[Senate Document 106-4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress                                                  S. Doc.
                                 SENATE                         
 1st Session                                                     106-4
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                          PROCEEDINGS OF THE


                         UNITED STATES SENATE



                                IN THE


 
   IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON VOLUME II:  
                       FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

 


                            VOLUME II OF IV

               February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-102                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

                         Gary Sisco, Secretary

                 Sharon A. Zelaska, Assistant Secretary

   Ronald Kavulick and Jerald D. Linnell, Chief Reporters of Debates

                     Bruce E. Kasold, Chief Counsel

                         Keith Simmons, Counsel

                                ------                                


                      UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

                   In the Senate of the United States

                           February 12, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be 
authorized to include these statements [of Senators explaining 
their votes], along with the full record of the Senate's 
proceedings, the filings by the parties, and the supplemental 
materials admitted into evidence by the Senate, in a Senate 
document printed under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Senate, that will complete the documentation of the Senate's 
handling of these impeachment proceedings.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                 To the memory of Raymond Scott Bates,

                    Legislative Clerk of the Senate,

who, until his untimely and tragic accidental death on February 
5, 1999, in the midst of these proceedings, brought to the 
conduct of this trial the constant dedication, skill, and 
professionalism that characterized his Senate career. Scott 
represented the best of the Senate staff who work tirelessly to 
support the institution and its members.
                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    This document contains the full record of the United States 
Senate proceedings in the impeachment trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton. Its purpose is to preserve for the 
future use of the Senate, the American people, and historians 
the formal record of the only Presidential impeachment trial of 
the 20th century. Together with the 24-volume Senate Document 
106-3, which contains all publicly available materials 
submitted to or produced by the Judiciary Committee of the 
House of Representatives, these four volumes represent the 
entire official record of the impeachment actions against 
President Clinton.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Senate, by a unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 
1999, authorized the Secretary of the Senate to oversee the printing of 
the Senate proceedings in order to complete the documentation of the 
impeachment trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The present four volumes include the Senate proceedings in 
open session; filings by the parties; supplemental materials 
received in evidence that were not part of the House record, 
such as affidavits and depositions; floor statements of 
Senators in open session expressing their views regarding the 
proceedings; and statements delivered in closed deliberations 
that individual Senators elected to make public.
    The document is divided into four sections--
          Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings
          Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings
          Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits
          Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the 
        Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson 
        Clinton

                   Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings

    This volume contains the portion of the Senate proceedings 
that occurred before the actual trial commenced. On December 
19, 1998, the House of Representatives adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton (House Resolution 611, 
105th Congress) and a subsequent resolution appointing managers 
on the part of the House (House Resolution 614, 105th 
Congress).
    Because the Senate of the 105th Congress had already 
completed its business and adjourned sine die, the House 
managers, in the late afternoon of December 19, 1998, delivered 
the articles of impeachment to the Secretary of the Senate. The 
Senate of the 106th Congress convened and organized on January 
6, 1999, and the House notified the Senate that it had 
reappointed the managers (House Resolution 10, 106th Congress). 
On January 7, 1999, the House managers exhibited the articles 
of impeachment to the Senate and the Chief Justice of the 
United States, as presiding officer during the impeachment 
trial, took the prescribed oath, as did all Senators.
    On January 8, 1999, the Senate unanimously directed that 
the summons be issued to President Clinton and that his answer 
to the articles be filed, together with the response of the 
House of Representatives (Senate Resolution 16, 106th 
Congress). This resolution admitted into evidence the materials 
submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and authorized their 
publication. It also allowed the parties to file preliminary 
motions (none was filed), established a schedule for the filing 
of trial briefs by the parties, and established further 
procedures for the conduct of the trial. Although all these 
documents were previously printed in Senate Document 106-2--as 
well as the text of the provisions of the United States 
Constitution applicable to impeachment and the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice of the Senate When Sitting in 
Impeachment Trials--they are reprinted here for ease of 
reference.

                   Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings

    This volume reproduces the full record of the Senate floor 
proceedings in the impeachment trial as provided under Senate 
Resolution 16. The resolution first permitted the parties an 
extended period to make their presentations. The managers 
presented their case on behalf of the House of Representatives 
on January 14, 15, and 16, 1999. Counsel for the President 
presented their case on January 19 and 20, 1999. The Senate 
then devoted January 22 and 23, 1999, to posing questions to 
the House managers and counsel.
    Senate Resolution 16 also provided that, at the end of the 
question-and-answer period, the Senate would consider 
separately a motion to dismiss and a motion to subpoena 
witnesses and to present additional evidence not in the record. 
On January 25, 1999, the Senate heard argument on the motion to 
dismiss and, on January 26, 1999, considered the motion by the 
House managers to call witnesses and admit additional evidence. 
The Senate voted to deny the motion to dismiss and to grant the 
motion to subpoena witnesses.
    On January 28, 1999, the Senate established procedures for 
the taking of depositions (Senate Resolution 30), and three 
witnesses were deposed on February 1, 2, and 3, 1999. On 
February 4, 1999, the Senate heard argument and voted on 
motions to admit the deposition testimony into evidence, to 
call witnesses to testify on the Senate floor, and to proceed 
directly to closing arguments. The portions of the deposition 
transcripts admitted into evidence are reproduced in this 
volume, while the full transcripts of the three depositions 
appear in Volume III. Both parties presented evidence to the 
Senate on February 6, 1999.
    On February 8, 1999, the parties presented final arguments 
to the Senate. The Senate then considered proposals by various 
Senators to suspend the Senate impeachment rules to permit 
deliberation in open session, but all deliberations on motions 
and on the articles of impeachment occurred in closed session. 
(The proceedings in closed session are not published here, but 
statements that Senators elected to make public are printed in 
Volume IV.) Volume II concludes with the record of the February 
12, 1999, vote and judgment of the Senate to acquit President 
Clinton on both articles of impeachment.

                 Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits

    This volume reproduces the complete transcripts of the 
depositions taken by the Senate of witnesses Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal. It also 
contains the affidavits of Christopher Hitchens, Carol Blue, 
and R. Scott Armstrong, which were admitted into evidence by a 
unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 1999.

 Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the Impeachment Trial of 
                  President William Jefferson Clinton

    By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to provide each 
Senator an opportunity to place in the Congressional Record a 
statement describing his or her own views on the impeachment. 
The statement could, if a Senator so chose, be a statement he 
or she had delivered during closed deliberations. Since not all 
Senators chose to publish their remarks, the fact that a 
statement of a particular Senator does not appear in Volume IV 
does not mean that the Senator did not address the Senate 
during its closed deliberations.


    The publication of these four volumes, supplemented with 
Senate Document 106-3, contributes to a fuller understanding of 
the way in which the Senate conducted these important and 
historic proceedings.


                               Gary Sisco,                 
                          Secretary of the Senate.                 


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................     V

                   VOLUME I: PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment.........................     1
Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
  Impeachment Trials.............................................     3

                            January 6, 1999

Statements of Senators Lott and Reid regarding access to Senate 
  floor, galleries, and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]........................    15
Unanimous-consent agreement on access to Senate floor, galleries 
  and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S7-8 
  (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]......................................    16
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives by 
  Secretary of the Senate during sine die adjournment announcing 
  impeachment of President and appointment of Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S14-15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\1\.......................    17
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives 
  announcing reappointment of Managers, H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. 
  (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\2\........    19
Unanimous-consent agreement on receiving Managers and requesting 
  attendance of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................    20
Message from House of Representatives announcing reappointment of 
  Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].........    22
H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    23
H. Res. 614, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    29
H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    31
Sample of Senate Impeachment Trial gallery tickets...............    33

                            January 7, 1999

Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson 
  Clinton, President of the United States [145 Cong. Rec. S39-41 
  (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]......................................    35
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize taking 
  photograph in Senate Chamber of swearing-in, S. Res. 11, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].....    38
Appointment of escort committee to receive Chief Justice [145 
  Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].......................    38
Administration of oath to Chief Justice and Members of Senate 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S41-42 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]...............    40
S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    41
Photographs taken pursuant to S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).....    42

                            January 8, 1999

Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle providing for issuance of 
  summons to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
  States, and establishing trial procedures, S. Res. 16, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999)].....    45
    Rollcall Vote No. 1 [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 
      1999)].....................................................    47
S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    48
Writ of Summons (January 8, 1999)................................    53

                            January 11, 1999

Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999).................................    58
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999)....................................    71

                            January 13, 1999

Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999)......................................................   365
Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
  Clinton (January 20, 1999)\3\..................................   500

                            January 14, 1999

Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment (January 
  14, 1999)......................................................   735
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999)..........................................................   740

                   VOLUME II: FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
                            January 14, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott to authorize installation of 
  appropriate equipment and furniture in Senate Chamber, S. Res. 
  17, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   773
Unanimous-consent agreement on floor privileges during closed 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S59-60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]......   774
Unanimous-consent agreement on authority to print documents filed 
  by the parties and other impeachment documents \4\ [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................   775
Writ of Summons and Return of Service by Sergeant at Arms 
  (January 8, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S60-61 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   776
Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S61-63 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................................   778
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S63-190 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 14, 1999)]................................................   783
Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S191-214 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]..   938
Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S214-15 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]........................   992
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S215-21 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].......   994
Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S221-51 
  (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].....................................  1007
S. Res. 17, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1087
Floor plan and seating arrangements in Senate Chamber for 
  impeachment trial proceedings..................................  1089

                            January 15, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S260-79 
  (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999)].....................................  1091

                            January 16, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S281-300 
  (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)].....................................  1144

                            January 19, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S483-95 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]............................................  1195
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S720-21 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]........................  1225

                            January 20, 1999

Statement of Senator Harkin in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S729-32 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1227
Statement of Senator Wellstone in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S732-33 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1234
Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S810-30 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]............................................  1237

                            January 21, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S832-48 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]............................................  1292
Statement of Senator Lott regarding procedure for question-and-
  answer period [145 Cong. Rec. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]..  1335
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Harkin and Wellstone [145 Cong. Rec. S848-49 (daily ed. Jan. 
  21, 1999)].....................................................  1336

                            January 22, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S869-92 (daily ed. Jan. 
  22, 1999)].....................................................  1338
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Hutchison, Specter, Lieberman, Hagel, Collins, and Snowe [145 
  Cong. Rec. S892 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999)].....................  1396
Sample question card used by Senators............................  1398

                            January 23, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S933-56 (daily ed. Jan. 
  23, 1999)].....................................................  1400
Letter from Senator Harkin to Chief Justice (January 23, 1999)...  1461

                            January 25, 1999

Letter from Chief Justice to Senator Harkin (January 25, 1999)...  1462
Unanimous-consent agreement on argument on motion to dismiss and 
  on motion to open debate [145 Cong. Rec. S962-63 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 25, 1999)]................................................  1466
Motion of Senator Byrd to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................  1469
Argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S963-65 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1469
Argument of counsel for President in support of motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S965-70 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1476
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to 
  dismiss [145 Cong. Rec. S970-73 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....  1489
Motion to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin, 
  Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye, 
  Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb, 
  Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer, 
  Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 
  (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................................  1495
    Rollcall Vote No. 2 [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 (daily ed. Jan. 
      25, 1999)].................................................  1496
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S974 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 
  1999)].........................................................  1497
Statement of Senator Mikulski in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)]...........................  1498

                            January 26, 1999

Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of United States House 
  of Representatives for Appearance of Witnesses at Deposition 
  and to Admit Evidence Not in Record (January 26, 1999).........  1500
Motion of House of Representatives for appearance of witnesses 
  and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S991-92 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 26, 1999)]................................................  1531
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S992-99 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1532
Unanimous-consent agreement on order of consideration of and 
  deliberation on motions to suspend rules and for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S999-1000 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1552
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence, cont. [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1000-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]............................  1552
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1002-07 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1558
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  appearance of witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1007-09 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].......................  1571
Motion of Senator Harkin to Suspend the Rules of the Senate [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]....................  1578
    Rollcall Vote No. 3 [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
      1999)].....................................................  1579
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
  1999)].........................................................  1580

                            January 27, 1999

Vote on motion to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]............................  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 4 [145 Cong. Rec. S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 
      27, 1999)].................................................  1582
Vote on motion for appearance of witnesses and admission of 
  evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]......  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 5 [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 
      1999)].....................................................  1583
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Affidavit of Barry W. Ward, Law Clerk to Honorable Susan 
      Webber Wright, U.S. District Judge for Eastern District of 
      Arkansas...................................................  1585
    Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, with attachments............  1586
    Telephone records documenting conversations between President 
      Clinton and Monica S. Lewinsky.............................  1594
Statement of Senator Hollings in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1028-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1595
Statements of Senator Abraham in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1029-30, 1031 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)] 

aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
8 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
601982
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601984
I74February 11, 1999
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
(1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
d to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
 in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
I21Order to Secretary of the Senate

Statement of Senator Lieberman in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1030-31 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1599

                            January 28, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott and amendments thereto by Senator 
  Daschle relating to procedures for taking depositions, S. Res. 
  30, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1069-73 (daily ed. Jan. 
  28, 1999)].....................................................  1605
    Rollcall Vote No. 6 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1608
    Rollcall Vote No. 7 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071-72 (daily ed. Jan. 
      28, 1999)].................................................  1609
    Rollcall Vote No. 8 [145 Cong. Rec. S1072 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1610
Unanimous-consent agreement on taking of depositions [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1073-74 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1614
S. Res. 30, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1616
Leadership protocol on depositions pursuant to S. Res. 16 and S. 
  Res. 30 (January 28, 1999).....................................  1623
Statement of Senator Cleland in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1105-06 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1624
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1628
Statements of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1107-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1631

                            January 29, 1999

Subpoenas issued for witnesses to appear at depositions:
    Monica S. Lewinsky (January 29, 1999)........................  1639
    Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (January 29, 1999).....................  1642
    Sidney Blumenthal (January 29, 1999).........................  1645

                            February 3, 1999

Statement of Senator Dorgan in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1117-19 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999)]........................  1648

                            February 4, 1999

Motion of House of Representatives for admission of evidence, 
  appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1199-1200 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]................  1653
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for admission of 
  evidence, appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S1200-05 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............  1654
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1205-07 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1667
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1207-08 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1673
Votes on motions for admission of evidence, appearance of 
  witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-
  10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]...................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 9 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 10 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1678
    Rollcall Vote No. 11 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-10 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1680
    Rollcall Vote No. 12 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1681
Motion of Senator Daschle to proceed to closing arguments [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].....................  1681
    Rollcall Vote No. 13 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1682
Motion of counsel for President for provision of written notice 
  by House Managers of designated video excerpts [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............................  1683
    Rollcall Vote No. 14 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1685
Unanimous-consent agreement on printing partial transcripts of 
  depositions in Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1212 
  (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]......................................  1687
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1212-29 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1687
    Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1229-46 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1736
    Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1246-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1776

                            February 6, 1999

Presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1290-
  1303 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].................................  1800
Presentation of evidence by counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1303-15 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1836
Rebuttal presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1315-17 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]........................  1866
Unanimous-consent request of Senator Boxer to show additional 
  deposition testimony [145 Cong. Rec. S1317-18 (daily ed. Feb. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................  1873
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Lott, Daschle, Hutchison, Harkin, Collins, Specter, Wellstone, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]......  1873
Statements of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1330-32 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1874

                            February 8, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Lott for admission of 
  affidavits into evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1337 (daily ed. Feb. 
  8, 1999)]......................................................  1882
Final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1337-44 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 8, 1999)].............................................  1882
Final arguments of counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S1344-54 
  (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......................................  1900
Rebuttal final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1354-
  65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]...................................  1925
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle, Lott, Hutchison, Harkin, Wellstone, Collins, Specter, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......  1955
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle and Feinstein [145 Cong. Rec. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 
  1999)].........................................................  1955
Letter from House Managers to Senators Lott and Daschle (Feb. 8, 
  1999)..........................................................  1956

                            February 9, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Specter to allow parties to 
  take additional discovery [145 Cong. Rec. S1385 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1964
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to Suspend the Rules of the 
  Senate [145 Cong. Rec. S1385-86 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]......  1964
    Rollcall Vote No. 15 [145 Cong. Rec. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1965
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize Senators to 
  insert statements delivered in closed deliberations into 
  Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1386-87 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1966
Motion of Senator Lott to close doors of Senate for final 
  deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...  1970
    Rollcall Vote No. 16 [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1970
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1388 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
  1999)].........................................................  1971
Statement of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1406-09 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1971
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...........................  1978
Statement of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1409-10 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1980

                           February 10, 1999

Colloquy on record of closed deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411-
  12 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)]..................................  1982
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
  1999)].........................................................  1984

                           February 11, 1999

Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 
  1999)].........................................................  1986
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to 
  authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment 
  vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437-38 
  (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)].....................................  1987
Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate 
  Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1454-55 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]............................  1987
Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]....  1988
S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1989

                           February 12, 1999

Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators 
  in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document 
  containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  1992
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1993
Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................................  1994
    Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1995
Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458-59 
  (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....................................  1997
    Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1997
Order to Secretary of the Senate to communicate judgment of 
  Senate to Secretary of State and House of Representatives [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  1998
Statement of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 
  12, 1999)].....................................................  1998
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle expressing gratitude of 
  Senate to Chief Justice of the United States, S. Res. 37, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1459-60 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1999
Unanimous-consent agreement on admitting affidavits into evidence 
  and making full deposition transcripts part of the record [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  2000
Adjournment sine die [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  2000
Statements of Senators Lott, Daschle and Chafee in legislative 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......  2001
Motion of Senator Feinstein in legislative session to suspend the 
  rules in order to permit the consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....  2002
Motion of Senator Gramm in legislative session to indefinitely 
  postpone consideration of motion to suspend rules [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2002
    Rollcall Vote No. 19 [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 
      12, 1999)].................................................  2003
Statement of Senator Feinstein in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1664-66 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2004
Statement of Senator Snowe in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1546-47 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................  2010
Statement of Senator Ashcroft in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1461 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2011
Statement of Senator Chafee in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1639 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2013
Statement of Senator Kohl in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]...............................  2014
Resolution by Senator Hollings in legislative session to censure 
  President [145 Cong. Rec. S1657 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....  2015
Statement of Senator Daschle in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1637-38 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2015
Statement of Senator Warner in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1667 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2017
S. Res. 37, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  2019
Photograph taken pursuant to S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)......  2021
Legislative Clerk's tally sheets for Senate votes on articles of 
  impeachment....................................................  2022
Judgment of United States Senate (Feb. 12, 1999).................  2024

                         TABLE OF ROLLCALL VOTES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Measure/
 Vote No.        Date           Description           Result        Page
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........  1/8/99.........  S. Res. 16........  Resolution Agreed     47
                                                 to 100-0.
2........  1/25/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1496
                             suspend the rules.  43-57.
3........  1/26/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1579
                             suspend the rules.  41-58.
4........  1/27/99........  Byrd motion to      Motion Rejected     1582
                             dismiss the         44-56.
                             impeachment
                             proceedings.
5........  1/27/99........  House Managers'     Motion Agreed to    1583
                             motion to           56-44.
                             subpoena
                             witnesses and
                             admit evidence
                             not in record.
6........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1608
                             1 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 44-54.
7........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1609
                             2 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 43-55.
8........  1/28/99........  S. Res. 30 as       Resolution Agreed   1610
                             amended.            to 54-44.
9........  2/4/99.........  Division I of       Motion Agreed to    1677
                             House Managers'     100-0.
                             motion re:
                             admission of
                             evidence.
10.......  2/4/99.........  Division II of      Motion Rejected     1678
                             House Managers'     30-70.
                             motion re:
                             appearance of
                             witnesses.
11.......  2/4/99.........  Murray motion to    Motion Rejected     1680
                             substitute          27-73.
                             Division III of
                             House Managers'
                             motion.
12.......  2/4/99.........  Division III of     Motion Agreed to    1681
                             House Managers'     62-38.
                             motion re:
                             presentation of
                             evidence.
13.......  2/4/99.........  Daschle motion to   Motion Rejected     1682
                             proceed to          44-56.
                             closing arguments.
14.......  2/4/99.........  White House         Motion Rejected     1685
                             Counsel's motion    46-54.
                             on video
                             deposition
                             excerpts.
15.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Rejected     1965
                             suspend the rules.  59-41.
16.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Agreed to    1970
                             close the doors.    53-47.
17.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 45-55.   1995
                             Article I.
18.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 50-50.   1997
                             Article II.
19.......  2/12/99........  Gramm motion to     Motion Rejected     2003
                             postpone            43-56.
                             consideration of
                             rules suspension
                             motion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 VOLUME III: DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS

Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (full transcript)  2027
Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (full 
  transcript)....................................................  2224
Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (full transcript).  2399
Affidavit of Christopher Hitchens (Feb. 5, 1999).................  2534
Affidavit of Carol Blue (Feb. 7, 1999)...........................  2535
Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong (Feb. 8, 1999)...................  2536

 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON \5\
                           February 12, 1999

Sen. Specter \6\.................................................  2537
Sen. Gorton......................................................  2537
Sen. Feingold \7\................................................  2545
Sen. Hutchison...................................................  2548
Sen. Conrad......................................................  2558
Sen. Hutchinson..................................................  2561
Sen. Murray......................................................  2563
Sen. McCain......................................................  2565
Sen. Johnson.....................................................  2567
Sen. Lugar.......................................................  2570
Sen. Biden.......................................................  2573
Sen. Abraham.....................................................  2616
Sen. Mikulski....................................................  2622
Sen. Grams.......................................................  2625
Sen. Breaux......................................................  2627
Sen. Domenici....................................................  2630
Sen. Sarbanes....................................................  2633
Sen. Campbell....................................................  2637
Sen. Kerrey......................................................  2639
Sen. Voinovich...................................................  2641
Sen. Lautenberg..................................................  2643
Sen. Bond \8\....................................................  2646
Sen. Robb........................................................  2652
Sen. Boxer.......................................................  2656
Sen. Mack........................................................  2659
Sen. Fitzgerald..................................................  2672
Sen. Roth........................................................  2681
Sen. Burns.......................................................  2684
Sen. Inhofe \9\..................................................  2685
Sen. Cleland.....................................................  2689
Sen. Frist.......................................................  2694
Sen. Bunning.....................................................  2703
Sen. Durbin......................................................  2706
Sen. Kyl.........................................................  2710
Sen. Specter.....................................................  2715
Sen. Levin.......................................................  2738
Sen. Kohl........................................................  2758
Sen. Thompson....................................................  2761
Sen. Moynihan....................................................  2789
Sen. Graham......................................................  2792
Sen. Allard......................................................  2794
Sen. McConnell...................................................  2799
Sen. Kennedy.....................................................  2807
Sen. Collins.....................................................  2812
Sen. Harkin......................................................  2814
Sen. Reid........................................................  2826
Sen. Edwards.....................................................  2830
Sen. Akaka.......................................................  2833
Sen. Leahy \10\..................................................  2837
Sen. Grassley....................................................  2867
Sen. Craig.......................................................  2870
Sen. Dodd \11\...................................................  2873
Sen. Jeffords....................................................  2877
Sen. Wellstone...................................................  2884
Sen. Stevens.....................................................  2888
Sen. Lieberman...................................................  2892
Sen. Brownback...................................................  2905
Sen. Bryan.......................................................  2913
Sen. Ashcroft....................................................  2917
Sen. Thurmond....................................................  2934
Sen. Crapo.......................................................  2937
Sen. Dorgan......................................................  2939
Sen. Kerry.......................................................  2943
Sen. DeWine......................................................  2948
Sen. Lincoln.....................................................  2956
Sen. Helms.......................................................  2959
Sen. Hollings....................................................  2962
Sen. Wyden.......................................................  2965
Sen. Smith (Ore.)................................................  2967
Sen. Hagel.......................................................  2971
Sen. Rockefeller.................................................  2972
Sen. Murkowski...................................................  2977
Sen. Byrd........................................................  2981
Sen. Inhofe......................................................  2987
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  2996
Sen. Snowe.......................................................  3000

                           February 22, 1999

Sen. Nickles.....................................................  3005
Sen. Landrieu....................................................  3013
Sen. Smith (N.H.)................................................  3016
Sen. Bingaman....................................................  3022
Sen. Bennett.....................................................  3024
Sen. Reed \12\...................................................  3026
Sen. Enzi........................................................  3033
Sen. Feingold....................................................  3042

                           February 23, 1999

Sen. Daschle.....................................................  3053
Sen. Bond........................................................  3058
Sen. Sessions \13\...............................................  3059
Sen. Coverdell...................................................  3063
Sen. Hatch.......................................................  3066
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3090
Sen. Sessions....................................................  3094
Sen. Dodd........................................................  3099
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3102

                           February 24, 1999

Sen. Reed........................................................  3103

    \1\ On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives agreed to H. 
Res. 611, 105th Cong., the Articles of Impeachment, [144 Cong. Rec. 
H12040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998)] and H. Res. 614, 105th Cong., 
which provided for the appointment of managers and procedures relating 
to impeachment proceedings [id. at H12042-43].
    \2\ The House of Representatives agreed to H. Res. 10, 106th Cong., 
on January 6, 1999 [145 Cong. Rec. H216-17 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].
    \3\ The Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, consisting of exhibits, was filed separately on January 20, 
1999, but is inserted here for ease of reference.
    \4\ For ease of reference, the documents contained in S. Doc. 106-
2, i.e., the pertinent constitutional provisions, the Senate 
Impeachment Rules, the Articles of Impeachment, the Answer of President 
Clinton, and the Replication of the House of Representatives, are 
reprinted in this publication. Separately, the Senate admitted into 
evidence and authorized the printing, pursuant to S. Res. 16, 106th 
Cong., of the publicly available materials submitted to or produced by 
the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings 
or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives 
or the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to H. Res. 525 and H. Res. 
581, 105th Cong. (1998). That evidentiary record, S. Doc. 106-3 (1999) 
[24 vols.], is not reproduced here.
    \5\ The unanimous-consent agreement of February 9, 1999, allowed 
each Senator to place in the Congressional Record his or her statement 
delivered during closed deliberations. Not all Senators chose to 
publish their remarks; the fact that a statement of a particular 
Senator does not appear here does not mean that Senator did not address 
the Senate during the closed sessions. Additionally, the unanimous-
consent agreement of February 12, 1999, allowed Senators to have 
statements and opinions explaining their votes printed in the 
Congressional Record.
    \6\ Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2715 below.
    \7\ Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, 
see p. 3042 below.
    \8\ Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see 
p. 3058 below.
    \9\ Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2987 below.
    \10\ Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and 
February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, 3102 below.
    \11\ Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see 
pp. 3099 and 3100 below.
    \12\ Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24, 
see p. 3103 below.
    \13\ Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February 
23, see p. 3094 below.
                       Thursday, January 14, 1999

                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                

                                 prayer
    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all 
through our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure 
of wisdom for the women and men of this Senate as they act as 
jurors in this impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's 
refuge and strength in triumphs and troubles, prosperity and 
problems. Now, dear Father, help us through this difficult 
time. As You guided the Senators to unity in matters of 
procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the 
truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in 
a spirit of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial 
days to come. Bless the distinguished Chief Justice as he 
presides over this trial. We commit to You all that is said and 
done and ultimately decided. In Your holy Name. Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States 
is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by 
the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the 
majority leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        installing equipment and furniture in the senate chamber
    Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for 
installing equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and 
ask that it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid 
upon the table.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by 
title.
    The legislative clerk read as follows:

    A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of 
appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for the 
impeachment trial.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is 
considered and agreed to.
    The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows:

                               S. Res. 17

  Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements raised by 
the impeachment trial of a President of the United States, the Sergeant 
at Arms shall install appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate 
chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives and 
counsel to the President in their presentations to the Senate during 
all times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief Justice 
of the United States presiding.
  Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to in the 
first section is as follows:
          (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and 
        tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers 
        from the House of Representatives and counsel for the President 
        which shall be placed in the well of the Senate.
          (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display 
        of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and 
        microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by the 
        managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel to 
        the President.
  Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this resolution 
shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that provides the least 
practicable disruption to Senate proceedings.

                         Privilege of the Floor

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent 
that floor privileges be granted to the individuals listed on 
the document I send to the desk, during the closed impeachment 
proceedings of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    The document follows.

                 Floor Privileges During Closed Session

    David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader.
    Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader.
    Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader.
    Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Andrea LaRue, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
    Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip.
    Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader.
    Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader.
    Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel.
    Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel.
    Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
    Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms.
    David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary.
    Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary.
    Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian.
    Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian.
    Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk.
    Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk.
    David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk.
    Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter.
    Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter.
    Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter.
    Joel Breitner, Official Reporter.
    Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter.
    Paul Nelson, Official Reporter.
    Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter.
    Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter.
    Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter.
    Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk.
    Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland.

    Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate 
document all documents filed by the parties together with other 
materials for the convenience of all Senators.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series 
of unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the 
consideration of the Senate. In addition to these matters, I 
would like to state for the information of all Senators that, 
pursuant to S. Res. 16, the evidentiary record on which the 
parties' presentations over the next days will be based was 
filed by the House managers yesterday and was distributed to 
all Senators through their offices. These materials are now 
being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate 
documents. The initial documents of the record have been 
printed and are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of 
the rest of the volumes of the record is completed over the 
next few days, they will also be placed on the Senators' desks 
for their convenience.

                              THE JOURNAL

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in 
the Senate Journal the following documents:
    The precept, issued on January 8, 1999;
    The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the 
receipt of summons, dated January 8, 1999.
    The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in 
the Senate Journal the following documents, which were received 
by the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 
16, 106th Congress, first session:
    The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the 
House of Representatives against him on January 7, 1999, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
    The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
    The trial brief filed by the President, received by the 
Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999;
    The replication of the House of Representatives, received 
by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and
    The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives, 
received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999.
    Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed 
in the Congressional Record.
    The documents follow:

The United States of America, ss:

The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms, 
United States Senate, greeting:
    You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with William 
Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if not, to leave at 
his usual place of abode, a true and attested copy of the within writ 
of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in 
whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least 2 days 
before the answer day mentioned in the said writ of summons.
    Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with 
your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the day for answering 
mentioned in the said writ of summons.
    Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at 
Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and 
twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
    Attest:
                                                Gary Sisco,
                                           Secretary of the Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
The United States of America, ss:

The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, greeting:
    Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of 
America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to the Senate 
articles of impeachment against you, the said William Jefferson 
Clinton, in the words following:
    ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people 
of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support 
of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

                               Article I

    ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
    ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: 
(1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate 
Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; 
(3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to 
make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his 
corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

                               Article II

    ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, 
and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged 
personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of 
conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the 
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
    ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included one or more of the following acts:
    ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he 
knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.
    ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and 
when called to testify personally in that proceeding.
    ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him.
    ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a 
witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order 
to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that 
proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would 
have been harmful to him.
    ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading 
statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a 
communication to that judge.
    ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.
    ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in 
a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
    ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
to the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.''

And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, should be put 
to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such 
proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had 
as are agreeable to law and justice.
    You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore hereby 
summoned to file with the Secretary of the United States Senate, S-220 
The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an answer to the said articles of 
impeachment no later than noon on the 11th day of January, 1999, and 
therefore to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and 
judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises 
according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
    Hereof you are not to fail.
    Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at 
Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and 
twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
    Attest:
                                                Gary Sisco,
                                           Secretary of the Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
    The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William Jefferson 
Clinton, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept, 
addressed to me, were duly served upon the said William Jefferson 
Clinton, by my delivering true and attested copies of the same to 
Charles Ruff, at the White House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at 
5:27 p.m.
    Attest:
                                           James W. Ziglar,
                                                  Sergeant at Arms.
                                             Loretta Symms,
                                           Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
    Dated: January 8, 1999.

Witnesseth:
    Gary Sisco, Secretary,
    United States Senate.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
        States

   ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF 
                              IMPEACHMENT

    The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, in response to the summons of the Senate of the United States, 
answers the accusations made by the House of Representatives of the 
United States in the two Articles of Impeachment it has exhibited to 
the Senate as follows:

                                Preamble

     The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or 
                              Misdemeanors

    The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the 
conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The 
President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper. 
But Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the 
President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to the level of 
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by the Founding 
Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standard 
applied throughout our Nation's history. Accordingly, the Articles of 
Impeachment should be dismissed.

        The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice

    The President denies each and every material allegation of the two 
Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in this answer.

                               Article I

    President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.

                     Factual Responses to Article I

    Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers 
the following factual responses to the allegations in Article I:
(1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of 
        his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before the 
grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to admit his improper 
intimate relationship with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated 
by Article I, which accuses the President of lying about ``the nature 
and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to the 
grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I 
engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters . . . did involve 
inappropriate intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand 
jury how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence 
early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He also 
described to the grand jury how he had attempted to testify in the 
deposition in the Jones case months earlier without having to 
acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he ultimately admitted to the 
grand jury--that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury 
acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The statement was 
offered at the beginning of his testimony to focus the questioning in a 
manner that would allow the Office of Independent Counsel to obtain 
necessary information without unduly dwelling on the salacious details 
of the relationship. The President's statement was followed by almost 
four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his statement was in 
any respect perjurious, false and misleading, the President denies it. 
The President also denies that the statement was in any way an attempt 
to thwart the investigation.
    The President states, as he did during his grand jury testimony, 
that he engaged in improper physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
President was truthful when he testified before the grand jury that he 
did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood 
that term to be defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning 
of him in that deposition. The President further denies that his other 
statements to the grand jury about the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were perjurious, false, and misleading.
(2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury when he testified about statements 
        he had made in the Jones deposition
    There is a second myth about the President's testimony before the 
grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted his entire Jones 
deposition testimony in the grand jury. The President was not asked to 
and did not broadly restate or reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony. 
Instead, in the grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers 
he gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury about 
statements he made in the Jones deposition. The President stated to the 
grand jury that he did not attempt to be helpful to or assist the 
lawyers in the Jones deposition in their quest for information about 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the 
grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition 
without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Accordingly, the 
full, underlying Jones deposition is not before the Senate.
    Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an article 
of impeachment based on the President's deposition in the Jones case. 
The House managers should not be allowed to prosecute before the Senate 
an article of impeachment which the full House has rejected.
(3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``statements he allowed his 
        attorney to make'' during the Jones deposition
    The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to the grand jury about the statements his attorney made 
during the Jones deposition. The President was truthful when he 
explained to the grand jury his understanding of certain statements 
made by his lawyer, Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The 
President also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing 
on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the attorneys and 
Judge Wright.
(4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury concerning alleged efforts ``to 
        influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
        discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
    For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article II, the 
President denies that he attempted to influence the testimony of any 
witness or to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. Thus, 
the President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements before the grand jury when he testified about these matters.

 First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

    For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, 
Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional standard for 
conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President and 
should be dismissed.

Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction 
                              and Removal

    Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could 
know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. It 
alleges that the President provided the grand jury with ``perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four 
subject areas. But it fails to identify any specific statement by the 
President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. The 
House has left the Senate and the President to guess at what it had in 
mind.
    One of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution 
is that a person has a right to know what specific charges he or she is 
facing. Without such fair warning, no one can prepare the defense to 
which every person is entitled. The law and the Constitution also 
mandate adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the 
vote they must make. Without a definite and specific identification of 
false statements, a trial becomes a moving target for the accused. In 
addition, the American people deserve to know upon what specific 
statements the President is being judged, given the gravity and effect 
of these proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national 
election.
    Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required definite 
and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be 
dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally 
defective and should fail.

 Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One 
                                Article

    Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple instances 
of alleged perjurious, false and misleading statements in one article. 
The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule 
XXIII provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible 
for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' By 
the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if 
he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony in ``one or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very 
real possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators were 
in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. Put simply, the 
structure of Article I presents the possibility that the President 
could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted if separate 
votes were taken on each allegedly perjurious statement. For example, 
it would be possible for the President to be convicted and removed from 
office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single statement 
was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the four categories in 
Article I would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict and 
remove.
    By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of 
Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article I should fail.

                    Factual Responses to Article II

    Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers 
the following factual responses to the allegations in Article II:
(1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn 
        affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
        false and misleading''
    The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute 
a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, the only witness 
cited in support of this allegation, denies this allegation as well. 
Her testimony and proffered statements are clear and unmistakable:
     ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.''
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie . . .''
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
    The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky 
asked him whether she might be able to avoid testifying the Jones case 
because she knew nothing about Ms. Jones or the case. The President 
further states that he told her he believed other witnesses had 
executed affidavits, and there was a chance they would not have to 
testify. The President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The 
President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a 
limited but truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid 
having to testify in the Jones case.
(2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, 
        false and misleading testimony of and when called to testify 
        personally'' in the Jones litigation
    Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie 
if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case. The 
testimony and proffered statements of Monica Lewinsky, the only witness 
cited in support of this allegation, are clear and unmistakable:
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.''
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie . . .''
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
    The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in 
the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have talked about what to do 
to conceal their relationship from others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a 
witness in any legal proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own 
testimony and statements support the President's recollection. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the possibility 
that she and the President ever had discussions about denying the 
relationship after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case. Ms. 
Lewinsky also stated that ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to 
say about their relationship] is specific relation to the Jones 
matter,'' and that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of 
any deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.''
(3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to 
        conceal evidence'' in the Jones case
    The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or supported 
any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in the Jones case, 
including any gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. The President states 
that he gave numerous gifts to Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997. 
The President states that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired 
as to what to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he 
had given her, to which the President responded that she would have to 
turn over whatever she had. The President states that he was 
unconcerned about having given her gifts and, in fact, that he gave Ms. 
Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1997. The President denies 
that he ever asked his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts 
he had given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie told 
prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly thereafter that it 
was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her about retrieving gifts.
(4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
        Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York to 
        ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones 
        case
    The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or sought to prevent her truthful 
testimony in the Jones case. The President states that he discussed 
with Ms. Lewinsky her desire to obtain a job in New York months before 
she was listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms. 
Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations more than 
a month before she was identified as a possible witness. The President 
also states that he believes that Ms. Lewinsky raised with him, again 
before she was ever listed as a possible witness in the Jones case, the 
prospect of having Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms. 
Lewinsky corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for 
Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was aware that Mr. 
Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain employment in New York. The 
President denies that any of these efforts had any connection 
whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's status as a possible or actual witness in 
the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's 
denial when she testified, ``I was never promised a job for my 
silence.''
(5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
        make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' 
        concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements concerning Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to 
a Federal judge during the Jones deposition. The President denies that 
he was focusing his attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange 
between his attorney and Judge Wright.
(6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false 
        and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
        Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    The President denies that he obstructed justice or endeavored in 
any way to influence any potential testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. The 
President states that he spoke with Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998. The 
President testified that, in that conversation, he was trying to find 
out what the facts were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether 
his own recollection was correct about certain aspects of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she felt no 
pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's statements and no pressure 
``to agree with [her] boss.'' The President denies knowing or believing 
that Ms. Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time of 
this conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness lists 
proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton states that, after 
the Independent Counsel investigation became public, when Ms. Currie 
was scheduled to testify, he told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.''
(7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
        allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    The President denies that he obstructed justice when he misled his 
aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the 
days immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky 
investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days following 
the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he misled his family, 
his friends and staff, and the Nation to conceal the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He sought to avoid disclosing his 
personal wrongdoing to protect his family and himself from hurt and 
public embarrassment. The President profoundly regrets his actions, and 
he has apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation. 
The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose or any intent to 
influence the ongoing grand jury proceedings.

First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional 
                  Standard for Conviction and Removal

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article 
II does not meet the constitutional standard for convicting and 
removing a duly elected President from office and should be dismissed.

     Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit 
                         Conviction and Removal

    Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could 
know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. 
Article II alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the 
administration of justice'' in both the Jones case and the grand jury 
investigation. But it provides little or no concrete information about 
the specific acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or 
with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise impeded the 
administration of justice.
    As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to Article I, one 
of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a 
person has the right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. 
Without such fair warning, no one can mount the defense to which every 
person is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the 
President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he is able 
to confront those charges and defend himself.
    Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little definite and 
specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. 
As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and 
should fail.

Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One 
                                Article

    For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense to 
Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges 
multiple instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which 
makes it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional 
mandates that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of 
the members. Accordingly, Article II should fail.
            Respectfully submitted,
                                   David E. Kendall,
                                   Nicole K. Seligman,
                                   Emmet T. Flood,
                                   Max Stier,
                                   Glen Donath,
                                   Alicia Marti,
                                           Williams & Connolly,
                                           725 12th Street, N.W.,
                                           Washington, D.C. 20005.
                                   Charles F. C. Ruff,
                                   Gregory B. Craig,
                                   Bruce R. Lindsey,
                                   Cheryl D. Mills,
                                   Lanny A. Breuer,
                                           Office of the White House 
                                               Counsel,
                                           The White House,
                                           Washington, D.C. 20502.

    Submitted: January 11, 1999.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

     TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

    Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by and 
through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully submits to the 
United States Senate its Brief in connection with the Impeachment Trial 
of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                Summary

    The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury and 
false and misleading testimony and statements under oath before a 
federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in a course of conduct 
or scheme to delay and obstruct justice (Article II).
    The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a unified 
whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges.
                perjury and false statements under oath
    President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified falsely 
under oath when he appeared before a federal grand jury on August 17, 
1998. Although what follows is not exhaustive, some of the more overt 
examples will serve to illustrate.
     At the very outset, the President read a prepared 
statement, which itself contained totally false assertions and other 
clearly misleading information.
     The President relied on his statement nineteen times in 
his testimony when questioned about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
     President Clinton falsely testified that he was not paying 
attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at 
the Jones deposition.
     He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. Lewinsky did 
not fall within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that was given 
at his deposition.
     He falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully 
at his deposition concerning, among other subjects, whether he had been 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky.
     He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky to 
turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed.
     He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie after his 
deposition.
     He falsely testified that he was truthful to his aides 
when he gave accounts of his relationship, which accounts were 
subsequently disseminated to the media and the grand jury.
                         obstruction of justice
    The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both the 
Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he undertook a continuing 
and concerted plan to tamper with witnesses and prospective witnesses 
for the purpose of causing those witnesses to provide false and 
misleading testimony. Examples abound:
     The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story to 
conceal their relationship, and the President suggested that she employ 
that story if subpoenaed in the Jones case.
     The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide an 
affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he knew that the 
affidavit would need to be false to accomplish its purpose.
     The President knowingly and willfully allowed his attorney 
to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it for the purpose of 
obstructing justice in the Jones case.
     The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she provide a 
false account of how she received her job at the Pentagon.
     The President attempted to influence the expected 
testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with a false 
account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky.
     The President provided several of his top aides with 
elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that those 
aides would convey the false information to the public and to the grand 
jury. When he did this, he knew that those aides would likely be called 
to testify, while he was declining several invitations to testify. By 
this action, he obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury.
     The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie 
to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the Jones case, and 
thereby delayed and obstructed justice.
     The President and his representatives orchestrated a 
campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect adversely her 
credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted to obstruct justice 
both in the Jones case and the grand jury.
     The President lied repeatedly under oath in his 
disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice in that 
case.
     The President's lies and misleading statements under oath 
at the grand jury were calculated to, and did obstruct, delay and 
prevent the due administration of justice by that body.
     The President employed the power of his office to procure 
a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false affidavit by causing 
his friend to exert extraordinary efforts for that purpose.
    The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern of 
obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending over a period 
of several months, and having the effect of seriously compromising the 
integrity of the entire judicial system.
    The effect of the President's misconduct has been devastating in 
several respects.
    (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.''
    (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law enforcement 
officer to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's rights 
as a citizen to due process and the equal protection of the laws, 
though he had sworn to protect those rights.
    (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading statements and 
deceit, he has seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of 
the Office of President and thereby the honor and integrity of the 
United States.
    (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and witness 
tampering has affected the truth seeking process which is the 
foundation of our legal system.
    (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he has 
attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government.
    The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred state 
offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and removal from 
office of President William Jefferson Clinton. The Articles charge that 
the President has committed perjury before a federal grand jury and 
that he obstructed justice in a federal civil rights action. The 
Senate's own precedents establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants 
conviction and removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and 
removed three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of 
justice undermines the judicial system in the same fashion that perjury 
does, and it also warrants conviction and removal.
    Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same 
standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments for perjury set the 
standard here. Finally, the Senate's own precedents further establish 
that the President's crimes need not arise directly out of his official 
duties. Two of the three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for 
perjury that had nothing to do with their official duties.

                              Introduction

    This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate generally of the 
evidence that the Managers intend to produce, if permitted, and of the 
applicable legal principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively 
all of the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every 
witness and document that the Managers would produce in the course of 
the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline for the use of the 
Senate in reviewing and assessing the evidence as it is set forth at 
trial--it is not, and is not intended to be a substitute for a trial at 
which all of the relevant facts will be developed.

               H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998)

    The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with high 
crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One alleges that 
President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial 
process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, 
impeding the administration of justice'' in that he willfully provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has 
prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and 
engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a federal civil rights action brought against him.'' Both Articles 
are now before the Senate of the United States for trial as provided by 
the Constitution of the United States.
    The Office of President represents to the American people and to 
the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of all, the honor and 
integrity that makes us a great nation and an example for the world. 
Because all eyes are focused upon that high office, the character and 
credibility of any temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to 
the domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, serious 
breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely influence the 
reputation of the United States.
    This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about multiple 
obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, and 
witness tampering--all committed or orchestrated by the President of 
the United States.
    Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it is 
important to place the events in the proper context. If this were only 
about private sex we would not now be before the Senate. But the manner 
in which the Lewinsky relationship arose and continued is important 
because it is illustrative of the character of the President and the 
decisions he made.

                               Background

    Monica Lewinsky, a 22-year-old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during the government 
shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 730) Prior 
to their first intimate encounter, she had never even spoken with the 
President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President 
Clinton flirted with each other. (Id.) The President of the United 
States of America then invited this unknown young intern into a private 
area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited her back 
later and when she returned, the two engaged in the first of many acts 
of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732)
    Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. Lewinsky were 
seen, she was bringing papers to the President. That story was totally 
false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p. 
34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1314) The only papers she brought were personal 
messages having nothing to do with her duties or those of the 
President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 774-775) 
After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the Pentagon, her 
frequent visits to the President were disguised as visits to Betty 
Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are important, because they play a 
vital role in the later perjuries and obstructions.

                               Encounters

    Over the term of their relationship the following significant 
matters occurred:
    1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least twenty-
one occasions;
    2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, excluding 
phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 1997;
    3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least seventeen 
of which involved phone sex;
    4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and,
    5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. Referral, 
App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111)
    These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for all of 
the events that followed.
    The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, 
though relevant, need not be detailed either in this document or 
through witness testimony. It is necessary, though, briefly to outline 
that evidence, because it will demonstrate that the President 
repeatedly lied about that sexual relationship in his deposition, 
before the grand jury, and in his responses to the Judiciary 
Committee's questions. He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky 
merely performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual 
manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn grand jury 
testimony of three of her friends and the statements by two 
professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared the 
details of her relationship. (O.I.C. Referral, H.Doc. 105-310, pgs. 
138-140)
    While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is much more 
offensive for the President to expect the Senate to believe that in 
1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky was so 
limited that it did not fall within his narrow interpretation of a 
definition of ``sexual relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not 
even conceive his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his 
grand jury appearance.

                        How To View the Evidence

    We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must be 
viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is essential to 
avoid considering each event in isolation, and then treating it 
separately. Events and words that may seem innocent or even exculpatory 
in a vacuum may well take on a sinister, or even criminal connotation 
when observed in the context of the whole plot. For example, everyone 
agrees that Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie; 
nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 1161)
    When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, in the 
context of the other evidence, another picture emerges. Of course no 
one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in there and lie.'' They didn't have 
to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what was expected of her. Similarly, nobody 
promised her a job, but once she signed the false affidavit, she got 
one.

                               The Issue

    The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of conduct is 
such as to affect adversely the Office of the President and also upon 
the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in a manner 
contrary to his trust as President and subversive to the Rule of Law 
and Constitutional government.

                             The Beginning

    The events that form the basis of these charges actually began in 
late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the winter of 1997 and the 
first month of 1998. The event culminated when the President of the 
United States appeared before a federal grand jury, raised his right 
hand to God and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth.

                           December 5-6, 1997

    On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty Currie if 
the President could see her the next day, Saturday, but Ms. Currie said 
that the President was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that 
Friday, Ms. Lewinsky spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas 
party. (ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ, 
p. 108; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 828)

                      The Witness List Is Received

    That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of potential 
witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC-00000128; 849-DC-
00000121-37; Referral, H.Doc. 105-311, p. 88) The list included Monica 
Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did not find out that her name was on 
the list until the President told her ten days later, on December 17. 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 121-123; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay 
is significant.

                       Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit

    After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the President at 
the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President 
terminating their relationship. (ML-55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms. 
Lewinsky went to the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts 
for the President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H.Doc. 
105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, Ms. 
Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and one of them told 
her that the President was not with his lawyers, as she thought, but 
rather, he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-316, 
pgs. 2907-2908; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie 
from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98 
GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie 
told the Secret Service watch commander that the President was so upset 
about the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted 
somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H.Doc. 105-316, 
pgs. 3356-3357).

                      The Telephone Conversations

    At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged Bruce 
Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC-00000862; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, 
while she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
spoke by phone. The President was very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that 
no one had every treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
113-14; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to the 
grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and 
considered it inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
537). Nevertheless, in a sudden change of mood, he invited her to visit 
him at the White House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 834)

                      Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit

    Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time that 
day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 827-DC-00000018) 
Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry'' 
with her during their recent telephone conversation, he was ``sweet'' 
and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-
15; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would talk 
to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-16; 
H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836)

                The Discussions With the Secret Service

    The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the Secret 
Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if they kept quiet 
about the Lewinsky incident, there would be no disciplinary action. 
(Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery 
7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret 
Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President 
personally told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I 
can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3353) Deputy 
Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that he 
knew of no other time in his fourteen years of service at the White 
House where the President raised a performance issue with a member of 
the Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., pgs. 40-
41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his conversation with the 
President, Captain Purdie told a number of officers that they should 
not discuss the Lewinsky incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3343; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316, 
p. 3114)
    When the President was before the grand jury and questioned about 
his statements to the Secret Service regarding this incident, the 
President testified, ``I don't remember what I said and I don't 
remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 534) When confronted with Captain Purdie's testimony, the President 
testified, ``I don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I 
have no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 543)

             The President's Knowledge of the Witness List

    President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he learned 
that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that evening, Saturday, 
December 6, during a meeting with his lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-
84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535-536) He stood by this answer in response to 
Request Number 16 submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18). 
The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left the 
White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to Bruce Lindsey, at the 
meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the Jones witness list faxed to Mr. 
Bennett the previous night. (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 2419) (Exhibit 15)
    However, during his deposition, the President testified that he had 
heard about the witness list before he saw it. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
70) In other words, if the President testified truthfully in his 
deposition, then he knew about the witness list before the 5 p.m. 
meeting. It is valid to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a 
witness list prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained 
change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that Saturday 
afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it prompted him to give 
the unique instruction to a Secret Service watch commander to use 
``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which 
the watch commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from 
discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-
316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33; H.Doc. 105-315, 
pgs. 3360-3361)

                    The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky

    Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high profile 
job in New York since the previous July. She was not having much 
success despite the President's promise to help. In early November, 
Betty Currie arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan who was supposed to 
help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592)
    On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. Jordan 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No action followed; no 
job interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts with 
Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that he made no effort to find a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so unimportant to him that he ``had no 
recollection of an early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was 
not a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) (Chart R) 
Nothing happened throughout the month of November, because Mr. Jordan 
was either gone or would not return Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 825-826)
    During the December 6 meeting with the President, she mentioned 
that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. Jordan and that it 
did not seem he had done anything to help her. The President responded 
by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something to 
that effect. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There 
was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met the 
President the next day, December 7, but the meeting was unrelated to 
Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805, 
1810)

                     The December 11, 1997 Activity

    The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually procure 
employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky 
and gave her a list of contact names. The two also discussed the 
President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840) 
That meeting Mr. Jordan remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 1798) Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective 
employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1800-
1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the President to give him 
a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. Jordan and the President were now very 
interested in helping Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98 
GJ, p. 95; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807)

                   Significance of December 11, 1997

    This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered on 
December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that 
Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any state or federal 
employee with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual 
relations, or sought to have sexual relations.
    The President knew that it would be politically and legally 
expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
And the President knew that that relationship would be fostered by 
finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was accomplished through enlisting the 
help of Vernon Jordan.

         December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List

    On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, Monica 
Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the President of the United 
States. The President said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two 
things: one was that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car 
accident; secondly, the President said that he ``had some more bad 
news,'' that he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and 
her name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) The 
President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke 
his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be subpoenaed, 
[she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that [she] had received 
the subpoena.'' (Id.) Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if 
subpoenaed. The President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to 
be false and misleading to accomplish the desired result.

                     The President's ``Suggestion''

    Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for Monica 
Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He did not 
specifically tell her to lie. What he did say is ``you know, you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843)
    In order to understand the significance of this statement, it is 
necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky had previously structured in order to deceive those who 
protected and worked with the President.
    Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited the 
President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, `here are your 
letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would answer, `Okay that's good.' '' 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left 
White House employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the 
guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775)
    Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she would always 
deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The President 
would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of encouragement. (ML 
8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1078)
    So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on December 
17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her 
of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the 
President brought up the misleading stories, she understood that the 
two would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception.

                       The President's Intention

    It became clear that the President had no intention of making his 
sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public affair. And he would 
use lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not be 
known.
    It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked the 
President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m., 
he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . . . it is quite 
possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 567)
    And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to 
continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the 
letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that 
night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565)
    Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' lawyers 
were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. Lewinsky could file a 
false affidavit, but it might not work. It was absolutely essential 
that both parties told the same story. He knew that he would lie if 
asked about Ms. Lewinsky, and he wanted to make certain that she would 
lie also. That is why the President of the United States called a 
twenty-four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning.

                          The Evidence Mounts

    But the President had an additional problem. It was not enough that 
he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the relationship. The evidence was 
beginning to accumulate. Because of the emerging evidence, the 
President found it necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time, 
the evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts, 
that the President and Monica Lewinsky were spending a significant 
amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. It was no longer 
expedient simply to refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'', 
``stalker'', ``clutch'', or ``home wrecker'' as the White House first 
attempted to do. The unassailable facts were forcing the President to 
acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he still had 
the opportunity to establish a non-sexual explanation for their 
meetings, since his DNA had not yet been identified on Monica 
Lewinsky's blue dress.

                        Need for the Cover Story

    Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along with 
the cover story in order to provide an innocent, intimate-free 
explanation for their frequent meetings. And that innocent explanation 
came in the form of ``document deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with 
Betty Currie.''
    Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 17, 1998, 
he used the exact same cover stories that had been utilized by Ms. 
Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent with any future Lewinsky 
testimony while still maintaining his defense in the Jones lawsuit.
    In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was ever 
alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . She--
it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. 
In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, 
exchange a few words and go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-
53)
    Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. Lewinsky's 
frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President did not hesitate to 
mention Betty Currie in his answers, for example:

    And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after [the 
pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] but my 
secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 58)
    Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. She 
came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there 
talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/
98 Dep., p. 68)

             December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed

    On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in a 
deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the Jones case. (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) (Charts F and G) Extremely 
distraught, she immediately called the President's closest friend, 
Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President 
previously told her to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She 
called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died 
and she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; H.Doc. 
105-311, pgs. 848, 849)

                          Vernon Jordan's Role

    Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she arrived 
shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. Around this time, 
Mr. Jordan called the President and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1) 
During the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as 
``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1716), she 
talked about her infatuation with the President. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan decided that he would call a lawyer 
for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726)

                    Mr. Jordan Informs the President

    That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed his 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely important 
because the President, in his deposition, did not recall that meeting. 
Mr. Jordan told the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her fascination with the 
President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the 
President would leave the First Lady. He also asked the President if he 
had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc 
105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition:

    Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica 
Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?
    A. I don't think so.
    Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility 
that she might be asked to testify in this case?
    A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she was, I 
think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I want to be as 
accurate as I can.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69)
    In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial that Mr. 
Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when given more specific facts, he 
admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the 
subpoena on the night of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. . 
. .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an 
attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, the President 
testified in the grand jury that he was trying to remember who told him 
first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that 
was not the question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one 
considers the nature of the conversation between the President and Mr. 
Jordan, the suggestion that it would be forgotten defies common sense.

                           December 28, 1997

    December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence shows 
that the President made false and misleading statements to the federal 
court, the federal grand jury and the Congress of the United States 
about the events on that date. (Chart J) It is also a date on which he 
obstructed justice.

                        The President's Account

    The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he invited 
Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 33; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that he ``probably'' gave Ms. 
Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/
98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts 
on other occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many 
gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he 
said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks later, the President forgot that 
he had given any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky.
    As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not tolerate 
someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that answer is unreasonable 
under the circumstances. He also knew that, under those circumstances, 
his answer in the deposition could not be believed. When asked in the 
grand jury why he was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms. 
Lewinsky so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the deposition, 
the President put forth an obviously contrived explanation.

    ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not 
that I don't recall whether I had given them.''

 (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503)

                     Response to Committee Requests

    The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 to the 
House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. (Exhibit 18) He was 
not asked in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked, 
``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a 
witness to insert unstated premises or mental reservations into the 
question to make his answer technically true, if factually false. The 
essence of lying is in deception, not in words.
    The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves that his 
explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee is also false. The 
President would have us believe that he was able to analyze questions 
as they were being asked, and pick up such things as verb tense in an 
attempt to make his statements at least literally true. But when he was 
asked a simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it. 
Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted explanation is 
reasonable or true.

                       Testimony Concerning Gifts

    The President was asked in the deposition if Monica Lewinsky ever 
gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
77) This is also false testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He 
answered this question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee 
by saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the 
precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not support the 
President's position. An answer that baldly understates a numerical 
fact in response to a specific quantitative inquiry can be deemed 
technically true but actually false. For example, a witness is 
testifying falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in 
fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had also gone five 
times. So too, when the President answered once or twice in the face of 
evidence that Ms. Lewinsky was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying. 
(Chart C)

                          Concealment of Gifts

    On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct justice 
and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and 
that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. She recalled telling 
the President that the subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused 
her concern. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872) 
The President told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, 
p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she 
take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe to Betty. The 
President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' 
(ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L) 
Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I 
understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you 
have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-
311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about this incident, 
but says that ``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. 
(Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581)

                         The Cell Phone Record

    There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is 
wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie called from her 
cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms. 
Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves 
conclusively that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several 
hours after she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself 
later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on 
this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) The facts 
prove that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.

                       Ms. Currie's Later Actions

    That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If Ms. 
Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, Ms. Currie 
would logically ask the reason for such a transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was 
giving her a box of gifts from the President yet she did not tell the 
President of this strange request. She simply took the gifts and placed 
them under her bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
pgs. 57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 114; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582)
    The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 and 25 
from the House Committee that he was not concerned about the gifts. 
(Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he recalled telling Monica that if 
the Jones lawyers request gifts, she should turn them over. The 
President testified that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena 
asked for gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494-
495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning over gifts 
to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena 
asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested 
gifts, why would he give Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she never 
questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but keep this 
private'' and that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to 
be taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 105-311, 
p. 886) The only logical inference is that the gifts--including the 
bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that 
they would deny the relationship--even in the face of a federal 
subpoena.

                  The President's Deposition Testimony

    Furthermore, the President, at various times in his deposition, 
seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 28 in order to obstruct the administration of justice. First, 
he was asked: ``Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in 
this case?'' The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she 
had been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68)
    He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . .,'' he said. he 
then added that he may have joked to her that the Jones lawyers might 
subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we 
ever had more of a conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/
98 Dep., p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this 
testimony, but the President also directly contradicted himself before 
the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said that 
he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and that 
they had a ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.'' 
(WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this conversation about 
her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks before his deposition. Again, 
his version is not reasonable.

   January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job

    The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to execute a 
false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content that when she asked 
if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen fifteen of 
them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his 
information from discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan 
generally about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President 
had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be 
certain the mission was accomplished.

                     Additional Presidential Advice

    In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with her 
lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 192; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some hard questions about 
how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) 
After the meeting, she called Betty Currie and said that she wanted to 
speak to the President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President discussed 
the issue of how she would answer under oath if asked about how she got 
her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) 
The President told her: ``Well, you could always say that the people in 
Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and misleading.

                        Vernon Jordan's New Role

    The President was also kept advised as to the contents of the 
Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the 
Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 
GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to 
look at the Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his 
imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 194-
195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. 
Jordan conferred about the contents and agreed to delete a paragraph 
inserted by Mr. Carter which might open a line of questions concerning 
whether she had been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he had 
nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 12; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, that he spoke with the 
President after conferring with Ms. Lewinsky about the changes made to 
her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827)

                 Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit

    The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 924-925) 
(Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that 
same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4) 
Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified the President that she signed an 
affidavit denying a sexual relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1739)

                       Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job

    On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for Ms. 
Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky 
called Mr. Jordan and informed him. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's 
job search from early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews 
and Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could 
happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1829) Mr. Jordan 
called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928-929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was 
called by MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given more 
interviews the next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
929)
    After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, 
she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 210; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan to tell him, he passed 
the good news on to Betty Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ 
5/28/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called 
the President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P)

              The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior

    After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job--since July 
according to the President's lawyers--Vernon Jordan made the critical 
call to a CEO the day after the false Affidavit was signed. Mr. 
Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a 
job recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman 
to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a 
very talented attorney from Akin Gump; (3) a Harvard business school 
graduate; and (4) Monica Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 1747) Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. 
Lewinsky's qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals 
previously recommended by Mr. Jordan.
    Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. Lewinsky 
worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59) 
and that she did not like her Pentagon job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point 
during this process you wondered about her qualifications for 
employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to 
make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1707) Yet, when he 
called Mr. Perelman the day after she signed the Affidavit, he referred 
to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman 
4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that 
she had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic 
expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 37-
38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a disturbing story 
about the President leaving the First Lady, and how the President was 
not spending enough time with her. Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan 
pause in making the recommendation, especially after Monica was 
subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1725)

                 The Importance of the False Affidavit

    Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, through 
his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition ``. . . 
there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form 
with President Clinton. . . .'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When 
questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President stated 
specifically that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was 
``absolutely true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later 
affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before the grand 
jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 473) Paragraph 8 
of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states:

    ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me 
employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he 
did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
relationship.''

    Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on January 
6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being alone 
with the President. She showed a copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon 
Jordan, who called the President and told him that she had signed it. 
(VJ, 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98 
GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828)

                     The Rush To File the Affidavit

    For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding questions 
by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it had to be filed with 
the Court and provided to the President's attorneys in time for his 
deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called 
Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out if he 
had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 15, the President's 
attorneys called her attorney twice. When they finally reached him, 
they requested a copy of the Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on 
time?'' (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms. 
Lewinsky's lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123, 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of its 
contents and used it powerfully in the deposition.
    Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on January 
15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on Saturday, January 17. 
(Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424) 
(Exhibit 5) He finished the Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition 
in the early morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court 
with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. (Carter 6/18/
98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The President's lawyers left him 
another message on January 16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.'' 
(Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the 
President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court to support 
his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in the deposition, and 
thereby obstruct justice.

                          The Newsweek Inquiry

    On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty Currie and 
asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her by courier. (BC 5/6/
98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie then called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about 
it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The 
President was out of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky 
back, and asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; H.Doc. 105-
316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with Bruce Lindsey and 
Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. Currie testified that she spoke 
immediately to Mr. Lindsey about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584)

                 January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath

    By the time the President concluded his deposition on January 17, 
he knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who had personal knowledge 
was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky 
created, and that he used himself during the deposition, were now in 
jeopardy. It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky, 
but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the relationship 
from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night 
of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she 
come in the following day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President 
ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday night. (BC 1/
27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart S) Sometime in the 
early morning hours of January 18, 1998, the President learned of a 
news report concerning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/
17/98 GJ, p. 142-143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14)

              The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie

    As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., there 
were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the President. (Exhibit 
7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) He told her that he had just been 
deposed and that the attorneys asked several questions about Monica 
Lewinsky. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then 
made a series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T)

    (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
    (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 
GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked whether 
she believed that the President wished her to agree with the 
statements:

    Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he stated [these 
five points] and the demeanor that he was using at the time that he 
stated it to you--that he wished you to agree with that statement?
    A. I can't speak for him, but----
    Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these [previous] 
meetings in the last several days that that is how you took it.
    A. [Nodding.]
    Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President made to 
you, ``You remember I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' Was 
that also a statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you to 
agree with that?
    A. Correct.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559)
    Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not necessarily 
feel pressured by the President, she did state that she felt the 
President was seeking her agreement (or disagreement) with those 
statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669)

                    Was This Obstruction of Justice?

    The President essentially admitted to making these statements when 
he knew they were not true. Consequently, he had painted himself into a 
legal corner. Understanding the seriousness of the President 
``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the argument has been made that those 
statements to her could not constitute obstruction because she had not 
been subpoenaed, and the President did not know that she was a 
potential witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law 
and the facts.
    The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and 
stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if he 
urges or persuades a prospective witness to give false testimony. 
Neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time of the 
offense, nor must he or she actually give testimony at a later time.'' 
United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing, 
e.g., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 1981)).
    Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the President 
clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate him, as his testimony 
demonstrates. The President claims that he called Ms. Currie into work 
on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But the President 
knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had 
told the truth during his deposition the day before, then he would have 
no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, the 
President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his demeanor, and the 
blatant lies that he suggested clearly prove that the President was not 
merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was looking for 
corroboration for his false cover-up, and that is why he coached her.

                January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky

    Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 p.m., 
the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica Lewinsky began. 
(Chart S) Between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms. 
Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky 
and Ms. Currie agreed to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 
216; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms. 
Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 
160; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 702)

                    January 19, the Search Continues

    The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to work 
diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. and 8:41 a.m., 
she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After 
the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called the President at 8:43 a.m. and said 
that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-
162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again 
paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family 
Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky into 
calling back. That may have been the President's idea, since Ms. Currie 
had just spoken with him. The President was obviously quite concerned 
because he called Betty Currie only six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. 
Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different 
tact, sending the message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the 
President's suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good 
news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. Lewinsky to 
call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 165; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's recollection of why she was 
calling was again fuzzy. She said at one point that she believes the 
President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and she thought she was 
calling just to tell her that her name came up in the deposition. (BC 
7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed; of course her name came up in the deposition. There was 
obviously another and more important reason the President needed to get 
in touch with her.

         Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search

    At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who then 
joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four minutes, from 
10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White House three times, 
paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. 
Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. 
Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House.

                    Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer

    Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter. 
Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer represented Ms. 
Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan 
then made feverish attempts to reach the President or someone at the 
White House to tell them the bad news, as represented by the six calls 
between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to 
relay this information to the White House because ``[t]he President 
asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was 
``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, pgs. 45-46; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan then called Mr. Carter 
back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they had already talked about. (VJ 3/
5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104-316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached 
the President at 5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired. 
(VJ 6/9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970)

                    The Reason for the Urgent Search

    This activity shows how important it was for the President of the 
United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom she was talking. 
Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. Lewinsky. The President 
had just completed a deposition in which he provided false and 
misleading testimony about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was 
a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, 
and he was losing control over her. The President never got complete 
control over her again.

     Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury

    Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of false grand 
jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some salient examples of 
false statements are described below. When judging the statements made 
and the answers given, it is vital to recall that the President spent 
literally days preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his 
attorney were fully aware that the testimony would center around his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony in the 
Jones case.

                          Grand Jury Testimony

    On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the United 
States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow citizens and took an 
oath to tell the complete truth. The President proceeded to equivocate 
and engage in legalistic fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony 
was calculated to mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct 
its process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He set the 
tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a witness can tell the 
truth, lie or assert his privileges against self incrimination. (Chart 
Y) President Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was 
permitted to read a statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9)

                   The President's Prepared Statement

    That statement itself is demonstrably false in many particulars. 
President Clinton claims that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' 
Notice he did not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three 
``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual contact 
with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year old intern at 
the time.
    The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three visits 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they engaged in sexual 
conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/
6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's 
ruling, this evidence was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual 
harassment claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11, 
1997, p. 3)
    The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The 
encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that 
term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 deposition.'' That assertion 
is patently false. It is directly contradicted by the corroborated 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32; 
H.Doc. 311, p. 1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357, 
1358)
    Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
``sexual relations'' as the President understood the term to be defined 
at his deposition and as any reasonable person would have understood 
the term to have been defined.
    Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's conduct 
during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits did constitute 
``sexual relations'' as he understood the term to be defined at his 
deposition. Before the grand jury, the President admitted that directly 
touching or kissing another person's breast, or directly touching 
another person's genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual 
relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 94-95; H.Doc 
105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President maintained that he did 
not engage in such conduct. (Id.) These statements are contradicted by 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and the testimony of numerous individuals with 
whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with 
the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky repeated and 
unilaterally performed acts on the President while he tailored his 
conduct to fit a contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' which he 
had not contemplated at the time of the acts, defies common sense.
    Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted 
interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in the grand 
jury until after his deposition had concluded. This is demonstrated by 
the substantial evidence revealing the President's state of mind during 
his deposition testimony. First, the President continuously denied at 
his deposition any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship, 
including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 
78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-
53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. Lewinsky had ever given him 
gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) Second, the President testified that 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely 
true'' when, even by his current reading of the definition, it is 
absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White House 
produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' 
stating flatly that the President's definition of ``sexual relations'' 
included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the President made statements to 
staff members soon after the deposition, saying that he did not have 
sexual relations, including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/
98 GJ, pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to tell 
people she and the President had an affair when he rebuffed her sexual 
advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth, 
President Clinton's Answer filed in Federal District Court in response 
to Paula Jones' First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that 
``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with 
respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of Defendant William 
Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, para. 39) Sixth, in 
President Clinton's sworn Answers to Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11, 
as amended, he flatly denied that he had sexual relations with any 
federal employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his 
deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat silently 
while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, represented 
to the court that there was no sex of any kind or in any manner between 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54)
    This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state of mind 
at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in technically or 
legally accurate answers, but in categorically denying anything 
improper. His grand jury testimony about his state of mind during the 
deposition is false.

                    Reasons for the False Testimony

    The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect himself from 
embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the affair. Before his grand 
jury testimony, the President's semen had been identified by laboratory 
tests on Ms. Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an 
``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, In fact, 
when he testified before the grand jury, he was only hours away from 
admitting the affair on national television. Embarrassment was 
inevitable. But, if he truthfully admitted the details of his 
encounters with Ms. Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be 
acknowledging that he lied under oath during his deposition when he 
claimed that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. 
(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, he chose to lie, not to 
protect his family or the dignity of his office, but to protect himself 
from criminal liability for his perjury in the Jones case.

              Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement

    The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what began as 
a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 9; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much more troubling. As Ms. 
Lewinsky testified, her relationship with the President began with 
flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky showing the President her underwear. 
(ML 7/30/98 Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky 
candidly admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her 
name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295)

                         Reason for the Falsity

    The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, was not 
an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to a particular 
question. It was carefully drafted testimony which the President read 
and relied upon throughout his deposition. The President attempted to 
use the statement to foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on 
nineteen separate occasions. Yet, this prepared testimony, which along 
with other testimony provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually 
contradicts his sworn deposition testimony.

                     Contrary Deposition Testimony

    In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. Lewinsky 
were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to make this admission 
in his deposition in the Jones case. During the deposition, the 
following exchange occurred:

    Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica 
Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky together alone in 
the Oval Office?
    A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the 
legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on the 
weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring 
me things on the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to me 
once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be 
in there, drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I 
don't have any specific recollections of what the issues were, what was 
going on, but when the Congress is there, we're working all the time, 
and typically I would do some work on one of the days of the weekends 
in the afternoon.
    Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then, 
that you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of 
that ever happening?
    A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was 
working there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought 
it to me, she was the only person there. That's possible.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
    After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President was given 
an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange followed:

    Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone 
together in any room in the White House?
    A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it 
is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on 
duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs 
office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend. 
That's--I have a general memory of that.
    Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those meetings?
    A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't remember.

(WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
    Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he testified 
truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, in part, the basis 
for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My goal in this deposition was to 
be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to 
walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the 
law, and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 
532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he certainly was alone 
with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, as the President 
conceded in his prepared grand jury statement.
    In other words, the President's assertion before the grand jury 
that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he testified truthfully 
in his deposition, is inconsistent. Yet, to this day, both the 
President and his attorneys have insisted that he did not lie at his 
deposition and that he did not lie when he swore under oath that he did 
not lie at his deposition.
    In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his deposition. All 
of those lies are incorporated in Article I, Item 2.

                Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit

    Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing perjurious, 
false and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury concerning 
false and misleading statements his attorney Robert Bennett made to 
Judge Wright at the President's deposition. In one statement, while 
objecting to questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the 
Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] is fully 
aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in 
possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., 
pgs. 53-54) When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her 
concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett responded, 
``In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness is 
fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a 
single thing he doesn't know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis 
added)
    When asked before the grand jury about his statement to Judge 
Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I paid attention 
to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p. 
476) He added, ``I didn't pay much attention to this conversation, 
which is why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the 
deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) Finally, 
``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the 
exact words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully 
for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed me by.'' 
(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 29; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 481)
    This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his 
deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. Jones' 
attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which continued while Ms. 
Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he did not want the truth to be 
known. Of course, when Ms. Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the 
deposition, particularly in connection with sex, the President is going 
to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. Bennett's 
representations are eliminated by watching the videotape of the 
President's deposition. The videotape shows the President looking 
directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to 
Judge Wright.

           False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice

    Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury perjury 
regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and his 
efforts to impede discovery in the Jones  v. Clinton lawsuit. These 
lies are perhaps the most troubling, as the President used them in an 
attempt to conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office.
    For example, the President testified before the grand jury that he 
recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the 
gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should 
provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He 
stated, ``And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have 
to give them whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.) 
This testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony and common sense.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she discussed 
with the President the subpoena's request for her to produce gifts, 
including a hat pin. She told the President that it concerned her, (ML 
8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 871) and he said that it 
``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) 
Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe 
to Betty. But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms. 
Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me 
think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 872) 
Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky on her cellular 
phone and said, ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the 
President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 
154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875)
    Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she remembers is that 
Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) 
She later conceded that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers 
on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A 
telephone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie 
did call her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. Lewinsky's 
meeting with the President. The only logical reason Ms. Currie called 
Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from the President is that the President 
told her to do so. He would not have given this instruction if he 
wished the gifts to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys.

                    Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie

    The President again testified falsely when he told the grand jury 
that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made 
a series of statements to Ms. Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC 
8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that 
she met with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, and 
he proceeded to make these statements to her:

    (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
    (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

(BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 
GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements than 
questions, and that, as far as she understood, the President wanted her 
to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 
559)
    The President was asked specifically about these statements before 
the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he was ``trying to 
refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 
131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He added that he wanted to ``know what 
Betty's memory was about what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 506) and that he was ``trying to get as much 
information as quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 
105-311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's explanation is 
contrived and false.
    A person does not refresh his recollection by firing declarative 
sentences dressed up as leading questions to his secretary. If the 
President was seeking information, he would have asked Ms. Currie what 
she recalled. Additionally, a person does not refresh his recollection 
by asking questions concerning factual scenarios of which the listener 
was unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener knew 
were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always there when Ms. 
Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, acknowledged during her grand 
jury testimony that Ms. Lewinsky could have visited the President at 
the White House when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 65-
66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that there were 
several occasions when the President and Ms. Lewinsky were in the Oval 
Office or study area without anyone else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 
32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 552-553)
    More importantly, the President admitted in his statement to the 
grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions. 
(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his 
own admission, his statement to Ms. Currie about never being alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky was false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie 
certainly could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or 
not.
    The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear 
everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury testimony. 
During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, he ensured 
everyone, including Ms. Currie, was excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53; 
H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why would someone refresh his recollection by 
making a false statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is 
obvious--he would not.
    Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was 
``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently explaining that 
he made these statements because he did not have time to listen to 
answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-
311, p. 508) But, if he was in such a hurry, why did the President not 
ask Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on 
the telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate explanation 
as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 minutes with Ms. 
Currie on January 18 to get her version of the events. In fact, Ms. 
Currie testified that she first met the President on January 18 while 
he was on the White House putting green, and he told her to go into the 
office and he would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70; 
H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, why did he 
repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ, 
pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560-561) The reason for these 
statements had nothing to do with time constraints or refreshing 
recollection; he had just finished lying during the Jones deposition 
about these issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary.

                   Testimony About Influencing Aides

    Not only did the President lie about his attempts to influence Ms. 
Currie's testimony, but he lied about his attempts to influence the 
testimony of some of his top aides. Among the President's lies to his 
aides, described in detail later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky 
did not perform oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him 
while he rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then disseminated 
to the media and attributed to White House sources. They were also 
disseminated to the grand jury.
    When the President was asked about these lies before the grand 
jury, he testified:

    ``And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's 
nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I never 
would have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
    ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter 
further. So I said things that were true. They may have been 
misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and 
I'm sorry.''

(WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558)
    To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must believe that 
many of the President's top aides engaged in a concerted effort to lie 
to the grand jury in order to incriminate him at the risk of subjecting 
themselves to a perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative 
of the President's character that he never felt any compunction in 
exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he could conceal 
his own perjuries. Simply put, such a conspiracy did not exist.
    The above are merely highlights of the President's grand jury 
perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In order to keep 
these lies in perspective, three facts must be remembered. First, 
before the grand jury, the President was not lying to cover up an 
affair and protect himself from embarrassment, as concealing the affair 
was now impossible. Second, the President could no longer argue that 
the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow 
irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent Counsel and the 
grand jury had mandates to explore them. Third, he cannot claim to have 
been surprised or unprepared for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before 
the grand jury, as he spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses 
to such questions.

                         The President's Method

    Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to give the 
appearance of being candid, when actually his intent was the opposite. 
In addition, throughout the testimony, whenever the President was asked 
a specific question that could not be answered directly without either 
admitting the truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said, 
``I rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and 
misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those lies in 
``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg. 
139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591)

                     The House Committee's Request

    In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its inquiry to 
an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the House of 
Representatives submitted to the President 81 requests to admit or deny 
specific facts relevant to this investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although, 
for the most part, the questions could have been answered with a simple 
``admit'' or ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of 
selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, 
artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. When he did answer, 
he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting in an obvious attempt to skirt 
the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct the due proceedings of the 
Committee.

