you to come on weekends?

    A. I believe it was the President's.

    Q. When you--when the President was in his office, was your purpose 
to go there and see him? If he was in the office, you would go see him?

    A. What--I'm sorry.

    Q. No--that's not clear. I'll withdraw that question.

    Was Ms. Currie, the President's secretary--was she in the loop, so 
to speak, in keeping this relationship and how you got in and out of 
the White House, keeping that quiet?

    A. I think I actually remember reading part of my grand jury 
testimony about this and that it was more specific in that she was in 
the loop about my friendship with the President, but I just want to not 
necessarily--there was a clarification, I believe, in that about 
knowledge of the complete relationship or not. So--

    Q. She would help with the gifts and notes and things like that--
the passing?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Would you agree that these cover stories that you've just 
testified to, if they were told to the attorneys for Paula Jones, that 
they would be misleading to them and not be the whole story, the whole 
truth?

    A. They would--yes, I guess misleading. They were literally true, 
but they would be misleading, so incomplete.

    Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were 
reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was 
on the witness list, I should say?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness 
list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to 
testify in the Paula Jones case?

    A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a 
possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was 
a subpoena to testify, but--

    Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And that was what--

    A. December 19th, 1997.

    Q. December 19th.

    Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing 
comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very 
conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you 
that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could 
sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?

    A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing 
affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--

    Q. Well, those two--

    A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked 
for me.

    Q. But they were in the same conversation, were they not?

    A. Yes, they were.

    Q. Did you understand in the context of the conversation that you 
would deny the--the President and your relationship to the Jones 
lawyers?

    A. Do you mean from what was said to me or--

    Q. In the context of that--in the context of that conversation, 
December the 17th--

    A. I--I don't--I didn't--

    Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the 
telephone conversation with the President that early morning of 
December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your 
relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of 
these cover stories?

    A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I 
don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to 
myself I knew I would deny the relationship.

    Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?

    A. Yes, correct.

    Q. Good.

    A. If--if that's what it came to.

    Q. And in fact you did deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers 
in the affidavit that you signed under penalty of perjury; is that 
right?

    A. I denied a sexual relationship.

    Q. The President did not in that conversation on December the 17th 
of 1997 or any other conversation, for that matter, instruct you to 
tell the truth; is that correct?

    A. That's correct.

    Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you--you both spoke--

    A. Well, I guess any conversation in relation to the Paula Jones 
case. I can't say that any conversation from the--the entire 
relationship that he didn't ever say, you know, ``Are you mad? Tell me 
the truth.'' So--

    Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you both spoke about 
denying this relationship if asked?

    A. Yes. That was discussed.

    Q. He would say something to the effect that--or you would say 
that--you--you would deny anything if it ever came up, and he would nod 
or say that's good, something to that effect; is that right?

    A. Yes, I believe I testified to that.

    Q. Let me shift gears just a minute and ask you about--and I'm 
going to be delicate about this because I'm conscious of people here in 
the room and my--my own personal concerns--but I want to refer you to 
the first so-called salacious occasion, and I'm not going to get into 
the details. I'm not--

    A. Can--can we--can you call it something else?

    Q. Okay.

    A. I mean, this is--this is my relationship--

    Q. What would you like to call it?

    A. --so, I mean, is--

    Q. This is the--or this was--

    A. It was my first encounter with the President, so I don't really 
see it as my first salacious--that's not what this was.

    Q. Well, that's kind of been the word that's been picked up all 
around. So--

    A. Right.

    Q. --let's stay on this first--

    A. Encounter, maybe?

    Q. Encounter, okay.

    A. Okay.

    Q. So we all know what we're talking about. You had several of 
these encounters, perhaps 10 or 11 of these encounters; is that right?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the first one on November the 15th, 
1995, you have testified to a set of facts where the President actually 
touched you in certain areas--is that right--and that's--that's where I 
want to go. That's as far as I want to go with that question.

    MR. CACHERIS: If that's as far as it goes, we will not object--

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    MR. CACHERIS: --and if it goes any further, we will object.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. You have testified to that?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And I have the excerpts out, and I don't--but they've been 
adopted and affirmed as true. So I'm not going to get--get you looking 
at--have you read those excerpts.

    A. I appreciate that.

    Q. Now, in the--in later testimony before the grand jury, you were 
given a definition, and in fact it was the same definition that was 
used in the Paula Jones lawsuit, of ``sexual relations.'' Do you recall 
the--

    A. So I've read.

    Q. Yes.

    A. I was not shown that definition.

    Q. But you were asked a question that incorporated that definition.

    A. Not prior to this whole--not prior to the Independent Counsel 
getting involved.

    Q. But--no--it was the Independent Counsels themselves who asked 
you this question.

    A. Right. Oh, so you're--you're saying in the grand jury, I was 
shown a definition of--

    Q. Right.

    A. Yes, that's correct.

    Q. And you admitted in that answer to that question that the 
conduct that you were involved in, the encounter of November the 15th, 
1995, fit within that definition of ``sexual relations''?

    A. The second encounter of that evening did.

    Q. Right.

    And were there other similar encounters later on with the 
President, not that day, but other occasions that would have likewise 
fit into that definition of ``sexual relations'' in the Paula Jones 
case?

    A. Yes. And--yes.

    Q. There was more than one occasion where that occurred?

    A. Correct.

    Q. So, if the President testifies that he did not--he was not 
guilty of having a sexual relationship under the Paula Jones definition 
even, then that testimony is not truthful, is it?

    MR. CACHERIS: Objection. She should not be called upon to testify 
what was in the mind of another person. She's testifying to the facts, 
and she has given the facts.

    MR. BRYANT: I would ask that she answer the question.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Go ahead.

    SENATOR LEAHY: The objection is noted for the record.

    SENATOR DeWINE: The objection is noted. She may answer the 
question.

    THE WITNESS: I--I really--

    SENATOR LEAHY: If she can.

    THE WITNESS: --don't feel comfortable characterizing whether what 
he said was truthful or not truthful. I know I've testified to what I 
believe is true.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Well, truth is not a wandering standard.

    A. Well--

    Q. I would hope not. But you have testified, as I've told you, that 
what you and he did together on November the 15th, 1995 fit that 
definition of the Paula Jones, and you've indicated that there were 
other occasions that likewise--

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. --that that occurred.

    But now the President has indicated as a part of his specific 
defense--he has filed an answer with this Senate denying that this 
occurred, that he did these actions.

    A. I know. I'm not trying to be difficult, but there is a portion 
of that definition that says, you know, with intent, and I don't feel 
comfortable characterizing what someone else's intent was.

    I can tell you that I--my memory of this relationship and what I 
remember happened fell within that definition.

    If you want to--I don't know if there's another way to phrase that, 
but I'm just not comfortable commenting on someone else's intent or 
state of mind or what they thought.

    Q. Let's move forward to December the 19th, 1997, at that point you 
made reference to earlier.

    A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the date again? I'm sorry.

    Q. Yes. December the 19th, 1997.

    A. Okay, sorry.

    Q. At that point where you testified that you received a subpoena 
in the Paula Jones case, and that was, of course, on December the 19th, 
1997.

    Do you recall the specific time of day and where you were when you 
were served with the subpoena?

    A. I was actually handed the subpoena at the Metro entrance of the 
Pentagon--at the Pentagon, and the time--I think it was around 4:30--
4--I--I--if I've testified to something different, then, I accept 
whatever I testified to, closer to the date. Sometime in the late 
afternoon.

    Q. Did they call you, and you had to come out of your office and go 
outside--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --and do that?

    Okay. And what did you do after you accepted service of the 
subpoena?

    A. I started crying.

    Q. Did he just give it to you and walk away, or did he give you any 
kind of explanation?

    A. I think I made a stink. I think I was trying to hope that he 
would convey to the Paula Jones attorneys that I didn't know why they 
were doing this, and this is ridiculous, and he said something or 
another, there is a check here for witness fee. And I said I don't want 
their stinking money, and so--

    Q. What did you do after, after you got through the emotional part?

    A. I went to a pay phone, and I called Mr. Jordan.

    Q. Any reason you went to a pay phone, and why did you call Mr. 
Jordan? Two questions, please.

    A. First is because my office in the Pentagon was probably a room 
this size and has--let's see, one, two, three, four--four other people 
in it, and there wasn't much privacy. So that I think that's obvious 
why I wouldn't want to discuss it there.

    And the second question was why Mr. Jordan--

    Q. Why did you call Mr. Jordan; yes.

    A. Because I couldn't call Mrs. Currie because it was--I hadn't 
expected to be subpoenaed that soon. So she was grieving with her 
brother's passing away, and I didn't know who else to turn to. So--

    Q. And what--what occurred with that conversation with Mr. Jordan?

    A. Well, I remember that--that he couldn't understand me because I 
was crying. So he kept saying: ``I don't understand what you're saying. 
I don't understand what you're saying.''

    And I just was crying and crying and crying. And so all I remember 
him saying was: ``Oh, just come here at 5 o'clock.''

    So I did.

    Q. You went to see Mr. Jordan, and you were inside his office after 
5 o'clock, and you did--is that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Were--were you interrupted, in the office?

    A. Yes. He received a phone call.

    Q. And you testified that you didn't know who that was that called?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did you excuse yourself?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What--after you came back in, what--what occurred? Did he tell 
you who he had been talking to?

    A. No.

    Q. Okay. What happened next?

    A. I know I've testified about this--

    Q. Yes.

    A. --so I stand by that testimony, and my recollection right now is 
when I came back in the room, I think shortly after he had placed a 
phone call to--to Mr. Carter's office, and told me to come to his 
office at 10:30 Monday morning.

    Q. Did you know who Mr. Carter was?

    A. No.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you who he was?

    A. No--I don't remember.

    Q. Did you understand he was going to be your attorney?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you express any concerns about the--the subpoena?

    A. I think that happened before the phone call came.

    Q. Okay, but did you express concerns about the subpoena?

    A. Yes, yes.

    Q. And what were those concerns?

    A. In general, I think I was just concerned about being dragged 
into this, and I was concerned because the subpoena had called for a 
hatpin, that I turn over a hatpin, and that was an alarm to me.

    Q. How--in what sense was it--in what sense was it an alarm to you?

    A. The hatpin being on the subpoena was evidence to me that someone 
had given that information to the Paula Jones people.

    Q. What did Mr. Jordan say about the subpoena?

    A. That it was standard.

    Q. Did he have any--did he have any comment about the specificity 
of the hatpin?

    A. No.

    Q. And did you--

    A. He just kept telling me to calm down.

    Q. Did you raise that concern with Mr. Jordan?

    A. I don't remember if--if I've testified to it, then yes. If--I 
don't remember right now.

    Q. Did--would you have remembered then if he made any comment or 
answer about the hatpin?

    A. I mean, I think I would.

    Q. And you don't remember?

    A. I--I remember him saying something that it was--you know, calm 
down, it's a standard subpoena or vanilla subpoena, something like 
that.

    Q. Did you ask Mr. Jordan to call the President and advise him of 
the subpoena?

    A. I think so, yes. I asked him to inform the President. I don't 
know if it was through telephone or not.

    Q. And you did that because the President had asked you to make 
sure you let Betty know that?

    A. Well, sure. With Betty not being in the office, I couldn't--
there wasn't anyone else that I could call to get through to him.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan say to you when he might see the President next?

    A. I believe he said he would see him that evening at a holiday 
reception.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan during that meeting make an inquiry about the 
nature of the relationship between you and the President?

    A. Yes, he did.

    Q. What was that inquiry?

    A. I don't remember the exact wording of the questions, but there 
were two questions, and I think they were something like did you have 
sex with the President or did he--and if--or did he ask for it or 
some--something like that.

    Q. Did you--what did you suspect at that point with these questions 
from Mr. Jordan in terms of did he know or not know about this?

    A. Well, I wasn't really sure. I mean, two things. I think there 
is--I know I've testified to this, that there was another component to 
all of this being Linda Tripp and her--what she might have led me to 
believe or led me to think and how that might have characterized how I 
was perceiving the situation.

    I--I sort of felt that I didn't know if he was asking me as what 
are you going to say because I--I don't know these answer to these 
questions, or he was asking me as I know the answer to these questions 
and what are you going to say. So, either way, for me, the answer was 
no and no.

    Q. And that's just what I wanted to ask you--you did answer no to 
both of those, but--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --as you explained--you didn't mention this directly, but you 
mentioned in some of your earlier testimony about it, that this was 
kind of a wink and--you thought this might be a wink-and-nod 
conversation, where he really knew what was going on, but--

    A. Well, I think that's what I just said.

    Q. --he was testing you to see what you would say?

    A. --that I wasn't--I--that was one of the--that was one of the 
things that went through my mind. I mean, it was not--I think that's 
what I just testified to, didn't I?

    Q. You didn't use the term ``wink-and-nod,'' though.

    A. Oh.

    Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Jordan during that 
meeting about the specifics of an affidavit?

    A. No.

    Q. Do you know if the subject of an affidavit even came up?

    A. I don't think so.

    Q. What happened next? Is that when he made the call to Mr. Carter, 
after this conversation?

    A. No. He made the call to Mr.--I think--well, I think he made the 
call to Mr. Carter, uh, shortly after I came back into the room, but I 
could be wrong.

    Q. And then the meeting concluded after that--after the appointment 
was set up with Mr. Carter, the meeting concluded?

    A. Yes.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, we're going to need to break sometime 
in the next 5 minutes. Is this a good time, or do you want to 
complete--

    MR. BRYANT: This is a good time.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Okay. We'll take a 5-minute break.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 12:04 p.m.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 12:16 p.m.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are back on the record.

    Let me advise House Managers that they have consumed one hour and 
54 minutes.

    Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, sir.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, let me just cover a couple of quick points, and 
then I'll move on to another area, at least the next meeting with Mr. 
Jordan and eventual meeting with Mr. Carter.

    Back when issues of--we were discussing the issues of cover 
stories, uh, would you tell me about the, uh, code name with Betty 
Currie, the President's secretary and how that worked in terms of the 
use--I guess the word ``Kay,'' the name ``Kay,'' and were there other 
code names, and when did this start?

    A. Sure. First, let me say there's--from my experience with working 
with Independent Counsel on this subject area, there--my initial memory 
of things and then what I came to learn from, from other evidence, I 
think, are sort of two different things. So I initially hadn't 
remembered when that had happened or what had happened.

    The name ``Kay'' was used because Betty and I first came to know 
each other and know--or, I guess I came to know of Mrs. Currie through 
Walter Kaye, who was a family friend, and I think that that--I don't 
remember when we started using it, but I know that by January at some 
point--by let's just say January, I think, 12th or 13th, we were doing 
that. So I know I was beyond paranoid at this point.

    Q. Was ``Kay'' your code name, so to speak?

    A. I believe--yes, yes. So she was ``Kay'' and I was ``Kay.''

    Q. So any time, uh--not any time--so you used the ``Kay'' name 
interchangeably between the two--just between the two of you?

    A. Just for paging messages.

    Q. And, uh, when we're talking about that Ms. Currie would WAVE you 
into the White House, would that occur when the President was there? I 
mean, you went in--

    A. There--there were times that I went to see Mrs. Currie when the 
President wasn't there.

    Q. Right. And she would WAVE you in.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And there were times other people WAVE'd you in when the 
President wasn't there?

    A. Correct.

    Q. But when the President was there, and you were going to see the 
President, Ms. Currie was the one that always WAVE'd you in?

    A. Yes, and I think, unless--maybe on the occasions of the radio 
address or it was an official function.

    Q. Now, I think we talked a little bit about this. During your 
December the 19th meeting with Mr. Jordan, uh, he did schedule you a 
time to meet, uh, and introduce you to Mr. Carter?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And that--when was that meeting with Mr. Carter scheduled?

    A. Uh, I believe for--it was Monday morning. I think it was 11 
o'clock, around--sometime around that time.

    Q. And my notes say that would have been December the 22nd, 1997.

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did you, uh, call to meet him earlier, and if so, why?

    A. Yes. I had--I had had some concerns over the weekend that I 
didn't know if--if Mr. Jordan knew about the relationship or didn't 
know about the relationship. I was concerned about--I'm sure you can 
understand that I was dealing with a set of facts that were very 
different from what the President knew about being pulled into this 
case in that I had, in fact, disclosed information. So I was very 
paranoid, and, uh, I, uh, I--I was trying to--trying to see what Mr. 
Jordan knew was--was trying to inform him, was trying to just get a 
better grasp of what was going on.

    Is that--is that clear? No?

    Q. You were--you were worried that Mr. Jordan didn't have a--did 
not have a grasp of what was really going on?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And that would be in terms of actually knowing the real 
relationship between you and the President?

    A. Correct.

    Q. So how did you attempt to correct that?

    A. Well, I--I sort of--I think the way it came up was I said, uh--I 
think I said to Mr. Jordan--I know I've testified to this, uh, that--
something about what about if someone overheard the phone calls that I 
had with him. And Mr. Jordan, I believe, said something like: So what? 
The President's allowed to call people.

    And then--well.

    Q. Now, was this at a meeting on December the 22nd, before you went 
to see Mr. Carter?

    A. Correct.

    Q. I assume you--you went to Mr. Jordan's office first, and then he 
was going to escort you over and turn you over to Mr. Carter?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And it was at that meeting that you brought up the possibility 
of someone overhearing a conversation with the President and you--
between the two of you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What else was said at that meeting with Mr. Jordan?

    A. I think it covered a topic that I thought we weren't discussing 
here.

    Q. Uh, okay. All right. I'm not sure.

    A. Okay. Well, I--I know I've testified to this in my--I think in 
all three, if not both of my grand jury appearances, and I'm very happy 
to stand by that testimony.

    Q. All right. I'm going to go around this a little bit without 
getting into details. You had a conversation with Mr. Jordan to 
detail--to give him more specific details of your relationship with the 
President.

    A. Uh, to give him more details of some of the types of phone calls 
that we had.

    Q. Okay. Uh, did you ask Mr. Jordan had he spoken with the 
President during that conversation?

    A. Yes, I believe so.

    Q. And why was this--why did you need to know that, or why was it 
important that you know that?

    A. I wanted the President to know I'd been subpoenaed.

    Q. Did, uh--in your, uh, proffer, you say that you made it clear to 
Mr. Jordan that you would deny the sexual relationship. Do you recall 
saying that in your proffer?

    A. Uh, I know--I know that was written in my proffer.

    Q. Okay. Well, I guess the better question is did you--did you in 
fact make that clear to Mr. Jordan that you would deny a sexual 
relationship with the President?

    A. I--I'm not really sure. I--this is sort of an area that, uh, has 
been difficult for me. I think, as I might have discussed in the grand 
jury, that when I originally wrote this proffer, it was to be a road 
map and, really, something to help me to get immunity and not 
necessarily--it's not perfect.

    Uh, so, I think that was my intention--I know that was my intention 
of--or at least what I thought I was doing--but I never really thought 
that this would become the be-all and end-all, my proffer.

    Q. Did, uh, did you bring with you to the meeting with Mr. Jordan, 
and for the purpose of carrying it, I guess, to Mr. Carter, items in 
response to this request for production?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you discuss those items with Mr. Jordan?

    A. I think I showed them to him, but I'm not 100 percent sure. If 
I've testified that I did, then I'd stand by that.

    Q. Okay. How did you select those items?

    A. Uh, actually, kind of in an obnoxious way, I guess. I--I felt 
that it was important to take the stand with Mr. Carter and then, I 
guess, to the Jones people that this was ridiculous, that they were--
they were looking at the wrong person to be involved in this. And, in 
fact, that was true. I know and knew nothing of sexual harassment. So I 
think I brought the, uh, Christmas cards, that I'm sure everyone in 
this room has probably gotten from the President and First Lady, and 
considered that correspondence, and some innocuous pictures and--they 
were innocuous.

    Q. Were they the kind of items that typically, an intern would 
receive or, like you said, any one of us might receive?

    A. I think so.

    Q. In other words, it wouldn't give away any kind of special 
relationship?

    A. Exactly.

    Q. And was that your intent?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you discuss how you selected those items with anybody?

    A. I don't believe so.

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan make any comment about those items?

    A. No.

    Q. Were any of these items eventually turned over to Mr. Carter?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did you tell Mr. Jordan at that meeting that morning that 
these were not all of the gifts?

    A. I think I--I know I sort of alluded to that in my proffer, and I 
don't, uh--it's possible. I don't have a specific recollection of that.

    Q. And do you have a recollection of any response he may have made 
if you said that?

    A. No.

    Q. That--did you tell Mr. Jordan that day that the, uh, President 
gave you a hatpin and that the hatpin was mentioned in the subpoena?

    A. No.

    Q. Did you discuss the hatpin with Mr. Jordan?

    A. On the 22nd?

    Q. Yes.

    A. No.

    Q. Any other time?

    A. Yes.

    Q. When was that?

    A. On the 19th.

    Q. Okay, and what was--I think I may have missed that, going 
through that. Tell me about it.

    A. Actually, I think we--we went through it.

    Q. You just maybe mentioned it.

    A. I mentioned it when I first mentioned to him the subpoena that 
the hatpin had concerned me.

    Q. What was the significance of that hatpin to you? That seems to 
stand out. Was that--was that a--

    A. Right. I think, as I mentioned before, it was an alarm to me 
because it was a specific item--

    Q. Right.

    A. --in this list of generalities--I don't know generalities, but 
of general things--you sort of go--hatpin?

    Q. Right. I recall that, but I--I think my question was, was it of 
any special significance to you.

    A. Sure.

    Q. Was it, like, the first gift or something, that it really stood 
out above the others?

    A. Yes. It--it was--it was the first gift he gave me. It was a 
thoughtful gift. It was beautiful.

    Q. And was the hatpin in that list, that group of items that you 
carried to surrender to Mr. Carter?

    A. No.

    Q. And the hatpin was not in that list of items that you showed Mr. 
Jordan?

    A. I--I didn't show Mr. Jordan a list of items.

    Q. No--I thought you said you showed him the items.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And the hatpin was not in that group--I may have ``list''--

    A. Oh.

    Q. --but the hatpin was not in that group of items--

    A. No, it was not.

    Q. --that you showed Mr. Jordan. Okay.

    Tell us, if you would, how you arrived at Mr. Carter's. I know you 
rode in a car, but Mr. Jordan was with you--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --you went in--and tell us what happened.

    A. Uh, in the car, we spoke about job things. I know he mentioned 
something about, I think, getting in touch with Howard Pastor, and I 
mentioned to Mr. Jordan that Mr. Bacon knew Mr. Pastor and had already 
gotten in touch with him, and so he should--I just wanted Mr. Jordan to 
be aware of that.

    Uh, we talked about--it was really all about the job stuff because 
Mr. Jordan--the man driving the car--I didn't want to discuss anything 
with the case.

    Q. But once you arrived and Mr. Jordan made the introduction--

    A. Correct.

    Q. --between the two of you. And did he explain to Mr. Carter your 
situation, or did he go beyond just the perfunctory introduction?

    A. No.

    Q. Did he leave?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you, uh--I guess--generally, what did you discuss with Mr. 
Carter?

    A. The same vanilla story I had kind of--well, actually, not even 
that. I discussed with Mr. Carter the--uh, that this was ridiculous, 
that I was angry, I didn't want to be involved with this, I didn't want 
to be associated with Paula Jones, with this case.

    Q. Did you, uh--

    A. I asked if I could sue Paula Jones. [Laughing.]

    Q. Did you discuss an affidavit?

    A. Yes, I believe I mentioned an affidavit.

    Q. Did you mention, uh, the, uh--well, was there discussion about 
how you could sign an affidavit that might be--allow you to skirt being 
called as a witness?

    A. Mr. Carter said that was a possibility but that there were other 
things that we should try first; that he, uh, thought--well, actually, 
can I ask my attorneys a question for a moment?

    MR. BRYANT: Uh, sure.

    [Witness conferring with counsel.]

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, Ms. Lewinsky's mike is carrying; it's 
picking up, so we don't want to--

    THE WITNESS: Sorry. I was only saying nice things about you all.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Thank you.

    [Laughter.]

    MR. CACHERIS: So that you'll know what we're discussing here, as 
you know, Ms. Lewinsky is not required to give up her lawyer-client 
privileges, and the question we don't know the answer to and would like 
to address after lunch is whether in fact Mr. Carter has testified to 
this conversation.

    Therefore, perhaps--

    SENATOR DeWINE: All right. Maybe counsel at this point could--could 
you rephrase--rephrase the question or ask another question, and after 
lunch, we can come back--

    MR. CACHERIS: Or come back.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Well, I don't want--I don't think he has to move 
off the general area if he can--I'll leave that up to counsel.

    MR. BRYANT: There may be some misunderstanding or--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Why don't you rephrase the question and we'll see 
where we are.

    MR. BRYANT: --on this issue of--well, on this issue of the 
attorney-client privilege, it is our understanding that she is able to 
testify. But again, I don't know, uh, if we're going to resolve that 
right now.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Why don't we try to resolve that issue over lunch 
and--

    MR. BRYANT: Because I do have other questions that would relate to 
this area.

    SENATOR DeWINE: --you can stay in this general area.

    MR. BRYANT: Well, I'm not sure I can stay in this area too far 
without other questions that might arguably be involved in that 
privilege. I can ask them and you can object if you think they're 
within that range.

    MR. CACHERIS: Well, as I said, it's our understanding that under 
her agreement with the Independent Counsel, she has not been required 
to waive her lawyer-client privilege, and we don't want to do so here. 
That's that simple. And, Mr. Bryant, I want to check to see if Mr. 
Carter has testified about this. If he has, then we might be 
objecting--

    MR. BRYANT: Well, she has already, I think, waived that privilege 
through talking with the FBI and those folks. I mean, we have 
statements that concern those conversations--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Well, let's, instead of--

    MR. BRYANT: --and the 302's.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, let me just--if I could interrupt both of 
you, to keep moving here. Mr. Bryant, you have a choice. You can 
continue on this line of questioning, and we will have to deal with 
that, or you can move off of it, and in 20 minutes we'll be at a lunch 
break and then we can try to resolve that.

    MR. BRYANT: To be clear and fair, let's just--let me postpone the 
rest of this--

    SENATOR DeWINE: That will be fine.

    MR. BRYANT: --exam, and we'll move over to December 28th, and we'll 
come back if it's appropriate.

    SENATOR DeWINE: That will be fine.

    THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I'm not trying to be difficult. I'm sorry.

    MR. BRYANT: No. That's a valid concern; it really is.

    Let's talk a minute--I just don't want to forget to do this; unless 
I make notes, I forget.

    SENATOR LEAHY: You've got enough people here making notes; I don't 
think it'll be--I don't think it'll be forgotten.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. We're going to move in the direction of the December 28th, 1997 
meeting, and I'm going to ask you, at some point did you meet with the 
President later in December?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay, and what date was that?

    A. December 28th, 1997.

    Q. Thank you. How did the meeting come about?

    A. Uh, I contacted Mrs. Currie after Christmas and asked her to 
find out if the President still wanted to give me his Christmas 
present, or my Christmas present.

    Q. Did Ms. Currie get back to you?

    A. Yes, she did.

    Q. And what was her response?

    A. To come to the White House at 8:30 a.m. on the 28th.

    Q. And that would have been Sunday?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you in fact go to the White House on that date?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And how did you get in?

    A. I believe the Southwest Gate.

    Q. Did Ms. Currie WAVE you in?

    A. I think so.

    Q. You've testified to that previously.

    A. Okay, then I accept that.

    Q. This, uh, meeting on the 28th was a Sunday, and Ms. Currie--
again, according to your prior testimony--WAVE'd you in. This was all 
consistent with what the President had told you to do about, number 
one, coming on weekends; is that correct?

    A. I--I--I don't think me coming in on that Sunday had--I mean, for 
me, my memory of it was that it was a holiday time, so it could have 
been any day. It's pretty quiet around the White House from Christmas 
to New Year's.

    Q. And it would have been consistent with her WAVEing you in when 
she was there at work on Sunday?

    A. Yes.

    Q. That was unusual, though, for her to be in on Sunday, wasn't it?

    A. I--I--I--I think so, but I mean, that's her--I think that's 
something you'd have to ask her.

    MR. BRYANT: I'm concerned about the time. I'm going to go ahead and 
continue with this, and we'll just stop wherever we have a--whenever 
you tell us to stop. This will take a little bit longer than another 15 
minutes or so; but it's appropriate, I think, for us to continue.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Well, frankly, it's up to you.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Do you have a problem in breaking it?

    MR. BRYANT: No; no, I don't think so.

    SENATOR DeWINE: I mean, if you do, we can take lunch now. I'll 
leave that up to you.

    MR. BRYANT: Uh, why don't we take the lunch now--

    SENATOR DeWINE: All right. No one has any objection to that, we 
will do that.

    THE WITNESS: I never object to food.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Let me just announce to counsel you have used 2 
hours and 14 minutes. It is now 20 minutes until 1. We'll come back 
here at 20 minutes until 2. And we need during this break also to see 
counsel and try to resolve the other issue prior to going back in. This 
is the privilege issue.

    SENATOR LEAHY: Did counsel for Ms. Lewinsky have to make a couple 
phone calls first, before we have that discussion? I think--

    SENATOR DeWINE: My suggestion would be we do that at the last 15 
minutes of the break.

    SENATOR LEAHY: I think he said he wanted to call Mr. Carter; that's 
why--

    MR. CACHERIS: Meet you back up here?

    SENATOR DeWINE: Yes. I would also--the sergeant-at-arms has asked 
me to announce that the food is on this floor, and since we have a very 
limited period of time, we suggest you try to stay on the floor.

    MS. HOFFMANN: We were planning to go back--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Except--I understand. I know that you're--

    MR. CACHERIS: We have our own arrangements.

    SENATOR DeWINE: I know that you have your room, and you've made 
your own arrangements, and that's fine.

    So we will start back in one hour.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 12:39 p.m.

    [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the deposition was recessed, to 
reconvene at 1:39 p.m. this same day.]
                           afternoon session

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 13:43 hours.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

    As we broke for lunch, there was an objection that had been made by 
Ms. Lewinsky's counsel. Let me call on them at this point for 
statements.

    MR. CACHERIS: Yes. We have examined the record during the course of 
the break, and while we know that the immunity agreement does provide 
for Ms. Lewinsky to maintain her lawyer-client privilege, we think in 
this instance, the matter has been testified so fully that it has been 
waived. So the objection that we lodged is withdrawn.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Thank you very much.

    Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Mr. Senator.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. We've got you to the point where Mr. Jordan has escorted you to 
Mr. Carter's office and has departed, and you and Mr. Carter have 
conversations.

    Generally, what did you discuss with Mr. Carter?

    A. I guess the--the reasons why I didn't think I should be called 
in this matter.

    Q. Did he ask you questions?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What type of questions did he ask you?

    A. Um, they ranged from where I lived and where I was working to 
did I have a relationship with the President, did--everything in 
between.

    Q. When he--when he asked you about the relationship, did you 
understand he meant a sexual-type relationship?

    A. He asked me questions that--that indicated he was being 
specific.

    Q. And did--did you deny such a relationship?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Did he ask you questions about if you were ever alone with the 
President?

    A. Yes, he did.

    Q. And did you deny that?

    A. I think I mentioned that I might have brought the President 
papers on occasion, may have had an occasion to be alone with him, but 
not--not anything I considered significant.

    Q. But that was not true either, was it?

    A. No.

    Q. And in fact, that--the fact that you brought him papers, that 
was part of the cover-up story?

    A. Correct.

    Q. I'm unclear on a point I want to ask you. Also, did Mr. Carter 
ask you about how you perhaps were pulled into this case, and you gave 
some answer about knowing Betty Currie and--and Mr. Kaye? Does that 
ring bells? You gave that testimony in your deposition.

    A. That that's how I got pulled into the case?

    Q. Right. Did--

    A. May I see that, please?

    Q. It's about your denying the relationship with the President, and 
you think maybe you got pulled into the case. It's--certainly, it's--
it's in your grand jury--okay. It's--it's in the August 1 interview, 
page 9. This was a 302 exam from the FBI.

    A. Um--

    MR. BRYANT: Let me give that to her. Let me just give it to her to 
refresh her memory. I'm not going to put it in evidence, although 
it's--it should be there.

    [Handing document.]

    [Witness perusing document.]

    THE WITNESS: I don't think that's an accurate representation of 
what I might have said in this interview.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. Would you--how would you have related Walter Kaye in that 
interview? How would his name have come up?

    A. In this interview or with Mr. Carter?

    Q. Well, in the interview with Mr. Carter that I assume was sort of 
summarized in that--

    A. Right.

    Q. --302, but, yes, with Mr. Carter.

    A. Uh, I think I mentioned that I was friendly with Betty Currie, 
the President's secretary.

    Q. And how would Mr. Kaye's name have come up in the conversation?

    A. Because of how I met Ms. Currie was through--that's how I came 
to know of Ms. Currie and--and first introduced myself to her. Excuse 
me.

    Q. Let's go back now and resume where we were before the lunch 
break. We were talking about the December visit to the White House and 
the conversation with the President. You had discussed--well, I think 
we're to the point where perhaps you--or I'll ask you to bring up your 
discussion with the President about the subpoena and the request for 
production.

    A. Um, part way into my meeting with the President, I brought up 
the concern I had as to how I would have been put--how I might have 
been alerted or--not alerted, but how I was put on the witness list and 
how I might have been alerted to the Paula Jones attorneys, and that 
that was--I was sort of concerned about that. So I discussed that a 
little, and then I said, um, that I was concerned about the hatpin. And 
to the best of my memory, he said that that had concerned him as well, 
and--

    Q. Could he have said that bothered him?

    A. He--he could have. I--I mean, I don't--I know that sometimes in 
the--in my grand jury testimony, they've put quotations around things 
when I'm attributing statements to other people, and I didn't 
necessarily mean that those were direct quotes. That was the gist of 
what I remembered him saying. So, concern, bothered, it doesn't--

    Q. Was--was there a discussion at that point as to how someone 
might have--may have discovered the--the hatpin and why?

    A. Well, he asked me if I had told anybody about it, and I said no.

    Q. But the two of you reached no conclusion as to how that hatpin 
came--

    A. No.

    Q. --to appear on the motion?

    A. No.

    Q. Did he appear at all, I think, probably surprised that--that you 
had received a request for production of documents or the--the hatpin 
was on that document?

    A. I didn't discuss--we didn't discuss documents, request for 
documents, but with regard to the hatpin, um, I don't remember him 
being surprised.

    Q. Mm-hmm. How long did the discussion last about the--this request 
for production of--of the items?

    A. The topic of the Paula Jones case, maybe 5 minutes. Not very 
much.

    Q. What else was said about that?

    A. About the case?

    Q. Yes.

    A. There was--then, at some point in this discussion--I think it 
was after the hatpin stuff--I had said to him that I was concerned 
about the gifts and maybe I should put them away or possibly give them 
to Betty, and as I've testified numerously, his response was either 
ranging from no response to ``I don't know'' or ``let me think about 
it.''

    Q. Did the conversation about the--the gifts that you just 
mentioned, did that immediately follow and tie into, if you will, the 
conversation about the request for production of items, the hatpin and 
so forth? Did one lead to the other?

    A. I don't remember. I know the gift conversation was subsequent to 
the hatpin comment, but I--I don't remember if one led to the other.

    Q. What else happened after that?

    A. Hmm, I think we went back to sort of--we left that topic, kind 
of went back to the visit.

    Q. Did--which included exchanging the Christmas gifts?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Okay.

    A. I had already--he had already given me my presents at this 
point.

    Q. Okay. Did--he gave you some gifts that day, and my question to 
you is what went through your mind when he did that, when you knew all 
along that you had just received a subpoena to produce gifts. Did that 
not concern you?

    A. No, it didn't. I was happy to get them.

    Q. All right. Why did it--beyond your happiness in receiving them, 
why did the subpoena aspect of it not concern you?

    A. I think at that moment--I mean, you asked me when he gave me 
those gifts. So, at that moment, when I was there, I was happy to be 
with him. I was happy to get these Christmas presents. So I was nervous 
about the case, but I had made a decision that I wasn't going to get 
into it too much--

    Q. Well--

    A. --with a discussion.

    Q. --have you in regards to that--you've testified in the past that 
from everything that the President had told you about things like this, 
there was never any question that you were going to keep everything 
quiet, and turning over all the gifts would prompt the Jones attorneys 
to question you. So you had no doubt in your mind, did you not, that 
you weren't going to turn these gifts over that he had just given you?

    A. Uh, I--I think the latter half of your statement is correct. I 
don't know if you're reading from my direct testimony, but--because you 
said--your first statement was from everything the President had told 
you. So I don't know if that was--if those were my words or not, but 
I--no, I was--I--it--I was concerned about the gifts. I was worried 
someone might break into my house or concerned that they actually 
existed, but I wasn't concerned about turning them over because I knew 
I wasn't going to, for the reason that you stated.

    Q. But the pattern that you had had with the President to conceal 
this relationship, it was never a question that, for instance, that 
given day that he gave you gifts that you were not going to surrender 
those to the Jones attorneys because that would--

    A. In my mind, there was never a question, no.

    Q. I'm just actually looking at your deposition on page--no, I'm 
sorry--your grand jury proceedings of August the 6th, just to be clear, 
since you raised that question.

    1004 in the book, appendices.

    You indicate that in response to a question, ``What do you think 
the President is thinking when he is giving you gifts when there is a 
subpoena covering gifts. I mean, does he think in any way, shape or 
form that you're going to be turning these gifts over?'' And your 
answer is, ``You know, I can't answer what he was thinking, but, to me, 
it was--there was never a question in my mind, and I--from everything 
he said to me, I never questioned him that we were ever going to do 
anything but keep this private. So that meant deny it, and that meant 
do whatever appropriate--take whatever appropriate steps needed to be 
taken, you know, for that to happen, meaning that if--if I had to turn 
over every gift--if I had turned over every gift he had given me--first 
of all, the point of the affidavit and the point of everything was to 
try to avoid a deposition. So where I'd have to sort of--you know, I 
wouldn't have to lie as much as I would necessarily in an affidavit how 
I saw it,'' and you continue on, just one short paragraph.

    A. Right.

    Q. ``So, by turning over all of these gifts, it would at best 
prompt him to want to question me about what kind of friendship I had 
with the President, and they would want to speculate and they'd leak 
it, and my name would be trashed and he would be in trouble.''

    So you recall giving that testimony?

    A. Yes. I accept--I accept what's said here.

    Q. Okay.

    A. It's a little different from what you said, but very close.

    Q. Thank you.

    Did the President ever tell you to turn over the gifts?

    A. Not that I remember.

    Q. Now, is that--does that bring us to the end of this conversation 
with the President, or did other things occur?

    A. I think that the aspect of where this case is related, yes.

    Q. Okay. And then you left, and where did you go when you left the 
White House?

    A. I think I went home.

    Q. This is at--at your apartment?

    A. My mother's apartment.

    Q. Mother's apartment.

    Did you later that day receive a call from Betty Currie?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Tell us about that.

    A. I received a call from--from Betty, and to the best of my 
memory, she said something like I understand you have something for me 
or I know--I know I've testified to saying that--that I remember her 
saying either I know you have something for me or the President said 
you have something for me. And to me, it's a--she said--I mean, this is 
not a direct quote, but the gist of the conversation was that she was 
going to go visit her mom in the hospital and she'd stop by and get 
whatever it was.

    Q. Did you question Ms. Currie or ask her, what are you talking 
about or what do you mean?

    A. No.

    Q. Why didn't you?

    A. Because I assumed that it meant the gifts.

    Q. Did--did you have other telephone calls with her that day?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. What was the purpose of those conversations?

    A. I believe I spoke with her a little later to find out when she 
was coming, and I think that I might have spoken with her again when 
she was either leaving her house or outside or right there, to let me 
know to come out.

    Q. Do--at that time, did you have the caller identification--

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. --on your telephone?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And did you at least on one occasion see her cell phone number 
on your caller-ID that day?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Now, Ms. Currie has given different versions of what happened 
there, but I recall one that she mentioned about Michael Isikoff, that 
you had called her and said Michael Isikoff is calling around or called 
me--

    A. Mm-hmm.

    Q. --about some gifts.

    Did Mr. Isikoff ever call you about the gifts?

    A. No.

    Q. Okay. Would there have been--would there have been any reason 
for you not to have carried the gifts to Ms. Currie had you wanted 
her--had you called her, would you have had her come over to get them 
from you, or does that--

    A. Probably not.

    Q. I mean, is there--is there any doubt in your mind that she 
called you to come pick up the gifts?

    A. I don't think there is any doubt in my mind.

    Q. Okay. Let me ask was--I think you did something special for her, 
as I recall, too, or her mother. Did you prepare a plant or something 
for her to pick up?

    A. Um, no. I just--

    Q. To take to her mother?

    A. I bought a small plant and a balloon.

    Q. Okay. What was your understanding about her mother, and was--

    A. Oh, I--I knew her mom was in--was in the hospital and was sick, 
and I think this was her second trip to the hospital in several months, 
and it had been a tough year.

    Q. And was she--was Mrs. Currie coming by your place on her way to 
visit her mother in the hospital? Do you know that?

    A. That's what I remember her saying.

    Q. So you prepared--and you bought a gift for her mother?

    A. Correct.

    Q. Okay. Do you know what kind of time frame this covered? First of 
all, it was the same day, December the 28th, 1997?

    A. Seven, yes.

    Q. Do you know what kind of time frame it covered?

    A. I think it was afternoon. I know I've testified to around 2 
o'clock.

    Q. Could it have been later?

    A. Sure.

    Q. So, when Betty Currie came, what--what did you have prepared for 
her?

    A. I had a box from the Gap with some of the presents the President 
had given me, taped up in it.

    Q. What happened when she arrived?

    A. Uh, I think I walked out to the car and asked her to hold onto 
this, and I think we talked about her mom for a few minutes. Um--

    Q. Did she call you right before she arrived, or did you just go 
wait for her in the building?

    A. I think she called me right before she--at some point, I think, 
before she--either when she was leaving or she was outside.

    Q. Do you know--did you have any indication from Ms. Currie what 
she was going to do with that box of gifts?

    A. Um, I know I've testified to this. I don't--I don't remember. I 
think maybe she said something about putting it in a closet, but 
whatever I--I stand by whatever I've said in my testimony about it.

    Q. But she was supposed to keep these for you?

    A. Well, I had asked her to.

    Q. Okay. Did Ms. Currie ask you at any time about what was in the 
box?

    A. No, or not that I recall, I guess I should say.

    Q. What was the--in your mind, what was the purpose of having Ms. 
Currie retain these gifts as opposed to another friend of yours?

    A. Hmm, I know I've testified to this, and I can't--can I look at 
my grand jury--I mean, I don't really remember sitting here right now, 
but if I could look at my grand jury testimony, I--or I'd just stand by 
it.

    Q. We will pass that to you.

    A. Okay. Thank you.

    [Witness handed documents.]

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. The answer I'm looking for is--if this refreshes your 
recollection is that turning these over was a reassurance to the 
President that everything was okay. Is that--

    A. Can I read it in context, please?

    Q. Sure, sure.

    A. Thank you.

    [Witness perusing document.]

    THE WITNESS: I--I--I stand by this testimony. I mean, I'd just note 
that it--what I'm saying here about giving it to the President or the 
assurance to the President is how I saw it at that point, not 
necessarily how I felt then. So I think you asked me what--why I didn't 
at that point, and I'm just--that's what's a little more clear there, 
just to be precise. I'm sorry.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. Did you have any later conversations with either Ms. 
Currie or the President about these gifts in the box?

    A. No.

    Q. Let me direct your attention to your meeting with Vernon Jordan 
on December the 31st of 1997. Was that to go back and talk about the 
job again?

    A. Little bit, but the--the--for me, the point of that meeting was 
I had gotten to a point where Linda Tripp wasn't returning my phone 
calls, and so I felt that I needed to devise some way, that somehow--to 
kind of cushion the shock of what would happen if Linda Tripp testified 
all the facts about my relationship, since I had never disclosed that 
to the President. So that was sort of my intention in meeting with Mr. 
Jordan, was hoping that I could give a little information and that 
would get passed on.

    Q. This was at a meeting for breakfast at the Park Hyatt Hotel?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Were just the two of you present?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you discuss other things, other than Linda Tripp and your 
job search?

    A. I think we talked about what each of us were doing New Year's 
Eve.

    Q. Specifically about some notes that you had at your apartment?

    A. Oh, yes. I'm sorry.

    Um, well, I mean, that really was in relation to discussing Linda 
Tripp. So--

    Q. And the Jones lawyers, too. Was that right?

    A. Um, I--I don't know that I discussed the Jones lawyers. If I've 
testified that I discussed the Jones lawyers, then I did, but--

    Q. Okay. Well, tell us about the notes.

    A. Well, the--sort of the--I don't know what to call it, but the 
story that I gave to Mr. Jordan was that I was trying to sort of alert 
to him that, gee, maybe Linda Tripp might be saying these things about 
me having a relationship with the President, and right now, I'm 
explaining this to you. These aren't the words that I used or how I 
said it to him, and that, you know, maybe she had seen drafts of notes, 
trying to obviously give an excuse as to how Linda Tripp could possibly 
know about my relationship with the President without me having been 
the one to have told her. So that's what I said to him.

    Q. And what was his response?

    A. I think it was something like go home and make sure--oh, 
something about a--I think he asked me if they were notes from the 
President to me, and I said no. I know I've testified to this. I stand 
by that testimony, and I'm just recalling it, that I said no, they were 
draft notes or notes that I sent to the President, and then I believe 
he said something like, well, go home and make sure they're not there.

    Q. And what did you do when you went home?

    A. I went home and I searched through some of my papers, and--and 
the drafts of notes I found, I sort of--I got rid of some of the notes 
that day.

    Q. So you threw them away?

    A. Mm-hmm.

    THE REPORTER: Is that a ``yes''?

    THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. On your way home, you were with Mr. Jordan? I mean, he carried--
did he carry you someplace or take you home, drop you off?

    A. Yes, he dropped me off.

    Q. Okay. On the way home--

    A. It wasn't on the way to my home, but--

    Q. Okay. Did he--did you tell him that you had had an affair with 
the President?

    A. Yes.

    Q. What was his response?

    A. No response.

    Q. When was the next time--well, let me direct your attention to 
Monday, January the 5th, 1998. You had an occasion to meet with your 
lawyer, Mr. Carter, about your case, possible depositions, and so 
forth.

    Did you have some concern at that point about those depositions and 
how you might answer questions in the Paula Jones case?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Did you reach any sort of determination or resolution of those 
concerns by talking to Mr. Carter?

    A. No.

    Q. What's the status of the affidavit at this point? Is there one?

    A. No.

    Q. Do you recall any other concerns or questions that either you or 
Mr. Carter may have presented to each other during that meeting?

    A. I think I--I think it was in that meeting I brought up the 
notion of having my family present, if I had to do a deposition, and he 
went through what--I believe we discussed--at this point, I think I 
probably knew at this point I was going to sign an affidavit, but it 
wasn't created yet, and I believe we discussed what--if the affidavit 
wasn't, I guess, successful--I don't know how you'd say legally--say 
that legally--but what a deposition would be like, sitting at a table.

    Q. I'll bet he never told you it would be like this, did he?

    A. No.

    Q. Did you try to contact the President after you left the meeting 
with Mr. Carter?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And you reached Betty Currie?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And you told her to pass along to the President that you 
wanted--it was important to talk with him?

    A. Yes.

    Q. You may have mentioned to her something about signing something?

    A. Right; I might have.

    Q. What response did you get from that telephone call?

    A. Uh, Betty called me back, maybe an hour or two later, and put 
the President through.

    Q. And what was that conversation?

    A. I know I've testified to this, and it was sort of two-fold. On 
the one hand, I was, uh, upset, so I was sort of in a pissy mood and a 
little bit contentious. Uh, but more related to the case, uh, I had 
concerns that from questions Mr. Carter had asked me about how I got my 
job at the Pentagon and transferred and, and, uh, I was concerned as to 
how to answer those questions because those questions involved naming 
other people who I thought didn't like me at the White House, and I was 
worried that those people might try and--just to get me in trouble 
because they didn't like me--so that if they were then--I mean, I had 
no concept of what exactly happens in these legal proceedings, and I 
thought, well, maybe if I say Joe Schmo helped me get my job, then 
they'd go interview Joe Schmo, and so, if Joe Schmo said, ``No, that's 
not true,'' because he didn't like me, then I didn't want to get in 
trouble. So--

    Q. Did there appear to be a question possibly about how you--how 
you got the job at the Pentagon? Did you fear for some questions there?

    A. Yes. I think I tend to be sort of a detail-oriented person, and 
so I think it was, uh, my focusing on the details and thinking 
everything had to be a very detailed answer and not being able to kind 
of step back and look at how I could say it more generally. So that's 
what concerned me.

    Q. Mm-hmm. This--

    A. Because clearly, I mean, I would have had to say, ``Gee, I was 
transferred from the Pentagon because I had this relationship that I'm 
not telling you about with the President.'' So there was--there was 
that concern for me there.

    Q. And what did the President tell you that you could say instead 
of saying something like that?

    A. That the people in Legislative Affairs helped me get the job--
and that was true.

    Q. Okay, but it was also true, to be complete, that they moved you 
out into the Pentagon because of the relationship with the President?

    A. Right.

    Q. Did--did the subject of the affidavit come up with the 
President?

    A. Yes, towards the end of the conversation.

    Q. And how did--tell us how that occurred.

    A. I believe I asked him if he wanted to see a copy of it, and he 
said no.

    Q. Well, I mean, how did you introduce that into the subject--into 
the conversation?

    A. I don't really remember.

    Q. Did he ask you, well, how's the affidavit coming or--

    A. No, I don't think so.

    Q. But you told him that you had one being prepared, or something?

    A. I think I said--I think I said, you know, I'm going to sign an 
affidavit, or something like that.

    Q. Did he ask you what are you going to say?

    A. No.

    Q. And this is the time when he said something about 15 other 
affidavits?

    A. Correct.

    Q. And tell us as best as you can recall what--how that--how that 
part of the conversation went.

    A. I think that was the--sort of the other half of his sentence as, 
No, you know, I don't want to see it. I don't need to--or, I've seen 15 
others.

    It was a little flippant.

    Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated 
that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt 
these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.

    Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?

    A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all, 
ever.

    Q. But, I mean, he didn't make an offer that, you know, here's what 
you can do, or let me send you over something that can maybe keep you 
from committing perjury?

    A. No. We never discussed perjury.

    Q. On--well, how did that conversation end? Did you talk about 
anything else?

    A. I said goodbye very abruptly.

    Q. The next day--well, on January the 6th--I'm not sure exactly 
what day we are--1998, did you pick up a draft of the affidavit from 
Mr. Carter?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. What did you do with that draft?

    A. I read it and went through it.

    Q. How did it look?

    A. I don't really remember my reaction to it. I know I had some 
changes. I know there's a copy of this draft affidavit that's part of 
the record, but--

    Q. Were portions of it false?

    A. Incomplete and misleading.

    Q. Did you take that affidavit to Mr. Jordan?

    A. I dropped off a copy in his office.

    Q. Did you have any conversation with him at that point or some 
later point about that affidavit?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. And tell us about that.

    A. I had gone through and had, I think, as it's marked--can I maybe 
see? Isn't there a copy of the draft?

    [Witness handed document.]

    [Witness perusing document.]

    The WITNESS: Thank you.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, can you reference for the record at 
this point?

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    SENATOR DeWINE: If you can.

    MR. BRYANT: It would be--

    MR. SCHIPPERS: 1229.

    SENATOR DeWINE: 1229?

    MR. SCHIPPERS: Yes.

    SENATOR DeWINE: All right. Thank you.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. Have you had an opportunity to review the draft of your 
affidavit?

    A. I--yes.

    Q. Okay. What--do you have any comment or response?

    A. I received it. I made the suggested changes, and I believe I 
spoke with Mr. Jordan about the changes I wanted to make.

    Q. Did he have any comment on your proposed changes?

    A. I think he said the part about Lewis & Clark College was 
irrelevant. I'd have to see the--I don't believe it's in the final copy 
in the affidavit, so--but I could be mistaken.

    Q. At this point, of course, you had a lawyer, Mr. Carter, who was 
representing your interest. Mr. Jordan was--I'm not sure if he--how you 
would characterize him, but would it--would it be that you view Mr. 
Jordan as, in many ways, Mr.--the President--if Mr. Jordan knew it, the 
President knew it, or something of that nature?

    A. I think I testified to something similar to that. I felt that, I 
guess, that Mr. Jordan might have had the President's best interest at 
heart and my best interest at heart, so that that was sort of maybe a--
some sort of a blessing.

    Q. I think, to some extent, what you--what you had said was getting 
Mr. Jordan's approval was basically the same thing as getting the 
President's approval. Would you agree with that?

    A. Yeah. I believe that--yes, I believe that's how I testified to 
it.

    Q. The fact that you assume that Mr. Jordan was in contact with the 
President--and I believe the evidence would support that through his 
own testimony that he had talked to the President about the signed 
affidavit and that he had kept the President updated on the subpoena 
issue and the job search--

    A. Sir, I'm not sure that I knew he was having contact with the 
President about this. I--I think what I said was that I felt that it 
was getting his approval. It didn't necessarily mean that I felt he was 
going to get a direct approval from the President.

    I'm sorry to interrupt you.

    Q. Oh, that's fine. At any time you need to clarify a point, 
please--please feel free to do so.

    Did--did--did you have any indication from Mr. Jordan that he--when 
he discussed the signed affidavit with the President, they were 
discussing some of the contents of the affidavit? Did you have--

    A. Before I signed it or--

    Q. No; during the drafting stage.

    A. No, absolutely not--either/or. I didn't. No, I did not.

    Q. Now, the changes that you had proposed, did Mr. Jordan agree to 
those changes?

    A. I believe so.

    Q. And then you somehow reported those changes back to Mr. Carter 
or to someone else?

    A. No. I believe I spoke with Mr. Carter the next morning, before I 
went in to see him, and that's when I--I believe that's--I dictated the 
changes.

    Q. Okay. Mr. Jordan did not relay the changes to Mr. Carter--you 
did?

    A. I know I relayed the changes, these changes to Mr. Carter.

    Q. Specifically, the concerns that you had about--about the draft, 
what did they include, the changes?

    A. I think one of the--I think what concerned me--and I believe 
I've testified to this--was--was in Number 6. Even just mentioning that 
I might have been alone with the President, I was concerned that that 
would give the Jones people enough ammunition to want to talk to me, to 
think, oh, well, maybe if she was alone with him that--that he 
propositioned me or something like that, because I hadn't--of course, I 
mean, you remember that at this point, I had no idea the amount of 
knowledge they had about the relationship. So--

    Q. Did--Mr. Carter, I assume, made those changes, and then you 
subsequently signed the affidavit?

    A. We worked on it in his office, and then, yes, I signed the 
affidavit.

    Q. Is this the same day--

    A. Yes.

    Q. --at this point?

    A. This was the 7th?

    Q. Yes.

    A. Correct.

    Q. Did--did you take the signed--or a copy of the signed affidavit, 
I should say--did you take a copy--did you keep a copy?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Did you give it to anyone or give anyone else a copy?

    A. No.

    Q. Now, did you, the next day on the 8th, go to New York for some 
interviews for jobs?

    A. It was--it--I either went later on the 7th or on the 8th, but 
around that time, yes.

    Q. Was this a place that you had already interviewed?

    A. Yes.

    Q. And I assume this was at McAndrews and Forbes?

    A. Yes.

    Q. How did you feel that the interview went?

    A. I--I know I characterized it in my grand jury testimony as 
having not gone very well.

    Q. Okay. I think you also mentioned it went very poorly, too. Does 
that sound--does that ring a bell?

    A. Sure.

    Q. Why? Why would you so characterize it?

    A. Well, as I've had a lot of people tell me, I'm a pessimist, but 
also I--I wasn't prepared. I was in a waiting room downstairs at 
McAndrews and Forbes, and--or at least, I thought it was a waiting 
room--and Mr. Durnan walked into the room unannounced, and the 
interview began. So I felt that I started on the wrong foot, and I just 
didn't feel that I was as articulate as I could have been.

    Q. Did you call Mr. Jordan after that?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. Did you express those same concerns?

    A. Yes, I did.

    Q. What did he say?

    A. And this is a little fuzzy for me. I know that I had a few phone 
calls with him in that day. I think in this call, he said, you know, 
``Don't worry about it.'' I--my testimony is probably more complete on 
this. I'm sorry.

    Q. What--what other phone calls did you have with him that day?

    A. I remember talking to--I know that at some point, he said 
something about that he'd call the chairman, and then I think he said 
just at some point not to worry. He was always telling me not to worry 
because I always--I overreact a little bit.

    Q. All total, how many calls did you have with him that day--your 
best guess?

    A. I have no idea.

    Q. More than two?

    A. I--I don't know.

    Q. Can you think of any other subjects the two of you would have 
talked about?

    A. I don't think so.

    Q. Did he, Mr. Jordan, tell you that he had talked to the chairman, 
or Mr. Perelman, whatever his title is?

    A. I'm sorry. I know I've testified to this. I don't--I think so.

    Q. And you had--did you have additional interviews at this company 
or a subsidiary?

    A. Yes, I--well, I had with the sort of, I guess, daughter--
daughter company, Revlon. I had an interview with Revlon the next day.

    Q. And you were offered a job?

    A. Yes, I was.

    Q. About the 9th or so? That would have been 2 days after the 
affidavit?

    A. Oh. Actually, no. I think I was offered a position, whatever 
that Friday was. Oh, yes, the 9th. I'm sorry. You're right.

    Oh, wait. It was either the 9th or the 13th--or the 12th--the 9th 
or the 12th.

    Q. Okay. Now, I'm--I was looking away. I'm confused.

    A. That's okay. I--my interview was on the 9th, and I don't 
remember right now--I know I've testified to this--whether I found out 
that afternoon or it was on Monday that I got the informal offer.

    Q. Mm-hmm.

    A. So, if you want to tell me what I said in my grand jury 
testimony, I'll be happy to affirm that.

    Q. I think we may be talking about perhaps an informal offer. Does 
that--on the 9th?

    A. Yes. I know it was--okay. Was it on the--I don't--

    Q. Yes.

    A. --remember if it was the 9th or the 13th--

    A. Okay.

    Q. --but I know Ms. Sideman called me to extend an informal offer, 
and I accepted.

    Q. Okay. Now, in regard to the affidavit--do you still have your 
draft in front of you?

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. In paragraph number 3, you say: ``I can not fathom any reason--
fathom any reason why--that the plaintiff would seek information from 
me for her case.''

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. Did Mr. Carter at all go into the gist of the Paula Jones 
lawsuit, the sexual harassment part of it, and tell you what it was 
about?

    A. I think I knew what it was about.

    Q. All right. And then you indicated that you didn't like the part 
about the doors, being behind closed doors, but on the sexual 
relationship, paragraph 8, the first sentence, ``I've never had a 
sexual relationship with the President''--

    A. Mm-hmm.

    Q. --that's not true, is it?

    A. No. I haven't had intercourse with the President, but--

    Q. Was that the distinction you made when you signed that 
affidavit, in your own mind?

    A. That was the justification I made to myself, yes.

    Q. Let me send you the final affidavit. It might be a little easier 
to work from--

    A. Okay.

    Q. --than the--than the original.

    MR. BRYANT: Do we have all the--1235.

    [Witness handed document.]

    SENATOR DeWINE: Congressman?

    MR. BRYANT: Yes.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We're down to 3 minutes on the tape. Would now be a 
good time to have him switch tapes and then we'll go right back in?

    MR. BRYANT: Okay, that would be fine.

    SENATOR DeWINE: I think we'll hold right at the table, and we'll 
get the tapes switched.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay, we will do that now.

    This marks the end of Videotape Number 2 in the deposition of 
Monica S. Lewinsky.

    We are going off the record at 14:31 hours.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 3 in 
the deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. The time is 14:44 hours.

    SENATOR DeWINE: We are back on the record.

    Let me advise counsel that you have used 3 hours and 2 minutes.

    Congressman Bryant, you may continue.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, sir.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, let me just follow up on some points here, and 
then I'll move toward the conclusion of my direct examination very, 
very quickly, I hope.

    In regard to the affidavit--I think you still have it in front of 
you--the final copy of the affidavit--I wanted to revisit your answer 
about paragraph 8--

    A. Yes, sir.

    Q. --and also refer you to your grand jury testimony of August the 
6th. This begins on--actually, it is on page 1013 of the--it should be 
the Senate record, in the appendices, but it's your August 6th, 1998, 
grand jury testimony.

    And it's similar to the--my question about paragraph 8 about the 
sexual relationship-- and I notice you--you now carve out an exception 
to that by saying you didn't have intercourse, but I would direct your 
attention to a previous answer and ask if you can recall being asked 
this question in your grand jury testimony and ask--giving the answer--
the question is: ``All right. Let me ask you a straightforward 
question. Paragraph 8, at the start, says, quote, 'I have never had a 
sexual relationship with the President,' unquote. Is that true?,'' and 
your answer is, ``No.''

    Now, do you have any comment about why your answer still would not 
be no, that that is not a true statement in paragraph 8?

    A. I think I was asked a different question.

    Q. Okay.

    A. My recollection, sir, was that you asked me if that was a lie, 
if paragraph 8 was--I--I'm not trying to--

    Q. Okay. Well, if--if I ask you today the same question that was 
asked in your grand jury, is your statement, quote, ``I have never had 
a sexual relationship with the President,'' unquote, is that a true 
statement?

    A. No.

    Q. Okay, that's good.

    Now, also in paragraph 8, you mention that there were occasions 
after you left--I think it looks like the--the last sentence in 
paragraph 8, ``The occasions that I saw the President after I left my 
employment at the White House in April 1996 were official receptions, 
formal functions, or events related to the United States Department of 
Defense, where I was working at the time,'' period--actually the last 
sentence, ``There were other people present on those occasions.'' Now, 
that also is not a truthful statement; is that correct?

    A. It--I think I testified that this was misleading. It's 
incomplete--

    Q. Okay. It's not a truthful statement?

    A. --and therefore, misleading.

    Well, it--it is true; it's not complete.

    Q. Okay. All right. Now, I will accept that.

    A. Okay. Thank you.

    Q. Thank you.

    Going back to the gift retrieval of December the 28th, I want to be 
clear that we're on the same sheet of music on this one. As I 
understand, there's no doubt in your mind that Betty Currie called you, 
initiated the call to you to pick up the gifts? She--

    A. That's how I remember this event.

    Q. And you went through that process, and at the very end, you were 
sitting out in the car with her, with a box of gifts, and it was only 
at that time that you asked her to keep these gifts for you?

    A. I don't think I said ``gifts.'' I don't--

    Q. Or keep this package?

    A. I think I said--gosh, was it in the car that I said that or on 
the phone? I think it was in the car. I--I'm--I don't know if that 
makes a difference.

    Q. But this was at the end of a process that Betty Currie had 
initiated by telephone earlier that day to come pick up something that 
you have for her?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Now, were you ever under the impression from anything that 
the President said that you should turn over all the gifts to the Jones 
lawyers?

    A. No, but where this is a little tricky--and I think I might have 
even mentioned this last weekend--was that I had an occasion in an 
interview with one of the--with the OIC--where I was asked a series of 
statements, if the President had made those, and there was one 
statement that Agent Phalen said to me--I--there were--other people, 
they asked me these statements--this is after the President testified 
and they asked me some statements, did you say this, did you say this, 
and I said, no, no, no. And Agent Phalen said something, and I think it 
was, ``Well, you have to turn over whatever you have.'' And I said to 
you, ``You know, that sounds a little bit familiar to me.''

    So that's what I can tell you on that.

    Q. That's in the 302 exam?

    A. I don't know if it's in the 302 or not, but that's what 
happened.

    Q. Uh-huh.

    A. Or, that's how I remember what happened.

    Q. Okay. And your response to the question in the deposition that I 
just asked you--were you ever under the impression from anything the 
President said that you should have--that you should turn over all the 
gifts to the Jones lawyers--your answer in that deposition was no.

    A. And which date was that, please?

    Q. The deposition was August the 26th.

    A. Oh, the 26th.

    Q. Yes.

    A. It might have been after that, or maybe it was--I don't--

    Q. Okay. I wanted to ask you, too, about a couple of other things 
in terms of your testimony. Regarding the affidavit--and this appears 
to be, again, grand jury testimony--

    A. Sir, do you have a copy that I could look at if you're going 
to--

    Q. Sure. August, the August 6th--233--it's the--it's this page 
here.

    While we're looking at that, let me ask you a couple other things 
here. I wanted to ask you--I talked to you a little bit about the 
President today and your feelings today that persist that you think 
he's a good President, and I assume you think he's a very intelligent 
man?

    A. I think he's an intelligent President.

    [Laughter.]

    MR. BRYANT: Okay. Thank goodness, this is confidential; otherwise, 
that might be the quote of the day. I know we won't see that in the 
paper, will we?

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Referring to January the 18th, 1998, the President had a 
conversation with Betty Currie, and he made five statements to her. One 
was that ``I was never really alone with Monica; right?'' That's one. 
That's not true, is it, that ``I was never alone with''--

    A. Sir, I was not present for that conversation. I don't feel 
comfortable--

    Q. Let me ask you, though--I realize none of us were there--but 
that statement, ``I was never really alone with Monica; right?''--that 
was not--he was alone with you on many occasions, was he not?

    A. I--I'm not trying to be difficult, but I feel very uncomfortable 
making judgments on what someone else's statement when they're defining 
things however they want to define it. So if you--if you ask me, 
Monica, were you alone with the President, I will say yes, but I'm not 
comfortable characterizing what someone else says--

    Q. Okay.

    A. --passing judgment on it. I'm sorry.

    Q. Were you--was Betty Currie always with you when the President 
was with you?

    A. Betty Currie was always at the White House when I went to see 
the President at the White House after I left working at the White 
House.

    Q. But was--at all times when you were alone with the President, 
was Betty Currie always there with you?

    A. Not there in the room.

    Q. Okay. Did--did--did you come on to the President, and did he 
never touch you physically?

    A. I guess those are two separate questions, right?

    Q. Yes, they are.

    A. Did I come on to him? Maybe on some occasions.

    Q. Okay.

    A. Not initially.

    Q. Okay. Not initially.

    A. I--

    Q. Did he ever--did he ever touch you?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Could Betty Currie see and hear everything that went on 
between the two of you all the time?

    A. I can't answer that. I'm sorry.

    Q. As far as you know, could she see and hear everything that went 
on between the two of you?

    A. Well, if I was in the room, I couldn't--I--I couldn't be in the 
room and being able to see if Betty Currie could see and hear what 
was--

    Q. I think I--

    MR. STEIN: Wouldn't it be a little speedier--if I may make this 
observation, you have her testimony; you have the evidence of--

    SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, is this an objection?

    MR. STEIN: I just would ask him to draw whatever inferences there 
were to speed this up.

    SENATOR DeWINE: I'll ask him to rephrase the question.

    MR. BRYANT: I would just stop at that point. I think, uh, that's 
enough of that.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. The President also had conversations with Mr. Blumenthal on 
January the 21st, 1998, and indicated that you came on to the President 
and made a sexual demand. At the initial part of this, did you come on 
to the President and make a sexual demand on the President?

    A. No.

    Q. At the initial meeting on November the 15th, 1995, did he ever 
rebuff you from these advances, or from any kind of--

    A. On November 15th?

    Q. November 15th. Did he rebuff you?

    A. No.

    Q. Did you threaten him on November 15th, 1995?

    A. No.

    Q. On January 23rd, 1998, the President told John Podesta that--
many things. I'll--I'll withdraw that. Let me go--kind of wind this 
down. I'd like to save some time for redirect.

    You've indicated that with regard to the affidavit and telling the 
truth, there is some testimony I'd like to read you from your 
deposition that we started out--August the 6th--I'm sorry--the grand 
jury, August 6th, 1998--

    MS. MILLS: What internal page number?

    MR. SCHIPPERS: 1021 internal, 233.

    MR. BRYANT: Okay, we need to get her a copy.

    MR. SCHIPPERS: Do you have the August 6th still over there?

    THE WITNESS: I can share with Sydney--if you don't mind.

    [Witness perusing document.]

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Beginning--do you have page 233--

    A. Uh-huh.

    Q. --okay--beginning at line 6--

    A. Okay.

    Q. --it reads--would you prefer to read that? Why don't you read--

    A. Out loud?

    Q. Would you read it out loud?

    A. Okay.

    Q. Through line 16--6 through 16. This is your answer.

    A. ``Sure. Gosh. I think to me that if--if the President had not 
said the Betty and letters cover, let's just say, if we refer to that, 
which I'm talking about in paragraph 4, page 4, I would have known to 
use that. So to me, encouraging or asking me to lie would have--you 
know, if the President had said, Now, listen, you'd better not say 
anything about this relationship, you'd better not tell them the truth, 
you'd better not--for me, the best way to explain how I feel what 
happened was, you know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no 
one discouraged me, either.''

    Q. Okay. That--that statement, is that consistent in your view with 
what you've testified to today?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. Look at page 234, which is right below there.

    A. Okay. [Perusing document.]

    Q. Beginning with the--your answer on line 4, and read down, if you 
could, to line 14--4 through 14.

    A. ``Yes and no. I mean, I think I also said that Monday that it 
wasn't as if the President called me and said, You know, Monica, you're 
on the witness list. This is going to be really hard for us. We're 
going to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of the 
entire world about what we've done, which I would have fought him on, 
probably. That was different. And by him not calling me and saying 
that, you know, I knew what that meant. So I, I don't see any 
disconnect between paragraph 10 and paragraph 4 on the page. Does that 
answer your question?''

    Q. Okay. Now, has that--has your testimony today been consistent 
with that provision?

    A. I--I think so.

    Q. Okay.

    A. I've intended for my testimony to be consistent with my grand 
jury testimony.

    Q. Okay. And one final read just below that, line 16 through 24.

    A. ``Did you understand all along that he would deny the 
relationship also?''

    ``Mm-hmm, yes.''

    Q. And 19 through 24--the rest of that.

    A. Oh, sorry.

    ``And when you say you understood what it meant when he didn't say, 
Oh, you know you must tell the truth, what did you understand that to 
mean?''

    ``That, that, as we had on every other occasion and in every other 
instance of this relationship, we would deny it.''

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    Could we have just--go off the record here a minute?

    SENATOR DeWINE: Sure. Let's go off the record at this point.

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 1459 hours.

    [Recess.]

    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 1504 hours.

    SENATOR DeWINE: Manager Bryant, you may proceed.

    MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Ms. Lewinsky, I have just a few more questions here.

    With regard to the false affidavit, you do admit that you filed an 
untruthful affidavit with the court in the Jones case; is that correct?

    A. I think I--I--yes--I mean, it was incomplete and misleading, 
and--

    Q. Okay. With regard to the cover stories, on December the 6th, you 
and the President went over cover stories, and in the same conversation 
he encouraged you to file an affidavit in the Jones case; is that 
correct?

    A. No.

    MS. SELIGMAN: I think that misstates the record.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. All right. On December the 17th. Let's try December 17; all 
right?

    A. Okay.

    Q. You and the President went over cover stories--that's the 
telephone conversation--

    A. Okay--I'm sorry--can you repeat the question?

    Q. Okay. On December 17th, you and the President went over cover 
stories in a telephone conversation.

    A. Correct.

    Q. And in that same telephone conversation, he encouraged you to 
file an affidavit in the Jones case?

    A. He suggested I could file an affidavit.

    Q. Okay. With regard to the job, between your meeting with Mr. 
Jordan in early November and December the 5th when you met with Mr. 
Jordan again, you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help 
you get a job; is that correct?

    MS. SELIGMAN: Objection. Misstates the record.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Okay. You can answer that.

    A. It--

    Q. Let me repeat it. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early 
November and December the 5th when you met with Mr. Jordan again, you 
did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help you get a job; is 
that correct?

    MS. SELIGMAN: Same objection.

    THE WITNESS: Do you mean when I met with him again on December 
11th? I don't--

    MR. BRYANT: The--

    THE WITNESS: --I didn't meet with Mr. Jordan on December 5th. I'm 
sorry--

    MR. BRYANT: Okay.

    THE WITNESS: --am I misunderstanding something?

    MR. BRYANT: We're getting our numbers wrong here.

    THE WITNESS: Okay.

    BY MR. BRYANT:

    Q. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early November and 
December the 11th when you met with Mr. Jordan again, you did not feel 
that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help you get a job; is that correct?

    A. I hadn't seen any progress.

    Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December, you began 
to interview in New York and were much more active in your job search; 
correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon with the 
help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?

    A. Yes.

    Q. Okay. With regard to gifts, regarding the gifts that were 
subpoenaed in the Jones case, you are certain that Ms. Currie called 
you and that she understood you had something to give her; is that 
correct?

    A. That's my recollection.

    Q. You never told Ms. Currie to come pick up the gifts or that 
Michael Isikoff had called about them; is that correct?

    A. I don't recall that.

    Q. Regarding stalking, you never stalked the President; is that 
correct?

    A. I--I don't believe so.

    Q. Okay. You and the President had an emotional relationship as 
well as a physical one; is that right?

    A. That's how I'd characterize it.

    Q. Okay. He never rebuffed you?

    A. I--I think that gets into some of the intimate details of--no, 
then, that's not true. There were occasions when he did.

    Q. Uh-huh. Okay. But he never rebuffed you initially on that first 
day, November the 15th, 1995?

    A. No, sir.

                                     Law Offices of
                                            Plato Cacheris,
                                  Washington, DC, February 2, 1999.
Re February 1, 1999, Monica S. Lewinsky deposition transcript.


    Dear Ms. Jardim and Mr. Bitsko: Upon our review of the videotape 
and transcript of Monica S. Lewinsky's deposition transcript, we have 
noted the following errors or omissions:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Page     Line                         Corrections
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     19    14      The oath and affirmation are not transcribed.
     24     9      ``second . . .'' should replace ``2d''
     44     6      Comments by counsel are not transcribed.
     61  11-13     Delete quotation marks. These are not direct quotes
                    in this instance.
     62    23      ``town'' should replace ``down''
     63    17      ``called'' should replace ``found''
     63    23      ``after Thanksgiving'' should follow ``back.''
     63    24      Insert following line 23:
                     A: Yes I did.
                     Q: What did he tell you then?
     65    21      ``tchotchke'' should replace ``chochki''
     65    24      ``on'' should replace ``home''
     66    20      The line should read:
                     ``see if I could see the President. I apologize,''
                    not
                     ``see if I could see the President and apologize.''
     75     1      ``needed'' should replace ``need''
     90     5      ``the'' should replace ``some''
    116    16      ``said'' should precede ``list''
    128     9      ``that's'' should replace ``of''
    154     5      Delete quotation marks.
    156     6      ``Seidman'' should replace ``Sideman''
    161    15      ``Fallon'' should replace ``Phalen''
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Provided these changes are made, we will waive signature on behalf 
of Ms. Lewinsky.
    We understand from Senate Legal Counsel that copies of this letter 
will be made available to the parties and Senate.
    Thank you for your assistance.
            Sincerely,
                                   Plato Cacheris.
                                   Preston Burton.
                                   Sydney Hoffmann.
                                 ______
                                 

    In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the 
   Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
                                 States

