    [Senate Document 106-4]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    106th Congress                                                  S. Doc.
                                     SENATE
     1st Session                                                     106-4
    _______________________________________________________________________

                              PROCEEDINGS OF THE

                             UNITED STATES SENATE

                                    IN THE

       IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON VOLUME II:
                           FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

                                VOLUME II OF IV

                   February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    57-102                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                     OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

                             Gary Sisco, Secretary

                     Sharon A. Zelaska, Assistant Secretary

       Ronald Kavulick and Jerald D. Linnell, Chief Reporters of Debates

                         Bruce E. Kasold, Chief Counsel

                             Keith Simmons, Counsel

                                    ------

                          UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

                       In the Senate of the United States

                               February 12, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be
    authorized to include these statements [of Senators explaining
    their votes], along with the full record of the Senate's
    proceedings, the filings by the parties, and the supplemental
    materials admitted into evidence by the Senate, in a Senate
    document printed under the supervision of the Secretary of the
    Senate, that will complete the documentation of the Senate's
    handling of these impeachment proceedings.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                     To the memory of Raymond Scott Bates,

                        Legislative Clerk of the Senate,

    who, until his untimely and tragic accidental death on February
    5, 1999, in the midst of these proceedings, brought to the
    conduct of this trial the constant dedication, skill, and
    professionalism that characterized his Senate career. Scott
    represented the best of the Senate staff who work tirelessly to
    support the institution and its members.
                                    FOREWORD

                                  ----------

        This document contains the full record of the United States
    Senate proceedings in the impeachment trial of President
    William Jefferson Clinton. Its purpose is to preserve for the
    future use of the Senate, the American people, and historians
    the formal record of the only Presidential impeachment trial of
    the 20th century. Together with the 24-volume Senate Document
    106-3, which contains all publicly available materials
    submitted to or produced by the Judiciary Committee of the
    House of Representatives, these four volumes represent the
    entire official record of the impeachment actions against
    President Clinton.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The Senate, by a unanimous-consent agreement of February 12,
    1999, authorized the Secretary of the Senate to oversee the printing of
    the Senate proceedings in order to complete the documentation of the
    impeachment trial.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The present four volumes include the Senate proceedings in
    open session; filings by the parties; supplemental materials
    received in evidence that were not part of the House record,
    such as affidavits and depositions; floor statements of
    Senators in open session expressing their views regarding the
    proceedings; and statements delivered in closed deliberations
    that individual Senators elected to make public.
        The document is divided into four sections--
              Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings
              Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings
              Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits
              Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the
            Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson
            Clinton

                       Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings

        This volume contains the portion of the Senate proceedings
    that occurred before the actual trial commenced. On December
    19, 1998, the House of Representatives adopted two articles of
    impeachment against President Clinton (House Resolution 611,
    105th Congress) and a subsequent resolution appointing managers
    on the part of the House (House Resolution 614, 105th
    Congress).
        Because the Senate of the 105th Congress had already
    completed its business and adjourned sine die, the House
    managers, in the late afternoon of December 19, 1998, delivered
    the articles of impeachment to the Secretary of the Senate. The
    Senate of the 106th Congress convened and organized on January
    6, 1999, and the House notified the Senate that it had
    reappointed the managers (House Resolution 10, 106th Congress).
    On January 7, 1999, the House managers exhibited the articles
    of impeachment to the Senate and the Chief Justice of the
    United States, as presiding officer during the impeachment
    trial, took the prescribed oath, as did all Senators.
        On January 8, 1999, the Senate unanimously directed that
    the summons be issued to President Clinton and that his answer
    to the articles be filed, together with the response of the
    House of Representatives (Senate Resolution 16, 106th
    Congress). This resolution admitted into evidence the materials
    submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and authorized their
    publication. It also allowed the parties to file preliminary
    motions (none was filed), established a schedule for the filing
    of trial briefs by the parties, and established further
    procedures for the conduct of the trial. Although all these
    documents were previously printed in Senate Document 106-2--as
    well as the text of the provisions of the United States
    Constitution applicable to impeachment and the Rules of
    Procedure and Practice of the Senate When Sitting in
    Impeachment Trials--they are reprinted here for ease of
    reference.

                       Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings

        This volume reproduces the full record of the Senate floor
    proceedings in the impeachment trial as provided under Senate
    Resolution 16. The resolution first permitted the parties an
    extended period to make their presentations. The managers
    presented their case on behalf of the House of Representatives
    on January 14, 15, and 16, 1999. Counsel for the President
    presented their case on January 19 and 20, 1999. The Senate
    then devoted January 22 and 23, 1999, to posing questions to
    the House managers and counsel.
        Senate Resolution 16 also provided that, at the end of the
    question-and-answer period, the Senate would consider
    separately a motion to dismiss and a motion to subpoena
    witnesses and to present additional evidence not in the record.
    On January 25, 1999, the Senate heard argument on the motion to
    dismiss and, on January 26, 1999, considered the motion by the
    House managers to call witnesses and admit additional evidence.
    The Senate voted to deny the motion to dismiss and to grant the
    motion to subpoena witnesses.
        On January 28, 1999, the Senate established procedures for
    the taking of depositions (Senate Resolution 30), and three
    witnesses were deposed on February 1, 2, and 3, 1999. On
    February 4, 1999, the Senate heard argument and voted on
    motions to admit the deposition testimony into evidence, to
    call witnesses to testify on the Senate floor, and to proceed
    directly to closing arguments. The portions of the deposition
    transcripts admitted into evidence are reproduced in this
    volume, while the full transcripts of the three depositions
    appear in Volume III. Both parties presented evidence to the
    Senate on February 6, 1999.
        On February 8, 1999, the parties presented final arguments
    to the Senate. The Senate then considered proposals by various
    Senators to suspend the Senate impeachment rules to permit
    deliberation in open session, but all deliberations on motions
    and on the articles of impeachment occurred in closed session.
    (The proceedings in closed session are not published here, but
    statements that Senators elected to make public are printed in
    Volume IV.) Volume II concludes with the record of the February
    12, 1999, vote and judgment of the Senate to acquit President
    Clinton on both articles of impeachment.

                     Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits

        This volume reproduces the complete transcripts of the
    depositions taken by the Senate of witnesses Monica S.
    Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal. It also
    contains the affidavits of Christopher Hitchens, Carol Blue,
    and R. Scott Armstrong, which were admitted into evidence by a
    unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 1999.

     Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the Impeachment Trial of
                      President William Jefferson Clinton

        By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to provide each
    Senator an opportunity to place in the Congressional Record a
    statement describing his or her own views on the impeachment.
    The statement could, if a Senator so chose, be a statement he
    or she had delivered during closed deliberations. Since not all
    Senators chose to publish their remarks, the fact that a
    statement of a particular Senator does not appear in Volume IV
    does not mean that the Senator did not address the Senate
    during its closed deliberations.

        The publication of these four volumes, supplemented with
    Senate Document 106-3, contributes to a fuller understanding of
    the way in which the Senate conducted these important and
    historic proceedings.

                                   Gary Sisco,
                              Secretary of the Senate.

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                                                       Page

    Foreword.........................................................     V

                       VOLUME I: PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

    Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment.........................     1
    Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
      Impeachment Trials.............................................     3

                                January 6, 1999

    Statements of Senators Lott and Reid regarding access to Senate
      floor, galleries, and wing during impeachment proceedings [145
      Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]........................    15
    Unanimous-consent agreement on access to Senate floor, galleries
      and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S7-8
      (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]......................................    16
    Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives by
      Secretary of the Senate during sine die adjournment announcing
      impeachment of President and appointment of Managers [145 Cong.
      Rec. S14-15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\1\.......................    17
    Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives
      announcing reappointment of Managers, H. Res. 10, 106th Cong.
      (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\2\........    19
    Unanimous-consent agreement on receiving Managers and requesting
      attendance of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan.
      6, 1999)]......................................................    20
    Message from House of Representatives announcing reappointment of
      Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].........    22
    H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    23
    H. Res. 614, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    29
    H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    31
    Sample of Senate Impeachment Trial gallery tickets...............    33

                                January 7, 1999

    Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson
      Clinton, President of the United States [145 Cong. Rec. S39-41
      (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]......................................    35
    Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize taking
      photograph in Senate Chamber of swearing-in, S. Res. 11, 106th
      Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].....    38
    Appointment of escort committee to receive Chief Justice [145
      Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].......................    38
    Administration of oath to Chief Justice and Members of Senate
      [145 Cong. Rec. S41-42 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]...............    40
    S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    41
    Photographs taken pursuant to S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).....    42

                                January 8, 1999

    Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle providing for issuance of
      summons to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
      States, and establishing trial procedures, S. Res. 16, 106th
      Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999)].....    45
        Rollcall Vote No. 1 [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8,
          1999)].....................................................    47
    S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    48
    Writ of Summons (January 8, 1999)................................    53

                                January 11, 1999

    Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of
      Impeachment (January 11, 1999).................................    58
    Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with
      Appendix (January 11, 1999)....................................    71

                                January 13, 1999

    Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January
      13, 1999)......................................................   365
    Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson
      Clinton (January 20, 1999)\3\..................................   500

                                January 14, 1999

    Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President
      William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment (January
      14, 1999)......................................................   735
    Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial
      Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14,
      1999)..........................................................   740

                       VOLUME II: FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
                                January 14, 1999

    Resolution by Senator Lott to authorize installation of
      appropriate equipment and furniture in Senate Chamber, S. Res.
      17, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 14,
      1999)].........................................................   773
    Unanimous-consent agreement on floor privileges during closed
      session [145 Cong. Rec. S59-60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]......   774
    Unanimous-consent agreement on authority to print documents filed
      by the parties and other impeachment documents \4\ [145 Cong.
      Rec. S60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................   775
    Writ of Summons and Return of Service by Sergeant at Arms
      (January 8, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S60-61 (daily ed. Jan. 14,
      1999)].........................................................   776
    Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of
      Impeachment (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S61-63 (daily
      ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................................   778
    Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with
      Appendix (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S63-190 (daily ed.
      Jan. 14, 1999)]................................................   783
    Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January
      13, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S191-214 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]..   938
    Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President
      William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment [145 Cong.
      Rec. S214-15 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]........................   992
    Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial
      Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14,
      1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S215-21 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].......   994
    Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S221-51
      (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].....................................  1007
    S. Res. 17, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1087
    Floor plan and seating arrangements in Senate Chamber for
      impeachment trial proceedings..................................  1089