                  The President Repeats His Falsities

    Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a lack of 
memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable memory, for 
his amazing ability to recall details.
    In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to ``White 
House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior testimony and that 
of others. He answered several of the requests by merely restating the 
same deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury. We will point 
out several false statements in this Brief.
    In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive and 
misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct the efforts of 
the House Committee. They had the effect of seriously hampering its 
ability to inquire and to ascertain the truth. The President has, 
therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry and an investigation before 
the Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the 
Judicial Branch of our constitutional system of government.

                    The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky

    After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office of 
President was marshaled to destroy the character and reputation of 
Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been ill-used by the President. 
As soon as her name surfaced, the campaign began to muzzle any possible 
testimony, and to attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted 
effort to obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed 
by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked.
    When the President testified at his deposition that he had no 
sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with Monica Lewinsky, he 
felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only other witness was on board. She 
had furnished a false affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he 
realized from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were taped 
conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he had to develop a 
new story, and he did. In addition, he recounted that story to White 
House aides who passed it on to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct 
that tribunal too.
    On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post published a 
story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes 
Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones' 
Lawyers.'' The White House learned the substance of the Post story on 
the evening of January 20, 1998.

                          Mr. Bennett's Remark

    After the President learned of the existence of the story, he made 
a series of telephone calls.
    At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a 
conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the 
Washington Post stating:

    ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added, 
``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.''

                            Additional Calls

    After that conversation, the President had a half hour conversation 
with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey.
    At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke to her 
for 20 minutes.
    He then called Bruce Lindsey again.
    At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan.
    After that, the President again conversed with Bruce Lindsey.
    This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which the 
President would soon inflict upon top White House aides and advisors.

                  The President's Statements to Staff

                             erskine bowles
    On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with White 
House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two deputies, John 
Podesta and Sylvia Matthews.
    Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 9:00 
a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's immediate words as 
he and two others entered the Oval Office:

    And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said to the 
American people.
    He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual relationships 
with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. And 
when the facts come out, you'll understand.''

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the President 
made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded:

    I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I don't 
know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever they are, you 
ought to get them out. And you ought to get them out rignt now.''

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
    When counsel asked whether the President responded to Bowles' 
suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded:

    I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree with me.

(Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
                              john podesta
January 21, 1998
    Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the 
President on the morning of January 21, 1998.
    He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval 
Office that morning:

    A. And we started off meeting--we didn't--I don't think we said 
anything. And I think the President directed this specifically to Mr. 
Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not 
true.''
    Q. What else did he say?
    A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship with 
her, and that he never asked anybody to lie.

(Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310)
January 23, 1998
    Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another 
discussion with the President:

    ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working on this 
draft and he said to me that he never had sex with her, and that--and 
that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he was 
extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.''

Then Podesta testified as follows:

    Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more specific than 
sex, than the word ``sex.''
    A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
    Q. Okay, share that with us.
    A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate. Of, 
you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had 
sex with her in any way whatsoever----
    Q. Okay.
    A. That they had not had oral sex.

(Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) (Exhibit V)
                           sidney blumenthal
    Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called Sidney 
Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note how the President's 
lies become more elaborate and pronounced when he has time to concoct 
this newest line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and 
Mr. Podesta, he simply denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to 
Mr. Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his defense 
strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the aggressor; (2) he 
launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her as a 
``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent victim being 
attacked by the forces of evil.
    Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 4, 1998 
testimony: (Chart U)

    And it was at this point that he gave his account of what had 
happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, 
``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.'' He 
rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused 
pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'' She 
threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an 
affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she 
hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she 
wouldn't be the stalker anymore.

(Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
    And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal moments 
later:

    And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like 
somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a 
lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character 
in the novel Darkness at Noon.
    And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were 
you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of 
someone.''

(Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
    At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to 
describe the President's manner and demeanor during the exchange.

    Q. In response to my question how you responded to the President's 
story about a threat or discussion about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky, 
you mentioned you didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally 
the nature of your response to the President?
    A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I certainly 
believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he was pouring out 
his heart, and I believed him.

(Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 192-193)
                              betty currie
    When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she could not 
recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with the President 
on Tuesday, January 20, or Wednesday, January 21. But she did state 
that on one of those days, the President summoned her back to his 
office. At that time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday 
afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It was at that 
meeting that the President made a series of statements to Ms. Currie, 
to some of which she could not possibly have known the answers. (e.g. 
``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98 
GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; 
H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
    When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the same tone 
and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday session.
    Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned that she 
might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 Int., p. 8; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 536)

                        Motive for Lies to Staff

    It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff 
were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more 
important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate 
that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that 
this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had 
recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the 
Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys 
and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post 
journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky 
affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on 
Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to 
interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because 
the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of 
events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The 
President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called 
before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311, 
pgs. 557-557)
    In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely 
to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He 
said that he was ``sensitive about not exchanging information because I 
knew I was a potential witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to 
provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta 
had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 
105-316, p. 3332)
    In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White 
House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the 
effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and 
grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told 
them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the 
President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn, 
gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to 
base any decisions.

                             Win, Win, Win

    President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-costs strategy 
calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case 
and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by 
Richard ``Dick'' Morris to the federal grand jury.
    Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on 
January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the 
turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations 
against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an 
overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive 
the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When 
Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President:

    ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, 
it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to 
forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice 
or the various other things.' ''

(Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929)
    Morris recalls the following exchange:

    Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' meaning the 
voters.
    WJC: Well, we just have to win, then.

(Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930)
    The President, of course, cannot recall this statement, 
(Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71)

                 The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky

    In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the public, and 
hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica 
Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky 
to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in 
and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and 
that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President 
employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its 
press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998:

    Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to 
destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky. 
Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker? 
(The Plain Dealer)

Again:

    ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. Charles 
Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of 
the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played 
with a full deck in her other experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer)

From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30:

    ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this 
thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and 
take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in 
which the President was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like 
the woman who followed David Letterman around.'' (NBC News)

From another ``source'' on February 1:

    ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as 
`the stalker.' ''

And on February 4:

    ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as 
`infatuated' with the President, `star struck' and even `a stalker'.'' 
(Buffalo News)

Finally, on January 31:

    ``One White House aide called reporters to offer information about 
Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was 
her nickname--`The Stalker.' ''
    ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be 
identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, 
and was `A little bit weird.' ''
    ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between 
U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White 
House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as 
an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.''
    ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made 
unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the `troubled' product of 
divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her 
mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three 
famous opera singers.''
    ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George 
Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he 
ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup 
of the same coffee to `surprise him.' '' (Toronto Sun)

    This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy 
the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that 
these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of 
the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his 
deportment in the highest office in the land.
    On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury. 
He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides 
(Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called 
before the grand jury.

    Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after 
January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was 
looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that 
they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
    WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after 
that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but 
I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't 
want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you 
information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by 
and large, didn't talk to people about it.
    Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute. 
Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine 
Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's 
involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a 
sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
    WJC. No.
    Q. And you've told us that you----
    WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I 
meant by it when they started this deposition.
    Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it 
might have been misleading. Is that correct?
    WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do was to 
give them something they could--that would be true, even if misleading 
in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and 
let's deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous 
suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, 
in other words.

(WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560)
    As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained 
that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that 
when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The 
President stated that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual 
relations'' to be literally true because he was only referring to 
intercourse.
    However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied 
sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' The President 
told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he 
did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman.
    Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury 
appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, ``Talking 
Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This ``Talking 
Points'' document outlines proposed questions that the President may be 
asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The 
``Talking Points'' purport to state the President's view of sexual 
relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
(Exhibit 17)
    The ``Talking Points'' state as follows:

    Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual 
relationship?
    A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I 
am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' discussion of what 
constitutes a sexual relationship.
    Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the 
President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the 
President, constitute a sexual relationship?
    A. Of course it would.

    The President's own talking points refute the President's ``literal 
truth'' argument.

                   Effect of the President's Conduct

    Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's deportment 
affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity 
and honor of the country.
    Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of 
the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he is required to take an oath 
to ``Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.'' Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol, 
raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath.
    The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.''
    The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the right of 
trial by jury shall be preserved.''
    Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and 
the equal protection of the laws.

                    The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights

    Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt 
that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong 
was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed 
essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in 
turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was 
not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the 
United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve 
and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-
minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously right violations by 
someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to 
enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test. 
As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to 
petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by 
filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At 
this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due 
process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the 
defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates that right to a 
full and fair trial, which, in turn, means the right to call and 
question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her 
case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she 
actually get? None of the above.
    On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to 
zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' Paula Jones ``has a 
right to an orderly disposition of her claims.`` In accordance with the 
Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber 
Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to 
information regarding state or federal employees with whom the 
President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge 
Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this 
ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. 
The President's Answer stated: ``President Clinton denies that he 
engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other 
woman.''
    Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by 
perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit 
testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false 
and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the 
case, it would have been deprived of critical information.
    That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional 
proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the 
President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve, 
protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the ``sanctity of 
an oath'' means to the President.

                 The Effect on the Office of President

    Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the 
people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign 
matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the 
credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of 
a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a 
long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is 
seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our 
country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to 
confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States?
    Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound 
to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it 
affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it 
affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without 
which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a 
pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of 
justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the 
resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is, 
of necessity, devastating.

                        The Effect on the System

    Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath. 
Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the 
foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of 
obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely 
affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a 
lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain 
that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough 
pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So 
too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and 
unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of 
them, the system itself will implode.
    That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been 
indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under 
oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury 
in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they 
gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that 
they should not be charged because their motives may have been to 
protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the 
perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports; 
i.e., betting on college football games.

                      Disregard of the Rule of Law

    Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an 
attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law. 
Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights 
of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of 
the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of 
the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the 
United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the 
entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the 
Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those 
supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will 
collapse altogether.

                     Effect on the Judicial Branch

    The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth-seeking 
process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial 
Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies, 
half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers 
to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated 
his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative 
Branch.
    Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may 
not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the 
Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect 
on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that 
manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely 
destructive.

          The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal

    The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction 
and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that 
perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office. 
Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need 
not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties.

                               Precedents

    In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three 
federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History 
of Impeachment Hearings Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. 
Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'') 
Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that 
perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor 
did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment 
proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and 
misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon, 
it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with 
the exercise of the judges' judicial powers.

                              Judge Nixon

    In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and 
removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense 
stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal 
officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of 
Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge 
Nixon's.
    Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew 
Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley 
Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the 
prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend 
of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of 
Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. 
Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again 
denied his involvement before that grand jury.
    After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on 
two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years 
in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge 
Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged 
him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury 
that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case with the 
prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative 
false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had ``nothing 
whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild 
case.'' The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false 
statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand 
jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03.
    The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House 
Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable 
offense:

    ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal 
process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his 
testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain 
on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he 
sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary 
citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial 
oath?''

House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of 
Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the 
question even more directly:

    ``There are basically two questions before you in connection with 
this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles 
of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate 
on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and 
wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. 
Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives 
Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on 
the bench.''

135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
    The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of 
perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As 
Senator Carl Levin explained:

    ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that 
Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading 
and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I 
and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon 
and remove him from office.''

135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin).

                             Judge Hastings

    Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for, 
among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate 
convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge 
Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy 
stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr. 
William Borders to ``fix'' cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for 
cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his 
own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any 
participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted 
Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge 
Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of 
which were for lying under oath at his trial.
    The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report 
left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable:

    ``It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony 
charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to 
convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence 
were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the 
conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes, 
the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct 
that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster 
one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt 
conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from 
public office.''

The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of 
Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) 
also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings:

    ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high 
crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve 
than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be 
disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to 
attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy 
and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, 
we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that 
we demand of everyone else.''

134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers).

                            Judge Claiborne

    In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and 
removed from office for making false statements under penalties of 
perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax 
returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result, 
he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false 
statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206 
(a). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles 
of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal 
income tax filings were not impeachable was never even seriously 
considered. As the House Managers explained:

    ``[T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two Articles of 
Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax returns] are readily 
resolved. The Constitution provides that Judge Claiborne may be 
impeached and convicted for ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article 
II, Section 4. The willful making or subscribing of a false statement 
on a tax return is a felony offense under the laws of the United 
States. The commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge 
Claiborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate.''

Proceedings of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of Judge 
Harry E. Claiborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986) (Claiborne 
Proceedings'') (emphases added).
    House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate, 
emphatically made the same point:

    ``Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public officials 
who respect the law, not in those who violate the trust that has been 
given to them when they are trusted with public office. Judge Harry E. 
Claiborne has, sad to say, undermined the integrity of the judicial 
branch of Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public 
confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne must be 
convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that of reducing 
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary].''

132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino).
    The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator Albert 
Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and remove him from 
office:

    ``The conclusion is inescapable that Claiborne filed false income 
tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than negligently. . . . 
Given the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its 
constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. An 
individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no business 
receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens. 
More importantly, an individual quality of such reprehensible conduct 
ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers which the 
Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary.''

Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986).

                      Application to the President

    To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents--and in 
particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment for, conviction, 
and removal for perjury--the only recourse for the President's 
defenders is to argue that a high crime or misdemeanor for a judge is 
not necessarily a high crime or misdemeanor for the President. The 
arguments advanced in support of this dubious proposition do not 
withstand serious scrutiny. (See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193)
    The Constitution provides that Article III judges ``shall hold 
their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. III, 1. Thus, 
these arguments suggest that judges are impeachable for ``misbehavior'' 
while other federal officials are only impeachable for treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.
    The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and the 
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in the 1990s 
both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 1974, the staff of 
the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a report which 
included the following conclusion:

    ``Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states 
that judges `shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the 
relevance of the ten impeachments of judges with respect to 
presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by some? It does 
not. The argument is that `good behavior' implies an additional ground 
for impeachment of judges not applicable to other civil officers. 
However, the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention and 
included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its 
expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and 
defines impeachment offenses as `Treason, Bribery, and other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.' ''

Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., 
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print 1974) 
(``1974 Staff Report'') at 17.
    The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal came to 
the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that ``the most plausible 
reading of the phrase `during good Behavior' is that it means tenure 
for life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification 
debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the 
assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through 
impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on Judicial 
Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on Judicial 
Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993) (footnote omitted).
    The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also argues 
against different impeachment standards for federal judges and 
presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to dismiss 
the articles of impeachment against him for failure to state 
impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was that ``[t]he 
standard for impeachment of a judge is different than that for other 
officers'' and that the Constitution limited ``removal of the judiciary 
to acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office.'' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment 
on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter 
cited as ``Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986) 
(hereinafter cited as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings'').
    Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the term 
`good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is totally misplaced 
and virtually all commentators agree that that is directed to affirming 
the life tenure of judges during good behavior. It is not to set them 
down, differently, as judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. at 
81-82. He further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any support for 
the notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the 
United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II of the 
Constitution.'' Id. at 81.
    The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the Senate 
was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained therein because it 
later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus rejected the claim that the 
standard of impeachable offenses was different for judges than for 
presidents.
    Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and 
misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely the 
President ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than 
judges. In the course of the 1980s judicial impeachments, Congress 
emphasized unequivocally that the removal from office of federal judges 
guilty of crimes indistinguishable from those currently charged against 
the President was essential to the preservation of the rule of law. If 
the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule of law as to make 
it intolerable that he remain in office, then how much more so does 
perjury committed by the President of the United States, who alone is 
charged with the duty ``to take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'' (See generally, Cooper Testimony at 194)
    It is just as devastating to our system of government when a 
President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in 
justifying an article of impeachment against President Nixon, the 
President not only has ``the obligation that every citizen has to live 
under the law,'' but in addition has the duty ``not merely to live by 
the law but to see that law faithfully applied.'' Impeachment of 
Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides that he 
``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const. 
Art. II, Sec. 3. When a President, as chief law enforcement officer of 
the United States, commits perjury, he violates this constitutional 
oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a 
nation ruled by laws and not men.

           Perjury and Obstruction Are as Serious as Bribery

    Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction 
and removal comes directly from the text of the Constitution. Because 
the Constitution specifically mentions bribery, no one can dispute that 
it is an impeachable offense. U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 4. Because the 
constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take it to 
mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically criminalize 
bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony in 
judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See 
also 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute), 
1512 (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the 
efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return for 
submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles might easily have 
been charged under these statutes. No one could reasonably argue that 
the President's bribing a witness to provide false testimony--even in a 
private lawsuit--does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. 
The plain language of the Constitution indicates that it is.
    Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a witness 
is illegal because it leads to false testimony that in turn undermines 
the ability of the judicial system to reach just results. Thus, among 
other things, the Framers clearly intended impeachment to protect the 
judicial system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and obstruction of 
justice are illegal for exactly the same reason, and they accomplish 
exactly the same ends through slightly different means. Simple logic 
establishes that perjury and obstruction of justice--even in a private 
lawsuit--are exactly the types of other high crimes and misdemeanors 
that are of the same magnitude as bribery.

                      High Crimes and Misdemeanors

    Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' much of the background and history of the 
impeachment process contradicts the President's claim that these 
offenses are private and therefore do not warrant conviction and 
removal. Two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of 
impeachment are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's 
defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts in this 
case compel the conviction and removal of President Clinton.
    Many have commented on the report on ``Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment'' prepared in February 1974 by the staff of 
the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The general principles concerning 
grounds for impeachment set forth in that report indicate that perjury 
and obstruction of justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key 
language from the staff report describing the type of conduct which 
gives rise to impeachment:
    ``The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--
undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties 
and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental 
process, adverse impact on the system of government.''

1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphasis added).
    Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the 
integrity of office.'' They unavoidably erode respect for the office of 
the President. Such offenses obviously involve ``disregard of [the 
President's] constitutional duties and oath of office.'' Moreover, 
these offenses have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system 
of government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on 
the due administration of justice--a core function of our system of 
government.
    The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment'' 
prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 
January of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive 
impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of office:
    It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for

``impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . . . 
Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of 
government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen to 
constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, the 
essential nexus to damaging the integrity of government may be found in 
acts which constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers 
of, official position. It may also be found in acts which, without 
directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of 
public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers 
that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free 
society.''

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential 
Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphasis added). The commission of perjury 
and obstruction of justice by a President are acts that without doubt 
``undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of the [the 
President] that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a 
free society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law which 
is essential to the well-being of our constitutional system.
    That the President's perjury and obstruction do not directly 
involve his official conduct does not diminish their significance. The 
record is clear that federal officials have been impeached for reasons 
other than official misconduct. As set forth above, two recent 
impeachments of federal judges are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge 
Walter Nixon was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for 
committing perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury 
involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a business 
partner--a matter in which he had no official role. In 1986, Judge 
Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office 
for making false statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax 
returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his official 
responsibilities.
    Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution 
suggests that officials are subject to impeachment only for official 
misconduct. Perjury and obstruction of justice--even regarding a 
private matter--are offenses that substantially affect the President's 
official duties because they are grossly incompatible with his 
preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' 
Regardless of their genesis, perjury and obstruction of justice are 
acts of public misconduct--they cannot be dismissed as understandable 
or trivial. Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters; 
they are crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment, 
conviction, and removal are appropriate.
    The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings affirms 
that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the ranking member of 
the Judiciary Committee and one of the House managers in the Senate 
trial, stated that ``[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in 
the course of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence 
of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be 
justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of 
public office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 132 
Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
    Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate dismiss the 
articles of impeachment for failure to state impeachable offenses 
provides additional evidence that personal misconduct can justify 
impeachment. One of the arguments his attorney made for the motion was 
that ``there is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge 
Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in his official 
function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' (Senate Claiborne 
Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar 
Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3)
    Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it would be 
absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape, 
or perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from 
office by the U.S. Senate.'' (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81) 
Kastenmeier's response was repeated by the House of Representatives in 
its pleading opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to 
Claiborne Motion at 2)
    The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it later 
voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 
1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that private improprieties 
could be, and were in this instance, impeachable offenses.
    The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it relates to 
a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's official duties--a 
judge's personal tax returns--is an impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's 
false statements were also in regard to a matter distinct from his 
official duties. In short, the Senate's own precedents establish that 
misconduct need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal.

                               Conclusion

    This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an institution, 
because if the President is not convicted as a consequence of the 
conduct that has been portrayed, then no House of Representatives will 
ever be able to impeach again and no Senate will ever convict. The bar 
will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to 
be concerned.
    Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to impeach 
President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. Can you imagine a 
future President, faced with possible impeachment, pointing to the 
perjuries, lies, obstructions, and tampering with witnesses by the 
current occupant of the office as not rising to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can 
the standard be lowered without completely compromising the credibility 
of the office for all time?
    Dated: January 11, 1999.
                                   The United States
                                   House of Representatives

                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham.
                                  Managers on the Part of the House
                                 ______
                                 

                                APPENDIX

 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

  Appendix to Trial Memorandum of the Managers Appointed by the U.S. 
                        House of Representatives

                           Table of Contents

                                 charts
    A. The President's Contacts Alone With Lewinsky
    B. The President's Telephone Contacts With Lewinsky
    C. Lewinsky's Gifts to The President
    D. The President's Gifts to Lewinsky
    E. 12/5/97 Facsimile Transmission of Witness List in Jones v. 
Clinton
    F. The December 19, 1997 Subpoena to Lewinsky in Jones v. Clinton
    G. December 19, 1997 Activities Following Lewinsky's Receipt of 
Subpoena
    H. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 
10 in Jones v. Clinton
    I. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 
11 in Jones v. Clinton
    J. December 28, 1997, The President's Final Meeting With Lewinsky 
and Concealment of Gifts
    K. Currie's Cell Phone Records for 12/28/97
    L. The President's Statements About Concealing Gifts
    M. Lewinsky's Draft Affidavit
    N. Lewinsky Final Affidavit dated January 7, 1998 Paragraph 8, 
Jones v. Clinton
    O. Filing Lewinsky's Affidavit and Motion to Quash (1/14/98-1/17/
98)
    P. Mission Accomplished: Lewinsky Signs Her Affidavit and Is Hired 
By Revlon in New York (1/5/98-1/9/98)
    Q. The President's Involvement With Lewinsky's Job Search
    R. Jordan's Testimony About His Pre-Witness List Job Search Efforts
    S. Activity Following The President's Deposition (1/17/98-1/19/98)
    T. The President's Statements to Currie 1/18/98
    U. The President's Denial of Sexual Relations
    V. The President's 1/21/98 Denial of Sexual Relations to 
Blumenthal, Podesta and Morris
    W. The White House 1/24/98 ``Talking Points''
    X. The President's Claims That He Was Truthful With Aides
    Y. The Three Options of a Grand Jury Witness
    Z. The President's Grand Jury ``Statement''
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart A]

              THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS ALONE WITH LEWINSKY

               Lewinsky White House Employee (7/95-4/96)

                                  1995
11/15/95 (Wed): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in Oval 
            Office study and hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual 
            Encounter)
11/17/95 (Fri): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in The 
            President's private bathroom outside the Oval Office study. 
            (Sexual Encounter)
12/5/95 (Tues): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office and study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/31/95 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office and Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
                                  1996
1/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the bathroom 
            outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
1/21/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway 
            outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
2/4/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study and in the adjacent hallway. (Sexual 
            Encounter)
2/19/96 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office. (No Sexual Encounter)
3/31/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in hallway 
            outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter)
4/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway 
            outside the Oval Office study and in the Oval Office study. 
            (Sexual Encounter)
                                  1997
2/28/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office private bathroom. (Sexual Encounter)
3/29/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
5/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office dining room, study and hallway. (No Sexual 
            Encounter)
7/4/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter)
7/14/97 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in Heinreich's 
            office. (No Sexual Encounter)
7/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
8/16/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
10/11/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
11/13/97 (Thurs): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/6/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
12/28/97 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval 
            Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart B]

            THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONTACTS WITH LEWINSKY

1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--first call to ML's home.
1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at office.
1/15 or 1/16/96 (Mon or Tue): Conversation, approx. 12:30 a.m.--ML at 
            home.*
Approx. 1/28/96 (Sun): Caller ID on ML's office phone indicated POTUS 
            call.
1/30/96 (Tues): Conversation--during middle of workday at ML's office.
2/4/96 (Sun): Conversations--ML at office--multiple calls.
2/7 or 2/8/96 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
2/8 or 2/9/96 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--ML at home.*
2/19/96 (Mon): Conversation--ML at home.
Approx. 2/28 or 3/5/96: Conversation--approx. 20 min.--after chance 
            meeting in hallway--ML at home.
3/26/96 (Tues): Conversation--approx. 11 a.m.--ML at office.
3/29/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 8 p.m.--invitation to 
            movie.
3/31/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 1 p.m.--Pres. ill.
4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation----ML at home.
4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation--ML at home--why ML left.
4/12/96 (Fri): Conversation--ML at home--daytime.
4/12 or 4/13/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home--after midnight.
4/22/96 (Mon): Conversations--job talk--ML at home.
4/29 or 4/30/96 (Mon or Tues): Message--after 6:30 a.m.
5/2/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.*
5/6/96 (Mon): Possible phone call.
5/16/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
5/21/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
5/31/96 (Fri): Message.
6/5/96 (Wed): Conversation--ML at home--early evening.
6/23/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
7/5 or 7/6/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
7/19/96 (Fri): Conversation--6:30 a.m.--ML at home.*
7/28/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.
8/4/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
8/24/96 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
9/5/96 (Thur): Conversation--Pres. In Fla--ML at home.*
9/10/96 (Tues): Message.
9/30/96 (Mon): Conversation.*
10/22/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
10/23 or 10/24/96 (early am): Conversation--ML at home.
12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--approx. 10-15 min.--ML at home.
12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--later that evening--ML at home--approx. 
            10:30 p.m.--Pres fell asleep.*
12/18/96 (Wed): Conversation--approx. 5 min.--10:30 p.m.--ML at home.
12/30/96 (Mon): Message.
1/12/97 (Sun): Conversation--job talk--ML at home.*
2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home--mid-day--11:30-12:00.
2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--job talk--1:30 or 2:00 p.m.--ML at home.*
3/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--three minutes--ML at work.
4/26/97 (Sat): Conversation--late afternoon--20 min.--ML at home.
5/17/97 (Sat): Conversations--multiple calls.
5/18/97 (Sun): Conversations--multiple calls.
7/15/97 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.
8/1/97 (Fri): Conversation.
9/30/97 (Tues): Conversation.*
10/9 or 10/10/97 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--long, from 2 or 2:30 a.m. 
            until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m.--job talk--argument--ML at home.
10/23/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--end b/c HRC.
10/30/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--interview prep.
11/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--discuss re: ML visit.*
12/6/97 (Sat): Conversation--approx. 30 min--ML at home.
12/17 or 12/18/97 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--b/t 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 
            a.m.--ML at home--witness list.
1/5/98 (Mon): Conversation.

    *Conversation that involved and may have involved phone sex.
                               [Chart C]

                    LEWINSKY GIFTS TO THE PRESIDENT

10/24/95: Lewinsky (before the sexual relationship began) gives her 
            first gift to The President of a matted poem given by her 
            and other White House interns to commemorate ``National 
            Boss' Day''. It is the only gift the President sent to the 
            archives instead of keeping.
11/20/95: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie.
3/31/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Hugo Boss Tie.
Christmas 1996: Lewinsky gives The President a Sherlock Homes game and 
            a glow in the dark frog.
Before 8/16/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie and a t-
            shirt from Bosnia.
Early 1997: Lewinsky gives The President Oy Ve, a small golf book, golf 
            balls, golf tees, and a plastic pocket frog.
3/97: Lewinsky gives The President a care package after he injured his 
            leg including a metal magnet with The Presidential seal for 
            his crutches, a license plate with ``Bill'' for his 
            wheelchair, and knee pads with The Presidential seal.
3/29/97: Lewinsky gives The President her personal copy of Vox, a book 
            about phone sex, a penny medallion with the heart cut out, 
            a framed Valentine's Day ad, and a replacement for the Hugo 
            Boss tie that had the bottom cut off.
5/24/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Banana Republic casual shirt 
            and a puzzle on gold mysteries.
7/14/97: Lewinsky gives The President a wooden B, with a frog in it 
            from Budapest.
Before 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President The Notebook.
8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique book on Peter the 
            Great, the card game ``Royalty'', and a book, Disease and 
            Misrepresentation.
10/21/97 or 10/22/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Calvin Klein tie, 
            and pair of sunglasses.
10/97: Lewinsky gives The President a package Before filled with 
            Halloween-related items, such as a Halloween pumpkin lapel 
            pin, a wooden letter opener with a frog on the handle, and 
            a plastic pumpkin filled with candy.
11/13/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique paperweight that 
            depicted the White House.
12/6/97: Lewinsky gives The President Our Patriotic President: His Life 
            in Pictures, Anecdotes, Sayings, Principles and Biography; 
            an antique standing cigar holder; a Starbucks Santa Monica 
            mug; a Hugs and Kisses box; and a tie from London.
12/28/97: Lewinsky gives The President a hand-painted Easter Egg and 
            ``gummy boobs'' from Urban Outfitters.
1/4/98: Lewinsky gives Currie a package with her final gift to The 
            President containing a book entitled The Presidents of the 
            United States and a love note inspired by the movie 
            Titanic.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart D]

                   THE PRESIDENT'S GIFTS TO LEWINSKY

12/5/95: The President gives Lewinsky an autographed photo of himself 
            wearing the Zenga necktie she gave him.*
2/4/96: The President gives Lewinsky a signed ``State of the Union'' 
            Address.*
3/31/96: The President gives Lewinsky cigars.
2/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky a hat pin*, ``Davidoff'' cigars, 
            and the book the Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman as belated 
            Christmas gifts.
    The President gives Lewinsky a gold brooch.*
    The President gives Lewinsky an Annie Lennox compact disk.
    The President gives Lewinsky a cigar.
7/24/97: The President gives Lewinsky an antique flower pin in a wooden 
            box, a porcelain object d'art, and a signed photograph of 
            the President and Lewinsky.*
Early 9/97: The President brings Lewinsky several Black Dog items, 
            including a baseball cap*, 2 T-shirts*, a hat and a dress.*
12/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky the largest number of gifts 
            including:
    1. a large Rockettes blanket,*
    2. a pin of the New York skyline,*
    3. a marblelike bear's head from Vancouver,*
    4. a pair of sunglasses,*
    5. a small box of cherry chocolates,
    6. a canvas bag from the Black Dog,*
    7. a stuffed animal wearing a T-shirt from the Black Dog.*

    (*Denotes those items Lewinsky produced to the OIC on 7/29/98).
    
    
                               [Chart F]

                           LEWINSKY SUBPOENA

                            Jones v. Clinton

                           december 19, 1997
    The Jones v. Clinton subpoena to Lewinsky called for:

(1) Her testimony on January 23, 1998 at 9:30 a.m.;
(2) Production of ``each and every gift including but not limited to, 
            any and all dresses, accessories, and jewelry, and/or hat 
            pins given to you by, or on behalf of, Defendant Clinton;'' 
            and
(3) ``Every document constituting or containing communications between 
            you and Defendant Clinton, including letters, cards, notes, 
            memoranda and all telephone records.''
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart G]

                           DECEMBER 19, 1997

                                (Friday)

         Lewinsky is Served with a Subpoena in Jones v. Clinton

1:47-1:48 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan's office.
3:00-4:00 p.m.: Lewinsky is served with a subpoena in Jones v. Clinton.
--: Lewinsky telephones Jordan immediately about subpoena.
3:51-3:52 p.m.: Jordan telephones The President and talks to Debra 
            Schiff.
4:17-4:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Social Office.
4:47 p.m.: Lewinsky meets Jordan and requests that Jordan notify The 
            President about her subpoena.
5:01-5:05 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan; Jordan notifies The 
            President about Lewinsky's subpoena.
5:06 p.m.: Jordan telephones attorney Carter to represent Lewinsky.
Later that Evening: The President meets alone with Jordan at the White 
            House.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart H]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 10

    Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name, address, and telephone 
number of each and every individual (other than Hillary Rodham Clinton) 
whom you had sexual relations when you held any of the following 
positions:

a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
c. President of the United States.

(Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present 
involving state or federal employees.)
    Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (as modified by 
direction of the Court): None.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart I]

                           DECEMBER 23, 1997

                 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 11

    Interrogratory No. 11: Please state the name, address, and 
telephone number of each and every individual (other than Hillary 
Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual relations, when you 
held any of the following positions:

    a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
    b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
    c. President of the United States.

(Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present 
involving state or federal employees.)
    Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 11 (as modified by 
direction of the Court): None.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart J]

                           DECEMBER 28, 1997

                                (Sunday)

The President's Final Meeting with Lewinsky and The Concealment of the 
                           Gifts to Lewinsky

8:16 a.m.: Lewinsky meets The President at the White House at Currie's 
            direction.

 The President gives Lewinsky numerous gifts.
 The President and Lewinsky discuss the subpoena, calling for, 
            among other things, the hat pin. The President acknowledges 
            ``that sort of bothered [him] too.''
 Lewinsky states to The President: ``Maybe I should put the 
            gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
            someone, maybe Betty [Currie].''

3:32 p.m.: Currie telephones Lewinsky at home from Currie's cell phone.

``I understand you have something to give me.'' or
``The President said you have something to give me.''

Later that Day: Currie picks up gifts from Lewinsky. 


                               [Chart L]

           THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT CONCEALING GIFTS

                                12/28/97

    ``[Lewinsky]: And then at some point I said to him [The President], 
`Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my 
house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of 
said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about 
that.' And left that topic.''--(Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 152)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart M]

                        AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #

    1. My name is Jane Doe # . I am 24 years old and I currently reside 
at 700 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
    2. On December 19, 1997, I was served with a subpoena from the 
plaintiff to give a deposition and to produce documents in the lawsuit 
filed by Paula Corbin Jones against President William Jefferson Clinton 
and Danny Ferguson.
    3. I can not fathom any reason that the plaintiff would seek 
information from me for her case.
    4. I have never met Ms. Jones, nor do I have any information 
regarding the events she alleges occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May 
8, 1991 or any other information concerning any of the allegations in 
her case.
    5. I worked at the White House in the summer of 1995 as a White 
House intern. Beginning in December, 1995, I worked in the Office of 
Legislative Affairs as a staff assistant for correspondence. In April, 
1996, I accepted a job as assistant to the Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense. I maintained that job 
until December 26, 1997. I am currently unemployed but seeking a new 
job.
    6. In the course of my employment at the White House, I met 
President Clinton on several occasions. I do not recall ever being 
alone with the President, although it is possible that while working in 
the White House Office of Legislative Affairs I may have presented him 
with a letter for his signature while no one else was present. This 
would have lasted only a matter of minutes.
    7. I have the utmost respect for the President who has always 
behaved appropriately in my presence.
    8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he 
did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me 
employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he 
did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a sexual 
relationship with the President, was offered employment or other 
benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied 
employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The 
occasions that I saw the President, with crowds of other people, after 
I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996 related to 
official receptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S. 
Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were 
other people present on all of these occasions.
    9. Since I do not possess any information that could possibly be 
relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible 
evidence in this case, I asked my attorney to provide this affidavit to 
plaintiff's counsel. Requiring my deposition in this matter would cause 
unwarranted attorney's fees and costs, disruption of my life, 
especially since I am looking for employment, and constitute an 
invasion of my right to privacy.
    I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct.
                                                Monica S. Lewinsky.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:
    Monica S. Lewinsky, being first duly sworn on oath according to 
law, deposes and says that she has read the foregoing Affidavit of Jane 
Doe # by her subscribed, that the matters stated herein are true to the 
best of her information, knowledge and belief.
                                                Monica S. Lewinsky.

    Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of __________, 
1998.
                                         __________________________
                                                Notary Public, D.C.
    My Commission expires: ________
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart N]

               FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #6 [LEWINSKY]

                                 1/7/98

8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
            not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not 
            offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a 
            sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other 
            benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. I do not know 
            of any other person who had a sexual relationship with the 
            President, was offered employment or other benefits in 
            exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied 
            employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual 
            relationship. The occasions that I saw the President after 
            I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996, 
            were official receptions, formal functions or events 
            related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
            working at the time. There were other people present on 
            those occasions.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart O]

                    LEWINSKY'S AFFIDAVIT GETS FILED

                           (1/14/98-1/17/98)

                      january 14, 1998 (wednesday)
7:45 p.m.: Bennett's firm (Sexton) leaves Carter telephone message.
--: Carter faxes signed affidavit to Bennett's firm.
                      january 15, 1998 (thursday)
9:17 a.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
12:59 p.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
--: Currie called by Newsweek.
--: Lewinsky drives Currie to meet Jordan.
--: Sexton telephones Carter: ``STILL ON TIME?''
--: Carter telephones Court Clerk for Saturday (1/17/98) Filing of 
            Affidavit and motion to quash.
                       january 16, 1998 (friday)
2 a.m. (Approx.): Carter completes motion to quash Lewinsky's 
            deposition.
    Carter sends by overnight mail motion to quash and affidavit to 
            Bennett's firm and to the Court.
11:30 a.m.: Sexton message to Carter: ``Please call.''
                      january 17, 1998 (saturday)
--: Lewinsky Affidavit is submitted to the Court.
--: The President is deposed.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart P]

 MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: LEWINSKY SIGNS AFFIDAVIT AND GETS A NEW YORK JOB

                            (1/5/98-1/9/98)

                            january 5, 1998
Lewinsky meets with attorney Carter for an hour; Carter drafts an 
            Affidavit for Lewinsky in an attempt to avert her 
            deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton scheduled for 
            January 23, 1998.
Lewinsky telephones Currie stating that she needs to speak to the 
            President about an important matter; specifically that she 
            was anxious about something she needed to sign--an 
            Affidavit.
The President returns Lewinsky's call; Lewinsky mentions the Affidavit 
            she'd be signing; Lewinsky offers to show the Affidavit to 
            The President who states that he doesn't need to see it 
            because he has already seen about fifteen others.
                            january 6, 1998
11:32 a.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter.'' 
            Lewinsky meets Carter and receives draft Affidavit.
2:08-2:10 p.m.: Jordan calls Lewinsky. Lewinsky delivers draft 
            Affidavit to Jordan.
3:14 p.m.: Carter again pages Lewinsky: ``Frank Carter at [telephone 
            number] will see you tomorrow morning at 10:00 in my 
            office.''
3:26-3:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
3:38 p.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich, Deputy Assistant to The 
            President.
3:48 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
3:49 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky to discuss draft Affidavit. Both 
            agree to delete implication that she had been alone with 
            The President.
4:19-4:32 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan.
4:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
4:34-4:37 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Carter.
5:15-5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
9:26-9:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
10:00 a.m.: Lewinsky signs false Affidavit at Carter's Office.
--: Lewinsky delivers signed Affidavit to Jordan.
11:58 a.m.-12:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
5:46-5:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House (Hernreich's Office).
6:50-6:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House and tells The 
            President that Lewinsky signed an Affidavit.
                            january 8, 1998
9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's Office.
9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
--: Lewinsky interviews in New York at MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
            Inc. (MFH)
11:50-11:51 a.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
3:09-3:10 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
4:48-4:53 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New 
            York MFH Interview went ``Very Poorly.''
4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ronald Perelman in New York, CEO of Revlon 
            (subsidiary of MFH) ``to make things happen . . . if they 
            could happen.''
4:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky stating, ``I'm doing the best I 
            can to help you out.''
6:39 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Counsel's Office (Cheryl 
            Mills), possibly about Lewinsky.
Evening: Revlon in New York telephones Lewinsky to set up a follow-up 
            interview.
9:02-9:03 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan about Revlon interview in 
            New York.
                            january 9, 1998
--: Lewinsky interviews in New York with Senior V.P. Seidman of 
            MacAndrews & Forbes and two Revlon individuals.
    Lewinsky offered Revlon job in New York and accepts.
1:29 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
4:14 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan to say that Revlon offered her a 
            job in New York.
    Jordan notifies Currie: ``Mission Accomplished'' and requests she 
            tell The President.
    Jordan notifies The President of Lewinsky's New York job offer. The 
            President replies ``Thank you very much.''
4:37 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Carter.
5:04 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
5:05 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
5:08 p.m.: The President telephones Currie.
5:09-5:11 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
5:12 p.m.: Currie telephones The President.
5:18-5:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
5:21-5:26 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Q]

          THE PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT WITH LEWINSKY JOB SEARCH

``Q: Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that this 
            has happened [Carter had been fired]?
[Jordan]: Thought they had a right to know.
Q: Why?
[Jordan]: The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got 
            her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new 
            counsel. I thought that was information that they ought to 
            have. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/9/98 Tr. 45-46)
``Q: Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank Carter 
            had been replaced?
[Jordan]: Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew 
            that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was 
            interested in this matter. He is the source of it coming to 
            my attention in the first place. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 
            6/9/98 Tr. 58-59)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart R]

              JORDAN'S PRE-WITNESS LIST JOB SEARCH EFFORTS

``[Jordan]: I have no recollection of an early November meeting with 
            Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of 
            it and I have no record of it.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 3/3/98 
            Tr. 50)
          * * * * * * *
``Q: Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica Lewinsky a 
            job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?
[Jordan]: I think that's fair to say.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 Tr. 
            76)
          * * * * * * *
``[Lewinsky]: [Referring to 12/6/97 meeting with the President]. I 
            think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch with 
            Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work 
            out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job 
            front].
Q: Did the President say what he was going to do?
[Lewinsky]: I think he said he would--you know, this was not sort of 
            typical of him, to sort of say, `Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll 
            get on it.' '' (Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 115-116)
          * * * * * * *
``Q: But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 11th, you 
            are clear that at that point you had made a decision that 
            you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.
[Jordan]: There is no question about that.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 
            Tr. 95)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart S]

                            January 17, 1998

                                saturday
 4:00 p.m. (approx): THE PRESIDENT finishes testifying under 
            oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al.
 5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
 5:38 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home but does 
            not speak with her.
 7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT places a call to Jordan's office.
 7:13 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks 
            her to meet with him on Sunday.

                            January 18, 1998

                                 sunday
 6:11 a.m.: Drudge Report Released.
 --: The President learns of the Drudge Report and [Tripp] 
            tapes.
 11:49 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 12:30 p.m.: Jordan has lunch with Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey 
            informs Jordan about the Drudge Report and [Tripp] tapes.
 12:50 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 1:11 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 2:15 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 2:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT.
 5:00 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT meets with Currie, concerning his 
            contacts with Lewinsky.
 5:12 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 6:22 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 7:06 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 7:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills, White House 
            Counsel's Office.
 8:28 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Call Kay.''
 10:09 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie at home.
 11:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks 
            if she reached Lewinsky.

                            January 19, 1998

                     monday--martin luther king day
 7:02 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home at 
            8:00 this morning.''
 8:08 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay .''
 8:33 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
 8:37 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home. 
            It's a social call. Thank you.''
 8:41 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Kay is at home. Please 
            call.''
 8:43 a.m.: Currie telephones The President from home to say 
            she has been unable to reach Lewinsky.
 8:44 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kate re: 
            family emergency.''
 8:50 a.m. THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 8:51 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Msg. From Kay. Please 
            call, have good news.''
 8:56 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
 10:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from his office.
 10:35 a.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the White 
            House.
 10:36 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at 
            [number redacted].''
 10:44 a.m.: Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the White 
            House.
 10:53 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
 10:58 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office.
 11:04 a.m.: Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the White 
            House.
 11:16 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at 
            [number redacted].''
 11:17 a.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey at the White House.
 12:31 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular 
            phone.
 --: Jordan lunches with Carter.
 1:45 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
 2:29 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular 
            phone.
 2:44 p.m.: Jordan enters the White House and over the course 
            of an hour meets with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine Bowles, Bruce 
            Lindsay, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm Emanuel and 
            others.
 2:46 p.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter 
            at [number redacted].''
 4:51 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 4:53 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at home.
 4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at his office. Carter 
            informs Jordan that Lewinsky has replaced Carter with a new 
            attorney.
 4:58 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 4:59 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ruff, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Lindsey, White House 
            Counsel's Office.
 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
 5:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:14 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter concerning his termination 
            as Lewinsky's attorney.
 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's 
            Office.
 5:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 5:56 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office; 
            Jordan informs The President that Carter was fired.
 6:04 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
 6:26 p.m.: Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide to THE 
            PRESIDENT.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart T]

          THE PRESIDENT'S POST-DEPOSITION STATEMENTS TO CURRIE

                                1/18/98

     ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
     ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
     ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
     ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
     ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do 
that.''--(Currie Grand Jury 7/22/98 Tr. 6-7; Currie Grand Jury 1/27/98 
Tr. 70-75)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart U]

                        THE PRESIDENT'S DENIALS

                                1/21/98

    ``And it was at that point that he gave his account of what had 
happened to me [sic] and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He 
said, `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He 
rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused 
pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'
    She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had 
an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that 
she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then 
she wouldn't be the stalker any more.''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 
Tr. 49)
    ``And he said, `I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like 
somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a 
lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character 
in the novel Darkness at Noon.'
    And I said to him, I said, `When this happened with Monica 
Lewinsky, were you alone? He said, `Well, I was within eyesight or 
earshot of someone.' ''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 Tr. 50)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart V]
    ``Q. Okay. Share that with us.
    ``A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of, 
you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had 
sex with her in any way whatsoever--
    ``Q. Okay.
    ``A. --that they had not had oral sex''--(John Podesta Grand Jury 
6/16/98 Tr. 92)
          * * * * * * *
    ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, 
it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to 
forgive you [The President] for adultery, but not for perjury or 
obstruction of justice or the various other things.' ''--(Dick Morris 
Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 10, 12, 20)
          * * * * * * *
    ``And I said, `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the voters.' 
And he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to win, then.' ''--
(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 30)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart W]

                          ``TALKING POINTS'' *

                            January 24, 1998

          * * * * * * *
    ``Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the 
President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the 
President, constitute a sexual relationship?''
    ``A. Of course it would.''
          * * * * * * *
    * Produced by the White House pursuant to OIC Subpoena.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart X]

            THE PRESIDENT CLAIMS HE WAS TRUTHFUL WITH AIDES

    [President]: And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's 
nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I would 
never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
    But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter 
further. So I said things that were true. They may have been 
misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and 
I'm sorry.--(The President Grand Jury 8/17/98 Tr. 106)
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Y]

                          GRAND JURY WITNESSES

    A person testifying before a federal grand jury has three options 
under the law:
          (1) To obey the oath and testify to the truth, the whole 
        truth and nothing but the truth;
          (2) To lie;
          (3) To assert the Fifth Amendment or another legally 
        recognized privilege.
                                 ______
                                 
                               [Chart Z]

               PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
    While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I 
can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and 
others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, 
this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
    I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions 
including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions 
about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood 
it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions 
concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my statement.''
                                 ______
                                 

                           Table of Contents

                                exhibits
Telephone records
    (1) Summary chart, 12/19/97
    (2) Currie Cell phone records, 12/28/97
    (3) Summary chart, 1/6/98
    (4) Summary chart, 1/7/98
    (5) Summary chart, 1/15/98-1/16/98
    (6) Summary chart, 1/17/98
    (7) Summary chart, 1/18/98
    (8) Summary chart, 1/19/98
Court Documents
    (9) Jones v. Clinton. Jan. 29, 1998 District Court Order regarding 
discovery
    (10) President Clinton's Answer to First Amended Complaint. Jones 
v. Clinton
    (11) In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3053 & 3059, U.S. Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia
    (12) Jane Doe #6 (Lewinsky) Affidavit filed in Jones v. Clinton
    (13) ``Sexual Relations'' definition
Miscellaneous
    (14) 1/18/98 Drudge Report
    (15) Jones' attorneys fax cover sheet of witness list to Bennett
    (16) White House ``Talking Points,'' January 24, 1998
    (17) LA Times 1/25/98 Article regarding White House ``Talking 
Points''
    (18) Response of William J. Clinton to Judiciary Committee 
Questions
    (19) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 138 L. 16-23 (From GJ Tape 2)
    (20) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 100 L. 20-25, Tr. 105 L. 19-
25, Tr. 106 L. 1-12 (From GJ Tape 3)
    (21) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 75 L. 2-8, Tr. 76 L. 24-25, 
Tr. 77 L. 1-2, (From Dep. Tape 1)
    (22) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 52 L. 18-25, Tr. 53 L. 1-9, 
10-18, Tr. 58 L. 22-25, Tr. 59 L. 1-3, 7-16, 17-20 (From Dep. Tape 3)
    (23) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 78 L. 4-23, (From Dep. Tape 
4)
    (24) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 53 L. 22-25, Tr. 54 L. 1-7, 
20-25, Tr. 55 L. 1-3 (From Dep. Tape 5)
    (25) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 204 L. 5-14, (From Dep. Tape 
8)
    (26) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 9-11
    
    
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
        States

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                           Table of Contents

    I. INTRODUCTION
    A. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been 
Satisfied
    B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice
    C. Compound Charges and Vagueness
    II. BACKGROUND
    A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End
    B. The Paula Jones Litigation
    C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky
    D. Proceedings in the House of Representatives
    III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION
    A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors
    1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question 
Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
    2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
    a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an Intentionally High 
Standard for Removal
    b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government
    3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not 
Alone State Impeachable Offenses
    a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon
    b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton
    4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm 
that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
    a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
    b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations Would Forever 
Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and to Our Government 
of Separated Powers
    5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
    B. The Standard of Proof
    IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I
    A. Applicable Law
    B. Structure of the Allegations
    C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article I
    1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading 
statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his 
relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the 
Jones case
    3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements of his 
attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
    4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence'' in the Jones case
    V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II
    A. Applicable Law
    B. Structure of the Allegations
    C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II
    1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit 
in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
misleading''
    2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in 
the Jones litigation
    3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, 
or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to 
Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
    a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
    b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
    c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the 
President's Actions
    4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection 
with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an effort 
to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case
    a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge
    b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
    c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
    (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan
    (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment offer
    d. Conclusion
    5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning 
Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating 
``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    VI. THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND VOTE
    A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in 
Specificity
    1. The Structure of Article I
    2. The Structure of Article II
    B. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate the Constitutional 
Requirement That Two-Thirds of the Senate Reach Agreement that Specific 
Wrongdoing Has Been Proven
    1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation 
of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
    a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence 
Requirement
    b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections 
that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single Accusation
    C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process 
Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations
    1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
    2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
    D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak 
Clearly and Intelligibly
    VII. THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY
    VIII. CONCLUSION

        TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

    Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left their 
homes and work places to travel to schools, church halls and other 
civic centers to elect a President of the United States. And on January 
20, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term 
of office for four years.
    The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the House of 
Representatives, is now gathered in trial to consider whether that 
decision should be set aside for the remaining two years of the 
President's term. It is a power contemplated and authorized by the 
Framers of the Constitution, but never before employed in our nation's 
history. The gravity of what is at stake--the democratic choice of the 
American people--and the solemnity of the proceedings dictate that a 
decision to remove the President from office should follow only from 
the most serious of circumstances and should be done in conformity with 
Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation and its 
people.
    The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the Senate 
fall far short of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they 
placed in the hands of the Congress the power to impeach and remove a 
President from office. They fall far short of what the American people 
demand be shown and proven before their democratic choice is reversed. 
And they even fall far short of what a prudent prosecutor would require 
before presenting a case to a judge or jury.
    Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-
flying rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see clearly that the 
House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from 
office because he:
     used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe the 
frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. 
There were, according to the House Managers, eleven such contacts over 
the course of approximately 500 days.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because he used the phrase 
``certain occasions'' to describe eleven events over some 500 days? 
That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
     used the word ``occasional'' to describe the frequency of 
inappropriate telephone conversations between he and Monica Lewinsky. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
between ten and fifteen such conversations spanning a 23-month period.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because he used the word 
``occasional'' to describe up to 15 telephone calls over a 23-month 
period? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to 
do.
     said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began in 
early 1996, while she recalls that it began in November 1995. And he 
said the contact did not include touching certain parts of her body, 
while she said it did.
    Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the 
United States be removed from office because two people have a 
different recollection of the details of a wrongful relationship--which 
the President has admitted? That is what the House of Representatives 
asks the Senate to do.
    The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples cited 
above, but the other allegations of wrongdoing are similarly 
unconvincing. There is the charge that the President unlawfully 
obstructed justice by allegedly trying to find a job for Monica 
Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about their relationship. This 
charge is made despite the fact that no one involved in the effort to 
find work for Ms. Lewinsky--including Ms. Lewinsky herself--testifies 
that there was any connection between the job search and the affidavit. 
Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. Lewinsky's statements to Ms. 
Tripp, was expressly repudiated by Ms. Lewinsky under oath.
    There is also the charge that the President conspired to obstruct 
justice by arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts that he had given 
her, even though the facts and the testimony contain no evidence that 
he did so. In fact, the evidence shows that the President gave her new 
gifts on the very day that the articles allege he conspired to conceal 
his gifts to her.
    In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to remove the 
President because he had a wrongful relationship and sought to keep the 
existence of that relationship private.
    Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse the 
President's actions. By his own admission, he is guilty of personal 
failings. As he has publicly stated, ``I don't think there is a fancy 
way to say that I have sinned.'' He has misled his family, his friends, 
his staff, and the Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He hoped to avoid exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to 
protect his family and himself and to avoid public embarrassment. He 
has acknowledged that his actions were wrong.
    By the same token, these actions must not be mischaracterized into 
a wholly groundless excuse for removing the President from the office 
to which he was twice elected by the American people. The allegations 
in the articles and the argument in the House Managers' Trial 
Memorandum do not begin to satisfy the stringent showing required by 
our Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected President from office, 
either as a matter of fact or law.
 a. the constitutional standard for impeachment has not been satisfied
    There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal scholars 
and historians that the substance of the articles does not amount to 
impeachable offenses. On November 6, 1998, 430 Constitutional law 
professors wrote:

    ``Did President Clinton commit `high Crimes and Misdemeanors' 
warranting impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that 
the misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . . 
does not cross the threshold. . . . [I]t is clear that Members of 
Congress could violate their constitutional responsibilities if they 
sought to impeach and remove the President for misconduct, even 
criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high constitutional 
standard required for impeachment.''

    On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a joint 
statement warning that because impeachment had traditionally been 
reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive 
power, impeachment of the President based on the facts alleged in the 
OIC Referral would set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward, 
they will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, 
at the mercy as never before of caprices of any Congress. The 
Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great 
national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges 
of the future.''
    We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise to the 
level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' in Section III, 
Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof.
      b. the president did not commit perjury or obstruct justice
    Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. Article II 
alleges obstruction of justice. Both perjury and obstruction of justice 
are statutory crimes. In rebutting the allegations contained in the 
articles of impeachment, this brief refers to the facts as well as to 
laws, legal principles, court decisions, procedural safeguards, and the 
Constitution itself. Those who seek to remove the President speak of 
the ``rule of law.'' Among the most fundamental rules of law are the 
principles that those who accuse have the burden of proof, and those 
who are accused have the right to defend themselves by relying on the 
law, established procedures, and the Constitution. These principles are 
not ``legalisms'' but rather the very essence of the ``rule of law'' 
that distinguishes our Nation from others.
    We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance we can 
decipher in Section IV, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I, 
and in Section V, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article II.
                   c. compound charges and vagueness
    If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives has 
utterly failed in its constitutional responsibility to the Senate and 
to the President, that doubt vanishes upon reading the Trial Memorandum 
submitted by the House Managers. Having proferred two articles of 
impeachment, each of which unconstitutionally combines multiple 
offenses and fails to give even minimally adequate notice of the 
charges it encompasses, the House--three days before the Managers are 
to open their case--is still expanding, not refining, the scope of 
those articles. In further violation of the most basic constitutional 
principles, their brief advances, merely as ``examples,'' nineteen 
conclusory allegations--eight of perjury under Article I and eleven of 
obstruction of justice under Article II, some of which have never 
appeared before, even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary 
Committee (``Committee Report''), much less in the Office of 
Independent Counsel (``OIC'') Referral or in the articles 
themselves.\1\ If the target the Managers present to the Senate and to 
the President is still moving now, what can the President expect in the 
coming days? Is there any point at which the President will be given 
the right accorded a defendant in the most minor criminal case--to know 
with certainty the charges against which he must defend?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For example, the House managers add a charge that the President 
engaged in ``legalistic hair splitting [in his response to the 81 
questions] in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to 
deceive and obstruct'' the Committee. This charge was specifically 
rejected by the full House of Representatives when it rejected Article 
IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and has, in 
past proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles far less flawed 
than these. The constitutional concerns raised by the House's action 
are addressed in Section VI, The Structural Deficiencies of the 
Articles Preclude a Constitutionally Sound Vote.

                             II. Background

                a. the whitewater investigative dead-end
    The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the long-
running Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the Special 
Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Court Circuit appointed Kenneth W. Starr as Independent 
Counsel to conduct an investigation centering on two Arkansas entities, 
Whitewater Development Company, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings and 
Loan Association.
    In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any expansion of 
jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state troopers who had once been 
assigned to the Governor's security detail, and ``[t]he troopers said 
Starr's investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including 
Paula Corbin Jones. . . .'' Woodward & Schmidt, ``Starr Probes Clinton 
Personal Life,'' The Washington Post (June 25, 1997) at A1 (emphasis 
added). ``The nature of the questioning marks a sharp departure from 
previous avenues of inquiry in the three-year old investigation. . . . 
Until now, . . . what has become a wide-ranging investigation of many 
aspects of Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of 
questions about Clinton's relationships with women. . . .'' \2\ One of 
the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater 
investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones case. One 
of the troopers interviewed declared, ``[t]hey asked me about Paula 
Jones, all kinds of questions about Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton 
and Paula together and how many times.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid. Trooper Roger Perry, a 21-year veteran of the Arkansas 
state police, stated that he ``was asked about the most intimate 
details of Clinton's life: `I was left with the impression that they 
wanted me to show he was a womanizer. . . . All they wanted to talk 
about was women.' '' Ibid. (Ellipsis in original).
    \3\ Ibid. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had conducted these 
interrogations and acknowledged that at that time, he had not sought 
expansion of his jurisdiction from either the Special Division or the 
Attorney General.\4\ Mr. Starr contended that these inquiries were 
somehow relevant to his Whitewater investigation: ``we were, in fact 
interviewing, as good prosecutors, good investigators do, individuals 
who would have information that may be relevant to our inquiry about 
the President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty Savings 
and Loan and the like.''\5\ It seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC 
was in fact engaged in an unauthorized attempt to gather embarrassing 
information about the President--information wholly unrelated to 
Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, but potentially 
relevant to the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Transcript of November 19, 1998 House Judiciary Committee 
Hearing at 377-378.
    \5\ Ibid. at 378.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     b. the paula jones litigation
    The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about events she 
said had occurred three years earlier, in 1991, when the President was 
Governor of Arkansas. Discovery in the case had been stayed until the 
Supreme Court's decision on May 27, 1997, denying the President 
temporary immunity from suit.\6\ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal 
team began a public relations offensive against the President, headed 
by Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Mr. Susan Carpenter-McMillan, and her 
new counsel affiliated with the conservative Rutherford Institute.\7\ 
``I will never deny that when I first heard about this case I said, 
`Okay, good. We're gonna get that little slimeball,' said Ms. 
Carpenter-McMillan.'' \8\ While Ms. Jones' previous attorneys, Messrs. 
Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata, had largely avoided the media, as 
the Jones civil suit increasingly became a partisan vehicle to try to 
damage the President, public personal attacks became the order of the 
day.\9\ As is now well known, this effort led ultimately to the Jones 
lawyers being permitted to subpoena various women, to discover the 
nature of their relationship, if any, with the President, allegedly for 
the purpose of determining whether they had information relevant to the 
sexual harassment charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
    \7\ Ms. Jones was described as having ``accepted financial support 
of a Virginia conservative group,'' which intended to ``raise $100,000 
or more on Jones's behalf, although the money will go for expenses and 
not legal fees.'' ``Jones Acquires New Lawyers and Backing,'' The 
Washington Post (October 2, 1998) at A1. Jones' new law firm, the 
Dallas-based Radar, Campbell, Fisher and Pyke, had ``represented 
conservatives in antiabortion cases and other causes.'' Ibid. See also 
Dallas Lawyers Agree to Take on Paula Jones' Case--Their Small Firm Has 
Ties to Conservative Advocacy Group,'' The Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2, 
1997) (Rutherford Institute a ``conservative advocacy group.'').
    \8\ ``Cause Celebre: An Antiabortion Activist Makes Herself the 
Unofficial Mouthpiece for Paula Jones.'' The Washington Post (July 23, 
1998) at C1. Ms. Carpenter-McMillan, ``a cause-oriented, self-defined 
`conservative feminist' '', described her role as ``flaming the White 
House'' and declared `` `Unless Clinton wants to be terribly 
embarrassed, he'd better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody that comes 
out and testifies against Paula better have the past of a Mother 
Teresa, because our investigators will investigate their morality.' '' 
``Paula Jones' Team Not All About Teamwork,'' USA Today (Sept. 29, 
1997) at 4A.
    \9\ After Ms. Jones' new team had been in action for three months, 
one journalist commented: ``In six years of public controversy over 
Clinton's personal life, what is striking in some ways is how little 
the debate changes. As in the beginning, many conservatives nurture the 
hope that the past will be Clinton's undoing. Jones' adviser, Susan 
Carpenter-McMillan, acknowledged on NBC's `Meet the Press' yesterday 
that her first reaction when she first heard Jones' claims about 
Clinton was, `Good, we're going to get that little slime ball.' '' 
(Harris, ``Jones Case Tests Political Paradox,'' The Washington Post 
(Jan. 19, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In January 1998, Ms. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of certain 
information she believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in 
the Jones case. At that time, the OIC investigation began to intrude 
formally into the Jones case: the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the 
week of January 12, and with her cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky 
discussing the Jones case and the President. Ms. Tripp also informed 
the OIC that she had been surreptitiously taping conversations with Ms. 
Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in exchange for her 
cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from federal 
prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from state 
prosecution.\10\ On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp wore a body 
wire and had taped conversations with Ms. Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC 
received jurisdiction from the Attorney General and formalized an 
immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United States 
House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code 
Section 595(C), H.Doc. 105-316 (hereinafter ``Supp.'') at 3758-3759, 
4371-4373 (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled to take 
place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we now know, Ms. Tripp 
met with and briefed the lawyers for Ms. Jones the night before the 
deposition on her perception of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky 
and the President--doing so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had 
entrusted to her.\11\ She was permitted to do so even though she has 
been acting all week at the behest of the OIC and was dependent on the 
OIC to use its best efforts to protect her from state prosecution. At 
the deposition the next day, the President was asked numerous questions 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky by lawyers who already knew 
the answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Baker, ``Linda Tripp Briefed Jones Team on Tapes: Meeting 
Occurred Before Clinton Deposition,'' The Washington Post (Feb. 14, 
1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She was a 
peripheral player and, since her relationship with the President was 
concededly consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' case. Shortly after the 
President's deposition, Chief Judge Wright ruled that evidence 
pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Jones trial 
because ``it is not essential to the core issues in this case.'' \12\ 
The Court also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones 
case, the Lewinsky evidence ``might be inadmissible as extrinsic 
evidence'' under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it involved 
merely the ``specific instances of conduct'' of a witness.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Order, at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.) 
(Jan. 29, 1998).
    \13\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no case and 
granted summary judgment for the President. Although Judge Wright 
``viewed the record in the light most favorable to [Ms. Jones] and 
[gave] her the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences,'' \14\ the 
Court ruled that, as a matter of law, she simply had no case against 
President Clinton, both because ``there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact'' and because President Clinton was ``entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.'' Id. at 11-12. After reviewing all the 
proffered evidence, the Court ruled that ``the record taken as a whole 
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for'' Ms. Jones. Id. at 
39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), Memorandum 
Opinion and Order (April 1, 1998), at 3 n.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       c. the president's grand jury testimony about ms. lewinsky
    On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to the 
grand jury and specifically acknowledged that he had had a relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky involving ``improper intimate contact,'' and that he 
``engaged in conduct that was wrong.'' App. at 461.\15\ He described 
how the relationship began and how he had ended it early in 1997--long 
before any public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury 
``it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,'' App. at 533, and told the grand 
jurors, ``I take full responsibility for it. It wasn't her fault, it 
was mine.'' App. at 589-90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 
595(c), H.Doc. 105-311 (hereinafter ``App.'') at 461 (House Judiciary 
Committee) (Sept. 18, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President also explained how he had tried to navigate the 
deposition in the Jones case months earlier without admitting what he 
admitted to the grand jury--that he had been engaged in an improper 
intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Id. a 530-531. He further 
testified that the ``inappropriate encounters'' with Ms. Lewinsky had 
ended, at his insistence, in early 1997. He declined to describe, 
because of considerations of personal privacy and institutional 
dignity, certain specifics about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky,\16\ but 
he indicated his willingness to answer,\17\ and he did answer, the 
other questions put to him about his relationship with her. No one who 
watched the videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt that 
the President admitted to having had an improper intimate relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my 
family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of 
the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these 
particular matters.'' App. at 461.
    \17\ ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations,' as I 
understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and 
questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of 
justice, and intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 461.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             d. proceedings in the house of representatives
    On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to the House 
of Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the President related to 
the Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion of the OIC, ``may constitute 
grounds for an impeachment.'' \18\ The allegations fell into three 
broad categories: lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and abuse 
of power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c), at 1 (House Judiciary Committee) (printed September 11, 
1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Judiciary held a total of four hearings and called but 
one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee allowed the President's 
lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House 
presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses who testified 
that the facts, as alleged, did not constitute an impeachable offense, 
did not reveal an abuse of power, and would not support a case for 
perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable prosecutor would 
bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the 
Committee on behalf of the President, which is incorporated into this 
Trial Memorandum by reference.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Also incorporated by reference into this Trial Memorandum are 
the four prior submissions of the President to the House of 
Representatives: Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral of Office 
of Independent Counsel (September 11, 1998) (73 pages); Initial 
Response to Referral of Office of Independent Counsel (September 12, 
1998) (42 pages); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment 
(October 2, 1998) (30 pages); Submission by Counsel for President 
Clinton to the Committee on the House Judiciary of the United States 
House of Representatives (December 8, 1998) (184 pages).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted essentially 
along party lines to approve four articles of impeachment. Republicans 
defeated the alternative resolution of censure offered by certain 
Committee Democrats. Almost immediately after censure failed in the 
Committee, the House Republican leadership declared publicly that no 
censure proposal would be considered by the full House when it 
considered the articles of impeachment.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ See Baker & Eilperin, ``GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate 
Censure in House: Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article of Impeachment,'' 
The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1998) at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, the House 
of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment: Article I, 
which alleged perjury before the grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to 
206 and Article III, which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a 
vote of 221 to 212. The full House defeated two other Articles: Article 
II, which alleged that the President committed perjury in his civil 
deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse of power. Consideration 
of a censure resolution was blocked, even though members of both 
parties had expressed a desire to vote on such an option.
    From beginning to end the House process was both partisan and 
unfair. Consider:
     The House released the entire OIC Referral to the public 
without ever reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or allowing the 
President's counsel to review it;
     The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee said he had 
``no interest in not working in a bipartisan way''; \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Associated Press (March 25, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The Chairman also pledged a process the American people 
would conclude was fair; \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ ``This whole proceeding will fall on its face if it's not 
perceived by the American people to be fair.'' Financial Times (Sept. 
12, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote of 
conscience on a motion to censure; \23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ ``The next House Speaker, Robert Livingston, said the coming 
impeachment debate should allow lawmakers to make a choice between 
ousting President Clinton and imposing a lesser penalty such as 
censure. The Louisiana Republican said the House can't duck a vote on 
articles of impeachment if reported next month by its Judiciary 
Committee. But an `alternative measure is possible' he said, and the 
GOP leadership should `let everybody have a chance to vote on the 
option of their choice.' '' Wall Street Journal (Nov. 23, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Members of the House were shown secret ``evidence'' in 
order to influence their vote--evidence which the President's counsel 
still has not been able to review.

   III. The Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof for Decision

a. the offenses alleged do not meet the constitutional standard of high 
                        crimes and misdemeanors
1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question 
        Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
    It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the question 
whether the articles state an impeachable offense.\24\ That 
Constitutional question has not, in the words of one House Manager, 
``already been resolved by the House.'' \25\ To the contrary, that 
question now awaits the Senate's measured consideration and independent 
judgment. Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this question has 
been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional obligation to 
``try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. Art. Sec. 3, cl.7. In the words 
of John Logan, a House Manager in the 1868 proceedings:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ In the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the President's 
counsel answered (to at least one article) that the matters alleged 
``do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this 
respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor the 
omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty 
in his office of President of the United States.'' 1 Trial of Andrew 
Johnson (1868) (``TAJ'') 53.
    \25\ See Statement of Rep. Bill McCollum: ``[A]re these impeachable 
offenses, which I think has already been resolved by the House. I think 
constitutionally that's our job to do.'' Fox News Sunday (January 3, 
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``It is the rule that all questions of law or fact are to be 
decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. It is also the rule, that in determining this 
general issue senators must consider the sufficiency or insufficiency 
in law or in fact of every article of accusation.'' \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Closing argument of Manager John H. Logan, 2 TAJ 18 (emphasis 
added). See also Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on 
Impeachment Issues at 25-26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (``Because the Senate acts 
as both judge and jury in an impeachment trial, the Senate's conviction 
on a particular article of impeachment reflects the Senate's judgment 
not only that the accused engaged in the misconduct underlying the 
article but also that the article stated an impeachable offense'').

We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do not state 
wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses under our 
Constitution.
2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High Crimes 
        and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
            a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an 
                    Intentionally High Standard for Removal
    The Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from 
office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Constitution, 
Art. II, section 4. The charges fail to meet the high standard that the 
Framers established.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ For a more complete discussion of the Standards for 
Impeachment, please see Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to 
the House Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives at 
24-43 (December 8, 1998); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment 
(October 2, 1998); and Impeachment of William Jefferson, President of 
the United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to 
Accompany H. Res. 611, H. Rpt. 105-830, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 332-39 
(citing Minority Report). References to pages 2-203 of the Committee 
Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Committee Report.'' References to 
pages 329-406 of the Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as 
``Minority Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The syntax of the Constitutional standard ``Treason, Bribery or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' (emphasis added) strongly 
suggests, by the interpretive principle noscitur a sociis,28 
that, to be impeachable offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be 
of the seriousness of ``Treason'' and ``Bribery.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ `` `It is known from its associates' . . . the meaning of a 
word is or may be known from the accompanying words.'' Black's Law 
Dictionary 1209 (4th ed. 1968).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard must be a 
very high one. Ours is a Constitution of separated powers. In that 
Constitution, the President does not serve at the will of Congress, but 
as the directly elected,\29\ solitary head of the Executive Branch. The 
Constitution reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the 
law independently of legislative will, is a necessary protection for a 
free people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Of course, that election takes place through the mediating 
activity of the Electoral College. See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 
2-3 and Amend. XII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These elementary facts of constitutional structure underscore the 
need for a very high standard for impeachment. The House Managers, in 
their Brief, suggest that the failure to remove the President would 
raise the standard for impeachment higher than the Framers intended. 
They say that if the Senate does not remove the President, ``The bar 
will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to 
be concerned.'' But that standard is just a modified version of the 
plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which says 
a President can only be impeached and removed for ``Treason, Bribery, 
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The Framers wanted a high bar. 
It was not the intention of the Framers that the President should be 
subject to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander 
Hamilton said in a warning against the politicization of impeachment: 
``There will always be the greater danger that the decision will be 
regulated more by comparative strength of parties than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.'' Federalist 65. Our system of 
government does not permit Congress to unseat the President merely 
because it disagrees with his behavior or his policies. The Framers' 
decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one reason they 
caused the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' to appear in the Constitution itself. They chose to 
specify those categories of offenses subject to the impeachment power, 
rather than leave that judgment to the unfettered whim of the 
legislature.
    Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably viewed 
by the public as arising from one of those rare cases when the 
Legislature is compelled to stand in for all the people and remove a 
President whose continuation in office threatens grave harm to the 
Republic. Indeed, it is not exaggeration to say--as a group of more 
than 400 leading historians and constitutional scholars publicly 
stated--that removal on these articles would ``mangle the system of 
checks and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of 
public power.'' \30\ Removal of the President on these grounds would 
defy the constitutional presumption that the removal power rests with 
the people in elections, and it would do incalculable damage to the 
institution of the Presidency. If ``successful,'' removal here ``will 
leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the 
mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.'' \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution (Oct. 
28, 1998) (``Statement of Historians''); see also Schmitt, ``Scholars 
and Historians Assail Clinton Impeachment Inquiry,'' The New York Times 
(Oct. 19, 1998) at A18.
    \31\ Statement of Historians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected public 
official (together with the Vice-President), responsible to all the 
people. Therefore, when articles of impeachment have been exhibited, 
the Senate confronts this inescapable question: is the alleged 
misconduct so profoundly serious, so malevolent to our Constitutional 
system, that it justifies undoing the people's decision? Is the wrong 
alleged of a sort that not only demands removal of the President before 
the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also justifies the 
national trauma that accompanies the impeachment trial process itself? 
The wrongdoing alleged here does not remotely meet that standard.
            b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were 
                    Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of 
                    Government
    ``[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors'' refers to nothing short of 
Presidential actions that are ``great and dangerous offenses'' or 
``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \32\ Impeachment was never 
intended to be a remedy for private wrongs. It was intended to be a 
method of removing a President whose continued presence in the Office 
would cause grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of 
government.\33\ Thus, ``in all but the most extreme instances, 
impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office, not private 
misconduct unrelated to public office.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ George Mason, 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787 550 (Rev. ed. 1966).
    \33\ As the 1975 Watergate staff report concluded ``Impeachment is 
the first step in remedial process--removal from office and possible 
disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment 
is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government. . . . In an impeachment proceeding a 
President is called to account for abusing powers that only a President 
possesses.'' Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, 
Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on 
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1974) (``Nixon Impeachment 
Inquiry'').
    \34\ Minority Report at 337.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing wrongful 
public conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson wrote, ``our 
President . . . is amendable to [the laws] in his private character as 
a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.'' \35\ As such, 
impeachment is limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander 
Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction 
as ``those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or 
in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They 
are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society 
itself.'' 36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ 2 Elliot, The Debate in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 480 (reprint of 2d ed.)
    \36\ The Federalist No. 65 at 331 (Gary Wills ed. 1982). As one of 
the most respected of the early commentators explained, the impeachment 
``power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to 
the society in its political character.'' Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution, Sec. 744. (reprint of 1st ed. 1833).

    The Framers ``intended that a president be removable from office 
for the commission of great offenses against the Constitution.'' \37\ 
Impeachment therefore addresses public wrongdoing, whether denominated 
a ``political crime [  ] against the state,'' \38\ or ``an act of 
malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \39\ or a ``great offense [  ] 
against the federal government.'' \40\ Ordinary civil and criminal 
wrongs can be addressed through ordinary judicial processes. And 
ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box and by 
public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most serious public 
misconduct, those aggravated abuses of executive power that, given the 
President's four-year term, might otherwise go unchecked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ John Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 94 (1978).
    \38\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment 61 (1973).
    \39\ Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal 
Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 724 (1987/1988).
    \40\ Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its 
Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone 
        State Impeachable Offenses
    Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular will of 
the people, as evidence by an election, it must be used with great 
circumspection. As applicable precedents establish, it should not be 
used to punish private misconduct.
            a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
                    Nixon
    Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then-President 
Nixon by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in 
1974. Three were approved and two were not. The approved articles 
alleged official wrongdoing. Article I charged President Nixon with 
``using the powers of his high office [to] engage [  ] . . . in a 
course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct'' the 
Watergate investigation.\41\ Article II described the President as 
engaging in ``repeated and continuing abuse of the powers of the 
Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle of the rule of law 
in our system of government'' thereby ``us[ing] his power as President 
to violate the Constitution and the law of the land.'' \42\ Article III 
charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary Committee 
subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to ``preserve the 
integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability of Congress 
to act as the ultimate safeguard against improper Presidential 
conduct.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, H. 
Rep. 93-1305 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereinafter ``Nixon Report'') at 133.
    \42\ Nixon Report at 180.
    \43\ Id. 212-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee charged 
that President Nixon both ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to report 
certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal 
income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' \44\ The 
President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of 
perjury,\45\ and there was reason to believe that the underlying facts 
would have supported a criminal prosecution against President Nixon 
himself.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Id. at 220. The President was alleged to have failed to report 
certain income, to have taken improper tax deductions, and to have 
manufactured (either personally or through his agents) false documents 
to support the deductions taken.
    \45\ Given the underlying facts, that act might have provided the 
basis for multiple criminal charges; conviction on, for example, the 
tax evasion charge, could have subjected President Nixon to a 5-year 
prison term.
    \46\ See Nixon Report at 344 (``the Committee was told by a 
criminal fraud tax expert that on the evidence presented to the 
Committee, if the President were an ordinary taxpayer, the government 
would seek to send him to jail'') (Statement of Additional Views of Mr. 
Mezvinsky, et al.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the majority 
staff concluded that ``[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave 
step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our 
government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the 
president office.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Nixon Impeachment Inquiry at 26 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And the minority views of many Republican members were in 
substantial agreement: ``the framers . . . were concerned with 
preserving the government from being overthrown by the treachery or 
corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is our judgment, based upon this 
constitutional history, that the Framers of the United States 
Constitution intended that the President should be removable by the 
legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system 
of government established by the Constitution.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Nixon Report at 364-365 (Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson, 
Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and 
Latta).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The legal principle that impeachable offenses required misconduct 
dangerous to our system of government provided one basis for the 
Committee's rejection of the fraudulent-tax-return charge. As 
Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter, the Constitution's phrase 
``high crime signified a crime against the system of government, not 
merely a serious crime,''\49\ As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving 
an act which did not demonstrate public misconduct, was rejected by an 
overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12 margin.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Id. (quoting with approval conclusion of Nixon Impeachment 
Inquiry).
    \50\ Nixon Report at 220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander 
                    Hamilton
    In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury Alexander 
Hamilton for alleged financial misdealings with a convicted swindler. 
Hamilton had made payments to the swindler and had urged his wife 
(Hamilton's paramour) to burn incriminating correspondence. Members of 
Congress investigated the matter and it came to the attention of 
President Washington and future Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison 
and Monroe.
    This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. Hamilton 
as Secretary of the Treasury.\51\ Even when it eventually became 
public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's appointment to high position in 
the United States Army. Although not insignificant, Hamilton's behavior 
was essentially private. It was certain not regarded as impeachable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ See generally Rosenfeld, ``Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch,'' 
The Los Angeles Times (September 18, 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that 
        Impeachable Offenses Are not Present
            a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
    There is strong agreement among constitutional scholars and 
historians that the articles do not charge impeachable offenses. As 
Professor Michael Gerhardt summarized in his recent testimony before a 
subcommitte of the House of Representatives, there is ``widespread 
recognition [of] a paradigmatic case for impeachment.'' \52\ In such a 
case, ``there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable 
official and the latter's official duties.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt Before the House 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee 
Regarding the Background and History of Impeachment (November 9, 1998) 
at 13 (``Subcommittee Hearings'').
    \53\ Ibid. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so far 
removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to 
weaken significantly the Presidency itself. As the more than 400 
prominent historians and constitutional scholars warned in their public 
statement: ``[t]he theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is 
unprecedented in our history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for 
the future of our political institutions. If carried forward, [the 
current processes] will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and 
diminished, at the mercy as never before of the caprices of any 
Congress.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Statement of Historians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an 
extraordinary group of 430 legal scholars argued together that these 
offenses, even if proven true, did not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.\55\ The gist of these scholarly objections is that 
the alleged wrongdoing is insufficiently connected to the exercise of 
public office. Because the articles charge wrongdoing of an essentially 
private nature, any harm such behavior poses is too removed from our 
system of government to justify unseating the President. Numerous 
scholars, opining long before the current controversy, have emphasized 
the necessary connection of impeachable wrongs to threats against the 
state itself. They have found that impeachment should be reserved for:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ See Letter of 430 Law Professors to Messrs. Gingrich, 
Gephardt, Hyde and Conyers (released Nov. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``offenses against the government''; \56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``political crime against the state''; \57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Berger, Impeachment at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``serious assaults on the integrity of the processes of 
government''; \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Charles L. Black, Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so egregious 
that [the President's] continuation in office is intolerable''; \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Labovitz Presidential Impeachment at 110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \60\ bearing a 
``functional relationship'' to public office; \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Rotunda, 76 Ky. L.J. at 726.
    \61\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``great offense[s] against the federal government''; \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Gerhardt, 68 Tex. L. Rev. at 85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine the 
integrity of government.'' \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Committee on Federal Legislation of the Bar Ass'n of the City 
of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment 18 (1974).