         excerpts of video deposition of vernon e. jordan, jr.
             (Tuesday, February 2, 1999, Washington, D.C.)
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. If there are no further questions from 
the parties or counsel for the witness, I'll now swear in the witness. 
Mr. Jordan, will you please raise your right hand?
    Do you, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., swear that the evidence you shall 
give in this case now pending between the United States and William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
    THE WITNESS: I do.
    Whereupon, VERNON E. JORDAN, JR., was called as a witness and, 
after having been first duly sworn by Senator Fred Thompson, was 
examined and testified as follows:
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. The House Managers may begin their 
questioning of the witness.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson and Senator Dodd.
                     examination by house managers
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Good morning, Mr. Jordan. For the record, would you state your 
name, please?
    A. Good morning, Congressman. My name is Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
    Q. And, Mr. Jordan, we have not had the opportunity to meet 
previously, is that correct?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And I do appreciate--I have met your counsel, Mr. Hundley, in 
his office, and so I've looked forward to this opportunity to meet you. 
Now, you have--
    A. I can't say that the feeling is mutual.
    [Laughter.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. I certainly understand.
    You have testified, I believe, five times previously before the 
Federal grand jury?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And so I know that probably about every question that could be 
asked has been asked, but there are a number of reasons I want to go 
over additional questions with you, and some of them will be 
repetitious of what's been asked before.
    Prior to coming in today, though, have you had the opportunity to 
review your prior testimony in those five appearances before the grand 
jury?
    A. I have done some preparation, Congressman.
    Q. And let me start with the fact that the oath that you took today 
is the same as the oath that you took before the Federal grand jury?
    A. I believe that's correct.
    Q. And, Mr. Jordan, what is your profession?
    A. I am a lawyer.
    Q. And where do you practice your profession?
    A. I am a senior partner at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, 
Hauer & Feld, here in Washington, D.C., with offices in Texas, 
California, Pennsylvania and New York, three offices in Europe, London, 
Brussels and Moscow.
    Q. And how long have you been a senior partner?
    A. I have been a senior partner--well, I didn't start out as a 
senior partner. I started out as a partner, and at some point--I don't 
know when, but not long thereafter I was elevated to this position of 
senior partner.
    Q. And what type of law do you practice?
    A. I am a corporate international generalist at Akin, Gump.
    Q. And does Akin, Gump have about 800 lawyers?
    A. We have about 800 lawyers, yes.
    Q. Which is an incredible number for lawyers from someone who 
practiced law in Arkansas.
    How do all of those lawyers--
    A. We have some members of our law firm who are from Arkansas, so 
it's not unusual for them.
    Q. And how is it that you are able to obtain enough business for 
800 lawyers?
    A. I don't think that's my entire responsibility. I'm just one of 
800 lawyers, and that is what I do in part, but I'm not alone in that 
process of making rain.
    Q. When you say ``making rain,'' that's the terminology of being a 
rainmaker?
    A. I think even in Arkansas, you understand what rainmaking is.
    Q. We've read Grisham books.
    And so, when you say making rain or being a rainmaker, that is to 
bring in business so that you can keep the lawyers busy practicing law?
    A. Well, that is--that is part and parcel of the practice of law.
    Q. And do you bill by the hour?
    A. I do not.
    Q. And I understand you used to, but you do not anymore?
    A. I graduated.
    Q. A fortunate graduation.
    And when the--when you did bill by the hour, what was your billable 
rate the last time you had to do that?
    A. I believe my billable rate at the last time was somewhere 
between 450 and 500 an hour.
    Q. Now, would you describe--
    A. Not bad for a Georgia boy. I'm from Georgia. You've heard of 
that State, I'm sure.
    Q. It's probably not bad from Washington standards.
    Would you describe the nature of your relationship with President 
Clinton?
    A. President Clinton has been a friend of mine since approximately 
1973, when I came to your State, Arkansas, to make a speech as 
president of the National Urban League about race and equal opportunity 
in our Nation, and we met then and there, and our friendship has grown 
and developed and matured and he is my friend and will continue to be 
my friend.
    Q. And just to further elaborate on that friendship, it's my 
understanding that he and his--and the First Lady has had Christmas Eve 
dinner with you and your family for a number of years?
    A. Every year since his Presidency, the Jordan family has been 
privileged to entertain the Clinton family on Christmas Eve.
    Q. And has there been any exceptions in recent years to that?
    A. Every year that he has been President, he has had, he and his 
family, Christmas Eve with my family.
    Q. And have you vacationed together with the Clinton family?
    A. Yes. I think you have seen reels of us playing golf and having 
fun at Martha's Vineyard.
    Q. And so you vacation together, you play golf together on a semi-
regular basis?
    A. Whenever we can. We've not been doing it recently, for reasons 
that I think are probably very obvious to you, Counsel.
    Q. Well, explain that to me.
    A. Just what I said, for a time, I was going before the grand jury, 
and under the advice of counsel and I'm sure under advice of the 
President's counsel, it was thought best that we not play golf 
together.
    So, from the time that I first went to the grand jury, I don't 
think--we have not played golf this year, unfortunately, together.
    Q. Since you--I think your first appearance at the grand jury was 
March 3 of '98. Then you went March 5, and then in May, I believe you 
were two times before the grand jury and then one in June of '98.
    Since your last testimony before the grand jury in June of '98, 
have you been in contact with the President of the United States?
    A. Yes, I have.
    Q. And are these social occasions or for business purposes?
    A. Social occasions. I was invited to the Korean State Dinner. I 
forget when that was. I think that was the first time I was in the 
White House since Martin Luther King Day of last year.
    I saw the President at Martha's Vineyard. I was there when he got 
off Air Force One to greet him and welcome him to--to the Vineyard, and 
I was at the White House for one of the performances about music. The 
Morgan State Choir sang, and so I've been to the White House only for 
social occasions in the last year since Martin Luther King's birthday, 
I believe.
    Q. Have you had any private conversations with the President?
    A. Yes, I have, as a matter of fact.
    Q. And has this been on the telephone or in person?
    A. I've talked to him on the telephone, and I talked to him at the 
Vineyard. He was at my house on Christmas Eve. There were a lot of 
people around, but, yes, I've talked to the President.
    Q. And did you discuss your testimony before the grand jury or his 
testimony before the grand jury?
    A. I did not.
    Q. There was one reference that he made in his Federal grand jury 
testimony, and I'll refer counsel, if they would like. It was on page 
77 of the President's testimony in his appearance before the grand jury 
on August 17th.
    And he referenced discussions with you, and he said, ``I think I 
may have been confused in my memory because I've also talked to him on 
the phone about what he said, about whether he had talked to her or met 
with her. That's all I can tell you,'' and I believe the ``her'' is a 
reference to Ms. Lewinsky.
    And it appeared to me from reading that, that there might have been 
some conversations with you by the President, perhaps in reference to 
your grand jury testimony or your knowledge of when and how you talked 
to Ms. Lewinsky.
    A. If I understand your question about whether or not the President 
of the United States and I talked about my testimony before the grand 
jury or his testimony before the grand jury, I can say to you 
unequivocally that the President of the United States and I have not 
discussed our testimony. I was advised by my counsel, Mr. Hundley, not 
to discuss that testimony, and I have learned in this process, Mr. 
Hutchinson, to--to take the advice of counsel.
    Q. I would certainly agree that that is good counsel to take, but 
going back to the question--and I will try to rephrase it because it 
was a very wordy question that I asked you--and it's clear from your 
testimony that you have not discussed your grand jury testimony--
    A. That is correct.
    Q. --but did you, subsequent to your last testimony before the 
grand jury, talk to the President in which you discussed conversation 
that you have had with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I have not discussed a conversation that I have had with Monica 
Lewinsky with the President of the United States.
    Q. And have you had any discussions about Monica Lewinsky with the 
President of the United States since your last testimony before the 
grand jury?
    A. I have not.
    Q. Now, going back to your relationship with the President, you 
have been described as a friend and advisor to the President. Is that a 
fair terminology?
    A. I think that's fair.
    Q. And in the advisor capacity, had you served as co-chairman of 
the Clinton-Gore transition team in 1992?
    A. I believe I was chairman.
    Q. That is an important distinction.
    And have you served in any other official or semi-official 
capacities for this administration?
    A. I have not, except that I was asked by the President to lead the 
American delegation to the inauguration of President Li in Taiwan, and 
that was about as official as you can get, but beyond that, I have 
not--not had any official capacity.
    For a very brief moment, very early in the administration, I was 
appointed to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee, and I went to 
one meeting and stayed half that meeting, went across the street and 
told Bruce Lindsey that that was not for me.
    Q. Now, let's move on. After we've established to a certain degree 
your relationship with the President, let's move on to January 20th of 
1998, and just to put that in clearer terms, this is a Tuesday after 
the January 17 deposition of President Clinton in the Paula Jones civil 
rights case. Do you recall that time frame?
    A. [Nodding head up and down.]
    Q. This is in the afternoon of January 20th, again, after the 
President's deposition. You contacted Mr. Howard Gittis, who I believe 
is General Counsel of McAndrews & Forbes Holdings?
    A. Howard Gittis is Vice Chairman of McAndrews, Forbes, and he is 
not the General Counsel. He is a lawyer, but he is not the General 
Counsel.
    Q. And what was the purpose of you contacting Mr. Howard Gittis on 
January 20th?
    A. If I talked to Howard Gittis on the 20th, I don't recall exactly 
what my conversation with Howard Gittis was about. I think it was a 
telephone call, maybe.
    Q. And that's difficult. Let me see if I can't help you in that 
regard.
    A. Right.
    Q. Was the purpose of that call with Mr. Gittis to arrange 
breakfast the next morning on January 21st?
    A. Yeah. I was in New York, and I did call Mr. Gittis and say--and 
as I remember, I had breakfast with him on the 21st, I believe. Yes, I 
did.
    Q. And this is a breakfast that you had set up?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And what was the reason you made the decision to request a 
breakfast meeting with Mr. Gittis?
    A. Yes. As I remember, I had gotten a telephone call from David 
Bloom at 1 o'clock in the morning at the St. Regis Hotel about the 
matter that was about to break having to do with the entire Lewinsky 
matter, and I had not at any time discussed the Lewinsky matter with--
with Howard Gittis. And so I had breakfast with him to tell him that 
reporters were calling, that this would obviously involve Revlon, which 
had responded to my--my efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky employment, and so 
Howard Gittis is a friend of mine. Howard Gittis is a fellow board 
member with me at Revlon. He is the Vice Chairman of McAndrews & 
Forbes, and I thought it--I thought I had--it was incumbent upon me to 
stop and say, ``Listen, there's trouble a-brewing.''
    Q. And just--you've mentioned McAndrews & Forbes and Revlon. 
McAndrews & Forbes, am I correct, is the parent company of--
    A. It's the holding company.
    Q. The holding company of Revlon and presumably other companies.
    And you sit on the board of McAndrews & Forbes?
    A. I do not. I sit on the board of Revlon.
    Q. All right. And that is a position that brings you an annual 
salary--
    A. There is a director's fee.
    Q. You receive a director's fee, and in addition, your law firm 
receives--from business from--
    A. We do--
    Q. --Revlon?
    A. We do. We do business. We've represented Revlon, and we 
represented Revlon before I was elected a director.
    Q. And you mention that things were breaking that you felt like you 
needed to advise Mr. Gittis concerning. At the time that you made the 
arrangements for the breakfast on January 21st, had you become aware of 
the Drudge Report?
    A. Yes, I had.
    Q. And you had had lunch with Bruce Lindsey on January 20th?
    A. No. I don't think it was on January--it was on Sunday. No, that 
was not the 20th.
    Q. And during that luncheon, did you become aware of the Drudge 
Report--
    A. That is correct.
    Q. --and receive a copy of it?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And that was from Bruce Lindsey?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And that Drudge Report, did it mention your name?
    A. I don't think so, but I don't remember.
    Q. Was there some news stories that had mentioned your name in 
reference to Ms. Lewinsky and the President?
    A. I believe that my name has been an integral part of this process 
from the beginning.
    Q. And did you in fact have the breakfast meeting with Mr. Gittis?
    A. Yes, I did.
    Q. And what information did you convey to Mr. Gittis concerning Ms. 
Lewinsky at that breakfast meeting?
    A. I just simply said that the press was calling about Ms. 
Lewinsky; that while I had not dealt with him, I had dealt with Richard 
Halperin, I had dealt with Ronald Perelman. I had not dealt with him, 
but that he ought to know and that I was sorry about this.
    And I also said that it would probably be even more complicated 
because early on I had referred Webb Hubbell to them to be hired as 
counsel.
    Q. And I want to get to that in just a moment, but you indicated 
that you said you were sorry. Were you referring to the problems that 
this might create for the company?
    A. Well, I was obviously concerned. I am a director. I am their 
counsel. They're my friends. And publicity was breaking. I thought I 
had some responsibility to them to give them a heads-up as to what was 
going on.
    Q. Now, is it true that your efforts to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky 
that you referenced in that meeting with Mr. Gittis--were your efforts 
carried out at the request of the President of the United States?
    A. There is no question but that through Betty Currie, I was acting 
on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. I think that's 
clear from my grand jury testimony.
    Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure that that's firmly 
established. And in reference to your previous grand jury testimony, 
you indicated, I believe, on May 28th, 1998, at page 61, that ``She''--
referring to Betty Currie--''was the one that called me at the behest 
of the President.''
    A. That is correct, and I think, Congressman, if in fact the 
President of the United States' secretary calls and asks for a request 
that you try to do the best you can to make it happen.
    Q. And you received that request as a request coming from the 
President?
    A. I--I interpreted it as a request from the President.
    Q. And then, later on in June of '98 in the grand jury testimony at 
page 45, did you not reference or testify that ``The President asked me 
to get Monica Lewinsky a job''?
    A. There was no--there was no question but that he asked me to help 
and that he asked others to help. I think that is clear from 
everybody's grand jury testimony.
    Q. And just one more point in that regard. In the same grand jury 
testimony, is it correct that you testified that ``He''--referring to 
the President--''was the source of it coming to my attention in the 
first place''?
    A. I may--if that is--if you--if it's in the--
    Q. It's at page 58 of the grand jury--
    A. I stand on my grand jury testimony.
    Q. All right. Now, during your efforts to secure a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky, I think you mentioned that you talked to Mr. Richard 
Halperin.
    A. Yes.
    Q. And he is with McAndrews & Forbes?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And you also at one point talked to Mr. Ron Perelman; is that 
correct?
    A. I made a call to Mr. Perelman, I believe, on the 8th of January.
    Q. And he is the--
    A. He is the chairman/CEO of McAndrews Forbes. He is a majority 
shareholder in McAndrews Forbes. This is his business.
    Q. Now, at the time that you requested assistance in obtaining Ms. 
Lewinsky a job, did you advise Mr. Perelman or Mr. Halperin of the fact 
that the request was being carried out at the request of the President 
of the United States?
    A. I don't think so. I may have.
    Q. Well, the first answer you gave was ``I don't think so.'' Now, 
in fact, you did not advise either Mr. Perelman or Mr. Halperin of that 
fact because am I correct that Mr. Perelman--or, excuse me, Mr. 
Gittis--expressed some concern that Revlon was never advised of that 
fact?
    A. Then, uh, I cannot say, I guess, precisely that I told that ``I 
am doing this for the President of the United States.''
    I do believe, on the other hand, that given the fact that she was 
in the White House, given the fact that she had been a White House 
intern, I would not be surprised if that was their understanding.
    Q. Well, in your conversation with Mr. Halperin.
    A. Yes--I'm certain I did not say that to Richard Halperin.
    Q. Okay. So there's no question that you did not tell Mr. Halperin 
that you were acting at the request of the President?
    A. I'm fairly certain I did not.
    Q. And in your conversation with Mr. Perelman, did you indicate to 
him that you were calling--or you were seeking--employment for Ms. 
Lewinsky at the request of the President?
    A. Yes--I don't think that I, that I made that explicit in my 
conversation with Mr. Perelman, and I'm not sure I thought it necessary 
to say ``This is for the President of the United States.''
    By the same token, I would have had no hesitance in doing that.
    Q. Now, at the time that you had called Mr. Perelman, which I 
believe you testified was in January of '98--
    A. That's right.
    Q. --I think you said January 8th--
    A. Right.
    Q. --you were aware at that time, were you not, that Ms. Lewinsky 
had received a subpoena to give a deposition in the Jones versus 
Clinton case?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. At the time that you talked to Mr. Perelman requesting his 
assistance for Monica Lewinsky, did you advise Mr. Perelman of the fact 
that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the Jones case?
    A. I did not.
    Q. And when you--did Mr. Perelman, Mr. Gittis or Mr. Halperin ever 
express to you disappointment that they were not told of two facts--
either of these two facts--one, that Ms. Lewinsky was being helped at 
the request of the President; and secondly, that she was known by you 
and the President to be under subpoena in that case?
    A. No.
    Q. Now, you are on the board of directors of Revlon.
    A. I am.
    Q. And how long have you been on the board of Revlon?
    A. I forget. Ten years, maybe.
    Q. And as a member of the board of directors, do you not have a 
fiduciary responsibility to the company?
    A. I do.
    Q. And how would you define a fiduciary responsibility?
    A. I define my fiduciary responsibility to the company about 
company matters.
    Q. And how would you define fiduciary responsibility in reference 
to company matters?
    A. Anything that has to do with the company, that I believe in the 
interest of the company, I have some fiduciary responsibility to 
protect the company, to help the company in any way that I--that is 
possible.
    Q. And is fiduciary responsibility sometimes considered a trust 
relationship in which you owe a degree of trust and responsibility to 
someone else?
    A. I think--I think that ``trust'' and ``fiduciary'' are probably 
synonymous.
    Q. Okay. Do you believe that you were acting in the company's 
interest or the President's interest when you were trying to secure a 
job for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Well, what I knew was that the company would take care of its 
own interest. This is not the first time that I referred somebody, and 
what I know is, is that if a person being referred does not meet the 
standards required for that company, I have no question but that that 
person will not be hired. And so the referral is an easy thing to do; 
the judgment about employment is not a judgment as a person referring 
that I make. But I do have confidence in all of the companies on whose 
boards that I sit that, regardless of my reference, that as to their 
needs and as to their expectations for their employees that they will 
make the right decisions, as happened in the American Express 
situation.
    American Express called and said: We will not hire Ms. Lewinsky. I 
did not question it, I did not challenge it, because they understood 
their needs and their needs in comparison to her qualifications. They 
made a judgment. Revlon, on the other hand, made another judgment.
    I am not the employer, I am the referrer, and there is a major 
difference.
    Q. Now, going back to what you knew as far as information and what 
you conveyed to Revlon, you indicated that you did not tell Mr. 
Halperin that you were making this request or referral at the request 
of the President of the United States.
    A. Yes, and I didn't see any need to do that.
    Q. And then, when you talked to Mr.--
    A. Nor do I believe not saying that, Counselor, was a breach of 
some fiduciary relationship.
    Q. And when you had your conversation with Mr. Perelman--
    A. Right.
    Q. --at a later time--
    A. Right.
    Q. --you do not remember whether you told him--you do not believe 
you told him you were calling for the President--
    A. I believe that I did not tell him.
    Q. --but you assumed that he knew?
    A. No. I did not make any assumptions, let me say. I said: Ronald, 
here is a young lady who has been interviewed. She thinks the interview 
has not gone well. See what you can do to make sure that she is 
properly interviewed and evaluated--in essence.
    Q. And did you reference her as a former White House intern?
    A. Probably. I do not have a recollection of whether I described 
her as a White House intern, whether I described her as a person who 
had worked for the Pentagon. I said this is a person that I have 
referred.
    I think, Mr. Hutchinson, that I have sufficient, uh, influence, 
shall we say, sufficient character, shall we say, that people have been 
throughout my career able to take my word at face value.
    Q. And so you didn't need to reference the President. The fact that 
you were calling Mr. Perelman--
    A. That was sufficient.
    Q. --and asking for a second interview for Ms. Lewinsky, that that 
should be sufficient?
    A. I thought it was sufficient, and obviously, Mr. Perelman thought 
it was sufficient.
    Q. And so there is no reason, based on what you told him, for him 
to think that you were calling at the request of the President of the 
United States?
    A. I think that's about right.
    Q. And so, at least with the conversation with Mr. Halperin and Mr. 
Perelman, you did not reference that you were acting in behalf of the 
President of the United States. Was there anyone else that you talked 
to at Revlon in which they might have acquired that information?
    A. The only persons that I talked to in this process, as I 
explained to you, was Mr. Halperin and Mr. Perelman about this process. 
And it was Mr. Halperin who put the--who got the process started.
    Q. So those are the only two you talked about, and you made no 
reference that you were acting in behalf of the President?
    A. Right.
    Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that you knew 
and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the 
Jones case, and that information was not provided to either Mr. 
Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Now, I wanted to read you a question and answer of Mr. Howard 
Gittis in his grand jury testimony of April 23, 1998.
    The question was: ``Now, you had mentioned before that one of the 
responsibilities of director is to have a fiduciary duty to the 
company. If it was the case that Ms. Lewinsky had been noticed as a 
witness in the Paula Jones case, and Vernon Jordan had known that, is 
that something that you believe as a person who works for McAndrews & 
Forbes, is that something that you believe that Mr. Jordan should have 
told you, or someone in the company, not necessarily you, but someone 
in the company, when you referred her for employment?''
    His answer was ``Yes.''
    Do you disagree with Mr. Gittis'' conclusion that that was 
important information for McAndrews & Forbes?
    A. I obviously didn't think it was important at the time, and I 
didn't do it.
    Q. Now, in your previous answers, you reference the fact that you--
--
    A. I think, on the other hand, that had she been a defendant in a 
murder case and I knew that, then I probably wouldn't have referenced 
her. But her being a witness in a civil case I did not think important.
    Q. Despite the fact that you were acting at the request of the 
President, and this witness was potentially adverse to the President's 
interest in that case?
    A. I didn't know that. I mean, I don't--I don't know what her 
position was or whether it was adverse or not.
    Q. All right. Mr. Jordan, prior to you answering that, did you get 
an answer from your attorney?
    A. My attorney mumbled something in my ear, but I didn't hear him.
    MR. HUNDLEY: It was a spontaneous remark. I'll try to refrain.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I know that--
    THE WITNESS: He does have a right to mumble in my ear, I think.
    MR. HUNDLEY: I mumble too loud because I don't hear too well 
myself.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Now, going back to a complicating factor in your conversation 
with Mr. Gittis and this embarrassing situation of the Lewinsky job, 
the complicating fact was that you had also helped Webb Hubbell get a 
job or consulting contracts with the same company; is that--
    A. Yes. You use the word ``complicated.'' I did not view it as a 
complication. I viewed it as a, as another something that happened, and 
that that caused some embarrassment to the company, and here again, we 
were back for another embarrassment for the company, and I thought I 
had a responsibility to say that.
    Q. Would you explain how you helped Webb Hubbell secure a job or a 
contract with Revlon?
    A. Yes. Webb Hubbell came to me after his resignation from the 
Justice Department. Webb and I got to be friends during the transition, 
and Webb came to me and he said, ``I'm leaving the Justice 
Department,'' or ``I've left the Justice Department''--I'm not sure 
which--and he said, ``I really need work.''
    And I said, ``Webb, I will do what I can to help you.''
    I called New York, made arrangements. I took Webb Hubbell to New 
York. We had lunch. I took him the headquarters of McAndrews & Forbes 
at 62nd Street. I introduced him to Howard Gittis, Ronald Perelman, and 
I left.
    Q. And did, subsequently, Mr. Hubbell obtain consulting contracts 
with Revlon?
    A. Subsequently, Mr. Hubbell was hired, as I understand it, as 
outside counsel to McAndrews & Forbes, or Revlon, or some entity within 
the Perelman empire.
    Q. And was that consulting contracts of about $100,000 a year?
    A. I--I think so, I think so.
    Q. And did you make other contacts with other companies in which 
you had friends for assistance for Webb Hubbell?
    A. I did not.
    Q. And was the effort to assist Mr. Webb Hubbell during this time--
was it after he left the Department of Justice and prior to the time 
that he pled guilty to criminal charges?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And at the time you assisted Webb Hubbell by securing a job with 
Revlon for him, was he a potential adverse witness to the President in 
the ongoing investigation by the Independent Counsel?
    A. I don't know whether he was an adverse witness or not. What he 
was was my friend who had just resigned from the Justice Department, 
and he was out of work, and he asked for help, and I happily helped 
him.
    Q. And did you know at the time that he was a potential witness in 
the investigation by the OIC?
    A. I don't know whether I knew whether he was a potential witness 
or not. I simply responded to Webb Hubbell who was a friend in trouble 
and needing work.
    Q. Now, let's backtrack to the time when you first had any contact 
with Ms. Lewinsky. We've talked about this January 20-21st meeting with 
Mr. Gittis and covered a little bit of the tail end of this entire 
episode. Now I would like to go back in time to your first meetings 
with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now, when was the first time that you recall that you met with 
Monica Lewinsky?
    A. If you've read my grand jury testimony--
    Q. I have.
    A. --and I'm sure that you have--there is testimony in the grant 
jury that she came to see me on or about the 5th of November. I have no 
recollection of that. It was not on my calendar, and I just have no 
recollection of her visit. There is a letter here that you have in 
evidence, and I have to assume that in fact that happened. But as I 
said in my grand jury testimony, I'm not aware of it, I don't remember 
it--but I do not deny that it happened.
    Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has made reference to a meeting that occurred 
in your office on November 5, and that's the meeting that you have no 
recollection of?
    A. That is correct. We have no record of it in my office, and I 
just have no recollection of it.
    Q. And in your first grand jury appearance, you were firm, shall I 
say, that the first time you met with Ms. Lewinsky, that it was on 
December 11th?
    A. Yes. It was firm based on what my calendar told me, and 
subsequently to that, there has been a refreshing of my recollection, 
and I do not deny that it happened. By the same token, I will tell you, 
as I said in my grand jury testimony, that I did not remember that I 
had met with her.
    Q. And in fact today, the fact that you do not dispute that that 
meeting occurred is not based upon your recollection but is simply 
based upon you've seen the records, and it appears that that meeting 
occurred?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. Okay. And you've made reference to my first exhibit there, which 
is front of you, and I would refer you to this at this time, which is 
Exhibit 86.
    Now, this is captioned as a ``Letter from Ms. Lewinsky to Mr. 
Vernon Jordan dated November 6, 1997,'' and it appears that this letter 
thanks you for meeting with her in reference to her job search. And do 
you recall this--
    MR. KENDALL: Mr. Hutchinson, excuse me. May I ask--this is an 
unsigned copy. Do you have a signed copy of this letter?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Let me go through my questions if I might.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Do you recall receiving this letter?
    A. I do not.
    Q. Do you ever recall seeing this letter before?
    A. The first time I saw this letter was when I was before the grand 
jury.
    Q. And am I correct that it's your testimony that the first time 
you ever recall hearing the name ``Monica Lewinsky'' was in early 
December of '97?
    A. That's correct. I--I may have heard the name before, but the 
first time I remember seeing her and having her in my presence was 
then.
    Q. Well, regardless of whether you met with her in November or not, 
the fact is you did not do anything in November to secure a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky until your activities on December 11 of '97?
    A. I think that's correct.
    Q. And on December 11, I think you made some calls for Ms. Lewinsky 
on that particular day?
    A. I believe I did. I have some--it's all right for me to refresh 
my recollection?
    Q. Certainly.
    A. Thank you. [Perusing documents.] I did make calls for her on the 
11th, yes.
    Q. And may I just ask what you're referring to?
    A. I'm referring here to telephone logs prepared by counsel here 
for me to refresh my recollection about calls.
    MR. HUNDLEY: You are welcome to have a copy of that.
    THE WITNESS: You are welcome to see it.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Do you have an extra copy?
    THE WITNESS: Yes--in anticipation.
    MR. HUNDLEY: There are a few calls.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Might this be a good time to take a 5-minute 
break?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Certainly.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's adjourn for 5 minutes.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 10:03 a.m.
    [Recess.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:16 a.m.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Counsel has consumed 38 minutes.
    Counsel, would you proceed?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
    At this time, I would offer as Jordan Deposition Exhibit 86, if you 
don't mind me going by that numerology--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Would it be better to do that or make it Jordan 
Exhibit Number 1? Does counsel have any preference on that--is that--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: One is fine.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Let's do it that way. It will be made a part of 
the record, Jordan Deposition Number 1.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 1 marked for identification.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, let me go back to that meeting on December 11th. I 
believe we were discussing that. My question would be: How did the 
meeting on December 11 of 1997 with Ms. Lewinsky come about?
    A. Ms. Lewinsky called my office and asked if she could come to see 
me.
    Q. And was that preceded by a call from Betty Currie?
    A. At some point in time, Betty Currie had called me, and Ms. 
Lewinsky followed up on that call, and she came to my office, and we 
had a visit.
    Q. Ms. Lewinsky called, set up a meeting, and at some point sent 
you a resume, I believe.
    A. I believe so.
    Q. And did you receive that prior to the meeting on December 11th?
    A. I--I have to assume that I did, but I--I do not know whether she 
brought it with her or whether--it was at some point that she brought 
with her or sent to me--somehow it came into my possession--a list of 
various companies in New York with which she had--which were here 
preferences, by the way--most of which I did not know well enough to 
make any calls for.
    Q. All right. And I want to come back to that, but I believe--would 
you dispute if the record shows that you received the resume of Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 8th?
    A. I would not.
    Q. And presumably, the meeting on December 11th was set up 
somewhere around December 8th by the call from Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I--I would not dispute that, sir.
    Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess 
some people refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
    A. Not jobs--companies.
    Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment 
with.
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go 
with your own list of friends and companies that you had better 
contacts with.
    A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business, 
and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel 
comfortable in calling.
    Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and 
ask you response to this, but many times I will be listed as a 
reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed 
as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference 
anywhere, would it not?
    A. I would hope so.
    Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the 
best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
    A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms. 
Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were 
not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
    Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms. 
Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you 
were going to be a reference for.
    A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting 
jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an 
assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
    Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to 
get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, going back--going to your meeting that we're talking about 
on December 11th, prior to the meeting did you make any calls to 
prospective employers in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I don't think so. I think not. I think I wanted to see her 
before I made any calls.
    Q. And so if they were not before, after you met with her, you made 
some calls on December 11th?
    A. I--I believe that's correct.
    Q. And you called Mr. Richard Halperin of McAndrews & Forbes?
    A. That's right.
    Q. You called Mr. Peter--
    A. Georgescu.
    Q. --Georgescu. And he is with what company?
    A. He is chairman and chief executive officer of Young & Rubicam, a 
leading advertising agency on Madison Avenue.
    Q. And did you make one other call?
    A. Yes. I called Ursie Fairbairn, who runs Human Resources at 
American Express, at the American Express Company, where I am the 
senior director.
    Q. All right. And so you made three calls on December 11th. You 
believe that they were after you met with Ms. Lewinsky--
    A. I doubt very seriously if I would have made the calls in advance 
of meeting her.
    Q. And why is that?
    A. You sort of have to know what you're talking about, who you're 
talking about.
    Q. And what did you basically communicate to each of these 
officials in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I essentially said that you're going to hear from Ms. Lewinsky, 
and I hope that you will afford her an opportunity to come in and be 
interviewed and look favorably upon her if she meets your 
qualifications and your needs for work.
    Q. Okay. And at what level did you try to communicate this 
information?
    A. By--what do you mean by ``what level''?
    Q. In the company that you were calling, did you call the chairman 
of human resources, did you call the CEO--who did you call, or what 
level were you seeking to talk to?
    A. Richard Halperin is sort of the utility man; he does everything 
at McAndrews & Forbes. He is very close to the chairman, he is very 
close to Mr. Gittis. And so at McAndrews & Forbes, I called Halperin.
    As I said to you, and as my grand jury testimony shows, I called 
Young & Rubicam, Peter Georgescu as its chairman and CEO. I have had a 
long-term relationship with Young & Rubicam going back to three of its 
CEOs, the first being Edward Ney, who was chairman of Young & Rubicam 
when I was head of the United Negro College Fund, and it was during 
that time that we developed the great theme, ``A mind is a terrible 
thing to waste.'' So I have had a long-term relationship with Young & 
Rubicam and with Peter Georgescu, so I called the chairman in that 
instance.
    At American Express, I called Ms. Ursie Fairbairn who is, as I said 
before, in charge of Human Resources.
    So that is the level--in one instance, the chairman; in one 
instance a utilitarian person; and in another instance, the head of the 
Human Resources Department.
    Q. And the utilitarian connection, Mr. Richard Halperin, was sort 
of an assistant to Mr. Ron Perelman?
    A. That's correct. He's a lawyer.
    Q. Now, going to your meeting on December 11th with Ms. Lewinsky, 
about how long of a meeting was that?
    A. I don't--I don't remember. You have a record of it, Congressman.
    Q. And actually, I think you've testified it was about 15 to 20 
minutes, but don't hold me to that, either.
    During the course of the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, what did you 
learn about her?
    A. Uh, enthusiastic, quite taken with herself and her experience, 
uh, bubbly, effervescent, bouncy, confident, uh--actually, I sort of 
had the same impression that you House Managers had of her when you met 
with her. You came out and said she was impressive, and so we come out 
about the same place.
    Q. And did she relate to you the fact that she liked being an 
intern because it put her close to the President?
    A. I have never seen a White House intern who did not like being a 
White House intern, and so her enthusiasm for being a White House 
intern was about like the enthusiasm of White House interns--they liked 
it.
    She was not happy about not being there anymore--she did not like 
being at the Defense Department--and I think she actually had some 
desire to go back. But when she actually talked to me, she wanted to go 
to New York for a job in the private sector, and she thought that I 
could be helpful in that process.
    Q. Did she make reference to someone in the White House being 
uncomfortable when she was an intern, and she thought that people did 
not want her there?
    A. She felt unwanted--there is no question about that. As to who 
did not want her there and why they did not want her there, that was 
not my business.
    Q. And she related that--
    A. She talked about it.
    Q. --experience or feeling to you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky was on December 11th, and I 
believe that Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met with the President 
on December 5--excuse me, on December 6--at the White House and 
complained that her job search was not going anywhere, and the 
President then talked to Mr. Jordan.
    Do you recall the President talking to you about that after that 
meeting?
    A. I do not have a specific recollection of the President saying to 
me anything about having met with Ms. Lewinsky. The President has never 
told me that he met with Ms. Lewinsky, as best as I can recollect. I--I 
am aware that she was in a state of anxiety about going to work. She 
was in a state of anxiety in addition because her lease at Watergate, 
at the Watergate, was to expire December 31st. And there was a part of 
Ms. Lewinsky, I think, that thought that because she was coming to me, 
that she could come today and that she would have a job tomorrow. That 
is not an unusual misapprehension, and it's not limited to White House 
interns.
    Q. I mentioned her meeting with the President on the same day, 
December 6th. I believe the record shows the President met with his 
lawyers and learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list. 
Now, did you subsequently meet with the President on the next day, 
December 7th?
    A. I may have met with the President. I'd have to--I mean, I'd have 
to look. I'd have to look. I don't know whether I did or not.
    Q. If you would like to confer--I believe the record shows that, 
but I'd like to establish that through your testimony.
    MS. WALDEN: Yes.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. All right. So you met with the President on December 7th. And 
was it the next day after that, December 8th, that Ms. Lewinsky called 
to set up the job meeting with you on December 11th?
    A. I believe that is correct.
    Q. And sometime after your meeting on December 11th with Ms. 
Lewinsky, did you have another conversation with the President?
    A. Uh, you do understand that conversations between me and the 
President, uh, was not an unusual circumstance.
    Q. And I understand that--
    A. All right.
    Q. --and so let me be more specific. I believe your previous 
testimony has been that sometime after the 11th, you spoke with the 
President about Ms. Lewinsky.
    A. I stand on that testimony.
    Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness 
list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and 
then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky 
on the 11th.
    Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you 
discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if 
so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
    A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit 
to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it 
was about the job search.
    Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about 
the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted 
to get a job in New York?
    A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her 
job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was 
also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector, 
and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me. 
There is no doubt about that.
    Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
    A. There's no question about that, either.
    Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that 
you had with the President after the witness list came out, your 
conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the 
11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the 
witness list in the Jones case?
    A. He did not.
    Q. And did you consider this information to be important in your 
efforts to be helpful to Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I never thought about it.
    Q. Was there a time that you became aware that Ms. Lewinsky had 
been subpoenaed to give a deposition in the Jones versus Clinton case?
    A. On December 19th when she came to my office with the subpoena--I 
think it's the 19th.
    Q. That's right. Now, you indicated you never thought about it, 
because of course, at that point, you didn't know that she was on the 
witness list, according to your testimony.
    A. [Nodding head up and down.]
    Q. Now, you said that she came to see you on December 19th--I'm 
sorry. I've been informed you didn't respond out loud, so--
    A. Well, if you'd ask the question, I'd be happy to respond.
    Q. I was afraid you would ask me to ask the question again.
    Well, let's go to the December 19th meeting.
    A. Fine.
    Q. How did it come about that you met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 
19th?
    A. Ms. Lewinsky called me in a rather high emotional state and said 
that she needed to see me, and she came to see me.
    Q. And she called you on the telephone on December 19th, in which 
she indicated she had received a subpoena?
    A. That's right, and was emotional about it and asked, and so I 
said come over.
    Q. And what was your reaction to her having received a subpoena in 
the Jones case?
    A. Surprise, number one; number two, quite taken with her emotional 
state.
    Q. And did you see that she had a problem?
    A. She obviously had a problem--she thought--
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We have to go off the record.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Off the record.
    [Recess due to power failure.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:49 a.m.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, let the record reflect that we've been 
down for 20 to 25 minutes due to a power failure, but we are ready to 
proceed now, counsel.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
    And Mr. Jordan, before we go back to my line of questioning, I have 
been informed that we have that question in which we did not get an 
audible response, and so I'm going to ask the court reporter to read 
that question back.
    [The court reporter read back the requested portion of the record.]
    THE WITNESS: I did not know that she was on the witness list, 
Congressman. And let me say parenthetically here that our side had 
nothing to do with the power outage.
    [Laughter.]
    THE WITNESS: As desirable as that may have been.
    [Laughter.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Thank you, Mr. Jordan. And again, we're talking about the fact 
you never thought about the President not telling you that Ms. Lewinsky 
was on the witness list because you didn't know it at the time.
    A. I--I did not know it.
    Q. All right. Now, before we go back to December 19th, I've also 
been informed that I've been neglectful, and sometimes you will give a 
nod of the head, and I've not asked you to give an audible response. So 
I'm going to try to be mindful of that, but at the same time, Mr. 
Jordan, if you can try to give an audible response to a question rather 
than what we sometimes do in private conversation, which is a nod of 
the head. Fair enough?
    A. I'm happy to comply.
    Q. Now, we're talking about December 19th, that you had received a 
call from Monica Lewinsky; she had been subpoenaed in the Jones case. 
She was upset. You said, Come to my office.
    Now, when she got to the office, I asked you, actually, before 
that, what was your reaction to her having this subpoena, and she had a 
problem because of the subpoena.
    A. Yes.
    Q. And I believe you previously indicated that any time a witness 
gets a subpoena, they've got a problem that they would likely need 
legal assistance.
    A. That's been my experience.
    Q. And in fact she did subsequently come to see you at the office 
on that December 19th, is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And what happened at that meeting in your office with Ms. 
Lewinsky on the 19th?
    A. She, uh, as I said, was quite emotional. She was--she was 
disturbed about the subpoena. She was disturbed about not having, in 
her words, heard from the President or talked to the President.
    It was also in that meeting that it became clear to me that the--
that her eyes were wide and that she, uh, that--let me--for lack of a 
better way to put it, that she had a ``thing'' for the President.
    Q. And how long was that meeting?
    A. I don't know, uh, but it's in the record.
    MR. HUNDLEY: You testified 45 minutes.
    THE WITNESS: Forty-five minutes. Thank you.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Is that okay if I--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: That's all right, and that's helpful, Mr. Hundley.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Thank you. I'm trying to be helpful.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And during this meeting, did she in fact show you the subpoena 
that she had received in the Jones litigation?
    A. I'm sure she showed me the subpoena.
    Q. And the subpoena that was presented to you asked her to give a 
deposition, is that correct?
    A. As I recollect.
    Q. But did it also ask Ms. Lewinsky or direct her to produce 
certain documents and tangible objects?
    A. I think, if I'm correct in my recollection, it asked that she 
produce gifts.
    Q. Gifts, and some of those gifts were specifically enumerated.
    A. I don't remember that. I do remember gifts.
    Q. And did you discuss any of the items requested under the 
subpoena?
    A. I did not. What I said to her was that she needed counsel.
    Q. Now, just to help you in reference to your previous grand jury 
testimony of March 3, '98--and if you would like to refer to that, page 
121, but I believe it was your testimony that you asked her if there 
had been any gifts after you looked at the subpoena.
    A. I may have done that, and if I--if that's in my testimony, I 
stand by it.
    Q. And did she--from your conversation with her, did you determine 
that in your opinion, there was a fascination on her part with the 
President?
    A. No question about that.
    Q. And I think you previously described it that she had a ``thing'' 
for the President?
    A. ``Thing,'' yes.
    Q. And did you make any specific inquiry as to the nature of the 
relationship that she had with the President?
    A. Yes. At some point during that conversation, I asked her 
directly if she had had sexual relationships with the President.
    Q. And is this not an extraordinary question to ask a 24-year-old 
intern, whether she had sexual relations with the President of the 
United States?
    A. Not if you see--not if you had witnessed her emotional state and 
this ``thing,'' as I say. It was not.
    Q. And her emotional state and what she expressed to you about her 
feelings for the President is what prompted you to ask that question?
    A. That, plus the question of whether or not the President at the 
end of his term would leave the First Lady; and that was alarming and 
stunning to me.
    Q. And she related that question to you in that meeting on December 
19th?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Now, going back to the question in which you asked her if she 
had had a sexual relationship with the President, what was her 
response?
    A. No.
    Q. And I'm sure that that was not an idle question on your part, 
and I presume that you needed to know the answer for some purpose.
    A. I wanted to know the answer based on what I had seen in her 
expression; obviously, based on the fact that this was a subpoena about 
her relationship with the President.
    Q. And so you felt like you needed to know the answer to that 
question to determine how you were going to handle the situation?
    A. No. I thought it was a factual data that I needed to know, and I 
asked the question.
    Q. And why did you need to know the answer to that question?
    A. I am referring this lady, Ms. Lewinsky, to various companies for 
jobs, and it seemed to me that it was important for me to know in that 
process whether or not there had been something going on with the 
President based on what I saw and based on what I heard.
    Q. And also based upon your years of experience--I mean your--
    A. I don't understand that question.
    Q. Well, you have children?
    A. I have four children; six grandchildren.
    Q. And you've raised kids, you've had a lot of experiences in life, 
and do you not apply that knowledge and experience and wisdom to 
circumstances such as this?
    A. Yes. I've been around, and I've seen young people, both men and 
women, overly excited about older, mature, successful individuals, yes.
    Q. Now, let me just go back as to what signals that you might have 
had at this particular point that there was a sexual relationship 
between Ms. Lewinsky and the President. Was one of those the fact that 
she indicated that she had a fascination with the President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And did she relate that ``He doesn't call me enough''?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And was the fact that there was an exchange of gifts a factor in 
your consideration?
    A. Well, I was not aware that there had been an exchange of gifts. 
I thought it a tad unusual that there would be an exchange of gifts, 
uh, but it was just clear that there was a fixation by this young woman 
on the President of the United States.
    Q. And was it also a factor that she had been issued a subpoena in 
a case that was rooted in sexual harassment?
    A. Well, it certainly helped.
    Q. And that was an ingredient that you factored in and decided this 
is a question that needed to be asked?
    A. There's no question about that.
    Q. Now, heretofore, the questions or the discussions with Ms. 
Lewinsky had simply been about a job?
    A. Had been about a job.
    Q. And I think you indicated that you didn't have to be an Einstein 
to know that this was a question that needed to be asked after what you 
learned on this meeting?
    A. Yes, based on my own judgment, that is correct.
    Q. Now, at this point, you're assisting the President in obtaining 
a job for a former intern, Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Right.
    Q. It comes to your attention from Ms. Lewinsky that she has a 
subpoena in a civil rights case against the President. And did this 
make you consider whether it was appropriate for you to continue 
seeking a job for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Never gave it a thought.
    Q. Despite the fact that you were seeking the job for Ms. Lewinsky 
at the request of the President when she is under subpoena in a case 
adverse to the President?
    A. I--I did not give it a thought. I had committed that I was going 
to help her, and I was going to--and I kept my commitment.
    Q. And so, however she would have answered that question, you would 
have still prevailed upon your friends in industry to get a job for 
her?
    A. Congressman, that is a hypothetical question, and I'm not going 
to answer a hypothetical question.
    Q. Well, I thought you had answered it before, but if--so you don't 
know whether it would have made a difference or not, then?
    A. I asked her whether or not she had had sexual relationships with 
the President. Ms. Lewinsky told me no.
    MR. HUNDLEY: I'd just like to interject. My recollection, 
Congressman, is that in the grand jury, he gave basically the same 
answer, that it was a hypothetical question, and that he really didn't 
know what he would have done had the answer been different. You could 
double-check it if you want, but I'm sure I'm right.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Okay, I'm not asking you a hypothetical question. I want to ask 
it in this phrase, in this way. Did her answer make you consider 
whether it was appropriate for you to continue seeking a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky at the request of the President?
    A. I did not see any reason why I should not continue to help her 
in her job search.
    Q. Now, was the fact that she was under subpoena important 
information to you?
    A. It was additional information, certainly.
    Q. If you were trying to get Ms. Lewinsky a job, did you expect her 
to tell you if she had any reason to believe she might be a witness in 
the Jones case?
    A. She did in fact tell me by showing me the subpoena. I had no 
expectations one way or the other.
    Q. Well, I refer you to your grand jury testimony of March 3, '98 
at page 96. Do you recall the answer: ``I just think that as a matter 
of openness and full disclosure that she would have done that.''
    A. And she did.
    Q. Precisely. She disclosed to you, of course, when she received 
the subpoena, and that's information that you expected to know and to 
be disclosed to you?
    A. Fine.
    Q. Is--
    A. Yes. Fine.
    Q. And in fact, if Ms. Currie--I'm talking about Betty Currie--if 
she had known that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have 
expected her to tell you that information as well since you were 
seeking employment for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Well, it would have been fine had she told me. I do make a 
distinction between being a witness on the one hand and being a 
defendant in some sort of criminal action on the other. She was a 
witness in the civil case, and I don't believe witnesses in civil cases 
don't have a right for--to employment.
    Q. Okay. I refer you to page 95 of your grand jury testimony, in 
which you said: ``I believe that had Ms. Currie known, that she would 
have told me.''
    And the next question: ``Let me ask the question again, though. 
Would you have expected her to tell you if she knew?''
    And do you recall your answer?
    A. I don't.
    Q. ``Yes, sure.''
    A. I stand by that answer.
    Q. And so it's your testimony that if Ms. Currie had known that Ms. 
Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have expected her to tell you 
that information?
    A. It would have been helpful.
    Q. And likewise, would you have expected the President to tell you 
if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be called as a 
witness in the Paula Jones case?
    A. That would have been helpful, too.
    Q. And that was your expectation, that he would have done that in 
your conversations?
    A. It--it would certainly have been helpful, but it would not have 
changed my mind.
    Q. Well, being helpful and that being your expectation is a little 
bit different, and so I want to go back again to your testimony on 
March 3, page 95, when the question is asked to you--question: ``If the 
President had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky could be called a 
witness in the Paula Jones case, would you have expected him to tell 
you that when you spoke with him between the 11th and the 19th about 
her?''
    And your answer: ``And I think he would have.''
    A. My answer was yes in the grand jury testimony, and my answer is 
yes today.
    Q. All right. So it would have been helpful, and it was something 
you would have expected?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so 
advise you of that fact in the conversations that he had with you on 
December 7th and December 11th after he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was 
on the witness list?
    A. As I testified--
    MR. KENDALL: Objection. Misstates the record with regard to 
December 11th.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I--I will restate the question. I believe it 
accurately reflects the record, and I'll ask the question.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so 
advise you of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list 
despite the fact that he had conversations with you on two occasions, 
on December 7th and December 11th?
    A. I have no recollection of the President telling me about the 
witness list.
    Q. And during this meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on the 11th, did you 
take some action as a result of what she told you?
    A. On the 11th or the 18th?
    Q. Excuse me. I'm sorry. Let me go to the 19th.
    A. Nineteenth.
    Q. Thank you for that correction.
    Did you refer her to an attorney?
    A. Yes, I did.
    Q. Okay, and who was the attorney that you referred her to?
    A. Frank Carter, a very able local attorney here.
    Q. And did you give her two or three attorneys to select from, or 
did you just give her one recommendation?
    A. I made a recommendation of Frank Carter. That was the only 
recommendation.
    Q. Now, let me go to I believe it's the next three exhibits that 
are in front of you, if you'd just turn that first page, and I believe 
they are marked 29, 31, 32 and 33. And these are, I believe, exhibits 
that you have seen before and are summaries and documents relating to 
telephone conversations on this particular day of December 19th.
    [Witness perusing documents.]
    SENATOR DODD: How are these going to be marked--as Jordan 
Deposition Exhibits--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: These should be marked as Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
    SENATOR DODD: Okay.
    MR. KENDALL: Excuse me, Mr. Manager. Are you offering these in 
evidence?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Not at this time.
    I guess it's 2, 3, 4 and 5.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Are we referring to the next four exhibits in the 
package here?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes, sir.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Well, we'll just--identify them one at a time, 
and we'll--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: All right.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Let's go to Exhibit 29 as it's marked, but for our purpose, 
we're going to refer to it as Deposition Exhibit 2.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. For identification for right now, 
we'll call that Jordan Exhibit Number 2 for identification, which is 
marked as, I assume, Grand Jury Exhibit Number 29.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 2 marked for identification.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And from this record, would you agree that you received a call 
from Ms. Lewinsky at 1:47 p.m.?
    A. For 11 seconds.
    Q. All right. And subsequent to that, you placed a call to talk to 
the President at 3:51 p.m. and talked to Deborah Schiff?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And what was the purpose of that call to Deborah Schiff?
    A. I--I'm certain that I did not call Deborah Schiff. I had no 
reason to call Deborah Schiff. My suspicion was that if I in fact 
called 1414, that somehow Deborah Schiff was answering the telephone.
    Q. Were you trying to get hold of the President?
    A. I think maybe I was.
    Q. All right. And then, subsequent to that, Ms. Lewinsky arrived in 
your office at 4:47 p.m.--and I believe that would be reflected on 
Exhibit 3--excuse me--Exhibit 4.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Four.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And does it also reflect, going back to the call records, that 
you talked to the President during the course of your meeting with Ms. 
Lewinsky at approximately 5:01 p.m.?
    A. I beg your pardon?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: This would be Exhibit 5.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's mark these for identification 
purposes.
    We have already identified Deposition Exhibit Number 29 as Exhibit 
Number 2 for identification in Mr. Jordan's deposition.
    The next one would be Grand Jury Exhibit Number 31, and we will 
mark that as Exhibit Number 3 for identification purposes. Following 
that will be Grand Jury Exhibit Number 32, that we will identify as 
Exhibit Number 4 to Mr. Jordan's deposition for identification 
purposes; and Grand Jury Exhibit Number 33 will be Exhibit Number 5 to 
Mr. Jordan's deposition for identification purposes.
    Now, do we need to go any further at this time?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: No. Thank you.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 and 5 marked for 
identification.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan--
    A. Yes.
    Q. --under Exhibit--
    A. Yes.
    Q. --according to these records, specifically Exhibit 5, does it 
reflect that you talked to the President during the course of your 
meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at approximately 5:01 p.m.?
    MR. KENDALL: Object to the form of the question.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: You may answer.
    THE WITNESS: I'm confused.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: There's an objection as to the form of the 
question.
    THE WITNESS: Oh.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: We can resolve it.
    MR. KENDALL: The question was do these records indicate this. If he 
offers Number 2, I'm going to object to it. It's not the best evidence. 
It's a chart. I don't know who prepared it--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: He's referring to 5 now, I believe, isn't he?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: I believe this had to do with 5.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: All right.
    THE WITNESS: Would you ask your question?
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, I'm simply trying to establish, and using Exhibit 5 
to refresh your recollection--
    MR. KENDALL: I withdraw the objection, I withdraw the objection.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir; very fine.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. --that this record, Exhibit 5, reflects that you talked to the 
President during the course of your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at 
approximately 5:01 p.m.
    A. Yes. I--I have never had a conversation with the President while 
Ms. Lewinsky was present. The wave-in sheet from my office said that 
she came in at 5:47--
    Q. Four forty-seven.
    A. --4:47. She may have been in the reception area, or she may have 
been outside my office, but Ms. Lewinsky was not in my office during 
the time that I had a conversation with the President.
    Q. And the other alternative would be that she came into your 
office, and then you excused her while you received a call from the 
President?
    A. That's a possibility, too--
    Q. All right.
    A. --but she was not present in my office proper during the time 
that I was having a conversation with the President.
    Q. Absolutely, and that is clear.
    Now, because we got a little bogged down in the records, let me 
just go back for a moment. Is it your understanding, based upon the 
records and recollection, that you received a call from Ms. Lewinsky 
about 1:47; you talked to Deborah Schiff trying to get hold of the 
President about 3:51 that afternoon; Ms. Lewinsky arrived at about 4:47 
p.m.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Am I correct so far?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And then you received a call from the President at about 5:01 
p.m.?
    A. That's correct.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I want to say ``Your Honor''--I've wanted to do 
this all day, Senator--I would offer these Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5 at 
this time.
    MR. KENDALL: I would object to the admission of Exhibit Number 2.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Hutchinson, could you identify what this 
exhibit is from?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, this exhibit is a summary exhibited based 
upon the original records that establish this. Now, we've established 
it clearly through the testimony, so it's not of earth-shattering 
significance whether this is in the record or not, because the witness 
has established it.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. But this is a compilation of what you 
contend--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: --is otherwise in the record?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel, do we really have a problem with that?
    MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, I don't know who prepared this or 
what records it's based on. I have not objected to any of the original 
records, and I'll continue my objection.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: I think in light of that we will sustain it, if 
Mr. Hutchinson thinks it's otherwise in the record anyway, and not make 
an issue out of that.
    So we will, then, make as a part of the record Exhibits Numbers 3, 
4 and 5 that have previously been introduced for identification 
purposes; they will now be made a part of the record.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 and 5 received in evidence.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, you indicated you had this conversation with 
the President at about 5:01 p.m. out of the presence of Ms. Lewinsky. 
Now, during this conversation with the President, what did you tell the 
President in that conversation?
    A. That Lewinsky--I'm sure I told him that Ms. Lewinsky was in my 
office, in the reception area, that she had a subpoena and that I was 
going to visit with her.
    Q. And did you advise the President as well that you were going to 
recommend Frank Carter as an attorney?
    A. I may have.
    Q. And why was it necessary to tell the President these facts?
    A. I don't know why it was not unnecessary to tell him these facts. 
I was keeping him informed about what was going on, and so I told him.
    Q. Why did you make the judgment that you should call the President 
and advise him of these facts?
    A. I just thought he ought to know. He was interested it--he was 
obviously interested in it--and I felt some responsibility to tell him, 
and I did.
    Q. All right. And what was the President's response?
    A. He said thank you.
    Q. Subsequent to your conversation with the President about Monica 
Lewinsky, did you advise Ms. Lewinsky of this conversation with the 
President?
    A. I doubt it.
    Q. And if she indicates that she was not aware of that 
conversation, would you dispute her testimony in that regard?
    A. I would not.
    Q. And you say that you doubt it. Was there a reason that you would 
not disclose to her the fact that you talked to the President when she 
was the subject of that conversation?
    A. No. I--I didn't feel any particular obligation to tell her or 
not to tell her, but I did not tell her.
    Q. Now, we have discussed to a limited extent the gifts that were 
mentioned in the subpoena in this discussion that you had with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Did she in fact tell you about the gifts she had received 
from the President?
    A. I think she told me that she had received gifts from the 
President.
    Q. Did she also indicate that there had been an exchange of gifts?
    A. She did.
    Q. And did you think that it was somewhat unusual that there had 
been an exchange of gifts?
    A. Uh, a tad unusual, I thought.
    Q. These--
    A. Which again occasioned the question.
    Q. Pardon?
    A. Which again occasioned the ultimate question.
    Q. On--on whether there was a sexual relationship?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And so that was a significant fact in determining whether that 
question should be asked?
    A. It was an additional fact.
    Q. Now, the subpoena also references ``documents constituting or 
containing communications between you''--which would have been Ms. 
Lewinsky under the subpoena--``and the Defendant Clinton, including 
letters, cards, notes, et cetera.''
    Did you ask Ms. Lewinsky at all whether there were any kinds of 
cards or communications between them?
    A. Uh, I did not, but she may have volunteered that.
    Q. And did she tell you about telephone conversations with the 
President?
    A. She did tell me that she and the President talked on the 
telephone.
    Q. And did she express it in a way that it was frustrating because 
the President didn't call her sufficiently?
    A. Well, that--that is correct, and she was disappointed, uh, and 
disapproving of the fact that she was not hearing from the President of 
the United States on a regular basis.
    Q. During this conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, she also made 
reference to the First Lady?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And that was another question of concern when she asked if you 
thought that the President would leave the First Lady at the end of his 
term?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And what was your reaction to this statement?
    A. My reaction to the statement after I got over it was that--no 
way.
    Q. Did it send off alarm bells in your mind as to her relationship 
with the President?
    A. I think it's safe to say that she was not happy.
    Q. You're speaking of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. That's the only person we're talking about, Congressman.
    Q. Now, based upon all of this, was it your conclusion the subpoena 
meant trouble?
    A. Beg your pardon?
    Q. Based upon all of these facts and your conversation with Ms. 
Lewinsky, was it your conclusion that the subpoena meant trouble?
    A. Well, I always, based on my experience with the grand jury, 
believe that subpoenas are trouble.
    Q. I think you've used the language, ``ipso facto'' meant trouble?
    A. Yes, yes, right.
    Q. Now, subsequent to your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on this 
occasion, did you in fact set up an appointment with Mr. Frank Carter?
    A. Yes--for the 22nd, I believe.
    Q. Which I believe would have been the first part of the next week?
    A. That's right.
    Q. And still on December 19th, after your meeting with Ms. 
Lewinsky, did you subsequently see the President of the United States 
later that evening?
    A. I did.
    Q. And is this when you went to the White House and saw the 
President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. At the time that Ms. Lewinsky came to see you on December 19th, 
did you have any plans to attend any social function at the White House 
that evening?
    A. I did not.
    Q. And in fact there was a social invitation that you had at the 
White House that you declined?
    A. I had--I had declined it; that's right.
    Q. And subsequent to Ms. Lewinsky visiting you, did you change your 
mind and go see the President that evening?
    A. After the--a social engagement that Mrs. Jordan and I had, we 
went to the White House for two reasons. We went to the White House to 
see some friends who were there, two of whom were staying in the White 
House; and secondly, I wanted to have a conversation with the 
President.
    Q. And this conversation that you wanted to have with the President 
was one that you wanted to have with him alone?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And did you let him know in advance that you were coming and 
wanted to talk to him?
    A. I told him I would see him sometime that night after dinner.
    Q. Did you tell him why you wanted to see him?
    A. No.
    Q. Now, was this--once you told him that you wanted to see him, did 
it occur the same time that you talked to him while Ms. Lewinsky was 
waiting outside?
    A. It could be. I made it clear that I would come by after dinner, 
and he said fine.
    Q. Now, let me backtrack for just a moment, because whenever you 
talked to the President, Ms. Lewinsky was not inside the room--
    A. That's correct.
    Q. --and therefore, you did not know the details about her 
questions on the President might leave the First Lady and those 
questions that set off all of these alarm bells.
    A. [Nodding head up and down.]
    Q. And so you were having--is the answer yes?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And so you were having this discussion with the President not 
knowing the extent of Ms. Lewinsky's fixation?
    A. Uh--
    Q. Is that correct?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And, regardless, you wanted to see the President that night, and 
so you went to see him. And was he expecting you?
    A. I believe he was.
    Q. And did you have a conversation with him alone?
    A. I did.
    Q. No one else around?
    A. No one else around.
    Q. And I know that's a redundant question.
    A. It's okay.
    Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
    A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came 
in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left 
the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan 
went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with 
him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he 
had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said, 
``No, never.''
    Q. All right. Now, during that conversation, did you tell the 
President again that Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
    A. Well, we had established that.
    Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about 
her fascination?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that 
day?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked 
about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the 
term?
    A. I did.
    Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to 
whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of 
conversation.
    Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to 
Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question 
to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this 
question to the President?
    A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who 
happens to be the President of the United States.
    Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United 
States, to give you a truthful answer?
    A. I did.
    Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to 
continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
    A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to 
do.
    Q. Well, my question was more did you rely upon the President's 
answer in your decision to continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a 
job.
    A. I did not rely on his answer. I was going to pursue the job in 
any event. But I got the answer to the question that I had asked Ms. 
Lewinsky earlier from her, and I got the answer from him that night as 
to the sexual relationships, and he said no.
    Q. It would appear to me that there's two options. One, you asked 
the question in terms of idle conversation, and that does not seem 
logical in view of the fact that you made a point to go and visit the 
President about this alone.
    A. Yes. I never said that--I never talked about options. I told you 
I went to ask him that question.
    Q. Well, was it idle conversation, or was there a purpose in you 
asking him that question?
    A. It obviously, Congressman, was not idle conversation.
    Q. All right.
    A. For him nor for me.
    Q. There was a purpose in it--and would you describe it as being 
important, the question that you asked to him?
    A. I wanted to satisfy myself, based on my visit with her, that 
there had been no sexual relationships, and he said no, as she had said 
no.
    Q. And why was it important to you to satisfy yourself on that 
particular point?
    A. I had seen this young lady, and I had seen her reaction, uh, and 
it raised a presumption, uh, and I wanted to satisfy myself, as I had 
done with her, that there had been no sexual relationship between them.
    Q. If you had--
    A. And I did satisfy myself.
    Q. And if you had--well, let me rephrase it. If you believed the 
presumption, or if you had evidence that Ms. Lewinsky did have sexual 
relations with the President, would this have affected your decision to 
act in the President's interest in locating her a job when she had been 
subpoenaed in a case adverse to the President?
    A. I do not think it would have affected my decision.
    Q. Now, you mentioned that you set up an appointment for Ms. 
Lewinsky at the office of Frank Carter for December 22nd.
    A. Right.
    Q. Prior to that appointment with Mr. Carter, did Ms. Lewinsky come 
to see you in your office?
    A. I took Ms. Lewinsky from my office, in my Akin Gump, chauffeur-
driven car, to Frank Carter's office.
    Q. And when she arrived at your office, did you have a discussion 
with her?
    A. I think I got my coat, she got her--she had on her coat--and we 
left.
    Q. While in your office before going to see Mr. Carter, did Ms. 
Lewinsky ask about her job?
    A. Every conversation that I had with Ms. Lewinsky had at some 
point to do with pending employment.
    Q. And I take that as a ``yes'' answer, but I would also refer you 
to page 184 of your previous testimony in which that answer was 
``yes.''
    A. Yes.
    Q. And so prior to going to see Mr. Carter, you met with Ms. 
Lewinsky and--where she asked about her job?
    A. Well, as I'm putting on my coat, I mean, we did not sit down and 
have a conference. We had an appointment.
    Q. Now, you last testified before the grand jury in June of 1998, 
and you have not had the opportunity to address some issues that Ms. 
Lewinsky raised when she testified before the grand jury in August of 
1998, and I would like to--there will be a number of questions as we go 
through this today relating to some things that she testified to, 
because it's important that we hear your responses to it, and so I'd 
like to ask you about a couple of these particular areas.
    During this meeting--and you say it was a short meeting, that you 
really didn't sit down--but during this time, did Ms. Lewinsky ask if 
you had told the President that she had been subpoenaed in the Jones 
case?
    A. She may have, and--and if she did, I answered yes.
    Q. Even though you did not tell her about the conversation on 
December 19th that you had with the President in which you told the 
President she had been subpoenaed?
    A. If she had asked, I would have told her. If she asked me on the 
22nd, I answered yes.
    Q. And did Ms. Lewinsky show you any gifts that she was bringing to 
Mr. Frank Carter?
    A. Yeah--I'm not aware that Ms. Lewinsky showed me any gifts. I 
have no--I have no recollection of her having shown me gifts given her 
by the President. And my best recollection is that she came to my 
office, I got myself together, and that we left. I have no recollection 
of her showing me gifts given her by the President.
    Q. Would you dispute if she in fact had gifts with her on that 
occasion?
    A. I don't know whether she had gifts with her or not. I do have--I 
have no recollection of her showing me, saying, ``This is a gift given 
me by the President of the United States.''
    Q. And if she testifies that she showed you the gifts she was 
bringing Mr. Carter, you would dispute that testimony?
    A. I have not any recollection of her showing me any gifts.
    Q. And I take that as not denying it--
    MR. KENDALL: Objection to form.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. --but that you have no recollection.
    A. Uh, I don't know how else to say it to you, Mr. Congressman.
    Q. Well--
    A. I have no recollection of Ms. Lewinsky coming to my office and 
showing me gifts given her by the President of the United States.
    Q. Let me go on. Did Ms. Lewinsky tell you that she and the 
President had had phone sex?
    A. I think Ms.--I know Ms. Lewinsky told me about, uh, telephone 
conversations with the President. If Ms. Lewinsky had told me something 
about phone sex, I think I would have remembered that.
    Q. And therefore, if she testifies that she told you that Ms. 
Lewinsky and the President had phone sex, then you'd simply deny her 
testimony in that regard?
    A. I--
    MR. KENDALL: Object to the form.
    THE WITNESS: I have no recollection, Congressman, of Ms. Lewinsky 
telling me about phone sex--but given my age, I would probably have 
been interested in what that was all about.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: We'll overrule the objection. It's a leading 
question, but I think that it will be permissible for these purposes.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: It's my understanding, Senator, that under the 
Senate rule, that the witness would be considered an adverse witness.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: That's correct.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Well, I don't mean to engage in disputes over fine points, but I 
guess--
    A. Well, you obviously, Congressman, have Ms. Lewinsky saying one 
thing and me saying another. I stand by what I said.
    Q. Which is that you have no recollection of that discussion taking 
place.
    A. But I do think that I would have remembered it had it happened.
    Q. All right. Now, after your brief encounter or meeting with Ms. 
Lewinsky in your office, did you take Ms. Lewinsky in your vehicle to 
Mr. Carter's office?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And when you arrived at Mr. Carter's office, did you meet with 
Mr. Carter in advance, while Ms. Lewinsky waited outside?
    A. I said a brief hello to him. We talked about lunch. I never took 
off my coat. I did take off my hat, because it was inside. And I left 
them, and I got a piece of his candy.
    Q. Now, I was looking at the testimony of Mr. Carter. Now, do you 
recall a meeting with Mr. Carter in his office while Ms. Lewinsky 
waited outside, even if it might have been a brief meeting?
    A. Yes, I think maybe I went in. I just don't know--I was there for 
a very short time.
    Q. Did you explain to Mr. Carter that you were seeking Ms. Lewinsky 
a job at the request of the President?
    A. No, I did not, but I think he knew that.
    Q. And why do you think he knew that?
    A. I must have told him.
    Q. So at some point, you believe that you told Mr. Carter that you 
were seeking Ms. Lewinsky a job at the request of the President?
    A. I think I may have done that.
    Q. Now, you have referred other clients to Mr. Carter during your 
course of practice here in Washington, D.C.?
    A. Yes, I have.
    Q. About how many have you referred to him?
    A. Oh, I don't know. Maggie Williams is one client that I--I 
remember very definitely.
    I like Frank Carter a lot. He's a very able young lawyer. He's a 
first-class person, a first-class lawyer, and he's one of my new 
acquaintances amongst lawyers in town, and I like being around him. We 
have lunch, and he's a friend.
    Q. And is it true, though, that when you've referred other clients 
to Mr. Carter that you never personally delivered and presented that 
client to him in his office?
    A. But I delivered Maggie Williams to him in my office. I had 
Maggie Williams to come to my office, and it was in my office that I 
introduced, uh, Maggie Williams to Mr. Carter, and she chose other 
counsel. I would have happily taken Maggie Williams to his office.
    Q. But this is the only occasion that you took your Akin, Gump-
chauffeured vehicle and delivered the client to Mr. Carter in his 
office?
    A. It was.
    Q. Now, we're not going to go through, probably to your relief, 
each day's phone calls, but is it safe to say that Ms. Lewinsky called 
you regularly, both keeping you posted on her interviews and contacts, 
but also asking you what you knew about her job desires?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And it is also true that during this process, you kept the 
President informed?
    A. That, too, is correct.
    Q. And did the President ever give you any other instruction other 
than to find Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York?
    A. I do not view the President as giving me instructions. The 
President is a friend of mine, and I don't believe friends instruct 
friends. Our friendship is one of parity and equality.
    Q. Let me rephrase it, and that's--
    A. Thank you.
    Q. That's a fair comment that you certainly made.
    Did you ever receive any other request from the President in 
reference to your dealing with Monica Lewinsky other than the request 
to find her a job in New York?
    A. That is correct.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I've been informed that there's a few minutes left 
on the tape. Do you want to break?
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's take a 5-minute break at this 
point.
    Also, if it's not objectionable to anyone, let's move a little 
closer to 1 o'clock, after all, for lunch, if that's okay. We have a 
conference that that will coincide with a little better, but for right 
now, let's take a 5-minute break.
    SENATOR DODD: Just before we do, just to make it--and the 
admonition about these--these--this matter being in--confidential.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Right.
    SENATOR DODD: And I'm going to restate that over and over again 
today, so that people understand the rules under which we're operating 
here, and this is confidential and no one is to reveal anything they 
hear, except to the people that was listed in Senator Thompson's 
opening remarks.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Absolutely.
    We'll be in recess.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Videotape Number 1 in the 
deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. We are going off the record at 
11:35 a.m.
    [Recess.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 2 in 
the deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. We are going back on the record 
at 11:49 a.m.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, Mr. Hutchinson, and you have consumed 
an hour and 40 minutes.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, I was reminded that the last question I asked you 
received an answer that I didn't, at least, understand, so I'm going to 
reask that question, and the question that I had asked, I believe, was: 
Did you ever receive any other request from the President in reference 
to your dealings with Ms. Lewinsky other than the request to find her a 
job in New York? And I think your answer was: That's correct. And that 
confuses me a little bit, so let me rephrase the question.
    Did you ever receive--not rephrase it, but restate the question. 
Did you ever receive any other request from the President in reference 
to your dealings with Monica Lewinsky other than the request to find 
her a job in New York?
    A. I did not.
    Q. Now, let me go to December 31, 1997, in reference to another 
issue that Ms. Lewinsky has testified about in her August grand jury 
appearance and in which you have not had the opportunity to discuss in 
detail.
    Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met you for breakfast at the 
Park Hyatt--
    MR. HUNDLEY: Excuse me. I think you misspoke yourself. You said 
'97.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: This is '97, right?
    MR. HUNDLEY: It is? I apologize.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Hundley. The years are 
confusing, but I believe this is December 31, 1997.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met you for breakfast at 
the Park Hyatt, and even specifically as to what she had for breakfast 
on that particular occasion when she met with you and as to the 
conversation that she had.
    And I want to show you, in order to hopefully refresh your 
recollection, an exhibit which I'm going to mark as the next exhibit 
number, which will be 6, I believe?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes. What--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: And it's in the binder as Exhibit 42. It is not 
there, but it is in the binder as Exhibit 42.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Let's take a moment so everyone can refer to 
that.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Have you located that, Mr. Jordan?
    A. [Nodding head up and down.]
    Q. And this receipt, is this a receipt for a charge that you had at 
the Park Hyatt on December 31st?
    A. That's an American Express receipt for breakfast.
    Q. And is the date December 31st?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And does it reflect the items that were consumed at that 
breakfast?
    A. It reflects the items that were paid for at that breakfast.
    [Laughter.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Does it appear to you that this is a breakfast for two people?
    A. The price suggests that it was a breakfast for two people.
    Q. All right. And the fact that there's two coffees, there is one 
omelet, one English muffin, one hot cereal, and can you identify from 
that what you ordinarily eat at breakfast?
    A. What I ordinarily eat at breakfast varies. This morning, it was 
fish and grits.
    Q. All right. Now, Ms. Lewinsky in her testimony, I think, 
referenced as to what she ate, which I believe would be confirmed in 
this record.
    Do you recall a meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at the Park Hyatt on 
December 31st of--
    A. If you--
    Q. --1997?
    A. If you would refer to my testimony before the grand jury when 
asked about a breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on December 31st, I testified 
that I did not have breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on December 31st 
because I did not remember having had breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 31st. It was not on my calendar. It was New Year's Eve. I have 
breakfast at the Park Hyatt Hotel three or four times a week if I am in 
town, and so I really did not remember having breakfast with Ms. 
Lewinsky. And that's an honest statement, I did not remember, and I 
told that to the grand jury.
    It is clear, based on the evidence here, that I was at the Park 
Hyatt on December 31st. So I do not deny, despite my testimony before 
the grand jury, that on December 31st that I was there with Ms. 
Lewinsky, but I did testify before the grand jury that I did not 
remember having a breakfast with her on that date, and that was the 
truth.
    My recollection has subsequently been refreshed, and--and so it 
is--it is undeniable that there was a breakfast in my usual breakfast 
place, in the corner at the Park Hyatt. I'm there all the time.
    Q. All right. And so--and that would be with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And so the--so your memory has been refreshed, and I appreciate 
the statement that you just made.
    Let me go to that meeting with her and ask whether during this 
occasion that you met her for breakfast that there was a discussion 
about Ms. Linda Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with her and 
conversations with her.
    A. I also testified in my grand jury testimony that I never heard 
the name ``Linda Tripp'' until such time that I saw the Drudge Report. 
I did not have a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky at the breakfast at the 
Park Hyatt Hotel on December 31st about Linda Tripp. I never heard the 
name ``Linda Tripp,'' knew nothing about Linda Tripp until I read the 
Drudge Report.
    Q. All right. And do you recall a discussion with Ms. Lewinsky at 
the Park Hyatt on this occasion in which there were notes discussed 
that she had written to the President?
    A. I am certain that Ms. Lewinsky talked to me about notes.
    Q. On this occasion?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And would these have been notes that she would have sent to the 
President?
    A. I think that there was--these notes had to do with 
correspondence between Ms. Lewinsky and the President.
    Q. And would have she mentioned the retention or copies of some of 
that correspondence on her computer in her apartment?
    A. She may have done that.
    Q. And did you ask her a question, were these notes from the 
President to you?
    A. I understood from our conversation that she and the President 
had correspondence that went back and forth.
    Q. And did you make a statement to her, ``Go home and make sure 
they're not there''?
    A. Mr. Hutchinson, I'm a lawyer and I'm a loyal friend, but I'm not 
a fool, and the notion that I would suggest to anybody that they 
destroy anything just defies anything that I know about myself. So the 
notion that I said to her go home and destroy notes is ridiculous.
    Q. Well, I appreciate that reminder of ethical responsibilities. It 
was--
    A. No, it had nothing to do with ethics, as much as it's just good 
common sense, mother wit. You remember that in the South.
    Q. And so--and let me read a statement that she made to the grand 
jury on August 6th, 1998. This is the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, 
referring to a conversation with you at the Park Hyatt that, ``She,'' 
referring to Linda Tripp, ``was my friend. I didn't really trust her. I 
used to trust her, but I didn't trust her anymore, and I was a little 
bit concerned because she had spent the night at my home a few times, 
and I thought--I told Mr. Jordan. I said, `Well, maybe she's heard 
some'--you know, I mean, maybe she saw some notes lying around, and Mr. 
Jordan said, `Notes from the President to you?,' and I said, `No. Notes 
from me to the President,' and he said, `Go home and make sure they're 
not there.' ''
    A. And, Mr. Hutchinson, I'm saying to you that I never heard the 
name ``Linda Tripp'' until I read the Judge--Drudge Report.
    Secondly, let me say to you that I, too, have read Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony about that breakfast, and I can say to you, without fear of 
contradiction on my part, maybe on her part, that the notion that I 
told her to go home and destroy notes is just out of the question.
    Q. And so this is not a matter of you not recalling whether that 
occurred or not--
    A. I am telling you--
    Q. Well, let me--
    A. --emphatically--
    Q. Mr. Jordan, let me finish the question.
    A. Okay, all right.
    Q. Please, sir.
    A. Okay.
    Q. It's sort of important for the record.
    This is a statement by Ms. Lewinsky that you flatly and 
categorically deny?
    A. Absolutely.
    Q. Now, you talked about ``mother wit,'' I think it was; that you 
knew at the time that you had this discussion with Ms. Lewinsky that 
these notes would have been covered by the subpoena based upon your 
discussion of that on December 19th?
    A. Ask that question again.
    Q. All right. This is a meeting on December 31st at the Park Hyatt.
    A. Right.
    Q. A discussion about the notes, correspondence between Ms. 
Lewinsky and the President.
    A. Right.
    Q. You are aware, based upon your discussion of the subpoena on 
December 19th, that these were covered under the subpoena?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And did you tell Ms. Lewinsky that you need to make sure you 
tell your attorney, Mr. Carter, and that these are turned over under 
the subpoena?
    A. What I did not tell her was to destroy the notes. Whether I told 
her to give them to Mr. Carter or not, I have no recollection of that.
    Q. But you knew at the time that these notes were a matter of 
evidence?
    A. I think that's a valid assumption.
    Q. But you knew that?
    A. It's a valid assumption.
    Q. Now, during this meeting at the Park Hyatt, did Ms. Lewinsky 
also make it clear to you that she was in love with the President?
    A. That, I had already concluded.
    Q. And if Ms.--now, was there anything else at the Park Hyatt at 
this meeting on December 31st that you recall discussing with Ms. 
Lewinsky?
    A. Job, work, in New York, in the private sector.
    Q. And that was the--was this a meeting that was set up at her 
request or your request?
    A. I'm certain it was at her request. I am fairly certain that I 
did not call Ms. Lewinsky and say will you join me at the Park Hyatt 
for breakfast on December 31st, on New Year's Eve.
    Q. All right. And did you also talk about her situation under the 
subpoena and the fact that she was going to have to give testimony, it 
looked like?
    A. I am not Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, and I did not view it as my 
responsibility to give Ms. Lewinsky advice and counsel.
    I had found her very able, competent counsel.
    Q. Respectfully, I am simply asking whether that was discussed.
    A. And I am simply saying to you, I did not provide her legal 
counsel.
    Q. Okay. Was it discussed in--not in terms of legal representation, 
but in terms of Mr. Jordan to Monica Lewinsky about any emotional 
concerns she might have about pending testimony?
    A. I have no recollection of talking to her about pending 
testimony.
    Q. Fair enough. Now, let's go back to Mr. Carter's representation 
of Ms. Lewinsky that you referred to. Were you aware that Mr. Carter 
was preparing an affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky to sign in the Jones case?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And on or about the 6th or 7th of January, did you become aware 
that she in fact had signed the affidavit and that Mr. Carter had filed 
a motion to quash her subpoena in the case?
    A. She told me that she had signed the affidavit.
    Q. And did in fact Mr. Carter also relate to you that that had 
occurred?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And I think you made a statement in your March grand jury 
testimony that there was no reason for accountability, that he 
reassured me that he had things under control?
    A. That is correct. I stand by that testimony.
    Q. And now, if you would, look at the next exhibit, which is in 
that stapled bunch of exhibits that have been provided to you.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: This will be Exhibit No. 7, we'll mark for your 
deposition.
    And, Senator, did we put Exhibit No. 6 in?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: No, we didn't.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I would like to offer that as an exhibit to this 
deposition.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: It will be made a part of the record.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7 marked for identification.]
    [Witness perusing document.]
    SENATOR DODD: That is Number 6?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Six. That's the Park Hyatt.
    SENATOR DODD: Oh, that is going to be Number 6, the Park Hyatt, not 
the--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Now, what is 7?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Now, 7 is the affidavit of Jane Doe Number 6, which 
in the--I think everybody has found that in the book.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: What is the grand jury number?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: It's 85, the grand jury number.
    This will be Deposition Exhibit Number 7.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, I think you're reviewing that.
    This affidavit bears the signature on the last page of Monica S. 
Lewinsky, is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And have you ever seen this signed affidavit before?
    A. I don't think so.
    Q. Do you not recall that Ms. Lewinsky brought this in and showed 
it to you?
    A. She may have.
    Q. And I'd be glad to refresh you. I know that some of this--
    A. Yeah, if it's in the testimony, Congressman.
    Q. Page 192 of your previous grand jury testimony. Is it your 
recollection that she showed this to you in a meeting in your office 
after she had signed it?
    A. I stand by that testimony.
    Q. And so the date of that signature of Ms. Lewinsky, is that 
January 7?
    A. January 7th, 1998.
    Q. All right. Now, whenever she presented this signed affidavit to 
you, did you read it sufficiently to know that it stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky did not have a sexual relationship with the President?
    A. I was aware that that was in the affidavit.
    Q. And I believe you previously testified that you're a quick 
reader and you skimmed it and familiarized yourself with it?
    A. Skimmed it.
    Q. And prior to seeing the signed affidavit that she brought to 
you, the day after it was signed, was there a time that Ms. Lewinsky 
called you concerning the affidavit and said that she had some 
questions about the draft of the affidavit?
    A. Yes. I do recollect her calling me and asking me about the 
affidavit, and I said to her that she should talk to the--talk to Frank 
Carter, her counsel, about the affidavit and not to me.
    Q. And if I could go into, again, some areas that had not been 
previously asked to you, and since Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand 
jury on August 6th.
    Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she dropped a copy of the affidavit 
to you, and that you--and that you and she had a telephone conversation 
in which you discussed changes to the affidavit. Does this refresh your 
recollection, and do you agree with Ms. Lewinsky's recollection of a 
discussion on changes in the affidavit?
    A. I do agree with the assumption--I mean, I do agree with the 
statement that Ms. Lewinsky dropped the affidavit off and called me up 
about the affidavit and was quite verbose about it, and I sort of 
listened and said to her, ``You need to talk to Frank Carter.''
    She was not satisfied with that, and so she kept talking and I kept 
doodling and listening as she went on in sort of a, for lack of a 
better word, babble about this--about this thing, but it was not my job 
to advise her about an affidavit. I don't do affidavits.
    Q. Now, if I may show you, which would be Exhibit--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: First, let me go ahead and offer 7.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: It's made a part of the record.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 7 received in evidence.]
    MR. HUTCHINSON: It's part of the record.
    And then go to Exhibit 8, which was marked as Exhibit 39 as your 
previous grand jury testimony.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 8 marked for identification.]
    [Witness perusing document.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Now, Exhibit 8 is a summary of telephone calls on January 6th, 
which would be the day before the affidavit was signed by Ms. Lewinsky 
on the 7th.
    Now, you can reflect on that for a moment, but in reviewing these 
calls, it appears that Mr. Carter was paging Ms. Lewinsky early on in 
the day, 11:32 a.m., and then at 3:26, you had a telephone call with 
Mr. Carter for 6 minutes and 42 seconds.
    And then there was--call number 6 was to Ms. Lewinsky, which was 
obviously a 24-second short call, and then a subsequent call for almost 
6 minutes at 3:49 p.m. to Ms. Lewinsky.
    Was this last call for 5 minutes to Ms. Lewinsky the call that you 
just referenced in which the draft affidavit was discussed?
    A. I think that is correct. The 24-second call, I think, was voice 
mail.
    Q. Was--was--pardon?
    A. Voice mail.
    Q. Certainly.
    And subsequent to your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky for 5 minutes 
and 54 seconds, did you have two calls to Mr. Carter, which would be 
No. 9 and 10?
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter on three 
occasions, the day before the affidavit was signed?
    A. Yeah. I--my recollection is--is that I was exchanging or sharing 
with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she had asked me to do, what I 
refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the lawyer and I was not 
the lawyer. I mean, it would be so presumptuous of me to try to advise 
Frank Carter as to how to practice law.
    Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your conversations 
with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I may have.
    Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about the 
affidavit, would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned about 
the economics of law practice, he would have likely billed Ms. Lewinsky 
for some of those telephone calls?
    A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.
    Q. It wouldn't surprise you if his billing did reflect a--a charge 
for a telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan?
    A. Keep in mind that Mr. Carter spent most of his time in being a 
legal services lawyer. I think his concentration is primarily on 
service, rather than billing.
    Q. But, again, based upon the conversations you had with him, which 
sounds like conversations of substance in reference to the affidavit, 
that it would be consistent with the practice of law if he charged for 
those conversations?
    A. That's a question you'd have to ask Mr. Carter.
    Q. They were conversations of substance with Mr. Carter concerning 
the affidavit?
    A. And they were likely conversations about more than Ms. Lewinsky.
    Q. But the answer was yes, that they were conversations of 
substance in reference to the affidavit?
    A. Or at least a portion of them.
    Q. In other words, other things might have been discussed?
    A. Yes.
    Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the affidavit 
being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both the job and her 
concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky talked to her 
about the job, on one hand, or job being interrelated with the 
conversation about the affidavit. The affidavit was over here. The job 
was over here.
    Q. But the--in the same conversations, both her interest in a job 
and her discussions about the affidavit were contained in the same 
conversation?
    A. As I said to you before, Counselor, she was always interested in 
the job.
    Q. Okay. And she was always interested in the job, and so, if she 
brought up the affidavit, very likely it was in the same conversation?
    A. No doubt.
    Q. And that would be consistent with your previous grand jury 
testimony when you expressed that you talked to her both about the job 
and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. Now, on January 7th, the affidavit was signed. Subsequent to 
this, did you notify anyone in the White House that the affidavit in 
the Jones case had been signed by Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Yeah. I'm certain I told Betty Currie, and I'm fairly certain 
that I told the President.
    Q. And why did you tell Betty Currie?
    A. I'm--I kept them informed about everybody else that was--
everything else. There was no reason not to tell them about that she 
had signed the affidavit.
    Q. And why did you tell the President?
    A. The President was obviously interested in her job search. We had 
talked about the affidavit. He knew that she had a lawyer. It was in 
the due course of a conversation. I would say, ``Mr. President, she 
signed the affidavit. She signed the affidavit.''
    Q. And what was his response when you informed him that she had 
signed the affidavit?
    A. ``Thank you very much.''
    Q. All right. And would you also have been giving him a report on 
the status of the job search at the same time?
    A. He may have asked about that, and--and part of her problem was 
that, you know, she was--there was a great deal of anxiety about the 
job. She wanted the job. She was unemployed, and she wanted to work.
    Q. Now, I think you indicated that he was obviously concerned 
about--was it her representation and the affidavit?
    A. I told him that I had found counsel for her, and I told him that 
she had signed the affidavit.
    Q. Okay. You indicated that he was concerned, obviously, about 
something. What was he obviously concerned about in your conversations 
with him?
    A. Throughout, he had been concerned about her getting employment 
in New York, period.
    Q. And he was also concerned about the affidavit?
    A. I don't know that that was concern. I did tell him that the 
affidavit was signed. He knew that she had counsel, and he knew that I 
had arranged the counsel.
    Q. Do you know whether or not the President of the United States 
ever talked to her counsel, Mr. Carter?
    A. I have--I have no knowledge of that.
    Q. Did you ever relate to Mr. Carter that you were having 
discussions with the President concerning his representation of Ms. 
Lewinsky and whether she had signed the affidavit?
    A. I don't know whether I told him that she had--he had--I don't 
know whether I told Mr. Carter that I told the President he had signed 
the affidavit. It is--it is not beyond reasonableness.
    Q. Now let's go on. After the affidavit was signed, were you 
ultimately successful in obtaining Ms. Lewinsky a job?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And in fact, the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed the affidavit, 
you placed a personal call to Mr. Ron Perelman of Revlon, encouraging 
him to take a second look at Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. That is correct, based on the fact that Ms. Lewinsky thought 
that her interview had not gone well, when in fact it had gone well.
    Q. Okay. And in fact, Ms. Lewinsky had called you on a couple of 
occasions after the interview and finally got a hold of you and told 
you she thought the interview went poorly?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And as a response to that information, you did not call Mr. 
Halperin back, who you had previously talked to about the issue, but 
you called Mr. Perelman?
    A. That's right.
    Q. Was there a reason that you called Mr. Perelman in contrast to 
Mr. Halperin?
    A. Well, the same reason I would have called you about a committee 
if you were chairman of it, as opposed to calling to a member of the 
committee.
    Q. All right. You wanted to go to the top?
    A. When it's necessary.
    Q. And I remember a phrase you used. I might not have it exactly 
right, but you don't get any richer or more powerful than Mr. Perelman?
    A. Certainly not much richer.
    Q. Okay. And--and so you had a conversation with Mr. Perelman, and 
did you tell him something like, make it happen if it can happen?
    A. I said, ``This young lady''--I mean, I think I said, ``This 
young lady has been interviewed. She thinks it did not go well. Would 
you look into it?''
    Q. And what was his response?
    A. That he would look into it.
    Q. Now I'd like to show you the next exhibit, and before I do that, 
I would go back and offer Number 7.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Seven is the last.
    This would be Number 8 that you--that you have been discussing. The 
compilation of the telephone call record?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    MR. KENDALL: I object. Same ground as before. It's not best 
evidence. We don't know who compiled these. These are not primary 
records.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Jordan has verified several of these items, 
but I do notice there are some items here that do not have to do with 
Mr. Jordan, that we could not expect him to be able to verify.
    So I would ask counsel, if he needs to identify any more of these 
conversations and use this to reflect Mr. Jordan's memory, he's free to 
do so, but as an exhibit, I think the objection is probably well taken.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Let me just state, Senator, that this is a 
compilation of calls based upon the records that have been in the 
Senate record, and this has been--this compilation has been in there 
some time.
    Now, I, quite frankly, understand the objection, and it might have 
meritorious if this was being introduced into evidence in the actual 
trial, and so I would suggest perhaps, since he's identified most of 
the calls already, that this could be referenced as a deposition 
exhibit because he's referred to it and that's helpful, without--
obviously, there might in a more--it might not be entered into evidence 
as such.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Could I ask you if it's been in the record as a 
compilation?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes, it has.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: In this form? I notice that it has a grand jury--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: It's--Senator, it's Volume III of the Senate 
record, page 161, and so it's all in there, anyway.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: I notice in the record here, counsel is informing 
me that it is in the record, but there are several redactions. Is that 
correct?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: That is correct, and for that reason--in fact, a 
number of these summaries are not redacted in our form and they're 
redacted in the record, and we'd like to have the opportunity to redact 
it in the form of taking out the personal telephone numbers.
    MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, if I may be heard, my objection is--
to this is a summary. We don't know who did it. We don't know what it's 
based on.
    The witness has testified, and his testimony is in the record, so 
far as his recollection is refreshed.
    I have no objection to original phone records, but I do object to 
the summary.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel, could I suggest that maybe you just make 
a reference specifically to where it is in the existing record? I think 
it would serve your same purpose and to keep you from having--
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Sure.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: --to go through and redact everything. Would that 
be satisfactory?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I think that would be satisfactory, and what I can 
do is that I can withdraw this exhibit and reference in the transcript 
of this deposition that the exhibit is found in Table 35 of Senate 
record, Volume III, at page 161.
    SENATOR DODD: Let me just ask the House Manager, if I can as well. 
Are these from the Senate record? I'm told that some of these are not 
from the Senate record, and we're kind of confined to the Senate 
record, as I understand it.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, other than the redactions, this summary 
itself is in the Senate record.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes.
    Counsel informs me, it's already in. It refers to evidentiary 
record Volume IV.
    MS. BOGART: Is it IV or III?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: It says IV here, Part 2 of--Part 2 of 3.
    So, for the record, this would be pages 1884 and 1885 of the 
evidentiary record, Volume IV, Part 2 of 3, all right?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. So the record will be--the objection 
will be sustained, and reference has been made.
    SENATOR DODD: And can we just--because I presume you may have more 
of these coming along, and it seems to me you might want to have staff 
or others begin to work so we don't go through this every time, 
particularly with the unredacted material that may be included in here, 
which is not part of the Senate record.
    The unredacted information comes out of the House record, as I 
understand, and that is a distinction.
    MR. HUNDLEY: I would just add that Mr. Jordan--the last 3 days of 
his grand jury testimony, they asked him about every phone call, and if 
you want to use those, you know, go to his grand jury testimony, you 
know, I think it would move things along.
    There isn't a phone call. We produced like a telephone book of 
phone calls that Mr. Jordan made, and they called them all out, after 
they got through asking about who's that, who's that and who's the--
you've got a pretty good record of calls that might have some relevance 
in this.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir. All right.
    SENATOR DODD: Let me also just suggest on the earlier--Senator 
Thompson, in the earlier objection raised by Counsel Kendall, sustained 
the objection, but had made reference to the fact that since this 
material had been brought into the record that those--if any 
documentation is included there, that we--we do use the Senate 
documents with the redacted information, rather than the House records 
for the purposes of this deposition.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Proceed.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And I will handle it this way, Mr. Jordan, and let me say that I 
was sort of constructing my questioning, so as not to get bogged down 
in an extraordinary number of telephone calls, but let me go to the 
chart in front of you which is Grand Jury Exhibit 44, which is marked 
for our purposes as Exhibit 9 for identification purposes.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 9 marked for identification.]
    [Witness perusing document.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And I'm going to--I'd like for you to refer that--refer you to 
that for purposes of putting this particular day, January 8th, in 
context and asking you some questions about some of those telephone 
calls.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: I'm sorry. What was the question? Are you making 
reference for identification purposes?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes. This is Exhibit 9, which is Grand Jury Exhibit 
44.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, for identification purposes.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Now, this is the day, January 8th, which is the day that Ms. 
Lewinsky felt like she had a poor job interview. Does this reflect 
calls from the Peter Strauss residence to your office?
    A. I see a call number 3, 11:50 a.m., Peter Strauss residence. The 
number is here to my office.
    Q. All right.
    A. And it says length of call, one minute.
    Q. All right. And, in fact, calls 3, 4 and 5 and 9 are calls from 
the Peter Strauss residence to your office?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And Peter Strauss is the residence in which Ms. Lewinsky was 
staying while in New York?
    A. I just know that Peter Strauss, my old friend, is Monica 
Lewinsky's stepfather.
    MR. HUNDLEY: But he wasn't there.
    THE WITNESS: You know, where she was and all of that, I don't know. 
I'm just--
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. You received calls from Ms. Lewinsky on this particular day?
    A. From this number, according to this piece of paper.
    Q. And does this time reference coincide with your recollection as 
to when you received calls from Ms. Lewinsky on this particular day?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And during these calls is when she related the difficulty of the 
job interview; is that correct?
    A. I believe so--that it had not gone well.
    Q. All right. And then, subsequently, you put in a call to Mr. 
Perelman at Revlon?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And that was to encourage him to take a second look. Is that 
call number 6 on this summary?
    A. Call number 6; it lasted one minute and 42 seconds.
    Q. And is that the call that you placed to Mr. Perelman?
    A. I believe that is correct.
    Q. And this was subsequent to the calls that you received from Ms. 
Lewinsky?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And then you let Ms. Lewinsky know that you had called Mr. 
Perelman; and do you recall what you would have told her at that time?
    A. I think I told her that I had spoken with, uh--with, uh, Mr. 
Perelman, the chairman, and that I was hopeful that things would work 
out.
    Q. All right. And, in fact, they did work out because the next day 
you were informed that a temporary job--or a preliminary job offer had 
been made to Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. That's right.
    Q. So she was able to secure the job based upon your call to Mr. 
Perelman?
    A. Based upon my call, from the time that I called Halperin through 
to Mr. Perelman.
    Q. All right.
    A. I take credit for that.
    Q. All right. Now, in fact, you've used terms like ``the Jordan 
magic worked''?
    A. It--it has from time to time.
    Q. And it did on this occasion?
    A. I believe so.
    Q. And then, you also informed Ms. Betty Currie that the mission 
was accomplished?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And after securing the job for Ms. Lewinsky, you did inform 
Betty Currie of that fact?
    A. And the President.
    Q. All right. And was the purpose of letting Betty Currie know so 
that she could tell the President?
    A. She saw the President much more often that I did.
    Q. And--but you wanted to inform the President personally that you 
were successful in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And you did that, uh--was it on the--what, the day after she 
secured the job or the day--the day that she secured the job?
    A. I don't know the answer to that.
    Q. Well, shortly thereafter is it fair to say that you informed the 
President personally?
    A. I certainly told him.
    Q. All right. Now, at this point, you had successfully obtained a 
job for Ms. Lewinsky at the request of the President, and you had been 
successful in obtaining an attorney for Ms. Lewinsky. Did you see your 
responsibilities in regard to Ms. Lewinsky as continuing or completed?
    A. I don't know, uh, that I saw them as, uh, necessary completed. 
There is--as you know from your own experience in helping young people 
with work, there tends to be some sense of responsibility to follow 
through, that they get to work on time, that they work hard, and that 
they succeed. So I don't think that I felt that my responsibility had 
terminated. I felt like I had a continuing responsibility to just make 
sure that it happened and that she--that it worked out all right. But I 
don't think I acted on that responsibility.
    Q. Well, this is--the job was completed--I believe it was January 
8th when she secured the job?
    A. That was the day that I called Ronald Perelman.
    Q. Okay, so it would have been the 9th that she would have been 
informed that she had the job.
    A. That's right.
    Q. So this is the 9th of January, and that mission had been 
accomplished. Now, I want you to recall your testimony of May 28th 
before the grand jury in which the question was asked to you--and this 
is at page 81; the question begins at the bottom of page 80.
    Question: ``When you introduced Monica Lewinsky to Frank Carter on 
December 22, 1997, what further involvement did you expect to have with 
Monica Lewinsky and Frank Carter?''
    Answer: ``Beyond getting her the job, I thought it was finished, 
done''--and what's that last word you used?
    A. ``Fini.''
    Q. ``Fini.'' And so that was the basis on the question, was your 
previous testimony that after you got Ms. Lewinsky a job and after you 
secured her attorney, there was really no other need for involvement or 
continued meetings with her?
    A. That is correct. That does not mean, on the other hand, that, 
uh, if you go to a meeting at the board, that you don't stop in and see 
how--how people are doing. In this circumstance, that process was 
short-circuited very quickly.
    Q. I'm sorry?
    A. She never ended up working there. You--you--you do remember 
that.
    Q. Now, but you had described your frequent telephone calls from 
Ms. Lewinsky as being bordering on annoyance, I think. Is that a fair 
characterization?
    A. That's a fair characterization.
    Q. And you're a busy man. You stopped billing at $450 an hour. 
You're having calls from Ms. Lewinsky. Were you glad at this point to 
have this ``bordering on annoyance'' situation completed?
    A. ``Glad'' is probably the wrong word. ``Relieved'' is maybe a 
better word.
    Q. All right. Now, during the time that you were helping Ms. 
Lewinsky secure a job, this was widely known at the White House, is 
that correct?
    A. I--I don't know the extent to which it was widely known. I dealt 
with Ms. Currie and with the President.
    Q. In fact, Ms. Cheryl Mills, sitting here at counsel table, knew 
that you were helping Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I believe that's true.
    Q. And Betty Currie knew that you were helping Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Yes.
    Q. The President knew it?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And you presumed that Bruce Lindsey knew it?
    A. I presumed that. That's a very small number, given the number of 
people who work at the White House.
    Q. Now, after that December 19 meeting--and I'm backtracking a 
little bit--the meeting that you had with Ms. Lewinsky in which she 
covered with you the fact that she had been subpoenaed, after that, you 
had numerous conversations with Ms. Betty Currie; is that correct?
    A. I'm not sure I had numerous conversations with Ms. Betty Currie, 
but I have always during this administration been in touch with Ms. 
Currie.
    Q. And during those conversations with Ms. Betty Currie, did you 
let her know that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
    A. I think I've testified to that.
    Q. All right, and so would that have been fairly shortly after the 
meeting on December 19th with Ms. Lewinsky that you notified Betty 
Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had in fact been subpoenaed?
    A. I--I think that's safe to say, Counselor.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Senator, I--this would be a good time for a break, 
if that would meet with your approval, for lunch.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: And I'm--it's hard to estimate, and you probably 
don't trust lawyers when they tell you how long it's going to take 
after lunch, but--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Try your best. Do you want to make an estimate, 
or you'd rather not?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Oh, I think it would be less than an hour that I 
would have remaining, and most likely much shorter than that.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
    THE WITNESS: May I make a suggestion? It's 25 minutes to 1. Do you 
want to go to 1 o'clock?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I think a break would be helpful.
    THE WITNESS: To you or to me?
    [Laughter.]
    SENATOR THOMPSON: I think some of us have some scheduling issues, 
and I do understand that, so I'm open to any suggestions, Senator Dodd 
or anyone else, as to how long we want to take. Yesterday, they took an 
hour. I'm not--we have a conference and I could use a little extra 
time, I suppose, in addition to the hour, but it's not of major concern 
to me.
    I assume you want to get back as soon as possible.
    THE WITNESS: I'm prepared to forgo lunch and stay here as long as 
need be so we can finish. And we don't have to have lunch; we can just 
keep going, if it's all right with counsel.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Well, we've got some scheduling issues that we 
are going to have to take care of. So let's just make it--let's just 
make it--
    SENATOR DODD: That clock is a little fast, I think.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Is it?
    SENATOR DODD: Is that right? It's about 12:30?
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: It's 12:35.
    SENATOR DODD: So an hour and 15 minutes. Is that--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: What about--what about--let's come back at 1:45. 
That will be about, what--that's an hour and 10 minutes, isn't it, or 8 
minutes, something like that?
    All right. Without objection, then--
    SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Senator, we have lunch outside here. It's 
sandwiches--
    SENATOR DODD: Can we go off the record?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Are we off the record? Let's go off the record.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record now at 12:33 p.m.
    [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken.]
                           afternoon session
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 1349 hours.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Mr. Hutchinson?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senators.
             direct examination by house managers--resumed
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, good afternoon.
    A. Good afternoon.
    Q. You testified very clearly earlier today that you were a close 
friend of the President. Would you also describe yourself as a friend 
of Mr. Kendall, sitting to my left, one of the attorneys for the 
President?
    A. Not only is Mr. Kendall my friend, Mr. Kendall has, 
unfortunately, the distinction of graduating from Wabash College, a 
little, small town in Indiana, and I'm a graduate of DePauw University, 
and we have a 100-year rivalry. And Mr. Kendall and I bet.
    Mr. Hutchinson, I am pleased to tell you that Mr. Kendall is in 
debt to me for 2 years because DePauw--
    MR. KENDALL: May I object?
    [Laughter.]
    THE WITNESS: --because DePauw University has defeated Wabash 
College two times in succession. And so, yes, we are very good friends. 
I have great respect for him as a person, as a lawyer, and despite his 
undergraduate degree from Wabash, I respect his intellect.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. May I assume from that answer that the answer to my question is 
yes?
    A. The answer--the answer to your question is, indubitably, yes.
    Q. Now I am going to ask another question in similar vein. You can 
answer yes or no. Do you consider yourself a friend of Cheryl Mills?
    A. That requires more than just a ``yes'' answer.
    Q. I do not want to shortchange her, but I know that--in fact, I 
think you might have, to a certain extent, mentored her. Is that a fair 
description?
    A. And vice versa.
    Q. All right. And Bruce Lindsey, is he also a friend of yours?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now--so when was the last time that you met with any member of 
the President's defense team?
    A. I have not had a meeting with a member of the President's 
defense team. They were right nextdoor to me just a few minutes ago, 
and we said hello, but we have not had a meeting. And maybe if you'd 
tell me about what, I can be more specific.
    Q. Well--and that's a good point. Certainly, we're lawyers, and we 
have casual conversations, and we visit and we exchange pleasantries, 
and that's the way life should be.
    I guess I was more specifically going to the question as to whether 
you have discussed with the President's defense team any matter of 
substance relating to the present proceedings in the United States 
Senate.
    A. Any matter of substance relating to these proceedings here in 
the United States Senate have been handled very ably by my lawyer, Mr. 
William Hundley.
    Q. And I understand that, but my question is--despite your able 
representation by Mr. Hundley--my question is--is whether you had any 
meetings or discussions with the President's defense team in regard to 
these proceedings.
    A. The answer is no.
    Q. Thank you.
    And has anyone briefed you other than your attorney, Mr. Hundley, 
on yesterday's deposition of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. The answer is no.
    Q. Now, you know Greg Craig?
    A. I do know Greg Craig.
    Q. And he's a member of the President's defense team as well?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And you have not had any meetings of substance with him in 
regard to the present proceedings?
    A. I have not.
    Q. And have you had any meetings with any of the President's 
defense team in regard to not just the present proceedings, but prior 
proceedings related to your testimony before the grand jury or the 
investigation by the OIC?
    A. I have had conversations with the President's lawyer, Mr. 
Bennett, and a conversation or two with Mr. Kendall on the issue of 
settlement of the Paula Jones case, and I believe I testified to that 
before the grand jury.
    Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Jordan, and now let me move to another 
area.
    Do you recall an occasion in which Ms. Betty Currie came to see you 
in your office a few days before the President's deposition in the 
Jones case on January 17th?
    A. Yes, I do.
    Q. And I believe you have previously indicated that it was on a 
Thursday or Friday, which would have been around the 15th or 16th?
    A. Yeah. I've testified to that specifically as to the date in my 
grand jury testimony, and I stand on that testimony.
    Q. Certainly. But in general fashion, it would have been a couple 
of days before the President's testimony on January 17th?
    A. I believe that is correct, sir.
    Q. And did--was this meeting with Betty Currie originated by a 
telephone call with Ms. Betty Currie?
    A. Ms. Currie called me.
    Q. And did she explain to you why she needed to see you?
    A. Yes, she did.
    Q. And was that that she had a call from Michael Isikoff of 
Newsweek magazine?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And what did she say about that that caused her to call you?
    A. She had said that Mr. Isikoff had called her and wanted to 
interview her, having something to do with Monica Lewinsky, and I said 
to her, why don't you come to see me.
    Q. And why did you ask her to come see you, rather than just 
talking to her about it over the telephone?
    A. I felt more comfortable doing that, and I think she felt 
comfortable or more comfortable doing that, rather than doing it on the 
telephone. And so I asked her to come to my office, and she did.
    Q. Did you consider--or did she seem upset at the time that she 
called?
    A. I think she was concerned.
    Q. And as--you did in fact meet with her in your office?
    A. I did.
    Q. And what did she relate to you in your office?
    A. That Michael Isikoff was a friend of hers, and that Michael 
Isikoff had called to--pursuant to a story that he was about to write 
having to do with Ms. Lewinsky, and she--she was concerned about what 
to do. And I suggested to her that she talk to Bruce Lindsey and to 
Mike McCurry as to what she should do, Bruce Lindsey on the legal side 
and Mike McCurry on the communications side.
    Q. Did she explain to you what it was specifically that Mr. Isikoff 
was inquiring about in reference to Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. No. I don't remember the exact nature of Isikoff's inquiry. What 
I do remember is that Isikoff, a Newsweek magazine reporter, had called 
and was making these inquiries, and she was at a loss as to where to 
turn or to what to do, and I think that stemmed from the fact of some 
White House policy saying that before you talk to anybody in the media, 
you check it out.
    Q. And did she explain to you that she had already seen Bruce 
Lindsey about it before she came to see you?
    A. She did not.
    Q. And so you were basically telling her to see Bruce Lindsey, and 
if she had already seen that, then that might have not been that 
helpful?
    A. I don't know whether I was being helpful or not. I responded to 
her, and I gave her the advice to call Bruce Lindsey and to call Mike 
McCurry.
    Q. Let me refer you to the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, and 
perhaps that will help refresh you, and if not, perhaps you can respond 
to it.
    A. Sure.
    Q. And for reference purposes, I'm referring to the grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Betty Currie on May 6th, 1998, at page 122.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Is there a way I--
    MR. HUNDLEY: We don't have that. If you want to--if you want us to 
read along or just--
    THE WITNESS: Wait a minute. I might have it right here. What page?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: What's the exhibit number?
    MR. HUNDLEY: How long is it, Mr. Hutchinson?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: This would just be some short question-and-answers.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Why don't you just read it? We don't--go ahead.
    THE WITNESS: Oh, fine.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. I'm going to read it, and if there's--it's at page 122, but this 
just puts it in context.
    The question: ``Ms. Currie, if I'm not mistaken, if I could ask you 
a couple of questions. When you found out Mr. Isikoff was curious about 
the courier receipts, you were concerned enough to go visit Vernon 
Jordan?''
    The answer is: ``Correct.''
    And I'm skipping on down. I'm trying to point to a couple of things 
that are of interest.
    And question: ``And you went to Bruce Lindsey because you said you 
knew that he was working on the matter?''
    And question: ``What did Bruce tell you after you told him this?''
    And answer: ``He told me not to call him back, referring to Mr. 
Isikoff, make him work for the story. I remember that.''
    And then she refers to going to see Mr. Jordan.
    Why did you tell him, or, ``Why did you call Mr. Jordan?''
    Answer: ``Because I had a comfort level with Vernon, and I wanted 
to see what he had to say about it.''
    MR. KENDALL: Counsel, excuse me. I object to your reading of that, 
but my understanding that the conversation with Bruce Lindsey occurred 
later. Are you representing that it occurred before the visit to Mr. 
Jordan? I don't have the transcript in front of me.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, I'm--I'm not making a representation one way 
or the other. I'm just representing what Ms. Currie testified to, and 
that is the context of it, that the visit to Mr. Lindsey was prior to 
going to see Mr. Jordan. And that is at page 122 through 130 of Betty 
Currie's transcript of May 6th, 1998.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. But the first question, Mr. Jordan, is that she refers to 
courier receipts. I believe that was referring to courier records of 
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the President.
    Did Ms. Currie come to you and say specifically that Mr. Isikoff 
was inquiring about courier records on gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the 
President?
    A. I have no recollection of her telling me about the specific 
inquiry that Isikoff was making. The issue for her was whether or not 
she should see him, and I said to her, before she made any decision 
about that, that she should talk to these two particular people on the 
White House staff.
    Q. Well, again, if Ms. Currie refers to the courier receipts on 
gifts, would that be in conflict in any way with your recollection as 
to what Mr. Isikoff was inquiring about, what Ms. Currie told you?
    A. I stand on what I've just said to you.
    Q. Now, you followed this case, and, of course--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: While we're on that subject, does counsel need 
any additional time to look over that? I don't want to leave an 
objection on the record. If you feel like you need to press it--
    SENATOR DODD: Do you have a copy of the document?
    MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, we don't have the full copy of the 
Currie transcript. This was not--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Why don't we reserve this, then, and you can be 
looking at it, and then we'll--we'll take it up a little later.
    MR. KENDALL: We're still actually missing some pages of the 
transcript. I don't know if somebody has that.
    SENATOR DODD: Why don't you see if you can't get them for them?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Okay.
    SENATOR DODD: All right?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: We'll let them be doing that, if that's okay with 
everyone and--
    SENATOR DODD: And you'll withdraw your objection as of right now, 
or--
    MR. KENDALL: Yes. I'll withdraw it until I can scrutinize the 
pages, but I may then renew it.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. On--there's been some testimony in this case by Ms. Lewinsky 
that on December 28th, there was a gift exchange with the President; 
that subsequent to that, Ms. Currie went out and picked up gifts from 
Ms. Lewinsky, and she put those gifts under Ms. Currie's bed. Are you 
familiar with that basic scenario?
    A. I read about it and heard about it. I do not know that because 
that was told to me by Ms. Lewinsky or by Ms. Currie.
    Q. Certainly, and I'm just setting that forth as a backdrop for my 
questioning.
    Now, you know, I guess it's--it might be difficult to understand a 
great deal of concern about a news media call, but if that news media 
call was about gifts or evidence that was in fact under Ms. Currie's 
bed or involved in that exchange, then that would be a little 
heightened concern.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Would that seem fair?
    A. I do not, as I've said to you, know specifically the nature of 
Mr. Isikoff's inquiry to Ms. Currie, and I know nothing at that 
particular time about Mr. Isikoff making an inquiry about gifts under 
the bed.
    Q. All right. I refer you to your grand jury testimony of March 5, 
1998, at page 73, when the question was asked of you about Ms. Currie's 
visit to you, ``What exactly did she tell you?'' and your answer: ``She 
told me that she had a call from Isikoff from Newsweek magazine, who 
was calling to make inquiries about Monica Lewinsky and some taped 
conversations, and I said you have to talk to Mike McCurry and you have 
to talk to Bruce Lindsey.''
    And so, despite your statement today that you have no recollection 
as to what she told you, going back to your March testimony, you 
referred to her relating Isikoff inquiring about taped conversations.
    A. And that's what it says, ``taped conversations,'' and I stand by 
that.
    What was taped, I don't know.
    Q. Well, I don't think you previously today mentioned taped 
conversations.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Well, I don't really think your question would have 
called for that response, but I'm not going to object.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Hundley.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. I'm trying to get to the heart of the matter. Ms. Currie is 
concerned enough that she leaves the White House and goes to see Mr. 
Vernon Jordan, and she raises an issue with you and, according to your 
testimony, you told her simply, you need to go see Mike McCurry or 
Bruce Lindsey.
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And it's your testimony that she never raised with you any issue 
concerning the--Mr. Isikoff inquiring about gifts and records of gifts 
by Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I stand by what I--what you just read to me about--from my 
testimony about tapes conversations. I have no recollection about gifts 
or gifts under the bed.
    Q. Okay. Are you saying it did not happen, or you have no 
recollection?
    A. I certainly have no recollection of it.
    Q. Well, do you have a specific recollection that it did not 
happen, that she never raised the issue of gifts with you?
    A. It is my judgment that it did not happen.
    Q. Did she seem satisfied with your advice to go see Mr. Bruce 
Lindsey, who she presumably had already seen?
    A. I assumed that she took my advice.
    Q. Did she discuss in any way with you the incident on December 
28th when she retrieved the gifts--
    A. She did not.
    Q. --from Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. She did not.
    Q. Now, a few days later, the President of the United States 
testified before the grand jury in the--excuse me--testified in his 
deposition in the Jones case.
    After the President's deposition, did he have a conversation with 
you on that day?
    A. Yes. I'm sure we talked.
    Q. And then, on the next day, and without getting into the entire 
record of telephone calls, there was, is it fair to say, a flurry of 
telephone calls in which everyone was trying to locate Ms. Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. The next day being which day?
    Q. The next day would have been--well, January 18th.
    A. That's Sunday.
    Q. Correct.
    MR. HUNDLEY: I think it's the 19th.
    THE WITNESS: I think it's the 19th when there was a flurry of 
calls.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I think you're absolutely correct.
    THE WITNESS: We'll be glad to be helpful to you in any way we can.
    MR. HUNDLEY: We're even now. I was wrong on one. You were wrong.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: That's fair enough, fair enough.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And on the 19th--of course, the 18th is in the record where the 
President visited with Ms. Betty Currie at the White House--on the 
19th, which would have been Monday, was there on that day a flurry of 
activity in which there were numerous telephone calls, trying to locate 
Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Yes. And you have a record of those telephone calls, and those 
telephone calls, Congressman, were driven by two events--first, the 
Drudge Report; and later in the afternoon, driven by the fact that, uh, 
I had been informed by Frank Carter, counsel to Ms. Lewinsky, that he 
had been relieved of his responsibilities as her counsel. And that is 
the basis for these numerous telephone calls.
    Q. And you yourself were engaged in some of those telephone calls 
trying to locate Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Oh, yes, to ask her--I mean, I had just found out that she had 
been involved in these conversations with this person called Linda 
Tripp, and that was of some curiosity and concern to me.
    Q. And you had heard Ms. Tripp's name previously on December 31st 
at the Park Hyatt?
    A. I've testified already that I never heard the name ``Linda 
Tripp'' until I saw the Drudge Report. I did not testify that I heard 
the name ``Linda Tripp'' on December 31st.
    Q. So the first time you heard Ms. Tripp's name was on January 19th 
when the Drudge Report came out?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And you had already secured a--
    A. The 18th, I believe it was.
    MR. HUNDLEY: Eighteenth.
    THE WITNESS: Not the 19th.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Thank you.
    You had already secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And you--
    A. Found a lawyer.
    Q. And a lawyer. And, as you had said at one point, job finished--
fini. Why is it that you felt like you needed to join in the search for 
Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. If you had been sitting where I was, and all of a sudden you 
found out, after getting her a job and after getting her a lawyer, that 
there's a report that says that she's been--she's been taped by some 
person named Linda Tripp, I think just, mother wit, common sense, 
judgment, would have suggested that you would be interested in what 
that was about.
    Q. And were you trying to provide assistance to the President of 
the United States in trying to locate Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I was not trying to help the President of the United States. At 
that point, I was trying to satisfy myself as to what had gone on with 
this person for whom I had gotten both a job and a lawyer.
    Q. Now, subsequent to this, you felt it necessary to make a public 
statement on January 22 in front of the Park Hyatt Hotel?
    A. I did make a public statement on January 22nd at the Park Hyatt 
Hotel.
    Q. And what was the reason that you gave this public statement?
    A. I gave the public statement because I was being rebuked and 
scorned and talked about, sure as you're born, and I felt some need to 
explain to the public what had happened.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: All right. And I have a copy of that public 
statement that is marked as Grand Jury Exhibit 87, but we will mark it 
as Exhibit--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Seven, I believe.
    SENATOR DODD: We've gone through 9, haven't we? You're marking it. 
If you're only marking it, I think we--
    SENATOR THOMPSON: We have six exhibits, didn't we?
    SENATOR DODD: We've done more than that, haven't we?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I have nine.
    SENATOR DODD: Nine. Did you enter 9, or did you just note it?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Six were entered, two were sustained, I think.
    MS. MILLS: I have seven.
    SENATOR DODD: Nine, you have here, but we didn't--I don't know if 
you--you don't have 9 as an exhibit, or just noted?
    MR. GRIFFITH: Nine was Grand Jury 44.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: We just noted it, I believe.
    SENATOR DODD: You didn't ask that it be entered in the record?
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I believe that's correct.
    SENATOR DODD: Yes.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: How about those we sustained objections to? That 
doesn't count.
    SENATOR DODD: Well, they're still marked.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: They were marked?
    SENATOR DODD: So which one should this be? Ten?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: This will be 10?
    SENATOR DODD: This is 10, then.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: All right, Number 10.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 10 marked for identification.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Do you have a copy of that, Mr. Jordan?
    A. I have a copy of it. Thank you.
    Q. Thank you. Now, prior to making this public statement, did you 
consult with the President's attorney, Mr. Bob Bennett?
    A. I did not, not about this statement.
    Q. Did you consult with the President's attorney, Mr. Bob Bennett?
    A. I did not consult with him. Mr. Bennett came to my office and 
met with me and my attorney, Mr. Hundley, in my office.
    Q. All right. And that was sometime prior to making this statement?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And it would be--and it would have been between the 19th and the 
22nd?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. It would have been after all of the public issues--
    A. It was after--
    Q. --came up?
    A. --I returned from Washington, and it may have been--from New 
York--and it may have been, I think, Wednesday afternoon.
    Q. Now, in this statement, you indicated that you referred Ms. 
Lewinsky for interviews at American Express and at Revlon.
    A. That is correct, and Young & Rubicam.
    Q. And in fact, as your testimony today indicates, you did more 
than refer her for interviews, did you not?
    A. Explain what you mean, and I'll be happy to answer.
    Q. Well, in fact, when the interview went poorly, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, you made calls to get her a second interview and to make it 
happen.
    A. That is safe to say.
    Q. All right. And I think you've also described your involvement in 
the job search as running the job search?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And so it was a little bit more than simply referring her for 
interviews. Is that a fair statement?
     That's a fair statement.
    Q. And then, in this statement, you also indicate that ``Ms. 
Lewinsky was referred to me by Ms. Betty Currie''----
    A. Yes.
    Q. --is that correct?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And in fact, you were acting, as you stated, at the behest of 
the President?
    A. Through Ms. Currie. I'm satisfied with this statement as 
correct.
    Q. So--but you were acting in the job search at the behest of the 
President, as you have previously testified?
    A. I've testified to that.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Now, we would offer this as Exhibit No. 10.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Without objection, it will be made a part of the 
record.
    [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 10 received in evidence.]
    MR. HUNDLEY: The only problem with this line of questioning is I 
think I wrote that thing.
    [Laughter.]
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. After you--after you last testified before the grand jury in 
June of '98, since then, the President testified before the grand jury 
in August, and prior to his testimony before the grand jury in August, 
he made his statement to the Nation in which he--I believe the language 
was admitted to ``an inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.''
    Now, at the time that you testified in June of '98, you did not 
have this information, did you?
    A. He had not made that statement on the 17th of August, that's for 
sure.
    Q. And was he in fact, to your knowledge, still denying the 
existence of that relationship?
    A. I think, as I remember the statement, he said he misled the 
American people.
    Q. And subsequent to this admission, did you talk to your friend, 
the President of the United States, about his false statements to you?
    A. I have not spoken to him about any false statements, one way or 
the other.
    Q. Now, you have testified that you in the job search were acting 
at the behest of the President of the United States; is that correct?
    A. I stand on that.
    Q. And there is no question but that Ms. Monica Lewinsky understood 
that?
    A. I have to assume that she understood that.
    Q. Okay. And in the law, there is the rule of agency and apparent 
authority. Is it safe to assume that Ms. Lewinsky believed that you had 
apparent authority on behalf of the President of the United States?
    A. I think I know enough about the law to say that the law of 
agency is not applicable in this situation where there was a potential 
romance and not a work situation. I think the law of agency has to do 
with a work situation and an employment situation and not having to do 
with some sort of romance. I think that's right.
    Q. Well, let me take it out of the legal realm.
    A. You raised it--I didn't.
    Q. And let's put it in the realm of mother wit. Ms. Lewinsky is 
looking to you as a friend of the President of the United States, 
knowing that you're acting at the behest of the President of the United 
States. Is it not reasonable to assume that when she communicates 
something to you or she hears something from you, that it's as if she 
is talking to someone who is acting for the President?
    A. No. When she's talking to me, she's talking to me, and I can 
only speak for me and act for me.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Could I have just a moment?
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: At this time, Your Honors, the House Managers would 
reserve the balance of its time.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel?
    MR. HUNDLEY: Fine.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
    THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Kendall?
        examination by counsel for the president by mr. kendall
    Q. Mr. Jordan, is there anything you think it appropriate to add to 
the record?
    A. Mr. Hutchinson, I'd just like to----
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I'm going to object to the form of that question. I 
think that even though--and that's not even a leading question; that's 
an open-ended question that calls for a narrative response. And I think 
in fairness to the record that that is just simply too broad for this 
deposition purpose.
    SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Kendall, is there any chance of perhaps your 
rephrasing the question somewhat?
    MR. KENDALL: Certainly.
    BY MR. KENDALL:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, you were asked questions about job assistance. Would 
you describe the job assistance you have over your career given to 
people who have come to you requesting help finding a job or finding 
employment?
    A. Well, I've known about job assistance and have for a very long 
time. I learned about it dramatically when I finished at Howard 
University Law School, 1960, to return home to Atlanta, Georgia to look 
for work. In the process of my--during my senior year, it was very 
clear to me that no law firm in Atlanta would hire me. It was very 
clear to me that, uh, I could not get a job as a black lawyer in the 
city government, the county government, the State government or the 
Federal Government.
    And thanks to my high school bandmaster, Mr. Kenneth Days, who 
called his fraternity brother, Donald L. Hollowell, a civil rights 
lawyer, and said, ``That Jordan boy is a fine boy, and you ought to 
consider him for a job at your law firm,'' that's when I learned about 
job referral, and that job referral by Kenneth Days, now going to Don 
Hollowell, got me a job as a civil rights lawyer working for Don 
Hollowell for $35 a week.
    I have never forgotten Kenneth Days' generosity. And given the fact 
that all of the other doors for employment as a black lawyer graduating 
from Howard University were open to me, that's always--that's always 
been etched in my heart and my mind, and as a result, because I stand 
on Mr. Days' shoulders and Don Hollowell's shoulders, I felt some 
responsibility to the extent that I could be helpful or got in a 
position to be helpful, that I would do that.
    And there is I think ample evidence, both in the media and by 
individuals across this country, that at such times that I have been 
presented with that opportunity that I have taken advantage of that 
opportunity, and I think that I have been successful at it.
    Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in 
any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones 
case?
    A. No.
                                 ______
                                 