                                January 15, 1999

    Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S260-79
      (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999)].....................................  1091

                                January 16, 1999

    Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S281-300
      (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)].....................................  1144

                                January 19, 1999

    Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S483-95 (daily
      ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]............................................  1195
    Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S720-21 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]........................  1225

                                January 20, 1999

    Statement of Senator Harkin in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S729-32 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1227
    Statement of Senator Wellstone in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S732-33 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1234
    Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S810-30 (daily
      ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]............................................  1237

                                January 21, 1999

    Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S832-48 (daily
      ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]............................................  1292
    Statement of Senator Lott regarding procedure for question-and-
      answer period [145 Cong. Rec. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]..  1335
    Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators
      Harkin and Wellstone [145 Cong. Rec. S848-49 (daily ed. Jan.
      21, 1999)].....................................................  1336

                                January 22, 1999

    Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and
      counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S869-92 (daily ed. Jan.
      22, 1999)].....................................................  1338
    Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators
      Hutchison, Specter, Lieberman, Hagel, Collins, and Snowe [145
      Cong. Rec. S892 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999)].....................  1396
    Sample question card used by Senators............................  1398

                                January 23, 1999

    Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and
      counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S933-56 (daily ed. Jan.
      23, 1999)].....................................................  1400
    Letter from Senator Harkin to Chief Justice (January 23, 1999)...  1461

                                January 25, 1999

    Letter from Chief Justice to Senator Harkin (January 25, 1999)...  1462
    Unanimous-consent agreement on argument on motion to dismiss and
      on motion to open debate [145 Cong. Rec. S962-63 (daily ed.
      Jan. 25, 1999)]................................................  1466
    Motion of Senator Byrd to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145
      Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................  1469
    Argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to dismiss
      [145 Cong. Rec. S963-65 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1469
    Argument of counsel for President in support of motion to dismiss
      [145 Cong. Rec. S965-70 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1476
    Rebuttal argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to
      dismiss [145 Cong. Rec. S970-73 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....  1489
    Motion to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin,
      Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye,
      Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb,
      Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer,
      Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74
      (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................................  1495
        Rollcall Vote No. 2 [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 (daily ed. Jan.
          25, 1999)].................................................  1496
    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S974 (daily ed. Jan. 25,
      1999)].........................................................  1497
    Statement of Senator Mikulski in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)]...........................  1498

                                January 26, 1999

    Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of United States House
      of Representatives for Appearance of Witnesses at Deposition
      and to Admit Evidence Not in Record (January 26, 1999).........  1500
    Motion of House of Representatives for appearance of witnesses
      and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S991-92 (daily ed.
      Jan. 26, 1999)]................................................  1531
    Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of
      witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S992-99
      (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1532
    Unanimous-consent agreement on order of consideration of and
      deliberation on motions to suspend rules and for appearance of
      witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S999-1000
      (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1552
    Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of
      witnesses and admission of evidence, cont. [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1000-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]............................  1552
    Argument of counsel for President in opposition to appearance of
      witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1002-07
      (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1558
    Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for
      appearance of witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1007-09 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].......................  1571
    Motion of Senator Harkin to Suspend the Rules of the Senate [145
      Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]....................  1578
        Rollcall Vote No. 3 [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
          1999)].....................................................  1579
    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
      1999)].........................................................  1580

                                January 27, 1999

    Vote on motion to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]............................  1582
        Rollcall Vote No. 4 [145 Cong. Rec. S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan.
          27, 1999)].................................................  1582
    Vote on motion for appearance of witnesses and admission of
      evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]......  1582
        Rollcall Vote No. 5 [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27,
          1999)].....................................................  1583
    Materials admitted into evidence:
        Affidavit of Barry W. Ward, Law Clerk to Honorable Susan
          Webber Wright, U.S. District Judge for Eastern District of
          Arkansas...................................................  1585
        Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, with attachments............  1586
        Telephone records documenting conversations between President
          Clinton and Monica S. Lewinsky.............................  1594
    Statement of Senator Hollings in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1028-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1595
    Statements of Senator Abraham in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1029-30, 1031 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]

    aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    . 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    8 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    986
    I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    601982
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601984
    I74February 11, 1999
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
    I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    aking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
    d to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate
     in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
    I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
    I74February 12, 1999
    I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
    I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
    A
    I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
    I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
    I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601997
    I21Order to Secretary of the Senate

    Statement of Senator Lieberman in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1030-31 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1599

                                January 28, 1999

    Resolution by Senator Lott and amendments thereto by Senator
      Daschle relating to procedures for taking depositions, S. Res.
      30, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1069-73 (daily ed. Jan.
      28, 1999)].....................................................  1605
        Rollcall Vote No. 6 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071 (daily ed. Jan. 28,
          1999)].....................................................  1608
        Rollcall Vote No. 7 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071-72 (daily ed. Jan.
          28, 1999)].................................................  1609
        Rollcall Vote No. 8 [145 Cong. Rec. S1072 (daily ed. Jan. 28,
          1999)].....................................................  1610
    Unanimous-consent agreement on taking of depositions [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1073-74 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1614
    S. Res. 30, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1616
    Leadership protocol on depositions pursuant to S. Res. 16 and S.
      Res. 30 (January 28, 1999).....................................  1623
    Statement of Senator Cleland in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1105-06 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1624
    Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1628
    Statements of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1107-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1631

                                January 29, 1999

    Subpoenas issued for witnesses to appear at depositions:
        Monica S. Lewinsky (January 29, 1999)........................  1639
        Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (January 29, 1999).....................  1642
        Sidney Blumenthal (January 29, 1999).........................  1645

                                February 3, 1999

    Statement of Senator Dorgan in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1117-19 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999)]........................  1648

                                February 4, 1999

    Motion of House of Representatives for admission of evidence,
      appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145
      Cong. Rec. S1199-1200 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]................  1653
    Argument of House Managers in support of motion for admission of
      evidence, appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence
      [145 Cong. Rec. S1200-05 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............  1654
    Argument of counsel for President in opposition to motion for
      admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and
      presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1205-07 (daily ed.
      Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1667
    Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for
      admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and
      presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1207-08 (daily ed.
      Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1673
    Votes on motions for admission of evidence, appearance of
      witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-
      10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]...................................  1677
        Rollcall Vote No. 9 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1677
        Rollcall Vote No. 10 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1678
        Rollcall Vote No. 11 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-10 (daily ed. Feb.
          4, 1999)]..................................................  1680
        Rollcall Vote No. 12 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1681
    Motion of Senator Daschle to proceed to closing arguments [145
      Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].....................  1681
        Rollcall Vote No. 13 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1682
    Motion of counsel for President for provision of written notice
      by House Managers of designated video excerpts [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............................  1683
        Rollcall Vote No. 14 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb.
          4, 1999)]..................................................  1685
    Unanimous-consent agreement on printing partial transcripts of
      depositions in Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1212
      (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]......................................  1687
    Materials admitted into evidence:
        Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (partial
          transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1212-29 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1687
        Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (partial
          transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1229-46 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1736
        Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (partial
          transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1246-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
          1999)].....................................................  1776

                                February 6, 1999

    Presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1290-
      1303 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].................................  1800
    Presentation of evidence by counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1303-15 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1836
    Rebuttal presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1315-17 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]........................  1866
    Unanimous-consent request of Senator Boxer to show additional
      deposition testimony [145 Cong. Rec. S1317-18 (daily ed. Feb.
      6, 1999)]......................................................  1873
    Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators
      Lott, Daschle, Hutchison, Harkin, Collins, Specter, Wellstone,
      and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]......  1873
    Statements of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1330-32 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1874

                                February 8, 1999

    Unanimous-consent request of Senator Lott for admission of
      affidavits into evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1337 (daily ed. Feb.
      8, 1999)]......................................................  1882
    Final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1337-44 (daily
      ed. Feb. 8, 1999)].............................................  1882
    Final arguments of counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S1344-54
      (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......................................  1900
    Rebuttal final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1354-
      65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]...................................  1925
    Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators
      Daschle, Lott, Hutchison, Harkin, Wellstone, Collins, Specter,
      and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......  1955
    Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators
      Daschle and Feinstein [145 Cong. Rec. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
      1999)].........................................................  1955
    Letter from House Managers to Senators Lott and Daschle (Feb. 8,
      1999)..........................................................  1956

                                February 9, 1999

    Unanimous-consent request of Senator Specter to allow parties to
      take additional discovery [145 Cong. Rec. S1385 (daily ed. Feb.
      9, 1999)]......................................................  1964
    Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to Suspend the Rules of the
      Senate [145 Cong. Rec. S1385-86 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]......  1964
        Rollcall Vote No. 15 [145 Cong. Rec. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
          1999)].....................................................  1965
    Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize Senators to
      insert statements delivered in closed deliberations into
      Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1386-87 (daily ed. Feb.
      9, 1999)]......................................................  1966
    Motion of Senator Lott to close doors of Senate for final
      deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...  1970
        Rollcall Vote No. 16 [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
          1999)].....................................................  1970
    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1388 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
      1999)].........................................................  1971
    Statement of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1406-09 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1971
    Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...........................  1978
    Statement of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1409-10 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1980

                               February 10, 1999

    Colloquy on record of closed deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411-
      12 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)]..................................  1982
    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10,
      1999)].........................................................  1984

                               February 11, 1999

    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11,
      1999)].........................................................  1986
    Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to
      authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment
      vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437-38
      (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)].....................................  1987
    Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate
      Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1454-55 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]............................  1987
    Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure
      resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]....  1988
    S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1989