The articles contain nothing approximating that level of wrongdoing. 
Indeed the House Managers themselves acknowledge that ``the President's 
[alleged] perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official 
conduct.'' \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ House Br. at 109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations would 
                    Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the 
                    Presidency and to Our Government of Separated 
                    powers
    These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about 
sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual 
misbehavior. These kinds of wrongs are simply not subjects fit for 
impeachment. To remove a President on this basis would lower the 
impeachment bar to an unprecedented level and create a devastating 
precedent. As Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., addressing this 
problem, has testified:
    ``Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel . . . 
revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send us on an 
adventure with ominous implications for the separation of powers that 
the Constitution established as the basis of our political order. It 
would permanently weaken the Presidency.'' \65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Arthur 
Schlesinger, Tr. at 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger described must 
stop here. Professor Jack Rakove made a similar point when he stated 
that ``Impeachment [is] a remedy to be deployed only in . . . 
unequivocal cases where . . . the insult to the constitutional system 
is grave.'' \66\ Indeed, he said, there ``would have to be a high 
degree of consensus on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in both 
Houses to proceed.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Professor Jack 
Rakove at 4).
    \67\ Subcommittee Hearings (Oral Testimony of Professor Rakove).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the House 
of Representatives. No civil officer--no President, no judge, no 
cabinet member--has ever been impeached by so narrow a margin as 
supported the articles exhibited here.\68\ The closeness and partisan 
division of the vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the 
charges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ The present articles were approved by margins of 228-206 
(Article I) and 221-212 (Article II). All prior resolutions were 
approved by substantially wider margins in the House of 
Representatives. See Impeachments of the following civil officers: 
Judge John Pickering (1803) (45-8; Justice Samuel Chase (1804) (73-32; 
Judge James Peck (1830) 143-49; Judge West Humphreys (1862) (no vote 
available, but resolution of impeachment voted ``without division,'' 
see 3 Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2386); 
President Andrew Johnson (1868) (128-47; Judge James Belknap (1876) 
(unanimous); Judge Charles Swayne (1903) (unanimous); Judge Robert 
Archibald (1912) (223-1); Judge George English (1925) (306-62); Judge 
Harold Louderback (1932) (183-143); Judge Halsted Ritter (1933) (181-
146); Judge Harry Claiborne (1986) (406-0); Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. 
(1988) (417-0); Judge Alcee L. Hastings (1988) (413-3). The impeachment 
resolution against Senator William Bount in 1797 was by voice vote and 
so no specific count was recorded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they have 
passed only by the narrowest, partisan margin, the future of our 
constitutional politics is in the balance. The very stability of our 
Constitutional government may depend upon the Senate's response to 
these articles. Nothing about this case justifies removal of a twice-
elected President, because no ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are 
alleged.
5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
    The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an impeachable 
offense because (1) several federal judges have been impeached and 
removed for perjury, and (2) those precedents control this case. See 
House Br. at 95-105. That notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the 
qualitative differences among different allegations of perjury and the 
very basic differences between federal judges and the President.
    First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, while a very 
solemn task, implicates very different considerations than the 
impeachment of a president. Federal judges are appointed without public 
approval and enjoy life tenure without public accountability. 
Consequently, they hold their offices under our Constitution only 
``during good behavior.'' Under our system, impeachment is the only way 
to remove a Federal judge from office--even a Federal judge sitting in 
jail.\69\ By contrast, a president is elected by the Nation to a term, 
limited to a specified number of years, and he faces accountability in 
the form of elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, during 
a recent judicial impeachment proceeding, cogently explained the unique 
position that Federal judges hold in our Constitutional system:
    ``The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position of 
trust and responsibility in our government: They are the only members 
of any branch that hold their office for life; they are purposely 
insulated from the immediate pressures and shifting currents of the 
body politic. But with the special prerogative of judicial independence 
comes the most exacting standard of public and private conduct . . . 
The high standard of behavior for judges is inscribed in article III of 
the Constitution, which provides that judges ``shall hold offices 
during good behavior. . . .'' (132 Cong. Rec. H4712 (July 22, 1986) 
(impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to the 
level of an impeachable offense depends necessarily on the particulars 
of that statement, and the relation of those statements to the 
fulfillment of official responsibilities. In the impeachment of Judge 
Harry Claiborne, the accused had been convicted of filing false income 
tax returns.\70\ As a judge, Claiborne was charged with the 
responsibility of hearing tax-evasion cases. Once convicted, he simply 
could not perform his official functions because his personal probity 
had been impaired such that he could no longer be an arbiter of others' 
oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct connection to the performance of 
his judicial tasks. The inquiry into President Nixon disclosed similar 
wrongdoing, but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an 
article of impeachment against the President on that basis. The case of 
Judge Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted of making perjurious 
statements concerning his intervention in a judicial proceeding, which 
is to say, employing the power and prestige of his office to obtain 
advantage for a party.\71\ Although the proceeding at issue was not in 
his court, his use of the judicial office for the private gain of a 
party to a judicial proceeding directly implicated his official 
functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for 
making perjurious statements at his trial for conspiring to fix cases 
in his own court.\72\ As with Judges Claiborne and Nixon, Judge 
Hastings' perjurious statements were immediately and incurably 
detrimental to the performance of his official duties. The allegations 
against the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) ``do not 
directly involve his official conduct,'' House Br. at 109, simply do 
not involve wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to foreclose effective 
performance of the Presidential office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-48 at 
291-98 (1986) (``Claiborne Proceedings'').
    \71\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 
at 430-440 (1989) (``Judge Nixon Proceedings'').
    \72\ See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 
(1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial 
impeachment cases predating Watergate, observed that:

    ``For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial 
impeachment] cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for 
impeachment of a president. The practical reason was that it seemed 
inappropriate to determine the fate of an elected chief executive on 
the basis of law developed in proceedings directed at petty misconduct 
by obscure judges. The legal reason was that the Constitution provides 
that judges serve during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good behavior] 
clause made a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the 
application of these cases to presidential impeachment''.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 92-93 (emphasis added).

Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House Managers have 
only ``limited force when applied to the impeachment of a President.'' 
\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Impeachment 
Issues at 26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (summarizing view of some commentators).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes from 
President Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, offered as a 
congressman in 1970 in connection with an effort to impeach Associate 
Justice William O. Douglas--that it is, in essence, ``whatever the 
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be''--has been 
cited. Almost never noted is the more important aspect of then-
Congressman Ford's statement--that, in contrast to the life-tenure of 
judges, because presidents can be removed by the electorate, ``to 
remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes of the 
magnitude of treason and bribery.'' \75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ 116 Cong. Rec. 11912, 11913, (1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        b. the standard of proof
    Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense, 
each Senator must confront the question of what standard the evidence 
must meet to justify a vote of ``guilty.'' The Senate has, of course, 
addressed this issue before--most recently in the trials of Judge 
Claiborne and Judge Hastings. We recognize that the Senate chose in the 
Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in the Hastings trial, not to 
impose itself any single standard of proof but, rather, to leave that 
judgment to the conscience of each Senator. Many Senators here today 
were present for the debate on this issue and chose a standard by which 
to test the evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new 
one. And none previously has had to face the issue in the special 
context of a Presidential impeachment.
    We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must treat a 
vote to impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the President from 
office and that a decision of such moment ought not to be based on 
anything less than ``clear and convincing'' evidence. That standard is 
higher than the ``preponderance of the evidence'' test applicable to 
the ordinary civil case but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless, we felt that the clear 
and convincing standard was consistent with the grave responsibility of 
triggering a process that might result in the removal of a President. 
In fact, it had been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate 
Committee majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for 
President Nixon) twenty-four years ago.
    Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the Senate. 
Indeed, we submit that the gravity of the decision the Senate must 
reach should lead each Senator to go further and ask whether the House 
has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of proof as 
meaningless legal jargon with no application to the real world of 
difficult decisions. But it is much more than that. In our system of 
justice, it is the guidepost that shows the way through the labyrinth 
of conflicting evidence. It tells the factfinder to look within and 
ask: ``Would I make the most important decisions of my life based on 
the degree of certainty I have about these facts?'' In the unique 
legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects against 
partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that this grave 
decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a disciplining force to 
carry into the deliberations.
    This point is given added weight by the language of the 
Constitution. Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United States 
Constitution gives to the Senate ``the Power to try all Impeachments. . 
. . and no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two 
thirds of the Members present.'' (Emphasis added.) Use of the words 
``try'' and ``convicted'' strongly suggests that an impeachment trial 
is akin to a criminal proceeding and that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard of criminal proceedings should be used. This position was 
enunciated in the Minority Views contained in the Report of the House 
Judiciary Committee on the impeachment proceedings against President 
Nixon (H. Rep. 93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct 
standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, Strom 
Thurmond and John Stennis.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Claiborne Proceedings at 106-107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is 
appropriate for judicial impeachments, it does not follow that it 
should be applied where the Presidency itself is at stake. With judges, 
the Senate must balance its concern for the independence of the 
judiciary against the recognition that, because judges hold life-time 
tenure, impeachment is the only available means to protect the public 
against those who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is 
on trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the Senate 
is asked, in effect, to overturn the results of an election held two 
years ago in which the American people selected the head of one of the 
three coordinate branches of government. It is asked to take this 
action in circumstances where there is no suggestion of corruption or 
misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our system of 
government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's term, 
when once again the people will judge who they wish to lead them. In 
this setting, the evidence should be tested by the most stringent 
standard we know--proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the 
American people be confident that this most serious of constitutional 
decisions has been given the careful consideration it deserves.

           IV. The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I

    The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I.
                           a. applicable law
    Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading 
statements, before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a statutory crime 
that is set forth in the United States Code at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623.\77\ 
Before an accused may be found guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a 
prosecutor must prove all elements of the offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ Section 1623 provides in relevant part:
    ``(a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly 
makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other 
information . . . knowing the same to contain any false material 
declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than five years, or both.'' (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a) (1994)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the criminal law context, Sec. 1623 requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an accused (1) while 
under oath (2) knowingly (3) made a false statement as to (4) material 
facts. The ``materiality'' element is fundamental: it means that 
testimony given to a grand jury may be found perjurious only if it had 
a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper the grand jury's 
investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419 
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). If an answer provided to a grand jury has no impact on the grand 
jury's investigation, or if it relates to a subject that the grand jury 
is not considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being 
perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details that a 
grand jury is not investigating cannot as a matter of law constitute 
perjury, since such testimony by definition is immaterial. See, e.g., 
United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where 
defendant admitted signing letter and testified to its purpose, his 
denial of actually writing letter was not material to grand jury 
investigation and was incapable of supporting perjury charge); United 
States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (details such as 
whether defendant ``paid the rent on her Washington apartment, as she 
testified that she did'' were ``not pertinent to the issue being 
tried;'' therefore, ``the false statement attributed to [defendant] was 
in no way material in the case in which she made it and did not 
constitute perjury within the meaning of the statute.'') In other 
words, mere falsity--even knowing falsity--is not perjury if the 
statement at issue is not ``material'' to the matter under 
consideration.
    An additional ``element'' of perjury prosecutions, at least as a 
matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury conviction cannot 
rest solely on the testimony of one witness. In United States v. 
Weiler, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945), the Supreme Court observed that 
the ``special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the 
evidence of a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries.'' 
While Sec. 1623 does not literally incorporate the so-called ``two-
witness'' rule, the case law makes clear that perjury prosecutions 
under this statute require a high degree of proof, and that prosecutors 
should not, as a matter of reason and practicality, try to bring 
perjury prosecutions based solely on the testimony of a single witness. 
As the Supreme Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest 
merely upon ``an oath against an oath.'' Id. at 609.
    Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former federal 
prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A panel of former 
federal prosecutors, some Republican, testified that they would not 
charge perjury based upon the facts in this case. For example, Mr. 
Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the Northern 
District of Illinois, told the Committee that ``the evidence set out in 
the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a 
responsible federal prosecutor.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial 
Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 
1998); see generally Minority Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan 
emphasized, ``because perjury and obstruction charges often arise from 
private dealings with few observers, the courts have required either 
two witnesses who testified directly to the facts establishing the 
crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the facts constituting the 
alleged perjury, that there be substantial corroborating proof to 
establish guilt.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for 
Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998). The other 
prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who served as an 
Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
and as a Task Force Leader for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 
testified that ``it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury 
prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.'' 
Id. A review of the perjury alleged here thus requires both careful 
scrutiny of the materiality of any alleged falsehood and vigilance 
against conviction merely on an ``oath against an oath.'' Weiler, 323 
U.S. at 609.
                    b. structure of the allegations
    Article I charges that the President committed perjury when he 
testified before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It alleges he 
``willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury concerning ``one or more of the following: (1) the nature 
and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; 
(2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence in that civil rights action.'' As noted above, the article 
does not provide guidance on the particular statements alleged to be 
perjurious, false and misleading. But by reference to the different 
views in the House Committee Report, the presentation of House Majority 
Counsel David Schippers, the OIC Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of 
the House Managers, we have attempted to identify certain statements 
from which members of the House might have chosen.
    Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury before the 
grand jury about the details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--
including apparently such insignificant matters as mis-remembering the 
precise month on which certain inappropriate physical contact started, 
understating as ``occasional'' his infrequent inappropriate physical 
and telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months, 
characterizing their relationship as starting as a friendship, and 
touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for certain purposes during 
their intimate encounters.
    Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made 
perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he 
testified about certain responses he had given in the Jones civil 
deposition. The House Managers erroneously suggest that in the grand 
jury President Clinton was asked about and reaffirmed his entire 
deposition testimony, including his deposition testimony about whether 
he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2, 60. That is 
demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did in fact 
make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his deposition testimony, 
were truthful. Moreover, to the extent this subpart repeats allegations 
of Article II of the original proposed articles of impeachment, the 
full House of Representatives has explicitly considered and 
specifically rejected those charges, and their consideration would 
violate the impeachment procedures mandated by the Constitution.
    Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the grand 
jury when he testified about certain activities in late 1997 and early 
1998. They are based on statements about conduct that the House 
Managers claim constitutes obstruction of justice under Article II and 
in many respects track Article II. Compare Article I (3) (perjury in 
the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading 
statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with 
Article II (5) (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to 
make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and compare 
Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``corrupt 
efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery 
of evidence'') with Article II (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when 
he (3) ``engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence,'' i.e., gifts; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' 
of Betty Currie; (7) ``made false and misleading statements to 
potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses''). These perjury 
allegations are without merit both because the obstruction charges upon 
which they are based are wrong and because the statements that 
President Clinton made in the grand jury about these charges are true. 
Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in this 
submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these overlapping 
allegations in the next section addressing Article II (obstruction of 
justice), and address them only briefly in this section.
         c. response to the particular allegations in article i
    The president testified truthfully before the grand jury. There 
must be no mistake about what the President said. He admitted to the 
grand jury that he had engaged in an inappropriate intimate 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months. He 
admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
admitted to the grand jury that he had misled his family, his friends 
and staff, and the entire Nation about the nature of that relationship. 
No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched the 
President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt that he had 
admitted to an ongoing physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The article makes general allegations about his testimony but does 
not specify alleged false statements, so direct rebuttal is impossible. 
In light of this uncertainty, we set forth below responses to the 
allegations that have been made by the House Managers, the House 
Committee, and the OIC, even though they were not adopted in the 
article, in an effort to try to respond comprehensively to the charges.
1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of 
        his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
    (a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President specifically 
acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that 
involved ``improper intimate contact.'' App. at 461. He described how 
the relationship began and how it ended early in 1997--long before any 
public attention or scrutiny.
    In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the President 
read the following statement:

    ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    ``These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
    ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I 
can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and 
others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, 
this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
    ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions 
including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions 
about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood 
it to be denied at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions 
concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
intimidation of witnesses.''

App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to this 
statement--but only when asked very specific questions about his 
physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and he otherwise responded 
fully to four hours of interrogation about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, his answers in the civil deposition, and his conduct 
surrounding the Jones deposition.
    The articles are silent on precisely what statements the President 
made about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that were allegedly 
perjurious. But between the House Brief and the Committee Report, both 
drafted by the Managers, it appears there are three aspects of this 
prepared statement that are alleged to be false and misleading because 
Ms. Lewinsky's recollection differs--albeit with respect to certain 
very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first, when the President 
admitted that inappropriate conduct occurred ``on certain occasions in 
early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because 
in the Managers' view, the first instance of inappropriate conduct 
apparently occurred a few months prior to ``early 1996,'' see House Br. 
at 53; second, when the President admitted to inappropriate conduct 
``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly 
committed perjury because, according to the House Committee, there were 
eleven total sexual encounters and the term ``on certain occasions'' 
implied something other than eleven. see Committee Report at 34; and 
third, when the President admitted that he ``had occasional telephone 
conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included sexual banter,'' he 
allegedly committed perjury because, according to the House Committee 
(although not Ms. Lewinsky), seventeen conversations may have included 
sexually explicit conversation, ibid. Apart from the fact that the 
record itself refutes some of the allegations (for example, seven of 
the seventeen calls were only ``possible,'' according even to the OIC, 
App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky recalled fewer than seventeen, App. at 
744), simply to state them is to reveal their utter immateriality. \78\
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    \78\ Even the OIC Referral did not allege perjury based on these 
latter two theories and mentioned the first only briefly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President categorically denies that his prepared statement was 
perjurious, false and misleading in any respect. He offered his written 
statement to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC 
to obtain the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the 
salacious details of his relationship. It preceded almost four hours of 
follow-up questions about the relationship. It is utterly remarkable 
that the Managers now find fault even with the President's very painful 
public admission of inappropriate conduct.
    In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The Committee 
Report takes issue with the terms ``on certain occasions'' and 
``occasional,'' but neither phrase implies a definite or maximum 
number. ``On certain occasions''--the phrase introducing discussion of 
the physical contacts--has virtually no meaning other than ``it 
sometimes happened.'' It is unfathomable what objective interpretation 
the Majority gives to this phrase to suggest that it could be false. An 
attack on the phrase ``occasional''--the phrase introducing discussion 
of the inappropriate telephone contacts--is little different. 
Dictionaries define ``occasional'' to mean ``occurring at irregular or 
infrequent intervals'' or ``now and then.'' \79\ It is a measure of the 
Committee Report's extraordinary overreaching to suggest that the 
eleven occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority over 
well more than a year did not occur, by any objective reading, ``on 
certain occasions.'' And since even the OIC Referral acknowledges that 
the inappropriate telephone contact occurred not ``at least 17 times'' 
(as the Committee Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at 
8; House Br. at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month 
period,\80\ ``occasional'' would surely seem not just a reasonable 
description but the correct one.
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    \79\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) p. 803; see 
also Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary (1988) p. 812 (``occurring 
from time to time; infrequent''); Chambers English Dictionary (1988 
ed.) p. 992 (``occurring infrequently, irregularly, now and then''); 
The American Heritage Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.) (``occurring from time 
to time''); Webster's New World Dictionary (3d Coll. ed.) p. 937 (``of 
irregular occurrence; happening now and then; infrequent'').
    \80\ The OIC chart of contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President identifies ten phone conversations ``including phone sex'' 
and seven phone conversations ``possibly'' including phone sex. App. at 
116-26.
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    Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise number of such 
encounters, it is of no consequence whatsoever to anything, given his 
admission of their relationship. This is precisely the kind of 
disagreement that the law does not intend to capture as perjury.
    The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally 
immaterial. Having acknowledged the relationship, the President had no 
conceivable motive to misstate the date on which it began. The Managers 
assert that the President committed perjury when he testified about 
when the relationship began, but they offer no rationale for why he 
would have done so.\81\ The President had already made a painful 
admission. Any misstatement about when the intimate relationship began 
(if there was a misstatement) cannot justify a charge of perjury, let 
alone the removal of the President from office. As Chairman Hyde 
himself stated in reference to this latter allegation, ``It doesn't 
strike me as a terribly serious count.'' Remarks of Chairman Hyde at 
Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998.
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    \81\ The Committee Report did not adopt the baseless surmise of the 
OIC Referral, i.e., that the President lied about the starting date of 
his relationship because Ms. Lewinsky was still an intern at the time, 
whereas she later became a paid employee. For good reason. The only 
support offered by the Referral for this conjecture is a comment Ms. 
Lewinsky attributes to the President in which he purportedly said that 
her pink ``intern pass'' ``might be a problem.'' Referral at 149-50. 
But even Ms. Lewinsky indicated that the President was not referring to 
her intern status, but rather was noting that, as an intern with a pink 
``intern pass,'' she had only limited access to the West Wing of the 
White House. App. at 1567 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98). Moreover, Ms. 
Lewinsky had in fact become an employee by late 1995, so even under the 
OIC theory the President could have acknowledged such intimate contact 
in 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, after 
admitting that he had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, he maintained that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner 
that met the definition used in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at 
54. The President admits that he engaged in inappropriate physical 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in 
activity that met the convoluted and truncated definition he was 
presented in the Jones deposition.\82\
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    \82\ At the deposition, the Jones attorneys presented a broad, 
three-part definition of the term ``sexual relations'' to be used by 
them in the questioning. Judge Wright ruled that two parts of the 
definition were ``too broad'' and eliminated them. Dep. at 22. The 
President, therefore, was presented with the following definition (as 
he understood it to have been amended by the Court):
    Definition of Sexual Relations--
    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in ``sexual 
relations'' when the person knowingly engages in or causes--
    (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, 
or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the 
sexual desire of any person;
    (2) contact between any part of the person's body or an object and 
the genitals and anus of another person; or
    (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and any part 
of another person's body.
    ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either directly or through 
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that this Jones definition was not of the 
President's making. It was one provided to him by the Jones' lawyers 
for their questioning of him. Under that definition, oral sex performed 
by Ms. Lewinsky on the President would not constitute sexual relations, 
while touching certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent to 
arouse her would meet the definition. The President testified in the 
grand jury that [he] believed that oral sex performed on him fell 
outside the Jones definition. App. at 544.\83\ As strange as this may 
sound, a totally reasonable reading of the definition supports that 
conclusion, as many commentators have agreed.\84\
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    \83\ The Managers erroneously suggest that the President's 
explanation of his understanding of the Jones deposition definition of 
``sexual relations'' is a recent fabrication rather than an accurate 
account of his view at the time of the deposition. House Br. at 54-55. 
To support this contention, the Managers, among other meritless 
arguments, point to a document produced by the White House entitled 
``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating that oral sex would 
constitute a sexual relationship for the President. Id. at 55. This 
document, however, was not created, reviewed or approved by the 
President and did not represent his views. It is irrelevant to the 
issue at hand for the additional reason that it does not speak by its 
own terms to the meaning of the contorted definition of ``sexual 
relations'' used in the Jones deposition.
    \84\ See, e.g., Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998 (Statement of 
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg at 2) (``That definition defined certain 
forms of sexual contact as sexual relations but, for reasons known only 
to the Jones lawyers, limited the definition to contact with any person 
for the purpose of gratification.''); MSNBC Internight, August 12, 1998 
(Cynthia Alksne) (``[W]hen the definition finally was put before the 
president, it did not include the receipt of oral sex''); ``DeLay Urges 
a Wait For Starr's Report,'' The Washington Times (August 31, 1998) 
(``The definition of sexual relations, used by lawyers for Paula Jones 
when they questioned the president, was loosely worded and may not have 
included oral sex''); ``Legally Accurate,'' The National Law Journal 
(August 31, 1998) (``Given the narrowness of the court-approved 
definition in [the Jones] case, Mr. Clinton indeed may not have 
perjured himself back then if, say, he received oral sex but did not 
reciprocate sexually'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial 
details concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship.
2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the 
        Jones case
    First, it is important to understand that the allegation of Article 
I that the President ``willfully provided false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . prior perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony he gave in'' the Jones deposition is premised 
on a misunderstanding of the President's grand jury testimony. The 
President was not asked to, and he did not, reaffirm his entire Jones 
deposition testimony during his grand jury appearance. For example, 
contrary to popular myth and the undocumented assertion of the House 
Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never even asked in the 
grand jury about his answer to the deposition question whether he and 
Ms. Lewinsky had been ``together alone in the Oval Office.'' Dep. at 
52-53,\85\ and he therefore neither reaffirmed it nor even addressed 
it. In fact, in the grand jury he was asked only about a small handful 
of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated below, his 
explanation of these answers were not reaffirmations or in any respect 
evasive or misleading--they were completely truthful, and they do not 
support a perjury allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ The only questions the OIC asked the President about being 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky did not reference the deposition at all. 
Instead, the OIC asked the President to elaborate on his 
acknowledgement in his prepared statement before the grand jury that he 
had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, App. at 481, and to explain why he 
made a statement, ``I was never alone with her'' to Ms. Currie on 
January 18th. See, e.g., App. at 583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority misses 
the mark is dramatically apparent when it is compared with the OIC's 
Referral. The OIC did not charge that the President's statements about 
his prior deposition testimony were perjurious (apart from the charge 
discussed above concerning the nature and details of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky).\86\ See OIC Ref. at 145. It would be remarkable to 
contemplate charges beyond those brought by the OIC, particularly in 
the context of a perjury claim where the OIC chose what to ask the 
President and itself conducted the grand jury session.
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    \86\ Specifically, the Referral alleges that the President lied 
when he testified (1) that ``he believed that oral sex was not covered 
by any of the terms and definitions for sexual activity used at the 
Jones deposition''; (2) that their physical contact was more limited 
than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony suggests; and (3) that their intimate 
relationship began in early 1996 and not late 1995. Id. at 148-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Managers point to a single statement made by President 
Clinton in the grand jury to justify their contention that every 
statement from his civil deposition is now fair game. House Br. at 60. 
Specifically, the House Managers rely on President Clinton's 
explanation in the grand jury of his state of mind during the Jones 
deposition: ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mine 
field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I 
did.'' App. at 532. In addition to being a true statement of his belief 
as to his legal position, this single remark plainly was not intended 
as and was not a broad reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the 
statements the President made during the Jones deposition. Indeed, 
given that he told the grand jury that he had an intimate relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with her, no one who heard 
the grand jury testimony could have understood it to be the unequivocal 
reaffirmation that is alleged.
    The Managers charge that the President did not really mean it when 
he told the grand jury how he was trying to be literally truthful in 
the Jones deposition without providing information about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President had endeavored to 
navigate the deposition without having to make embarrassing admissions 
about his inappropriate, albeit consensual, relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to the line 
between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive testimony and (b) 
false testimony as he could without crossing it. He sought, as he 
explained to the grand jury, to give answers that were literally 
accurate, even if, as a result, they were evasive and thus misleading. 
We repeat: what is at issue here is not the underlying statements made 
by the President in the deposition, but the President's explanations in 
the grand jury of his effort to walk a fine line. Anyone who reads or 
watches that deposition knows the President was in fact trying to do 
precisely what he has admitted--to give the lawyers grudging, 
unresponsive or even misleading answers without actually lying. However 
successful or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no evidence 
that controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's 
intention.
    An examination of the statements that the President actually did 
make in the grand jury about his deposition testimony further 
demonstrates the lack of merit in this article. In the grand jury, the 
President only was asked about three areas of his deposition testimony 
that were covered in the failed impeachment article alleging perjury in 
the civil deposition.\87\ The first topic was the nature of any 
intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has already been addressed 
above.
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    \87\ The proposed article of impeachment alleging perjury in the 
civil deposition, like the two that are before the Senate, did not 
identify any specific instances of false testimony, but we have made 
our comparison with the Committee Report's elaboration of the 
deposition perjury article as it undoubtedly represents the largest 
universe of alleged perjurious statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second topic was the President's testimony about his knowledge 
of gifts he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, 
the President had the following exchange with the OIC:

    Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was only two 
and a half weeks after you had given her these six gifts, you were 
asked, at page 75 in your deposition, lines 2 through 5, ``Well, have 
you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?'' And you answered, ``I 
don't recall.''
    And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually asked them, 
for prompting, ``Do you know what they were?''
    A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, 
not that I don't recall whether I had given them. And then if you see, 
they did give me these specifics, and I gave them quite a good 
explanation here. I remembered very clearly what the facts were about 
The Black Dog. . . .

App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not recall 
the exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and that he 
affirmatively sought prompting from the Jones lawyers is entirely 
consistent with his deposition testimony. This record plainly does not 
support a charge of perjury.
    The third and last topic was the President's deposition testimony 
that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying having a sexual 
relationship with the President was correct:

    Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement 
that she had no sexual relationship with him] was absolutely correct.
    A: I did. . . . I believe at the time that she filled out this 
affidavit, if she believed that the definition of sexual relationship 
was two people having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe 
that this is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it. 
. . .

App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was truthful. As Ms. 
Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before any of this matter was 
public, this was in fact Ms. Lewinsky's definition of ``sex'' and 
apparently the President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape); 
see also App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no evidence 
whatever that the President did not believe this definition of sexual 
relations, and his belief finds support in dictionary definitions, the 
courts and commentators.\88\ Moreover, the record establishes that Ms. 
Lewinsky shared this view.\89\ Since the President's grand jury 
testimony about his understanding is corroborated both by dictionaries 
and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky, it simply cannot be 
labeled ``wrong'' or, more seriously, ``perjurious.''
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    \88\ As one court has stated, ``[i]n common parlance the terms 
`sexual intercourse' and `sexual relations' are often used 
interchangeably.'' J.Y. v. D.A, 381 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. App. 1978). 
Dictionary definitions make the same point:
     Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st ed. 
1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
     Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 1996) 
at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; 
coitus;''
     Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) at 
1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
     Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560, 
defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and
     Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1996) 
at 1775, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; 
coitus.''
    \89\ Ms. Lewinsky took the position early on that her contact with 
the President did not constitute ``sex'' and reaffirmed that position 
even after she had received immunity and began cooperating with the 
OIC. For example, in one of the conversations surreptitiously taped by 
Ms. Tripp, Ms. Lewinsky explained to Ms. Tripp that she ``didn't have 
sex'' with the President because ``[h]aving sex is having 
intercourse.'' Supp. at 2664; see also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stated that Ms. Lewinsky had said that 
the President and she ``didn't have sex''). Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed 
this position even after receiving immunity, stating in an FBI 
interview that ``her use of the term `having sex' means having 
intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). Likewise, 
in her original proffer to the OIC, she wrote, ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was 
comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the `sexual 
relationship' because she could justify to herself that she and the 
Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 
Proffer).
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    The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in the grand 
jury about his civil deposition testimony.
3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury about the statements of his 
        attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
    It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such as this 
one that even the OIC, which conducted the President's grand jury 
appearance, chose not to include in the Referral (presumably because 
there was no ``substantial and credible information'' to support the 
claim). Subpart (3) appears to allege that the President lied in his 
grand jury testimony when he characterized his state of mind in his 
civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky affidavit as 
meaning ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form.'' 
Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the House Managers appear to base their 
perjury claim on President Clinton's grand jury statement that ``I'm 
not even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying.'' 
House Br. at 62.
    The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's statement that 
he was ``not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange'' 
because, it alleges, the ``videotape [of the deposition] shows the 
President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to 
his argument to Judge Wright.'' Ibid. While it is true that the 
videotape shows the President staring in what is presumably Mr. 
Bennett's direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was indeed 
``paying close attention'' to the lengthy exchange. Notably absent from 
the videotape is any action on the part of the President that could be 
read as affirming Mr. Bennett's statement, such as a nod of the head, 
or any other activity that could be used to distinguish between a fixed 
stare and true attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The 
President was a witness in a difficult and complex deposition and, as 
he testified, he was ``focussing on [his] answers to the questions.'' 
App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the common law has never seen a 
perjury charge based on so little.\90\
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    \90\ This allegation is nearly identical to the allegation of 
Article II(5), and, for the sake of brevity, it is addressed at greater 
length in the response to Article II, below.
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4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
        statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to 
        influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
        discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
    The general language of the final proviso of Article I, according 
to the House Managers, is meant to signify a wide range of allegations, 
see House Br. at 60-69, although none were thought sufficiently 
credible to be included in the OIC Referral. These allegations were not 
even included in the summary of the Starr evidence presented to the 
Committee on October 5, 1998, by House Majority Counsel Schippers. They 
are nothing more than an effort to inflate the perjury allegations by 
converting every statement that the President made about the subject 
matter of Article II into a new count for perjury. As the discussion of 
Article II establishes, the President did not attempt to obstruct 
justice. Thus, his explanations of his statements in the grand jury 
were truthful.
    The House Brief asserts that the President committed perjury with 
respect to three areas of his grand jury testimony about the 
obstruction allegations. These claims are addressed thoroughly in the 
next section along with the corresponding Article II obstruction 
claims, and they are addressed in a short form here. The first claim is 
that the President committed perjury ``when he testified before the 
grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' 
lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President, she should provide them.'' House Br. at 63. The House 
Managers contest the truthfulness of this statement by asserting that 
the President was responsible for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to 
Ms. Currie in late December. In other words, if the obstruction claim 
is true, they allege, this statement is not true. As is laid out in 
greater detail in the next section, the House Manager's view of this 
matter ignores a wealth of evidence establishing that the idea to 
conceal some of the gifts she had received originated with, and was 
executed by, Ms. Lewinsky. See e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); 
Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98); 
App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 1481 (``LEWINSKY . 
. . suggested to the President that Betty Currie hold the gifts'') 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98).
    Second, the House Managers contend that the President provided 
perjurious testimony when he explained to the grand jury that he was 
trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he spoke with Betty Currie 
on January 18, 1998 about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br. 
at 65. The House Managers completely ignore the numerous statements 
that Ms. Currie makes in her testimony that support the President's 
assertion that he was merely trying to gather information. For example, 
Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with the OIC that ``Clinton 
then mentioned some of the questions he was asked at his deposition. 
Currie advised the way Clinton phrased the queries, they were both 
statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 
302 1/24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue 
also supports the President's explanation of his questioning:

    Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the 
President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel 
pressured when he told you those statements?
    A: None whatsoever.
    Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    A: At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
    Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say--because he 
would end each of the statements with ``Right?,'' with a question.
    A:  I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say ``Right'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
    Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true?
    A: Correct.
    Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    A: None.

Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added).
    Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he 
was looking for information as a result of his deposition. There is no 
basis to doubt the President's explanation that his expectation of a 
media onslaught prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed, 
neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the only 
two participants in this conversation--conceivably supports the 
inference that he had any other intent. The House Managers' contention 
that the President's explanation to the grand jury was perjurious 
totally disregards the testimony of the only two witnesses with first-
hand knowledge and has no basis in fact or in the evidence.
    Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton ``lied 
about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top 
aides.'' House Br. at 68. The basis for this charge appears to be the 
President's testimony that, although he said misleading things to his 
aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things 
that were true. Id. at 69. Once again, the record does not even 
approach a case for perjury. The President acknowledged that he misled; 
he tried, however, not to lie. It is a mystery how the Managers could 
try to disprove this simple statement of intent.

           V. The President Should be Acquitted on Article II

    The evidence does not support the allegations of Article II.
                           a. applicable law
    Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory crime that 
is set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, the ``Omnibus Obstruction 
Provision.'' In the criminal law context, Sec. 1503 requires proof of 
the following elements: (1) that there existed a pending judicial 
proceeding; (2) that the accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that 
the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct 
or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See, 
e.g., United States  v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989). 
False statements alone cannot sustain a conviction under Sec. 1503. See 
United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 covers witness tampering. It is clear that 
the allegations in Article II could not satisfy the elements of 
Sec. 1512. That provision requires proof that a defendant knowingly 
engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, 
or corrupt persuasion with intent to influence, delay, or prevent 
testimony or cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an 
official proceeding. It is clear from the case law that ``misleading 
conduct'' as contemplated by Sec. 1512 does not cover scenarios where 
an accused urged a witness to give false testimony without resorting to 
coercive or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., United States  v. Kulczyk, 
931 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction under Sec. 1512 
because ``there is simply no support for the argument that [defendant] 
did anything other than ask the witnesses to lie''); United States v. 
King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (``Since the only allegation in 
the indictment as to the means by which [defendant] induced [a witness] 
to withhold testimony was that [the defendant] misled [the witness], 
and since the evidence failed totally to support any inference that 
[the witness] was, or even could have been, misled, the conduct proven 
by the government was not within the terms of Sec. 1512.''). Deceit is 
thus the gravamen of an obstruction of justice charge that is 
predicated on witness tampering.
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                    b. structure of the allegations
    Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives alleges that 
the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the 
administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and 
through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme 
designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of 
evidence and testimony'' in the Jones case. The Article alleges that 
the President did so by engaging in ``one or more of the following 
acts'': the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky ``to 
execute a sworn affidavit . . . that he knew to be perjurious, false 
and misleading''; (2) ``corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to 
testify personally'' in the Jones case; (3) ``corruptly engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been 
subpoenaed'' in the Jones case, namely gifts given by him to Ms. 
Lewinsky; (4) ``intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky between December 7, 1997 and January 14, 
1998, ``in order to corruptly prevent [her] truthful testimony'' in the 
Jones case; (5) ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements'' to Judge Susan Webber Wright at the Jones 
deposition; (6) ``related a false and misleading account of events'' 
involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a ``potential witness'' in the 
Jones case, ``in order to corruptly influence'' her testimony; and (7) 
made false and misleading statements to certain members of his staff 
who were ``potential'' grand jury witnesses, in order to corruptly 
influence their testimony.
    As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of the 
perjury allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges particular 
acts of obstruction while Article I (4) alleges that the President lied 
in the grand jury when he discussed those allegations.\92\ Both sets of 
allegations are unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of 
these charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the 
allegations in Article I (4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning 
alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to 
impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II (1)-(3), (6) 
(obstructing justice when he (1) ``encouraged witness . . . to execute 
a [false] sworn affidavit''; (2) ``encouraged a witness . . . to give 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony''; (3) ``engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''; (6) 
``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty Currie). Compare also 
Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior 
false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by 
``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        c. response to the particular allegations in article ii
1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn 
        affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
        false and misleading''
    Article II (1) alleges that the President ``corruptly encouraged'' 
Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that 
he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.'' The House Managers 
allege that during a December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked 
the President what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones 
case and that the President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.'' House Br. at 22. This admitted statement by the President 
of totally lawful conduct is the Managers' entire factual basis for the 
allegation in Article II (1).
    The Managers do not allege that the President ever suggested to Ms. 
Lewinsky she should file a false affidavit or otherwise told her what 
to say in the affidavit. Indeed they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky 
has repeatedly and forcefully denied any such suggestions:
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 
(2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
     ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that 
she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie. . . .'' App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
98).
     ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various 
times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That 
wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
    In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence 
supporting their theory,\93\ the Managers offer their view that ``both 
parties knew the affidavit would have to be false and misleading in 
order to accomplish the desired result.'' House Br. at 22; see also 
Committee Report at 65 (the President ``knew [the affidavit] would have 
to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying''). But there is no 
evidence to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is 
true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President testified that, given the 
particular claims in the Jones  case, they thought a truthful, limited 
affidavit might establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to 
offer. The President explained to the grand jury why he believed that 
Ms. Lewinsky would execute a truthful but limited affidavit that would 
have established that she was not relevant to the Jones case:\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ The myth that the President told Ms. Lewinsky to lie in her 
affidavit springs not from the evidence but from the surreptitiously 
recorded Tripp tapes. But as Ms. Lewinsky explained to the grand jury, 
many of the statements she made to Ms. Tripp--including on this 
subject--were not true: ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know 
at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to 
lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
    \94\ Indeed, the Committee Report alleges without support that the 
President lied to the grand jury when he indicated his belief that Ms. 
Lewinsky could indeed have filed a truthful but limited affidavit that 
might have gotten her out of testifying in the Jones case. Article I 
(4). This claim fails for the reasons discussed in the text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what 
she says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no benefit 
in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual harassment. And 
if she defined sexual relationship in the way I think most Americans 
do, meaning intercourse, then she told the truth.'' App. at 474.
     ``You know, I believed then, I believe now, that Monica 
Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under 
reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit of what Linda Tripp 
did to her, would have given her a chance not to be a witness in this 
case.'' App. at 521.
     ``I believed then, I believe today, that she could execute 
an affidavit which, under reasonable circumstances with fair-minded, 
nonpolitically-oriented people, would result in her being relieved of 
the burden to be put through the kind of testimony that, thanks to 
Linda Tripp's work with you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have 
been put through. I don't think that's dishonest. I don't think that's 
illegal.'' App. at 529.
     ``But I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable 
that she could have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have 
disclosed the embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had, 
which had been over for many, many months by the time this incident 
occurred.'' App. at 568-69.
     ``I've already told you that I felt strongly that she 
could issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be 
factually truthful, that might get her out of having to testify. . . . 
And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? 
Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? No, I did 
not.'' App. at 571.

The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual 
solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President was 
consensual, and she knew nothing about the factual allegations of the 
Jones case.
    Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need not be 
false in order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a deposition:
     LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the affidavit was 
to avoid being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that one does this by giving a 
portion of the whole story, so the attorneys do not think you have 
anything of relevance to their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/
29/98) (emphasis added).
     LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be as 
benign as possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 1421 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added).
     I thought that signing an affidavit could range from 
anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being 
deposed and so that that could range from anywhere between maybe just 
somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe 
having to deny any kind of a relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
6/98) (emphasis added).
    The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have known that 
the President wanted her to lie because he never told her to fully 
detail their relationship in her affidavit and because an affidavit 
fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship would have 
been damaging to him in the Jones case. Committee Report at 65. The 
Managers wisely appear to have abandoned this argument.\95\ Ms. 
Lewinsky plainly was under no obligation to volunteer to the Jones 
lawyers every last detail about her relationship with the President--
and the failure of the President to instruct her to do so is neither 
wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited, truthful affidavit 
might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not relevant to the Jones 
case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. Lewinsky could submit an 
affidavit in lieu of a deposition, as the President knew other 
potential deponents in the Jones case had attempted to do, in order to 
avoid the expense, burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones 
case was entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United 
States could face removal from office not because he told Monica 
Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged her to do so, but because he did not 
affirmatively instruct her to disclose every detail of their 
relationship to the Jones lawyers is simply not supportable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky ``contextually 
understood that the President wanted her to lie'' because he never told 
her to file an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their 
relationship. Committee Report at 65. The only support cited for this 
``contextual understanding'' obstruction theory advanced by the 
Committee Report was a reference back to the OIC Referral. The OIC 
Referral, in turn, advanced the same theory, citing only the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie, 
he remained silent about what she should do or say, and by such 
silence, ``I knew what that meant.'' App. at 954 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) 
(cited in Referral at 174). It is extraordinary that the President of 
the United States could face removal from office not because he told 
Ms. Lewinsky to lie, or said anything of the sort, but instead because 
he stayed silent--and Ms. Lewinsky thought she ``knew what that 
meant.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, at the 
time she executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly believed that 
her denial of a sexual relationship was accurate given what she 
believed to be the definition of a ``sexual relationship'':
     ``I never even came close to sleeping with [the President] 
. . . We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is having intercourse. That's 
how most people would--'' Supp. at 2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/
97).\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ A friend of Ms. Lewinsky's also testified that, based on her 
close relationship with her, she believed that Ms. Lewinsky did not lie 
in her affidavit based on her understanding that when Ms. Lewinsky 
referred to ``sex'' she meant intercourse. Supp. at 4597 (6/23/98 grand 
jury testimony of Ms. Dale Young). See also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury 
testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stating that Ms. Lewinsky had said that 
the President and she ``didn't have sex'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit 
with regard to the sexual relationship because she could justify to 
herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' 
App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having sex' 
means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/
98).
    The allegation contained in Article II(1) is totally unsupported by 
evidence. It is the product of a baseless hypothesis, and it should be 
rejected.
2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he 
        ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, 
        false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
        personally'' in the Jones litigation
    Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky 
to give false testimony if and when she was called to testify 
personally in the Jones litigation. Again, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly 
denied that anyone told her or encouraged her to lie:
     ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on 
their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 
(2/1/98 Proffer).
     ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
     ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that 
she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
     ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky 
to say anything or to lie. . . . App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
98).
     ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various 
times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That 
wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added).
    The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 17 to inform her that she had been listed as a potential 
witness in the Jones case, and that during this conversation, he ``sort 
of said, `You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or 
that you were bringing me letters.' '' House Br. at 22; App. at 843 
(Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). Other than the fact that Ms. Lewinsky recalls 
this statement being made in the same conversation in which she learned 
that her name was on the Jones witness list, the Managers cite no 
evidence whatsoever that supports their claim that the President 
encouraged her to make such statements ``if and when called to testify 
personally in the Jones case.'' They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had 
discussed such explanations for her visits with the President in the 
past. Unremarkably, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been concerned 
about concealing their improper relationship from others while it was 
ongoing.
    Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements undercut 
their case:
     When asked what should be said if anyone questioned Ms. 
Lewinsky about her being with the President, he said she should say she 
was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or 
visiting Betty Currie (after she left the WH). There is truth to both 
of these statements. . . . [This] occurred prior to the subpoena in the 
Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis 
added).
     After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the Pres[ident], that 
she was identified as a possible witness in the Jones case, the 
Pres[ident] and Ms. L[ewinsky] discussed what she should do. The 
President told her he was not sure she would be subpoenaed, but in the 
event that she was, she should contact Ms. Currie. When asked what to 
do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could sign an 
affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. In 
general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to see Ms. Currie 
and, on occasion when working at the WH, she brought him letters when 
no one else was around. Neither of those statements untrue. App. at 712 
(2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
     To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does not 
believe they discussed the content of any deposition that Ms. 
L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date. App. at 712 (2/1/98 
Proffer) (emphasis added).
     LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the issue in 
specific relation to the JONES matter, she and CLINTON had discussed 
what to say when asked about LEWINSKY's visits to the White House. App. 
at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (emphasis added).
    Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the President 
what to say if ``anyone'' asked about her visits, that the President 
said ``in general'' she could give such an explanation, and that they 
``did not discuss the issue in specific relation to the Jones matter.''
    This is consistent with the President's testimony that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at 
some point in the past,'' although he had no specific memory of that 
conversation. App. at 569. The President also stated in his grand jury 
testimony that he did not recall saying anything like that in 
connection with Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case:

    Q: And in that conversation, or in any conversation in which you 
informed her she was on the witness list, did you tell her, you know, 
you can always say that you were coming to see Betty or bringing me 
letters? Did you tell her anything like that?
    A: I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can tell you 
this. I absolutely never asked her to lie.

App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this discussion was had 
in reference to testimony she may or may not have been called to give 
personally, and the Managers' implication is directly contradicted by 
Ms. Lewinsky's statement that she and the President did not discuss her 
deposition testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 (2/1/98 
Proffer) (``To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, she does not 
believe they discussed [in the December 17 conversation] the content of 
any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later 
date.'').
    In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony that she told the President she would deny the 
relationship and that the President made some encouraging comment. 
House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the President 
any such thing on December 17, or at any other time after she had been 
identified as a witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that that 
discussion did not take place after she learned she was a witness in 
the Jones case:

    Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions [about 
denying the relationship] after you learned that you were a witness in 
the Paula Jones case?
    A: I don't believe so. No.
    Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
    A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it would 
be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that would 
show me different, but I--it was 2:30 in the--I mean, the conversation 
I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 17th, which was----
    Q: The telephone call.
    A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I 
remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so.

App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
    Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that neither of 
these so-called ``cover stories'' was untrue. In her handwritten 
proffer, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she asked the President what to say 
if anyone asked her about her visits to the Oval Office and he said 
that she could say ``she was bringing him letters (when she worked in 
Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left the White 
House).'' App. at 709 (Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer). Ms. Lewinsky expressly 
stated: ``There is truth to both of these statements.'' Id.  (emphasis 
added); see also App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``[n]either of those 
statements [was] untrue.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky 
testified to the grand jury that she did in fact bring papers to the 
President and that on some occasions, she visited the Oval Office only 
to see Ms. Currie:

    Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all?
    A: Yes.
    Q: All right. Tell us a little about that.
    A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of letters. . . .

App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

``I saw Betty on every time that I was there . . . most of the time my 
purpose was to see the President, but there were some times when I did 
just go see Betty but the President wasn't in the office.''

App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that those 
stories were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also Committee Report at 
66 (delivering documents to the President was a ``ruse that had no 
legitimate business purpose.''). In other words, while the so-called 
``cover stories'' were literally true, such explanations might have 
been misleading. But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and 
obstruction cases, as is Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the statements 
were, in fact, literally true.
    The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported by the 
evidence and should be rejected.
3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or 
        supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to 
        Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
    This allegation charges that the President participated in a scheme 
to conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky. It apparently 
centers on two events allegedly occurring in December 1997: (a) a 
conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two 
allegedly discussed the gifts the President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and 
(b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and 
storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not support the 
charge.
            a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
    Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 1997, 
sometime shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas presents. App. at 
868 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the 
subject of gifts she had received from the President in relation to the 
Jones subpoena, and this was the first and only time that this subject 
arose. App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky Depo. 
8/26/98).
    The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one version of 
Ms. Lewinsky's description of that December 28 conversation:

``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--maybe I 
should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I 
don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' App. 
at 872 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

    In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky has 
addressed this crucial exchange with prosecutors on at least ten 
different occasions, which we lay out in the margin for review.\97\ The 
accounts varied--in some Ms. Lewinsky essentially recalled that the 
President gave no response, but the House Managers, like the Committee 
Report and the OIC Referral, cite only the account most favorable to 
their case, failing even to take note of the other inconsistent 
recollections. But the important fact about Ms. Lewinsky's various 
descriptions of this conversation is that, at the very most, the 
President stated ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about it'' when Ms. 
Lewinsky raised the issue of the gifts. Even by the account most 
unfavorable to the President, the record is clear and unambiguous that 
the President never initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he 
tell or even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the gifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Those statements, from earliest to latest in time:
    1. Proffer (2/1/98): ``Ms. L then asked if she should put away 
(outside her home) the gifts he had given her or, maybe, give them so 
someone else.'' App. at 715.
    2. FBI 302 (7/27/98): ``LEWINSKY expressed her concern about the 
gifts that the President had given LEWINSKY and specifically the hat 
pin that had been subpoenaed by PAULA JONES. The President seemed to 
know what the JONES subpoena called for in advance and did not seem 
surprised about the hat pin. The President asked LEWINSKY if she had 
told anyone about the hat pin and LEWINSKY denied that she had, but may 
have said that she gave some of the gifts to FRANK CARTER. . . . 
LEWINSKY asked the President if she should give the gifts to someone 
and the President replied `I don't know.' '' App. at 1395.
    3. FBI 302 (8/1/98): ``LEWINSKY said that she was concerned about 
the gifts that the President had given her and suggested to the 
President that BETTY CURRIE hold the gifts. The President said 
something like, `I don't know,' or `I'll think about it.' The President 
did not tell LEWINSKY what to do with the gifts at that time.'' App. at 
1481.
    4. Grand Jury (8/6/98): ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you 
know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house 
somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I 
think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And 
left that topic.'' App. at 872.
    5. FBI 302 (8/13/97): ``During their December 28, 1997 meeting, 
CLINTON did not specifically mention which gifts to get rid of.'' App. 
at 1549.
    6. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``It was December 28th and I was there to 
get my Christmas gifts from him. . . And we spent maybe about five 
minutes or so, not very long, talking about the case. And I said to 
him, `Well, do you think' . . . And at one point, I said, `Well do you 
think I should--' I don't think I said `get rid of,' I said, `But do 
you think I should put away or maybe give to Betty or give someone the 
gifts?' And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something 
like, `I don't know,' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.'' 
App. at 1121-22.
    7. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's 
name [at the December 28 meeting during which gifts were supposedly 
discussed] or did the President bring up Betty's name? THE WITNESS: I 
think I brought it up. The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's 
name because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. . .'' App. 
at 1122.
    8. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: You had said that the President 
had called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone 
there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed 
concern, the President really didn't say anything.'' App. at 1126.
    9. FBI 302 (8/24/98): ``LEWINSKY advised that CLINTON was sitting 
in the rocking chair in the Study. LEWINSKY asked CLINTON what she 
should do with the gifts CLINTON had given her and he either did not 
respond or responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what 
was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not 
have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566.
    10. FBI 302 (9/3/98): ``On December 28, 1997, in a conversation 
between LEWINSKY and the President, the hat pin given to Lewinsky by 
the President was specifically discussed. They also discussed the 
general subject of the gifts the President had given Lewinsky. However, 
they did not discuss other specific gifts called for by the PAULA JONES 
subpoena. LEWINSKY got the impression that the President knew what was 
on the subpoena.'' App. at 1590.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of the 
President's reaction depict the President as not even acknowledging her 
suggestion. Among those versions, ignored by the Committee Report and 
the Managers, are the following:
     ``And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was 
something like, `I don't know,' '' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no 
response.'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
     ``[The President] either did not respond or responded `I 
don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is 
certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in 
her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98) 
(emphasis added).
     ``The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name, 
because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . .'' App. at 
1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
     ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you 
initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had 
a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed concern, the 
President didn't really say anything.'' App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/
98) (emphasis added).\98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Here a grand juror is restating Ms. Lewinsky's earlier 
testimony, with which Ms. Lewinsky appeared to agree (she did not 
dispute the accuracy of the grand juror's recapitulation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially no 
discussion of gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no evidence of 
any ``scheme . . . designed to . . . conceal the existence'' of any 
gifts.
            b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
    Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction by the 
President at his December 28 meeting with Monica Lewinsky, Article II 
(3) necessarily depends on the added assumption that, after the 
December 28 meeting, the President must have instructed his secretary, 
Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby 
consummating the obstruction of justice. As the following discussion 
will demonstrate, the record is devoid of any direct evidence that the 
President discussed this subject with Ms. Currie. At most, it 
conflicted on the question of whether Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky 
initiated the gift retrieval.
    We begin with what is certain. The record is undisputed that Ms. 
Currie picked up a box containing gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and placed 
them under her bed at home. The primary factual dispute, therefore, is 
which of the two initiated the pick-up. According to the logic of the 
Committee Report, if Ms. Currie initiated the retrieval, she must have 
been so instructed by the President. Committee Report at 69 (``there is 
no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the President'').
    But the facts are otherwise. Both Ms. Currie and the President have 
denied ever having any such conversation wherein the President 
instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. App. at 
502 (President Clinton GJ 8/17/98); Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). In 
other words, the only two parties who could have direct knowledge of 
such an instruction by the President have denied it took place.
    In the face of this direct evidence that the President did not ask 
Ms. Currie to pick up these gifts, the Committee Report's obstruction 
theory hinges on the inference that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky and 
must have done so at the direction of the President. To be sure, Ms. 
Lewinsky has stated on several occasions that Ms. Currie initiated a 
call to her to inquire about retrieving something. The Managers and the 
Committee Report cited the following passage from Ms. Lewinsky's grand 
jury testimony:

    Q: What did [Betty Currie] say?
    A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give me.'' Or, 
``The President said you have something to give me.'' Along those 
lines. . . .
    Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I understand you 
have something to give me,'' or ``The President says you have something 
for me,'' what did you understand her to mean?
    A: The gifts.
App. at 874 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). See also App. at 715 (2/1/98 Proffer) 
(``Ms. Currie called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres. 
had told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her.'').
    However, Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged that it was she who first raised 
the prospect of Ms. Currie's involvement in holding the gifts:

    A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the President 
bring up Betty's name?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: I think I brought it up. The President wouldn't 
have brought up Betty's name because he really didn't--he really didn't 
discuss it.

App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). And contrary to the Committee 
Report's suggestion that Lewinsky's memory of these events has been 
``consistent and unequivocal'' and she has ``recited the same facts in 
February, July, and August,'' Committee Report at 69, Ms. Lewinsky 
herself acknowledged at her last grand jury appearance that her memory 
of the crucial conversation is less than crystal clear:

    A JUROR: . . . Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the 
President had told her to call?
    [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right now. I don't. I don't remember. . . .

App. at 1141 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
    Moreover, Ms. Currie has repeatedly and unvaryingly stated that it 
was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted Ms. Currie about the gifts, not the 
other way around. A few examples include:
     ``LEWINSKY called CURRIE and advised she had to return all 
gifts CLINTON had given LEWINSKY as there was talk going around about 
the gifts.'' Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98);
     ``Monica said she was getting concerned, and she wanted to 
give me the stuff the President had given her--or give me a box of 
stuff. It was a box of stuff.'' Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98);
     Q: . . . Just tell us for a moment how this issue first 
arose and what you did about it and what Ms. Lewinsky told you.
     A: The best I remember it first arose with a conversation. 
I don't know if it was over the telephone or in person. I don't know. 
She asked me if I would pick up a box. She said Isikoff had been 
inquiring about gifts.'' Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
     ``The best I remember she said that she wanted me to hold 
these gifts--hold this--she may have said gifts, I'm sure she said 
gifts, box of gifts--I don't remember--because people were asking 
questions. And I said, `Fine.' '' Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
     ``The best I remember is Monica calls me and asks me if 
she can give me some gifts, if I'd pick up some gifts for her.'' Supp. 
at 706 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).
    The Committee Report attempts to portray Ms. Currie's memory as 
faulty on the key issue of whether Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift 
retrieval by unfairly referencing Ms. Currie's answer to a completely 
different question. Ms. Currie was asked whether she had discussed with 
the President Ms. Lewinsky's ``turning over to [her]'' the gift he had 
given her. Ms. Currie indicated that she could remember no such 
occasion. ``If Monica said [Ms. Currie] talked to the President about 
it,'' she was then asked, ``would that not be true?'' Then, only on the 
limited question of whether Ms. Currie ever talked to the President 
about the gifts--wholly separate from the issue of who made the initial 
contact--did Ms. Currie courteously defer, ``Then she may remember 
better than I. I don't remember.'' Supp. at 584 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). 
Ironically, it is the substance of this very allegation--regarding 
conversations between Ms. Currie and the President--that Ms. Lewinsky 
told the grand jury she could not recall. (In later testimony, 
referring to a conversation she had with the President on January 21, 
Ms. Currie testified that she was ``sure'' that she did not discuss the 
fact that she had a box of Ms. Lewinsky's belongings under her bed. 
Supp. at 705 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).)
    To support its theory that Ms. Currie initiated a call to Ms. 
Lewinsky, the House Managers place great reliance on a cell phone 
record of Ms. Currie, calling it ``key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy 
recollection is wrong'' and which ``conclusively proves'' that ``the 
President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.'' House Br. at 33. 
There is record of a one-minute call on December 28, 1998 from Ms. 
Currie's cell phone to Ms. Lewinsky's home at 3:32 p.m. Even assuming 
Ms. Lewinsky is correct that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts on December 
28, her own testimony refutes the possibility that the Managers' 
mysterious 3:32 p.m. telephone call could have been the initial contact 
by Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts. To the contrary, the timing and 
duration of the call strongly suggest just the opposite. It is 
undisputed that Ms. Lewinsky entered the White House on the morning of 
December 28 at 8:16 a.m. App. at 111 (White House entry records). While 
no exit time for Ms. Lewinsky was recorded because she inadvertently 
left her visitor badge in the White House, she has testified that the 
visit lasted around an hour. App. at 870-72 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). 
Consistent with this timing, records also indicate that the President 
left the Oval Office at 9:52 a.m., thus placing Ms. Lewinsky's exit 
around 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. App. at 111. Ms. Lewinsky has indicated on 
several occasions that her discussion with Betty Currie occurred just 
``several hours'' after she left. App. at 875 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); 
App. at 1395 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Ms. Lewinsky three times 
placed the timing of the actual gift exchange with Ms. Currie ``at 
about 2:00 p.m.'' App at 1127 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1396 
(Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98); App. at 1482 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98). 
This, in light of undisputed documentary evidence and Ms. Lewinsky's 
own testimony, it becomes clear that the 3:32 p.m. telephone record 
relied upon by the Committee Report in fact is unlikely to reflect a 
call placed to initiate the pick-up.
    Apart from this conspicuous timing defect, there is another, 
independent reason to conclude that the 3:32 p.m. telephone call could 
not have been the conversation Ms. Lewinsky describes. The 3:32 p.m. 
call is documented to have lasted no longer than one minute, and 
because such calls are rounded up to the nearest minute, it quite 
conceivably could have been much shorter in duration. It is difficult 
to imagine that the conversation reflected in Ms. Lewinsky's statements 
could have taken place in less than one minute. Both Ms. Currie and Ms. 
Lewinsky have described the various matters that were discussed in 
their initial conversation: not only was this the first time the topic 
of returning gifts was discussed, which quite likely generated some 
discussion between the two, but they also had to discuss and arrange a 
convenient plan for Ms. Currie to make the pick-up.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ The OIC Referral, which took great pains to point out every 
allegedly incriminating piece of evidence, made no reference to this 
telephone record, perhaps because the OIC knew it tended not to 
corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's time line. In its place, the Referral rested 
its corroboration hopes in the following bizarre analysis: ``More 
generally, the person making the extra effort (in this case, Ms. 
Currie) is ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' Referral at 
170. Wisely, the House Managers chose not to pursue this groundless 
speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What, then, to make of this call so heavily relied upon by the 
House Managers? The record is replete with references that Ms. Currie 
and Ms. Lewinsky communicated very frequently, especially during this 
December 1997-January 1998 time period. See, e.g., Supp. at 554 (Currie 
GJ 1/27/98) (many calls around Christmas-time). They often called or 
paged each other to discuss a host of topics, including Ms. Lewinsky's 
pending job search, Ms. Currie's mother's illness, and her contacts 
with Mr. Jordan. There is simply no reason to believe this call was 
anything other than one of the many calls and exchanges of pages that 
these two shared during the period.
            c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds 
                    With the President's Actions
    Ultimately, and irrespective of the absence of evidence implicating 
the President in Ms. Lewinsky's gift concealment, the charge fails 
because it is inconsistent with other events of the very same day. 
There is absolutely no dispute that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky 
numerous additional gifts during their December 28 meeting. It must 
therefore be assumed that on the very day the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky were conspiring to hide the gifts he had already given to her, 
the President added to the pile. No stretch of logic will support such 
an outlandish theory.
    From the beginning, this inherent contradiction has puzzled 
investigators. If there were a plot to conceal these gifts, why did the 
President give Ms. Lewinsky several more gifts at the very moment the 
concealment plan was allegedly hatched? The House Managers OIC 
prosecutors, grand jurors, and even Ms. Lewinsky hopelessly searched 
for an answer to that essential question:

    Q: Although, Ms. Lewinsky, I think what is sort of--it seems a 
little odd and, I guess really the grand jurors wanted your impression 
of it, was on the same day that you're discussing basically getting the 
gifts to Betty to conceal them, he's giving you a new set of gifts.
    A: You know, I have come recently to look at that as sort of a 
strange situation, I think, in the course of the past few weeks. . . .

App. at 887-88 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). See House Br. at 
34.
    The Committee Report fails to resolve this significant flaw in its 
theory.\100\ The report admits that Ms. Lewinsky ``can't answer'' why 
the President would in one breath give her gifts and in the next hatch 
a plan to take them back. But it cites only to Ms. Lewinsky's 
understanding of the relationship's pattern of concealment and how she 
contemplated it must apply to the gifts. It creates the erroneous 
impression that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky instructions to conceal 
the gifts in the December 28 meeting by quoting her testimony that 
``from everything he said to me'' she would conceal the gifts. But we 
know that Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly testified that no such discussion 
ever occurred. Her reliance on ``everything he said to me'' must, 
therefore, reflect her own plan to implement discussions the two had 
had about concealing the relationship long before her role in the Jones 
litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Incredibly, not only does the Committee Report fail to offer 
a sensible answer to this perplexity, but without any factual or 
logical support it accuses the President of lying to the grand jury 
when he testified that he was not particularly concerned about the 
gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky and thus had no compunction about 
giving her additional gifts on December 28. Article I (4). For whatever 
reason, neither the Committee Report nor the OIC Referral acknowledges 
the most reasonable explanation for these events: as the President has 
testified repeatedly, he was not concerned about the gifts he had given 
Ms. Lewinsky.
     ``I was never hung up about this gift issue. Maybe it's 
because I have a different experience. But, you know, the President 
gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe more. I have always given a lot of 
gifts to people, especially if they give me gifts. And this was no big 
deal to me.'' App. at 495.
     ``this gift business . . . didn't bother me.'' App. at 
496.
     ``I wasn't troubled by this gift issue.'' App. at 497.
     ``I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have always 
been given gifts. I do not think there is anything improper about a man 
giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving a man a gift, that necessarily 
connotes an improper relationship. So, it didn't bother me.'' App. at 
498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What this passage confirms is that Ms. Lewinsky had very much in 
her mind that she would do what she could to conceal the relationship--
a modus operandi she herself acknowledged well pre-dated the Jones 
litigation. That she took such steps does not mean that the President 
knew of or participated in them. Indeed, it appears that the entire 
gift-concealment plan arose not from any plan suggested by the 
President--which the Committee Report so desperately struggles to 
maintain--but rather more innocently from the actions of a young woman 
taking steps she thought were best.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \101\ As the President has stated about this potentiality, ``I 
didn't then, I don't now see this [the gifts] as a problem. And if she 
thought it was a problem, I think it--it must have been from a, really 
a misapprehension of the circumstances. I certainly never encouraged 
her not to, to comply lawfully with a subpoena.'' App. at 497-98 
(emphasis added.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In any event, the record evidence is abundantly clear that the 
President has not obstructed justice by any plan or scheme to conceal 
gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and logic and reason fully undercut 
any such theory.
4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with 
        Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an 
        effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in 
        the Jones case
    Again, in the absence of specifics in Article II itself, we look to 
the Committee Report for guidance on the actual charges. The Committee 
Report would like to portray this claim in as sinister a light as 
possible, and it alleges that the President of the United States 
employed his close friend Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job in 
New York to influence her testimony or perhaps get her away from the 
Jones lawyers. To reach this conclusion, and without the benefit of a 
single piece of direct evidence to support the charge, it ignores the 
direct testimony of several witnesses, assigns diabolical purposes to a 
series of innocuous events, and then claims that ``[i]t is logical to 
infer from this chain of events'' that the job efforts ``were motivated 
to influence the testimony of'' Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 71. 
Again, the evidence contradicts the inferences the Committee Report 
strives to draw. Ms. Lewinsky's New York job search began on her own 
initiative long before her involvement in the Jones case. By her own 
forceful testimony, her job search had no connection to the Jones case.
    Mr. Jordan agreed to help Ms. Lewinsky not at the direction of the 
President but upon the request of Betty Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-time 
friend. And bizarrely, the idea to involve Mr. Jordan (which arose well 
before Ms. Lewinsky became a possible Jones witness) came not from the 
President but apparently emanated from Ms. Tripp. In short, the facts 
directly frustrate the House Majority's theory.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ This allegation has gone through several iterations. As 
initially referred to the House of Representatives, the charge was that 
the President ``help[ed] Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York at a 
time when she would have been a witness against him'' in the Jones 
case. OIC Referral at 181. Faced with the significant evidence that Ms. 
Lewinsky's job efforts had originated long before she became involved 
in the Jones case and were in fact entirely unrelated to the Jones 
case, the Judiciary Committee Majority was forced to recraft this 
claim. Instead of implying a complete connection between the job search 
and the Jones ligitation, the article now oddly charges that the 
President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky ``at a time when the truthful testimony 
of [Ms. Lewinsky] would have been harmful to him,'' Article II (5) 
(emphasis added)--thereby admitting that the initial effort was 
motivated by appropriate concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This 
                    Charge
    It is hard to overstate the importance of the fact that--by the 
House Managers', the Committee Report's and the OIC's own admission--
there is not one single piece of direct evidence to support this 
charge. Not one. Indeed, just the contrary is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified that there was never an 
explicit or implicit agreement, suggestion, or implication that Ms. 
Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for her silence or false 
testimony. One need look no further than their own testimony:

    Lewinsky: ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised 
a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98);
    ``There was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, or anyone else 
that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones affidavit before getting a job in 
New York. LEWINSKY never demanded a job from Jordan in exchange for a 
favorable affidavit. Nether the President nor JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY 
that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
    Jordan: ``As far as I was concerned, [the job and the affidavit] 
were two very separate matters.'' Supp. at 1737 (Jordan GJ 3/5/98).
    ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no''--in response to the question 
whether the job search and the affidavit were in any way connected. 
Supp. at 1827 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ The only person who suggested any such quid pro quo was Ms. 
Tripp, who repeatedly urged Ms. Lewinsky to demand such linkage. App. 
at 1493 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/2/98 (``TRIPP told LEWINSKY not to sign the 
affidavit until LEWINSKY had a job.''). To appease Linda Tripp's 
repeated demands on this point, Ms. Lewinsky ultimately told Ms. Tripp 
that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't sign the affidavit until she 
had a job. But as she later emphasized to the grand jury, ``That was 
definitely a lie, based on something Linda had made me promise her on 
January 9th.'' App. at 1134 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).

    This is the direct evidence. The House Managers' circumstantial 
``chain of events'' case, House Br. 39-41, cannot overcome the hurdle 
the direct evidence presents.
            b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
    By its terms, Article II(4) would have the Senate evaluate Ms. 
Lewinsky's job search by considering only the circumstances 
``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1997.'' Article II(4). Although 
barely mentioned in the Committee Report's ``explanation'' of Article 
II(4), the significant events occurring before December 7, 1997 cannot 
simply be ignored because they are inconsistent with the Majority's 
theory. Without reciting every detail, the undisputed record 
establishes that the following facts occurred long before Ms. Lewinsky 
was involved in the Jones case:
    First, Ms. Lewinsky had contemplated looking for a job in New York 
as early as July 1997. App. at 1414 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (July 3 
letter ``first time [Lewinsky] mentioned the possibility of moving to 
New York''); App. at 787-788 (On July 4, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky wrote the 
President a letter describing her interest in a job ``in New York at 
the United Nations''); Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had been 
searching for a highly paid job in New York since the previous July.'') 
She conveyed that prospect to a friend on September 2, 1997. App. at 
2811 (Lewinsky e-mail).
    Second, in early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, then-Deputy 
Chief of Staff John Podesta asked U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson to 
consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. Supp. at 3404 
(Richardson GJ 4/3/98). Ms. Currie testified that she was acting on her 
own in this effort. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98).
    Third, around October 6, Ms. Tripp told Ms. Lewinsky that an 
acquaintance in the White House reported that it was unlikely Ms. 
Lewinsky would ever be re-employed at the White House. After this 
disclosure, Ms. Lewinsky ``was mostly resolved to look for a job in the 
private sector in New York.'' App. at 1543-44 (Lewinsky FBI 302) 8/13/
98; see also App. at 1460 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (remarks by the 
Linda Tripp acquaintance were the ``straw that broke the camel's 
back'').
    Fourth, sometime prior to October 9, 1997, Ms. Tripp and Ms. 
Lewinsky discussed the prospect of enlisting Mr. Vernon Jordan to 
assist Ms. Lewinsky in obtaining a private sector job in New York. App. 
at 822-24 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); see also App. at 1079 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
20/98) (``I don't remember . . . if [enlisting Jordan] was my idea or 
Linda's idea. And I know that that came up in discussions with her, I 
believe, before I discussed it with the President''). On either October 
9 or 11, Ms. Lewinsky conveyed to the President this idea of asking Mr. 
Jordan for assistance. Id.
    Fifth, in mid-October, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky purchased a book on jobs 
in New York. App. at 1462 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky 
completed and sent to Betty Currie at the White House a packet of jobs-
related materials on October 15 or 16. Supp. at 735 (Lewinsky Tripp 
tape of 10/15/97 conversation).
    Sixth, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for a position 
with Ambassador Bill Richardson at the United Nations in New York. 
Ambassador Richardson was ``impressed'' with Ms. Lewinsky and, on 
November 3, offered her a position, which she ultimately rejected. 
Supp. at 3411 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3731 (Sutphen GJ 5/27/
98). Ms. Currie informed the President that Ms. Lewinsky had received a 
job offer at the U.N. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ambassador 
Richardson never spoke to the President or Mr. Jordan about Ms. 
Lewinsky, and he testified emphatically and repeatedly that no one 
pressured him to hire her. Supp. at 3422-23 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); 
Supp. at 3418 (same); Supp. at 3429 (same).
    Seventh, as of late October or November, Ms. Lewinsky had told Mr. 
Kenneth Bacon, her boss at the Pentagon, that she wanted to leave the 
Pentagon and move to New York. In a series of conversations, she 
enlisted his assistance in obtaining a private sector job in New York. 
Supp. at 11 (Kenneth Bacon FBI 302 2/26/98). In response, Mr. Bacon 
contacted Howard Paster, CEO of the public relations firm Hill & 
Knowlton about Ms. Lewinsky. Id.
    Eighth, in November, Ms. Lewinsky gave notice to the Pentagon that 
she would be leaving her Pentagon job at year's end. Supp. at 116 
(Clifford Bernath GJ 5/21/98).
    Ninth, Ms. Lewinsky apparently had a preliminary meeting with Mr. 
Jordan on November 5, 1997 to discuss her job search. During this 
twenty-minute meeting, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan discussed a list of 
potential employers she had compiled. App. at 1464-65 (Lewinsky FBI 302 
7/31/98). In that meeting, Ms. Lewinsky never informed Mr. Jordan of 
any time constraints on her need for job assistance. Supp. at 2647 
(Lewinsky-Tripp Tape of 11/8/97 conversation). Mr. Jordan had to leave 
town the next day. App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 Form 7/31/98). Ms. 
Lewinsky had a follow-up telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan around 
Thanksgiving wherein he advised her that he was ``working on her job 
search'' and instructed her to call him again ``around the first week 
of December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98); see also App. 
at 825 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (``And so Betty arranged for me to speak 
with [Jordan] again and I spoke with him when I was in Los Angeles 
before--right before Thanksgiving.'') \104\ Inexplicably, the Committee 
Report, the presentation by its chief counsel, and the Starr Referral 
all choose to ignore this key piece of testimony--that contact resumed 
in early December because Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan agreed (in 
November) that it would. See Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had 
no further contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time [early November to mid 
December].''); Schippers Dec. 10, 1998 Presentation at 38 (``Vernon 
Jordan, who, by the way, had done nothing from early November to mid-
December.''); Referral at 182 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no contact with . . . 
Mr. Jordan for another month [after November 5].'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Mr. Jordan was then out of the country from the day after 
Thanksgiving until December 4. Supp. at 1804 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, the record is clear that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to 
seek a job in New York many months before her involvement in the Jones 
case. She had asked her Pentagon boss to help, as well as Ms. Currie, 
who arranged indirectly for Ms. Lewinsky to interview with Ambassador 
Richardson at the United Nations. Mr. Jordan became involved in the job 
search at the request of Ms. Currie (apparently at the suggestion of 
Ms. Tripp) and, notwithstanding his travels in November, Supp. at 1811 
(Jordan GJ 5/5/98), kept in contact with Ms. Lewinsky with plans to 
reconvene early in December.
            c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
    Article II ignores this background and merely alleges that efforts 
to aid Ms. Lewinsky's job search ``intensified and succeeded'' in 
December 1997. While not adopted in the article, the House Brief, the 
Committee Report, and the accompanying final presentation by Majority 
Counsel Schippers offer some guidance as to the meaning of the actual 
charge. They cite three events--Mr. Jordan's December 11 meeting with 
Ms. Lewinsky to discuss job prospects in New York, Ms. Lewinsky's 
execution of her Jones affidavit, and her receipt of a job--in an 
effort to portray Ms. Lewinsky's job search as sinister. But the full 
record easily dispels any suggestion that there were any obstructive or 
improper acts.

      (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan

    The House Managers and the Committee Report suggest that Mr. Jordan 
took action on Ms. Lewinsky's job search request only after, and 
because, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list on December 5 
and only after, and because, Judge Wright ordered the President to 
answer certain questions about ``other women'' on December 11. See 
House Br. at 21. Consider the Committee Report portrayal:

    ``[T]he effort to obtain a job for Monica Lewinsky in New York 
intensified after the President learned, on December 6, 1997, that 
Monica Lewinsky was listed on the witness list for the case Jones v. 
Clinton.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Committee Report at 70. That portrayal flatly contradicts the 
Committee Report's earlier statement that on December 6 ``there was 
still no urgency to help Lewinsky.'' Committee Report at 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon Jordan at 
the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan on December 11 to 
discuss specific job contacts in New York. Mr. Jordan then made calls 
to certain New York companies on Ms. Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan 
telephoned President Clinton to keep him informed of the efforts to get 
Ms. Lewinsky a job.'' Committee Report at 70.
    ``Something happened that changed the priority assigned to the job 
search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright 
ordered President Clinton to provide information regarding any state or 
federal employee with whom he had, proposed, or sought sexual 
relations. To keep Ms. Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical 
importance.'' Committee Report at 11.