    In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the 
   Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
                                 States

           excerpts of video deposition of sidney blumenthal
            (Wednesday, February 3, 1999, Washington, D.C.)
    SENATOR SPECTER: If none, I will swear the witness.
    Mr. Blumenthal, will you please stand up and raise your right hand?
    You, Sidney Blumenthal, do swear that the evidence you shall give 
in this case now pending between the United States and William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
    MR. BLUMENTHAL: I do.
    Whereupon, SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL was called as a witness and, after 
having been first duly sworn by Senator Specter, was examined and 
testified as follows:
    SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you.
    THE WITNESS: Thank you.
    SENATOR SPECTER: The House Managers may begin their questioning.
    MR. ROGAN: Thank you, Senator.
                     examination by house managers
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, first, good morning.
    A. Good morning to you.
    Q. My name is Jim Rogan. As you know, I am one of the House 
Managers and will be conducting this deposition pursuant to authority 
from the United States Senate.
    First, as a preliminary matter, we have never had the pleasure of 
meeting or speaking until this morning, correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. If any question I ask is unclear or is in any way ambiguous, if 
you would please call that to my attention, I will be happy to try to 
restate it or rephrase the question.
    A. Thank you.
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, where are you currently employed?
    A. At the White House.
    Q. Is that in the Executive Office of the President?
    A. It is.
    Q. What is your current title?
    A. My title is Assistant to the President.
    Q. Was that your title on January 21st, 1998?
    A. It was.
    Q. For the record, that is the date that The Washington Post story 
appeared that essentially broke the Monica Lewinsky story?
    A. Yes.
    Q. On that date, were you the Assistant to the President as to any 
specific subject matter?
    A. I dealt with a variety of areas.
    Q. Did your duties entail any specific matter, or were you 
essentially a jack-of-all-trades at the White House for the President?
    A. Well, I was hired to help the President develop his ideas and 
themes about the new consensus for the country, and I was hired to deal 
with problems like the impact of globalization, democracy 
internationally and domestically, the future of civil society, and the 
Anglo-American Project; and I also was hired to work on major speeches.
    Q. You testified previously that your duties are such as the 
President and Chief of Staff shall decide. Would that be a fair 
characterization?
    A. Oh, yes.
    Q. How long have you been employed in this capacity?
    A. Since August 11th, 1997.
    Q. And in the course of your duties, do you personally advise the 
President as to the matters that you just shared with us?
    A. Yes.
    Q. How often do you meet with the President personally to advise 
him?
    A. It varies. Sometimes several times a week; sometimes I go 
without seeing him for a number of weeks at a time.
    Q. Is dealing with the media part of your--your job?
    A. Yes. It's part of my job and part of the job of most people in 
the White House.
    Q. Was that also one of your responsibilities on January 21st, 
1998, when the Monica Lewinsky story broke?
    A. Yes.
    Q. You previously testified that you had a role in the Monica 
Lewinsky matter after the story broke in The Washington Post on that 
date, at least in reference to your White House duties; is that 
correct?
    A. I'm unclear on what you mean by ``a role.''
    Q. Specifically, you testified that you attended meetings in the 
White House in the Office of Legal Counsel in the morning and in the 
evening almost every day once the story broke?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And what times did those meetings occur after the story broke, 
these regular meetings?
    A. The morning meetings occurred around 8:30, after the morning 
message meeting, and the evening meetings occurred around 6:45.
    Q. Are those meetings still ongoing?
    A. No.
    Q. Can you tell me when those meetings ended?
    A. Oh, I'd say about the time that the impeachment trial started.
    Q. That would be about a month or--about a month ago?
    A. Yeah, something like that.
    Q. Thank you.
    A. I don't recall exactly.
    Q. Sure. But up until that point, were these essentially regularly 
scheduled meetings, twice a day, 8:30 in the morning and 6:45 in the 
evening?
    A. Right.
    Q. Did you generally attend those meetings?
    A. Generally.
    Q. Now, initially, when you testified before the grand jury on 
February 26th, 1998, your first grand jury appearance, you stated that 
these twice-daily meetings dealt exclusively with the Monica Lewinsky 
matter, correct?
    A. They dealt with our press reaction, how we would respond to 
press reports dealing with it. This was a huge story, and we were being 
inundated with hundreds of calls.
    Q. Right.
    A. So--
    Q. What I'm--what I'm trying to decipher is that at least 
initially, at the time of your first grand jury appearance, which was 
about a month after the story broke--
    A. Right.
    Q. --the meetings were exclusively related to Monica Lewinsky. Is 
that correct?
    A. Pretty much.
    Q. And then, 4 months later, when you testified before the grand 
jury in June, you said these meetings were still ongoing, and you 
referenced them at that time as discussing the policy, political, legal 
and media impact of scandals and how to deal with them. Do you remember 
that testimony?
    A. If I could see it.
    Q. Certainly. I'm happy to invite your attention to your grand jury 
testimony of June 4th, 1998, page 25, lines 1 through 5.
    MR. ROGAN: And that would be, for the Senators' and counsel's 
benefit--I believe that's in Tab 4 of the materials provided.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: Right. I see it.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. You've had a chance to review that, Mr. Blumenthal?
    A. I have.
    Q. And that--that's correct testimony?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Thank you.
    At the time you spoke of--you used the word ``scandals'' in the 
plural, and you were asked on June 4th what other scandals were 
discussed and you said they range from the Paula Jones trial to our 
China policy. Is that a fair statement?
    A. Oh, yes, yes. I do.
    Q. Who typically attended those meetings?
    A. As I recall, there were about a dozen or so people, sometimes 
more, sometimes less.
    Q. Do you remember the names of the people?
    A. I'll try to.
    Q. Would it be helpful if I directed your attention to a couple of 
passages in the grand jury testimony?
    A. Sure, if you'd like.
    MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senate and counsel's attention to the 
February 26th grand jury testimony, page 11, lines 2 through 16.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: Sure. Yeah.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. That would be Tab Number 1.
    A. Right, I see that.
    What it says here is that the names listed are Charles Ruff, Lanny 
Breuer, who is right over here, Cheryl Mills, Bruce Lindsey, John 
Podesta, Rahm Emanuel, Paul Begala, Jim Kennedy, Mike McCurry, Joe 
Lockhart, Ann Lewis, Adam Goldberg, Don Goldberg, and that's--those are 
the names that I--that I recall.
    Q. Thank you.
    And just for my benefit, Mr. Ruff, Mr. Breuer, Ms. Mills, and Mr. 
Lindsey, those are all White House counsel?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Could you just briefly identify for the record the other 
individuals that are--that are listed in your testimony?
    A. Sure. John Podesta was Deputy Chief of Staff. Rahm Emanuel was a 
Senior Advisor. Paul Begala had the title of Counselor. Jim Kennedy was 
in the Legal Counsel Office. Mike McCurry was Press Secretary. Joe 
Lockhart at that time was Deputy Press Secretary. Ann Lewis was 
Director of Communications, still is. Adam Goldberg worked as a--as an 
Assistant in the Legal Counsel Office, and Don Goldberg worked in 
Legislative Affairs.
    Q. Thank you.
    Mr. Blumenthal, specifically inviting your attention to January 
21st, 1998, you testified before the grand jury that on that date, you 
personally spoke to the President regarding the Monica Lewinsky matter, 
correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. When you spoke to the President, did you discuss The Washington 
Post story about Ms. Lewinsky that appeared that morning?
    A. I don't recall if we talked about that article specifically.
    Q. Do you recall on June 25th testifying before the grand jury, and 
I'm quoting, ``We were speaking about the story that appeared that 
morning''?
    A. Right. We were--we were speaking about that story, but I don't 
know if we referred to The Post.
    Q. Thank you.
    You are familiar with The Washington Post story that broke that 
day?
    A. I am.
    Q. That story essentially stated that the Office of Independent 
Counsel was investigating whether the President made false statements 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case, correct, to 
the best of your recollection?
    A. If you could repeat that?
    Q. Sure. The story stated that the Office of Independent Counsel 
was investigating whether the President made false statements about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case.
    A. Right.
    Q. And also that the Office of Independent Counsel was 
investigating whether the President obstructed justice in the Jones 
case. Is that your best recollection of what that story was about?
    A. Yes.
    Q. How did you end up speaking to the President on that specific 
date?
    A. I don't remember exactly whether he had summoned me or whether I 
had asked to speak him--to him.
    Q. And I realize, by the way, I--just so you know, I'm not trying 
to trick you or anything. I realize this is a year later--
    A. Right.
    Q. --and your testimony was many months ago, and so if I invite 
your attention to previous grand jury testimony to refresh your 
recollection, I don't want you to feel that in any way I'm trying to 
imply that you're not being candid in your testimony.
    With that, if I may invite your--your attention to the June 4th 
grand jury testimony on page 47, lines 5 through 6.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Let me see if this helps to refresh your recollection. You said, 
``It was about a week before the State of the Union speech.''
    A. I see.
    Q. ``I was in my office, and the President asked me to come to his 
office.''
    Does that help to refresh your recollection?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And so you now remember that the President asked to speak with 
you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you go to the Oval Office?
    A. Yes.
    Q. During that conversation, were you alone with the President?
    A. I was.
    Q. Do you remember if the door was closed?
    A. It was.
    Q. When you met with the President, did you relate to him a 
conversation you had with the First Lady earlier that day?
    A. I did.
    Q. What did you tell the President the First Lady told you earlier 
that day?
    A. I believe that I told him that the First Lady had called me 
earlier in the day, and in the light of the story in The Post had told 
me that the President had helped troubled people in the past and that 
he had done it many times and that he was a compassionate person and 
that he helped people also out of his religious conviction and that 
this was part of--part of his nature.
    Q. And did she also tell you that one of the other reasons he 
helped people was out of his personal temperament?
    A. Yes. That's what I mean by that.
    Q. And the First Lady also at least shared with you her opinion 
that he was being attacked for political motives?
    MR. McDANIEL: Can I get a clarification, Senator--Senator Specter? 
The earlier question, I thought, had been what Mr. Blumenthal had 
relayed to the President had been said by the First Lady.
    MR. ROGAN: That's correct.
    MR. McDANIEL: And now the questions are back--it seems to me have 
moved to another topic--
    MR. ROGAN: No. That's--
    MR. McDANIEL: --which is what--
    MR. ROGAN: I'm--
    MR. McDANIEL: --did the First Lady say.
    MR. ROGAN: And I thank--I thank the gentleman for that 
clarification. I'm specifically asking what the witness relayed to the 
President respecting his conversation with--his earlier conversation 
with the First Lady.
    MR. McDANIEL: Thank you.
    Do you understand that, what he said?
    THE WITNESS: I understand the distinction, and I don't--
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. I'll restate the question, if that would help.
    A. Please.
    Q. Do you remember telling the President that the First Lady said 
to you that she felt that with--in reference to this story that he was 
being attacked for political motives?
    A. I remember her saying that to me, yes.
    Q. And you relayed that to the President?
    A. I'm not sure I relayed that to the President. I may have just 
relayed the gist of the conversation to him. I don't--I'm not sure 
whether I relayed the entire conversation.
    MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators' and counsel's attention to the 
June 4th, 1998, testimony of Mr. Blumenthal, page 47, beginning at line 
5.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, let me just read a passage to you and tell me if 
this helps to refresh your memory.
    A. Mm-hmm.
    MR. ROGAN: Do you have that, Lanny?
    MR. BREUER: Yes, I do. Thank you.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Reading at line--at line 5, ``I was in my office, and the 
President asked me to come to the Oval Office. I was seeing him 
frequently in this period about the State of the Union and Blair's 
visit''--and I--that was Prime Minister Tony Blair, as an aside, 
correct?
    A. That's right.
    Q. Thank you.
    And then again, reading at line 7, ``So I went up to the Oval 
Office and I began the discussion, and I said that I had received--that 
I had spoken to the First Lady that day in the afternoon about the 
story that had broke in the morning, and I related to the President my 
conversation with the First Lady and the conversation went as follows. 
The First Lady said that she was distressed that the President was 
being attacked, in her view, for political motives for his ministry of 
a troubled person. She said that the President ministers to troubled 
people all the time,'' and then it goes on to--
    A. Right.
    Q. --relate the substance of the answer you just gave.
    Does that help to refresh your recollection with respect to what 
you told the President, the First Lady had said earlier?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Thank you.
    And do you now remember that the First Lady had indicated to you 
that she felt the President was being attacked for political motives?
    A. Well, I remember she said that to me.
    Q. And just getting us back on track, a few moments ago, I think 
you--you shared with us that the First Lady said that the President 
helped troubled people and he had done it many times in the past.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Do you remember testifying before the grand jury on that 
subject, saying that the First Lady said he has done this dozens, if 
not hundreds, of times with people--
    A. Yes.
    Q. --with troubled people?
    A. I recall that.
    Q. After you related the conversation that you had with the First 
Lady to the President, what do you remember saying to the President 
next about the subject of Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Well, I recall telling him that I understood he felt that way, 
and that he did help people, but that he should stop trying to help 
troubled people personally; that troubled people are troubled and that 
they can get you in a lot of messes and that you had to cut yourself 
off from it and you just had to do it. That's what I recall saying to 
him.
    Q. Do you also remember in that conversation saying to him, ``You 
really need to not do that at this point, that you can't get near 
anybody who is even remotely crazy. You're President''?
    A. Yes. I think that was a little later in the conversation, but I 
do recall saying that.
    Q. When you told the President that he should avoid contact with 
troubled people, what did the President say to you in response?
    A. I'm trying to remember the sequence of it. He--he said that was 
very difficult for him. He said he--he felt a need to help troubled 
people, and it was hard for him to--to cut himself off from doing that.
    Q. Do you remember him saying specifically, ``It's very difficult 
for me to do that, given how I am. I want to help people''?
    A. I recall--I recall that.
    Q. And when the President referred to trying to help people, did 
you understand him in that conversation to be referring to Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. I think it included Monica Lewinsky, but also many others.
    Q. Right, but it was your understanding that he was all--he was 
specifically referring to Monica Lewinsky in that list of people that 
he tried to help?
    A. I believe that--that was implied.
    Q. Do you remember being asked that question before the grand jury 
and giving the answer, ``I understood that''?
    A. If you could point it out to me, I'd be happy to see it.
    Q. Certainly.
    MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators' and counsel's attention to the 
June 25th, 1998, grand jury, page 5, I believe it's at lines 6 through 
8.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: Yes, I see that. Thank you.
    By MR. ROGAN:
    Q. You recall that now?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Thank you.
    Mr. Blumenthal, did the President then relate a conversation he had 
with Dick Morris to you?
    A. He did.
    Q. What was the substance of that conversation, as the President 
related it to you?
    A. He said that he had spoken to Dick Morris earlier that day, and 
that Dick Morris had told him that if Nixon, Richard Nixon, had given a 
nationally televised speech at the beginning of the Watergate affair, 
acknowledging everything he had done wrong, he may well have survived 
it, and that was the conversation that Dick Morris--that's what Dick 
Morris said to the President.
    Q. Did it sound to you like the President was suggesting perhaps he 
would go on television and give a national speech?
    A. Well, I don't know. I didn't know.
    Q. And when the President related the substance of his conversation 
with Dick Morris to you, how did you respond to that?
    A. I said to the President, ``Well, what have you done wrong?''
    Q. Did he reply?
    A. He did.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said, ``I haven't done anything wrong.''
    Q. And what did you say to that response?
    A. Well, I said, as I recall, ``That's one of the stupidest ideas I 
ever heard. If you haven't done anything wrong, why would you do 
that?''
    Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened 
between him and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. As I recall, he did.
    Q. What did the President tell you?
    A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point 
and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he 
had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him. 
And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the 
stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would 
claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and 
that she would tell people.
    Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky 
would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her 
peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
    A. Yes, that's right.
    Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm 
quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot 
of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
    A. Yes. He told me that.
    Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the 
President?
    A. Right, in--in that sequence.
    Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared 
this information with you?
    A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.
    Q. And at that point, did you repeat your earlier admonition to him 
as far as not trying to help troubled people?
    A. I did. I--I think that's when I told him that you can't get near 
crazy people, uh, or troubled people. Uh, you're President; you just 
have to separate yourself from this.
    Q. And I'm not sure, based on your testimony, if you gave that 
admonition to him once or twice. Let me--let me clarify for you why my 
questioning suggested it was twice. In your grand jury testimony on 
June the 4th, at page 49, beginning at line 25, you began the sentence 
by saying, and I quote, ``And I repeated to the President''--
    A. Right.
    Q. --``that he really needed never to be near people who were''--
    A. Right.
    Q. --``troubled like this,'' and so forth. Do you remember now if 
you--if that was correct? Did you find yourself in that conversation 
having to repeat the admonition to him that you'd given earlier?
    A. I'm sure I did. Uh, I felt--I felt that pretty strongly. He 
shouldn't be involved with troubled people.
    Q. Do you remember the President also saying something about being 
like a character in a novel?
    A. I do.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. Uh, he said to me, uh, that, uh, he felt like a character in a 
novel. Uh, he felt like somebody, uh, surrounded by, uh, an oppressive 
environment that was creating a lie about him. He said he felt like, 
uh, the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.
    Q. Did he also say he felt like he can't get the truth out?
    A. Yes, I--I believe he said that.
    Q. Politicians are always loathe to confess their ignorance, 
particularly on videotape. I will do so. I'm unfamiliar with the novel 
Darkness at Noon. Did you--do you have any familiarity with that, or 
did you understand what the President meant by that?
    A. I--I understood what he meant. I--I was familiar with the book.
    Q. What--what did he mean by that, per your understanding?
    A. Uh, the book is by Arthur Koestler, who was somebody who had 
been a communist and had become disillusioned with communism. And it's 
an anti-communist novel. It's about, uh, uh, the Stalinist purge trials 
and somebody who was a loyal communist who then is put in one of 
Stalin's prisons and held on trial and executed, uh, and it's about his 
trial.
    Q. Did you understand what the President was trying to communicate 
when he related his situation to the character in that novel?
    A. I think he felt that the world was against him.
    Q. I thought only Members of Congress felt that way.
    Mr. Blumenthal, did you ever ask the President if he was ever alone 
with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I did.
    Q. What was his response?
    A. I asked him a number of questions that appeared in the press 
that day. I asked him, uh, if he were alone, and he said that, uh, he 
was within eyesight or earshot of someone when he was with her.
    Q. What other questions do you remember asking him?
    A. Uh, there was a story in the paper that, uh, there were recorded 
messages, uh, left by him on her voice-mail and I asked him if that 
were true.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said, uh, that it was, that, uh, he had called her.
    Q. You had asked him about a press account that said there were 
potentially a number of telephone messages left by the President for 
Monica Lewinsky. And he relayed to you that he called her. Did he tell 
you how many times he called her?
    A. He--he did. He said he called once. He said he called when, uh, 
Betty Currie's brother had died, to tell her that.
    Q. And other than that one time that he shared that information 
with you, he shared no other information respecting additional calls?
    A. No.
    Q. He never indicated to you that there were over 50 telephone 
conversations between himself and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Based on your conversation with the President at that time, 
would it have surprised you to know that there were over 50--there were 
records of over 50 telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky and the 
President?
    A. Would I have been surprised at that time?
    Q. Yes.
    A. Uh, I--to see those records and if he--I don't fully grasp the 
question here. Could you--would I have been surprised?
    Q. Based on the President's response to your question at that time, 
would it have surprised you to have been told or to have later learned 
that there were over 50 recorded--50 conversations between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I did later learn that, uh, as the whole country did, uh, and I 
was surprised.
    Q. When the President told you that Monica Lewinsky threatened him, 
did you ever feel compelled to report that information to the Secret 
Service?
    A. No.
    Q. The FBI or any other law enforcement organization?
    A. No.
    Q. I'm assuming that a threat to the President from somebody in the 
White House would normally send off alarm bells among staff.
    A. It wouldn't--
    MR. McDANIEL: Well, I'd like to object to the question, Senator. 
There's no testimony that Mr. Blumenthal learned of a threat 
contemporaneously with it being made by someone in the White House. 
This is a threat that was relayed to him sometime afterwards by someone 
who was no longer employed in the White House. So I think the question 
doesn't relate to the testimony of this witness.
    MR. ROGAN: Respectfully, I'm not sure what the legal basis of the 
objection is. The evidence before us is that the President told the 
witness that Monica Lewinsky threatened him.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: We've conferred and overrule the objection on the 
ground that it calls for an answer; that, however the witness chooses 
to answer it, was not a contemporaneous threat, or he thought it was 
stale, or whatever he thinks. But the objection is overruled.
    MR. ROGAN: Thank you.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Let me--let me restate the question, if I may. Mr. Blumenthal, 
would a threat--
    SENATOR SPECTER: We withdraw the ruling.
    [Laughter.]
    MR. McDANIEL: I withdraw my objection, then.
    [Laughter.]
    MR. ROGAN: Senator Specter, the ruling is just fine by my light. 
I'm just going to try to simplify the question for the witness' 
benefit.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We'll hold in abeyance a decision on whether to 
reinstate the ruling.
    MR. ROGAN: Thank you. Maybe I should just quit while I'm ahead and 
have the question read back.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Basically, Mr. Blumenthal, what I'm asking is, I mean, normally, 
would a threat from somebody against the President in the White House 
typically require some sort of report being made to a law enforcement 
agency?
    A. Uh, in the abstract, yes.
    Q. This conversation that you had with the President on January the 
21st, 1998, how did that conversation conclude?
    A. Uh, I believe we, uh--well, I believe after that, I said to the 
President that, uh--who was--seemed to me to be upset, that you needed 
to find some sure footing and to be confident. And, uh, we went on, I 
believe, to discuss the State of the Union.
    Q. You went on to other business?
    A. Yes, we went on to talk about public policy.
    Q. When this conversation with the President concluded as it 
related to Monica Lewinsky, what were your feelings toward the 
President's statement?
    A. Uh, well, they were complex. Uh, I believed him, uh, but I was 
also, uh--I thought he was very upset. That troubled me. And I also was 
troubled by his association with troubled people and thought this was 
not a good story and thought he shouldn't be doing this.
    Q. Do you remember also testifying before the grand jury that you 
felt that the President's story was a very heartfelt story and that 
``he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him''?
    A. Yes, that's what I told the grand jury, I believe; right.
    Q. That was--that was how you interpreted the President's story?
    A. Yes, I did. He was, uh--he seemed--he seemed emotional.
    Q. When the President told you he was helping Monica Lewinsky, did 
he ever describe to you how he might be helping or ministering to her?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he ever describe how many times he may have tried to help or 
minister to her?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times he visited with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times Monica Lewinsky visited him in 
the Oval Office complex?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times he was alone with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. He never described to you any intimate physical activity he may 
have had with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Oh, no.
    Q. Did the President ever tell you that he gave any gifts to Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you that Monica Lewinsky gave him any gifts?
    A. No.
    Q. Based on the President's story as he related on January 21st, 
would it have surprised you to know at that time that there was a 
repeated gift exchange between Monica Lewinsky and the President?
    A. Well, I learned later about that, and I was surprised.
    Q. The President never told you that he engaged in occasional 
sexual banter with her on the telephone?
    A. No.
    Q. He never told you about any cover stories that he and Monica 
Lewinsky may have developed to disguise a relationship?
    A. No.
    Q. He never suggested to you that there might be some physical 
evidence pointing to a physical relationship between he--between 
himself and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did the President ever discuss his grand jury--or strike that.
    Did the President ever discuss his deposition testimony with you in 
the Paula Jones case on that date?
    A. Oh, no.
    Q. Did he ever tell you that he denied under oath in his Paula 
Jones deposition that he had an affair with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did the President ever tell you that he ministered to anyone 
else who then made a sexual advance toward him?
    A. No.
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, after you testified before the grand jury, did 
you ever communicate to the President the questions that you were 
asked?
    A. No.
    Q. After you testified before the grand jury, did you ever 
communicate to the President the answers which you gave to those 
questions?
    A. No.
    Q. After you were subpoenaed to testify but before you testified 
before the Federal grand jury, did the President ever recant his 
earlier statements to you about Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. After you were subpoenaed but before you testified before the 
federal grand jury, did the President ever say that he did not want you 
to mislead the grand jury with a false statement?
    A. No. We didn't have any subsequent conversation about this 
matter.
    Q. So it would be fair also to say that after you were subpoenaed 
but before you testified before the Federal grand jury, the President 
never told you that he was not being truthful with you in that January 
21st conversation about Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Uh, he never spoke to me about that at all.
    Q. The President never instructed you before your testimony before 
the grand jury not to relay his false account of his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky?
    A. We--we didn't speak about anything.
    Q. And as to your testimony on all three appearances before the 
grand jury on February 26th, June 4th and June 25th, 1998--as an aside, 
by the way, let me just say I think this question has been asked of all 
the witnesses, so this is not peculiar to you--but as to those three 
grand jury appearances, do you adopt as truth your testimony on all 
three of those occasions?
    A. Oh, yes.
    MR. ROGAN: If I may have a moment?
    SENATOR SPECTER: Of course. Would you like a short break?
    MR. ROGAN: That might be convenient, Senator.
    SENATOR SPECTER: All right. It's a little past 10. We'll take a 5-
minute recess.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10 o'clock a.m.
    [Recess.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:12 a.m.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We shall proceed; Mr. Graham questioning for the 
House Managers.
    MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, Senator.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Again, Mr. Blumenthal, if I ask you something that's confusing, 
just slow me down and straighten me out here.
    A. Thank you.
    Q. Okay. I'm going to ask as direct, to-the-point questions as I 
can so we all can go home.
    June 4th, 1998, when you testified to the grand jury, on page 49--I 
guess it's page 185 on tab 4.
    MR. McDANIEL: Page 49?
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    MR. McDANIEL: Thank you.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the 
President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe the 
President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I do.
    Q. I appreciate your honesty. You had raised executive privilege at 
some time in the past, I believe.
    MR. McDANIEL: I object, Senator. Mr. Blumenthal was a passive 
vessel for the raising of executive privilege by the President. It's 
not his privilege to assert, so the question, I think, is misleading.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. At any time--I'm sorry.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I have conferred and believe 
that he can answer the question if he did not raise the privilege, so 
we will overrule the objection.
    SENATOR EDWARDS: Either he asserted it or it was asserted on his 
behalf.
    THE WITNESS: If you could repeat it, please.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. I believe early on in your testimony and throughout your 
testimony to the grand jury, the idea of executive privilege covering 
your testimony or conversations with the President was raised. Is that 
correct?
    A. It was.
    Q. Do you believe the White House knew that this privilege would be 
asserted in your testimony? That was no surprise to them?
    A. Uh--
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. It's the White House's privilege 
to assert it could not have been surprised. It's a mischaracterization 
of the facts.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I believe the objection is 
well-founded on the ground that he cannot testify as to what someone 
else knew. So would you rephrase the question? The objection will be 
sustained.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. When executive privilege was asserted, do you know how it came 
about? Do you have any knowledge of how it came about?
    A. What I recall is that I--in my first appearance before the grand 
jury, I was asked questions about my conversations with the President. 
And I went out into the hall, asked if I could go out in the hall, and 
I spoke with the White House legal counsel who was there, Cheryl Mills, 
and said, ``What do I say?''
    Q. And she said?
    A. And I was advised to assert privilege.
    Q. So the executive privilege assertion came about from advice to 
you by White House counsel?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, you've stated, I think, very honestly, and I appreciate, 
that you were lied to by the President. Is it a fair statement, given 
your previous testimony concerning your 30-minute conversation, that 
the President was trying to portray himself as a victim of a 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I think that's the import of his whole story.
    Q. During this period of time, the Paula Jones lawsuit, other 
allegations about relationships with the President and other women were 
being made and found their way in the press. Is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, when you have these morning meetings and evening meetings 
about press strategy, I believe your previous testimony goes along the 
lines that any time a press report came out about a story between the 
President and a woman, that you would sit down and strategize about 
what to do. Is that correct?
    A. Well, we would, uh, talk about what the White House spokesman 
would say about it.
    Q. Does the name ``Kathleen Willey'' mean anything to you in that 
regard?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. It's beyond the scope of this 
deposition. In the proffer from the Managers, they explicitly state the 
areas that they want to go into, and they explicitly state that they 
want to speak to Mr. Blumenthal about his January 21, 1998, 
conversation with the President about Monica Lewinsky. And any aspects 
as to Kathleen Willey are--have nothing to do with the Articles of 
Impeachment, nor do they have anything to do with the proffer made by 
the Managers, and it's beyond the scope of this deposition.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Just wait one second.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Graham, as you know, the scope of the 
examination of Mr. Blumenthal is limited by the subject matters 
reflected in the Senate record. Are you able to substantiate the Senate 
record as a basis for asking the question?
    MR. GRAHAM: I'm assuming, yes, Senator, that the grand jury 
testimony of Mr. Blumenthal is part of the Senate record. And on June 
25th, 1998, on page 21, there's a discussion between Mr. Blumenthal and 
the Independent Counsel's Office about strategy meetings and other 
women, and in that testimony, he mentions that ``we discussed Paula 
Jones, Kathleen Willey, in our strategy meeting.''
    And I think the question will not be as ominous as some may think 
it sounds. I think I can get right to the point pretty quickly about 
what I'm trying to do with--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Well, would you make an offer of proof so that we 
can see what the scope is that you have in mind?
    MR. GRAHAM: Basically, his testimony is that when a press report 
came about concerning Ms. Jones or Kathleen Willey or a relationship 
between the President and another woman, they sat down and strategized 
about how to respond to those press accounts, what to do and what to 
say--at least that's what his testimony indicates. And I just want to 
ask him, once the January 21st story about Ms. Lewinsky came out, how 
they discussed her in relationship to other strategy meetings.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Breuer, how would you respond to Congressman 
Graham's statement that as he refers to a reference to Ms. Willey in 
the record?
    MR. BREUER: Senator, I haven't seen the one reference, but I may--I 
would acknowledge that there may be one passing reference to Ms. Willey 
in the voluminous materials that are before us here in the grand jury, 
Senator. But it's clearly not germane to this deposition. It's clearly 
not germane to the proffer made by the Managers about why Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal was a witness. It is clearly not germane to the Articles of 
Impeachment.
    And, indeed, in Mr. Lindsey Graham's proffer just now, he said that 
he wants to go back and ask about the January 21 conversation. It's my 
view that Kathleen Willey is tangential, at best, and is not germane to 
this deposition and ought not to be inquired into.
    SENATOR EDWARDS: And, Senator Specter, I would ask that we go off 
the record for this discussion, given the question of whether this is 
within the scope of the Senate record.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We shall go off the record.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10:20 a.m.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:48 a.m.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Congressman Lindsey, you may proceed.
    MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Blumenthal. I appreciate it.
    A. Thank you.
    Q. Let's get back to the--we'll approach this topic another way and 
we'll try to tie it up at the end here.
    The January 21st article breaks, and I think it's in The Washington 
Post, is that correct, the January 21st article about Ms. Lewinsky 
being on tape, talking about her relationship with the President? Are 
you familiar with that article?
    A. I'm familiar with an article on January 21st in The Washington 
Post.
    Q. And what--what was the essence of that article, as you remember 
it?
    A. If you have it there, I'd be happy to look at it.
    Q. Yeah. Let's see if we can find it, what tab that is. Tab 7.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: Well--
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. If you'd like a chance to read it over, just take your time.
    A. Yes. Thank you.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: It's a long article.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Yes, sir, it is, and just--
    A. Yeah.
    Q. --just take your time. I'm not going to give you a test on the 
article. I just wanted--
    A. No. I just wanted to read it.
    Q. --to refresh your memory. Absolutely, you take your time.
    A. I hope you don't mind if I took the time here.
    Q. No, sir. Are you--you're okay now?
    A. I am.
    Q. Okay. In essence, what this article is--is alleging is what we 
now know, the allegations that Ms. Lewinsky had a relationship with the 
President, that Mr. Jordan was trying to help her secure counsel, to 
file an affidavit saying they had no relationship, and the relationship 
on January 21st was being exposed through some tape recordings, 
supposedly, the Independent Counsel had access to between Ms. Lewinsky 
and Ms. Tripp. Is that correct?
    A. Well, there are a lot of questions in there.
    Q. Okay, yeah, and I'm sorry.
    This article seems to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky is telling a 
friend--
    A. Mm-hmm.
    Q. --that she has a relationship with the President, a sexual 
relationship with the President.
    A. Mm-hmm.
    Q. You understand that from the article?
    A. Yes.
    Q. This article also alleges that an affidavit was filed by Ms. 
Lewinsky denying that relationship, and Mr. Jordan sought an attorney 
for her, a friend of the President. Is that correct?
    A. It says she filed an affidavit, and I'm just looking for where 
it says that Jordan had secured the attorney.
    Q. The very first paragraph, let me read it. ``The Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr has expanded his investigation of President 
Clinton to examine whether Clinton and his close friend, Vernon Jordan, 
encouraged a 24-year-old''--
    A. Right.
    Q. --``former White House intern to lie to lawyers for Paula Jones 
about whether the intern had an affair with the President, sources 
close to the investigation said yesterday.''
    A. Right.
    Q. So I guess that first paragraph kind of sums up the accusation.
    A. I think--
    Q. What type reaction did the White House have when this--as you 
recall--when this article came to light?
    A. I--I think the White House was overwhelmed with press inquiries.
    Q. Was there a sense of alarm that this was a bad story?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And wasn't there a sense of reassurance by the President himself 
that this was an untrue story?
    A. The President did make a public statement that afternoon.
    Q. And I believe White House officials on his behalf denied the 
essence of this story; is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And basically, you were passing along what somebody you trust 
and admire told you to be the case, and from the White House point of 
view, that was the response to this story, that we deny these 
allegations.
    MR. McDANIEL: Senator, I really object to the question where we mix 
``you'' and ``we'' and the ``White House.'' I'd like, if possible, for 
the question--if they want to know what Mr. Blumenthal did, to ask him 
what he did, and questions about what the White House did and what we 
and you did.
    MR. GRAHAM: That's fair enough.
    MR. McDANIEL: Okay, we thank you.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We think that's well-founded.
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, and I agree. I agree that is well-founded.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Did you have any discussions with White House press people about 
the nature of this relationship after this article broke?
    A. No.
    Q. Did you have any discussions with White House lawyers after this 
article broke about the nature of the relationship?
    A. No.
    Q. After you had the conversation with the President, sometime the 
week of the 21st--I believe that's your testimony--shortly after the 
news story broke, this 30-minute conversation where he tells you 
about--
    A. There's not a question.
    Q. Okay. Is that correct? When did you have this conversation with 
the President? Do you recall?
    A. Yes. It was in the early evening of January 21st.
    Q. Early evening of January 21st?
    A. Yes.
    Q. The same day the story was reported?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay. So, from your point of view, this was something that 
needed to be addressed?
    MR. McDANIEL: Your Honor, I--Senator, I object to the question 
about ``this'' is something that needs to be addressed. I don't 
understand what the ``this'' is, exactly, that the question refers to. 
Does it refer to the story? Does it refer to the President's statement 
to Mr. Blumenthal?
    SENATOR SPECTER: Well, we think--Senator Edwards and I concur that 
the witness can answer the question. If he does not understand it, he 
can say so and then can have the question rephrased.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. You have a conversation with the President on the same day the 
article comes out, and the conversation includes a discussion about the 
relationship between him and Ms. Lewinsky. Is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay. So it was certainly on people's minds, including the 
President, is that correct, the essence of this story?
    MR. McDANIEL: I object to the question about whether it's on 
people's minds. I think he can answer about what he knew or about what 
he learned from people who spoke to him, but the question goes far 
beyond that.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Well, let me ask you this. We know it was on the President's 
mind.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that, technically, 
that's correct, and perhaps you can avoid it by just pinpointing it 
just a little more.
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes. We'll try to be laser-like in these questions.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. You had a conversation with the President of the United States 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky on the same day The Washington 
Post article came out. That's correct? Yes or no?
    A. That--I--I--that's right.
    Q. Okay. During that period of time, that day or any day 
thereafter, were you involved in any meeting with White House lawyers 
or press people where the conversation--or where the topic of Ms. 
Lewinsky's allegations or the--Ken Starr's allegations about Ms. 
Lewinsky came up?
    A. I'm confused about which allegations you're talking about.
    Q. That she had a relationship with the President, and they were 
trying to get her to file a false affidavit. Did that topic ever come 
up in your presence with the Press Secretary, White House press people 
or lawyers for the White House?
    A. I think the whole story was discussed by senior staff in the 
White House.
    Q. When did that begin to occur?
    A. I'm sure we were discussing it on January 21st.
    Q. Do you recall that every--
    A. Every--everyone in the country was talking about it.
    Q. Well, do you recall the tenor of that conversation? Do you 
recall the flavor of it? Can you describe it the best you can, about--
was there a sense of alarm, shock? How would you describe it?
    A. I think we felt overwhelmed by the crisis atmosphere.
    Q. Did anybody ever suggest who is Monica Lewinsky, go find out 
about who she is and what she does?
    A. No.
    Q. So is it your testimony that this accusation comes out on 
January 21st, and the accusation being that a White House intern has an 
inappropriate relationship with the President, filed a false affidavit 
on his behalf, and nobody at this meeting suggested let's find out who 
Monica Lewinsky is and what's going on here?
    A. Well, I wasn't referring to any meeting, but in any of my 
discussions with members of the White House staff, nobody discussed 
Monica Lewinsky's personal life or decided that we had to find out who 
she was.
    Q. Could I turn you now to Tab 15, please? Okay.
    MR. McDANIEL: Would you like him to read this?
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes. Yes, please. Just take your time. And I am now 
referring to an AP story by Karen G-u-l-l-o. I don't want to 
mispronounce her name.
    [Witness perusing document.]
    THE WITNESS: I'm ready, Congressman.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Thank you.
    And this article--do you know this reporter, by any chance?
    A. I do know this reporter, but I did not know this reporter on 
January 30th.
    Q. All right. Do you subsequently know--
    A. Some months later, I met this reporter.
    Q. And the basic essence of my question, Mr. Blumenthal, will be 
this report indicates some derogatory information about Ms. Lewinsky, 
and it also has some statements by White House Press Secretary and Ms. 
Lewis. And I want to ask how those two statements go together.
    This report indicates that a White House aide called this reporter 
to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky's past included weight problems, and she 
was called ``The Stalker.'' And it says that ``Junior staff members, 
speaking on condition that they not be identified, said she was known 
as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, was `` `a little bit weird'.'' 
And the next paragraph says: ``Little by little, ever since the 
allegations of an affair between President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky 
surfaced 10 days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-
scenes campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed 
with the President.''
    Do you have any direct knowledge or indirect knowledge that such a 
campaign by White House aides or junior staff members ever existed?
    A. No.
    Q. Okay. Do you ever remember hearing Ms. Lewis or Mr. McCurry 
admonishing anyone in the White House about ``watch what you say about 
Ms. Lewinsky''?
    A. No. I don't recall those incidents described in this article, 
but I do note that among senior advisors at one of the meetings that we 
held--it could have been in the morning or late afternoon--we felt very 
firmly that nobody should ever be a source to a reporter about a story 
about Monica Lewinsky's personal life, and I strongly agreed with that 
and that's what we decided.
    Q. When did that meeting occur?
    A. I'd say within a week of the story breaking.
    Q. Who was at that meeting?
    A. I don't recall exactly, but I would say that the list of names 
that I mentioned before.
    Q. And that would be?
    A. I may not get them all, but I would say Chuck Ruff, Cheryl 
Mills, Bruce Lindsey, Lanny Breuer, Jim Kennedy, Mike McCurry, Joe 
Lockhart, Adam Goldberg, Don Goldberg, Ann Lewis, Paul Begala, Rahm 
Emanuel, myself.
    Q. And this occurred about a week after the January 21st article?
    A. I don't recall the exact date.
    Q. At least 7 days?
    A. Within a week--
    Q. Okay.
    A. --I believe.
    Q. Would it be fair to say that you were sitting there during this 
conversation and that you had previously been told by the President 
that he was in essence a victim of Ms. Lewinsky's sexual demands, and 
you said nothing to anyone?
    MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said''--
    THE WITNESS: I don't--
    MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said nothing to anyone about 
what the President told you?''?
    MR. GRAHAM: Right.
    THE WITNESS: I never told any of my colleagues about what the 
President told me.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. And this is after the President recants his story--recounts his 
story--to you, where he's visibly upset, feels like he's a victim, that 
he associates himself with a character who's being lied about, and you 
at no time suggested to your colleagues that there is something going 
on here with the President and Ms. Lewinsky you need to know about. Is 
that your testimony?
    A. I never mentioned my conversation. I regarded that conversation 
as a private conversation in confidence, and I didn't mention it to my 
colleagues, I didn't mention it to my friends, I didn't mention it to 
my family, besides my wife.
    Q. Did you mention it to any White House lawyers?
    A. I mentioned it many months later to Lanny Breuer in preparation 
for one of my grand jury appearances, when I knew I would be questioned 
about it. And I certainly never mentioned it to any reporter.
    Q. Do you know how, over a period of weeks, stories about Ms. 
Lewinsky being called a stalker, a fantasizer, obsessed with the 
President, called the name ``Elvira''--do you know how that got into 
the press?
    A. Which--which--which question are you asking me? Which part of 
that?
    Q. Okay. Do you have any idea how White House sources are 
associated with statements such as ``She's known as `Elvira','' ``She's 
obsessed with the President,'' ``She's known as a flirt,'' ``She's the 
product of a troubled home, divorced parents,'' ``She's known as `The 
Stalker' ''? Do you have any idea how that got in the press?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. The document speaks for itself, 
but it's not clear that the terms that Mr. Lindsey has used are 
necessarily--any or all of them--are from a White House source. I 
object to the form and the characterization of the question.
    MR. GRAHAM: The ones that I have indicated are associated with the 
White House as being the source of those statements and--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that question is 
appropriate, and the objection is overruled.
    THE WITNESS: I have no idea how anything came to be attributed to a 
White House source.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Do you know a Mr. Terry Lenzner?
    A. I--I met him once.
    Q. When did you meet him?
    A. I met him outside the grand jury room.
    Q. And who is he?
    A. He's a private investigator.
    Q. And who does he work for?
    A. He works for many clients, including the President.
    Q. Okay. Mr. Blumenthal, I appreciate your candor here.
    Do you know Mr. Harry Evans?
    A. Harold Evans?
    Q. Yes, sir.
    A. Yes, I do.
    Q. Who is Mr. Harold Evans?
    A. Harold Evans is--I don't know his exact title right now. He 
works for Mort Zuckerman, involving his publications, and he's the 
husband of my former editor, Tina Brown.
    Q. Has he ever worked for the New York Daily News?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to this line of questioning. It 
seems well beyond the scope of this deposition. I have never heard of 
Mr. Harold Evans, and it's not clear to me that's anywhere in this 
voluminous record or any of these issues.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think it would be 
appropriate to have an offer of proof on this, Congressman Graham.
    MR. GRAHAM: I'm going to ask Mr. Blumenthal if he has ever at any 
time passed on to Mr. Evans or anyone else raw notes, notes, work 
products from a Mr. Terry Lenzner about subjects of White House 
investigations to members of the press, to include Ms. Lewinsky.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Relating to Monica Lewinsky?
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, and anyone else.
    MR. McDANIEL: That's a good question. I think we don't have any 
objection to that question.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Well, we still have to rule on it. Overruled. The 
objection is overruled.
    MR. GRAHAM: All right. Now I think I know the answer.
    [Laughter.]
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. So let's phrase it very clearly for the record here. You know 
Mr. Evans; correct?
    A. I do.
    Q. Have you at any time received any notes, work product from a Mr. 
Terry Lenzner about anybody?
    A. No.
    Q. Okay. So, therefore, you had nothing to pass on?
    A. Right.
    Q. Fair enough. Do you know a Mr. Gene Lyons?
    A. Yes, I do.
    Q. Who is Mr. Gene Lyons?
    A. He is a columnist for the Arkansas Democrat Gazette.
    Q. Are you familiar with his appearance on ``Meet the Press'' where 
he suggests in an article he wrote later that maybe the President is a 
victim similar to David Letterman in terms of somebody following him 
around, obsessed with him?
    A. Is this one of the exhibits?
    Q. Yes, sir.
    A. I wonder if you could refer me to it.
    Q. Sure. I can't read my writing.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Well, while we are looking for the exhibit, let me ask you this. 
Do you have any independent knowledge of him making such a statement?
    A. Well, I'd like to see the exhibit so--
    Q. Okay.
    A. --so I could know exactly what he said.
    Q. Okay.
    MR. McDANIEL: If I might--Congressman, I don't know whether the one 
you're thinking of is--I note in Exhibit 20, there are--well, it's not 
a story by Mr. Lyons--
    MR. GRAHAM: And that's it.
    MR. McDANIEL: There are references to him in--in that story.
    MR. GRAHAM: That's it. Thank you very much.
    MR. McDANIEL: You're welcome.
    MR. GRAHAM: I appreciate it.
    THE WITNESS: This is 20?
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Yes, sir.
    A. Thank you.
    Do you mind if I just read through it?
    Q. Yes, sir. Take your time.
    A. Thank you. [Witness perusing document.] I've read this.
    Q. My question is that this article is a Boston Globe article, 
Saturday, February the 21st, and it references an appearance on ``Meet 
the Press'' by Mr. Gene Lyons. And I believe you know who Mr. Gene 
Lyons is; is that correct?
    A. I do.
    Q. Did you know who he was in January of 1998?
    A. I did.
    Q. And in this press appearance, it refers to it being the Sunday 
before the Saturday, February 21st, sometime in the middle of February.
    He indicates on the show, at least this article recounts that he 
indicates, that the President could be in fact in ``a totally innocent 
relationship in which the President was, in a sense, the victim of 
someone, rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.''
    Do you know how Mr. Lyons would come to that conclusion? I know 
word travels fast, but how would he know that? Do you have any 
independent knowledge of how he would know that?
    A. What exactly is the question?
    Q. Well, the question is Mr. Lyons is indicating in the middle of 
February that the truth of the matter may very well be that the 
President is in an ``innocent relationship in which the President was, 
in a sense, the victim of someone, rather like the woman who followed 
David Letterman around,'' and the question is that scenario of the 
President being a victim of someone obsessed seems rather like the 
conversation you had with the President on January the 21st. Do you 
know how Mr. Lyons would have had that take on things?
    MR. McDANIEL: Well, I object to a question that sort of loads up 
premises, Senators. That question sort of, you know, says, well, this 
conversation is a lot like the one you had with the President, and then 
asks the question. And the danger to the witness is that he'll--by 
answering the question accepts the premise.
    And I ask that if you want to ask him whether it's like the 
conversation with the President, that's a fair question, he'll answer 
it, but it ought to be broken out of there.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I disagree on the ruling, so 
we're going to take Senator Edwards and ask you to rephrase the 
question since it--
    [Laughter.]
    MR. GRAHAM: Fair enough.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. The characterization embodied here indicates this could be a 
totally innocent relationship in which the President was in a sense the 
victim of someone. Is it fair to say, Mr. Blumenthal, that is very much 
like the scenario the President painted to you when you talked with him 
on January the 21st?
    A. It could be like that.
    Q. Okay. And it goes on further: ``rather like the woman who 
followed David Letterman around.'' Is that very much like the 
characterization the President indicated to you between him and Ms. 
Lewinsky?
    A. Could be.
    Q. Did you ever at any time talk with Mr. Gene Lyons about Ms. 
Lewinsky or any other person that was the subject of a relationship 
with the President?
    A. I did talk to Gene Lyons about Monica Lewinsky.
    Q. Could you tell us what you told him?
    A. He asked me my views, and I told him, in no uncertain terms, 
that I wouldn't talk about her personally. I talked about Monica 
Lewinsky with all sorts of people, my mother, my friends, about what 
was in the news stories every day, just like everyone else, but when it 
came to talking about her personally, I drew a line.
    Q. So, when you talk to your mother and your friends and Mr. Lyons 
about Ms. Lewinsky, are you telling us that you have these 
conversations, and you know what the President has told you and you're 
not tempted to tell somebody the President is a victim of this lady, 
out of his own mouth?
    A. Not only am I not tempted, I did not.
    Q. You don't know how all this information came out? You have no 
knowledge of it at all?
    MR. McDANIEL: I don't understand the question about--
    MR. GRAHAM: About her being a stalker, her being obsessed with the 
President, the President being like David Letterman in relationship to 
her.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. You had no knowledge of how that all happened in the press?
    A. I have an idea how it started in the press.
    Q. Well, please share that with us.
    A. I believe it started on January 21st with the publication of an 
article in Newsweek by Michael Isikoff that was posted on the World 
Wide Web and faxed around to everyone in the news media, in Washington, 
New York, everywhere, and in the White House. And in that article, 
Michael Isikoff reported the contents of what became known as the 
talking points.
    And there was a mystery at the time about who wrote the talking 
points. We know subsequently that Monica Lewinsky wrote the talking 
points. And in that document, the author of the talking points advises 
Linda Tripp that she might refer to someone who was stalking the ``P'', 
meaning the President, and after that story appeared, I believe there 
were a flood of stories and discussions about this, starting on 
``Nightline'' that very night and ``Nightline'' the next night and so 
on. And that's my understanding from observing the media of how this 
started.
    Q. How long have you been involved in the media yourself?
    A. Before I joined the White House staff, I was a journalist for 27 
years.
    Q. Is it your testimony that the Isikoff article on the 21st 
explains how White House sources contact reporters in late January and 
mid-February trying to explain that the President is a victim of a 
stalker, an obsessed young lady, who is the product of a broken home? 
Is that your testimony?
    A. No.
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question. There 
is no evidence that White House officials, both in January and in 
February, if at any time, contacted sources, press sources.
    MR. GRAHAM: I will introduce these articles. The articles are dated 
with White House sources, unsolicited, calling about this event, saying 
these things in January and February.
    MR. BREUER: Well--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I agree that the question may 
be asked and answered. Overruled.
    THE WITNESS: If you could restate it, please?
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Is it your testimony that the White House sources that are being 
referred to by the press are a result of the 21st of January Isikoff 
article? That's not what you're saying, is it?
    A. No.
    MR. McDANIEL: Well--
    MR. GRAHAM: Thank you.
    MR. McDANIEL: --I don't think that there ought to be argument with 
Mr. Blumenthal. I think he ought to be asked a question and given an 
opportunity to answer it, and that's an argumentative question and 
followed up by, ``That's not what you're saying, is it?''
    I also think the questions are remarkably imprecise, in that they 
do not specify what information it is this questioner is seeking to get 
Mr. Blumenthal to talk about, and in that regard, I think the questions 
are both irrelevant and unfair.
    SENATOR EDWARDS: Are you objecting to a question that's already 
been asked and answered?
    MR. McDANIEL: I might be, Senator, and I had that feeling when I 
heard Mr. Blumenthal say something, that I might be doing that.
    MR. GRAHAM: That would be my reply. He understood what I asked, and 
he answered, and I'll accept his answer and we'll move on.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I think the objection is mooted at this 
point.
    MR. GRAHAM: Okay.
    SENATOR SPECTER: I do--I do think that to the extent you can be 
more precise, because these articles do contain--
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --a lot of information. We're still looking for 
that laser.
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. And these--and the reason this comes up, Mr. Isikoff--excuse 
me--Mr. Blumenthal, is you've referenced the Isikoff article on the 
21st, and my question goes to White House sources indicating that Ms. 
Lewinsky is a stalker, the January 30th article, that she's obsessed 
with the President, that she wears tight skirts.
    What I'm trying to say is that you--you are not saying--it is not 
your testimony--that those White House sources are picking up on the 
21st article, are you?
    A. I don't know about any White House sources on these stories.
    Q. When you talked to Mr. Lyons, you never mentioned what time at 
all that Ms. Lewinsky was making demands on the President and he had to 
rebuff her?
    A. Absolutely not.
    Q. You never at one time told Mr. Lyons or anyone else that the 
President felt like that he was a victim much like the person in the 
novel, Darkness at Noon?
    MR. McDANIEL: Well, I object to that question. This witness has 
testified that he told his wife and that he told White House counsel at 
a later date, and the question included anyone else. So I think it--
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes. Strike that.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Excluding those two people?
    A. Well, I believe I've asked--I've been asked, and answered that, 
and I haven't told anyone else.
    Q. Was there--
    A. I didn't tell anyone else.
    Q. Was there ever an investigation at the White House about how 
these stories came out, supposedly?
    A. No.
    Q. Was anybody ever fired?
    A. No.
    MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Blumenthal.
    THE WITNESS: I thank you.
    MR. ROGAN: No further questions.
    MR. BREUER: Could we take a 5-minute break, Senator?
    SENATOR SPECTER: We can. We will recess for 5 minutes.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 11:24 a.m.
    [Recess.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going on the record at 11:40 a.m.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Turn to White House counsel, Mr. Lanny Breuer.
    MR. BREUER: Senators, the White House has no questions for Mr. 
Blumenthal.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We had deferred one line of questions which had 
been subject objection and considerable conference, and we put it at 
the end of the transcript so it could be excised. Do you wish to--
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --proceed further?
    MR. BREUER: May we approach off the record, Senators?
    SENATOR SPECTER: Off the record.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 11:41 a.m.
    [Discussion off the record.]
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 12:10 p.m.
    SENATOR SPECTER: The Senators have considered the matter, and in 
light of the references, albeit abbreviated, in the record and the 
generalization that answers--questions and answers would be permitted, 
reserving the final judgment to the full Senate, we will permit 
Congressman Graham to question on pattern and practice with respect to 
Ms. Willey.
    MR. GRAHAM: Okay. Thank you.
                 further examination by house managers
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, we're really close to the end here. If you could 
turn to Tab 5, page 193.
    A. We have it.
    Q. Okay, thank you.
    And page 20, the last question, it's in the right-hand corner. I'll 
read the question, and we'll kind of follow the testimony. ``Have you 
ever had a discussion with people in the White House or been present 
during any meeting where the allegation has come up that other women 
are fabricating an affair with the President?''
    Now, could you read the answer for me, please?
    A. Sure. My--my answer in the grand jury is this: ``We've discussed 
news stories that arose out of the Jones case, which was dismissed by 
the judge as having no basis, in which there were allegations made 
against the President, and these were stories that were in the press.''
    Q. ``And you''--''And did you discuss those with the President?''
    You said, ``No.''
    And the next question is: ``So what form did you discuss those news 
stories in?''
    And your answer was?
    A. ``In strategy meetings.''
    Q. Okay. ``And that would include the daily meetings, the morning 
and the evening meetings?''
    A. Yes.
    Q. And your answer was ``Yes.''
    Now, within that context, I want to walk through a bit how those 
strategy meetings came about and the purpose of the strategy meetings.
    The next question goes as follows: ``And there were names of the 
women that you discussed in that context that there had been news 
stories about and public allegations of an affair with the President?''
    And your answer was?
    A. ``As I recall, we discussed Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, we've 
discussed''--and the rest is redacted.
    Q. Redacted--and that's fine, that's fine.
    And the question later on, on line 24: ``When you say that that was 
a complete and utter fraudulent allegation--'', the answer is: ``In my 
view, yes.'' Right?
    A. Well--
    Q. About a woman?
    MR. McDANIEL: Senator, I must object to this, because I believe 
that question, clearly from the context, refers to redacted material--
    MR. GRAHAM: Right.
    MR. McDANIEL: --which has been preserved as secret by the grand 
jury, and I think it's somewhat misleading to talk about a fraudulent 
allegation that the grand jury heard that Mr. Blumenthal testified 
about, which is clearly not in the record before the Senate.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Well, it is unclear on the face of the record. So, 
Congressman Graham, if you could--
    MR. GRAHAM: The point I'm trying--
    SENATOR SPECTER: --excuse me, let me just finish--
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --if you could specify on what is on the record 
that you've put in up to now.
    MR. GRAHAM: Okay. What I'm reading from, Senator, is--is a question 
and answer and a redacted name, and the point I'm trying to make is 
ever who that person was, the allegation was considered to be 
fraudulent based on your prior testimony.
    THE WITNESS: That was--that was my testimony, that it was my view.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. And that leads to this question. Was there ever a discussion in 
these strategy meetings where there was an admission that the 
allegation was believed to be true against the President in terms of 
relationship with other women?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question in that 
it's referring to other women. Even based on the discussion that went 
off the record, I think that what Mr. Graham is doing now is certainly 
beyond any record in this case.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards would like to hear the question 
repeated.
    MR. GRAHAM: The strategy meetings--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Good idea?
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. The strategy meetings involved press accounts of allegations 
between the President and other women. The question is very simple. At 
any of those meetings, was it ever conceded that the President did have 
in fact a relationship?
    MR. BREUER: Object. I object to the question for the reasons I just 
previously stated.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards raises the concern that I think 
he's correct on, that we have limited it to Willey, Ms. Willey. So, if 
you would--if you would focus--
    MR. GRAHAM: Absolutely.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --there--
    MR. GRAHAM: Absolutely.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --it would be within your proffer and what we have 
permitted.
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. Very well.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. In regards to Ms. Willey, is it fair to say that the consensus 
of the group was that these allegations were not true?
    A. I don't know.
    Q. Do you recall Ms. Willey giving a ``60 Minutes'' interview?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Do you recall any discussions after the interview at a strategy 
meeting about Ms. Willey?
    MR. BREUER: I want the record to be clear that the White House has 
a continuing objection as to this line of inquiry.
    SENATOR SPECTER: The record will so note.
    THE WITNESS: If you could repeat the question, please.
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
    THE WITNESS: Sorry.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. After the ``60 Minutes'' interview, was there ever a strategy 
meeting about what she said?
    A. At one of the morning or evening meetings, we discussed the ``60 
Minutes'' interview.
    Q. And can you--I--I know it's hard because these meetings go on a 
lot. How--do you know who was there on that occasion, who would be the 
players that would be there?
    A. They would be the same as before. I'd be happy to enumerate them 
for you, if you want me to.
    Q. But the same as you previously testified to?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay, that's fine.
    Do you recall what the discussions were about in terms of how to 
respond to the ``60 Minutes'' story?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Could you tell us?
    A. They were what our official spokespeople would say.
    Q. Did they include anything else?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Could you please tell us?
    A. There was a considerable complaining about how, in the ``60 
Minutes'' broadcast, Bob Bennett was not given adequate time to speak 
and present his case, and how he was, as I recall, poorly lighted.
    Q. Was there any discussion about what Ms. Willey said herself and 
how that should be responded to?
    A. I don't recall exactly. We just spoke about what our official 
spokespeople should respond to.
    Q. Did anybody ever discuss the fact that Ms. Willey may have had a 
checkered past?
    A. No, absolutely not. We never discussed the personal lives of any 
woman in those meetings.
    Q. Did it ever come up as to, well, here's what we know about 
Kathleen Willey and the President, or let's go see what we can find out 
about Kathleen Willey and the President?
    A. No.
    Q. Who had the letters that Kathleen Willey wrote to the President?
    A. I don't know exactly. The White House had them.
    Q. Isn't it fair to say that somebody found those letters, kept 
those letters, and was ready to respond with those letters, if needed 
to be?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question that 
it's outside the proffer of the Manager.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    MR. McDANIEL: Yes. I object to the compound nature of the question, 
and--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Could you rephrase the question, Congressman 
Lindsey--
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    SENATOR SPECTER: --or, Graham?
    MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
    SENATOR SPECTER: I think that would solve your problem.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. There were letters written to Ms. Willey to the President that 
were released to the media. Is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Do you know who gathered those letters up and how they were 
gathered up?
    MR. BREUER: Objection.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I agree that the Congressman 
may ask the question. Overruled.
    THE WITNESS: No.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Would it be fair to say, using common sense, that somebody was 
planning to answer Ms. Willey by having those letters to offer to the 
press?
    MR. BREUER: Objection.
    MR. McDANIEL: It's argumentative.
    MR. BREUER: It certainly is.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Would you repeat that question?
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. The question is: Mr. Blumenthal, do you believe it's a fair 
assumption to make that somebody in the White House made a conscious 
effort to go seek out the letters between the President and Ms. Willey 
and use in response to her allegations?
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    THE WITNESS: Well, that's an opin--
    MS. MARSH: Wait, wait, wait.
    MR. McDANIEL: Please, Mr. Blumenthal.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards says, and I agree with him, that 
you ought to direct it to somebody with specific knowledge so you 
don't--
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Do you have any knowledge--
    SENATOR SPECTER: --deal totally with speculation.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. Do you have any specific knowledge of that event occurring, 
somebody gathering the letters up, having them ready to be able to 
respond to Ms. Willey if she ever said anything?
    A. No.
    Q. You have no knowledge whatsoever of how those letters came into 
the possession of the White House to be released to the press?
    A. No, I don't. I don't know--
    MR. GRAHAM: Thank you. I--
    THE WITNESS: --who had them--
    MR. GRAHAM: --don't have any--
    THE WITNESS: --in the White House.
    MR. GRAHAM: --further questions.
                                ------                                


                                program

    Mr. LOTT. Under the order just granted, the Senate will 
meet again as the Court of Impeachment on Saturday. On 
Saturday, the Senate will hear presentations from the House 
managers and the White House counsel for not to exceed 6 hours. 
After those presentations, the Senate will resume its business 
on Monday for 6 hours, beginning at 1 p.m.
                                ------                                


          ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent 
the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, and 
ask that all Senators remain at their desks until the Chief 
Justice departs the Chamber.
    There being no objection, at 4:31 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday, February 
6, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                ------                                


                       Saturday, February 6, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 10:05 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the 
following:
    Mr. Chief Justice, it is with profound sadness that we 
express our grief over the loss of our legislative clerk, R. 
Scott Bates, who, along with his wife, Ricki Ellison Bates, 
last evening was struck by a car while walking across Lee 
Highway in Arlington. Mrs. Bates remains in serious condition 
and needs our prayers throughout this day.
    Let us pray.
    O eternal God, our heavenly Father, who loves us with an 
everlasting love and transforms the darkness of the Valley of 
the Shadow of Death into bright hope, the Senate family of 
Members and staff call on You for strength, comfort, and 
courage. Tragic death has taken from us a beloved friend, an 
admired fellow worker, a faithful Senate employee for over 30 
years.
    In the quietness we can hear his voice call the roll, read 
proposed legislation and, most of all, express his caring 
friendship to us all.
    Thank You for Scott's commitment to excellence and his 
dedication to the work of the Senate regardless of long 
sessions or arduous debate. We intercede now for his wife, for 
her complete healing and recovery. Hold his wonderful children 
in Your loving arms: Lisa, Lori, and Paul. We remember with 
gratitude Lisa and Lori's outstanding service as pages in the 
Senate. Help them and their brother, Paul, to know that their 
dad, whom they loved so deeply, is with You. He trusted You in 
this life and now lives with You forever. Traumatic as was his 
physical death, it was but a transition in his eternal life.
    Now, Lord, bless the Senate as it turns to the work of this 
day, cognizant of the shortness of time and the length of 
eternity for all of us. In the sure hope of the resurrection 
and eternal life. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
                                ------                                


                   R. SCOTT BATES, LEGISLATIVE CLERK

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, our Senate family grieves 
today and our hearts are heavy as a result of the tragic loss 
of Scott Bates. Senators come and Senators go, but Scott has 
been a fixture in this great Chamber for 30 years and the last 
8 years as our legislative clerk. His familiar voice was a 
pillar of our continuity and tradition. He was not just a 
coworker; he was a friend, really a great guy. Even as we 
conduct our business today, we will be grieving, but those who 
knew him well know that that is exactly what he would want us 
to do, to continue with the work of the Senate to which he 
devoted his life. He was an example of public service at its 
finest, never claiming the spotlight, never seeking a headline, 
but always working for the good of this institution and for the 
country we are here to serve.
    We pray for the recovery of his wife, Ricki. We ask that 
the Lord keep her and their three children always in His care. 
Before I ask for a moment of silence by the Senate, I yield to 
Senator Daschle for his comments.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The minority leader is recognized.
    Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the majority leader. I thank our 
Chaplain for his gracious prayer.
    The presence of Scott Bates in that chair and in our lives 
is something most of us have counted on each and every day. As 
the majority leader so eloquently said, he, Scott, served the 
Senate, our country, and each of us so admirably for the last 
30 years. Who can forget that resonant voice? Who can forget 
the call of the roll? Who can forget the authority with which 
he articulated each of our names? The answer is--no one.
    When Scott began his service, Senator Mansfield was the 
majority leader and Senator Hugh Scott the minority leader. 
Ever since that time, Scott was an integral part of the history 
created in this Chamber and certainly an integral part of our 
Senate family. He grew up with small town values, active in his 
church and Boy Scouts. He loved politics and school and served 
as a page in both the House and the Senate in the Arkansas 
Legislature. Scott's love of politics came naturally for him. 
His father actually served as a member of the Arkansas State 
Legislature. In 1970 he came here as a summer intern for 
Senator John McClellan, in the bill clerk's office, and began 
his work for us in 1973.
    Today, we send our thoughts and our prayers to his wife, 
Ricki, who remains in the hospital, and to their three 
children, Lisa, Lori, and Paul, and his family in Arkansas, who 
are now dealing with this tragic loss.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask that all Senators 
rise and let's observe a moment of silence for our friend, 
Scott Bates.
    [Moment of silence, Senators rising.]
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, under the order for today 
there will be a 6-hour presentation equally divided between the 
House managers and the White House counsel. It is our intention 
to have a break around noon so we will have an opportunity for 
lunch, and also it may be necessary to have one break, a brief 
break, before that time.
    Following today's presentation, the Senate will adjourn 
over until 1 p.m. on Monday.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
the proceedings of the trial is approved to date.

                           Order of Procedure

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to the order of February 1, 
1999, the managers on the part of the House of Representatives 
and the counsel for the President each have 3 hours to make 
their presentation. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan to 
begin the presentation on the part of the House of 
Representatives.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel 
for the President, Members of the United States Senate, this is 
the first and only chance you will have in this historic 
impeachment trial to consider the evidence from a few of the 
actual witnesses. After weeks of proceedings, the day has 
finally arrived when the U.S. Senate will listen, not just to 
lawyers talk about the evidence, but to witnesses with direct 
knowledge of the unlawful conduct of the President of the 
United States.
    Today in particular, you will have your only opportunity to 
hear from the one person whose testimony invariably leads to 
the conclusion that the President of the United States 
committed perjury and obstructed justice in a Federal civil 
rights action. That person is Monica Lewinsky, a bright lady 
whose life has forever been marked by the most powerful man on 
the Earth.
    If her testimony is truthful, then the President committed 
the offenses alleged in the articles of impeachment. Many 
different opinions have been formed about her over the last 
year. Nearly all of this has been fueled by spin and by 
propaganda rather than by truth. Today, the analysis and the 
speculation ends. There is only one judgment the Senate must 
make for history about Monica Lewinsky: Do you believe her?
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    SENATOR DeWINE. Do you, Monica S. Lewinsky, swear or affirm 
that the evidence you shall give in the case now pending 
between the United States and William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, shall be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
    THE WITNESS. I do.
    SENATOR DeWINE. The House managers may now begin your 
questioning.

    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Who is this former intern who swore 
under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth? Monica Lewinsky is an intelligent, articulate young 
woman who, until recently, held untarnished hope for tomorrow, 
like any other recent college graduate. That hope was 
drastically altered when she was subpoenaed in a lawsuit 
against the President of the United States.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    But for the record, would you state your name once again, your full 
name?
    A. Yes. Monica Samille Lewinsky.
    Q. And you're a--are you a resident of California?
    A. I'm--I'm not sure exactly where I'm a resident now, but I--
that's where I'm living right now.
    Q. Okay. You--did you grow up there in California?
    A. Yes.
    Q. I'm not going to go into all that, but I thought just a little 
bit of background here.
    You went to college where?
    A. Lewis and Clark, in Portland, Oregon.
    Q. And you majored in--majored in?
    A. Psychology.
    Q. Tell me about your work history, briefly, from the time you left 
college until, let's say, you started as an intern at the White House.
    A. Uh, I wasn't working from the time I--
    Q. Okay. Did you--
    A. I graduated college in May of '95.
    Q. Did you work part time there in--in Oregon with a--with a 
District Attorney--
    A. Uh--
    Q. --in his office somewhere?
    A. During--I had an internship or a practicum when I was in school. 
I had two practicums, and one was at the public defender's office and 
the other was at the Southeast Mental Health Network.
    Q. And those were in Portland?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay. What--you received a bachelor of science in psychology?
    A. Correct.
    Q. Okay. As a part of your duties at the Southeast Health Network, 
what did you--what did you do in terms of working? Did you have direct 
contact with people there, patients?
    A. Yes, I did. Um, they referred to them as clients there and I 
worked in what was called the Phoenix Club, which was a socialization 
area for the clients to--really to just hang out and, um, sort of work 
on their social skills. So I--
    Q. Okay. After your work there, you obviously had occasion to come 
to work at the White House. How did--how did you come to decide you 
wanted to come to Washington, and in particular work at the White 
House?
    A. There were a few different factors. My mom's side of the family 
had moved to Washington during my senior year of college and I wanted--
I wasn't ready to go to graduate school yet. So I wanted to get out of 
Portland, and a friend of our family's had a grandson who had had an 
internship at the White House and had thought it might be something I'd 
enjoy doing.
    Q. Had you ever worked around--in politics and campaigns or been 
very active?
    A. No.
    Q. You had to go through the normal application process of 
submitting a written application, references, and so forth to--to the 
White House?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you do that while you were still in Oregon, or were you 
already in D.C.?
    A. No. The application process was while I was a senior in college 
in Oregon.
    Q. Had you ever been to Washington before?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Obviously, you were accepted, and you started work when?
    A. July 10th, 1995.

    That image, the image of a young woman, very much like a 
family member or a friend that we might know, is an image that 
the President did not want America to see when his 
indiscretions with her became public. When that happened, the 
President painted Monica Lewinsky in a very different and 
callous light.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON: But I want to say one thing to 
the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to 
say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that 
woman, Ms. Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single 
time, never. These allegations are false, and I need to go back 
to work for the American people. Thank you.

    ``That woman'' with that subtle description, the President 
invited a waiting America to adopt a totally false impression 
of Monica Lewinsky. That was not fair. Yet, with his close 
aides, aides that he later testified he knew would be witnesses 
before the grand jury, he went much further than a subtle 
sneer. Hear the words of Sidney Blumenthal, assistant to the 
President, recount how the President painted this vulnerable 
young intern who made the tragic mistake of becoming involved 
with him.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened 
between him and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. As I recall, he did.
    Q. What did the President tell you?
    A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point 
and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he 
had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him. 
And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the 
stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would 
claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and 
that she would tell people.
    Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky 
would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her 
peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
    A. Yes, that's right.
    Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm 
quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot 
of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
    A. Yes. He told me that.
    Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the 
President?
    A. Right, in--in that sequence.
    Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared 
this information with you?
    A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.

    He was a man in anguish. This was more than rakish 
behavior. When the President used his aides as a conduit to 
impart false information to a Federal grand jury in a criminal 
investigation, his behavior graduated from the unconscionable 
to the illegal.
    Members of the Senate, your task is to determine who is 
telling the truth and who is lying. As you weigh that option, 
consider Mr. Blumenthal's conclusion drawn on the very subject.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the 
President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe 
the President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky?
    A. I do.

    To justify a vote of not guilty for the President, you 
certainly have the right to reject Monica Lewinsky's testimony 
as untruthful. However, I trust your sense of fairness will 
dictate that you will listen to all of her testimony before you 
dismiss it outright. If you believe her, you will see this 
morning how the President wove the web of perjury and 
obstruction of justice. You will see why he was impeached by 
the House of Representatives, and you will see why a just and 
proper verdict in this body would be to replace him as 
President with Vice President Al Gore.
    Consider, for example, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding 
witness tampering, one element of the obstruction of justice 
charge against the President. The President stands charged with 
illegally encouraging a witness in a Federal civil rights suit 
brought against him to give perjured testimony in that 
proceeding. Did he do this? Listen to Monica Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation 
in the morning with you and the President, and he has among 
other things mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones 
witness list. He has also mentioned to you that perhaps you 
could file an affidavit to avoid possible testifying in that 
case. Is that right?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were 
in our questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he 
had had, that perhaps you could say that you were coming to my 
office to deliver papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?
    A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that 
story.
    Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that 
instantly familiar to you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. You knew what he was talking about?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And why was this familiar to you?
    A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.

    It was part of the pattern of the relationship. During Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony earlier this week under oath pursuant to a 
Senate deposition order, she further elaborated on this 
critical piece of evidence.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I 
would draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded 
to that earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that 
night?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And what was said?
    A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--
you can always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me 
papers.
    Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that 
that night. You are sure he said that that night?
    A. Yes.

    Consider also Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding concealing 
subpoenaed evidence; namely, the gifts he gave her. This is yet 
another element in the obstruction of justice allegation 
against the President. The President stands charged with 
corruptly engaging in a scheme to conceal evidence that had 
been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him. Did he do this? Remember, on the morning of 
December 28, 1997, a few days after Ms. Lewinsky received a 
subpoena directing her to turn over any gifts she had received 
from the President, the President met with Ms. Lewinsky. She 
suggested to him that she could give the gifts he gave her to 
Betty Currie, the President's personal secretary. The President 
said that he would think about it. Listen to what Monica 
Lewinsky said happened next.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Did you later that day receive a call from Betty Currie?
    A. Yes, I did.
    Q. Tell us about that.
    A. I received a call from--Betty, and to the best of my 
memory, she said something like I understand you have something 
for me or I know--I know I've testified to saying that--that I 
remember her saying either I know you have something for me or 
the President said you have something for me. And to me, it's 
a--she said--I mean, this is not a direct quote, but the gist 
of the conversation was that she was going to go visit her mom 
in the hospital and she'd stop by and get whatever it was.
    Q. Did you question Ms. Currie or ask her, what are you 
talking about or what do you mean?
    A. No.
    Q. Why didn't you?
    A. Because I assumed that it meant the gifts.

    As you can see, the only way Betty Currie would have known 
to come and get the gifts would have been for the President to 
tell her to do so.
    Finally, consider Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding the 
President's help in securing a New York job for her to 
encourage her silence, which is another element of the 
obstruction of justice charge against him. The President is 
charged with chasing a job for her in order to prevent her 
truthful testimony. Did he do this? Remember that the President 
learned on December 6, 1997, that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Paula 
Jones witness list.
    Listen to Monica Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Okay. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early 
November, and December the 11th when you met with Mr. Jordan 
again, you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help 
you get a job; is that correct?
    A. I hadn't seen any progress.
    Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December, 
you began to interview in New York and were much more active in 
your job search; correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon 
with the help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?
    A. Yes.

    Members of the Senate, these are but a few highlights of a 
broad tapestry of corruption that Mr. Manager Hutchinson and I 
will develop for you this morning through videotape testimony 
and through other evidence.
    Before we proceed to that, it is worth briefly recounting 
the circumstances that elevated the President's initial 
indiscretions to the level of impeachable offenses. The lesson 
is not complex. It is quite elementary.
    In all the things we do in life, life is about making 
choices. Parents teach children that bad choices bring sorrow 
and consequences. We do that because the failure to impose 
meaningful consequences for bad choices brings about more bad 
choices. That simple primer on life encapsulates the political 
and personal legacy of Bill Clinton, his continuing pattern of 
indulging all choices and accepting no consequences. This is 
demonstrated by the actions he took leading to his impeachment 
and trial before the Senate.
    In May 1991, an incident allegedly occurred that led the 
President to make a bad choice. According to Paula Jones, a 
subordinate government employee, then-Governor Clinton made a 
crude and unwelcome sexual advance on her. She later filed a 
legal claim for sexual harassment against him.
    In November 1995, the President made another bad choice. He 
began a physical relationship with a 22-year-old White House 
intern. He chose to begin a physical relationship with her. 
This was not, as he told the grand jury, a relationship that 
began as a friendship only to later blossom into intimacy. The 
President impulsively began using her for his gratification the 
very day he first spoke with her. Later, he made the bad choice 
of continuing the relationship after Monica became a paid 
Government employee.
    An important note. As regrettable as his choice was here, 
any accountability for the private aspect of this should not be 
determined by the Congress of the United States. It should be 
determined by his family. Had the President's bad choice simply 
ended with this indiscretion, we would not be here today. 
Adultery may be a lot of things, but it is not an impeachable 
offense.
    Unfortunately, the President's bad choices only grew worse. 
In December 1997, the President made a bad choice. In order to 
avoid any possible legal accountability to Paula Jones, he 
chose to destroy her lawful right to proceed with her case. And 
this is how he did it: During the so-called discovery portion 
of the Paula Jones case, Federal Judge Susan Wright ordered the 
President to answer questions under oath about any intimate 
relationship he may have had with subordinate female government 
employees while he was Governor or President.
    Why did Judge Susan Wright order him to answer these 
questions? She did it because sexual harassers in the workplace 
usually do not commit their offenses in the open. Typically 
they get their victims alone and isolated. Predators know if 
they can do this, one of two things generally will happen. Out 
of fear and intimidation the victim will submit, or out of fear 
and intimidation the victim will not submit but the victim will 
not tell anybody about it.
    There usually is no other way for a sexual harassment 
victim to learn if there is evidence of a pattern of similar 
conduct by a predator without being able to ask these kinds of 
questions in a sexual harassment case. Without this 
information, a harassment victim in the workplace generally 
would not be able to prove her case. This is why courts 
routinely order defendants to answer these kinds of questions 
in almost every sexual harassment case in the country.
    Now, President Clinton vigorously pursued legal arguments 
and motions to avoid answering these questions about his sexual 
relations with subordinate government employees. Yet, after 
hearing his arguments, Judge Susan Wright ordered the President 
to answer under oath these routine questions. And by the way, 
Paula Jones also was required to provide truthful answers under 
oath as part of the trial in the discovery process. Had Paula 
Jones lied in providing such answers, she would have been 
liable for criminal prosecution.
    It was while the Paula Jones case was proceeding in the 
summer of 1995, that a 22-year-old named Monica Lewinsky went 
to work as an intern at the White House. Shortly thereafter, in 
November 1995, the President began his physical relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. And this continued from 1995 until the 
early part of 1997.
    In order to shield him, Monica Lewinsky promised the 
President that she would always deny the sexual nature of their 
relationship. She said she would always protect him. The 
President spoke words of approval and encouragement to this 
pledge of secrecy. Monica and the President even agreed to 
cover stories to disguise the true nature of their 
relationship.
    In April 1996, Monica was transferred, against her will, 
from the White House job to a job at the Pentagon. After she 
left employment at the White House, she frequently returned 
there to continue her secret relationship with the President 
under the guise of visiting Betty Currie, the President's 
personal secretary.
    After working at the Pentagon for over a year, Monica 
became disheartened. Despite the President's promises to the 
contrary, Monica was not returned to work at the White House. 
In July 1997, she began looking for a job in New York. She 
wasn't having any luck, despite the President's promise to help 
her with this, too. By early November 1997, Monica became 
frustrated with the lack of assistance.
    Finally, Betty Currie arranged a meeting for Monica with 
Vernon Jordan, one of the President's closest friends. They 
sought to enlist his help in her New York job search. On 
November 5, 1997, Monica met for 20 minutes with Mr. Jordan in 
his office. No job referrals followed, no job interviews were 
arranged, and there were no contacts from Mr. Jordan. In short, 
Mr. Jordan made no effort to find Monica a job. Indeed, getting 
her a job was so unimportant to him that Mr. Jordan later 
testified that he didn't even remember meeting her on November 
5.
    Nothing happened on her job search through the month of 
November, because Mr. Jordan was either gone or he simply 
wasn't returning Monica's phone calls. All that changed on 
December 5, 1997. That was the day Monica Lewinsky's name 
appeared on the Paula Jones witness list.
    Members of the Senate, this is how the whole thing started. 
A lone woman in Arkansas felt that she had been wronged by the 
President of the United States. The law said that she had a 
right to have her claim heard in a court of law. At each stage 
the President could have chosen to uphold the law. Instead, he 
chose to obstruct justice and to commit perjury.
    In his presentation, Mr. Manager Hutchinson will show you, 
through videotape words of the key witnesses, how the President 
used his position to obstruct justice as set forth in the 
articles of impeachment. I will then return to make the same 
showing respecting the allegations of perjury in the articles. 
Throughout all of this, throughout this presentation, it is 
important to keep in mind that we seek no congressional 
punishment for a man who chose to cheat on his wife. However, 
we have a legal obligation to expect constitutional 
accountability for a President who chooses to cheat the law.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I want to continue the 
presentation that was commenced this morning by Mr. Rogan. Let 
me continue with the path of obstruction. The obstruction, for 
our purposes, began on December 5, 1997, when the witness list 
came out in the civil rights case. It was faxed to the 
President's lawyers. It was later given to the President.
    At that point, the administration of justice became a 
threat to the President of the United States. He determined 
that the truth would be harmful to the case that he was trying 
to defend, and the President made a decision to take whatever 
steps were necessary to suppress the truth rather than to 
uphold the law. The acts of obstruction included attempts to 
improperly influence the testimony of witnesses in the case 
against him, the procurement of a false affidavit in the case, 
the willful concealment of evidence that was under subpoena, 
and efforts to illegally influence the testimony of witnesses 
before the Federal grand jury.
    You have heard these areas of obstruction presented to you 
before by managers on behalf of the House. Today it is 
important that you hear this case from those who have testified 
by deposition at your direction. And as you hear their 
testimony, you will see that the President may have been the 
only individual who had the complete picture. He had all the 
facts, and he did not always share those facts with others. He 
did not share those facts with Mr. Vernon Jordan, nor did he 
share all the facts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky, until he 
determined the time was right to do so.
    For example, he knows that Ms. Lewinsky is a witness but 
does not tell Ms. Lewinsky that fact until the time is right 
and whenever the job search is proceeding. He asks Mr. Jordan 
to help Ms. Lewinsky to get a job, but he does not tell Mr. 
Jordan the essential facts, first of all, that Ms. Lewinsky is 
a witness and, secondly, that there is a dangerous relationship 
between them in which, if she testified, her testimony would be 
harmful.
    The President was obviously concerned about the truth of 
the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky. It would have been harmful to 
his interests in the case. As a result, the President 
personally obstructed and directed the efforts of Mr. Jordan to 
secure Ms. Lewinsky a job and urge the filing of the affidavit. 
Now, what is the President's defense to this charge? Let's 
listen.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in 
any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones 
case?
    A. No.

    Now, you have heard that before. As you can see, Mr. Jordan 
defends his actions and, by implication, defends the actions of 
the President. You can weigh his intentions, but his intentions 
are not the issue, because regardless of your view of Mr. 
Jordan and his motivations, they are irrelevant. His view as to 
whether there is a connection between the job and the testimony 
is not an issue. It is not an issue as to whether Ms. Lewinsky 
thought there was a connection between the job and the 
testimony. It is not an issue as to whether Revlon thought 
there was a connection between the job and the testimony.
    There is only one issue, and that is whether the President 
viewed that there was a connection between those two. And it is 
the President who, under the law, had to have the corrupt 
intent, and that is the question that you have to answer. And I 
believe that the evidence will show that regardless of what 
anyone else believed, he knew the direct connection.
    Now, after each of you hears the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan, some of you will conclude that surely he had to 
know that there was an inappropriate relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky. And why do I say that? Well, Ms. 
Lewinsky will testify that he made it clear--that she made it 
clear to Mr. Jordan that there was that type of relationship. 
At first, she sort of is careful about it, but then she just 
ultimately tells him, as you will see from her testimony. But 
Mr. Jordan also, for those who have listened to his testimony, 
refers to mother wit, and his oft relied upon mother wit would 
have told him as well, under the circumstances, that there is 
something more going on.
    If he knew about the relationship, he had to know that all 
was not as it should be in what the President was asking him to 
do. The President requested a job for Ms. Lewinsky at the same 
time he was monitoring the filing of a false affidavit and 
knowing she was a witness in a case against him: All indicated 
that the job was not a favor for a young friend but it was a 
favor for someone in high office that had to be accomplished in 
order to assure the cooperation of a dangerous witness. That 
evidence will show that it is the President who suggested the 
assistance from Ms. Lewinsky and it is the President who 
suggested the false affidavit.
    Now, let's listen to the testimony, step by step, through 
the job search, through the signing of the false affidavit, to 
the encouragement to file the false affidavit on December 17, 
to the discussion of the gifts on December 28, through the 
tampering with the testimony of Betty Currie on two occasions, 
and then with the President's aide when they were called before 
the Federal grand jury, or prior to that.
    First, let's go to the job benefit to Ms. Lewinsky. How 
involved was the President in this activity? Let's first listen 
to the President as to what he said when he testified under 
oath in his deposition.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Do you know a man named Vernon Jordan?
    A. I know him well.
    Q. You have known him for a long time?
    A. A long time.
    Q. Has it ever been reported to you that he met with Monica 
Lewinsky and talked about this case?
    A. I knew that he met with her. I think Betty suggested he 
met with her and she may have met with her. I thought that he 
talked with her about something else. I thought he had given 
her some advice about her move to New York. It seems like that 
is what Betty said.