                               February 12, 1999

    Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators
      in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document
      containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  1992
    Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12,
      1999)].........................................................  1993
    Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily
      ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................................  1994
        Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
          1999)].....................................................  1995
    Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458-59
      (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....................................  1997
        Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
          1999)].....................................................  1997
    Order to Secretary of the Senate to communicate judgment of
      Senate to Secretary of State and House of Representatives [145
      Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  1998
    Statement of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb.
      12, 1999)].....................................................  1998
    Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle expressing gratitude of
      Senate to Chief Justice of the United States, S. Res. 37, 106th
      Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1459-60 (daily ed. Feb. 12,
      1999)].........................................................  1999
    Unanimous-consent agreement on admitting affidavits into evidence
      and making full deposition transcripts part of the record [145
      Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  2000
    Adjournment sine die [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12,
      1999)].........................................................  2000
    Statements of Senators Lott, Daschle and Chafee in legislative
      session [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......  2001
    Motion of Senator Feinstein in legislative session to suspend the
      rules in order to permit the consideration of censure
      resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....  2002
    Motion of Senator Gramm in legislative session to indefinitely
      postpone consideration of motion to suspend rules [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2002
        Rollcall Vote No. 19 [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb.
          12, 1999)].................................................  2003
    Statement of Senator Feinstein in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1664-66 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2004
    Statement of Senator Snowe in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1546-47 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................  2010
    Statement of Senator Ashcroft in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1461 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2011
    Statement of Senator Chafee in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1639 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2013
    Statement of Senator Kohl in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec.
      S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]...............................  2014
    Resolution by Senator Hollings in legislative session to censure
      President [145 Cong. Rec. S1657 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....  2015
    Statement of Senator Daschle in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1637-38 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2015
    Statement of Senator Warner in legislative session [145 Cong.
      Rec. S1667 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2017
    S. Res. 37, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  2019
    Photograph taken pursuant to S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)......  2021
    Legislative Clerk's tally sheets for Senate votes on articles of
      impeachment....................................................  2022
    Judgment of United States Senate (Feb. 12, 1999).................  2024

                             TABLE OF ROLLCALL VOTES
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Measure/
     Vote No.        Date           Description           Result        Page
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1........  1/8/99.........  S. Res. 16........  Resolution Agreed     47
                                                     to 100-0.
    2........  1/25/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1496
                                 suspend the rules.  43-57.
    3........  1/26/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1579
                                 suspend the rules.  41-58.
    4........  1/27/99........  Byrd motion to      Motion Rejected     1582
                                 dismiss the         44-56.
                                 impeachment
                                 proceedings.
    5........  1/27/99........  House Managers'     Motion Agreed to    1583
                                 motion to           56-44.
                                 subpoena
                                 witnesses and
                                 admit evidence
                                 not in record.
    6........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1608
                                 1 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 44-54.
    7........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1609
                                 2 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 43-55.
    8........  1/28/99........  S. Res. 30 as       Resolution Agreed   1610
                                 amended.            to 54-44.
    9........  2/4/99.........  Division I of       Motion Agreed to    1677
                                 House Managers'     100-0.
                                 motion re:
                                 admission of
                                 evidence.
    10.......  2/4/99.........  Division II of      Motion Rejected     1678
                                 House Managers'     30-70.
                                 motion re:
                                 appearance of
                                 witnesses.
    11.......  2/4/99.........  Murray motion to    Motion Rejected     1680
                                 substitute          27-73.
                                 Division III of
                                 House Managers'
                                 motion.
    12.......  2/4/99.........  Division III of     Motion Agreed to    1681
                                 House Managers'     62-38.
                                 motion re:
                                 presentation of
                                 evidence.
    13.......  2/4/99.........  Daschle motion to   Motion Rejected     1682
                                 proceed to          44-56.
                                 closing arguments.
    14.......  2/4/99.........  White House         Motion Rejected     1685
                                 Counsel's motion    46-54.
                                 on video
                                 deposition
                                 excerpts.
    15.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Rejected     1965
                                 suspend the rules.  59-41.
    16.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Agreed to    1970
                                 close the doors.    53-47.
    17.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 45-55.   1995
                                 Article I.
    18.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 50-50.   1997
                                 Article II.
    19.......  2/12/99........  Gramm motion to     Motion Rejected     2003
                                 postpone            43-56.
                                 consideration of
                                 rules suspension
                                 motion.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     VOLUME III: DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS

    Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (full transcript)  2027
    Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (full
      transcript)....................................................  2224
    Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (full transcript).  2399
    Affidavit of Christopher Hitchens (Feb. 5, 1999).................  2534
    Affidavit of Carol Blue (Feb. 7, 1999)...........................  2535
    Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong (Feb. 8, 1999)...................  2536

     VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF
                    PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON \5\
                               February 12, 1999

    Sen. Specter \6\.................................................  2537
    Sen. Gorton......................................................  2537
    Sen. Feingold \7\................................................  2545
    Sen. Hutchison...................................................  2548
    Sen. Conrad......................................................  2558
    Sen. Hutchinson..................................................  2561
    Sen. Murray......................................................  2563
    Sen. McCain......................................................  2565
    Sen. Johnson.....................................................  2567
    Sen. Lugar.......................................................  2570
    Sen. Biden.......................................................  2573
    Sen. Abraham.....................................................  2616
    Sen. Mikulski....................................................  2622
    Sen. Grams.......................................................  2625
    Sen. Breaux......................................................  2627
    Sen. Domenici....................................................  2630
    Sen. Sarbanes....................................................  2633
    Sen. Campbell....................................................  2637
    Sen. Kerrey......................................................  2639
    Sen. Voinovich...................................................  2641
    Sen. Lautenberg..................................................  2643
    Sen. Bond \8\....................................................  2646
    Sen. Robb........................................................  2652
    Sen. Boxer.......................................................  2656
    Sen. Mack........................................................  2659
    Sen. Fitzgerald..................................................  2672
    Sen. Roth........................................................  2681
    Sen. Burns.......................................................  2684
    Sen. Inhofe \9\..................................................  2685
    Sen. Cleland.....................................................  2689
    Sen. Frist.......................................................  2694
    Sen. Bunning.....................................................  2703
    Sen. Durbin......................................................  2706
    Sen. Kyl.........................................................  2710
    Sen. Specter.....................................................  2715
    Sen. Levin.......................................................  2738
    Sen. Kohl........................................................  2758
    Sen. Thompson....................................................  2761
    Sen. Moynihan....................................................  2789
    Sen. Graham......................................................  2792
    Sen. Allard......................................................  2794
    Sen. McConnell...................................................  2799
    Sen. Kennedy.....................................................  2807
    Sen. Collins.....................................................  2812
    Sen. Harkin......................................................  2814
    Sen. Reid........................................................  2826
    Sen. Edwards.....................................................  2830
    Sen. Akaka.......................................................  2833
    Sen. Leahy \10\..................................................  2837
    Sen. Grassley....................................................  2867
    Sen. Craig.......................................................  2870
    Sen. Dodd \11\...................................................  2873
    Sen. Jeffords....................................................  2877
    Sen. Wellstone...................................................  2884
    Sen. Stevens.....................................................  2888
    Sen. Lieberman...................................................  2892
    Sen. Brownback...................................................  2905
    Sen. Bryan.......................................................  2913
    Sen. Ashcroft....................................................  2917
    Sen. Thurmond....................................................  2934
    Sen. Crapo.......................................................  2937
    Sen. Dorgan......................................................  2939
    Sen. Kerry.......................................................  2943
    Sen. DeWine......................................................  2948
    Sen. Lincoln.....................................................  2956
    Sen. Helms.......................................................  2959
    Sen. Hollings....................................................  2962
    Sen. Wyden.......................................................  2965
    Sen. Smith (Ore.)................................................  2967
    Sen. Hagel.......................................................  2971
    Sen. Rockefeller.................................................  2972
    Sen. Murkowski...................................................  2977
    Sen. Byrd........................................................  2981
    Sen. Inhofe......................................................  2987
    Sen. Leahy.......................................................  2996
    Sen. Snowe.......................................................  3000

                               February 22, 1999

    Sen. Nickles.....................................................  3005
    Sen. Landrieu....................................................  3013
    Sen. Smith (N.H.)................................................  3016
    Sen. Bingaman....................................................  3022
    Sen. Bennett.....................................................  3024
    Sen. Reed \12\...................................................  3026
    Sen. Enzi........................................................  3033
    Sen. Feingold....................................................  3042

                               February 23, 1999

    Sen. Daschle.....................................................  3053
    Sen. Bond........................................................  3058
    Sen. Sessions \13\...............................................  3059
    Sen. Coverdell...................................................  3063
    Sen. Hatch.......................................................  3066
    Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3090
    Sen. Sessions....................................................  3094
    Sen. Dodd........................................................  3099
    Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3102

                               February 24, 1999

    Sen. Reed........................................................  3103

        \1\ On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives agreed to H.
    Res. 611, 105th Cong., the Articles of Impeachment, [144 Cong. Rec.
    H12040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998)] and H. Res. 614, 105th Cong.,
    which provided for the appointment of managers and procedures relating
    to impeachment proceedings [id. at H12042-43].
        \2\ The House of Representatives agreed to H. Res. 10, 106th Cong.,
    on January 6, 1999 [145 Cong. Rec. H216-17 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].
        \3\ The Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson
    Clinton, consisting of exhibits, was filed separately on January 20,
    1999, but is inserted here for ease of reference.
        \4\ For ease of reference, the documents contained in S. Doc. 106-
    2, i.e., the pertinent constitutional provisions, the Senate
    Impeachment Rules, the Articles of Impeachment, the Answer of President
    Clinton, and the Replication of the House of Representatives, are
    reprinted in this publication. Separately, the Senate admitted into
    evidence and authorized the printing, pursuant to S. Res. 16, 106th
    Cong., of the publicly available materials submitted to or produced by
    the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings
    or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives
    or the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to H. Res. 525 and H. Res.
    581, 105th Cong. (1998). That evidentiary record, S. Doc. 106-3 (1999)
    [24 vols.], is not reproduced here.
        \5\ The unanimous-consent agreement of February 9, 1999, allowed
    each Senator to place in the Congressional Record his or her statement
    delivered during closed deliberations. Not all Senators chose to
    publish their remarks; the fact that a statement of a particular
    Senator does not appear here does not mean that Senator did not address
    the Senate during the closed sessions. Additionally, the unanimous-
    consent agreement of February 12, 1999, allowed Senators to have
    statements and opinions explaining their votes printed in the
    Congressional Record.
        \6\ Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12,
    see p. 2715 below.
        \7\ Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22,
    see p. 3042 below.
        \8\ Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see
    p. 3058 below.
        \9\ Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12,
    see p. 2987 below.
        \10\ Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and
    February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, 3102 below.
        \11\ Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see
    pp. 3099 and 3100 below.
        \12\ Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24,
    see p. 3103 below.
        \13\ Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February
    23, see p. 3094 below.
                           Thursday, January 14, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer
        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all
    through our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure
    of wisdom for the women and men of this Senate as they act as
    jurors in this impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's
    refuge and strength in triumphs and troubles, prosperity and
    problems. Now, dear Father, help us through this difficult
    time. As You guided the Senators to unity in matters of
    procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the
    truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in
    a spirit of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial
    days to come. Bless the distinguished Chief Justice as he
    presides over this trial. We commit to You all that is said and
    done and ultimately decided. In Your holy Name. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep
    silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States
    is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by
    the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the
    majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
            installing equipment and furniture in the senate chamber
        Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for
    installing equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and
    ask that it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid
    upon the table.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by
    title.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of
    appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for the
    impeachment trial.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is
    considered and agreed to.
        The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows:

                                   S. Res. 17

      Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements raised by
    the impeachment trial of a President of the United States, the Sergeant
    at Arms shall install appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate
    chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives and
    counsel to the President in their presentations to the Senate during
    all times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief Justice
    of the United States presiding.
      Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to in the
    first section is as follows:
              (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and
            tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers
            from the House of Representatives and counsel for the President
            which shall be placed in the well of the Senate.
              (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display
            of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and
            microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by the
            managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel to
            the President.
      Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this resolution
    shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that provides the least
    practicable disruption to Senate proceedings.