    The unmistakable intention of this narrative is to suggest that, 
after the President learned Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list 
on December 6, he (1) contacted Mr. Jordan on December 7 to engage his 
assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, and only then did Mr. Jordan agree to meet 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and further, that (2) Mr. Jordan met with Ms. 
Lewinsky on December 11 and took concrete steps to help Ms. Lewinsky 
only after and as a result of Judge Wright's December 11 order. Both 
suggestions are demonstrably false.
    The President had nothing to do with arranging the December 11 
meeting between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. As the record indicates, 
after receiving a request from Ms. Currie on December 5 that he meet 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and telling Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call 
him, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan on December 8. Supp. at 1705 
(Jordan GJ 3/3/98). As noted above, that call had been presaged by a 
conversation between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky around Thanksgiving in 
which Jordan told her ``he was working on her job search'' and asked 
her to contact him again ``around the first week of December.'' App. at 
1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In the December 8 call, the two 
arranged for Ms. Lewinsky to come to Mr. Jordan's office on December 
11; on the same day, Ms. Lewinsky sent Mr. Jordan via courier a copy of 
her resume. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). At the time of that 
contact, Mr. Jordan did not even know that Ms. Lewinsky knew President 
Clinton. Id.
    In the intervening period before Ms. Lewinsky's December 11 meeting 
with Mr. Jordan, the President met with Mr. Jordan on December 7. As 
the Committee Report acknowledges, that meeting had nothing to do with 
Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 11. Yet the House Managers' Brief, 
like the Committee Report before it, states that ``the sudden interest 
[in helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job] was inspired by a court order 
entered on December 11, 1997'' in the Jones case.\106\ House Br. at 21. 
No evidence supports that supposition. The December 11 meeting had been 
scheduled on December 8. Neither the OIC Referral nor the Committee 
Report nor the Managers' Brief cites any evidence that the President or 
Mr. Jordan had any knowledge of the contents of that Order at the time 
of the December 11 meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ That Order authorized Paula Jones' attorneys to obtain 
discovery relating to certain government employees ``with whom the 
President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to 
have sexual relations.'' House Br. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky shortly after 1:00 p.m. on 
December 11. Supp. at 1863 (Akin Gump visitor log); Supp. at 1809 
(Jordan GJ 5/5/98). In anticipation of that meeting, Mr. Jordan had 
made several calls to prospective employers about Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. 
at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). Mr. Jordan spoke about Ms. Lewinsky with 
Mr. Peter Georgescu of Young & Rubicam at 9:45 a.m. that morning, and 
with Mr. Richard Halperin of Revlon around 1:00 p.m., immediately 
before meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). 
Again, there is no evidence that any of this occurred after Mr. Jordan 
learned of Judge Wright's order.
    Although the Committee Report claims that a heightened sense of 
urgency attached in December which ``intensified'' the job search 
efforts, it ignores the sworn testimony of Mr. Jordan denying any such 
intensification: ``Oh, no. I do not recall any heightened sense of 
urgency [in December]. What I do recall is that I dealt with it when I 
had time to do it.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \107\ Mr. Jordan explained that not much activity occurred in 
November because ``I was traveling.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 9/5/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``heightened urgency'' theory also is undermined by the simple 
fact that Mr. Jordan indisputably placed no pressure on any company to 
give Ms. Lewinsky a job and suggested no date by which Ms. Lewinsky had 
to be hired. The first person Mr. Jordan contacted, Mr. Georgescu of 
Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller, told investigators that Mr. Jordan 
did not engage in a ``sales pitch'' for Lewinsky. Supp. at 1222 
(Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). Mr. Georgescu told Mr. Jordan that the 
company ``would take a look at [Ms. Lewinsky] in the usual way,'' Supp. 
at 1219 (Georgescu FBI 302 1/29/98), and that once the initial 
interview was set up, Ms. Lewinsky would be ``on [her] own from that 
point.'' Supp. at 1222 (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). The executive who 
interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at Burson-Marsteller stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky's recruitment process went ``by the book'' and, ``while 
somewhat accelerated,'' the process ``went through the normal steps.'' 
Supp. at 111 (Berk FBI 302 3/31/98).
    At American Express, Mr. Jordan contacted Ms. Ursula Fairbairn, who 
stated that Mr. Jordan exerted ``no . . . pressure'' to hire Lewinsky. 
Supp. at 1087 (Fairbairn FBI 302 2/4/98). Indeed, she considered it 
``not unusual for board members'' like Mr. Jordan to recommend talented 
people for employment and noted that Mr. Jordan had recently 
recommended another person just a few months earlier. Id. The person 
who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky stated that he felt ``absolutely no 
pressure'' to hire her and indeed told her she did not have the 
qualifications necessary for the position. Supp. at 3521 (Schick FBI 
302 1/29/98).
    Perhaps most telling of the absence of pressure applied by Mr. 
Jordan is the fact that neither Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller or 
American Express offered Ms. Lewinsky a job.
    Similarly, at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon, where Ms. Lewinsky 
ultimately was offered a job (see below), Mr. Jordan initially 
contacted Mr. Halperin, who has stated that it was not unusual for Mr. 
Jordan to make an employment recommendation. Supp. at 1281 (Halperin 
FBI 302 1/26/98). Moreover, he emphasized that Mr. Jordan did not ``ask 
[him] to work on any particular timetable,'' Supp. at 1294 (Halperin GJ 
4/23/98), and that ``there was no implied time constraint or 
requirement for fast action.'' Supp. at 1286 (Halperin FBI 3/27/98.)
            (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment 
                    offer
    The Committee Report attempts to conflate separate and unrelated 
acts--the signing of the affidavit and the Revlon job offer--to sustain 
its otherwise unsustainable obstruction theory. The Committee Report's 
description of these events is deftly misleading:

    ``The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit. She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. 
She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to President Clinton that 
it had been signed and another mission had been accomplished.
    On January 8, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan 
with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. The interview went poorly. 
Afterwards, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Mr. 
Jordan, who had done nothing from early November to mid-December, then 
called the chief executive officer of MacAndrews & Forbes, Ron 
Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' Mr. Jordan 
called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. That evening, 
MacAndrews & Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told her that she would be 
given more interviews the next morning.
    The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for signing the 
false affidavit. After a series of interviews with MacAndrews & Forbes 
personnel, she was informally offered a job. Committee Report at 18 
(citations omitted).

    By this portrayal, the Committee Report suggests two conclusions: 
first, that Ms. Lewinsky was ``reward[ed]'' with a job for her signing 
of the affidavit; second, that the only reason Ms. Lewinsky was given a 
second interview and ultimately hired at Revlon was Mr. Jordan's 
intervention with Mr. Perelman. Once again, both conclusions are 
demonstrably false.
    Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky have testified under oath that there 
was no causal connection between the job search and the affidavit. The 
only person to draw (or, actually, recommend) any such linkage was Ms. 
Tripp. The factual record easily debunks the second insinuation--that 
Ms. Lewinsky was hired as a direct result of Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. 
Perelman. One fact is virtually dispositive: the Revlon executive who 
scheduled Ms. Lewinsky's January 9 interview and decided to hire her 
that same day never even knew about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman, 
or any interest Mr. Perelman might have in Ms. Lewinsky, and thus could 
not have been acting in furtherance of such a plan.
    Ms. Lewinsky initially interviewed with Mr. Halperin of MacAndrews 
& Forbes (Revlon's parent company) on December 18, 1997. (Mr. Jordan 
had spoken with Mr. Halperin on December 11.) Prior to interviewing Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin forwarded a copy of her resume to Mr. Jaymie 
Durnan, also of MacAndrews & Forbes, for his consideration. Supp. at 
1286-87 (Halperin FBI 302 3/27/98). Following his interview of Ms. 
Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin thought that she would likely be ``shipped to 
Revlon'' for consideration. Id.
    Mr. Durnan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume from Mr. Halperin in mid-
December and, after reviewing it, decided to interview Ms. Lewinsky 
after the first of the year. (He was going on vocation the last two 
weeks of December). Supp. at 1053 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). When he 
returned from vacation, his assistant scheduled an interview with Ms. 
Lewinsky for January 7, 1998, but, because of scheduling problems, he 
rescheduled the interview for the next day, January 8, 1998. Supp. at 
1049 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Durnan's decision to interview Ms. 
Lewinsky was made independently of the decision by Mr. Halperin to 
interview her. Indeed, only when Mr. Durnan interviewed Ms. Lewinsky in 
January did he discover that she had had a December interview with Mr. 
Halperin. Id.
    It was this interview with Mr. Durnan that Ms. Lewinsky later 
described as having gone poorly in her view. App. at 926 (Lewinsky GJ 
8/6/98). The House Managers (``[t]he interview went poorly,'' House Br. 
at 38), the Committee Report (``The interview went poorly'', id. at 
21), and the OIC Referral (``The interview went poorly,'' id. at 184) 
all emphasize only Ms. Lewinsky's impression of the job interview--for 
obvious reasons: it tends to heighten the supposed relevance of the 
Jordan call to Mr. Perelman. In other words, under this theory, Ms. 
Lewinsky had no prospect of a job at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon until 
Mr. Jordan resurrected her chances with Mr. Perelman.
    Unfortunately, like so much other ``evidence'' in the obstruction 
case, the facts do not bear out this sinister theory. Mr. Durnan had no 
similar impression that his interview with Ms. Lewinsky had gone 
``poorly.'' In fact, just the opposite was true: he was ``impressed'' 
with Ms. Lewinsky and thought that she would ``fit in'' with MacAndrews 
& Forbes but ``there was nothing available at that time which suited 
her interests.'' Supp. at 1054 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Durnan 
therefore decided to forward Ms. Lewinsky's resume to Ms. Allyn Seidman 
of Revlon. After the interview, he called Ms. Seidman and left her a 
voicemail message about his interview with Ms. Lewinsky and explained 
that, while there was no current opening at MacAndrews & Forbes, 
``perhaps there was something available at Revlon.'' Id.
    In the meantime, Mr. Jordan had called Mr. Perelman about Ms. 
Lewinsky. Mr. Perelman described this conversation as ``very low key 
and casual.'' Supp. at 3273 (Perelman FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Jordan 
``made no specific requests and did not request'' him ``to intervene''; 
nonetheless, Mr. Perelman agreed to ``look into it.'' Id. Later that 
day, Mr. Durnan spoke to Mr. Perelman, who mentioned that he had 
received a call from Mr. Jordan about a job candidate. Mr. Perelman 
told Mr. Durnan ``let's see what we can do,'' Supp. at 3276 (Perelman 
FBI 302 3/27/98), but Mr. Durnan never concluded that hiring Ms. 
Lewinsky was ``mandatory.'' Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. 
Perelman later called Mr. Jordan and said they would do what they 
could; Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency to Mr. Perelman. Supp. at 3276 
(Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98).
    By the time Mr. Durnan had discussed Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. 
Perelman, he had already forwarded her resume to Ms. Seidman at Revlon. 
Supp. at 1049-50 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). After speaking with Mr. 
Perelman, Mr. Durnan spoke with Ms. Seidman, following up on the 
voicemail message he had left earlier that day. Supp. at 1055 (Durnan 
FBI 302 3/27/98). Upon speaking to Ms. Seidman about Ms. Lewinsky, 
however, Mr. Durnan did not tell Ms. Seidman that CEO Perelman has 
expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Rather, he simply said that 
if she liked Ms. Lewinsky, she should hire her. Supp. at 1050 (Durnan 
FBI 302 1/26/98).
    For her part, Ms. Seidman has testified that she had no idea that 
Mr. Perelman had expressed interest in Ms. Lewinsky:

    Q: Did [Mr. Durnan] indicate to you that he had spoken to anyone 
else within MacAndrews or Revlon about Monica Lewinsky?
    A: Not that I recall, no.
    Q: Do you have knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Perelman spoke 
with anyone either on the MacAndrews & Forbes side or the Revlon side 
about Monica Lewinsky?
    A: No.

Supp. at 3642 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). Rather, Ms. Seidman's 
consideration of Ms. Lewinsky proceeded on the merits. Indeed, as a 
result of the interview, Ms. Seidman concluded that Ms. Lewinsky was 
``bright, articulate and polished,'' Supp. at 3635 (Seidman FBI 302 1/
26/98), and ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman'' who would 
be a ``good fit in [her] department.'' Supp. at 3643 (Seidman Depo. 4/
23/98). She decided after the interview to hire Ms. Lewinsky, and 
thereafter called Mr. Durnan ``and told him I thought she was great,'' 
Id.
    In sum, Ms. Seidman made the decision to grant an interview and 
hire Ms. Lewinsky on the merits. She did not even know that Mr. 
Perelman had expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky or that Mr. Jordan 
had spoken to Mr. Perelman the day before. As amply demonstrated, the 
House Managers' Jordan-Perelman intervention theory just doesn't hold 
water.
            d. Conclusion
    From the preceding discussion of the factual record, two 
conclusions are inescapable. First, there is simply no direct evidence 
to support the job-for-silence obstruction theory. From her initial 
proffer to the last minutes of her grand jury appearance, the testimony 
of Ms. Lewinsky has been clear and consistent: she was never asked or 
encouraged to lie or promised a job for her silence or for a favorable 
affidavit. Mr. Jordan has been equally unequivocal on this point. 
Second, the ``chain of events'' circumstantial case upon which this 
obstruction allegation must rest falls apart after inspection of the 
full evidentiary record. Ms. Lewinsky's job search began on her own 
volition and long before she was ever a witness in the Jones case. Mr. 
Jordan's assistance originated with a request from Ms. Currie, which 
had no connection to events in the Jones litigation. No pressure was 
applied to anyone at any time. And Ms. Lewinsky's ultimate hiring had 
absolutely no connection to her signing of the affidavit in the Jones 
case. Viewed on this unambiguous record, the job-search allegations are 
plainly unsupportable.
5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to 
        make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' 
        concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
    Article II (5) charges that the President engaged in an obstruction 
of justice because he ``did not say anything'' during his Jones 
deposition when his attorney cited the Lewinsky affidavit to Judge 
Wright and stated that ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape, or form.'' Committee Report at 72. The rationale underlying this 
charge of obstruction of justice hinges on an odd combination of a 
bizarrely heightened legal obligation, a disregard of the actual record 
testimony, and a good does of amateur psychology. This claim is 
factually and legally baseless.
    The law, of course, imposes no obligation on a client to monitor 
every statement and representation made by his or her lawyer. 
Particularly in the confines of an ongoing civil deposition, where 
clients are routinely counseled to focus on the questions posed of them 
and their responses and ignore all distractions, it is totally 
inappropriate to try to remove a President from office because of a 
statement by his attorney. Indeed, the President forcefully explained 
to the grand jury that he was not focusing on the exchange between 
lawyers but instead concentrating on his own testimony:
     ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he was 
saying. I was thinking, I was ready to get on with my testimony here 
and they were having these constant discussions all through the 
deposition.'' App. at 476;
     ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to this 
exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.'' App. at 510;
     ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges 
between the lawyers all that carefully.'' App. at 510;
     ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made that 
statement that I was concentrating on the exact words he used.'' App. 
at 511;
     ``When I was in there, I didn't think about my lawyers. I 
was, frankly, thinking about myself and my testimony and trying to 
answer the questions.'' App. at 512;
     ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went 
on. I was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I was 
worried about my own testimony.'' App. at 513.
    The Committee Report ignores the President's repeated and 
consistent description of his state of mind during the deposition 
exchange. Instead, the Committee Report and majority counsel's final 
presentation undertake a novel exercise in video psychology, claiming 
that by studying the President's facial expressions and by noting that 
he was ``looking in Mr. Bennett's direction'' during the exchange, it 
necessarily follows that the President was in fact listening to and 
concentrating on every single word uttered by his attorney \108\ and 
knowingly made a decision not to correct his attorney.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ It is upon this same fanciful methodology that the Committee 
Report premises the allegation of Article I (3) that the President lied 
to the grand jury in providing these responses. Citing the President's 
oft-criticized response about Mr. Bennett's use of the present tense in 
his statement ``there is no sex of any'' (``It depends on what the 
meaning of the word `is' is.'' App. at 510), the Committee Report 
claims that such parsing contradicts the President's claim that he was 
not paying close attention to the exchange. But contrary to the 
Committee Report's suggestion, the President's response to this 
question did not purport to describe the President's contemporaneous 
thinking at the deposition, but rather only in retrospect whether he 
agreed with the questioner that it was ``an utterly false statement.'' 
Id. The President later emphasized that he ``wasn't trying to give . . 
. a cute answer'' in his earlier explanation, but rather only that the 
average person thinking in the present tense would likely consider that 
Mr. Bennett's statement was accurate since the relationship had ended 
long ago. App. at 513.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The futility of such an exercise is manifest. It is especially 
unsettling when set against the President's adamant denials that he 
harbored any contemporaneous or meaningful realization of his 
attorney's colloquy with the Judge. The theory is factually flimsy, 
legally unfounded, and should be rejected.
6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false 
        and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty 
        Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
    There is no dispute that the President met with his secretary, Ms. 
Currie, on the day after his Jones deposition and discussed questions 
he had been asked about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers cast this 
conversation in the most sinister light possible and alleges that the 
President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness'' by 
pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of facts 
about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers claim that ``the President essentially 
admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true.'' 
House Br. at 47. That is totally false. The President admitted nothing 
of the sort and the Managers cite nothing in support. The President has 
adamantly denied that he had any intention to influence Ms. Currie's 
recollection of events or her testimony in any manner. The absence of 
any such intention is further fortified by the undisputed factual 
record establishing that to the President's knowledge, Ms. Currie was 
neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones litigation at 
the time of the conversation. And critically, Ms. Currie testified 
that, during the conversation, she did not perceive any pressure 
``whatsoever'' to agree with any statement made by the President.
    The President's actions could not as a matter of law support this 
allegation. To obstruct a proceeding or tamper with a witness, there 
must be both a known proceeding and a known witness. In the proceeding 
that the President certainly knew about--the Jones case--Ms. Currie was 
neither an actual nor prospective witness. As for the only proceeding 
in which Ms. Currie ultimately became a witness--the OIC 
investigation--no one asserts the President could have known it existed 
at that time.
    At the time of the January 18 conversation.\109\ Ms. Currie was not 
a witness in the Jones case, as even Mr. Starr acknowledged: ``The 
evidence is not that she was on the witness list, and we have never 
said that she was.'' Transcript of November 19, 1998 Testimony at 192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Ms. Currie remembers a second conversation similar in 
substance a few days after the January 18 discussion, but still in 
advance of the public disclosure of this matter on January 21, 1998. 
Supp. at 561 (Currie GJ 1/27/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor was there any reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play any role 
in the Jones case. The discovery period was, at the time of this 
conversation, in its final days, and a deposition of Ms. Currie 
scheduled and completed within that deadline would have been highly 
unlikely.
    Just as the President could not have intended to influence the 
testimony of ``witness'' Betty Currie because she was neither an actual 
nor a prospective witness, so too is it equally clear that the 
President never pressured Ms. Currie to alter her recollection. Such 
lack of real or perceived pressure also fatally undercuts this charge. 
Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into saying 
she was pressured to agree with the President's statements, Ms. Currie 
adamantly denied any such pressure. As she testified:

    Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the 
President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel 
pressured when he told you those statements?
    A: None whatsoever.
    Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
          * * * * * * *
    Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because he 
would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', with a question.
    A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say ``Right'' and I could have said. ``Wrong.''
    Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true?
    A: Correct.
    Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    A: None.

Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). Ms. Currie explained that she felt no 
pressure because she basically agreed with the President's statements:

    Q: You testified with respect to the statements as the President 
made them, and, in particular, the four statements that we've already 
discussed. You felt at the time that they were technically accurate? Is 
that a fair assessment of your testimony?
    A: That's a fair assessment.
    Q: But you suggested that at the time. Have you changed your 
opinion about it in retrospect?
    A: I have not changed my opinion, no.

Supp. at 667 (Currie GJ 7/22/98); see also Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 
1/24/98) (``Currie advised that she responded ``right'' to each of the 
statements because as far as she knew, the statements were basically 
right.''); Supp. at 665 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (``I said `Right' to him 
because I thought they were correct, `Right, you were never really 
alone with Monica, right' '').
    What, then, to make of this conversation if there was no effort to 
influence Ms. Currie's testimony? Well, to understand fully the 
dynamic, one must remove the memory of all that has transpired since 
January 21 and place oneself in the President's position after the 
Jones deposition. The President had just faced unexpectedly detailed 
questions about Ms. Lewinsky. The questions addressed, at times, minute 
details and at other times contained bizarre inaccuracies about the 
relationship. As the President candidly admitted in his grand jury 
testimony, he had long thought the day would come when his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky would become public:

    ``I formed an opinion early in 1996, once I got into this 
unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when it stopped, which I knew I'd 
have to do and which I should have done long before I did, that she 
would talk about it. Not because Monica Lewinsky is a bad person. She's 
basically a good girl. She's a good young woman with a good heart and a 
good mind. . . . But I knew that the minute there was no longer any 
contact, she would talk about this. She would have to. She couldn't 
help it. It was, it was part of her psyche.''

App. at 575-76 (emphasis added). Now, with the questioning about Ms. 
Lewinsky in the Jones case and the publication of the first internet 
report article about Ms. Lewinsky, the President knew that a media 
storm was about to erupt. And erupt it did.
    So it was hardly surprising that the President reached out to Ms. 
Currie at this time. He was trying to gather all available information 
and assess the political and personal consequences that this revelation 
would soon have. Though he did not confide fully in Ms. Currie, he knew 
Ms. Currie was Ms. Lewinsky's main contact and thus could have 
additional relevant information to help him assess and respond to the 
impending media scrutiny. As the President testified:

    ``I do not remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie or 
when. I don't. I can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I 
first heard about this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the 
facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was. I remember 
that I was highly agitated, understandably, I think.''

App. at 593. And further, ``[W]hat I was trying to determine was 
whether my recollection was right and that she was always in the office 
complex when Monica was there. . . . I thought what would happen is 
that it would break in the press, and I was trying to get the facts 
down.'' App. at 507-08 (emphasis added). As the President concluded: 
``I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something that was 
untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I 
could.'' App. at 508.
    Ms. Currie's grand jury testimony confirms the President's 
``agitated'' state of mind and information-gathering purpose for the 
discussion. She testified that the President appeared, in her words, to 
be ``shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just 
talking.'' Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). She described the 
President's remarks as ``both statements and questions at the same 
time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98).
    Finally, the inference that the President intended to influence Ms. 
Currie's testimony before she ever became a witness is firmly undercut 
by the advice the President gave to her when she ultimately did become 
a witness in the OIC investigation:

    ``And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to testify 
to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she had been through 
this loss of her sister, this horrible accident Christmas that killed 
her brother, and her mother was in the hospital. I was trying to do--to 
make her understand that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the 
grand jury. And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine, 
just go in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I 
remember.''

App. at 593; see also App. at 508 (``I think Ms. Currie would also 
testify that I explicitly told her, once I realized you were involved 
in the Jones case--you, the Office of Independent Counsel--and that she 
might have to be called as a witness, that she should just go in there 
and tell the truth, tell what she knew, and be perfectly 
truthful.'').\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Only groundless speculation and unfounded inferences support 
the Committee Report's mirror allegation of Article I (4) that the 
President lied to the grand jury when he described his motivation in 
discussing these matters with Ms. Currie. That allegation should be 
rejected for the same reasons discussed more fully in the text of this 
section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In sum, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the 
President--the only two participants in this conversation--supports the 
inference that the conversation had an insidious purpose. The 
undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor 
contemplated witness in the Jones case. And when Ms. Currie did 
ultimately become a witness in the Starr investigation, the President 
told her to tell the truth, which she did.
7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed 
        allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
    This final allegation of Article II should be rejected out of hand. 
The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff, and the 
Nation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he has expressed 
his profound regret for such conduct. But this Article asserts that the 
President should be impeached and removed from office because he failed 
to be candid with his friends and aides about the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. These allegedly impeachable denials 
took place in the immediate aftermath of the Lewinsky publicity--at the 
very time the President was denying any improper relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky in nearly identical terms on national television. Having made 
this announcement to the whole country on television, it is simply 
absurd to believe that he was somehow attempting corruptly to influence 
the testimony of aides when he told them virtually the same thing at 
the same time.\111\ Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the 
President spoke with these individuals regarding the allegations 
because of the longstanding professional and personal relationships he 
shared with them and the corresponding responsibility he felt to 
address their concerns once the allegations were aired. The Managers 
point to no evidence--for there is none--that the President spoke to 
these individuals for any other reason, and certainly not that he spoke 
with them intending to obstruct any proceeding.\112\ They simply assert 
that since he knew there was an investigation, his intent had to be 
that they relate his remarks to the investigators and grand jurors. 
House Br. at 80.
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    \111\ As the Supreme Court has held, to constitute obstruction of 
justice such actions must be taken `'with an intent to influence 
judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' United States v. Aguilar, 515 
U.S. 592, 599 (1995).
    \112\ The Committee Reports's allegation under Article I (4) that 
the President committed perjury before the grand jury when, in the 
course of admitting that he misled his close aides, he stated that he 
endeavored to say to his aides ``things that were true,'' App. at 557-
60, without disclosing the full nature of the relationship is simply 
bizarre.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, there is no allegation that the President attempted to 
influence these aides' testimony about their own personal knowledge or 
observations. Nor is there any evidence that the President knew any of 
these aides would ultimately be witnesses in the grand jury when he 
spoke with them. None was under subpoena at the time the denials took 
place and none had any independent knowledge of any sexual activity 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, the only evidence these 
witnesses could offer on this score was the hearsay repetition of the 
same public denials that the members of the grand jury likely heard on 
their home television sets. Under the strained theory of this article, 
every person who heard the President's public denial could have been 
called to the grand jury to create still additional obstructions of 
justice.
    To bolster this otherwise unsupportable charge, the Managers point 
to an excerpt of the President's testimony wherein he acknowledged 
that, to the extent he shared with anyone any details of the facts of 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, they could conceivably be called 
before the grand jury--which for the sake of his friends the President 
wanted to avoid:

    ``I think I was quite careful what I said after [January 21]. I may 
have said something to all of these people to that effect [denying an 
improper relationship], but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any 
details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you 
into a witness or give you information that could get you in trouble. I 
just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about 
this.''

App. at 647. The point was not that the President believed these people 
would be witnesses and so decided to mislead them, but rather that he 
decided to provide as little information as possible (consistent with 
his perceived obligation to address their legitimate concerns) in order 
to keep them from becoming witnesses solely because of what he told 
them.
    In conclusion, this Article fails as a matter of law and as a 
matter of common sense. It should be soundly rejected.

      VI. The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a 
                      Constitutionally Sound Vote

    The Constitution prescribes a strict and exacting standard for the 
removal of a popularly elected President. Because each of the two 
articles charges multiple unspecified wrongs, each is 
unconstitutionally flawed in two independent respects.
    First, by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of 
Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members. Since Senate Rules require that an entire 
article be voted as a unit, sixty-seven Senators could conceivably vote 
to convict while in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong 
committed--for example, they could completely disagree on what 
statement they believe is false--in direct violation of the 
Constitutional requirements of ``Concurrence'' and due process.
    Second, by charging perjury without identifying a single allegedly 
perjurious statement, and charging obstruction of justice without 
identifying a single allegedly obstructive action by the President, the 
House of Representatives has failed to inform the Senate either of the 
statements it agreed were perjurious (if it agreed), or of the actual 
conduct by the President that it agreed constituted obstruction of 
justice (again, if it agreed). The result is that the President does 
not have the most basic notice of the charges against him required by 
due process and fundamental fairness. He is not in a position to defend 
against anything other than a moving target. The guesswork involved 
even in identifying the charges to be addressed in this Trial 
Memorandum highlights just how flawed the articles are.\113\
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    \113\ The House Managers cannot constitutionally unbundle the 
charges in the articles or provide the missing specifics. This is 
because the Constitution provides that only the House of 
Representatives can amend articles of impeachment, and judicial 
precedent demonstrates that unduly vague indictments cannot be cured by 
a prosecutor providing a bill of particulars. Only the charging body--
here, the House--can particularize an impermissibly vague charge.
    Indeed, Senate precedent confirms that the entire House must grant 
particulars when articles of impeachment are not sufficiently specific 
for a fair trial. During the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge Harold 
Louderback, counsel for the Judge filed a motion to make the original 
Article V, the omnibus or ``catchall'' article, more definite. 77 Cong 
Rec. 1852, 1854 (1933). The House Managers unanimously consented to the 
motion, which they considered to be akin to a motion for a bill of 
particulars, and the full House amended Article V to provide the 
requested specifics. Id. Thereafter, the Clerk of the House informed 
the Senate that the House had adopted an amendment to Article V. Id. 
Judge Louderback was then tried on the amended article. Judge 
Louderback was subsequently acquitted on all five articles. Impeachment 
of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report by Staff of 
the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., Appendix B at 55 (Feb. 1974).
    The power to define and approve articles of impeachment is vested 
by the Constitution exclusively in the House of Representatives. U.S. 
Const. Art I, Sec. 2, cl. 5. It follows that any alteration of an 
Article of Impeachment can be performed only by the House. The House 
cannot delegate (and has not delegated) to the Managers the authority 
to amend or alter the Articles, and Senate precedent demonstrates that 
only the House (not the Managers unilaterally) can effect an amendment 
to articles of impeachment.
    Case law is consistent with this precedent. When indictments are 
unconstitutionally vague, they cannot be cured by a prosecutor's 
provision of a bill of particulars, because only the charging body can 
elaborate upon vague charges. As the Supreme Court noted in Russell v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 749, 771 (1962):
    ``It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in these 
cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. But it is a 
settled rule that a bill of particular cannot save an invalid 
indictment . . . To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a 
subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the 
time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a 
basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury 
was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the 
basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the 
grand jury which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected 
by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be 
amended except by resubmission to the grand jury. . . .''
    See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214, 216 (1960) 
quoting Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (``If it lies within the 
province of a court to charging part to an indictment to suit its own 
notions of what it ought to have been or what they grand jury would 
probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested 
changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an 
indictment by a grand jury . . . may be frittered away until its value 
is almost destroyed.'').
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    The result is a pair of articles whose structure does not permit a 
constitutionally sound vote to convict. If they were counts in an 
indictment, these articles would not survive a motion to dismiss. Under 
the unique circumstances of an impeachment trial, they should fail:
  a. the articles are both unfairly complex and lacking in specificity
    A cursory review of the articles demonstrates that they each allege 
multiple and unspecified acts of wrongdoing.
1. The Structure of Article I
    Article I accuses the President of numerous different wrongful 
actions. The introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) 
violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and 
defend the Constitution; (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed; (iii) willfully corrupting 
and manipulating the judicial process; and (iv) impeding the 
administration of justice.
    The second paragraph charges the President with (a) perjurious, (b) 
false, and (c) misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one 
or more'' of four different subject areas:
    (1) the nature and details of this relationship with a subordinate 
government employee;
    (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him;
    (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney 
to make to a federal judge in that action;
    (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and 
to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    The third paragraph alleges that, as a consequence of the 
foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States:
     undermined the integrity of his office;
     brought disrepute on the Presidency;
     betrayed his trust as President; and
     acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and 
justice.
    It is imperative to note that although Article I alleges 
``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony concerning ``one or 
more'' of four general subject areas, it does not identify the 
particular sworn statements by the President that were allegedly 
``perjurious,'' (and therefore potentially illegal), or ``false'' or 
``misleading'' (and therefore not unlawful). In fact, contrary to the 
most basic rules of fairness and due process, Article I does not 
identify a single specific statement that is at issue.
    In sum, Article I appears to charge the President with four general 
forms of wrongdoing (violations of two oaths, manipulation of legal 
process, impeding justice), involving three (perjurious, false, 
misleading) distinct types of statements, concerning different subjects 
(relationship to Ms. Lewinsky, prior deposition testimony, prior 
statements of his attorney, obstruction of justice),\114\ resulting in 
four species of harms either to the Presidency (undermining its 
integrity, bringing it into disrepute) or to the people (acting in a 
manner subversive of the rule of law and to the manifest injury of the 
people). And it alleges all of this without identifying a single, 
specific perjurious, false or misleading statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ It appears that each of these topic areas includes various, 
unspecified allegedly perjurious, false and misleading statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Absent a clear statement of which statements are alleged to have 
been perjurious, and which specific acts are alleged to have been 
undertaken with the purpose of obstructing the administration of 
justice, it is impossible to prepare a defense. It is a fundamental 
tenet of our jurisprudence that an accused must be afforded notice of 
the specific charges against which he must defend. Neither the Referral 
of the Office of the Independent Counsel, nor the Committee Report of 
the Judiciary Committee, nor the House Managers' Trial Memorandum was 
adopted by the House, and none of them can provide the necessary 
particulars. It is impossible to know whether the different statements 
and acts charged in the Referral, or the Report, or the Trial 
Memorandum, or all, or none, are what the House had in mind when it 
passed the Articles.
2. The Structure of Article II
    Article II accuses the President of a variety of wrongful acts. The 
introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) violating his 
constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and defend the 
Constitution and (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed by (iii) preventing, obstructing 
and impeding the administration of justice by engaging (personally and 
through subordinates and agents) in a scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action.
    The second paragraph specifies the various ways in which the 
violations in the first paragraph are said to have occurred. It states 
that the harm was effectuated by ``means'' that are not expressly 
defined or delimited, but rather are said to include ``one or more'' of 
seven ``acts'' attributed to the President:
    (1) corruptly encouraging a witness to execute a perjurious, false 
and misleading affidavit;
    (2) corruptly encouraging a witness to give perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony if called to testify;
    (3) corruptly engaging in, encouraging or supporting a scheme to 
conceal evidence;
    (4) intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
testimony of that witness at a time when that witness's truthful 
testimony would have been harmful;
    (5) allowing his attorney to make false and misleading statements 
to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant questioning;
    (6) relating a false and misleading account of events to a 
potential witness in a civil rights action in order to corruptly 
influence the testimony of that person;
    (7) making false and misleading statements to potential witnesses 
in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence 
their testimony and causing the grand jury to receive false and 
misleading information.
    The third paragraph alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, the 
President has, to the manifest injury of the people of the United 
States:
     undermined the integrity of his office;
     brought disrepute on the Presidency;
     betrayed his trust as President; and
     acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and 
justice.
    As with the first article, Article II does not set forth a single 
specific act alleged to have been performed by the President. Instead, 
it alleges general ``encourage[ment]'' to execute a false affidavit, 
provide misleading testimony, and conceal subpoenaed evidence. This 
Article also includes general allegations that the President undertook 
to ``corruptly influence'' and/or ``corruptly prevent'' the testimony 
of potential witnesses and that he ``engaged in . . . or supported'' a 
scheme to conceal evidence. Again, the Senate and the President have 
been left to guess at the charges (if any) actually agreed upon by the 
House.
   b. conviction on these articles would violate the constitutional 
requirement that two-thirds of the senate reach agreement that specific 
                       wrongdoing has been proven
1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of 
        the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
            a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds 
                    Concurrence Requirement
    Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``no person 
shall be convicted [on articles of impeachment] without the Concurrence 
of two thirds of the Members present.'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 
6. The Constitution's requirement is plain. These must be 
``Concurrence,'' which is to say genuine, reliably manifested, 
agreement, among those voting to convict. Both the committing of this 
task to the Senate and the two-thirds requirement are important 
constitutional safeguards reflecting the Framers' intent that 
conviction not come easily. Conviction demands real and objectively 
verifiable agreement among a substantial supermajority.
    Indeed, the two-thirds supermajority requirement is a crucial 
constitutional safeguard. Supermajority provisions are constitutional 
exceptions \115\ to the presumption that decisions by legislative 
bodies shall be made by majority rule.\116\ These exceptions serve 
exceptional ends. The two-thirds concurrence rule serves the 
indispensable purpose of protecting the people who chose the President 
by election. By giving a ``veto'' to a minority of Senators, the 
Framers sought to ensure the rights of an electoral majority--and to 
safeguard the people in their choice of Executive. Only the Senate and 
only the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence could provide that 
assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ See e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2 (two thirds vote 
required to override Presidential veto); U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2, 
cl. 2 (two thirds required for ratification of treaties); U.S. Const. 
Art. V (two thirds required to propose constitutional amendments); U.S. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2 (two thirds required to expel members of 
Congress).
    \116\ Madison referred to majority voting as ``the fundamental 
principal of free government.'' Federalist No. 58 at 248 (G. Wills ed. 
1982).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ``Concurrence'' required is agreement that the charges stated 
in specific articles have in fact been proved, and the language of 
those articles is therefore critical. Since the House of 
Representatives is vested with the ``sole Power of Impeachment,'' U.S. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5, the form of those articles cannot be 
altered by the Senate. And Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and 
Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials (``Senate 
Rules'') provides that ``[a]n article of impeachment shall not be 
divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the 
trial.''
    It follows that each Senator may vote on an article only in its 
totality. By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for 
impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in any ``one or more'' of four topic areas. But 
that prospect creates the very real possibility that ``conviction'' 
could occur even though fewer than two-thirds of the Senators actually 
agree that any particular false statement was made.\117\ Put 
differently, the article's structure presents the possibility that the 
President could be convicted on Article I even though he would have 
been acquitted if separate votes were taken on individual allegedly 
perjurious statements. To illustrate the point, consider that it would 
be possible for conviction to result even with as few as seventeen 
Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because 
seventeen votes for one statement in each of four categories would 
yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict. The problem is even 
worse if Senators agree that there is a single perjurious statement but 
completely disagree as to which statement within the 176 pages of 
transcript they believe is perjurious. Such an outcome would plainly 
violate the Constitution's requirement that there be conviction only 
when a two-thirds majority agrees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ There remains the additional problem that the articles allege 
not specific perjurious statements, but perjury within a topic area. 
Perjury as to a category (rather than as to specific statements) is an 
incomprehensible notion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The very same flaw renders Article II unconstitutional as well. 
That Article alleges a scheme of wrongdoing effected through ``means'' 
including ``one or more'' of seven factually and logically discrete 
``acts.'' That compound structure is fraught with the potential to 
confuse. For example, the Article alleges both concealment of gifts on 
December 28, 1997, and false statements to aides in late January 1998. 
These two allegations involve completely different types of behavior. 
They are alleged to have occurred in different months. They involved 
different persons. And they are alleged to have obstructed justice in 
different legal proceedings. In light of Senate Rule XXIII's 
prohibition on dividing articles, the combination of such patently 
different types of alleged wrongdoing in a single article creates the 
manifest possibility that votes for conviction on this article would 
not reflect any two-third agreement whatsoever.
    The extraordinary problem posed by such compound articles is well-
recognized and was illustrated by the proceedings in the impeachment of 
Judge Walter Nixon. Article III of the Nixon proceedings, like the 
articles here, was phrased in the disjunctive and charged multiple 
false statements as grounds for impeachment. Judge Nixon moved to 
dismiss Article III on a number of grounds, including on the basis of 
its compound structure.\118\ Although that motion was defeated in the 
full Senate by a vote of 34-63,\119\ the 34 Senators who voted to 
dismiss were a sufficient number to block conviction on Article III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ See Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Hearings 
Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 
at 257, 281-84 (1989).
    \119\ Judge Nixon Proceedings at 430-32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Judge Nixon (although convicted on the first two articles) was 
ultimately acquitted on Article III by a vote of 57 (guilty) to 40 (not 
guilty).\120\ Senator Biden, who voted not guilty on the article, 
stated that the structure of the article made it ``possible . . . for 
Judge Nixon to be convicted under article III even though two-thirds of 
the members present did not agree that he made any one of the false 
statements.'' \121\ Senator Murkowski concurred: ``I don't appreciate 
the omnibus nature of article III, and I agree with the argument that 
the article could easily be used to convict Judge Nixon by less than 
the super majority vote required by the Constitution.'' Id. at 
464.\122\ And Senator Dole stated that ``Article III is redundant, 
complex and unnecessarily confusing. . . . It alleges that Judge Nixon 
committed five different offenses in connection with each of fourteen 
separate events, a total of seventy charges. . . . [I]t was virtually 
impossible for Judge Nixon and his attorney's to prepare an adequate 
defense.'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ Id. at 435-36.
    \121\ Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., id. at 459.
    \122\ See also Statement of Senator Bailey, Impeachment of Judge 
Harold Louderback, 77 Cong. Rec. 4238 (May 26, 1933) (respondent should 
be tried on individual articles and not on all of them assembled into 
one article).
    \123\ Statement of Senator Robert Dole, Judge Nixon Proceedings at 
457.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In his written statement filed after the voting was completed, 
Senator Kohl pointed out the dangers posed by combining multiple 
accusations in a single article:

    ``Article III is phrased in the disjunctive. It says that Judge 
Nixon concealed his conversations through `one or more' of 14 false 
statements.
    ``This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all, it 
means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two thirds of the 
Senate does not agree on which of his particular statements were false. 
. . .
    ``The House is telling us that it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on 
Article III even if we have different visions of what he did wrong. But 
that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the American 
people. Let's say we do convict on Article III. The American people--to 
say nothing of history--would never know exactly which of Judge Nixon's 
statements were regarded as untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, 
this ambiguity would prevent us from being totally accountable to the 
voters for our decision.'' \124\

    \124\ Statement of Senator Herbert H. Kohl, id. at 449 (emphasis 
added). Senator Kohl did not believe that the constitutional question 
concerning two-thirds concurrence had to be answered in the Judge Nixon 
proceedings because he believed that the bundling problem created an 
unfairness (in effect, a due process violation) that precluded 
conviction. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, the Senate acquitted Judge Nixon on the omnibus article--very 
possible because of the constitutional and related due process and 
fairness concerns articulated by Senator Kohl and others.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ See also Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment: 
Modern Precedents, Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, 
Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1998) (discussing Sen. 
Kohl's position).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The constitutional problems identified by those Senators are 
significant when a single federal judge (one of roughly 1000) is 
impeached. But when the Chief Executive and sole head of one entire 
branch of our government stands accused, those infirmities are 
momentous. Fairness and the appearance of fairness require that the 
basis for any action this body might take be clear and specific. The 
Constitution clearly forbids conviction unless two thirds of the Senate 
concurs in a judgment. Any such judgment would be meaningless in the 
absence of a finding that specific, identifiable, wrongful conduct has 
in fact occurred. No such conclusion is possible under either article 
as drafted.
            b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process 
                    Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a 
                    Single Accusation
    Even apart from the Constitution's clear requirement of 
``Concurrence'' in Article I, section 3, the fundamental principles of 
fairness and due process that underlie our Constitution and permeate 
our procedural and substantive law compel the same outcome. In 
particular, the requirement that there be genuine agreement by the 
deciding body before an accused is denied life, liberty or property is 
a cornerstone of our jurisprudence.\126\
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    \126\ Judicial precedent is persuasive here on these due process 
and fairness questions. Indeed, in prior impeachment trials, the Senate 
has been guided by decisions of the courts, because they reflect 
cumulative wisdom concerning fairness and the search for justice. 
During the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Senator 
Specter stated:
    ``[T]he impeachment process relies in significant measure on 
decisions of the court and the opinion of judges . . . [T]he decisions 
and interpretations of the courts should be highly instructive to us. 
In our system of Government, it has been the courts that through the 
years have been called upon to construe, define and apply the 
provisions of our Constitution. Their decisions reflect our values and 
our evolving notions of justice . . . Although we are a branch of 
Government coequal with the judiciary, and by the Constitution vested 
with the `sole' power to try impeachments, I believe that the words and 
reasoning of judges who have struggled with the meaning and application 
of the Constitution and its provisions ought to be given great heed 
because that jurisprudence embodies the values of fairness and justice 
that ought to be the polestar of our own determinations.'' (S. Doc. 
101-18, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 740-41.)
    (As Senator Specter observed, judicial rules have been developed 
and refined over the years to assure that court proceedings are fair, 
and that an accused is assured the necessary tools to prepare a proper 
defense, including proper notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While in the federal criminal context due process requires that 
there be genuine agreement among the entire jury, see United States v. 
Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir. 1998), Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 
624 (1991) (plurality), in the impeachment context, that requirement of 
genuine agreement must be expressed by a two-thirds supermajority. But 
the underlying due process principles is the same in both settings. 
This basic principle is bottomed on two fundamental notions: (1) that 
there be genuine agreement--mutuality of understanding--among those 
voting to convict, and (2) that the unanimous verdict be understood (by 
the accused and by the public) to have been the product of genuine 
agreement.
    This principle is given shape in the criminal law in the well-
recognized prohibition on ``duplicitous'' charges. ``Duplicity is the 
joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate 
offenses.'' United States v. UCO Oil, 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 
1976.) In the law of criminal pleading, a single count that charges two 
or more separate offenses is duplicitous. See United States v. Parker, 
991 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hawkes, 753 
F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985).\127\ A duplicitous charge in an 
indictment violates the due process principle that ``the requisite 
specificity of the charge may not be compromised by the joining of 
separate offenses.'' Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) 
(plurality).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a): 
``Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or 
information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses 
charged . . . are of the same or similar charter or are based on the 
same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'' 
(emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More specifically, a duplicitous charge poses the acute danger of 
conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury; some jurors may find the 
defendant guilty of one charge but not guilty of a second, while other 
jurors find him guilty of a second charge but not the first. See United 
States v. Saleh, 875 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1979); Bins v. United States, 331 
F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).\128\ Our federal system of justice 
simply does not permit conviction by less than unanimous agreement 
concerning a single, identified charge. See United States v. Fawley, 
137 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (conviction requires unanimous agreement 
as to particular statements); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 
929 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversal required where no instruction was given 
to ensure that all jurors concur in conclusion that at least one 
particular statement was false); see also United States v. Gipson, 553 
F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to unanimous verdict violated 
by instruction authorizing conviction if jury found defendant committed 
any one of six acts proscribed by statute).\129\ The protection against 
conviction by less than full agreement by the factfinders is enshrined 
in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which dictates 
that ``[t]he verdict shall be unanimous.'' \130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Each of the four categories charged here actually comprises 
multiple allegedly perjurious statements. Thus, the dangers of 
duplicitousness are increased exponentially.
    \129\ The Supreme Court has stated that ``[u]nanimity in jury 
verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.'' 
Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404 (1972) (same).
    \130\ That rule gives expression to a criminal defendant's due 
process right to a unanimous verdict. See United States v. Fawley, 137 
F.2d 458, 4771 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the Constitution does not 
tolerate the risk of a less than unanimous verdict in the criminal 
setting, ``where the complexity of a case or other factors create the 
potential for confusion as to the
legal theory or factual basis which sustains a defendant's conviction, 
a specific unanimity instruction is required.'' United States v. 
Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Beros, 
833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). Such instructions are required where 
the government charges several criminal acts, any of which alone could 
have supported the offense charged, because of the need to provide 
sufficient guidance to assure that all members of the jury were 
unanimous on the same act or acts of illegality. Id. at 88. As the 
Seventh Circuit recently concluded in a case alleging multiple false 
statements, ``the jury should have been advised that in order to have 
convicted [the defendant], they had to unanimously agree that a 
particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made.'' 
Fawley, 137 F.2d at 470.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, where the charging instrument alleges multiple types of 
wrongdoing, the unanimity requirement ``means more than a conclusory 
agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question; 
there is a requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal 
factual elements underlying a specified offense.'' United States v. 
Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, although there need not be unanimity as to every bit of 
underlying evidence, due process ``does require unanimous agreement as 
to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply that a violation 
has occurred.'' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Such agreement is necessary to fulfill the 
demands of fairness and rationality that inform the requirement of due 
process. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 637.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ In our federal criminal process, a duplicitous pleading 
problem may sometimes be cured by instructions to the jury requiring 
unanimous agreement on a single statement, see Fawley, supra, but that 
option is not present here. Not only do the Senate Rules not provide 
for the equivalent of jury instructions, they expressly rule out the 
prospect of subdividing an article of impeachment for purposes of 
voting. See Senate Impeachment Rule XXIII. Nor is the duplicitousness 
problem presented here cured by any specific enumeration of elements 
necessary to be found by the factfinder. See, e.g., Santarpio v. United 
States, 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977) (duplicitous charge harmless 
because indictments adequately set out the elements of the federal 
crime; appellants were not misled or prejudiced). Article I does not 
enumerate specific elements to be found by the factfinder. To the 
contrary, the Article combines multiple types of wrong, allegedly 
performed by different types of statements, the different types 
occurring in multiple subject matter areas, and all having a range of 
allegedly harmful effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Where multiple accusations are combined in a single charge, neither 
the accused nor the factfinder can know precisely what that charge 
means. When the factfinder body cannot agree upon the meaning of the 
charge, it cannot reach genuine agreement that conviction is warranted. 
These structural deficiencies preclude a constitutionally sound vote on 
the articles.
 c. conviction on these articles would violate due process protections 
             prohibiting vague and nonspecific accusations
1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
    Impermissibly vague indictments must be dismissed, because they 
``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what he must be 
prepared to meet.' '' United States v. Russell, 369 U.S. 749, 764 
(1962) (internal quotation omitted). In Russell, the indictment at 
issue failed to specify the subject matter about which the defendant 
had allegedly refused to answer questions before a Congressional 
subcommittee. Instead, the indictment stated only that the questions to 
which the answers were refused ``were pertinent to the question then 
under inquiry'' by the Subcommittee. Id. at 752. The Court held that 
because the indictment did not provide sufficient specificity, it was 
unduly vague and therefore had to be dismissed. Id. at 773. The Supreme 
Court explained that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy for an 
unduly vague indictment, because only the charging body can elaborate 
upon vague charges:

    ``To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess 
as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned 
the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which 
the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to 
secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts 
not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grant jury which 
indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by the settled 
rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except 
by resubmission to the grand jury . . .''

Id. at 771. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216 
(1960); see also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 
1954) (perjury count too vague to be valid cannot be cured even by bill 
of particulars); United States v. Tonelli, 557 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 
1978) (vacating perjury conviction where ``the indictment . . . did not 
`set forth the precise falsehood[s] alleged' '').
    Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited Articles present 
paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely to enable the 
accused to meet the accusations fairly. More than a century ago, the 
Supreme Court stated that ``[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal 
pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at 
common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient 
that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms 
as in the definition; but it must state the species--it must descend to 
particulars.'' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). 
The Court has more recently emphasized the fundamental ``vice'' of 
nonspecific indictments: that they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the 
defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' Russell, 369 U.S. 
at 764.
    The Supreme Court emphasized in Russell that specificity is 
important not only for the defendant, who needs particulars to prepare 
a defense, but also for the decision-maker, ``so it may decide whether 
[the facts] are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one 
should be had.'' Id. at 768 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). An unspecific indictment creates a ``moving target'' for the 
defendant exposing the defendant to a risk of surprise through a change 
in the prosecutor's theory. ``It enables his conviction to rest on one 
point and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives 
the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by 
surmise and conjecture.'' Russell, 369 U.S. at 766. Ultimately, an 
unspecific indictment creates a risk that ``a defendant could . . . be 
convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even 
presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.'' Id. at 770.
2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
    Article I alleges that in his August 17, 1998 grand jury testimony, 
President Clinton provided ``perjurious, false and misleading'' 
testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four subject 
areas. Article I does not, however, set forth a single specific 
statement by the President upon which its various allegations are 
predicated. The Article haphazardly intermingles alleged criminal 
conduct with totally lawful conduct, and its abstract generalizations 
provide no guidance as to actual alleged perjurious statements.
    Article I thus violates the most fundamental requirement of perjury 
indictments. It is fatally vague in three distinct respects: (1) it 
does not identify any statements that form the basis of its 
allegations,\132\ (2) it therefore does not specify which of the 
President's statements to the grand jury were allegedly ``perjurious,'' 
which were allegedly ``false,'' and which were allegedly 
``misleading,'' and (3) it does not even specify the subject matter of 
any alleged perjurious statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ One of the cardinal rules of perjury cases is that ``[a] 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623 may not stand where the indictment 
fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis 
of its falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine 
its verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality 
of those falsehoods.'' United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d 
Cir. 1977). Courts have vacated convictions for perjury in instances 
where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the precise 
falsehood(s) alleged.'' Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The first defect is fatal, because it is axiomatic that if the 
precise perjurious statements are not identified in the indictment, a 
defendant cannot possibly prepare his defense properly. See, e.g., 
Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977). Indeed, in past impeachment 
trials in the Senate where articles of impeachment alleged the making 
of false statements, the false statements were specified in the 
Articles. For example, in the impeachment trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 
Articles of Impeachment II-XIV specified the exact statements that 
formed the basis of the false statement allegations against Judge 
Hastings.\133\ Similarly, in the impeachment trial of Walter L. Nixon, 
Jr., Articles of Impeachment I-III specified the exact statements that 
formed the basis of their false statement allegations.\134\ In this 
case, Article I falls far short of specificity standards provided in 
previous impeachment trials in the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 at 4-7 
(1989). See, e.g., Id. at 2 (Article II alleging that the false 
statement was ``that Judge Hastings and Wiliam Borders, of Washington, 
D.C., never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in 
United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings'').
    \134\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 
at 430-32 (1989). See, e.g., Id., at 432 (Article I alleging that the 
false statement was ``Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes 
never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As to the second vagueness defect, there is a significant legal 
difference between, on the one hand, statements under oath which are 
``perjurious,'' and those, on the other hand, which are simply 
``false'' or misleading.'' Only the former could form the basis of a 
criminal charge. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that 
``misleading'' statements alone cannot form the basis of a prejury 
charge. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court 
held that literally true statements are by definition non-perjurious, 
and ``it is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the 
defendant] intended to mislead his examiner,'' since ``[a] jury should 
not be permitted to enage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer. 
. . was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.'' Id. at 358-60 
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized that ``the perjury statute is 
not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a 
wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner so long as the 
witness speakes the literal truth.'' Id. Thus, specification of the 
exact statements alleged to be prejurious is required, because ``to 
hold otherwise would permit the trial jury to inject its inferences 
into the grand jury's indictment, and would allow defendants to be 
convicted for immaterial falsehoods or for `intent to mislead' or 
`perjury by implication,' which Bronston specifically prohibited.'' 
Slawik, 538 F.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added). Thus, if the House meant 
that certain statements were misleading but literally truthful, they 
might be subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense 
was not impeachable.
    The same is true for allegedly ``false'' answers, because it is 
clear that mere ``false'' answers given under oath, without more, are 
not criminal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the statute proscribing perjury 
before a federal grand jury, requires additional elements beyond 
falsity, including the defendant's specific intent to testify falsely 
and the statement's materiality to the proceeding. A defense to a 
perjury charge is therefore tied directly to the specific statement 
alleged to have been perjurious. Did the defendant know the particular 
answer was false? Was it material? \135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Not surprisingly, courts have specifically held that because 
of these additional elements (the lack of which may undermine a perjury 
prosecution), a defendant must know exactly which statements are 
alleged to form the basis of a perjury indictment to test whether the 
requisite elements are present. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 
215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (``The accused is entitled under the 
Constitution to be advised as to every element in respect to which it 
is necessary for him to prepare a defense''). For example, because of 
the intent requirement, one potential defense to a perjury prosecution 
is that the question to which the allegedly perjurious statement was 
addressed was fundamentally ambiguous, as courts have held that 
fundamentally ambiguous questions cannot as a matter of law produce 
perjurious answers. See, e.g., Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 199; United States 
v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967). A separate defense to a perjury 
prosecution is that the statement alleged to have been perjurious was 
not material to the proceeding. Thus, ``false'' statements alone are 
not perjurious if they were not material to the proceeding. By not 
specifying which statements are alleged to be ``false'' or 
``misleading,'' Article I precludes the President from preparing a 
materiality defense, and it also fails to distinguish allegedly 
criminal conduct from purely lawful conduct. As one court explained,
    ``It is to be observed that * * * it is not sufficient to 
constitute the offense that the oath shall be merely false, but that it 
must be false in some `material matter.' Applying that definition to 
the facts stated in either count of this indictment, and it would seem 
that there is an entire lack in any essential sense to disclose that 
the particulars as to which the oath is alleged to have been false were 
material in the essential sense required for purposes of an indictment 
for this offense.'' (United States v. Cameron, 282 F. 684, 692 (D. 
Ariz. 1922).).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article I's third vagueness defect is that it does not specify the 
subject matter of the alleged perjurious statements. Instead, it simply 
alleges that the unspecified statements by the President to the grand 
jury were concerning ``one or more'' of four enumerated areas. The 
``one or more'' language underscores the reality that the President--
and, critically, the Senate--cannot possibly know what the House 
majority had in mind, since it may have failed even to agree on the 
subject matter of the alleged perjury. The paramount importance of this 
issue may be seen by reference to court decisions holding that a jury 
has to ``unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the 
indictment was falsely made.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 
471 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also discussion of unanimity 
requirement in Section VI.B, supra.
    Article II is also unconstitutionally vague. It alleges that the 
President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice * * * 
in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up 
and conceal'' unspecified evidence and testimony in the Jones case. It 
sets forth seven instances in which the President allegedly 
``encouraged'' false testimony or the concealment of evidence, or 
``corruptly influenced'' or ``corruptly prevented'' various other 
testimony, also unspecified. In fact, not only does Article II fail to 
identify a single specific act performed by the President in this 
alleged scheme to obstruct justice, it does not even identify the 
``potential witnesses'' whose testimony the President allegedly sought 
to ``corruptly influence.''
    The President cannot properly defend against Article II without 
knowing, at a minimum, which specific acts of obstruction and/or 
concealment he is alleged to have performed, and which ``potential 
witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to influence. For example, 
it is clear that, in order to violate the federal omnibus obstruction 
of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, an accuser must prove that 
there was a pending judicial proceeding, that the defendant knew of the 
proceeding, and that the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the 
specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due 
administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 
1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 729 F. Supp. 1380, 
1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990). Without knowing which ``potential witnesses'' he 
is alleged to have attempted to influence, and the precise manner in 
which he is alleged to have attempted to obstruct justice, the 
President cannot prepare a defense that would address the elements of 
the offense with which he has been charged--that he had no intent to 
obstruct, that there was no pending proceeding, or that the person 
involved was not a potential witness.
    It follows that the requisite vote of two-thirds of the Senate 
required by the Constitution cannot possibly be obtained if there are 
no specific statements whatsoever alleged to be perjurious, false or 
misleading in Article I or no specific acts of obstruction alleged in 
Article II. Different Senators might decide that different statements 
or different acts were unlawful without any concurrence by two-thirds 
of the Senate as to any particular statement or act. Such a scenario is 
antithetical to the Constitution's due process guarantee of notice of 
specific and definite charges and it threatens conviction upon vague 
and uncertain grounds. As currently framed, neither Article I nor 
Article II provides a sufficient basis for the President to prepare a 
defense to the unspecified charges upon which the Senate may vote, or 
an adequate basis for actual adjudication.
  d. the senate's judgment will be final and that judgment must speak 
                        clearly and intelligibly
    An American impeachment trial is not a parliamentary inquiry into 
fitness for office. It is not a vote of no confidence. It is not a 
mechanism whereby a legislative majority may oust a President from a 
rival party on political grounds. To the contrary, because the 
President has a limited term of office and can be turned out in the 
course of ordinary electoral processes, a Presidential impeachment 
trial is a constitutional measure of last resort designed to protect 
the Republic.
    This Senate is therefore vested with an extremely grave 
Constitutional task: a decision whether to remove the President for the 
protection of the people themselves. In the Senate's hands there rests 
not only the fate of one man, but the integrity of our Constitution and 
our democratic process.
    Fidelity to the Constitution and fidelity to the electorate must 
converge in the impeachment trial vote. If the Senate is to give 
meaning to the Constitution's command, any vote on removal must be a 
vote on one or more specifically and separately identified ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as set forth in properly drafted impeachment 
articles approved by the House. If the people are to have their twice-
elected President removed by an act of the Senate, that act must be 
intelligible. It must be explainable and justifiable to the people who 
first chose the President and then chose him again. The Senate must 
ensure that it has satisfied the Constitution's requirement of a 
genuine two-thirds concurrence that specific, identified wrongdoing has 
been proven. The Senate must also assure the people, through the sole 
collective act the Senate is required to take, that its decision has a 
readily discernible and unequivocal meaning.
    As matters stand, the Senate will vote on two highly complex 
Articles of Impeachment. Its vote will not be shaped by narrowing 
instructions. Its rules preclude a vote on divisible parts of the 
articles. There will be no judicial review, no correction of error, and 
no possibility of retrial. The Senate's decision will be as conclusive 
as any known to our law--judicially, politically, historically, and 
most literally, irrevocable.
    Under such circumstances, the Senate's judgment must speak clearly 
and intelligibly. That cannot happen if the Senate votes for conviction 
on these articles. Their compound structure and lack of specificity 
make genuine agreement as to specific wrongs impossible, and those 
factors completely prevent the electorate from understanding why the 
Senate as a whole voted as it did. As formulated, these articles 
satisfy neither the plain requirement of the Constitution nor the 
rightful expectations of the American people. The articles cannot 
support a constitutionally sound vote for conviction.

                      VII. The Need for Discovery

    The Senate need not address the issue of discovery at this time, 
but because the issue may arise at a later date, it is appropriate to 
remark here on its present status. Senate Resolution 16 provides that 
the record for purposes of the presentation by the House Managers and 
the President is the public record established in the House of 
Representatives.\136\ Since this record was created by the House itself 
and is ostensibly the basis for the House's impeachment vote, and 
because this evidence has been publicly identified and available for 
scrutiny, comment, and rebuttal, it is both logical and fair that this 
be the basis for any action by the Senate. Moreover, Senate Resolution 
16 explicitly prohibits the President and the House Managers from 
filing at this time any ``motions to subpoena witnesses or to present 
any evidence not in the record.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ S. Res. 16 defined the record for the presentations as 
``those publicly available materials that have been submitted to or 
produced by the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of 
public hearings or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of 
Representatives or House Judiciary Committee pursuant to House 
Resolutions 525 and 581.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the event, however, that the Senate should later decide, 
pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, to allow the House 
Managers to expand the record in some way, our position should be 
absolutely clear. At such time, the President would have an urgent need 
for the discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these 
proceedings has he been able to subpoena documents or summon and cross-
examine witnesses. He would need to use the compulsory process 
authorized by Senate Impeachment Rules V and VI\137\ to obtain 
documentary evidence and witness depositions. While the President has 
access to some of the grand jury transcripts and FBI interview 
memoranda of witnesses called by the OIC, the President's own lawyers 
were not entitled to be present when these witnesses were examined. The 
grand jury has historically been the engine of the prosecution, and it 
was used in that fashion in this case. The OIC sought discovery of 
evidence with the single goal of documenting facts that it believed 
were prejudicial to the President. It did not examine witnesses with a 
view toward establishing there was no justification for impeachment; it 
did not follow up obvious leads when they might result in evidence 
helpful to the President; and it did not seek out and document 
exculpatory evidence. It did not undertake to disclose exculpatory 
information it might have identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
Impeachment Trials (Senate Manual 99-2, as revised by S. Res. 479 (Aug. 
16, 1986)). There is ample precedent for liberal discovery in Senate 
impeachment trials. For example, in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, 
the Senate issued numerous orders addressing a range of pretrial issues 
over several months including:
     requiring the parties to provide witness lists along with 
a description of the general nature of the testimony that was expected 
from each witness months in advance of the scheduled evidentiary 
hearing;
     requiring the House Managers to turn over exculpatory 
materials, certain prior statements of witnesses, and documents and 
other tangible evidence they intended to introduce into evidence;
     requiring the production from the House Managers of other 
documents in the interest of allowing the Senate to develop ``a record 
that fully illuminates the matters that it must consider in rendering a 
judgment;''
     setting a briefing schedule for stipulations of facts and 
documents;
     setting a number of pretrial conferences;
     designating a date for final pretrial statements; and
     permitting a number of pre-trial depositions.
     Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Hearings 
Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. at 
281, 286-87, 342-43, 606-07, 740.
    The need for discovery in this case is in fact greater than in 
prior impeachment proceedings. In all other impeachment trials, there 
were either substantive investigations by the House or prior judicial 
proceedings in which the accused had a full opportunity to develop the 
evidentiary record and cross-examine witnesses. See Id. at 163-64 
(pretrial memorandum of Judge Hastings).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor did the House of Representatives afford the President any 
discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be helpful in his 
defense. Indeed, the House called no fact witnesses at all, and at the 
few depositions it conducted, counsel for the President were excluded. 
Moreover, the House made available only a selected portion of the 
evidence it received from the OIC. While it published five volumes of 
the OIC materials (two volumes of appendices and three volumes of 
supplements), it withheld a great amount of evidence, and it denied 
counsel for the President access to this material. It is unclear what 
the criterion was for selecting evidence to include in the published 
volumes, but there does not appear to have been an attempt to include 
all evidence that may have been relevant to the President's defense. 
The President has not had access to a great deal of evidence in the 
possession of (for example) the House of Representatives and the OIC 
which may be exculpatory or relevant to the credibility of witnesses on 
whom the OIC and the House Managers rely.
    Should the Senate decide to authorize the House Managers to call 
witnesses or expand the record, the President would be faced with a 
critical need for the discovery of evidence useful to his defense--
evidence which would routinely be available to any civil litigant 
involved in a garden-variety automobile accident case. The House 
Managers have had in their possession or had access at the OIC to 
significant amounts of non-public evidence, and they have frequently 
stated their intention to make use of such evidence. Obviously, in 
order to defend against such tactics, counsel for the President are 
entitled to discovery and a fair opportunity to test the veracity and 
reliability of this ``evidence,'' using compulsory process as necessary 
to obtain testimony and documents. Trial by surprise obviously has no 
place in the Senate of the United States where the issues in the 
balance is the removal of the one political leader who, with the Vice-
President, is elected by all the citizens of this country.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ In another context, the Supreme Court has observed that ``the 
ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery 
which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information 
from which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility 
of surprise at trial.'' Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The need for discovery does not turn on the number of witnesses the 
House Managers may be authorized to depose.\139\ If the House Managers 
call a single witness, that will initiate a process that leaves the 
President potentially unprepared and unable to defend adequately 
without proper discovery. The sequence of discovery is critical. The 
President first needs to obtain and review relevant documentary 
evidence not now in his possession. He then needs to be able to depose 
potentially helpful witnesses, whose identity may only emerge from the 
documents and from the depositions themselves. Obviously, he also needs 
to depose potential witnesses identified by the House Managers. Only at 
that point will the President be able intelligently to designate his 
own trial witnesses. This is both a logical procedure and one which is 
the product of long experience designed to maximize the search for 
truth and minimize unfair surprise. There is no conceivable reason it 
should not be followed here--if the evidentiary record is opened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ It is not sufficient that counsel for the President have the 
right to depose the witnesses called by the Managers, essential as that 
right is. The testimony of a single witness may have to be refuted 
indirectly, circumstantially, or by a number of witnesses; it is often 
necessary to depose several witnesses in order to identify the one or 
two best.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, it is simply impossible to ascertain how a witness 
designated by the House Managers could fairly be rebutted without a 
full examination of the available evidence. It is also the case that 
many sorts of helpful evidence and testimony emerge in the discovery 
process that may at first blush appear irrelevant or tangential. In any 
event, the normal adversarial process is the best guarantor of the 
truth. The President needs discovery here not simply to obtain evidence 
to present a trial but also in order to make an informed judgment about 
what to introduce in response to the Managers' expanded case. The 
President's counsel must be able to make a properly knowledgeable 
decision about what evidence may be relevant and helpful to the 
President's defense, both in cross-examination and during the 
President's own case.
    The consequences of an impeachment trial are immeasurably grave: 
The removal of a twice-elected President. Particularly given what is at 
stake, fundamental fairness dictates that the President be given at 
least the same right as an ordinary litigant to obtain evidence 
necessary for his defense, particularly when a great deal of that 
evidence is presently in the hands of his accusers, the OIC and the 
House Managers. The Senate has wisely elected to proceed on the public 
record established by the House of Representatives, and this provides a 
wholly adequate basis for Senate decision-making. In the event the 
Senate should choose to expand this record, affording the President 
adequate discovery is absolutely essential.

                            VIII. Conclusion

    As the Senate considers these Articles of Impeachment and listens 
to the arguments, individual Senators are standing in the place of the 
Framers of the Constitution, who prayed that the power of impeachment 
and removal of a President would be invoked only in the gravest of 
circumstances, when the stability of our system of government hung in 
the balance--to protect the Republic itself from efforts to subvert our 
Constitutional system.
    The Senate has an obligation to turn away an unwise and unwarranted 
misuse of the awesome power of impeachment. If the Senate removes this 
President for a wrongful relationship he hoped to keep private, for 
what will the House ask the Senate to remove the next President, and 
the next? Our Framers wisely gave us a constitutional system of checks 
and balances, with three co-equal branches. Removing this President on 
these facts would substantially alter the delicate constitutional 
balance, and move us closer to a quasi-parliamentary system, in which 
the President is elected to office by the choice of people, but 
continues in office only at the pleasure of Congress.
    In weighing the evidence and assessing the facts, we ask that 
Senators consider not only the intent of the Framers but also the will 
and interests of the people. It is the citizens of these United States 
who will be affected by and stand in judgment of this process. It is 
not simply the President--but the vote the American people rendered in 
schools, church halls and other civic centers all across the land 
twenty-six months ago--that is hanging in the balance.
    Respectfully submitted.

David E. Kendall                      Charles F.C. Ruff
Nicole K. Seligman                    Gregory B. Craig
Emmet T. Flood                        Bruce R. Lindsey
Max Stier                             Cheryl D. Mills
Alicia L. Marti                       Lanny A. Breuer
Williams & Connolly                   Office of the White House Counsel
725 12th Street, N.W.                 The White House
Washington, D.C. 20005                Washington, D.C. 20502
 

    January 13, 1999.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT 
        WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

    The House of Representatives, through its Managers and counsel, 
replies to the Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to the 
Articles of Impeachment (``Answer''), as follows:

                                Preamble

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in the Preamble to the Answer, including the sections 
entitled ``The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' and ``The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct 
Justice.'' With respect to the allegations in the Preamble, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Articles I and II is true and that Articles I and II properly state 
impeachable offenses, are not subject to a motion to dismiss, and 
should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court 
of Impeachment.

                               Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in 
the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or 
wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. 
With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article I, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Article I is true and that Article I properly states an impeachable 
offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be 
considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment.

                 First Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article I 
warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from 
holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article I is not 
unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson 
Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                 Third Affirmative Defense to Article I

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article I does not charge 
multiple offenses in one article.

                               Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in 
the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or 
wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. 
With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article II, the House 
of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in 
Article II is true and that Article II properly states an impeachable 
offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be 
considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment.

                First Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article II 
warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from 
holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                Second Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article II is not 
unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson 
Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                Third Affirmative Defense to Article II

    The House of Representatives denies each and every material 
allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives 
further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, 
is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House 
of Representatives further states that Article II does not charge 
multiple offenses in one article.

               Conclusion of the House of Representatives

    The House of Representatives further states that it denies each and 
every material allegation of the Answer not specifically admitted in 
this Replication. By providing this Replication to the Answer, the 
House of Representatives waives none of its rights in this proceeding. 
Wherefore, the House of Representatives states that both of the 
Articles of Impeachment warrant the conviction, removal from office, 
and disqualification from holding further office of President William 
Jefferson Clinton. Both of the Articles should be considered and 
adjudicated by the Senate.
    Respectfully submitted,
    The United States House of Representatives.
                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                   Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                   General Counsel.

                                   David P. Schippers,
                                       Chief Investigative Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
 [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

   REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TRIAL 
           MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                            I. Introduction

    The President's Trial Memorandum contains numerous factual 
inaccuracies and misstatements of the governing law and the Senate's 
precedents. These errors have largely been addressed in the Trial 
Memorandum of the House of Representatives filed with the Senate on 
January 11, 1999, and given the 24-hour period to file this reply, the 
House cannot possibly address them all here. The House of 
Representatives will address them further in its oral presentation to 
the Senate, and it reserves the right to address these matters further 
in the briefing of any relevant motions. However, President Clinton has 
raised some new issues in his Trial Memorandum, and the House of 
Representatives hereby replies to those issues.

                               II. Facts

    The President's Trial Memorandum outlines what he claims are facts 
showing that he did not commit perjury before the grand jury and did 
not obstruct justice. The factual issues President Clinton raises are 
addressed in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
    A complete and impartial review of the evidence reveals that the 
President did in fact commit perjury before the grand jury and that he 
obstructed justice during the Jones litigation and the grand jury 
investigation as alleged in the articles of impeachment passed by the 
House of Representatives. The House believes a review of the complete 
record, including the full grand jury and deposition testimony of the 
key witnesses in this case, will establish that.
    The evidence which President Clinton claims demonstrates that he 
did not commit the offenses outlined in the Articles of Impeachment are 
cited in Sections IV and V of his Memorandum. Regarding Article I, 
President Clinton maintains that his testimony before the grand jury 
was entirely truthful. At the outset of his argument, he states that he 
told the truth about the nature and details of his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, and he insists that any false impressions that his 
deposition testimony might have created were remedied by his admission 
of ``improper intimate contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky. However, his 
subsequent testimony demonstrates that this admission is narrowly 
tailored to mean that Ms. Lewinsky had ``sexual relations'' with him, 
but he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her, as he understood the 
term to be defined. In other words, he admitted only what he knew could 
be conclusively established through scientific tests. He denied what 
the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the testimony of a number of her 
confidantes, and common sense proves: that while she engaged in sexual 
relations with him, he engaged in sexual relations with her, regardless 
of how President Clinton attempts to redefine the term.
    Following this pattern, President Clinton discounts substantial 
evidence as well as common sense when he maintains that he testified 
truthfully in the grand jury about, among other things, his prior 
deposition testimony, his attorney's statements to Judge Wright during 
his deposition, and his intent in providing a series of false 
statements to his secretary after his deposition. Again, a complete 
review of the record and witness testimony reveals that President 
Clinton committed perjury numerous times in his grand jury testimony.
    In regard to Article II, President Clinton extracts numerous items 
of evidence from the record and analyzes them in isolation in an effort 
to provide innocent explanations for the substantial amount of 
circumstantial evidence proving his guilt. Yet when the record is 
viewed in its entirety, including the portions of President Clinton's 
deposition testimony concerning Ms. Lewinsky and his grant jury 
testimony, it demonstrates that President Clinton took a number of 
actions designed to prevent Paula Jones's attorneys, the federal 
district court, and a federal grand jury from learning the truth. These 
actions are described in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
    To the extent that President Clinton's Trial Memorandum raises 
issues of credibility, those issues are best resolved by live testimony 
subject to cross-examination. The Senate, weighing the evidence in its 
entirety, will make an independent assessment of the facts as they are 
presented, and a detailed, point-by-point argument of these matters is 
best resolved on the Senate floor. The House is confident that a 
thorough factual analysis will not only refute President Clinton's 
contentions, but will prove the very serious charges contained in the 
articles.