    Rather vague. Attributes all of his knowledge about Vernon 
Jordan, in reference to Ms. Lewinsky, to Betty, to Betty.
    Let's go on and hear more of what the President has to say 
in this connection.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Have you ever had a conversation with Vernon Jordan in 
which Monica Lewinsky was mentioned?
    A. I have. He told me that he thought he mentioned in 
passing to me that he had talked to her and she had come to him 
for advice about moving to New York.
    Q. She had come to him for advice.
    A. She had come to him for advice about moving to New York. 
She had called him and asked if she could come see him, and 
Betty, I think, maybe had said something to him about talking 
to him and he had given her some advice about moving to New 
York.
    That's all I know about that.

    That is all I know about that--diminished knowledge, 
diminished responsibility.
    But let's see what his good friend and confidant, Mr. 
Jordan, says about what the President knew, when he knew it, 
and to what extent he controlled this effort.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, is it true that your efforts to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky 
that you referenced in that meeting with Mr. Gittis--were your efforts 
carried out at the request of the President of the United States?
    A. There is no question but that through Betty Currie, I was acting 
on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. I think that's 
clear from my grand jury testimony.
    Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure that that's firmly 
established. And in reference to your previous grand jury testimony, 
you indicated, I believe, on May 28th, 1998, at page 61, that ``She''--
referring to Betty Currie--``was the one that called me at the behest 
of the President.''
    A. That is correct, and I think, Congressman, if in fact the 
President of the United States' secretary calls and asks for a request 
that you try to do the best you can to make it happen.
    Q. And you received that request as a request coming from the 
President?
    A. I--I interpreted it as a request from the President.
    Q. And then, later on in June of '98 in the grand jury testimony at 
page 45, did you not reference or testify that ``The President asked me 
to get Monica Lewinsky a job''?
    A. There was no--there was no question but that he asked me to help 
and that he asked others to help. I think that is clear from 
everybody's grand jury testimony.
    Q. And just one more point in that regard. In the same grand jury 
testimony, is it correct that you testified that ``He''--referring to 
the President--``was the source of it coming to my attention in the 
first place''?
    A. I may--if that is--if you--if it's in the--
    Q. It's at page 58 of the grand jury--
    A. I stand on my grand jury testimony.

    As Mr. Jordan testified, the President was a source of it 
coming to his attention in the first place. Mr. Jordan, the 
President's friend, testified that this was not a casual matter 
for the President. He was interested, he was directing the show 
and, as will be clear, he was consumed with preventing the 
truth from coming out in the civil rights case.
    But let's start back, for a moment, at the beginning. In 
the packet provided to you, there is a time line, and you can 
see again that there was the witness list that came out on 
December 5. That triggered the action in this case. But as we 
know, there was a meeting on November 5 between Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan in Mr. Jordan's office. Ms. Lewinsky wanted a 
job before the witness list came out, but not a whole lot was 
happening in that regard.
    Let's look at the testimony of Mr. Jordan in regard to this 
November 5 meeting that he was first asked about, which he had 
no recollection about. When the records were reproduced for 
him, he had a recollection.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Well, regardless of whether you met with her in November or not, 
the fact is you did not do anything in November to secure a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky until your activities on December 11 of '97?
    A. I think that's correct.
    Q. And on December 11, I think you made some calls for Ms. Lewinsky 
on that particular day?
    A. I believe I did.

    There will be a pattern developing, as you can see. Mr. 
Jordan had no recollection of the November 5 meeting when he 
originally testified before the grand jury. He had no 
recollection whatsoever of that meeting. Basically, he said it 
didn't happen.
    The second time he testified before the grand jury, the 
record was produced and it was substantiated. He recalls that. 
The second thing you can see from this was the meeting was of 
absolutely no consequence to him because this was not a 
priority issue to him. He was not going to do anything. It 
started happening, of course, when the witness list came out. 
The President met with the attorneys with the witness list, and 
on December 7 the President and Mr. Jordan meet. On December 8, 
a meeting is set up by Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. Jordan for the 
11th, and it was on the 11th when they met that things started 
moving and calls were being made. Of course, that was done at 
the direction of the President.
    Look at Ms. Lewinsky's recollection of that same November 5 
meeting.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. . . . you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help 
you get a job; is that correct?
    A. I hadn't seen any progress.
    Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December, you began 
to interview in New York and were much more active in your job search; 
correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon with the 
help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?
    A. Yes.

    Ms. Lewinsky, at this point, is at their mercy. She doesn't 
know what the communication is, she doesn't know what the 
President knows. The witness list has come in, and she hoped 
things were moving, but she doesn't know it. Finally, they 
start moving after the witness list comes in. On December 11, 
she has the meeting at which things start moving.
    Was this a typical referral? Each of you in this body have 
had occasions where friends and acquaintances, at different 
levels, or previous employees come to you and say: I am going 
to be applying for a job with such and such a company. Will you 
be a reference for me?
    Sometimes they ask you to make a call to that company to 
which they are applying for a job. This is not a typical 
referral, as you will see from the testimony. A few days prior 
to the December 11 meeting, Ms. Lewinsky sends up a wish list 
of the companies she wanted to apply. Mr. Jordan quickly said, 
``I'm not concerned about your wish list. I have the people I 
want to deal with.'' He took control of the job search.
    Let's listen to the testimony of Mr. Jordan as he 
emphasizes that point.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess some people 
refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
    A. Not jobs--companies.
    Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment 
with.
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go 
with your own list of friends and companies that you had better 
contacts with.
    A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business, 
and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel 
comfortable in calling.
    Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and 
ask your response to this, but many times I will be listed as a 
reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed 
as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference 
anywhere, would it not?
    A. I would hope so.
    Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the 
best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
    A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms. 
Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were 
not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
    Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms. 
Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you 
were going to be a reference for.
    A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting 
jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an 
assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
    Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to 
get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
    A. Yes.


    The testimony is very clear as to Mr. Jordan running the 
job search--in essence, a job placement on behalf of the 
President.
    Let's go again to that meeting of December 11 at which Ms. 
Lewinsky goes, for the first time Mr. Jordan remembers, for 
that meeting about the jobs. Ms. Lewinsky's view of this 
meeting--again, Jordan's list--he was the one controlling the 
job search. Also, you will see that Mr. Jordan acquires some 
knowledge from Ms. Lewinsky as to the relationship.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Let's go forward another week or so to December the 11th and a 
lunch that you had with Vernon Jordan, I believe, in his office.
    A. Yes.
    Q. How did--how was that meeting set up.
    A. Through his secretary.
    Q. Did you instigate that, or did he call through his secretary?
    A. I don't remember.
    Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?
    A. Uh, it was to discuss my job situation.
    Q. And what, what--how was that discussed?
    A. Uh, Mr. Jordan gave me a list of three names and suggested that 
I contact these people in a letter that I should cc him on, and that's 
what I did.
    Q. Did he ask you to copy him on the letters that you sent out?
    A. Yes.
    Q. During this meeting, did he make any comments about your status 
as a friend of the President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What--what did he say?
    A. In one of his remarks, he said something about me being a friend 
of the President.
    Q. And did you respond?
    A. Yes.
    Q. How?
    A. I said that I didn't, uh--I think I--my grand jury testimony, I 
know I talked about this, so it's probably more accurate. My memory 
right now is I said something about, uh, seeing him more as, uh, a man 
than as a President, and I treated him accordingly.
    Q. Did you express your frustration to Mr. Jordan with, uh, with 
the President?
    A. I expressed that sometimes I had frustrations with him, yes.
    Q. And what was his response to you about, uh--after you talked 
about the President?
    A. Uh, he sort of jokingly said to me, You know what your problem 
is, and don't deny it--you're in love with him. But it was a sort of 
light-hearted nature.
    Q. Did you--did you have a response to that?
    A. I probably blushed or giggled or something.

    That was on December 11. And I am sure Mr. Jordan and 
others were starting to kick in, at this point, understanding 
that there was something a little bit more involved in the 
relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President.
    But let's go to another aspect of the relationship on the 
job search. Let's look how information is controlled. Mr. 
Jordan learns ultimately on December 19 clearly that Ms. 
Lewinsky is on the witness list because she presents a subpoena 
to him. But whenever he pursues the jobs later on and maybe the 
call to Mr. Perelman, he does not pass that information along 
to the company. Does that make a difference to Revlon? You will 
hear some reference to Mr. Halperin, who is one of the 
executives at MacAndrews & Forbes, the parent company of 
Revlon, and Mr. Perelman, who is the CEO of MacAndrews and 
Forbes as well.
    Let's listen to the testimony of Mr. Jordan on how 
information is controlled.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that 
you knew and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under 
subpoena in the Jones case, and that information was not 
provided to either Mr. Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that 
correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Now, I wanted to read you a question and answer of Mr. 
Howard Gittis in his grand jury testimony of April 23, 1998.
    The question was: ``Now, you had mentioned before that one 
of the responsibilities of director is to have a fiduciary duty 
to the company. If it was the case that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
noticed as a witness in the Paula Jones case, and Vernon Jordan 
had known that, is that something that you believe as a person 
who works for MacAndrews & Forbes, is that something that you 
believe that Mr. Jordan should have told you, or someone in the 
company, not necessarily you, but someone in the company, when 
you referred her for employment?''
    His answer was ``Yes.''
    Do you disagree with Mr. Gittis' conclusion that that was 
important information for MacAndrews & Forbes?
    A. I obviously didn't think it was important at the time, 
and I didn't do it.

    Why would Revlon want to know that Ms. Lewinsky was on a 
witness list and under subpoena in a case that was adverse to 
the President and the fact the President was really the one 
that was wanting the job placement for Ms. Lewinsky? I think 
everyone understands the extraordinary conflict, extraordinary 
impropriety of that circumstance. As Mr. Jordan himself 
testified previously, that whenever the subpoena was issued, it 
changed the circumstances, and, yet, that information was not 
provided to Revlon, and Mr. Gittis certainly would have thought 
that it should have been.
    So Revlon wanted to know for the same reason, really, that 
Mr. Jordan would have liked to have had that information. But 
when the President learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness 
list, he did not share that information with Mr. Jordan 
himself.
    So it is explosive information that the President did not 
make available to him until the right time.
    Let's listen to Mr. Jordan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness 
list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and 
then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky 
on the 11th.
    Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you 
discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if 
so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
    A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit 
to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it 
was about the job search.
    Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about 
the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted 
to get a job in New York?
    A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her 
job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was 
also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector, 
and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me. 
There is no doubt about that.
    Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
    A. There's no question about that, either.
    Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that 
you had with the President after the witness list came out, your 
conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the 
11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the 
witness list in the Jones case?
    A. He did not.

    The President knew it was not disclosed to Mr. Jordan, 
according to his testimony. Mr. Jordan has to be reminded as to 
how important this information was because he previously 
testified that he expected to be told. It was significant 
enough information that if Ms. Betty Currie knew that Ms. 
Lewinsky was under subpoena that Betty Currie should tell him. 
He expected the President to tell him. That was his 
expectation, for natural reasons--that this is an extraordinary 
conflict whenever the President knows there is a relationship. 
She is an adverse witness. She is under subpoena, and provided 
a job benefit. But he kept some of those details to himself 
without disclosing.
    Let's listen again to Mr. Jordan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Precisely. She disclosed to you, of course, when she received 
the subpoena, and that's information that you expected to know and to 
be disclosed to you?
    A. Fine.
    Q. Is--
    A. Yes. Fine.
    Q. And in fact, if Ms. Currie--I'm talking about Betty Currie--if 
she had known that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have 
expected her to tell you that information as well since you were 
seeking employment for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Well, it would have been fine had she told me. I do make a 
distinction between being a witness on the one hand and being a 
defendant in some sort of criminal action on the other. She was a 
witness in the civil case, and I don't believe witnesses in civil cases 
don't have a right for--to employment.
    Q. Okay. I refer you to page 95 of your grand jury testimony, in 
which you said: ``I believe that had Ms. Currie known, that she would 
have told me.''
    And the next question: ``Let me ask the question again, though. 
Would you have expected her to tell you if she knew?''
    And do you recall your answer?
    A. I don't.
    Q. ``Yes, sure.''
    A. I stand by that answer.
    Q. And so it's your testimony that if Ms. Currie had known that Ms. 
Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have expected her to tell you 
that information?
    A. It would have been helpful.
    Q. And likewise, would you have expected the President to tell you 
if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be called as a 
witness in the Paula Jones case?
    A. That would have been helpful, too.
    Q. And that was your expectation, that he would have done that in 
your conversations?
    A. It--it would certainly have been helpful, but it would not have 
changed my mind.
    Q. Well, being helpful and that being your expectation is a little 
bit different, and so I want to go back again to your testimony on 
March 3, page 95, when the question is asked to you--question: ``If the 
President had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky could be called a 
witness in the Paula Jones case, would you have expected him to tell 
you that when you spoke with him between the 11th and the 19th about 
her?''
    And your answer: ``And I think he would have.''
    A. My answer was yes in the grand jury testimony, and my answer is 
yes today.
    Q. All right. So it would have been helpful, and it was something 
you would have expected?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so 
advise you of that fact in the conversations that he had with you on 
December 7th and December 11th after he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was 
on the witness list?
    A. As I testified--
    MR. KENDALL: Objection. Misstates the record with regard to 
December 11th.
    MR. HUTCHINSON: I--I will restate the question. I believe it 
accurately reflects the record, and I'll ask the question.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so 
advise you of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list 
despite the fact that he had conversations with you on two occasions, 
on December 7th and December 11th?
    A. I have no recollection of the President telling me about the 
witness list.

    Now, I am providing some long snippets because I want you 
to see the testimony of the witnesses. I think it is very 
important as you piece it together. You might say, well, there 
is nothing explosive here. Whenever you are talking about 
obstruction of justice, it ties together, it fits together. 
Information is controlled and that is what we see in this 
particular case.
    Clearly, Mr. Jordan expected information because he knew 
that something that the President should have shared, it was 
not shared, according to Mr. Jordan's testimony. And for 
natural reasons.
    If you look at the exhibit that I passed out, on the time 
line we have talked about when the witness list came out, on 
the 7th, and on the 11th, or sometime thereafter, the President 
and Mr. Jordan meet, and that information is not disclosed, 
despite the fact that the President knows she is on the witness 
list.
    And now, let's go to the 17th, because now the President is 
ready to share some additional information with Ms. Lewinsky. 
Now that he has got the job search moving, perhaps she is in a 
more receptive mood so that she can handle the news that she is 
on the witness list. So let's listen to Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony as to this December 17, 2 a.m., telephone 
conversation from the President of the United States.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December 
the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?
    A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother 
had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was 
on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned 
the Christmas present he had for me.
    Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of 
2 o'clock to 2:30.
    A. Correct.
    Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?
    A. No.
    Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones 
witness list?
    A. Yes.
    Q. I will try to ask sharper questions to avoid these objections. 
At that point we got a telephone conversation in the morning with you 
and the President. And he has, among other things, mentioned to you 
that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has also mentioned to 
you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid possible 
testifying in that case. Is that right.
    A. Correct.
    Q. And he's also, I think, now at the point that we were in our 
questioning in reference to the cover story that you and he had, that 
perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver 
papers or to see Betty Currie. Is that right.
    A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship. That's correct.
    Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly 
familiar to you.
    A. Yes.
    Q. You knew what he was talking about.
    A. Yes.
    Q. And why was this familiar to you.
    A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.
          * * * * *
    Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were 
reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--
    A. Correct.
    Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was 
on the witness list, I should say?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness 
list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to 
testify in the Paula Jones case?
    A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a 
possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was 
a subpoena to testify, but--
    Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And that was what--
          * * * * *
    Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the 
telephone conversation with the President that early morning of 
December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your 
relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of 
these cover stories?
    A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I 
don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to 
myself I knew I would deny the relationship.
    Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?
    A. Yes, correct.
    Q. Good.

    Do you believe Monica Lewinsky? I believe her testimony is 
credible. She is not trying to hammer the President. She is 
trying to tell the truth as to her recollection of this 2 a.m. 
call to her by the President of the United States on December 
17.
    The news is broken to her that she is on the witness list. 
It puts it in a legal context. This is a 24-year-old ex-intern. 
She might not have the legal sophistication of the President, 
but the President certainly knows the legal consequences as to 
his actions. What he is telling a witness in a case that is 
adverse to him is that: You do not have to tell the truth. You 
can use the cover stories that we used before. And that might 
have been in a nonlegal context, but now we are in a different 
arena and he says: Continue the same lies, even though you are 
in a court of law. Continue the same pattern.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, in my book that is 
illegal, and I hate to say it, but that is obstruction of 
justice by the President of the United States. And, if you 
believe Ms. Lewinsky, then you have to accept that fact. 
Otherwise, we are saying that it is all right for someone to 
take a witness who is against them and say: Don't tell the 
truth, don't worry about that, use the cover stories. You can 
file an affidavit. You can avoid telling the truth.
    Ladies and gentlemen, this is significant. It is important. 
Do not diminish this, the impact of what happened on December 
17, with the obstruction of justice on that occasion.
    And, now, let's move on. That is December 17. We can move 
on to December 19, and this is when the subpoena is actually 
delivered to Ms. Lewinsky. She calls Vernon Jordan. She is in 
tears. She is upset. Vernon Jordan says, ``Come over to my 
office,'' and they have the discussion. And you are going to 
hear Mr. Jordan's version of what happens on December 19. You 
are going to hear Ms. Lewinsky's testimony as to what happens 
in that office on December 19 as well.
    Let's hear from Mr. Jordan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. And during this meeting, did she in fact show you the subpoena 
that she had received in the Jones litigation?
    A. I'm sure she showed me the subpoena.
    Q. And the subpoena that was presented to you asked her to give a 
deposition, is that correct?
    A. As I recollect.
    Q. But did it also ask Ms. Lewinsky or direct her to produce 
certain documents and tangible objects?
    A. I think, if I'm correct in my recollection, it asked that she 
produce gifts.
    Q. Gifts, and some of those gifts were specifically enumerated.
    A. I don't remember that. I do remember gifts.
    Q. And did you discuss any of the items requested under the 
subpoena?
    A. I did not. What I said to her was that she needed counsel.
    Q. Now, just to help you in reference to your previous grand jury 
testimony of March 3, '98--and if you would like to refer to that, page 
121, but I believe it was your testimony that you asked her if there 
had been any gifts after you looked at the subpoena.
    A. I may have done that, and if I--if that's in my testimony, I 
stand by it.
    Q. And did she--from your conversation with her, did you determine 
that in your opinion, there was a fascination on her part with the 
President?
    A. No question about that.
    Q. And I think you previously described it that she had a ``thing'' 
for the President?
    A. ``Thing,'' yes.
    Q. And did you make any specific inquiry as to the nature of the 
relationship that she had with the President?
    A. Yes. At some point during that conversation, I asked her 
directly if she had had sexual relationships with the President.
    Q. And is this not an extraordinary question to ask a 24-year-old 
intern, whether she had sexual relations with the President of the 
United States?
    A. Not if you see--not if you had witnessed her emotional state and 
this ``thing,'' as I say. It was not.
    Q. And her emotional state and what she expressed to you about her 
feelings for the President is what prompted you to ask that question?
    A. That, plus the question of whether or not the President at the 
end of his term would leave the First Lady; and that was alarming and 
stunning to me.
    Q. And she related that question to you in that meeting on December 
19th?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Now, going back to the question in which you asked her if she 
had had a sexual relationship with the President, what was her 
response?
    A. No.
    Q. And I'm sure that that was not an idle question on your part, 
and I presume that you needed to know the answer for some purpose.
    A. I wanted to know the answer based on what I had seen in her 
expression; obviously, based on the fact that this was a subpoena about 
her relationship with the President.
    Q. And so you felt like you needed to know the answer to that 
question to determine how you were going to handle the situation?
    A. No. I thought it was a factual data that I needed to know, and I 
asked the question.
    Q. And why did you need to know the answer to that question?
    A. I am referring this lady, Ms. Lewinsky, to various companies for 
jobs, and it seemed to me that it was important for me to know in that 
process whether or not there had been something going on with the 
President based on what I saw and based on what I heard.

    Why was it important? Why was it important for Mr. Jordan 
to know whether she was under subpoena? Why was it important 
for Mr. Jordan to know whether there was a sexual relationship? 
Why was it important? Because those would be incredible, 
explosive ingredients in a circumstance that is fraught with 
danger and impropriety, and he knows that and he asked the 
right questions. But he doesn't listen to the right answer, nor 
does he take the right steps, because he is acting at the 
direction of the President.
    As you will see, during his meeting on December 19, he was 
keeping the President very closely informed. You will see in 
your packet of materials that the call--as soon as he was 
notified, Mr. Jordan was notified Ms. Lewinsky was under 
subpoena, he tried to get ahold of the President, exhibit H-25, 
a 3:51 call to the President. He didn't make contact at that 
point. Ms. Lewinsky came into his office about 4:47. It was at 
5:01 that he received a call from the President. So the 
President actually called him at the same time Ms. Lewinsky was 
in the office.
    Let's look at Ms. Lewinsky's testimony as to her 
recollection of that December 19 meeting with Mr. Jordan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. You went to see Mr. Jordan, and you were inside his office after 
5 o'clock, and you did--is that correct?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Were--were you interrupted, in the office?
    A. Yes. He received a phone call.
    Q. And you testified that you didn't know who that was that called?
    A. Correct.
    Q. Did you excuse yourself?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What--after you came back in, what--what occurred? Did he tell 
you who he had been talking to?
    A. No.
    Q. Okay. What happened next?
    A. I know I've testified about this--
    Q. Yes.
    A. --so I stand by that testimony, and my recollection right now is 
when I came back in the room, I think shortly after he had placed a 
phone call to--to Mr. Carter's office, and told me to come to his 
office at 10:30 Monday morning.
    Q. Did you know who Mr. Carter was?
    A. No.
    Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you who he was?
    A. No--I don't remember.
    Q. Did you understand he was going to be your attorney?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you express any concerns about the--the subpoena?
    A. I think that happened before the phone call came.
    Q. Okay, but did you express concerns about the subpoena?
    A. Yes, yes.
    Q. And what were those concerns?
    A. In general, I think I was just concerned about being dragged 
into this, and I was concerned because the subpoena had called for a 
hatpin, that I turn over a hatpin, and that was an alarm to me.
    Q. How--in what sense was it--in what sense was it an alarm to you?
    A. The hatpin being on the subpoena was evidence to me that someone 
had given that information to the Paula Jones people.
    Q. What did Mr. Jordan say about the subpoena?
    A. That it was standard.
    Q. Did he have any--did he have any comment about the specificity 
of the hatpin?
    A. No.
    Q. And did you--
    A. He just kept telling me to calm down.
    Q. Did you raise that concern with Mr. Jordan?
    A. I don't remember if--if I've testified to it, then yes. If--I 
don't remember right now.
    Q. Did--would you have remembered then if he made any comment or 
answer about the hatpin?
    A. I mean, I think I would.
    Q. And you don't remember?
    A. I--I remember him saying something that it was--you know, calm 
down, it's a standard subpoena or vanilla subpoena, something like 
that.

    What we see here is another example of compartmentalization 
of information. During this meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. 
Jordan receives a call from the President, presumably in 
response to a call he had placed to the President, to tell him 
Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. When the President calls, Mr. 
Jordan takes that call in private. It is about Ms. Lewinsky, it 
is about the subpoena, and that information is not shared with 
Ms. Lewinsky. It is of interest to her.
    Let's go on and hear some more about Ms. Lewinsky's version 
of that conversation on December 19.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did Mr. Jordan during that meeting make an inquiry about the 
nature of the relationship between you and the President?
    A. Yes, he did.
    Q. What was that inquiry?
    A. I don't remember the exact wording of the questions, but there 
were two questions, and I think they were something like did you have 
sex with the President or did he--and if--or did he ask for it or 
some--something like that.

    At this point, Ms. Lewinsky denies the relationship. She 
thinks this is some type of a test. She is not sure the reason 
for the question. She thinks he knows there is a little 
confusion on that. Clearly, Mr. Jordan is not satisfied with 
the answer. Mother wit is still around, as he indicated. But he 
feels so concerned about it that that night he goes to see the 
President, that we will later see, and asks that same question 
of the President.
    Now, let's talk to President Clinton and see what he 
testifies about when this information was reported to him on 
the subpoena. Let's listen to the testimony of President 
Clinton.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that 
Monica Lewinsky had been served with subpoena in this case?
    A. I don't think so.
    Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case?
    A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she 
was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I 
want to be as accurate as I can.

    Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Nebraska.
    Mr. KERREY. Can I ask the manager to identify which 
deposition this is?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. This is the January deposition.
    Mr. KERREY. Mr. Chief Justice, will the manager answer the 
question and then show that again? This is the second time he 
has shown a tape of the President without indicating which 
deposition it was.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes, I think it would be a good idea for 
the manager if he will indicate what deposition it was, if you 
are showing a deposition video of the President.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and I 
thank the Senator for the question. It is a very fair question, 
and I will try to be more clear in the identification of that. 
This is the testimony of William Jefferson Clinton before the 
deposition in the Jones case in January, January 17. I 
believe--can we replay that? We are not going to replay that. 
Let me go on.
    The testimony that he gave at that time was, ``Did anyone 
other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky 
had been served with a subpoena in that case,'' and the answer 
was, ``I don't think so.'' Clearly, Mr. Jordan was keeping 
close contact with the President, telling him every step of the 
way, when the subpoena, the call, he is placing a call back--
the information is there, but, of course, the President tries 
to diminish that.
    Let's go on with some more testimony of Ms. Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did you ask Mr. Jordan to call the President and advise 
him of the subpoena?
    A. I think so, yes. I asked him to inform the President. I 
don't know if it was through telephone or not.
    Q. And you did that because the President had asked you to 
make sure you let Betty know that?
    A. Well, sure. With Betty not being in the office, I 
couldn't--there wasn't anyone else that I could call to get 
through to him.
    Q. Did Mr. Jordan say to you when he might see the 
President next?
    A. I believe he said he would see him that evening at a 
holiday reception.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, could I inquire, was the 
manager thinking in terms of concluding this portion in 15 
minutes, or do you want to take a break now?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. This would be a good time for a 
break.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take a 15-minute break at this time.
    There being no objection, at 11:30 a.m., the Senate 
recessed until 11:53 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I was 
going to take the opportunity to replay the videotape--in fact, 
I will now--that I did not properly explain before. This is the 
videotape of President Clinton and his testimony before the 
civil deposition in the Jones case in January of 1997.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. When you say ``before,'' you actually 
mean ``during,'' don't you? It is not before the deposition; 
his testimony was during the deposition.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, you are 
absolutely correct. Excuse me. Thank you.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that 
Monica Lewinsky had been served with subpoena in this case?
    A. I don't think so.
    Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case?
    A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she 
was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I 
want to be as accurate as I can.

    And now let's go to what Mr. Jordan has to say in reference 
to his contacts with the President when he learned of the 
subpoena on December 19. Let's play that tape.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, you indicated you had this conversation with 
the President at about 5:01 p.m. out of the presence of Ms. Lewinsky. 
Now, during this conversation with the President, what did you tell the 
President in that conversation?
    A. That Lewinsky--I'm sure I told him that Ms. Lewinsky was in my 
office, in the reception area, that she had a subpoena and that I was 
going to visit with her.
    Q. And did you advise the President as well that you were going to 
recommend Frank Carter as an attorney?
    A. I may have.
    Q. And why was it necessary to tell the President these facts?
    A. I don't know why it was not unnecessary to tell him these facts. 
I was keeping him informed about what was going on, and so I told him.
    Q. Why did you make the judgment that you should call the President 
and advise him of these facts?
    A. I just thought he ought to know. He was interested it--he was 
obviously interested in it--and I felt some responsibility to tell him, 
and I did.
    Q. All right. And what was the President's response?
    A. He said thank you.
    Q. Subsequent to your conversation with the President about Monica 
Lewinsky, did you advise Ms. Lewinsky of this conversation with the 
President?
    A. I doubt it.

    Once again, Mr. Jordan testifies that the President was 
obviously interested in it. This was not a matter of casual 
interest to him. It was a matter of deep concern that 
jeopardized what he saw as his position in that lawsuit.
    Now, let's go back again to the testimony of President 
Clinton, this time before the grand jury in August of 1998.
    [Playing of videotape.]
    Mr. STEVENS. We cannot hear that monitor.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I will read the answer again:

    . . . and Mr. Jordan informed you of that, is that right?
    Answer: No, sir.

    Now, in fairness to the President, he gives a longer answer 
than that. I welcome anybody to read it, but it appears rather 
convoluted. I think that you can see the contrast. There is no 
question in Mr. Jordan's mind as to the details that he is 
providing to the President on a regular basis. We are on 
December 19. The subpoena is issued. He notifies the President. 
He notifies the President how the job search is going. He 
notifies the President that they got representation through Mr. 
Carter. So the details are provided to the President and to 
contrast that with the President's recollection as to did he 
have any contact with Mr. Jordan, once again diminishing that.
    Let's go back to December 19, back to the chart--to 
December 19 when the subpoena is issued. Mr. Jordan meets with 
Monica Lewinsky. He confronts her about the relationship. Now, 
he goes that evening to see the President at the White House to 
confront him personally about it to discuss this with him. 
Let's hear from Mr. Jordan, and this is at the White House.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
    A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came 
in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left 
the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan 
went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with 
him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he 
had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said, 
``No, never.''

    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. Well, we had established that.
    Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about 
her fascination?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that 
day?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked 
about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the 
term?
    A. I did.
    Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to 
whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of 
conversation.
    Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to 
Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question 
to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this 
question to the President?
    A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who 
happens to be the President of the United States.
    Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United 
States, to give you a truthful answer?
    A. I did.
    Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to 
continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
    A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to 
do.
    Q. Well, my question was more did you rely upon the President's 
answer in your decision to continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a 
job.
    A. I did not rely on his answer. I was going to pursue the job in 
any event. But I got the answer to the question that I had asked Ms. 
Lewinsky earlier from her, and I got the answer from him that night as 
to the sexual relationships, and he said no.

    You will have to judge for yourselves as to why Mr. Jordan 
felt compelled to ask the question. He is asking the right 
questions. It was important information. If the President had 
said, ``Yes; there is,'' then it would certainly have been 
inappropriate to continue providing a job benefit for a witness 
that you are seeking an affidavit from denying a relationship 
when you know the relationship exists, when that witness would 
be adverse to the President's interest who is seeking the job.
    To some that might be convoluted, and perhaps I didn't 
explain it as best it can be. But it looks to me like that is 
why Mr. Jordan is asking the question because he knows it would 
be inappropriate if that, in fact, did exist. He got an answer 
``no.'' I don't know what was in his mind. But clearly you see 
the conversations develop when Ms. Lewinsky made it totally 
clear to him without any question that there was that 
relationship. But still the job benefit was provided.
    We are not going to have time to go through it all. But 
sequentially, the next thing that happens is December 2 when 
Ms. Lewinsky goes to Mr. Jordan's office where Mr. Jordan 
drives her in the chauffeur-driven government vehicle to Mr. 
Frank Carter's office where the attorney is that is provided 
for Ms. Lewinsky. That is the only time that it happened in the 
referral that Mr. Jordan took it upon himself to personally 
deliver a client to Mr. Carter. During that conversation, Ms. 
Lewinsky tells Mr. Jordan more of the details of their 
relationship.
    But let's go to another element of obstruction--on December 
28, a few days after Christmas. You are very familiar with this 
episode in which Ms. Lewinsky and the President meet. They 
exchange gifts. The testimony in the Jones case is discussed. 
There is concern expressed about the gifts. She asks the 
President in essence, Should I get them out of my house? And 
you will hear her answer. Her testimony is very clear on this. 
That is what I would like you to listen to. There is no 
ambiguity. There are no ``what-ifs.'' It is very clear. And 
let's move now to the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky.
    [Inaudible.]
    Mr. LAUTENBERG. I can't hear.
    Mr. GRAMM. Can we turn this up?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I don't think the question is 
audible.
    Well, that is a different--it's not as sophisticated a 
sound collection system as the U.S. Senate used in the 
depositions here, so I apologize for the fact that that was 
inaudible but the question was asked of the President:

    Q. After you gave her the gifts on December 28, did you 
speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up a 
box of gifts that was some compilation of gifts that Ms. 
Lewinsky would have?

    His answer:

    No, sir, I did not do that.

    His denial and then the facts presented by Ms. Lewinsky and 
the circumstantial evidence, the question was asked of Ms. 
Lewinsky:

    Q. Did the President ever tell you to turn over the gifts?
    A. Not that I remember.

    But when I say that she that testified unequivocally, 
whenever Ms. Lewinsky was asked ``Did you later that day 
receive a call from Ms. Currie,'' the answer was, ``Yes, I 
did,'' and she goes ahead and explains it. There is no 
hesitation. There is no question. But their memory is clear 
that the call came from Betty Currie.
    Now, how could Betty Currie know to go pick up the gifts? I 
think you understand there is only one way that could have come 
about, and that would be through a communication from the 
President to her.
    Now, let's go on down the path. After we see the meeting on 
December 28, there was a meeting at the Hyatt on December 31. 
We could play this video--I would like to--with Vernon Jordan 
and with Ms. Lewinsky. This is a meeting at the Hyatt that Mr. 
Jordan totally denied ever happened in his first few 
testimonies before the grand jury. But in his most recent 
testimony before the Senate, in the deposition, he was 
confronted with receipts from the Hyatt, and the testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky which was clear, and the corroborating facts, and 
he said yes, in fact, it did happen. Not only did he recall the 
meeting, but then he recalled what was discussed, that yes, in 
fact, notes were discussed there.
    Ms. Lewinsky testifies that she raised the issue of other 
evidence that would be possibly in her apartment, notes to the 
President. According to her testimony, she was told that: You 
need to get rid of those.
    Now, Mr. Jordan totally denies that. But the point is, 
there is more evidence at risk for the President. Mr. Jordan, 
who is doing the work for the President, has this conversation 
with Ms. Lewinsky that he earlier denied ever happened.
    So, I think you look at credibility there. You believe Ms. 
Lewinsky? If you accept the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, then you 
have more evidence that is at issue, and that is being urged to 
be destroyed and not available for the truth-seeking endeavor 
in the civil rights case. I think that is significant.
    Now, you say that is not the President, that is Mr. Jordan. 
You have to put this in context. It is Ms. Lewinsky who says 
that she is talking to the President when she is talking to Mr. 
Jordan--and I am paraphrasing that, but that is what she was 
seeing--seeing Mr. Jordan as a conduit to the President.
    Then we go on after the meeting in the Hyatt, we go into 
January, where the job search continues. But it is tied 
directly to the signing of the affidavit, which is false by its 
nature.
    If we look at the testimony of Mr. Jordan, in the January 5 
timeframe where the affidavit is prepared and discussed with 
Mr. Jordan:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter 
on 3 occasions the day before the affidavit was signed?
    A. Yeah, my recollection is, is that I was exchanging or 
sharing with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she asked me to 
do, what I refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the 
lawyer and I was not the lawyer. I mean, it would be so 
presumptuous of me to try to advise Frank Carter as to how to 
practice law.
    Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I may have.
    Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about 
the affidavit would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned 
about the economics of law practice he would have likely billed 
Ms. Lewinsky for some of those telephone calls?
    A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.

    So you have Mr. Jordan discussing the affidavit with both 
Ms. Lewinsky and her attorney, Mr. Carter. And if you look at 
the testimony of Mr. Carter, he talks about the fact that he 
did bill some time for his conversations with Mr. Jordan. 
Certainly they are matters of substance in relation to the 
affidavit that was being discussed between the three: Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Carter.
    Now, let's hear what Ms. Lewinsky has to say on the changes 
that were made in the affidavit:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. OK, have you had an opportunity to review the draft of 
your affidavit?
    A. I--yes.
    Q. Do you have any comment or response?
    A. I received it. I made the suggested changes. And I 
believe I spoke with Mr. Jordan about the changes I wanted to 
make.

    Now, because of time, I am not going to be able to go 
completely through all of their testimony but let me tell you 
time sequentially what is happening here. This is the second 
page of the time chart that you have.
    January 5 and 6, the affidavit is prepared and discussed 
with Mr. Jordan and with the President.
    On the 7th, the affidavit is signed. You recall Mr. Jordan 
lets the President know that the affidavit was signed. And he 
says he was interested, he was obviously interested in this.
    On January 8 the job came through, the day after the 
affidavit was signed. And of course it had to come through, the 
personal call of Mr. Jordan to Mr. Perelman to ``make it 
happen--if it can happen.'' Once that job is secured, the 
President is informed: Mission accomplished.
    January 15, there are some inquiries from the news media 
about the gifts that had been delivered to the White House. 
This makes Betty Currie nervous enough that she has to go see 
Mr. Jordan about it.
    You go to the 17th; the President gives his deposition in 
which that false affidavit is presented on behalf of Ms. 
Lewinsky and the President's attorney.
    And then the next day, after that deposition is given, you 
go to January 18, where he is very concerned because he 
mentions Betty Currie's name so many times.
    We were not able--we did not ask for the deposition of 
Betty Currie. We wish that we had had that opportunity. We 
would like to call her here. But that is one of the most 
critical and important elements of the structure in which the 
truth is so critically clear, because it happened not just on 
one day, because it happened on a couple of days.
    We see on the 17th, the President is deposed. This is the 
third chart that you have. The 18th, the President coaches 
Betty Currie, going through the series of questions. On the 
19th, there is this dramatic search for Ms. Lewinsky. On the 
20th, the Washington Post story becomes known, because the 
President's counselors get calls and the OIC investigation 
becomes known.
    On the 21st, at 12:30 a.m., the Post story appears on the 
Internet. At 12:41, the President calls Bruce Lindsey. At 1:16 
a.m, the Post story appears. The President calls Betty Currie 
for 20 minutes, discusses the Post story. And then, according 
to Betty Currie, on the 20th or the 21st, it was the second 
incident of coaching that took place, where the President calls 
her in and goes through that series of questions: I did nothing 
wrong; she came on to me; we were never alone. So that was the 
second time that it happened. And that, ladies and gentlemen of 
the Senate, is another example of witness tampering: A known 
witness clearly going to be testifying, a subordinate employee 
who is called in and coached.
    Now, the President says, ``I was trying to gain facts.'' 
You determine that. You are the ones who have to defend that 
question as to whether, under common sense, the President was 
gaining information on two separate occasions or whether he was 
actually trying to tamper with the testimony of a witness.
    The 21st, she is subpoenaed by the OIC. The 23rd, she is 
added to the Jones witness list.
    Now I want to play the last video clip that I am going to 
move to on Ms. Lewinsky, some things that she said that are 
different with regard to the President:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. The President did not in that conversation on December 17 of 
1997, or any other conversation for that matter, instruct you to tell 
the truth; is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
          * * * * *
    Q. But the--the pattern that you had with the President to conceal 
this relationship, it was never questioned that, for instance, that 
given day that he gave you gifts you were not going to surrender those 
to the Jones attorneys because that would--
    A. In my mind there is no reflection; no.

    We have one more here we would like you to listen to.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. Sure, gosh, I think to me that if the President had not 
said to Betty in letters us--cover--let us just say if we refer 
to that which I am talking about in paragraph 4 of page 4, I 
would have known to use that. So, to me, encouraging or asking 
me to lie would have, you know if the President had said now 
listen you better not say anything about this relationship, you 
better not tell them the truth, you better not--for me the best 
way to explain how I feel what happened was, you know, no one 
asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me 
either.

    It is very important to understand that we want you to know 
very clearly that Ms. Lewinsky says that the President never 
told her to lie. There is no question about that. There is no 
dispute about that, either. I think you have to look at all the 
context of this. What the President did suggest to her was to 
use an affidavit to avoid truthful testimony, to stick with the 
cover stories under legal context.
    Is the issue here whether Ms. Lewinsky believed the 
President was encouraging her to lie, that's what the President 
was trying to do here? Or is the issue what the President was 
trying to do? It is your determination. You have to make the 
decision whether the President, in talking to a 24-year-old ex-
employee, whether he is encouraging her to come forward and to 
tell the truth or, in a legal context, to use the old cover 
stories, to lie, to use false affidavits, to avoid the truth 
from coming out.
    It is not Ms. Lewinsky's viewpoint that is important. It is 
what the President intended. What did the President intend by 
this conversation when he told her on December 17, ``Guess 
what, bad news; you're a witness''. Then he proceeded to 
suggest to her ways to avoid truthful testimony.
    I really don't care what is in Ms. Lewinsky's mind at that 
point. The critical issue is what is in the President's mind at 
that point as to what he was intending. Was it an innocent 
conversation, or was it a conversation with corrupt intent?
    I believe that if you put all of this in context--from the 
affidavit to the job search, to the coaching of Ms. Betty 
Currie, to all of the other conversations with the aides--that 
it was the President's intent to avoid the workings of the 
administration of justice, to impede the flow of the truth in 
the administration of justice for his own benefit, and that is 
what obstruction of justice is about. That is what people go to 
jail about, and that is what we are presenting to you as a 
factual basis for this case.
    I now yield to my fellow manager, Mr. Rogan.

                                 recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I think it would be 
appropriate if we take a break at this time for lunch and 
return at 1:15, and I so ask unanimous consent.
    There being no objection, at 12:22 p.m., the Senate 
recessed until 1:24 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled 
when called to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    I believe we are ready to resume the presentation by the 
House managers, and Mr. Manager Rogan is prepared to speak.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, before the break, you had the opportunity to hear the 
very able presentation from Mr. Manager Hutchinson relating to 
the article of impeachment alleging obstruction of justice 
against the President of the United States. I would like to use 
my portion to discuss very briefly article I of the impeachment 
resolution that alleges on August 17, 1998, the President 
committed perjury before a Federal grand jury conducting a 
criminal investigation. He did this in a number of ways, 
embarking on a calculated effort to cover up illegal 
obstruction of justice.
    First, the President lied about statements he made to his 
top aides regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This 
is significant because the President admitted, under oath, that 
he knew these aides were potential witnesses before a criminal 
grand jury.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said there was 
nothing going on between us. That was true. I said I have not had sex 
with her as I define it. That was true. And did I hope that I never had 
to be here on this day giving this testimony, of course. But I also 
didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter further.
    So I said things that were true that may have been misleading, and 
if they were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I am sorry.
    Q. It may have been misleading, but you knew, though, after January 
21 when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was looking 
into this, you knew they might be witnesses, you knew they might be 
called into the grand jury?
    A. That's right.
    Q. And you do recall denying any sexual relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky to the following people: Harry Thomasson, Erskine Bowles, 
Harold Ickes, Mr. Podesta, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Jordan, Miss Betty 
Currie. Do you recall denying any sexual relation--

    The question to the President: ``You knew they might be 
called into a grand jury, didn't you?'' Answer by the 
President: ``That's right.''
    The President's testimony that he said things that were 
misleading but true to his aides was perjury.
    Just as the President predicted, several of his top aides 
later were called to testify before the grand jury as to what 
the President told them. When they testified before the grand 
jury, they passed along the President's false account, just as 
the President intended. The President's former chief of staff, 
Erskine Bowles, and his current chief of staff, John Podesta, 
went before the grand jury and testified that the President 
told them he did not have sexual relations with Monica and he 
did not ask anybody to lie.
    Mr. Podesta had an additional meeting with the President 2 
days after the story broke. Mr. Podesta testified that at that 
meeting with the President, the President was extremely 
explicit in saying he never had sex with her in any way 
whatsoever and that he was not alone with her in the Oval 
Office.
    The most glaring example of the President using an aide as 
a messenger of lies to the grand jury was his manipulation of 
his Presidential assistant, Mr. Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal has 
been assistant to the President since August of 1997. Mr. 
Blumenthal testified that dealing with the media was one of his 
responsibilities on January 21, 1998, the day the Monica 
Lewinsky story broke. Mr. Blumenthal testified under oath that 
once the story became public, he attended twice-a-day White 
House strategy sessions called to deal with the political, 
legal, and media impact of the Clinton scandals on the White 
House.
    In his deposition testimony taken just this week by 
authority of the U.S. Senate, Mr. Blumenthal shared in chilling 
detail the story of how the President responded to the public 
discovery of his longstanding relationship with a young woman 
who had shared tearful and emotional descriptions of her love 
for him. Mr. Clinton responded not in love, not in friendship, 
not even with a grain of concern for her well-being or 
emotional stability. Instead, the President took the deep and 
apparently unrequited emotional attachment Monica Lewinsky had 
formed for him, and prepared to summarily take her life and 
throw it on the ash heap.
    The date is January 21, 1998. The Lewinsky scandal had just 
broken in the newspapers that morning. Mr. Blumenthal met 
initially with the First Lady, Mrs. Clinton, to get her take on 
the growing political fire storm. Later that day, Mr. 
Blumenthal is summoned to the Oval Office. Listen as Sidney 
Blumenthal describes, step by step, the destructive mechanism 
of the man who twice was elected President under the banner of 
feeling other people's pain.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, specifically inviting your attention to January 
21, 1998, you testified before the grand jury that on that date you 
personally spoke to the President regarding the Monica Lewinsky matter, 
correct?
    A. Yes.
          * * * * *
    Q. You are familiar with the Washington Post story that broke that 
day?
    A. I am.
          * * * * *
    Q. The story stated that the Office of Independent Counsel was 
investigating whether the President made false statements about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case?
    A. Right.
    Q. And also that the Office of Independent Counsel was 
investigating whether the President obstructed justice in the Jones 
case, is that your best recollection of what that story was about?
    A. Yes.
          * * * * *
    Q. And you now remember that the President asked to speak with you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you go to the Oval Office?
    A. Yes.
    Q. During that conversation were you alone with the President?
    A. I was.
    Q. Do you remember if the door was closed?
    A. It was.
    Q. When you met with the President, did you relate to him a 
conversation you had with the First Lady earlier that day?
    A. I did.
    Q. What did you tell the President the First Lady told you earlier 
that day?
    A. I believe that I told him that the First Lady had called me 
earlier in the day, and in the light of the story in the Post had told 
me that the President had helped troubled people in the past and that 
he had done it many times and that he was a compassionate person and 
that he helped people also out of his religious conviction and that 
part it was part of--his nature.
    Q. And did she also tell you that one of the other reasons he 
helped people was out of his personal temperament?
    A. Yes. That is what I mean by that.
          * * * * *
    Q. Do you remember telling the President that the First Lady said 
to you that she felt that with--in reference to the story that he was 
being attacked for political motives?
    A. I remember her saying that to me, yes.
    Q. And you relayed that to the President?
    A. I'm not sure I relayed that to the President. I may have just 
relayed the gist of the conversation to him. I don't --I'm not sure 
whether I relayed the entire conversation.

    Mr. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators and counsel's attention to the 
June 4th, 1998 testimony of Mr. Blumenthal, page 47, beginning at line 
5.

    By Mr. ROGAN:
    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, let me just read a passage to you and tell me if 
this helps to refresh your memory?
    A. Mm-hmm.
    Q. Reading at line 5, ``I was in my office, and the President asked 
me to come to the Oval Office. I was seeing him frequently in this 
period about the State of the Union and Blair's visit''--that was Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, as an aide--correct?
    A. That's right.
          * * * * *
    Q. Reading at line 7, ``So I went up to the Oval Office and I began 
a discussion, and I said that I HAD received--that I had spoken to the 
First Lady that day in the afternoon about the story that had broke in 
the morning, and I related to the President my conversation with the 
First Lady and the conversation went as follows. The First Lady said 
that she was distressed that the President was being attacked, in her 
view, for political motives for his ministry of a troubled person. She 
said that the President ministers to troubled people all the time,'' 
and then it goes on to--
    Does that help refresh your recollection with respect to what you 
told the President the First Lady had said earlier?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And do you now remember that the First Lady had indicated to you 
that she felt the President was being attacked for political motives?
    A. Well, I remember she said that to me.
    Q. And just getting us back on track, a few moments ago, I think 
you--you shared with us that the First Lady said that the President 
helped troubled people and he had done it many times in the past.
    A. Yes.
    Q. Do you remember testifying before the grand jury on that 
subject, saying that the First Lady said that he has done this dozens, 
if not hundreds, of times with people--
    A. Yes.
    Q. --with troubled people?
    A. I recall that.
    Q. After you related the conversation that you had with the First 
Lady to the President, what do you remember saying to the President 
next about the subject of Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Well, I recall telling him that I understood he felt that way, 
and that he did help people, but that he should stop trying to help 
troubled people personally, that troubled people are troubled and that 
they can get you in a lot of messes and that you had to cut yourself 
off from it and you just had to do it. That's what I recall saying to 
him.
    Q. Do you also remember in that conversation saying to him, ``You 
really need to not do that at this point, that you can't get near 
anybody who is even remotely crazy. You're President''?
    A. Yes. I think that was a little later in the conversation, but I 
do recall saying that.
    Q. When you told the President that he should avoid contact with 
troubled people, what did the President say to you in response?
    A. I'm trying to remember the sequence of it. He--he said that was 
very difficult for him. He said he--he felt a need to help troubled 
people, and it was hard for him to--to cut himself off from doing that.
    Q. Do you remember him saying specifically, ``It's very difficult 
for me to do that given how I am. I want to help people''?
    A. I recall--I recall that.
    Q. And when the President referred to helping people, did you 
understand him in that conversation to be referring to Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I think it included Monica Lewinsky, but also many others.
    Q. Right, but it was your understanding that he was all--he was 
specifically referring to Monica Lewinsky in that list of people that 
he tried to help?
    A. I believe that--that was implied.
    Q. Do you remember being asked that question before the grand jury 
and giving the answer, ``I understood that''?
    A. If you could point it out to me, I'd be happy to see it.
          * * * * *
    By Mr. ROGAN: Inviting Senators' and counsels' attention to June 
25th, 1998 grand jury, page 5, I believe it's at lines 6 through 8.
    The WITNESS: Yes, I see that. Thank you.
    By Mr. ROGAN:
    Q. You recall that now?
    A. Yes.

    Following this conversation where Mr. Blumenthal told the 
President about his conversation with the First Lady that day, 
the President told Mr. Blumenthal about the President's own 
conversation he had earlier that day with his pollster, Dick 
Morris.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. Blumenthal, did the President then relate a conversation he 
had with Dick Morris to you?
    A. He did.
    Q. What was the substance of that conversation, as the President 
related it to you?
    A. He said that he had spoken to Dick Morris earlier that day, and 
that Dick Morris had told him that if Nixon, Richard Nixon, had given a 
nationally televised speech at the beginning of the Watergate affair, 
acknowledging everything he had done wrong, he may well have survived 
it, and that was the conversation that Dick Morris--that's what Dick 
Morris said to the President.
    Q. Did it sound to you like the President was suggesting perhaps he 
would go on television and give a national speech?
    A. Well, I don't know. I didn't know.
    Q. When the President related the substance of his conversation 
with Dick Morris to you, how did you respond to that?
    A. I said to the President, ``Well, what have you done wrong?''
    Q. Did he reply?
    A. He did.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said, ``I haven't done anything wrong.''
    Q. And what did you say to that response?
    A. Well, I said, as I recall, ``That's one of the stupidest ideas I 
ever heard. If you haven't done anything wrong, why would you do 
that?''

    After denying to Mr. Blumenthal any wrongdoing with Monica 
Lewinsky, the President then struck the harshest of blows 
against her. He launched a preemptive strike against her name 
and her character to an aide who he expected would be, and very 
shortly became, a witness before a Federal grand jury 
investigation.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened 
between him and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. As I recall, he did.
    Q. What did the President tell you?
    A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point 
and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he 
had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him. 
And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the 
stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would 
claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and 
that she would tell people.
    Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky 
would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her 
peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
    A. Yes, that's right.
    Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm 
quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot 
of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
    A. Yes. He told me that.
    Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the 
President?
    A. Right, in--in that sequence.
    Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared 
this information with you?
    A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.
    Q. And at that point, did you repeat your earlier admonition to him 
as far as not trying to help troubled people?
    A. I did. I--I think that's when I told him that you can't get near 
crazy people, uh, or troubled people. Uh, you're President; you just 
have to separate yourself from this.
    Q. And I'm not sure, based on your testimony, if you gave that 
admonition to him once or twice. Let me--let me clarify for you why my 
questioning suggested it was twice. In your grand jury testimony on 
June the 4th, at page 49, beginning at line 25, you began the sentence 
by saying, and I quote, ``And I repeated to the President''--
    A. Right.
    Q. --``that he really needed never to be near people who were''--
    A. Right.
    Q. --``troubled like this,'' and so forth. Do you remember now if 
you--if that was correct? Did you find yourself in that conversation 
having to repeat the admonition to him that you'd given earlier?
    A. I'm sure I did. Uh, I felt--I felt that pretty strongly. He 
shouldn't be involved with troubled people.
    Q. Do you remember the President also saying something about being 
like a character in a novel?
    A. I do.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. Uh, he said to me, uh, that, uh, he felt like a character in a 
novel. Uh, he felt like somebody, uh, surrounded by, uh, an oppressive 
environment that was creating a lie about him. He said he felt like, 
uh, the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.
    Q. Did he also say he felt like he can't get the truth out?
    A. Yes, I--I believe he said that.
    Q. Politicians are always loathe to confess their ignorance, 
particularly on videotape. I will do so. I'm unfamiliar with the novel 
Darkness at Noon. Did you--do you have any familiarity with that, or 
did you understand what the President meant by that?
    A. I--I understood what he meant. I--I was familiar with the book.
    Q. What--what did he mean by that, per your understanding?
    A. Uh, the book is by Arthur Koestler, who was somebody who had 
been a communist and had become disillusioned with communism. And it's 
an anti-communist novel. It's about, uh, uh, the Stalinist purge trials 
and somebody who was a loyal communist who then is put in one of 
Stalin's prisons and held on trial and executed, uh, and it's about his 
trial.
    Q. Did you understand what the President was trying to communicate 
when he related his situation to the character in that novel?
    A. I think he felt that the world was against him.
    Q. I thought only Members of Congress felt that way.

    The President continued to pass along false information to 
Mr. Blumenthal with regard to the substance of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Blumenthal, did you ever ask the President if he was ever alone 
with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I did.
    Q. What was his response?
    A. I asked him a number of questions that appeared in the press 
that day. I asked him, uh, if he were alone, and he said that, uh, he 
was within eyesight or earshot of someone when he was with her.
    Q. What other questions do you remember asking him?
    A. Uh, there was a story in the paper that, uh, there were recorded 
messages, uh, left by him on her voice-mail and I asked him if that 
were true.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said, uh, that it was, that, uh, he had called her.
    Q. You had asked him about a press account that said there were 
potentially a number of telephone messages left by the President for 
Monica Lewinsky. And he relayed to you that he called her. Did he tell 
you how many times he called her?
    A. He--he did. He said he called once. He said he called when, uh, 
Betty Currie's brother had died, to tell her that.
    Q. And other than that one time that he shared that information 
with you, he shared no other information respecting additional calls?
    A. No.
    Q. He never indicated to you that there were over 50 telephone 
conversations between himself and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Based on your conversation with the President at that time, 
would it have surprised you to know that there were over 50--there were 
records of over 50 telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky and the 
President?
    A. Would I have been surprised at that time?
    Q. Yes.
    A. Uh, I--to see those records and if he--I don't fully grasp the 
question here. Could you--would I have been surprised?
    Q. Based on the President's response to your question at that time, 
would it have surprised you to have been told or to have later learned 
that there were over 50 recorded--50 conversations between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I did later learn that, uh, as the whole country did, uh, and I 
was surprised.
    Q. When the President told you that Monica Lewinsky threatened him, 
did you ever feel compelled to report that information to the Secret 
Service?
    A. No.
    Q. The FBI or any other law enforcement organization?
    A. No.
    Q. I'm assuming that a threat to the President from somebody in the 
White House would normally send off alarm bells among staff.
    A. It wouldn't--
    MR. McDANIEL: Well, I'd like to object to the question, Senator. 
There's no testimony that Mr. Blumenthal learned of a threat 
contemporaneously with it being made by someone in the White House. 
This is a threat that was relayed to him sometime afterwards by someone 
who was no longer employed in the White House. So I think the question 
doesn't relate to the testimony of this witness.
    MR. ROGAN: Respectfully, I'm not sure what the legal basis of the 
objection is. The evidence before us is that the President told the 
witness that Monica Lewinsky threatened him.
    [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
    SENATOR SPECTER: We've conferred and overrule the objection on the 
ground that it calls for an answer; that, however the witness chooses 
to answer it, was not a contemporaneous threat, or he thought it was 
stale, or whatever he thinks. But the objection is overruled.
    MR. ROGAN: Thank you.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Let me--let me restate the question, if I may. Mr. Blumenthal, 
would a threat--
    SENATOR SPECTER: We withdraw the ruling.
    [Laughter.]
    MR. McDANIEL: I withdraw my objection, then.
    [Laughter.]
    MR. ROGAN: Senator Specter, the ruling is just fine by my light. 
I'm just going to try to simplify the question for the witness' 
benefit.
    SENATOR SPECTER: We'll hold in abeyance a decision on whether to 
reinstate the ruling.
    MR. ROGAN: Thank you. Maybe I should just quit while I'm ahead and 
have the question read back.
    BY MR. ROGAN:
    Q. Basically, Mr. Blumenthal, what I'm asking is, I mean, normally, 
would a threat from somebody against the President in the White House 
typically require some sort of report being made to a law enforcement 
agency?
    A. Uh, in the abstract, yes.
    Q. This conversation that you had with the President on January the 
21st, 1998, how did that conversation conclude?
    A. Uh, I believe we, uh--well, I believe after that, I said to the 
President that, uh--who was--seemed to me to be upset, that you needed 
to find some sure footing and to be confident. And, uh, we went on, I 
believe, to discuss the State of the Union.
    Q. You went on to other business?
    A. Yes, we went on to talk about public policy.
    Q. When this conversation with the President concluded as it 
related to Monica Lewinsky, what were your feelings toward the 
President's statement?
    A. Uh, well, they were complex. Uh, I believed him, uh, but I was 
also, uh--I thought he was very upset. That troubled me. And I also was 
troubled by his association with troubled people and thought this was 
not a good story and thought he shouldn't be doing this.
    Q. Do you remember also testifying before the grand jury that you 
felt that the President's story was a very heartfelt story and that 
``he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him''?
    A. Yes, that's what I told the grand jury, I believe; right.
    Q. That was--that was how you interpreted the President's story?
    A. Yes, I did. He was, uh--he seemed--he seemed emotional.
    Q. When the President told you he was helping Monica Lewinsky, did 
he ever describe to you how he might be helping or ministering to her?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he ever describe how many times he may have tried to help or 
minister to her?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times he visited with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times Monica Lewinsky visited him in 
the Oval Office complex?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you how many times he was alone with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. He never described to you any intimate physical activity he may 
have had with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Oh, no.
    Q. Did the President ever tell you that he gave any gifts to Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did he tell you that Monica Lewinsky gave him any gifts?
    A. No.
    Q. Based on the President's story as he related on January 21st, 
would it have surprised you to know at that time that there was a 
repeated gift exchange between Monica Lewinsky and the President?
    A. Well, I learned later about that, and I was surprised.
    Q. The President never told you that he engaged in occasional 
sexual banter with her on the telephone?
    A. No.
    Q. He never told you about any cover stories that he and Monica 
Lewinsky may have developed to disguise a relationship?
    A. No.
    Q. He never suggested to you that there might be some physical 
evidence pointing to a physical relationship between he--between 
himself and Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did the President ever discuss his grand jury--or strike that.
    Did the President ever discuss his deposition testimony with you in 
the Paula Jones case on that date?
    A. Oh, no.
    Q. Did he ever tell you that he denied under oath in his Paula 
Jones deposition that he had an affair with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. Did the President ever tell you that he ministered to anyone 
else who then made a sexual advance toward him?
    A. No.

    One of the things that the President's counsel has 
continuously urged upon this body, as they did over in the 
House of Representatives, is to look at the President's state 
of mind in determining whether, in fact, he committed the crime 
of perjury. We hope that you will do that. Because nowhere is 
the President's state of mind more evident than it is in the 
manner in which he dealt with Sidney Blumenthal at this point.
    Remember, the date of this conversation that Sidney 
Blumenthal just related to you was January 21, the day the 
Monica Lewinsky story broke. About a month later, Sidney 
Blumenthal was called to testify as a witness before the grand 
jury. That was the first time.
    Five months later or 4 months later Sidney Blumenthal was 
called back to testify to the grand jury--not once, but two 
more times. From January 21 until the end of June 1998, the 
President had almost 6 months in which to tell Sidney 
Blumenthal, after he was subpoenaed, but before he testified, 
not to tell the grand jury information that was false. The 
President had the opportunity to not use his aide as a conduit 
of false information. Listen to what Sidney Blumenthal said the 
President failed to tell him.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. After you were subpoenaed to testify but before you testified 
before the Federal grand jury, did the President ever recant his 
earlier statements to you about Monica Lewinsky?
    A. No.
    Q. After you were subpoenaed but before you testified before the 
federal grand jury, did the President ever say that he did not want you 
to mislead the grand jury with a false statement?
    A. No. We didn't have any subsequent conversation about this 
matter.
    Q. So it would be fair also to say that after you were subpoenaed 
but before you testified before the Federal grand jury, the President 
never told you that he was not being truthful with you in that January 
21st conversation about Monica Lewinsky?
    A. Uh, he never spoke to me about that at all.
    Q. The President never instructed you before your testimony before 
the grand jury not to relay his false account of his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky?
    A. We--we didn't speak about anything.

    The President of the United States used a special 
assistant, one of his aides, as a conduit to go before a 
Federal grand jury and present false and misleading information 
and precluded the grand jury from being able to make an honest 
determination in their investigation. He obstructed justice 
when he did it, and when he denied that testimony he committed 
the offense of perjury.
    In response to a question from Mr. Manager Graham, Mr. 
Blumenthal candidly addressed the President's claim under oath 
that he was truthful with his aides that he knew would be 
future grand jury witnesses:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. . . . Knowing what you know now, do you believe the 
President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I do.
    Q. I appreciate your honesty . . . .

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. . . . Is it a fair statement, given your previous 
testimony concerning your 30-minute conversation, that the 
President was trying to portray himself as a victim of a 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

    In an earlier presentation, the President's attorney, Mr. 
Ruff, said that the very same denial the President made to his 
family and his friends was the same one he made to the American 
people.
    Mr. Ruff said:

    Having made the announcement to the whole country, it is 
simply absurd, I suggest to you, to believe that he was somehow 
attempting corruptly to influence his senior staff when he told 
them virtually the same thing at the same time.

    Members of the Senate, Mr. Ruff's conclusion is wrong 
because his premise is wrong. The President didn't tell the 
American public and his aides the same thing, nor did he make 
the very same denial. On the contrary, the President went out 
of his way with his aides to make explicit denials, coupled 
with character assassination against Monica Lewinsky. Why the 
distinction? Because the American public was not destined to be 
subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury and the 
President's aides were.
    Members of the Senate, our time draws short. The record is 
replete with other examples which I have addressed and Mr. 
Manager Hutchinson has addressed dealing with the President's 
perjuries in other areas, for instance, in the Paula Jones 
deposition where he emphatically denied having a relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky that we now know to be true, a 
relationship that a Federal judge ordered him to discuss with 
Paula Jones' attorneys because it was relevant information in 
the sexual civil harassment lawsuit.
    The President's perjury is with respect to Betty Currie and 
using Betty Currie as somebody to be brought into the Oval 
Office so that he could coach her as a witness and doing 
everything he could in his own testimony to ensure that the 
Jones attorney would subpoena her as a witness, to once again 
use a White House aide as a conduit of false information before 
the grand jury.
    I don't feel the need to have to go over this ground with 
you any further. In my final couple of minutes, before I 
reserve time, I do want to raise one last point, because I 
think it is a valid one and it, perhaps, in the long run, is 
the most important point that this body should consider in 
coming to their verdict.
    We have heard an awful lot throughout this entire episode 
about the idea of proportionality of punishment. We have also 
heard that lying about sex somehow minimizes the perjury 
because everybody does it. Many people in everyday life under 
the stress of ordinary relations may well lie about personal 
matters when confronted with embarrassing situations. But, no, 
everybody doesn't commit perjury under oath in a court 
proceeding, having been ordered by a Federal judge to answer 
questions. And if they did so, they generally don't expect to 
keep their job or their liberty if they get caught.
    The dispensation this President wants for himself is not 
the same dispensation he grants as head of the executive branch 
to ordinary Americans when they lie about sex under oath. Bill 
Clinton wants it both ways. The question before this body is 
whether you are going to give it to him.
    During our committee hearings, we learned the Clinton 
administration had no shyness in prosecuting other people for 
lying under oath about consensual sex in civil cases, even when 
the underlying civil case was dismissed. For instance, Dr. 
Barbara Battalino was an attorney and a VA doctor when she 
began a relationship with one of her counseling patients at a 
VA hospital. On a single occasion, she performed an 
inappropriate sexual act with him in her office. The patient 
later sued the Veterans Administration for, among other things, 
sexual harassment.
    During a deposition in this civil lawsuit, Dr. Battalino 
was asked if anything of a sexual nature took place in her 
office with the patient. Fearing embarrassment, disgrace and 
the loss of her job, Dr. Battalino answered, ``No.'' Later, she 
learned the patient had tape recorded conversations which 
proved she lied about sex under oath.
    Even though the patient's harassment case was eventually 
dismissed, the Clinton Justice Department prosecuted Dr. 
Battalino. She lost her medical license. She lost her right to 
practice law. She was fired from her job. She later agreed to a 
plea bargain. She was fined $3,500 and sentenced to 6 months of 
imprisonment under electronic monitoring.
    Listen to the words of Dr. Battalino as she testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee, and then explain to her 
the theory of proportionality, if you can.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Dr. Battalino, your case intrigues me.
    I want to make sure I understand the factual circumstances. You 
lied about a one-time act of consensual sex with someone on Federal 
property; is that correct?
    Ms. Battalino. Yes, absolutely, correct.
    Mr. Rogan. This act of perjury was in a civil lawsuit, not in a 
criminal case?
    Ms. Battalino. That's also correct.
    Mr. Rogan. And, in fact, the civil case eventually was dismissed?
    Ms. Battalino. Correct.
    Mr. Rogan. Yet despite the dismissal, you were prosecuted by the 
Clinton Justice Department for this act of perjury; is that correct?
    Ms. Battalino. That is correct.
    Mr. Rogan. I want to know, Dr. Battalino: During your ordeal, 
during your prosecution, did anybody from the White House, from the 
Clinton Justice Department, any Members of Congress, or academics from 
respected universities every show up at your trial and suggest that you 
should be treated with leniency because ``everybody lies about sex''?
    Ms. Battalino. No, sir.
    Mr. Rogan. Did anybody ever come forward from the White House or 
from the Clinton Justice Department and urge leniency for you because 
your perjury was only in a civil case?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Mr. Rogan. Did they argue for leniency because the civil case in 
which you committed perjury was ultimately dismissed?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from the White House ever say that leniency 
should be granted to you because you otherwise did your job very well?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Mr. Rogan. Did anybody ever come forward from Congress to suggest 
that you were the victim of an overzealous or sex-obsessed prosecutor?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Mr. Rogan. Now, according to the New York Times, they report that 
you lied when your lawyer asked you at a deposition whether ``anything 
of a sexual nature'' occurred; is that correct?
    Ms. Battalino. Yes, that is correct.
    Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from Congress or from the White House come 
forward to defend you, saying that that phrase was ambiguous or it all 
depended on what the word ``anything'' meant?
    Ms. Battalino. No, sir. May I just--I am not sure it was my lawyer 
that asked the question, but that is the exact question that I was 
asked.
    Mr. Rogan. The question that was asked that caused your prosecution 
for perjury.
    Ms. Battalino. That's correct.
    Mr. Rogan. No one ever argued that that phrase itself was 
ambiguous, did they?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Rogan. Regrettably, my time is limited and I will not yield for 
that reason.
    Now, Doctor, you lost two licenses. You lost a law license.
    Ms. Battalino. Well, I have a law degree. I was not a member of any 
bar.
    Mr. Rogan. Your conviction precludes you from practicing law?
    Ms. Battalino. That is correct, sir.
    Mr. Rogan. You also had a medical degree and license.
    Ms. Battalino. That is correct.
    Mr. Rogan. You lost your medical license?
    Ms. Battalino. Yes. I am no longer permitted to practice medicine 
either.
    Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from either the White House or from Congress 
come forward during your prosecution, or during your sentencing, and 
suggest that rather than you suffer the severe punishment of no longer 
being able to practice your profession, perhaps you should simply just 
receive some sort of rebuke or censure?
    Ms. Battalino. No one came to my aid or defense, no.
    Mr. Rogan. Nobody from the Clinton Justice Department suggested 
that during your sentencing hearing?
    Ms. Battalino. No.
    Mr. Rogan. Has anybody come forward from the White House to suggest 
to you that in light of circumstances, as we now see them unfolding, 
you should be pardoned for your offense?
    Ms. Battalino. Nobody has come no. . . .

    That is how the Clinton administration defines 
proportionality in punishment.
    Mr. Chief Justice, we reserve the remainder of our time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes the 
majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe now we are prepared 
to hear from White House counsel for up to 3 hours. How much 
time is remaining for the House managers?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Thirty-one minutes.
    Mr. LOTT. Does the Chief Justice suggest we take a brief 
break here?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. No, let's keep going.
    Mr. LOTT. All right, sir.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. LOTT. I guess that settles that.
    [Laughter.]
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Counsel Seligman.
    Ms. Counsel SELIGMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, the House managers have suggested to 
you that the deposition of Ms. Lewinsky helped their case. The 
opposite is true. Ms. Lewinsky undermined critical aspects of 
the House managers' obstruction case.
    As those of you who watched the entire video are well 
aware, the managers have cleverly snipped here and there in an 
effort to present their story even if, as a result, the story 
they are telling you is not Ms. Lewinsky's story. They have 
distorted, they have omitted, and they have created a 
profoundly erroneous impression.
    So let's look at the facts.
    In her deposition this week, Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed her 
previous testimony and provided extremely useful supplements to 
that testimony. We asked her no questions. Why? Because there 
was no need. Her testimony exonerated the President. In four 
areas in particular, what she said demonstrates that the 
allegations in the articles cannot stand.
    First, she refuted the allegations in article II, subpart 
(1), with respect to alleged efforts to obstruct and influence 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
    Second, she contradicted the allegations in article II, 
subpart (2), with respect to alleged efforts to influence Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony as distinct from her affidavit.
    Third, she undermined the allegations in article II, 
subpart (3), with respect to alleged efforts to conceal gifts.
    And fourth, she rebutted the allegations in article II, 
subpart (4), with respect to Ms. Lewinsky's job search.
    I will discuss each briefly.
    Let's begin with the December 17 phone call between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky, which is at the heart of article 
II's first two subparts. The managers have consistently 
exaggerated the facts, the impact, and the import of this 
conversation. They have relentlessly argued that you should 
draw inferences and conclusions that are not supported by the 
evidence. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony this week should put an end 
to these inflated claims about that call.
    Article II charges, in subpart (1), that the President: 
``On or about December 17, 1997 . . . corruptly encouraged a 
witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to 
execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
perjurious, false and misleading.''
    ``On or about December 17.'' In other words, the allegation 
is firmly grounded in the December 17 phone call. That is where 
the House of Representatives charged the deed was done. That is 
the single event on which the managers base the first 
obstruction of justice charge.
    Indeed, Mr. Manager McCollum made this point emphatically 
before the Senate. He claimed:

    In this context, the evidence is compelling that the 
President committed both the crimes of obstruction of justice 
and witness tampering right then and there on December 17th.

    He went on:

    Now, Monica Lewinsky's testimony is so clear about this 
that the President's lawyers probably won't spend a lot of time 
with you on this; they didn't in the Judiciary Committee. I 
could be wrong, and they probably will just to show me I am 
wrong.

    Well, Mr. McCollum was wrong in one respect. We do plan to 
spend time on that call. But he was absolutely right in another 
respect. He was correct that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is so 
clear on this issue. It is so clear it exonerates the 
President.
    The managers asked this body to permit the deposition and 
later the live testimony of Ms. Lewinsky to complete their 
proof. As Mr. Manager Bryant stated:

    An appropriate examination--and an appropriate cross-
examination, I might add; let's don't limit the White House 
attorneys here--of Ms. Lewinsky on the factual disputes of the 
affidavit and their cover story, wouldn't that be nice to hear?

    Well, the managers got their examination of Ms. Lewinsky 
about the December 17 phone call, and it defeated the charge. 
It showed that she and the President did not discuss the 
content of an affidavit--never ever. Again, the managers ask 
you to convict the President and remove him from office for 
what turns out to be his silence. No discussion of content.
    Let's listen to the testimony of Monica Lewinsky about that 
December 17 phone call. It is critically important. And we are 
showing it to you unvarnished, not in snippets, because the 
snippets you have seen are terribly misleading. The tape you 
will hear establishes beyond doubt that she and the President 
did not discuss the content of the affidavit in that call, or 
ever. It establishes beyond doubt that what happened is not 
obstruction of justice.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December 
the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?
    A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother 
had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was 
on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned 
the Christmas present he had for me.
    Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of 
2 o'clock to 2:30.
    A. Correct.
    Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?
    A. No.
    Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones 
witness list?
    A. Yes.
    Q. I realize he, he commented about some other things, but I do 
want to focus on the witness list.
    A. Okay.
    Q. Did he say anything to you about how he felt concerning this 
witness list?
    A. He said it broke his heart that, well, that my name was on the 
witness list.
    Can I take a break, please? I'm sorry.
    SENATOR DeWINE: Sure, sure.
          * * * * *
    BY MR. BRYANT:
    Q. Did--did we get your response? We were talking about the 
discussion you were having with the President over the telephone, early 
morning of the December 17th phone call, and he had, uh, mentioned that 
it broke his heart that you were on that list.
    A. Correct.
    Q. And I think you were about to comment on that further, and then 
you need a break.
    A. No.
    Q. No.
    A. I just wanted to be able to focus--I know this is an important 
date, so I felt I need a few moments to be able to focus on it.
    Q. And you're comfortable now with that, with your--you are ready 
to talk about that?
    A. Comfortable, I don't know, but I'm ready to talk about.
    Q. Well, I mean comfortable that you can focus on it.
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Good. Now, with this discussion of the fact that your name 
appeared as a witness, had you--had you been asleep that night when the 
phone rang?
    A. Yes.
    Q. So were you wide awake by this point? It's the President calling 
you, so I guess you're--you wake up.
    A. I wouldn't say wide awake.
    Q. He expressed to you that your name--you know, again, you talked 
about some other things--but he told you your name was on the list.
    A. Correct.
    Q. What was your reaction to that?
    A. I was scared.
    Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact that 
your name was on the list? You were scared; he was disappointed, or it 
broke his heart. What other discussion did you have?
    A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not necessarily 
direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that he said something 
about that, uh, just because my name was on the list didn't necessarily 
mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some point, I asked him what I should do 
if I received a subpoena. He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie 
know. Uh--
    Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to 
avoid being deposed.
    Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an 
affidavit?
    A. I don't think he did.
    Q. You just accepted that statement?
    A. [Nodding head.]
    Q. Yes?
    A. Yes, yes. Sorry.
    Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation to you 
about what you could say in that affidavit or--
    A. No.
    Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that affidavit to 
avoid testifying?
    A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. To the 
best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it was a range of 
things. I mean, it could either be, uh, something innocuous or could go 
as far as having to deny the relationship. Not being a lawyer nor 
having gone to law school, I thought it could be anything.
    Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other version?
    A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a further 
discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in an affidavit.
    Q. When you say, uh, it would be--it could have been something 
where the relationship was denied, what was your thinking at that 
point?
    A. I--I--I think I don't understand what you're asking me. I'm 
sorry.
    Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted 
stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there 
some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these 
stories--the cover stories?
    A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the 
affidavit.
    Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would accomplish 
preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?
    A. No.
    Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--why 
would you have wanted to avoid testifying?
    A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second of all, 
I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones or her case. 
And--I guess those two reasons.
    Q. You--you have already mentioned that you were not a lawyer and 
you had not been to law school, those kinds of things. Did, uh, did you 
understand when you--the potential legal problems that you could have 
caused yourself by allowing a false affidavit to be filed with the 
court, in a court proceeding?
    A. During what time--I mean--I--can you be--I'm sorry--
    Q. At this point, I may ask it again at later points, but the night 
of the telephone--
    A. Are you--are you still referring to December 17th?
    Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could file an 
affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of filing a false 
affidavit with the court?
    A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it would have 
to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't remember having any 
thoughts like that, so I imagine I would remember something like that, 
and I don't, but--
    Q. Did you know what an affidavit was?
    A. Sort of.
    Q. Of course, you're talking at that time by telephone to the 
President, and he's--and he is a lawyer, and he taught law school--I 
don't know--did you know that? Did you know he was a lawyer?
    A. I--I think I knew it, but it wasn't something that was present 
in my, in my thoughts, as in he's a lawyer, he's telling me, you know, 
something.
    Q. Did the, did the President ever tell you, caution you, that you 
had to tell the truth in an affidavit?
    A. Not that I recall.
    Q. It would have been against his interest in that lawsuit for you 
to have told the truth, would it not?
    A. I'm not really comfortable--I mean, I can tell you what would 
have been in my best interest, but I--
    Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did 
you?
    A. Uh, actually, I did.
    Q. To avoid testifying.
    A. Yes.
    Q. But had you testified truthfully, you would have had no--
certainly, no legal implications--it may have been embarrassing, but 
you would have not had any legal problems, would you?
    A. That's true.
    Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would 
draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that 
earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And what was said?
    A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.
    Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that 
night. You are sure he said that that night?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
    A. I don't believe so, no.
    Q. Why would he have told you you could always say that?
    A. I don't know.
          * * * * *
    We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation in the 
morning with you and the President, and he has among other things 
mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has 
also mentioned to you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid 
possible testifying in that case. Is that right?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were in our 
questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he had had, that 
perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver 
papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?
    A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that story.
    Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly 
familiar to you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. You knew what he was talking about?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And why was this familiar to you?
    A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.
    Q. Had you actually had to use elements of this cover story in the 
past?
    A. I think so, yes.
          * * * * *
    Q. Okay. Now let me go back again to the December 11th date--I'm 
sorry--the 17th. This is the conversation in the morning. What else--
was there anything else you talked about in terms of--other than your 
name being on the list and the affidavit and the cover story?
    A. Yes. I had--I had had my own thoughts on why and how he should 
settle the case, and I expressed those thoughts to him. And at some 
point, he mentioned that he still had this Christmas present for me and 
that maybe he would ask Mrs. Currie to come in that weekend, and I said 
not to because she was obviously going to be in mourning because of her 
brother.
          * * * * *
    Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were 
reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--
    A. Correct.
    Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was 
on the witness list, I should say?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness 
list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to 
testify in the Paula Jones case?
    A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a 
possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was 
a subpoena to testify, but--
    Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And that was what--
    A. December 19th, 1997.
    Q. December 19th.
    Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing 
comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very 
conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you 
that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could 
sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?
    A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing 
affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--
    Q. Well, those two--
    A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked 
for me.
    Q. But they were in the same conversation, were they not?
    A. Yes, they were.
    Q. Did you understand in the context of the conversation that you 
would deny the--the President and your relationship to the Jones 
lawyers?
    A. Do you mean from what was said to me or--
    Q. In the context of that--in the context of that conversation, 
December the 17th--
    A. I--I don't--I didn't--
    Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the 
telephone conversation with the President that early morning of 
December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your 
relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of 
these cover stories?
    A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I 
don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to 
myself I knew I would deny the relationship.
    Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?
    A. Yes, correct.
    Q. Good.
    A. If--if that's what it came to.
    Q. And in fact you did deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers 
in the affidavit that you signed under penalty of perjury; is that 
right?
    A. I denied a sexual relationship.
    Q. The President did not in that conversation on December the 17th 
of 1997 or any other conversation, for that matter, instruct you to 
tell the truth; is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you--you both spoke--
    A. Well, I guess any conversation in relation to the Paula Jones 
case. I can't say that any conversation from the--the entire 
relationship that he didn't ever say, you know, ``Are you mad? Tell me 
the truth.'' So--
    Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you both spoke about 
denying this relationship if asked?
    A. Yes. That was discussed.
    Q. He would say something to the effect that--or you would say 
that--you--you would deny anything if it ever came up, and he would nod 
or say that's good, something to that effect; is that right?
    A. Yes, I believe I testified to that.
    Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated 
that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt 
these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.
    Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
    A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all, 
ever.

    Now, there is a lot there, but that's the testimony. I 
would like to go quickly through some parts of it. First, let's 
be very clear, as you saw, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly told Mr. 
Manager Bryant that she and the President did not discuss the 
content of the affidavit in that phone call.
    Let's listen quickly again:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation 
to you about what you could say in that affidavit or--
    A. No.
    Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that 
affidavit to avoid testifying?
    A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. 
To the best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it 
was a range of things. I mean, it could either be, uh, 
something innocuous or could go as far as having to deny the 
relationship. Not being a lawyer nor having gone to law school, 
I thought it could be anything.
    Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other 
version?
    A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a 
further discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in 
an affidavit.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has 
indicated that he thought he had--might have had a way that he 
could have you--get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, 
but yet still skirt these issues enough that you wouldn't be 
called as a witness.
    Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
    A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at 
all, ever.

    Now, ladies and gentlemen, the managers skipped these 
excerpts. They hid from you this key fact about the call. To 
borrow a phrase, they ``want to win too badly.''
    In that excerpt, Ms. Lewinsky also made clear that the 
President only suggested she might be able to file an affidavit 
that might enable her to avoid testifying.
    Let's listen:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?
    A. Yes.
    Q. What did he say?
    A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to 
avoid being deposed.
    Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an 
affidavit?
    A. I don't think he did.
    Q. You just accepted that statement?
    A. [Nodding head.]
    Q. Yes?
    A. Yes, yes. Sorry.
          * * * * *
    Q. And in that same telephone conversation, he encouraged you to 
file an affidavit in the Jones case?
    A. He suggested I could file an affidavit.
    She also made clear that the President was not certain she 
even would be subpoenaed and have to confront the issue.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact 
that your name was on the list? You were scared; he was 
disappointed, or it broke his heart. What other discussion did 
you have?
    A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not 
necessarily direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that 
he said something about that, uh, just because my name was on 
the list didn't necessarily mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some 
point, I asked him what I should do if I received a subpoena. 
He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie know. Uh----

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would 
accomplish preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?
    A. No.

    Now, where does this leave us? Ms. Lewinsky described a 
brief conversation in which the President mentioned the 
possibility that an affidavit might enable her to avoid 
testifying if the need for it arose, and they left the subject. 
No discussion of content. No discussion of logistics. No 
discussion of timing. Virtually no discussion at all. And that 
very brief exchange is the heart of the case.
    Now, the managers contend that because Ms. Lewinsky also 
recalls a reference to cover stories in that call, it is clear 
beyond doubt that the President instructed her to file a false 
affidavit.
    But for at least two reasons, this claim fails also. First, 
Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly told Mr. Manager Bryant that the 
mention of cover stories in that call was not connected to the 
mention of a possible affidavit--a position, I must note, that 
she had taken with the independent counsel for a very long 
time.
    Second, Ms. Lewinsky has insisted for more than a year that 
the cover stories were not, in any event, false--a position she 
reasserted this week in explaining why an affidavit didn't 
necessarily have to be false.
    Let's look quickly at Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, first, with 
respect to the alleged connection between cover stories and the 
affidavit.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted 
stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there 
some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these 
stories--the cover stories?
    A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the 
affidavit.
          * * * * *
    Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would 
draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that 
earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And what was said?
    A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.
    Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that 
night. You are sure he said that that night?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
    A. I don't believe so, no.
    Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing 
comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very 
conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you 
that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could 
sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?
    A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing 
affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--
    Q. Well, those two--
    A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked 
for me.

    Again, the managers did not play these excerpts for you 
either. They don't want you to know Ms. Lewinsky's 
recollection, which is that the cover stories and the affidavit 
were not connected in that telephone call. And that is the call 
that is at the heart of that first obstruction charge.
    The managers have suggested to you that Ms. Lewinsky for 
the first time this week offered responses, responses 
concerning the literal truth, for example, of the cover story 
designed to help the President. That was a suggestion a few 
days ago. Concerned then that the testimony might now undermine 
their case, they suddenly did an about-face and attacked her on 
Thursday.
    Through these proceedings, the managers have consistently 
told you how credible a witness Ms. Lewinsky is and they have 
invoked her immunity agreement as the reason that she must be 
honest, and today they again credit her testimony, but 
carefully, only in snippets, only when it suits their purposes. 
The responses Ms. Lewinsky provided about the cover story that 
were mentioned on Thursday by Mr. Manager Bryant are not new; 
they are the same responses Ms. Lewinsky gave to the 
independent counsel. For example, when asked about the so-
called cover story, Ms. Lewinsky testified as follows this 
week.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Would you agree that these cover stories that you've 
just testified to, if they were told to the attorneys for Paula 
Jones, that they would be misleading to them and not be the 
whole story, the whole truth?
    A. They would--yes, I guess misleading. They were literally 
true, but they would be misleading, so incomplete.

    The managers suggest that this testimony may be new, 
different, tinted, and tainted, I think they said on Thursday, 
but they don't tell you that Ms. Lewinsky said the very same 
things to the independent counsel. She did so repeatedly, and 
she did so--and this is key--before the President testified. 
She didn't know what he would say. He didn't know what she had 
said.
    For example, Ms. Lewinsky referred to the two cover stories 
in her February 1998 proffer, more than a year ago. Remember, 
one such cover story concerned the reasons for visiting the 
President before she left the White House. That was to bring 
papers to him. And the other concerned her reasons for visiting 
the President after she left the White House, and that was to 
visit Betty Currie. Ms. Lewinsky was asked and said that 
neither of these statements was untrue and also that there was 
truth to both of these statements in her proffer a year ago.
    She repeated this testimony in July to the independent 
counsel, telling an FBI agent that ``these statements were not 
untrue but were misleading'' and that ``some facts were omitted 
from this statement.'' That is what she said this week.
    The cover story testimony is consistent and is consistently 
exculpatory. Of course, it was easy for Mr. Manager Bryant to 
stand before you on Thursday reminiscing about the open and 
forthcoming Ms. Lewinsky he had met during the informal 
interview. It was easy for Mr. Manager Bryant to complain that 
the Ms. Lewinsky of the deposition was, I believe he said, not 
open to discussion or fully responsive to their inquiry. Let 
the questions and answers let you be the judge of that. It was 
easy for him to say that, because the House managers had 
refused Senator Daschle's request that they be allowed to make 
a transcript of the interview. That absence of a transcript 
allowed them this unverifiable fallback if their examination 
was disappointing: Oh, she changed on us. The truth is that she 
didn't tell the story that the managers wanted to hear. 
Remember those stubborn facts.
    So we know that the managers are disappointed and want to 
blame their disappointment on Ms. Lewinsky. But when you get to 
the substance of today's presentation by the House managers, it 
shows that they have not in fact identified any significant 
area where Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on Monday differs from her 
earlier testimony in the grand jury. Her view of the cover 
story has been consistent from day 1.
    Mr. Manager McCollum has also insisted that in the December 
17 call it was clear both to the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
that the affidavit had to be false. As he put it--and I quote-- 
``Can there be any doubt that the President was suggesting that 
they file an affidavit that contained lies and falsehoods that 
might keep her from ever having to testify in the Jones case, 
and give the President the kind of protection he needed when he 
testified?'' Yes, there surely is doubt.
    Ms. Lewinsky herself explains this week that she did not 
discuss the content of the affidavit with the President--we 
played those portions already and I will not again--but also 
that in her mind an affidavit presented a whole range of 
possibilities that were not necessarily false.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could 
file an affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of 
filing a false affidavit with the court?
    A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it 
would have to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't 
remember having any thoughts like that, so I imagine I would 
remember something like that, and I don't, but--

    Thus, as we have seen and heard, Ms. Lewinsky testified 
that there was no discussion of what would be in the affidavit 
and also that, to her thinking, the affidavit would not 
necessarily have been false.
    Now that the December 17 call has fallen short, the 
managers have tried to transform the articles, as drafted, by 
asserting that the alleged obstruction occurred also on another 
date, January 5, in a call that took place then, even though 
the articles pin everything on December 17.
    With respect to a January 5 call, Mr. Manager Hutchinson 
made the following claim to you. He asserted, and I quote:

    Well, the record demonstrates that Monica Lewinsky's 
testimony is that she had a conversation with the President on 
the telephone in which she asked questions about the affidavit. 
She was concerned about signing that affidavit and according to 
Ms. Lewinsky, the President said, ``Well, you could always say 
the people in legislative affairs got it for you or helped you 
get it.''

    This is still a quote:

    And that is in reference to a paragraph in a particular 
affidavit.

    Those were Mr. Manager Hutchinson's words. But the record 
unequivocally demonstrates that Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
did not ever discuss the content of that affidavit in this 
January 5 call or otherwise. And I challenge you to find any 
paragraph in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, either her draft or the 
final, reflecting this conversation. There isn't one. The call 
wasn't about the affidavit. He didn't tell her what to say in 
the affidavit. It is just not there.
    In fact, Mr. Manager Hutchinson repeatedly represented to 
you that Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the content of her affidavit 
with the President. He had to say that because he is asking you 
to remove the President from office for getting her to file a 
false affidavit. That is a tough sell if they never talked 
about the content of the affidavit. That is why he told you, 
and I quote, ``On January 6th''--5th or 6th--``she discussed 
that with the President, signing that affidavit, and the 
content of the affidavit.''
    That is why Mr. Manager Hutchinson also told you, ``She 
went over the contents of that, even though she might not have 
had it in hand, with the President.''
    That is just not true. It is not true. To borrow a phrase, 
again: It is wanting to win too much. What is clear from Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony is that she never went over the contents 
of the affidavit with the President, on January 5 or at any 
other time. Let's watch a brief excerpt about this matter.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did--did the subject of the affidavit come up with the 
President?
    A. Yes, towards the end of the conversation.
    Q. And how did--tell us how that occurred.
    A. I believe I asked him if he wanted to see a copy of it, and he 
said no.
    Q. Well, I mean, how did you introduce that into the subject--into 
the conversation?
    A. I don't really remember.
    Q. Did he ask you, well, how's the affidavit coming or--
    A. No, I don't think so.
    Q. But you told him that you had one being prepared, or something?
    A. I think I said--I think I said, you know, I'm going to sign an 
affidavit, or something like that.
    Q. Did he ask you what are you going to say?
    A. No.
    Q. And this is the time when he said something about 15 other 
affidavits?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And tell us as best as you can recall what--how that--how that 
part of the conversation went.
    A. I think that was the--sort of the other half of his sentence as, 
No, you know, I don't want to see it. I don't need to--or, I've seen 15 
others.
    It was a little flippant.
    Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated 
that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt 
these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.
    Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
    A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all, 
ever.

    In fact, Ms. Lewinsky made clear she did not have any 
indication whatsoever that the President learned of the content 
of the affidavit from Mr. Jordan, either.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. The fact that you assume that Mr. Jordan was in contact 
with the President--and I believe the evidence would support 
that through his own testimony that he had talked to the 
President about the signed affidavit and that he had kept the 
President updated on the subpoena issue and the job search--
    A. Sir, I'm not sure that I knew he was having contact with 
the President about this. I--I think what I said was that I 
felt that it was getting his approval. It didn't necessarily 
mean that I felt he was going to get a direct approval from the 
President.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. Did you have any indication from Mr. Jordan that he--
when he discussed the signed affidavit with the President, they 
were discussing some of the contents of the affidavit? Did you 
have--
    A. Before I signed it or--
    Q. No; during the drafting stage.
    A. No, absolutely not--either/or. I didn't. No, I did not.

    Finally, lacking any direct evidence of any kind that there 
was a discussion about the content of the affidavit, the 
managers have argued again and again that the President must 
have told Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit because it was 
in his interest, not hers, to avoid her testifying in the Jones 
case. Mr. Manager Bryant argued to you at the start of these 
proceedings, ``When everything is said and done, Ms. Lewinsky 
had no motivation, no reason whatsoever, to want to commit a 
crime by willfully submitting a false affidavit with a court of 
law. She really did not need to do this at that point in her 
life.''
    Mr. Manager Bryant also argued that only the President 
would benefit from a false affidavit, so he must have 
instructed her to do it. As he put it, ``Ms. Lewinsky files a 
false affidavit in the Jones case. What is the result of filing 
that false affidavit and who benefited from that?''
    But he was wrong. He was wrong, as Ms. Lewinsky made very 
clear when Mr. Manager Bryant asked her about this very subject 
this week. Let's listen to what she said:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best 
interest, did you?
    A. Uh, actually, I did.
    Q. To avoid testifying.
    A. Yes.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--
why would you have wanted to avoid testifying?
    A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second 
of all, I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones 
or her case. And--I guess those two reasons.

    Ms. Lewinsky concedes that she had a reason to act on her 
own.
    Now, we have been discussing subpart (1) of article II, the 
affidavit allegation. But this testimony also undermined 
subpart (2) of article II, which alleges that the President 
obstructed justice in that very same phone call by encouraging 
Ms. Lewinsky to lie in any testimony that she might give. Ms. 
Lewinsky previously denied that she and the President ever 
discussed the content of any deposition testimony in that 
conversation. That happened before this week. Indeed, she had 
told the FBI that she and the President never discussed what to 
say about her visits to the White House in the context of the 
Paula Jones case. And the managers themselves said, in a press 
release on January 19 of this year, that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky ``did not discuss the deposition that evening because 
Monica had not yet been subpoenaed.''
    So it is not entirely surprising that the managers did not 
ask Ms. Lewinsky to confirm that she and the President talked 
about the testimony in this call, even though that is where the 
obstruction allegedly occurred. They didn't ask her about that 
this week because they knew the answer. They knew the answer 
was ``No.'' They knew there was no discussion about the content 
of her testimony during that call. And the testimony you have 
seen today confirms that answer resoundingly. There is no 
evidence to support the charge in subpart (2) either. The 
managers did not even try to elicit it.
    The President did not obstruct justice. Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony explodes these two claims arising out of the December 
17 telephone call.
    Now let's turn to the allegation in article II concerning 
gifts. Subpart (3) charges that:

    On or about December 28, 1997, [the President] corruptly 
engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him.