                             Privilege of the Floor

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent
    that floor privileges be granted to the individuals listed on
    the document I send to the desk, during the closed impeachment
    proceedings of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
    United States.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        The document follows.

                     Floor Privileges During Closed Session

        David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader.
        Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader.
        Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader.
        Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
        Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
        Andrea LaRue, Counsel, Democratic Leader.
        Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip.
        Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader.
        Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader.
        Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel.
        Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel.
        Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
        Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms.
        David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary.
        Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary.
        Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian.
        Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian.
        Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk.
        Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk.
        David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk.
        Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter.
        Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter.
        Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter.
        Joel Breitner, Official Reporter.
        Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter.
        Paul Nelson, Official Reporter.
        Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter.
        Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter.
        Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter.
        Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk.
        Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland.

        Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate
    document all documents filed by the parties together with other
    materials for the convenience of all Senators.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series
    of unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the
    consideration of the Senate. In addition to these matters, I
    would like to state for the information of all Senators that,
    pursuant to S. Res. 16, the evidentiary record on which the
    parties' presentations over the next days will be based was
    filed by the House managers yesterday and was distributed to
    all Senators through their offices. These materials are now
    being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate
    documents. The initial documents of the record have been
    printed and are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of
    the rest of the volumes of the record is completed over the
    next few days, they will also be placed on the Senators' desks
    for their convenience.

                                  THE JOURNAL

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in
    the Senate Journal the following documents:
        The precept, issued on January 8, 1999;
        The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the
    receipt of summons, dated January 8, 1999.
        The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in
    the Senate Journal the following documents, which were received
    by the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution
    16, 106th Congress, first session:
        The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
    United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the
    House of Representatives against him on January 7, 1999,
    received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
        The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives,
    received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999;
        The trial brief filed by the President, received by the
    Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999;
        The replication of the House of Representatives, received
    by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and
        The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives,
    received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999.
        Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed
    in the Congressional Record.
        The documents follow:

    The United States of America, ss:

    The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms,
    United States Senate, greeting:
        You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with William
    Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if not, to leave at
    his usual place of abode, a true and attested copy of the within writ
    of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in
    whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least 2 days
    before the answer day mentioned in the said writ of summons.
        Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with
    your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the day for answering
    mentioned in the said writ of summons.
        Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at
    Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and
    twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
        Attest:
                                                    Gary Sisco,
                                               Secretary of the Senate.
                                     ______

    The United States of America, ss:

    The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, greeting:
        Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of
    America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to the Senate
    articles of impeachment against you, the said William Jefferson
    Clinton, in the words following:
        ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives
    of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people
    of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support
    of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

                                   Article I

        ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William
    Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
    to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the
    best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
    the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and
    manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal
    gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
        ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the
    truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal
    grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William
    Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following:
    (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate
    Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him;
    (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to
    make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his
    corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede
    the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
        ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the
    integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has
    betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive
    of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of
    the United States.
        ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants
    impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to
    hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States.

                                   Article II

        ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William
    Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
    to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the
    best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
    the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed,
    and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged
    personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of
    conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the
    existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights
    action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
        ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme
    included one or more of the following acts:
        ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
    corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought
    against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he
    knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.
        ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
    corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought
    against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and
    when called to testify personally in that proceeding.
        ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
    corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal
    evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action
    brought against him.
        ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing
    through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton
    intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a
    witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order
    to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that
    proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would
    have been harmful to him.
        ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil
    rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly
    allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a
    Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent
    questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading
    statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a
    communication to that judge.
        ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William
    Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events
    relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a
    potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence
    the testimony of that witness.
        ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson
    Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in
    a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the
    testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made
    by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the
    grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading
    information.
        ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the
    integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has
    betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive
    to the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of
    the United States.
        ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants
    impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to
    hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States.''

    And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, should be put
    to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such
    proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had
    as are agreeable to law and justice.
        You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore hereby
    summoned to file with the Secretary of the United States Senate, S-220
    The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an answer to the said articles of
    impeachment no later than noon on the 11th day of January, 1999, and
    therefore to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and
    judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises
    according to the Constitution and laws of the United States.
        Hereof you are not to fail.
        Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at
    Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and
    twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States.
        Attest:
                                                    Gary Sisco,
                                               Secretary of the Senate.
                                     ______

        The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William Jefferson
    Clinton, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept,
    addressed to me, were duly served upon the said William Jefferson
    Clinton, by my delivering true and attested copies of the same to
    Charles Ruff, at the White House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at
    5:27 p.m.
        Attest:
                                               James W. Ziglar,
                                                      Sergeant at Arms.
                                                 Loretta Symms,
                                               Deputy Sergeant at Arms.
        Dated: January 8, 1999.

    Witnesseth:
        Gary Sisco, Secretary,
        United States Senate.
                                     ______

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
    In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
            States

       ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF
                                  IMPEACHMENT

        The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
    States, in response to the summons of the Senate of the United States,
    answers the accusations made by the House of Representatives of the
    United States in the two Articles of Impeachment it has exhibited to
    the Senate as follows:

                                    Preamble

         The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or
                                  Misdemeanors

        The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the
    conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The
    President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.
    But Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the
    President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and
    Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and
    Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to the level of
    ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by the Founding
    Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standard
    applied throughout our Nation's history. Accordingly, the Articles of
    Impeachment should be dismissed.

            The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice

        The President denies each and every material allegation of the two
    Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in this answer.

                                   Article I

        President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and
    misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.

                         Factual Responses to Article I

        Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers
    the following factual responses to the allegations in Article I:
    (1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of
            his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
        There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before the
    grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to admit his improper
    intimate relationship with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated
    by Article I, which accuses the President of lying about ``the nature
    and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky.
        The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to the
    grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I was alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I
    engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters . . . did involve
    inappropriate intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand
    jury how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence
    early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He also
    described to the grand jury how he had attempted to testify in the
    deposition in the Jones case months earlier without having to
    acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he ultimately admitted to the
    grand jury--that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury
    acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The statement was
    offered at the beginning of his testimony to focus the questioning in a
    manner that would allow the Office of Independent Counsel to obtain
    necessary information without unduly dwelling on the salacious details
    of the relationship. The President's statement was followed by almost
    four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his statement was in
    any respect perjurious, false and misleading, the President denies it.
    The President also denies that the statement was in any way an attempt
    to thwart the investigation.
        The President states, as he did during his grand jury testimony,
    that he engaged in improper physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The
    President was truthful when he testified before the grand jury that he
    did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood
    that term to be defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning
    of him in that deposition. The President further denies that his other
    statements to the grand jury about the nature and details of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were perjurious, false, and misleading.
    (2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury when he testified about statements
            he had made in the Jones deposition
        There is a second myth about the President's testimony before the
    grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted his entire Jones
    deposition testimony in the grand jury. The President was not asked to
    and did not broadly restate or reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony.
    Instead, in the grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers
    he gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury about
    statements he made in the Jones deposition. The President stated to the
    grand jury that he did not attempt to be helpful to or assist the
    lawyers in the Jones deposition in their quest for information about
    his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the
    grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition
    without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Accordingly, the
    full, underlying Jones deposition is not before the Senate.
        Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an article
    of impeachment based on the President's deposition in the Jones case.
    The House managers should not be allowed to prosecute before the Senate
    an article of impeachment which the full House has rejected.
    (3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury about ``statements he allowed his
            attorney to make'' during the Jones deposition
        The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
    statements to the grand jury about the statements his attorney made
    during the Jones deposition. The President was truthful when he
    explained to the grand jury his understanding of certain statements
    made by his lawyer, Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The
    President also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing
    on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the attorneys and
    Judge Wright.
    (4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury concerning alleged efforts ``to
            influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the
            discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
        For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article II, the
    President denies that he attempted to influence the testimony of any
    witness or to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. Thus,
    the President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
    statements before the grand jury when he testified about these matters.

     First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional
                      Standard for Conviction and Removal

        For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer,
    Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional standard for
    conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President and
    should be dismissed.

    Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction
                                  and Removal

        Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could
    know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. It
    alleges that the President provided the grand jury with ``perjurious,
    false, and misleading testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four
    subject areas. But it fails to identify any specific statement by the
    President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. The
    House has left the Senate and the President to guess at what it had in
    mind.
        One of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution
    is that a person has a right to know what specific charges he or she is
    facing. Without such fair warning, no one can prepare the defense to
    which every person is entitled. The law and the Constitution also
    mandate adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the
    vote they must make. Without a definite and specific identification of
    false statements, a trial becomes a moving target for the accused. In
    addition, the American people deserve to know upon what specific
    statements the President is being judged, given the gravity and effect
    of these proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national
    election.
        Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required definite
    and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be
    dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally
    defective and should fail.

     Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One
                                    Article

        Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple instances
    of alleged perjurious, false and misleading statements in one article.
    The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted without
    the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule
    XXIII provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible
    for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' By
    the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if
    he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony in ``one or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very
    real possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators were
    in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. Put simply, the
    structure of Article I presents the possibility that the President
    could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted if separate
    votes were taken on each allegedly perjurious statement. For example,
    it would be possible for the President to be convicted and removed from
    office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single statement
    was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the four categories in
    Article I would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict and
    remove.
        By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of
    Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with
    the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of
    two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article I should fail.

                        Factual Responses to Article II

        Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers
    the following factual responses to the allegations in Article II:
    (1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
            ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn
            affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious,
            false and misleading''
        The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute
    a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, the only witness
    cited in support of this allegation, denies this allegation as well.
    Her testimony and proffered statements are clear and unmistakable:
         ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never promised a
    job for my silence.''
         ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky
    to say anything or to lie . . .''
         ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on
    their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
        The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky
    asked him whether she might be able to avoid testifying the Jones case
    because she knew nothing about Ms. Jones or the case. The President
    further states that he told her he believed other witnesses had
    executed affidavits, and there was a chance they would not have to
    testify. The President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or
    suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The
    President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a
    limited but truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid
    having to testify in the Jones case.
    (2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
            ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious,
            false and misleading testimony of and when called to testify
            personally'' in the Jones litigation
        Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie
    if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case. The
    testimony and proffered statements of Monica Lewinsky, the only witness
    cited in support of this allegation, are clear and unmistakable:
         ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a
    job for my silence.''
         ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky
    to say anything or to lie . . .''
         ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on
    their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.''
        The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in
    the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have talked about what to do
    to conceal their relationship from others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a
    witness in any legal proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own
    testimony and statements support the President's recollection. Ms.
    Lewinsky testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the possibility
    that she and the President ever had discussions about denying the
    relationship after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case. Ms.
    Lewinsky also stated that ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to
    say about their relationship] is specific relation to the Jones
    matter,'' and that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of
    any deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.''
    (3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, he
            ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to
            conceal evidence'' in the Jones case
        The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or supported
    any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in the Jones case,
    including any gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. The President states
    that he gave numerous gifts to Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997.
    The President states that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired
    as to what to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he
    had given her, to which the President responded that she would have to
    turn over whatever she had. The President states that he was
    unconcerned about having given her gifts and, in fact, that he gave Ms.
    Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1997. The President denies
    that he ever asked his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts
    he had given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or
    suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie told
    prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly thereafter that it
    was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her about retrieving gifts.
    (4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with
            Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York to
            ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones
            case
        The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with
    Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or sought to prevent her truthful
    testimony in the Jones case. The President states that he discussed
    with Ms. Lewinsky her desire to obtain a job in New York months before
    she was listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms.
    Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations more than
    a month before she was identified as a possible witness. The President
    also states that he believes that Ms. Lewinsky raised with him, again
    before she was ever listed as a possible witness in the Jones case, the
    prospect of having Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms.
    Lewinsky corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for
    Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was aware that Mr.
    Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain employment in New York. The
    President denies that any of these efforts had any connection
    whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's status as a possible or actual witness in
    the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's
    denial when she testified, ``I was never promised a job for my
    silence.''
    (5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to
            make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge''
            concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
        The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney to make
    false and misleading statements concerning Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to
    a Federal judge during the Jones deposition. The President denies that
    he was focusing his attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange
    between his attorney and Judge Wright.
    (6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false
            and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty
            Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
        The President denies that he obstructed justice or endeavored in
    any way to influence any potential testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. The
    President states that he spoke with Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998. The
    President testified that, in that conversation, he was trying to find
    out what the facts were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether
    his own recollection was correct about certain aspects of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she felt no
    pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's statements and no pressure
    ``to agree with [her] boss.'' The President denies knowing or believing
    that Ms. Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time of
    this conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness lists
    proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton states that, after
    the Independent Counsel investigation became public, when Ms. Currie
    was scheduled to testify, he told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.''
    (7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed
            allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
        The President denies that he obstructed justice when he misled his
    aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the
    days immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky
    investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days following
    the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he misled his family,
    his friends and staff, and the Nation to conceal the nature of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He sought to avoid disclosing his
    personal wrongdoing to protect his family and himself from hurt and
    public embarrassment. The President profoundly regrets his actions, and
    he has apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation.
    The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose or any intent to
    influence the ongoing grand jury proceedings.

    First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional
                      Standard for Conviction and Removal

        For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article
    II does not meet the constitutional standard for convicting and
    removing a duly elected President from office and should be dismissed.

         Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit
                             Conviction and Removal

        Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could
    know what specific charges are being leveled against the President.
    Article II alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the
    administration of justice'' in both the Jones case and the grand jury
    investigation. But it provides little or no concrete information about
    the specific acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or
    with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise impeded the
    administration of justice.
        As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to Article I, one
    of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a
    person has the right to know what specific charges he or she is facing.
    Without such fair warning, no one can mount the defense to which every
    person is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the
    President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he is able
    to confront those charges and defend himself.
        Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little definite and
    specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed.
    As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and
    should fail.

    Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One
                                    Article

        For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense to
    Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges
    multiple instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which
    makes it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional
    mandates that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of
    the members. Accordingly, Article II should fail.
                Respectfully submitted,
                                       David E. Kendall,
                                       Nicole K. Seligman,
                                       Emmet T. Flood,
                                       Max Stier,
                                       Glen Donath,
                                       Alicia Marti,
                                               Williams & Connolly,
                                               725 12th Street, N.W.,
                                               Washington, D.C. 20005.
                                       Charles F. C. Ruff,
                                       Gregory B. Craig,
                                       Bruce R. Lindsey,
                                       Cheryl D. Mills,
                                       Lanny A. Breuer,
                                               Office of the White House
                                                   Counsel,
                                               The White House,
                                               Washington, D.C. 20502.

        Submitted: January 11, 1999.
                                     ______

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
    In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

         TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

        Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by and
    through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully submits to the
    United States Senate its Brief in connection with the Impeachment Trial
    of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                    Summary

        The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury and
    false and misleading testimony and statements under oath before a
    federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in a course of conduct
    or scheme to delay and obstruct justice (Article II).
        The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a unified
    whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges.
                    perjury and false statements under oath
        President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified falsely
    under oath when he appeared before a federal grand jury on August 17,
    1998. Although what follows is not exhaustive, some of the more overt
    examples will serve to illustrate.
         At the very outset, the President read a prepared
    statement, which itself contained totally false assertions and other
    clearly misleading information.
         The President relied on his statement nineteen times in
    his testimony when questioned about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
         President Clinton falsely testified that he was not paying
    attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at
    the Jones deposition.
         He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. Lewinsky did
    not fall within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that was given
    at his deposition.
         He falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully
    at his deposition concerning, among other subjects, whether he had been
    alone with Ms. Lewinsky.
         He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky to
    turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed.
         He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie after his
    deposition.
         He falsely testified that he was truthful to his aides
    when he gave accounts of his relationship, which accounts were
    subsequently disseminated to the media and the grand jury.
                             obstruction of justice
        The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both the
    Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he undertook a continuing
    and concerted plan to tamper with witnesses and prospective witnesses
    for the purpose of causing those witnesses to provide false and
    misleading testimony. Examples abound:
         The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story to
    conceal their relationship, and the President suggested that she employ
    that story if subpoenaed in the Jones case.
         The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide an
    affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he knew that the
    affidavit would need to be false to accomplish its purpose.
         The President knowingly and willfully allowed his attorney
    to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it for the purpose of
    obstructing justice in the Jones case.
         The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she provide a
    false account of how she received her job at the Pentagon.
         The President attempted to influence the expected
    testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with a false
    account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky.
         The President provided several of his top aides with
    elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that those
    aides would convey the false information to the public and to the grand
    jury. When he did this, he knew that those aides would likely be called
    to testify, while he was declining several invitations to testify. By
    this action, he obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury.
         The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie
    to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the Jones case, and
    thereby delayed and obstructed justice.
         The President and his representatives orchestrated a
    campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect adversely her
    credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted to obstruct justice
    both in the Jones case and the grand jury.
         The President lied repeatedly under oath in his
    disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice in that
    case.
         The President's lies and misleading statements under oath
    at the grand jury were calculated to, and did obstruct, delay and
    prevent the due administration of justice by that body.
         The President employed the power of his office to procure
    a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false affidavit by causing
    his friend to exert extraordinary efforts for that purpose.
        The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern of
    obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending over a period
    of several months, and having the effect of seriously compromising the
    integrity of the entire judicial system.
        The effect of the President's misconduct has been devastating in
    several respects.
        (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect and
    defend the Constitution of the United States.''
        (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law enforcement
    officer to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
        (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's rights
    as a citizen to due process and the equal protection of the laws,
    though he had sworn to protect those rights.
        (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading statements and
    deceit, he has seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of
    the Office of President and thereby the honor and integrity of the
    United States.
        (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and witness
    tampering has affected the truth seeking process which is the
    foundation of our legal system.
        (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he has
    attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government.
        The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred state
    offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and removal from
    office of President William Jefferson Clinton. The Articles charge that
    the President has committed perjury before a federal grand jury and
    that he obstructed justice in a federal civil rights action. The
    Senate's own precedents establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants
    conviction and removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and
    removed three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of
    justice undermines the judicial system in the same fashion that perjury
    does, and it also warrants conviction and removal.
        Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same
    standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
    misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments for perjury set the
    standard here. Finally, the Senate's own precedents further establish
    that the President's crimes need not arise directly out of his official
    duties. Two of the three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for
    perjury that had nothing to do with their official duties.

                                  Introduction

        This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate generally of the
    evidence that the Managers intend to produce, if permitted, and of the
    applicable legal principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively
    all of the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every
    witness and document that the Managers would produce in the course of
    the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline for the use of the
    Senate in reviewing and assessing the evidence as it is set forth at
    trial--it is not, and is not intended to be a substitute for a trial at
    which all of the relevant facts will be developed.