           III. The Articles Properly State Removal Offenses

        a. the offenses alleged are high crimes and misdemeanors
1. The Senate Has Never Exercised Its Power To Dismiss an Article of 
        Impeachment Except When the Official Impeached Has Resigned
    The House acknowledges that the Senate has the power to dismiss an 
article of impeachment on the ground that it does not state a removable 
offense. Beyond that, however, President Clinton completely ignores the 
Senate's precedents concerning the use of that power. In the fifteen 
cases in which the House has forwarded articles of impeachment to the 
Senate, the Senate has never granted a dispositive motion to preclude a 
trial on the articles with one exception. In the 1926 case of Judge 
George English, the Senate granted a motion to adjourn after Judge 
English resigned from office making a trial moot on the issue of 
removal. See Impeachment of George W. English, U.S. District Judge, 
Eastern District of Illinois, 68 Cong. Rec. 347-48 (1926). The Senate 
also granted a motion to adjourn in the 1868 trial of President Andrew 
Johnson, but only after a full trial and votes to acquit on three 
articles. III Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives 
Sec. 2443.
    In addition, the Senate has never granted a motion to dismiss or 
strike an article of impeachment. However, in the 1936 case of Judge 
Halsted Ritter, the House managers themselves moved to strike two 
counts of a multi-count article to simplify the trial, and the motion 
was granted. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898-99 (April 3, 1936). However, the 
remainder of the article was fully considered, and Judge Ritter was 
convicted on that article. The House managers in the 1986 Judge Harry 
Claiborne case made the only motion for summary judgment in the history 
of impeachment. Hearings of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee 
(Judge Harry Claiborne), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1986). They did so 
on the basis that Judge Claiborne had already been convicted of the 
charges in a criminal trial. Id. The Senate postponed a decision on the 
motion and never ruled on it, but it ultimately convicted Judge 
Claiborne. In short, the Senate precedents firmly establish that the 
Senate has always fulfilled its responsibility to give a full and fair 
hearing to articles of impeachment voted by the House of 
Representatives.
2. The Constitutional Text Sets One Clear Standard for Removal
            a. There is Only One Impeachment Standard
    The Constitution sets one clear standard for impeachment, 
conviction, and removal from office: the commission of ``Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II, 
Sec. 4. The Senate has repeatedly determined that perjury is a high 
crime and misdemeanor. Simple logic dictates that obstruction of 
justice which has the same effect as perjury and bribery of witnesses 
must also be a high crime and misdemeanor. Endless repetition of the 
claim that this standard is a high one does not change the standard.
    President Clinton claims that to remove him on these articles would 
permanently disfigure and diminish the Presidency and mangle the system 
of checks and balances. President's Trial Memorandum at 18. Quite the 
contrary, however, it is President Clinton's behavior as set forth in 
the articles that has had these effects. Essentially, President Clinton 
argues that the Presidency and the system of checks and balances can 
only be saved if we allow the President to commit felonies with 
impunity. To state that proposition is to refute it. Convicting him and 
thereby reaffirming that criminal behavior that strikes at the heart of 
the justice system will result in removal will serve to strengthen the 
Presidency, not weaken it.
            b. Impeachment and Removal Are Appropriate for High Crimes 
                    and Misdemeanors Regardless of Whether They Are 
                    Offenses Against the System of Government
    President Clinton argues that impeachment may only be used to 
redress wrongful public misconduct. The point is academic. Perjury and 
obstruction of justice as set forth in the articles are, by definition, 
public misconduct. See generally House Trial Memorandum at 107-12. 
Indeed, it is precisely their public nature that makes them offenses--
acts that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm 
become crimes when they enter that realm. Lying to one's spouse about 
an extramarital affair, although immoral, is not a crime. Telling the 
same lie under oath in a judicial proceeding is a crime. Hiding gifts 
given to an adulterous lover to conceal the affair, although immoral, 
is not a crime. When those gifts become potential evidence in a 
judicial proceeding, the same act becomes a crime. One who has 
committed these kinds of crimes that corrupt the judicial system simply 
is not fit to serve as the nation's chief law enforcement officer.
    Apart from that, the notion that high crimes and misdemeanors 
encompass only public misconduct will not bear scrutiny. Numerous 
``private'' crimes would obviously require the removal of a President. 
For example, if he killed his wife in a domestic dispute or molested a 
child, no one would seriously argue that he could not be removed. All 
of these acts violate the President's unique responsibility to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
3. President Clinton Cites Precedents That Do Not Apply Rather Than 
        Relying on the Senate's Own Precedents Clearly Establishing 
        Perjury as a Removable Offense
            a. President Clinton Continues To Misrepresent the 
                    Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President 
                    Nixon
    In his trial memorandum, President Clinton argues that the failure 
in 1974 of the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an article of 
impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud supports the claim 
that current charges against President Clinton do not rise to the level 
of impeachable and removable offenses. President's Trial Memorandum at 
21. The President's lawyers acknowledge the charge in the article 
against President Nixon of ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to 
report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his 
Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' Id. The 
President's lawyers go on to state that ``[t]he President had signed 
his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,'' Id., trying to 
distinguish away the Claiborne impeachment and removal precedent from 
1986, and by extension all the judicial impeachments from the 1980s 
which clearly establish perjury as an impeachable and removable 
offense.
    President Clinton's argument that a President was not and should 
not be impeached for tax fraud because it does not involve official 
conduct or abuse of presidential powers simply is unfounded based on 
the 1974 impeachment proceedings against President Nixon. Moreover, the 
fact that the President and his lawyers make this argument in defense 
of the President is telling. He effectively claims that a large scale 
tax cheat could be a viable chief executive.
    It is undisputed that the Judiciary Committee rejected the proposed 
tax fraud article against President Nixon by a vote of 26 to 12. A slim 
minority of Committee members stated the view that tax fraud would not 
be an impeachable offense. That minority view is illustrated by the 
comments of Rep. Waldie that in the tax fraud article there was ``not 
an abuse of power sufficient to warrant impeachment. . . .'' Debate on 
Article of Impeachment 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary 
Pursuant H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 548 (1974) (Statement 
of Rep. Waldie). Similar views were expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep. 
Mayne. Rep. Railsback took the position that there was ``a serious 
question,'' id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Railsback), whether 
misconduct of the President in connection with his taxes would be 
impeachable.
    Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their 
opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based his 
opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that these charges 
may be reached in due course in the regular process of law.'' Id. at 
549 (Statement of Rep. Thornton). Rep. Butler stated his view that the 
tax fraud article should be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound 
judgment would indicate that we not add this article to the trial 
burden we already have.'' Id. at 550 (Statement of Rep. Butler).
    The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of 
those who expressed a view in the debate in opposition to the tax fraud 
article based their opposition on the insufficiency of the evidence, 
and not on the view that tax fraud, if proven, would not be an 
impeachable offense.
    The comments of then-Rep. Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974 
directly contradict the view that Mr. Owens has expressed in recent 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. Although Mr. Owens in 
1974 expressed his ``belief'' that President Nixon was guilty of 
misconduct in connection with his taxes, he clearly stated his 
conclusion that ``on the evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's offenses were 
not impeachable. Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Owens). Mr. Owens spoke 
of the need for ``hard evidence'' and discussed his unavailing efforts 
to obtain additional evidence that would tie ``the President to the 
fraudulent deed'' or that would otherwise ``close the inferential gap 
that has to be closed in order to charge the President.'' Id. He 
concluded his comments in the 1974 debate by urging the members of the 
Committee ``to reject this article . . . based on that lack of 
evidence.'' Id.
    In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee stated 
the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax fraud to support 
the article against President Nixon. Wiggins: ``fraud . . . is wholly 
unsupported in the evidence.'' Id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Wiggins). 
McClory: ``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Id. at 531 
(Statement of Rep. McClory). Sandman: ``There was absolutely no intent 
to defraud here.'' Id. at 532 (Statement of Rep. Sandman). Lott: ``mere 
mistakes or negligence by the President in filing his tax returns 
should clearly not be grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 533 (Statement 
of Rep. Lott). Maraziti: discussing absence of evidence of fraud. Id. 
at 534 (Statement of Rep. Maraziti). Dennis: ``no fraud has been 
found.'' Id. at 538 (Statement of Rep. Dennis). Cohen: questioning 
whether ``in fact there was criminal fraud involved.'' Id. at 548 
(Statement of Rep. Cohen). Hungate: ``I think there is a case here but 
in my judgment I am having trouble deciding if it has as yet been 
made.'' Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Hungate). Latta: only ``bad 
judgment and gross negligence.'' Id. at 554 (Statement of Rep. Latta). 
Fish: ``There is not to be found before us evidence that the President 
acted wilfully to evade his taxes.'' Id. at 556 (Statement of Rep. 
Fish). Moorhead: ``there is no showing that President Nixon in any way 
engaged in any fraud.'' Id. at 557 (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
    The group of those who found the evidence insufficient included 
moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, as well as 
Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. McClory, all of whom 
supported the impeachment of President Nixon.
    In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert that the 
House Judiciary Committee in 1974 determined that tax fraud by the 
President would not be an impeachable offense. The failure of the 
Committee to adopt the tax fraud article against President Nixon simply 
does not support the claim of President Clinton's lawyers that the 
offenses charged against him do not rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses.
    In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made that tax 
fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient evidence--would be an 
impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who later served as chairman of the 
Committee, said:

    ``No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty to 
establish now that evidence of specific statutory crimes and 
constitutional violations by the President of the United States will 
subject all Presidents now and in the future to impeachment.
          * * * * * * *
    ``No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and the laws 
of the United States from accountability for personal misdeeds any more 
than he is for official misdeeds. And I think that we on this Committee 
in our effort to fairly evaluate the President's activities must show 
the American people that all men are treated equally under the law.''

(Debate on Articles of Impeachment, 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 525, 554.)
    Professor Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large-scale tax 
cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' Charles Black, Impeachment: A 
Handbook, (Yale University Press, 1974) at 42. What is true of tax 
fraud is also true of a persistent pattern of perjury by the President. 
An incorrigible perjurer is not a viable chief magistrate.
            b. President Clinton Continues to Misrepresent The 
                    Allegations Against Alexander Hamilton
    President Clinton continues to try to persuade the American public 
that the House of Representatives has impeached him for having an 
extramarital affair. See Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton 
to the Articles of Impeachment at 1 (``The charges in the two Articles 
of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of 
a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.'') (emphasis added). In doing so, the 
President's lawyers refer to an incident involving then Secretary of 
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton being blackmailed by the husband of a 
woman named Maria Reynolds with whom he was having an adulterous 
affair. However, the President's lawyers omit the relevant 
distinguishing facts even as they cast aspersions upon Alexander 
Hamilton: none of Hamilton's ``efforts'' to cover up his affair 
involved the violation of any laws, let alone felonies. Indeed, the 
fact of the matter is that Hamilton was the victim of the crime of 
extortion.
    Never did Hamilton raise his right hand to take a sacred oath and 
then willfully betray that oath and the rule of law to commit perjury. 
Never did Alexander Hamilton obstruct justice by tampering with 
witnesses, urging potential witnesses to sign false affidavits, or 
attempt to conceal evidence from a Federal criminal grand jury.
    Again, the significance of the distinctions are glaringly obvious: 
it is apparent from the Hamilton case that the Framers did not regard 
private sexual misconduct as an impeachable offense. It is also 
apparent that efforts to cover up such private behavior outside of a 
legal setting, including even paying hush money to induce someone to 
destroy documents, did not meet the standard. Neither Hamilton's high 
position, nor the fact that his payments to a securities swindler 
created an enormous appearance problem, were enough to implicate the 
standard. These wrongs were real, and they were not insubstantial, but 
to the Framers they were essentially private and therefore not 
impeachable. David Frum, ``Smearing Alexander Hamilton,'' The Weekly 
Standard (Oct. 19, 1998) at 14.
    But the Alexander Hamilton incident President Clinton cites 
actually clarifies the precise point at which personal misconduct 
becomes a public offense. Hamilton could keep his secret only by a 
betrayal of public responsibilities. Hamilton came to that point and, 
at immense personal cost, refused to cross the line. President Clinton 
came to that point and, fully understanding what he was doing, 
knowingly charged across the line. President Clinton's public acts of 
perjury and obstruction of justice transformed a personal misconduct 
into a public offense.
4. The Views of the Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars the 
        President Cites Do Not Stand Up to Careful Scrutiny
    It speaks volumes that the most distinguished of the 400 historians 
referred to in President Clinton's trial brief is Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. Professor Schlesinger had a different view of impeachment 25 years 
ago. President Clinton himself asserts that ``the allegations are so 
far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here 
threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself.'' President's 
Trial Memorandum at 24. However, Schlesinger has written that:

    ``The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could punish 
the man without [ ] punishing the office. For, in the Presidency as 
elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to [do] good meant also the 
power to do harm, the power to serve the republic also the power to 
demand and defile it.''

(Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Easton Press edit. 
1973) (hereinafter ``Schlesinger'') at 415.)
    The statement of the 400 historians cited with approval in the 
President's trial memorandum makes the following statement: ``[t]he 
Framers explicitly reserved that step for high crimes and misdemeanors 
in the exercise of executive power.'' Statement of Historians in 
Defense of the Constitution, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 1998) at A15. 
The 400 historians then believe that commission of a murder or rape by 
the President of the United States in his personal capacity is not 
subject to the impeachment power of Article II, Section 4.
    President Clinton in his trial memorandum asserts that this case 
does not fit the paradigmatic case for impeachment. President's Trial 
Memorandum at 24. However, none of his predecessors ever faced 
overwhelming evidence of repeatedly lying under oath before a federal 
court and grand jury and otherwise seeking to obstruct justice to 
benefit himself--directly contradicting his oath to ``take care that 
the laws are faithfully executed.'' But as former Attorney General 
Griffin Bell, who served under President Carter, said before the House 
Judiciary Committee recently, ``[a] President cannot faithfully execute 
the laws if he himself is breaking them.'' Background and History of 
Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 203 (Comm. Print 
1998) (Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell).
    President Clinton goes on to state that to make the offenses 
alleged against him impeachable and removable conduct ``would forever 
lower the bar in a way inimical to the Presidency and to our government 
of separated powers. These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) 
statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the 
fact of sexual misbehavior.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26. While 
President Clinton and his able counsel would like to define the case 
this way, what is at issue in the articles of impeachment before the 
Senate is clear: perjury and obstruction of justice committed by the 
President of the United States in order to thwart a duly instituted 
civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit against him as well as a 
subsequent grand jury investigation. While the President may think such 
allegations would forever lower the bar in terms of the conduct we 
expect from our public officials, we must square his opinion and that 
of his lawyers with the fact that his Justice Department puts people in 
prison for similar conduct. While the President's brief again quotes 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. for the proposition that we must not ``lower 
the bar,'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26, Schlesinger held a 
different view during the impeachment of President Nixon:

    ``If the Nixon White House escaped the legal consequences of its 
illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and their associates not 
suppose themselves entitled to do what the Nixon White House had done? 
Only condign punishment would restore popular faith in the Presidency 
and deter future Presidents from illegal conduct.''
(Schlesinger at 418.)
5. The President and Federal Judges are Impeached, Convicted, and 
        Removed From Office Under the Same Standard
    President Clinton's argument that Presidents are held to a lower 
standard of behavior than federal judges completely misreads the 
Constitution and the Senate's precedents. See generally House Trial 
Brief at 101-06. The Constitution provides one standard for the 
impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of ``[t]the President, 
the Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States.'' U.S. 
Const. art II, Sec. 4. It is the commission of ``Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Id.  The Senate has already 
determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the cases of 
Judge Nixon, Judge Hastings, and Judge Claiborne.
    President Clinton argues that the standard differs because judges 
have life tenure whereas Presidents are accountable to the voters at 
elections. That argument fails on several grounds. The differing 
tenures are set forth in the Constitution, and there is simply no 
textual support for the idea that they affect the impeachment standard 
at all. If electoral accountability were a sufficient means of 
remedying presidential misconduct, the framers would not have 
explicitly included the President in the impeachment clause. Finally, 
even if this argument were otherwise valid, it does not apply to 
President Clinton because he will never face the voters again. U.S. 
Const. amend. XXII. Indeed, all of the conduct charged in the Articles 
occurred after the 1996 election.
    Then President Clinton rejects the Senate's own precedents showing 
that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the three judicial 
impeachments of the 1980s arguing that all of the lying involved there 
concerned the judges' official duties. That is true with respect to 
Judge Hastings, but completely false with respect to Judge Claiborne 
and Judge Nixon. Judge Claiborne was impeached and convicted for lying 
on his income tax returns, an entirely personal matter. President 
Clinton tries to explain this away by saying: ``Once convicted, [Judge 
Claiborne] simply could not perform his official functions because his 
personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an 
arbiter of others' oaths.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 29. The 
same is true of President Clinton. He ultimately directs the Department 
of Justice which must decide whether people are prosecuted for lying. 
If he has committed perjury and obstructed justice, how can he be the 
arbiter of other's oaths? As Professor Jonathan Turley put it:

    ``As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate authority 
over the Justice Department and the Administration's enforcement 
policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let 
alone prosecute, citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of 
justice under circumstances nearly identical to the President's. Such 
inherent conflict will be even greater in the military cases and the 
President's role as Commander-in-Chief.''

(Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess. at 274 (Comm. Print 1998) (Testimony of Professor Jonathan 
Turley).)
    In the same vein, President Clinton claims that Judge Nixon 
``employ[ed] the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage 
for a party.'' President's Trial Brief at 29. In fact, Judge Nixon 
intervened in a state criminal case in which he had no official role. 
His ability to persuade the prosecutor to drop the case rested on his 
friendship with the state prosecutor--not his official position. 
President Clinton argues that it was Judge Nixon's intervention in a 
judicial proceeding that ties it to his official position. The same is 
true of President Clinton. He intervened in two judicial proceedings 
and his actions had the same effect as Judge Nixon's--to defeat a just 
result.
    As the person who ultimately directs the Justice Department--the 
federal government's prosecutorial authority--the President must follow 
his constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed. U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 3. His special constitutional duty 
is at least as high, if not higher, than the judge's. Indeed, President 
Clinton acknowledged as much early in his Administration when 
controversy arose about the nomination of Zoe Baird and the potential 
nomination of Judge Kimba Wood to be Attorney General. Questions were 
raised about whether they had properly complied with laws relating to 
their hiring of household help. At that time, President Clinton said 
the Attorney General ``should be held to a higher standard than other 
Cabinet members on matters of this kind [i.e. strictly complying with 
the law].'' Remarks of President Clinton with Reporters Prior to a 
Meeting with Economic Advisers, February 8, 1993, 29 Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents 160. If the Attorney General is held to a 
higher standard of compliance with the law, then her superior, 
President Clinton, must be also.
  b. the individual consciences of senators determines the burden of 
                      proof in impeachment trials
    The Constitution does not discuss the standard of proof for 
impeachment trials. It simply states that ``the Senate shall have the 
Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const., Art I, Sec. 3, clause 5. 
Because the Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to 
look at the past practice of the Senate. Historically, the Senate has 
never set a standard of proof for impeachment trials. ``In the final 
analysis the question is one which historically has been answered by 
individual Senators guided by their own consciences.'' Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, Standard of Proof in Senate 
Impeachment Proceedings, Thomas B. Ripy, Legislative Attorney, American 
Law Division (January 7, 1999).
    President Clinton argues that the impeachment trial is similar to a 
criminal trial and that the appropriate standard should therefore be 
``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' That argument is not new: it has been 
made in the past, and the Senate has rejected it, as indeed, President 
Clinton acknowledges. He asserts, however, that the impeachment trial 
of a President should proceed under special procedures that do not 
apply to the trial of other civil officers. His arguments are 
unpersuasive.
1. The Senate has Never Adopted the Criminal Standard of ``Beyond a 
        Reasonable Doubt'' or Any Other Standard of Proof for 
        Impeachment Trials
    The Senate has never adopted the standard of ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' in any impeachment trial in U.S. history. In fact, the Senate 
has chosen not to impose a standard at all, preferring to leave to the 
conscience of each senator the decision of how best to judge the facts 
presented.
    In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, counsel for the 
respondent moved to designate ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the 
standard of proof for conviction. Gray & Reams, The Congressional 
Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the 
Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5, 
Document 41, X (1987). The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion by 
a vote of 17-75. In the floor debate on the motion, House Manager 
Kastenmeier emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each 
member to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. 132 Cong. Rec. 
S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
    The question of the appropriate standard of proof was also raised 
in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings. In the Senate Impeachment Trial 
Committee, Senator Rudman said in response to a question about the 
historical practice regarding the standard of proof that there has been 
no specific standard, ``you are not going to find it. It is what is in 
the mind of every Senator. . . . I think it is what everybody decides 
for themselves.'' Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on 
the Articles Against Judge Alcee Hastings: Hearings before the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee (Part 1) 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75, 
(discussion involving Senator Lieberman and Senator Rudman).
2. The Criminal Standard of Proof is Inappropriate for Impeachment 
        Trials
    President Clinton argues that an impeachment trial is akin to a 
criminal trial and that, therefore, the criminal standard should apply. 
That assertion is, of course, at direct odds with his apparent 
opposition to the presentation of evidence through witnesses, another 
normal criminal trial procedure. The Senate Rules Committee rejected 
this analogy in 1974, stating, ``an impeachment trial is not a criminal 
trial,'' and advocating a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
Executive Session Hearings, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration, ``Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment 
Trials'' 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (August 5-6, 1974). Indeed, it is 
undisputed that impeachable offenses need not be criminal offenses. See 
Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 
2d Sess. at 14 (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998) (``Impeachable acts need 
not be criminal acts.'')
    Moreover, the result of conviction in an impeachment trial is 
removal from office, not punishment. As the House argued in the 
Claiborne trial, the reasonable standard was designed to protect 
criminal defendants who risked ``forfeitures of life, liberty and 
property'' (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 
(1949)). This standard is inappropriate here because the Constitution 
limits the consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from 
office and disqualification from holding office in the future, 
explicitly preserving the option for a subsequent criminal trial in the 
courts. U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 6.
    In addition, as the House argued in the Claiborne trial, the 
criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by its 
nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more heavily than 
the interest of the individual defendant. Gray & Reams, The 
Congressional Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and 
Materials on the Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, 
Volume 5, Document 41, X (1987). During the course of the floor debate 
on this motion in the Claiborne trial, Representative Kastenmeier 
argued for the House that the use of the criminal standard was 
inappropriate where the public interest in removing corrupt officials 
was a significant factor. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed. 
October 7, 1986).
3. A President Who Is Impeached Should Not Receive Special Procedural 
        Benefits That Do Not Apply in the Impeachment Trials of Other 
        Civil Officers
    President Clinton argues that he should be exempted from the weight 
of historical practice and precedent and be given a special rule on the 
standard of proof. This argument is based on fallacious assertions, the 
first of which is that different constitutional standards apply to the 
impeachment of judges and presidents. See above at 14-16 and House 
Trial Memorandum at 101-06.
    President Clinton also employs inflammatory rhetoric to suggest 
that a presidential impeachment trial ought to be treated differently, 
explaining that the criminal standard is needed because ``the 
Presidency itself is at stake'' and because conviction would ``overturn 
the results of an election.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 32-33. 
The presidency is, of course, not at stake, though the tenure of its 
current office holder may be. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution 
ensures that impeachment and removal of a President would not overturn 
an election because it is the elected Vice President who would replace 
the President not the losing presidential candidate.
    Finally, President Clinton argues that the evidence should be 
tested by the most stringent standard because ``there is no suggestion 
of corruption or misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our 
system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the 
President's term.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. While the 
President might be expected to argue that he did not act corruptly, he 
cannot credibly assert that ``there is no suggestion of corruption,'' 
because ``corrupt'' conduct is precisely what he is charged with in the 
articles of impeachment. Though not persuasive as an argument, this 
statement is significant in what it concedes--that corruption is among 
the ``conduct that places our system of government at risk.'' 
President's Trial Memorandum at 33. Having acknowledged this, President 
Clinton cannot be heard to complain that the House has failed to charge 
him with conduct which rises to the level of an impeachable offense.

       IV. The Structure of the Articles is Proper and Sufficient

            a. the articles are not unconstitutionally vague
    President Clinton's trial memorandum argues that the two articles 
of impeachment are unfairly complex. To the contrary, the articles 
present the misdeeds of President Clinton and their consequences in as 
transparent and understandable a manner as possible.
    The first article of impeachment charges that President Clinton 
violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by willfully 
corrupting and manipulating the judicial process. He did this by 
providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a grand jury in 
regard to one or more of four matters. The deleterious consequences his 
actions had for the people of the United States are then described. The 
second article charges that President Clinton violated his enumerated 
constitutional responsibilities by a course of conduct that prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice. One or more of 
seven listed acts constitute the particulars of President Clinton's 
course of conduct. As in the first article, the deleterious 
consequences his actions had for the people of the United States are 
then described.
    To do as President Clinton requests would require separating out 
into a unique article of impeachment each possible combination of (a) a 
particular violation of his duties, (b) a particular wrongful act, and 
(c) a particular consequence of his actions. This would require 48 
different articles in the case of the first article and 84 in the case 
of the second. Such a multiplicity of articles is not required and 
would assist no one. Of course, if the president had violated fewer 
presidential duties, committed fewer misdeeds, and been responsible for 
fewer harmful consequences to the American people, the articles could 
have been drafted more simply.
    The trial memorandum then makes the contention that the two 
articles of impeachment are impermissibly vague and lacking in 
specificity in that they do not meet the standards of a criminal 
indictment. This contention clearly misses the mark. Impeachment is a 
political and not a criminal proceeding, designed, as recognized by 
Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest nineteenth century 
interpreter, ``not . . . to punish an offender'' by threatening 
deprivation of his life or liberty, but to ``secure the state'' by 
``divest[ing] him of his political capacity''. J. Story, Commentaries 
on the Constitution (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) Sec. 803. 
Justice Story thus found the analogy to an indictment to be invalid:

    ``The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict 
form and accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in 
the form of the allegations; but always contain, or ought to contain, 
so much certainty, as to enable the party to put himself upon the 
proper defense, and also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of 
it, as a bar to another impeachment.''

(Id. at Sec. 806).
    In explaining the impeachment process to the citizens of New York 
in Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton stated in more general terms 
that impeachment ``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either 
in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the 
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the 
discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' The Federalist 
No. 65, at 398 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
    Can the president legitimately argue that he is unable to put on a 
proper defense? President Clinton has committed a great number of 
impeachable misdeeds. The House Judiciary Committee's committee report 
requires 20 pages just to list the most glaring instances of the 
president's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before a 
federal grand jury and it requires 13 pages just to list the most 
glaring incidents in the president's course of conduct designed to 
prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice. The House 
believes that President Clinton's attorneys have reviewed the committee 
report. They know exactly what he is being charged with, as is 
acknowledged in the president's trial memorandum. The memorandum states 
in its introduction that ``[t]ake away the elaborate trappings of the 
Articles and the high-flying rhetoric that accompanied them, and we see 
clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the 
President from office because he . . .'' President's Trial Memorandum 
at 2. In addition, in the House proceedings, the President filed three 
documents: a Preliminary Memorandum, an Initial Response, and a 
Submission by Counsel. The first two documents were printed together 
and ran to 57 pages. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the 
United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the Independent 
Counsel and Initial Response of the President of the United States to 
Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess., H.Doc. No. 105-317 (1998). The third was printed and ran to 404 
pages. Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on 
the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998). He was also given 30 
hours to present his case before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 
during which he called numerous witnesses. The Committee repeatedly 
asked President Clinton to provide it with any exculpatory evidence, an 
offer which he never accepted. Now President Clinton's Trial Memorandum 
to the Senate runs to 130 pages. Clearly, President Clinton has not 
suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles of impeachment.
    If he had, he would have availed himself of the opportunity to file 
a motion for a bill of particulars. He had that opportunity on January 
11, 1999, and he waived it. He should not now be heard to claim that he 
does not know what the charges are.
    Unlike the judicial impeachments of the 1980s, President Clinton 
has not committed a handful of specific misdeeds that can easily be 
listed in separate articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the 
whole melange of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives to 
impeach President Clinton, the Judiciary Committee looked to the only 
analogous case--that of President Nixon. In 1974, the Committee was 
also faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable length 
against a president who had committed a long series of improper acts 
designed to achieve an illicit end.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon charged 
that in order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of 
the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and obstruct 
the consequent investigation (and for certain other purposes), he 
engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or causing to be made 
false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative 
officers'', ``endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency'', 
and ``endeavoring to cause prospective defendants and individuals duly 
tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in 
return for their silence or false testimony.'' Impeachment of Richard 
M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). The article did not list each false or 
misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, and did not 
list each prospective defendant and what they were promised.
    In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against President 
Clinton charge him with providing perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony concerning four subjects, such as an his relationship with a 
subordinate government employee, and engaging in a course of conduct 
designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of 
justice, such course including four generals acts such as an effort to 
secure job assistance for that employee. An argument can be made that 
the articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted with 
more specificity than those against President Nixon. Unless President 
Clinton is arguing that the Senate should have dismissed the first 
article of impeachment against President Nixon (had the president not 
resigned), he has little ground to complain about the articles against 
himself. In short, President Clinton knows exactly what the charges 
are, and the Senate should now require him to account for his behavior.
   b. the articles do not improperly charge multiple offenses in one 
                                article
    President Clinton argues unpersuasively that the articles of 
impeachment are ``unconstitutionally flawed'' in two respects. First, 
he argues that ``by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House 
of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with 
the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of 
two-thirds of the members.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 101. 
Second, he argues that the articles do not provide him ``the most basic 
notice of the charges against him required by due process and 
fundamental fairness.'' Id. Both arguments are factually deficient, 
ignore Senate precedent and procedure, and are constitutionally flawed.
    The articles of impeachment allege that the President made ``one or 
more'' ``perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand 
jury'' and committed ``one or more'' acts in which he obstructed 
justice. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998). The articles of 
impeachment are modeled after those adopted by the House Committee on 
the Judiciary against President Nixon and were drafted with the rules 
of the Senate in mind. Senate Rules specifically contemplate that the 
House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner and prior 
rulings of the Senate have held that such drafting is not deficient and 
will not sustain a motion to dismiss.
    In 1986, the United States Senate amended the Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials. S. Res. 
479, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). As part of the reform, Rule XXIII, 
which deals generally with voting the final question, was amended to 
clarify the articles of impeachment are not divisible. Rule XXIII 
provides in relevant part that:

    ``An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose 
of voting thereon at any time during the trial. Once voting has 
commenced on an article of impeachment, voting shall be continued until 
voting has been completed on all articles of impeachment unless the 
Senate adjourns for period not to exceed one day or adjourns sine 
die.''

    The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, after thoroughly 
reviewing the impeachment rules, prior articles of impeachments, and 
prior Senate trials, decided that articles of impeachment should not be 
divisible. In drafting the amendment to Rule XXIII providing that 
articles of impeachment not be divided, the Senate was aware that the 
House may combine multiple counts of impeachable conduct in one article 
of impeachment. The Committee report explains the Senate's position:

    ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the divisions 
of an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the 
most judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a 
general manner and, in particular, with respect to the form of the 
articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon. 
The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an 
impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the 
first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges 
alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of 
transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of 
Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had 
thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the'' enumerated 
specifications. The general review of the Committee at that time was 
expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division 
of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted 
specifications might ``be time consuming and confusing, and a matter 
which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will * 
* *.'' Accordingly, it was agreed to write into the proposed rules 
language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either 
the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person 
impeached was ``guilty'' or one or more of the enumerated 
specifications.''

Amending the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting 
on Impeachment Trials, Report of the Comm. on Rules and Administration, 
S. Rept. 99-401, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 8 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Because the Senate was aware that multiple specifications of 
impeachment conduct may be contained in an article of impeachment, the 
Senate's rules implicitly countenance such drafting.
    The issue regarding whether articles of impeachment are divisible 
is not new to the Senate. In fact, the Senate's Committee on Rules and 
Administration reviewed the Senate's impeachment procedures in 1974 to 
prepare for a possible trial of President Richard Nixon. The Committee 
passed the exact same language as the Committee did in 1986 prohibiting 
the division of an article of impeachment. Because President Nixon 
resigned, the full Senate never considered the amendments.
    Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York submitted a statement to the 
Committee in 1974 addressing the divisibility issue and advised that 
Rule XXIII be amended to prohibit the division of an article of 
impeachment. His comments, as follows, are instructive:

    ``Rule XXIII provides for the yeas and nays to be taken on each 
article separately but does not set any order for a vote when there are 
several articles. In the [President] Johnson trial, this was done by 
order of the Senate and several votes were taken on the order. This 
procedure, setting a vote for final consideration, should be stated in 
the rules. Also the rule is silent about the division of any article. 
In the Johnson trial a division was requested and the Chief Justice 
attempted to devise one, but could not, and the article as a whole was 
submitted for a vote to the Senate. I believe articles should not be 
divided because this raises a further question of whether a two-thirds 
vote is required on each part of an article and whether the House 
action on the construction of a particular article can be changed 
without further action by the House. Thus the rule should provide for 
no division of an article by the Senate.''

(Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials, 
Executive Session Hearings before the Comm. on Standing Rules and 
Administration, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 116 (August 5th and 6th, 1974) 
(emphasis added).)
    In addition to implicitly recognizing that articles of impeachment 
may contain multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the Senate 
has convicted a number of judges on such ``omnibus'' articles, 
including Judges Archbald, Ritter, and Claiborne. In the case of Judge 
Nixon, the Senate acquitted on the article, but refused to dismiss it.
    The most recent example, that of Judge Nixon in 1989, is 
instructive. Judge Walter L. Nixon filed a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that Article III was duplicative, among other things. Senator 
Fowler, the chairman of the committee appointed to take evidence in the 
impeachment trial of Judge Nixon explained the reasons for denying 
Nixon's motion to refer the motion to dismiss to the full Senate:

    ``To the extent that the motion rests on the House's inclusion of 
fourteen distinct allegations of false statements in one article, we 
believe that Article III states an intelligible and adequately discrete 
charge of an impeachable offense by alleging that Judge Nixon concealed 
information concerning several conversations in which he had engaged by 
making ``one or more'' false statements to a grand jury. The House has 
substantial discretion in determining how to aggregate related alleged 
acts of misconduct in framing Articles of Impeachment and has 
historically frequently chosen to aggregate multiple factual 
allegations in a single impeachment article. The House's itemization of 
the fourteen particular statements whose knowing falsity it is alleging 
serves to give Judge Nixon fair notice of the contours of the charge 
against him without reducing the intelligibility of the article's 
essential accusation that Judge Nixon knowingly concealed material 
information from the government's law enforcement agents. Because the 
Committee believes that evidentiary proceedings may fairly be conducted 
on Article III as it is presently drafted, Judge Nixon's motion to 
refer his motion to dismiss Article III to the Senate at this time is 
denied.''

(135 Cong. Rec. 19635-36 (September 6, 1989).)
    The full Senate eventually rejected Judge Nixon's motion to dismiss 
by a vote of 34 to 63. Mr. Manager Cardin persuasively summed up the 
argument against the motion to dismiss as follows:

    ``Judge Nixon argues, in his brief, that you must find all 14 
statements to be false to vote guilty on article III. But that is 
untrue. Read the article closely. The question posed by article III is, 
did Judge Nixon conceal information? Did he conceal information, first 
by one or more false or misleading statements in his interview, and 
then by one or more false and misleading statements in his grand jury 
testimony?
    ``You need not find all 14 statements to be false. The House is 
unanimously convinced that all 14 are complete and utter lies. We hope 
you will agree. But after considering the evidence, perhaps you will 
conclude that only 12 of the statements are false. It really does not 
matter. Just one intentionally false and misleading statement in the 
interview, or one in the grand jury, should be enough. Because if you 
conclude that Judge Nixon concealed information, whether by 1 false 
statement or 14, he should be removed from the bench. You should vote 
guilty on article III.
    ``And you need not necessarily agree on which statements are false, 
if you reach the conclusion that he concealed information. If two-
thirds of the Senators present believe Judge Nixon lied, regardless of 
how each individual Senator reached that conclusion, he will properly 
be removed from office.
          * * * * * * *
    ``This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if you might 
differ on which particular statements are lies, the bottom line is that 
two-thirds of you will have agreed that he concealed information, 
rendering him unfit for office. That is what the Constitution 
requires.''

(Id. at 26751.)
    Given the clear Senate precedent permitting articles of impeachment 
containing multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the 
President's attack on the construction of the articles is an attack on 
Senate rules and precedent. The President's concerns, if assumed to be 
valid, could be addressed simply by permitting a division of the 
question. Under the standing rules of the Senate, any Senator may have 
the same divided if ``the question in debate contains several 
propositions.'' Senate Rule XV. A question is divisible if it contains 
two or more separate and distinct propositions. The Senate, however, 
has made an affirmative decision to dispense with the regular order 
which governs bills, resolutions, and amendments thereto, and instead 
adopted a different procedure not permitting the division of articles 
of impeachment. The Senate has not acted unconstitutionally in the past 
regarding prior impeachments, and is not on a course to do so in the 
trial of President Clinton.
    The claim that President Clinton is not on notice regarding the 
charges is ludicrous. The Lewinsky matter is arguably the most reported 
and scrutinized story of 1998 and possibly of 1999. The facts of the 
case are contained in numerous documents, statements, reports, and 
filings. Specifically, President Clinton has had the following 
documents, among others, containing the facts and specifics of the 
case: (1) Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in 
Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c), H.Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998); (2) 
Investigatory Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary with Respect to its 
Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rept. 105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 
7, 1998); (3) Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Rept. 105-830 (Dec. 16, 
1998); and (4) Trial Memorandum of the United States House of 
Representatives. If all of these reports and the thousands of pages of 
documents are not enough, President Clinton will have the opportunity 
to review the presentation of the Managers on the Part of the House for 
up to twenty-four hours.

    V. President Clinton Completely Misstates the Record as to the 
    Discovery Procedures That Were Available to Him in the House of 
                            Representatives

    President Clinton's trial memorandum claimed to the Senate that, 
should it decide ``to allow the House managers to expand the record in 
some way . . . the President would have an urgent need for the 
discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these 
proceedings has been able to subpoena documents or summon or cross-
examine witnesses.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 125 (emphasis 
added). The President also states that ``the House of Representatives 
[did not] afford the President any discovery mechanisms to secure 
evidence that might be helpful in his defense.'' Id.
    We will not address every discovery issue here since those issues 
will be resolved in the coming days; however, the Senate should know 
that these claims are absolutely false. In fact, the President's own 
brief refutes his claims. ``The Committee allowed the President's 
lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House 
presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses. . . .'' White 
House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on 
behalf of the President. . . .'' Id. at 13.
    The House Committee on the Judiciary repeatedly asked the 
President's attorneys to supply any exculpatory evidence to the 
Committee, both orally and in writing. They never did. When, at the 
last minute, the President's counsel requested witnesses, the Committee 
invited to testify every witness they requested. Aside from this, 
President Clinton nor his attorneys never asked to ``subpoena 
documents'' or ``summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' If President 
Clinton's argument is that the Committee did not provide his staff a 
stack of blank subpoenas, that is correct. However, neither the House 
of Representatives, nor the Senate, has the ability to ``turn over'' 
its constitutionally based subpoena power to the executive branch.
    President Clinton's attorneys never asked to do the things they now 
claim they never had the ability to do. In fact, when minority members 
of the Committee publicly asked that Judge Starr be called as a 
witness, Judge Starr was called. In fact, President Clinton's attorney 
and minority counsel questioned Judge Starr for over two hours. Every 
Member of the Committee questioned him for at least five minutes each. 
Judge Starr was a witness, and he was cross-examined by David Kendall, 
President Clinton's private attorney. President Clinton's claims are 
just not accurate.
    President Clinton's attorneys raise the issue of fairness. They are 
entitled to their own opinion about the House's proceedings, but they 
are not entitled to rewrite history. The truth is that the Committee's 
subpoena power could have been used to subpoena documents or witnesses 
on behalf of the President if they had so requested. They did not. All 
they requested, is that lawyers, law professors, and historians testify 
before the Committee. In short, President Clinton's statements about 
what happened in the House completely misstate what occurred.

                             VI. Conclusion

    For the reasons stated herein and in the Trial Memorandum of the 
United States House of Representatives, the House respectfully submits 
that the articles properly state impeachable offenses, that the Senate 
should proceed to a full trial on the articles, and that after trial, 
the Senate should vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton, 
remove him from office, and disqualify him from holding further office.
            Respectfully submitted,

                                   The United States
                                   House of Representatives.

                                   Henry J. Hyde,
                                   F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                   Bill McCollum,
                                   George W. Gekas,
                                   Charles T. Canady,
                                   Stephen E. Buyer,
                                   Ed Bryant,
                                   Steve Chabot,
                                   Bob Barr,
                                   Asa Hutchinson,
                                   Chris Cannon,
                                   James E. Rogan,
                                   Lindsey O. Graham,
                                 Managers on the Part of the House.

                                          Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                   General Counsel.
                                        David P. Schippers,
                                       Chief Investigative Counsel.
    Dated: January 14, 1999.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. I would like to inform Members of the 
Senate and the parties in this case of my need to stand on 
occasion to stretch my back. I have no intention that the 
proceedings should be in any way interrupted when I do so.
    The Presiding Officer notes the presence in the Senate 
Chamber of the managers on the part of the House of 
Representatives and counsel for the President of the United 
States.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
managers for the House of Representatives have 24 hours to make 
the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you.
    The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde to begin 
the presentation of the case for the House of Representatives.
    Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel 
for the President, and Senators, we are brought together on 
this solemn and historic occasion to perform important duties 
assigned to us by the Constitution.
    We want you to know how much we respect you and this 
institution and how grateful we are for your guidance and your 
cooperation.
    With your permission, we, the managers of the House, are 
here to set forth the evidence in support of two articles of 
impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. You 
are seated in this historic Chamber not to embark on some great 
legislative debate, which these stately walls have so often 
witnessed, but to listen to the evidence, as those who must sit 
in judgment.
    To guide you in this grave duty, you have taken an oath of 
impartiality. With the simple words ``I do,'' you have pledged 
to put aside personal bias and partisan interest and to do 
``impartial justice.'' Your willingness to take up this calling 
has once again reminded the world of the unique brilliance of 
America's constitutional system of Government. We are here, Mr. 
Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, as advocates for the 
rule of law, for equal justice under the law and for the 
sanctity of the oath.
    The oath. In many ways, the case you will consider in the 
coming days is about those two words: ``I do,'' pronounced at 
two Presidential inaugurations by a person whose spoken words 
have singular importance to our Nation and to the great globe 
itself.
    More than 450 years ago, Sir Thomas More, former Lord 
Chancellor of England, was imprisoned in the Tower of London 
because he had, in the name of conscience, defied the absolute 
power of the King. As the playwright Robert Bolt tells it, More 
was visited by his family, who tried to persuade him to speak 
the words of the oath that would save his life, even while, in 
his mind and heart, he held firm to his conviction that the 
King was in error. More refused. As he told his daughter, 
Margaret, ``When a man takes an oath, Meg, he's holding his own 
self in his hands. Like water. And if he opens his fingers 
then--he needn't hope to find himself again . . .'' Sir Thomas 
More, the most brilliant lawyer of his generation, a scholar 
with an international reputation, the center of a warm and 
affectionate family life which he cherished, went to his death 
rather than take an oath in vain.
    Members of the Senate, what you do over the next few weeks 
will forever affect the meaning of those two words: ``I do.'' 
You are now stewards of the oath. Its significance in public 
service and our cherished system of justice will never be the 
same after this. Depending on what you decide, it will either 
be strengthened in its power to achieve justice or it will go 
the way of so much of our moral infrastructure and become a 
mere convention, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
    The House of Representatives has named myself and 12 other 
Members as managers of its case. I have the honor of 
introducing those distinguished Members and explaining how we 
will make our initial presentation. The gentleman from 
Wisconsin, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, will begin the 
presentation with an overview of the case. Representative 
Sensenbrenner is the ranking Republican member of the House 
Judiciary Committee, and has served for 20 years. In 1989, 
Representative Sensenbrenner was a House manager in the 
impeachment trial of Judge Walter L. Nixon, who was convicted 
on two articles of impeachment for making false and misleading 
statements before a federal grand jury.
    Following Representative Sensenbrenner will be a team of 
managers who will make a presentation of the relevant facts of 
this case. From the very outset of this ordeal, there has been 
a great deal of speculation and misinformation about the facts. 
That has been unfortunate for everyone involved. We believe 
that a full presentation of the facts and the law by the House 
managers--will be helpful.
    Representative Ed Bryant, from Tennessee, was a United 
States Attorney from the Western District of Tennessee. As a 
captain in the Army, Representative Bryant served in the Judge 
Advocate General Corps and taught at the United States Military 
Academy at West Point. Representative Bryant will explain the 
background of the events that led to the illegal actions of the 
President.
    Following Representative Bryant,  Representative Asa 
Hutchinson, from Arkansas, will give a presentation of the 
factual basis for article II, obstruction of justice. 
Representative Hutchinson is a former United States Attorney 
for the Western District of Arkansas.
    Next, you will hear from Representative Jim Rogan of 
California. Representative Rogan is a former California State 
judge and Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney. 
Representative Rogan will give a presentation of the factual 
basis for article I, grand jury perjury. This should conclude 
our presentation for today.
    Tomorrow, Representative Bill McCollum of Florida will tie 
all of the facts together and give a factual summation. 
Representative McCollum is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Crime, a former Naval Reserve Commander and member of the Judge 
Advocate General Corps.
    Following the presentation of the facts, a team of managers 
will present the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of 
justice and how it applies to the articles of impeachment 
before you. While the Senate has made it clear that a crime is 
not essential to impeachment and removal from office, these 
managers will explain how egregious and criminal the conduct 
alleged in the articles of impeachment is. This team includes 
Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania, Representative 
Steve Chabot of Ohio, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, and 
Representative Chris Cannon of Utah. Representative Gekas is 
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and 
Administrative Law. And in 1989, Representative Gekas served as 
a manager of the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, who 
the Senate convicted on eight articles for making false and 
misleading statements under oath and one article of conspiracy 
to engage in a bribery. Representative Gekas is a former 
assistant district attorney. Representative Chabot serves on 
the Subcommittee on Crime and has experience as a criminal 
defense lawyer. Representative Barr is a former United States 
Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, where he 
specialized in public corruption. He also has experience as a 
criminal defense attorney. Representative Cannon has had 
experience as the Deputy Associate Solicitor General of the 
Department of the Interior and as a practicing attorney. That 
should conclude our presentation for Friday.
    On Saturday, three managers will make a presentation on 
Constitutional law as it relates to this case. There has been a 
great deal of argument about whether the conduct alleged in the 
articles rises to the level of removable offenses. This team's 
analysis of the precedents of the Senate and application of the 
facts of this case will make it clear that the Senate has 
established the conduct alleged in the articles to be removable 
offenses. In this presentation you will hear from 
Representative Charles Canady of Florida, Representative Steve 
Buyer of Indiana and Representative Lindsey Graham of South 
Carolina. Representative Canady is the Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution and one of the leading voices 
on constitutional law in the House. Representative Buyer served 
in the United States Army as a member of the Judge Advocate 
General's Corps where he was assigned as Special Assistant to 
the United States Attorney in Virginia. He also served as a 
deputy to the Indiana Attorney General. Representative Graham 
served in the Air Force as a member of the Judge Advocate 
General's Corps and as a South Carolina Assistant Attorney.
    Following the presentation of the facts, the law of perjury 
and obstruction of justice and constitutional law, Mr. Rogan 
and myself will give you a final summation and closing to our 
initial presentation.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner is recognized.
    Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished 
counsel to the President, and Senators, in his third annual 
message to Congress on December 7, 1903, President Theodore 
Roosevelt said:

    No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we 
ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. 
Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a 
favor.

    We are here today because President William Jefferson 
Clinton decided to put himself above the law--not once, not 
twice, but repeatedly. He put himself above the law when he 
engaged in a multifaceted scheme to obstruct justice during the 
Federal civil rights case of Paula Corbin Jones versus William 
Jefferson Clinton, et. al. He put himself above the law when he 
made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath 
during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998. In both 
instances, he unlawfully attempted to prevent the judicial 
branch of Government--a coequal branch--from performing its 
constitutional duty to administer equal justice under the law.
    The U.S. House of Representatives has determined that the 
President's false and misleading testimony to the grand jury 
and his obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit are high 
crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the Constitution. 
Should the Senate conduct a fair and impartial trial which 
allows each side to present its best case, then the American 
public can be confident that justice has been served, 
regardless of the outcome.
    We hear much about how important the rule of law is to our 
Nation and to our system of government. Some have commented 
that this expression is trite. But, whether expressed by these 
three words, or others, the primacy of law over the rule of 
individuals is what distinguishes the United States from most 
other countries and why our Constitution is as alive today as 
it was 210 years ago.
    The framers of the Constitution devised an elaborate system 
of checks and balances to ensure our liberties by making sure 
that no person, institution, or branch of Government became so 
powerful that a tyranny could ever be established in the United 
States of America.
    We are the trustees of that sacred legacy and whether the 
rule of law and faith in our Nation emerges stronger than ever 
or are diminished irreparably, depends upon the collective 
decision of the message each Senator chooses to send forth in 
the days ahead.
    The evidence you will hear relates solely to the 
President's misconduct, which is contrary to his constitutional 
public responsibility to ensure the laws be faithfully 
executed. It is not about the President's affair with a 
subordinate employee, an affair that was both inappropriate and 
immoral. Mr. Clinton has recognized that this relationship was 
wrong. I give him credit for that. But he has not owned up to 
the false testimony, the stonewalling and legal hairsplitting, 
and obstructing the courts from finding the truth. In doing so, 
he has turned his affair into a public wrong. And for these 
actions, he must be held accountable through the only 
constitutional means the country has available--the difficult 
and painful process of impeachment.
    Impeachment is one of the checks the framers gave to 
Congress to protect the American people from a corrupt or 
tyrannical executive or judicial branch of Government. Because 
the procedure is cumbersome and because a two-thirds vote in 
the Senate is required to remove an official following an 
impeachment trial, safeguards are there to stop Congress from 
increasing its powers at the expense of the other two branches. 
The process is long. It is difficult. It is unpleasant. But, 
above all, it is necessary to maintain the public's trust in 
the conduct of their elected officials--elected officials, such 
as myself and yourselves, who through our oaths of office have 
a duty to follow the law, fulfill our constitutional 
responsibilities, and protect our Republic from public 
wrongdoing.
    The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a separate and 
distinct process in the House and in the Senate. They did not 
expect the House and Senate to conduct virtually identical 
proceedings with the only difference being that conviction in 
the Senate requires a two-thirds vote. That is why the 
Constitution reserves the sole power of impeachment to the 
House of Representatives and the sole power to try all 
impeachments to the Senate. History demonstrates different 
processes were adopted to reflect very different roles.
    In the case of President Andrew Johnson, no hearings were 
held or witnesses called by the House on the President's 
decision to remove Secretary of War Stanton from office. The 
House first approved a general article of impeachment that 
simply stated that President Johnson was impeached for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Five days later, a special House 
committee drew up specific articles. Eleven articles were 
passed by the House, all but two of which were based upon 
President Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office 
Act by his actions in removing Secretary of War Stanton. The 
trial was then conducted with witnesses in the Senate.
    In the case of President Nixon, the House Judiciary 
Committee passed three articles of impeachment based not upon 
their own investigation, but upon the evidence gathered by the 
Ervin Committee, the Patman Committee, the Joint Tax Committee, 
and material from the special prosecutor and various court 
proceedings. Nine witnesses were called at the end of the 
impeachment inquiry, five of them at the request of the White 
House, and their testimony was not at the center of the 
impeachment articles.
    In the Judge Walter Nixon impeachment in 1989, a trial with 
live witnesses was held even after the Senate rejected by less 
than a two-thirds vote a defense motion to dismiss one article 
of impeachment on the grounds that it did not constitute an 
impeachable offense.
    The House managers submit that witnesses are essential to 
give heightened credence to whatever judgment the Senate 
chooses to make on each of the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton.
    The matter of how this proceeding will be conducted remains 
somewhat unsettled. Senate impeachment precedent has been to 
hold a trial. In every impeachment case, the Senate has heard 
from live witnesses. Should the President's counsel dispute the 
facts as laid out by the House of Representatives, the Senate 
will need to hear from live witnesses in order to reach a 
proper and fair judgment as to the truthful facts of this case.
    The House concluded the President made perjurious, false 
and misleading statements before the grand jury, which the 
House believes constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Our 
entire legal system is based upon the courts being able to find 
the truth. That's why witnesses must raise their right hand and 
swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth. That's why there are criminal penalties for perjury and 
making false statements under oath. The need for obtaining 
truthful testimony in court is so important that the Federal 
sentencing guidelines have the same penalties for perjury as 
for bribery.
    The Constitution specifically names bribery as an 
impeachable offense. Perjury is the twin brother of bribery. By 
making the penalty for perjury the same as that for bribery, 
Congress has acknowledged that both crimes are equally serious. 
It follows that perjury and making false statements under oath, 
which is a form of perjury, be considered among the ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' the framers intended to be grounds 
for impeachment.
    The three judicial impeachments of the 1980s were all about 
lies told by a federal judge. Judge Claiborne was removed from 
office for lying on his income tax returns, Judge Hastings was 
removed for lying under oath during a trial, and Judge Nixon 
was removed for making false statements to a grand jury. In 
each case, the Senate showed no leniency to judges who lied. 
Their misconduct was deemed impeachable and more than two-
thirds of the Senate voted to convict.
    If the Senate is convinced that President Clinton lied 
under oath and does not remove him from office, the wrong 
message is given to our courts, those who have business before 
them, and to the country as a whole. That terrible message is 
that we as a nation have set a lower standard for lying under 
oath for Presidents than for judges. Should not the leader of 
our country be held to at least as high a standard as the 
judges he appoints? Should not the President be obliged to tell 
the truth when under oath, just as every citizen must? Should 
not our laws be enforced equally? Your decision in this 
proceeding will answer these questions and set the standard of 
conduct of public officials in town halls and courtrooms and 
the Oval Office for generations.
    Justice is never served by the placing of any public 
official above the law. The framers rejected the British law of 
``The King can do no wrong,'' when they wrote our basic law in 
1787. Any law is only as good as its enforcement, and the 
enforcement of the law against the President was left to 
Congress through the impeachment process.
    A Senate conviction of the President in this matter will 
reaffirm the irrefutable fact that even the President of the 
United States has no license to lie under oath. Deceiving the 
courts is an offense against the public. It prevents the courts 
from administering justice and citizens from receiving justice. 
Every American has the right to go to court for redress of 
wrongs, as well as the right to a jury trial. The jury finds 
the facts. The citizens on the jury cannot correctly find the 
facts absent truthful testimony. That's why it's vital that the 
Senate protect the sanctity of the oath to obtain truthful 
testimony, not just during judicial proceedings but also during 
legislative proceedings.
    Witnesses before Congress, whether Presidential nominees 
seeking Senate confirmation to high posts in the executive or 
judicial branches, federal agency heads testifying during 
investigative hearings, or witnesses at legislative hearings 
giving their opinions on bills are sworn to tell the truth. 
Eroding the oath to tell the truth means that Congress loses 
some of its ability to base its decisions upon truthful 
testimony. Lowering the standard of the truthfulness of sworn 
testimony will create a cancer that will keep the legislative 
branch from discharging its constitutional functions as well.
    Mr. Chief Justice, we are here today because William 
Jefferson Clinton decided to use all means possible--both legal 
and illegal--to subvert the truth about his conduct relevant to 
the federal civil rights suit brought against President Clinton 
by Ms. Paula Jones. Defendants in civil lawsuits cannot pick 
and choose which laws and rules of procedure they will follow 
and which they will not. That's for the trial judge to decide, 
whether the defendant be President or pauper.
    In this case, a citizen claimed her civil rights were 
violated when she refused then Governor Clinton's advances and 
was subsequently harassed at work, denied merit pay raises, and 
finally forced to quit. The court ruled she had the right to 
obtain evidence showing other women including Ms. Lewinsky, got 
jobs, promotions, and raises after submitting to Mr. Clinton, 
and whether other women suffered job detriments after refusing 
similar advances.
    When someone lies about an affair and tries to hide the 
fact, they violate the trust their spouse and family put in 
them. But when they lie about it during a legal proceeding and 
obstruct the parties from obtaining evidence, they prevent the 
courts from administering justice.
    That is an offense against the public, made even worse when 
a poor or powerless person seeks the protections of our civil 
rights from the rich or powerful.
    When an American citizen claims his or her civil rights 
have been violated, we must take those claims seriously. Our 
civil rights laws have remade our society for the better. The 
law gives the same protections to the child denied entry to a 
school or college based upon race as to an employee claiming 
discrimination at work. Once a hole is punched in civil rights 
protections for some, those protections are not worth as much 
for all. Many in the Senate have spent their lives advancing 
individual rights. Their successful efforts have made America a 
better place. In my opinion, this is no time to abandon that 
struggle--no matter the public mood or the political 
consequence.
    Some have said that the false testimony given by the 
President relating to sex should be excused, since as the 
argument goes: ``Everyone lies about sex.'' I ask the Senate to 
stop to think about the consequences of adopting that attitude. 
Our sexual harassment laws would become unenforceable since 
every sexual harassment lawsuit is about sex and much of 
domestic violence litigation is at least partly about sex. If 
defendants in these types of suits are allowed to lie about 
sex, justice cannot be done, and many victims, mostly women, 
will be denied justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the House has adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. Each 
meets the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and each 
is amply supported by the evidence.
    Article I impeaches the President for ``perjurious, false 
and misleading'' testimony during his August 17, 1998, 
appearance before a grand jury of the United States in four 
areas.
    First, the nature and details of his relationship with a 
subordinate government employee;
    Second, prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he 
gave in a federal civil rights action brought against him;
    Third, prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
attorney to make to a federal judge in that federal civil 
rights lawsuit;
    Fourth, his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil 
rights action.
    The evidence will clearly show that President Clinton's 
false testimony to the grand jury was not a single or isolated 
instance which could be excused as a mistake but, rather, a 
comprehensive and calculated plan to prevent the grand jury 
from getting the accurate testimony in order to do its job. 
Furthermore, it is important to dispel the notion that the 
President's false testimony before the grand jury simply 
relates to details of the relationship between President 
Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky. These charges only make up a small 
part of article I. The fact is, the evidence will show that 
President Clinton made numerous perjurious, false and 
misleading statements regarding his efforts to obstruct 
justice.
    Before describing what the evidence in support of article I 
shows, it is also important to clearly demonstrate that the 
Senate has already decided that making false statements under 
oath to a federal grand jury is an impeachable offense.
    The last impeachment decided by the Senate, that of United 
States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, 
involved the Judge's making false statements under oath to a 
federal grand jury, precisely the same charges contained in 
article I against President Clinton. Following an unanimous 417 
to 0 vote in the House, the Senate conducted a full trial and 
removed Judge Nixon from office on the two articles charging 
false statements to a grand jury by votes of 89 to 8 and 78 to 
19. The Senate was clear that the specific misconduct, that is, 
making false statements to a grand jury, which was the basis 
for the Judge's impeachment, warranted his removal from office 
and the Senate proceeded to do just that.
    These votes, a little more than nine years ago on November 
3, 1989, set a clear standard that lying to a grand jury is 
grounds for removal from office. To set a different standard in 
this trial is to say that the standard for judicial 
truthfulness during grand jury testimony is higher than that of 
presidential truthfulness.
    That result would be absurd. The truth is the truth and a 
lie is a lie. There cannot be different levels of the truth for 
judges than for presidents.
    The President's perjurious, false and misleading statements 
regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began early in his 
grand jury testimony. These statements included parts of the 
prepared statement the President read at the beginning of his 
testimony. He referred or reverted to his statement at least 19 
times during the course of his testimony.
    Further, the evidence will show the President made other 
false statements to the grand jury regarding the nature and 
details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at times when he 
did not refer to his prepared statement.
    Second, the evidence will show that the President piled 
perjury upon perjury when he provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in Ms. Paula 
Jones' case.
    On two occasions, the President testified to the grand jury 
that his deposition testimony was the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, and that he was required to give a 
complete answer to each question asked of him during the 
deposition. That means he brought to the grand jury his 
untruthful answers to questions at the deposition.
    Third, the evidence will show the President provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a Federal grand 
jury regarding his attorney's use of an affidavit he knew to be 
false during the deposition in Ms. Paula Jones' case before 
Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright.
    The President denied that he even paid attention to Mr. 
Bennett's use of the affidavit. The evidence will show he made 
this denial because his failure to stop his attorney from 
utilizing a false affidavit at a deposition would constitute 
obstruction of justice. The evidence will also show the 
President did not admit that Mr. Bennett's statement was false 
because to do so would be to admit that he had perjured himself 
earlier that day during the grand jury testimony, as well as at 
the deposition.
    Fourth, the evidence will show that the President provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury 
concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in Ms. Paula 
Jones' civil rights action.
    The evidence will show that these statements related to at 
least four areas:
    First, his false statements relating to gifts exchanged 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The subpoena served on 
Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case required her to produce each and 
every gift she had received from the President. These gifts 
were not turned over as required by the subpoena but ended up 
under Ms. Betty Currie's bed in a sealed container. The 
President denied under oath that he directed Ms. Currie to get 
the gifts, but the evidence will show that Ms. Currie did call 
Ms. Lewinsky about them and that there was no reason for her 
doing so unless directed by the President.
    Second, the President made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to the grand jury regarding his knowledge that the 
Lewinsky affidavit submitted at the deposition was untrue. The 
evidence will show that the President testified falsely on this 
issue on at least three separate occasions during his grand 
jury testimony. He also provided false testimony on whether he 
encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit.
    Third, the President made false and misleading statements 
to the grand jury by reciting a false account of the facts 
regarding his interactions with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie, 
who was a potential witness against him in Ms. Jones' case.
    The record reflects the President tried to coach Ms. Currie 
to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions should she 
be called as a witness. The evidence will show the President 
testified to the grand jury that he was trying to figure out 
what the facts were, but in reality the conversation with Ms. 
Currie consisted of a number of very false and misleading 
statements.
    Finally, the President made perjurious, false and 
misleading statements to aides regarding his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President tried 
to have it both ways on this issue. He testified that his 
statements to aides were both true and misleading--true and 
misleading.
    The evidence will show that he met with four aides who 
would later be called to testify before the grand jury. They 
included Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. John Podesta, Mr. Erskine 
Bowles, and Mr. Harold Ickes. Each of them related to the grand 
jury the untruths they had been told by the President. I have 
recited this long catalogue of false statements to show that 
the President's false statements to the grand jury were neither 
few in number nor isolated but, rather, pervaded his entire 
testimony.
    There can be no question that the President's false 
statements to the grand jury were material to the subject of 
the inquiry. Grand juries are utilized to obtain sworn 
testimony from witnesses to determine whether a crime has been 
committed. The Attorney General and the Special Division of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit appointed an independent counsel pursuant to law and 
added areas of inquiry because they believed there was evidence 
that the President may have committed crimes. Grand jury 
testimony relevant to the criminal probe is always material to 
the issue of whether someone has committed a crime.
    Based upon the precedent in the Judge Nixon impeachment, 
the law, the facts, and the evidence, if you find the President 
made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath to 
the grand jury, I respectfully submit that your duty will be to 
find William Jefferson Clinton guilty with respect to article I 
and to remove him from office.
    Article II impeaches William Jefferson Clinton for 
preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of 
justice in the Jones case by either directly or through 
subordinates and agents engaging in a scheme to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony 
relating to Ms. Jones' Federal civil rights action.
    As in the case of article I, the President's direct and 
indirect actions were not isolated mistakes but were 
multifaceted actions specifically designed to prevent Ms. Paula 
Jones from having her day in court.
    While the Senate determined in the Judge Nixon trial that 
the making of false statements to a Federal grand jury 
warranted conviction and removal from office, no impeachment on 
an obstruction of justice charge has ever reached the Senate.
    Therefore, this article is a matter of first impression. 
However, the impeachment inquiry of the House Judiciary 
Committee into the conduct of President Richard Nixon, as well 
as the relevant Federal criminal statutes, clearly shows 
President Clinton's actions to be within the definition of 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' contained in the Constitution.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon 
approved by the Judiciary Committee charged Mr. Nixon with 
``engag(ing) personally and through his subordinates and agents 
in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and 
obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up, 
conceal and protect those responsible and to conceal the 
existence and scope of other unlawful activities.''
    The article charged that the implementation of the plan 
included nine separate areas of misconduct. Included among 
these were, one, making or causing to be made false and 
misleading statements to investigative officers and employees 
of the United States; two, withholding relevant and material 
evidence from such persons; three, approving, condoning, 
acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to the 
giving of false and misleading statements to such persons as 
well as in judicial and congressional proceedings.
    History shows us that President Nixon's resignation was the 
only act that prevented the Senate from voting on this article, 
and that the President's conviction and removal from office 
were all but certain.
    There are two sections of the Federal Criminal Code placing 
penalties on those who obstruct justice. Title 18, United 
States Code, section 1503, punishes ``whoever . . . corruptly, 
or by threats or force . . . obstructs, or impedes or endeavors 
to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of 
justice.''
    The courts have held that this section relates to pending 
judicial process, which can be a civil action. Ms. Jones' case 
fits that definition at the time of the President's actions as 
alleged in article II, as does the Office of Independent 
Counsel's investigation.
    Title 18, United States Code, section 1512, punishes, 
``Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts 
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to . . . influence, delay or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding . . . (or) 
cause or induce any person to . . . withhold testimony, or 
withhold a record, document, or other object from an official 
proceeding. . . .''
    The evidence will show that President Clinton's actions 
constituted obstruction of justice in seven specific instances 
as alleged in article II. Paragraph one alleges that on or 
about December 17, 1997, the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky, 
who would be subpoenaed as a witness in Ms. Jones' case two 
days later, to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew would be 
perjurious, false, and misleading.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
    Second, article II alleges that on or about that same day, 
the President corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called 
to testify personally in that proceeding. Ms. Lewinsky, on the 
witness list at that time, could have been expected to be 
required to give live testimony in the Jones case and in fact 
she was subsequently subpoenaed for a deposition in that case.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
    Third, article II alleges on or about December 28, 1997, 
the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
scheme to conceal evidence which had been subpoenaed in Ms. 
Jones' civil rights case. He did so by asking Ms. Betty Currie 
to retrieve evidence from Ms. Lewinsky that had been subpoenaed 
in the case of Jones v. Clinton.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated the 
second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
    Fourth, article II alleges that beginning on or about 
December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 
14, 1998, the President intensified and succeeded in an effort 
to secure job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in order to corruptly 
prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case at a time when 
her truthful testimony would have been harmful to him.
    While Ms. Lewinsky had sought employment in New York City 
long before the dates in question, helping her find a suitable 
job was clearly a low priority for the President and his 
associates until it became obvious she would become a witness 
in the Jones case. The evidence will clearly show an 
intensification of that effort after her name appeared on the 
witness list. This effort was ultimately successful and the 
evidence will show that the President's actions violated both 
Federal obstruction statutes.
    Fifth, article II alleges on January 17, 1998, the 
President corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements to Judge Wright characterizing the 
Lewinsky affidavit in order to prevent questioning deemed 
relevant by the judge. The President's attorney, Robert 
Bennett, subsequently acknowledged such false and misleading 
statements in a communication to Judge Wright.
    The evidence will show the President's actions clearly 
violate the second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
    Sixth, article II alleges that on or about January 18, 20, 
and 21, 1998, the President related a false and misleading 
account of events relevant to Ms. Jones' civil rights suit to 
Ms. Betty Currie, a potential witness in the proceeding, in 
order to corruptly influence her testimony.
    The evidence will show that President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, his personal 
secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to 
possible questions that might be asked of her if called to 
testify in Ms. Paula Jones' case. The President did this 
shortly after he had been deposed in the civil action.
    During the deposition, he frequently referred to Ms. 
Currie, and it was logical that, based upon his testimony, Ms. 
Currie would be called as a witness.
    The evidence will show that two hours after the completion 
of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie to ask her 
to come to the office the next day, which was a Sunday.
    When Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, she 
acknowledged the President made a series of leading statements 
or questions and concluded that the President wanted her to 
agree with him.
    The evidence will show the President's actions violated 
both statutes but, most particularly, section 1512.
    In United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77 at 82 (2d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said,

    The most obvious example of a section 1512 violation may be 
the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a 
false story as if the story were true, intending that the 
witness believes the story and testifies to it before the grand 
jury.

    If the President's actions do not fit this example, I'm at 
a loss to know what actions do.
    Seventh, and last, article II alleges on or about January 
21, 23, and 26, 1998, the President made false and misleading 
statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury 
proceeding in order to corruptly influence this testimony of 
those witnesses. The article further alleges these false and 
misleading statements were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and 
misleading information.
    The evidence will show that these statements were made to 
Presidential aides Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. Erskine Bowles, 
Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Harold Ickes. They all testified to 
the grand jury. By his own admission seven months later, on 
August 17, 1998, during his sworn grand jury testimony, the 
President said that he told a number of aides that he did not 
have an affair with Ms. Lewinsky and did not have sex with her. 
He told one aide, Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, that Ms. Monica 
Lewinsky came on to him and he rebuffed her. President Clinton 
also admitted that he knew these aides might be called before 
the grand jury as witnesses. The evidence will show they were 
called; they related the President's false statements to the 
grand jury; and that by the time the President made his 
admission to the grand jury the damage had already been done.
    This is a classic violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1512.
    The seven specific allegations of obstruction of justice 
contained in article II were designed to prevent the judicial 
branch of government, a separate and coequal branch, from doing 
its work in Ms. Paula Jones' lawsuit. Based upon the allegation 
of article I against President Nixon in 1974, as well as 
repeated and calculated violations of two key criminal 
obstruction statutes, William Jefferson Clinton committed an 
impeachable offense.
    In article II, the evidence is conclusive that President 
Clinton put himself above the law in obstructing justice, not 
once, not just a few times, but as a part of a extensive scheme 
to prevent Ms. Jones from obtaining the evidence she thought 
she needed to prove her civil rights claims.
    Complying with the law is the duty of all parties to 
lawsuits and those who are required to give truthful testimony. 
A defendant in a Federal civil rights action does not have the 
luxury to choose what evidence the court may consider. He must 
abide by the law and the rules of procedure. William Jefferson 
Clinton tried to say that the law did not apply to him during 
his term of office in civil cases were concerned. He properly 
lost that argument in the Supreme Court in a unanimous 
decision.
    Even though the Supreme Court decided that the President 
wasn't above the law and that Ms. Jones' case could proceed, 
William Jefferson Clinton decided--and decided alone--to act as 
if the Supreme Court had never acted and that Judge Wright's 
orders didn't apply to him. What he did was criminal, time and 
time again. These criminal acts were in direct conflict with 
the President's obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.
    Based upon the repeated violations of Federal criminal law, 
its effect upon the courts to find the truth, and the 
President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, if you find that the President did, indeed, obstruct 
the administration of justice through his acts, I respectfully 
submit your duty will be to find William Jefferson Clinton 
guilty with respect to article II and to remove him from 
office.
    It is truly sad when the leader of the greatest nation in 
the world gets caught up in a series of events where one 
inappropriate and criminal act leads to another and another and 
another.
    Even sadder is that the President himself could have 
stopped this process simply by telling the truth and accepting 
the consequences of his prior mistakes. At least six times 
since December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton could have 
told the truth and suffered the consequences. Instead, he chose 
lies, perjury, and deception. He could have told the truth when 
he first learned that Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the 
Jones case. He could have told the truth at his civil 
deposition. He could have told the truth to Betty Currie. He 
could have told the truth when the news media first broke the 
story of his affair. He could have told the truth to his aides 
and cabinet. He could have told the truth to the American 
people. Instead, he shook his finger at each and every American 
and said, ``I want you to listen to me,'' and proceeded to tell 
a straight-faced lie to the American people.
    Finally, he had one more opportunity to tell the truth. He 
could have told the truth to the grand jury. Had he told the 
truth last January, there would have been no independent 
counsel investigation of this matter, no grand jury appearance, 
no impeachment inquiry, no House approval of articles of 
impeachment, and we would not be here today fulfilling a 
painful but essential constitutional duty. Instead, he chose 
lies and deception, despite warnings from friends, aides, and 
members of the House and Senate that failure to tell the truth 
would have grave consequences.
    When the case against him was being heard by the House 
Judiciary Committee, he sent his lawyers, who did not present 
any new evidence to rebut the facts and evidence sent to the 
House by the Independent Counsel. Rather, they disputed the 
Committee's interpretation of the evidence by relying on 
tortured, convoluted, and unreasonable interpretations of the 
President's words and actions.
    During his presentation to the House Judiciary Committee, 
the President's very able lawyer, Charles Ruff, was asked 
directly: Did the President lie during his sworn grand jury 
testimony?
    Mr. Ruff could have answered that question directly. He did 
not, and his failure to do so speaks a thousand words.
    Is there not something sacred when a witness in a judicial 
proceeding raises his or her right hand and swears before God 
and the public to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth? Do we want to tell the country that its leader 
gets a pass when he is required to give testimony under oath? 
Should we not be concerned about the effect of allowing 
perjurious, false, and misleading statements by the President 
to go unpunished on the truthfulness of anyone's testimony in 
future judicial or legislative proceedings? What do we tell the 
approximately 115 people now in Federal prison for the crime of 
perjury?
    The answers to all these questions ought to be obvious.
    As elected officials, our opinions are frequently shaped by 
constituents telling us their own stories. Let me tell you one 
related to me about the poisonous results of allowing false 
statements under oath to go unpunished.
    Last October while the Starr report was being hotly 
debated, one circuit court judge for Dodge County, WI, 
approached me on the street in Mayville, WI. He said that some 
citizens had business in his court and suggested that one of 
them take the witness stand and be put under oath to tell the 
truth. The citizen then asked if he could tell the truth ``just 
like the President.''
    How many people who have to come to court to testify under 
oath about matters they would like to keep to themselves think 
about what that citizen asked Judge John Storck? How will the 
courts be able to administer the ``equal justice under law'' we 
all hold so dear if we do not enforce the sanctity of that oath 
even against the President of the United States?
    When each of us is elected or chosen to serve in public 
office, we make a compact with the people of the United States 
of America to conduct ourselves in an honorable manner, 
hopefully setting a higher standard for ourselves than we 
expect of others. That should mean we are careful to obey all 
the laws we make, execute, and interpret.
    There is more than truth in the words, ``A public office is 
a public trust.''
    When someone breaks that trust, he or she must be held 
accountable and suffer the consequences for the breach. If 
there is no accountability, that means a President can set 
himself above the law for 4 years, a Senator for 6, a 
Representative for 2, and a judge for life. That, Mr. Chief 
Justice, poses a far greater threat to the liberties guaranteed 
to the American people by the Constitution than anything 
imaginable.
    For the past 11 months, the toughest questions I have had 
to answer have come from parents who wanted to know what to 
tell their children about what President Clinton did.
    Every parent tries to teach their children to know the 
difference between right and wrong, to always tell the truth, 
and when they make mistakes, to take responsibility for them, 
and to face the consequences of their actions.
    President Clinton's actions at every step since he knew Ms. 
Lewinsky would be a witness in Ms. Jones' case have been 
completely opposite to the values parents hope to teach their 
children.
    But being a poor example isn't grounds for impeachment. 
Undermining the rule of law is. Frustrating the court's ability 
to administer justice turns private misconduct into an attack 
upon the ability of one of the three branches of our government 
to impartially administer justice. This is a direct attack upon 
the rule of law in our country and a very public wrong that 
goes to the constitutional workings of our government and its 
ability to protect the civil rights of even the weakest 
American.
    What is on trial here is the truth and the rule of law. 
Failure to bring President Clinton to account for his serial 
lying under oath and preventing the courts from administering 
equal justice under law will cause a cancer to be present in 
our society for generations.
    Those parents who ask the questions should be able to tell 
their children that even if you are the President of the United 
States, if you lie when sworn to tell the truth, the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, you will face the consequences 
of that action even when you won't accept the responsibility 
for it.
    How those parents will answer those questions is up to the 
U.S. Senate.
    While how today's parents answer those questions is 
important, equally important is what parents tell their 
children in the generations to come about the history of our 
country and what has set our government in the United States of 
America apart from the rest of the world.
    Above the President's dais in this Senate chamber appears 
our national motto: ``E pluribus unum''--``out of many, one.'' 
When that motto was adopted more than 200 years ago, the First 
Congress referred to how 13 separate colonies turned themselves 
into one united nation.
    As the decades have gone by, that motto has taken an 
additional meaning. People of all nationalities, faiths, 
creeds, and values have come to our shores, shed their 
allegiances to their old countries and achieved their dreams to 
become Americans.
    They came here to flee religious persecution, to escape 
corrupt, tyrannical and oppressive governments, and to leave 
behind the economic stagnation and endless wars of their 
homelands.
    They came here to be able to practice their faiths as they 
saw fit--free of government dictates and to be able to provide 
better lives for themselves and their families by the sweat of 
their own brows and the use of their own intellect.
    But they also came here because they knew America has a 
system of government where the Constitution and laws protect 
individual liberties and human rights. Everyone--yes, 
everyone--can argue that this country has been a beacon for the 
individual citizen's ability to be what he or she can be.
    From countries where the rulers ruled at the expense of the 
people, they fled to America where the leaders were expected to 
govern for the benefit of the people.
    Throughout the years, America's leaders have tried to earn 
the trust of the American people, not by their words but by 
their actions.
    America is a place where government exists by the consent 
of the governed, and that means our Nation's leaders must earn 
and re-earn the trust of the people with everything they do.
    Whenever an elected official stumbles, that trust is eroded 
and public cynicism goes up. The more cynicism that exists 
about government, its institutions, and those chosen to serve 
in them, the more difficult the job is for those who are 
serving.
    That's why it is important--yes, vital--that when a cancer 
exists in the body politic, our job--our duty--is to excise it. 
If we fail in our duty, I fear the difficult and dedicated work 
done by thousands of honorable men and women elected to serve 
not just here in Washington but in our State capitals, city 
halls, courthouses and school board rooms, will be swept away 
in a sea of public cynicism. We must not allow the beacon of 
America to grow dim or the American dream to disappear with 
each waking morning.
    In 1974, the Congress did its painful public duty when the 
President of the United States broke the public trust.
    During the last decade, both Houses impeached and removed 
three Federal judges who broke their trust with the people.
    During the last 10 years, the House of Representatives 
disciplined two Speakers for breaking the rules and their trust 
with the public.
    Less than 6 years ago, this honorable Senate did the same 
to a senior Senator whose accomplishments were widely praised.
    In each case, Congress did the right thing to help restore 
the vital trust upon which our Government depends. It wasn't 
easy, nor was it always popular, but Congress did the right 
thing. Now this honorable Senate must do the right thing. It 
must listen to the evidence; it must determine whether William 
Jefferson Clinton repeatedly broke our criminal laws and thus 
broke his trust with the people--a trust contained in the 
Presidential oath put into the Constitution by the framers--an 
oath that no other Federal official must take, an oath to 
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
    How the Senate decides the issues to be presented in this 
trial will determine the legacy we pass to future generations 
of Americans.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who have made 
America what it is.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who put their 
``lives, fortunes and Sacred Honor'' on the line when they 
signed the Declaration of Independence.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of the framers of the 
Constitution whose preamble states that one of its purposes is 
``to establish justice.''
    The Senate can follow the legacy of James Madison and the 
Members of the First Congress who wrote and passed a Bill of 
Rights to protect and preserve the liberties of the American 
people.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who achieved 
equal rights for all Americans during the 1960s in Congress, in 
the courts, on the streets, in the buses, and at the lunch 
counters.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of those who brought 
President Nixon to justice during Watergate in the belief that 
no President can place himself above the law.
    The Senate can follow the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt who 
lived and governed by the principle that no man is above the 
law.
    Within the walls of the Capitol and throughout this great 
country there rages an impassioned and divisive debate over the 
future of this Presidency. This Senate now finds itself in the 
midst of the tempest. An already immense and agonizing duty is 
made even more so because the whims of public opinion polls, 
the popularity and unpopularity of individuals, even questions 
over the strength of our economy, risk subsuming the true 
nature of this grave and unwelcome task.
    We have all anguished over the sequence of events that have 
led us to this, the conclusive stage in the process. We have 
all identified in our own minds where it could have and should 
have stopped, but we have ended up here, before the Senate of 
the United States, where you, the Senators, will have to render 
judgment based upon the facts.
    A scientist in search of the basic nature of a substance 
begins by boiling away what is not of the essence. Similarly, 
the Senate will sift through the layers of debris that shroud 
the truth. The residue of this painful and divisive process is 
bitter, even poisonous at times. But beneath it lies the 
answer. The evidence will show that at its core, the question 
over the President's guilt and the need for his conviction will 
be clear because at its core, the issues involved are basic 
questions of right versus wrong--deceptive, criminal behavior 
versus honesty, integrity, and respect for the law.
    The President engaged in a conspiracy of crimes to prevent 
justice from being served. These are impeachable offenses for 
which the President should be convicted. Over the course of the 
days and weeks to come, we, the House managers, will endeavor 
to make this case.
    May these proceedings be fair and thorough. May they embody 
our highest capacity for truth and mutual respect. With these 
principles as our guides, we can begin with the full knowledge 
our democracy will prevail and that our Nation will emerge a 
stronger, better place.
    Our legacy now must be not to lose the trust the people 
should have in our Nation's leaders.
    Our legacy now must be not to cheapen the legacies left by 
our forebears.
    Our legacy must be to do the right thing based upon the 
evidence.
    For the sake of our country, the Senate must not fail.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the 
Senate, and my distinguished colleagues from the bar, I am Ed 
Bryant, the Representative from the Seventh District of 
Tennessee. During this portion of the case, I, along with 
Representative Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas, Representative James 
Rogan of California, and Representative Bill McCollum of 
Florida, will present the factual elements of this case. Our 
presentation is a very broad roadmap with which, first, I will 
provide the history and background of the parties, followed by 
Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Rogan, who will review the articles of 
impeachment. Mr. McCollum will close with a summation of these 
facts and evidence.
    It is our intent to proceed in a chronological fashion, 
although by necessity there will be some overlap of the facts 
and circumstances arising from what I have called ``the four-
way intersection collision'' of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, Ms. Paula Corbin Jones, Monica Lewinsky, and the U.S. 
Constitution.
    As a further preface to my remarks, permit me to say that 
none of us present here today in this hallowed Chamber relishes 
doing this job before us. But we did not choose to be involved 
in that reckless misconduct, nor did we make those reasoned and 
calculated decisions to cover up that misconduct which 
underlies this proceeding. However, this collision at the 
intersection, if you will, of the President, Ms. Jones, and Ms. 
Lewinsky, is not in and of itself enough to bring us together 
today. No. Had truth been a witness at this collision and 
prevailed, we would not be here. But when it was not present, 
even under an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth in a judicial matter, the impact of our 
Constitution must be felt. Hence, we are together today--to do 
our respective duties.
    By voting these articles of impeachment, the House is not 
attempting to raise the standard of conduct to perfection for 
our political leadership. Such a person does not walk the world 
today. Everyone falls short of this mark every day.
    Political life is not so much about how an individual fails 
but, rather, how the person reacts to that failure. For 
example, a person campaigning for a political office admits 
wrongdoing in his past and says he will not do that again. Most 
people accept that commitment. He is elected. Thereafter, he 
repeats this wrongdoing and is confronted again. What does he 
do? He takes steps to cover up this wrongdoing by using his 
workers and his friends. He lies under oath in a lawsuit which 
is very important to the person he is alleged to have harmed. 
He then takes a political poll as to whether he should tell the 
truth under oath. The poll indicates the voters would not 
forgive him for lying under oath. So he then denies the truth 
in a Federal grand jury. If this person is the President of the 
United States, the House of Representatives would consider 
articles of impeachment. It did and voted to impeach this 
President.
    But do not let it be argued in these chambers that ``we are 
not electing Saints; we are electing Presidents.'' Rather, let 
it be said that we are electing people who are imperfect and 
who have made mistakes in life but who are willing to so 
respect this country and the Office of the President that he or 
she will now lay aside their own personal shortcomings and have 
the inner strength to discipline themselves sufficiently that 
they do not break the law which they themselves are sworn to 
uphold.
    Every trial must have a beginning and this trial begins on 
a cold day in January 1993.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    I, William Jefferson Clinton, do solemnly swear that I will 
faithfully execute the office of President of the United 
States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States. So help me 
God.