    Now, the managers have indicated to you that Ms. Lewinsky 
provided testimony useful to their case with respect to the 
President's involvement in the transfer of gifts to Ms. Currie. 
We must have attended a different deposition. In fact, Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony provides powerful support for the position 
that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to keep from the Jones 
lawyers the gifts she had received from the President. It 
provides powerful support for the position that she had her own 
reasons and concerns for keeping the gifts from them. And it 
provides powerful support for the position that she never 
discussed either the topic of gifts or her own reasons for 
concern with the President before making her own independent 
decision on how to handle the gifts.
    Perhaps most notably, her testimony also provides 
corroboration for the President's testimony that he told her 
she had to turn over to the Jones lawyers what gifts she had. 
That is new evidence. But it undermines the managers' case, it 
doesn't help it.
    In one of the most extraordinary points in the deposition--
and we will get to this in a moment--we learned that the Office 
of Independent Counsel failed to disclose to the House, to the 
Senate, to the President, Ms. Lewinsky's exculpatory statement 
on this point.
    Since the OIC evidently had chosen not to share the 
information with us, with the House or with this body, we owe 
the managers a small debt of gratitude for allowing us to learn 
of it here.
    Now let's look at the record with respect to the phone 
calls giving rise to the gift pickup. The managers repeatedly 
asserted at the outset that they could prove Ms. Currie called 
Ms. Lewinsky and not the other way around. They claimed they 
had found a cell phone record documenting that initial call to 
arrange to pick up the gifts. As Mr. Manager Hutchinson said 
tantalizingly at the start of these proceedings:

    Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of 
Monica Lewinsky, but since then, the cell phone record was 
retrieved. And you don't have it in front of you, but it will 
be available. The cell phone record was retrieved that showed 
on Betty Currie's cell phone calls that a call was made at 3:32 
p.m. from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky and--

    Still under quotes--

this confirms the testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the 
followup to get the gifts came from Betty Currie.

    That is what Mr. Manager Hutchinson promised the record 
would show. But that is not, in the end, what the record now 
shows. There is no evidence that the cell phone call initiated 
the process, as the managers claimed, and since there is no 
evidence that that call from Ms. Currie was the call initiating 
the process, there is no documentary evidence that Ms. Currie 
initiated the process. It is that simple. The proof has failed.
    What the record does show is that there was a cell phone 
call that day, a proposition that no one has ever disputed. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified to the managers that she recalls a cell 
phone call that day. Let's look at the testimony. This passage 
that you are about to see addresses the calls between Ms. 
Lewinsky and Ms. Currie on December 28. Ms. Lewinsky has just 
described Ms. Currie's call to her about picking something up, 
and this is what follows.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did--did you have other telephone calls with her that day?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Okay. What was the purpose of those conversations?
    A. I believe I spoke with her a little later to find out when she 
was coming, and I think that I might have spoken with her again when 
she was either leaving her house or outside or right there, to let me 
know to come out.
    Q. Do--at that time, did you have the caller identification--
    A. Yes, I did.
    Q. --on your telephone?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And did you at least on one occasion see her cell phone number 
on your caller-ID that day?
    A. Yes, I did.

    Nowhere does Ms. Lewinsky say which call was the cell phone 
call. In fact, if anything, it is logical to assume that it is 
the call from Ms. Currie announcing her imminent arrival which, 
of course, says nothing about how the visit was initially 
planned, and no one ever has disputed that Ms. Currie picked up 
the box. The fact that she might have called to say, ``I'm 
downstairs now,'' is of no additional evidentiary value 
whatsoever.
    Left without a documentary record, the managers assert that 
there is new testimonial evidence of other calls on December 28 
that somehow corroborate their theory of the case. But the new 
testimony doesn't even establish who made the other calls that 
day, and the record already had evidence of other calls on that 
day. Ms. Lewinsky mentioned such calls to the grand jury. Ms. 
Lewinsky and Ms. Currie spoke often, especially in that time 
period. There were phone calls.
    There is nothing new here. Ms. Currie has one recollection; 
Ms. Lewinsky has a different recollection. Indeed, when asked 
by Mr. Manager Bryant whether there was any doubt in her mind 
that it was Betty Currie who called her, Ms. Lewinsky stated 
simply, ``That's how I remember this event.''
    Straining for something beyond this absolutely unresolvable 
conflict, the managers promised evidence to tip the balance, 
and they produced none. The much-touted cell phone call utterly 
fails to establish who initiated the gift pickup by Ms. Currie.
    It is, therefore, clear that the deposition testimony does 
not advance the managers' case with respect to the gifts, but 
it sure advances the defense case. Remember, Ms. Lewinsky 
received a subpoena on December 19 requesting gifts she had 
received from the President. She met with her lawyer, Frank 
Carter, on December 22, and she did not speak to the President 
in the interim.
    In her deposition this week, Ms. Lewinsky testified at some 
length about how she decided what to bring her attorney, Frank 
Carter, in response to that request for gifts. As we will see, 
she decided on her own that she would bring only innocuous 
things to produce, things that any intern might have in his or 
her possession.
    Again, this was on December 22, well before the December 28 
meeting with the President at which the managers and the 
articles say the plan to hide the gifts was hatched. Ms. 
Lewinsky explained to the managers what she did and why she did 
it. Let's listen.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did, uh, did you bring with you to the meeting with Mr. Jordan, 
and for the purpose of carrying it, I guess, to Mr. Carter, items in 
response to this request for production?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you discuss those items with Mr. Jordan?
    A. I think I showed them to him, but I'm not 100 percent sure. If 
I've testified that I did, then I'd stand by that.
    Q. Okay. How did you select those items?
    A. Uh, actually, kind of in an obnoxious way, I guess. I--I felt 
that it was important to take the stand with Mr. Carter and then, I 
guess, to the Jones people that this was ridiculous, that they were--
they were looking at the wrong person to be involved in this. And, in 
fact, that was true. I know and knew nothing of sexual harassment. So I 
think I brought the, uh, Christmas cards, that I'm sure everyone in 
this room has probably gotten from the President and First Lady, and 
considered that correspondence, and some innocuous pictures and--they 
were innocuous.
    Q. Were they the kind of items that typically, an intern would 
receive or, like you said, any one of us might receive?
    A. I think so.
    Q. In other words, it wouldn't give away any kind of special 
relationship?
    A. Exactly.
    Q. And was that your intent?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Did you discuss how you selected those items with anybody?
    A. I don't believe so.
    Q. Did Mr. Jordan make any comment about those items?
    A. No.
    Q. Were any of these items eventually turned over to Mr. Carter?
    A. Yes.

    As an aside, contrary to the assertion of Mr. Manager 
Rogan, it is also clear from that excerpt that Ms. Lewinsky 
knew nothing of sexual harassment. That is what she said.
    So it is clear from this tape that well before December 28 
Ms. Lewinsky had made her own decision for her own reasons not 
to produce the gifts. She remained firm in this decision for 
her own reasons on December 28 when the President gave her more 
gifts. Let's watch again.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Okay. Did--he gave you some gifts that day, and my question to 
you is what went through your mind when he did that, when you knew all 
along that you had just received a subpoena to produce gifts. Did that 
not concern you?
    A. No, it didn't. I was happy to get them.
    Q. All right. Why did it--beyond your happiness in receiving them, 
why did the subpoena aspect of it not concern you?
    A. I think at that moment--I mean, you asked me when he gave me 
those gifts. So, at that moment, when I was there, I was happy to be 
with him. I was happy to get these Christmas presents. So I was nervous 
about the case, but I had made a decision that I wasn't going to get 
into it too much--
    Q. Well--
    A. --with a discussion.
    Q. --have you in regards to that--you've testified in the past that 
from everything that the President had told you about things like this, 
there was never any question that you were going to keep everything 
quiet, and turning over all the gifts would prompt the Jones attorneys 
to question you. So you had no doubt in your mind, did you not, that 
you weren't going to turn these gifts over that he had just given you?
    A. Uh, I--I think the latter half of your statement is correct. I 
don't know if you're reading from my direct testimony, but--because you 
said--your first statement was from everything the President had told 
you. So I don't know if that was--if those were my words or not, but 
I--no, I was--I--it--I was concerned about the gifts. I was worried 
someone might break into my house or concerned that they actually 
existed, but I wasn't concerned about turning them over because I knew 
I wasn't going to, for the reason that you stated.

    Now, when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of gifts with the 
President on December 28, she did not state he even answered. 
Her recollection of whether he said anything has been murky, as 
we have heard discussed here. And in her recent deposition she 
declined to resolve the inconsistencies in favor of the version 
the managers have advanced.
    And then what happened after she left on December 28? As 
Ms. Lewinsky recounted the subsequent events, Ms. Currie later 
called and arranged to pick up something. But what? According 
to Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie never said ``gifts'' when she 
called. Ms. Lewinsky assumed that was what she was calling 
about--that is her testimony--no doubt because they had been on 
her mind for the reasons we have just heard explained.
    Now, the managers attempt to respond to all this by saying 
over and over, yes, but the President never told Ms. Lewinsky 
she had to produce the gifts he had given her. They attempt to 
convert his silence into a failure to perform a legal duty and 
then to convert that failure to perform a legal duty into a 
high crime.
    But are we really sure that he didn't tell her to produce 
the gifts? Remember, the President volunteered on his own in 
the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky had raised the subject of 
gifts with him. That was long before he knew she had said it. 
And remember, he said what his response was: ``You have to give 
them whatever you have.''
    Now, the managers would have you believe Ms. Lewinsky 
rejected that recollection wholesale, that she said he never 
said any such thing. They need that to be the case. But it is 
not so, we now learn, no thanks to Mr. Starr's agents.
    Let's watch.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Okay. Now, were you ever under the impression from anything that 
the President said that you should turn over all the gifts to the Jones 
lawyers?
    A. No, but where this is a little tricky--and I think I might have 
even mentioned this last weekend--was that I had an occasion in an 
interview with one of the--with the OIC--where I was asked a series of 
statements, if the President had made those, and there was one 
statement that Agent Phalen said to me--I--there were--other people, 
they asked me these statements--this is after the President testified 
and they asked me some statements, did you say this, did you say this, 
and I said, no, no, no. And Agent Phalen said something, and I think it 
was, ``Well, you have to turn over whatever you have.'' And I said to 
you, ``You know, that sounds a little bit familiar to me.''
    So that's what I can tell you on that.
    Q. That's in the 302 exam?
    A. I don't know if it's in the 302 or not, but that's what 
happened.
    Q. Uh-huh.

    This is extraordinary testimony. Why? Because Ms. Lewinsky 
apparently corroborated the President. She recognized those 
words when she heard them. She didn't refute the President. And 
the OIC never told us that that was what she said. Never told 
the House. Never told this body. We had no idea about Ms. 
Lewinsky's recollection until we heard her testimony. We can 
only wonder--in troubled disbelief--how much more we still 
don't know. The President did not obstruct justice. Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony seriously undermines the gift claim that 
is before you.
    We have reviewed the first three subparts of article II. 
Now, let's look quickly at the fourth.
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony also confirms what has been clear 
throughout these proceedings: That her New York job search 
efforts began in October 1997, well before Ms. Lewinsky was 
ever named a potential witness in the Jones case; and that Mr. 
Jordan first became involved in the job search effort in 
November, early November, also before she became a witness; 
that Ms. Lewinsky had received a job offer in New York from the 
United Nations in November also, and also well before there was 
any indication she would be a witness; and that Mr. Jordan and 
Ms. Lewinsky had several contacts related to her job search in 
November, despite the fact that both of them were traveling 
extensively, including out of the country in that period.
    In fact, Ms. Lewinsky makes it clear in this testimony that 
she and Mr. Jordan began arranging the meeting that took place 
on December 11 before Thanksgiving, before anyone knew Ms. 
Lewinsky's name would be on a witness list--all of this, of 
course, before anyone knew Ms. Lewinsky's name would be on a 
witness list. If the fact that the assistance to Ms. Lewinsky 
preceded her appearance on the witness list needed 
confirmation, it has been confirmed again.
    But there is more. What has also been confirmed is Ms. 
Lewinsky's grand jury testimony that, ``No one ever asked me to 
lie. And I was never promised a job for my silence.'' We have 
repeatedly reminded this body of these plain and simple words 
with their plain, simple and exculpatory meaning.
    The House managers repeatedly have tried to suggest that 
these words must mean something else. But at no time in their 
hours of questioning Ms. Lewinsky did they question her about 
this pivotal assertion regarding the job search allegation. 
They did not ask her to explain it, to amend it, to qualify it. 
They did not challenge it. They did not confront it. They 
didn't dare. They knew the answer. They knew there was no quid 
pro quo. And their failure to elicit a response speaks volumes.
    The President did not obstruct justice. Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony undermines this job search claim, as well. Plain and 
simple, the evidence is to the contrary.
    Now, Mr. Manager Bryant remarked on Thursday that after 
deposing Ms. Lewinsky he felt like the actor Charles Laughton 
in the film ``Witness for the Prosecution.'' As counsel for the 
President, I would respectfully submit that another famous role 
of Charles Laughton might be the more fitting reference. It is 
that of the dogged, tireless, obsessed Inspector Javert once 
played by Mr. Laughton in the 1935 movie version of ``Les 
Miserables.''
    The most recent testimony of Ms. Lewinsky has seriously 
damaged the managers' case and has confirmed that it is time 
for this tireless pursuit of the President to come to an end.
    I turn now to my partner, Mr. Kendall, who will discuss Mr. 
Jordan's recent testimony.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. I think I see in the Chief Justice's eyes the 
desire for----
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. LOTT. --a 15-minute break. Let's return as shortly 
after 3:30 as is possible.
    Thereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Senate recessed until 3:42 
p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by 
the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe the White 
House counsel has an additional presenter at this time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes White House Counsel 
Kendall.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and 
gentlemen of the Senate, distinguished House Managers, I am 
going to deal with Vernon Jordan's videotape deposition. That 
deposition was taken on February 2, this last Tuesday, and it 
produced nothing at all which was significant and new. Time and 
again, Mr. Manager Hutchinson cited Mr. Jordan's previous grand 
jury testimony, and time and again Mr. Jordan confirmed and 
recited his previous grand jury testimony.
    The managers had a full and fair opportunity to take Mr. 
Jordan's testimony, and they, indeed, had time to spare. They 
used just about 3 hours of their allotted 4-hour time. And they 
discovered nothing that was not contained in the previous 900 
pages of Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony which has been taken 
in his March 3, March 5, May 5, May 28, and June 9 appearances 
before the OIC grand jury. Assertions by counsel is not the 
same thing as proof. And I think that it is clear when you 
watch the actual video as we have done today of the three 
witnesses whose testimony the managers took earlier this week.
    For example, with respect to Mr. Jordan, Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson, who did a first-rate job of interrogation as you 
can see from the video, told you last Thursday that he needed 
to have in evidence the videotape, and you admitted it into 
evidence, because--and I quote--``Mr. Jordan's testimony goes 
to the connection between the job search, the benefit provided 
to a witness, and the solicited false testimony from that 
witness.''
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson also asserted more than once last 
Thursday that Mr. Jordan's testimony will prove that the 
President was controlling the job search. There is only one 
problem with these assertions. When you actually look at the 
videotape and listen to what Mr. Jordan testified to, there is 
no support for these propositions. There is no direct evidence 
and there is no circumstantial evidence. It is plain that to 
help somebody find a job is an acceptable activity. It is only 
when this is tied, as the second article of impeachment alleges 
it is tied, to some obstruction in the Paula Jones case that it 
becomes illegal. And, when fairly considered, Mr. Jordan's 
testimony provides no evidence whatsoever of that.
    Mr. Jordan was a long-time and close personal friend of the 
President.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. It's probably not bad from Washington standards.
    Would you describe the nature of your relationship with President 
Clinton?
    A. President Clinton has been a friend of mine since approximately 
1973, when I came to your State, Arkansas, to make a speech as 
president of the National Urban League about race and equal opportunity 
in our Nation, and we met then and there, and our friendship has grown 
and developed and matured and he is my friend and will continue to be 
my friend.
    Q. And just to further elaborate on that friendship, it's my 
understanding that he and his--and the First Lady has had Christmas Eve 
dinner with you and your family for a number of years?
    A. Every year since his Presidency, the Jordan family has been 
privileged to entertain the Clinton family on Christmas Eve.
    Q. And has there been any exceptions in recent years to that?
    A. Every year that he has been President, he has had, he and his 
family, Christmas Eve with my family.
    Q. And have you vacationed together with the Clinton family?
    A. Yes. I think you have seen reels of playing golf and having fun 
at Martha's Vineyard.
    Q. And so you vacation together, you play golf together on a semi-
regular basis?
    A. Whenever we can.

    It has been, since the start of this investigation, well 
known that Mr. Jordan was active in helping Ms. Lewinsky secure 
employment in New York, and also that he construed this request 
which came to him through Betty Currie as having come from the 
President himself. In his May 28 grand jury testimony, for 
example, Mr. Jordan testified that Betty Currie is the 
President's secretary. ``She was the person who called me at 
the behest of the President, I believe, to ask me to look into 
getting Monica Lewinsky the job.''
    And, again, on June 9, Mr. Jordan testified to the grand 
jury that, ``The President asked me to help get Monica Lewinsky 
a job.''
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson played an excerpt, which I will not 
play again, which once more repeats that testimony.
    Mr. Jordan, however, made clear that while he recommended 
Ms. Lewinsky for a job at three New York firms which he had 
some connection with, the decision to hire her was the 
company's, and he put no pressure of any kind on these 
companies to hire Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, she received an offer 
at one company, Revlon, and failed to obtain one from American 
Express or Burson-Marsteller.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Okay. Do you believe that you are acting in the company's 
interest or the President's interest when you were trying to secure a 
job for Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Well, what I knew was that the company would take care of its 
own interest. This is not the first time that I referred somebody, and 
what I know is, is that if a person being referred does not meet the 
standards required for that company, I have no question but that that 
person will not be hired. And so the referral is an easy thing to do; 
the judgment about employment is not a judgment as a person referring 
that I make. But I do have confidence in all of the companies on whose 
boards I sit that, regardless of my reference, that as to their needs 
and as to their expectations for their employees that they will make 
the right decisions, as happened in the American Express situation.
    American Express called and said: We will not hire Ms. Lewinsky. I 
did not question it, I did not challenge it, because they understood 
their needs and their needs in comparison to her qualifications. They 
made a judgment. Revlon, on the other hand, made another judgment.
    I am not the employer. I am the referrer, and there is a major 
difference.
    Q. Now, going back to what you knew as far as information and what 
you conveyed to Revlon, you indicated that you did not tell Mr. 
Halperin that you were making this request or referral at the request 
of the President of the United States.
    A. Yes, and I didn't see any need to do that.
    Q. And then, when you talked to Mr.--
    A. Nor do I believe not saying that, Counselor, was a breach of 
some fiduciary relationship.
    Q. And when you had your conversation with Mr. Perelman--
    A. Right.
    Q. --at a later time--
    A. Right.
    Q. --you do not remember whether you told him--you do not believe 
you told him you were calling for the President--
    A. I believe that I did not tell him.
    Q. --but you assumed that he knew?
    A. No. I did not make any assumptions, let me say. I said: Ronald, 
here is a young lady who has been interviewed. She thinks the interview 
has not gone well. See what you can do to make sure that she is 
properly interviewed and evaluated--in essence.
    Q. And did you reference her as a former White House intern?
    A. Probably. I do not have a recollection of whether I described 
her as a White House intern, whether I described her as a person who 
had worked for the Pentagon. I said this is a person that I have 
referred.
    I think, Mr. Hutchinson, that I have sufficient, uh, influence, 
shall we say, sufficient character, shall we say, that people have been 
throughout my career able to take my word at face value.
    Q. And so you didn't need to reference the President. The fact that 
you were calling Mr. Perelman--
    A. That was sufficient.
    Q. --and asking for a second interview for Ms. Lewinsky, that that 
should be sufficient?
    A. I thought it was sufficient, and obviously, Mr. Perelman thought 
it was sufficient.
    Q. And so there is no reason, based on what you told him, for him 
to think that you were calling at the request of the President of the 
United States?
    A. I think that's about right.
    Q. And so, at least with the conversation with Mr. Halperin and Mr. 
Perelman, you did not reference that you were acting in behalf of the 
President of the United States. Was there anyone else that you talked 
to at Revlon in which they might have acquired that information?
    A. The only persons that I talked to in this process, as I 
explained to you, was Mr. Halperin and Mr. Perelman about this process. 
And it was Mr. Halperin who put the--who got the process started.
    Q. So those are the only two you talked about, and you made no 
reference that you were acting in behalf of the President?
    A. Right.
    Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that you knew 
and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the 
Jones case, and that information was not provided to either Mr. 
Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that correct?
    A. That's correct.

    The most critical thing about this deposition is it 
contained no evidence of any kind which supports the central 
allegation of article II, the obstruction of justice article, 
that Mr. Jordan's job search assistance was tied to Ms. 
Lewinsky testifying in a certain way or that the President 
intended Mr. Jordan's assistance to corruptly influence her 
testimony. Mr. Jordan was unequivocal about the fact that he 
had frequently helped other people and that here there was no 
quid pro quo, no tie-in of any kind. Indeed, he provided direct 
evidence of this fact.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. Jordan, you were asked questions about job assistance. Would 
you describe the job assistance you have over your career given to 
people who have come to you requesting help finding a job or finding 
employment?
    A. Well, I've known about job assistance and have for a very long 
time. I learned about it dramatically when I finished at Howard 
University Law School, 1960, to return home to Atlanta, Georgia to look 
for work. In the process of my--during my senior year, it was very 
clear to me that no law firm in Atlanta would hire me. It was very 
clear to me that, uh, I could not get a job as a black lawyer in the 
city government, the county government, the State government or the 
Federal Government.
    And thanks to my high school bandmaster, Mr. Kenneth Days, who 
called his fraternity brother, Donald L. Hollowell, a civil rights 
lawyer, and said, ``That Jordan boy is a fine boy, and you ought to 
consider him for a job at your law firm,'' that's when I learned about 
job referral, and that job referral by Kenneth Days, now going to Don 
Hollowell, got me a job as a civil rights lawyer working for Don 
Hollowell for $35 a week.
    I have never forgotten Kenneth Days' generosity. And given the fact 
that all of the other doors for employment as a black lawyer graduating 
from Howard University were open to me, that's always--that's always 
been etched in my heart and my mind, and as a result, because I stand 
on Mr. Days' shoulders and Don Hollowell's shoulders, I felt some 
responsibility to the extent that I could be helpful or got in a 
position to be helpful, that I would do that.
    And there is I think ample evidence, both in the media and by 
individuals across this country, that at such times that I have been 
presented with that opportunity that I have taken advantage of that 
opportunity, and I think that I have been successful at it.
    Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in 
any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones 
case?
    A. No.

    That is direct evidence. That is not circumstantial 
evidence. That is unimpugned direct evidence.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson emphasized that Mr. Jordan now 
admits that he met with Ms. Lewinsky for breakfast on December 
31. But Mr. Jordan also conceded in his deposition that, while 
he has no direct recollection of it, he also met with Ms. 
Lewinsky on November 5, a date well before any of the many 
managerial-selected dates for the beginning of the corrupt 
conspiracy here.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. . . . Now, when was the first time that you recall that you met 
with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. If you've read my grand jury testimony--
    Q. I have.
    A. --and I'm sure that you have--there is testimony in the grand 
jury that she came to see me on or about the 5th of November. I have no 
recollection of that. It was not on my calendar, and I just have no 
recollection of her visit. There is a letter here that you have in 
evidence, and I have to assume that in fact that happened. But as I 
said in my grand jury testimony, I'm not aware of it, I don't remember 
it--but I do not deny that it happened.
    Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has made reference to a meeting that occurred 
in your office on November 5, and that's the meeting that you have no 
recollection of?
    A. That is correct. We have no record of it in my office, and I 
just have no recollection of it.
    Q. And in your first grand jury appearance, you were firm, shall I 
say, that the first time you met with Ms. Lewinsky, that it was on 
December 11th?
    A. Yes. It was firm based on what my calendar told me, and 
subsequently to that, there has been a refreshing of my recollection, 
and I do not deny that it happened. By the same token, I will tell you, 
as I said in my grand jury testimony, that I did not remember that I 
had met with her.
    Q. And in fact today, the fact that you do not dispute that that 
meeting occurred is not based upon your recollection but is simply 
based upon you've seen the records, and it appears that that meeting 
occurred?
    A. That is correct.

    The managers' theory is that it wasn't the original job 
assistance which constitutes obstruction of justice, it was, 
rather, the intensification of it which began at a certain 
point--and that point has varied.
    When you boil it all down, when you look at Mr. Jordan's 
deposition or read his grand jury testimony, you see that he 
acted for Ms. Lewinsky on two different occasions. On December 
11 he made three phone calls for her to New York firms, and 
then on January 8, when she thought an interview had gone 
badly, he made another phone call, this time to Mr. Perelman. 
That is all he did.
    Now, you also will recall, I think, that the managers' 
original theory was that what catalyzed this job search 
intensification, what really kick-started it, was the entry of 
an order in the Paula Jones case by Judge Wright on December 
11.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you on January 14 what that 
triggered:

    Let's look at the chain of events. The judge--the witness 
list came in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the 
President into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan 
into action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job 
search along. . . . Remember what else happened on that day, 
December 11. Again, that was the same day that Judge Wright 
ruled that the questions about other relationships could be 
asked by the Jones attorneys.

    That was the theory then. This is now. We demonstrated, in 
our own presentation, of course, that that order was entered 
late in the day at a time when Mr. Jordan was high over the 
Atlantic in an airplane on his way to Amsterdam.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson's very able examination did not try 
to resuscitate that theory. He didn't even make the attempt. He 
didn't ask Mr. Jordan about the December 11 order.
    So today we have a different time line. We have a new chart 
and a new time line. Let's look at this.
    This is Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart this morning. What 
is critical here? Well, we learned today that it is the 
December 5 date that is critical. That is when the witness list 
was faxed to the President's counsel, and that is what 
triggered the succeeding chain of events. Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson remarked, if I heard him correctly, that whenever 
you are talking about obstruction of justice, it ties together, 
it all fits together.
    Let's look at his chart. We see that December 11 is on 
here, but Judge Wright's order has dropped off entirely, unless 
it is there where I don't see it. Judge Wright's order is now 
not part of the chain of causation.
    We look at December 7. We ask ourselves what happened then; 
this is 2 days after the witness list came in. It must have 
been something nefarious, because the President and Jordan 
meet. But Mr. Manager Hutchinson did not represent to you that 
they even talked about the Jones litigation or Ms. Lewinsky 
because they didn't. The managers told you that in their trial 
brief, and it has been Mr. Jordan's consistent testimony.
    On December 11, Mr. Jordan did have a meeting with Ms. 
Lewinsky. That was originally set up not on December 8, you 
will recall, but back in November when Ms. Lewinsky had agreed 
to call Mr. Jordan when he returned from his travel.
    So the chronology here produces no even circumstantial 
evidence of some linkage between the Paula Jones case and Mr. 
Jordan's job search.
    It is also significant, I think, while the witness list 
came in on December 5, the President met with his lawyers on 
December 6, the President doesn't call Ms. Lewinsky until 
December 17 and Mr. Jordan doesn't learn about the fact that 
Ms. Lewinsky is on the witness list until December 19. There 
does not seem to be a lot of urgency here.
    Let's review the nefarious conspiracy that we have heard 
about today to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. We are told today that 
Vernon Jordan had no corrupt intent, that Ms. Lewinsky had no 
corrupt intent, and that Revlon had no corrupt intent. Rather, 
it was the President who somehow spun out this conspiracy. But 
I ask you, where, in all of the voluminous record, is there any 
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the President 
somehow tied these things together through Mr. Jordan? It is a 
shell game, but the game doesn't have any shell in it, and I 
think this is the loneliest conspiracy in human history, if it 
was a conspiracy. But it wasn't.
    On the subject of quid pro quo, I want to play two 
excerpts, and part of these I ask your indulgence. They were 
played in part by Mr. Manager Hutchinson, but I think they 
deserve to be seen in their full context. In one of them you 
are going to hear Mr. Jordan say that he was running the job 
search, he was in control of the job search. I think that is 
true about the Vernon Jordan job search. Ms. Lewinsky's job 
search had also been proceeding with Mr. Richardson--Mr. Jordan 
was not involved in any way with that--and through her superior 
at the Pentagon, Mr. Ken Bacon. Let's listen to the full 
context and listen for any evidence of a quid pro quo.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. Mr. Jordan, let me go back to that meeting on December 11th. I 
believe we were discussing that. My question would be: How did the 
meeting on December 11 of 1997 with Ms. Lewinsky come about?
    A. Ms. Lewinsky called my office and asked if she could come to see 
me.
    Q. And was that preceded by a call from Betty Currie?
    A. At some point in time, Betty Currie had called me, and Ms. 
Lewinsky followed up on that call, and she came to my office, and we 
had a visit.
    Q. Ms. Lewinsky called, set up a meeting, and at some point sent 
you a resume, I believe.
    A. I believe so.
    Q. And did you receive that prior to the meeting on December 11th?
    A. I--I have to assume that I did, but I--I do not know whether she 
brought it with her or whether--it was at some point that she brought 
with her or sent to me--somehow it came into my possession--a list of 
various companies in New York with which she had--which were her 
preferences, by the way--most of which I did not know well enough to 
make any calls for.
    Q. All right. And I want to come back to that, but I believe--would 
you dispute if the record shows that you received the resume of Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 8th?
    A. I would not.
    Q. And presumably, the meeting on December 11th was set up 
somewhere around December 8th by the call from Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I--I would not dispute that, sir.
    Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess 
some people refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
    A. Not jobs--companies.
    Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment 
with.
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go 
with your own list of friends and companies that you had better 
contacts with.
    A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business, 
and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel 
comfortable in calling.
    Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and 
ask your response to this, but many times I will be listed as a 
reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed 
as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference 
anywhere, would it not?
    A. I would hope so.
    Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the 
best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
    A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms. 
Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were 
not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
    Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms. 
Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you 
were going to be a reference for.
    A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting 
jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an 
assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
    Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to 
get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, going back--going to your meeting that we're talking about 
on December 11th, prior to the meeting did you make any calls to 
prospective employers in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I don't think so. I think not. I think I wanted to see her 
before I made any calls.
    Q. And so if they were not before, after you met with her, you made 
some calls on December 11th?
    A. I--I believe that's correct.
    Q. And you called Mr. Richard Halperin of McAndrews & Forbes?
    A. That's right.
    Q. You called Mr. Peter--
    A. Georgescu.
    Q. --Georgescu. And he is with what company?
    A. He is chairman and chief executive officer of Young & Rubicam, a 
leading advertising agency on Madison Avenue.
    Q. And did you make one other call?
    A. Yes. I called Ursie Fairbairn, who runs Human Resources at 
American Express, at the American Express Company, where I am the 
senior director.
          * * * * *
    Q. And what did you basically communicate to each of these 
officials in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I essentially said that you're going to hear from Ms. Lewinsky, 
and I hope that you will afford her an opportunity to come in and be 
interviewed and look favorably upon her if she meets your 
qualifications and your needs for work.
    Q. Okay. And at what level did you try to communicate this 
information?
    A. By--what do you mean by ``what level''?
    Q. In the company that you were calling, did you call the chairman 
of human resources, did you call the CEO--who did you call, or what 
level were you seeking to talk to?
    A. Richard Halperin is sort of the utility man; he does everything 
at McAndrews & Forbes. He is very close to the chairman, he is very 
close to Mr. Gittis. And so at McAndrews & Forbes, I called Halperin.
    As I said to you, and as my grand jury testimony shows, I called 
Young & Rubicam, Peter Georgescu as its chairman and CEO. I have had a 
long-term relationship with Young & Rubicam going back to three of its 
CEOs, the first being Edward Ney, who was chairman of Young & Rubicam 
when I was head of the United Negro College Fund, and it was during 
that time that we developed the great theme, ``A mind is a terrible 
thing to waste.'' So I have had a long-term relationship with Young & 
Rubicam and with Peter Georgescu, so I called the chairman in that 
instance.
    At American Express, I called Ms. Ursie Fairbairn who is, as I said 
before, in charge of Human Resources.
    So that is the level--in one instance, the chairman; in one 
instance a utilitarian person; and in another instance, the head of the 
Human Resources Department.
    Q. And the utilitarian connection, Mr. Richard Halperin, was sort 
of an assistant to Mr. Ron Perelman?
    A. That's correct. He's a lawyer.
    Q. Now, going to your meeting on December 11th with Ms. Lewinsky, 
about how long of a meeting was that?
    A. I don't--I don't remember. You have a record of it, Congressman.
    Q. And actually, I think you've testified it was about 15 to 20 
minutes, but don't hold me to that, either.
    During the course of the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, what did you 
learn about her?
    A. Uh, enthusiastic, quite taken with herself and her experience, 
uh, bubbly, effervescent, bouncy, confident, uh--actually, I sort of 
had the same impression that you House Managers had of her when you met 
with her. You came out and said she was impressive, and so we come out 
about the same place.
    Q. And did she relate to you the fact that she liked being an 
intern because it put her close to the President?
    A. I have never seen a White House intern who did not like being a 
White House intern, and so her enthusiasm for being a White House 
intern was about like the enthusiasm of White House interns--they liked 
it.
    She was not happy about not being there anymore--she did not like 
being at the Defense Department--and I think she actually had some 
desire to go back. But when she actually talked to me, she wanted to go 
to New York for a job in the private sector, and she thought that I 
could be helpful in that process.
    Q. Did she make reference to someone in the White House being 
uncomfortable when she was an intern, and she thought that people did 
not want her there?
    A. She felt unwanted--there is no question about that. As to who 
did not want her there and why they did not want her there, that was 
not my business.
    Q. And she related that--
    A. She talked about it.
    Q. --experience or feeling to you?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky was on December 11th, and I 
believe that Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met with the President 
on December 5--excuse me, on December 6--at the White House and 
complained that her job search was not going anywhere, and the 
President then talked to Mr. Jordan.
    Do you recall the President talking to you about that after that 
meeting?
    A. I do not have a specific recollection of the President saying to 
me anything about having met with Ms. Lewinsky. The President has never 
told me that he met with Ms. Lewinsky, as best as I can recollect. I--I 
am aware that she was in a state of anxiety about going to work. She 
was in a state of anxiety in addition because her lease at Watergate, 
at the Watergate, was to expire December 31st. And there was a part of 
Ms. Lewinsky, I think, that thought that because she was coming to me, 
that she could come today and that she would have a job tomorrow. That 
is not an unusual misapprehension, and it's not limited to White House 
interns.
    Q. I mentioned her meeting with the President on the same day, 
December 6th. I believe the record shows the President met with his 
lawyers and learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list. 
Now, did you subsequently meet with the President on the next day, 
December 7th?
    A. I may have met with the President. I'd have to--I mean, I'd have 
to look. I'd have to look. I don't know whether I did or not.
    Q. If you would like to confer--I believe the record shows that, 
but I'd like to establish that through your testimony.
    MS. WALDEN: Yes.
    THE WITNESS: Yes.
    BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
    Q. All right. So you met with the President on December 7th. And 
was it the next day after that, December 8th, that Ms. Lewinsky called 
to set up the job meeting with you on December 11th?
    A. I believe that is correct.
    Q. And sometime after your meeting on December 11th with Ms. 
Lewinsky, did you have another conversation with the President?
    A. Uh, you do understand that conversations between me and the 
President, uh, was not an unusual circumstance.
    Q. And I understand that--
    A. All right.
    Q. --and so let me be more specific. I believe your previous 
testimony has been that sometime after the 11th, you spoke with the 
President about Ms. Lewinsky.
    A. I stand on that testimony.
    Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness 
list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and 
then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky 
on the 11th.
    Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you 
discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if 
so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
    A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit 
to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it 
was about the job search.
    Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about 
the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted 
to get a job in New York?
    A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her 
job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was 
also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector, 
and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me. 
There is no doubt about that.
    Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
    A. There's no question about that, either.
    Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that 
you had with the President after the witness list came out, your 
conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the 
11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the 
witness list in the Jones case?
    A. He did not.
    Q. And did you consider this information to be important in your 
efforts to be helpful to Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I never thought about it.

    Mr. Jordan found out about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena on 
December 19 when a weeping Ms. Lewinsky telephoned him and came 
to his office. Mr. Manager Hutchinson played that excerpt from 
the testimony this morning. I won't replay it. Mr. Jordan then 
did what I think is best called due diligence. He talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky, got her a lawyer, asked her whether there was any 
sexual relationship with the President, and was assured that 
there was not. That same evening, he went to the White House 
and made a similar inquiry of the President and he received a 
similar response.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. And still on December 19th, after your meeting with Ms. 
Lewinsky, did you subsequently see the President of the United States 
later that evening?
    A. I did.
    Q. And is this when you went to the White House and saw the 
President?
    A. Yes.
    Q. At the time that Ms. Lewinsky came to see you on December 19th, 
did you have any plans to attend any social function at the White House 
that evening?
    A. I did not.
    Q. And in fact there was a social invitation that you had at the 
White House that you declined?
    A. I had--I had declined it; that's right.
    Q. And subsequent to Ms. Lewinsky visiting you, did you change your 
mind and go see the President that evening?
    A. After the--a social engagement that Mrs. Jordan and I had, we 
went to the White House for two reasons. We went to the White House to 
see some friends who were there, two of whom were staying in the White 
House; and secondly, I wanted to have a conversation with the 
President.
    Q. And this conversation that you wanted to have with the President 
was one that you wanted to have with him alone?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. And did you let him know in advance that you were coming and 
wanted to talk to him?
    A. I told him I would see him sometime that night after dinner.
    Q. Did you tell him why you wanted to see him?
    A. No.
    Q. Now, was this--once you told him that you wanted to see him, did 
it occur the same time that you talked to him while Ms. Lewinsky was 
waiting outside?
    A. It could be. I made it clear that I would come by after dinner, 
and he said fine.
    Q. Now, let me backtrack for just a moment, because whenever you 
talked to the President, Ms. Lewinsky was not inside the room--
    A. That's correct.
    Q. --and therefore, you did not know the details about her 
questions on the President might leave the First Lady and those 
questions that set off all of these alarm bells.
    A. [Nodding head up and down.]
    Q. And so you were having--is the answer yes?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. And so you were having this discussion with the President not 
knowing the extent of Ms. Lewinsky's fixation?
    A. Uh--
    Q. Is that correct?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And, regardless, you wanted to see the President that night, and 
so you went to see him. And was he expecting you?
    A. I believe he was.
    Q. And did you have a conversation with him alone?
    A. I did.
    Q. No one else around?
    A. No one else around.
    Q. And I know that's a redundant question.
    A. It's okay.
    Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
    A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came 
in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left 
the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan 
went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with 
him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he 
had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said, 
``No, never.''
    Q. All right. Now, during that conversation, did you tell the 
President again that Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
    A. Well, we had established that.
    Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about 
her fascination?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that 
day?
    A. I did.
    Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked 
about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the 
term?
    A. I did.
    Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to 
whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of 
conversation.
    Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to 
Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question 
to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this 
question to the President?
    A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who 
happens to be the President of the United States.
    Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United 
States, to give you a truthful answer?
    A. I did.
    Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to 
continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
    A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to 
do.

    This morning, a very short portion of the President's grand 
jury testimony was played. The sound was not very good. It was 
a very short snippet, but it relates to what happened between 
Mr. Jordan and the President in that December 19, late-night 
meeting at the White House. The snippet that was played for you 
was:

    Q. And Mr. Jordan informed you of that, is that correct?

    ``That'' being the subpoena.

    A. No, sir.

    That leaves the misleading impression in his grand jury 
testimony the President did not acknowledge this visit with Mr. 
Jordan. The question right above the one that was quoted, 
however, was the following:

    Q. You were familiar, weren't you, Mr. President, that she 
had received the subpoena? You have already acknowledged that.

    The answer was, ``Yes, sir, I was.''
    And then two pages later, the President was asked by the 
OIC:

    Q. Did you, in fact, have a conversation with Mr. Jordan on 
the evening of December 19, 1997, in which he talked to you 
about Monica being in Mr. Jordan's office, having a copy of the 
subpoena and being upset about being subpoenaed?

    And the President's answer was:

    I remember that Mr. Jordan was in the White House on 
December 19 for an event of some kind, that he came up to the 
residence floor and told me that he had--that Monica had gotten 
subpoenaed or Monica was going to have to testify and I think 
he told me he recommended a lawyer for her. I believe that's 
what happened, but it was a very brief conversation.

    So I think it is absolutely clear that there is no conflict 
between the President's testimony and Mr. Jordan's testimony 
about this. Mr. Jordan had recommended Ms. Lewinsky and took 
her to the lawyer's office, to a lawyer, a Mr. Frank Carter, a 
respected Washington, DC, lawyer, to whom Mr. Jordan had 
recommended other clients.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, you have referred other clients to Mr. Carter during your 
course of practice here in Washington, D.C.?
    A. Yes, I have.
    Q. About how many have you referred to him?
    A. Oh, I don't know. Maggie Williams is one client that I--I 
remember very definitely.
    I like Frank Carter a lot. He's a very able young lawyer. He's a 
first-class person, a first-class lawyer, and he's one of my new 
acquaintances amongst lawyers in town, and I like being around him. We 
have lunch, and he's a friend.

    Q. And is it true, though, that when you've referred other clients 
to Mr. Carter that you never personally delivered and presented that 
client to him in his office?
    A. But I delivered Maggie Williams to him in my office. I had 
Maggie Williams to come to my office, and it was in my office that I 
introduced, uh, Maggie Williams to Mr. Carter, and she chose other 
counsel. I would have happily taken Maggie Williams to his office.

    I will skip the next two videotapes, 21 and 22. I hear a 
sigh of relief.
    I want to use the next videotape--and I am almost through--
to correct the record as to one point that was made by the 
managers on Thursday. And again, this representation was 
important because it asserted an interconnection between the 
job search assistance and testimony in the Jones case.
    We were shown a chart on Thursday and it was a chart that 
was entitled ``Interconnection Between Job Help and 
Testimony.''
    Managers' version:

    Q. [so you] Talk to her both about the job and her concerns 
about parts of the affidavit.

    Answer, according to the managers' version, ``That is 
correct.''
    When we actually looked at the testimony which we will see 
in just a second, the question is:

    Q. Did you, in fact, talk to her about the job and her 
concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky 
talked to her about the job, on the one hand, or job being 
interrelated with the conversation about the affidavit. The 
affidavit was over here. The job was over here.

    I don't suggest any intentional misrepresentation, but I 
think the record deserves to be corrected.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter on three 
occasions, the day before the affidavit was signed?
    A. Yeah. I--my recollection is--is that I was exchanging or sharing 
with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she had asked me to do, what I 
refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the lawyer and I was not 
the lawyer. I mean, it would be so presumptuous of me to try to advise 
Frank Carter as to how to practice law.
    Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your conversations 
with Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. I may have.
    Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about the 
affidavit, would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned about 
the economics of law practice, he would have likely billed Ms. Lewinsky 
for some of those telephone calls?
    A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.
    Q. It wouldn't surprise you if his billing did reflect a--a charge 
for a telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan?
    A. Keep in mind that Mr. Carter spent most of his time in being a 
legal services lawyer. I think his concentration is primarily on 
service, rather than billing.
    Q. But, again, based upon the conversations you had with him, which 
sounds like conversations of substance in reference to the affidavit, 
that it would be consistent with the practice of law if he charged for 
those conversations?
    A. That's a question you'd have to ask Mr. Carter.
    Q. They were conversations of substance with Mr. Carter concerning 
the affidavit?
    A. And they were likely conversations about more than Ms. Lewinsky.
    Q. But the answer was yes, that they were conversations of 
substance in reference to the affidavit?
    A. Or at least a portion of them.
    Q. In other words, other things might have been discussed?
    A. Yes.
    Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the affidavit 
being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both the job and her 
concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky talked to her 
about the job, on one hand, or job being interrelated with the 
conversation about the affidavit. The affidavit was over here. The job 
was over here.
    Q. But the--in the same conversations, both her interest in a job 
and her discussions about the affidavit were contained in the same 
conversation?
    A. As I said to you before, Counselor, she was always interested in 
the job.
    Q. Okay. And she was always interested in the job, and so, if she 
brought up the affidavit, very likely it was in the same conversation?
    A. No doubt.
    Q. And that would be consistent with your previous grand jury 
testimony when you expressed that you talked to her both about the job 
and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. That is correct.
    Q. Now, on January 7th, the affidavit was signed. Subsequent to 
this, did you notify anyone in the White House that the affidavit in 
the Jones case had been signed by Ms. Lewinsky?
    A. Yeah. I'm certain I told Betty Currie, and I'm fairly certain 
that I told the President.
    Q. And why did you tell Betty Currie?
    A. I'm--I kept them informed about everybody else that was--
everything else. There was no reason not to tell them about that she 
had signed the affidavit.
    Q. And why did you tell the President?
    A. The President was obviously interested in her job search. We had 
talked about the affidavit. He knew that she had a lawyer. It was in 
the due course of a conversation. I would say, ``Mr. President, she 
signed the affidavit. She signed the affidavit.''
    Q. And what was his response when you informed him that she had 
signed the affidavit?
    A. ``Thank you very much.''
    Q. All right. And would you also have been giving him a report on 
the status of the job search at the same time?
    A. He may have asked about that, and--and part of her problem was 
that, you know, she was--there was a great deal of anxiety about the 
job. She wanted the job. She was unemployed, and she wanted to work.
    Q. Now, I think you indicated that he was obviously concerned 
about--was it her representation and the affidavit?
    A. I told him that I had found counsel for her, and I told him that 
she had signed the affidavit.
    Q. Okay. You indicated that he was concerned, obviously, about 
something. What was he obviously concerned about in your conversations 
with him?
    A. Throughout, he had been concerned about her getting employment 
in New York, period.
    Q. And he was also concerned about the affidavit?
    A. I don't know that that was concern. I did tell him that the 
affidavit was signed. He knew that she had counsel, and he knew that I 
had arranged the counsel.

    In his presentation, Mr. Manager Hutchinson discussed the 
breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan now concedes he 
had, on December 31. He showed you the restaurant bill. I am 
not going to dwell long on that because it really is not 
relevant to article II.
    First of all, it is nowhere alleged as a ground of 
obstruction of justice. Mr. Manager Hutchinson referred to the 
seven pillars of obstruction in article II. Those are seven 
different factual grounds. This alleged obstruction is nowhere 
in the grounds.
    There is plainly a conflict in the testimony between Ms. 
Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan; although Mr. Jordan, as you will 
recall, vehemently denies ever giving that instruction, saying 
in the videotape played this morning: ``I'm a lawyer and I'm a 
loyal friend, but I'm not a fool. That's ridiculous. I never 
did that.''
    The second reason why I think this is irrelevant is, it was 
not presented as a separate ground for impeachment by the 
independent counsel. It was identified--the fact of the 
conflicted testimony was identified, but it was not urged as a 
separate ground, despite the very, very energetic investigation 
of Mr. Starr. We have heard a lot in this case about ``dogs 
that won't hunt.'' In my mind, this is like a Sherlock Holmes 
story about the dog that didn't bark. If the independent 
counsel didn't raise it, that is significant. Finally, it has 
nothing whatsoever to do with the President, by anybody's 
contention.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to raise a question now, 
which arose in the final stage of the Vernon Jordan deposition. 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson had taken the deposition. I had asked a 
couple of questions in response. After I had concluded, Mr. 
Jordan made a statement defending his own integrity to which 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson objected. I propose--since the issue has 
arisen of his integrity and since Mr. Jordan is an honorable 
man and has had a distinguished career--that I be allowed to 
play the approximately 2-minute segment of his own statement 
about his integrity.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Do the managers object?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my 
understanding that that is not a part of the Senate record, and 
therefore it would not be appropriate to be played under the 
rules of the Senate.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. But is it a part of the deposition of 
him that was taken?
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. It is not a part of the deposition 
that was entered into the Senate record under the Senate rules.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Well, the Parliamentarian advises me 
that Division I of the motion on Thursday, which was approved, 
would prevent the playing of that. So the Chair will rule that 
that is not acceptable.
    Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont, Mr. Leahy, is 
recognized.
    Mr. LEAHY. I was one of the Senators at that deposition. I 
think it would be extremely interesting to hear it. It was 
taken at the deposition. I ask unanimous consent that it----
    Mr. NICKLES. Regular order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont may appeal the 
decision of the Chair, which is that it not be played, ask 
consent for----
    Mr. LEAHY. I'm asking unanimous consent, under the 
circumstances and because it is so short, that the deposition--
and it would clarify that part of the deposition Mr. Jordan 
gave, which has been videotaped--be allowed to be shown here on 
the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. NICKLES. Objection.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Counsel may proceed.
    Mr. Counsel KENDALL. I would like to recognize my 
colleague. Well, I think that concludes our presentation.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. We yield back the remainder of our time, 
Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The managers have 31 minutes 
remaining.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. We will 
conclude our roughly half hour by responding to as many of the 
contentions and statements raised by counsel for the White 
House as we can. I first want to talk, I suppose, about the 
statement that we heard back a couple of weeks ago, which was 
repeated today by one of the White House counsels, that ``the 
managers want to win too much.''
    This is not a game. This is not a game to anyone here. 
There are extraordinary consequences to what we are doing and 
what we have been doing and what your decision will be. The 
stakes are very high. We don't need to take a poll to do what 
we did. I am reminded of the testimony of the President and 
Dick Morris taking the poll to determine whether to tell the 
truth or not, and then after deciding the public would not 
forgive his perjury, he said, ``We will just have to win.'' But 
that's not the attitude the House managers have in bringing 
this case here. The managers fully appreciate the seriousness 
and the consequences of this. We want to do the right thing. We 
are not here just to win. We want to help the Senate in this 
constitutional process do the constitutional thing--not only 
for the precedent of this Senate but for the precedent of 
future generations in terms of how the courts now and later 
will view obstruction of justice and perjury. We believe this 
is a constitutional effort and not a game.
    The question about snippets, that we just put some snippets 
on the air today--we wanted to call live witnesses. We wanted 
Ms. Lewinsky to be here and let everybody examine her fully and 
completely. But we are working with a timeframe, and we brought 
up those points in her testimony and in Mr. Jordan's testimony 
and Mr. Blumenthal's testimony that we felt proved our case.
    With regard to the issue that Ms. Seligman raised about 
filing a false affidavit, she ran that testimony many times. I 
thought we ran the President's earlier in these hearings 
several times, but I think she beat our record with that 
testimony. I appreciate that.
    But what that is important for is not what Ms. Lewinsky 
felt was going on that night; but I think it perfectly 
illustrates what I told you the other day about her testimony. 
While she was truthful and while she gave us the testimony she 
had to give us to keep her immunity agreement, where there were 
some blanks to fill in, or where there was something that could 
be bent, she did so.
    As they pointed out on the question of the linkage between 
filing an affidavit and this cover story, it was so obvious 
that they were connected that the OIC did not ask that 
question, ``Did you think about this when you''--and that. It 
was obvious. But he did not ask that question. She was right; 
the question was not asked. So when she, Ms. Lewinsky, had an 
opportunity in these hearings, when I asked her, she said, 
``Well, you know, I really didn't link the two together.'' 
Let's not throw away all of our common sense here.
    She gets a phone call in the middle of the night with a 
message that you are on the witness list, and she says three 
things occurred: You are on the witness list, you can file an 
affidavit, and you can use a cover story. Why else would the 
President raise the issue of a cover story at 2:30 in the 
morning if he didn't intend for her to use that?
    But keep in mind, too, it really doesn't matter how she 
appreciated this. It really matters what the President 
intended. And he intended to let her know that she was on the 
list, she could be subpoenaed, she could file an affidavit, and 
she could use the cover story.
    And in fact she did use that cover story. She went to her 
lawyer, Mr. Carter, and told him that. And it was incorporated 
into the draft affidavit that she went to take papers to the 
President to sign, and in those cases she may have been alone. 
But they didn't like the specter of her being alone. So they 
struck that provision out of the final affidavit. But they did 
attempt to use it.
    But keep in mind also that it is the President's intent. 
And his intent was to interfere with justice in the Paula Jones 
case and to have her give a false affidavit. And that is why he 
so suggested that.
    On the gifts to people, is it really an issue? Is there 
really an issue here? There is some fabulous lawyering over 
here. But there is no issue here. Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
there was no doubt in her mind that Ms. Currie initiated the 
call. That is all there is to this issue. The fact that there 
were other calls in the day, the fact that one of the other 
calls may have been at 3:30, really are moot points. The issue 
is, if Betty Currie initiated that phone call, the only impetus 
for her to initiate that call had to come from the President. 
She was not in that conversation that morning. The President 
had to tell her, and apparently did so, because she made the 
call.
    At the end of the examination of her testimony, or toward 
the end--it was shown several times--we asked her, ``Did the 
President ever tell you anything about the gifts?'' And she 
said, ``Not that I remember.'' And then later on in the 
segment, you also saw she was asked the question again by me: 
``OK. Were you ever under any impression or the impression from 
the President that you should turn over all the gifts to the 
Jones lawyers?'' And she said, ``No.'' Then she goes on to say, 
``This gets a little tricky here, and it could be I heard the 
statements from agents, or somewhere along the line, or perhaps 
that it did sound familiar.''
    I would suggest to you what happened there is that Mr. 
Carter--it is clearly in the testimony and before all of us in 
the record--her own lawyer told her she had to turn over all 
the records. That is where she heard that.
    But logic demands that you reject that view, because why 
would the President, whose intent was to conceal this whole 
affair, ever think of telling her that: You have to turn over 
all those gifts? If he did tell her that she had to turn over 
all of those gifts, why would she immediately go out that 
afternoon and reject that instruction, and just completely say: 
Well, I am going to forget what he told me to do. I am going to 
call his secretary and have her come pick up these gifts and 
store them for me?
    That is just not logical. Common sense tells us that didn't 
happen that way. Ms. Lewinsky was absolutely positive that 
there was no doubt that Betty Currie initiated the call. And 
that is that.
    Job search: Very quickly, this is not a bribery case. This 
is not giving her a job, bribing her with a job to get her 
false testimony. It is not a bribery case. If it was, we 
wouldn't be arguing about the impeachability of obstruction of 
justice. It would be clear that bribery is mentioned in the 
Constitution. It is about attempting to corruptly persuade or 
influence the behavior of a witness. That is exactly what that 
is about.
    I would also close very quickly by telling you in the 
beginning I urged you to look at particularly obstruction of 
justice charges, the result-benefit analysis. And I do not ever 
hear anybody talking about that but me. So maybe I am off base 
here. But I ask you to consider each of these seven pillars of 
obstruction that Mr. Hutchinson raised, and look at the end 
results of those acts, and look at who benefited from those 
results. And what I believe you would have found and can still 
find is that each case resulted in impeding justice in the 
Paula Jones case in some way that favored the President. And 
the benefit naturally inured to the President.
    I guess if you reject that result-benefit test, and if you 
accept each and every argument of these extremely fine defense 
counsel that the President wasn't behind any of this, then I 
guess you just have to reach the conclusion that the President 
was the luckiest man in the world, that people would commit 
crimes by filing false affidavits, by hiding evidence, by going 
out and possibly trashing the witnesses and giving false 
testimony in grand jury proceedings. If that is the way you 
feel about it, so be it; we will abide by your judgment. But I 
suggest to you that the facts of this case are really not in 
contest. They have been argued very well by defense counsel for 
the White House.
    I am about to exhaust my time. So I yield to Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson to make some remarks.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. This 
will be very brief, and then I will yield to Mr. Graham.
    Let's recall Ms. Monica Lewinsky to the stand for a brief 
moment. Let's go to the Park Hyatt Hotel, December 31, 1997, 
breakfast between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. Well, the--sort of the--I don't know what to call it, 
but the story that I gave to Mr. Jordan was that I was trying 
to sort of alert to him that, gee, maybe Linda Tripp might be 
saying these things about me having a relationship with the 
President, and right now, I'm explaining this to you. These 
aren't the words that I used or how I said it to him, and that, 
you know, maybe she had seen drafts of notes, trying to 
obviously give an excuse as to how Linda Tripp could possibly 
know about my relationship with the President without me having 
been the one to have told her. So that's what I said to him.
    Q. And what was his response?
    A. I think it was something like go home and make sure--oh, 
something about a--I think he asked me if they were notes from 
the President to me, and I said no. I know I've testified to 
this. I stand by that testimony, and I'm just recalling it, 
that I said no, they were draft notes or notes that I sent to 
the President, and then I believe he said something like, well, 
go home and make sure they're not there.
    Q. And what did you do when you went home?
    A. I went home and I searched through some of my papers, 
and--and the drafts of notes I found, I sort of--I got rid of 
some of the notes that day.
    Q. So you threw them away?
    A. Mm-hmm.
    THE REPORTER: Is that a ``yes''?
    THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

    Thank you. This goes to the overall pattern of obstruction. 
It goes to credibility. I believe it is relevant in this case. 
I yield to Mr. Graham.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. How much 
time do I have?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. You have 18 minutes and some seconds.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I may yield back some of the seconds, I 
hope.
    [Laughter.]
    Point of agreement, rebuttal is to refocus, and the law 
allows that for the person or the party with the burden. And we 
do have the burden.
    Point of agreement, White House counsel says there is much 
more that we need to know. There is much more we need to know.
    White House counsel said strongly, when these proceedings 
opened up, the President is not guilty of obstruction of 
justice, the President is not guilty of perjury. Refocus: No 
fair-minded person, in my opinion, could come to any other 
rational conclusion than that our President obstructed justice, 
that our President committed perjury in front of a grand jury.
    You vote your conscience. I have told you to do so. If we 
disagree at the end of the day, that is America at its best. I 
have never suggested there was any reasonable doubt that this 
President committed crimes. I will ask you at the conclusion of 
this case to remove him with a clear conscience. You vote your 
conscience, and I know it will be clear.
    Refocus: The gifts. Simply put, if you believe the 
President of the United States, in his grand jury testimony, 
said: I told her, look, the way these things work is when a 
person gets a subpoena, you have to give them whatever you 
have. That's what the law is, if you believe that, we need to 
congratulate our President because he did, in fact, state the 
law correctly, he fulfilled his obligation as Chief Executive 
Officer of the land. He fulfilled his obligation as an 
honorable person by telling someone, who happened to be Ms. 
Lewinsky: You are doing a bad thing here even by suggesting we 
do something with these gifts. You need to turn them over 
because that is what the law says.
    If you believe that, that is the only time he really 
embraced the law in this case, as I can see. Everything about 
him, in the way he behaved, was 180 degrees out from that 
statement. That is the most self-serving statement that flies 
in the face of every action he took for months. The truth is 
that a reasonable person should conclude that when Ms. Lewinsky 
approached him about what to do with the gifts, he said: I'll 
have to think about that. And you know what, ladies and 
gentlemen, he thought about it. And do you know what he did 
after he thought about it.--Betty, go get those gifts. And they 
wound up under the bed of the President's secretary. And the 
people are wondering what the heck happened here? What the heck 
happened here is you have a man trying to hide his crimes.
    Affidavit--where I come from, if you call somebody at 2:30 
in the morning, you are up to no good.
    [Laughter.]
    That will be borne out, if you listen to the testimony and 
use your common sense. He was up to no good. He told her: My 
heart is breaking because you are on this witness list and 
maybe here's a way to get out of it. That is the God's truth. 
That is what he did. That is wrong. That is a crime.
    The rule of law, what does it mean? It means that process 
and procedure wins out over politics and personality. That 
means that subpoenas have to be honored by the great and the 
small. That means when subpoenas come, you can't, as the 
President, try to defeat them because you are nobody special in 
the eyes of the law--except that you are the guardian of the 
law. If you are special, you are special in a more ominous way, 
not a lesser way.
    When you file an affidavit in a court of law, nobody, 
because of their position in society, has the right to cheat 
and to get somebody to lie for them, even as the President. 
That means we are not a nation of men or kings, we are a nation 
of laws. And that is what this case has always been about to 
me.
    This affidavit was false for a reason--because the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky wanted it to be false.
    The job search? ``Mission accomplished,'' says it all. 
``Mission accomplished.'' It went from being no big deal to the 
biggest deal in the world with a telephone bill. I don't know 
what the telephone bill was to get this job, but it was huge. 
``Mission accomplished.''
    All these are crimes. All these are things that average 
Americans should not be allowed to do. But I am going to tell 
you something. At this point in time what is going on is that 
he is trying to conceal a relationship about the workplace that 
would be embarrassing and that would be illegal and that would 
help Ms. Jones and would hurt him. And it is not just about his 
private life. But you can say this about the President, he was 
trying to get her a job and he was trying to just get her to 
file a false affidavit so this would go away. And he was trying 
to hide the gifts. That is bad but that is not nearly as bad as 
what was to come.
    Let me tell you what was to come, ladies and gentlemen. 
After the deposition, when it was clear that Ms. Lewinsky may 
have been talking, or somebody knew something they weren't 
supposed to know, the alarm bells went off and concealing the 
relationship changed to redefining the relationship. That is 
why he should not be our President. The redefining of the 
relationship began very quickly after that deposition. It 
started with the President's secretary, and it goes like this: 
The President, on two occasions, under the guise of refreshing 
his memory, makes the following statements to his secretary: 
You were always there when she was there, right? We were never 
really alone? You could see and hear everything? Monica came on 
to me, and I never touched her, right? She wanted to have sex 
with me, and I couldn't do that.
    If you believe that is about refreshing your memory, you 
are not being reasonable. That is about coaching a witness. But 
here is where it gets to be nasty. Here is where it gets to be 
mean: ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? 
She wanted to have sex with me, and I couldn't do that.'' He 
didn't say it once, he said it twice, just to make sure Ms. 
Currie would get the point.
    Now that Ms. Lewinsky may be a problem, let me tell you how 
the discussion goes. It is not from concealing; now it is 
redefining.
    Conversation with Mr. Morris, after they did the poll about 
what to do here, and ``We just have to win.'' The President had 
a followup conversation with Mr. Morris during the evening of 
January 22, 1998, the day after the story broke, when Mr. 
Morris was considering holding a press conference to blast Ms. 
Lewinsky out of the water. The President told Mr. Morris to be 
careful, to be careful. According to Mr. Morris, the President 
warned him not to be too hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there 
is some slight chance that she may not be cooperating with Mr. 
Starr and we don't want to alienate her by anything we are 
going to put out.'' In other words, don't blast her now, she 
may not be a problem to us.
    During this period of time, it went from concealing to 
redefining. When he knew he had to win, what did he do? He went 
to his secretary and he made her a sexual predator and him an 
innocent victim, and he did it twice. But did he do it to 
anybody else? Did he redefine his relationship to anybody else?
    I now would like to have a clip from Mr. Blumenthal, 
please.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. You have a conversation with the President on the same 
day the article comes out, and the conversation includes a 
discussion about the relationship between him and Ms. Lewinsky, 
is that correct?
    A. Yes.

    Next tape:

    Q. Now, you stated, I think very honestly, and I appreciate 
that, you were lied to by the President. Is it a fair 
statement, given your previous testimony concerning your 30-
minute conversation, that the President was trying to portray 
himself as a victim of a relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

    Ladies and gentlemen, that is the import of his whole 
story. That story was told on the day this broke in the press, 
and it goes on. That story is very detailed. It makes him the 
victim of a sexual predator called Ms. Lewinsky. He had to 
rebuff her. She threatened him. And it goes on and on and on. I 
have always wondered, how did that story make it to the grand 
jury and how did it make it into the press? We know how it made 
it to the grand jury, because Mr. Blumenthal told it, and the 
President told him, and they claimed executive privilege, and 
the President never straightened it out. Your President 
redefined this relationship, and your President let that lie be 
passed to a grand jury. Your President obstructed justice in a 
mean way.
    Next statement.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the 
President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe 
the President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky?
    A. I do.
    Q. Okay. Do you have any idea how White House sources are 
associated with statements such as ``She's known as `Elvira','' 
``She's obsessed with the President,'' ``She's known as a 
flirt,'' ``She's the product of a troubled home, divorced 
parents,'' ``She's known as `The Stalker'''? Do you have any 
idea how that got in the press?
    MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. The document speaks for 
itself, but it's not clear that the terms that Mr. Lindsey has 
used are necessarily--any or all of them--are from a White 
House source. I object to the form and the characterization of 
the question.
    MR. GRAHAM: The ones that I have indicated are associated 
with the White House as being the source of those statements 
and--
    SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that question 
is appropriate and the objection is overruled.
    THE WITNESS: I have no idea how anything came to be 
attributed to a White House source.

    Everybody wants this over so bad you can taste it, 
including me, but don't let's leave a taste behind that history 
cannot stand. It was shouted in this Chamber, ``For God's sake, 
vote.''
    Let me quietly, if I can, for God's sake, get to the truth; 
for God's sake, figure out what kind of person we have here in 
the White House; for God's sake, spend some time to fulfill 
your constitutional duty so that we can get it right, not just 
for our political moment but for the future of this Nation.
    When the President redefined this relationship, he did so 
by telling a lie. He told a lie to a key White House aide, who 
repeated that lie to a Federal grand jury. In our system, 
ladies and gentlemen, that is a crime. That lie made it into 
the public domain. That lie was mean. That lie would have the 
effect of running this young lady over. You think what you want 
to think, too, about Ms. Tripp. I agree she is not going to be 
in the hall of fame of friends, but let me tell you, the best 
advice she gave that young lady was to keep that blue dress.
    The final thing is that our President, in my opinion, and 
for you to judge, in August of last year, after being begged 
not to by many Members of this body and prominent Americans, 
appeared before a Federal grand jury to answer for his conduct 
in this case. We have alleged that with forewarning and 
knowledge on his part, that instead of clearing it up and 
making America a better place, instead of fulfilling his role 
as the chief law enforcement officer of the land to do honor to 
the law, instead of taking this burden off all Americans' 
backs, he told a story that defies common sense, that he played 
a butchery game with the English language that ``is'' maybe is 
not is, and ``alone'' is not alone, and he told John Podesta, 
``My relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was not sexual, including 
oral sex.''
    He went on and told an elaborate farce to a Federal grand 
jury that they just didn't ask the right question and really 
the sexual relationship did include one thing but not another. 
And he says he never lied to his aides, and he says he never 
lied to the grand jury. Well, God knows he lied to somebody, 
and he lied to that grand jury, and this whole story is a fraud 
and a farce. The last people in the United States to straighten 
it out is the U.S. Senate. God bless you in your endeavors.
    Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
California.
    Mrs. BOXER. In light of the negative comments made against 
Mr. Jordan by Manager Hutchinson and Manager Graham, I ask once 
again unanimous consent that in fairness--
    Mr. GREGG. Regular order.
    Mr. LOTT. Regular order.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Regular order of business has been 
called for.
    Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent that, in fairness, Mr. 
Jordan's 2-minute testimony regarding his own integrity be 
shown to the Senate at this time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. GREGG. I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, has all time been used or 
yielded back?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. All time has been used or yielded back.

  notice of intent to suspend the rules of the senate by senator lott

    In accordance with Rule V of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate, I (for myself, Mr. Daschle, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Harkin, 
Mr. Wellstone, Ms. Collins, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Leahy) hereby 
give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to 
suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials in 
regard to any deliberations by Senators on the articles of 
impeachment during the trial of President William Jefferson 
Clinton.
    (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
    (2) the following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate 
shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its 
decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon 
without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall 
be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be 
entered on the record''; and
    (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except 
when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that 
case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.

                                program

    Mr. LOTT. That concludes the presentations for today. The 
Senate will reconvene as a Court of Impeachment on Monday at 1 
p.m. At that time, the managers and White House counsel will 
proceed to closing arguments for not to exceed 3 hours each and 
further business will resume after that.
                                ------                                


           ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of 
Impeachment stand adjourned under the previous order.
    There being no objection, at 5:06 p.m. the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Monday, February 8, 
1999, at 1 p.m.
                                ------                                


          SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, last week the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, voted on Senator Byrd's motion to 
dismiss the articles of impeachment brought by the managers 
from the House of Representatives. I voted in support of this 
motion, and would like to briefly state my position on this 
important question.
    While the motion failed, it received the support of 44 
Senators--11 more votes than needed to acquit the President of 
the charges made by the articles. Therefore, this vote 
demonstrates to a near certainty that there are insufficient 
votes to support the managers' position that the President 
should be convicted.
    This result comes as a surprise to no one--including most, 
if not all, of those who support the President's removal. These 
articles should never have been presented to the Senate. The 
President's actions were undoubtedly reprehensible. They 
deserve condemnation and may warrant prosecution after he 
leaves office. But they do not warrant removal--a sanction 
unprecedented in our Nation's history, and one that the framers 
of our Constitution envisioned would be used in only the rarest 
of circumstances to protect the country.
    The case presented by the managers is fatally deficient in 
three respects:
    First, the facts presented, even if viewed in the light 
most favorable to the managers' case, do not allege conduct 
that meets the high standard laid out by the framers for the 
impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of a 
President.
    Second, the articles as drafted are vague and contain 
multiple allegations--denying the President the fairness and 
due process that is the right of every American citizen, and 
depriving Senators of the clarity that is essential to 
discharging their responsibility as triers of fact.
    Third, the managers have failed to present facts that meet 
their heavy burden of proving the allegations contained in the 
articles.
    Let me address these points in turn.
    The conduct alleged by the managers to be worthy of 
conviction arises out of a private, civil lawsuit and a 
private, consensual, yet improper relationship between the 
President and Ms. Monica Lewinsky. It is the President's 
conduct in that lawsuit and in that relationship that are the 
basis of the charges at issue here. No charges arise from his 
official conduct as President.
    It is worth noting that, with regard to the Jones matter, 
the Supreme Court itself considered the conduct alleged therein 
to be private. The Court ruled that, while the President may 
delay or avoid until leaving office lawsuits based on his 
official conduct, he may claim no such immunity in an action 
based on private conduct unrelated to official duties.
    The managers claim that what is at issue is not the 
President's private actions but his actions in connection with 
efforts to prevent his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from 
becoming known to his family and others. These actions, the 
managers argue--including his testimony in the grand jury and 
his statements to staff and others--are official in nature. 
However, these actions clearly arise out of the President's 
efforts to keep secret a personal relationship which he 
admitted to be wrong. Under no reasonable analysis can they be 
understood to relate to the President's official duties.
    It follows, then, that the President's actions certainly do 
not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' set forth by the framers as the 
standard for removing a President from office. As Alexander 
Hamilton explained, impeachment is to be reserved as ``a remedy 
for great injuries done to the society itself''. The 
impeachment process is intended to protect the Nation from 
official wrongdoing, not punish a President for personal 
misconduct.
    It is not in my view reasonable to conclude that the 
President's actions--while by his own admission wrong and 
offensive--pose a danger to the institutions of our society. 
The President's past behavior did not--and his continuation in 
office does not--pose a threat to the stability of those 
institutions.
    Indeed, I submit that convicting and removing the President 
based on these actions, not the actions themselves, would have 
a destabilizing effect on our institutions of government. Were 
this scenario to come to pass, then henceforth any President 
would have to worry that he or she could be removed on a 
partisan basis for essentially personal conduct. That standard 
would weaken the Presidency. In the words of Madison, it would 
in effect make the President's term equivalent to ``a tenure 
during pleasure of the Senate'', and upset the careful system 
of checks and balances established by the framers to govern 
relations between the legislative and executive branches.
    The articles also deserve to be dismissed because of the 
fatally flawed manner in which they are drafted. Those flaws 
are of two separate kinds.
    First, the articles fail to allege wrongdoing with the kind 
of specificity required to allow the President--or indeed, any 
person--to defend himself, and to allow the Senate to fully 
understand and judge the charges made against him. White House 
counsel described the articles as an ``empty vessel'', a 
``moving target'' where neither the President nor the Senate 
knows with precision what has been alleged. Senators were 
presented with videotaped testimony of former Federal 
prosecutors who stated that standard prosecutorial practice 
requires that allegations of perjury and obstruction must be 
stated with particularity and specificity. The allegations here 
have not been so stated. That lack of specificity is manifestly 
unfair to the President. And it is detrimental to the Senate's 
ability to discharge its responsibility as the trier of fact in 
this case.
    The second fatal structural flaw in the articles is that 
the managers have aggregated multiple allegations of wrongdoing 
into single articles. Article I allows the President to be 
impeached for ``one or more'' of four enumerated, unspecified 
categories of alleged misconduct. Similarly, in article II he 
is alleged to have obstructed justice in ``one or more'' of 
seven ways. This smorgasbord approach to the allegations 
creates the deeply troubling prospect that the President could 
be convicted and removed without two-thirds of the Senate 
agreeing on what precisely he did wrong. For this reason, too, 
dismissal is appropriate.
    Dismissal is, finally, appropriate because the facts 
undergirding the managers' case do not prove the criminal 
wrongdoing the managers allege. Manager McCollum told the 
Senate that it must first find criminal wrongdoing and then 
determine whether to remove the President from office. While it 
is left to each Senator to determine the standard of proof he 
or she will use to judge the evidence, Manager McCollum's own 
analysis suggests that that standard should be beyond a 
reasonable doubt. After all, that is the standard used in all 
other criminal cases. Why should the President be subjected to 
any lower standard than that to which all citizens are 
entitled? Indeed, he should not--not only because he deserves 
no less fairness than other citizens, but also because this 
high standard of proof is appropriate to the gravity of the 
sanction the Senate is being asked to impose.
    In my view, the managers have failed to prove criminal 
culpability on the part of the President beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The record is replete with exculpatory, contradictory, 
and ambiguous facts.
    Consider, for example, these:
    (1) Ms. Lewinsky--who was questioned some 22 times by 
investigators, prosecutors, and grand jurors (not to mention 
twice by the managers themselves)--said under oath that neither 
the President nor anyone else ever asked her to lie.
    (2) She also said--again, under oath--that no one ever 
promised her a job for her silence.
    (3) Further, she stated without contradiction that the 
President did not suggest that she return the gifts given her 
by the President to him or anyone else on his behalf.
    (4) Betty Currie, the President's secretary--who was 
questioned some nine times--likewise testified that the 
President did not suggest that the gifts to Ms. Lewinsky be 
returned.
    (5) She also said that she never felt pressure to agree 
with the President when he spoke with her following the Jones 
deposition, and, indeed, felt free to disagree with his 
recollection.
    (6) Lastly, the managers argued that a December 11, 1997 
ruling by the judge in the Jones case, permitting the calling 
of witnesses regarding the President's conduct, triggered 
intensive efforts that very day by the President and Vernon 
Jordan to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job. We now know that the 
facts contradict that account of the managers. A meeting on 
that date between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky was scheduled 3 
days earlier. It was held several hours before the judge's 
ruling. At the time of that ruling, Mr. Jordan was on an 
airplane bound for Holland.
    In addition, factual discrepancies between the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky--about when their relationship began, about 
the nature of the inappropriate contacts between them, about 
the number of those contacts, and about the number of 
inappropriate telephone calls between them--amount to 
differences in recollection that in no way can be considered 
criminal on the part of the President. More fundamentally, they 
cannot be considered material to this proceeding. Not even the 
Office of Independent Counsel considered these discrepancies 
relevant or material to the matter at hand. It cannot 
reasonably be argued, in any event, that the President should 
be removed from his office because of them.
    For all of these reasons--the failure of the managers to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the President committed 
criminal wrongdoing, the structural flaws in the articles 
themselves, and the failure of the allegations, even if proven, 
to warrant the unprecedented action of conviction and removal--
these articles should be dismissed. We have reviewed enough 
evidence, heard enough arguments, and asked enough questions to 
know with reasonable certainty that the flaws in the managers' 
case cannot be remedied. We know enough to decide this matter 
now. The national interest is best served not by extending this 
proceeding needlessly, but by ending it.
    I regret that the Senate has failed to do that. But I 
continue to believe that we must dispose of this matter as soon 
as possible so we can return to the other important business of 
the Nation.
                                ------                                


     OPPOSITION TO MANAGERS' MOTION FOR THE APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, last week the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, voted on a motion by the managers 
for the appearance of witnesses and to admit evidence not in 
the trial record. I opposed this motion, and would like to 
briefly state my reasons for doing so.
    While the motion carried, the fact that it was opposed by 
44 Senators demonstrates that a large number of our colleagues 
believe that the record of this case is sufficient to allow 
Senators to decide on the articles of impeachment. Indeed, it 
is not merely sufficient, it is voluminous. As I will discuss 
more fully below, neither the managers nor counsel for the 
President would in any way be harmed by a requirement that they 
rely on the record as presently constituted.
    Let me concede at the outset that this motion is not an 
easy one to decide. There is an argument to be made for calling 
witnesses. Our colleagues who believe there ought to be 
witnesses are motivated by earnest reasons.
    However, the issue for us is not whether there is a case 
for witnesses. It is this: Do we need to hear from witnesses in 
order to fulfil our responsibility as triers of fact? The 
answer to that question, in my opinion, is no. We know enough 
to decide this case, and decide it now.
    There may be legitimate reasons for calling witnesses. But 
the reasons for not calling them are compelling.
    There are five reasons, in particular, that strongly argue 
against the motion.
    First, the record is more than sufficient to allow the 
Senate to decide this case. We are all painfully familiar with 
the essential details of this matter. Like most Americans, we 
have been subjected to the blizzard of media attention paid to 
it from its very start just over a year ago.
    This is not 1868, when only a handful of people could 
witness the last Presidential impeachment. One hundred and 
thirty years later, we can receive an independent counsel's 
voluminous and graphic report over the Internet literally at 
the moment it is made available to the public. We can witness 
the proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee live on 
television. We can observe the televised impeachment 
proceedings in the House Chamber as if we are there.
    This trial is now in its fourth week. We have been provided 
with massive portions of a record that exceeds 67,000 pages in 
length. We have heard days of arguments. Ninety of us have 
asked some 105 questions to the House Republican managers and 
to counsel for the President.
    So I daresay that the facts of this case have been drilled 
into our consciousness--relentlessly, overwhelmingly, and, it 
seems endlessly.
    I should add one more adverb: repeatedly. That leads to the 
second reason for not calling witnesses: they have testified 
repeatedly and without contradiction on the key facts.
    Again and again, the record shows the same questions asked 
of the same witnesses. Ms. Lewinsky has been questioned a total 
of 23 times; Ms. Currie 9 times; Mr. Jordan 6 times; and Mr. 
Blumenthal 5 times. They were asked hundreds upon hundreds of 
questions--by some of the toughest, shrewdest legal minds in 
the country. Their testimony fills in excess of two 2,500 pages 
of the trial record.
    What is the likelihood that prolonging this trial to hear 
from these and possibly other witnesses will bring new details 
to light that could change the outcome of this trial? Regarding 
at least one witness--Ms. Lewinsky--we know from her interview 
by the managers two weekends ago: virtually nil.
    A third reason to oppose this motion is that witness 
testimony will invite the introduction of salacious details 
onto the floor of the U.S. Senate--details with which we are 
already painfully familiar, and details about which any 
differences between the President and Ms. Lewinsky are 
immaterial and irrelevant to the charges contained in the 
articles presented by the House Republican managers.
    The managers tell us that they have no interest in raising 
any such details. But sexual misconduct is at the core of this 
case. Manager Bryant admitted as much when he said on the floor 
that the issue in article I is ``perjury about sex''. The same 
could be said about article II--the issue is obstruction about 
sex.
    Every question about perjury or obstruction, then, 
necessarily invites testimony about the sexual details of this 
scandal. Given the massive size of the record, I do not think 
we need to risk allowing the Senate to become a forum for that 
kind of speech. It will not bring dignity to this proceeding or 
credit to this institution.
    If we somehow think that we can summon witnesses to appear 
in this trial and at the same time guarantee that the Senate 
will not become a kind of burlesque stage for the airing of 
this case's tawdry factual essence, let me remind my colleagues 
of the frenzied circus that formed immediately upon the news 
that Ms. Lewinsky had arrived in Washington, D.C. for 
questioning by the managers. Once the door to witnesses is 
opened, the Senate will be hard-pressed to keep that atmosphere 
from spilling into this trial and this body.
    The fourth reason why we should not call witnesses is that 
they will prolong this process needlessly and extensively. 
Senator Warner made the point well several days ago: It is 
questionable whether the list of witnesses, and the time 
required to hear from them, could be strictly limited because 
to do so might deny the President his right to defend himself.
    The point was echoed by one of the attorneys for the 
President. He stated that he and his associates would be 
committing ``malpractice'' if they failed to seek the most 
aggressive possible discovery process should that course be 
opened to them.
    That discovery process may reasonably be expected to 
include subpoenas for documents, interviews with corroborating 
witnesses, depositions, examinations and cross-examinations. As 
any person familiar with litigation knows, such a process is 
not easily restricted in time and scope. It could take weeks, 
or longer, to conclude. During that time, Senators would not 
necessarily be free from the burdens of serving as triers of 
fact in the Court of Impeachment. They could well be called 
upon to make any number of evidentiary rulings. They could be 
called upon to comment publicly on matters raised during 
depositions--including on salacious matters that deserve no 
comment. In short, this process could drag on and on.
    Fifth, and finally, let me say that I remain unconvinced by 
the argument of the managers that witnesses are so critical 
here. They have failed convincingly to explain why witnesses 
are so indispensable in this trial if they were so dispensable 
during the impeachment proceedings in the other body.
    During those proceedings, Mr. Manager Hyde said that ``the 
most relevant witnesses have already testified at length about 
the matters in issue. And in the interest of finishing our 
expeditious inquiry, we will not require most of them to come 
before us to repeat their testimony.'' Regarding Monica 
Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he added that they ``have already 
testified under oath. We have their testimony. We don't need to 
reinvent the wheel.''
    Likewise, Mr. Manager Gekas stated during the House 
hearings that ``bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony 
that's already concretely in the record would be a waste of 
time and serve no purpose at all.''
    The fervor with which the managers call for witnesses now 
is not only inconsistent with their refusal to call them 
earlier, it is also inconsistent with their underlying 
assertion that the facts in evidence already prove the 
President's criminal culpability. If the managers have any 
doubt about whether their evidence was sufficient to prove 
guilt and justify removal, then they had a responsibility to 
resolve those doubts in the House of Representatives--before 
they came to this body and had us take an oath to do impartial 
justice. They should never have put us through this trial.
    In conclusion, and at the risk of stating the obvious, we 
should remember that we, the Members of the Senate, are the 
triers of fact here. We are the ones who control how this trial 
is to be conducted. Each side deserves to be treated fairly. 
But neither side deserves an unlimited and open-ended right to 
put forth their arguments.
    I have never known a lawyer arguing a losing case to say he 
or she couldn't benefit from one more day in court. The proper 
response to a lengthy trial and a weak case is not more length 
and more case--it is an end to the case.
    Does anyone seriously believe that the outcome of this 
proceeding will be changed by allowing a parade of witnesses?
    Does anyone seriously believe that they will shed new and 
meaningful light on the key areas of this dispute?
    After our historic, bipartisan agreement to begin this 
trial, after weeks of the trial itself, after the opportunity 
to read a massive factual record, after the opportunity to ask 
over 100 questions--after all this, I do not believe that 
witnesses are now needed to demonstrate the Senate's commitment 
to conduct this trial in a fair and thorough manner. The 
dignity of this proceeding and the decorum of this institution 
are not likely to be enhanced--and could well be damaged--by 
taking such a step.
    In my view, the managers' motion to call witnesses is the 
expression of an increasingly desperate desire to breathe life 
into a case that--as the vote on the motion to dismiss 
demonstrated--has failed to convince anywhere close to two-
thirds of the Senate as to its merit. They are eager for 
something, anything, to rescue the sinking ship that their 
impeachment has become.
    Their motion, furthermore, is an expression of the partisan 
process that they began in the House and now seek to perpetuate 
in the Senate. Having lost five seats in the November 
elections, Republican leaders in the other body, including the 
managers, knew that their best chance to impeach the President 
was during the lame duck session of the 105th Congress. So they 
eschewed a bipartisan inquiry, decided not to call witnesses, 
and forbade Members from considering a censure resolution in 
that Chamber--all so they could force a vote on articles of 
impeachment before the start of the 106th Congress. Two of the 
articles considered failed. Two others passed, but only by 
exceedingly slim margins: the article alleging obstruction of 
justice would have failed if just five Representatives had 
voted differently; the article alleging perjury would have 
failed if just 11 Representatives had cast their vote against 
impeachment.
    Having rushed to judgment in the House, the managers now 
rush to delay judgment in the Senate. Why? I think the reason 
is obvious: because they know that their case is weak. From the 
moment the articles were drafted in the House, they have 
attempted to obscure that inescapable fact.
    Each side of this dispute has now had ample opportunity to 
present its case. The time has come to bring this matter to a 
close, and return to the other compelling issues that we were 
elected to address. While I regret that the majority party in 
the Senate has decided to move forward with the calling of 
witnesses and gathering of additional information, I remain 
hopeful that we can conclude this trial at the earliest 
possible opportunity.
                                ------                                


                        Monday, February 8, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:06 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Almighty God, guide the Senators today as they move closer 
to the completion of this impeachment trial and confront some 
of the most difficult decisions of their lives. Give them 
physical strength and mental fortitude for this day. In 
anticipation of Your burden-lifting blessing, we place our 
trust in You.
    We renew our prayers for peace in the Middle East. Thank 
You for the life and leadership of King Hussein of Jordan, that 
persistent peacemaker and emissary of light in the often dim 
negotiations for just peace. Now at this time of his untimely 
death, we pray for the people of Jordan and for his son, King 
Abdullah, as he assumes the immense challenges of leadership. 
In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. This afternoon the Senate will resume 
consideration of the articles of impeachment. Pursuant to S. 
Res. 30, the Senate will proceed to final arguments for not to 
exceed 6 hours, equally divided between the House managers and 
the White House counsel.
    At the conclusion of those arguments today, I expect the 
Senate to adjourn the impeachment trial until tomorrow. We 
expect tonight, when we go out of the impeachment trial, to 
have a period for legislative business so we can pass a 
resolution or consider a resolution with regard to King 
Hussein.