                   H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998)

        The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with high
    crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One alleges that
    President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial
    process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration,
    impeding the administration of justice'' in that he willfully provided
    perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on
    August 17, 1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has
    prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and
    engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede,
    cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related
    to a federal civil rights action brought against him.'' Both Articles
    are now before the Senate of the United States for trial as provided by
    the Constitution of the United States.
        The Office of President represents to the American people and to
    the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of all, the honor and
    integrity that makes us a great nation and an example for the world.
    Because all eyes are focused upon that high office, the character and
    credibility of any temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to
    the domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, serious
    breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely influence the
    reputation of the United States.
        This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about multiple
    obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, and
    witness tampering--all committed or orchestrated by the President of
    the United States.
        Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it is
    important to place the events in the proper context. If this were only
    about private sex we would not now be before the Senate. But the manner
    in which the Lewinsky relationship arose and continued is important
    because it is illustrative of the character of the President and the
    decisions he made.

                                   Background

        Monica Lewinsky, a 22-year-old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during the government
    shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 730) Prior
    to their first intimate encounter, she had never even spoken with the
    President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President
    Clinton flirted with each other. (Id.) The President of the United
    States of America then invited this unknown young intern into a private
    area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited her back
    later and when she returned, the two engaged in the first of many acts
    of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732)
        Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. Lewinsky were
    seen, she was bringing papers to the President. That story was totally
    false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p.
    34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1314) The only papers she brought were personal
    messages having nothing to do with her duties or those of the
    President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 774-775)
    After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the Pentagon, her
    frequent visits to the President were disguised as visits to Betty
    Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are important, because they play a
    vital role in the later perjuries and obstructions.

                                   Encounters

        Over the term of their relationship the following significant
    matters occurred:
        1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least twenty-
    one occasions;
        2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, excluding
    phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 1997;
        3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least seventeen
    of which involved phone sex;
        4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and,
        5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. Referral,
    App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111)
        These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for all of
    the events that followed.
        The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky,
    though relevant, need not be detailed either in this document or
    through witness testimony. It is necessary, though, briefly to outline
    that evidence, because it will demonstrate that the President
    repeatedly lied about that sexual relationship in his deposition,
    before the grand jury, and in his responses to the Judiciary
    Committee's questions. He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky
    merely performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual
    manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn grand jury
    testimony of three of her friends and the statements by two
    professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared the
    details of her relationship. (O.I.C. Referral, H.Doc. 105-310, pgs.
    138-140)
        While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is much more
    offensive for the President to expect the Senate to believe that in
    1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky was so
    limited that it did not fall within his narrow interpretation of a
    definition of ``sexual relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not
    even conceive his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his
    grand jury appearance.

                            How To View the Evidence

        We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must be
    viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is essential to
    avoid considering each event in isolation, and then treating it
    separately. Events and words that may seem innocent or even exculpatory
    in a vacuum may well take on a sinister, or even criminal connotation
    when observed in the context of the whole plot. For example, everyone
    agrees that Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie;
    nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-
    311, p. 1161)
        When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, in the
    context of the other evidence, another picture emerges. Of course no
    one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in there and lie.'' They didn't have
    to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what was expected of her. Similarly, nobody
    promised her a job, but once she signed the false affidavit, she got
    one.

                                   The Issue

        The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of conduct is
    such as to affect adversely the Office of the President and also upon
    the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in a manner
    contrary to his trust as President and subversive to the Rule of Law
    and Constitutional government.

                                 The Beginning

        The events that form the basis of these charges actually began in
    late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the winter of 1997 and the
    first month of 1998. The event culminated when the President of the
    United States appeared before a federal grand jury, raised his right
    hand to God and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth.

                               December 5-6, 1997

        On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty Currie if
    the President could see her the next day, Saturday, but Ms. Currie said
    that the President was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. (ML
    8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that
    Friday, Ms. Lewinsky spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas
    party. (ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ,
    p. 108; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 828)

                          The Witness List Is Received

        That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of potential
    witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC-00000128; 849-DC-
    00000121-37; Referral, H.Doc. 105-311, p. 88) The list included Monica
    Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did not find out that her name was on
    the list until the President told her ten days later, on December 17.
    (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 121-123; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay
    is significant.

                           Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit

        After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the President at
    the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President
    terminating their relationship. (ML-55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms.
    Lewinsky went to the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts
    for the President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H.Doc.
    105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, Ms.
    Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and one of them told
    her that the President was not with his lawyers, as she thought, but
    rather, he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H.Doc. 105-316,
    pgs. 2907-2908; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie
    from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. (ML
    8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98
    GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie
    told the Secret Service watch commander that the President was so upset
    about the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted
    somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H.Doc. 105-316,
    pgs. 3356-3357).

                          The Telephone Conversations

        At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged Bruce
    Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC-00000862; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky,
    while she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and the President
    spoke by phone. The President was very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that
    no one had every treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs.
    113-14; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to the
    grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and
    considered it inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p.
    537). Nevertheless, in a sudden change of mood, he invited her to visit
    him at the White House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 834)

                          Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit

        Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time that
    day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 827-DC-00000018)
    Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry''
    with her during their recent telephone conversation, he was ``sweet''
    and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-
    15; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would talk
    to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-16;
    H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836)

                    The Discussions With the Secret Service

        The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the Secret
    Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if they kept quiet
    about the Lewinsky incident, there would be no disciplinary action.
    (Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery
    7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret
    Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President
    personally told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I
    can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; H.Doc. 105-
    316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3353) Deputy
    Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that he
    knew of no other time in his fourteen years of service at the White
    House where the President raised a performance issue with a member of
    the Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., pgs. 40-
    41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his conversation with the
    President, Captain Purdie told a number of officers that they should
    not discuss the Lewinsky incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 3343; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316,
    p. 3114)
        When the President was before the grand jury and questioned about
    his statements to the Secret Service regarding this incident, the
    President testified, ``I don't remember what I said and I don't
    remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311,
    p. 534) When confronted with Captain Purdie's testimony, the President
    testified, ``I don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I
    have no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 543)

                 The President's Knowledge of the Witness List

        President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he learned
    that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that evening, Saturday,
    December 6, during a meeting with his lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-
    84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535-536) He stood by this answer in response to
    Request Number 16 submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18).
    The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left the
    White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66;
    H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to Bruce Lindsey, at the
    meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the Jones witness list faxed to Mr.
    Bennett the previous night. (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 2419) (Exhibit 15)
        However, during his deposition, the President testified that he had
    heard about the witness list before he saw it. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p.
    70) In other words, if the President testified truthfully in his
    deposition, then he knew about the witness list before the 5 p.m.
    meeting. It is valid to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a
    witness list prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained
    change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that Saturday
    afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it prompted him to give
    the unique instruction to a Secret Service watch commander to use
    ``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which
    the watch commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from
    discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-
    316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33; H.Doc. 105-315,
    pgs. 3360-3361)

                        The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky

        Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high profile
    job in New York since the previous July. She was not having much
    success despite the President's promise to help. In early November,
    Betty Currie arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan who was supposed to
    help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592)
        On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. Jordan
    (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No action followed; no
    job interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts with
    Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that he made no effort to find a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so unimportant to him that he ``had no
    recollection of an early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was
    not a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) (Chart R)
    Nothing happened throughout the month of November, because Mr. Jordan
    was either gone or would not return Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p.
    105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 825-826)
        During the December 6 meeting with the President, she mentioned
    that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. Jordan and that it
    did not seem he had done anything to help her. The President responded
    by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something to
    that effect. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There
    was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met the
    President the next day, December 7, but the meeting was unrelated to
    Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805,
    1810)

                         The December 11, 1997 Activity

        The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually procure
    employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky
    and gave her a list of contact names. The two also discussed the
    President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840)
    That meeting Mr. Jordan remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-
    316, p. 1798) Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective
    employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1800-
    1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the President to give him
    a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. Jordan and the President were now very
    interested in helping Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98
    GJ, p. 95; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807)

                       Significance of December 11, 1997

        This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered on
    December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that
    Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any state or federal
    employee with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual
    relations, or sought to have sexual relations.
        The President knew that it would be politically and legally
    expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    And the President knew that that relationship would be fostered by
    finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was accomplished through enlisting the
    help of Vernon Jordan.

             December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List

        On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, Monica
    Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the President of the United
    States. The President said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two
    things: one was that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car
    accident; secondly, the President said that he ``had some more bad
    news,'' that he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and
    her name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) The
    President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke
    his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be subpoenaed,
    [she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that [she] had received
    the subpoena.'' (Id.) Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if
    subpoenaed. The President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an
    affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to
    be false and misleading to accomplish the desired result.

                         The President's ``Suggestion''

        Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for Monica
    Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He did not
    specifically tell her to lie. What he did say is ``you know, you can
    always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me
    letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843)
        In order to understand the significance of this statement, it is
    necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky had previously structured in order to deceive those who
    protected and worked with the President.
        Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited the
    President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, `here are your
    letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would answer, `Okay that's good.' ''
    (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left
    White House employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the
    guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p.
    55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775)
        Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she would always
    deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The President
    would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of encouragement. (ML
    8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1078)
        So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on December
    17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her
    of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the
    President brought up the misleading stories, she understood that the
    two would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception.

                           The President's Intention

        It became clear that the President had no intention of making his
    sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public affair. And he would
    use lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not be
    known.
        It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked the
    President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m.,
    he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . . . it is quite
    possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 567)
        And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to
    continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the
    letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that
    night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565)
        Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' lawyers
    were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. Lewinsky could file a
    false affidavit, but it might not work. It was absolutely essential
    that both parties told the same story. He knew that he would lie if
    asked about Ms. Lewinsky, and he wanted to make certain that she would
    lie also. That is why the President of the United States called a
    twenty-four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning.

                              The Evidence Mounts

        But the President had an additional problem. It was not enough that
    he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the relationship. The evidence was
    beginning to accumulate. Because of the emerging evidence, the
    President found it necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time,
    the evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts,
    that the President and Monica Lewinsky were spending a significant
    amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. It was no longer
    expedient simply to refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'',
    ``stalker'', ``clutch'', or ``home wrecker'' as the White House first
    attempted to do. The unassailable facts were forcing the President to
    acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he still had
    the opportunity to establish a non-sexual explanation for their
    meetings, since his DNA had not yet been identified on Monica
    Lewinsky's blue dress.