    Mr. Manager BRYANT. I had expected a video portion, but all 
of you heard the audio portion. As you can hear from the audio 
portion--perhaps some of you can see--William Jefferson Clinton 
placed his left hand on the Bible in front of his wife, the 
Chief Justice, and every American watching that day and 
affirmatively acknowledged his oath of office. On that very day 
and again in January of 1997, the President joined a privileged 
few; he became only the 42nd person in our Nation to make the 
commitment to ``faithfully execute'' the office of the 
President and to ``preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution.'' He has the complete executive power of the 
Nation vested in him by virtue of this Constitution.
    As we progress throughout the day, I would ask that you be 
reminded of the importance of this oath. Before you is a copy 
of it and certainly available as anyone would like to look at 
it on breaks.
    William Jefferson Clinton is a man of great distinction. He 
is well-educated, with degrees from Georgetown University and 
Yale Law School. He has taught law school courses to aspiring 
young lawyers. He served as Governor and Attorney General for 
the State of Arkansas, enforcing the laws of that state. The 
President now directs our great Nation. He sets our agenda and 
creates national policy in a very public way. He is in fact a 
role model for many.
    President Clinton also serves as the Nation's chief law 
enforcement officer.
    It is primarily in this capacity that the President 
appoints Federal judges. Within the executive branch, he 
selected Attorney General Janet Reno and appointed each of the 
93 U.S. attorneys who are charged with enforcing all Federal, 
civil, and criminal law in Federal courthouses from Anchorage, 
AK, to Miami, FL, and from San Diego, CA, to Bangor, ME.
    Before you we have another chart which shows the schematics 
of the Department of Justice and how it is under the direct 
control of the President through his Cabinet, Attorney General 
and then down to such functions as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Immigration, U.S. Marshals Office, Bureau of Prisons, and so 
many other very important legal functions this Federal 
Government performs.
    As protectors of our Constitution, the U.S. attorneys and 
their assistants prosecute more than 50,000 cases per year.
    Through these appointments and his administration's 
policies, the President establishes the climate in this country 
for law and order. Each and every one of these 50,000 cases 
handled by his U.S. attorneys is dependent upon the parties and 
witnesses telling the truth under oath. Equally as important in 
these proceedings is that justice not be obstructed by 
tampering with witnesses nor hiding evidence.
    Quoting from the November 9, 1998 Constitution Subcommittee 
testimony of attorney Charles J. Cooper, a Washington, DC 
attorney, he states:

    The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the 
crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses 
against our system of government, visiting injury immediately 
upon society itself, whether or not committed in connection 
with the exercise of official government powers. Before the 
framing of our Constitution and since, our law has consistently 
recognized that perjury primarily and directly injures the body 
politic, for it subverts the judicial process and this strikes 
at the heart of the rule of law itself.

    Professor Gary McDowell, the Director at the Institute for 
United States Studies at the University of London, also 
testified in the same hearing in reference to the influential 
writer William Paley, and this is also in chart form for those 
who would like to review it later. Paley saw the issue of oaths 
and perjury as one of morality as well as law. Because a 
witness swears that he will speak the truth, the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth, a person under oath cannot cleverly 
lie and not commit perjury. If the witness conceals any truth, 
Paley writes, that relates to the matter in adjudication, that 
is as much a violation of the oath as to testify a positive 
falsehood. Shame or embarrassment cannot justify his 
concealment of truth; linguistic contortions with the words 
used cannot legitimately conceal a lie or, if under oath, 
perjury.
    Professor McDowell concludes with a quote from Paley which 
accurately provides, I believe, the essence of a lie or 
perjurious statement:

    It is willful deceit that makes the lie; and we willfully 
deceive, where our expressions are not true in the sense in 
which we believe the hearer apprehends them.

    Neither has this U.S. Senate been silent on the issue of 
perjury. You have rightfully recognized through previous 
impeachment proceedings the unacceptable nature of a high 
government official lying under oath, even in matters initially 
arising from what some would argue here are merely personal. In 
1989, many of you present today, using the very same standard, 
which is section 4 of the Constitution, which is set forth 
there, for impeaching a Federal judge or the President, 
actually voted in support of a conviction and the removal of a 
U.S. district judge.
    Indeed, truth-telling is the most important judicial 
precept underpinning our great system of justice, a system 
which permits the courthouse doors to be open to all people, 
from the most powerful man in America to a young woman from 
Arkansas.
    On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones attempted to open that 
courthouse door when she filed a Federal sexual harassment 
lawsuit against President Clinton. The case arose from a 1991 
incident when she was a State employee and he was the Governor. 
Further details of the underlying allegations are not important 
to us today, but Ms. Jones' pursuit for the truth is worth a 
careful study.
    The parties first litigated the question of whether Ms. 
Jones' lawsuit would have to be deferred until after the 
President left office. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
the President's contention and allowed the case to proceed 
without further delay.
    Ms. Jones sought and appropriately won ``her day in 
court.'' Incumbent with this victory, however, was the 
reasonable expectation that President Clinton would tell the 
truth.
    After all, this was the most important case in the whole 
world to Paula Corbin Jones.
    Notwithstanding this, the fact didn't happen that the 
President told the truth. Even after the President was ordered 
to stand trial, pursuing the truth for Ms. Jones remained an 
elusive task. The evidence will indicate that President Clinton 
committed perjury and orchestrated a variety of efforts to 
obstruct justice, all of which--all of which--had the effect of 
preventing the discovery of the truth in the Paula Jones case.
    During the discovery phase, Judge Susan Webber Wright of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of 
Arkansas ordered the President to answer certain historical 
questions about his sexual relations with either State or 
Federal employees.
    In part, Judge Wright said:

    The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled 
to information regarding any individuals with whom the 
President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have 
sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame 
state or federal employees.

    Judge Wright validated Ms. Jones' right to use this 
accepted line of questioning in sexual harassment litigation. 
More often than not, these cases involve situations where ``he 
said/she said,'' and they produce issues of credibility and are 
often done in private. Because of this, they are really 
difficult for a victim to prove.
    Such standard questions are essential in establishing 
whether the defendant has committed the same kind of acts 
before or since--in other words, a pattern or practice of 
harassing conduct. The existence of such corroborative evidence 
or the lack thereof is likely to be critical in these types of 
cases. Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
guidelines and the Federal Rules of Evidence permit this type 
of evidence. In short, a defendant's sexual history, at least 
with respect to other employees, is ordinarily discoverable in 
a sexual harassment lawsuit.
    To not expect a defendant in this type of litigation to 
speak the truth creates, in its worst case, a very real danger 
to the entire area of sexual harassment law which would be 
irreparably damaged and, in its best case, sends out a very 
wrong message. As such, the will and intent of Congress with 
regard to providing protection against sexual harassment in the 
workplace would be effectively undermined.
    The ``pattern and practice'' witnesses whom Paula Corbin 
Jones was entitled to discover should have included the name of 
Monica Lewinsky. But before I discuss the Ms. Lewinsky matter, 
I want to offer three matters of cause to each of you as jurors 
in this very important matter.
    No. 1, I do not intend to discuss the specific details of 
the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky. However, I do not 
want to give the Senate the impression that those encounters 
are irrelevant or lack serious legal implications. In fact, 
every day in the courtrooms all across America, victims of 
sexual harassment, of rape, assault, and abuse must testify in 
many public cases in order to vindicate their personal rights 
and society's right to be free of these intolerable acts.
    The President's lies about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky in 
the Oval Office also make these unseemly details highly 
relevant. If you are to accept the President's version about 
the relationship, you must in effect say to Ms. Lewinsky that 
she is the one who is disregarding the truth. But beyond this, 
his denials also directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, 
not only directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony but also 
contradict eight of her friends and the statements by two 
professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared 
details of her relationship. By law, their testimony may serve 
as proper and admissible evidence to corroborate her side of 
this important story.
    No. 2, the evidence and testimony in this proceeding must 
be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. Please do 
not be misled into considering each event in isolation and then 
treating it separately. Remember, events and words that may 
seem innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on 
a sinister or even criminal connotation when observed in the 
context of the whole plot.
    For example, we all agree that Ms. Lewinsky testified, ``No 
one ever told me to lie . . .'' When considered alone, this 
statement would seem exculpatory. In the context of other 
evidence, however, we see that this one statement gives a 
misleading inference. Of course no one said, ``Now, Monica, you 
go down there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Based upon their 
previous spoken and even unspoken words, Ms. Lewinsky knew what 
was expected of her. Surely, if the President were to come to 
the Senate floor and give testimony during this proceeding, he 
would not tell you that he honestly expected her to tell the 
truth about their personal relationship. After all, the purpose 
of her filing the false affidavit was to avoid testifying in 
the Jones case and discussing the nature of their relationship. 
If she had told the truth in that affidavit instead of lying, 
she would have been invited to testify immediately, if not 
sooner.
    No. 3, throughout our presentation of the facts, especially 
as it relates to the various illegal acts, I ask you to pay 
particular attention to what I call the big picture. Look at 
the results of those various acts as well as who benefited. 
Please make a mental note now, if you can, and ask yourself 
always as you look at each one of these illegal acts that are 
presented to you: A. What was the result of that illegal act? 
B. Who benefited from that illegal act?
    I believe you will find that the evidence will show that 
while the President's ``fingerprints'' may not be directly on 
the evidence proving these illegal acts, the result of the acts 
usually inures to the benefit of the President and the 
President alone. Subordinates and friends alike are drawn into 
this web of deceit. The President is insulated. Crimes are 
committed. Justice is denied. The rule of law is suspended. And 
this President is the beneficiary.
    Some examples:
    No. 1, subpoenaed evidence disappears from Ms. Lewinsky's 
apartment and reappears under Ms. Currie's bed. What was the 
result of that? Who had the benefit of that?
    No. 2, Ms. Lewinsky files a false affidavit in the Jones 
case. What is the result of filing that false affidavit and who 
benefited from that?
    No. 3, the President's attorney files the Lewinsky 
affidavit, not knowing it was false, representing to the Court 
that ``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape, or form,'' while the President sits in the deposition 
and does not object to that--very silently sits in the 
deposition. What was the result of that? And who benefited from 
that filing of the affidavit?
    No. 4, and finally, Ms. Lewinsky, after months of job 
searching in New York City, is offered a job with a Fortune 500 
company in New York City within 48 hours of her signing this 
false affidavit. Who shared the results of that with Ms. 
Lewinsky? And who obtained the benefit of that?
    Another example occurred in a meeting between the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky in July--on July 4, 1997, to be specific--
when, as a part of their conversation, she mentioned she heard 
someone from Newsweek was working on a story about Kathleen 
Willey. The President has Ms. Lewinsky back for a visit on July 
14, some 10 days later, following his return from an overseas 
trip. She was questioned about the Willey story and 
specifically if Linda Tripp had been her source.
    Important to this point--important to this point--the 
President then asked Ms. Lewinsky to try to persuade Ms. Tripp 
to call White House Legal Counsel Bruce Lindsey. The President 
told her to notify Ms. Currie the following day, ``without 
getting into the details with her, even mentioning names with 
her,'' whether Ms. Lewinsky had ``mission accomplished'' with 
Linda. And as you will learn from Mr. Hutchinson, who will 
follow me with his presentation, this is very similar to the 
method of operation with another job the President requested be 
done, which in that case succeeded with a ``mission 
accomplished.'' I ask you to watch for that in Mr. Hutchinson's 
presentation.
    I want to now rewind the clock back to November of 1995. We 
are here in Washington where Ms. Lewinsky has been working at 
the White House since July of 1995.
    As you continue to listen to the evidence, from this point 
on November 15 forward, remember that Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President were alone in the Oval Office workplace area at least 
21 times. And I have a list of these, in chart form, beginning 
in November of 1995 and going through 1996 and into the early 
part of 1997, continuing through the year. During that time, 
they had at least 11 of the so-called salacious encounters 
there in the workplace at various times during the day and 
night: Three in 1995, five in 1996, and three in 1997.
    They also had in excess of 50 telephone conversations, most 
of which appear to have been telephone calls to and from Ms. 
Lewinsky's home. And I have a schedule of all these telephone 
calls to show you, the 50-plus telephone calls. Also, they 
exchanged some 64 gifts, with the President receiving 40 of 
these gifts and Ms. Lewinsky receiving 24 of these gifts. And 
again we have charts that reflect the receipt of both sets of 
gifts. And again these charts will be here in the front, always 
available for your inspection.
    We also note that their affair began on November 15. 
Interestingly, there is even a conflict here with the 
President. According to Ms. Lewinsky, they had never spoken to 
each other up to that point. Yet he asked an unknown intern 
into the Oval Office and kissed her and then invited her back 
to return later that day, when the two engaged in the first of 
the 11 acts of misconduct.
    The contradiction is in the statement that the President 
relied upon in his grand jury testimony that has been 
referenced earlier--very carefully worded--and that statement 
the President gave in testimony before the grand jury about 
meeting in this relationship. And he says, ``I regret that what 
began as a friendship came to include this conduct . . .'' 
Almost as if it had evolved over a period of time. So there is 
very clearly a conflict there.
    As Ms. Lewinsky's internship was ending that year, she did 
apply and receive a paying job with the White House Office of 
Legislative Affairs. This position allowed her even more access 
to the Oval Office area. She remained a White House employee 
until April 1996 when she was reassigned to the Pentagon. The 
proof will show that Ms. Evelyn Lieberman, Deputy Chief of 
Staff at the time, believed that the transfer was necessary 
because Ms. Lewinsky was so persistent in her efforts to be 
near the President. Although Ms. Lieberman could not recall 
hearing any rumors linking her and the President, she 
acknowledged the President was vulnerable to these kinds of 
rumors. While Ms. Lewinsky tried to return to work in the White 
House, her absence was appreciated by those on the President's 
staff who wanted to protect him.
    After she began her job at the Pentagon in April, there was 
no further physical contact with the President through the 1996 
election and the remainder of that year. The two communicated 
by telephone and on occasion saw each other at public events. 
Their only attempt at a private visit in the Oval Office was 
thwarted because Ms. Lieberman was nearby. On December 17, she 
attended a holiday celebration at the White House and had a 
photograph made shaking hands with the President.
    However, the evidence establishes that in 1997, Ms. 
Lewinsky was more successful in arranging visits to the White 
House. This was because she used the discreet assistance of Ms. 
Currie, the President's secretary, to avoid the likes of Ms. 
Lieberman. Ms. Currie indicated she did not want to know the 
details of this relationship. Ms. Currie testified on one 
occasion when Ms. Lewinksy told her, ``As long as no one saw 
us--and no one did--then nothing happened.'' Ms. Currie 
responded, ``I don't want to hear it. Don't say any more. I 
don't want to hear any more.''
    Early on during their secret liaisons, the two concocted a 
cover story to use if discovered. Ms. Lewinksy was to say she 
was bringing papers to the President. The evidence will show 
that statement to be false. The only papers that she ever 
brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her 
duties or the President's. The cover story plays an important 
role in the later perjuries and the obstruction of justice.
    Ms. Lewinksy stated that the President did not expressly 
instruct her to lie. He did, however, suggest, indeed, the 
``misleading'' cover story. When she assured him that she 
planned to lie about the relationship, he responded 
approvingly. On the frequent occasions that she promised that 
she would ``always deny'' the relationship and ``always protect 
him,'' for example, the President responded, in her 
recollection, ``That's good,'' or something affirmative, not 
``Don't deny it.''
    The evidence will establish further that the two of them 
had, in her words, ``a mutual understanding'' that they would 
``keep this private, so that meant deny it and . . . take 
whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken.'' When she and 
the President both were subpoenaed in the Jones case, Ms. 
Lewinksy anticipated that ``as we had on every other occasion 
and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny 
it.''
    In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton acknowledged 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do 
in a nonlegal context'' to hide their relationship and that he 
``might well have said'' that Ms. Lewinsky should tell people 
she was bringing letters to him or coming to visit Ms. Currie. 
He always stated that ``I never asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
    But neither did the President ever say that they must now 
tell the truth under oath; to the contrary, as Ms. Lewinsky 
stated: ``It wasn't as if the President called me and said, 
`You know, Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to 
be really hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth 
and be humiliated in front of the entire world about what we've 
done,' which I would have fought him on probably,'' she said. 
``That was different. By not calling me and saying that, you 
know, I knew what that meant,'' according to Monica Lewinsky.
    In a related but later incident that Mr. Hutchinson may 
refer to, Monica Lewinsky testified that President Clinton 
telephoned her at home around 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock in the 
morning on December 17, 1997--2:00 or 2:30 a.m. He told her 
that her name was on the list of possible witnesses to be 
called in the Paula Jones lawsuit. When asked what to do if she 
was subpoenaed, the President suggested that she could sign an 
affidavit. Ms. Lewinsky indicated that she was 100 percent sure 
that he had suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit. 
She understood his advice to mean that she might be able to 
execute an affidavit that would not disclose the true nature of 
their relationship.
    When Ms. Lewinsky agreed to that false affidavit, she told 
the President by telephone that she would be signing it and 
asked if he wanted to see it before she signed it. According to 
Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded that he did not, as he 
had already seen about 15 others.
    Concurrent with these events I just described, the evidence 
will further demonstrate that as Ms. Lewinsky attempted to 
return to work at the White House after the 1996 elections, she 
spoke with the President. According to Betty Currie, the 
President instructed Betty Currie and Marsha Scott, Deputy 
Director of Personnel, to assist in her return to the White 
House. In the spring of 1997, she met with Ms. Scott. She 
complained in subsequent notes to Ms. Scott and the President 
about no progress being made with her getting back to the White 
House. On July 3 of that year, she dispatched a more formal 
letter to the President--in fact, using the salutation, ``Dear 
Sir''--and raising a possible threat that she might have to 
tell her parents about why she no longer had a job at the White 
House if they did not get her another job. She also indicated a 
possible interest in a job in New York at the United Nations. 
The President and Ms. Lewinsky met the next day in what Ms. 
Lewinsky characterized as a ``very emotional'' visit, including 
the President scolding her, that it was illegal to threaten the 
President of the United States. Their conversation eventually 
moved on to other topics, though primarily her complaining 
about his failure to get her a job at the White House.
    Continuing with Ms. Lewinsky's effort to return to work 
near the President, there was a July 16 meeting and September 3 
telephone call with Ms. Scott. On the evening of September 30, 
the President advised Ms. Lewinsky that he would have Chief of 
Staff Erskine Bowles help with a job search, and Bowles later 
passed this on to John Podesta, although each recalled their 
involvement occurring earlier in the year.
    A few days later, however, her hopes of a job at the White 
House quickly ended. On October 6, she had a conversation with 
Linda Tripp, who told her that she would never return to the 
White House, according to a friend of hers on the staff. 
Learning this ``secondhand'' was, according to Ms. Lewinsky, 
the ``straw that broke the camel's back.'' She decided to ask 
the President for a job in New York with the United Nations and 
sent him a letter to that effect on October 7.
    During an October 11 meeting with the President, he 
suggested that she give him a list of New York companies which 
interested her. She asked if Vernon Jordan might also help. 
Five days later, she provided the President with her ``wish 
list'' and indicated that she was no longer interested in the 
U.N. position, although she did receive an offer on November 24 
and declined it on January 5, 1998.
    After this meeting with the President, arrangements were 
made through the President and Ms. Currie for Ms. Lewinsky to 
meet with Mr. Jordan. On the morning of November 5, 1997, Mr. 
Jordan spoke by telephone with the President about 5 minutes 
and later met with Ms. Lewinsky for the first time for about 20 
minutes. According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan told her he had 
spoken with the President, that she came highly recommended, 
and that ``We're in business.''
    However, the evidence reflects that Mr. Jordan took no 
steps to help Ms. Lewinsky until early December of that year 
after she appeared on the witness list in the Jones case. 
Actually, Mr. Jordan testified in his grand jury testimony that 
he had no recollection of even having met Ms. Lewinsky on 
November 5.
    When he was shown documentary evidence demonstrating that 
his first meeting with Ms. Lewinsky occurred in early November, 
he acknowledged that such meeting ``was entirely possible.'' 
You can see that was not to be a high priority for Mr. Jordan 
at that time, until December.
    For many months, Ms. Lewinsky had not been able to find a 
job to her satisfaction--even without the perceived ``help'' of 
various people. Then in December of 1997, something happened 
which caused those interested in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in 
New York to intensify their search. Within 48 hours of her 
signing this false affidavit in the Paula Jones case, Ms. 
Lewinsky had landed a job with a prestigious Fortune 500 
Company.
    It is anticipated that attorneys for the President will 
present arguments which will contest much of the relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. The President has maintained throughout 
the last several months that while there was no sexual 
relationship or sexual affair, in fact, there was some type of 
inappropriate, intimate contact with her. What has now been 
dubbed as ``legal gymnastics'' on the part of the President has 
made its appearance.
    Other examples followed. Within his definition of the word 
``alone,'' he denies being alone with Ms. Lewinsky at any time 
in the Oval Office. He also questions the definition of the 
word ``is''--it depends on what the word ``is'' means in how 
you answer a particular question. Further, we would expect the 
President to continue to disavow knowledge of why evidence 
detrimental to his defense in the Jones case was removed from 
Ms. Lewinsky's apartment and hidden beneath Ms. Currie's bed or 
knowledge of how Ms. Lewinsky found herself with an employment 
offer in New York virtually at the same time she finally 
executed an affidavit in the Jones case.
    Unfortunately, for your search for the truth in these 
proceedings, the President continues today to parse his words 
and use ``legal hairsplitting'' in his defense. I cite for your 
consideration his Answer filed with this body just days ago. 
For instance:
    One. Responding in part to the impeachment article I, the 
President persists in a wrongheaded fashion with his legal 
hairsplitting of the term ``sexual relations,'' which permits 
him to define that term in such a way that in the particular 
salacious act we are talking about here, one person has sex and 
the other person does not. As a graduate of one of the finest 
law schools in America and as a former law professor and 
attorney general for the State of Arkansas, the President knows 
better. I have this statement here extracted out of the 
President's Answer to this proceeding.
    Two. Responding to both articles of impeachment, the 
President now would have you believe that he ``was not 
focusing'' when his attorney, Bob Bennett, was objecting during 
the deposition and attempting to cut off a very important line 
of questioning of the President by representing to Judge Wright 
that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit proved that there is no need to 
go into this testimony about the President's life. He said that 
this affidavit proves that ``there is absolutely no sex of any 
kind, in any manner, shape or form.'' Remember that this is the 
same President who now pleads that he lost his focus during 
this very important part of this deposition. This is the very 
same President who is renowned for his intelligence and his 
ability ``to compartmentalize,'' to concentrate and focus on 
whatever matter is at hand. And now he comes before this 
Senate, to each one of you, in his Answer, by and through his 
attorneys, and pleads that he simply wasn't paying attention at 
this very important point during his own deposition. In 
Tennessee, we have a saying for situations like that: ``That 
dog won't hunt.''
    Three. In his further response to article I, the President 
effectively admits guilt to obstruction. As I read this, his 
pleadings refer to the President himself, and he states that 
he, the President, ``truthfully explained to the grand jury his 
efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition without 
disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.'' So he said he 
did answer the questions in the Jones deposition in a way so as 
not to disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. At the 
bottom of the same page, he denies that he attempted ``to 
impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case.'' Think 
about this with me for a minute. Basically, the purpose of the 
Jones deposition of the President was to secure truthful 
testimony about these kinds of ``pattern and practice'' 
witnesses, and therein discover the likes of Monica Lewinsky. 
That is the purpose of being there. The President admitted in 
his Answer that he purposely answered questions so as not to 
disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Said another way, 
he intentionally answered questions to avoid the discovery of 
one of these female employees with whom he was sexually 
involved. That is precisely, folks, what impeding the discovery 
of evidence is.
    I ask you, if you get an opportunity, to look at this very 
closely.
    Four. In his answer to article II, the President ``denies 
that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit 
in the Jones case.'' When everything is said and done, Ms. 
Lewinsky had no motivation, no reason whatsoever to want to 
commit a crime by willfully submitting a false affidavit with a 
court of law. She really did not need to do this at that point 
in her life, but this 20-something-year-old young lady was 
listening to the most powerful man in the United States, whom 
she greatly admired, hearing him effectively instruct her to 
file a false affidavit to avoid having to testify about their 
relationship. And in order to do that, she had to lie about the 
physical aspects of their relationship. According to her, the 
President didn't even want to see that actual affidavit because 
he had seen 15 more just like it and as such he knew what it 
would be.
    Five. In an additional response to article II, the 
President answers and asserts that ``he believed that Ms. 
Lewinsky could have filed a limited and truthful affidavit that 
might have enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones 
case.'' That is an incredible statement. That is an incredible 
statement given the fact that the President knew firsthand of 
the extent of their sexual relationship, and he also knew that 
the Jones discovery efforts were specifically after that type 
of conduct. Even with the best of the legal hairsplitting, it 
is still difficult to envision a truthful affidavit from Ms. 
Lewinsky that could have skirted this issue enough to avoid 
testifying.
    And if you really think the President had this belief, 
don't you think he would have accepted Ms. Lewinsky's offer to 
review her affidavit and perhaps share this bit of wisdom he 
had with her before she signed it and lied? After all, in this 
answer he just filed, he says he had an out for her, a way for 
her to have the best of both worlds--not to have to lie and 
still avoid testifying in the Jones case. Why didn't he share 
that with her when she gave him the opportunity if he in fact 
had such an idea? I suggest that perhaps that is a recent idea.
    Even if, for some reason, you don't believe Ms. Lewinsky 
offered to share that affidavit with him, don't you think it 
still would have been in the President's best interest to give 
Ms. Lewinsky his thoughts before she violated the law with a 
completely false affidavit?
    Now, indeed, is the time to stop the legal gymnastics and 
hairsplitting and deal with these charges and facts 
appropriately.
    As a House manager, I believe I can speak for all of us out 
of a sense of fairness, and again request that we and the 
President be permitted to call witnesses. I submit that the 
state of the evidence is such that unless and until the 
President has the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to testify if he 
desires, there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the 
facts. A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it 
presently exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.
    While it has been the consistent defense of the White House 
to be inconsistent, it still comes as something of a surprise 
that the President has not made a stronger case for the calling 
of witnesses. Before now, he has aggressively sought the 
opportunity to challenge the truth and veracity of witnesses in 
these impeachment proceedings. During the hearings in the 
House, which many believe are analogous to a grand jury 
proceeding, the President's defenders and his attorneys 
consistently complained of the failure to call witnesses and 
the lack of fairness and due process. Almost every day, there 
were partisan attacks from the White House and its emissaries 
who were dispatched throughout the media talk shows with the 
same complaints of no witnesses.
    And always, our measured response was a calm assurance that 
there would be witnesses called during the trial phase in the 
Senate. Is there any doubt that our forefathers intended a two-
step impeachment proceeding?
    The House would function as the grand jury and determine 
whether to charge--to impeach. Then you, as the trier of fact, 
would function as the jury to try the case and weigh the 
testimony of the fact witnesses. In recent days, some have 
publically asserted that the House is hypocritical because it 
didn't call some of the fact witnesses it now asks to call in 
the Senate. For the record, it must be noted that the House 
Judiciary Committee, out of an abundance of fairness, did allow 
the President's defense team 30 hours in which to present any 
witnesses that they could have chosen and they could have 
examined.
    But any allegation of hypocrisy certainly appears to miss 
the point that the writers of our Constitution never 
contemplated two separate trials for an impeachment proceeding. 
But now we would respectfully suggest is the time for 
witnesses.
    All Americans, including the President, are entitled to 
enjoy a private family life, free from public or governmental 
scrutiny. But the privacy concerns raised in this case are 
subject to limits, three of which I will briefly discuss here.
    The first limit was imposed when the President was sued in 
Federal court for alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in 
such litigation is often personal. At times, that evidence is 
highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge 
Wright noted at the President's January 1998 deposition, ``I 
have never had a sexual harassment case where there was not 
some embarrassment.'' Nevertheless, Congress and the Supreme 
Court have concluded that embarrassment-related concerns must 
give way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties 
to pursue their claims. Courts have long recognized the 
difficulties of proving sexual harassment in the work place, 
inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in 
private. To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on 
the ground that the evidence covered only ``personal'' or 
``private'' behavior would frustrate the goals that Congress 
and the courts have sought to achieve in enacting and 
interpreting the Nations's sexual harassment laws. That is 
particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed--
sexual relations in the workplace between a high official and a 
young subordinate employee--itself conflicts with those goals.
    The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required 
disclosure of the precise information that is in part the 
subject of this hearing today. A Federal judge specifically 
ordered the President, on more than one occasion, to provide 
the requested information about relationships with other women, 
including Ms. Lewinsky. The fact that Judge Wright later 
determined that the evidence would not be admissible at trial, 
and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, does 
not change the President's legal duty at the time he testified. 
Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to 
the discovery questions and to seek guidance from the court if 
he thought those questions were improper. But having failed to 
convince the court that his objections were well founded, the 
President was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully. 
Perjury and attempts to obstruct the gathering of evidence can 
never be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless of 
the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.
    The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and 
other forms of obstruction of justice: ``In this constitutional 
process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no 
place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant 
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 
Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are 
therefore imperative.''
    The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is 
civil or criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court 
considered a false statement made in a civil administrative 
proceeding: ``False testimony in a formal proceeding is 
intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a 
`flagrant affront' to truth-seeking function of adversary 
proceedings . . . Perjury should be severely sanctioned in 
appropriate cases.'' Stated more simply, ``perjury is an 
obstruction of justice.''
    The third limit is unique to the President. ``The 
Presidency is more than an executive responsibility. It is the 
inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and 
ideals.'' As the head of the Executive Branch, the President 
has the constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.'' The President gave his testimony in the 
Jones case under oath and in the presence of a Federal judge, a 
member of a co-equal branch of government; he then testified 
before a Federal grand jury, a body of citizens who had 
themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of the 
enormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office, 
the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct at 
all times complies with the law of the land.
    In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by any 
citizen--whether in a criminal case, a grand jury 
investigation, a congressional hearing, a civil trial or civil 
discovery--are profoundly serious matters. When such acts are 
committed by the President of the United States, those acts are 
grounds for conviction and removal from his Office.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess of the proceedings for 15 minutes.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have just about 1 
minute and I will conclude.
    Mr. LOTT. I withhold my request.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
    Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you.
    As I reach the conclusion of my presentation, the time line 
is now in December of 1997. Following her November 5 meeting 
with Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky had no communication with him or 
the President for a month. Then in early December, the parties 
in the Jones case exchanged witness lists and Ms. Lewinsky was 
scheduled as a potential witness by the Jones attorneys. On or 
about that same day, Ms. Lewinsky attempted to make an 
uninvited visit to the White House and later that day was 
allowed in by the President. But it was during this time, in 
December of 1997, that some of the seams began to unravel for 
the President.
    I will conclude my remarks at this point and thank the 
Chief Justice and the Members of the Senate for their careful 
attention. My colleague from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson, will 
follow me now or at the end of any recess as may be necessary.

                                 RECESS

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, my apologies to the manager 
for the interruption at the end of his remarks.
    I renew my request of unanimous consent to take a 15-minute 
recess.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so 
ordered.
    [Thereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, recessed until 3:30 p.m.]
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are prepared now 
to go forward with the next manager's presentation.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Manager 
Hutchinson.
    Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I am 
Asa Hutchinson, a Member of Congress from the Third 
Congressional District of Arkansas. I am grateful for this 
opportunity, although it comes with deep regret, to be before 
you. I do want to tell you in advance that we have presented to 
you, on your tables, a selection of charts that I will be 
referring to here so everyone will have the advantage of being 
able to see at least in some fashion the charts to which I will 
be referring. And we will have the charts here as well.
    This is certainly a humbling experience for a smalltown 
lawyer. I learned to love and to respect the law trying cases 
in the courtrooms of rural Arkansas. The scene is different in 
this setting, in this historic Chamber with the Chief Justice 
presiding and Senators sitting as jurors. But what is at stake 
remains the same.
    In every case heard in every courtroom across this great 
country, it is the truth, it is justice, it is the law that is 
at stake. In this journey on Earth, there is nothing of greater 
consequence to devote our energies to than the search for the 
truth, to pursue equal justice, and to uphold the law. It is 
for those reasons that I serve as a manager. And as you, I hope 
that I can help in some way to bring this matter to a 
conclusion for our country. This afternoon I will be discussing 
the evidence and the testimony from witnesses that we do hope 
to call, and during my presentation I will be focusing on the 
evidence that demonstrates obstruction of justice under article 
II.
    You might wonder, well, why are we going to article II 
before we have covered article I on perjury? And the answer is 
that in a chronological flow, article II, the obstruction 
facts, precedes much of the perjury allegations. And so, 
following my presentation, Manager Rogan will present article I 
on perjury.
    The presentation I make will be based upon the record, the 
evidence, and the facts that have been accumulated. I want you 
to know that I am going to be presenting those facts, and from 
time to time I will argue those facts. I believe they are well 
supported in the record, but I urge each of you, if you ever 
find anything that you question, to search the record and 
verify the facts because I do not intend to misrepresent 
anything to this body. In fact, we will be submitting to each 
of your offices my presentation with annotations to the record, 
to the grand jury transcripts which will tie in the facts that 
I present to you. Again, I believe and trust you will find they 
are well supported.
    So let's start with obstruction of justice. Later on, there 
will be a full discussion of the law on obstruction of justice, 
but for our purposes, it is simply any corrupt act or attempt 
to influence or impede the proper functioning of our system of 
justice. It is a criminal offense, a felony, and it has 
historically been an impeachable offense.
    Let me first say, it is not a crime nor an impeachable 
offense to engage in inappropriate personal conduct, nor is it 
a crime to obstruct or conceal personal embarrassing facts or 
relationships. It might be offensive, but there are no 
constitutional consequences. But as we go through the facts of 
the case, the evidence will show in this case that there was a 
scheme that was developed to obstruct the administration of 
justice, and that is illegal. And the obstruction of justice is 
of great consequence and significance to the integrity of our 
Nation when committed by anyone but particularly by the Chief 
Executive of our land, the President of the United States.
    Mr. Bryant took us factually up to a certain point 
pertaining to the job search. This is chart No. 1 that you have 
before you. This puts it in perspective a little bit. Just for 
a brief review, go back in the calendar, back into October. 
That is when Ms. Lewinsky sends the President her wish list of 
jobs. And then shortly after that, Ms. Currie faxes Lewinsky 
the resume to Ambassador Richardson, and Ambassador Richardson 
gets involved in the job search.
    October 30, the President promised to arrange a meeting 
between Lewinsky and Jordan. This was set up in November. It 
was actually November 5. But preceding that, there was a job 
offer at the United Nations extended to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. 
Lewinsky decided that she was not interested in a job at the 
United Nations; she wanted to go into the private sector. And 
so that was the purpose on November 5 of the meeting between 
Jordan and Lewinsky. That is when Mr. Jordan says, ``We're in 
business.'' But the facts will show that there was nothing 
really done in November, and that is when I will get a little 
bit more into my presentation, and then I will get into 
December when some things happened there that picked up speed 
on this issue.
    The obstruction, for our purposes, started on December 5, 
1997, and that is when the witness list from the Paula Jones 
case was faxed to the President's lawyers. At that point, the 
wheels of obstruction started rolling, and they did not stop 
until the President successfully blocked the truth from coming 
out in the civil rights case.
    These acts of obstruction included attempts to improperly 
influence a witness in a civil rights case--that is, Monica 
Lewinsky--the procurement and filing of a false affidavit in 
the case; unlawful attempts to influence the testimony of a key 
witness, Betty Currie; the willful concealment of evidence 
under subpoena in that case, which are the gifts of December 
28; and illegally influencing the testimony of witnesses--that 
is, the aides who testified before the grand jury--before the 
grand jury of the United States. Each of these areas of 
obstruction will be covered in my presentation today.
    As I said, it began on Friday, December 5, when the witness 
list came from the Paula Jones case. Shortly thereafter, the 
President learned that the list included Monica Lewinsky. This 
had to be startling news to the President because if the truth 
about his relationship with a subordinate employee was known, 
the civil rights case against him would be strengthened and it 
might have totally changed the outcome.
    But to compound the problem, less than a week later, Judge 
Wright, a Federal district judge in Arkansas, on December 11, 
issued an order, and that order directed that the President had 
to answer questions concerning other relationships that he 
might have had during a particular timeframe with any State or 
Federal employee. And when I say ``relationships,'' I am 
speaking of sexual relationships. So Judge Wright entered the 
order that is not in your stack, but I have it here. It was 
filed on December 11 in the district court in Arkansas and 
directs the President that he has to answer those questions 
within a timeframe, as Mr. Bryant said, which is typical in a 
civil rights case of this nature.
    The White House knew that Monica was on the witness list. 
The President knew it was likely she would be subpoenaed as a 
witness and that her truthful testimony would hurt his case.
    What did the President do? What he had to do was to make 
sure Monica Lewinsky was on his team and under control. And 
then on December 17, the President finally called Ms. Lewinsky 
to let her know she was on the list. This was a call between 2 
a.m. and 2:30 a.m. in the morning.
    Now, what happened in the time between the President 
learning Monica Lewinsky was on the list and when he notified 
her of that fact on December 17 is very important. The 
President, during that timeframe, talked to his friend, his 
confidante, and his problem-solver, Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan 
had come to the President's rescue on previous occasions. He 
was instrumental in securing consulting contracts for Mr. Webb 
Hubbell while Mr. Hubbell was under investigation by the 
independent counsel.
    Let me parenthetically go to that point, right before Mr. 
Hubbell announced his resignation from the Justice Department.
    During that timeframe, there was a meeting at the White 
House in which the President, the First Lady, and others were 
present. After that meeting, Vernon Jordan agreed to help 
obtain financial assistance for Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan then 
introduced Mr. Hubbell to the ``right people.'' The 
introduction was successful and Mr. Hubbell obtained a $100,000 
contract. The ``right people'' that Mr. Jordan contacted 
happened to be the same ``right people'' for both Mr. Hubbell 
and ultimately for Monica Lewinsky, which is the parent company 
of Revlon. So the President was aware that Mr. Jordan had the 
contacts and the track record to be of assistance to the 
President in delicate matters.
    Now let's go back a little. Monica Lewinsky had been 
looking for a good-paying and high-profile job in New York, 
since the previous July, as I pointed out.
    She had been offered a job at the United Nations, but she 
wanted to work in the private sector. She was not having much 
success, and then in early November it was Betty Currie who 
arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan, which was ultimately on 
November 5. At this meeting, Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan 
for about 20 minutes.
    Now, let's refer to Mr. Vernon Jordan's grand jury 
testimony on that meeting that occurred on November 5. And you 
have that, and it should be your chart No. 2, or exhibit 2.
    As Mr. Jordan testified before the Federal grand jury on 
March 3, 1998, in reference to the November 5 meeting, he said:

    I have no recollection of an early November meeting with 
Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of it 
and I have no record of it.

    He goes on to testify, at page 76 of the grand jury 
testimony.
    Question:

    Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica 
Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?

    His answer:

    I think that's fair to say.

    Now, let's stop there for a moment. What happened as a 
result of this meeting? No action followed whatsoever. No job 
interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts 
with Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan made no effort to find a job for 
Ms. Lewinsky for over a month. Indeed, it was so unimportant to 
him that he ``had no recollection of an early November 
meeting,'' and, in fact, he testified finding her a job was not 
a priority. And then you will see that during this timeframe 
the President's attitude was exactly the same.
    And so look at the same exhibit 2, the last item on that 
chart, where it refers to Monica Lewinsky's grand jury 
testimony. And there she is referring to a December 6 meeting 
with the President:

    I think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch 
with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work 
out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job 
front].

    And the question was:

    Did the President say what he was going to do?

    The answer:

    I think he said he would--you know, this was sort of 
typical of him, to sort of say, ``Oh I'll talk to him. I'll get 
on it.''

    So you can see from that that it was not a high priority 
for the President either. It was: Sure, I'll get to that. I 
will do that.
    It was clear from Monica Lewinsky that nothing was 
happening.
    But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What 
started out as a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed 
after Ms. Lewinsky became a witness; the judge's order was 
issued, again, on December 11. And at that time, the President 
talked personally--personally--to Mr. Jordan and requested his 
help in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job. And that would be, again, 
back on exhibit 2 on that chart, the third item of testimony 
there. Back to Mr. Jordan, his grand jury testimony, May 5, 
1998.
    The question is:

    But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 
11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a decision 
that you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.

    His answer:

    There is no question about that.

    Let's look at the chain of events. The witness list came 
in. The judge's order came in. That triggered the President to 
action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into action. 
That chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.
    Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--I hope to 
be able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his 
loyalties lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his 
eyes and determine the truthfulness of his statements. You must 
decide whether he is telling the truth or withholding 
information.
    And so let's go to exhibit 3 in your booklet. Again, 
recalling Mr. Jordan, he testifies about that meeting. He 
testifies, in his March 3, 1998, grand jury testimony:

    I am certain after the 11th that I had a conversation with 
the President and as a part of that conversation I said to him 
that Betty Currie had called me about Monica Lewinsky. And the 
conversation was that he knew about her situation which was 
that she was pushed out of the White House, that she wanted to 
go to New York and he thanked me for helping her.

    Remember what else happened on that day, again, the same 
day that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other 
relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.
    Now, let's go back again to Mr. Jordan's testimony. What 
does he say about the involvement of the President of the 
United States in regard to these jobs? You look at exhibit 4. 
That is in your booklet. This is, again, Vernon Jordan's grand 
jury transcript of June 9, 1998.
    Now, the question is on a different issue. The question is 
about why did he tell the White House that Frank Carter--Frank 
Carter was the attorney for Monica Lewinsky that Vernon Jordan 
arranged and introduced to Monica Lewinsky. He was hired. And 
at whatever point he was terminated, then Vernon Jordan 
notified the President. So the question relates to that:

    Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that 
this has happened, [Carter had been fired]?

    Answer:

    Thought they had a right to know.

    Question:

    Why?

    And here is the answer that is critical for my point:

    The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got 
her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new counsel. 
I thought that was information that they ought to have. . . .

    ``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.'' 
Clear, straightforward testimony; no doubt about it.
    Then go on down to page 58 of his grand jury testimony of 
June 9.
    The question:

    Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank 
Carter had been replaced?

    Answer:

    Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew 
that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was interested 
in this matter. He is the source of it coming to my attention 
in the first place.

    ``He is the source of it coming to my attention in the 
first place.'' Remember, he had already met with Betty Currie. 
Nothing was happening in the November timeframe. Nothing was 
happening. Vernon Jordan--it was not a priority. Then the 
President of the United States called him and it became a 
priority. And that is who he was acting for in trying to get 
Monica Lewinsky a job.
    At this point we do not know all that the President was 
telling Vernon Jordan, but we do know that there were numerous 
calls back and forth between Mr. Jordan and the President. 
There were numerous calls being made by Mr. Jordan on behalf of 
Monica Lewinsky searching for a job, and that despite the fact 
that Monica Lewinsky did not know that she was witnessed--she 
did not know she was a witness--the President knew that she was 
a witness during his intensified efforts to get her a job.
    Now, the President's counselors have made a defense that 
the job search started before Monica Lewinsky was a witness and 
there was nothing wrong with that. My response to that is, it 
is true there is nothing wrong with a public official, under 
the right circumstances, helping someone get a job. And what 
might have started out being innocent, if you accept that 
argument, crossed the line whenever it was tied and 
interconnected with the President's desire to get a false 
affidavit from Monica Lewinsky, and whenever the job is out 
there and preparing the false affidavit, you will see that they 
are totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated; and that 
is where the line has crossed into obstruction.
    For example, when the President was waiting on Ms. Lewinsky 
to sign the false affidavit in the Jones case during the 
critical time in January, a problem developed. The job 
interviews were unproductive, despite the numerous calls by Mr. 
Jordan. On one particular day, Monica called Mr. Jordan and 
said the interview with Revlon did not go well. Mr. Jordan, 
what did he do? He picked up the phone to the CEO of--the 
president of the company, Mr. Perelman, to, as Vernon Jordan 
testified, ``make things happen--if they could happen.'' That 
is the request from Mr. Jordan to the CEO of a company, after a 
job interview with Monica Lewinsky did not go well.
    What happened? Things happened. He made things happen. 
Monica Lewinsky got a job. The affidavit was signed and the 
President was informed by Mr. Jordan, through Betty Currie, 
that the mission was accomplished.
    The question here is not why did the President do a favor 
for an ex-intern, but why did he use the influence of his 
office to make sure it happened? The answer is that he was 
willing to obstruct, impede justice by improperly influencing a 
witness in order to protect himself in a civil rights case.
    The next step in the obstruction is the false affidavit. 
This is directly related to the job mission. The President 
needed the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit, 
and that was assured by the efforts to secure her a job. Again, 
the President brought Ms. Lewinsky into the loop on December 
17. Over 10 days after the witness list was received by the 
President, the President was ready to tell Monica the news.
    That timeframe is important. He gets the witness list. He 
could have called Monica Lewinsky immediately, but he needed 7 
days because he needed to make sure the job situation was in 
gear. And in fact, the day after, if you look back on exhibit 
1, you will see that the day after the December 17 timeframe 
that she was informed that she was on the witness list, the 
next day she already had lined up job interviews for her. So 
she felt confident. But she was notified on December 17. 
Between 2 and 2:30 a.m., her phone rang. It was the President 
of the United States. The President said that he had seen the 
witness list in the case and her name was on it. Ms. Lewinsky 
asked what she should do if subpoenaed, and the President 
responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.''
    Well, how would this work? Both parties knew that the 
affidavit would need to be false and misleading in order to 
accomplish the desired result. Clearly, truthful testimony by 
Monica Lewinsky would make her a witness, would not keep her 
away from testifying. Only a false affidavit would avoid the 
deposition.
    So look at what I have marked as exhibit 4.1, which is just 
a review of the key dates on this job search. Again, November 5 
was the first meeting between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. In 
November nothing happened. According to Jordan, ``not a high 
priority.'' On December 5, the President receives the witness 
list. On the 11th, things intensify with Judge Wright's order. 
The 11th, the President talks to Mr. Jordan about the job for 
Monica. He gets into action. On the 17th, they are ready to 
tell Monica that she is on the witness list. And then, on the 
19th, she is actually served with a subpoena. Again, remember, 
after she was finally notified, it was the next day that she 
had the job interviews.
    Now we will spend some time on the December 17 
conversation, the day that Monica Lewinsky was notified that 
she was on the witness list. During that conversation, the 
President had a very pointed suggestion for Ms. Lewinsky that 
left no doubt about his purpose and the intended consequences. 
He did not say specifically, ``Go in and lie.'' This is 
something that you will hear, and Monica Lewinsky testified in 
her grand jury testimony: ``The President never told me to 
lie.''
    How do you tell people to lie? You can tell them the facts 
that they can use that would, in substance, be a false 
statement or you can say, ``Go in and lie and make up your own 
false testimony.'' The President chose to give her the ideas as 
to what she could testify to that would be false, but he never 
said the words, ``You need to go in and lie.'' So what he did 
say to her was, ``You know, you can always say you were coming 
to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
    That, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is a false 
representation, is a false statement that he is telling Ms. 
Lewinsky to utter. Remember, at this point the President knows 
she is a witness, and what does he do? As evidenced by the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky, he encourages her to lie: ``You 
can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were 
bringing me letters.''
    It should also be remembered that the President, when 
questioned about encouraging Monica Lewinsky to lie, has denied 
these allegations and therefore there is certainly a conflict 
in the testimony. It is our belief that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony is credible and she has the motive to tell the truth 
because of her immunity agreement with the independent counsel, 
where she gets in trouble only if she lies, whereas the 
President has the motive to cover up and to testify falsely.
    In order to understand the significance of this statement 
made by the President, it is necessary to recall the cover 
stories that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously 
concocted in order to deceive those people who might inquire. 
It was to deceive those people that they worked with. The 
difference in the initial cover stories, though, to protect the 
President and Monica from an embarrassing personal 
relationship, from friends and coworkers and the media, now is 
in a different arena, with the pending civil rights case and 
Ms. Lewinsky being on the witness list.
    Despite the legal responsibilities, the President made the 
decision to continue the pattern of lying which ultimately 
became an obstruction of the administration of justice. We are 
still on December 17, when the President called Monica at 2 
a.m. on that particular day to tell her she was on the witness 
list, to remind her of the cover stories. Monica Lewinsky 
testified, when the President brought up the cover story, she 
understood that the two of them would continue their 
preexisting pattern of deception, and it became clear that the 
President had no intention of making his relationship with a 
subordinate Federal employee an issue in that civil rights 
case, no matter what the Federal courts told him he needed to 
answer. And he used lies, deceit, and deception to carry out 
that purpose.
    It is interesting to note that the President, when he was 
asked by the grand jury whether he remembered calling Monica 
Lewinsky at 2 a.m. on December 17, responded, ``No, sir, I 
don't, but it is quite possible that that happened.'' When he 
was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the 
cover stories of coming to see Betty or bringing letters, he 
answered, ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that 
night.''
    This is not a denial, and therefore I believe you should 
accept the testimony of Monica Lewinsky. If you say in your 
mind, well, I'm not going to believe her, then you should first 
give us the opportunity to present this witness so that you as 
jurors can fairly and honestly determine her credibility.
    As expected, 2 days later, on December 19, Ms. Lewinsky 
received a subpoena to testify in the Jones case. This sets 
about an immediate flurry of activity. There are a series of 
telephone calls between Ms. Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, the 
President, and his staff. You will see this pattern of 
telephone calls repeated and generated at any point in time 
when it appears that the truth may be told in the civil rights 
case.
    Now, let's look at exhibit 5, which is the activity on 
Friday, December 19. This is the day that Monica Lewinsky is 
served with a subpoena. Now, after Mr. Jordan is notified that 
Monica Lewinsky is served with a subpoena, what does he do? In 
the 3:51-3:52 notation, Jordan telephones the President and 
talks to Debra Schiff, his assistant. The subpoena is issued. 
Monica calls Jordan and Jordan immediately calls the President. 
``Lewinsky meets with Jordan and requests that Jordan notify 
the President about her subpoena.'' This is at 4:47 p.m.
    Presumably, in the middle of that meeting, at 5:01 p.m., 
the President of the United States telephones Mr. Jordan and 
Jordan notifies the President about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena.
    Then that is whenever he arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's 
attorney--``Jordan telephones attorney Carter''--for 
representation, and that night Vernon Jordan goes to the White 
House to meet privately with the President on these particular 
issues.
    Now, in that meeting--and I am speaking of the meeting that 
happened late that night at the White House--Mr. Jordan told 
the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and 
related to the President the substance and details of his 
meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. It wasn't a casual consideration; 
the details were discussed, including her fascination with the 
President and other such issues.
    This led Mr. Jordan to ask the President about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and the response by the 
President of the United States was the first of many denials to 
his friends and aides. The President stated in his deposition 
that he did not recall that meeting. But you should remind 
yourselves of the testimony and the description provided by 
Vernon Jordan when he said, ``The President has an 
extraordinary memory.'' In fact, we all know that he is world 
famous for that memory.
    Now, the subpoena had been delivered, but the testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky was not scheduled until January 23, and the 
President's deposition, which was even more critical, was not 
scheduled until January 17. So the President and his team had 
some time to work. The work was not the business of the Nation; 
it was the distraction and self-preservation in the civil 
rights case.
    Under the plan, Mr. Jordan would be the buffer; he would 
obtain an attorney--Mr. Carter--and that attorney would keep 
Mr. Jordan informed on the progress of the representation, 
including reviewing any copy of the affidavit, knowing about 
the motion to quash, and the general progress of the 
representation. All along the way, when Mr. Jordan gets 
information, what does he do with that? Mr. Jordan keeps the 
President informed both about the affidavit and the prospects 
of the job in New York, for which Ms. Lewinsky was totally 
dependent on the help of her friends in high places.
    Let me go back again. There is nothing wrong with helping 
somebody get a job. But we all know there is one thing 
forbidden in public office: We must avoid quid pro quo, which 
is: This is for that. But Vernon Jordan testified he kept the 
President informed on the status of the false affidavit, the 
job search, and the status of Ms. Lewinsky's representation. 
Why? Is this just idle chatter with the President of the United 
States or are these matters the President is vitally interested 
in and, in fact, coordinated? Mr. Jordan answers this question 
himself on page 25 of his grand jury testimony, where he 
testified, ``I knew the President was concerned about the 
affidavit and whether or not it was signed.'' That was his 
March 5, 1998, grand jury testimony. The President was 
concerned not just about the affidavit but specifically about 
whether it was signed.
    The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to make a 
false affidavit. He was so certain of the contents that when 
Monica Lewinsky asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, 
that he had seen 15 of them. Besides, the President had 
suggested the affidavit himself, and he trusted Mr. Jordan to 
be certain to keep things under control. In fact, that was one 
of the main purposes of Mr. Jordan's continued communication 
with Monica Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter.
    Even though Mr. Jordan testifies at one point he never had 
any substantive discussions on the representation with Mr. 
Carter, he contradicts himself in his March 3 grand jury 
testimony where he states:

    Mr. Carter at some point told me--this is after January--
that she had signed the affidavit, that he had filed a motion 
to quash her subpoena and that--I mean, there was no reason for 
accountability, but he reassured me that he had things under 
control.

    Mr. Jordan was aware of the substance of the drafting of 
the affidavit, the representation, the motion to quash, and 
even had a part in the redrafting. This was clearly important 
to Mr. Jordan and clearly important to the President.
    Now, let's go to the time when the false affidavit was 
actually signed, January 5, 1998. These will be exhibits 7, 8, 
and 9 in front of you. Let's go to January 5. This is sort of a 
summary of what happened on that day. Ms. Lewinsky meets with 
her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an hour. Carter drafts the 
affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky on the deposition. In the second 
paragraph, Ms. Lewinsky telephones Betty Currie, stating that 
she needs to speak to the President, that this is about an 
important matter; specifically, that she was anxious about 
something she needed to sign--an affidavit. Frank Carter drafts 
the affidavit she is concerned about. She calls the President. 
The President returns Ms. Lewinsky's call.
    Big question: Should the President return Ms. Lewinsky's 
call? He does, that day, quickly. Ms. Lewinsky mentions the 
affidavit she is signing and offers to show it to the 
President. That is where he says no, he had seen 15 others.
    Let's go to the next day. The next exhibit is January 6. On 
this particular day, Ms. Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit. 
At 2:08 to 2:10 p.m., she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr. 
Jordan. That is after she got it. She delivers it to Jordan. 
And then, at 3:26 p.m., Mr. Jordan telephones Mr. Carter. At 
3:38, Mr. Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich of the White House. 
At 3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about the draft affidavit, 
and, at 3:49, you will see in red that both agree to delete a 
portion of the affidavit that created some implication that 
maybe she had been alone with the President.
    So Mr. Jordan was very involved in drafting the affidavit 
and the contents of that.
    And then at 4:19, presumably in response to some of the 
calls by Jordan earlier in the day, the President telephones 
Mr. Jordan and they have a discussion. And then Mr. Jordan 
telephones Carter and the conversations go back and forth. At 
the end of the day, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. So 
the affidavit is still in the drafting process.
    Let's go to the next day, exhibit 9. Monica signs the 
affidavit here. At 10 a.m., Ms. Lewinsky signs a false 
affidavit in Mr. Carter's office. Then she delivers the signed 
affidavit to Mr. Jordan. And then what does he do? The usual. 
At 11:58, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. At 5:46, Mr. 
Jordan telephones the White House. At 6:50, Mr. Jordan 
telephones the White House and tells the President that Ms. 
Lewinsky signed the affidavit.
    Is this important information for the President, to know he 
was vitally interested in it?
    The next day--exhibit 10--January 8. After it is signed, 
what is important? It was the other part of the arrangement, 
that she has the job interview with MacAndrews in New York. She 
had that job interview. The only problem was that it went 
poorly, very poorly. So at 4:48 p.m. on this particular day, 
Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New York 
interview went ``very poorly.''
    What does Mr. Jordan do? He telephones Ron Perelman, the 
CEO of Revlon, the subsidiary of MFH, to make things happen, if 
they could happen. What does he do next? Jordan telephones Ms. 
Lewinsky, saying, ``I'm doing the best I can to help you out.'' 
And they set up another interview for the next day. Jordan 
telephones the White House Counsel's Office, and, in the 
evening, Revlon in New York telephones Ms. Lewinsky to set up a 
follow-up interview. They said the first interview didn't go 
well, but because Mr. Jordan intercedes--and why? Because the 
false affidavit has been signed and he wants to make sure this 
is carried out. At 9:02 p.m., Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan 
about the Revlon interview in New York, and presumably it went 
better on that particular day.
    Then on January 9--exhibit 11--it is confirmed that she has 
the job. Lewinsky is offered the Revlon job in New York and 
accepts.
    Lewinsky telephones Jordan. And then, at 4:14, Jordan 
notifies Currie, calls Betty Currie, and says ``Mission 
accomplished'' and requests that she tell the President. Jordan 
notifies the President of Lewinsky's job offer and says, 
``Thank you, very much, Mr. President.'' And then that evening 
the President telephones Currie, and so on. But the President 
is notified that the job has been secured--``mission 
accomplished.''
    Let me ask you a question, after I have gone through these 
exhibits. Would Mr. Jordan have pushed for a second interview 
without cooperation on the affidavit? Would Monica Lewinsky 
have received the support and secured the job if she had said, 
``I don't want to sign an affidavit; I am just going to go in 
there and tell the truth; whatever they ask me, I am going to 
answer; I am going to tell the truth.'' Does anyone in this 
room believe that she would have been granted the job if Mr. 
Jordan had not made that call to get that second interview, if 
she had not had help from her friends in high places?
    Now the affidavit has been signed. The job is secure. 
Monica Lewinsky is on the team, and the President of the United 
States is armed for the deposition.
    So let's move there.
    Just how important was Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit to 
the President's deposition? Let's look. What did the 
President's attorney, Robert Bennett, say about that affidavit 
to the Federal judge during the deposition? That false 
affidavit allowed Mr. Bennett, the attorney for Mr. Clinton, 
when talking about the question of the relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky, to assert that `` . . . there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with 
President Clinton. . . .''
    That is a statement of Robert Bennett--his representation 
to the court about that relationship. It is a representation 
that he had to later, probably based upon his own professional 
embarrassment, withdraw and to correct that inaccurate part of 
the record.
    When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the 
President stated specifically the key paragraph of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit was ``absolutely true.''
    Paragraph 8 of her affidavit states:

    I have never had a sexual relationship with the President. 
. . .

    If it enters your mind at this point as to what was meant 
by ``sexual relationship,'' please remember that this affidavit 
was drafted upon a common understanding of that phrase at that 
point and not based upon any definition used in the deposition 
of the President.
    I am sure it was the President's hope and belief that the 
false affidavit used in the deposition to bolster his own 
testimony would be the end of the matter, but that was not the 
case. We know in life that one lie leads to another. And so it 
is when we attempt to thwart the administration of justice--one 
obstruction leads to another.
    Now we move to another key witness, Betty Currie.
    By the time the President concluded his deposition, he knew 
there were too many details out about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He knew that the only person who would probably be 
talking was Ms. Lewinsky herself. He knew the cover story that 
he had carefully created and that was converted into false 
statements in the affidavit was now in jeopardy and had to be 
backed at this point by the key witnesses, Monica Lewinsky and 
Betty Currie. After the deposition, the President needed to do 
two things: He had to contact Ms. Lewinsky to see if she was 
still on the team, but he also had to make sure that his 
secretary, Betty Currie, was lying to protect him. So let's 
look at how the concern became a frenzied and concerted effort 
to keep the holes plugged in the dike.
    Let's look at exhibits 12 and 13.
    What happened on the day the deposition--really the night 
of the deposition--on January 17. The President finishes 
testifying in the deposition around 4 p.m. At 5:38 p.m., the 
President telephones Mr. Jordan at home. And then, at 7:13, the 
President telephones Ms. Currie at home. At 7:02, the President 
places a call to Mr. Jordan's office. And then, at 7:13, he 
gets Ms. Currie at home, finally, and asks her to meet with him 
on Sunday. It is vitally important that he meet with Ms. Currie 
at this point because he knows his whole operation is coming 
unglued.
    So the next day, on January 18, which is exhibit 13, there 
is a whole flurry of activity.
    I am not going to go through all of them. You can see the 
frantic pace at the White House because at 6:11 in the morning, 
the President had some more bad news. The Drudge Report was 
released. And that created a greater flurry. Then between 11:49 
and 2:55 p.m., two phone calls were made between Mr. Jordan and 
the President.
    Then, at 5 p.m., we see the meetings. That is on the second 
page. At 5 p.m., Ms. Currie meets with the President. And the 
President then tells Ms. Currie to find Monica Lewinsky. The 
telephone calls were generated, and there was no success in 
that.
    Then, that evening the President calls Ms. Currie at home 
to try once again to see if she had found Monica.
    But it was on that day that there was that critical 
meeting--on that Sunday--in the Oval Office between Betty 
Currie and the President of the United States.
    For that reason, we need next to hear from Betty Currie, 
the President's personal secretary, as to what occurred during 
that most unusual meeting on Sunday following the deposition.
    Betty Currie testified in the grand jury that the President 
said that he had just been deposed and that the attorneys had 
asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. This is a 
violation of the judge's gag order. And the President made some 
comments that were not in line. But he had some choices to 
make, and he made the wrong choices.
    But let's look at exhibit 14, which covers the series of 
statements made to Ms. Currie. At this point there is the 
testimony of Betty Currie. She is reciting to the grand jury 
each of the statements the President made to her after his 
grand jury testimony.
    The first: ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
    Second: ``You were always there when Monica was there, 
right?''
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
    I am not going to read each one of those. You can read 
them. You have heard those as well.
    But the President is making those simple declaratory 
statements to her.
    There are three areas that are covered.
    First of all, the President makes a case that he was never 
alone with Monica Lewinsky.
    Second, he is making a point to her that ``she was the 
aggressor, not me.''
    The third point he is making, ``I did nothing wrong.''
    Those are the basic three points of those five statements 
that the President made to Betty Currie.
    During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony she was asked 
whether she believed that the President wished her to agree to 
the statements.
    Let's look at Betty Currie for a second. She is the 
classical reluctant witness. Where are her loyalties? How would 
you examine her testimony? Where is she uncomfortable in her 
testimony when she is asked the question? How does she shift in 
the chair? Those are the kind of ways you have to evaluate the 
truthfulness of the testimony, where their loyalties lie, and 
their demeanor.
    During the questioning she was clearly reluctant.
    She was asked a series of questions, and she finally 
acknowledges that the President was intending for her to agree 
with the statements that were made. She says, ``That is 
correct.'' And that is page 74 of Betty Currie's grand jury 
testimony.
    When the President testified in the August 17 grand jury, 
he was questioned about his intentions when he made those five 
statements to Ms. Currie in his office on that Sunday. And the 
President's explanation is as follows to the grand jury:
    The President:

    . . . I thought we were going to be deluged by the press 
comments. And I was trying to refresh my memory about what the 
facts were.

    Then he goes on to testify:

    So, I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something 
that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as 
quickly as I could.

    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have to determine 
what the purpose of those five statements to Betty Currie were. 
Were they to get information or were they to get her to falsely 
testify when she was called as a witness? Logic tells us that 
the President's argument is that he was just trying to refresh 
his memory. Well, so much of a novel legal defense argument.
    First, consider the President's options after he left the 
deposition.
    He could have abided by the judge's gag order and not said 
anything.
    Second, he could have called Betty Currie in and asked her 
an open-ended question: Ms. Currie, or Betty, what do you 
remember happened?
    The third option was to call her in and to make these 
declaratory statements, violate the judge's order, and tamper 
with the anticipated testimony of Betty Currie.
    That is the course that the President chose. He made sure 
it was a face-to-face meeting, not a telephone call. He made 
sure that no one else was present. He made sure that the 
meeting was on his territory and in his office where he could 
feel comfortable and he could utilize the power and prestige of 
his office to have the greatest influence on her future 
testimony.
    After Ms. Currie was in the President's office, he made 
short, clear, understandable, declarative statements telling 
Ms. Currie what the story was. He was not interested in what 
she knew. Why? Because he knew the truth, but he did not want 
Ms. Currie to tell the truth. The only way to ensure that was 
by telling her what to say, not asking her what she remembered. 
You do not refresh someone's memory by telling that person what 
he or she remembers, and you certainly do not make the 
declarative statements to someone regarding factual scenarios 
of which the listener was unaware.
    From the statements that were made to her, Betty Currie 
could not have had any possible knowledge about whether they 
were ever alone, as to whether she came on to him. No. This was 
not any attempt for the President to refresh his recollection. 
It was witness tampering, pure and simple.
    Understanding the seriousness of the President's attempting 
to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie, his attorneys have 
tried to argue that those statements could not constitute 
obstruction of justice because she had not been subpoenaed and 
the President did not know that she was a potential witness at 
this time. Well, the argument is refuted by both the law and 
the facts.
    The law is clear that a person may be convicted of 
obstructing justice if he corruptly influenced the testimony of 
a prospective witness. The witness does not actually have to 
give testimony. The witness does not have to be under any 
subpoena. The witness does not have to be on any witness list. 
And so the law is clear.
    Secondly, let's examine the defense in light of the facts. 
The President himself brought Ms. Currie into the civil rights 
case as a corroborating witness when he repeatedly used her 
name in the deposition, and just as significantly the President 
had to be concerned about a looming perjury charge against him 
in light of his false testimony in the deposition. At least six 
times in that deposition the President challenged the 
plaintiff's attorneys to question Ms. Currie about the 
particular issue.
    You don't have it in front of you, but you will see it when 
we distribute the copies of my remarks. I will go through those 
six times.
    At page 58 of the deposition, the President, when asked 
whether he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, said that he was not 
alone with her or that Betty Currie was there with Monica.
    At page 70, when asked about the last time the President 
saw Ms. Lewinsky, he falsely testified he only recalled that 
she was there to see Betty.
    At page 64, he told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' 
whether Lewinsky was alone with him in the White House or not 
or with Betty in the White House between the late hours.
    At page 65 of the deposition, the President was asked 
whether Ms. Lewinsky sent packages to him, and he stated that 
Betty handled the packages.
    At page 72, the President was asked whether he may have 
assisted in any way with a job search. He said he thought Betty 
suggested Vernon Jordan talk to her.
    At page 74, he said Monica asked Betty to ask someone to 
talk to Ambassador Richardson. He asserted Betty as a 
corroborating witness at least six times in the deposition.
    There is no question that Ms. Currie was a prospective 
witness, and the President clearly wanted her to be deposed as 
a witness as his ``ask Betty'' testimony demonstrates.
    But there is another fact that, thus far, has been 
overlooked, and let me draw your attention to this.
    Two days before the President's deposition, Betty Currie 
receives a call from Michael Isikoff, a reporter with Newsweek 
magazine, inquiring about the records, the courier records of 
gifts going from Ms. Lewinsky to the President.
    You've got a news reporter for a national publication two 
days before the President's deposition talking to the 
President's secretary, saying, ``I need to see the courier 
records at the White House.'' What does Betty Currie do? She 
testified that she probably told the President this. Then she 
tells Bruce Lindsey, but she also goes to see Vernon Jordan. 
Why? Why would the secretary go see Vernon Jordan because she 
had a press inquiry? The reason is, as we see later on, 
remember, this is January 15. What happened on December 28 that 
we will get to a little bit later? On December 28 Betty Currie 
went and put those gifts under her bed. Why is she nervous? 
Because Mike Isikoff is calling about the gifts that are 
presently under her bed, and she is nervous. I would be 
nervous. And so she goes to see Bruce Lindsey. She goes to see 
Vernon Jordan: I need help. What do I do? And she probably told 
the President.
    It is all breaking loose, the house of cards is falling 
down, and she is either going to report to Mr. Jordan or to 
seek advice from him. Either way, she knows it is serious; it 
all has legal consequences. And she is a witness to it all.
    Not only does Betty Currie's testimony talk about this call 
from Michael Isikoff and going to see Vernon Jordan, but Vernon 
Jordan's testimony confirms the visit as well.
    The President claims he called Ms. Currie in to work on 
that Sunday night only to find out what she knew, but the 
President knew the truth about the relationship, and if he told 
the truth in deposition the day before, he would have had no 
reason to be refreshed by Betty Currie.
    More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's 
reaction, and the suggested lies clearly prove that the 
President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he 
was looking for corroboration for his false coverup, and that 
is why he coached her. He needed a witness for him, not against 
him.
    Now, let's go to exhibit 5, Betty Currie's testimony--
excuse me, exhibit 15.
    This is Betty Currie's testimony before the grand jury on 
January 27, 1998. And Betty Currie is asked about this. Now, 
remember, it was on a Sunday that Betty Currie was first called 
into the White House to go through these five statements, this 
coaching by the President. And then she testified to the grand 
jury:

    Question: Did there come a time after that that you had 
another conversation with the President about some other news 
about what was going on? That would have been Tuesday or 
Wednesday--when he called you into the Oval Office?

    Betty Currie's answer:

    It was Tuesday or Wednesday. I don't remember which one this was, 
either. But the best I remember, when he called me in the Oval Office, 
it was sort of a recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--
you know, ``I was never alone with her''--that sort of thing.
    Question: Did he pretty much list the same----
    Answer: To my recollection, sir, yes.
    Question: And did he say it in sort of the same tone and demeanor 
that he used the first time he told you on Sunday?
    Answer: The best I remember, yes, sir.

    And this needs to be emphasized. Not only was that witness 
coaching taking place on Sunday but it took place a couple days 
later. It was twice repeated by the President to Betty Currie. 
He needed to have her good and in line.
    This is more than witness tampering. It is witness 
compulsion of false testimony by an employer to a subordinate 
employee. This has nothing to do with facts, nothing to do with 
media inquiries. It has to do with keeping his team on board, 
keeping the ship from sinking, and hiding the facts that are 
important. At this point we are not talking about hiding 
personal facts from inquiring minds but an effort to impede the 
legitimate and necessary functioning of our court system.
    And now let's go to the Martin Luther King holiday, almost 
exactly a year ago, Monday, January 19. Again, you will see the 
example of the frantic search for Monica Lewinsky did continue.
    Exhibit 16. I am not going to go through all of this, but I 
just want to briefly show the frantic activity on this 
particular day.
    First of all, you will see Betty Currie is trying to 
fulfill her responsibility to get ahold of Ms. Lewinsky. She 
uses the pager system, and she says, ``Please call Kay at 
home.'' Now ``Kay'' is the code name that is used for Betty 
Currie. That is the agreed upon signal. And she uses three 
messages: ``Please call Kay. Please call Kay. Please call 
Kay.''
    Then she starts using different techniques to get her 
attention. ``It's a social call.'' And then she later uses it's 
a ``family emergency.'' Then she later uses it's ``good news.'' 
She is using every means possible to get the attention of 
Monica Lewinsky. And then at 8:50 a.m. the President telephones 
Currie at home. At 8:56 a.m. the President telephones Jordan at 
home.
    Go on down to 10:56 a.m. ``The President telephones Jordan 
at his office.'' And so what is going on here? They are 
nervous; they are afraid; it is all breaking loose. They are 
trying to get ahold of Monica Lewinsky to find out what is 
going on, who she is talking to.
    Later that day things continued to destabilize for the 
President. At 4:54 p.m. Mr. Jordan learned from the attorney, 
Frank Carter, that he no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky, and 
so Mr. Jordan's link had been cut off. Mr. Jordan continued to 
attempt to reach the President or someone at the White House. 
Between 4:58 and 5:22 p.m., he made six calls trying to get 
ahold of someone at the White House, the President.
    When Mr. Jordan was asked about why he was urgently trying 
to get ahold of the White House, he responded, ``Because the 
President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job'' and he 
thought it was ``information they ought to have.'' Jordan 
finally reaches the President about 6 p.m. and tells him that 
Carter had been fired.
    Why this flurry of activity? It shows how important it was 
for the President of the United States to find Ms. Lewinsky. 
Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Monica, and it could 
not happen, it did not happen. Ms. Lewinsky was a co-
conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Federal court 
and he was losing control over her. In fact, she ultimately 
agreed to testify truthfully, under penalty of perjury, in this 
matter. This was trouble for the President.
    Let's continue exploring the web of obstruction. But to do 
this we have to backtrack to what I have already referred to, 
and that was the incident on December 28, the episode with the 
gifts.
    On December 28, another brick in the wall of obstruction 
was laid. It was the concealment of evidence. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she discussed with the President the fact that 
she had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to 
produce gifts. And this is what Ms. Lewinsky was telling the 
President at the meeting with him on December 28. She testified 
before the grand jury that she recalled telling the President 
that the subpoena in question had requested a hatpin and other 
items, and this concerned her--the specificity of it. And the 
President responded it ``bothered'' him, too.
    Well, let's look at the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, which is 
exhibit 17. This is Lewinsky testifying about the meeting.

    And then at some point I said to him [the President], 
``Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
Betty.'' And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't 
know,'' or, ``Let me think about that,'' and left that topic.

    Not exactly the response you would hope for or expect from 
the President. But the answer led to action. Later that day Ms. 
Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said, ``I understand 
you have something to give to me,'' or, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, ``The President said you have something to give me.'' 
She wasn't exactly sure of the phrase but it was either, ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' what Betty Currie 
said, or Betty Currie said, ``The President said you have 
something to give to me.''
    And so, ladies and gentlemen, if you accept the testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky on that point, you must conclude that the 
directive to retrieve the gifts came from the President. I will 
concede that there is a conflict in the testimony on this point 
with the testimony of Betty Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand 
jury testimony, had a fuzzy memory, a little different 
recollection. She testified that ``the best she can remember'' 
Ms. Lewinsky called her. But whenever she was asked further, 
she said that maybe Ms. Lewinsky's memory is better than hers 
on that issue. But there is helpful evidence to clear up this 
discrepancy, or this inconsistency. Monica, you will recall, in 
her deposition said she thought that Betty had called her and 
she thought that the call came from her cell phone number.
    Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of 
Monica Lewinsky, but since then the cell phone record was 
retrieved. And you don't have it in front of you, but it will 
be available. The cell phone record was retrieved that showed, 
on Betty Currie's cell phone calls, a call was made at 3:32 
from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky. And this confirms the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the followup to get the gifts 
came from Betty Currie. The only way she would know about it is 
if the President directed her to go retrieve the gifts, as was 
discussed with Monica earlier.
    Now, the President will argue that Monica's timeline does 
not fit with the time of the cell phone call. But remember, the 
cell phone record was retrieved subsequent to both the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie before the grand 
jury, and therefore the record was not available to refresh the 
recollection or to make inquiry with him about that. Monica 
Lewinsky's time estimates as to when Betty Currie arrived to 
pick up the gifts was based upon her memory without the benefit 
of records.
    The questions raised by the President on this issue are 
legitimate and demonstrate the need to call the key witnesses 
to a trial of this case and to assess which version of the 
events is believable and substantiated by the corroborating 
evidence. This is certainly an area of testimony where the 
juror needs to hear from Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky and 
to examine all of the circumstantial evidence and documentary 
evidence to determine the truth. It is my belief, based upon 
common sense and based upon the documentary evidence, that the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky is supported in the record and it 
leads to the conclusion that it was the President who initiated 
this retrieval of the gifts and the concealment of the 
evidence.
    There are many lawyers in this room, and you know that in 
Federal cases all across this country judges instruct juries on 
circumstantial evidence. We have presented to you a great 
amount of direct evidence, grand jury testimony, eyewitness 
testimony, documentary evidence. But juries can use 
circumstantial evidence as well. There is a typical line from 
the instruction that is given in Federal courts to Federal 
juries all across the land:

    The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight 
or value to be given either to direct or circumstantial 
evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of 
circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.