                  Order for Tuesday, February 9, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that when the Senate 
completes its business today, it stand in adjournment, to 
reconvene as a Court of Impeachment at 1 p.m. on Tuesday, 
February 9, 1999.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                       Unanimous Consent Request

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the February 5, 1999, affidavit of Mr. Christopher Hitchens and 
the February 7, 1999, affidavit of Ms. Carol Blue be admitted 
into evidence in this proceeding.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. DASCHLE. At this juncture in the trial, I am compelled 
to object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe we are ready to proceed, Mr. Chief 
Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Sensenbrenner.
    Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
counsel for the President, and Senators, I am Congressman Jim 
Sensenbrenner. I represent 580,000 people in southeastern 
Wisconsin in the U.S. House of Representatives. During my 
entire service in Congress, I have served as a member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
    We are nearing the end of a long and difficult process. The 
Senate has considered for the past several weeks the grave 
constitutional responsibility to determine whether the actions 
of President Clinton merit his conviction and removal from 
office. The Senate has been patient, attentive and engaged 
throughout this unwelcome task, and for this the House managers 
are grateful. The managers also thank the distinguished Chief 
Justice for his patience and impartial demeanor throughout this 
trial.
    At the outset of the managers' closing arguments, it is 
important to distinguish what has caused only the second 
Presidential impeachment in history from extraneous matters 
that bear no relation to the verdict the Senate will shortly 
reach. When this trial began 4 long weeks ago, we said that 
what was on trial was the truth and the rule of law. That has 
not changed, despite the lengthy legal arguments you have 
heard. The truth is still the truth and a lie is still a lie. 
And the rule of law should apply to everyone no matter what 
excuses are made by the President's defenders.
    The news media characterizes the managers as 13 angry men. 
They are right in that we are angry, but they are dead wrong 
about what we are angry about. We have not spent long hours 
poring through the evidence, sacrificed time with our families 
and subjected ourselves to intense political criticism to 
further a political vendetta. We have done so because of our 
love for this country and respect for the Office of the 
Presidency, regardless of who may hold it. We have done so 
because of our devotion to the rule of law and our fear that if 
the President does not suffer the legal and constitutional 
consequences of his actions, the impact of allowing the 
President to stand above the law will be felt for generations 
to come.
    ``The Almanac of American Politics'' has called me ``a 
stickler for ethics.'' To that, I plead guilty as charged 
because laws not enforced are open invitations for more serious 
and criminal behavior. This trial was not caused by Kenneth 
Starr, who only did his duty under a law which President 
Clinton himself signed. It was not caused by the House 
Judiciary Committee's review of the independent counsel's 
mountain of evidence. Nor was it caused by the House of 
Representatives approving two articles of impeachment, nor by 
the Senate conducting a trial mandated by the Constitution.
    Regardless of what some may say, this constitutional crisis 
was caused by William Jefferson Clinton and by no one else. 
President Clinton's actions, and his actions alone, have caused 
the national agenda for the past year to be almost exclusively 
concentrated on those actions and what consequences the 
President, and the President alone, must suffer for them.
    This trial is not about the President's affair with Monica 
Lewinsky. It is about the perjury and obstruction of justice he 
committed during the course of the civil rights lawsuit filed 
against him, and the subsequent independent counsel 
investigation authorized by Attorney General Janet Reno.
    The President has repeatedly apologized for his affair, but 
he has never, never apologized for the consequences of the 
perjury and obstruction of justice he has committed. Perhaps 
those decisions were based upon a Dick Morris public opinion 
poll which told the President that the American people would 
forgive his adultery but not his perjury. Perhaps it was for 
another reason. Whatever the White House's motivations were, 
the fact remains that the President's apologies and the 
statements of his surrogate contritionists have been carefully 
crafted for the President to continue to evade and, yes, avoid 
responsibility for his deceiving the courts to prevent them 
from administering justice.
    Because the President's actions to obstruct justice are so 
egregious and repeated, many have ignored his grand jury 
perjury, charges before you in article I. I wish to point out 
four glaring examples of William Jefferson Clinton's 
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury 
and not at the civil deposition in the Paula Jones case.
    First, the President lied under oath to the grand jury when 
he falsely testified about his attorneys' use of a false 
affidavit at his deposition. Second, he lied under oath to the 
grand jury about his conversations with Betty Currie. Third, he 
lied under oath to the grand jury about what he told his aides 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, knowing that those 
aides would be called to testify to the grand jury. Fourth, he 
lied under oath to the grand jury when he testified about the 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    An ordinary citizen who lies under oath four times to a 
grand jury is subject to substantial time in a Federal prison. 
The decision each Senator must make with respect to article I 
is whether the President is to pay a price for his perjury, 
just like any citizen must. The President's defenders and spin 
doctors would have you believe that the President told all of 
these lies under oath to protect himself and his family from 
personal embarrassment, and even if he did tell a lie, it was 
not that bad a lie.
    Senators, please remember that the President's grand jury 
appearance was over 6 months after the news media broke the 
story about the President's affair with Ms. Lewinsky. By August 
17, few people doubted that he had an affair with her. There 
was little left to hide. And he lied after practically everyone 
who was asked--including many of you--advised the President to 
tell the truth to the grand jury. And still he lied.
    We have heard a litany of excuses, including the President 
saying he was not paying a great deal of attention and that he 
was trying to figure out what the facts were, and that he 
needed to know whether his recollection was right, and that he 
had not done anything wrong. And on and on. The President knew 
what had happened. If Monica Lewinsky came on to him and made a 
sexual demand upon him and he rebuffed her, as he told Sidney 
Blumenthal, he would have nothing to apologize for.
    Senators, don't be fooled by the President's excuses and 
spin control. The facts and the evidence clearly show that he 
knew what he was doing was to deceive everyone, including the 
grand jury. He and his defenders are still in denial. They will 
not accept the consequences of his repeated and criminal 
attempts to defeat the judicial process. His lies to the grand 
jury were not to protect his family or the dignity of his 
office but to protect himself from criminal liability for his 
perjury and obstruction of justice in the Jones case.
    Over 9 years ago, the Senate removed Judge Walter Nixon 
from office for about the same offense--lying under oath to the 
grand jury. The vote in the Senate was 89-8 in favor of Judge 
Nixon's removal, with 48 current Senators and Vice President 
Gore voting guilty. To boot a Federal judge from office while 
keeping a President in power after the President committed the 
same offense sets a double standard and lowers the standard of 
what the American people should expect from the leader of their 
country. To conclude that the standard of Presidential 
truthfulness is lower than that of a Federal judge is absurd. 
To conclude that perjury and obstruction of justice are 
acceptable if committed by a popular President during times of 
peace and prosperity sets a dangerous precedent which sets 
America on the road back to an imperial Presidency above the 
law.
    To justify the President's criminal behavior by demonizing 
those who seek to hold him accountable ignores the fact that 
President Clinton's actions, and those actions alone, 
precipitated the investigations which have brought us here 
today. To keep a President in office whose gross misconduct and 
criminal actions are a well-established fact will weaken the 
authority of the Presidency, undermine the rule of law, and 
cheapen those words which have made America different from most 
other nations on the Earth: equal justice under law.
    For the sake of our country and for future generations, 
please find the President guilty of perjury and obstruction of 
justice when you cast your votes.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Cannon. 
If you will wait a moment, Mr. Manager Cannon. If there is no 
objection, the Journal of the proceedings of the trial is 
approved to date. Please go ahead.
    Mr. Manager CANNON. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel to the 
President, Members of the Senate, my name is Christopher B. 
Cannon, and I represent over 600,000 people in the Third 
District of Utah.
    I want to begin with a couple of thank-yous. First, I thank 
you Senators for your attention during this series of 
presentations. I know that you all have deep conflicts over the 
matter before you. Some of you have made strong and public 
statements about it. But you have all paid extraordinary 
attention, and for that I thank you.
    I also thank the other members of the management team. It 
has been a remarkable experience to have been associated with 
them during the last 5 months--almost as good, I might say, as 
it would have been to have been home with my wife, children, 
and our new baby.
    I want to share with you a recent family experience. I have 
been home just about a little over a day out of the last 3 
weeks. It took my 10-month-old baby a little while to warm up 
to me when I was home last. Later, as I started packing, she 
realized I was leaving again and she insisted that I hold her. 
I think she felt that if she held on, I wouldn't disappear. 
Unfortunately, she fell asleep during the trip to the airport. 
I know that the other managers have had similar disruptions in 
their families. For instance, Charles Canady's wife had a baby 
during the trial.
    I, therefore, thank my wife and children, and the wives and 
children of all of the managers for their forbearance and 
support during this process. Like us, they believe in the 
obligation we have to assure good government. I might say that, 
like us, they are grateful that the managers' role is ending.
    For the managers, this process is almost done. I hope that 
history will judge that we have done our duty well. We have 
been congratulated and condemned. But we are done.
    While our difficult role is ending, yours is just 
beginning. While I am certain that sitting here silently has 
been difficult, the truly daunting task before you now is to 
conclude this trial with some sense of legitimacy. For America 
is deeply divided, and the end result of an impeachment trial 
was designed by the Founding Fathers to salve those wounds. 
Traditionally, after an airing of the facts and a vote by the 
Senate, either a President is removed or he is vindicated. In 
this case, it seems, neither of those results may be realized. 
While the facts are clear that the President committed perjury 
and obstruction of justice, it is equally clear that this body 
may not remove him from office. From this perception, you face 
the challenge of legitimizing the end result. Your vote will 
end this matter. It is nonjusticiable. Whatever your decision 
is, it cannot be undone. The outcome will be right by 
definition. But how well you do the work of divining that 
outcome will affect the way we as a nation deal with the 
divisions among us.
    To proceed in a manner that will be trusted, and viewed as 
legitimate by the American people, you must deal with the 
differences between this proceeding and prior impeachment 
trials. You must do this with an obvious commitment to your 
oath to do justice impartially according to the Constitution 
and the law. The law includes the rules and precedents of the 
Senate.
    Senate Resolution 16 made this process different from all 
of the preceding 13 Senate trials on impeachment, principally 
by removing from the managers the right to present our case as 
we see fit. I suspect that the lewd subject matter and the 
partisan fight in the House may have influenced your decision.
    But there is an integrity to the historic rules and reasons 
for them. For instance, the Senate by nature will be divided in 
the impeachment proceedings while the managers are united. It 
is therefore easier for the managers to decide on how to 
present their case than for the Senate.
    There are other differences in this proceeding from 
historic impeachment practice before the Senate. May I list the 
changes for you with the intent to help you focus on the goal 
of a conclusion that we, the people, will feel is legitimate.
    Senate Resolution 16 called for a 24-hour presentation or 
``trial,'' that mainly consisted of what the public saw as the 
yammering of lawyers. Time was equally divided rather than 
sequenced as it is in a trial where opening statements are made 
and then evidence is put on through witnesses. In a trial, each 
side typically takes the time necessary to establish its case 
or undermine the witness through cross-examination. After the 
moving party has made its case, the responding party makes it 
case. Time is dictated only by what each side feels it needs. 
Each witness is subject to whatever cross-examination is 
appropriate. The case develops tested piece by tested piece, 
and ultimately one side prevails.
    Here, the managers had to cut very important portions of 
our limited case. We had a limited number of witnesses, limited 
to videotaped appearances, limited to fit an arbitrary three 
hour rule. That time was lessened because we had to reserve 
time for rebuttal.
    According to judicial traditions, defendants have to 
challenge each witness as they appear, not wrap the credibility 
of all in one wide ranging response. In these proceedings, the 
Senate has not had the opportunity to assess the credibility of 
witnesses as the case developed. The White House then used its 
time with long video portions and small cutting accusations. 
Who knows what the White House might have done if it had been 
able, or found it necessary, to challenge witnesses as they 
testified?
    Another diversion from judicial and Senate trial precedent 
was that the only rebuttal for the managers was what we 
reserved after our video presentation and, awkwardly, in the 
questioning period where important, complicated issues were cut 
off by artificial time limits, while peripheral issues got more 
time than they deserved. This questioning period had the 
unfortunate side effect of focusing the public on the 
partisanship of the Senate.
    The problem of the newness of the presentation format was 
exacerbated by our new media environment. The Internet with its 
immediate and often unvetted content, and cable television with 
its perpetual talking heads, gave equal time and equivalency of 
weight to the managers and the White House, with no witness 
testimony to constrain them. The process gave rise to the 
perception that the ``fix was in,'' leaving some to gloat at 
having scammed the situation, and others angry at being 
unheard.
    And that is the context within which the Senate must now 
find a legitimate outcome. Given the wide-ranging discussions 
of options, it is clear this is no easy task. Will it be:
    Adjournment with condemnation?
    Findings of fact about the President's behavior?
    A bifurcated vote to show agreement with the articles of 
impeachment but not removing the President?
    A simple up or down on the articles of impeachment?
    Or a vote for acquittal followed by censure?
    I don't know which, if any, of these options really makes 
sense. And I don't know of any other options. I do know that 
the issue is grave, and that your responsibility is great.
    So I am here today to ask you to set aside some natural 
inclinations for the good of the country.
    I implore you, Senators, both Republican and Democrat, to 
set aside partisanship, politics, polls, and personalities and 
exchange them for loftier inclinations--those of ``procedure,'' 
``policy,'' and ``precedents.'' These are the only guidelines 
this body should have.
    As the Senate deliberates this case, I ask that a few key 
facts never be forgotten:
    One. That the President committed perjury when he lied 
under oath.
    Two. The Senate has historically impeached judges for 
perjury--even recently by some of you assembled here.
    Three. Any American watching these proceedings who commits 
perjury would also be punished by the law.
    Four. If the Senate follows our Nation's precedents of 
punishing perjurers, and if the Senate follows its own 
precedents of convicting perjurers, then there is only one 
clear conclusion in this matter: conviction.
    Senators, we as Americans and legislators have never 
supported a legal system which has one set of laws for the 
ruler and another for the ruled. After all, our very own Pledge 
of Allegiance binds us together with the language of ``liberty 
and justice for all.'' If that is the case, if we intend to 
live up to the oaths and pledges we take, then our very own 
President must be subject to the precedents our Nation's 
judicial system and this Senate body have heretofore set.
    Because I love this country and its institutions, I pray 
for inspiration for each of you as you seek the proper, 
legitimate outcome. May God bless you in the process.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
    Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues on each 
side of the podium, Members of the Senate, if I were to take 
some time to thank the Chief Justice for his patience in all 
this, would that be counted against my time?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
    Mr. Manager GEKAS. Then I will send you a note.
    [Laughter.]
    We do offer our thanks to the Chief Justice.
    I come from Pennsylvania, and the people in my district and 
the entire State, and the people in their 49 brethren States 
across the Nation recognize that there is really only one 
issue, with all the fury and the tumult and the shouting and 
the invective, the language, and just the plain shouting that 
has occurred across the Halls of Congress and every place else 
in the country.
    It all swoops down the telescope to one issue: Did the 
President utter falsehoods under oath? Everyone understands 
that. Everyone comes to the conclusion that that is a serious 
allegation that has been made through the impeachment, and one 
which you must judge in the final vote that you will be 
casting.
    But why is it important about whether or not the President 
uttered the falsehoods under oath? It is important not just to 
constitute the basis of perjury, as is alleged, and/or 
obstruction of justice, which is alleged, but even if those two 
were not proved in all their elements as crimes, you would 
still have to consider a falsehood under oath as constituting 
an impeachable offense. I say that advisedly.
    It starts--my contention does--with the assertions of our 
esteemed colleagues who represent the President. Time after 
time, and in their briefs and in their statements on and off 
the floor, they have stated you need not have a criminal 
offense for it to constitute an impeachable offense. They 
provided examples of that. They said that all you have to 
demonstrate is that an impeachable offense is one that rocks 
against the integrity of the system of government. I am 
paraphrasing, of course.
    I submit--and I feel this so strongly that it bothers me 
that I can't make it clear--that to violate the oath as a 
witness in a civil case, or a criminal case, in the Jones 
matter, or in the grand jury, smashes against the integrity of 
our system of government. There are sundry reasons for that.
    In this case, if you follow the logic and the extreme 
intellectual presentation made by White House counsel that 
refutes every item that--or attempts to refute, not refutes--
attempts to refute every item asserted by the managers, if you 
believe all of that and are confused or in doubt about the 
Jones case and whether lies under oath were committed, or at 
the grand jury, you must think about this. This is, to me, 
proof positive that the President uttered falsehoods under oath 
in all of his public stances.
    On December 23, the President, under oath, answered 
interrogatories that were sent to him by the court in the Jones 
case in which he said, in answer to the question, Have you ever 
had sexual relations with anyone in a subordinate role while 
you were Governor of Arkansas, or President of the United 
States?--this is important. At that time--and the record will 
disclose all of this--at that time, there was no definition in 
front of him, no gaggle of attorneys trying to dispute what 
word meant what, no judge there to interpose the legal standard 
that should be employed, but rather the boldfaced, naked phrase 
of ``sexual relations'' that everyone in the whole world 
understands to be what it is--and the President answered under 
oath ``None.''
    I submit to the Members of the Senate, if the answer then, 
December 23, before ever stepping foot in the deposition of the 
Paula Jones case, if he never appeared there, or whatever he 
said there was so clouded you can't draw a conclusion, 
certainly you can refer back to December 23 and see a starting 
point of a pattern of conduct on the part of the President that 
proves beyond all doubt that he committed a pattern and actual 
falsehoods under oath time and time again.
    If that is not enough, on January 15, as the record will 
disclose, he answered under oath requests for documents in 
which the question is asked under oath, to which the President 
responded, Have you ever received any gifts or documents from--
and it mentioned among others Monica Lewinsky--and the 
President under oath said ``No'' or ``None.'' The record will 
show for sure exactly what he said. But he denied that any 
gifts were transferred from, or any documents, or any items of 
personalty, from Lewinsky to the President.
    I submit to you that if you are confused about that, 
because of the great presentation made by the counsel for the 
President about the murkiness and cloudiness of the Jones 
deposition, the maddening consequences of the President's 
testimony--``maddening,'' they said--then you can refer back to 
January 15 before the deposition, and December 23, and find 
proof positive in the documents already a part of the case that 
you have to decide that, indeed, a pattern of falsehoods under 
oath was initiated and conducted by the President of the United 
States.
    That is very important. Those allegations, by the way, have 
gone completely uncontradicted by the President of the United 
States.
    I think they took great delight--these colleagues of mine 
on behalf of the President--great delight in saying--at one 
point they put the marquee in the sky, that in so many 
different ways when Monica Lewinsky said, ``Nobody told me to 
lie,'' that was the case for them. What a case they made. 
``Nobody told me to lie.'' They won the case right then and 
there in their minds, because that was exculpatory and that was 
brandishing in this case once and for all, Monica said, 
``Nobody told me to lie.''
    I am going to take some liberties with the Latin that I 
learned in school, and we all learned in college and law 
school, ``falsum in unum is falsum in toto,'' meaning if you 
say something false in one phase of your testimony, more than 
likely the triers of fact can find that you were false in all 
of them.
    I am going to change that. I think I am right when I say 
that ``veritas in unum is veritas in toto.'' So when Monica 
Lewinsky says, ``Nobody told me to lie,'' and that is the 
indomitable, indestructible truth that the White House counsel 
say, that is the case, then it also must be ``veritas in 
toto,'' because when she said that she gave gifts to the 
President, then you must accept that ``veritas in unum is 
veritas in toto.''
    That goes on and on and on.
    Somebody is waving, ``Cut this short.''
    [Laughter.]
    It is very tough for me to do that, but I will comply.
    I have a witness. I call a witness to bolster my part of 
this summation. The witness is the American people.
    Mr. Craig, in his last appearance on this podium, was 
delighted to be able to quote a poll that showed that 75 
percent of the people of our country felt that there was no 
need to present videotapes to the Senate in the trial--75 
percent, he said with great gusto, of the American people.
    Of course the polls of all types were quoted time and time 
again by the supporters of the President as showing why you 
should vote to acquit. The polls, the polls, the polls.
    I now call the American people's poll on whether or not 
they believe that the President committed falsehoods under 
oath--80 percent of the American people--I call them to my side 
here at the podium to verify to you that the President 
committed falsehoods under oath.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Chabot.
    Mr. Manager CHABOT. Thank you. I am Steve Chabot. I 
represent the First District of Ohio, which is Cincinnati.
    This week we will likely finally conclude this trial. Has 
it been difficult? Yes. Would we all have preferred that none 
of this ever happened? Of course. But the President has put our 
Nation through a terrible ordeal, and it has been our duty to 
pursue this case to its conclusion.
    Despite the dire warnings, scare tactics and heavy-handed 
threats by those who would circumvent the solemn constitutional 
process that we are all engaged in, our great country has 
survived. We have finished this trial in just a few weeks. The 
economy continues to be strong, and the Nation's business is 
getting done.
    But, Senators, before you turn out the lights and head 
home, you must make one final decision. It is a decision that 
should not be influenced by party affiliation or by politics or 
by personal ties. It is a decision that should be guided by our 
Constitution, by our laws, and by your own moral compass.
    A few months ago I stood here in your shoes, as did all the 
colleagues here, and the colleagues in the House, preparing to 
make what would likely be the most important vote of our 
careers. Throughout the process, I did my best to be fair, to 
keep an open mind. I listened carefully to the views of my 
constituents, the people who sent me to Congress. I reviewed 
the evidence in excruciating detail. Ultimately, for me, the 
choice was clear. I came to the conclusion that it was my duty 
to support impeachment. Now it is your turn to cast what could 
be the most important vote of your political careers. The 
question is, Will moral fortitude or political expediency rule 
the day?
    This past weekend, I had the opportunity to spend a couple 
hours at my college alma mater, William and Mary, not too far 
from here, down in Williamsburg, VA. As I walked around the 
campus, I could not help but think back to my college days and 
what motivated me to seek public office in the first place.
    Back in 1972, I was a 19-year-old college student casting 
my first ballot in a Presidential election. Like a majority of 
Americans that year, I voted for a Republican, Richard Nixon, 
for President. Four years later, however, I voted for a 
Democrat, Jimmy Carter. This decision stemmed from my profound 
disappointment over Watergate and a strong conviction that 
President Nixon should not have received immunity for his 
actions.
    Now, just as in college, I find myself extremely troubled 
by the actions of a President. In fact, as I started to think 
about what I would say to you today, I wasn't sure how to 
begin. How exactly do you wrap up in 10 minutes or less 
everything we have witnessed in the last year? We have seen 
Bill Clinton's finger-waving denial to the American people. We 
have seen the President lie before a Federal grand jury. We 
have seen the President obstruct justice. We have seen the 
President hold a public celebration immediately following the 
House impeachment vote. We all know the President's behavior 
has been reprehensible.
    President Clinton, however, refuses to admit what all of us 
know is true. To this day, he continues to deny and distort; he 
continues to dispute the undeniable facts that are before the 
Senate and before the American people. The President's 
attorneys have done their best to disguise the truth as well.
    At the beginning of this trial, I predicted in my 
presentation that they would use legal smokescreens to mask the 
law and the facts. To their credit, they produced smoke so 
thick that it continues to cloud this debate. But if you look 
through the smoke and the mirrors employed by these very able 
lawyers, you will see the truth. The truth is that President 
Clinton lied to a Federal grand jury. He lied about whether or 
not he had committed perjury in a civil deposition, about the 
extent of his relationship with a subordinate Federal employee, 
about his coaching of his secretary, Betty Currie, and about 
the countless other matters.
    In my opening statement before this body, I outlined the 
four elements of perjury: an oath, intent, falsity, 
materiality. In this case, all those elements have been met.
    President Clinton also obstructed justice and encouraged 
others to lie in judicial proceedings. He sought to influence 
the testimony of a potentially adverse witness with job 
assistance, and he attempted to conceal evidence that was under 
subpoena.
    These truths cannot be ignored, distorted, or swept under 
the rug. Some of the President's partisan defenders want you to 
do just that. But it would be wrong. It would be wrong for you 
to send the message to every American that it is acceptable to 
lie under oath and obstruct justice. It would be wrong for you 
to tell America's children that some lies are all right. It 
would be wrong to show the rest of the world that some of our 
laws don't really matter.
    I must agree with Phyllis and Jack Stanley, constituents of 
mine who live in my district, who wrote me a letter saying:

    We believe that President Bill Clinton should definitely be 
impeached for the sake of the country. If he is not impeached, 
will not the rule of law in this country be weakened? We do not 
feel glee over the prospect of President Clinton's impeachment, 
however. For the sake of coming generations, acknowledging that 
integrity, honor and decency matter greatly is very important, 
especially in the highest office of the land.

    Like most of you, I have spent countless hours at grocery 
stores, shopping malls, in schools, in my church talking to my 
constituents. I have also read thousands of letters that have 
been sent to my office, just as we all have. What I have heard 
and read doesn't surprise me. People in Cincinnati, OH, have a 
variety of views on what the ultimate verdict should be by this 
body. Many want the President removed from office. Others want 
a censure. Still others would just like to see the process end. 
But regardless of their views, they are honorable people who 
care about our country and our future.
    I know that throughout the process some of the President's 
more partisan defenders have harshly criticized the managers, 
the House of Representatives, and anyone who would dare believe 
the President committed any crimes. These partisan attacks have 
been unfortunate because I think we all know that these issues 
are serious and that they deserve serious consideration. I know 
it, the American people know it, and I think you all know it, 
too. But despite the partisan rhetoric of the attacks, I 
believe that once this trial ends, we must work together.
    So I ask everyone here today to make a commitment, a 
commitment to every American, that regardless of the trial's 
outcome, we will join together to turn the page on this 
unfortunate chapter that President Clinton has written into our 
Nation's history.
    The question before you now is: How will this chapter end? 
Will the final chapter say that the U.S. Senate turned its back 
on perjury and obstruction of justice by a President of the 
United States, or will it say that the Senate took a principled 
stand and told the world that no person, not even the 
President, stands above the law; that all Americans, no matter 
how rich, how powerful, or how well connected, are accountable 
for their actions, even the President.
    As the father of two children and a former schoolteacher 
myself at an inner-city school in Cincinnati, I believe it is 
very important that we teach our children that honesty, 
integrity, and the rule of law do matter.
    While I am in Cincinnati, I spend a lot of time visiting 
schools throughout my community. I taught the seventh and 
eighth grades back in Cincinnati. When I go there, I go to 
elementary schools, I go to junior highs, I go to high schools; 
and I have been doing this for a number of years. Do you know 
what is inevitably one of the questions that the kids will ask 
me almost every time? It is, ``Have you ever met the President 
of the United States?''
    Why do kids ask that question? Because our kids understand 
how important the Office of the Presidency is. The person who 
occupies that office owes it to the children of this Nation to 
treat the office with respect. In the past, when those kids 
asked me that question, they asked me that question out of 
pride and respect. They looked up to the office. They looked up 
to everything the office represents. Bill Clinton has let our 
children down, and that is one of the greatest things that 
bothers me. It is the effect this will have on the children of 
this Nation.
    Let me conclude with a statement that I received recently 
from a student, Juliette Asuncion, at Mother Mercy High School:

    I am writing to express my feelings on the scandalous 
situation that has taken over the White House for the past 
couple of months. First, I would like to state the qualities 
that should be found in the President of the United States. 
Since the President is the official representative of the 
United States, he should uphold the values and ideals held by 
the people of this country. The President should be honest and 
a trustworthy person. He should be a good decision maker, have 
good morals and have his priorities straight. He should devote 
his time to the country and set a good example for the people 
of this Nation. I feel that President Clinton does not measure 
up to these standards. He's lied to the American people; he's 
committed perjury. For someone in his position, this is an 
unforgivable act, and he should not be allowed to just walk 
away without a punishment. He has shown that he feels he can go 
above the law, and I strongly believe the President should be 
impeached.

    I conclude by telling you, when you cast your vote, you 
remember that by your vote you are determining the lesson that 
Julia, your children and grandchildren will learn. So how will 
this chapter end? The decision is yours.
    I now yield to the gentleman from Georgia, Robert Barr.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Barr.
    Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Distinguished and worthy adversarial counsel for the 
President, including my good friend and former Georgetown law 
professor, Charles Ruff, gentlemen and ladies of the Senate, my 
name is Bob Barr. I represent the Seventh District of Georgia, 
but in a broader sense I represent the country because I have 
been directed, as every one of the other 12 managers of the 
House has been directed by the American people, by a majority 
vote of the House of Representatives, to urge you to review the 
evidence and issue a verdict of conviction on the two articles 
of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives.
    Two days ago, all of us celebrated the birthday of former 
President Ronald Reagan. During his first year in office, on 
May 17, 1981, this President, known for giving voice to 
America's best and most decent instincts, spoke to the American 
people from Notre Dame University. Though spoken nearly 18 
years ago, and clearly not in contemplation of an impeachment, 
the former President's words provide guidance for you today.
    It was that date that President Reagan spoke of a certain 
principle; and in so doing, he quoted another giant of the 20th 
century, Winston Churchill. Specifically, President Reagan 
spoke of those who derided simple, straightforward answers to 
the problems confronting our country; those who decried clarity 
and certainty of principle, in favor of vagueness and 
relativism. He said:

    They say the world has become too complex for simple 
answers. They are wrong. There are no easy answers, but there 
are simple answers. We must have the courage to do what is 
morally right. Winston Churchill said that, ``the destiny of 
man is not measured by material computation. When great forces 
are on the move in the world, we learn we are spirits--not 
animals.'' And he said, ``there is something going on in time 
and space, and beyond time and space, which, whether we like it 
or not, spells duty.''

    Duty. A clear, simple concept. A foundational principle.
    Your duty is clearly set forth in your oath; your oath to 
do impartial justice according to the Constitution and the law.
    In the past month, you have heard much about the 
Constitution; and about the law. Probably more than you prefer; 
in a dizzying recitation of the U.S. Criminal Code: 18 U.S.C. 
1503. 18 U.S.C. 1505. 18 U.S.C. 1512. 18 U.S.C. 1621. 18 U.S.C. 
1623. Tampering. Perjury. Obstruction. That is a lot to digest, 
but these are real laws and they are applicable to these 
proceedings and to this President. Evidence and law, you have 
seen it and you have heard it.
    You have also seen and heard about straw men raised up by 
the White House lawyers, and then stricken down mightily. You 
have heard them essentially describe the President alternately 
as victim or saint. You have heard even his staunchest allies 
describe his conduct as ``reprehensible.'' Even some of you, on 
the President's side of the aisle, have concluded, ``there's no 
question about his having given false testimony under oath and 
he did that more than once.''
    There has also been much smoke churned up by the defense.
    Men and women of the Senate, Monica Lewinsky is not on 
trial. Her conduct and her intentions are not at issue here. 
Vernon Jordan is not on trial and his conduct and his 
intentions are not at issue here. William Jefferson Clinton is 
on trial here. His behavior, his intentions, his actions--these 
and only these are the issues here. When the White House 
lawyers raise up as a straw man that Vernon Jordan may have had 
no improper motive in seeking a job for Ms. Lewinsky; or that 
there was no formal ``conspiracy'' proved between the President 
and Vernon Jordan; or that Ms. Lewinsky says she did not draw a 
direct link between the President's raising the issue of a 
false affidavit and the cover stories, keep in mind, these are 
irrelevant issues. When the White House lawyers strike these 
theories down, even if you were to conclude they did, they are 
striking down nothing more than irrelevant straw men.
    What stands today, as it has throughout these proceedings, 
are facts--a false affidavit that benefits the President, the 
coaching of witnesses by the President, the secreting of 
subpoenaed evidence that would have harmed the President, lies 
under oath by the President. These reflect President Clinton's 
behavior; President Clinton's intentions; President Clinton's 
actions; and President Clinton's benefit. Not through the eyes 
of false theories; but by the evidence through the lens of 
common sense.
    You have heard tapes and read volumes of evidence. Not 
pursuant to the process we as House Managers would have 
preferred, but much evidence, nonetheless, has been presented.
    Many are saying, with a degree of certainty that usually 
comes only from ignorance, that there is nothing I or any of us 
can say to you today, on the eve of your deliberations, to sway 
your minds. I beg to differ with them. Moreover, we have been 
directed by the people of this country, by a majority vote of 
the House of Representatives, to fulfill and reaffirm a 
constitutional process and to present evidence to you and argue 
to you.
    There is much, in urging a vote for conviction, that can be 
gained by turning to, and keeping in mind, President Reagan's 
words to America, to do duty: duty unclouded by relativism, 
unmarred by artificiality. Duty that lives on after your vote--
just as America will live on and prosper after a vote to 
convict. Duty untainted by polls. The country's fascination 
with polls has wormed its way even into these proceedings when, 
just a few days ago, we heard one of the White House lawyers 
cite polls as a reason not to release the videotapes.
    Polls played no role in the great decisions, decisive 
decisions that make America a nation and kept it a free and 
strong nation. Polls likewise played no role in the great 
trials of our Nation's history that opened schools equally to 
all of America's children, or that provided due process and 
equal protection of the laws for all Americans, regardless of 
economic might or political power.
    Yet, it is in many respects polls that threaten to become 
the currency of political discourse and even of judicial 
process as we near to enter the 21st century.
    Your duty, which I know you recognize today, is and must be 
based not on polls or politics, but on law and the 
Constitution. In other words, principle.
    What you decide in this case, the case now before you, will 
tell America and the world what it is we have, as a foundation 
for our Nation, not just today, but for ages to come. It will 
tell us and this Nation whether these seats here today will 
continue to be filled by true statesmen. Whether these seats 
will continue to echo with the booming principles, eloquence 
and sense of duty of Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, Everett 
Dirksen, Robert Byrd. I would add to that list of statesmen my 
fellow Georgian and your former colleague, Sam Nunn, whose 
concern for duty and our Nation's security caused him recently 
on CNN to raise grave concerns over our Nation's security 
because of the reckless conduct of this President. Will the 
principles embodied in our Constitution and our laws be 
reaffirmed; wrested from the pallid hands of pollsters and 
pundits, and from the swarm of theorists surrounding these 
proceedings? Will they be taken up by you, and placed squarely 
and firmly back in the hands of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and so many other true statesmen of 
America's heritage? Principles that have stricken down bigotry, 
tyrants, and demagogs; principles that, through open and fair 
trials, have saved the innocent from the hangman's noose; and 
likewise have sent the guilty, clothed in due process, to then 
ether regions.
    It is principle, found and nurtured in our Constitution and 
our laws, that you are now called on to both use and reaffirm.
    Not only America is watching, the world is, too. And, for 
those who say people from foreign lands look down on this 
process and deride this process, I say, ``not so.''
    Let me speak briefly of a man not born in this country, but 
a man who has made this his country. A man born not in Atlanta, 
GA, though Atlanta is now his home. A man born many thousands 
of miles away, in Eritrea. A man to whom President Reagan 
surely was in a sense speaking, both in 1981 when he spoke of 
America's eternal sense of duty, and in January 1985, when he 
spoke of the ``American sound'' that echoes still through the 
ages and the continents.
    The man whose words I quote is a man who watches this 
process through the eyes of an immigrant, Mr. Seyoum Tesfaye. I 
have never met Mr. Tesfaye, but I have read his works. He 
wrote, in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, just 3 days 
ago, on February 5, that this impeachment process ``is an 
example of America at its best . . . a core constitutional 
principle that profoundly distinguishes America from almost all 
other nations.'' He noted without hyperbole, that this process, 
far from being the sorry spectacle that many of the President's 
defenders have tried to make it, truly ``is a hallmark of 
representative democracy,'' reaffirming the principle that ``no 
man is above the law--not even the President.''
    These are not the words of the House Managers; though they 
echo ours.
    These are not the words of a partisan.
    These are the words of an immigrant. A man who came to 
America to study, and has stayed to work and pay taxes just as 
millions of us do every day.
    Men and women of the United States Senate, you must, by 
affirming your duty to render impartial justice based on the 
Constitution and the law, reaffirm those same laws and that 
very same Constitution, which drew Mr. Tesfaye and countless 
millions of other immigrants to our shores over the ages. This 
is not a comfortable task for any of us. But, as Martin Luther 
King, Jr., correctly noted, in words that hang on my office 
wall, and perhaps on some of yours, it is not in ``times of 
comfort and convenience'' that we find the measure of a man's 
character, but in times of ``conflict and controversy.'' This 
is such a defining time.
    Obstruction of justice and perjury must not be allowed to 
stand. Perjury and obstruction cannot stand alongside the law 
and the Constitution.
    By your oath, you must, like it or not, choose one over the 
other, up or down, guilt or acquittal. I respectfully submit on 
behalf of the House of Representatives and on behalf of my 
constituents in the Seventh District of Georgia that the 
evidence clearly establishes guilt and that the Constitution 
and laws of this land demand it.
    I thank the Members of the Senate and yield to Mr. Manager 
Buyer.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Buyer.
    Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel and Senators, my 
name is Steve Buyer, House manager, from Monticello, IN. I 
represent 20 counties between South Bend and Indianapolis. I 
will not try to claim the cornerstone of Hoosier common sense. 
Mr. Kendall would wrestle me for that cornerstone. But as a 
former criminal defense attorney, I want to take a moment and 
compliment the White House counsel and Mr. Kendall for doing 
your best to defend your client in the face of overwhelming 
facts and compelling evidence.
    [Laughter.]
    Your role here--a side comment here--your role here is much 
easier, though, in a Court of Impeachment as opposed to a 
criminal court of law.
    As a former Federal prosecutor, I compliment Chairman Henry 
Hyde and my colleagues, the House managers, who have embraced 
and given life meaning of the rule of law and presented this 
case to the Senate in a professional, thorough, and dignified 
manner.
    I assure you, the House managers would not have prosecuted 
the articles of impeachment before the bar of the Senate had we 
not had the highest degree of faith, belief, and confidence 
that, based on the evidence, the President committed high 
crimes and misdemeanors which warrant his removal from office.
    As you come to judgment, I recommend you square yourself 
with your duty first.
    On January 7, I witnessed as the Chief Justice administered 
your oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution 
and the laws. You should follow this prescription: Find the 
truth, define the facts, apply the law, give reverence to the 
Senate precedents while defending the Constitution. But I 
submit, it is the integrity of your oath in which you must 
regulate to uphold the principle of equal justice under the 
law.
    During the question-and-answer phase with the Chief Justice 
on Saturday, January 23, I stood in the well of the Senate and 
recommended that you vote on findings of fact. I want to clear 
the record of my intent of the recommendation. It has been 
grossly distorted.
    It is not to establish the guilt, as some have alleged. A 
finding of fact is not a finding of fiction. On the contrary, 
it is to prevent decisions by triers of fact from basing their 
judgment on fiction or chance or politics. The Chief Justice 
ruled that you are triers of fact, and since this 
constitutional proceeding of impeachment is more like a civil 
proceeding than a criminal trial, I bring to your attention 
rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provides, 
in pertinent part, that when a judge sits alone as a trier of 
fact, he or she is required to set down in precise words the 
facts as he or she finds them. This requirement is mandatory 
and cannot be waived by the parties of Federal practice.
    A memorandum of findings of fact is not a radical concept 
to American jurisprudence. It is customary and habitually used 
in State and Federal courts all across this land. Since you sit 
collectively as a Court of Impeachment, as the triers of fact, 
I recommended the findings of fact to guarantee that you have 
carefully reviewed the evidence and have a rational basis for 
your final judgment.
    To claim that findings of fact is unconstitutional is 
false. The Supreme Court has consistently permitted the Senate 
to shape the contours and the due process of an impeachment 
trial.
    The Senate owes the American people and history an 
accounting of the stubborn facts.
    I would like to comment on some statements.
    I have heard some Senators state publicly that they are 
using the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Senate 
has held consistently that the criminal standard of proof is 
inappropriate for impeachment trials. The result of conviction 
in an impeachment trial is removal from office; it is not meant 
to punish. You are to be guided by your own conscience, not by 
the criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.
    I have also heard some Senators from both sides of the 
aisle state publicly, ``I think these offenses rise to the 
level of high crimes and misdemeanors.'' To state publicly that 
you believe that high crimes and misdemeanors have occurred, 
but for some reason you have this desire not to remove the 
President, that desire, though, does not square with the law, 
the Constitution, and the Senate's precedents for removing 
Federal judges for similar offenses.
    So long as William Jefferson Clinton is President, the only 
mechanism to hold him accountable for his high crimes and 
misdemeanors is the power of impeachment and removal. The 
Constitution is very clear. You cannot vindicate the rule of 
law by stating high crimes and misdemeanors have occurred, but 
leave the President in office subject to future prosecution 
after his term is expired.
    Without respect for the law, the foundation of our 
Constitution is not secure. Without respect for the law, our 
freedom is at risk.
    The President is answerable for his alleged crimes to the 
Senate here and now.
    Moreover, if criminal prosecution and not impeachment is 
the way to vindicate the rule of law, then the Senate would 
never have removed other civil officers such as Federal judges, 
who are not insulated from criminal prosecution while holding 
office.
    Thus, in providing for criminal punishment after conviction 
and removal from office, it was the framers who insured that 
the rule of law would be vindicated both in cleansing the 
office and in punishing the individual for the criminal act.
    I have asked myself many times how allowing a President to 
remain in office while having committed perjury and obstruction 
of justice is fair to those across the country who are sitting 
in jail for having committed the same crimes. I have had the 
fairness argument thrown into my face consistently.
    Fairness is important. Fairness is something that is simple 
in its nature and is powerful in the statement that it makes. A 
statement which you send carries us into tomorrow and becomes 
our future legacy.
    If you vote to acquit, think for a moment about what you 
would say to those who have been convicted of the same crimes 
as the President.
    What would you say to the 182 Americans who were sentenced 
in Federal court in 1997 for committing perjury?
    What would you say to the 144 Americans who were sentenced 
in Federal court in 1997 for obstruction of justice and witness 
tampering?
    Would you attempt to trivialize the evidence and say, 
``This case was only about lying about sex''?
    I want to cite the testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee of one woman who experienced the judicial system in 
the most personal sense, and that is the testimony of Dr. 
Barbara Battalino. I think it is compelling.
    She held degrees in medicine and law, and Manager Rogan 
showed some of the testimony just the other day. You see, she 
was prosecuted by the Clinton Justice Department and convicted 
for obstruction of justice because of her lie under oath about 
one act of consensual oral sex with a patient on VA premises. 
Her untruthful response was made in a civil suit which was 
later dismissed. In a legal proceeding, Dr. Battalino was asked 
under oath: ``Did anything of a sexual nature take place in 
your office on June 27, 1991?''
    Her one word reply, ``No,'' convicted her and forever 
changed her life.
    Her punishment? She was convicted of a felony, forced to 
wear an electronic monitoring device, and is presently on 
probation. She lost her license to practice medicine and her 
ability to practice law.
    Our prisons hold many who are truly contrite, they are 
sorry, they feel pain for their criminal offenses, and some 
whose victims have even forgiven them, others who were very 
popular citizens and had many friends and apologized profusely, 
but they were still held accountable under the law.
    Just like the President is acclaimed to be doing a good 
job, many in prison today were doing a good job in their chosen 
professions. None of our laws provides for good job 
performance, contrition, forgiveness, or popularity polls as a 
remedy for criminal conduct.
    These were the closing lines of Dr. Battalino's opening 
statement before the House Judiciary Committee:

    We all make mistakes in life. But, common frailty does not 
relieve us from our responsibility to uphold the Rule of Law. 
Regardless, this nation must never let any person or people 
undermine the Rule of Law. . . . If liberty and justice for all 
does not reign, we--like great civilizations before us--will 
surely perish from the face of the earth.

    What you would say to Dr. Battalino and others similarly 
situated is very important because fairness is important.
    Alexander Hamilton, writing not long after the Constitution 
was adopted, well expressed the harm that would come to our 
Republic from those who, by example, undermine respect for the 
law. In a statement that bears repeating, Hamilton wrote:

    If it were to be asked, What is the most sacred duty and 
the greatest source of security in a Republic? The answer would 
be, an inviolable respect for the Constitution and Laws--the 
first growing out of the last. . . . Those, therefore, who . . 
. set examples, which undermine or subvert the authority of the 
laws, lead us from freedom to slavery; they incapacitate us 
from a government of laws. . . .

    President Clinton, by his persistent and calculated 
misconduct and illegal acts, has set a pernicious example of 
lawlessness, an example which, by its very nature, subverts 
respect for the law. His perverse example inevitably undermines 
the integrity of both the Office of the President and the 
judicial process.
    You see, ladies and gentlemen, without choice we were all 
born free, and we inherited a legacy of liberty at great 
sacrifice by many who have come before us. We cannot 
collectively as a free people enjoy the liberties without 
measured personal restraint. And that is the purpose of the 
rule of law. It is the function of the courts to uphold the 
dignity of that prescription and the God-given liberties of all 
of us. That is how we are able to carry this Nation forward in 
the future generations.
    So in light of the historic principles regarding 
impeachment, the overwhelming evidence to the offenses alleged, 
and the application of the Senate precedents, I believe it 
makes it very clear that our President--who has shown such 
contempt for the law, the dignity and the integrity of the 
office of the Presidency that was entrusted to him--must be 
held to account; and it can only be by his removal from office.
    The House managers reserve the remainder of our time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    The Chair recognizes the White House counsel.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you.
    I wonder, Mr. Majority Leader, whether we can take a brief 
break because there is a need to arrange furniture.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. I was hesitant to suggest it, too, early today, 
Mr. Chief Justice.
    [Laughter.]

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. On the request of counsel, I ask unanimous 
consent that we take a 10-minute recess. And please return 
quickly to the Chamber so we can get back to business.
    There being no objection, at 2:12 p.m. the Senate recessed 
until 2:35 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. White House 
Counsel Ruff.
    Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief 
Justice, managers of the House, ladies and gentlemen of the 
Senate, I can't resist beginning, following the lead of my 
colleagues across the well here, by telling you that my name is 
Charles Ruff and I am from the District of Columbia, and we 
don't have a vote in the Congress of the United States.
    [Laughter.]
    I truly did not intend to begin quite this way, but I must. 
I do not think there is a court in the land where a prosecutor 
would be able to stand up for one-third of his allotted time, 
speak in general terms about what the people are entitled to 
and what the rule of law stands for--as important as all of 
that may be--and sit down and turn to the defense counsel and 
ask that defense counsel go forward, reserving 2 hours for 
rebuttal. I recognize that procedural niceties have not 
necessarily characterized the way this trial has gone forward. 
But I do believe--and this is the only time today I will say 
this, I promise--that kind of prosecutorial gambit is 
symptomatic of what we have seen before in these last weeks--
wanting to win too much.
    That said, let me begin where I intended to begin. We are 
taking the last steps along a path that, for most of us, has 
seemed to be unending. Indeed, some of us may have a sense that 
we have gone well beyond ``Yogi Berra land'' to deja vu all 
over again and all over again and all over again. I thought 
long and hard as I thought about what I was going to say today, 
and how I could be of most help to you as you make this 
momentous decision that will soon be entrusted to you. I 
momentarily considered whether the answer to that question was 
simply to yield back my time, but I weighed that against the 
special pleasure of stretching out our last hours with you.
    [Laughter.]
    Or as Ernie Banks would have said, ``It's such a nice day, 
let's play two.''
    [Laughter.]
    But cursed as I am with lawyerly instincts, I decided to 
compromise. I promise you as much brevity as I can manage, even 
if not much wit, while making a few final points that I think 
you need to carry with you as you go into your deliberations.
    You have heard the managers' vision--or at least some part 
of it--of the process we have been engaged in and the lessons 
we have learned and what it will look like at the end of our 
journey. I respect them as elected Representatives of their 
people and as worthy adversaries. But I believe their vision 
could be too dark, a vision too little attuned to the needs of 
the people, too little sensitive to the needs of our democracy. 
I believe it to be a vision more focused on retribution, more 
designed to achieve partisan ends, more uncaring about the 
future we face together.
    Our vision, I think, is quite different, but it is not 
naive. We know the pain the President has caused our society 
and his family and his friends. But we know, too, how much the 
President has done for this country. And more importantly, we 
know that our primary obligation, the duty we all have, is to 
preserve that which the founders gave us, and we can best 
fulfill that duty by carefully traveling the path that they 
laid out for us.
    You have heard many speeches over the past few weeks about 
high crimes and misdemeanors. As I look back on the arguments 
and the counterarguments, it seems to me that really very 
little can be gained by repeating them; for when all is said 
and done, what they mean is this: The framers chose stability. 
They made impeachment and removal constitutional recourses of 
last resort. The question that the managers appear to have 
asked--and I am unable to tell you what they will ask today--is 
whether perjury or obstruction of justice in the abstract are 
impeachable offenses. That is not the question you must answer.
    Nor must you assume, as the managers appear to, that 
because judges are removed for having committed perjury, a 
President must be removed as well. That is not what the rule of 
law requires. The rule of law and evenhanded justice is 
something more than a simple syllogism. You must decide whether 
on these facts arising out of these circumstances this 
President has so endangered the state that we can no longer 
countenance his remaining in office.
    I think in their hearts the managers do not truly disagree. 
Whatever they have been able to glean from the historical 
record or more modern scholarship, they cannot in the end avoid 
the conclusion that removal of the President is not something 
that the framers took lightly. Indeed, two of their own 
witnesses in the Judiciary Committee, Professor Van Alstyne and 
Judge Wiggins, tried to make it clear to them that even if they 
were to find that the offenses described in the independent 
counsel's referral as being committed, another decision had to 
be made. That decision was whether in the interest of society 
the President should be impeached. As Professor Van Alstyne put 
it, in words that I admit are unflattering to my client but 
nonetheless makes the point: ``In my own opinion,'' he said, 
``I regard what the President did, that which the Special 
Counsel report declared, are crimes of such a low order that it 
would unduly flatter the President by submitting him to trial 
in the Senate, I would not bother to do it.''
    I read that statement to you, not obviously because the 
professor and I are on the same side of the political divide or 
have the same view of the President's conduct, but because it 
is important, I think, to understand, as I fear the managers do 
not, that the framers full well understood what they were doing 
when they drafted the impeachment provision of the 
Constitution. They consciously chose not to make all misconduct 
by the President a basis for removal; they chose instead only 
that conduct that they viewed as most serious, as most 
dangerous, to our system of government.
    As I said, I think in their hearts the managers recognize 
the force of it. But they have argued to you that perjury and 
obstruction really should be treated as the equivalent of 
treason and bribery and the danger that they pose to our 
society. They have offered on this much rhetoric and a few 
substantive arguments. I want to look at just a few of these 
arguments as they were advanced in the managers' opening and 
not really addressed instead.
    First, a historical item, that Blackstone in his commentary 
listed bribery and perjury and obstruction of justice under the 
same heading of ``offenses against public justice''; second, a 
modern statutory equivalent of that argument that under the 
sentencing guidelines we actually treat perjury more severely 
than we do bribery; and, third--this is a theme you have heard 
throughout these proceedings, what I will call the ``system of 
justice argument''--that the President's conduct, if he is not 
removed, will somehow subvert enforcement of our civil rights 
laws.
    But all of these arguments are mere subterfuge, offered 
because the managers knew that to make any plausible case for 
removal they must bring these articles within the very small 
circle of offenses that the framers believed were truly 
dangerous to the state.
    First, Blackstone: It is true that the commentaries rate 
perjury as among 21 offenses against public justice. Notably, 
however, Blackstone ranks the 21 in order of seriousness, or, 
as he puts it, ``malignity.'' No. 1 on the list, a most 
malignant offense, is a felony that I have to admit is unknown 
to me--that of vacating records. No. 6 is returning from 
transportation, also an offense rarely seen in our modern 
society. Nos. 10 and 12 are barratry, maintenance and 
champerty, especially dear to me because they involve my 
profession, but rarely viewed these days, I think you will 
agree. And, at No. 15 is perjury.
    If, as Madison told us, Blackstone was in the hands of 
every man, what does that tell us about why the framers chose 
treason and bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors as 
the grounds of impeachment? It tells us that they fully 
understood that comparative gravity of offenses against public 
justice, and, nonetheless, chose only those that truly pose 
that danger to the state--treason, for obvious reasons, and 
bribery because to them the risk that the executive would sell 
himself to a foreign country, for example, was much more than 
mere speculation. And then other high crimes of similar 
severity.
    As to the lesson to be learned from the more modern day, 
the sentencing guidelines, Manager McCollum argued to you a few 
weeks ago that those to whom you have given the responsibility 
to assess the comparative severity of crimes have concluded 
that perjury is at least as serious a crime as bribery. That 
decision, he told you, is evidenced by the commission's 
decision to assign perjury an offense level of 12, or 
approximately 1 year in prison, and to bribery an offense level 
slightly below that. But even to the extent that such an 
argument were to be weighed in the constitutional balance, 
Manager McCollum was simply not being candid with you, for he 
failed to explain that under these same guidelines a bribe of, 
let's say, $75,000 taken by an elected official, or a judge for 
that matter, automatically carries an offense level of 24, or 
twice that of perjury, and a prison sentence four to five times 
longer.
    The drafters of our guidelines, to the extent that Mr. 
McCollum asked you to look at them, full well understand the 
special gravity of bribes taken by the country's leaders, and 
to distinguish that offense from the offenses, even at best, 
that are before you now.
    Lastly is this system of justice argument--the notion that 
somehow President Clinton has undermined our civil rights laws. 
Whatever I might say could not match the eloquence of my 
colleague, Ms. Mills, and, therefore, I will not attempt fate 
by venturing further into that territory.
    I really do not want to become further immersed in the 
minutia here. On this, I do agree with the managers. We cannot 
lose sight of the constitutional forest for some of the 
analytical trees.
    There is only one question before you, albeit a difficult 
one, one that is a question of fact, and of law and 
constitutional theory. Would it put at risk the liberty of the 
people to retain the President in office? Putting aside 
partisan animus, if you can honestly say that it would not, 
that those liberties are safely in his hands, then you must 
vote to acquit.
    Each of you has a sense of this in your mind and your heart 
better than anything I can convey, or I suspect anything better 
than my colleagues could convey to you. And I will not 
undertake to instruct you further on this issue.
    Just as we ultimately leave that question in your hands, we 
leave to the conscience of each Member the question of what 
standard of proof you apply. Despite Congressman Buyer's 
exhortation to the contrary, this body has never decided for 
any of you what standard is appropriate or what standard is 
inappropriate. Each Senator is left to his or her own best 
judgment.
    I suggested to you when I last spoke to you that I believe 
you must apply a standard sufficiently stringent to enable you 
to make this most important decision with certainty and in a 
manner that will ensure that the American people understand 
that it has been made with that certainty.
    This is not an issue as to which we as a people and we as a 
Republic can be in doubt.
    Let me move to the articles. Just as you have listened 
patiently to our debate about the meaning of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' you have, as well, heard seemingly endless 
discourse about the specific details of the various matters 
that the managers allege constitute grounds for removal. I will 
strive, therefore, not to be unduly repetitive more than is at 
least absolutely necessary.
    My colleagues, last Saturday and in their earlier 
presentations, have done my work for me, but I want to focus 
for just a little while on those aspects of the managers' 
presentation that merit your special attention or those that 
have been particularly elucidated or, for that matter, 
beclouded by the testimony you heard and watched on Saturday.
    As we start this discussion, let me offer you a phrase that 
I hope you will remember as I move through the articles with 
you. That phrase is ``moving targets and empty pots.'' ``Moving 
targets,'' ever-shifting theories, each one advanced to replace 
the last as it has fallen, fallen victim to the facts. ``Empty 
pots,'' attractive containers, but when you take the lid off 
you find nothing to sustain them.
    I used the term, ``empty vessels,'' in my opening 
presentation, but it has since struck me that that was much too 
flattering and might even suggest that they had the capacity to 
float, which they don't.
    Article I, the first moving target. As we have said 
repeatedly, we have been more than a little puzzled as to the 
exact nature of the charges advanced by the managers under the 
rubric of article I, and our puzzlement has only increased, I 
must tell you, since this trial began.
    We have argued, I think with indisputable force, that both 
articles are so deficient that they would not survive a motion 
to dismiss in any court in the land. We are not insensitive to 
the claim that we are advancing some lawyer's argument, and we 
are seeking some technical escape, but I urge you not to treat 
this issue so lightly. As you look to article I, for example, 
ask yourselves whether you can at this late moment in the trial 
identify for yourselves with any remote sense of certainty the 
statements that the managers claim were perjurious.
    I suspect you will hear a lot about that in the 2 hours 
following my presentation, but I will try to look ahead just a 
bit.
    Ask yourselves whether you are comfortable in this gravest 
of proceedings that when you retire to your deliberations you 
could ever know that the constitutionally required two-thirds 
vote is present on any one charge.
    We have been making this argument for some time and with 
some frequency, and so you would think that at least once the 
trial began the managers would have fixed on some definable set 
of charges. But, no. Indeed, it struck me even earlier this 
afternoon that when Manager Sensenbrenner rose to speak to you, 
he was prepared to give you four examples of perjury. We have 
heard a lot of examples. We haven't heard much certainty.
    Just to give you an example of how rapidly the target can 
move, you will recall that in describing the incidents of 
perjury allegedly committed by the President, the managers made 
much of the preliminary statement he read to the grand jury, 
including the use of the words ``occasionally,'' and ``on 
certain occasions'' to describe the frequency of certain 
conduct and made the general allegation that the statement was 
itself part of a scheme to deceive the grand jury.
    Yet, strangely, when Mr. Manager Rogan was asked about 
these very charges as late as January 20, he quite clearly 
abandoned them.
    I direct your attention to the exhibits before you and to 
the charts. Appearing on television on January 20, with Chris 
Matthews, this is what transpired:

    MATTHEWS. . . . now defend these--these elements--one, that 
the president lied when he said he had had these relationships 
with her on certain occasions. Is that the language?
    Rep. ROGAN. That is the . . .
    MATTHEWS. And--and why is that perjurious--perjurious?
    Rep. ROGAN. In fact, I'm not--I don't think it's 
necessarily perjurious. That is--that's one little piece of 
this answer that he gave at the grand jury. . . .

           *         *         *         *         *

    MATTHEWS. Well, another time he used a phrase with regard 
to this ridiculous thing called phone sex, he referred to it as 
occasionally or on occasion. Why do you add them in as part of 
the perjury indictment?
    Rep. ROGAN. That's not added in as part of the perjury 
indictment in Article I. I simply raised that issue when I was 
addressing the Senate.

           *         *         *         *         *

    MATTHEWS. You better get to those senators because I think 
they made the mistake I did of thinking that was one of the 
elements in the perjury charge.

    And similarly over here, although I have reversed the order 
a bit:

    MATTHEWS. . . . Go through what you think are the main 
elements in your perjury indictment of the president, 
impeachment. . . .
    Rep. ROGAN. One of the things they were focusing on is a 
point, I think, I made last week when I was presenting the case 
for perjury dealing with that preliminary statement that the 
president read that just really gave the grand jury a 
misperception of what the president's relationship was with 
Monica Lewinsky. Now I never said that was the basis for the 
perjury charge. In fact, that's not even one of the four areas 
that's alleged, but they're trying to pick these little dots 
out of the matrix and try to hang their hat on that. . . .

    I have to tell you, as did Mr. Matthews, I made the same 
mistake. I heard Manager Rogan say:

    This prepared statement he read to the grand jury on August 
17th, 1998, was the linchpin in his plan to ``win.''

    I heard him say:

    It is obvious that the reference in the President's 
prepared statement to the grand jury that this relationship 
began in 1996 was intentionally false.

    I heard him say:

    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain 
occasions.

    And I heard him say:

    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky 
as occasional.

    That is what I heard when Manager Rogan spoke to you a few 
weeks ago.
    I know it is unusual to be given a bill of particulars on 
television, but maybe that is part of the modern litigation 
age.
    So as to article I's charge, now that this is off the 
books, that the President perjured himself concerning his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, we are once again left with the 
claim that he lied about touching, about his denial that he 
engaged in conduct that fell within his subjective 
understanding of the definition used in the Jones deposition--
this in the course of testimony, Members of the Senate, in 
which the President had already made the single most 
devastating admission that any of us can conceive of. It defies 
common sense. And as any experienced prosecutor--and five 
experienced prosecutors said this to the Judiciary Committee--
will tell you, it defies real world experience to charge 
anyone, President or not, with perjury on the grounds that you 
disbelieve his testimony about his own subjective belief in the 
definition of a term used in a civil deposition.
    Nothing in the evidentiary record has changed since the OIC 
referred this matter to the House 6 months ago. Indeed, it is 
impossible to conceive what could change in the evidentiary 
record. And the managers have offered this charge and persist 
in it for reasons not entirely clear to me, but some blind 
faith that they must go forward, facts or no.
    There are three other elements of article I. First, the 
allegation that the President lied when he claimed he did not 
perjure himself in the Jones deposition. The President, of 
course, made no such representation in the grand jury.
    The managers cannot, no matter how they try, resurrect the 
charges of the article, then, article II, that was so clearly 
rejected by the House of Representatives. Yet, if you listen to 
their presentations over the past weeks, it becomes evident 
that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, they themselves 
have come to the point where the President's testimony on 
January 17 in the Jones deposition and August 17 in the grand 
jury are treated as though they were one and the same.
    Just a few minutes ago you heard Manager Gekas talk to you 
about perjury, and probably 90 percent of what he talked to you 
about was perjury in the Jones case--in the Jones case. It 
doesn't exist anymore. The House of Representatives determined 
that that was not an impeachable offense. It appears to make no 
difference, though, that the House rejected this charge, for 
the managers do continue to dwell on it as though somehow they 
could show the House from which they came that they made a 
mistake.
    Only last Saturday, Manager Graham could be heard decrying 
the President's claim that he had never been alone with Monica 
Lewinsky, something that comes not out of the grand jury but 
out of the Jones deposition, at the same time he was taking him 
to task for his disquisition on the word ``is,'' something that 
is in the grand jury but is entirely irrelevant to these 
perjury charges. You could even see it in their videotape 
presentation last Saturday when snippets from January 17, then 
August 17, were played without any definition and without any 
sense that there was any distinction between the two events.
    There is literally nothing in the President's grand jury 
testimony that purports to adopt wholesale his testimony in the 
Jones deposition. If anything, it is evident that he is 
explaining at length and clarifying and adding to his 
deposition testimony. Indeed, even if the original article II 
had survived, the President's belief that he had ``worked 
through the minefield of the Jones deposition without violating 
the law''--which is a quote from his grand jury testimony--
could not allow the managers, somehow, to establish that that 
statement was independently perjurious, and they surely cannot 
do so now that the original article II has disappeared.
    As to the second and third remaining elements of article I, 
that the President lied about Mr. Bennett's statement to Judge 
Wright at the time of the Jones deposition, and that he lied 
about his own statements to his staff, I will deal with them in 
my discussion of the obstruction charges in article II. Suffice 
it to say that nothing in the record as it came to you in 
January could support conviction on article I, and nothing 
added to the record since then has changed that result.
    Let me move to article II. Manager Hutchinson told you in 
his original presentation that article II rested on--his 
words--``seven pillars of obstruction.'' I had suggested in my 
opening statement of a few weeks ago that it would be more 
accurate to call them seven shifting sand castles of 
speculation, but Manager Hutchinson has not proved willing to 
accept my description and so I will accept his. Let's remove 
one pillar right at the start.
    Article II charges that the President engaged in a scheme 
to obstruct the Jones case--the Jones case--and alleges as one 
element of this scheme that in the days following January 21 
the President lied to his staff about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, conduct that could not possibly have had anything to 
do with the Jones litigation.
    I will get to the merits of that charge standing alone in a 
little while, but I bring up the more--forgive me--technical 
argument here, to highlight once more the extent to which the 
House simply ignored the most basic legal principles in 
bringing these charges to you. I have yet to hear from the 
managers a single plausible explanation for the inclusion of 
this charge as part of a scheme to obstruct the Jones 
litigation, and I can think of none. I am sure that in the 120 
minutes remaining to them, some portion of that time will be 
spent explaining just this point. And, so, one pillar gone; a 
slight list observed.
    Next: Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and the first of the empty 
pots. The managers charge that the President corruptly 
encouraged a witness to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew 
to be perjurious, false, and misleading, and similarly 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie if she were ever called as a 
witness. In my opening statement, and in Mr. Kendall's more 
detailed discussion, we made two points: First, that Ms. 
Lewinsky had repeatedly denied that she had ever been asked or 
encouraged to lie; and, second, that there was simply no direct 
or circumstantial evidence that the President had ever done 
such a thing.
    It is not in dispute that the President called Ms. Lewinsky 
in the early morning of December 17 to tell her about the death 
of Betty Currie's brother, and in the same call that he told 
her that she was now listed on the Jones witness list. The 
managers have from the beginning relied on one fact and on one 
baseless hypothesis stemming from this call which, in the 
managers' minds, was the beginning and the middle and the end 
of the scheme to encourage the filing of a false affidavit. 
There is literally no other event or statement on which they 
can rely.
    The one fact to which the managers point is Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony that the President said that if she were actually 
subpoenaed, she possibly could file an affidavit to avoid 
having to testify, and at some point in the call mentioned one 
of the so-called cover stories that they had used when she was 
still working at the White House--that is, bringing papers to 
him. And it is on this shaky foundation, a very slim pillar 
indeed, that the managers build the hypothesis.
    In the face of the seemingly insurmountable hurdle of Ms. 
Lewinsky's repeated denials that anyone ever asked or 
encouraged her to lie, the managers have persisted in arguing, 
and continue to do so, that the President did somehow encourage 
her to lie, even if she didn't know it. Now you have heard that 
theme sounded really for the first time on Saturday, and then a 
little bit today--even if she didn't know it, because both 
really understood that any affidavit Ms. Lewinsky would file 
would have to be false if it were to result in her avoiding her 
deposition. But neither the fact on which they rely nor their 
hypothesis was of much help to the managers before Ms. 
Lewinsky's deposition and neither, surely, has any force after 
her deposition.
    After you saw Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, there can be 
nothing left of what was, at best, only conjecture. Even before 
her deposition, Ms. Lewinsky had testified, as had the 
President in the grand jury, that given the claims being made 
in the Jones case, a truthful albeit limited affidavit might--
might--establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to 
offer in the way of testimony in the Jones case.
    Faced with this record, the managers asked you to authorize 
Ms. Lewinsky's deposition, representing that she would--and I 
quote, and this is from the managers' proffer--``rebut the 
following inferences drawn by White House counsel on key 
issues, among others that President Clinton did not encourage 
Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and that President 
Clinton did not have an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that 
the two would lie under oath.''
    Unhappily for the managers--and perhaps their unhappiness 
was best reflected in the tone of Manager Bryant's discussion 
on this subject--Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, as you saw yourself 
on Saturday, did just the opposite.
    In an extended colloquy with Mr. Manager Bryant on the 
subject of the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky made clear, beyond any 
doubt, first, that the President had never discussed the 
contents of the affidavit with her; second, that there was no 
connection between the suggestion that she might file an 
affidavit and the reference to any cover story; third, that she 
believed it possible to file a truthful affidavit.
    You saw much of this portion of Ms. Lewinsky's deposition 
on Saturday, and I am not going to impose too much on your 
patience, but I do want to play just a very few segments of 
that videotape.
    First, two segments dealing with the content of the 
affidavit.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation 
to you about what you could say in that affidavit or--
    A. No.
    Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that 
affidavit to avoid testifying?
    A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. 
To the best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it 
was a range of things. I mean, it could either be, uh, 
something innocuous or could go as far as having to deny the 
relationship. Not being a lawyer nor having gone to law school, 
I thought it could be anything.
    Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other 
version?
    A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a 
further discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in 
an affidavit.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has 
indicated that he thought he had--might have had a way that he 
could have you--get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, 
but yet still skirt these issues enough that you wouldn't be 
called as a witness.
    Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
    A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at 
all, ever.

    Next, a couple of brief segments on the issue of the cover 
stories.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the 
concocted stories and those things like that, did this come to 
mind? Was there some discussion about that, or did it come to 
your mind about these stories--the cover stories?
    A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the 
affidavit.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I 
would draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded 
to that earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that 
night?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And what was said?
    A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--
you can always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me 
papers.
    Q. I think You have testified that you're sure he said that 
that night. You are sure he said that that night?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
    A. I don't believe so, no.

           *         *         *         *         *

    Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your 
closing comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet 
in that very conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the 
President told you that you were on the witness list, he also 
suggested that you could sign an affidavit and use misleading 
cover stories. Isn't that correct?
    A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily 
signing affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, 
does--
    Q. Well, those two--
    A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they 
weren't linked for me.

    And third, a brief segment on the supposed falsity of any 
affidavit that might be filed.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could 
file an affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of 
filing a false affidavit with the court?
    A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it 
would have to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't 
remember having any thoughts like that, so I imagine I would 
remember something like that, and I don't, but--

    And last, if we might, a brief segment on the question of 
whose best interests were being served.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best 
interest, did you?
    A. Uh, actually, I did.
    Q. To avoid testifying.
    A. Yes.

    Brief, put pointed, I think, and I am sure you remember 
them from Saturday, and I am sure you will take those excerpts 
with you as you move into your deliberations.
    There was another issue that surfaced early on, although 
perhaps it has dissipated, and that is whether the President 
ever saw a draft of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, something that 
the managers alleged early on but, indeed, as we now know from 
that testimony, not only did nobody ever see a draft of the 
affidavit, the President and Ms. Lewinsky never even discussed 
the content of her affidavit. ``Not ever,'' as she put it, 
either on December 17 or on January 5 or on any other date. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President told her he didn't 
need to see a draft because he had seen other affidavits.
    Early on, Manager McCollum speculated for you--speculated 
for you--that when the President told Ms. Lewinsky that he 
didn't need to see her affidavit because he had seen other 
affidavits, he really must have meant that he had seen previous 
drafts of hers, and this is what he said:

    I doubt seriously the President was talking about 15 other 
affidavits of somebody else and didn't like looking at 
affidavits anymore. I suspect, and I would suggest to you, that 
he was talking about 15 other drafts of this proposed 
affidavit, since it had been around the horn a lot of rounds.

    That is what Manager McCollum told you. Now we know that 
those drafts didn't exist. They never existed. How do we know? 
Somewhat belatedly, the managers got around to telling us that. 
In describing the testimony they would expect to receive from 
Ms. Lewinsky when they moved for the right to take her 
deposition, they wrote in their motion:

    That same day, January 5, she called President Clinton to 
ask if the President would like to review her affidavit before 
it was signed. He declined, saying he had already seen about 15 
others. She understood that to mean that he had seen 15 other 
affidavits rather than 15 prior drafts of her affidavit (which 
did not exist).

    In sum, one, the only reference to an affidavit in the 
December 17 call was the suggestion of the President that 
filing one might possibly enable Ms. Lewinsky to avoid being 
deposed, itself an entirely legitimate and proper suggestion.
    Two, the President and Ms. Lewinsky never discussed the 
content of her affidavit on or after December 17.
    Three, the President never saw or read any draft of the 
affidavit before it was signed.
    Four, the President believed that she could file a true 
affidavit.
    Five, Ms. Lewinsky believed that she could file a true 
affidavit.
    Six, there is not one single document or piece of testimony 
that suggests that the President encouraged her to file a false 
affidavit.
    If there is no proof the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky 
to file a false affidavit, surely there must be some proof on 
the other charge that encouraged her to give perjurious 
testimony if she were ever called to testify. Well, there 
isn't.
    Let's begin by noting something that should help you assess 
the President's actions during this period--both the charge 
that he encouraged the filing of a false affidavit and the 
charge that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to testify falsely.
    The conversation that the managers allege gave rise to both 
offenses is that call of the early morning of December 17. The 
managers suggest that the President, in essence, used the 
subterfuge of a call to inform Ms. Lewinsky about the death of 
Ms. Currie's brother to discuss her status as a witness in the 
Jones case. Subterfuge? Come on. A tragedy had befallen a woman 
who was Ms. Lewinsky's friend and the President's secretary.
    But let's put this in the managers' own context. On 
December 6, the President learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the 
Jones witness list. According to the managers, that was a 
source of grave concern and spurred intensified efforts to find 
her a job--efforts that were still further intensified when, on 
December 11, Judge Wright issued her order allowing lawyers to 
inquire into the President's relationships with other women. 
Yet, I have not heard any explanation as to why the President, 
now theoretically so distraught that he was urging Mr. Jordan 
to keep Ms. Lewinsky happy by finding her a job, as Manager 
Hutchinson would have it, waited until December 17--11 days 
after he learned Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list and 6 
days after the supposedly critical events of December 11--to 
call and launch his scheme to suborn perjury.
    As to the charge of subornation, the managers do concede, 
as they must, that the President and Ms. Lewinsky did not even 
discuss her deposition on the 17th, logically, I suppose, since 
she wasn't actually subpoenaed until 2 days later.
    One might think that this would dispose of the matter, 
since they do not identify a single other moment in time when 
there was any discussion of Ms. Lewinsky's potential testimony. 
But once again, having lifted the lid and seen that their pot 
was empty, they ask you to find that the same signal that we 
now know did not encourage the filing of an affidavit was a 
signal to Ms. Lewinsky to lie if she was ever called to 
testify. But of course we have long known that there was no 
such signal. And the grand jury--as was so often the case, one 
of the jurors took it upon him or herself to ask that which the 
independent counsel chose not to. You have this before you, and 
you have seen it before:

    A JUROR: It is possible that you also had these discussions 
[about denying the relationship] after you learned that you 
were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: I don't believe so. No.
    A JUROR: Can you exclude that possibility?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: I pretty much can. I really don't remember 
it. I mean, it would be very surprising for me to be confronted 
with something that would show me different, but I--it was 2:30 
in the--I mean, the conversation I'm thinking of mainly would 
have been December 17th, which was--
    A JUROR: The telephone call.
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in 
the morning. I remember the gist of it and I--I really don't 
think so.
    A JUROR: Thank you.

    But all of this is not enough to dissuade the managers.
    Now that they know that the only two participants in the 
relevant conversation denied that there was any discussion of 
either the affidavit or the testimony, they have created still 
another theory. As Manager Bryant told you last week--and in 
essence it was repeated today--``I don't care what was in Ms. 
Lewinsky's mind.''
    That is quite extraordinary. The only witness, the supposed 
victim of the obstruction, the person whose testimony is being 
influenced, says that it didn't happen. And the managers 
nonetheless want you to conclude, I assume, that some 
subliminal message was being conveyed that resulted in the 
filing of a false affidavit without the affiant knowing that 
she was being controlled by some unseen and unheard force. I 
won't comment further. Two more pillars lie in the dust.
    Next, the gifts. On this charge, the record is largely, but 
in critical respects not entirely, as the record has been from 
the beginning. Here is what it shows.
    On the morning of December 28, the President gave Ms. 
Lewinsky Christmas presents in token of her impending departure 
for New York. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she raised the 
subject of her subpoena and said something about getting the 
gifts out of her apartment, to which she herself has now told 
you the President either made no response or said something 
like, ``Let me think about it.''
    Betty Currie testified consistently that Ms. Lewinsky 
called her to ask her to pick up a box and hold them for her. 
Ms. Lewinsky has testified equally consistently, and testified 
again in her deposition, that it was her recollection that Ms. 
Currie called her and said that she understood she ``had 
something for her'' or perhaps even the President said, ``You 
have something for me.'' The President denies that he ever 
spoke to Betty Currie about picking up gifts from Monica 
Lewinsky. Betty Currie denies that the President ever asked her 
to pick up gifts from Monica Lewinsky.
    Ms. Lewinsky has stated on three occasions before her most 
recent deposition that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts at 2 
o'clock in the afternoon on the 28th. Having been shown the 
infamous 3:32 cell phone call, which had previously been 
trumpeted by the managers as absolute proof that it was Ms. 
Currie who called Ms. Lewinsky, who initiated the process, Ms. 
Lewinsky testified on Monday that Ms. Currie came to pick up 
the gifts sometime during the afternoon and that there had been 
other calls earlier in the day.
    But we learned at least a couple of interesting new things 
from Ms. Lewinsky on this subject.
    First, when she received her subpoena on December 19, 9 
days--9 days--before she spoke to the President about them, Ms. 
Lewinsky was frightened at the prospect that the Jones lawyers 
would search her apartment, and she began to think about 
concealing the gifts that she cared most about that would 
suggest some special relationship with the President. And as 
she told you, she herself decided then that she would turn over 
only what she described as the most innocuous gifts, and it was 
those gifts that she took with her to see her lawyer, Mr. 
Carter, on December 22.
    Thus, when she arrived to pick up her Christmas gifts from 
the President on December 28, she had already decided that she 
would not turn over all the gifts called for by the subpoena 
and had already segregated out the ones she intended to 
withhold. But she didn't tell the President about that. 
Instead, as she testified, she broached the question of what to 
do with the gifts and the possibility of giving them to Betty 
Currie, again without describing what had already occurred, to 
which the President either made no reply or said something 
like, ``I'll think about it.''
    This testimony sheds light on one of the issues that has 
troubled everyone who has tried to make sense out of what 
happened on that day. Why would the President, if he were 
really worried about Ms. Lewinsky's turning over gifts pursuant 
to the subpoena, give her more gifts? From our perspective, the 
answer has always been an easy one. He wouldn't have been 
concerned. He has testified that he was not concerned about 
gifts, that he gives them all the time to all sorts of people, 
and he wasn't worried about it.
    We know that from Ms. Lewinsky's perspective, as she 
explained in her deposition, it also made no difference that 
the President was giving her additional gifts, because she had 
already decided, having had the subpoena in hand for 9 days, 
that she would not turn them over.
    A second ray of light also shines on two aspects of the 
managers' case from Ms. Lewinsky's deposition.
    You may remember that as part of article I in their trial 
brief, the managers allege that the President lied to the grand 
jury--this is one of the never-ending list of possible 
perjuries--that he recalled saying to Ms. Lewinsky on December 
28 that she would have to ``turn over whatever she had'' when 
she raised the gift issue with him.
    The managers sought to obtain from Ms. Lewinsky testimony 
that would support that charge of perjury as well as the 
concealment charge under article II, but she turned that world 
upside down on both the perjury charge and the obstruction 
charge.
    When asked whether the President had ever said to her, 
``You will have to give them whatever you have,'' or something 
like that, Ms. Lewinsky testified that FBI Agent Fallon of the 
OIC had interviewed her after the President's grand jury 
testimony, after they already knew what the President had said 
under oath, and asked her whether she recalled the President 
saying anything like that to her. I am sure somewhat to the 
surprise of Manager Bryant, she testified that she told Agent 
Fallon, ``That sounds familiar.''
    Now aside from the not-so-minor point that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony corroborates the President's recollection of his 
response and undermines the charge in both article I and 
article II, a couple of other things are worth noting. As my 
colleague, Ms. Seligman, pointed out to you on Saturday, this 
was the first time after all Ms. Lewinsky's recorded versions 
of the events of December 28, that we had ever heard that the 
President's version sounded familiar to her. And second, there 
is not a single piece of paper--at least that we are aware of--
in the entire universe turned over by the independent counsel, 
by the House, and thence to us that reflects the FBI's 
interview of Ms. Lewinsky. If she hadn't been honest enough to 
tell Manager Bryant about it, we and you would never have 
known.
    Senators, what else is there in the vaults of the 
independent counsel or in the memory of his agents that we 
don't know about?
    Another pillar down.
    The job search. It may have become tiresome to hear it, but 
any discussion of the job search must begin with Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony oft repeated that no one promised her a job to 
influence her testimony. Remember my two themes: Moving 
targets, empty pots. They come together here. What the managers 
have presented to you in a series of different speculative 
theories, as each one is shown to be what it is, they move on 
to the next in the hope they will find one, someday, that 
actually has a connection to reality. But they cannot find that 
elusive theory; for the stubborn facts will not budge, nor will 
the stubborn denials by every participant in their mythical 
plot.
    Now we know that Monica Lewinsky's job search began in the 
summer of 1997, well in advance of her being involved in the 
Jones case. In October, she interviewed with U.N. Ambassador 
Richardson, was offered a job. She had her first meeting with 
Mr. Jordan early in November, well before she appeared in the 
Jones case. The next contact was actually before Thanksgiving 
when she made an effort to set up another meeting with Mr. 
Jordan and was told to call back after the holiday. She did, on 
December 8, and set up a meeting on December 11--again, before 
either she or Mr. Jordan knew that she was involved in the 
Jones case.
    On that date of December 11 which we have heard so much 
about, Mr. Jordan did open doors for Ms. Lewinsky in New York, 
but there was no inappropriate pressure. At American Express 
and Young & Rubicam she failed on her own, and at Revlon she 
succeeded on her own. As Mr. Jordan told the grand jury when 
asked whether there was any connection between his assistance 
to her and the Jones case, his answer was ``unequivocally, 
indubitably no.''
    In search of some evidence that Mr. Jordan's efforts were, 
indeed, triggering Ms. Lewinsky's status as a witness and 
therefore inappropriate, the managers focused on his January 8 
call to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, 
admittedly a date known to Ms. Lewinsky, to Mr. Jordan, and to 
the President. Ms. Lewinsky had reported that her original 
interview had not gone well, although we know it actually had, 
and that her resume had already been sent over from MacAndrews 
& Forbes to Revlon where she ultimately was offered a job.
    Mr. Jordan was candid stating he went to the top because he 
wanted to get action if action could be had, but the record is 
clear that the woman involved at Revlon who interviewed Ms. 
Lewinsky had already made a decision to hire her. No one put 
any pressure on her. There was no special urgency. There was no 
fix. In fact, if you want it known what happens when Mr. Jordan 
calls the CEO of a company to get action, look at his call to 
the CEO of Young & Rubicam: No job; no job. They made an 
independent decision whether or not to hire Ms. Lewinsky.
    Other than the managers, there are only two people, as far 
as I can tell, who ever tried to create a link between the job 
search and the affidavit: Linda Tripp and Kenneth Starr. No 
one--not Ms. Lewinsky, not Mr. Jordan, not the President, no 
one--ever said anything to so much as suggest the existence of 
such a linkage, and the managers can find no proof; which is 
not to say they didn't try.
    Manager Hutchinson, you will recall, originally asked you 
to look at the events of January 5 when he said Ms. Lewinsky 
had met with her attorney, Mr. Carter, and then, according to 
the managers' account, Mr. Carter began drafting the affidavit 
and Ms. Lewinsky was so concerned that she called the President 
and he returned her call. The problem with that version, as my 
colleague, Mr. Kendall, showed you, was the affidavit wasn't 
drafted until January 6. Mr. Carter has so testified.
    The managers would also have you believe that Mr. Jordan 
was involved in drafting the affidavit and that he was involved 
in the deletion of language from the draft that suggested that 
she had been alone with the President. Ms. Lewinsky's and Mr. 
Jordan's testimony is essentially the same. They talked, Mr. 
Jordan listened--you recall him saying, ``Yes, she was talking, 
I was doodling,''--he called Mr. Carter, he transmitted to Mr. 
Carter some of her concerns, but he made it very clear to Ms. 
Lewinsky he wasn't her lawyer. And in words that will resonate 
forever, at least among the legal community, Mr. Jordan said, 
``I don't do affidavits.'' And, of course, Mr. Carter himself 
testified it was his idea to delete the language about being 
alone.
    The very best the managers can do on this issue is to 
establish that Ms. Lewinsky talked to Mr. Jordan in the same 
conversation about the job search and about her affidavit. But 
as Mr. Jordan told you, Ms. Lewinsky was always talking about 
the job search, and he made it very clear to you that there was 
no linkage between the two.
    If we can play just a very brief section of Mr. Jordan's 
deposition.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the 
affidavit being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both 
the job and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
    A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky 
talked to her about the job, on one hand, or job being 
interrelated with the conversation about the affidavit. The 
affidavit was over here. The job was over here.

    And of course we have already dispensed with the notion to 
the extent that the managers continue to assert that the 
President never discussed the contents of the affidavit with 
Ms. Lewinsky or even ever saw a draft.
    Recognizing that they would never be able to show that the 
inception of the job search was linked in any way to the 
affidavit, the managers developed a theory which they have 
advanced to you that the President committed obstruction of 
justice when the job search assistance became, in their words, 
``totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated,'' with the 
filing of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
    The problem the managers have had, however, is that they 
have not been able to figure out when this occurred, why it 
occurred, or how it occurred. Think back on how many versions 
of their theory you have heard just in the last few weeks. 
First, it all started on December 11 when Judge Wright issued 
her order permitting Jones' lawyers to take depositions to 
prove that the President had relations with other women. That 
was what galvanized the President and Mr. Jordan to make real 
efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky a job.
    Woops, didn't quite fit the facts.
    Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and made calls to 
prospective employers before the order was issued. Let's try 
this. Second, well, it wasn't really the 11th, it was the 5th 
when the witness list came out. But they had already told you 
in a trial brief quite explicitly, and in the majority report 
of the committee to the Congress, that there was ``no 
urgency.'' Those were their words; there was ``no urgency'' 
after December 5. I am a city boy, but that dog went back to 
sleep.
    Third, as Manager Hutchinson told you on Saturday, what 
really happened was that by December 17 the President had ``got 
the job search moving'' and thought ``maybe she is now more 
receptive,'' and that is why he called Ms. Lewinsky on the 17th 
and told her she was on the witness list.
    Nice try. No facts.
    I don't know whether this chart, which Manager Hutchinson 
used, was intended to speak for itself or to be elucidated by 
his own comments, but let's look at it. ``December 5th, witness 
list--Lewinsky,'' exclamation point. Her name is on it. 
``December 6: President meets with attorneys on witness list.''
    True.
    ``December 7th: President and Jordan meet.''
    That is also true, but we know they didn't talk about 
Monica Lewinsky. I am not quite sure why it is there.
    ``December 8th: Lewinsky sets up a meeting with Jordan for 
the 11th.''
    True. At that point, she doesn't know she is on the list 
and Mr. Jordan doesn't know she is on the list.
    ``December 11th: Lewinsky job meeting with Jordan.''
    Yes, true. But as we know, well before Judge Wright's order 
came out, the two of them still don't know that her name is on 
the witness list.
    December 17th was the calls.
    True. They are on the list.
    On December 19, the subpoena was served.
    True.
    ``December 28: President and Lewinsky meet; evidence 
(gifts) concealed.''
    True, but I am not sure what that means in this context.
    Last, interestingly, was breakfast at the Park Hyatt. 
``More evidence at risk.''
    It is clear that if you string all of these events together 
and you have a theory that will link them all together, you 
have made some progress. There is only one problem: Other than 
what we know to be true on this list, there is nothing other 
than surmise that links them together in any fashion that one 
could consider improper or certainly illegal. But that is, in 
essence, where the managers have brought us in their 
theorizing, for their fourth theory is that the pressure did 
not really begin to build until Ms. Lewinsky was actually 
subpoenaed and began to prepare an affidavit.
    On this theory, a call to Mr. Perelman was the final step--
going right to the top of MacAndrews & Forbes to make 
absolutely sure that Ms. Lewinsky stayed on the team. But here 
there are other facts with which to deal. For example, look 
what happened--or more importantly, didn't happen--on December 
19. On that day, Monica Lewinsky came, weeping, to Mr. Jordan's 
office carrying with her the dreaded subpoena. Mr. Jordan 
called the President and visited with him that evening. And you 
will recall that they talked in very candid terms to the 
President about their relationship. Wouldn't one think that if 
the President was, in fact, engaged in some scheme to use a job 
in New York to influence Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, this would 
be the critical moment, that some immediate steps would be 
taken to be absolutely sure that there was a job for her? But 
what do we find? Mr. Jordan takes no further action on the job 
front until January 8.
    There was never so much as a passing reference concerning 
any connection between the job search and the affidavit among 
any of the three participants--any of them--because there was 
not one conversation that anyone could conclude was designed to 
implement this nefarious scheme that the managers would have 
you find. So now we have an entirely new theory--the ``one-man 
conspiracy,'' a beast unknown, I think, to Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.
    The fact that Ms. Lewinsky--this is on the managers' 
theory--didn't know she was on the witness list until December 
17, and Mr. Jordan didn't know about it until she was 
subpoenaed on the 19th, and Mr. Perelman never knew it, all are 
``proof positive'' that the President himself was the 
``mastermind'' pulling on unseen strings and influencing the 
participants in this drama, without their even knowing that 
they were being influenced. Under this theory--the latest in a 
long line--Ms. Lewinsky's denial that she ever discussed the 
contents of her affidavit with the President, her denial that 
there was any connection between the job and her testimony, Mr. 
Jordan's denial that there was ever a connection between his 
efforts to find her a job and the affidavit, and the fact that 
Mr. Jordan never discussed any such connection with the 
President, are simply evidence of the fact that there must have 
been such a connection; that unbeknownst to Ms. Lewinsky, she 
was being corruptly encouraged to file a false affidavit. With 
all due respect, somebody has been watching too many reruns of 
``The X-Files.''
    Confronted with this problem, the managers now offer you 
one last theory. With ever-increasing directness, they now 
accuse Mr. Jordan himself of obstructing justice by urging Ms. 
Lewinsky to destroy her notes. Seemingly, they ask you to 
find--even in the face of Mr. Jordan's forceful denials--that 
one who would forget a breakfast at the Park Hyatt until 
reminded of it by being shown the receipt, and who then 
admitted his recollection was refreshed and would admit that he 
remembered a discussion of the notes, must have obstructed 
justice himself. And, of course, he must have been engaged all 
along with an effort to influence Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on 
behalf of the President.
    Nonsense. Nonsense. And so this pillar returns to the dust 
from which it came.
    Next, the events surrounding Mr. Bennett's statement to 
Judge Wright during the Jones deposition formed the basis for 
two charges: First, that the President obstructed justice in 
the Jones case; second, that he committed perjury by telling 
the grand jury that he really wasn't paying attention at the 
critical moment.
    Both charges depend on the managers' ability to prove that, 
indeed, the President had been paying attention. To do that, 
they always rely on the videotape of the deposition in which it 
can be seen that the President was looking in the direction of 
his lawyer while Mr. Bennett was talking.
    But 2 weeks ago, they came to you and they produced, with a 
modest flourish, a new bit of evidence--an affidavit from Mr. 
Barry Ward, clerk to Judge Wright, trumpeted, in their words, 
as ``lending even greater credence to their crime.'' In their 
memorandum in support of their request to expand the record by 
including Mr. Ward's affidavit, the managers told you the 
following, and this is the managers' own language:

    From his seat at the conference table next to the judge, he 
saw President Clinton listening attentively to Mr. Bennett's 
remarks, while the exchange between Mr. Bennett and the judge 
occurred.

    Then they said:

    Mr. Ward's declaration would lend even greater credence to 
the argument that President Clinton lied on this point during 
his grand jury testimony and obstructed justice by allowing his 
attorney to utilize a false affidavit in order to cut off a 
legitimate line of questioning. Mr. Ward's declaration proves 
that Mr. Ward saw President Clinton listening attentively while 
the exchange between Mr. Bennett and the presiding judge 
concurred.

    But this is what Mr. Ward's affidavit actually says. The 
affidavit was attached to the very motion the language of which 
I just read to you. I direct your attention only to the last 
sentence, because this is the only one of any moment: ``From my 
position at the conference table, I observed President Clinton 
looking directly at Mr. Bennett while this statement was being 
made.''
    Search if you will for any evidence relating to whether the 
President was looking attentively or not. There is not one iota 
of evidence added by the videotape. You were misled. Indeed, 
Mr. Ward said to the Legal Times on February 1, 1999, ``I have 
no idea if he was paying attention. He could have been thinking 
about policy initiatives, for all I know.'' You were misled.
    The record before the affidavit is the record after the 
affidavit. The managers ask that you remove the President of 
the United States on the basis of the videotape showing that he 
was looking in the direction of his lawyer.
    It was not much of a pillar to start with.
    There is no dispute of the conversation of January 18 
between the President and Ms. Currie. There is no dispute that 
President Clinton called Ms. Currie into the White House on 
Sunday, January 18, the day after his deposition, and asked her 
certain questions and made certain statements about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The only dispute is whether, in 
doing so, the President intended to tamper with a witness. The 
managers contend that he was corruptly attempting to influence 
Ms. Currie's testimony. The President denies it.
    Since we know that Ms. Currie was not on the Jones witness 
list at the time of the President's deposition, or at the time 
of either of the conversations with Ms. Currie, and we know 
that discovery was about to end, the managers have argued that 
the President's own references to her in the Jones deposition 
constituted an invitation to the Jones lawyers to subpoena her. 
They argue that proof of that invitation can be found in the 
witness list signed by the Jones lawyers on January 22, which 
listed Ms. Currie and other potential witnesses.
    When I spoke to you on January 19, I told you that Ms. 
Currie had never been placed on the witness list. I was wrong. 
Manager Hutchinson has quite properly taken me to task for it. 
But I fear that he became so caught up in this information that 
he has lost sight of its true significance, or rather a lack 
thereof.
    In order to convince you that Betty Currie was going to be 
called by the Jones lawyer when the President spoke to her on 
January 18, the managers, somewhat like Diogenes, lit their 
lantern and sought out the most reliable witness they could 
find, a witness whose credibility was beyond question, who had 
no ulterior motive, no bias--Paula Jones' lawyer. They brought 
it to you in a form that they hoped would allow his motive and 
bias to go untested.
    Remember how the managers told you that it is important to 
look a witness in the eye to test his demeanor. I doubt that 
you need to do that to understand what might color Mr. Holmes' 
view of the world. Let's look at what he had to say. You have 
in the exhibits before you an unredacted witness list attached 
to Mr. Holmes' affidavit. I have put up on the easels the 
redacted list as it was originally used by the managers a few 
weeks ago because I really see no purpose in unduly exposing 
the names of the people who are on that witness list. But let 
me direct you to these words just to highlight it: ``Under 
Seal.''
    You will remember that the President has been criticized 
for violating a gag order when he spoke to his own secretary 
about his deposition. What then do we say when the managers 
produce a document from a lawyer for one of the parties that is 
still under seal, not yet released by the court, and reveals 
the names of individuals who are no part of these proceedings? 
Surely the managers could have made their point just as well 
without such a revelation.
    Mr. Holmes states that the Jones lawyers had two reasons 
for putting Ms. Currie's name on the witness list: One, because 
of President Clinton's deposition testimony; and, two, because 
they had ``received what they considered to be reliable 
information that Ms. Currie was instrumental in facilitating 
Monica Lewinsky's meetings with Mr. Clinton and that Ms. Currie 
was central to the cover story Mr. Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky had 
developed to use in the event their affair was discovered.'' 
They don't tell us where he got this reliable information. But 
of course we know.
    Let's figure out whether in fact Betty Currie really made 
it on the list because of the President's testimony. If you 
look at the number of times she is mentioned in the deposition, 
it becomes conventional wisdom that the President inserted her 
name into his testimony so frequently and so gratuitously that 
he did in fact invite the Jones lawyers to call her and, thus, 
must have known that she was going to be a witness when he 
spoke to her on January 18. But if you look at the deposition, 
you will find that the first time her name is mentioned, the 
President is simply responding to a question about his earlier 
meetings with Ms. Lewinsky and stated that Betty was present.
    The lawyers for the plaintiff then asked 13 questions, give 
or take a few, about Ms. Currie. We know there is no secret 
here. They got their information from Linda Tripp. And Linda 
Tripp surely told them about Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with 
Ms. Currie. It was only in response to a couple of their 
questions about whether letters had ever been delivered to Ms. 
Currie and whether she stated at some extraordinarily late hour 
that the President said, ``You'll have to ask her.'' He did not 
invite, he did not suggest to them that they call Ms. Currie. 
They knew, whatever they needed to know about Ms. Currie, to 
put her on their witness list.
    To judge further whether Ms. Currie made it on the list 
because of the President's invitation, or because they already 
knew about witnesses from Ms. Tripp, let me direct your 
attention--if you look at the exhibit in front of you rather 
than the redacted version here, the first listed on the witness 
list is No. 165. Her name does not come up at all in the 
deposition. But we know that she was in fact the subject of 
conversation surreptitiously recorded between Ms. Tripp and Ms. 
Lewinsky. And note that the name of Vernon Jordan is not on the 
list. They are the ones, the Jones lawyers are the ones, who 
first bring them up. And we know, of course, that they knew 
from Ms. Tripp that he was already involved in this scenario.
    Thus, neither the January 22 witness list nor Mr. Holmes' 
affidavit supported the managers' theory. The President did not 
know that Ms. Currie would be a witness when he spoke to her 
after her deposition, and he could not, therefore, have 
tampered with the witness.
    Well beyond their statement about how they got this 
information, Mr. Holmes volunteers that they didn't get it from 
the Washington Post, or perhaps not. But it is clear that in 
the days after the Post article, we know that some of the names 
on the list came from the press reports, we know that Jones 
lawyers began tracking the newly public activities of the 
independent counsel, which was issuing its own subpoenas in the 
hours and days following the lawyers' release. And for some 
insight into what they believe the independent counsel thought 
was going on, look at the pleading they filed with Judge Wright 
on Wednesday, January 28, to prevent the Jones lawyers from 
continuing to use their investigation as an aid--that is, the 
independent counsel's investigation--as an aid to civil 
discovery.
    The pleading said, ``As recently as this afternoon, 
plaintiff's counsel caused process to be served on Betty Currie 
who appeared before the grand jury in Washington yesterday. 
Such deliberate and calculated shadowing of the grand jury's 
investigation will necessarily pierce the veil of grand jury 
secrecy.''
    The managers have criticized us for ignoring the second 
conversation between the President and Ms. Currie, suggesting 
that I suppose it takes on an even more sinister cast than the 
first. But there is simply nothing of any substance to take 
from this second conversation that adds to the events of 
January 18. It is clear that the conversation occurred on 
Tuesday, January 20, before the Starr investigation became 
public. The managers disingenuously have suggested in their 
exhibit, the one they distributed on Saturday, that this 
conversation occurred after the Post story appeared. If you 
look at the exhibit that was used on Saturday, you will see: 
January 20, Post story is known. Of course, that's late at 
night. January 21, Post story was on the Internet. The 
President calls Betty for 20 minutes. And then sort of sneaking 
it in down here, January 20 or 21, President coaches Currie for 
the second time.
    But the record shows this: Ms. Currie has said that the 
conversation occurred ``whenever the President was next in the 
White House.'' That is after the Sunday conversation. And that 
was Tuesday, the 20th, the day after the Martin Luther King 
holiday. Thus, the second conversation is of no greater legal 
significance than the first since the President knew no more 
about Ms. Currie's status as a witness on Tuesday than he did 
on Sunday.
    In sum, the managers have tried to convince you that the 
President knew or must have known that Betty Currie would be a 
witness in the Jones case. If anything, we now know that the 
reason she was put on the January 22 list, along with many 
others, had more to do with Linda Tripp than anything else.
    But putting this aside for the moment; that is, putting 
aside the question whether the President could have had any 
reason to believe that Ms. Currie would be a witness, look at 
whether Ms. Currie herself believed that she was being 
corruptly influenced on January 18. In response to continuing 
efforts by the prosecutors to get her to admit that she felt 
some untoward pressure from the President, she testified--and 
you have seen this before as well:

    . . . did you feel pressured when he told you those statements?
    A. None whatsoever.
    Q. What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    A. At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
          * * * * *
    Q. That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because he 
would end each of the statements with ``Rights?,'' with a question.
    A. I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say, ``Right?'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
    Q. But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true.
    A. Correct.
    Q. Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    A. None.

    So on a human level, we have the President, who has just 
seen his worst nightmare come true, and who knows that he is 
about to face a press tidal wave that will wash over him and 
his family and the country, and we have his secretary who knows 
of, indeed has been a part of, his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky but knows nothing about the long-since ended improper 
aspects of that relationship--we have a conversation that was 
the product of the emotions that were churning through the 
President's very soul on that day. What we do not have is an 
attempt to corruptly influence the testimony of the witness.
    Only one pillar left. The managers ask the Senate to find 
that the President's conversations with Mr. Blumenthal and 
other aides was an effort to influence their testimony before 
the grand jury. Their theory, much as was true of some of their 
other theories, flounders on shoals that they don't account 
for. As they would have it, in the days immediately following 
the Lewinsky story, the President spoke with a few members of 
his senior staff, as they would allege, knowing that they would 
probably be grand jury witnesses and misled them about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that they would convey that 
misinformation to the grand jury when they were called.
    Now, just so that you can see for yourself what the 
President testified to in the grand jury on the subject, I want 
to play about 3 or 4 minutes of that testimony for you.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. If they testified that you denied sexual relations or 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, or if they told us that you denied 
that, do you have any reason to doubt them, in the days after the story 
broke; do you have any reason to doubt them?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. No. The--let me say this. It's no secret to 
anybody that I hoped that this relationship would never become public. 
It's a matter of fact that it had been many, many months since there 
had been anything improper about it, in terms of improper contact. I--
    Q. Did you deny it to them or not, Mr. President?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. Let me finish. So, what--I did not want to 
mislead my friends, but I wanted find language where I could say that. 
I also, frankly, did not want to turn any of them into witnesses, 
because I--and, sure enough, they all became witnesses.
    Q. Well, you knew they might be----
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. And so----
    Q.--witnesses, didn't you?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. And so I said to them things that were true 
about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, 
there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not 
had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I 
would never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of 
course. But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter 
further. So, I said things that were true. They may have been 
misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it and 
I'm sorry.
    Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after 
January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was 
looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that 
they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I 
said after that. I may have said something to all these people to that 
effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, 
look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or 
give you information that could get you in trouble. I just wouldn't 
talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about this.
    Q. If all of these people--let's leave out Mrs. Currie for a 
minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, 
Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge 
Starr's involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you 
denied a sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. No.
    Q. And You have told us that you----
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told 
you what I meant by it when they started this deposition.
    Q. You have told us now that you were being careful, but that it 
might have been misleading. Is that correct?
    PRESIDENT CLINTON. It might have been. Since we have seen this 
four-year, $40-million-investigation come down to parsing the 
definition of sex, I think it might have been. I don't think at the 
time that I thought that's what this was going to be about. In fact, if 
you remember the headlines at the time, even you mentioned the Post 
story. All the headlines were--and all the talking, people who talked 
about this, including a lot who have been quite sympathetic to your 
operation, said, well, this is not really a story about sex, or this is 
a story about subornation of perjury and these talking points, and all 
this other stuff. So, what I was trying to do was to give them 
something they could--that would be true, even if misleading in the 
context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's 
deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion 
that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other 
words.