                            Need for the Cover Story

        Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along with
    the cover story in order to provide an innocent, intimate-free
    explanation for their frequent meetings. And that innocent explanation
    came in the form of ``document deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with
    Betty Currie.''
        Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 17, 1998,
    he used the exact same cover stories that had been utilized by Ms.
    Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent with any future Lewinsky
    testimony while still maintaining his defense in the Jones lawsuit.
        In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was ever
    alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . She--
    it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends.
    In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off,
    exchange a few words and go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-
    53)
        Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. Lewinsky's
    frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President did not hesitate to
    mention Betty Currie in his answers, for example:

        And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after [the
    pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] but my
    secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 58)
        Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. She
    came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there
    talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/
    98 Dep., p. 68)

                 December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed

        On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in a
    deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the Jones case. (ML 8/6/98
    GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) (Charts F and G) Extremely
    distraught, she immediately called the President's closest friend,
    Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President
    previously told her to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She
    called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died
    and she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; H.Doc.
    105-311, pgs. 848, 849)

                              Vernon Jordan's Role

        Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she arrived
    shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. Around this time,
    Mr. Jordan called the President and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been
    subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1)
    During the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as
    ``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1716), she
    talked about her infatuation with the President. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan decided that he would call a lawyer
    for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726)

                        Mr. Jordan Informs the President

        That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed his
    conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely important
    because the President, in his deposition, did not recall that meeting.
    Mr. Jordan told the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been
    subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her fascination with the
    President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the
    President would leave the First Lady. He also asked the President if he
    had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc
    105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition:

        Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica
    Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?
        A. I don't think so.
        Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility
    that she might be asked to testify in this case?
        A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she was, I
    think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I want to be as
    accurate as I can.

    (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69)
        In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial that Mr.
    Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p.
    39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when given more specific facts, he
    admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the
    subpoena on the night of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. .
    . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an
    attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, the President
    testified in the grand jury that he was trying to remember who told him
    first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that
    was not the question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one
    considers the nature of the conversation between the President and Mr.
    Jordan, the suggestion that it would be forgotten defies common sense.

                               December 28, 1997

        December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence shows
    that the President made false and misleading statements to the federal
    court, the federal grand jury and the Congress of the United States
    about the events on that date. (Chart J) It is also a date on which he
    obstructed justice.

                            The President's Account

        The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he invited
    Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 33;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that he ``probably'' gave Ms.
    Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/
    98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts
    on other occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many
    gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he
    said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-311,
    p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks later, the President forgot that
    he had given any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky.
        As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not tolerate
    someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that answer is unreasonable
    under the circumstances. He also knew that, under those circumstances,
    his answer in the deposition could not be believed. When asked in the
    grand jury why he was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms.
    Lewinsky so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the deposition,
    the President put forth an obviously contrived explanation.

        ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not
    that I don't recall whether I had given them.''

     (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503)

                         Response to Committee Requests

        The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 to the
    House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. (Exhibit 18) He was
    not asked in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked,
    ``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a
    witness to insert unstated premises or mental reservations into the
    question to make his answer technically true, if factually false. The
    essence of lying is in deception, not in words.
        The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves that his
    explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee is also false. The
    President would have us believe that he was able to analyze questions
    as they were being asked, and pick up such things as verb tense in an
    attempt to make his statements at least literally true. But when he was
    asked a simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it.
    Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted explanation is
    reasonable or true.

                           Testimony Concerning Gifts

        The President was asked in the deposition if Monica Lewinsky ever
    gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p.
    77) This is also false testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He
    answered this question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee
    by saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the
    precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not support the
    President's position. An answer that baldly understates a numerical
    fact in response to a specific quantitative inquiry can be deemed
    technically true but actually false. For example, a witness is
    testifying falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in
    fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had also gone five
    times. So too, when the President answered once or twice in the face of
    evidence that Ms. Lewinsky was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying.
    (Chart C)

                              Concealment of Gifts

        On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct justice
    and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she
    discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and
    that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. She recalled telling
    the President that the subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused
    her concern. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872)
    The President told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ,
    p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she
    take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe to Betty. The
    President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.''
    (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L)
    Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I
    understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you
    have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-
    311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about this incident,
    but says that ``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her.
    (Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581)

                             The Cell Phone Record

        There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is
    wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie called from her
    cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms.
    Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves
    conclusively that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several
    hours after she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself
    later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on
    this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) The facts
    prove that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.

                           Ms. Currie's Later Actions

        That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If Ms.
    Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, Ms. Currie
    would logically ask the reason for such a transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was
    giving her a box of gifts from the President yet she did not tell the
    President of this strange request. She simply took the gifts and placed
    them under her bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ,
    pgs. 57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 114;
    H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582)
        The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 and 25
    from the House Committee that he was not concerned about the gifts.
    (Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he recalled telling Monica that if
    the Jones lawyers request gifts, she should turn them over. The
    President testified that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena
    asked for gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494-
    495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning over gifts
    to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena
    asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested
    gifts, why would he give Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she never
    questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but keep this
    private'' and that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to
    be taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 105-311,
    p. 886) The only logical inference is that the gifts--including the
    bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that
    they would deny the relationship--even in the face of a federal
    subpoena.

                      The President's Deposition Testimony

        Furthermore, the President, at various times in his deposition,
    seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on
    December 28 in order to obstruct the administration of justice. First,
    he was asked: ``Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in
    this case?'' The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she
    had been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68)
        He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the
    possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . .,'' he said. he
    then added that he may have joked to her that the Jones lawyers might
    subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we
    ever had more of a conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/
    98 Dep., p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this
    testimony, but the President also directly contradicted himself before
    the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said that
    he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and that
    they had a ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.''
    (WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this conversation about
    her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks before his deposition. Again,
    his version is not reasonable.

       January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job

        The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to execute a
    false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content that when she asked
    if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen fifteen of
    them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his
    information from discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan
    generally about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President
    had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be
    certain the mission was accomplished.

                         Additional Presidential Advice

        In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with her
    lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 192;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some hard questions about
    how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915)
    After the meeting, she called Betty Currie and said that she wanted to
    speak to the President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p.
    195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President discussed
    the issue of how she would answer under oath if asked about how she got
    her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917)
    The President told her: ``Well, you could always say that the people in
    Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98
    GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and misleading.

                            Vernon Jordan's New Role

        The President was also kept advised as to the contents of the
    Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 105-316, p.
    1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the
    Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-
    311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98
    GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to
    look at the Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his
    imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 194-
    195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. Lewinsky and Mr.
    Jordan conferred about the contents and agreed to delete a paragraph
    inserted by Mr. Carter which might open a line of questions concerning
    whether she had been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he had
    nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 12;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, that he spoke with the
    President after conferring with Ms. Lewinsky about the changes made to
    her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827)

                     Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit

        The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false
    Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 924-925)
    (Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that
    same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4)
    Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified the President that she signed an
    affidavit denying a sexual relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 1739)

                           Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job

        On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for Ms.
    Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky
    called Mr. Jordan and informed him. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-
    311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's
    job search from early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews
    and Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could
    happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1829) Mr. Jordan
    called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs.
    208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928-929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was
    called by MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given more
    interviews the next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p.
    929)
        After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel,
    she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 210; H.Doc. 105-
    311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan to tell him, he passed
    the good news on to Betty Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ
    5/28/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called
    the President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P)

                  The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior

        After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job--since July
    according to the President's lawyers--Vernon Jordan made the critical
    call to a CEO the day after the false Affidavit was signed. Mr.
    Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a
    job recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105-316, p.
    3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman
    to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a
    very talented attorney from Akin Gump; (3) a Harvard business school
    graduate; and (4) Monica Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-
    316, p. 1747) Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms.
    Lewinsky's qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals
    previously recommended by Mr. Jordan.
        Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. Lewinsky
    worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59)
    and that she did not like her Pentagon job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44;
    H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point
    during this process you wondered about her qualifications for
    employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to
    make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1707) Yet, when he
    called Mr. Perelman the day after she signed the Affidavit, he referred
    to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman
    4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that
    she had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic
    expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 37-
    38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a disturbing story
    about the President leaving the First Lady, and how the President was
    not spending enough time with her. Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan
    pause in making the recommendation, especially after Monica was
    subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1725)

                     The Importance of the False Affidavit

        Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, through
    his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition ``. . .
    there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form
    with President Clinton. . . .'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When
    questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President stated
    specifically that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was
    ``absolutely true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later
    affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before the grand
    jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 473) Paragraph 8
    of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states:

        ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did
    not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me
    employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he
    did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual
    relationship.''

        Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on January
    6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being alone
    with the President. She showed a copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon
    Jordan, who called the President and told him that she had signed it.
    (VJ, 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98
    GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828)

                         The Rush To File the Affidavit

        For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding questions
    by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it had to be filed with
    the Court and provided to the President's attorneys in time for his
    deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called
    Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out if he
    had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 15, the President's
    attorneys called her attorney twice. When they finally reached him,
    they requested a copy of the Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on
    time?'' (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms.
    Lewinsky's lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123,
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of its
    contents and used it powerfully in the deposition.
        Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on January
    15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on Saturday, January 17.
    (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424)
    (Exhibit 5) He finished the Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition
    in the early morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court
    with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. (Carter 6/18/
    98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The President's lawyers left him
    another message on January 16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.''
    (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the
    President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court to support
    his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in the deposition, and
    thereby obstruct justice.

                              The Newsweek Inquiry

        On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty Currie and
    asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her by courier. (BC 5/6/
    98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie then called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about
    it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The
    President was out of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky
    back, and asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p.
    229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; H.Doc. 105-
    316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with Bruce Lindsey and
    Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. Currie testified that she spoke
    immediately to Mr. Lindsey about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584)

                     January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath

        By the time the President concluded his deposition on January 17,
    he knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who had personal knowledge
    was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky
    created, and that he used himself during the deposition, were now in
    jeopardy. It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky,
    but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the relationship
    from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night
    of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she
    come in the following day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President
    ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday night. (BC 1/
    27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart S) Sometime in the
    early morning hours of January 18, 1998, the President learned of a
    news report concerning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/
    17/98 GJ, p. 142-143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14)

                  The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie

        As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., there
    were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the President. (Exhibit
    7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ,
    p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) He told her that he had just been
    deposed and that the attorneys asked several questions about Monica
    Lewinsky. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then
    made a series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T)

        (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
        (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
        (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
        (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
        (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

    (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98
    GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
        During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked whether
    she believed that the President wished her to agree with the
    statements:

        Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he stated [these
    five points] and the demeanor that he was using at the time that he
    stated it to you--that he wished you to agree with that statement?
        A. I can't speak for him, but----
        Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these [previous]
    meetings in the last several days that that is how you took it.
        A. [Nodding.]
        Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President made to
    you, ``You remember I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' Was
    that also a statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you to
    agree with that?
        A. Correct.