    So I think it is incumbent upon you to evaluate the 
circumstances very carefully in addition to the testimony.
    Now, let's examine the key question for a moment. Why did 
Betty Currie pick up the gifts from Monica Lewinsky? Monica 
Lewinsky states that she did not request this and the retrieval 
was initiated by the call from Betty Currie. This was after the 
meeting with the President. Monica Lewinsky's version is 
corroborated by the cell phone record and the pattern of 
conduct on the part of Betty Currie. What do I mean by that? As 
a loyal secretary to the President, it is inconceivable that 
she would go to retrieve gifts that she knows the President is 
very concerned about and could bring down the whole house. 
Betty Currie, a subordinate employee, would not engage in such 
activity on such a sensitive matter without the approval and 
direction of the President himself.
    In addition, let's look further to the actions of Betty 
Currie. It becomes clear that she understands the significance 
of these gifts, their evidentiary value in a civil rights case, 
and the fact that they are under subpoena. She retrieves these 
items, and where does she place them? She hides them under her 
bed--significantly, a place of concealment.
    Now, let's look at the President's defense. The President 
stated in his response to questions 24 and 25, which were 
submitted from the House to the President, he was not concerned 
about the gifts. In fact, he recalled telling Monica that if 
the Jones lawyers request the gifts, she should just turn them 
over to them. The President testified he was ``not sure'' if he 
knew the subpoena asked for gifts.
    Now, why in the world would Monica and the President 
discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyer if Ms. Lewinsky 
had not told him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the 
other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would 
he give Monica more gifts on December 28? This seems odd. But 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she 
never questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but 
keep this private,'' and that means to take ``whatever 
appropriate steps need to be taken.'' That is from Monica's 
grand jury testimony of August 6.
    Why would the President even meet with Monica Lewinsky on 
December 28 when their relationship was in question and he had 
a deposition coming up? Certainly he knew he would be 
questioned about it. Certainly if Monica became a witness she 
would be questioned about the relationship, that she would be 
asked when was the last time you met with the President, and 
now they have to say December 28, if they were going to tell 
the truth.
    The answer is, the President knew that he had to keep 
Monica Lewinsky on the team and he was willing to take more 
risks so that she would continue to be a part of the conspiracy 
to obstruct the legitimate functions of the Federal court in a 
civil rights case.
    It should be remembered that the President has denied each 
and every allegation of the two articles of impeachment; he has 
denied each element of the obstruction of justice charges, 
including this allegation that he encouraged a scheme to 
conceal evidence in a civil rights case. This straightforward 
denial illustrates the dispute in the evidence and testimony. 
It sets the credibility of Monica Lewinsky, the credibility of 
Betty Currie, the credibility of Vernon Jordan, and others 
against the credibility of the President of the United States.
    How can you, as jurors, determine who is telling the truth? 
I have pointed to the corroborating evidence, the 
circumstantial evidence, as well as common sense supporting the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky. But let me ask you two questions: 
Can you convict the President of the United States without 
hearing personally the testimony of one of the key witnesses? 
The second question is: Can you dismiss the charges under this 
strong set of facts and circumstances without hearing and 
evaluating the credibility of key witnesses?
    Let me take this a step further and evaluate the 
credibility of the President. Let's first look back at his 
testimony on the December 28 meeting that he gave in his 
deposition. In that case, he seriously misrepresented the 
nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, and that was the gift 
exchange. First he was asked: ``Did she tell you that she had 
been served with a subpoena in this case?'' The President 
answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had been.''
    Again, this is his testimony in the deposition. He was also 
asked in the deposition if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky 
about the possibility of her testifying.'' His answer: ``I'm 
not sure,'' he said. He then added that he may have joked that 
the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever spoken 
to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation 
than that about it. . .''
    Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict his 
testimony but the President later had to answer questions in 
the grand jury about this same set of circumstances and the 
President directly contradicted himself. Speaking of this 
December 28 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course, 
that she had gotten a subpoena'' and they had a ``conversation 
about the possibility of her testifying.''
    I submit to this body that the inconsistencies of the 
President's own testimony, as well as common sense, seriously 
diminish his credibility on this issue.
    Now let's go forward, once again, to the time period in 
which the President gave his deposition in the Paula Jones 
case. The President testified under oath on January 17, and 
immediately thereafter, remember, he brought Betty Currie in to 
present a set of false facts to her, seeking her agreement and 
coaching her.
    But the President is fully convinced that he can get by 
with his false denials because no one will be able to prove 
what did or did not happen in the Oval Office. There were no 
witnesses, and it boils down to a ``he said, she said'' 
scenario, and as long as that is the case, he believes he can 
win. If the President can simply destroy Monica Lewinsky's 
credibility in public and before the grand jury, then he will 
escape the consequences for his false statements under oath and 
obstruction in the civil rights case. Now, remember, this 
viewpoint, though, is all before the DNA tests were performed 
on the blue dress, forcing the President to acknowledge certain 
items.
    In order to carry out this coverup and obstruction, the 
President needed to go further. He needed not only Betty Currie 
to repeat his false statements but also other witnesses who 
would assuredly be called before the Federal grand jury and who 
would be questioned by the news media in public forums. And 
this brings us to the false statements that the President made 
to his White House staff and Presidential aides.
    Let's call Sydney Blumenthal and John Podesta to the 
witness stand. I concede they would be adverse witnesses. This 
is referred to in exhibit 18 that you have in front of you.
    First, the testimony of Sydney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal, 
to put this in perspective, is testifying about his 
conversations when the President called him in to go through 
these facts of what happened. So Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
``it was at that point that he''--referring to the President--
``gave his account as to what happened to me and he said that 
Monica--and it came very fast. He said, `Monica Lewinsky came 
at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He rebuffed her. He 
said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a 
lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.' ''
    Look at this next line. ``She threatened him. She said that 
she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known 
as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if 
she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't 
be the stalker any more.''
    He talks about this character in a novel, and I haven't 
read that book. But the last line: ``And I said to him, I said, 
``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?' He 
said, `Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.' ''
    Let's go to John Podesta's testimony where he was called in 
the same fashion. The President talked to him about what is 
happening:

    Question: Okay. Share that with us.
    Answer: Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some 
spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said 
that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever.
    Question: Okay.
    Answer: --that they had not had oral sex.

    Very briefly, Dick Morris. You have heard this. I will 
refer to the last line: `` `They're just not ready for it,' 
meaning the voters. And he--the President--said, `Well, we just 
have to win, then.' ''
    As the President testified before the grand jury, he knew 
these witnesses would be called before the grand jury. At page 
106 of the President's testimony before the grand jury--I just 
want to confirm this point because it is important--he 
testified--the question was: ``You know that they''--and this 
is referring to John Podesta, Sydney Blumenthal and his aides--
``might be witnesses, you knew they might be called into the 
grand jury, didn't you?''
    His answer: ``That's right.''
    So there is no question these were witnesses going to 
testify before the grand jury. He was giving them false 
information, and he did not limit it to that. The false 
statements to them constitute witness tampering and obstruction 
of justice.
    I think there are two significant points in the statements 
the President made to his aides.
    First of all, the President, who wants to do away with the 
politics of personal destruction, indicates a willingness to 
destroy the credibility and reputation of a young person who 
worked in his office for what reason? In order to preserve not 
only his Presidency but, more significantly, to defeat the 
civil rights case against him. It is not a matter of saying he 
didn't do it because he could have simply uttered a denial, but 
he engaged in character assassination that he knew would be 
repeated to the Federal grand jury and throughout the public--
she was a stalker, she threatened me, she came on to me--and it 
was repeated.
    Secondly, he makes it clear in his statements to John 
Podesta that he denies any sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, including oral sex. There is no quibbling about 
definitions in this statement. It clearly reflects an attempt 
to deceive, lie, and obstruct our system of justice.
    In this case, at every turn, he used whatever means 
available to evade the truth, destroy evidence, tamper with 
witnesses, and took any other action required to prevent 
evidence from coming forward in a civil rights case that would 
prove a truth contrary to the President's interest. He had 
obstructed the administration of justice before the U.S. 
district court in a civil rights case and before the Federal 
grand jury. But as we move toward a conclusion, let's not focus 
just on the supporting cast we talked about, but we need to 
look at the direct and personal actions of the President.
    I want to look at exhibit 20. This just summarizes the 
seven pillars of obstruction. What did the President do that 
constitutes evidence of obstruction?
    No. 1, he personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky, 
to provide false testimony.
    No. 2, the President had direct involvement in assuring a 
job for a witness--underlining ``direct involvement.'' He made 
the calls, Vernon Jordan did, and it is connected with the 
filing of the false affidavit by that witness.
    No. 3, the President personally, with corrupt intentions, 
tampered with the testimony of a prospective witness, Betty 
Currie.
    No. 4, the President personally provided false statements 
under oath before a Federal grand jury.
    No. 5, by direct and circumstantial evidence the President 
personally directed the concealment of evidence under subpoena 
in a judicial proceeding.
    No. 6, the President personally allowed false 
representations to be made by his attorney, Robert Bennett, to 
a Federal district judge on January 17.
    No. 7, the President intentionally provided false 
information to witnesses before a Federal grand jury knowing 
that those statements would be repeated with the intent to 
obstruct the proceedings before that grand jury and that is the 
statements that he made to the aides.
    The seven pillars of this obstruction case were personally 
constructed by the President of the United States. It was done 
with the intent that the truth and evidence would be suppressed 
in a civil rights case pending against him. The goal was to 
win, and he was not going to let the judicial system stand in 
his way.
    At the beginning of my presentation, I tried to put this 
case into perspective for myself by saying that this proceeding 
is the same as to what takes place in every courtroom in 
America--the pursuit of truth, seeking equal justice, and 
upholding the law. All of that is true. But we know there is 
even more at stake in this trial. What happens here affects the 
workings of our Constitution, it will affect the Presidency in 
future decades, and it will have an impact on a whole 
generation of Americans. What is at stake is our Constitution 
and the principle of equal justice for all.
    I have faith in the Constitution of the United States, but 
the checks and balances of the Constitution are carried out by 
individuals--individuals who are entrusted under oath with 
upholding the trust given to us by the people of this great 
land. If I believe in the Constitution, that it will work, then 
I must believe in you.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I trust the 
Constitution of the United States. But today it is most 
important that I believe in you. I have faith in the U.S. 
Senate. You have earned the trust of the American people, and I 
trust each of you to make the right decision for our country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
we take another 15-minute break in the proceedings. And I urge 
the Senators to return promptly to the Chamber so we can begin 
after the 15-minute break.
    There being no objection, at 4:51 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 5:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to 
resume final presentation of the afternoon. Several Senators 
have inquired what will happen the balance of the day. I 
believe the presentation by Congressman Rogan will be the last 
of the day. It is anticipated we will complete today's 
presentation around 6:30 or 6:45.
    I yield the floor.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
    Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the 
President, Members of the United States Senate, my name is 
Congressman James E. Rogan. I represent the 27th District of 
California.
    May I say at the outset that some of the facts and evidence 
you will hear in my presentation may sound familiar in light of 
the last presentation. Although at times the facts may appear 
to be a crossover, the relevance will be presented in a 
different light.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation offered the evidence 
as it relates to the obstruction of justice charge against the 
President in article II. I will be inviting this body to view 
the evidence within the framework of article I, perjury before 
the grand jury.
    On behalf of the House of Representatives and in the name 
of the people of the United States, I will be presenting to the 
Senate evidence against the President to demonstrate he 
committed perjury before a Federal grand jury as set forth in 
article I of the articles of impeachment.
    Article I of the impeachment resolution against President 
Clinton alleges that he committed perjury before the grand 
jury.
    On August 17, 1998, President Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence 
shows that contrary to that oath, the President willfully 
provided perjurious, false, and misleading statements to the 
grand jury in four general areas:
    First, he perjured himself when he gave a false accounting 
to the grand jury about the nature and details of his 
relationship with a 21-year-old intern, Ms. Monica Lewinsky, 
who was a subordinate Federal Government employee.
    Second, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
repeated previous perjured answers he gave under oath in a 
sexual harassment suit, which was a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him by Paula Jones.
    Third, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
repeated previous perjured answers to justify his attorney's 
false representations to a Federal judge in the Paula Jones 
sexual harassment lawsuit against him.
    Finally, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he 
testified falsely about his attempts to get other potential 
grand jury witnesses to tell false stories to the grand jury, 
and to prevent the discovery of evidence in Paula Jones' sexual 
harassment lawsuit against him.
    In a judicial proceeding, a witness has a very solemn 
obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth. Perjury is a serious crime because our judicial 
system can only succeed if citizens are required to tell the 
truth in court proceedings. If witnesses may lie with impunity 
for personal or political reasons, ``justice'' is no longer the 
product of the court system and we descend into chaos. That is 
why the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a premium on truthful 
testimony and shows no tolerance for perjury.
    More than 20 years ago, the Supreme Court addressed this 
very concept of perjury and its dangerous effect on our system 
of law. Listen to the words of the U.S. Supreme Court:

    In this constitutional process of securing a witness' 
testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured 
testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic 
concepts of judicial proceedings. . . . Congress has made the 
giving of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe 
penalties; in no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into 
the open where the law can deal with it.

    That is the framework under which the House of 
Representatives acted in impeaching the President of the United 
States and now respectfully urges this body to call the 
President to constitutional accountability.
    The key to understanding the facts of this case is to 
understand why the President was asked, under oath, questions 
about his private life in the first place.
    Despite the popular spin, it wasn't because Members of 
Congress, or lawyers from the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, or a gaggle of reporters suddenly decided to invade 
the President's privacy. No. This all came about because of a 
claim against the President from when he was the Governor of 
Arkansas.
    During the discovery phase of the Paula Jones sexual 
harassment case against the President, Federal Judge Susan 
Webber Wright ordered him to answer questions under oath 
relating to any sexual relationship he may have had while 
Governor and President with subordinate female Government 
employees. These orders are common in similar cases, and the 
questions posed to President Clinton are questions routinely 
posed to defendants in civil rights sexual harassment cases 
every single day in courthouses throughout the land.
    During the President's deposition in the Paula Jones case, 
he was asked questions about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. The judge allowed these questions because they 
possibly could lead Ms. Jones to discover if there was any 
pattern of conduct to help prove her case. The President 
repeatedly denied that he had a sexual relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky.
    A few days later, the story about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky broke in the press. A criminal investigation began to 
determine whether the President perjured himself in the Paula 
Jones sexual harassment case and obstructed justice by trying 
to defeat her claim against him by corrupt means.
    On the afternoon of August 17, 1998, President Clinton 
raised his right hand and took an oath before the grand jury in 
their criminal investigation.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God?

    Note the incredibly solemn obligation of the oath the 
President took:

    Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to 
give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth?

    When the President made that solemn pledge, he was not 
obliging himself to tell the grand jury the partial truth; he 
was not obliging himself to tell the ``I didn't want to be 
particularly helpful'' truth; he was not obliging himself to 
tell the ``this is embarrassing so I think I'll fudge on it a 
little bit'' truth. He was required to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and he made that pledge 
in the name of God.
    The attorneys for the Office of the Independent Counsel 
showed great deference to the President when they questioned 
him that day. The President's attorneys were allowed to be 
there with him during the entire proceeding so that he could 
confer with them at his leisure if he was unsure of how to 
respond to a question. As a matter of fact, the attorney who 
questioned the President encouraged him to confer with his 
lawyers if there arose in the President's mind any reason to 
hesitate before answering a question.
    The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the 
President's testimony. The President was told:

    Normally, grand jury witnesses, while not allowed to have 
attorneys in the grand jury room with them, can stop and 
consult with their attorneys. Under our arrangement today, your 
attorneys are here and present for consultation and you can 
break to consult them as necessary. . . . Do you understand 
that, sir?

    The President responded: ``I do understand that.''
    As a practical matter, the President had three options as 
he appeared before the grand jury to testify.
    First, the President could tell the truth about his true 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    However, the evidence will clearly show that the President 
rejected the option of telling the truth.
    Second, the President knew he could invoke his fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
    The independent counsel's attorney explicitly reminded the 
President about his right to refuse to answer any question that 
might tend to incriminate him.
    The President was asked:

    You have a privilege against self-incrimination. If a 
truthful answer to any question would tend to incriminate you, 
you can invoke the privilege and that invocation will not be 
used against you. Do you understand that?

    The President's response was: ``I do.''
    The President knew he had the right to refuse to answer any 
incriminating questions and that no legal harm would have come 
to him for doing so.
    But he rejected this option, just as he rejected the option 
of telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth.
    Instead, he selected a third path.
    He continued to lie about corrupt efforts to destroy Paula 
Jones' civil rights lawsuit against him.
    If a trial is permitted before this body where live 
witnesses can be called and where their credibility can be 
scrutinized, the evidence will show this distinguished body 
that the course the President charted was a course of perjury.
    Despite the President's unique level of judicial 
sophistication and expertise, the attorneys at the grand jury 
were careful to make sure the President understood his 
responsibilities to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth.
    They did this at the outset of his testimony, before any 
questions were asked that might tempt the President to lie 
under oath.
    And they specifically warned him that if he were to lie or 
intentionally mislead the grand jury, he could face perjury and 
obstruction of justice charges, both of which are felonies 
under Federal law.
    This exchange occurred before the President's testimony:

    Q: Mr. President, you understand that your testimony here 
today is under oath?
    A: I do.
    Q: And you understand that because you have sworn to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that if 
you were to lie or intentionally mislead the grand jury, you 
could be prosecuted for perjury and/or obstruction of justice?
    A: I believe that's correct.
    Q: Is there anything that . . . I've stated to you 
regarding your rights and responsibilities that you would like 
me to clarify or that you don't understand?
    A: No, sir.

    Despite this ominous warning, the prosecutors continued 
emphasizing the need for the President to resist lying to the 
grand jury.
    Still intent on making sure the President understood his 
obligations, the attorneys further advised him:

    Q: Mr. President, I would like to read for you a portion of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 603, which discusses the important 
function the oath has in our judicial system.
    It says that the purpose of the oath is . . . calculated to 
awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind 
with the duty to tell the truth.
    Could you please tell the grand jury what that oath means 
to you for today's testimony?
    A: I have sworn an oath to tell the grand jury the truth, 
and that's what I intend to do.

    When the President said in that very last answer I just 
read that he swore an oath to tell the grand jury ``the 
truth,'' the prosecutor immediately followed up with this 
question. Here is what he was told.
    Question to the President:

    Q: You understand that [the oath] requires you to give the 
whole truth, that is, a complete answer to each question, sir?
    A: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I 
can.

    One would think these repetitive explanations would be 
enough to warn even the most legally unsophisticated witness 
about the need to treat a grand jury criminal investigation 
seriously, and the need to tell the whole truth at any cost.
    No reasonable person could believe at this point that the 
President did not understand his obligations.
    Yet, just to be sure, the attorneys again impressed on the 
President his solemn duty to tell the truth:
    Question to the President:

    Q: Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
    A: I did take an oath then.
    Q: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
you then as it does today?
    A: I believed then that I had to answer the questions 
truthfully. That is correct.  . . .
    Q: And it meant the same to you then as it does today?
    A: Well, no one read me a definition then and we didn't go 
through this exercise then.
    I swore an oath to tell the truth, and I believed I was 
bound to be truthful and I tried to be.

    Having just received his ``refresher course'' on either 
``taking the fifth'' and remaining silent, or telling the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth, the President acknowledged he 
was required to tell the truth when he gave answers to 
questions 8 months earlier in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
civil rights lawsuit.
    Question to the President:

    Q: At the Paula Jones deposition, you were represented by 
Mr. Robert Bennett, your counsel, is that correct?
    A: That is correct.
    Q: He was authorized by you to be your representative 
there, your attorney, is that correct?
    A: That is correct.
    Q: Your counsel, Mr. Bennett, indicated . . . and I'm 
quoting, ``The President intends to give full and complete 
answers as Ms. Jones is entitled to have.''
    My question to you is, do you agree with your counsel that 
a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is, to use his words, 
entitled to have the truth?
    A: I believe that I was bound to give truthful answers, 
yes, sir.
    Q: But the question is, sir, do you agree with your counsel 
that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is entitled to 
have the truth?
    A. I believe when a witness is under oath in a civil case, 
or otherwise under oath, the witness should do everything 
possible to answer the questions truthfully.

    Thus, the groundwork was laid for the President to testify 
under oath.
    He knew how the rules worked respecting testimony before 
the grand jury.
    If a question was vague or ambiguous, the President could 
ask for a clarification.
    If he was unsure how to answer, or indeed whether to answer 
a question, he could stop the questioning, take a break, and 
consult privately with his attorneys who were present with him.
    If giving an answer would tend to incriminate him, he could 
refuse to answer the question by claiming his fifth amendment 
rights.
    But if, after all of this, he decided to give an answer, 
the answer he gave was required to be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. And it was no different than 
the obligation when he testified in the Paula Jones 
deposition--the same oath, the same obligation.
    Let's look at how the President chose to meet his 
obligation.
    As noted in my opening remarks, the President's grand jury 
perjury is the basis for article I of the impeachment 
resolution. The evidence shows, and live witnesses clearly will 
demonstrate, that the President repeatedly committed perjury 
before the grand jury when he testified as a defendant in a 
sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit against him.
    He intentionally failed in his lawful obligation to tell 
the truth in four general areas. First, the President committed 
perjury before the grand jury when he testified about the 
nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, a 21-year-old 
White House intern who, by definition, was a subordinate 
Government employee.
    On December 5, 1995, Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the 
Paula Jones witness list. Later, the President was ordered by 
Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright to answer questions about 
Monica Lewinsky because the President was a defendant in a 
sexual harassment case.
    At his deposition in the Paula Jones case, the President 
was shown a definition approved by Judge Wright of what 
constitutes sexual relations. I am going to read the definition 
that was presented to the President.
    And let me say at the outset that I am going to slightly 
sanitize it. You have in your materials, Members of this body, 
a copy of the actual definition that was given to you, so you 
will be able to understand precisely what was put before the 
President.
    Definition of sexual relations:

    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or causes 
contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any person 
with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person.

    Members of the Senate, just for clarification, I did not 
feel the need to actually relate to this body what those 
enumerated body parts are.
    After reviewing the deposition, the President then denied 
that he ever had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. As 
we have already seen, from the day in January when the 
President testified in the Jones deposition until the day he 
appeared in August for his grand jury testimony, he vehemently 
denied ever having a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    Listen to the President addressing the American people on 
the subject of his credibility. The date is January 26, 1998, 5 
days after the Lewinsky story broke in the press.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    ``But I want to say one thing to the American people. I 
want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again.
    ``I did not have sexual relations with that woman--Miss 
Lewinsky.
    ``I never told anybody to lie--not a single time. Never. 
These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for 
the American people.
    ``Thank you.''

    Beginning in January 1998, the President went on an 8-month 
campaign, both under oath and in the press, denying any sexual 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky in any way, shape, or form. 
But 8 months after his deposition testimony and these 
passionate denials, the tide had turned against his story. By 
August, Monica Lewinsky was now cooperating with the office of 
the independent counsel. If she was telling the truth in her 
sworn testimony, then the President's January denial in the 
Paula Jones case would have been a clear case of him committing 
perjury and obstructing justice.
    Why? Because she was describing, in very graphic detail, 
conduct occurring between her and the President that clearly 
fit the definition of ``sexual relations'' as used in the Paula 
Jones deposition--conduct that he repeatedly denied under oath.
    So by the time the President sat down for his grand jury 
testimony to answer these questions under oath, he had put 
himself in a huge box. He could not continue the outright lie 
because Ms. Lewinsky had turned over her blue dress for DNA 
testing, and at the time of his grand jury testimony he didn't 
know what the results of that FBI test were. Under such 
circumstances, continuing the lie was too risky of a strategy 
even for the most accomplished of gamblers. But if he told the 
truth, his earlier perjury and obstruction of justice would 
have ended his Presidency. He was sure he would have been 
driven from office.
    Remember that the President had actually authorized that a 
poll be taken for him by Dick Morris, and the poll wasn't just 
taken on whether the American people would forgive him for 
adultery; the President asked Dick Morris to poll in two other 
areas. He asked Dick Morris to poll whether the American people 
would forgive him for perjury and obstruction of justice. When 
he got the poll results back, he learned that the American 
people would forgive him for the adultery but they would not 
forgive him for perjury or for obstruction of justice.
    Once he got the bad news from Dick Morris that his 
political career was over if he perjured himself, he told Dick 
Morris, ``We'll just have to win.'' So at his grand jury 
testimony, once the first question was asked about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the President produced a 
prepared statement and read from it. This prepared statement he 
read to the grand jury on August 17, 1998, was the linchpin in 
his plan to ``win.''
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, were you physically intimate with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. Mr. Bittman, I think maybe I can save you and the grand 
jurors a lot of time if I read a statement, which I think will 
make it clear what the nature of my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky was and how it related to the testimony I gave, what I 
was trying to do in that testimony. And I think it will perhaps 
make it possible for you to ask even more relevant questions 
from your point of view. And, with your permission, I'd like to 
read that statement.
    Q. Absolutely. Please, Mr. President.
    A. When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that 
was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in 
early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with 
Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include 
this conduct. I take full responsibility for my actions. While 
I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can, 
because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, 
and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the 
office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of 
these particular matters.
    I will try to answer to the best of my ability other 
questions, including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term of 
sexual relations, as I understood it to be defined at my 
January 17th, 1998, deposition, and questions concerning 
alleged subordination of perjury, obstruction of justice and 
intimidation of witnesses.
    That . . . is my statement.

    Beyond that statement, the President generally refused to 
answer specific questions about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. The President used that prepared statement as a 
substitute answer for specific questions about his conduct with 
Ms. Lewinsky 19 separate times during his testimony before the 
grand jury. The purpose of the prepared statement was to avoid 
answering the types of specific harassment lawsuit questions 
for which the U.S. Supreme Court and Judge Susan Webber Wright 
had earlier cleared the way. The evidence shows the President 
used this prepared statement in order to justify the perjurious 
answers he gave at his deposition which were intended to affect 
the outcome of the Paula Jones case. The fact that this 
statement was prepared in advance shows his intent to mislead 
the grand jury in this very area. Ironically, this prepared 
statement was supposed to inoculate the President from perjury. 
Instead, it opened him up to 19 more examples of giving 
perjurious, false, and misleading answers under oath.
    For example, in that prepared statement, the President said 
his sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky began in 1996, and not in 
1995, as Ms. Lewinsky had testified. This was not a mere slip 
of memory over a meaningless timeframe; there is a discrepancy 
in the dates for a reason. You see, under the President's 
version, in 1996 Monica Lewinsky was a paid White House 
employee. Under the facts as testified to by Ms. Lewinsky, when 
the relationship really began in 1995, she was not a paid 
employee at the White House; she was a young, 21-year-old White 
House intern.
    The concept of a President having a sexual relationship in 
the White House with a young intern less than half his age was 
a public relations disaster for the President, as everyone 
vividly remembers. It is clear that the President somehow 
viewed the concept as less combustible if he could take the 
``young intern'' phrase out of the public lexicon. Yet in his 
deposition testimony, the President admitted he met her and saw 
her when she was an intern working in the White House in 
November 1995, during the Government shutdown. Monica Lewinsky 
confirmed this. In fact, she testified that the first time she 
ever spoke to the President was on November 15, 1995, during 
the Government shutdown. And she also said that the very first 
time that she ever spoke to the President was the same day he 
invited her back to the Oval Office and began a sexual 
relationship with her.
    It is obvious that the reference in the President's 
prepared statement to the grand jury that this relationship 
began in 1996 was intentionally false.
    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain 
occasions. Actually, they were alone in the White House at 
least 20 times and had at least 11 sexual encounters at the 
White House. The President attempted to use language that 
subtly minimized the number of times they were alone.
    The President's statement was intentionally misleading when 
he described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky 
as ``occasional.'' In fact, there are at least 55 documented 
telephone conversations between the President of the United 
States and the young intern. And without going into further 
graphic detail, the evidence shows that, at least on 17 of 
those occasions, those conversations included much more than 
mere sexual banter, as the President described it.
    The most unsettling part of that statement was uttered near 
the close. Listen to what the President said: ``I regret that 
what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' 
``Friendship.'' The very day the President met and spoke with a 
young White House intern for the first time was the day he 
invited her back to the Oval Office to perform sex acts on him.
    In fact, Monica Lewinsky said that after their sexual 
relationship was over a month old, she didn't even think the 
President knew her name. The President's statement about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky beginning as a friendship is 
a callous and deceptive mischaracterization of how his 
relationship with this young woman really began.
    Thus, the President began his deposition testimony by 
reading a false and misleading statement to the grand jury. He 
then used that statement as an excuse not to answer specific 
questions that were directly relevant to allowing the grand 
jury to complete its criminal investigation. Had he given 
specific answers to specific questions about the true nature of 
his relationship, the grand jury would have been able to learn 
the whole truth about whether the President perjured himself 
and obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
civil rights lawsuit.
    Paula Jones had a legal and constitutional right to learn 
if the President, while as President or Governor, used his 
position of power and influence to get sexual favors from 
subordinate female employees in the workplace or to reward 
subordinate female employees for granting such favors to him. 
Instead, the President intentionally provided on 19 separate 
occasions a misleading statement instead of giving a true 
characterization of his conduct, as required by his oath.
    He had no legal or constitutional right to refuse to answer 
such questions without claiming a fifth amendment privilege and 
then allowing Judge Wright to make a determination as to 
whether the privilege applied. The President's preliminary 
statement delivered 19 times was an initial shot across the 
perjury bow offered by the President throughout his grand jury 
testimony. It showed a premeditated effort to thwart the grand 
jury's criminal investigation, to justify his prior wrongdoing, 
and to deny Paula Jones her constitutional right to bring 
forward her claim in a court of law.
    The President gave further perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. One of the ways the 
President tried to justify his perjurious answers in the Jones 
deposition about his relationship was to deconstruct the 
English language. Remember, the President was shown a copy of 
the definition of ``sexual relations'' that Judge Wright 
approved in his January deposition. This definition was 
directed by Judge Wright to be used as the guide under which 
the President was to answer questions about his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. After carefully reviewing that 
definition, the President said under oath that it did not apply 
to his relationship with her.
    It is important to remember that at the time the President 
testified that he never had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, this was not a risky perjury strategy. After all, he 
had successfully used Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a 
good job in New York, despite her questionable qualifications. 
She had filed a false affidavit in the Jones case denying a 
sexual relationship with the President. She and the President 
had previously agreed to comprehensive cover stories to deny 
the truth of their relationship if anyone ever confronted them 
about it. And the bevy of gifts the President had given to 
Monica were now nestled safely under Betty Currie's bed so that 
they would never be produced to or discovered by Mrs. Jones' 
attorneys in compliance with their subpoena to have those gifts 
produced.
    The perjury strategy was a safe bet in January at his 
deposition, but it soon turned upside down for the President. 
By the time of his grand jury testimony in August, the 
President knew things had changed drastically but not in his 
favor. In light of Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation with the 
independent counsel, the impending FBI report on the DNA 
testing on the blue dress, and the President's decision not to 
confess to his crime, the President needed to come up with some 
excuse. Here is how the President, at his August grand jury 
appearance, tried to explain away his January deposition denial 
of engaging in sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Did you understand the words in the first portion of the 
[Jones deposition] exhibit, Mr. President, that is, ``For the 
purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual 
relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes . . 
.''?
    Did you understand, do you understand the words there in 
that phrase?
    A. Yes . . . I can tell you what my understanding of the 
definition is, if you want . . . My understanding of this 
definition is it covers contact by the person being deposed 
with the enumerated areas, if the contact is done with an 
intent to arouse or gratify. That's my understanding of the 
definition.
    Q. What did you believe the definition to include and 
exclude? What kinds of activities?
    A. I thought the definition included any activity by the 
person being deposed, where the person was the actor and came 
into contact with those parts of the bodies with the purpose or 
intent of gratification, and excluded any other activity. For 
example, kissing's not covered by that, I don't think.
    Q. Did you understand the definition to be limited to 
sexual activity?
    A. Yes, I understood the definition to be limited to 
physical contact with those areas of the body with the specific 
intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I understood it to be.
    Q. What specific acts did the definition include, as you 
understood the definition on January 17th, 1998?
    A. Any contact with the areas that are mentioned, sir. If 
you contacted those parts of the body with an intent to arouse 
or gratify, that is covered.
    Q. What did you understand . . .
    A. The person being deposed. If the person being deposed 
contacted those parts of another person's body with an intent 
to arouse or gratify, that was covered.

    If that answer sounds confusing to you, there is a reason 
for that. It was meant to be.
    What the President now was saying to the grand jury is that 
during their intimate relationship in the Oval Office, Monica 
Lewinsky had sexual relations with him; he didn't have sexual 
relations with her.
    Consider that for a minute.
    The President is asking everyone to believe that between 
the years 1995 and 1997, while Monica Lewinsky was engaged in a 
pattern of explicit availability for him as she described in 
her testimony, the President carefully avoided having any 
intimate contact with her as described in Judge Wright's very 
detailed definition.
    According to the President, since he never intimately 
touched her as described in the definition--she only touched 
him--then he was under no obligation to answer questions in the 
harassment suit about Monica Lewinsky as Federal Judge Susan 
Webber Wright ordered him to do under oath.
    Not only does the President's claim strain all boundaries 
of common sense; it is directly in conflict with Monica 
Lewinsky's detailed and corroborated accounts of their 
relationship.
    As if this ridiculous expansion of Judge Wright's 
definition of what constituted sexual relations wasn't enough, 
the President then decided to take his interpretation of the 
judge's definition one step further. He added a new element as 
to why he claimed the definition didn't apply to him.
    When asked again, at his grand jury testimony, what he 
thought the definition of sexual relations meant, here is the 
new twist that the President came up with.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    A. As I remember from the previous discussion this was some 
kind of definition that had something to do with sexual 
harassment. So, that implies it's forcing to me. And I--there 
was never any issue of forcing in the case involving--well, any 
of these questions they were asking me. They made it clear in 
this discussion I just reviewed that what they were referring 
to was intentional sexual conduct, not some sort of forcible 
abusive behavior.
    So I basically--I don't think I paid any attention to it 
because it appeared to me that that was something that had no 
reference to the facts that they admitted they were asking me 
about.

    The President now took the position that the definition 
didn't apply to him because it would only have applied if he 
forced himself on Monica Lewinsky. Remember the definition. And 
I will read it again:

    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in 
sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or 
causes--
    (1) contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any 
person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of 
any person[.]

    As you can see, this straightforward definition did not 
include the subject of force or harassment.
    Yet when the independent counsel's attorney tried to 
clarify the President's newfound position, the President gave 
no ground. He simply plowed ahead with his new interpretation.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. I'm just trying to understand, Mr. President. You 
indicated that you put the definition in the context of a 
sexual harassment case . . .
    A. No, no, I think it was not in the context of sexual 
harassment. I just re-read those four pages, which obviously 
the grand jury doesn't have. But there was some reference to 
the fact that this definition apparently bore some--had some 
connection to some definition in another context and that this 
was being used not in that context, not necessarily in the 
context of sexual harassment.
    So I would think that this causes would be--means to force 
someone to do something. That's what I read it. That's the only 
point I'm trying to make. Therefore, I did not believe that any 
one had ever suggested that I had forced anyone to do anything 
and I did not do that. And so, that could not have had any 
bearing on any questions relating to Ms. Lewinsky.

    The evidence clearly shows from Monica Lewinsky's sworn 
testimony that the President deconstructed the English language 
to deny Paula Jones the opportunity to find out if other 
witnesses were out there who would help bolster her case 
against the President, and she was legally entitled to do that 
under our sexual harassment laws.
    No reasonable interpretation of the President's testimony 
could be made that he fulfilled his legal obligation to testify 
to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    His statements were perjurious. They were designed to 
defeat Paula Jones' right to pursue her sexual harassment civil 
rights lawsuit against this President.
    And by the way, in his testimony, the President conceded 
that if Monica Lewinsky's recitation of the facts was true, he 
would have perjured himself both in his deposition testimony 
and in repeating his denials before the grand jury. Listen to 
this.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations 
with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition under that 
definition, correct?
    A. That's correct, sir.
    Q. If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of 
another person, would that be in--with the intent to arouse the 
sexual desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in definition one, 
would that be, under your understanding, then and now, sexual 
relations?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Yes, it would?
    A. Yes, it would if you had a direct contact with any of 
these places in the body, if you had direct contact with intent 
to arouse or gratify, that would fall within the definition.
    Q. So you didn't do any of those three things with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did 
not have sexual relations as I understood this term to be 
defined.

    So, who is telling the truth? The only way to really know 
is to bring forth the witnesses, put them under oath and give 
each juror, each Member of this body, the opportunity to make 
that determination of credibility because the record shows that 
Monica Lewinsky delivered consistent and detailed testimony 
under oath regarding many specific encounters with the 
President that clearly fell within the definition of sexual 
relations in the Jones deposition.
    Monica Lewinsky's memory and accounts of these incidents 
are amazingly corroborated by her recollection of dates, places 
and phone calls which correspond with the official White House 
entrance logs and phone records.
    Monica Lewinsky's testimony is further corroborated through 
DNA testing and the testimony of her friends and family 
members, to whom she made near contemporaneous statements about 
the relationship.
    Most importantly, Monica Lewinsky had every reason to tell 
the truth to the grand jury. She was under a threat of 
prosecution for perjury, not only for her grand jury testimony 
but also for the false affidavit she filed on behalf of the 
President in the Jones case.
    She knew then and she knows today that her immunity 
agreement could be revoked at any time if she lies under oath 
or if she lied under oath in the past. Truthful testimony was 
and remains a condition for her immunity from prosecution.
    By way of contrast, the President was under obligation to 
give complete answers. Instead, he offered false answers that 
violated his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth. And incidentally, during his grand jury 
testimony, the President actually suggested that he had a right 
to give less than complete answers. Why? Because he questioned 
the motives of Ms. Jones in bringing her lawsuit.
    If this standard is acceptable, what does that do to the 
search for the truth when an oath is administered in a 
courtroom to one who claims to question the ``motives'' of 
their opponent in a trial? This suggestion has no basis in law. 
And it is destructive to the truth-seeking function of the 
courts.
    The President's perjurious legal hairsplitting used to 
bypass the requirement of telling the complete truth denied 
Paula Jones her constitutional right to have her day in court 
and an orderly disposition of her claim in the sexual 
harassment case against the President.
    To dismiss this conduct with a shrug because it is ``just 
about sex'' is to say that the sexual harassment laws 
protecting women in the workplace do not apply to powerful 
employers or others in high places of privilege. As one wag 
recently noted, if this case is ``just about sex,'' then 
robbery is just a disagreement over money.
    Next, the President perjured himself before the grand jury 
when he repeated previous perjured answers he gave in the 
deposition of the Paula Jones case. In his grand jury testimony 
in August, the President admitted he had to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth when he testified in the 
Paula Jones deposition.
    The question to the President:

    Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a 
deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
    A. I did take an oath then.
    Q. Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to 
you then as it does today?
    A. I believe then that I had to answer the questions 
truthfully; that is correct.

    When the President testified in his January deposition, he 
knew full well that Monica Lewinsky's affidavit filed in the 
case stating that they never had sexual relations was false. 
Yet when this affidavit was shown to him at the deposition, he 
testified that her false claim was, in his words, ``absolutely 
true.''
    He knew that the definition of ``sexual relations'' used in 
the earlier Jones deposition was meant to cover the same 
activity that was mentioned in Monica Lewinsky's false 
affidavit. Rather than tell the complete truth, the President 
lied about the relationship, the cover stories, the affidavit, 
the subpoena for gifts, and the search for a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Later he denied to the grand jury in August that he 
committed any perjury during his January deposition. This 
assertion before the grand jury that he testified truthfully in 
the Jones case is in and of itself perjurious testimony because 
the record is clear he did not testify truthfully in January in 
the Paula Jones case. He perjured himself.
    Thus, when the President testified before the grand jury in 
August, he knew he had given perjurious answers in the January 
deposition. If the President really thought, as he testified, 
that he had told the truth in his January deposition testimony, 
he would not have related a false account of events to his 
secretary, Betty Currie, whom he knew, by his own admission, 
might be called as a witness in the Jones case; he would not 
have repeatedly denied he was unable to recall being alone with 
Monica Lewinsky; and he would not have told false accounts to 
his aides whom he knew, by his own admission, were potential 
witnesses in later proceedings.
    The evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice is 
overwhelming in this case. He continued to use illegal means to 
defeat Ms. Jones' constitutional right to bring her harassment 
case against him.
    Next, the President committed perjury before the grand jury 
when he testified that he did not allow his attorney to make 
false representations while referring to Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit before the judge in the Jones case, an affidavit that 
he knew was false.
    Remember, at the Jones deposition in January 1998, Monica 
Lewinsky previously had filed a false affidavit that said, ``I 
have never had a sexual relationship with the President'' and 
that she had no relevant information to provide on the subject 
to Ms. Jones.
    When Ms. Jones' attorneys attempted to question the 
President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, objected to him even being 
questioned about the relationship.
    Mr. Bennett claimed that in light of Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit saying that there was no sexual relationship between 
the two, and there never had been, that Paula Jones' lawyer had 
no good faith belief even to question the President about a 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    Listen to what Mr. Bennett told Judge Wright in the 
deposition.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object 
to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I 
don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith 
of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully 
aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in 
the questions----
    Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
do not know whether counsel is basing this question on any 
affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on 
other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably 
coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, Mr. Fisher is an 
officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good 
faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good 
faith basis for asking this question, he could later be 
sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in 
camera any good faith basis he might have.
    Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness 
is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's) 
affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's 
sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least 
have a good faith proffer.
    Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
good faith basis for asking the question.
    Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
    Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal 
it to counsel.
    Mr. Bennett. Fine.
    Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
    Judge Wright. All right.
    Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is 
substantial basis.
    Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis 
can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the 
deponent, and the other party.

    May I say as an aside that by presenting that, I am in no 
way questioning the quality or the integrity of the President's 
attorney, Mr. Bennett, on that day. Mr. Bennett was doing his 
job as the President's lawyer. He had an affidavit from Monica 
Lewinsky that said none of this ever happened. And so I hope 
that none of you will assume that by my showing this deposition 
tape today I am trying to draw any unfair inference against the 
President's attorney on that date. But you can tell from what 
you have just observed that Mr. Bennett was using Monica 
Lewinsky's false affidavit in an attempt to stop questioning of 
the President about Ms. Lewinsky.
    What did the President do during that exchange? He sat 
mute. He did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even 
though the President knew that the affidavit upon which Mr. 
Bennett was relying was utterly false.
    Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection and allowed 
the questioning about Monica Lewinsky to proceed.
    Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read to the President 
the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied 
having a sexual relationship with the President. Mr. Bennett 
then asked the President, who was under oath, if Ms. Lewinsky's 
statement that they never had a sexual relationship was true 
and accurate.
    Listen to the President as he responds.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q: In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says this, ``I 
have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did 
not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not 
offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual 
relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits 
for reflecting a sexual relationship.''
    Is this a true and accurate statement as far as you know 
it?
    A: That is absolutely true.

    The President's answer: ``That is absolutely true.''
    When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury 
testimony 8 months later how he could have sat silently at his 
earlier deposition while his attorney made the false statement 
that ``there is no sex of any kind,'' in any manner, shape, or 
form, to Judge Wright, the President first said that he was not 
paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. Bennett's comments.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, I want to--before I go into a new subject 
area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. 
Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the 
Paula Jones deposition--counsel is fully aware--it's page 54, 
line 5. ``Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky is filing, 
has an affidavit, which they were in possession of, saying that 
there was absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or 
form with President Clinton.'' That statement was made by your 
attorney in front of Judge Susan Webber Wright.
    A. That's correct.
    Q. Your--that statement is a completely false statement. 
Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in 
any manner, shape or form with President Clinton'' was an 
utterly false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends upon what the meaning of the word ``is'' 
means. If ``is'' means is, and never has been, that's one 
thing. If it means, there is none, that was a completely true 
statement. But as I have testified--I'd like to testify again--
this is--it is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about 
his lawyer's statements instead of the other way around. I was 
not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
focusing on my own testimony.

    The President added to this explanation he was giving to 
the attorney questioning him. This is what the President said:

    And I'm not sure . . . as I sit here today that I sat there 
and followed all these interchanges between the lawyers. I'm 
quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges between 
the lawyers all that carefully. And I don't really believe, 
therefore, that I can say Mr. Bennett's testimony or statement 
is testimony and is imputable to me. I didn't--I don't know 
that I was really paying attention, paying that much attention 
to him.

    This denial of the President while his attorney was 
proffering a false statement to Judge Wright in an effort to 
keep the Paula Jones lawyers from even questioning the 
President about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky simply 
does not withstand the test of truth. The videotape of the 
President's January deposition shows the President paying very 
close attention to Mr. Bennett when Mr. Bennett was making the 
statement about ``no sex of any kind.''
    View again the video clip of the President during Mr. 
Bennett's argument that the Jones lawyers have no right to ask 
questions about Monica Lewinsky, only this time watch the 
President as he focuses on his lawyer speaking about one of the 
most important subjects he has ever faced in his entire life--
the survival of his Presidency.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need 
some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object 
to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I 
don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith 
of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully 
aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in 
the questions----
    Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I 
do not know whether counsel is basing this question an any 
affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on 
other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably 
coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, I Mr. Fisher is as 
officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good 
faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good 
faith basis for asking this question, he could later be 
sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in 
camera any good faith basis he might have.
    Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I 
would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness. 
In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness 
is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's) 
affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's 
sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least 
have a good faith proffer.
    Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a 
good faith basis for asking the question.
    Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
    Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be 
willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal 
it to counsel.
    Mr. Bennett. Fine.
    Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to 
the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
    Judge Wright. All right.
    Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do 
that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is 
substantial basis.
    Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question. 
He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett, 
this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis 
can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the 
deponent, and the other party.

    By the way, lest there be any doubt in the minds of any 
Member of this body as to whom the President was looking at and 
focusing at, we are fully prepared to bring in a witness for 
you who was present at the deposition and who will draw a map 
for every Member of this body and show the location of the 
President and every other person around the table.
    Just in case the President's ``I wasn't paying any 
attention'' excuse didn't fly, the President, in his grand jury 
testimony, decided to try another argument on for size. He 
suggested that when Mr. Bennett made his statement about 
``there is no sex of any kind,'' the President was focusing on 
the meaning of the word ``is.''
    He then said that when Mr. Bennett made the assertion that 
``there is no sex of any kind,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only 
in the present tense, as if the President understood that to 
mean ``there is no sex'' because there was no sex occurring at 
the time Mr. Bennett's remark was made.
    The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning of 
the word `is' is.''
    And that if it means there is none, that was a completely 
true statement. Listen and watch again to the same video clip 
from the President's grand jury testimony that we saw a few 
moments ago. Only this time, pay close attention to the 
President's excuse as to why he did not have to comply with the 
truth, because in his mind there is some question as to what 
the meaning of the word ``is'' is.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Q. Mr. President, I want to, before I go into a new subject 
area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. 
Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the 
Paula Jones deposition ``counsel is fully aware''--it's page 54 
line 5.--``counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, 
has an affidavit which they were in possession of saying that 
there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with 
President Clinton?'' That statement is made by your attorney in 
front of Judge Susan Webber Wright, correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. That statement is a completely false statement. Whether 
or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,'' was an utterly 
false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If 
``is'' means is, and never has been, that is one thing. If it 
means there is none, that was a completely true statement. But, 
as I have testified, and I'd like to testify again, this is--it 
is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about his lawyer's 
statements, instead of the other way around. I was not paying a 
great deal of attention to this exchange. I was focusing on my 
own testimony.

    In essence, here is what the President says in his own 
defense: I wasn't paying any attention to what my lawyer was 
saying when he offered the false affidavit on my behalf to the 
judge. However, if I was paying attention, I was focusing on 
the very narrow definition of what the word ``is'' is and the 
tense in which that was presented.
    Now, I am a former prosecutor, and that is like the 
murderer who says: I have an ironclad alibi. I wasn't at the 
crime scene; I was home with my mother eating apple pie; but if 
I was there, it is a clear case of self-defense.
    The President now asks this body of lawmakers to give 
acceptance to these ludicrous definitions of ordinary words and 
phrases. He asks you to believe this is what he really thought 
when he was asked if he ever had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky, and when he was asked about her false affidavit.
    By the way, as to the President's ``tense'' argument that 
he presented about what the meaning of the word ``is'' is, this 
fails to take into account another important fact. The false 
affidavit of Monica Lewinsky that Mr. Bennett was waiving that 
day before the judge made no such distinction. Her affidavit 
never said in the present tense, ``I am not now having a sexual 
relationship with the President.'' Her affidavit said, ``I have 
never had a sexual relationship with the President.''
    The President perjured himself when he said that Mr. 
Bennett's statement that there was no sex of any kind was 
``absolutely true,'' depending on what the meaning of the word 
``is'' is.
    The President did not admit to the grand jury that Mr. 
Bennett's statement was false because to do so would have been 
to admit that the term ``sexual relations'' as used in Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit meant ``no sex of any kind.'' Admitting 
that would be to admit that he perjured himself previously in 
his grand jury testimony and in his deposition.
    Now, interestingly, Ms. Lewinsky doesn't bother attempting 
to match the President's linguistic deconstructions of the 
English language. After she was granted immunity, Monica 
Lewinsky testified under oath that the part of her affidavit 
denying a sexual relationship with the President was a lie.
    I read from page 204 of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony:

    Q. Let me ask you a straightforward question. Paragraph 8--

    Referring to her affidavit--

at the start says, ``I have never had a sexual relationship 
with the President.'' Is that true?
    A. No.

    Thus, the President engaged in an evolving series of lies 
during his sworn testimony in order to cover previous lies he 
told in sworn testimony, and to conceal his conduct that 
obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit 
against him. He did this to deny Paula Jones her constitutional 
right to bring a case of sexual harassment against him and to 
sidetrack the investigation of the Office of Independent 
Counsel into his misconduct.
    Finally, the President committed perjury before the grand 
jury when he testified falsely about his blatant attempts to 
influence the testimony of potential witnesses and his 
involvement in a plan to hide evidence that had lawfully been 
subpoenaed in the civil rights action brought against him.
    This perjurious testimony breaks down into four categories:
    First, he made false and misleading statements to the grand 
jury concerning his knowledge of Monica Lewinsky's false 
affidavit.
    Second, he made false and misleading statements to the 
grand jury when he related a false account of his interaction 
with his secretary, Betty Currie, when he reasonably knew she 
might later be called before the grand jury to testify.
    Third, he made perjurious and misleading statements to the 
grand jury when he denied engaging in a plan to hide evidence 
that had been subpoenaed in the Jones civil rights case against 
him.
    Finally, he made perjurious and misleading statements to 
the grand jury concerning statements he made to his aides about 
Monica Lewinsky when he reasonably knew these aides might be 
called later to testify.
    Let's look briefly at the first area.
    The President made false and misleading statements before 
the grand jury regarding his knowledge of the contents of 
Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
    As we now know conclusively, Monica Lewinsky filed an 
affidavit in the Jones case in which she denied ever having a 
sexual relationship with the President, and that was a lie when 
it was filed.
    Remember, during his deposition in the Jones case, the 
President said that Ms. Lewinsky's denial of ever having a 
sexual relationship was ``absolutely true.''
    Monica Lewinsky later testified that she is ``100 percent 
sure'' that the President suggested she might want to sign an 
affidavit to avoid testifying in the case of Jones versus 
Clinton. In fact, the President gave the following testimony 
before the grand jury:

    And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an 
affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false 
affidavit? No, I did not.

    This testimony is false because it could not be possible 
that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit in 
the Jones case, an affidavit acknowledging a sexual 
relationship with the President, that would have helped her to 
avoid having to appear as a witness in the Paula Jones case.
    The attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking evidence of 
sexual relationships with the President and ones that the 
President might have had with other State or Federal employees.
    This information was legally obliged to be produced by the 
President to Paula Jones in her sexual harassment lawsuit 
against him to help prove her claim.
    Judge Susan Webber Wright had already ruled that Paula 
Jones was entitled to this information from the President for 
purposes of discovery.
    If Monica Lewinsky had filed a truthful affidavit that 
acknowledged a sexual relationship with the President, then she 
certainly could not have avoided having to testify in a 
deposition.
    The President knew this.
    His grand jury testimony on this subject is perjury.
    Next, the President provided false testimony concerning his 
conversations with his personal secretary, Betty Currie, about 
Monica after he testified in the Jones deposition.
    Recall Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation a short time 
ago. The President had just testified on January 17, 1998, in 
the Paula Jones deposition. He said he could not recall being 
alone with Monica Lewinsky and that he did not have a sexual 
relationship with her.
    After his testimony, on the very next day and in a separate 
conversation with her a few days later, President Clinton made 
statements to Ms. Currie that he knew were false.
    He made them to coach Ms. Currie and to influence her 
potential future testimony.
    He coached her by reciting inaccurate answers to possible 
questions that she might be asked if she were called to testify 
in the Paula Jones case.
    By the way, the President discussed his deposition 
testimony with Ms. Currie in direct violation of Judge Wright's 
order that he not discuss his testimony with anyone. Judge 
Wright warned the President at the deposition:

    Before he leaves, I want to remind him, as the witness in 
this matter, . . . that this case is subject to a Protective 
Order regarding all discovery, . . . [A]ll parties present, 
including . . . the witness are not to say anything whatsoever 
about the questions they were asked, the substance of the 
deposition, . . ., any details . . .

    After he coached her, the President wanted Betty Currie to 
be a witness.
    During his deposition testimony, the President did 
everything he could to suggest to the Jones lawyers they needed 
to depose Betty Currie. He did this by referring to her over 
and over again as the one with the information they needed for 
information about him and Monica Lewinsky.
    He stated to the Jones lawyer in his deposition, for 
example, that:

. . . the last time he had seen Ms. Lewinsky was when she had 
come to the White House to see Ms. Currie; that Ms. Currie was 
present when the President had made a joking reference about 
the Jones case to Ms. Lewinsky; that Ms. Currie was his source 
of information about Vernon Jordan's assistance to Ms. 
Lewinsky; and that Ms. Currie had helped set up the meetings 
between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan regarding her move to New 
York.

    Because the President referred so often to Ms. Currie, it 
is obvious he wanted her to become a witness in the Jones 
matter, particularly if specific allegations of the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky came to light.
    According to Ms. Currie, President Clinton even told her at 
some point that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky.
    Two and a half hours after he returned from the Paula Jones 
deposition, President Clinton called Ms. Currie at home and 
asked her to come to the White House the next day, a Sunday.
    Ms. Currie testified that it was rare for the President to 
ask her to come in on a Sunday.
    At about 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, January 18, Ms. Currie went 
to meet with President Clinton at the White House.
    Listen to what Betty Currie told the grand jury:

    He said that he had had his deposition yesterday, and they 
had asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. And I was a 
little shocked by that or--(shrugging). And he said--I don't 
know if he said--I think he may have said, ``There are several 
things you may want to know,'' or ``There are things--'' He 
asked me some questions.

    According to Ms. Currie, the President then said to her in 
rapid succession:

    You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
never really alone.
    You could see and hear everything.
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.

    Ms. Currie indicated that these remarks were ``more like 
statements than questions.''
    Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree 
with him.
    Ms. Currie also said that she felt the President made these 
remarks to see her reaction.
    Ms. Currie said that she indicated her agreement with each 
of the President's statements, although she knew that the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky had in fact been alone in the Oval 
Office and in the President's study.
    Ms. Currie also knew that she could not and did not hear or 
see the President and Ms. Lewinsky while they were alone.
    Ms. Currie testified that two or three days after her 
conversation with the President at the White House, he again 
called her into the Oval Office to discuss this.
    She described their conversation as ``sort of a 
recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--you know, 
I was never alone with her--that sort of thing.''

    Q: [To Ms. Currie] Did he pretty much list the same?
    A: To my recollection, sir, yes.

    In his grand jury testimony, the President was asked why he 
might have said to Ms. Currie in their meeting on that Sunday: 
We were never alone together, right? You could see and hear 
everything.
    Here is how the President testified:

    [W]hat I was trying to determine was whether my 
recollection was right and that she was always in the office 
complex when Monica was there, and whether she thought she 
could hear any conversations we had, or did she hear any--I was 
trying to--I knew . . . to a reasonable certainty that I was 
going to be asked more questions about this. I didn't really 
expect you to be in the Jones case at the time. I thought what 
would happen is that it would break in the press, and I was 
trying to get the facts down. I was trying to understand what 
the facts were.

    The President told the grand jury that he was putting those 
questions to Betty Currie on that Sunday to refresh his 
recollection and trying to pin down what the facts were.
    Later, the President stated that he was referring to a 
larger area than simply the room where he and Ms. Lewinsky were 
located. He also testified that his statements to Ms. Currie 
were intended to cover a limited range of dates.
    Listen to the President's answer.

    A: [W]hen I said, we were never alone, right, I think I 
also asked her a number of other questions, because there were 
several times, as I'm sure she would acknowledge, when I either 
asked her to be around. I remember once in particular when I 
was talking with Ms. Lewinsky when I asked Betty to be in the, 
actually, in the next room in the dining room, and, as I 
testified earlier, once in her own office. But I meant that she 
was always in the Oval Office complex, in that complex, while 
Monica was there. And I believe that this was part of a series 
of questions I asked her to try to quickly refresh my memory. 
So, I wasn't trying to get her to say something that wasn't so. 
And, in fact, I think she would recall that I told her to just 
relax, go in the grand jury and tell the truth when she had 
been called as a witness.

    Now the President was treating the grand jury to his 
construction of what the word ``alone'' means to him.
    When asked he answered:

    It depends on how you define alone, and there were a lot of 
times when we were alone, but I never really thought we were.

    The President also was asked about his specific statement 
to Betty Currie that ``you could see and hear everything.'' He 
testified that he was uncertain what he intended by that 
comment:
    Question to the President:

    Q: When you said to Mrs. Currie, you could see and hear 
everything, that wasn't true either, was it, as far as you 
knew. . . .
    A: My memory of that was that, that she had the ability to 
hear what was going on if she came in the Oval Office from her 
office. And a lot of times, you know, when I was in the Oval 
Office, she just had the door open to her office. Then there 
was--the door was never completely closed to the hall. So I 
think there was--I'm not entirely sure what I meant by that, 
but I could have meant that she generally would be able to hear 
conversations, even if she couldn't see them. And I think 
that's what I meant.

    The President also was asked about his comment to Ms. 
Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had ``come on'' to him, but that he 
had ``never touched her.''
    Question to the President:

    Q: [I]f [Ms. Currie] testified that you told her, Monica 
came on to me and I never touched her, you did, in fact, of 
course, touch Ms. Lewinsky, isn't that right, in a physically 
intimate way?
    A: Now, I've testified about that. And that's one of those 
questions that I believe is answered by the statement that I 
made.
    Q: What was your purpose in making these statements to Mrs. 
Currie, if it weren't for the purpose to try to suggest to her 
what she should say if ever asked?
    A: Now, Mr. Bittman, I told you, the only thing I remember 
is when all this stuff blew up, I was trying to figure out what 
the facts were. I was trying to remember. I was trying to 
remember every time I had seen Ms. Lewinsky. . . . I knew this 
was all going to come out. . . . I did not know [at the time] 
that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved. And I was 
trying to get the facts and try to think of the best defense we 
could construct in the face of what I thought was going to be a 
media onslaught.

    Finally, the President was asked why he would have called 
Ms. Currie into his office a few days after the Sunday meeting 
and repeated the statements about Ms. Lewinsky to her.
    The President testified that although he would not dispute 
Ms. Currie's testimony to the contrary, he did not remember 
having a second conversation with her along these lines.
    Thus, the President referred to Ms. Currie many times in 
his deposition when describing his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    He himself admitted that a large number of questions about 
Ms. Lewinsky were likely to be asked in the very near future.
    The President reasonably could foresee that Ms. Currie 
either might be deposed or questioned or might need to prepare 
an affidavit.
    When he testified he was only making statements to Ms. 
Currie to ``ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain 
what Betty's perception was,'' this statement was false, and it 
was perjurious.
    We know it was perjury because the President called Ms. 
Currie into the White House the day after his deposition to 
tell her--not ask her, to tell her--that:

    he was never alone with Ms. Lewinsky;
    to tell her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them;
    and to tell her that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky.

    These were false statements, and he knew that the 
statements were false at the time he made them to Betty Currie.
    The President's suggestion that he was simply trying to 
refresh his memory when talking to Betty Currie is nonsense.
    What if Ms. Currie had confirmed these statements, 
statements the President knew were false? It could not in any 
way remind the President of what really happened in the Oval 
Office with Monica Lewinsky because the President already knew 
he was alone with Monica Lewinsky. The President already knew 
that obviously Ms. Currie could not always see him back in the 
Oval Office area with Monica Lewinsky. And the President 
already knew that he had an intimate sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
    There is no logical way to justify his claim that he made 
these statements to Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection.
    The only reasonable inference from the President's conduct 
is that he tried to enlist a potential witness to back up his 
perjury from the day before at the deposition.
    The circumstances surrounding the President's statements 
clearly show, clearly show that he improperly sought to 
influence Ms. Currie's potential future testimony.
    His actions were an obstruction of justice and a blatant 
attempt to illegally influence the truthful testimony of a 
potential witness.
    And his later denials about it under oath were perjurious.
    Next, the President gave perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony before the grand jury when he denied he was engaged 
in a plot to hide evidence that had been subpoenaed in the 
Paula Jones case.
    On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
    The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in 
January, and the subpoena required her to produce each and 
every gift President Clinton had given her.
    Nine days after she received this subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky 
met with the President for about 45 minutes in the Oval Office.
    By this time, President Clinton knew that she had been 
subpoenaed in the case.
    At this meeting they discussed the fact that the gifts that 
he had given Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, including a 
hat pin--the first gift the President had ever given Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this 
meeting she said to the President,

    Well, you know, I--maybe I should put the gifts away 
outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe 
Betty.
    And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't know'' 
or ``Let me think about that.'' And left that topic.

    President Clinton provided the following explanation to the 
grand jury and to the House Judiciary Committee regarding this 
conversation:

    Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, ``what if they ask 
me about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know whether 
that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or earlier.
    Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told 
her ``that if they [the Jones Lawyers] asked her for gifts, 
she'd have to give them whatever she had. . . .''
    I simply was not concerned about the fact that I had given 
her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional gifts on December 28, 
1997.

    The President's statement that he told Ms. Lewinsky that if 
the attorneys for Paula Jones asked for the gifts, then she had 
to provide them, is perjurious.
    It strains all logic to believe the President would 
encourage Monica Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do so 
would have raised questions about their relationship and would 
go against all of their other efforts to conceal the 
relationship, including filing a false affidavit about their 
relationship. The fact that the President gave Monica Lewinsky 
additional gifts on December 28, 1998, doesn't exonerate the 
President. It demonstrates that the President never believed 
that Monica Lewinsky in light of all of their relationship, all 
of the cover stories, all of the plans that they had put 
forward, her willingness to subject herself to a perjury 
prosecution by filing a false affidavit, all of that was 
because he knew that Monica Lewinsky would never turn those 
gifts over pursuant to the subpoena. And as Ms. Lewinsky 
testified, she never questioned, as she said, ``that we were 
ever going to do anything but keep this quiet.''
    This meant that they would take, in her words, ``whatever 
steps needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet.
    By giving more gifts to Monica Lewinsky after she received 
a subpoena to appear in the Jones case, the President believed 
that Monica Lewinsky would never testify truthfully about their 
relationship.
    Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky said she could not answer why 
the President would give her more gifts on the 28th when he 
knew she had to produce gifts in response to the subpoena. She 
did testify, however, that----

    To me it was never a question in my mind and I--from 
everything he said to me, I never questioned him, that we were 
never going to do anything but keep this private, so that meant 
deny it and that meant do--take whatever appropriate steps 
needed to be taken, you know, for that to happen. . . . So by 
turning over these gifts, it would at least prompt [the Jones 
attorneys] to question me about what kind of friendship I had 
with the President. . . .

    After this meeting on the morning of December 28, Betty 
Currie called Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up 
gifts the President had given to Ms. Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury 
that a few hours after meeting with the President on December 
28, 1997, where they discussed what to do about the gifts he 
gave to her, Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky explained it to the grand jury as follows:

    Q. What did [Betty Currie] say?
    A. She said, ``I understand you have something to give 
me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give me.'' 
Along those lines. . . .
    Q. When she said something along the lines of ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The President 
says you have something for me,'' what did you understand her 
to mean?
    A. The gifts.

    Later in the day on December 28, Ms. Currie drove to Monica 
Lewinsky's home.
    Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained 
several gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President, 
including the hatpin that was specifically named in the Jones 
subpoena.
    As further corroboration, Monica Lewinsky had told the FBI 
earlier that when Betty Currie called her about these gifts, it 
sounded like Betty Currie was calling on her cell phone. Ms. 
Lewinsky gave her best guess on the time of day the call came 
on December 28.
    Although Ms. Lewinsky's guess on the hour the call came was 
a bit off, phone records were later produced revealing that 
Betty Currie in fact called Monica Lewinsky on her cell phone, 
just as Ms. Lewinsky had described it. The only logical 
conclusion is that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky about 
retrieving the President's gifts. There would have been no 
reason for Betty Currie, out of the blue, to return gifts 
unless instructed to do so by the President. Betty Currie 
didn't know about the gift issue ahead of time. Only the 
President and Monica Lewinsky had discussed it. There is no 
other way Ms. Currie could have known to call Monica Lewinsky 
about the gifts unless the President told her to do it.
    President Clinton perjured himself when he testified before 
the grand jury on this issue and reiterated to the House 
Judiciary Committee that he did not recall any conversation 
with Ms. Currie around December 28. He also perjured himself 
when he testified before the grand jury that he did not tell 
Betty Currie to take possession of the gifts that he had given 
Ms. Lewinsky.
    Question to the President:

    After you gave her the gifts on December 28th, did you 
speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up a 
box of gifts that were some compilation of gifts that Ms. 
Lewinsky would have----
    A. No, sir, I didn't do that.
    Q. --to give to Ms. Currie?
    A. I did not do that.

    The President had a motive to conceal the gifts because 
both he and Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts might 
raise questions about their relationship. By confirming that 
the gifts would not be produced, the President ensured that 
these questions would never arise. The concealment of these 
gifts from Paula Jones' attorneys allowed the President to 
provide perjurious statements about the gifts at his deposition 
in the Jones case.
    Finally, the President gave perjurious testimony to the 
grand jury concerning statements he gave to his top aides 
regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Here is a 
portion of his grand jury transcript, when the President 
testified about his conversation with key aides, once the 
Monica Lewinsky story became public.
    Question to the President:

    Q. Did you deny to them or not, Mr. President?
    A. . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I want 
to define language where I can say that. I also, frankly, do 
not want to turn any of them into witnesses because I--and sure 
enough, they all became witnesses.
    Q. Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't you?
    A. And so I said to them things that were true about this 
relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, 
there is nothing go[ing] on between us. That was true. I said, 
I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And 
did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day 
giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do 
anything to complicate this matter further. So, I said things 
that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they 
were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.

    The President's testimony that day that he said things that 
were true to his aides is clearly perjurious. Just as the 
President predicted, several of the President's top aides were 
later called to testify before the grand jury as to what the 
President told them. And when they testified before the grand 
jury they passed along the President's false account, just as 
the President intended them to do.
    I will not belabor the point any further with the Members 
of this body because I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson ably 
presented that testimony.
    But we know from the evidence that Erskine Bowles, John 
Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, all came before the grand jury. 
They all provided testimony to the grand jury establishing that 
the President's comments to them were the truth. The President 
had them go in. The President gave them that information so 
false information would be shared with the grand jury so that 
the grand jury would never be armed with the truth. And when 
witnesses are called to come before this body, you will have an 
opportunity to make that determination.
    Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the United States Senate, 
posterity looks to this body to defend in a courageous way the 
public trust and take care that the basis of our Government is 
not undermined. On January 17, 1998, President Clinton, while a 
defendant in a civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit, gave 
sworn testimony in a deposition presided over by a Federal 
judge. In this deposition he raised his hand and he swore to 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    On August 17, President Clinton testified before a Federal 
grand jury in a criminal investigation. At this appearance he 
raised his hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence conclusively 
shows that the President rejected his obligations under oath on 
both occasions. He engaged in a serial pattern of perjury and 
obstruction of justice. These corrupt acts were done so he 
could deny a U.S. citizen, Ms. Paula Jones, her constitutional 
right to bring her claim against him in a court of law. In so 
doing, he intentionally violated his oath of office, his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, and his solemn obligation to respect Ms. Jones' 
rights by providing truthful testimony under oath.
    The evidence reviewed by the House of Representatives and 
relied upon by our body in bringing articles of impeachment 
against the President was not political. It was overwhelming. 
He has denied all allegations set forth in these articles. Who 
is telling the truth? There is only one way to find out.
    On behalf of the House of Representatives, we urge this 
body to bring forth the witnesses and place them under oath. If 
the witnesses can make the case against the President, if the 
witnesses that make the case against the President--who, 
incidentally, are his employees, his top aides, his former 
interns, and his close friends--if all of these people in the 
President's universe are lying, then the President has been 
done a grave disservice. He deserves not just an acquittal; he 
deserves the most profound of apologies.
    But if they are not lying, if the evidence is true, if the 
Chief Executive Officer of our Nation used his power and his 
influence to corruptly destroy a lone woman's right to bring 
forth her case in a court of law, then there must be 
constitutional accountability, and by that I mean the kind of 
accountability the framers of the Constitution intended for 
such conduct and not the type of accountability that satisfies 
the temporary mood of the moment.
    Our Founders bequeathed to us a Nation of laws, not of 
polls, not of focus groups, and not of talk show habitues. 
America is strong enough to absorb the truth about their 
leaders when those leaders act in a manner destructive to their 
oath of office. God help our country's future if we ever decide 
otherwise.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                   ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
the court stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and that 
all Members remain standing at their desks as the Chief Justice 
departs the Chamber. I further ask that after the court 
adjourns in a moment, the Senate will, while in legislative 
session, stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Thereupon, at 6:59 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, adjourned.


                                ------                                


                        Friday, January 15, 1999

                    [From the Congressional Record]

    The Senate met at 1:02 p.m. and was called to order by the 
Chief Justice of the United States.
                                ------                                


   TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of 
Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                ------                                

                                 prayer
    The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following 
prayer:
    Holy God, with awe and wonder we accept our 
responsibilities and our accountability to You. You are 
Sovereign of this land. When we commit our complexities to You, 
really seek Your guidance, You direct us. Make us attentive 
listeners, dedicated to the search for absolute truth. In the 
cacophony of voices, help us to hear Your voice.
    Dear Father, Your faithfulness never fails. You are 
consistent, reliable, and true. You expect nothing less from us 
for Your glory and for the good of America. To that end, fill 
this Chamber with Your presence and the minds of the Senators 
with Your gift of discernment. You are our Lord and Saviour. 
Amen.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the 
proclamation.
    The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as 
follows:

    Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States 
is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by 
the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States.

    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there have been a number of 
inquiries from Senators and others about some clarification 
with regard to the approximate times or the times we would be 
meeting on Saturday and Tuesday, and also how the afternoon 
would proceed, so I will make some unanimous consent requests 
to clarify that and give you a brief rundown on what I think 
the schedule will be this afternoon.
  orders for saturday, january 16, 1999 and tuesday, january 19, 1999
    Mr. Chief Justice, as in legislative session, I ask 
unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business 
today it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m., on Saturday, 
January 16. I further ask that when the Senate reconvenes on 
Saturday, immediately following the prayer, the Senate resume 
consideration of the articles of impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. I further ask unanimous consent that when the 
Senate completes its business on Saturday, it then adjourn over 
until Tuesday, January 19, at 9:30 a.m. I ask unanimous consent 
that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal 
of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed 
to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved 
for their use. I further ask consent that there then be a 
period for morning business until the hour of 11:30 a.m., with 
60 minutes under the control of the majority leader or his 
designee and 60 minutes under the control of the minority 
leader or his designee.
    I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday the Senate recess 
then from the hours of 11:30 a.m. until 1 p.m. for the weekly 
policy conferences. And I further ask consent that at 1 p.m., 
on Tuesday, the Senate resume consideration of the articles of 
impeachment.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
on Tuesday, following the conclusion of the presentation during 
the Court of Impeachment, the Senate recess until the hour of 
8:35 p.m., on Tuesday evening. And I ask consent that upon 
reconvening Tuesday evening the Senate proceed to the Hall of 
the House of Representatives in order to hear an address by the 
President regarding the State of the Union.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                           order of procedure
    Mr. LOTT. For the information of all my colleagues, then, I 
understand today's presentation is expected to continue until 
approximately 6 p.m., and there will be periodic breaks during 
the day to allow all Members to stand and stretch. I want to 
remind Senators to promptly return to their desks at the 
expiration of those 15-minute breaks in order that we can 
continue and complete at the earliest possible hour. I thank 
all Members for their cooperation.
    This afternoon we will hear from Congressman McCollum, take 
a 15-minute break, then hear from Congressmen Gekas, Chabot, 
and Cannon, and then take a break, and then Congressman Barr 
would complete the afternoon's presentations.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.
                              the journal
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of 
proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
    Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the 
managers for the House of Representatives have 18 hours 56 
minutes remaining to make the presentation of their case. The 
Senate will now hear you.
    The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum to 
resume the presentation of the case for the House of 
Representatives.
    Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, and my colleagues in the Senate, I drove 
in this morning to this Capitol. I drove up the George 
Washington Parkway, and I looked at the magnificent display of 
ice that was all over the trees, all over the grass, all over 
the foliage--a beautiful panorama.
    And just before I got to the 14th Street Bridge, I saw this 
incredible number of geese--I guess in the hundreds--that were 
lined up together between the highway and the Potomac River. It 
looked like they were an invading army. I thought of the awe of 
this, the awe of the beauty of it, the awe of Mother Nature, 
the awe of God. And I thought, also, of the awe of the 
responsibility we have to our children and our grandchildren 
about what we are commencing today. This is an awesome 
undertaking for all of us.
    I am here today to summarize for you what you heard 
yesterday. I do not want to bore you. I do not intend to do 
that. I am going to be as brief as I can. I am also here to 
help you digest the voluminous quantities of material that you 
have before you. There is a huge record out there. And I am 
also here to prepare you for the law discussion that is going 
to come after me about the law of the crimes of perjury and 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering.
    First of all, I want you to know I bear no personal 
animosity toward our President. But I happen to believe that if 
the President--if any President--commits the crimes of perjury, 
obstruction of justice, and witness tampering, he should not be 
allowed to remain in office, for if he is allowed to do so, it 
would undermine our courts and our system of justice.
    But that is for you to determine in the end, really, not 
me. That is my opinion. But you will have to weigh the 
evidence, you are going to have to hear the arguments, and 
ultimately make that decision. In fact, the first thing you 
have to determine is whether or not the President committed 
crimes. It is only if you determine he committed the crimes of 
perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering that you 
will move on to the question of whether he is removed from 
office. In fact, no one, none of us, would argue to you that 
the President should be removed from office unless you conclude 
he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed--
not every one of them necessarily, but certainly a good 
quantity, and there are a whole bunch of them that have been 
charged.
    I would like to call your attention to a couple of things. 
First of all, I don't want to be a schoolteacher; I just want 
to relate my own experience to you so you can understand it. I 
have been involved with this a lot longer than most of you have 
probably been dealing with the details. I constantly have to 
refer back to things. Every time I read something, there is so 
much detail here, I learn something new.
    While I go over the evidence with you, we will summarize 
the evidence one more time. As you are deliberating, as you are 
thinking about it, I want to call a couple of places to your 
attention that are the easiest places to refer back to, to find 
the facts and evidence. First of all, there is the official 
report that is in the record of the House's consideration of 
this, the Judiciary Committee report. In that report, right in 
the first couple of pages, there is a table of contents. While 
a couple of the articles did not come over to you that are 
listed in here, there are detailed discussions you can get from 
this table of contents as to every single count and every 
single part of these articles so you can figure out what we are 
talking about today.
    Secondly, I would like to bring to your attention that 
there is a Starr Report, and I know that has been maligned by 
some people. This thing is so dogeared--I have underlined it, 
torn it apart, done all kinds of things with it. It is a good 
reference source. You can find from the footnotes where else to 
check it out. There are two parts. These are the appendices. In 
the first part, you can find the transcript of all the key 
depositions, all the key testimony, all of the evidence that we 
are talking about, and read it for yourselves.
    I don't want to leave here today having summarized this 
evidence, as long as I may take--and I don't want to take a 
long time, but I will take a little while--and have you go away 
and think, gosh, what all did McCollum or Hutchinson or Rogan 
or Bryant say yesterday? You can find and refresh yourself 
through that and through whatever information you have--trial 
briefs and all that you have.
    Let's look at what the record shows. President Clinton was 
sued by Paula Jones in a sexual harassment civil rights 
lawsuit. To bolster her case, she was trying to show that the 
President engaged in a pattern of illicit relations with women 
in his employment, where he rewarded those who became involved 
with him and disadvantaged those who rejected him, as Paula 
Jones did.
    Whatever the merits of that approach, on May 27, 1997, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision that ``like 
every other citizen''--and that is a quote--``like every other 
citizen, Paula Jones has a right to an orderly disposition of 
her claims.'' Then on December 11 of 1997, Judge Susan Webber 
Wright issued an order that said Paula Jones was entitled to 
information regarding any State or Federal employee with whom 
the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, 
or sought to have sexual relations.
    The record shows that President Clinton was determined to 
hide his relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the Jones 
court. His lawyers will argue to you next week, I am sure, that 
he did everything to keep the relationship hidden and he did it 
in a legal way. They will say that he may have split a few 
hairs and evaded answers and given misleading answers but that 
it was all within the framework of responses and actions that 
any good lawyer would advise his client to do.
    They will also say if he crossed the line technically 
somewhere, he didn't do it knowingly or intentionally. Oh, how 
I wish that were true. We wouldn't be here today. But, alas, 
that is not so.
    If you believe the sworn testimony of Monica Lewinsky, if 
you believe her testimony that is in the record--and she is 
very credible--the President knowingly, intentionally, and 
willfully set out on a course of conduct in December 1997 to 
lie to the Jones court, to hide his relationship, and to 
encourage others to lie and hide evidence and to conceal the 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court. He engaged in 
a pattern of obstruction of justice, perjury, and witness 
tampering designed to deny the court what Susan Webber Wright, 
the judge in that court, had determined Paula Jones had the 
right to discover in order to prove her claim. If you believe 
the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, you cannot believe the 
President or accept the argument of his lawyers. You simply 
can't.
    The record is so clear on this that if you have any 
significant doubt about Monica Lewinsky's credibility or 
testimony, you should bring her in here and let us examine her 
face to face so you can judge her credibility for yourself.
    As you will hear explained later this afternoon, the same 
acts can constitute both the crimes of obstruction of justice 
and perjury, and the same acts can constitute the crimes of 
obstruction of justice and witness tampering. They are all cut 
from the same cloth. They are all crimes that obstruct the 
administration of justice and keep our courts from being able 
to get the evidence that they need to decide cases. Such 
obstruction is so detrimental to our system of justice that the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a greater punishment 
for perjury and obstruction of justice than they do for 
bribery.
    I want to show that to you. I know everybody can't see the 
chart. I think you have a handout of them. I will not show many 
charts today, but this is one about the sentencing guidelines. 
The guidelines rate these, in fact, in sequence. The most 
serious sentencing is a higher number; the lower number is the 
lower sentencing: Plain old vanilla bribery rights at a 10; 
other things are 8, 7, 4. Murder is way up there, much higher 
in the numbers. You will see that witness tampering is a 12, 
not a 10. Obstruction of justice is a 12, not a 10. Perjury is 
a 12, not a 10. All of them are the same. Interestingly enough, 
although I didn't put it on this chart, bribing a witness is 
different from plain vanilla bribery. If you try to bribe 
somebody in a business deal, that is one kind; if you go out 
and bribe a witness, that is another. Bribing a witness is also 
a 12.
    Now, I want to point that out right up front because the 
most important point that makes is that when you read the 
phrase in the Constitution that what is impeachable is treason, 
bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors, bribery is not 
considered by our court system. Pure bribery, plain old 
bribery, is not considered as serious in sentencing as perjury, 
witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and of course 
bribing a witness. They are all of the same cloth. Why? Because 
that interferes with the administration of justice. Because we 
can't have justice if people block the courts from getting at 
the truth. And if you go about doing it intentionally, you have 
committed these crimes.
    It should be pointed out that lies under oath in a court 
proceeding, whether or not they rise to the level of crimes of 
perjury, can be obstruction of justice. So when the President 
lied in the Jones deposition, this was part of the obstruction 
of justice charged under article II that is before you today, 
even though there is no separate count. And he lied a lot in 
that deposition. We will talk about that a little later. The 
fact that the House did not send you the article of impeachment 
for perjury in the Jones deposition does not keep you from 
considering the lies in that deposition as an obstruction of 
justice crime under article II that is before you. And you know 
that it is also incorporated in article I, because it is one of 
the four items specifically listed as the perjury that he lied 
about lying in the deposition.
    Now, having said that, think about all of this as one big 
obstruction, because perjury can be obstruction. Just plain 
lying can be obstruction. Witness tampering, by the way, is a 
separate crime because it is titled that way, but it is one of 
two separate obstruction of justice sections in the United 
States Criminal Code. It is just another version of obstruction 
of justice. So don't be confused. Witness tampering is 
obstruction of justice--literally, figuratively, and in every 
other way. But people think about it separately because it has 
a separate element, a lesser element of proof actually than 
obstruction of justice. But it is all part of the same fabric, 
again.
    To put the essence of all of this in a nutshell for you, 
think back on the evidence presented yesterday. I would suggest 
that President Clinton thought his scheme out well. He resented 
the Jones lawsuit. He was alarmed when Monica Lewinsky's name 
appeared on the witness list, and he was more alarmed when 
Judge Wright issued her orders signaling that the court would 
hear the evidence of other relationships. To keep his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court, once Judge 
Wright issued her ruling, he knew he would have to lie to the 
court. To succeed at this, he decided that he had to get Monica 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, to try to avoid having her 
testify. And he needed to get her a job to make her happy, to 
make sure she executed that false affidavit, and then stick 
with her lies when she was questioned about it.
    Then the gifts were subpoenaed and he had to have her hide 
the gifts--the only tangible evidence of his relationship with 
her that would trigger questions. She came up with the idea of 
giving them to Betty Currie, and the President seized on it. 
Who would think Betty Currie should be called to produce the 
gifts? Nobody would. Then he would be free to lie in his 
deposition, and that is, of course, what he did. But after he 
did this, he realized that he had to make sure that Betty would 
lie and cover for him.
    He got his aides convinced to repeat the lies to the grand 
jury and to the public, and all of this worked--until the dress 
showed up. Then he lied to the grand jury to try to cover up 
and explain away his prior crimes.
    That is the case in a nutshell. That is why we are here 
today. That is what this evidence in the record shows, I 
believe, in an exceptionally compelling way.
    Now, let's review what happened and, as we do, I ask you to 
think back to what Mr. Bryant said to you yesterday. Always ask 
yourself, what are the results of the act and who benefited. I 
think you will find each time that it is the President who 
benefited. Now we are going to go over the facts.
    On December 5, 1997, a year ago, about a week before Judge 
Wright issued her order making it clear that the President's 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky was relevant to the Jones 
case, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the Jones witness list. 
The President learned this fact the next day, December 6. The 
President telephoned Monica Lewinsky at about 2 a.m. on 
December 17 and informed her about her name being on the 
witness list. That was about 10 days after he learned about it 
and about 5 days after Judge Wright's order. It was the order 
that made it clear that his relationship with Monica was 
discoverable by the Jones attorneys in that case.
    Long before this, though, long before the President was 
called to give a deposition or Monica Lewinsky was named on the 
witness list in the Jones case, the evidence shows she and the 
President had concocted cover stories. They had an 
understanding that she would lie about the relationship, and so 
would he, if anybody asked about it.
    During a telephone conversation on the 17th of December, 
the President told Monica she might be called as a witness, and 
he at that time suggested that she might file an affidavit to 
avoid being called as a witness to testify in person in that 
case. In the same conversation, they reviewed these cover 
stories that they had concocted to conceal their relationship. 
He brought them up. They went over them again.
    Why do you think they did that? In her grand jury 
testimony, Monica said the President didn't tell her to lie, 
but because of their previous understanding she assumed that 
they both expected that she would lie in that affidavit. In 
this context, the evidence is compelling that the President 
committed both the crimes of obstruction of justice and witness 
tampering right then and there on December 17.
    Now, Monica Lewinsky's testimony is so clear about this 
that the President's lawyers probably won't spend a lot of time 
with you on this; they didn't in the Judiciary Committee. I 
could be wrong, and they probably will just to show me I am 
wrong.
    I want us to look at this and specifically look at her 
testimony together because it is so compelling. On pages 123 
and 124 of her testimony--you can find it in Part 1 of the 
Starr Report. I know you can't see all of this that well back 
there, but you should have the charts. I point out in red on 
this chart the most important part of it. This is where she 
described the December 17 telephone conversation. I am going to 
read you part of it.
    She said here in red:

    At some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it was 
before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, he sort of said, 
``You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you 
were bringing me letters,'' which I understood was really a reminder of 
things that we had discussed before.
    Question: So when you say things you had discussed, sort of ruses 
that you developed?
    Answer: Right. I mean, this was--this was something that--that was 
instantly familiar to me.
    Question: Right.
    Answer: And I knew exactly what he meant.
    Question: Had you talked with him earlier about these false 
explanations about what you were doing visiting him on several 
occasions?
    Answer: Several occasions throughout the entire relationship. Yes. 
It was the pattern of the relationship, to sort of conceal it.