    It is clear from that excerpt, I think, that in the hours 
and days immediately following the release of the Post story, 
the President was struggling with two competing concerns: How 
to give some explanation to the men and women he worked with 
every day, and worked with most closely, without putting them 
in a position of being grand jury witnesses. But he was not in 
any sense seeking to tamper with them or to obstruct the grand 
jury's investigation.
    Putting aside for the moment our strenuous disagreement 
both with the factual underpinning of and the legal conclusions 
that flow from the managers' analysis of these events, I find 
it difficult to figure out how it is that they believe the 
President intended that his statement to Mr. Blumenthal or his 
statement to Mr. Podesta would involve their conveying false 
information to the grand jury, or that he sought in some 
fashion to send that message to the grand jury when, at the 
very moment that those aides were first subpoenaed, he asserted 
executive privilege to prevent them from testifying before the 
grand jury. For someone who wanted Mr. Blumenthal to serve, as 
the managers would have it, as his messenger of lies, that is 
strange behavior indeed.
    There is an issue here that I don't really want to get into 
at length, and I, not having heard the last 2 hours of the 
managers' presentation, don't know whether they are going to 
get into, and that is Manager Graham's favorite issue, the 
question of whether there was some scheme to smear Monica 
Lewinsky--early, middle, or late. Other than to say that no 
such plan ever existed, I just want to ask the managers this. 
Although I must admit that for the first time in my life I have 
heard Marlene Dietrich's name used as a pejorative--what was 
Manager Bryant saying about Ms. Lewinsky? That she was lying? 
That she misled the managers? That because her testimony helped 
the President, they were now going to attack her character and 
her integrity? I don't know how many of you have seen ``Witness 
For The Prosecution,'' either before or after Mr. Bryant used 
that example, but ask yourselves: What was he saying? What was 
he doing?
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I don't know whether 
there is a market for used pillars, but they are all lying in 
the dust.
    It is difficult for me as a lawyer, as an advocate for my 
client, to speak to this body about lofty constitutional 
principles without seeming merely to engage in empty rhetoric. 
But I would like to think, I guess, that if there were ever a 
forum in which I could venture into that realm, be excused for 
doing so, could be heard without the intervening filter of 
skepticism that I fear too often lies between lawyer and 
listener, this is the time and this is the moment. Only once 
before in our Nation's history has any lawyer had the 
opportunity to make a closing argument on behalf of the 
President of the United States and only once before has the 
Senate ever had to sit in judgment on the head of the executive 
branch.
    We all must cast an eye to the past, looking over our 
shoulders to be sure that we have learned the right lessons 
from those who have sat in this Chamber before us. But we also 
must look to the future, to be sure that we leave the right 
lessons to those who come after us. We hope that no one will 
ever have need of them, but if they should, we owe them not 
only the proper judgment for today but the proper judgment for 
all time.
    You have heard the managers tell you very early on in these 
meetings that we have advanced a ``so what'' defense; that we 
are saying the President's conduct is really nothing to be 
concerned about; that we should all simply go home and ignore 
what he has done. And that, of course, to choose a word that 
would have been familiar to the framers themselves, is 
balderdash.
    If you want to see ``so what'' in action, look elsewhere. 
``So what'' if the framers reserved impeachment and removal for 
only those offenses that threaten the state? ``So what'' if the 
House Judiciary Committee didn't quite do their constitutional 
job, if they took the independent counsel's referral and added 
a few frills and then washed their hands of it? ``So what'' if 
the House approved articles that wouldn't pass muster in any 
court in the land? ``So what'' if the managers have been 
creating their own theories of impeachment as they go long? And 
``so what,'' and ``so what,'' and ``so what?''
    By contrast, what we offer is not ``so what,'' but this: 
Ask what the framers handed down to us as the standard for 
removing a President. Ask what impeachment and removal would 
mean to our system of government in years to come. Ask what you 
always ask in this Chamber: What is best for the country? No, 
the President wouldn't allow any of us to say ``so what,'' to 
so much as suggest that what he has done can simply be 
forgotten. He has asked for forgiveness from his family and 
from the American people, and he has asked for the opportunity 
to earn back their trust.
    In his opening remarks, Manager Hyde questioned whether 
this President can represent the interests of our country in 
the world. Go to Ireland and ask that question. Go to Israel 
and Gaza and ask that question. If you doubt whether he should, 
here at home, continue in office, ask the parent whose child 
walks safer streets or the men and women who go off to work in 
the morning to good jobs.
    We are together, I think, weavers of a constitutional 
fabric in which all of us now are clothed and generations will 
be clothed for millennia to come. We cannot leave even the 
smallest flaw in that fabric, for if we do, one day someone 
will come along and pull a thread and the flaw will grow and it 
will eat away at the fabric around it and soon the entire cloth 
will begin to unravel. We must be as close to perfect in what 
we do here today as women and men are capable of being. If 
there is doubt about our course, surely we must take special 
care, as we hold the fabric of democracy in our hands, to leave 
it as we found it, tightly woven and strong.
    Before today I wrote down the following: ``The rules say 
that the managers will have the last word.'' The rules today 
say the managers will have the last paragraphs. But that truly 
isn't so, because even when they are finished, theirs will not 
be the last voices you hear. Yes, one or more of them will now 
rise and come to the podium and tell you that they have the 
right of it and we the wrong, that our sense of what the 
Constitution demands is not theirs and should not be yours. 
That is their privilege.
    But as each of them does come before you for the final 
time, and as you listen to them, I know that you will hear not 
their eloquence, as grand as it may be; not the pointed jibes 
of Manager Hutchinson nor the stentorian tones of Manager Rogan 
nor the homespun homilies of Manager Graham nor the grave 
exhortations of Manager Hyde, but voices of greater eloquence 
than any of us can muster, the voices of Madison and Hamilton 
and the others who met in Philadelphia 212 years ago, and the 
voices of the generations since, and the voices of the American 
people now, and the voices of generations to come. These, not 
the voices of mere advocates, must be your guide.
    It has been an honor for all of us to appear before you in 
these last weeks on behalf of the President. And now our last 
words to you, which are the words I began with: William 
Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of the charges that have been 
brought against him. He did not commit perjury. He did not 
commit obstruction of justice. He must not be removed from 
office.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we take a 
15-minute recess.
    There being no objection, at 4:19 p.m. the Senate recessed 
until 4:41 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order. The Chair 
recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe now we are ready to 
proceed with the managers from the House. I understand that 
they do have a 2-hour presentation. I will look for guidance 
from the Chief Justice about whether we should take a break for 
the last 45 minutes--that would be after Mr. Manager Rogan--if 
at all.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice and 
Members of the Senate.
    At the outset of my closing remarks, I would like to lay 
the record straight on a couple of matters. With all due 
deference to White House counsel, the suggestion that Mr. Ruff 
made at the beginning of his closing, that we were somehow 
being unfair to him on the timing today of the rebuttal, seems 
to me to be a little strained. ``Methinks thou doth protest too 
much,'' was a remark I used earlier, a quote from Shakespeare, 
and I think it is appropriate here, too, because if you recall, 
we had no rebuttal at all as you normally would have in the end 
of our case, to begin with. Secondly, we thought we ought to 
have live witnesses here. We haven't had those. The list could 
go on. I really don't think we are being unfair.
    Secondly, I would like to make one correction and make a 
clear point. I am sure it was not intended, but in your 
remarks, I believe, Mr. Ruff, you indicated there was no 
history with regard to ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard. 
Maybe I misunderstood that, but I want the record to be clear 
that in the Claiborne case there was, in fact, a vote that took 
place here in the case of Judge Claiborne, 75-17, saying that 
that standard did not apply to impeachment cases.
    Having said that, I would like to move on to my own 
thoughts. Notwithstanding the clever and resourceful arguments 
that White House counsel have made to you today, and in the 
past few weeks, I suspect that most of you--probably more than 
two-thirds--believe that the President did, indeed, commit 
most, if not all, of the crimes he is charged with under these 
articles of impeachment. I suspect that a great many of you 
share my view that these are high crimes and misdemeanors.
    But nonetheless, it is my understanding that some of you 
who share these views are not prepared to vote to convict the 
President and remove him from office. That instead, you are of 
the mind at the moment--subject to our persuading you 
otherwise--in your own debate, to acquit him.
    Ultimately, the choice is yours, not ours. But I would like 
to spend a few moments with you reviewing just a few of the 
facts--not many--and suggesting to you what I believe we 
managers believe would be some very significant negative 
consequences of failing to remove this President.
    Having heard all of the evidence over the past few days and 
weeks, there should be little doubt that beginning in December 
1997 William Jefferson Clinton set out on a course of conduct 
designed to keep from the Jones court the true nature of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Once he knew he would have 
to testify, he knew he was going to lie in his deposition. And 
he knew he was going to have to lie, not only himself but get 
Monica Lewinsky to lie--if he was going to be successful--and 
he was going to have to get his personal secretary to lie about 
his relationship, and have his aides and others help cover them 
up if he would be successful in lying in the Jones court 
deposition.
    He did all of these things. And then he chose to lie to the 
grand jury again, because if he did not, he would have not been 
able to protect himself from the crimes he had already 
committed.
    No amount of arguments by White House counsel can erase one 
simple fact: If you believe Monica Lewinsky, you cannot believe 
the President. If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President 
committed most of the crimes with which he is charged in these 
arguments today.
    For example, while the President did not directly tell her 
to lie, he never advised her what to put in her affidavit, she 
knew from the December 17 telephone conversation with the 
President that he meant for her to lie about the relationship 
and file a false affidavit, and he would lie as well.
    I want to refresh your recollection. These charts we put up 
some time before--you have them in front of you. This is a 
direct quote from her. We showed this on television Saturday, 
where she was reading from her grand jury deposition and 
confirming, this is, indeed, what she said and what she--her 
interpretation of that affidavit, phone conversation, despite 
everything else you heard.
    She said:

    For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened 
was, you know, no one asked me or encouraged me to lie, but no 
one discouraged me either. . . .
. . . It wasn't as if the President called me and said, ``You 
know, Monica you're on the witness list, this is going to be 
really hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth and 
be humiliated in front of the entire world about what we've 
done,'' which I would have fought him on probably. That was 
different. And by him not calling me and saying that, you know, 
I knew what that meant. . . .

    ``I knew what that meant.''
    She lied in that affidavit. The President, clearly, 
intended to influence her by suggesting the affidavit and all 
the other things that went on in that conversation, and all of 
the circumstances that were there.
    Monica Lewinsky was equally clear in her testimony to you 
Saturday that Betty Currie called her about the gifts, not the 
other way around. And surely nobody believes that Betty Currie 
would have called Monica Lewinsky about the gifts on December 
28 unless the President had asked her to do so.
    Then the day after the President's deposition in the Jones 
case, the President clearly committed the crimes of witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice when, in logical 
anticipation of Betty Currie being called as a witness, he said 
to Betty Currie: ``You were always there when she was there, 
right? We were never really alone. You could see and hear 
everything. Monica came on to me and I never touched her, 
right? She wanted to have sex with me and I can't do that.''
    I am not going to rehash all of the evidence in this case 
again, but it is my understanding that some of you may be 
prepared to vote to convict the President on obstruction of 
justice and not on perjury. I don't know how you can do that. I 
honestly don't know how anybody can do that. If you believe 
Sidney Blumenthal's testimony that the President told him that 
Monica Lewinsky came at him and made a sexual demand and that 
he rebuffed her and that she threatened him and said she would 
tell people they had an affair, and that she was known as a 
stalker among her peers, surely you must conclude that the 
President committed perjury when he told the grand jury that he 
told his aides, including Blumenthal, nothing but the truth, 
even if misleading.
    The exact quotes, people are worried about the exact 
quotes. What are the words?

    And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship . . . so, I said things that were true. They may 
have been misleading . . . so, what I was trying to do was to 
give them something that could--that would be true, even if 
misleading. . . .

    That was played on television in the White House 
presentation a few minutes ago. That was perjury. What he told 
Sidney Blumenthal was not true. It wasn't just misleading, it 
was not true. He knew it was not true and it was perjury in 
front of the grand jury.
    If you believe the President committed the crimes of 
witness tampering and obstruction of justice when he called 
Betty Currie to his office the day after his deposition and 
told her, ``You were always there when she was, right''--the 
ones I just read to you, and the other statements to coach 
her--surely you must also conclude that the President committed 
perjury before the grand jury when he told the grand jurors his 
purpose in making these statements.
    These are his exact words to the grand jurors:

    I was trying to figure out what the facts were. I was 
trying to remember. I was trying to remember every time I had 
seen Ms. Lewinsky.

    That is not true. He knew that was not true. That is not 
what he was doing. No one can rationally reason that that is 
what he was trying to do when he made the coaching statements 
to Ms. Currie. That was perjury in front of the grand jury.
    We have heard a lot of talk about the civil deposition. 
Nobody is trying to prove up that deposition or is lying in 
here today. Nobody is trying to use that as a duplication or 
anything else of the sort. But the President said before the 
grand jurors:

    My goal--

    Talking about the Jones case deposition--

in this deposition was to be truthful . . . .

    That is the lie. That is the perjury. That is as simple as 
the second count of the perjury article is. Does anybody 
believe, after hearing all of this, that the goal of the 
President in the Jones deposition was to be truthful? He lied 
to the grand jury and committed perjury.
    Last but not least, if you believe Monica Lewinsky about 
the acts of a sexual nature that they engaged in, how can you 
not conclude the President committed perjury when he 
specifically denied those acts? Those were very explicit. Mr. 
Ruff suggested that maybe this is a subjective question. Maybe 
about the interpretation of the definition you might call it 
subjective. We are not going to go over it again today, but he 
used specific words that he confirmed were in that definition 
and said, ``I did not do those things. I did not touch those 
parts.'' Monica Lewinsky, if you believe her, testified that he 
did do those things--many times.
    He committed perjury when he said he didn't do those 
things, if you believe Monica Lewinsky. If you are going to 
vote to convict the President on the articles of impeachment 
regarding obstruction of justice, I urge you in the strongest 
way to also vote to convict him on the perjury article as well. 
I think you would be doing a disservice not to do that, and it 
would be sending a terrible message about perjury and the 
seriousness of it for history and to the American people.
    As you have seen in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
which Mr. Ruff talked about a while ago, perjury and 
obstruction of justice do have, under the baseline guidelines, 
a higher amount of sentencing than simple, plain ``vanilla'' 
bribery does. That is where they start. He is right, you can 
get enhancements for aggravating circumstances for bribery in 
certain cases, and you can get a greater sentence. But so can 
you get a greater sentence for perjury if there was a 
significant effort to wrongfully influence the administration 
of justice, for example; and you can get a significantly 
enhanced sentence for perjury if you committed perjury, and so 
on.
    We didn't choose to bring up a litany and show all the 
enhancements. Of course, you can do that. But for the pure 
base, there is no question about it.
    The other significant thing that you will recall I brought 
up--some of us did--a couple of weeks ago is witness bribery. 
Bribing a witness is treated more severely under sentencing 
guidelines for base sentencing than ordinary bribery is. 
Clearly, all three are high crimes and misdemeanors.
    What are the consequences of failing to remove this 
President from office if you believe he committed the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice? What are the consequences 
of failing to do that? What is the downside?
    First, at the very least, you will leave a precedent of 
doubt as to whether perjury and obstruction of justice are high 
crimes and misdemeanors in impeaching the President. In fact, 
your vote to acquit under these circumstances may well mean 
that no President in the future will ever be impeached or 
removed for perjury or obstruction of justice. Is that the 
record you want?
    Second, you will be establishing the precedent that the 
standard for impeachment and removal of a President is 
different from that of impeaching or removing a judge or any 
other official while, arguably--although it never happened--a 
Federal judge could be removed for the lesser standard under 
the good behavior clause of the Constitution. Such a removal 
would have to be by a separate tribunal, by a procedure set by 
statute, because under the impeachment provisions of the 
Constitution which all judges have been removed under 
previously, the same single standard exists for removing the 
President as for removing a judge. That standard is that you 
have to have treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    So while the Constitution on its face does not make a 
distinction for removing a President or removing a judge, if 
you vote to acquit, believing that the President committed 
perjury and obstruction of justice, for all times you are going 
to set a precedent that there is such a distinction.
    Third, if you believe the President committed the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice and that they are high 
crimes and misdemeanors, but you do not believe a President 
should be removed when economic times are good and it is 
strongly against the popular will to do so, by voting to acquit 
you will be setting a precedent for future impeachment trials.
    Can you imagine how damaging that could be to our 
constitutional form of government, to set the precedent that no 
President will be removed from office for high crimes and 
misdemeanors unless the polls show that the public wants that 
to happen? Would our Founding Fathers have ever envisioned 
that? Of course not. Our Constitution was structured to avoid 
this very situation.
    Fourth, what happens to the rule of law if you vote to 
acquit? What damage is done for future generations by a vote to 
acquit? Will more witnesses be inclined to commit perjury in 
trials? Will more jurors decide that perjury and obstruction of 
justice should not be crimes for which they convict? No 
military officer, no Cabinet official, no judge, no CEO of a 
major corporation, no president of a university, no principal 
of a public school in this Nation would remain in office, no 
matter how popular they were, if they committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice as charged here.
    To vote to acquit puts the President on a pedestal which 
says that, as long as he is popular, we are going to treat him 
differently with regard to keeping his job than any other 
person in any other position of public trust in the United 
States of America. The President is the Commander in Chief; he 
is the chief law enforcement officer; he is the man who 
appoints the Cabinet; he appoints the judges.
    Are you going to put on the record books the precedent that 
all who serve under the President and whom he has appointed 
will be held to a higher standard than the President? What 
legacy to history is this? What mischief have you wrought to 
our Constitution, to our system of government, to the values 
and principles cherished by future generations of Americans? 
All this because--I guess this is the argument--Clinton was 
elected and is popular with the people? All this, when it is 
clear that a vote to convict would amount to nothing more than 
the peaceful, orderly, and immediate transition of government 
of the Presidency to the Vice President?
    William Jefferson Clinton is not a king; he is our 
President. You have the power and the duty to remove him from 
office for high crimes and misdemeanors. I implore you to 
muster the courage of your convictions, to muster the courage 
the Founding Fathers believed that the Senate would always have 
in times like these. William Jefferson Clinton has committed 
high crimes and misdemeanors. Convict him and remove him.
    I yield to Mr. Canady.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Canady.
    Mr. Manager CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Members of the Senate, during the next few minutes I will 
address the constitutional issue you are called on to decide in 
this case: Are the crimes charged against the President 
offenses for which he may be removed from office? Are these 
crimes high crimes and misdemeanors? Are these crimes that 
proceed, as Alexander Hamilton said, ``from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust?''
    The President's lawyers have argued vigorously that even if 
all the charges against the President are true, the 
Constitution forbids the removal of this President. They 
contend that this isn't even a close case, that the crimes 
charged against the President are far removed from the 
constitutional category of high crimes and misdemeanors--a 
category of offenses they have sought to restrict narrowly to 
misconduct causing ruinous harm to the system of government.
    While the President's lawyers have been consistent in 
urging a narrow and restricted understanding of the impeachment 
and removal power, they have not been--and I repeat--they have 
not been consistent in describing the standard used to 
determine if high crimes and misdemeanors have been committed.
    In their submission to the House of Representatives they 
stated unequivocally that ``the Constitution requires proof of 
official misconduct for impeachment.'' Those are their words. I 
quote them again. ``The Constitution requires proof of official 
misconduct for impeachment.'' Indeed, that statement was the 
primary heading for their whole argument on constitutional 
standards. And likewise, in their trial memorandum submitted to 
the Senate, they argue that impeachment should not be used to 
punish private misconduct.
    Subsequently, they have apparently abandoned this position, 
recognizing that it would lead to the absurd result of 
maintaining in office Presidents who were undoubtedly unfit to 
serve. They now begrudgingly concede that a President is not 
necessarily impeached and removed simply because these crimes 
did not involve the abuse of powers of his office. They have 
been driven to concede there are at least some circumstances in 
which a President may be removed for crimes not involving what 
they call ``official misconduct.'' But, of course, they contend 
that the circumstances in this case don't even justify 
consideration of removal.
    In the proceedings in the House and in their trial 
memorandum submitted to the Senate, the President's lawyers 
made much of the argument that tax fraud by a President of the 
United States would not be sufficiently serious to justify 
impeachment and removal. I had mentioned this before in these 
proceedings, and I mention it again now because it vividly 
demonstrates the low standard of integrity, the pathetically 
low standard of integrity that would be established for the 
Presidency if the arguments of the President's lawyers are 
accepted by the Senate.
    Perhaps I missed something, but I do not recall any mention 
of the tax fraud issue by the President's lawyers in the course 
of their various presentations to the Senate. Could it be that 
the President's lawyers have come to understand that the 
argument that tax fraud is not an impeachable offense does not 
strengthen their case, but on the contrary highlights the 
weakness of their case? Tax fraud by a President, like lying 
under oath and obstruction of justice by a President in this 
case, would of course be wrong. It would be shameful, 
indefensible, unforgivable, but--this is the big ``but''--it 
would not be impeachable, they say; not even a close case. Bad? 
Yes. But clearly not impeachable. And why that? Why would it 
not be impeachable? Why is it clearly, unquestionably 
unimpeachable? This is the answer. This is the heart and soul 
of the President's defense. Tax fraud and a host of undefined 
other crimes, like lying under oath and obstruction of justice 
in this case, are just not serious enough for impeachment and 
removal. That is the answer. That is the defense. It is just 
not serious enough. All the grand legal argument, all the fine 
legal distinctions come down to this marvelously simple 
proposition: It is just not serious enough.
    Let me refer you once again to a statement from the 1974 
Report on Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 
prepared by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. I want 
to cite a portion of that report that I have previously cited 
to you. The President's lawyers have also cited this very same 
statement in both their trial memorandum and their argument 
during these proceedings.
    This is what the report says:

    Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the 
Nation it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either constitutional form and principles of 
our government or the proper performance of constitutional 
duties of the Presidential office. For our purposes now, 
impeachment is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible, or the proper performance of constitutional 
duties of the Presidential office.

    That is a standard the managers accept. That is a standard 
the President's lawyers apparently also accept, and that is a 
standard I hope all 100 Members of the U.S. Senate can accept. 
I believe we can reach agreement on this standard. The problem 
comes, of course, in applying the standard. There is the rub. A 
wide gulf separates us on how this standard should be applied. 
The President's lawyers say that under this standard the case 
against the President isn't even worth considering. The 
managers argue on the contrary, that a conscientious 
application of the standard leads to the firm conclusion that 
the President should be convicted and removed.
    Our fundamental difference goes to the issue of 
seriousness. It all goes back to the claim of the President's 
lawyers that his offenses just are not serious enough to 
justify removal.
    I think we have agreement that obstruction of justice and 
lying under oath are incompatible with the proper performance 
of the constitutional duties of the Presidential office. A 
President who has lied under oath and obstructed justice has by 
definition breached his constitutional duty to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed.
    Such conduct is directly and unambiguously at odds with the 
duties of this office. So far so good. But here is the real 
question. Is that conduct seriously incompatible with the 
President's constitutional duties?
    That is the question you all must answer. If you say yes, 
it is seriously incompatible, you must vote to convict and 
remove the President. If you say no, you must vote to acquit.
    The President's defenders have not offered a clear guide to 
determining what is serious enough to justify removal. Instead, 
they have simply sought to minimize the significance of the 
particular offenses charged against the President.
    Today we heard and attempt to minimize the significance of 
perjury. I was somewhat amazed to hear that. There was no 
mention made of what the first Chief Justice of the United 
States, Justice Jay, had to say about perjury, being of all 
crimes the most pernicious to society. That was omitted from 
the President's analysis.
    But let me say this: I believe that we should focus on any 
mitigating circumstances. We should also focus on the 
aggravating circumstances that relate to the particular facts 
of a given case. I would like to briefly review the factors 
advanced at mitigating the seriousness of the President's 
crimes.
    We all know what the leading mitigating factor is. We have 
all heard this 1,000 times. It goes like this: The offenses are 
not sufficiently serious because it is all about sex. This is 
directly linked to the claim that the President was simply 
trying to avoid personal embarrassment in committing these 
crimes. The problem with this argument is that it proves too 
much.
    It is very common for people to lie under oath and obstruct 
justice to do so at least in part to avoid personal 
embarrassment. People engage in such conduct in their efforts 
to extricate themselves from difficulty and embarrassing 
situations. To a large extent, the offenses of President Nixon 
could be attributed to his desire to avoid embarrassing 
revelations. Did that reduce his culpability? Did that lessen 
the seriousness of his misconduct? The answer is obvious. It 
did not.
    The desire to avoid embarrassment is not a mitigating 
factor. Likewise, the nature of the precipitating misconduct of 
a sexual affair does not mitigate the seriousness of the 
President's crimes. If you accept the argument that it is just 
about sex, you will render the law of sexual harassment 
virtually meaningless. Any defendant guilty of sexual 
harassment would obviously have an incentive to lie about any 
sexual misconduct that may have occurred. But no one--no one--
has the license to lie under oath about sex in a sexual 
harassment case or a divorce case or any other case.
    I suggest to you that an objective review of all the 
circumstances of this case--and you need to look at all of the 
circumstances, all of the facts in context--will point not to 
mitigating factors, but to aggravating factors.
    The conduct of the President was calculated and sustained. 
His subtle and determined purpose was corrupt. It was corrupt 
from start to finish. He knew exactly what he was doing. He 
knew that it was in violation of the criminal law. He knew that 
people could go to prison for doing such things. He knew that 
it was contrary to his oath of office. He knew that it was 
incompatible with his constitutional duty as President, and he 
most certainly knew that it was a very serious matter. I am 
sure he believed he could get away with it, but I am equally 
sure that he knew just how serious it would be if the truth 
were known and understood.
    He knew all these things. In the midst of it all, he showed 
not the slightest concern for the honor, the dignity, and the 
integrity of his high office. When he called Ms. Lewinsky at 
2:30 in the morning, he was up to no good, just as my 
colleague, Mr. Graham, noted. He knew exactly what he was 
doing. When he called Ms. Currie into his office twice and told 
her lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he knew 
exactly what he was doing.
    When he sent Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky--and that is the only way it happened--he knew exactly 
what he was doing. He was tampering with witnesses and 
obstructing justice. He was doing everything he could to make 
sure that Paula Jones did not get the evidence that a Federal 
district judge had determined and ordered that she was entitled 
to receive. He was doing everything he could to avoid adverse 
legal consequences in the Jones case. That is what he planned 
to do, and that is what he did. And to cap it all off, he went 
before the Federal grand jury and lied.
    Whatever you may think about the President's testimony to 
the grand jury, one thing is clear. He didn't lie to the grand 
jury to avoid personal embarrassment. The DNA on the dress had 
ensured his personal embarrassment. There was no avoiding that. 
There was no way to explain away the DNA. The stakes were 
higher before the Federal grand jury. This wasn't about 
avoiding personal embarrassment. This wasn't about avoiding 
liability in a sexual harassment case. This was a Federal 
criminal investigation concerning crimes against the system of 
justice. This was about lying under oath and obstructing 
justice in the Jones case.
    What did he do when he testified to the grand jury? He said 
anything he thought he needed to say to avoid responsibility 
for his prior crimes. The prosecutors went down to the White 
House, and William Jefferson Clinton sat there as President of 
the United States in the White House and lied to a Federal 
grand jury. He sat there in the White House, and he put on his 
most sincere face. He swore to God to tell the truth, and then 
he lied. He planned to lie, and he executed his plan because he 
believed it was in his personal and political interests to lie. 
Never mind the oath of office. Never mind the constitutional 
duty. Never mind that he solemnly swore to God to tell the 
truth.
    Ask yourself this simple question: Was this course of 
conduct seriously incompatible with the President's duty as 
President? If this doesn't fall within the meaning of the 
offenses Alexander Hamilton described as ``proceeding from the 
abuse or violation of some public trust,'' tell me what would. 
I respectfully suggest to you this is exactly the sort of 
conduct the framers had in mind when they provided a remedy for 
the removal of the Chief Executive who is guilty of misconduct. 
I believe they would have rejected the argument that this 
deliberate, willful, stubborn, corrupt course of criminal 
conduct just isn't serious enough for the constitutional remedy 
the framers established, a remedy that they designed to protect 
the health and integrity of our institutions.
    Those who established our Constitution would have 
understood the seriousness of the misconduct of William 
Jefferson Clinton. They would have understood that it was the 
President who has shown contempt for the Constitution, not the 
managers from the House of Representatives. They would have 
understood the seriousness of the example of lawlessness he has 
set. They would have understood the seriousness of the contempt 
for the law the President's conduct has caused. They would have 
understood the seriousness of the damage the President has done 
to the integrity of his high office. Those wise statesmen who 
established our form of government would have understood the 
seriousness of the harm President Clinton has done to the cause 
of justice and constitutional government. They would have 
understood that a President who does such things should not 
remain in office with his crimes.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, for the sake of justice 
and for the sake of the Constitution, this President should be 
convicted and removed.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Members of the Senate, the distinguished colleagues of the 
bar representing the President, I commend them for an 
outstanding effort they have made throughout these proceedings 
and tell them that I just read a poll from a couple days ago, 
that something over 80 percent of the American people believe 
the President is guilty of something here. But I think that 
moots our entire debate. I don't think there is any need to 
even talk about the facts any longer because of the poll.
    I use that tongue in cheek because that seems to beg the 
question that we are also going to talk about today, and that 
is whether the President ought to be removed for his conduct. 
One of the arguments I have heard put forward since we have 
been here is the fact that the polls support this President and 
that the stability issue would be in play. That is simply not 
the case because we all clearly understand that it is this 
body's function to determine not only the facts of this case, 
but also apply to it the law, as well as the constitutional 
law, as to the removal and conviction process.
    I still remain concerned with opposing counsels' continued 
reference that the House managers want to win too much. I know 
I am not that eloquent, but I did try to make that point the 
other day, and I will make it again. If I have to take an oath 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
I will do that and tell you we are not trying to win at all 
costs. This has been a process that I think has been healthy 
for this country, and regardless of the outcome--it is going to 
be in your hands very shortly--regardless of the outcome, this 
country will benefit not only in the short term but in the long 
term from this debate.
    There are many, many other issues at stake here, and I 
tried to tell you a few the other day, without this concept 
that all we want to do is win, as if it is a simple game. We 
have been over the last 4 weeks, as men and women, as ordinary 
men and women I might say, involved in an extraordinary 
process. It is uniquely thorough. We have tried to blend the 
facts of this case with the law of the charges, together with 
the politics and the polls and the media, and we have had to 
make some tough decisions. We have had to make some difficult 
decisions--I know we have on our side--as to what witnesses to 
call, how to treat these witnesses in depositions. I know on 
this side they have had to make difficult calls, I am sure. 
There has been some talk about having the President come down 
or not come down. What has in large part made this process 
distinct from past impeachments--and I am talking about the one 
last century of the President--and the subsequent judicial 
impeachments has been just, it seems, the media and the daily 
grind on all of us, the critiques. It is almost as if we are 
performing, we are in a play, and every day we get a review. We 
have been good, bad or indifferent.
    What concerns me most about that is as you move to the very 
serious issue of deciding whether or not this President should 
be convicted based on the facts, and whether this President 
should be removed, I am concerned that people are stressing the 
trees. If that is what you see on TV and that is what you read 
in the paper, you are going to see the trees and not the forest 
here and miss the big picture.
    That is so important. It is not about the personalities of 
these people or the personalities here or the politics involved 
or the polls, but it is about the facts. Ladies and gentlemen 
of the Senate, there are conclusive facts here that support a 
conviction. The President and his attorneys, as I said the 
other day, have made a good defense and have tried to paint a 
picture of the facts I think that simply does not match with 
logic or common sense.
    Take, for instance, the affidavit. We continue to see Ms. 
Lewinsky testifying on video that she never talked with the 
President that night about linking the false story, the 
concocted story with the affidavit. Mr. Ruff, I think, 
challenged people to say: What do you think the President meant 
to do that night when he called her at 2:30 in the morning?
    What do you think he intended to do in that call at 2:30 in 
the morning? Do you think he called her to tell her he had a 
Christmas present for her, or do you think his intent was to 
tell her, which he did, that you have been listed on the 
witness list and you could be subpoenaed and you might give an 
affidavit to avoid testifying. He suggested the affidavit, and 
then he said in that same conversation: well, you know, you can 
always use that cover story.
    Why would he suggest using a cover story that night? Were 
they even seeing each other then? It belittles all reasonable 
judgment to accept this type of defense of this conduct, that 
it was an innocent phone conversation, the President really 
meant nothing by it, and the fact that Ms. Lewinsky said: I 
didn't connect the two. But look at what she did. She went to 
her lawyer and used that concocted story in an affidavit that 
she filed in the case.
    It was in the draft affidavit. They took that out later for 
other reasons. But she did tell her lawyer that, and they 
attempted to use it. Again, it is the President's state of mind 
that matters and what his intent was on the false affidavit.
    Then that same false affidavit was later used in the court, 
and the President knew it was false. He knew it was false. It 
was used in the deposition. We have seen the deposition 
testimony, with the President sitting, listening to his lawyer 
talk about that affidavit when he submitted it. He obstructed 
justice by not objecting at that point, not instructing his own 
lawyer: Don't put that false evidence into this testimony.
    People stand up and laugh and say, he was not paying any 
attention, and they got this silly affidavit from this guy who 
was there and said he was looking at his lawyer but he couldn't 
tell what he was thinking. Of course he couldn't tell what he 
was thinking. Nobody is a mind reader. But this was a critical 
affidavit at that time which was going to cut off critical 
testimony in that case, and you can just about guarantee, I 
would say 100 percent, that the President was indeed listening 
very carefully, knew that his lawyer was submitting a false 
affidavit, and did nothing to stop it. That is another count of 
obstruction of justice.
    Tampering with Betty Currie--two occasions--and they say 
nothing happened between the first time and the second time. I 
am not so sure legally that matters. It was 2 or 3 days after 
it happened the day following his deposition and 2 or 3 days 
after that. Initially, remember his defense was: I was simply 
trying to recall what happened. And then we brought up the 
fact: Why did you go the second time? Did you have a short 
memory? Didn't you get it right the first time? And now we hear 
the defense today that nothing really changed and it is really 
one issue there, one big tampering rather than two attempts to 
tamper. It is still obstruction of justice.
    Mr. Hutchinson will talk about the job situation later. Mr. 
Blumenthal, the same thing; I am sure Mr. Rogan will talk about 
him in a minute.
    If you will look carefully, you will see that the President 
is the only thread that goes from each one of these, from the 
very beginning, from the point when he met Monica Lewinsky and 
from that point when he looked at that pink pass and said: 
That's going to be a problem. You know why that was going to be 
a problem. Because that limited her access to this President 
and what he was going to do. From that point until they 
terminated the relationship, this President is involved in each 
one of these issues of obstruction of justice.
    It is always him, by himself, testifying falsely, sitting 
there letting his lawyers submit a false affidavit, or it is 
him and one other person--he and Monica Lewinsky talking about 
filing a false affidavit; he and Monica Lewinsky talking about 
a concocted story to testify; he and Betty Currie on two 
occasions. You remember the testimony was like this. He and 
John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, the many aides--talking to 
them individually, giving them a false story.
    As Mr. Hutchinson pointed out so well in his argument the 
other day, it is always a private issue in terms of no one else 
knows what is going on. Vernon Jordan didn't know what was 
happening with the affidavit necessarily. Betty Currie didn't 
understand what was happening with the affidavit, or the job 
search, to the point that they knew what was going on. Look at 
and analyze each one of these and you will see there is a 
compartmentalization going on with this President, and he is at 
the center of it each time.
    What do we do with it? What do you do with it? It is going 
to be in your hands very shortly, and I want to address just a 
couple of points on the constitutional issue of the conviction 
and the removal because White House counsel argued very well 
the issue of proportionality. Again, proportionality simply 
means that the legacy of this Senate and this Congress will be 
that we have destroyed sexual harassment laws. When you argue 
that proportionality, think about what it is.
    We have heard this issue about, ``Back in my hometown, 80 
percent of the people who get divorced lie about this issue.'' 
Certainly we don't want that to be the legacy of this Congress, 
that we legitimize lying in divorce cases; nor would we want to 
have the legitimacy of this Congress being that we did not 
support the sexual harassment laws, because you know and I know 
that this is an important part. Going back and getting 
accurate, truthful testimony is absolutely essential in these 
types of cases, and if we send a message out on the 
proportionality theory that it is just about sex and you can 
lie about it, it will be the wrong thing to do.
    The laws, like the facts, are a very stubborn thing. If the 
law has been broken, if perjury has been committed, if 
obstruction of justice has been committed by this President, it 
is my belief that the fact that the economy is good should not 
prevent this Senate from acting and removing the President. If 
the economy was bad, you wouldn't want to be able to impeach 
the President because it is bad; and you don't want to not 
impeach him simply because the economy is good.
    It is a difficult task. We have had a difficult task 
bringing this case over to you, and I thank you. You have been 
in attendance the 4 weeks. You paid attention. When it was your 
turn to ask questions, you asked very good questions. You have 
been ready to listen, and I thank you for that.
    You have a difficult task ahead of you. I know when I voted 
on this I thought, ``If this were a Republican President, what 
would I do?'' It is a tough choice. I said, ``But I really 
think I would have voted the same way I voted even if it were a 
Republican President.'' I know. Like Mr. Chabot, I voted for 
Mr. Carter in 1976. I voted for Mr. Reagan in 1980, I might 
add, but I voted for Mr. Carter in 1976 after the 1974 
incident.
    It is tough. What has made it awfully hard is that you all 
have also taken an oath to do impartial justice. I simply ask 
you, as you consider these facts and do impartial justice, that 
you set a standard that, if you believe the President indeed 
did commit either perjury or obstruction of justice or both of 
those, that you set that standard high for the President, for 
the next President, for the next generations; you set that 
standard high for our courts that have to deal with perjury and 
obstruction every day, with people who are less than the 
President but yet who are watching very closely what we do 
here. But set that standard high for the President. Don't lower 
our expectation in what we expect of the President. If you do 
that, if you look high, if you set the standard high, the right 
thing will be done.
    I have confidence and trust, and I have just been so 
pleased with the way we have been received here. I know you 
will do the right thing.
    I apologize to you, as I will be talking to you probably 
for my last time, if I have come across as preaching to you. It 
is not my intent to lecture you. You do not need any lectures 
from me or for anyone else to preach to you. I hope I have 
rebutted some of the proof in the area for which I am in 
charge. There is conclusive proof here, particularly in terms 
of the obstruction of justice charges, of the hiding of the 
evidence, of the filing of a false affidavit.
    I did skip over the hiding of the evidence. I am not sure 
anything new can be added to what was said in the past. But if 
Monica is telling the truth, as her lawyers or as the 
President's lawyers seem to tell you, that is a no-brainer, 
because she says, ``I know for a fact that Ms. Currie called 
me, that she initiated the call.'' As I told you the other day, 
from that point forward it seems to me a moot issue because the 
initiation of the phone call by Betty Currie began a process to 
hide that evidence. The only way Betty Currie would have known 
to make that call to begin that process of hiding evidence 
would have been a conversation with the President, to have been 
instructed that way.
    For the President, whose intent was to conceal the 
relationship, it would have been totally inconsistent for him 
to suggest that she turn the evidence over. It would have been 
totally consistent for him to ask Betty Currie to get the 
evidence from Ms. Lewinsky and hide the evidence.
    As I close, let me just tell you, too--on the heels of Mr. 
Canady--that there are law professors who testified in our 
hearing who have a contrary view to the view that was expressed 
by other law professors that Mr. Ruff referred to, that it is 
constitutional to impeach a President for conduct that is not 
clearly official, that might be described as personal, 
particularly conduct of perjury or obstruction of justice.
    Professor Turley says:

    In my view, serious crimes in office, such as lying under 
oath before a federal grand jury, have always been ``malum in 
se'' conduct for a president and sufficient for impeachment.

    Professor John McGinnis of Benjamin Cardozo Law School says 
that obstruction of justice is clearly within the ambit of high 
crimes and misdemeanors.
    If there is any question of this private conduct versus 
personal conduct, that view is out there. Given the right type 
of personal misconduct, it is clearly an impeachable offense. 
With that, I call Mr. Manager Hutchinson to follow me.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, when I was appointed as 
a manager, I hoped to present the case before the Senate with 
my colleagues in a manner that was consistent with the dignity 
of this great body and also respectful of the constitutional 
independence of the Senate. I hope that you agree and believe 
that we have done that as we have come over here.
    During the months of this trial process, I have grown to 
appreciate the institution of the Senate to a greater degree 
than ever before, but I think of even more importance to me, I 
have grown to respect the individuals that comprise this body 
more than ever. Let me say, it has been a privilege to appear 
before you.
    As we come to the close of this case, let's go to the key 
questions that should be on your mind. First of all, has the 
obstruction of justice and perjury cases been proven? Have the 
allegations been proven? My colleagues have touched upon the 
perjury. Let me talk about article II on the obstruction of 
justice.
    The White House defense team, composed of extraordinarily 
distinguished and talented attorneys, has tried to diminish the 
significance of the overwhelming facts on obstruction by using 
certain phrases such as, ``It's all circumstantial,'' or ``The 
managers ignore those stubborn facts,'' or ``They want to win 
too badly,'' or ``It's a shell with no shell.'' And today the 
latest catch phrase, ``moving targets, empty pots.''
    Those are certainly quotable phrases designed to diminish 
the factual presentation with dripping sarcasm, but I believe 
that they ignore the underlying facts, testimony, and evidence 
that has been presented.
    Let me just address a couple of arguments that Mr. Ruff has 
presented during his presentation.
    The first argument that he presented as he described it was 
a technical argument, that the article II obstruction of 
justice charge in the articles of impeachment on the lying to 
the aides was not really in reference to the Federal civil 
rights case, and that is a true statement. But if you read 
article II, paragraph 7, it refers to this and says:

    . . . The false and misleading statements made by William 
Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand 
jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.

    The article is appropriately drafted, is well stated, and 
gives them total notice as to what that charge is about.
    Some of the other arguments have been handled by my 
colleagues, but Mr. Ruff also said, Why have the managers 
never, never explained, if this is such an urgent matter for 
the President, why did he wait until December 17 to tell Ms. 
Lewinsky that she was on the list?
    I am afraid Mr. Ruff failed to listen to my opening 
presentation when I went through that timeframe. In that 
timeframe, the witness list came out on December 5, it 
continued to accelerate, December 11 was Judge Wright's order. 
Then it was December 17 that the call was made at 2 a.m. in the 
morning to let Ms. Lewinsky know she was on the list. Why was 
it December 17? This is in the President's mind. No one knows 
why he picked that particular date, but perhaps it was that the 
job search was well underway then. He felt like she could 
handle this distressing information and, in fact, on the day 
after that call, she already had two interviews lined up on 
that same day, December 18, set up by Mr. Jordan. So perhaps it 
was an appropriate time to let her know she was on the witness 
list.
    They raised the question about the Christmas gifts. You 
have the testimony of Betty Currie, you have the testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky, and the issue is simply: Do you believe Monica 
Lewinsky? If you accept her reluctant testimony, yet forceful 
and clear testimony, that the call came from Betty Currie, then 
you have no choice but to conclude that the retention of the 
gifts, the retrieval of the gifts was initiated by the 
President of the United States.
    When you go to the job search, and they point to the 
testimony, they played the video of Mr. Jordan who said that 
there was never a conversation in which both the job and the 
false affidavit were discussed together, they cut it off at 
that point. You remember I had a ``but'' in there. If you had 
heard further beyond that, you would have heard me cross-
examining Mr. Jordan, as I did, and reminding him of his 
previous testimony in which he acknowledged that in every 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, they talked about the job. So 
he acknowledged that they talked about the job and the 
affidavit all in the same conversation together.
    Mr. Ruff makes the point that the managers got close enough 
to accuse Mr. Jordan of telling Ms. Lewinsky to destroy the 
notes, implying that we are making this up. But is this 
evidence that is coming from the managers? It is my 
recollection that it is testimony coming from Ms. Monica 
Lewinsky. We are not concocting this. It is testimony from 
witnesses who have been brought before this body, whose sworn 
testimony you have received, whose sworn testimony they 
defended and relied upon, but when it comes to this, they say, 
``No, it's the managers.''
    Then they come to another pillar of obstruction, the one 
they avoid at every opportunity, but finally addressed today, 
and that is the coaching of Betty Currie. I was interested in 
the fact that they finally talked about this, the first 
coaching incident and then the second one. Mr. Ruff tried to go 
into that it is clear it occurred on January 20 rather than 21. 
In fact, it is her testimony that it occurred on one of those 
days. But they miss the point.
    The legal significance of the second coaching episode is 
that it totally goes against the defense of the President--that 
it was there, he was doing this to acquire information, to get 
facts, to help in media inquiries.
    If that is the case, there is absolutely no reason for it 
to be done on the second occasion and, clearly, she was known 
to be a witness at that time, and that is the legal 
significance.
    It goes to his intent, his motive, what he was trying to do 
to a subordinate employee. The fact of this matter is that this 
is not a case that is based upon circumstantial evidence. On 
each element of obstruction, there is direct testimony linking 
the President to a consistent pattern of conduct designed to 
withhold information, conceal evidence and tamper with 
witnesses to avoid obedience and directives of a Federal court.
    Let's look at the direct proof, not circumstantial 
evidence, but direct testimony.
    What did Vernon Jordan testify as to the President's 
involvement in the job search?
    Question to Mr. Jordan:

    You're acting in behalf of the President when you're trying 
to get Ms. Lewinsky a job and you were in control of the job 
search?

    His answer:

    Yes.

    He was acting at the direction of the President and he was 
in control.
    What did Vernon Jordan testify he told the President when a 
job was secured for a key witness and the false affidavit was 
signed?

    Mr. President, she signed the affidavit, she signed the 
affidavit.

    Then the next day, the job is secured and the report to 
Betty Currie, the report to the President, ``Mission 
accomplished.''
    Is this circumstantial evidence? This is direct testimony 
by a friend and confidante of the President, Vernon Jordan.
    Who is the one person who clearly knew all of the 
ingredients to make the job search an obstruction of justice? 
It was the President who knew he had a dangerous relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew his friend was securing a job at his 
direction, and he knew that a false affidavit was being 
procured at his suggestion. He was the one person who knew all 
the facts.
    Is this circumstantial evidence or direct testimony when 
Ms. Lewinsky talked about what the President told her on 
December 17? She was a witness, and immediately following the 
fact she was a witness, the suggestion that she could use the 
cover stories, the suggestion that she could use an affidavit.
    Direct testimony--was it direct proof about the President's 
tampering with the testimony of Betty Currie? It was Betty 
Currie herself who acknowledged this and testified to it. No, 
this is not circumstantial evidence, it is direct testimony.
    The same with Sidney Blumenthal. Direct testimony after 
direct testimony painting a picture, setting up the pillars of 
obstruction.
    They want you to believe Monica Lewinsky sometimes, but 
they don't want you to believe her other times, and you have to 
weigh her testimony.
    I could go on with the facts, but the truth is that our 
case on obstruction of justice has been established. Some of 
you might conclude, ``I accept five or six of those pillars of 
obstruction, but there is one I have a reservation about.'' If 
you look at the article, if there is one element of obstruction 
that you accept and believe and you agree upon, then that is 
sufficient for conviction and, surely, it is sufficient to 
convict the President, if there was even one element of 
obstruction.
    I remind you that a typical jury instruction on conspiracy 
for obstruction would be that it takes only one overt act to 
satisfy the requirements for conviction. The Government doesn't 
have to prove all the overt acts, just one that was carried 
out.
    Another question some of you might be thinking about is, Is 
this serious enough to warrant conviction and removal? One of 
the foundations of our judicial system is that any citizen, 
regardless of position or power, has access to the court. Can 
you imagine the shock and outrage of this body if a 
corporation, in an effort to protect itself from liability, 
concealed evidence and provided benefits to those witnesses who 
are cooperative? Outrage; injustice. Those are the allegations 
against the tobacco companies. Those are the allegations last 
night on CBS, ``60 Minutes,'' about a major corporation. There 
should be outrage by this body. We would rightfully be outraged 
about that. And we should also be outraged if it happened by 
the President. It should be no less when it is conducted by the 
President.
    The next argument is: Yes, the President should be held 
accountable, but he can always be prosecuted later. In fact, I 
understand a censure resolution is being circulated emphasizing 
that the President can be held criminally responsible for his 
actions when he leaves office. This is not too subtle a 
suggestion that the independent counsel go ahead and file 
criminal charges against the President.
    I appreciate Judge Starr, but I do not believe that is what 
the country has in mind when they say they want to get this 
matter over. I do not believe your vote on the articles of 
impeachment should be a signal to the independent counsel to 
initiate criminal proceedings. It appears to me that is the 
implication of this censure resolution being discussed.
    I emphasize that it is this body that the Founding Fathers 
entrusted with the responsibility to determine whether a 
President's conduct has breached the public trust, and your 
decision in this body should conclude this matter. It should 
not be the initiation of another national drama that will be 
carried over the next 3 years.
    Finally, there are some who consider the politics of this 
matter. We have proven our case. I entered this body thinking 
that this was a legal, judicial proceeding and not political. I 
have been reminded there are political aspects under the 
Constitution to a Senate trial. So I concede the point.
    We are all familiar with ``Profiles in Courage'' written by 
John F. Kennedy. He reminds us of the courageous act of Senator 
Edmund G. Ross in voting for the acquittal of President Andrew 
Johnson in his impeachment trial. Senator Ross was a profile in 
courage because he knew the case against President Johnson was 
not legally sufficient, even though the politically expedient 
vote was to vote for conviction. Senator Ross followed the 
facts and he followed the law, and he voted his conscience. It 
was to his political detriment, but it reflected his political 
courage.
    Today we have a different circumstance. The question is, 
Will the Senators of this body have the political courage to 
follow the facts and the law as did Senator Ross, despite 
enormous political pressure to ignore the facts and the law and 
the Constitution? You will make that decision.
    I appear before this body as an advocate. I am not paid for 
this special responsibility. I am here because I believe the 
Constitution requires me to make this case. The facts prove 
overwhelmingly that the President committed obstruction of 
justice and perjury. Despite this belief, whatever conclusion 
you reach will not be criticized by me. I will respect this 
institution regardless of the outcome.
    As the late Federal Judge Orin Harris of Arkansas always 
said from the bench to the jury when I was trying cases--and I 
hated his instruction because I was the prosecutor--but he 
would tell the jury, ``Remember, the government never wins or 
loses a case. The government always wins when justice is 
done.'' This is the Congress and this is the Senate. It is your 
responsibility to determine the facts and to let justice roll 
down like mighty waters.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel 
for the President, Members of the U.S. Senate, for me the most 
poignant part of this entire proceeding was the day, a few 
weeks ago, when we were addressed by the distinguished former 
Senator from Arkansas, Dale Bumpers. Probably the thing that 
touched me most about his presentation is when he talked about 
the human element of what this impeachment proceeding has meant 
and how difficult that has been.
    It touched me because it made me remember that that 
difficulty is not limited solely for Democrats in this Chamber. 
I am one of the House managers. I am a Republican today. But 
that was not always the case. I used to be a Democrat, and 
being a House manager in the impeachment of President Clinton 
has been especially difficult for me. I would like to tell you 
why.
    Twenty years ago, in December 1978, I was finishing my last 
semester of college and had just applied to law school. I was 
waiting for my application to be accepted someplace. And in 
December of 1978, I was a delegate in Memphis, TN, to the 
Democratic Midterm Convention.
    At that time, President Carter was halfway through his term 
of office. He was not particularly popular among the party 
faithful. There was a great deal of sentiment that a Member of 
this body today should challenge him for the nomination. That 
decision had not yet been made, but among the delegates to that 
convention there was an overwhelming desire to see Senator Ted 
Kennedy appear.
    The Carter White House froze Senator Kennedy out of the 
proceedings. He was not invited to address the convention. His 
name appeared nowhere in the program. So the delegates did 
something on their own. There were workshops being held during 
the day, and a workshop on health care was called. Senator 
Kennedy was invited to fly out that day and address that 
workshop. He did that in the afternoon, and he left after he 
addressed it. I had gone to a workshop that morning where 
President Carter personally appeared, and my recollection is 
about 200 or 300 people came to that. Senator Kennedy's 
workshop had to be transferred to a large auditorium because 
about 2,000 people appeared to hear him.
    The Senator came, he spoke, and he left. I stayed even 
though most people left with him, because I was fascinated by 
the young fellow who was moderating the program that day. He 
was bright, he was in control, he was articulate. He didn't 
look that much older than me. I was stunned that this young man 
was not only the attorney general of his State, but he was the 
Governor-elect of the State.
    Sometime after that workshop I walked up to him and 
introduced myself. I told him who I was, and he spent about 15 
minutes encouraging me to go to law school, to stay active in 
politics. His name was Bill Clinton. I have never forgotten 
that day 20 years ago when then-Attorney General Clinton took 
the time for a young fellow who had an interest in the law and 
politics. I have never forgotten in recent days the 
graciousness he has shown to me, to my wife, and to my children 
when we have encountered him.
    This has been a very difficult proceeding for me and for my 
colleagues, the House managers. But our presence here isn't out 
of personal animosity toward our President. It is because we 
believe that, after reviewing all the evidence, the President 
of the United States had committed obstruction of justice and 
perjury, he had violated his oath of office; and in so doing he 
had sacrificed the principle that no person is above the law, 
and friendship and personal affection could not control under 
those circumstances.
    Up until now, the idea that no person is above the law has 
been unquestioned. Yet this standard is not our inheritance 
automatically. Each generation of Americans ultimately has to 
make that choice for themselves. Once again, it is a time for 
choosing. How will we respond? By impeaching the President? The 
U.S. House of Representatives made that choice. It went on 
record as saying that our body would not tolerate the most 
powerful man in the world trampling the constitutional rights 
of a lone woman, no matter how obscure or humble she might be.
    We refused to ignore Presidential misconduct despite its 
minimization by spin doctors, pundits, and, yes, even the 
polls. The personal popularity of any President pales when 
weighed against the fundamental concept that forever 
distinguishes us from every nation on the planet: No person is 
above the law.
    The House of Representatives jettisoned the spin and the 
propaganda. We sought, and we have now presented, the 
unvarnished truth. Now it is your unhappy task to make the 
final determination, face the truth, and polish the 
Constitution, or allow this Presidency, in the words of 
Chairman Henry Hyde, to take one more chip out of the marble.
    The Constitution solemnly required President Clinton, as a 
condition of his becoming President, to swear an oath to 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, and to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.
    That oath of obligation required the President to defend 
our laws that protect women in the workplace, just as it also 
required him to protect the legal system from perjury, abuse of 
power, and obstruction of justice. Fidelity to the Presidential 
oath is not dependent upon any President's personal threshold 
of comfort or embarrassment. Neither must it be a slave to the 
latest poll.
    How important was this oath to our founders? Did they 
intend the oath to have primacy over the shifting winds of 
political opinion? Or did they bequeath to us an ambiguous 
Constitution that was meant to roll with the punches of the 
latest polling data and focus groups? The Constitution gives us 
that answer in article II, section 1. It says:

    Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall 
take . . . [an] oath.

    And the oath is then prescribed.
    The mere fact that a person is elected President does not 
give him the right to become President, no matter how 
overwhelming his vote margin. Votes alone do not make a person 
President of the United States. There is a requirement that 
precedes obtaining the power and authority of obtaining the 
Presidency. It is the oath of office. It is swearing to 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. It is accepting 
the obligation that the laws are to be faithfully executed.
    No oath, no Presidency. It is the oath of office, and not 
public opinion polls, that gives life and legitimacy to a 
Presidency. This is true no matter how popular an elected 
President may be, or how broad his margin of victory.
    The founders did not intend the oath to be an afterthought 
or a technicality. They viewed it as an absolute requirement 
before the highest office in the land was entrusted to any 
person. The evidence shows the President repeatedly violated 
his oath of office. Now the focus shifts to your oath of 
office. The President hopes that in this Chamber the polls will 
govern. On behalf of the House of Representatives, we entreat 
you to require the Constitution reign supreme. For if polls 
matter more than the oath to uphold the law, then yet another 
chip out of the marble has been struck.
    The cry has also been raised that to remove the President 
is to create a constitutional crisis by undoing an election. 
There is no constitutional crisis when the simple process of 
the Constitution comes into play. Listen to the words of Dr. 
Larry Arnn of the Claremont Institute:

    [E]lections have no higher standing under our Constitution 
than the impeachment process. Both stem from provisions of the 
Constitution. The people elect a president to do a 
constitutional job. They act under the Constitution when they 
do it. At the same time they elect a Congress to do a different 
constitutional job. The president swears an oath to uphold the 
Constitution, both in elections and in the impeachment process.
    If the president is guilty of acts justifying impeachment, 
then he, not the Congress, will have ``overturned the 
election.'' He will have acted in ways that betray the purpose 
of his election. He will have acted not as a constitutional 
representative, but as a monarch, subversive of, or above, the 
law.
    If the great powers given the president are abused, then to 
impeach him defends not only the results of elections, but that 
higher thing which elections are in service, namely, the 
preeminence of the Constitution[.]

    The evidence clearly shows that the President engaged in a 
repeated and lengthy pattern of felonious conduct--conduct for 
which ordinary citizens can be and have been jailed and lost 
their liberty. This simply cannot be wished or censured away.
    With his conduct aggravated by a motivation of personal and 
monetary leverage in the Paula Jones lawsuit, the solemnity of 
our sacred oath obliges us to do what the President regretfully 
has failed to do: defend the rule of law, defend the concept 
that no person is above the law.
    On the day the House impeached President Clinton, I said 
that when they are old enough to appreciate the solemnity of 
that action, I wanted my little girls to know that when the 
roll was called, their father served with colleagues who 
counted it a privilege to risk political fortunes in defense of 
the Constitution.
    Today, I am more resolute in that opinion. From the time I 
was a little boy, it was my dream to one day serve in the 
Congress of the United States. My dream was fulfilled 2 years 
ago. Today, I am a Republican in a district that is heavily 
Democratic. The pundits keep telling me that my stand on this 
issue puts my political fortunes in jeopardy. So be it. That 
revelation produces from me no flinching. There is a simple 
reason why: I know that in life dreams come and dreams go. But 
conscience is forever. I can live with the concept of not 
serving in Congress. I cannot live with the idea of remaining 
in Congress at the expense of doing what I believe to be right.
    I was about 12 years old when a distinguished Member of 
this body, the late Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas, gave me 
this sage advice about elective office:

    Always put principle above politics; put honor above 
incumbency.

    I now return that sentiment to the body from which it came. 
Hold fast to it, Senators, and in doing so, you will be 
faithful both to our founders and to our heirs.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham. 
The managers have 45 minutes remaining.
    Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I promise not to take the whole 45 
minutes. I have been told that my voice fades, and I will try 
not to let that happen here.
    As we bring the trial to a conclusion, I think it needs to 
be said from our side of the aisle that our staff has been 
terrific. You don't know how many hours of sleep have been lost 
by the young men and women working to put this case together 
under the procedures that the Senate developed. They have done 
an absolutely magnificent job. If there is anybody to blame on 
our side, blame us, because our staff has done a terrific job. 
That just needs to be said.
    Now, let's talk about Mr. Rogan's district. True, if there 
is anybody on our side of the aisle who has been at risk it has 
been Jim. I have made some lifelong friends in this situation, 
really on both sides of the aisle. This has been tough, tough, 
tough for our country, but sometimes some good comes from tough 
situations, and I think some good will come from this before it 
is all said and done, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate. I 
know it doesn't look to be so, but it will be so later on.
    I come from a district where I am the first Republican in 
120 years. They told me they hanged the other guy, so I know I 
am doing better. I am 4 years into this thing. This is my third 
term.
    You can take the national polls and turn them upside down 
in my district, but I have on occasion said that if the 
President would reconcile himself to the law, I would be 
willing to consider something less than impeachment. I can 
assure you that did not go over well with some people in my 
district. But I thought that would be good for the country.
    The elections come and go and we can get through just about 
anything and everything in this country, but it does take 
leadership, and character does still count. Having said that, I 
am a sinner like the rest of us, and part of the problem with 
this case is we have to confront our own sins, because who are 
we to judge others when the things get to be private and 
personal? I am not asking you to use that standard. I am 
standing before you as a sinner, and I would never want my 
President or your President removed because of private sins, 
but only when it gets to be constitutionally out of bounds, 
only when it gets to be so egregious that you can't look your 
children in the eye and explain what happened here in terms of 
the law. We can all explain human failings, but we have a real 
mixed message going on, and it needs to be straightened out for 
them.
    If you could bring the Founding Fathers back, as everybody 
has suggested, the first debate would be, could we call them as 
a witness? There would be some people objecting to that. Live 
or dead, it has been hard to get a witness.
    [Laughter.]
    I think they would say to us: ``What's a poll?'' They would 
be instructive, but we can't summon them back. Do you know what 
I really think they would tell us? They would tell us that we 
started this thing, and it is up to you all to carry it on. And 
it is. They would be right. It is not their job to tell us what 
to do. It is our job to take the spirit of what they did and 
build on it.
    If you have kept an open mind, you have fulfilled your job. 
If you have listened to the facts and you vote your conscience, 
you will have fulfilled your job. I will not trample on your 
conscience; I have said that before. I started this process 
with great concern and I leave with a lot of contentment 
because I believe the facts have withstood the test of every 
type of scrutiny and demagoguery that have been thrown at them. 
They stand firm. Do you know what they are going to stand? 
They're going to stand the test of history. Some people suggest 
that history may judge you badly if you vote to convict this 
President. I suggest that that will be the least of your 
problems.
    Our past and this present moment become our Nation's 
future. What are we going to leave to the future generations? 
What do we do when the next Federal judge is brought before 
this body having been impeached by the House for cheating on 
his or her taxes? Are we going to self-righteously throw that 
Federal judge out after having listened to this massive case of 
obstruction of justice and perjury before a grand jury? We may 
throw that Federal judge out, but we will have to walk out the 
door backward; we will not walk out boldly. What happens when 
the next Federal judge is acquitted by a jury of his peers, and 
you know the result would be just to remove that judge? You did 
the right thing by not being bound by the acquittal in the case 
of Judge Hastings. You did the right thing to get to the truth 
and act accordingly, because for people who sit in judgment of 
others there needs to be no reasonable doubt about who they are 
and what they are able to do in that role. The President of the 
United States is at the top of the legal pyramid. If there is 
reasonable doubt about his ability to faithfully execute the 
laws of the land, our future will be better off if that 
individual is removed.
    Let me tell you what it all comes down to for me. If you 
can go back and explain to your children and your constituents 
how you can be truthful and misleading at the same time, good 
luck. That is the legacy that Bill Clinton has left all of us 
if we keep him in office--the idea that ``I was truthful but 
misleading.'' That scenario focuses around whether or not one 
type of sex occurred versus the other type of sex. He is 
wanting you to buy into this definition that was allowed to 
exist because the wording wasn't quite right. That is the 
essence of it--``I was truthful, but I was misleading.''
    Mr. Podesta asked a few more questions than the other 
people did and the President denied any type of sexual 
relationship to him. Was he truthful there? Was he truthful in 
his grand jury testimony? How can you be both? It is just 
absolutely impossible.
    I want to play two clips for you now.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Now, You have stated, I think, very honestly, and I 
appreciate, that you were lied to by the President. Is it a 
fair statement, given your previous testimony concerning your 
30-minute conversation, that the President was trying to 
portray himself as a victim of a relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

    Before you put the other tape in, every Member of this body 
should need to answer this question: Is that a truthful 
statement? If you believe that the President of the United 
States is a victim of Ms. Lewinsky, we all owe him an apology. 
He is not. He is not.
    You ask me why I want this President removed? Not only are 
they high crimes, not only do they rise to the level of 
constitutional out-of-bounds behavior, not only are they worse 
than what you remove judges for, they show a tremendous 
willingness of a national leader to put himself above anything 
decent and good. I hope that still matters in America.
    The next clip:
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Would it be fair to say that you were sitting there during this 
conversation and that you had previously been told by the President 
that he was in essence a victim of Ms. Lewinsky's sexual demands, and 
you said nothing to anyone?

    MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said''----
    THE WITNESS: I don't----
    MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said nothing to anyone about 
what the President told you?''----
    MR. GRAHAM: Right.
    THE WITNESS: I never told any of my colleagues about what the 
President told me.
    BY MR. GRAHAM:
    Q. And this is after the President recants his story--recounts his 
story--to you, where he's visibly upset, feels like he's a victim, that 
he associates himself with a character who's being lied about, and you 
at no time suggested to your colleagues that there is something going 
on here with the President and Ms. Lewinsky you need to know about. Is 
that your testimony?
    A. I never mentioned my conversation. I regarded that conversation 
as a private conversation in confidence, and I didn't mention it to my 
colleagues, I didn't mention it to my friends, I didn't mention it to 
my family, bedsides my wife.
    Q. Did you mention it to any White House lawyers?
    A. I mentioned it many months later to Lanny Breuer in preparation 
for one of my grand jury appearances, when I knew I would be questioned 
about it. And I certainly never mentioned it to any reporter.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I have asked you 
several times to vote your conscience, and I will not step on 
it if you disagree with me; but I have always said let us tell 
the story about what happened here. I am saying it again. 
Ladies and gentlemen, we need to get to the truth, nothing but 
the truth, the whole truth, and let the chips fall where they 
may.
    Let me say this about being truthful but misleading. Can 
you sit back as the President, after you told a lie to a key 
aide, where you portrayed yourself as a victim, and watch the 
press stories role out along the lines that ``she wears her 
dresses too tight''; ``she comes from a broken home''; ``she's 
a stalker''; ``she's sex obsessed''; can you sit back and watch 
all that happen and still be truthful but misleading?
    We have laws against that in this country. We have laws in 
this country that even high Government officials cannot tell a 
lie to somebody knowing that lie will be repeated to a grand 
jury. That is exactly what happened here. He portrayed himself 
as a victim, which is not a misleading statement; it is a lie 
because if you knew the truth, you wouldn't consider him a 
victim. And that lie went to the Federal grand jury. And those 
citizens were trying very hard to get it right, and he was 
trying very hard to mislead them. At every turn when they tried 
to get to the truth, he ran the other way, and he took the aura 
of the White House with him.
    If you believe he is a victim, then you ought to acquit 
him. If you believe he has lied, then he ought not to be our 
President.
    There are two things in this case that are crimes, two 
aspects of it--before the Paula Jones deposition and after the 
Paula Jones deposition. I am going to leave this with you for 
the very last time. The affidavit was an attempt to have a 
cover story where both of them could lie and go on about their 
lives. The job search was to take somebody who had been 
friendly and get them a job so they could go on about their 
lives someplace else, and get this matter behind them and 
conceal from a court the truth. Those things are crimes.
    These gifts being under the bed of Betty Currie, the 
President's secretary, is no accident. They didn't walk over 
there by themselves. They got conveyed by a secretary after she 
picked them up from his consensual lover. People have figured 
that part out. It is no accident that happened. That is a 
crime--when you are subpoenaed to give those gifts.
    But it is still about getting her a job and having a cover 
story so she could go on with her life. But when the article 
came out on January 21, the whole flavor of this case changed. 
I don't know how you are going to explain it to yourself or 
others, but I want to lay out to you what I think happened 
based on the evidence.
    That January 21 when the story broke that she may have been 
telling what went on, and the President was faced with the idea 
that the knowledge of their relationship was out in the public 
forum, what did he do then? There were no more nice jobs using 
a good friend. There was no more ``Let's see if we can hide the 
gifts and play hide the ball.'' Do you know what happened then? 
He turned on her. Not my favorite part of the case--it is the 
most disgusting part of the case. It is part of the case that 
history will judge. The crimes change. They become more 
ominous, because the character traits became more ominous. The 
young lady who was the stalker, who was sex-obsessed, who wore 
her skirts too tight, that young lady was being talked about 
openly in the public. That young lady was being lied about to 
the Federal grand jury. And the truth is that young lady fell 
in love with him. And probably to this day a 24- or 25-year-old 
young girl doesn't want to believe what was going to come her 
way. But you all are adults. You all are leaders of this 
Nation. For you to look at these facts and conclude anything 
else would be an injustice, because without that threat, ladies 
and gentlemen, the stories were going to grow in number, and we 
would have no admissions of ``misleading'' and ``truthful.''
    The White House is the bully pulpit. But it should never be 
occupied by a bully. The White House will always be occupied by 
sinners, including our Founding Fathers, and future occupants.
    What we do today will put a burden on the White House and 
the burden on our future, one way or the other. Is it too much 
of a burden to say to future Presidents, Don't fabricate 
stories in front of a grand jury, don't parse words, don't 
mislead, don't lie when you are begged not to? Is it too much 
to say to a President, If you are ever sued, play it straight; 
don't hide the gifts under the bed, don't give people false 
testimony, don't try to trash people who are witnesses against 
you? If that is too much of a burden to put on the White House, 
this Nation is in hopeless decline. It is not too much of a 
burden, ladies and gentlemen. It is only common decency being 
applied to the occupant of the White House.
    To acquit under these facts will place the burden on the 
constitutional process of impeachment and how we deal with 
others, Federal judges and other high public officials. That, I 
suggest to you, will be almost irreconcilable.
    I want my country to go boldly into the next century. I 
don't want us to limp into the next century. I don't want us to 
crawl into the next century regardless of rule of law. No 
matter what you do, we will make it. But the difference between 
how you vote here, I think, determines whether we go boldly 
with the rule of law intact, or whether we have to explain it 
for generations to come.
    I leave with you an example that I think says much. General 
MacArthur was removed by President Truman, a very popular 
fellow at the time. The reaction to the MacArthur dismissal was 
even more violent than Truman had expected. And for an entire 
year the majority of public opinion ranked itself ferociously 
against him. He said characteristically, as he felt that 
hostile poll, ``I wonder where Moses would have gone if they 
had taken a poll in Egypt. And what would Jesus Christ have 
preached if they had taken a poll in the land of Israel? It 
isn't polls that count. It is right and wrong and leadership of 
men with fortitude, honesty, and the belief in the right that 
make epics in the history of the world.''
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, thank you for 
listening. If you have any doubts about whether this President 
has committed high crimes, we need to make sure the Senate 
itself has told the truth. Don't leave any doubts lingering, 
because the evidence is overwhelming that these offenses 
occurred. The crime of perjury and obstruction of justice have 
traditionally been high crimes under our Constitution. For 
God's sake, let it remain so. And let it be said that no 
President can take the Presidency and the bully pulpit of the 
Presidency and hurt average citizens from it.
    Thank you very much. I yield now to our chairman.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, learned counsel, and 
the Senate, we are blessedly coming to the end of this 
melancholy procedure. But before we gather up our papers and 
return to the obscurity from whence we came--
    [Laughter.]
--permit, please, a few final remarks.
    First of all, I thank the Chief Justice not only for his 
patience and his perseverance but for the aura of dignity that 
he has lent to these proceedings. It has been a great thrill 
for me to be here in his company, as well as in the company of 
you, distinguished Senators.
    Second, I compliment the President's counsel. They have 
conducted themselves in the most professional way. They have 
made the most of a poor case, in my opinion. There is an old 
Italian saying--and it has nothing to do with the lawyers, but 
to your case--that ``you may dress the shepherd in the silk, he 
will still smell of the goat.''
    [Laughter.]
    But all of you are great lawyers. It has been an adventure 
being with you.
    You know, the legal profession, like politics, is ridiculed 
pretty much. Every lawyer feels that and understands the 
importance of the rule of law, to establish justice, to 
maintain the rights of mankind, to defend the helpless and the 
oppressed, to protect innocents, to punish the guilty. These 
are duties which challenge the best powers of man's intellect 
and the noblest qualities of the human heart. We are here to 
defend the bulwark of our liberty, the rule of law.
    As to the House managers, I want to tell you and our 
extraordinary staff how proud I am of your service. For myself, 
I cannot find the words to adequately express how I feel. I 
must use the inaudible language of the heart. I have gone 
through it all by your side--the media condemnation, the 
patronizing editorials, the hate mail, the insults hurled in 
public, the attempts at intimidation, the death threats, and 
even the disapproval of our colleagues, which cuts the worst.
    You know, all a Congressman ever gets to take with him when 
he leaves this building is the esteem of his colleagues and his 
constituents--and we have risked even that for a principle, for 
our duty, as we have seen it.
    In speaking to my managers, of whom I am interminably 
proud, I can borrow the words of Shakespeare, ``Henry V,'' as 
he addressed his little army of longbowmen before the Battle of 
Agincourt. And he said:

    We few, we happy few, we band of brothers
    For he that sheds his blood with me
    Shall be my brother
    And gentlemen in England, now abed
    shall think themselves accursed they
    were not here
    And hold their manhood cheap
    while any speaks
    That fought with us upon St. Chrispen's day

    As for the juror judges, you distinguished Senators, it is 
always a victory for democracy when its elected representatives 
do their duty, no matter how difficult and unpleasant, and we 
thank you for it. Please don't misconstrue our fervor for our 
cause to any lack of respect or appreciation for your high 
office. But our most formidable opponent has not been opposing 
counsel nor any political party; it has been the cynicism, the 
widespread conviction that all politics and all politicians 
are, by definition, corrupt and venal.
    That cynicism is an acid eating away at the vital organs of 
American public life. It is a clear and present danger, because 
it blinds us to the nobility and the fragility of being a self-
governing people.
    One of the several questions that needs answering is 
whether your vote on conviction lessens or enlarges that 
cynicism. Nothing begets cynicism like the double standard--one 
rule for the popular and the powerful and another for the rest 
of us.
    One of the most interesting things in this trial was the 
testimony of the President's good friend, the former Senator 
from Arkansas. He did his persuasive best to maintain the 
confusion that this is all about sex. Of course, it is useful 
for the defense to misdirect our focus to what everyone 
concedes are private acts and none of our business. But if you 
care to read the articles of impeachment, you won't find any 
complaints about private sexual misconduct. You will find 
charges of perjury and obstruction of justice which are public 
acts and Federal crimes, especially when committed by the one 
person duty bound to faithfully execute the laws. Infidelity is 
private and noncriminal. Perjury and obstruction are public and 
criminal. The deliberate focus on what is not at issue here is 
a defense lawyer's tactic and nothing more. This entire saga 
has been a theater of distraction and misdirection, time-
honored defense tactics when the law and the facts get in the 
way.
    One phrase you have not heard the defense pronounce is the 
``sanctity of the oath.'' But this case deeply involves the 
efficacy, the meaning, and the enforceability of the oath. The 
President's defenders stay away from the word ``lie,'' 
preferring ``mislead'' or ``deceive.'' But they shrink from the 
phrase ``sanctity of the oath,'' fearing it as one might a 
rattlesnake.
    There is a visibility factor in the President's public 
acts, and those which betray a trust or reveal contempt for the 
law are hard to sweep under the rug, or under the bed, for that 
matter. They reverberate, they ricochet all over the land, and 
provide the worst possible example for our young people. As 
that third-grader from Chicago wrote to me, ``If you can't 
believe the President, who can you believe?''
    Speaking of young people, in 1946 a British playwright, 
Terrance Rattigan, wrote a play based on a true experience that 
happened in England in 1910. The play was called ``The Winslow 
Boy.'' The story--as I say, a true story--involved a young 13-
year-old lad who was kicked out of the Royal Naval College for 
having forged somebody else's signature on a postal money 
order. Of course, he claimed he was innocent, but he was 
summarily dismissed and his family, of very modest means, could 
not afford legal counsel, and it was a very desperate 
situation. Sir Edward Carson, the best lawyer of his time--
barrister, I suppose--got interested in the case and took it on 
pro bono and lost all the way through the courts.
    Finally, he had no other place to go, but he dug up an 
ancient remedy in England called ``petition of right.'' You ask 
the King for relief. And so Carson wrote out five pages of 
reasons why a petition of right should be granted and, lo and 
behold, it got past the Attorney General, it got to the King. 
The King read it, agreed with it, and wrote across the front of 
the petition, ``Let right be done. Edward VII.''
    I have always been moved by that phrase. I saw the movie; I 
saw the play; and I have the book. And I am still moved by that 
phrase, ``Let right be done.'' I hope when you finally vote 
that will move you, too.
    There are some interesting parallels to our cause here 
today. This Senate Chamber is our version of the House of 
Lords, and while we managers cannot claim to represent that 13-
year-old Winslow boy, we speak for a lot of young people who 
look to us to set an example.
    Ms. Seligman last Saturday said we want to win too badly. 
This surprised me because none of the managers has committed 
perjury nor obstructed justice and claimed false privileges, 
none has hidden evidence under anyone's bed nor encouraged 
false testimony before the grand jury. That is what you do if 
you want to win too badly.
    I believe it was Saul Bellow who once said, ``A great deal 
of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for 
illusion is great.'' And those words characterize the defense 
in this case. ``The need for illusion'' is very great.
    I doubt there are many people on the planet who doubt the 
President has repeatedly lied under oath and has obstructed 
justice. The defense spent a lot of time picking lint. There is 
a saying in the courts, I believe, that equity will not stoop 
to pick up pins. But that was their case. So the real issue 
doesn't concern the facts, the stubborn facts, as the defense 
is fond of saying, but what to do about them.
    I am still dumbfounded about the drafts of the censures 
that are circulating. We aren't half as tough on the President 
in our impeachment articles as this draft is that was printed 
in the New York Times:

    An inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee 
in the White House which was shameless, reckless and 
indefensible.

    I have a problem with that. It seems they are talking about 
private acts of consensual sexual misconduct which are really 
none of our business. But that is the leadoff.
    Then they say:

    The President deliberately misled and deceived the American 
people and officials in all branches of the U.S. Government.

    This is not a Republican document. This is coming from 
here.

    The President gave false or misleading testimony and 
impeded discovery of evidence in judicial proceedings.

    Isn't that another way of saying obstruction of justice and 
perjury?

    The President's conduct demeans the Office of the President 
as well as the President himself and creates disrespect for the 
laws of the land. Future generations of Americans must know 
that such behavior is not only unacceptable but bears grave 
consequences including loss of integrity, trust and respect.

    But not loss of job.

    Whereas, William Jefferson Clinton's conduct has brought 
shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the 
President; whereas, he has violated the trust of the American 
people--

    See Hamilton's Federalist No. 65--

he should be condemned in the strongest terms.

    Well, the next to the strongest terms. The strongest terms 
would remove him from office.
    Well, do you really cleanse the office as provided in the 
Constitution or do you use the Airwick of a censure resolution? 
Because any censure resolution, to be meaningful, has to punish 
the President, if only his reputation. And how do you deal with 
the laws of bill of attainder? How do you deal with the 
separation of powers? What kind of a precedent are you setting?
    We all claim to revere the Constitution, but a censure is 
something that is a device, a way of avoiding the harsh 
constitutional option, and it is the only one we have up or 
down on impeachment. That, of course, is your judgment, and I 
am offering my views, for what they are worth.
    Once in a while I do worry about the future. I wonder if, 
after this culture war is over, this one we are engaged in, an 
America will survive that is worth fighting for to defend.
    People won't risk their lives for the U.N., or over the Dow 
Jones averages. But I wonder, in future generations, whether 
there will be enough vitality left in duty, honor and country 
to excite our children and grandchildren to defend America.
    There is no denying the fact that what you decide will have 
a profound effect on our culture, as well as on our politics. A 
failure to convict will make a statement that lying under oath, 
while unpleasant and to be avoided, is not all that serious. 
Perhaps we can explain this to those currently in prison for 
perjury. We have reduced lying under oath to a breach of 
etiquette, but only if you are the President.
    Wherever and whenever you avert your eyes from a wrong, 
from an injustice, you become a part of the problem.
    On the subject of civil rights, it is my belief this issue 
doesn't belong to anyone; it belongs to everyone. It certainly 
belongs to those who have suffered invidious discrimination, 
and one would have to be catatonic not to know that the 
struggle to keep alive equal protection of the law never ends. 
The mortal enemy of equal justice is the double standard, and 
if we permit a double standard, even for the President, we do 
no favor to the cause of human rights. It has been said that 
America has nothing to fear from this President on the subject 
of civil rights. I doubt Paula Jones would subscribe to that 
endorsement.
    If you agree that perjury and obstruction of justice have 
been committed, and yet you vote down the conviction, you are 
extending and expanding the boundaries of permissible 
Presidential conduct. You are saying a perjurer and obstructer 
of justice can be President, in the face of no less than three 
precedents for conviction of Federal judges for perjury. You 
shred those precedents and you raise the most serious questions 
of whether the President is in fact subject to the law or 
whether we are beginning a restoration of the divine right of 
kings. The issues we are concerned with have consequences far 
into the future because the real damage is not to the 
individuals involved, but to the American system of justice and 
especially the principle that no one is above the law.
    Edward Gibbon wrote his magisterial ``Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire'' in the late 18th century--in fact the first 
volume was issued in 1776. In his work, he discusses an emperor 
named Septimius Severus, who died in 211 A.D. after ruling 18 
years. And here is what Gibbon wrote about the emperor:

    Severus promised, only to betray; he flattered only to 
ruin; and however he might occasionally bind himself by oaths 
and treaties, his conscience, obsequious to his interest, 
always released him from the inconvenient obligation.

    I guess those who believe history repeats itself are really 
onto something. Horace Mann said:

    You should be ashamed to die unless you have achieved some 
victory for humanity.

    To the House managers, I say your devotion to duty and the 
Constitution has set an example that is a victory for humanity. 
Charles de Gaulle once said that France would not be true to 
herself unless she was engaged in some great enterprise. That 
is true of us all. Do we spend our short lives as consumers, 
space occupiers, clock watchers, as spectators, or in the 
service of some great enterprise?
    I believe, being a Senator, being a Congressman, and 
struggling with all our might for equal justice for all, is a 
great enterprise. It is our great enterprise. And to my House 
managers, your great enterprise was not to speak truth to 
power, but to shout it. Now let us all take our place in 
history on the side of honor and, oh, yes: Let right be done.
    I yield back my time.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                           Order Of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that concludes the 
closing arguments. Therefore, the Senate will reconvene as the 
Court of Impeachment at 1 p.m. on Tuesday to resume 
consideration of the articles of impeachment.

 notice of intent to suspend the rules of the Senate by Senator daschle

    In accordance to Rule V of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate, I (for myself, Mr. Lott, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Harkin, 
Mr. Wellstone, Ms. Collins, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Leahy) hereby 
give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to 
suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials in 
regard to any deliberations by Senators on the articles of 
impeachment during the trial of President William Jefferson 
Clinton:
    (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
    (2) the following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate 
shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its 
decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon 
without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall 
be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be 
entered on the record''; and
    (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except 
when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that 
case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.
                                ------                                


                   adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of 
Impeachment stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and I 
further ask consent that the Senate now resume legislative 
session. I remind all Senators to stand as the Chief Justice 
departs the Chamber.
    There being no objection, at 6:34 p.m. the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Tuesday, February 9, 
1999, at 1 p.m.
                                ------                                


                 NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE RULES

    Mr. DASCHLE. In accordance with rule V, on behalf of myself 
and Senator Feinstein, I hereby give notice in writing that it 
is my intention to move to suspend the following:
    Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar''; and
    Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two 
hours of a new legislative day.''
    This is in order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure 
resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to 
proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the 
calendar of business.

                 NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE RULES

 Mrs. FEINSTEIN. In accordance with rule V, on behalf of myself 
and Senator Daschle, I hereby give notice in writing that it is 
my intention to move to suspend the following:
    Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar''; and
    Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two 
hours of a new legislative day.''
    That is in order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure 
resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to 
proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the 
calendar of business.


                       Tuesday, February 9, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:05 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Almighty God, we renew our trust in You when we realize how 
much You have entrusted to us. We are stunned by the psalmist's 
reminder that You have crowned us with glory and honor and 
given us responsibility over the work of Your hands. We renew 
our dependence on You as we assume this breathtaking call to 
courageous leadership.
    Help the Senators to claim Your promised glory and honor. 
Imbue them with Your own attributes and strengthen their desire 
to do what is right and just. As they humbly cast before You 
any crowns of position or pride, crown them with Your presence 
and power. In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              the journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. This afternoon, the Senate will begin final 
deliberations on the articles of impeachment. However, pursuant 
to S. Res. 30, a Senator may at this time offer a motion to 
suspend the rules to allow the final deliberations to remain 
open. That motion is not amendable and no motions to that 
motion may be offered. Therefore, I expect at least one vote to 
occur shortly. Following that vote, if the motion is defeated, 
I will move to close deliberations. If that motion should be 
adopted, the Senate will begin full deliberations, with each 
Senator allocated 15 minutes to speak. And I note that that 
will be true whether it is in open or closed session, although 
Senator Daschle and I may have some further comments to make 
about that later on.
    I note that if each Senator uses his or her entire debate 
time, the proceedings will take 25 hours, not including breaks 
and recesses. Therefore, I remind all Senators that Lincoln 
gave his Gettysburg Address in less than 3 minutes and 
Kennedy's inaugural address was slightly over 7 minutes. But 
certainly every Senator will have his or her opportunity to 
speak for up to 15 minutes, if that is their desire, and, of 
course, we would also need to communicate with the Chief 
Justice about the time of the proceedings.
    I expect that we will try to go until about 6 or 6:30 this 
afternoon. I want to confer with Senator Daschle, but I think 
maybe we will try to begin earlier tomorrow and go throughout 
the day into the early evening. Again, we do have to take into 
consideration the fact that about 7 or 8 hours will be the 
absolute maximum we will probably be able to do in a single 
day. We will talk further about that and make an announcement 
before we conclude today.
    I now yield the floor to the Senator from Pennsylvania, 
Senator Specter, for the purpose of propounding a unanimous 
consent request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Senator Specter.

                       Unanimous Consent Request

    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of the leader, 
and in my capacity as a copresider for the Senate at the 
deposition of Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, I ask unanimous consent 
that the parties be allowed to take additional discovery, 
including testimony on oral deposition of Mr. Christopher 
Hitchens, Ms. Carol Blue, Mr. R. Scott Armstrong and Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal with regard to possible fraud on the Senate by 
alleged perjury in the deposition testimony of Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal with respect to allegations that he, Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal, was involved with the dissemination beyond the 
White House of information detrimental to the credibility of 
Ms. Monica Lewinsky, and that pursuant to the authority of 
title II of Senate Resolution 30, the Chief Justice of the 
United States, through the Secretary of the Senate, shall issue 
subpoenas for the taking of such testimony at a time and place 
to be determined by the majority leader after consultation with 
the Democratic leader, and, further, that these depositions be 
conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth in title II of 
Senate Resolution 30, except that the last four sentences of 
section 204 shall not apply to these depositions, provided, 
further, however, that the final sentence of section 204 shall 
apply to the deposition of Mr. Sidney Blumenthal.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                      Motion To Suspend The Rules

    Mr. LOTT. On behalf of myself and Senator Daschle, I move 
to suspend the rules on behalf of Senators Hutchison, Harkin, 
and others in order to conduct open deliberations.
    Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent that there be a 40-
minute debate, equally divided, between the leaders or their 
designees in open session on the motion to suspend the rules.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. GREGG. I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    The question is on the motion to suspend the rules. The 
yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the roll.
    The legislative clerk called the roll.
    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 15]

              [Subject: Lott motion to suspend the rules]

                                YEAS--59

Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Gorton
Graham
Hagel
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                                NAYS--41

Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 59, the nays 
are 41. Two-thirds of those Senators voting--a quorum being 
present--not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not 
agreed to.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
    The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to make this reminder: 
Only those people who are properly authorized to be on the 
floor of the Senate should be here. The Sergeant at Arms will 
act accordingly.
    Now, Mr. Chief Justice, there is a desire by a number of 
Senators that it be possible for their statements, even in 
closed session, to be made a part of the Record. Senator 
Daschle and I have talked a great deal about this. We think 
this is an appropriate way to proceed.

    Motion Relating to Record of Proceedings Held in Closed Session

    Mr. LOTT. Therefore, I send this motion to the desk: That 
the record of the proceedings held in closed session for any 
Senator to insert their final deliberations on the articles of 
impeachment shall be published in the Congressional Record at 
the conclusion of the trial.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] for himself and Mr. 
Daschle, moves as follows:
    That the record of the proceedings held in closed session 
for any Senator to insert their final deliberations on the 
Articles of Impeachment shall be published in the Congressional 
Record at the conclusion of the trial.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, so everybody can understand 
this, may I be recognized?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. It is the desire of one and all to have the 
opportunity for this record to be made. After the trial is 
concluded, Senators can have their statements in the closed 
session put into the Congressional Record--in the record of the 
trial. There may be Senators that choose, for whatever reason, 
not to do it in that way at that time. Senator Daschle and I 
have talked a great deal about this. We think this is the fair 
way to make that record. We urge that it be adopted.
    Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chief Justice, point of clarification.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from California, Mrs. 
Feinstein, is recognized.
    Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Leader, can I ask a point of 
clarification? Does this mean that repartee between Members 
will not be recorded, but just the statement as the Member 
submits it?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could respond to that, I 
think that would be up to the Senators. That has been one of my 
points. I hope we won't just have speeches and that, in fact, 
we will have deliberations. As we have found ourselves in 
previous closed sessions, almost uncontrollably we wound up 
discussing and talking with each other. I hope that if we come 
to that, the Senators involved in the exchange would make that 
a part of the record and part of history. I believe they would 
have that right under this proposal.
    Mr. DASCHLE. If the leader will yield for the purpose of 
clarification, I may have misunderstood what the majority 
leader described here. But our intent would be to allow 
statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record, not 
into the hearing record.
    Mr. LOTT. That is correct. I misstated that.
    Mr. DASCHLE. So that people understand, this would actually 
allow you the opportunity to insert your statement into the 
Congressional Record, succeeding the votes on the two articles.
    Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Wellstone, is recognized.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a question for the 
majority leader. I might not have heard this the right way. 
This would allow any Senator, who so wishes, to have his or her 
statements made in all of our--not just the final 
deliberations, but this would cover all of our sessions that 
have been in closed session; is that correct or not?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe this would be 
applicable only to the final deliberations.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could ask the 
majority leader whether he might be willing--it seems to me 
that if this is the principle, I wonder if he would amend his 
request to any Senator who wants to--and it is up to the 
Senator--this is far different than having our final 
deliberations a matter of public record, which is what I think 
we should do, but what you are saying is any Senator who so 
wishes can do so. Might that not apply to all of the closed 
sessions we had? It seems to me that the same principle 
applies.
    Mr. LOTT. That is not what is in this proposal. I would 
like to think about that and discuss it with the Senator from 
Minnesota and others. I remember making a passionate speech, 
but I had no prepared notes; and so I could not put it into the 
Record if I wanted to when we were in one of those closed 
sessions.
    I honestly had not considered that. This was aimed at the 
closing deliberations. I think we need to give some thought to 
reaching back now to the other closed sessions before we move 
in that direction.
    Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Idaho, Mr. Craig, is 
recognized.
    Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, will the majority leader 
yield for a question?
    Mr. LOTT. I would be glad to yield, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. CRAIG. Is my understanding correct that your motion 
would keep this session of deliberations closed, except for 
those Senators who would choose to have their statements become 
a part of the Congressional Record, and that it would be the 
choice of the individual Senators, and that the deliberations 
of the closed session would remain closed unless otherwise 
specified by each individual Senator, specific to their 
statements; is that a fair understanding?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, that is an accurate 
understanding, and that is with the presumption that we will go 
into closed session. And such a motion will be made in short 
order.
    I want to also clarify that this is made on behalf of 
Senator Daschle and myself. We have consulted a great deal on 
this and we have both been thinking about doing something like 
this, but we never put it on paper until a moment ago.
    Mr. CRAIG. I thank the leader.
    Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Georgia, Mr. Coverdell, 
is recognized.
    Mr. COVERDELL. I want to make an inquiry to the leader in 
response to the question by the Senator from California, who 
alluded to actual deliberations and statements among Senators. 
I assume that in order to go into the Congressional Record, it 
would require all of the participants of the colloquy----
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me that this 
is all out of order.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I may, in a moment I will 
make a motion to close the doors for deliberations. However, we 
have to dispose of this.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion----
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent to 
ask the majority leader one follow-up question on his motion.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to make sure I fully 
understand the distinguished majority leader. Our vote on what 
we do on the record does not include a vote on closing the 
session itself, it simply assumes that vote carries?
    Mr. LOTT. That is correct. That is my understanding.
    Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Iowa, Mr. Harkin.
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, again, I ask unanimous 
consent that I be able to ask the majority leader a question 
regarding the ethics.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mr. HARKIN. I have a question regarding the ethics rules. 
Under this proposed motion, could a Senator give his or her 
statement in public and then give the same statement in closed 
session and still not violate the ethics rules? I am concerned 
about how we might want to follow that.
    I yield to the head of the Ethics Committee for 
clarification.
    Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If the motion carries, as has 
been outlined by the majority leader, you have every right to 
release your statement. That would not violate rule 29.5.
    Mr. HARKIN. I could do whatever----
    Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Your statement, yours, not 
anybody else's.
    Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Washington, Mrs. 
Murray, is recognized.
    Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent to 
ask the majority leader a point of clarification.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mrs. MURRAY. If we reference another Senator's remarks in 
our statements, would we have to get that other Senator's 
consent in order to submit our statement, then, for the Record?
    Mr. LOTT. I am not chairman of the Ethics Committee, but I 
am assured by those on the committee that you would have to do 
so. Are we ready to move forward?
    Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Kerry, is recognized,
    Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
I be permitted to ask a point of clarification.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mr. KERRY. I ask the majority leader this: He mentioned 
that he hoped during the deliberations that there would be more 
than just speeches, that there would be a process of colloquy. 
I was wondering if he was contemplating how that would work 
because I think under the rules we are limited to one 
intervention of a specific time period. Does the majority 
leader contemplate approaching that difficulty?
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have discussed this with the 
Democratic leader, and there is no ironclad rule. You know, in 
our other closed session when we sort of got on a roll, we 
yielded additional time to each other, and then at some point 
we started to have a round robin. The Chief Justice probably 
thought it was all completely out of order, but he allowed us 
to go forward. I think we will have to deal with that when we 
get there. I think, as has been the case all the way along, we 
will be understanding of each other and try to make these 
deliberations genuine deliberations. I think it would benefit 
us all in the final result.
    Before I make a motion to close the doors, I yield to the 
Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, for a parliamentary 
inquiry.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. We have a motion, do we not?
    Mr. LOTT. I beg your pardon.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. However amorphous it may be.
    [Laughter.]
    The question is on agreeing to the motion.
    The motion was agreed to.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, for that amorphous 
ruling.
    [Laughter.]
    I yield to the Senator from Texas for a parliamentary 
inquiry.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Texas, Mrs. Hutchison.
    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Chief Justice, rule XX says that while 
the Senate is in session the doors shall remain open unless the 
Senate directs that the doors be closed.
    My inquiry is this: If the Senate, by a majority, voted not 
to direct the doors to be closed, would it be in order to 
proceed to deliberations with the doors open?
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair is of the view that it would 
not be in order for this reason: On the initial reading of 
rules XX and XXIV of the Senate impeachment rules, it would not 
appear to mandate that the deliberations and debate occur in 
closed session, but only to permit it. But it is clear from a 
review of the history of the rules that the committee that was 
established in 1868 to create the rules specifically intended 
to require closed sessions for debate and deliberation. Senator 
Howard reported the rules for the committee and clearly stated 
this intention, and Chief Justice Chase, in the Andrew Johnson 
trial, stated in response to an inquiry, ``There can be no 
deliberation unless the doors are closed. There can be no 
debate under the rules unless the doors be closed.''
    I understand from the Parliamentarian that it has been the 
consistent practice of the Senate for the last 130 years in 
impeachment trials to require deliberations and debate by the 
Senate to be held in closed session. Therefore--though there 
may be some ambiguity between the two rules--my ruling is based 
partly on deference to the Senate's longstanding practice.
    In the opinion of the Chair, there can be no deliberation 
on any question before the Senate in open session unless the 
Senate suspends its rules, or consent is granted.
    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you.

            Motion to Close the Doors for Final Deliberation

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, with that record now having 
been made, I now move that the doors for final deliberations be 
closed, and I ask unanimous consent that the yeas and nays be 
vitiated.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota is 
recognized.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, the majority leader is 
trying to get the floor, but I wonder whether I could not move 
that any Senator be allowed, if he or she makes it their 
choice, to have our statements that have been made and passed 
in closed session left entirely up to us to also be a part of 
the Congressional Record.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could respond, give us an 
opportunity to discuss this with you. We will have another 
opportunity to do that. I think maybe we can work something 
out. I would like to make sure we have thought it through, if 
that is appropriate, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
    The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the 
roll.
    The bill clerk called the roll.
    The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 47, as follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 16]

                  [Subject: Motion to close the doors]

                                YEAS--53

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Cochran
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                                NAYS--47

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The motion was agreed to.

                             Closed Session

    [At 1:52 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The 
proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until 
6:27 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                              Open Session

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate resume open session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                ------                                


                   adjournment until 10 a.m. tomorrow

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate stand adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow. I further 
ask unanimous consent that immediately following the prayer on 
Wednesday, the Senate resume closed session for further 
deliberations of the pending articles of impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? There being no 
objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. All Senators please remain standing at your desk.
    Thereupon, at 6:27 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned until Wednesday, February 10, 1999, at 
10 a.m.
                                ------                                


 MOTIONS TO OPEN TO THE PUBLIC THE FINAL DELIBERATIONS ON THE ARTICLES 
                             OF IMPEACHMENT

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, in relation to the earlier 
vote, I have these thoughts. Accustomed as we and the American 
people are to having our proceedings in the Senate open to the 
public and subject to press coverage, the most striking 
prescription in the ``Rules of Procedure and Practice in the 
Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials'' has been the closed 
deliberations required on any question, motion and now on the 
final vote on the articles of impeachment.
    The requirement of closed deliberation more than any other 
rule reflects the age in which the rules were originally 
adopted in 1868. Even in 1868, however, not everyone favored 
secrecy. During the trial of President Johnson, the senior 
Senator from Vermont, George F. Edmunds, moved to have the 
closed deliberations on the articles transcribed and officially 
reported ``in order that the world might know, without 
diminution or exaggeration, the reasons and views upon which we 
proceed to our judgment.'' (Cong. Globe Supp'l, Impeachment 
Trial of President Andrew Johnson, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 
4, p. 424.) The motion was tabled.
    In the 130 years that have passed since that time, the 
Senate has seen the advent of television in the Senate Chamber, 
instant communication and rapid news cycles, distribution of 
Senate documents over the Internet, the addition of 46 Senators 
representing 23 additional States, and the direct election of 
Senators by the people in our States.
    Opening deliberations would help further the dual purposes 
of our rules to promote fairness and political accountability 
in the impeachment process. I supported the motion by Senators 
Harkin, Wellstone, and others to suspend this rule requiring 
closed deliberations and to open our deliberations on Senator 
Byrd's motion to dismiss and at other points earlier in this 
trial. We were unsuccessful. Now that we are approaching our 
final deliberations on the articles of impeachment, themselves, 
I hope that this secrecy rule will be suspended so that the 
Senate's deliberations are open and the American people can see 
them. In a matter of this historic importance, the American 
people should be able to witness their Senators' deliberations.
    Some have indicated objection to opening our final 
deliberations because petit juries in courts of law conduct 
their deliberations in secret. Analogies to juries in courts of 
law are misplaced. I was privileged to serve as a prosecutor 
for 8 years before I was elected to the Senate. As a 
prosecutor, I represented the people of Vermont in court and 
before juries on numerous occasions. I fully appreciate the 
traditions and importance of allowing jurors to deliberate and 
make their decisions privately, without intrusion or pressure 
from the parties, the judge or the public. The sanctity of the 
jury deliberation room ensures the integrity and fairness of 
our judicial system.
    The Senate sitting as an impeachment court is unlike any 
jury in any civil or criminal case. A jury in a court of law is 
chosen specifically because the jurors have no connection or 
relation to the parties or their lawyers and no familiarity 
with the allegations. Keeping the deliberations of regular 
juries secret ensures that as they reach their final decision, 
they are free from outside influences or pressure.
    As the Chief Justice made clear on the third day of the 
impeachment trial, the Senate is more than a jury; it is a 
court. Courts are called upon to explain the reasons for 
decisions.
    Furthermore, to the extent the Senate is called upon to 
evaluate the evidence as a jury, we stand in different shoes 
than any juror in a court of law. We all know many of the 
people who have been witnesses in this matter; we all know the 
Republican managers--indeed, one Senator is a brother of one of 
the managers; and we were familiar with the underlying 
allegations in this case before the Republican managers ever 
began their presentation.
    Because we are a different sort of jury, we shoulder a 
heavier burden in explaining the reasons for the decisions we 
make here. I appreciate why Senators would want to have certain 
of our deliberations in closed session: to avoid embarrassment 
to and protect the privacy of persons who may be discussed. 
Yet, on the critical decisions we are now being called upon to 
make our votes on the articles themselves, allowing our 
deliberations to be open to the public helps assure the 
American people that the decisions we make are for the right 
reasons.
    In 1974, when the Senate was preparing itself for the 
anticipated impeachment trial of former President Richard 
Nixon, the Committee on Rules and Administration discussed the 
issue of allowing television coverage of the Senate trial. Such 
coverage did not become routine in the Senate until later in 
1986. In urging such coverage of the possible impeachment trial 
of President Nixon, Senator Metcalf (D-MT), explained:

    Given the fact that the party not in control of the White 
House is the majority party in the Senate, the need for 
broadcast media access is even more compelling. Charges of a 
`kangaroo court,' or a `lynch mob proceeding' must not be given 
an opportunity to gain any credence whatsoever. Americans must 
be able to see for themselves what is occurring. An impeachment 
trial must not be perceived by the public as a mysterious 
process, filtered through the perceptions of third parties. The 
procedure whereby the individual elected to the most powerful 
office in the world can be lawfully removed must command the 
highest possible level of acceptance from the electorate.'' 
(Hrg. August 5 and 6, 1974, p. 37).

    Opening deliberation will ensure complete and accurate 
public understanding of the proceedings and the reasons for the 
decisions we make here. Opening our deliberations on our votes 
on the articles would tell the American people why each of us 
voted the way we did.
    The last time this issue was actually taken up and voted on 
by the Senate was more than a century ago in 1876, during the 
impeachment trial of Secretary of War William Belknap. Without 
debate or deliberation, the Senate refused then to open the 
deliberations of the Senate to the public. That was before 
Senators were elected directly by the people of their State, 
that was before the Freedom of Information Act confirmed the 
right of the people to see how government decisions are made. 
Keeping closed our deliberations is wholly inconsistent with 
the progress we have made over the last century to make our 
Government more accountable to the people.
    Constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt noted in his 
important book, ``The Federal Impeachment Process,'' that ``the 
Senate is ideally suited for balancing the tasks of making 
policy and finding facts (as required in impeachment trials) 
with political accountability.'' Public access to the reasons 
each Senator gives for his vote on the articles is vital for 
the political accountability that is the hallmark of our role.
    I likewise urge the Senate to adjust these 130-year-old 
rules to allow the Senate's votes on the articles of 
impeachment to be recorded for history by news photographers. 
This is a momentous official and public event in the annals of 
the Senate and in the history of the Nation. This is a moment 
of history that should be documented for both its contemporary 
and its lasting significance.
    Open deliberation ensures complete accountability to the 
American people. Charles Black wrote that Presidential 
impeachment ``unseats the person the people have deliberately 
chosen for the office.'' (``Impeachment: A Handbook,'' p. 17.) 
The American people must be able to judge if their elected 
representatives have chosen for or against conviction for 
reasons they understand, even if they disagree. To bar the 
American people from observing the deliberations that result in 
these important decisions is unfair and undemocratic.
    The Senate should have suspended the rules so that our 
deliberations on the final question of whether to convict the 
President of these articles of impeachment were held in open 
session.
    I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Application of 
Cable News Network, submitted by Floyd Abrams and others, be 
printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

          IN THE U.S. SENATE SITTING AS A COURT OF IMPEACHMENT

                                 ______
                                 

                                 In re

   Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
                                 States

                                 ______
                                 
application of cable news network for a determination that the closure 
of these proceedings violates the first amendment to the united states 
                              constitution
                                 ______
                                 
To: The Honorable William H. Rehnquist and The Honorable Members of the 
        U.S. Senate
    Cable News Network (``CNN'') respectfully submits this application 
for a determination that the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution requires that the public be permitted to attend and view 
the debates, deliberations and proceedings of the United States Senate 
as to the issue of whether President William Jefferson Clinton shall be 
convicted and as to other related matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Footnotes at end of document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              introduction
    Under Rules VII, XX and XXIV of the ``Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate When Sitting On Impeachment Trials,'' the Senate 
has determined to sit in closed session during its consideration of 
various issues that have arisen during these impeachment proceedings. 
Motions to suspend the rules have failed and the debates among members 
of the Senate as to a number of significant matters have been closed. 
As the final debates and deliberations approach at which each member of 
the Senate will voice his or her views on the issue of whether 
President Clinton should be convicted or acquitted of the charges made, 
the need for the closest, most intense public scrutiny of the 
proceedings in this body increases. By this application, CNN seeks 
access for the public to observe those debates, as well as other 
proceedings that bear upon the resolution of the impeachment trial. The 
basis of this application is the First Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.
    We make this application mindful that deliberations upon 
impeachment were conducted behind ``closed doors'' at the last 
impeachment trial of a President, in 1868. We are, as well, mindful of 
the power of the Senate--consistent with the power conferred upon it in 
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution--to exercise full control over 
the conduct of impeachment proceedings held before it. In so doing, 
however, the Senate must itself be mindful of its unavoidable 
responsibility to adopt rules and procedures consistent with the 
entirety of the Constitution as it is now understood and as the Supreme 
Court has interpreted it.
    The commands of the First Amendment, we urge, are at war with 
closed-door impeachment deliberations. If there is one principle at the 
core of the First Amendment it is that, as Madison wrote, ``the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the 
Government over the people.'' 4 Annals of Congress, p. 934 (1794). That 
proposition in turn is rooted in the expectation that citizens--the 
people--will have the information that enables them to judge government 
and those in government. The right and ability of citizens to obtain 
the information necessary for self-government is indeed at the heart of 
the Republic itself: ``a people who mean to be their own Governors,'' 
Madison also wrote, ``must arm themselves with the power which 
knowledge gives.'' James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry, in 9 Writings 
of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910). As Chief Justice Warren 
Burger observed, writing for the Supreme Court in 1980 in one of its 
many recent rulings vindicating the principle of open government: 
``People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their 
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are 
prohibited from observing.'' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555, 572 (1980). Those very words could well have been written 
about the proceedings before the Senate today.
    All agree that the impeachment of a President presents the most 
solemn question of self-government that a free society can ever 
confront. All should also agree that the public ought to have the most 
complete information about each decision made by the body responsible 
for ruling upon that impeachment. Should the Senate vote to convict, a 
President duly elected twice by the public will be removed from office. 
Does not a self-governing public have the most powerful interest in 
being informed about every aspect of that decision and why it was 
taken? Should the Senate vote to acquit, the President will not be 
removed in the face of impeachment proceedings in which the majority in 
the House branded him a criminal. Can it seriously be doubted that the 
public possesses just as profound a right to know why?
    Only recently--and only during this century (and well after the 
trial of Andrew Johnson)--has our commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be open become not merely a nationally 
shared philosophy but an element embedded in constitutional law as 
well. But deeply-rooted in the law it has become. It is thus no answer 
to observe that impeachment deliberations in the Senate were closed in 
the nineteenth century. The Senate has a duty to consider the 
transformation of First Amendment principles since that time in 
determining whether it is now constitutionally permissible to close 
impeachment deliberations on the eve of the twenty-first century. If, 
as is also true, the Senate, rather than the Supreme Court, was chosen 
to try impeachments precisely because its members are ``the 
representatives of the nation,'' Federalist No. 65, and as such possess 
a greater ``degree of credit and authority'' than the Supreme Court to 
carry out the task of determining the fate of a President,\1\ that 
``credit and authority'' can only be brought to bear if the process by 
which judgment is reached is open to the public.
   the obligation of congress to account for and abide by the first 
                               amendment
    As we have said, we are mindful of the language of Article I, 
Section 3, according the Senate the ``sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.'' See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) 
(according the Senate broad discretion to choose impeachment 
procedures). But this very delegation of authority to the Senate, a 
delegation that makes most issues concerning impeachment rules ``non-
justiciable'', see Nixon, supra, also imposes on this body a very 
special responsibility to ensure that those rules comply with 
constitutional mandates.\2\ Congress itself--the very entity against 
which the First Amendment affords the most explicit protection \3\--is 
bound to abide by the First Amendment. The Constitution is ``the 
supreme Law of the Land,'' U.S. Const., art. VI, para. 2, and all 
``Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support'' it. Id. para. 3. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized that Congress is itself obligated to interpret 
the Constitution in exercising its authority. See, e.g., Rostker v. 
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (``Congress is a coequal branch of 
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States.''). And in promulgating its rules 
the Congress must, of course, abide by the Constitution: ``The 
constitution empowers each house to determine its rules and 
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints 
or violate fundamental rights. . . .'' United States v. Ballin, 144 
U.S. 1, 5 (1892), quoted in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. 
Periodical Correspondents' Assoc., 515 F.2d 1341, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); see Watkins v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
                   the command of the first amendment
    The architecture of free speech law--and, in particular, that law 
placed in the context of access to information as to how and why 
government power is being exercised--could not more strongly favor the 
broadest dissemination of information about, and comment on, 
government. The foundation of the First Amendment is, in fact, our 
republican form of government itself. As the Supreme Court recognized 
in the landmark free speech decision, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964): ``. . . the Constitution created a form of 
government under which `[t]he people, not the government possess the 
absolute sovereignty.' The structure of the government dispersed power 
in reflection of the people's distrust of concentrated power, and of 
power itself at all levels. This form of government was `altogether 
different' from the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign 
and the people were subjects.'' Id. at 274 (quoting Reporting of the 
General Assembly of Virginia, 4 Elliot's Debates). In Sullivan, a 
unanimous Court determined that the ``altogether different'' form of 
government ratified by the Founders necessitated an altogether 
``different degree of freedom'' as to political debate than had existed 
in England. Id. at 275 (citation omitted). It was in the First 
Amendment that this unique freedom was enshrined and protected.
    For the Court, the ``central meaning of the First Amendment,'' 376 
U.S. at 273, was the ``right of free public discussion of the 
stewardship of public officials. . . .'' Id. at 275. Thus, the First 
Amendment ``was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.'' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484. ``The maintenance 
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that 
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes 
may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the 
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.'' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369. 
Id. at 269.\4\
    The decision in Sullivan related specifically to libel law. But 
what made Sullivan so transformative--what made it, as the eminent 
First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn remarked, cause for 
``dancing in the streets'' \5\--was this: it recognized (in Madison's 
words) that ``[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute 
sovereignty.'' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274. It emphasized that the First 
Amendment protected the ``citizen-critic'' of government. Id. at 282. 
It barred government itself from seeking damages from insults directed 
at it by its citizens. And it declared that ``public discussion is a 
political duty.'' Id. at 270.
    In the decades following Sullivan, these notions became embedded in 
the First Amendment--and thus the rule of law--through dozens of 
rulings of the Supreme Court. In particular, and following from, the 
First Amendment protection of public discussion is the right of the 
public to receive information about government. The First Amendment is 
not merely a bar on the affirmative suppression of speech; as Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has observed, ``censorship . . . as often as not is 
exercised not merely by forbidding the printing of information in the 
possession of a correspondent, but in denying him access to places 
where he might obtain such information.'' William H. Rehnquist, ``The 
First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law,'' 12 Gonz. L. Rev. 
1, 17 (1976).
    And, indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's insight. ``[T]he First Amendment goes beyond 
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to 
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.'' First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Accord Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (``In a variety of contexts this Court has 
referred to a First Amendment right to `receive information and ideas.' 
'').
    The Supreme Court has thus ruled on four occasions that the First 
Amendment creates a right for the public to attend and observe criminal 
trials and related judicial proceedings, absent the most extraordinary 
of circumstances. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 
(1980); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). The cases are 
particularly relevant to this application because they--perhaps more 
clearly than any others--illustrate the core constitutional principle 
that government may not arbitrarily foreclose the opportunity for 
citizens to obtain information central to the decisions they make--and 
the judgments they render--about government itself.
    The teaching of this quartet of cases was aptly articulated by 
another Chief Justice, Warren Burger, writing for the Court in Richmond 
Newspapers, the first of the four decisions. The First Amendment, he 
wrote, ``assur[es] freedom of communication on matters relating to the 
functioning of government.'' 448 U.S. at 575. Noting the centrality of 
the openness in which trials were conducted to that end, id. at 575, 
the Court stated that openness was an ``indispensable attribute of an 
Anglo-American trial.'' Id. at 569. It had assured that proceedings 
were conducted fairly, and it had ``discouraged perjury, the misconduct 
of participants, and decisions based on secret bias''. Id. Most 
significantly, open trials had provided public acceptance of and 
support for the entire judicial process. It was with respect to this 
benefit of openness--the legitimacy it provides to the actions of 
government itself--that Chief Justice Burger (in the passage quoted 
above), observed that ``[p]eople in an open society do not demand 
infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to 
accept what they are prohibited from observing.'' Id. at 562.\6\
    To be sure, the Chief Justice in Richmond Newspapers rested heavily 
on the tradition of openness of criminal trials themselves--a 
difference of potential relevance because impeachment debates and 
deliberation have historically been conducted in secret. But, taken 
together, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny stand for propositions 
far broader than the constitutional value of any specific historical 
practice. The sheer range of proceedings endorsed as open by the 
Supreme Court suggests the importance under the First Amendment of 
public observation of the act of doing justice. Moreover, Supreme Court 
precedent itself suggests that the crucial right to see justice done 
prevails even where the specific kind of proceeding at issue had a 
history of being closed to the public. In Globe Newspaper Co.,  the 
Court ruled that the First Amendment barred government from closing of 
trials of sexual offenses involving minor victims. It did so despite 
the ``long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving 
sexual assaults, particularly those against minors.'' 457 U.S. at 614 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
    New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Richmond Newspapers have 
significance which sweep far beyond their holdings that debate about 
public figures must be open and robust and that trials must be 
accessible to the public. Both cases--and all the later cases they have 
spawned--are about the centrality of openness to the process of self-
governance. ``[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a 
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal 
trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact-
finding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as 
a whole. . . . And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal 
trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon 
the judicial process--an essential component in our structure of self 
government.'' Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.
    The First Amendment principles set forth above lead inexorably to a 
straightforward conclusion: the Senate should determine as a matter of 
First Amendment law that the public may attend and observe its debates 
and deliberations about the impeachment of President Clinton. No issue 
relates more to self-government. No determinations will have more 
impact on the public. No judgment of the Senate should be subject to 
more--and more informed--public scrutiny.
    We are well aware that it is sometimes easier to be subjected to 
less public scrutiny and that some have the perception (which has 
sometimes proved accurate) that more can be accomplished more quickly 
in secret than in public. But this is, at its core, an argument against 
democracy itself, against the notion that it is the public itself which 
should sit in judgment on the performance of this body. It is nothing 
less than a rejection of the First Amendment itself. What Justice 
Brennan said two decades ago in the context of judicial proceedings is 
just as applicable here: ``Secrecy of judicial action can only breed 
ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the 
competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting, 
criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the 
rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire 
criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system 
by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public 
accountability.'' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 
(1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
    That it is the tradition of this body to conduct impeachment 
deliberations in closed session is not irrelevant. But neither should 
it be governing. The Senate has, after all, conducted only one 
presidential impeachment trial before this one. Our society in 1868--
and, more significantly still, our law in 1868--was far different than 
it is today. As we have demonstrated, First Amendment jurisprudence as 
we know it--as it governs us and binds the Senate--is essentially a 
creature of the twentieth century. That jurisprudence assures public 
scrutiny, not public ignorance.
    There are, to be sure, certain limited instances when closure of 
Senate deliberations may serve useful purposes, such as when they 
involve disclosure of matters of national security. But no such 
concerns are present here. And however proper it may be to analogize 
the Senate in some ways to a jury, none of the considerations that 
permits juries to deliberate out of the public eye are present here. 
The identities of the ``jurors'' here are well known, as, under the 
Senate rules, will be how each one voted. The Constitution does not 
offer protection to the ``jurors'' here from the force of public 
opinion for their votes for or against the conviction of President 
Clinton. They will face the full weight of public approval or rejection 
the next time they seek re-election. The Constitution does require that 
the reasons they give for their votes and other statements made in the 
course of debate be made in public so that both the debate and the 
votes themselves can be assessed by the people--the ultimate 
``Governors'' in this republic.
                               conclusion
    From the time these proceedings commenced in the House of 
Representatives through the submission of this application, members of 
the Congress have repeatedly--and undoubtedly correctly--referred to 
the weighty constitutional obligations imposed upon them by this 
process. This application focuses on yet another constitutional 
obligation of the members of the Senate, an obligation reflected in the 
oath of office itself. It is that of adhering to the First Amendment. 
We urge the Senate to do so by permitting the public to observe its 
deliberations.

Dated: New York, NY, January 29, 1999.

            Respectfully submitted,
                                   David Hokler,
                                           Senior Vice President and 
                                               General Counsel, Cable 
                                               News Network;
                                   Floyd Abrams,
                                   Dean Ringel,
                                   Susan Buckley,
                                   Jonathan Sherman,
                                           Cahill Gordon & Reindel; 
                                               Counsel for Applicant 
                                               Cable News Network.
                               footnotes
    \1\ Federalist No. 65; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 
233-34 (1993).
    \2\ It is precisely because the Senate possesses this power over 
its own rules that this application is made to the Senate rather than 
to any court.
    \3\ ``Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .''
    \4\ See Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 
(1970); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Robert 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. 
L.J. 1, 23 (1971); see generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and 
Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
    \5\ Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on ``The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,'' 1964 Supp. Ct. Rev. 191, 211 n. 125.
    \6\ The right of the public and the press to have access ``to news 
or information concerning the operations and activities of 
government,'' a right predicated in part on the principles set forth in 
cases such as Richmond Newspapers and its progeny, has been recognized 
in a variety of contexts outside the courtroom. Cable News Network, 
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (court enjoins Executive's expulsion of television 
networks from press travel pool covering the President); see also 
Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court requires White 
House to publish standards for denying press accreditation on security 
grounds).
                                 ______
                                 

             IMPEACHMENT TRIAL--FINDINGS OF FACT PROPOSALS

    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, on January 28, I was the 
only Democratic Senator to cross party lines and oppose the 
motion to dismiss. I felt it would be unwise to end this trial 
prior to a more complete presentation of evidence and a final 
vote on the articles of impeachment themselves. Nonetheless, I 
had no doubt that a motion to dismiss was a constitutional way 
to end the trial, if a majority of Senators had supported the 
motion.
    The Senate must keep in mind at every step in this process 
that our actions will be scrutinized not just by our 
constituents today and for the rest of the trial, but also by 
history. If another impeachment trial should occur 130 years 
from now, the record of this trial will serve as an important 
precedent for the Senate as it determines how to proceed. It is 
our responsibility to abide by the Constitution as closely as 
possible throughout the remainder of this trial. My votes on 
House managers' motions on February 4 were based on the same 
concerns about prudence and precedent that motivated my earlier 
votes on the motion to dismiss and calling witnesses.
    With the judgment of history awaiting us, I did have 
serious concerns about the constitutionality of proposals that 
the Senate should adopt so-called findings of fact before the 
Senate votes on the articles of impeachment themselves. It now 
appears that support for such proposals has waned, and the 
Senate will not be called upon to vote on them. Nonetheless, I 
want to explain my opposition to such proposals for the record.
    Findings of fact would allow a simple 51-vote majority of 
the Senate to state the judgment of the Senate on the facts of 
this case and, in effect, to determine the President's 
``guilt'' of the crimes alleged in the articles. But the 
Constitution specifically requires that two-thirds of the 
Senate must convict the President on the articles in order to 
impose any sanction on him. The specific punishment set out by 
the Constitution if the Senate convicts is removal from office, 
and possibly disqualification from holding future office.
    The supermajority requirement makes the impeachment process 
difficult, and the framers intended that it be difficult. They 
were very careful to avoid making conviction and removal of the 
President something that could be accomplished for purely 
partisan purposes. In only 23 out of 105 Congresses and in only 
six Congresses in this century has one party held more than a 
two-thirds majority in the Senate. Never in our history has a 
President faced a Senate controlled by the other party by more 
than a two-thirds majority. The Republican party had nearly 80 
percent of the seats in the Senate that in 1868 tried Andrew 
Johnson. Johnson was at that time also a Republican, although 
he had been a Democrat before being chosen by Abraham Lincoln 
to be his Vice President in 1864. The great difficulty of 
obtaining a conviction in the Senate on charges that are seen 
as motivated by partisan politics has discouraged impeachment 
efforts in the past. Adding findings of fact to the process 
would undercut this salutary effect of the supermajority 
requirement for conviction.
    The Senate must fulfill its constitutional obligation and 
determine whether the President's acts require conviction and 
removal. The critical constitutional tool of impeachment should 
not be available simply to attack or criticize the President. 
Impeachment is unique. It is the sole constitutionally 
sanctioned encroachment on the principle of separation of 
powers, and it must be used sparingly. If findings of fact had 
been adopted in this trial, it would have set a dangerous 
precedent that might have led to more frequent efforts to 
impeach.
    The ability of a simple majority of the Senate to determine 
the President's guilt of the crimes alleged would distort the 
impeachment process and increase the specter of partisanship. 
When the Senate is sitting as a Court of Impeachment, its job 
is simply to acquit or convict. And that is the only judgment 
that the Senate should make during an impeachment trial.
                                ------                                


        MOTIONS PERTAINING TO WITNESS DEPOSITIONS AND TESTIMONY

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, on Thursday, February 4, the 
Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, considered several 
motions pertaining to the depositions and live testimony of 
witnesses Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney 
Blumenthal. I wish to speak briefly on the important issues 
raised by several of these motions.
    First, let me say that I am pleased that the Senate, by a 
bipartisan vote of 30-70, voted not to compel the live 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky. In my view, this was a sound 
decision to support the expeditious conduct of this trial, 
preserve the decorum of the Senate, and respect the privacy of 
this particular witness.
    Unfortunately, the Senate retreated from these same worthy 
aims in deciding to permit the videotaped depositions of Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Blumenthal to be entered into 
evidence and broadcast to the public. I believe that this 
decision was erroneous for three basic reasons:
    First, it needlessly prolonged the trial. Prior to February 
4, Senators had an opportunity to view the depositions of each 
of these witnesses--not once, but repeatedly. Numerous times we 
could have viewed the content of their testimony, the tone of 
their answers, and their demeanor while under oath. By 
requiring that Senators view portions of these depositions 
again on the floor, in whole or in part, the managers' motion 
unnecessarily required the Senate to convene for an entire day. 
We learned nothing by viewing excerpts of the depositions on 
the floor that we had not already had an opportunity to learn 
by viewing those depositions previously, either on videotape 
or, in the case of myself and five other Senators, in person.
    Second, allowing the depositions to be publicly aired on 
the Senate floor exaggerated their importance. Even Manager 
Hyde has acknowledged that these depositions broke no material 
new ground in this case. Allowing their broadcast thus was not 
only an injudicious use of the Senate's time, it also elevated 
the significance of this particular testimony over all other 
sworn testimony taken in this matter--solely by virtue of the 
fact that it was recently videotaped. Broadcasting these 
minuscule and marginal portions of the record--while not 
broadcasting other depositions--does not illuminate the record 
so much as distort it. The distortion is only compounded by 
broadcasting selected portions of those depositions rather than 
the depositions in their entirety. The President's counsel 
obviously had an opportunity to rebut the managers' 
presentation and characterization of those portions. However, 
that rebuttal only underscores the fact that the managers' 
motion to use these videotapes gave the videotapes a prominence 
and gravity that they do not merit.
    Third, under the circumstances, publicly airing portions of 
these depositions constituted a needless invasion of the 
privacy of the witnesses whose testimony was videotaped. Let us 
remember that these individuals are not public figures who have 
willingly surrendered a portion of their privacy as a 
consequence of their freely chosen status. They are private 
citizens, reluctantly drawn into legal proceedings. They have 
attempted to discharge their obligations in those proceedings. 
But that obligation does not extend to the public broadcast of 
their videotaped depositions--particularly given that they have 
testified repeatedly before, and that their videotaped 
testimony contains no new material information. The privacy 
rights of these individuals deserved greater consideration by 
the managers and by the Senate. The managers did not need to 
force the images of these witnesses into the living rooms and 
family rooms of America in order to present their case. The 
Senate did not need to allow that to happen in order to meet 
its constitutional responsibility in this matter.
    For these reasons, I opposed the managers' motion to 
broadcast the deposition videotapes. In my view, the time has 
come to bring this matter to an end. The record is voluminous, 
the arguments have been made. We know enough to decide the 
questions before us. That is why I supported Senator Daschle's 
motion to proceed to final arguments and a vote on each of the 
articles of impeachment. I regret that his motion was not 
adopted, and that instead the Senate decided to needlessly 
prolong this matter without sufficient regard for the privacy 
of the witnesses deposed last week. However, that said, I am 
pleased that, barring any unforseen developments, this trial 
will at last conclude later this week. It is time for the 
Senate to move on to the other important business of the 
country that we were elected to address.
                                ------                                


                      Wednesday, February 10, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 10:06 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Sovereign God, thank You for the good men and women of this 
Senate. Today we ask what should be done when really good 
people disagree. You have shown us so clearly what should and 
should not be done. When the fabric of our human relationships 
is being frayed, it is time to deepen our relationship with 
You. Draw each Senator into healing communion with You that 
will give physical strength and spiritual assurance of Your 
unqualified love for him or her. Then in the inner heart give 
Your peace and direction. Give each Senator the courage to 
speak truth as she or he hears it and knows it. When this trial 
is finished, may none feel the pangs of unspoken convictions.
    Dear God, we also know there is something we dare not do 
when good people disagree. You do not condone the impugning of 
other people's characters because they hold different 
convictions. You do not want us to break our unity or the bond 
of sacred friendship. Bless these good Senators as they press 
forward together with love for You, America, and each other. In 
the unity of Your Spirit and the bond of peace. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The majority leader is recognized.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a few moments, the Senate 
will resume the closed session in order to allow Members to 
continue to deliberate the two articles of impeachment. Members 
are reminded that the motion adopted yesterday allows for a 
Record to be printed on the day of the vote on the articles 
which could contain Senators' final statements if they choose 
to have them printed.
    Also, Senator Daschle was just noting that while Senators 
have been careful not to comment on the discussion in closed 
session, we still should use a lot of discretion in going out 
and talking to the media about the details of what is happening 
here. I don't think there have been any violations, but use a 
lot of discretion. I would prefer we not even talk about which 
Senator spoke or how many spoke. I think we need to be careful 
in doing that.
    I expect the Senate will be in session until approximately 
6. We will confer with the Senators, the leadership, and the 
Chief Justice, and see how the discussions are going, and the 
speeches, how many are being made. Perhaps we would wrap it up 
before that. It would just depend on how much endurance we have 
today.
    We will have a break from 12 until about 1:15, one hour and 
15 minutes for lunch, to allow the Chief Justice some time to 
return to the Supreme Court and then come back.
    I expect the Senate to convene again tomorrow at 10 a.m. in 
order to try to conclude the debate and vote on the articles if 
at all possible by 5 o'clock on Thursday. If we are still 
having speeches, if we can't do it, we would certainly just go 
over until Friday, but I think we need to talk about that goal 
of 5 o'clock on Thursday.
    Mr. REID. Thursday.
    Mr. LOTT. Also, I know some Senators are still on the way 
here from committee meetings. There are only two or three going 
on today, but we didn't give them much notice that we were 
going to begin at 10, but we are notifying everybody now that 
we will come in at 10 tomorrow, so that they will go ahead and 
be able to take action this morning to cancel those hearings 
and be here sharply at 10 o'clock.
    Again, we will alternate today, across the aisle, with the 
speakers going for up to 15 minutes.
    Senator Inhofe is scheduled to be our first speaker today.
    Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
    Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield to Senator Coverdell.
    Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent 
to pose a point of clarification to the majority leader.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
    Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Leader, I am still a little confused 
about this posting of a statement in the Record. Is it possible 
for a Member of the Senate to submit to the closed session 
their statement rather than speaking? I think that might be 
desirable on the part of some.
    Mr. LOTT. I think the answer to that is yes. You can do 
that.
    Mr. COVERDELL. In other words, if I chose, I could submit 
the statement in my sequence to the Record, and subsequently, 
at my choice, decide whether it will be made part of the 
Congressional Record subsequent to the close?
    Mr. LOTT. I believe that is correct.
    Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Leader.
    Mr. REID. Mr. Leader, and I would also say they would all 
appear the same as if they were spoken or not spoken.
    Mr. LOTT. Correct.
    Mr. LEAHY. Will the distinguished majority leader yield?
    Mr. LOTT. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice--and I appreciate the courtesy 
of my good friend from Mississippi--I notice, as he has, that 
there are a lot of empty seats here in the Chamber. I realize 
at one time we thought we were coming in at noon, to have 
committee meetings.
    If these statements are not made in the Record, the only 
time we are going to have a chance to discuss with each other 
what our thoughts are is in this closed session, by being here. 
I also think, in respect to the Chief Justice, we should be 
doing that.
    I am inclined, I say to my friend from Mississippi, to 
suggest the absence of a quorum. I am withholding, just for a 
moment, doing that. But if we are going to be off in committee 
meetings, I don't think that does service to the intent of this 
closed door hearing.
    I hope that both leaders--and I have discussed this with 
the distinguished Democratic leader, too--would urge Members to 
be here. Nothing could be more important than this on our 
agenda today and tomorrow.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I certainly agree with that. 
We are going to have to have a momentary quorum call, just to 
get the doors closed and then officially go forward. We will 
call and make sure all the committee hearings are being shut 
down. Actually, I think Members are coming in steadily, and 
within a moment we are probably going to have almost all the 
Senators here. But we will take just a couple of minutes to 
notify committees to complete their actions and for Senators to 
come on the floor.
    Mr. LEAHY. If I might complete then, Mr. Chief Justice, out 
of respect to my friend from Mississippi, and in courtesy to 
what he said, I will not make that suggestion, knowing that he 
is going to make a similar suggestion anyway.
    Mr. GRAMM. Will the distinguished majority leader yield?
    Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield.
    Mr. GRAMM. Mr. Chief Justice, we are eager to get on with 
the debate. We have a quorum present. The Senator can make a 
point of order that a quorum is not present, but it is obvious 
to the naked eye that a quorum is present.
    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Leader, would you yield?
    Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield.
    Mrs. HUTCHISON. I think it is important, for the record, 
that it be known there are at least 60 to 70 Members in the 
Chamber, ready to proceed.
    Mr. LOTT. My count is we have about 70 Members here. I am 
sure we will have a full complement here momentarily, so we can 
lock the doors and give a few more Senators a little more time 
to get here. Would the Senator from Alaska like to speak?
    Mr. MURKOWSKI. May I ask for clarification relative to 
submitting statements in the Record and having them printed? 
What day would they be printed in the Record, assuming that we 
finish Thursday? The Friday Record?
    Mr. LOTT. The day of the vote, which means it would come 
out, I guess, the next day. So if we vote on Thursday--if we 
vote on Friday, then it would be available, I guess, Saturday 
morning. If we vote Thursday night, it would be available in 
the Record Friday morning.
    Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the leader.
    Mr. LOTT. If the Senators choose.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Would the leader wish we go into closed 
session before the quorum call?
    Mr. LOTT. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, and then suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will now resume closed 
session for final deliberations on the articles of impeachment.

                             Closed Session

    [At 10:16 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The 
proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until 
6:21 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                              Open Session

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent 
that the Senate return to open session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                 Orders for Thursday, February 11, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in 
adjournment until 10 a.m. on Thursday, February 11. I further 
ask that upon reconvening on Thursday and immediately following 
the prayer, the majority leader be recognized to make a brief 
statement with respect to the Senate schedule. I further ask 
unanimous consent that following the majority leader's 
comments, the Senate resume final deliberations in closed 
session on the articles of impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so 
ordered.

                                Program

    Mr. LOTT. We will reconvene tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock. 
We hope to be able to finish tomorrow afternoon, Mr. Chief 
Justice, but we have to make a ot better progress than we did 
today.
                                ------                                


                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. If there is no further business, I ask unanimous 
consent that the Senate adjourn under the previous order.
    There being no objection, at 6:21 p.m., the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, February 
11, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                ------                                


                      Thursday, February 11, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 10:07 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Holy God, Who allows beginnings and brings an end, a time 
for healing, a time to mend, we ask You to pour out Your 
palpable, unifying power on this Senate. Today, may the 
Senators count on You more than they count votes. This is a 
time neither for gloating over victory nor for grimness over 
losing, but rather a period for grief over all that has brought 
us to this day. We are one Nation under You; we repent as a 
Nation; we turn from conditional ethics and seek to return to 
the absolutes of Your Commandments.
    Thank You, Lord, for the clarion convictions expressed 
during this trial by so many Senators of both parties that 
morals do matter and character does count. May this shared, 
common commitment unite them as they lead this Nation. Now, as 
their chaplain, I hold them all before Your grace and mercy; as 
their friend, I intercede for their spiritual strength and 
courage. When the final votes are taken, hold them together in 
the oneness America so desperately needs them to exemplify. 
Help them to model rectitude and reconciliation. By Your power, 
the winner will be neither the Republicans nor the Democrats, 
but the American people. In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order Of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. This morning the Senate will resume final 
deliberations in closed session. Our best guess, at this time, 
leaves approximately 37 Senators still intending to speak. It 
is possible that we could conclude and have the final votes 
this afternoon or late this evening, but I don't think that is 
going to be possible at this time. When we do approach that 
point, I would like to do it in an orderly fashion, that 
Members and those who are interested will be given notice. We 
have some business we would have to conclude, also, after all 
the deliberations have been complete. I will confer throughout 
the day with Senator Daschle to see how it is going, and as 
soon as we can see clearly when we would want to actually move 
to the final vote, we will notify all the Senators.
    We will also take a lunch break sometime today between 12 
and 12:30, and we will have, of course, some breaks throughout 
the day to take some refreshments.
    I yield the floor to allow the Chief Justice to close the 
session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will now go into closed 
session for final deliberations on the articles of impeachment. 
The Sergeant at Arms is directed to clear the galleries and 
close the doors of the Senate Chamber.

                             Closed Session

    [At 10:11 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The 
proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until 
7:00 p.m., at which time the following occurred.]

                              Open Session

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Senate resume open session.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                  ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of 
Impeachment stand in adjournment until 9:30 tomorrow morning, 
and the Senate then immediately proceed to closed session. I 
ask unanimous consent the Senate now resume legislative session 
in order to conduct some housekeeping business.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Thereupon, at 7 p.m. the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned until Friday, February 12, 1999, at 9:30 
a.m.
                                ------                                


AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE CHAMBER OF THE U.S. SENATE

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send a resolution to the desk 
regarding the taking of pictures in the Senate Chamber during 
the impeachment vote and ask unanimous consent the resolution 
be considered agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid 
upon the table.
    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I object. I would like to 
have a voice vote.
    Mrs. BOXER. Just a voice vote.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move that this resolution be 
adopted by the Senate.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The clerk will report.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    A resolution (S. Res. 36) authorizing the taking of 
photographs in the Chamber of the United States Senate.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the 
motion.
    The resolution (S. Res. 36) was agreed to, as follows:

                               S. Res. 36

    Resolved, That paragraph 1 of rule IV of the Rules for the 
Regulation of the Senate Wing of the United States Capitol (prohibiting 
the taking of pictures in the Senate Chamber) be temporarily suspended 
for the sole and specific purpose of permitting photographs to be taken 
on February 11 or 12, 1999, during the roll call vote on the Articles 
of Impeachment in the impeachment trial of the President of the United 
States.
    Sec. 2. The Sergeant at Arms of the Senate is authorized and 
directed to make the necessary arrangements therefor, which 
arrangements shall provide for a minimum of disruption to Senate 
proceedings.
                                 ______
                                 
           appointing a committee to escort the chief justice
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the 
Presiding Officer be authorized to appoint a committee of 
Senators, three upon the recommendation of the majority leader 
and three upon the recommendation of the minority leader, to 
escort the Chief Justice out of the Senate Chamber at the 
conclusion of the Court of Impeachment.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair, on 
behalf of the majority leader, appoints Mr. Thurmond of South 
Carolina, Mr. Roth of Delaware, and Mr. Domenici of New Mexico, 
and, on behalf of the Democratic leader, Mr. Sarbanes of 
Maryland, Mr. Moynihan of New York, and Mrs. Lincoln from 
Arkansas.
                                ------                                

            unanimous consent agreement--censure resolution
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that if 
Senator Feinstein offers her motion to suspend the rules in 
order to attempt to consider a censure resolution, and 
immediately following the reading of the motion by the clerk, 
Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to offer a motion to 
postpone the Feinstein motion indefinitely.
    I further ask that immediately following the reporting of 
the Gramm motion by the clerk, the Senate proceed to a vote on 
the Gramm motion, immediately, all without any intervening 
debate or action.
    I further ask that following the vote, if two-thirds of the 
Senate fail to defeat the motion to postpone, then the motion 
to suspend is withdrawn and that no further motions relative to 
censure be in order prior to this week's adjournment of the 
Senate.
    I finally ask that following that vote there be up to 2 
hours of morning business to be equally divided between the two 
leaders or their designees.
    And before the Chair puts the question on the unanimous 
consent request, I just want to advise my colleagues on both 
sides, this has been cleared on both sides of the aisle, by the 
sponsor, Senator Feinstein, and by Senator Gramm on the other 
side. I believe this is a fair way, all things considered, to 
deal with this matter.
    The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    
    
                       Friday, February 12, 1999


                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 9:36 a.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES


    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                


                                 prayer

    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:

    Gracious God, whose love for this Nation has been displayed 
so magnificently through our history, we praise You that Your 
presence fills this historic Chamber and enters into the minds 
of the Senators gathered here. Each of them is here by Your 
divine appointment. Together they claim Your promise, ``Call 
upon Me in the day of trouble: I will deliver you.''--Ps.50:15. 
We call upon You on this day of trouble in America as this 
impeachment trial comes to a close. You have enabled an honest, 
open debate of alternative solutions. Soon a vote will be 
taken. You have established a spirit of unity in the midst of 
differences. Most important of all, we know that we can trust 
You with the results. You can use what is decided and continue 
to accomplish Your plans for America. We entrust to Your care 
the President and his family. Use whatever is decided today to 
enable a deeper experience of Your grace in his life and 
healing in his family. We commit this day to You and thank You 
for the hope that fills our hearts as we place our complete 
trust in You. You are our Lord and Saviour. Amen.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.

    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to 
keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the 
United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of 
impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                              The Journal

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.

    The majority leader is recognized.

    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Order of Procedure

    Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, later on 
today, the Secretary of the Senate will be putting at each 
Senator's desk something I think you will enjoy reading later. 
It is the prayers of the Chaplain during the impeachment trial. 
Subsequently, we plan to put it in a small pamphlet because 
they truly have been magnificent. We thought you each would 
like to have copies.

    The Senate will resume final deliberations now in the 
closed session. Thank goodness. At this point in the 
proceedings, there are approximately eight Members who still 
wish to speak or submit part of their speech into the Record.

    Following those final speeches, the Senate will resume open 
session and proceed to the votes on the two articles of 
impeachment. I estimate that those votes will begin at 
approximately 11, 11:30. However, the exact time will depend on 
the length of the remaining speeches, and also we will have to 
have a few minutes to open the Chamber and the galleries so 
that our constituents and our families can enter the galleries 
if they would like to.

    Following those votes, all Senators should remain at their 
desks as the Senate proceeds to several housekeeping items 
relating to the adjournment of the Court of Impeachment. So 
again, I emphasize, please, after the votes, don't rush out of 
the Chamber because we have some very important proceedings to 
attend to, and I think you will enjoy them if you will stay and 
participate.

    Under the consent agreement reached last night, following 
those votes, a motion relating to censure may be offered by the 
Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein. If offered, Senator 
Gramm will be recognized to offer a motion relative to the 
Feinstein motion, with a vote to occur on the Gramm motion. 
Therefore, Senators may anticipate an additional vote or votes 
following the votes on the articles.

    I thank the Senators. And I believe we are ready to proceed 
to the closed session.

    Mrs. BOXER. Will the majority leader yield for a question?

    Mr. LOTT. Yes.

    Mrs. BOXER. Will there be intervening debate or no debate 
on any of those votes?

    Mr. LOTT. In the UC that was reached last night, I believe 
we have 2 hours, which will be equally divided, for Senators to 
submit statements at that point or to make speeches if they 
would like. So after the votes, yes.

    Mrs. BOXER. That is the question. Yes.

    Mr. LOTT. I presume we will go on for a couple hours--2 or 
3 o'clock in the afternoon, yes.

 Unanimous Consent Agreement--Printing of Statements in the Record and 
         Printing of Senate Document of Impeachment Proceedings

    Mr. LOTT. I would like to clarify one other matter. 
Senators will recall the motion approved February 9, 1999, 
which permitted each Senator to place in the Congressional 
Record his or her own statements made during final 
deliberations in closed session.

    I ask unanimous consent that public statements made by 
Senators subsequent to the approval of that motion, with 
respect to his or her own statements made during the closed 
session, be deemed to be in compliance with the Senate rules. 
This would permit a Senator to release to the public his or her 
statement made during final deliberations in closed session, 
except that, in doing so, a Senator may not disclose any 
remarks of the other Senators made during deliberations, 
without the prior consent, of course, of that Senator.

    I further ask unanimous consent that Senators have until 
Tuesday, February 23, 1999--that would be the Tuesday after we 
come back--to have printed statements and opinions in the 
Congressional Record, if they choose, explaining their votes.

    Finally, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be 
authorized to include these statements, along with the full 
record of the Senate's proceedings, the filings by the parties, 
and the supplemental materials admitted into evidence by the 
Senate, in a Senate document printed under the supervision of 
the Secretary of the Senate. That will complete the 
documentation of the Senate's handling of these impeachment 
proceedings.

    Mr. REID. Mr. Leader, point of clarification. I had a 
couple of Members ask, does it take an affirmative act of a 
Senator to get their speech placed in the Record or does it 
happen automatically?

    Mr. LOTT. I believe it does take an affirmative act. It is 
not automatic.

    Mr. REID. To whom should that be given?

    Mr. LOTT. It should be given to the clerks at the desk, or 
to Marty on your side, or your secretary of the minority, or 
the secretary of the majority. They will get it into the Record 
at the right place.

    So I believe, once again, we are ready to go to our closed 
session.

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the majority leader yield for a 
question?

    Mr. LOTT. Yes.

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. It does not require each person to ask 
unanimous consent to insert their remarks, just giving it?

    Mr. LOTT. Yes. That has already been cleared.

    I believe we have a unanimous consent request propounded.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

    The Senate will now go into closed session to complete its 
deliberations on the articles of impeachment. The Sergeant at 
Arms is directed to clear the galleries and close the doors of 
the Senate Chamber.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a 
quorum.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.

    The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

                             Closed Session

    [At 9:44 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The 
proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until 
12:04 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                              Open Session

    Mr. LOTT. Will Senators return to their desks? Managers, 
thank you for joining us. Would Senators stand, and the 
gallery, as the Chief Justice enters the Chamber, please.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, the 
Senate has met almost exclusively as a Court of Impeachment 
since January 7, 1999, to consider the articles of impeachment 
against the President of the United States. The Senate meets 
today to conclude this trial by voting on the articles of 
impeachment, thereby, fulfilling its obligation under the 
Constitution. I believe we are ready to proceed to the votes on 
the articles. I yield the floor.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair would inform those in 
attendance in the Senate galleries that under rule XIX of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, demonstrations of approval or 
disapproval are prohibited, and it is the duty of the Chair to 
enforce order on its own initiative.

                               Article I

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will now read the first 
Article of impeachment.

    The legislative clerk read as follows:

                               Article I

  In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:

  On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: 
(1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate 
Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; 
(3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to 
make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his 
corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.

  In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity 
of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed 
his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the 
rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the 
United States.

  Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair reminds the Senate that each 
Senator, when his or her name is called, will stand in his or 
her place and vote ``guilty'' or ``not guilty'' as required by 
rule XXIII of the Senate rules on impeachment.

    The Chair also refers to article I, section 3, clause 6, of 
the Constitution regarding the vote required for conviction on 
impeachment: ``[N]o Person shall be convicted without the 
Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.''

                           Vote On Article I

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the first article of 
impeachment. Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, William 
Jefferson Clinton, guilty or not guilty? A rollcall vote is 
required.

    The clerk will call the roll.

    The legislative clerk called the roll.

    Mr. SPECTER (When his name was called). Not proven, 
therefore, not guilty.

    The result was announced--guilty 45, not guilty 55, as 
follows:


                         [Rollcall Vote No. 17]

[Subject: Article I--Articles of Impeachment Against President William 
                           Jefferson Clinton]

                               GUILTY--45

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Thomas
Thurmond
Voinovich

                             NOT GUILTY--55

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Gorton
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Shelby
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thompson
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this article of impeachment, 45 
Senators having pronounced William Jefferson Clinton, President 
of the United States, guilty as charged, 55 Senators having 
pronounced him not guilty, two-thirds of the Senators present 
not having pronounced him guilty, the Senate adjudges that the 
respondent, William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, is not guilty as charged in the first article of 
impeachment.

                               Article II

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the second article 
of impeachment.

    The legislative clerk read as follows:

                               Article II

  In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, 
and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged 
personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of 
conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the 
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.

  The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme included 
one or more of the following acts:

          (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
        corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
        brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
        proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.

          (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
        corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
        brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading 
        testimony if and when called to testify personally in that 
        proceeding.

          (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
        corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to 
        conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil 
        rights action brought against him.

          (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
        through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson 
        Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
        assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
        brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
        testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the 
        truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to 
        him.

          (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
        rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton 
        corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading 
        statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in 
        order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such 
        false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged 
        by his attorney in a communication to that judge.

          (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
        Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of 
        events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought 
        against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order 
        to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.

          (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William 
        Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to 
        potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order 
        to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The 
        false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson 
        Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, 
        causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
        information.

  In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.

  Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

                           Vote on Article II

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the second article of 
impeachment. Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, William 
Jefferson Clinton, guilty or not guilty?

    The clerk will call the roll.

    The bill clerk called the roll.

    Mr. SPECTER (When his name was called). Not proven, 
therefore, not guilty.

    The result was announced--guilty 50, not guilty 50, as 
follows:

                         [Rollcall Vote No. 18]

[Subject: Article II--Articles of Impeachment against President William 
                           Jefferson Clinton]

                               GUILTY--50

Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Campbell
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                             NOT GUILTY--50

Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Schumer
Snowe
Specter
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
      
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The galleries will be in order.

    On this article of impeachment, 50 Senators having 
pronounced William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, guilty as charged, 50 Senators having pronounced him 
not guilty, two-thirds of the Senators present not having 
pronounced him guilty, the Senate adjudges that the respondent, 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, is 
not guilty as charged in the second article of impeachment.

    The Chair directs judgment to be entered in accordance with 
the judgment of the Senate as follows:

    The Senate, having tried William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, upon two articles of 
impeachment exhibited against him by the House of 
Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present not 
having found him guilty of the charges contained therein: it 
is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the said William 
Jefferson Clinton be, and he is hereby, acquitted of the 
charges in the said articles.

    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

      COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE HOUSE OF 
                            REPRESENTATIVES

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there is an order at the desk.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the order.

    The legislative clerk read as follows:


    Ordered, that the Secretary be directed to communicate to 
the Secretary of State, as provided by Rule XXIII of the Rules 
of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when sitting on 
impeachment trials, and also to the House of Representatives, 
the judgment of the Senate in the case of William Jefferson 
Clinton, and transmit a certified copy of the judgment to each.


    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the order will be 
entered.

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SENATE TRIAL

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair wishes to make a brief 
statement, without objection, I trust.

    [Laughter.]

    More than a month ago, I first came to preside over the 
Senate sitting as the Court of Impeachment. I was a stranger to 
the great majority of you. I underwent the sort of culture 
shock that naturally occurs when one moves from the very 
structured environment of the Supreme Court to what I shall 
call, for want of a better phrase, the more free-form 
environment of the Senate. [Laughter.]

    I leave you now a wiser but not a sadder man. I have been 
impressed by the manner in which the majority leader and the 
minority leader have agreed on procedural rules in spite of the 
differences that separate their two parties on matters of 
substance.

    I have been impressed by the quality of the debate in 
closed session on the entire question of impeachment as 
provided for under the Constitution. Agreed-upon procedures for 
airing substantive divisions must be the hallmark of any great 
deliberative body.

    Our work as a Court of Impeachment is now done. I leave you 
with the hope that our several paths may cross again under 
happier circumstances.

    The majority leader.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, we thank you for your 
comments.

   EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

    Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the resolution.

    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    A resolution (S. Res. 37) to express gratitude for the 
service of the Chief Justice of the United States as Presiding 
Officer during the impeachment trial.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent the 
Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 37 
introduced earlier today by Senator Lott and Senator Daschle.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid 
upon the table, and any statements that Senators wish to make 
on this resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

    The resolution (S. Res. 37) was agreed to.

    The preamble was agreed to.

    The resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

                               S. Res. 37

    Whereas Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the Constitution of the 
United States provides that, when the President of the United States is 
tried on articles of impeachment, the Chief Justice of the United 
States shall preside over the Senate;

    Whereas, pursuant to Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice 
in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, on January 6, 1999, 
the Senate notified William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United 
States, of the time and place fixed for consideration of the articles 
of impeachment against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, and requested him to attend;

    Whereas, in the intervening days since January 7, 1999, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist has presided over the Senate, when sitting on the 
trial of the articles of impeachment, for long hours over many days;

    Whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist, in presiding over the Senate, has 
exhibited extraordinary qualities of fairness, patience, equanimity, 
and wisdom;

    Whereas, by his manner of presiding over the Senate, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has contributed greatly to the Senate's conduct of fair, 
impartial, and dignified proceedings in the trial of the articles of 
impeachment;

    Whereas the Senate and the Nation are indebted to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist for his distinguished and valued service in fulfilling his 
constitutional duty to preside over the Senate in the trial of the 
articles of impeachment: Now, therefore, be it

    Resolved, That the Senate expresses its profound gratitude to 
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, for his 
distinguished service in presiding over the Senate, while sitting on 
the trial of the articles of impeachment against William Jefferson 
Clinton, President of the United States.

    Sec. 2. The Secretary shall notify the Chief Justice of the United 
States of this resolution.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of myself and the 
entire U.S. Senate, we offer you our thanks and the gratitude 
of the American people for your service to the Nation and to 
this institution throughout this Impeachment Court.

    As our Presiding Officer during most of the last 5 weeks, 
you have brought to our proceedings a gentle dignity and an 
unfailing sense of purpose and sometimes a sense of humor.

    The majority leader realized when it was time to take a 
break and not to take a break when the Chief Justice said let's 
go forward.

    By placing duty above personal convenience and many other 
considerations, you have taught a lesson in leadership. Your 
presence in the chair of the President of the Senate, following 
the directives of our Constitution, gave comity to this Chamber 
and assurance to the Nation. I would like to close with our 
traditional Mississippi parting: Y'all come back soon--I hope 
that is not taken the wrong way--but not for an occasion such 
as this one.

    So instead, as you return to your work on the Court in the 
great marble temple of the law right across the lawn from this 
Capitol, we salute you, sir, with renewed appreciation and 
esteem for a good friend and good neighbor.

                 Presentation of the Golden Gavel Award

    Now, Mr. Chief Justice, if the Democratic leader will join 
me, we have a small token of our appreciation. We have a 
tradition in the Senate that after you have presided over the 
Senate for 100 hours, we present you with the Golden Gavel 
Award. I am not sure it quite reached 100 hours, but it is 
close enough.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. It seemed like it.

    [Applause, Senators rising.]

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I wish to add my thanks to 
the Chief Justice for his untiring efforts throughout the 
impeachment trial and to commend him for his dignity, fairness, 
and humor.

    Mr. KYL. I add my expression of appreciation to the Chief 
Justice and the officers of the court who had a role in this 
proceeding--the House managers, the counsel for the White 
House, and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr--for their 
honorable service.

                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the February 5, 1999, affidavit of Mr. Christopher Hitchens; 
the February 7, 1999, affidavit of Ms. Carol Blue; and the 
affidavit of Mr. R. Scott Armstrong be admitted into evidence 
in this proceeding and the full written transcripts of the 
depositions taken pursuant to S. Res. 30 be included in the 
public record of the trial. This matter has been cleared on 
both sides of the aisle.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

            ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE OF THE COURT OF IMPEACHMENT

    Mr. LOTT. Now, Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment on the articles exhibited 
against William Jefferson Clinton, adjourn sine die.

    The motion was agreed to and, at 12:43 p.m., the Senate, 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned sine die.

                                ------                                


                     Escorting of the Chief Justice

    Mr. LOTT. The committee will go to the podium to escort the 
Chief Justice from the Chamber.

    Whereupon, the Committee of Escort: Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Roth, 
Mr. Domenici, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Moynihan, and Mrs. Lincoln, 
escorted the Chief Justice from the Chamber.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Sergeant at Arms will 
escort the House managers out of the Senate Chamber.

    Whereupon, the Sergeant at Arms escorted the House managers 
from the Chamber.

    Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will please come to 
order. The majority leader.

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President--I almost called you Mr. Chief 
Justice; I have to get used to going back to ``Mr. 
President''--before Senator Feinstein is recognized, I must 
take just a moment further to recognize a few individuals, and 
I know Senator Daschle would like to do that. In addition to 
the Chief Justice and his assistants who were here throughout--
--

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe the White House 
attorneys should have the same privilege of being escorted out.

    Mr. LOTT. I think we will ask Senator Nickles to handle 
that. [Laughter.]

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The White House counsel will be 
escorted from the Chamber.

    Whereupon, White House counsel were escorted from the 
Chamber.

                         THANKING SENATE STAFF

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could resume, I thank the 
assistants who came with the Chief Justice from the Supreme 
Court. I thank the Secretary of the Senate, Gary Sisco; the 
Sergeant at Arms, Jim Ziglar; and the Deputy Sergeant at Arms, 
Loretta Symms, who also gave us our instructions--the first 
time in history, I am sure, that a woman called the Senate to 
order.

    I would like to thank the secretary of the majority, 
Elizabeth Letchworth; counsel of the Senate, Tom Griffith, and 
deputy Morgan Frankel, our special impeachment counsel, Mike 
Wallace; my chief of staff, Dave Hoppe--who has just been 
tremendous and worked untold hours--and also all of our 
assistants at the desk--and especially our friend Scott Bates--
for their wonderful work. I want the Record to reflect how much 
we appreciate the dedication and the long hours, the patience, 
and the competence of all these staff members.

    I would like to yield to Senator Daschle for his comments 
in this area.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.

    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I know I speak for all of my 
colleagues on this side of the aisle, sharing the expressions 
of gratitude that Senator Lott has just articulated for all of 
our staff. They have done a remarkable job. He mentioned all 
those who work for all of us. Let me mention a couple of people 
who work for those of us on this side: Bob Bauer, Bill Corr, 
Pete Rouse, Marty Paone, and so many people who were 
particularly responsible for the fact that we were able to 
conduct our work so effectively throughout this very difficult 
challenge.

    So on behalf of the Democratic Caucus, we join with Senator 
Lott in expressing our deep sense of gratitude for the great, 
great job that they have done in these difficult weeks that we 
have now concluded.

    I yield the floor.

    Mr. CHAFEE addressed the Chair.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator 
from Rhode Island.

                     APPRECIATION TO THE LEADERSHIP

    Mr. CHAFEE. I wonder if this isn't an appropriate time to 
express our appreciation to our two leaders for guiding us 
through these very difficult times.

    [Applause, Senators rising.]

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator 
from California.

                         RESOLUTION OF CENSURE

    Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I move to proceed to my 
censure resolution which is at the desk.

    The text of the motion reads as follows:

    I move to suspend the following:

    Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar'', 
and;

    Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two 
hours of a new legislative day''.

    In order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure 
resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to 
proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the 
calendar of business.


    Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

    Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I have to object. This resolution 
is not on the Calendar. Therefore, it is not in order to 
present it to the Senate.

    Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

    Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in light of that objection, 
I move to suspend the rules, the notice of which I printed in 
the Record on Monday, February 8, in order to permit my motion 
to proceed.

    Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

    Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send a motion to the desk, a 
motion to indefinitely postpone the consideration of the 
Feinstein motion.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the motion.

    Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask that reading of the motion 
be dispensed with, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

    Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

    The yeas and nays were ordered.

    The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the 
motion of the Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm. The yeas and nays 
have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

    The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 43, nays 56, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 19 Leg.]

                                YEAS--43

Allard
Ashcroft
Bond
Brownback
Bunning
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
Crapo
DeWine
Enzi
Fitzgerald
Frist
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Inhofe
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McCain
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith Bob
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Voinovich
Warner

                                NAYS--56

Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Bayh
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Chafee
Cleland
Collins
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Edwards
Feingold
Feinstein
Gorton
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lincoln
Lugar
McConnell
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Schumer
Smith Gordon H
Snowe
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--1

  
Domenici
  
      

    The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). On this vote, the yeas 
are 43, the nays are 56. Two-thirds of the Senators not having 
voted in the negative, the motion to suspend is withdrawn and 
the Gramm point of order is sustained. The Feinstein motion to 
proceed falls.

       CENSURE RESOLUTION OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

    Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I just want to point out to 
everyone who is interested that a censure resolution has been 
entered at the desk. It has 38 cosponsors.

    During these trying days, the question has been asked of 
many of us: ``What will we tell our children about this sordid 
period in our Nation's history?''

    Members of the Senate, I had hoped to be able to tell my 
granddaughter and, indeed, the rest of our Nation, that the 
U.S. Senate had come together in bipartisan fellowship to 
approve a censure resolution that would deliver a clear message 
that the behavior of President William Jefferson Clinton has 
been inappropriate, intolerable, and unacceptable.

    Unfortunately, some in this body have forestalled our 
ability to bring such a resolution to the floor of the Senate 
for a vote. This I regret deeply.

    There are moments in history when we are able to rise up 
against the forces driving us apart and come together with a 
united purpose. I believe that the censure resolution provided 
us with just such an opportunity.

    While not a cure-all, the resolution is a way to share with 
our children and the rest of our nation our findings, our 
sentiments, our belief that the actions of the President are a 
violation of the trust of the American people and have brought 
shame and dishonor upon the Presidency and the man.

    But as has been made clear, those of us who truly believe a 
strong censure is the appropriate resolution in this case are 
being prevented from bringing it to the floor of this Senate 
for a vote.

    The main co-sponsor is the Senator from Utah, Mr. Robert 
Bennett. In all, it is co-sponsored by 36 Senators--over one-
third of this Senate.

    The words of the resolution were strong, but they are 
fitting words and I believe a bipartisan majority of the Senate 
would be prepared to vote for this censure resolution if it 
were permitted to come to a vote today.

    Over the past few weeks, I have worked very closely with a 
large number of Senators to develop a bipartisan resolution, 
largely because I felt it so important that anyone who looks at 
this shabby episode of American history understands that while 
one may not vote to convict and remove a President, one can 
have profound dismay and concern about the misconduct that was 
inherent in the articles of impeachment.

    That is why I regret deeply that some have seen fit to 
prevent us from voting on a censure resolution.

    Because that cannot happen today, I have joined with the 
cosponsors of this resolution to formally present it to the 
Senate and record it in the Congressional Record, making clear 
for all time the strong censure of this President and 
condemnation of his actions by at least one-third of the U.S. 
Senate.

    Earlier today, I voted against conviction and removal of 
the President on both articles of impeachment. I did not 
believe the House managers established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this President is guilty of perjury and obstruction 
of justice.

    Although I deplore the circumstances that have brought us 
to this point, I do not believe they present a clear and 
present danger to the functioning of our government, and 
therefore this President, who has been a good President for the 
people of the United States, should not be convicted and 
removed from office.

    However, I feel very strongly and sincerely that the 
acquittal of the President on the articles of impeachment 
should not be the Senate's last word on the President's 
conduct, and that without further action such as a resolution 
of censure, the wrong message about the President's actions and 
the Senate's views thereon will be sent to the country.

    One of the most worthwhile experiences of my Senate career 
has been listening to the remarks of the Senators over the past 
three days on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Each one gave 
substantial deliberation, serious thought and research, and 
tried his or her level best to maintain their oath of 
impartiality.

    It should be clear that this was not an easy time. It 
should be clear that everyone in the Senate at every minute of 
every day wished this were not happening. But we found 
ourselves caught up in a constitutional requirement that gave 
us little choice.

    I hope we come out of this with a deeper understanding of 
the divisions and polarization which all of this has caused, 
and that every effort can be made, not only by our leadership 
but by every Member of the Senate in every issue that comes 
before us to seek out a bipartisanship and to work together to 
solve the problems facing our Nation.

    A good start in this process would have been to have 
allowed a vote on the censure resolution. I hope that when we 
return from the President's Day recess, we will do better.

    I want to clear up once and for all the intent behind our 
censure resolution.

    The resolution does not express legal conclusions in the 
court of impeachment. Rather, it is a legislative measure, 
expressing our conclusions regarding the President's conduct.

    The legal conclusions to be made in this case, if any, will 
be left to a court of law. Our intent is not to bind or 
influence the court one way or another, for good or ill, in 
making any determinations which it may about the President's 
conduct.

    Instead, our purpose is to speak to the moral ramifications 
of the President's conduct and to the message that those 
actions send to the people of our nation, especially its youth.

    While the President's actions do not constitute a 
fundamental threat to the nation, neither were they at all 
acceptable. The President's conduct was both willful and wrong; 
clearly, by any standard, his behavior is indefensible.

    These actions demeaned the Office of the President, 
violated the trust of the American people, and brought shame 
and dishonor upon President Clinton.

    Let me speak for a moment about the process which we have 
gone through in developing the language. I began the process 
when I started to doubt whether the President's conduct rose to 
the level of a high crime or misdemeanor for which he should be 
removed from office.

    Senator Herb Kohl was an early partner in this effort, and 
he and his staff provided valuable input.

    As we developed the language further, I sounded out more of 
my colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, on the issue. I was 
fortunate enough to have Senator Bennett join me as the lead 
Republican co-sponsor. Senator Bennett has been a stalwart 
partner in this effort, and it has been a real pleasure working 
with him.

    Many senators offered input regarding the specific language 
of the resolution, and we have incorporated virtually every 
suggestion made.

    Senators Lincoln, Snowe, Levin, Jeffords, and Schumer, for 
instance, all have left their imprint upon this text, as has 
Senator Moynihan, who was appointed by Senator Daschle to join 
Senator Kohl and myself as a Democratic task force on censure.

    In the process of developing this language and striving for 
a bipartisanship, we have gone through some 25 drafts of the 
resolution. We believe that the text before you today is that 
which can obtain the most support from the most senators, of 
both parties.

    As a result of these efforts, I am very pleased that we 
have been joined by a very significant number of co-sponsors 
from both sides of the aisle. These co-sponsors run the 
ideological gamut from liberal to moderate to conservative. The 
breadth of these co-sponsors, I believe, represents the 
widespread consensus that the President's actions merit serious 
condemnation.

    Let me now discuss the ample historical precedents for this 
censure resolution.

    Censure is an extraordinary measure that Congress has used 
sparingly over the past 200 years.

    Censure is rare because it is such a powerful expression of 
Congressional criticism. In a censure resolution, a House of 
Congress publicly states its collective view that an individual 
has acted beyond the bounds of acceptable professional conduct. 
A censure records for history the major misdoings of public men 
and women.

    Over the past 200 years, the House and Senate have 
initiated censure proceedings against Executive Branch 
officials on at least 13 different occasions.

    Three times a House of Congress has adopted measures that 
could be described as a censure of a President. In 1834, the 
Senate censured President Andrew Jackson. Twice the House has 
adopted statements criticizing presidents--in the cases of John 
Tyler and James Buchanan.

    Censuring President Clinton would be consistent with 
historical use of this rare, but powerful, Congressional power.

    By far the most famous censure case of a sitting President 
involved Andrew Jackson.

    President Jackson feuded with Congress over the 
establishment of a Bank of the United States.

    First, in 1832, he vetoed the rechartering of the Bank of 
the United States on the grounds that it was unconstitutional, 
elitist, and had failed in establishing a sound currency.

    Second, Jackson directed the government to withdraw its 
funds from the Bank. When his Treasury Secretary protested the 
withdrawal, Jackson removed him from his position.

    On March 28, 1834, the Senate voted to censure President 
Jackson by a partisan vote of 26-20.

    The resolution stated:

    Resolved, That the President, in the last executive 
proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon 
himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution 
and laws, but in derogation of both.


    The censure resolution expressed more than idle words. It 
dealt Jackson a painful blow in the arena of public opinion and 
in history.

    Soon after the vote, Jackson wrote to the Senate 
challenging its action. He noted that the Senate resolution was 
``an imputation upon my private as well as public character.''

    This censure was such a powerful condemnation of President 
Jackson's actions that his supporters led the Senate to revisit 
the issue several years later. On January 14, 1837, the Senate 
voted to expunge the censure resolution from the record by a 
vote of 24-19.

    The House of Representatives has adopted two other 
statements that can be construed as censure motions against a 
President.

    In 1841, John Tyler assumed the Presidency upon the death 
of President William Henry Harrison. In contrast to President 
Harrison, whose Whig views coincided with views of the majority 
of Congress, Tyler espoused States rights.

    Tyler aroused the anger of Congress by vetoing Whig-
sponsored bills related to tariffs and the creation of a 
national bank. Exasperated members of the House of 
Representatives finally decided to publicly rebuke the 
President.

    A select committee drafted a report criticizing the 
President for:

    ``Gross abuse of constitutional power and bold assumptions 
of powers never vested in him by any law''; for having 
``assumed the whole Legislative power to himself, and levying 
millions of money upon the people, without any authority of 
law''; and for the ``abusive exercise of the constitutional 
power of the President to arrest the action of Congress upon 
measures vital to the welfare of the people.''


    On August 17, 1842, the House passed this select Committee 
report.

    Along with his Secretary of the Navy, President Buchanan 
was implicated in a financial scandal. There were accusations 
of ``kickbacks'' and the granting of government contracts to 
political supporters.

    On June 13, 1860 the House of Representatives voted 106-61 
in favor of ``censuring'' the Secretary of the Navy and stating 
that President Buchanan's conduct deserved its ``reproof.''

    The resolution stated:


    Resolved, That the President and the Secretary of the Navy, 
by receiving and considering the party relations of bidders for 
contracts and the effect of awarding contracts upon pending 
elections, have set an example dangerous to the public safety, 
and deserving the reproof of this House.

    Other executive officials: At least three secretaries of 
cabinet departments and one ambassador have also been censured.

    These cases include:

    (1) Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey, 1860--On June 13, 
1860, the House of Representatives passed a resolution 
censuring Secretary Toucey in the same ``kickback'' and bribery 
scandal that led to the ``reproof'' of President Buchanan.

    (2) Secretary of War Simon Cameron, 1862--In another 
corruption scandal, the House passed a censure resolution 
against Secretary of War Cameron for embezzlement and for 
entrusting public money to his lieutenant, Alexander Cummings. 
Mr. Cummings allegedly spent $21,000 of government funds on 
personal items like straw hats, linen pantaloons, scotch ale, 
and herring.

    (3) Attorney General, A.H. Garland, 1886--On March 24, 
1886, the Senate passed a resolution of ``condemnation'' of the 
Attorney General for refusing to turn over government papers 
regarding the removal of a District Attorney from Office.

    (4) Ambassador Thomas Bayard, 1896--On March 20, 1896 the 
House of Representatives considered a resolution condemning and 
censuring Ambassador Bayard for diplomatic improprieties. He 
was charged with making partisan remarks to British audiences.

    Congress has also used censure to condemn the conduct of 
its own Members. Nine Senators and 22 Members of the House have 
been censured.

    Indeed, many Members of this body personally know former 
Senators who have been censured. To those who argue that 
censure is ``a wet noodle across the wrist,'' I would 
respectfully request that they ask their colleagues how these 
former Senators felt about being censured. I am confident, 
because I have had some of these conversations myself, that 
they would find that censure was felt deeply and was a very 
significant stain upon their reputations and legacy.

    In sum, censure is a powerful tool used very sparingly by 
Congress to condemn unacceptable conduct. Congress has 
initiated censure proceedings in policy disputes, but it has 
also criticized executive branch officials in the case of 
President Buchanan, Navy Secretary Welles, and President Nixon 
for personal misconduct.

    So to those who argue that passing this censure would 
establish a precedent for the future where Presidents and 
cabinet officials could be censured, I hope this discussion has 
made it clear: that precedent has already been set.

    In this bipartisan censure, we provided the Senate with a 
real opportunity to achieve a strong, unifying, bipartisan 
conclusion to this whole tawdry, exhausting, and divisive 
controversy.

    The House's actions were marred with partisanship. Indeed, 
one example of this was the action of the House leadership to 
prevent a censure resolution from even being considered on the 
House floor.

    The Senate started its proceedings on a high note, when we 
came together to agree unanimously, across party lines, upon 
procedures for the trial. Passing our censure resolution by a 
strong, bipartisan vote would represent an appropriate 
``bookend'' to this bipartisan beginning and would stand this 
Senate well in the annals of history.

    Moreover, it would put the proper historical perspective 
upon the Senate's actions and determinations, which should not 
be read as a vindication of the President.

    I believe that passing this censure on a bipartisan basis 
would bring a real closure to the process, and would help to 
heal the divisions between the parties which were created 
during these proceedings, so that we can move on to work 
together to address the real problems confronting the American 
people, such as saving social security, improving education, 
and continuing the fight to reduce crime.

    It is time that we move on to these other matters of 
significance to our people, to reconcile differences between 
and within the branches of government, and to work together--
across party lines--for the benefit of the American people.

    I ask unanimous consent that a list of cosponsors and the 
text of the resolution be printed in the Record.

    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                               Cosponsors

    Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Kohl, 
Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Mr. Daschle, Ms. 
Snowe, Mr. Reid, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Bryan, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Cleland, Mr. 
Domenici, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Wyden, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. 
Kerry, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Wellstone, 
Mr. Breaux, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Reed, Ms. 
Landrieu, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Levin, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Robb, Mr. 
Inouye, and Mr. Akaka.

                                 ______
                                 

                         Resolution of Censure

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee in 
the White House, which was shameful, reckless and indefensible;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
deliberately misled and deceived the American people, and people in all 
branches of the United States government;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
gave false or misleading testimony and his actions have had the effect 
of impeding discovery of evidence in judicial proceedings;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is 
unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the 
Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates 
disrespect for the laws of the land;

    Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in 
such behavior;

    Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such 
behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences, 
including loss of integrity, trust and respect;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal 
actions in a court of law like any other citizen;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has 
brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the 
President; and

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton through his conduct in this 
matter has violated the trust of the American people: Now therefore, be 
it

    Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and does condemn his 
wrongful conduct in the strongest terms; and now be it

    Further resolved, That the United States Senate recognizes the 
historic gravity of this bipartisan resolution, and trusts and urges 
that future congresses will recognize the importance of allowing this 
bipartisan statement of censure and condemnation to remain intact for 
all time; and be it

    Further resolved, That the Senate now move on to other matters of 
significance to our people, to reconcile differences between and within 
the branches of government, and to work together--across party lines--
for the benefit of the American people.

                                censure

    Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, now that we have come to the end 
of the process required by the Constitution, I believe we have 
arrived at an appropriate time to consider a measure required 
by the President's conduct.

    I rise in support of censure because while I do not find 
that the President's behavior constitutes high crimes and 
misdemeanors requiring removal, I do believe that it compels us 
to record for history our recognition of the damage we all 
acknowledge he has inflicted upon the Office of the Presidency 
and the Nation.

    Acquittal must not be the last word. And while I have felt 
that it would have been more appropriate for the Senate to 
issue findings of fact in the impeachment case against the 
President, I am now prepared to support censure so that there 
is no mixed message for posterity about what the Senate thinks 
of the President's actions.

    As I said yesterday, the President's behavior is 
indefensible, and I for one have no interest in seeing another 
shameless ``Rose Garden Jubilee'' after today's vote by the 
Court of Impeachment. Acquittal is not exoneration. Nothing we 
do here today in any way absolves the President's 
responsibility for the harm he has inflicted--and the President 
must know this.

    Indeed, this has been a sordid chapter in the history of 
the Presidency, and it deserves to be closed with a stern 
warning and a strongly worded rebuke that will leave no doubt 
to future generations that this process was not simply much ado 
about nothing; it was, in fact, about something very 
important--the sanctity of public service.

    That's why I worked with Senators Feinstein and Bennett to 
include language expressing the will of this Senate that this 
resolution not be revoked by a future Congress. I also want to 
thank them for their willingness to include language that makes 
clear the Senate believes the President should be treated as 
any other citizen facing criminal allegations once he leaves 
office in 23 months.

    The fact is, even while this body has acquitted the 
President on articles of impeachment, the framers provided for 
an additional remedy for his conduct in standard criminal 
court. Why? Because they had known a country where some men 
were above the law and some below. They were determined to 
create a Nation where the level of justice served was not 
proportional to a person's pocketbook, social rank, or 
political power.

    I believe acquittal, though the proper outcome, by itself 
could present a skewed picture of the Senate's findings, and 
runs the risk that the President will claim exoneration for his 
actions. Such a claim, evidence of which is already apparent, 
is quite simply and obviously wrong.

    The President may not have committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors, but what he has done--in my mind including 
unlawfully influencing a potential witness--deserves a formal 
rebuke by the Senate. Censure would be an appropriate and 
constitutionally permissible way to do this.

    For a President who from the very beginning promised the 
most ethical administration any of us would ever see, censure 
would be a well-deserved legacy of a promise broken and a 
Presidency sullied. I will vote for this censure motion and I 
urge my colleagues to do likewise.

                           CENSURE RESOLUTION

    Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the debate we will be having 
in the Senate is on whether to suspend the rules of the Senate 
to consider a resolution censuring the President's conduct.

    A motion will be made to indefinitely postpone the motion 
to suspend the rules. These votes will occur before Senators 
have the opportunity to amend the resolution censuring the 
President's conduct.

    I take the floor of the Senate to make clear that I am 
opposed to a censure resolution of President Clinton.

    The Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson 
Clinton is over. The Senate has faithfully discharged its 
constitutional obligation by serving as impartial jurors of the 
articles of impeachment approved by a bipartisan majority of 
the U.S. House of Representatives.

    The Senate has rendered its verdict and has found the 
President not guilty as charged. The consequence of this action 
by the Senate is to keep the President in office where he is to 
fully and faithfully discharge the constitutional duties of his 
office.

    The trial is over. It is time for the Senate to focus on 
the national legislative agenda.

    On this last point, I chose my words carefully. I did not 
say it is time for the Senate to turn to the people's business.

    Some have said we should not have had the trial or should 
have adjourned the trial much earlier so that we could turn to 
the people's business.

    I reject that notion. I firmly believe that conducting the 
trial was doing the people's business.

    But the truth is the trial is over. I do not see any place 
for the pending resolution censuring the President. It is not 
the business of the Senate to punish President Clinton.

    As Senator Byrd has concluded, censure, unlike impeachment, 
is ``extra-constitutional.'' The Constitution empowers the 
Senate to try a President impeached by the House and remove him 
if 67 Senators agree. The Constitution does not empower the 
Senate to punish a President in the absence of 67 votes to 
remove.

    The impeachment trial is over. The Senate should move on 
and leave President Clinton alone.

    The Constitution recognizes that if a President cannot be 
removed through impeachment, he should not be weakened by 
censure. Although the Senate passes sense of the Senate 
resolutions on many subjects, censure is different because the 
Constitution requires a two-thirds vote before the Senate can 
discipline the President and requires removal upon conviction 
for impeachable offenses. Censure is an effort to end-run these 
constitutional requirements.

    One final problem is that any censure resolution will have 
to be weak. Even proponents of censure concede that a censure 
resolution that actually punished the President would be an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder. Any censure that is 
consistent with the bill of attainder clause is too weak to be 
worth doing.

    The highest form of censure the Constitution allows is 
impeachment by the House. The failure to convict the President 
will not erase that action by the House. It is time for the 
Senate to move on.

    If the effort to suspend the rules passes, and the text of 
the censure resolution is before the Senate and is amendable, I 
will seek recognition to offer the following substitute:

    After the word ``Resolved'' strike everything and insert 
the following:

    ``That the United States Senate at the earliest opportunity will 
consider and have final votes on legislation favorably reported by its 
committees that--

    (1) reduces taxes so that Americans no longer pay record high 
levels of federal income taxes;

    (2) prohibits the financial surplus in the Social Security Trust 
Funds from financing additional deficit spending in the operating 
budget of the United States Government;

    (3) increases funds and flexibility for programs that local school 
districts and their parents, teachers and principals believe will 
enhance teaching and learning;

    (4) offers comprehensive responses to juvenile justice needs and 
criminal drug abuse, including increased penalties for adults who use 
minors in the commission of crimes, increased penalties for drug 
trafficking, and greater resources for local law enforcement agencies 
to stop methamphetamine trafficking.

    (5) improves military pay to reduce sharp declines in attracting 
new and keeping well-qualified solders in the all-volunteer Armed 
Forces.''

    This substitute resolution speaks for itself. This 
resolution sets the Senate on the right course for the Senate 
to accomplish the legislative priorities of this nation.

    These priorities include:

    Congress this year should direct the budget surplus to 
where it belongs, and that is to the people whose hard work 
produced the surplus.

    That means Congress should cut taxes. Americans should no 
longer pay record high levels of federal income taxes.

    The average household paid 25 percent of its income in 
taxes--Federal, State, and local--30 percent of every 
additional dollar earned by a four-person median income 
household of $55,000 will go to pay taxes.

    The typical American family spends more money on taxes than 
on food, clothing, and shelter combined. Each year, Americans 
work 4 months and 10 days just to pay their taxes. The tax 
burden is getting worse, not better. For the past 5 years, tax 
payments have grown faster than salaries. Total federal taxes 
in 1997 were the highest since World War II.

    Second, Congress should protect Social Security.

    The best action we can take now to protect the economic 
security of tomorrow's retirees is to protect current surpluses 
from government raiding.

    Using these surpluses to pay down our debt will put our 
country in the best possible financial position to meet our 
future obligations.

    Third, we should improve education by increasing funds and 
flexibility for programs that local school districts and their 
parents, teachers, and principals believe will enhance teaching 
and learning.

    The Department of Education requires over 48.6 million 
hours worth of paperwork to receive federal dollars. This 
bureaucratic maze takes up to 35% of every federal education 
dollar.

    Local school districts could find far better uses of the 
$10-$12 billion Washington spends. With direct funding, local 
schools could deploy resources to areas they deem most crucial 
for their students, such as hiring new teachers, raising 
teacher salaries, buying new textbooks or new computers

    Fourth, Congress must fight crime and drug abuse.

    While in the last few years the violent crime rate has 
declined, it remains at levels that are far too high. In 1960, 
159 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants were reported; in 
1997, 611 were reported. In short, violent crime has quadrupled 
since 1960.

    Drug abuse, especially use of methamphetamines, is also at 
dangerous levels. Public health and law enforcement officials 
believe that meth is more dangerous and addictive than cocaine 
and heroin. Communities are being devastated and the problem is 
growing exponentially. In 1994, DEA agents in Missouri seized 
14 clandestine meth labs. Last year, they seized 421 labs.

    Meth use is dangerous, threatens our children, and causes 
users to commit other crimes. Among 12th graders, the use of 
ice, a smokeable form of meth, has risen 60 percent since 1992. 
Meth-related emergency room incidents are up 63 percent over 
this same period.

    Fifth, Congress should improve military pay to reduce sharp 
declines in attracting new and keeping well-qualified soldiers 
in the all-volunteer Armed Forces.

    1999 marks the 14th straight year of decline in real 
dollars spent on our national defense. The number of active 
duty personnel is down 30% since 1991. Despite these 
reductions, the military is being asked to do more than it did 
during the Cold War.

    In writing these principles, I strived for bipartisan 
agreement. I believe many, if not all, of these principles have 
been articulated as priorities on both sides of the aisle.

    I did not include my own proposals for accomplishing these 
objectives. The details of these principles can and should be 
worked out by the committees of the Senate and then by the full 
Senate.

        PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD FEEL THE DISDAIN OF THE SENATE

    Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, the Senate has been held in the 
grip of the impeachment trial for the past 6 weeks, the House 
has been involved in the impeachment process for the past 6 
months, and the Nation has been divided over the actions and 
fate of the President for more than a year. We were not 
compelled to undertake this nearly unprecedented Constitutional 
remedy by partisanship, as some at the White House have 
suggested. We were driven to this point by Bill Clinton and 
Bill Clinton alone.

    Although I voted to acquit the President on the charges, I 
have no doubt that if I served in the House, I would have voted 
to impeach him.

    Chairman Hyde offered the White House every opportunity to 
defend the President, but the White House chose a different 
course. They chose to belittle the charges against the 
President by suggesting that everyone lies about sex. They 
chose to accuse their accusers by attacking the motives and 
integrity of the Judiciary Committee Republicans and by 
insinuating that Judge Starr is a sex-obsessed prosecutor run 
amok. They did not question the evidence on which the 
impeachment vote was based.

    With that evidence, the House Managers presented a powerful 
case against the President. As a result of their presentations, 
I am convinced that the President acted to circumvent the law. 
The notion that the President of the United States, the number 
one citizen of our nation, the man in whom the trust and 
respect of the country is meant to rest, would deliberately 
maneuver around the laws of the land is reprehensible and 
should be condemned.

    Alexander Hamilton, in ``The Federalist Papers'' No. 65, 
said:

    The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply 
concerns the political reputation and resistance of every man 
engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for 
themselves.


    President Clinton betrayed that delicate trust. The House 
Managers tried to restore it. In the end, the witnesses, all of 
whom were sympathetic to or allies of the President, provided 
direct evidence that failed to corroborate the House Managers' 
case. Removing the President from office in the face of a 
conflict between direct and circumstantial evidence, in my 
view, would be mistaken. On that basis, I voted to acquit the 
President. Nevertheless, the House Managers and all of the 
evidence left me convinced that the President acted in a way 
that is abominable. By voting for the censure resolution 
proposed by Senator Feinstein, the Senate makes clear that it 
does not exonerate the President.

                                CENSURE

    Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, during the impeachment trial, it 
was the duty of the Senate to look at the facts, look at the 
law, look at the Constitution, and make a judgment. We did our 
duty.

    But now we need to go one step further because neither 
acquittal nor conviction is an entirely adequate conclusion to 
this sordid matter. We must speak our contempt and 
disappointment for the low behavior of our highest elected 
official.

    We need to speak for the spirit behind our laws, behind 
this institution, behind the country. We need to say that the 
President's actions and lies were wrong--``shameful, reckless 
and indefensible.'' We need to acknowledge that his conduct, 
unacceptable for any American, is especially so for the 
President of the United States because it ``creates disrespect 
for the laws of the land.''

    I am proud that all 100 Senators worked together through 
this ordeal to do our duty. I am proud that so many of us from 
both sides of the aisle worked together to craft this tough 
censure resolution.

    But I am sorry that a small minority will keep us from also 
doing what is honorable and what is right. We need to 
officially express our collective disdain for the President's 
conduct. It's the only truly appropriate, bipartisan way to 
bring closure to this melancholy moment in American history.

    When Senator Feinstein and I started talking about a 
censure resolution, as early as last December, I had no 
certainty that we would come so far and bring so many along. 
Her perseverance, hard work and legislative craftsmanship 
deserve our praise but our efforts deserve a clean ``up or 
down'' vote.

                         RESOLUTION OF CENSURE

    Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask that a draft of a 
proposed resolution of censure be printed in the Record.

    The material follows:

                         Resolution of Censure

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
engaged in an in appropriate relationship with a subordinate employee 
in the White House, which was shameful, reckless and indefensible;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
deliberately misled and deceived the American people, and people in all 
branches of the United States Government.

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is 
unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the 
Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates 
disrespect for the laws of the land;

    Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in 
such behavior;

    Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such 
behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences, 
including loss of integrity, trust and respect;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal 
actions in a court of law like any other citizen;

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has 
brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the 
President; and

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton through his conduct in this 
matter has violated the trust of the American people: Now therefore, be 
it

    Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and does condemn his 
wrongful conduct in the strongest terms; and now be it further

    Resolved, That the United States Senate recognizes the historic 
gravity of this resolution, and trusts and urges that future congresses 
will recognize the importance of allowing this statement of censure and 
condemnation to remain intact for all time; and be it further

    Resolved, That the Senate now move on to other matters of 
significance to our people, to reconcile differences between and within 
the branches of government, and to work together--across party lines--
for the benefit of the American people.

                A CALL FOR AN END TO THE POLITICAL WARS

    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, today's votes on the articles 
of impeachment mark the end of a long and difficult journey. 
The story of this impeachment process suggests a number of 
lessons on which I expect we will all reflect individually and 
collectively for some time.

    From the beginning of this process, I objected in the 
clearest terms to the President's legal hairsplitting and 
attempts to find a legal excuse, or any excuse, for his 
deplorable personal conduct. In my view, the President violated 
the public trust and brought dishonor to the office he holds. 
For that, he will have to answer to the people of this country 
and to history.

    But it was every Senator's duty to put personal views aside 
and render impartial justice, based on constitutional standards 
and the evidence before the Senate. In my view, the President's 
conduct did not, under our Constitution, warrant his removal 
from office. Others, acting on equally sincere motives, reached 
a different conclusion.

    It is regrettable that something about this process led to 
a situation, particularly in Washington, where sincere voices 
on both sides were too often drowned out by partisan voices--
again, on both sides. But, if we listen to voices outside the 
Nation's capital, the voices of citizens rather than of 
partisans, those voices tell us that something has gone 
terribly wrong in our public discourse.

    Those citizens see the impeachment process not as a solemn 
constitutional event, which it assuredly was, but, rather, as 
another sad episode in the sorry saga of a bitter, partisan, 
and negative political process that runs on the fuel of 
scandal. In this sense, to many Americans, the Starr 
investigation, and the impeachment process it spawned, were all 
too familiar.

    To much of the American public, this whole process was a 
long-running, 50-million-dollar negative ad built on personal 
attacks, the likes of which Americans regret and reject.

    I know this belief is shared by thousands of South Dakotans 
and millions of Americans who hold widely varying views of what 
the outcome of the impeachment proceeding should have been--
conviction or acquittal, removal or continued service by the 
President to the conclusion of his term.

    What are the elements, the component parts, of this 
political process that so many Americans judge to be merely an 
ugly spectacle increasingly unworthy of their participation? 
What is making Americans so cynical that they are voting in 
record-low numbers and tuning out the government meant to serve 
them?

    Surely they must be concerned about the increased use, and 
misuse, of the legal process in our political process. They are 
no longer certain they can distinguish the proper application 
of the law to address real wrongdoing properly before the 
courts from the hijacking of the law to bludgeon political 
opponents and extend the battlefield of political attack.

    In just 10 years, we have seen the public careers of three 
House Speakers, representing both political parties, destroyed 
by scandal. As the process has escalated, independent counsel 
have pursued members of Presidents' cabinets--of both parties 
and then the President of the United States himself.

    We have watched what we all acknowledge as ``the politics 
of personal destruction'' threaten to devour our democratic 
ideals.

    We can, and we will, argue the merits of the independent 
counsel statute when it comes up for reauthorization this 
session. We can, and we will, continue to pursue those who are 
corrupt, who use their offices for personal gain, or who 
otherwise deserve punishment.

    But the law must be preserved as an instrument for the 
rendering of justice, not manipulated to serve as another 
readily accessible weapon to be used against political 
adversaries.

    The law should not become a substitute for elections. 
Political choices in this country must remain in the hands of 
the people of this country, not conveyed to prosecutors and 
lawyers.

    It is not the law's fault that there has been a hardening 
of position and a commitment to win at any cost. To paraphrase 
our former colleague Dale Bumpers' now famous declaration in 
his presentation to the Senate, ``Sometimes we want to win too 
badly.''

    It is time for elected officials to ask themselves, ``Does 
anyone in this country really feel as though they have been 
winners in this seemingly interminable process of 
investigation, media spectacle and impeachment controversy?''

    I hope we can keep Senator Bumpers' words in mind and honor 
each other, with the same degree of commitment that we bring to 
our disagreements. I hope we can persuade without spinning; 
that we can argue without shouting; that we can dissent without 
dividing.

    We can be passionate in our beliefs without prosecuting 
those who believe differently.

    There were no winners in this impeachment process, but 
there were plenty of losers. There are good people who have 
accumulated thousands of dollars in legal bills as a result of 
the years of investigating the President. There are good 
people--on both sides of the aisle--whose private lives will be 
never be private again. There are people whose reputations have 
been battered and beaten.

    I hope we can keep those people in mind and call for--
indeed, insist upon--a truce in the political wars. We need now 
to think about what we owe ourselves, each other, and the 
public as we move--and I hope without further delay--to address 
the true agenda of the American people.

                         HEALING OF THE NATION

    Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the Senate to indulge me 
just a few words.

    It is a privilege for me to stand in for our distinguished 
leader, Mr. Lott. And my remarks also reflect on the 
outstanding performance not only by Leader Lott but Leader 
Daschle on this historic day of the Senate. Mr. President, I 
have just returned, as have most Senators, from responding to 
many requests by the media on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol. 
I have said that the verdict is in. It has been given by the 
Senate. It is now before the Nation and they will be the final 
jury, the final arbiter. The sovereignty of this country rests 
not in the high office holders, but it is in the hands of the 
people. It is for them to decide.

    As they approach the decision, I humbly submit to them: Let 
us put this chapter in our history, tragic though it may be, 
behind us, and that we heal ourselves and unite and go forward.

    This is a great and strong Nation. It is a leader of the 
world, not only in matters of security for ourselves but 
security for others, not only in matters of military security 
but in matters of economic security. Our President, by his own 
actions, is a weakened President. That strength which for a 
while he can no longer give to the Nation must be filled in by 
the people--individually and collectively. I think we should 
not spend time dwelling on the past. Leave it to the 
historians. Let us move forward to the future, heal ourselves, 
and strengthen our Nation so we can resume as a leader in the 
world. And may God rest his hand on this Senate and its verdict 
as being the best for the Nation and for our people.


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