    Now, let's look at another chart. Monica Lewinsky's August 
6 grand jury testimony, on pages 233 and 234. Both are from the 
August 6 grand jury testimony, where in the context of the 
affidavit she makes the now famous statement, ``No one asked or 
encouraged me to lie.'' She did say that, but let's look at how 
she said that:

    For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened was, you 
know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me 
either.

    ``. . . but no one discouraged me either.'' I don't know 
how many times anybody said that to you when they made their 
arguments, but that is what she said and the context.
    Later on, she says in her testimony on the same pages:

. . . it wasn't as if the President called me and said, ``You know, 
Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to be really hard for 
us, we're going to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of 
the entire world about what we've done,'' which I would have fought him 
on probably. That was different. And by him not calling me and saying 
that, you know, I knew what that meant. . . .
    Question: Did you understand all along that he would deny the 
relationship, also?
    Answer: Mm-hmm. Yes.
    Question: And when you say you understood what it meant when he 
didn't say, ``Oh, you know, you must tell the truth,'' what did you 
understand that to mean?
    Answer: That--that--as we had on every other occasion and every 
other instance of this relationship, we would deny it.

    After reading this, if you believe Monica Lewinsky, can 
there be any doubt that the President was suggesting that she 
file an affidavit that contains lies and falsehoods that might 
keep her from ever having to testify in the Jones case and give 
the President the kind of protection he needed when he 
testified?
    And, of course, in that same December 17 conversation, the 
President encouraged Monica to use cover stories and tell the 
same lies as he expected her to do in the affidavit if and when 
she was called to testify live and in person. Both of those 
would be obstruction of justice and witness tampering. Taken 
together--encouraging her to file this false affidavit that she 
clearly describes here, and the encouraging of her to lie if 
she is ever called as a witness--both of these are counts 1 and 
2 of the obstruction of justice charge.
    If I don't leave you with any other impression walking away 
from here today, I want you to think about this. This is the 
clearest, boldest, most significant obstruction of justice 
charge. I don't see how anybody can walk away from it and 
explain it away. It is a pattern. It should not be looked at in 
isolation. Think about it. It is the kickoff to what really 
happened. It is why we got involved in this in the first place. 
The President had a scheme and he went through this process. 
And it all ties together with the rest of it.
    Two days later, Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed and 
contacted Vernon Jordan who put her in touch with Attorney 
Frank Carter. That is the attorney he picked out. As we all 
know, this very false affidavit that Frank Carter prepared--
and, of course, knowing it was false when he prepared it, but 
Monica knew it and the President knew it--was filed just before 
the President's deposition in the Jones case January 17. The 
record shows that the President was kept abreast of the 
participation by Vernon Jordan and all of its contents, and 
Jordan advised the President when Monica signed the affidavit 
on January 7. He advised the President of that fact. Two days 
before Monica says in a conversation she asked the President if 
he wanted to see the draft affidavit, he replied--you recall 
from yesterday--he replied that he didn't need to see it 
because he had already seen ``15 others.''
    I doubt seriously he was talking about 15 other affidavits 
of somebody else and didn't like looking at affidavits anymore. 
I suspect and I would suggest to you that he was talking about 
15 other drafts of this proposed affidavit since it had been 
around the horn a lot of rounds.
    The circumstantial evidence makes it clear the President 
knew the context of the Lewinsky affidavit and he knew it was 
false.
    During the President's deposition in the Jones case on 
January 17, his attorney, Robert Bennett, at one point tried to 
stop the Jones lawyers from asking the President about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky by pointing out the affidavit 
she had signed.
    I think we all remember that because there was a lot of 
that on TV up here yesterday. Mr. Bennett asserted at the time 
that the affidavit indicated ``there is no sex of any kind, 
manner, shape or form.'' That is what he said. After a warning 
from Judge Wright, Mr. Bennett stated, ``I'm not coaching the 
witness. In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the 
witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have 
not told him a single thing he doesn't know.'' The President 
did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even though he 
knew the affidavit was false. The judge allowed the questioning 
to proceed and later Mr. Bennett read to the President a 
portion of paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit in which 
she denied having a ``sexual relationship'' with the President 
and asked him if Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and 
accurate, to which the President responded, ``That is 
absolutely true.''
    I am not going back over and putting that on the screen 
again. But I do want to put up here before you what you have in 
front of you, paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
    Paragraph 8 of her affidavit was absolutely false, and the 
President knew it.
    I want to go over that a little bit. What it says up here 
at the beginning of it is, ``I have never had a sexual 
relationship with the President. He did not propose that we 
have a sexual relationship,'' and so on. And we have a lot 
about that. But look at what it says down at the end of this. 
What is down at the end of this--you have it in front of you. 
It says down here, ``The occasions that I saw the President 
after I left my employment at the White House in April 1996 
were official receptions, formal functions, or events related 
to the United States Department of Defense, where I was working 
at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.''
    I just want to point out to you that paragraph 8, which was 
the subject of a lot of discussions, which the President 
certainly was fully aware of--which you watched where he was 
intensely responding, with regard to Mr. Bennett yesterday in 
that deposition--didn't just contain a lie about a sexual 
relationship where you quibble over a word, it is a full-
fledged lie and a cover story about this. None of that is true. 
Monica Lewinsky saw him a lot of other times, and the President 
certainly knew that. They weren't all official events or 
anything else. This is a complete falsehood, paragraph 8, and 
the President knew it.
    At that point in time when he allowed his attorney on the 
day of the deposition to make a false and misleading statement 
to the judge--and the attorney didn't know that--but it was a 
false and misleading statement to the judge characterizing this 
affidavit, he knew better. And the President at that point in 
time committed the crime of obstruction of justice. And that is 
count 5 of article II.
    Now, the President's lawyers are going to argue that he sat 
silent because he wasn't paying attention, and he didn't hear 
or appreciate what Mr. Bennett was saying. We have already seen 
the video. And you know that he was looking so intently. 
Remember he was intensely following the conversation with his 
eyes. I don't know if you watched it on TV yesterday and 
observed that. It was played twice. I don't know how anybody 
can say this man wasn't paying attention. He certainly wasn't 
thinking about anything else. That was very obvious from 
looking at the video.
    The President's other defense also falls apart on its face. 
During his grand jury testimony, the President argued that when 
Mr. Bennett characterized the Lewinsky affidavit as indicating 
``there is no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape or form'' 
that it was a completely true statement because at that 
particular time, at that moment, when the statement was being 
made on January 17, 1998, there was no sex going on. That was 
when the President made his famous utterings to the jury, ``It 
depends on what the meaning of the word `is' is.'' That is when 
he said that. Of course the President knew perfectly well that 
the context of Mr. Bennett's discussions with the judge and 
characterization of the Lewinsky affidavit was referring to the 
denial in paragraph 8 of the affidavit that there had never 
been any sexual relationship at any time, not that there was no 
sex or sexual relationship going on on January 17, the day of 
the deposition.
    I implore you not to get hung up on some of the details. It 
is absurd, some of the arguments that are being made and have 
been made by the President and his attorneys to try to explain 
this.
    This is a perfect example of that. When we start looking 
around at this, you can't see the forest sometimes for the 
trees. The big picture is what you need to keep in mind, not 
the compartmentalized portion. There will be a lot of effort, I 
am sure, to try to go and pick at one thing or another. But 
this is an extraordinarily good example of how the argument 
failed when put in that situation. And we shouldn't play word 
games.
    When Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify, she was 
also subpoenaed to produce any gifts that the President had 
given her. When she met with Vernon Jordan the day she received 
the subpoena, she told him of her concerns about the gifts and 
she asked him to tell the President about the subpoena.
    Early in the morning on December 28, near the end of the 
year, they met, the President and Monica, in his office, and 
they exchanged gifts and discussed the gifts being subpoenaed. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, she suggested that maybe she should 
put the gifts away outside of her house somewhere or give them 
to somebody like Betty Currie. She says he responded--the 
President responded--with an ``I don't know,'' or ``let me 
think about that.'' She was very clear that at no point did he 
ever give her the impression that she should turn the gifts 
over to the Jones attorneys.
    That is consistent with their cover stories--the one later 
and later in the perjury where the count discusses his lying to 
the grand jury. Consistent with their cover stories and all the 
plans for denying the relationship, her testimony in this 
regard is very believable.
    On the other hand, the President's testimony in front of 
the grand jury that encouraged her to turn all of the gifts 
over to the Jones attorneys is not believable. How can nobody 
believe that? When he said that to the grand jury, he committed 
perjury. When a few hours later, according to Monica Lewinsky, 
Betty Currie called her on the telephone and said, ``I 
understand you have something to give me,'' or maybe she said, 
``the President said you have something to give me,'' and Betty 
Currie came over and got the gifts and took them back and hid 
them under her bed, at that moment, the President's crime of 
obstruction of justice, as described in count 3 of article II, 
was complete.
    Remember, by its nature, obstruction of justice charges in 
crimes are most frequently proven by circumstantial evidence. 
As somebody said here the other day, we don't tell people we 
are going to go out under the elm tree and lie and obstruct 
things. Usually it is a lot more circuitous than that. In the 
context of all that was going on at the time and the general 
truthfulness of Monica Lewinsky's testimony, and other 
respects, how can anyone come to any other conclusion than that 
the President collaborated with Monica and Betty to hide these 
gifts on December 28? How can they? The sequence is there.
    The President's lawyers may spend a lot of time attacking 
this particular obstruction of justice charge. They may 
question why the President would have given Monica Lewinsky 
more gifts on December 28 if he was expecting her to hide the 
gifts. Monica's explanation and her testimony is ``from 
everything he said to me,'' he expected her to conceal the 
gifts, including the ones being given that day. When Ms. 
Currie's call came, wasn't it the logical thing for Monica to 
conclude that this was the result of the President having 
thought about what to do with the gifts, which he said he was 
going to do, according to her, and deciding to have Ms. Currie 
hide them?
    That is the logical thing.
    The President's attorneys will no doubt also question the 
veracity of Ms. Lewinsky with regard to who made the phone 
call, since Ms. Currie's recollection isn't very good. And at 
first she says she recalls Monica made it. Of course, the phone 
records indicate that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky. That is 
the much more logical sequence.
    Also it doesn't make sense that the President's secretary, 
who is so close to him--think about it--that she would have 
taken the gifts and would have hidden them under her bed and 
never talked with the President about doing so before or after 
she did so. That doesn't make sense.
    It is also noteworthy that the President did everything he 
could in his January 17 deposition to conceal the true nature 
of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This is consistent 
with the arguments that he never intended the gifts be kept 
from the Jones attorneys. He never intended them to be given to 
the Jones attorneys. If he had intended to give these gifts to 
the Jones attorneys, or have them given, why would he have gone 
through this elaborate series of lies in that deposition? 
Common sense tells us if he knew these gifts were revealed, 
questions would be raised and his relationship revealed.
    So all the logic is there. I don't know how you refute it.
    Another obstruction count the President's attorneys are 
likely to spend time on is one concerning the job search. There 
is no question that Monica Lewinsky was looking for a job in 
New York a long time before we get to December of 1997 and when 
the affidavit and all of this took place, long before the 
President had reason to be concerned that she would have to 
testify or he would have to testify in the case. There is no 
question about that. That is not the issue. The question is 
whether or not the President intensified his efforts to get her 
a job and make sure she got one after it became clear to him 
that he would need her to lie, sign a false affidavit, and 
stick with her lies in any questioning. That is what counts. 
That is what is important. Did he intensify his efforts and 
really go after it? Was it part of that pattern I described to 
you earlier which Mr. Hutchinson described yesterday? That is 
what is important.
    In other words, as count 34 of article II alleges, did she 
make sure she was rewarded with sticking with him in a scheme 
of concealment in anticipation that this reward would keep her 
happy and keep her from turning on him? Did the President make 
sure Monica Lewinsky signed a false affidavit by getting her a 
job?
    The record shows that while she did give some interviews 
from earlier contacts, including one involving the job with the 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, no one of real influence 
around the President put on a full court press to get her a job 
and she had not had any success as of December 6.
    She had not been able to get in touch with Vernon Jordan in 
her recent efforts. He had met with her once in November, but 
as you recall from yesterday's discussions, something he didn't 
even have a good memory of. He certainly wasn't very focused on 
it, and she wasn't getting where she wanted to get.
    And so on December 6 she mentioned that fact to the 
President. Remember, that is one day after she was named on a 
witness list. In fact, that is the day that he learned or may 
have learned--we know he learned of her being on that witness 
list. The President met with Vernon Jordan the next day, but he 
apparently didn't mention Ms. Lewinsky, according to Jordan's 
testimony. The record shows that not only on December 11 did 
Mr. Jordan act to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job when he met with 
her and gave her a list of contact names on December 11, Mr. 
Jordan that same day made calls to contacts at MacAndrews & 
Forbes, the parent corporation of Revlon, and two other New 
York companies. He also telephoned the President to keep him 
informed of his efforts.
    Keep in mind that on this day, this very same day, December 
11, Judge Wright issued her order in the Jones case entitling 
Jones' lawyers to discover the President's sexual relations. Is 
that a mere coincidence?
    Later in December, Monica Lewinsky interviewed with New 
York-based companies that had been contacted by Mr. Jordan. She 
discussed her move to New York with the President during that 
meeting on December 28. On January 5, she declined a United 
Nations offer. On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit. The next day, on January 8, she interviewed in New 
York with MacAndrews & Forbes, but the interview went very 
poorly. Learning of this, Vernon Jordan, that very day, called 
Ronald Perelman, the chairman of the board of MacAndrews & 
Forbes. She was interviewed the next morning again, and a few 
hours later she received an informal offer. She told Jordan 
about it. He immediately told Betty Currie about it, and he 
personally told the President about it later.
    On January 13, her job offer at Revlon was formalized, and 
within a day or so President Clinton told Erskine Bowles that 
Ms. Lewinsky had found a job in the private sector. It was a 
big relief to him.
    Then her false affidavit was filed, and on January 17 the 
President gave a deposition relying on the false affidavit and 
using their cover stories to conceal their relationship.
    Was this full court press in December and early January to 
assure Monica Lewinsky had a job just a coincidence? Logical 
common sense says no; the President needed her to continue to 
cooperate in his scheme to hide their relationship, keeping her 
happy so he could control her and he would be assured that she 
had filed this false affidavit and testifying untruthfully if 
she was called. It is the only plausible rationale for this 
stepped-up job assistance effort at this particular time. In 
doing so, the President committed the crimes of obstruction of 
justice and witness tampering as set forth in count 4 of 
article II.
    Well, we have gone through quite a few of these, and I am 
trying to be brief with you, but I think each one of them is 
important. Each one of them entangles the President further in 
a web that fits together, and it is kind of sticky just like 
the one the spider weaves.
    During his deposition in the Jones case, the President 
referred to Betty Currie several times and suggested that she 
might have answers to some of the questions. He used the cover 
stories, the same ones he and Monica talked about, and he 
talked about Betty Currie a good deal because she was a part of 
those cover stories. When he finished the deposition, he 
telephoned Ms. Currie, and he asked her to come to his office 
the next day and talk with him. Betty Currie told the grand 
jury when she came in the next day the President raised his 
deposition with her and said there were several things he 
wanted to know, then rattled off what you heard yesterday in 
succession: You were always there when she was there, right? We 
never were really alone. You can see and hear everything. 
Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She 
wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.
    All of those weren't true. They were all falsehoods. They 
were all declaratory statements. They weren't questions. It is 
clear from the record that Ms. Currie always tried her best to 
be loyal to the President, her boss. That is normal. That is 
natural.
    In answering the questions in her testimony, she tried to 
portray the events and the President's assertions in the light 
most favorable to him, even though she acknowledges that she 
could not hear and see everything that went on between Monica 
and the President and that she wasn't actually present in the 
same room with them on any number of occasions, so they were 
alone. And she could not say what they might have been doing or 
saying.
    On January 20 or 21, the President again met with Ms. 
Currie and, according to her, recapitulated what he said on 
Sunday, a day or two before, right after the deposition. In the 
context of everything, it seems abundantly clear that the 
President was trying to make sure that Betty Currie 
corroborated his lies and cover stories from the deposition if 
she was ever called to testify in the Jones case or grand jury 
or any other court proceeding. That is what he was doing. In 
doing so, the President committed the crimes of witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice.
    Later, the President testified, rather disingenuously, in 
my judgment, that he was simply trying to refresh his memory 
when he was talking to Ms. Currie. Ms. Currie's confirmation of 
false statements that the President made in his deposition 
could not in any way remind him of the facts. They were 
patently untrue. The idea that he was trying to refresh his 
recollection is implausible.
    Recognizing the weakness of their client's case on this, 
the President's attorneys have suggested that he was worried 
about what Ms. Currie might say if the press really got after 
her. That is what we heard, at least over in the Judiciary 
Committee. Of course, it is possible the President was worried 
about the press. I would suspect so. But common sense says he 
was much more worried about what Betty Currie might say to a 
court, after he had just named her several times and talked 
about her, if she were called as a witness.
    As those who follow me will tell you, the arguments by the 
President's lawyers that Betty Currie wasn't on the Jones 
witness list at the time and the window of opportunity to call 
her as a witness in that case closed shortly thereafter is 
irrelevant. They are going to argue--they argued to us that 
Betty Currie's name wasn't on the witness list. That is a big 
deal, they say. They say. But it is irrelevant. It doesn't 
matter. Witness tampering law doesn't even require that a 
pending judicial proceeding be going on for it to be a crime. 
So whether her name was on the witness list or not makes no 
difference.
    There are two types of obstruction of justice. One does 
require a pending proceeding. I submit--and you will hear more 
about this later in the law--that in this instance the 
President committed both of them. He certainly should have 
anticipated that she would be called in the pending proceeding 
that was going on in the Jones case, but even if there was no 
pending proceeding--and you will, again, hear more about this 
later--for the witness tampering part of the obstruction of 
justice, it doesn't require there to have been an ongoing 
judicial proceeding.
    Within 4 or 5 days of his Jones deposition, the President 
not only explicitly denied the true nature of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky to key White House aides, he also 
embellished the story when he talked with Sidney Blumenthal. To 
Sidney Blumenthal, he portrayed Monica Lewinsky as the 
aggressor, attacked her reputation by portraying her as a 
stalker and presented himself as the innocent victim being 
attacked by the forces of evil. Certainly he wanted his denial 
and his assertions to be spread to the public by these aides, 
but at the same time he knew that the Office of Independent 
Counsel had recently been appointed to investigate the Monica 
Lewinsky matter. He knew that at the time.
    In the context of everything else that he was doing to hide 
his relationship, it seems readily apparent that his false and 
misleading statements to his staff members, whom he knew were 
potential witnesses before any grand jury proceeding, were 
designed in part to corruptly influence their testimony as 
witnesses. In fact, the President actually acknowledged this in 
his grand jury testimony, that he knew his aides might be 
called before the grand jury. And one of the aides testified he 
expected to be called. Sure enough, they were, and they 
repeated the false and misleading information he had given 
them. In this, the President committed the crimes of witness 
tampering and obstruction of justice as set forth in count 7 of 
article II.
    Now, that is the obstruction of justice. Let's briefly 
review the grand jury perjury for a minute.
    If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the 
grand jury and committed perjury. If you believe her--and I 
think this one is very important, not that they all aren't. 
There was the web of the obstruction that I just described and 
then there is the grand jury perjury on top of it. I told you 
earlier, perjury and just plain lying can all be obstruction of 
justice as well. But the grand jury part is much later. It is 
after the President had time to really reflect on all of this, 
a long time later.
    If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the 
grand jury and committed perjury in denying he had sexual 
relations with Monica Lewinsky even if you accept his 
interpretation of the Jones court's definition of sexual 
relations. That is really important. There isn't anything 
clearer in the whole darned matter than that. Just look at the 
President's grand jury testimony. And I am not going to go over 
all of that, but it is on pages 93 and 96 of his grand jury 
testimony. It is laid out in this chart which you have in front 
of you, and I encourage you to read every page of it carefully. 
Specifically, I call your attention to the fact--again, I am 
not going to read all of this--but they asked him about 
touching certain parts of the body that are defined in the 
definition that you have had repeated many times, publicly and 
otherwise. And two of those body parts he acknowledges, the 
breast and genitalia, were in fact part of the definition. And 
at the end of this--and I think this is very important; and I 
am going to read it because it is part of his testimony--he 
answers the question that is the compelling bottom line crime. 
This is where he perjured himself above all else:

    You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did not 
have sexual relations, as I understood this term to be defined.
    Q. Including touching her breasts, kissing her breasts, or 
touching her genitalia?
    A. That's correct.

    In her sworn testimony, Monica Lewinsky described nine 
incidents of which the President touched and kissed her breasts 
and four incidents involving contact with her genitalia. On 
these matters, Lewinsky's testimony is corroborated by the 
sworn testimony of at least six friends and counselors to whom 
she related these incidents contemporaneously.
    Again, if you believe the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, and 
it certainly is credible here--I think it is credible 
throughout but it is certainly credible, with all the 
corroboration you have in the record--there is nothing clearer 
in all of this, in all of this you have before you, than that 
the President committed the crime of perjury in testifying 
before the grand jury regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    On the other hand, there is plenty here to indicate the 
President cleverly created his own narrow definition of sexual 
relations to include only sexual intercourse, absent the 
explicit definition of the court, after he had already lied in 
responding to the interrogatories and other pleadings and 
perhaps even in the depositions themselves in the Jones case. 
In other words, you are free to deduce that he knew full well 
what most people would include as sexual relations, oral sex, 
and the other intimate activities that he was engaged in with 
Ms. Lewinsky, before he contrived his own definition. In that 
case, you don't even have to rely on Monica Lewinsky's 
testimony to conclude that he committed the crime of perjury in 
testifying before the grand jury on the nature of his 
relationship with her.
    There are other perjurious lies the President's grand jury 
testimony contains regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with her. I am not going to outline all of those. 
I want to call your attention to one. The President's prepared 
statement, given under oath, said, ``I regret that what began 
as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' You may 
remember that from Mr. Rogan, I think, yesterday. ``I regret 
that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' 
That is what he said in the grand jury. The evidence indicates 
that he lied. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship with 
the President began with flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky 
showing the President her underwear, and just a couple of hours 
later they were kissing and engaging in intimacies. That is a 
little bit more than friendship. He lied when he said that to 
the grand jury.
    Before the grand jury, the President swore that he 
testified truthfully at his deposition. Remember, I told you I 
was going to come back to this. It is important because the 
Paula Jones deposition testimony is relevant to obstruction of 
justice but it is also relevant to the perjury here, because 
one of the portions of the perjury article that we have before 
us includes this issue of lying in the deposition. The perjury 
in this case is not the lying in the deposition, it is the 
lying to the grand jury about whether he lied in the 
deposition. He didn't have to have committed perjury. We didn't 
send you the perjury count over from the deposition. But if he 
lied--lying can be less than perjury. If he lied in the 
deposition, and then he told the grand jury that he didn't lie, 
he committed perjury in front of the grand jury.
    The evidence indicates that he did lie. He testified before 
the grand jury that ``my goal in this deposition was to be 
truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined 
to walk through the minefield of this deposition without 
violating the law and I believe I did.''
    Contrary to this testimony, the President was alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, which he even 
conceded in his grand jury statement. So he lied in the 
deposition then when he said he wasn't alone with her.
    In the deposition, the President swore he could never 
recall being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky 
except when she was perhaps delivering pizza. The evidence 
indicates that he lied.
    The President swore, in the Jones deposition, that he could 
not recall gifts exchanged between Monica Lewinsky and himself. 
The evidence indicates that he lied.
    He swore, in the deposition, that he did not know whether 
Monica Lewinsky had been served a subpoena to testify in the 
Jones case at the last time that he saw her in December 1997. 
The evidence indicates that he lied.
    In his deposition, the President swore that the last time 
he spoke to Monica Lewinsky was when she stopped by before 
Christmas 1997 to see Betty Currie at a Christmas party. The 
evidence indicates that he lied.
    In his deposition in the Jones case, the President swore 
that he didn't know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan, 
had met with Monica Lewinsky and talked about the case. The 
evidence indicates that he lied.
    The President, in his Paula Jones deposition, indicated 
that he was ``not sure'' whether he had ever talked to Monica 
Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to 
testify in the Jones case. Can anybody doubt the evidence 
indicates that he lied?
    The President, in his deposition, swore that the contents 
of the affidavit executed by Monica Lewinsky in the Jones case, 
in which she denied they had a sexual relationship, were 
``absolutely true.'' The evidence indicates that he lied.
    In other words, when the President swore in the grand jury 
testimony that his goal in the Jones deposition was to be 
truthful but not particularly helpful, the evidence is clear 
that he lied and committed the crime of perjury, inasmuch as he 
had quite intentionally lied on numerous occasions in his 
deposition testimony in the Jones case. His intention, in that 
deposition, was to be untruthful. That is what it was all 
about, to be untruthful. So he committed the crime of perjury 
in front of the grand jury--big time.
    The third part of article I concerning grand jury perjury 
relates to his not telling the truth about false and misleading 
statements his attorney, Robert Bennett--unintentionally, Mr. 
Bennett, by the way, but nonetheless false and misleading 
statements--Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright during the 
President's Jones case deposition. We have been on that a lot. 
I don't want to bore you with going over all those details 
again, but this is the third part of the perjury count as well 
as an obstruction of justice count.
    During the President's deposition in the Jones case, Mr. 
Bennett, however unintentional on his part, misled the court 
when he said, ``Counsel [counsel for Ms. Jones] is fully aware 
that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in 
possession of saying that there is no sex of any kind, of any 
manner shape or form, with President Clinton . . .'' Judge 
Wright, as you recall again, interrupted Mr. Bennett and 
expressed her concern that he might be coaching the President, 
to which Mr. Bennett responded, ``in preparation of the witness 
for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he 
doesn't know . . .''
    In his grand jury testimony about these statements by Mr. 
Bennett to the judge in the Jones case, the President 
testified:

    I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he was saying. . 
. . I didn't pay much attention to this conversation which is 
why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the 
deposition . . . I don't believe I ever even focused on what 
Mr. Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started 
reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That 
moment, the whole argument just passed me by.

    In so testifying before the grand jury, the President lied 
and committed the crime of perjury. As you saw yesterday in the 
video, during this portion of that deposition when Mr. Bennett 
was discussing this matter with Judge Wright, the President 
directly looked at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his 
argument to Judge Wright. He lied about that to the grand jury. 
He committed perjury when he said that he wasn't paying 
attention and he didn't know what Mr. Bennett was saying.
    Several of the most blatant examples of grand jury perjury 
are found in that portion of his testimony cited in the fourth 
part, the last part of article I which goes to his efforts, the 
President's efforts, to influence the testimony of witnesses 
and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. The 
President swore during the grand jury testimony that he told 
Ms. Lewinsky that if the Jones lawyers requested the gifts 
exchanged between them, she should provide them. If you believe 
Monica Lewinsky's testimony, the President lied and committed 
perjury.
    In her grand jury testimony, Ms. Lewinsky discussed in 
detail the December 28 meeting where gifts were discussed which 
preceded by a couple of hours Ms. Currie coming to her 
apartment and taking the gifts and hiding them under a bed. As 
you recall, she said she raised with the President the idea of 
removing her gifts from her house and giving them to somebody 
like Betty Currie and that his response was something to the 
effect of, ``Let me think about that.''
    She went on to say that from everything he said to her, 
they were not going to do anything but keep these gifts 
private. In a separate sworn statement, she testified she was 
never under the impression from anything the President said 
that she should turn over the gifts to the Jones attorneys, and 
obviously she didn't have the idea that she should do that 
because she gave them all to Betty Currie to hide under the 
bed.
    When the President told the grand jurors that he was simply 
trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made a series of 
statements to Betty Currie the day after his deposition, he 
lied and committed perjury. As I have already pointed out to 
you today, the evidence is compelling that those statements, 
such as ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' were 
made to try to influence Betty Currie's possible testimony, so 
that she would corroborate his cover stories and other false 
statements and lies that he had given the previous day in the 
Jones deposition, if she was called as a witness.
    If you conclude that these series of statements constitute 
witness tampering and obstruction of justice, then you must 
also conclude that the President committed perjury when he 
asserted that the sole purpose of these statements to Betty 
Currie was to ``refresh'' his recollection. You have to. Even 
if you were to buy the President's counsel's suggestion these 
statements might have been made to influence her in order for 
her to corroborate him, not in actual testimony in a court case 
but with the press, which they have said again to us--I don't 
know if they will say it to you--you would still conclude he 
was lying when he said that this was simply only to refresh his 
own recollection.
    In the context of all of this, the idea that he was 
refreshing his recollection by firing off these declarative 
statements doesn't make sense. It just doesn't make sense. If 
you read the statements and think about them on their face, 
they are inherently inconsistent with refreshing his 
recollection.
    Also, the President told the grand jury that the things he 
told his top aides about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky 
may have been misleading but they were true. If you believe the 
aides testified truthfully to the grand jury about what the 
President told them about his relationship, the President told 
them many falsehoods, absolute falsehoods. So when the 
President described them under oath to the grand jury as 
truths, he lied and committed the crime of perjury.
    One example of this comes from Deputy Chief John Podesta in 
his testimony before the grand jury on January 23 that the 
President explicitly told him that he and Monica Lewinsky had 
not had oral sex. Another is Sidney Blumenthal. His testimony 
was that on January 23 the President told him that Monica 
Lewinsky ``came at me and made a sexual demand on me'' and that 
he rebuffed her. And also Blumenthal's testimony that the 
President told him that Lewinsky threatened him and said that 
she would tell people that they had had an affair and that she 
was known as a stalker among her peers.
    In short, the President lied numerous times before the 
grand jury, my colleagues. He lied numerous times under oath 
last August 17. He committed perjury numerous times under oath. 
He certainly wasn't caught by surprise by any of this, by any 
of the questions that were asked him during the grand jury 
appearance, and he was given a lot of latitude. He was given 
latitude normally that grand jury witnesses don't have--to give 
a prepared statement, to have his counsel present, to refuse to 
answer questions without taking the fifth amendment.
    It is hard to imagine a case where it is clear that the 
lies meet the threshold of the crime of perjury. But I will 
leave the discussion of the elements and the law to the next 
group that is going to come up here.
    The facts are clear that the President lied about having 
sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky even under his 
understanding of the definition of the Jones case if you 
believe Monica.
    He lied when he said he gave truthful testimony in his 
Jones deposition.
    He lied when he said he wasn't paying attention to his 
attorney's discussion of Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit 
during his deposition in the Jones case.
    He lied when he said he told Monica Lewinsky she should 
turn over the gifts to the Jones lawyers if they asked for 
them.
    He lied when he told the grand jury that he made the 
declaratory statements to Betty Currie to refresh his 
recollection.
    And he lied when he told the grand jury that he only told 
the truth to his White House aides, such as John Podesta who 
testified the President told him he had not had oral sex with 
Lewinsky, and to Sidney Blumenthal who testified he told him 
very exaggerated and highly untrue characterizations of Monica 
Lewinsky's role in all of this.
    These impeachment proceedings aren't before you because of 
one or two lies about a sexual relationship. This is not about 
sex. This is about obstruction of justice. This is about a 
pattern. This is about a scheme. This is about a lot of lies. 
This is about a lot of perjury. They are before you because the 
President lied again and again in a perjurious fashion to a 
grand jury and tried to get a number of people, other people, 
to lie under oath in the Jones lawsuit and to the grand jury 
and encouraged the concealment of evidence.
    In a couple of days the President's lawyers are going to 
have their chance to talk to you, and I suspect they will try 
to get you to focus on 10, 15, or 20, or 30, maybe even 100 
specific little details. They are going to argue that these 
details don't square with some of the facts about this 
presentation. But I would encourage you never to lose sight of 
the totality of this scheme to lie and obstruct justice; never 
lose sight of the big picture. Don't lose sight of the forest 
for the trees. It is easy to do because there are a lot of 
facts in this case.
    I suggest you avoid considering any of this stuff in 
isolation and treating it separately. The evidence and the 
testimony needs to be viewed as a whole. The weight, we call it 
in law--and you are going to hear that in a few minutes--the 
weight of the evidence in this case is very great, it is huge 
in its volume, that the President engaged in a scheme, starting 
in December 1997, to conceal from the court in the Jones case 
his true relationship with Monica Lewinsky and then cover up 
his acts of concealment which he had to know by that time were 
serious crimes.
    The case against the President rests to a great extent on 
whether or not you believe Monica Lewinsky. But it is also 
based on the sworn testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie, 
Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and corroborating witnesses. 
Time and again, the President says one thing and they say 
something entirely different. Time and again, somebody is not 
telling the truth. And time and again, an analysis of the 
context, the motivation, and all of the testimony taken 
together with common sense says it is the President who is not 
telling the truth. But if you have serious doubts about the 
truthfulness of any of these witnesses, I, again, as all my 
colleagues do, encourage you to bring them in here. Let's 
examine Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie and the 
other key witnesses, let you examine the testimony, invite the 
President to come, and judge for yourself their credibility.
    But on the record, the weight of the evidence, taken from 
what we have given you today, what you can read in all of these 
books back here, everything taken together is huge that the 
President lied. It is refutable, but it is not refutable if 
somebody doesn't come in here besides just making an argument.
    I don't know what the witnesses will say, but I assume if 
they are consistent, they'll say the same that's in here. But 
you have a chance to determine whether they are telling the 
truth. The only way you will ever know that, other than just 
accepting it if you think the evidence and the weight is that 
huge--and it may be--is by looking them in the eye and 
determining their credibility.
    I believe that when you finish hearing and weighing all of 
the evidence, you will conclude, as I have, that William 
Jefferson Clinton committed the crimes of obstruction of 
justice, witness tampering, and perjury, that these in this 
case are high crimes and misdemeanors, that he has done grave 
damage to our system of justice, and leaving him in office 
would do more, and that he should be removed from office as 
President of the United States.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess in the proceedings for 15 minutes. Please 
return to your positions within 15 minutes.
    There being no objection, at 2:11 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 2:30 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as all Senators return to the 
Chamber, I believe now we are going to go to a segment where we 
will hear from three of the managers, including Congressmen 
Gekas, Chabot, and Cannon, and then we will take another break 
shortly after 3:30.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
    Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the 
President, my colleagues from the House, and Members of the 
Senate, up to now you have been fully informed of the state of 
the record in this case in many different ways, in very many 
different tonalities uttered by the managers, who so 
magnificently, in my judgment, have woven the story that began 
in 1997 and has not ended yet.
    But the narrative that the managers were able to produce 
for you and put on the record has met, even as we speak, with 
commentary in the public that ``we have all known all of this 
before.'' The big difference is that now it is part of the 
history of the country. It is lodged in the records of the 
Senate of the United States. And together with the 
Congressional Record of the proceedings that preceded these in 
the House, we now have the dawning of the final chapters of 
this particular incident involving the President, in which you 
will have the final word. But that is what the importance is of 
what you have heard up until now--the complete record woven 
together, step by step, so that no one in this Chamber at this 
juncture does not know all the facts that are pertinent to this 
case. That is a magnificent accomplishment on the part of the 
managers.
    But the record is not yet complete, and that is where I and 
Representative Chabot, Representative Cannon, and 
Representative Barr come in, so that now we can take the next 
step in fulfillment of the record, and that is, to try to apply 
the statutory laws, the laws of our Nation as they pertain to 
the facts that you now have well ingrained into your 
consciences. To do that, we have to repeat some of the facts. 
Some of these matters overlap, and just as you have given your 
attention to the matters at hand up until now, your undivided 
attention is needed continuously.
    For instance, we cannot discuss even the application of 
these statutes to the facts unless we repeat the series of 
events that catapulted us to this moment in history. And we 
must begin, as you have heard countless times now on and off 
this floor, in my judgment, with the Supreme Court of the 
United States, with all due deference to the Chief Justice, 
because the Supreme Court at one point in this saga determined 
in a suit brought by Paula Jones that indeed an average, day-
to-day, ordinary citizen of our Nation would have the right to 
have a day in court, as it were, even against the President of 
the United States. It is there that all of this began.
    That fellow American, Paula Jones--no matter how she may 
have been described by commentators and pundits and talking 
heads, et cetera--did have a bundle of rights at her command. 
Those rights went into the core of our system of justice to 
bring the President into the case as a defendant. That is an 
awesome and grand result of the Supreme Court decision at that 
juncture. This is what is being overlooked, in my judgment, as 
we pursue what we believe. If perjury indeed was committed--and 
the record is replete that it in fact was--and if indeed 
obstruction of justice was finally committed by the President 
of the United States--as the evidence abundantly demonstrates--
then we must apply the rights of Paula Jones to what has 
transpired.
    We are not saying that the President--even though the 
weight of the evidence demonstrates it amply--should be 
convicted of the impeachment which has brought us to this floor 
just because he committed perjury or obstructed justice, but 
because as a result of his actions both in rendering falsehoods 
under oath, as the evidence demonstrates amply, or in 
obstructing justice, that because of his conduct, he attempted 
to, or succeeded in, or almost succeeded in--it doesn't matter 
which of these results finally emerges--and attempted to 
destroy the rights of a fellow American citizen. That is what 
the gravamen of all that has occurred up to now really is.
    In attempting to obstruct justice, we mean by that 
obstructing the justice of whom? It was an attempt, a bold 
attempt, one that succeeded in some respects, to obstruct the 
justice sought by a fellow American citizen. That is heavy. 
That is soul searching in its quality. That goes beyond those 
who would say, ``He committed perjury about sex. So what?'' 
That goes beyond saying that, ``This is just about sex. So 
what? Everybody lies about sex.'' But when you combine all the 
features of the actions of the President of the United States 
and you see that they are funneled and tunneled and aimed and 
targeted toward obliterating from the landscape the rights of 
Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen, then you must take a 
second look at your own assertion that, ``So what? It's just a 
question of fact about sex.''
    Many of the Members of this Chamber and others have already 
acknowledged that the President has lied under oath. But then 
they are quick to add, ``So what?'' which is so disturbing in 
view of the results of what has happened in this case.
    Before the House of Representatives, as part of our record, 
we had a group of academicians, professors, testifying. 
Professor Higgenbotham--who, sadly I must relate, has passed 
away since his appearance--was trying to show how futile it was 
for us to even attempt to append perjury to an indictable, 
prosecutable offense, and that nowhere in the country is it 
prosecuted regularly, and that it is so trivial because it is 
based on sex. He went on to give an example of how trivial it 
is. I am paraphrasing it, but he said: Would you expect to 
indict the President of the United States for perjury if he 
lied about a 55-mile-an-hour speed limit, even though he was 
going 56? If he would say, ``I was only going 51,'' would you 
indict him on that?
    In the repartee that I had with him, at that juncture, I 
asked him, would he feel the same if, as a result of that 
perjurious testimony about only going 51 miles an hour, there 
was a victim in the case, that this might be a tort case, an 
``involuntarily'' case, a negligence case in which someone died 
as a result of an automobile accident, and the issue at hand 
would be the speed limit, would he feel the same way if, as a 
result of the perjury committed as to the rate of speed, that 
someone's rights were erased in the case by virtue of that 
perjury, and the gentleman acknowledged that that made a 
difference.
    That is what the difference is here. The perjury per se, 
that being a phrase that we lawyers can adopt, the perjury per 
se is almost a given pursuant to the commentaries that we have 
heard from the people in and out of that Chamber. But when you 
add to it the terrible consequences of seeing a fellow citizen 
pursuing justice thwarted, stopped in her tracks, as it were, 
by reason of the actions of the President, that is what the 
core issue here is.
    To take it, then, from the status of what consequence it 
had to that fellow American citizen to the next step is, in my 
judgment, an issue to go to the determination of whether or not 
there was an impeachable offense. My colleagues will show you 
how the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of justice 
relates to this pattern of factual circumstance that we bring 
to you. But in the meantime we must recount, even at the risk 
of overlapping some of the testimony, that following the 
initial recognition by the President that there was going to be 
a witness list and that Monica Lewinsky would eventually 
appear, as she did, on that witness list, this occurred, which 
is little examined thus far in the world of the scandal in 
which we are all participants, and that is this: The first item 
of business on the part of the Jones lawyers in pursuing the 
rights of Paula Jones was to issue a set of interrogatories, a 
discovery procedure that is well recognized in our courts all 
over the land, and that a set of interrogatories arrived at the 
President's desk.
    At this juncture--this is way before the President appeared 
at the deposition about which you know everything now. The 
facts have been related to you in a hundred different ways, and 
you know that pretty well. I know you do. But did you know, can 
you fasten your attention for a moment knowing that this 
happened at the deposition a month before, on December 23, 
1997, when the President had in front of him interrogatories 
that asked, did he ever have sexual relations with anyone other 
than his spouse during the time that he was Governor of 
Arkansas or President of the United States? And there the 
President answered--or I think that the interrogatory stated: 
Name any persons with whom you have had sexual relations other 
than your wife. And the answer that the President rendered in 
those interrogatories under oath was none.
    I say to the ladies and gentlemen of the Senate that this 
was the first falsehood stated under oath which became a chain 
reaction of falsehoods under oath, and even without the oath, 
all the way to the nuclear explosion of falsehoods that were 
uttered in the grand jury in August of 1998.
    This little innocuous piece of paper called interrogatories 
was placed before the President presumably with or without 
counsel. Let's even presume with counsel. And it was a straight 
question, not with any definitions, no confusing colloquy 
between a judge and a gaggle of lawyers, no interpretation 
being put on any particular word in the interrogatories, but 
whether or not sexual relations had been urged or participated 
in by the President of the United States, and the answer was 
none in naming those persons.
    What does that mean to you? What does that not mean to you? 
That when confronted right at the outset with the phrase 
``sexual relations'' that the President adopted and determined 
the common usage, well-understood definition of sexual 
relations that everybody in America recognizes as being the 
true meaning of sexual relations, meaning sex of any kind. Did 
not the President answer that under the common understanding 
that all of us entertain when we discuss, more so in the last 
year than ever before in our lives, the phrase ``sexual 
relations''? To me that is a telling feature of this case 
because when you leap over that and get to the depositions and 
everything that the President might have said in those 
depositions, as his counsel have repeatedly asserted to us were 
true, that he did not lie, that he did not commit perjury, that 
he did not evade the truth, that some of it was puzzling to 
them even, but it did not amount to perjury, what can they say 
about the statement one month before on December 23 in 
interrogatories?
    That is extremely important. That is my recollection. Yours 
is the one that will have to predominate, of course.
    But the weight that I put on it, I urge you to at least 
evaluate as you begin to level your weight on the evidence that 
has been presented.
    If that were not enough, on January 15, again before the 
deposition, another interrogatory--this one a request for 
documents--was submitted to the President, and again the 
question there was--you will see it in the record; it is in the 
record--the request of documents says to submit anything that 
pertained to Monica Lewinsky, the intern or employee, Monica 
Lewinsky, of whatever description--notes, gifts, whatever, and 
the President in that particular instance again said none. I am 
willing to give the President a reasonable doubt on that and 
even ask you, if you do not place as much weight on it as I do, 
to forget all about that. But the point is that these 
assertions under oath were made before the Jones deposition was 
ever even conceived, let alone undertaken on January 17.
    So he cannot, the President cannot use the lawyer talk and 
judge banter and the descriptions and definitions of sexual 
relations to cloud the answers that he gave at that time, and 
all of this in the continuous effort to destroy the rights of 
Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen.
    That brings up the question. If someone, a member of your 
family, or someone who is a witness to these proceedings has a 
serious case in which one's self, one's property, one's family 
has been severely damaged, would you suffer, without a whimper, 
perjurious testimony given against you? Would you, knowing down 
deep that at the end of the day it had caused you to lose your 
chance at retribution and a chance to be compensated for 
damages, to restore your family life?
    Isn't that what our system is all about? Isn't that what 
the adverse consequence is of the attempt to obliterate the 
Paula Jones civil suit?
    That is what it is, not that he committed perjury. So what? 
It is what the end result of that perjury might be that you 
should weigh. Skip over the fact that he committed perjury. We 
all acknowledge that it is said. But now tell me what that does 
to Paula Jones, or potentially could do to Paula Jones, or to 
one of you, or to one of your spouses, or to one of the members 
of your community who wants to have justice done in the courts.
    Obstruction of justice is obstruction of justice to an 
individual, to a family. You can take it from Paula Jones and 
telescope it upward to every community, in every courthouse, 
and every State and every community in our land, and there is a 
Paula Jones eager to assert certain rights and then confronted 
with someone who would tear them down by false testimony, by 
lies under oath.
    That is what the gravamen of all this really is.
    One more thing. The counsel for the President have 
repeatedly and very authoritatively, professionally asserted, 
as many of you have, that this is not an impeachable offense, 
for, after all, they say, an impeachable offense is one in 
which there is a direct attack on the system of government; not 
perjury, not obstruction of justice.
    So what, on those, they imply. They say it does not--
perjury, especially about sex--attack the system of government. 
I must tell you that as an 8- or 9- or 10-year-old, I would 
accompany my mother to naturalization school three or four 
nights a week where my mother was intent on learning the 
English language and learning about the history of the United 
States, as the teachers for naturalization were preparing these 
prospective citizens. And she was so proud that she learned 
that the first President of the United States was George 
Washington, and was prepared to answer that question if it was 
posed to her in naturalization court. And she was so proud when 
I was testing her, preparing her. Each time I would say, ``Mom, 
what are the three branches of Government?'' And she would say, 
``The `Exec' and the `legislate' and the `judish,' '' in her 
wonderful, lovable accent. She knew the system of government. 
And she did have to answer that in naturalization court. And 
she knew that one wall of the creed that protects our rights is 
the ``judish.'' She knew that the courthouse and the rights of 
citizens which are advanced in that courthouse are the system 
of government. Can anyone say that purposely attempting to 
destroy someone's case in the courthouse is not an attack on 
the system of government of our country?
    Mr. Chabot will elucidate on perjury.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Chabot.
    Mr. Manager CHABOT. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, 
distinguished counsel for the President, I am Steve Chabot. I 
represent the First District of Ohio. Prior to my election to 
Congress, I practiced law in Cincinnati for about 15 years. As 
I stand before you today, I must admit that I feel a long way 
away from that small neighborhood law practice that I had. 
Though, while this arena may be somewhat foreign to me, the law 
remains the same. As one of the managers who represents the 
House, I am here to summarize the law of perjury. While today's 
discussion of the law may not be as captivating as yesterday's 
discussion of the facts, it is nevertheless essential that we 
thoroughly review the law as we move forward in this historic 
process. I will try to lay out the law of perjury as succinctly 
as I can without using an extraordinary amount of the Senate's 
time but beg you to indulge me.
    In the United States Criminal Code, there are two perjury 
offenses. The offenses are found in sections 1621 and 1623 of 
title 18 of the United States Criminal Code. Section 1621 is 
the broad perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to 
knowingly and willfully make a false statement about a material 
matter while under oath. Section 1623 is the more specific 
perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to knowingly 
make a false statement about a material matter while under oath 
before a Federal court or before a Federal grand jury.
    It is a well-settled rule that when two criminal statutes 
overlap, the Government may charge a defendant under either 
one. As you know, the President's false statements covered in 
the first impeachment article were made before a Federal grand 
jury. Therefore, section 1623 is the most relevant statute. 
However, section 1621 is applicable as well.
    The elements of perjury. There are four general elements of 
perjury. They are: An oath, an intent, falsity, and 
materiality. I would like to walk you through each of those 
elements at this time.
    First, the oath.
    The oath need not be administered in a particular form, but 
it must be administered by a person or body legally authorized 
to do so. In this case, there has been no serious challenge 
made about the legitimacy of the oath administered to the 
President either in his civil deposition in the Jones v. 
Clinton case or before the Federal grand jury. Let's, once 
again, witness President Clinton swearing to tell the truth 
before a Federal grand jury.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God?

    The oath element has clearly been satisfied in this case.
    The next element is intent. To this day, the President has 
refused to acknowledge what the vast majority of Americans know 
to be true--that he knowingly lied under oath. The President's 
continued inability to tell the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth has forced this body, this jury, to 
determine the President's true intent.
    The intent element requires that the false testimony was 
knowingly stated and described. This requirement is generally 
satisfied by proof that the defendant knew his testimony was 
false at the time it was provided. As with almost all perjury 
cases, you will have to make a decision regarding the 
President's knowledge of his own false statements based on the 
surrounding facts and, yes, by circumstantial evidence. This 
does not in any way weaken the case against the President. In 
the absence of an admission by the defendant, relying on 
circumstantial evidence is virtually the only way to prove the 
crime of perjury.
    The Federal jury instructions which Federal courts use in 
perjury cases can provide helpful guidance in understanding 
what is meant by the requirement that the false statement must 
be made knowingly. Let me quote from the Federal jury 
instructions:

    When the word ``knowingly'' is used, it means that the 
defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the 
nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance, 
mistake or accident.

    So as you reflect on the President's carefully calculated 
statements, remember the Federal jury instructions and ask a 
few simple questions: Did the President realize what he was 
doing, what he was saying? Was he aware of the nature of his 
conduct or did the President simply act through ignorance, 
mistake or accident?
    The answers to these questions are undeniably clear even to 
the President's own attorneys. In fact, Mr. Ruff and Mr. Craig 
testified before the Judiciary Committee that the President 
willfully misled the court. Let's listen to Mr. Ruff.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    Mr. Ruff. I'm going to respond to your question. I have no 
doubt that he walked up to a line that he thought he understood 
reasonable people--and you maybe have reached this conclusion--
could determine that he crossed over that line and that what 
for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive and 
misleading or evasive was in fact false.

    In an extraordinary admission, the President's own attorney 
has acknowledged the care, the intention, the will of the 
President to say precisely what he said.
    The President's actions speak volumes about his intent to 
make false statements under oath. For example, the President 
called his secretary, Betty Currie, within hours of concluding 
his civil deposition and asked her to come to the White House 
the following day. President Clinton then recited false 
characterizations to her about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. As you have already heard, Ms. Currie testified that 
the President made the following statements to her:

    You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
never really alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica 
came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She wanted to 
have sex with me, and I can't do that.

    This is not the conduct of someone who believed he had 
testified truthfully. It is not the conduct of someone who 
acted through ignorance, mistake or accident. Rather, it is the 
conduct of someone who lied, knew he had lied, and needed 
others to modify their stories accordingly.
    Finally, it is painstakingly clear during the President's 
grand jury testimony that he, again, knows exactly what he is 
doing. Let's again watch the following excerpt from that 
testimony.
    [Text of videotape presentation:]

    . . . was an utterly false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.

    In this instance, and in many others that have been 
presented to you over the last 2 days, the facts and the law 
speak plainly.
    The President's actions and demeanor make the case that 
President Clinton knowingly and willfully lied under oath in a 
grand jury proceeding and in a civil deposition. The compelling 
evidence in this case satisfies the intent element required 
under both sections 1621 and 1623 of the Federal Criminal Code.
    The next element, falsity. The next element of perjury is 
falsity. In order for perjury to occur in this case, the 
President must have made one or more false statements. 
Yesterday my colleagues went through the evidence on this 
matter in great detail and clearly demonstrated that the 
President did, in fact, make false statements while under oath. 
Because of the evidence that was presented to date, without 
question the President's falsity and his false statements have 
been shown, so I am going to move forward to the final element 
of perjury, which is materiality.
    The test for whether a statement is material, as stated by 
the Supreme Court in Kungys v. United States, is simply whether 
it had a ``natural tendency to influence'' or was ``capable of 
influencing'' the official proceeding. The law also makes clear 
that the false statement does not have to actually impede the 
grand jury's investigation for the statement to be material.
    The law regarding the materiality of false statements 
before a grand jury is very straightforward. Because a grand 
jury's authority to investigate is broad, the realm of 
declarations regarded as material is broad. The President's 
false statements to the grand jury were material because the 
grand jury was investigating whether the President had 
obstructed justice and committed perjury in a civil deposition.
    Now let's look at potential legal smokescreens. The 
President's attorneys will try to distract you from the 
relevant law and facts in this case. To help you stay focused 
on the law, I would like to preview some of the arguments that 
may be made by the President's attorneys.
    Legal smokescreen No. 1, the Bronston case. You will 
probably hear opposing counsel argue that the President did not 
technically commit perjury, and appeal to the case of Bronston 
v. United States. This is a legal smokescreen. In the Bronston 
case, the Supreme Court held that statements that are literally 
truthful and nonresponsive cannot by themselves form the basis 
for a perjury conviction. This is the cornerstone of the 
President's defense. However, the Court also held that the 
unresponsive statements must be technically true in order to 
prevent a perjury conviction; such statements must not be 
capable of being conclusively proven false.
    As we have seen, none of the President's perjurious 
statements before the grand jury, covered in the first 
impeachment article, are technically true. So, when the 
President's counsel cites the Bronston case, remember the 
facts. Ask yourselves, are the President's answers literally 
true? And remember, to be literally true they must actually be 
true.
    It is also important to note that, consistent with the 
Bronston case, the response, ``I don't recall,'' is not 
technically true if the President actually could recall. The 
factual record in the case, consisting of multiple sworn 
statements contradicting the President's testimony and highly 
specific corroborating evidence, demonstrates that the 
President's statements were not literally true or legally 
accurate. On the contrary, the record establishes that the 
President repeatedly lied, he repeatedly deceived, he 
repeatedly feigned forgetfulness.
    There are other clear and important limitations on the 
Bronston case's scope. In United States v. DeZarn, handed down 
just 3 months ago by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
court made an important ruling that is directly on point in 
this case. The court of appeals stated:

    Because we believe that the crime of perjury depends not 
only upon the clarity of the questioning itself, but also upon 
the knowledge and reasonable understanding of the testifier 
[President Clinton] as to what is meant by the questioning, we 
hold that a defendant may be found guilty of perjury if a jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence 
presented that the defendant knew what the question meant and 
gave knowingly untruthful and materially misleading answers in 
response.

    The Bronston case has further limitations. For example, in 
United States v. Swindall, the court held that the jury can 
convict for perjury even if the questions or statements 
involved are capable of multiple interpretations where only one 
interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances 
surrounding their utterances.
    In United States v. Doherty, the court held that the 
prosecution for perjury is not barred under Bronston, 
``whenever some ambiguity can be found by an implausibly 
strained reading of the question'' posed. I would submit to 
this body that ``implausibly strained reading of the question'' 
posed is precisely what confronts us time and again in the case 
of the President before the grand jury.
    Legal smokescreen No. 2, the two-witness rule. In the 
coming days you may hear opposing counsel argue that the 
President did not commit perjury by appealing to the so-called 
two-witness rule. Again, this is nothing but a legal 
smokescreen. This common law rule requires that there be either 
two witnesses to a perjurious statement or, in the alternative, 
that there be one witness and corroborating evidence of the 
perjury. Opposing counsel may suggest that, because there were 
not two witnesses present for some of the President's false 
statements, he did not technically commit perjury. Such an 
appeal to the two-witness rule is wrong for several reasons.
    First, the two-witness rule is not applicable under section 
1623, only under 1621. The language of 1623 expressly provides, 
``it shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any 
particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type 
of evidence.''
    Congress passed section 1623 back in 1970 to eliminate the 
two-witness requirement and to facilitate the prosecution of 
perjury and enhance the reliability of testimony before Federal 
courts and Federal grand juries. The legislative history 
establishes this as the fundamental purpose of the statute.
    Additionally, substantial evidence has been presented over 
the last 2 days to satisfy the requirements of the two-witness 
rule under section 1621. Remember, when the two-witness rule 
applies, it does not actually require two witnesses. Indeed, it 
requires either two witnesses or one witness and corroborating 
evidence. As you know, there is a witness to each and every one 
of the President's false statements and there is voluminous 
evidence which corroborates the falsehood of his statements.
    Finally, case law tells us that the two-witness rule is not 
applicable under certain circumstances, when the defendant 
falsely claims an inability to recall a material matter.
    Another possible legal smokescreen, the drafting of article 
I, article I being the first article of impeachment.
    As you know, impeachment article I says:

    Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully 
provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury . . .

    You may hear opposing counsel argue that section 1621 is 
the only applicable statute because the article of impeachment 
accuses the President of willfully committing perjury. This is 
another legal smokescreen.
    Following that reasoning, one could just as easily make the 
argument that 1623 was contemplated here because the term 
``false'' does not appear in 1621 but does appear in 1623. 
However, that is not the point. The point is that the language 
of the impeachment article did not use these terms as terms of 
art as they are defined and used in various criminal statutes.
    While the article of impeachment does not draw a 
distinction between the standards, evidence has been presented 
over the last 2 days that demonstrates that the President did 
knowingly and willfully lie under oath regarding material 
matters before a grand jury, and that satisfies both 1623 and 
1621.
    Again, in the context of perjury law, the distinction 
between a knowing falsehood and a willful falsehood is almost a 
distinction without a difference. In American Surety Company v. 
Sullivan, the Second Circuit stated that ``the word `willful,' 
even in a criminal statute, means no more than the person 
charged with the duty knows what he is doing.''
    So that, in essence, is the law of perjury.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, throughout this 
long and difficult process, apologists for the President have 
maintained that his actions might well have been reprehensible 
but are not necessarily worthy of impeachment and removal from 
office. I submit, however, that telling the truth under oath is 
critically important to our judicial system and that perjury, 
of which I believe a compelling case is being made, strikes a 
terrible blow against the machinery of justice in this country.
    The President of the United States, the chief law 
enforcement officer of this land, lied under oath. He raised 
his right hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, and then he lied, pure and simple.
    Why is perjury such a serious offense? Under the American 
system of justice, our courts are charged with seeking the 
truth. Every day, American citizens raise their right hand in 
courtrooms across the country and take an oath to tell the 
truth. Breaking that oath cripples our justice system. By lying 
under oath, the President did not just commit perjury, an 
offense punishable under our criminal code, but he chipped away 
at the very cornerstone of our judicial system.
    The first Chief Justice of the United States of the Supreme 
Court, John Jay, eloquently stated why perjury is so dangerous 
over 200 years ago. On June 25, 1792, in a charge to the grand 
jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Vermont, the 
Chief Justice said:

    Independent of the abominable Insult which Perjury offers 
to the divine Being, there is no Crime more extensively 
pernicious to Society. It discolours and poisons Streams of 
Justice, and by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the 
Foundations of personal and public Rights--Controversies of 
various kinds exist at all Times, and in all Communities. To 
decide them, Courts of Justice are instituted--their Decisions 
must be regulated by Evidence, and the greater part of Evidence 
will always consist of the Testimony of witnesses. This 
Testimony is given under those solemn obligations which an 
appeal to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to 
be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would 
become insecure.

    Why has the President been impeached by the U.S. House of 
Representatives? Why is he on trial here today in the U.S. 
Senate? Because he lied under oath. Because he committed 
perjury. Because if the oaths cease to be held sacred, our 
dearest and most valuable rights will become insecure.
    During the course of this trial, Members of this 
distinguished body, the jurors in this case, will have to 
consider the law and the facts very carefully. It is a daunting 
task and an awesome responsibility, one that cannot be taken 
lightly. I humbly suggest to those sitting in judgment of the 
President that we must all weigh the impact of our actions, not 
only on our beloved Nation today, but on American history. It 
is my belief that if the actions of the President are 
ultimately disregarded or minimized, we will be sending a sorry 
message to the American people that the President of the United 
States is above the law. We will be sending a message to our 
children, to my children, that telling the truth doesn't really 
matter if you have a good lawyer or you are an exceptionally 
skilled liar. That would be tragic.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, let us instead send a message 
to the American people and to the boys and girls who will be 
studying American history in the years to come that no person 
is above the law and that this great Nation remains an entity 
governed by the rule of law. Let us do what is right. Let us do 
what is just. Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Cannon.
    Mr. Manager CANNON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, 
distinguished counsel of the President, my name is Chris 
Cannon. I represent Utah's Third Congressional District.
    John Locke once said, ``Wherever law ends, tyranny 
begins.'' And speaking to our American experience, Teddy 
Roosevelt added, ``No man is above the law and no man is below 
it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to 
obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not as a 
favor.''
    This case is about the violation of law. My task is to 
clarify what the law states pertaining to obstruction of 
justice and what legal precedent is applicable to the charges 
against William Jefferson Clinton.
    While both the laws and the violations in this case are 
clear and direct, the presentation I am about to make will not 
be simple. I ask your indulgence and attention as I walk you 
through case history and statutory elements. I promise to be 
brief--probably less than a half-hour--and direct.
    I will present the legal underpinnings of the law of 
obstruction of justice. You should have before you the full 
text of this speech, including full citations to cases and 
copies of the charts I will use in this presentation.
    Article II of the articles of impeachment alleges that the 
President prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration 
of justice, both personally and through his subordinates and 
agents, and that he did so as part of a pattern designed to 
delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence 
and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him.
    Article II specifies seven separate instances in which the 
President acted to obstruct justice. The House believes the 
evidence in this case proves that each of the seven separate 
acts which comprise the President's scheme constitutes 
obstruction of justice.
    I would like to draw your attention at this time to the 
chart on my right, and the first page in your packet, which 
depicts elements of section 1503:

    (a) Whoever . . . corruptly . . . influences, obstructs or impedes; 
or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration 
of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
    (b) The punishment for an offense under this section is . . .
    (3) . . . imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under 
this title, or both.

    Section 1503 is often referred to as the general 
obstruction statute. It describes obstruction simply as an 
impact on the due administration of justice.
    Section 1503 deems it criminal to use force or threats, or 
to otherwise act corruptly, in order to influence, obstruct, or 
impede the due administration of justice.
    Federal court rulings clarify that it is not necessary for 
a defendant to succeed in obstructing justice. Again, I direct 
your attention to the chart, or the accompanying chart, in your 
package.
    Russell and Aguilar each ruled that it is not necessary 
that a defendant's endeavor succeed for him to have violated 
the law. Rather, simply attempting to influence, obstruct, or 
impede the due administration of justice violates the statute.
    Maggitt clearly stated, ``it is the endeavor to bring about 
a forbidden result and not the success in actually achieving 
the result, that is forbidden.''
    For the Government to prove a section 1503 crime, it must 
demonstrate that the defendant acted with intent. This can be 
shown through use of force, threats by the defendant, or by 
simply showing that the defendant acted ``corruptly.'' The 
following chart gives three case histories regarding the term 
``acting corruptly.''
    Haldeman and Sprecher held that a defendant acts corruptly 
by having an evil or improper purpose or intent.
    Barfield defined ``acting corruptly'' as knowingly and 
intentionally acting in order to encourage obstruction.
    Sprecher also ruled the Government need not prove the 
actual intent of the defendant, but, rather, the intent to act 
corruptly can be inferred from that proof that the defendant 
knew corrupt actions would obstruct the justice being 
administered.
    Under section 1503, the Government must also prove that the 
defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due 
administration of justice. The statute is broadly applicable to 
all phases of judicial proceedings.
    Brenson described due administration of justice as 
``providing a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings, 
regardless of the stage in which the improper activity 
occurs.''
    Section 1503 is also intended to protect the discovery 
phase of a judicial proceeding, stating that the phrase ``due 
administration of justice'' is intended to provide a ``free and 
fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending case in Federal 
court to learn what he may learn . . . concerning the material 
facts and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony of 
such facts.''
    The House believes that the facts of this case make it very 
clear that the President did, corruptly, impair the ability of 
a litigant in Federal court to learn all of the facts that she 
was entitled to learn. In doing so, the President committed 
obstruction of justice under section 1503.
    The other Federal crime which the President committed was 
witness tampering under section 1512 of title 18. Again, I 
refer you to the chart on my right, and to the second page in 
the package, which depicts the elements of the section.

    (b) Whoever knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person, or 
attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person, with intent to--
    (1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an 
official proceeding; or
    (2) cause or induce any person to--
    (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a . . . document . . . or an 
object . . . from an official proceeding;
    . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more 
than ten years or both.

    Sections 1503 and 1512 differ in an important way. There 
does not need to be a case pending at the time the defendant 
acts to violate the law under section 1512. The statute 
specifically states that ``for the purpose of this section, an 
official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense . . .'' for the crime to 
be committed.
    Putting it another way, a person may attempt to tamper with 
a witness and commit the crime of witness tampering before such 
a person is called as a witness and even before there is a case 
underway in which that person might be called to testify.
    For the Government to prove the crime of witness tampering, 
it must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause 
one of several results. The defendant can be convicted if he 
acted to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any 
person in an official proceeding; or the defendant can be 
convicted if he acted to cause another person to withhold an 
object from an official proceeding.
    In the case before us, the evidence proves that the 
President endeavored to cause both of these results on several 
occasions. And the Government may show intent on the part of 
the defendant in several ways. It may prove the use of 
intimidation, physical force or threats; or it may prove intent 
by showing the use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct.
    In this case, the evidence shows that on several occasions 
the President acted corruptly to persuade some witnesses, and 
engaged in misleading conduct toward others, in order to 
influence their testimony and cause them to withhold evidence 
or give wrongful testimony. In each instance, the President 
violated the witness tampering statute.
    How does acting corruptly to persuade a witness differ from 
engaging in misleading conduct? Section 1515 in title 18 
states:

    (a) as used in section 1512 [the witness tampering section] . . . 
of this title and this section--
    (3) the term ``misleading conduct'' means--
    (A) knowingly making a false statement; or
    (B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby 
causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally 
concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by 
such statement; or
    (C) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting 
reliance on a writing or recording that is false, forged, altered or 
otherwise lacking in authenticity;

    The difference between corruptly persuading a witness and 
engaging in misleading conduct toward the witness depends on 
the witness' level of knowledge about the truth of the 
defendant's statement.
    Rodolitz held that misleading conduct involves a situation 
``where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as 
if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the 
story and testify to it before the grand jury.''
    Let me clarify this detail: If a defendant simply asks a 
witness to lie and the witness knows that he is being asked to 
lie, then the defendant is corruptly persuading the witness. In 
contrast, if a defendant lies to a witness, hoping the witness 
will believe his story, this is misleading conduct. They are 
different, but they are both criminal.
    Some may ask if it is necessary that the witness who is 
influenced or tampered with know that he or she might be called 
to testify? The answer is no.
    And both sections 1503 and 1512 answer this question:
    The witness tampering statute can be violated even if the 
victim has not been subpoenaed or listed as a potential witness 
in an ongoing proceeding.
    In Shannon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit reviewed the conviction of a defendant under section 
1503 who had attempted to influence the testimony of a person 
who had not yet been subpoenaed or placed on a witness list. On 
appeal, the defendant argued that because the target of the 
obstruction had not yet become an official witness in the case, 
it was impossible for the defendant to have engaged in 
obstruction toward her. The court of appeals rejected that 
assertion. In affirming the conviction, the court held 
``neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time 
of the offense nor must he or she actually give testimony at a 
later time. It is only necessary that there is a possibility 
that the target of the defendant's activities be called on to 
testify in an official proceeding.''
    The witness tampering statute can be violated even when no 
case is pending.
    Therefore, it will not always be clear to whom the 
defendant intended the individual to testify--and the statute 
does not require proof of this.
    In Morrison, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia explained that section 1512 is violated if 
the defendant asks a person to lie ``to anyone who asks.'' The 
court held that it is not necessary that the defendant even use 
the words ``testify'' or ``trial'' when he tries to influence 
the testimony of the other person. In such a case, there are no 
subpoenas, there are no witness lists.
    The mere attempt to influence the person to lie, if asked, 
is the crime.
    So, under either section 1503 or 1512, the fact that the 
target of a defendant's actions is not named as a witness, or 
whether the person is not ever called to be a witness, is 
immaterial.
    The focus of both statutes is on what the defendant 
believed.
    If the defendant believes that it is possible that some 
person might some day be called to testify at some later 
proceeding and then acted to influence, delay or prevent his or 
her testimony, the defendant commits the crime.
    Now, some have asserted that an obstruction of justice 
charge cannot, or should not, be made against the President 
because some of his acts occurred in the context of a civil 
trial. There is simply no merit to this view.
    There is no question that the obstruction and witness 
tampering statutes can be violated by acts that occur in civil 
proceedings. And, case law is consistent in upholding that any 
attempt to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration 
of justice in a civil proceeding violates section 1503.
    Lundwall, which I referred to earlier, is a perfect 
example, as it began as a civil case.
    The actual language of the witness tampering statute makes 
it clear that it also applies to civil cases.
    The statute provides for enhanced penalties in criminal 
proceedings--a provision that would be unnecessary if the law 
were only to apply to criminal cases.
    In short, the fact that some instances of the President's 
misconduct occurred in the course of a civil proceeding does 
not absolve him of criminal liability.
    As Mr. Barr will demonstrate, the President of the United 
States endeavored and did obstruct justice and tamper with 
witnesses in violation of the law of the United States.
    On numerous occasions he acted with an improper purpose 
with the intent to interfere with the due administration of 
justice in the Federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Paula 
Jones.
    President Clinton corruptly endeavored to persuade 
witnesses to lie. In some cases, he succeeded. In every case, 
he violated the law.
    President Clinton engaged in misleading conduct in order to 
influence the testimony of witnesses in judicial proceedings. 
He succeeded. In each case, he violated the law.
    President Clinton acted with an improper purpose to 
persuade a person to withhold objects from a judicial 
proceeding in which that person was required to produce them. 
He succeeded, and in so doing he violated the law.
    President Clinton made misleading statements for the 
purpose of deterring a litigant from further discovery that 
would lead to facts which the judge ordered relevant in a 
Federal civil rights case. In so doing, he obstructed the due 
administration of justice in that case and violated the law.
    Whether attempting to persuade a person to testify falsely, 
or to ignore court orders to produce objects; whether 
suggesting to an innocent person a false story in hopes that he 
or she will repeat it in a judicial proceeding; or testifying 
falsely in the hopes of blocking another party's pursuit of the 
truth--all these acts obstruct justice; all these acts are 
Federal felony crimes; all these acts were committed by William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    Thank you.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.

                                 Recess

    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
there now be a recess again of the proceedings for 15 minutes. 
Please return promptly to the Chamber.
    There being no objection, at 3:29 p.m., the Senate recessed 
until 3:47 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called 
to order by the Chief Justice.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority 
leader.
    Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready for the 
final subject today, from Manager Barr.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Barr.
    Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, learned counsel for the 
President, and fellow managers on behalf of the House of 
Representatives, I thank the Senate for the opportunity to 
appear today and to present this argument. The House, and I, 
especially, greatly appreciate the time and effort the Senate 
has taken on this most important and notable matter.
    You have heard the facts summarized by my colleagues. They 
have described for you the law of perjury and the law of 
obstruction. I will discuss several of the specific instances 
in which William Jefferson Clinton violated these laws as set 
forth in the articles of impeachment presented to you.
    The process facing you as jurors, of fitting the Federal 
law of obstruction of justice and of witness tampering and of 
perjury into the facts of the case against President William 
Jefferson Clinton, is not a case in which there is nor should 
be a great deal of difficulty. It is not a problem of fitting a 
round peg into a square hole. Quite the contrary. We have a 
case here, you have a case here, for consideration in which the 
fit between fact and law is as precise as the finely tuned 
mechanism of a Swiss watch or as seamless a process as the 
convergence and confluence of two great rivers such as flow 
through many of the cities which you represent. The evidence 
that President William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice is overwhelming. These are pattern 
offenses.
    I beg your attention to the following exposition of facts 
and law. But before commencing, I would like to address three 
issues that have come up during the course of the proceedings, 
which I believe might be helpful for all of us to keep in mind 
as we proceed not only through today's final presentations but 
tomorrow's and those that will be made by learned counsel for 
the President.
    First, by way of background on the process--that is, the 
process that brings us, the House managers, to the well of this 
great body and the trial of the President of the United States 
of America--as has been indicated previously by one of my 
colleague House managers, and as everyone here knows full well, 
the responsibilities, the jurisdiction, and the process between 
the House of Representatives and the Senate is very different 
in all three of those respects. Therefore, while coming as no 
surprise to all of you, all of us in this room, but perhaps to 
some in America, the steps that each body takes, and should 
take and must take, are very different.
    Just as one example, one might ask, ``Why were no witnesses 
called in the House of Representatives?'' A valid question. It 
deserves a valid answer. That valid answer can be found not 
simply in impeachment proceedings and the history thereof, but 
also in the day-in/day-out proceedings in our Federal courts 
and in our State courts. It can be found in the difference 
between the body which has responsibility and jurisdiction for 
charging a crime and the jurisdiction and responsibility of the 
body that has responsibility for trying a crime, or an alleged 
crime. The House of Representatives, though it is not in every 
respect like a grand jury, operates much more like a grand jury 
than a petit jury. As something akin to a grand jury, we had in 
mind--and I know you have in mind--being very mindful and 
knowledgeable about the difference in procedure between the 
House and Senate on matters of impeachment, that frequently in 
court cases presented to Federal grand juries--and I suspect 
similarly to State grand juries--the evidence to the grand 
jurors themselves is not presented through a long array, a 
repetitive array of witnesses themselves--witnesses, that is, 
with firsthand knowledge of each and every fact, which would 
later be proved at trial. Rather, it is the more standard 
procedure--certainly in Federal courts, with which I am more 
familiar--for the Government to present its case to the grand 
jury by way of summary witnesses. Normally, that would mean 
case agents that have been working with the assistant U.S. 
attorneys, or with the U.S. attorney, in gathering and 
evaluating the evidence that will eventually be brought to bear 
in the trial of the case.
    If one were to be a fly on the wall of a Federal grand 
jury, one would normally see witnesses for the Government that 
would come in and discuss t