    (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559)
        Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not necessarily
    feel pressured by the President, she did state that she felt the
    President was seeking her agreement (or disagreement) with those
    statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669)

                        Was This Obstruction of Justice?

        The President essentially admitted to making these statements when
    he knew they were not true. Consequently, he had painted himself into a
    legal corner. Understanding the seriousness of the President
    ``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the argument has been made that those
    statements to her could not constitute obstruction because she had not
    been subpoenaed, and the President did not know that she was a
    potential witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law
    and the facts.
        The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and
    stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if he
    urges or persuades a prospective witness to give false testimony.
    Neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time of the
    offense, nor must he or she actually give testimony at a later time.''
    United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing,
    e.g., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 1981)).
        Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the President
    clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate him, as his testimony
    demonstrates. The President claims that he called Ms. Currie into work
    on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But the President
    knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had
    told the truth during his deposition the day before, then he would have
    no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, the
    President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his demeanor, and the
    blatant lies that he suggested clearly prove that the President was not
    merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was looking for
    corroboration for his false cover-up, and that is why he coached her.

                    January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky

        Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 p.m.,
    the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica Lewinsky began.
    (Chart S) Between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms.
    Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky
    and Ms. Currie agreed to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p.
    216; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms.
    Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p.
    160; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 702)

                        January 19, the Search Continues

        The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to work
    diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. and 8:41 a.m.,
    she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After
    the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called the President at 8:43 a.m. and said
    that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-
    162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again
    paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family
    Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky into
    calling back. That may have been the President's idea, since Ms. Currie
    had just spoken with him. The President was obviously quite concerned
    because he called Betty Currie only six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m.
    Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different
    tact, sending the message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the
    President's suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good
    news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. Lewinsky to
    call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 165;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's recollection of why she was
    calling was again fuzzy. She said at one point that she believes the
    President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and she thought she was
    calling just to tell her that her name came up in the deposition. (BC
    7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been
    subpoenaed; of course her name came up in the deposition. There was
    obviously another and more important reason the President needed to get
    in touch with her.

             Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search

        At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who then
    joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four minutes, from
    10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White House three times,
    paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter.
    Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr.
    Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House.

                        Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer

        Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer represented Ms.
    Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan
    then made feverish attempts to reach the President or someone at the
    White House to tell them the bad news, as represented by the six calls
    between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to
    relay this information to the White House because ``[t]he President
    asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was
    ``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, pgs. 45-46;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan then called Mr. Carter
    back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they had already talked about. (VJ 3/
    5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104-316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached
    the President at 5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired.
    (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970)

                        The Reason for the Urgent Search

        This activity shows how important it was for the President of the
    United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom she was talking.
    Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. Lewinsky. The President
    had just completed a deposition in which he provided false and
    misleading testimony about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was
    a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys,
    and he was losing control over her. The President never got complete
    control over her again.

         Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury

        Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and
    misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of false grand
    jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some salient examples of
    false statements are described below. When judging the statements made
    and the answers given, it is vital to recall that the President spent
    literally days preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his
    attorney were fully aware that the testimony would center around his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony in the
    Jones case.

                              Grand Jury Testimony

        On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the United
    States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow citizens and took an
    oath to tell the complete truth. The President proceeded to equivocate
    and engage in legalistic fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony
    was calculated to mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct
    its process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He set the
    tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a witness can tell the
    truth, lie or assert his privileges against self incrimination. (Chart
    Y) President Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was
    permitted to read a statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9)

                       The President's Prepared Statement

        That statement itself is demonstrably false in many particulars.
    President Clinton claims that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with
    Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.''
    Notice he did not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three
    ``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual contact
    with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year old intern at
    the time.
        The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three visits
    alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they engaged in sexual
    conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/
    6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's
    ruling, this evidence was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual
    harassment claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11,
    1997, p. 3)
        The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The
    encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that
    term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 deposition.'' That assertion
    is patently false. It is directly contradicted by the corroborated
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32;
    H.Doc. 311, p. 1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357,
    1358)
        Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in
    ``sexual relations'' as the President understood the term to be defined
    at his deposition and as any reasonable person would have understood
    the term to have been defined.
        Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's conduct
    during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits did constitute
    ``sexual relations'' as he understood the term to be defined at his
    deposition. Before the grand jury, the President admitted that directly
    touching or kissing another person's breast, or directly touching
    another person's genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual
    relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 94-95; H.Doc
    105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President maintained that he did
    not engage in such conduct. (Id.) These statements are contradicted by
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and the testimony of numerous individuals with
    whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with
    the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky repeated and
    unilaterally performed acts on the President while he tailored his
    conduct to fit a contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' which he
    had not contemplated at the time of the acts, defies common sense.
        Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted
    interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in the grand
    jury until after his deposition had concluded. This is demonstrated by
    the substantial evidence revealing the President's state of mind during
    his deposition testimony. First, the President continuously denied at
    his deposition any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe
    that he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship,
    including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p.
    78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-
    53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. Lewinsky had ever given him
    gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) Second, the President testified that
    Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely
    true'' when, even by his current reading of the definition, it is
    absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White House
    produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,''
    stating flatly that the President's definition of ``sexual relations''
    included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the President made statements to
    staff members soon after the deposition, saying that he did not have
    sexual relations, including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/
    98 GJ, pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to tell
    people she and the President had an affair when he rebuffed her sexual
    advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth,
    President Clinton's Answer filed in Federal District Court in response
    to Paula Jones' First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that
    ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with
    respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of Defendant William
    Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, para. 39) Sixth, in
    President Clinton's sworn Answers to Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11,
    as amended, he flatly denied that he had sexual relations with any
    federal employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his
    deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat silently
    while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, represented
    to the court that there was no sex of any kind or in any manner between
    the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54)
        This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state of mind
    at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in technically or
    legally accurate answers, but in categorically denying anything
    improper. His grand jury testimony about his state of mind during the
    deposition is false.

                        Reasons for the False Testimony

        The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect himself from
    embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the affair. Before his grand
    jury testimony, the President's semen had been identified by laboratory
    tests on Ms. Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an
    ``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, In fact,
    when he testified before the grand jury, he was only hours away from
    admitting the affair on national television. Embarrassment was
    inevitable. But, if he truthfully admitted the details of his
    encounters with Ms. Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be
    acknowledging that he lied under oath during his deposition when he
    claimed that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky.
    (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, he chose to lie, not to
    protect his family or the dignity of his office, but to protect himself
    from criminal liability for his perjury in the Jones case.

                  Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement

        The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what began as
    a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 9;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much more troubling. As Ms.
    Lewinsky testified, her relationship with the President began with
    flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky showing the President her underwear.
    (ML 7/30/98 Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky
    candidly admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her
    name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295)

                             Reason for the Falsity

        The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, was not
    an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to a particular
    question. It was carefully drafted testimony which the President read
    and relied upon throughout his deposition. The President attempted to
    use the statement to foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on
    nineteen separate occasions. Yet, this prepared testimony, which along
    with other testimony provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually
    contradicts his sworn deposition testimony.

                         Contrary Deposition Testimony

        In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. Lewinsky
    were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to make this admission
    in his deposition in the Jones case. During the deposition, the
    following exchange occurred:

        Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica
    Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky together alone in
    the Oval Office?
        A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the
    legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on the
    weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring
    me things on the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to me
    once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be
    in there, drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I
    don't have any specific recollections of what the issues were, what was
    going on, but when the Congress is there, we're working all the time,
    and typically I would do some work on one of the days of the weekends
    in the afternoon.
        Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then,
    that you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of
    that ever happening?
        A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was
    working there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought
    it to me, she was the only person there. That's possible.

    (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
        After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President was given
    an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange followed:

        Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone
    together in any room in the White House?
        A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it
    is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on
    duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs
    office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend.
    That's--I have a general memory of that.
        Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those meetings?
        A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't remember.

    (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53)
        Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he testified
    truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, in part, the basis
    for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My goal in this deposition was to
    be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to
    walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the
    law, and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105-311, p.
    532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he certainly was alone
    with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, as the President
    conceded in his prepared grand jury statement.
        In other words, the President's assertion before the grand jury
    that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he testified truthfully
    in his deposition, is inconsistent. Yet, to this day, both the
    President and his attorneys have insisted that he did not lie at his
    deposition and that he did not lie when he swore under oath that he did
    not lie at his deposition.
        In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his deposition. All
    of those lies are incorporated in Article I, Item 2.

                    Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit

        Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing perjurious,
    false and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury concerning
    false and misleading statements his attorney Robert Bennett made to
    Judge Wright at the President's deposition. In one statement, while
    objecting to questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the
    Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] is fully
    aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in
    possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any
    manner, shape or form, with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep.,
    pgs. 53-54) When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her
    concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett responded,
    ``In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness is
    fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a
    single thing he doesn't know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis
    added)
        When asked before the grand jury about his statement to Judge
    Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I paid attention
    to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p.
    476) He added, ``I didn't pay much attention to this conversation,
    which is why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the
    deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) Finally,
    ``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the
    exact words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully
    for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed me by.''
    (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 29; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 481)
        This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his
    deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. Jones'
    attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which continued while Ms.
    Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he did not want the truth to be
    known. Of course, when Ms. Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the
    deposition, particularly in connection with sex, the President is going
    to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. Bennett's
    representations are eliminated by watching the videotape of the
    President's deposition. The videotape shows the President looking
    directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to
    Judge Wright.

               False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice

        Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury perjury
    regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and his
    efforts to impede discovery in the Jones  v. Clinton lawsuit. These
    lies are perhaps the most troubling, as the President used them in an
    attempt to conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office.
        For example, the President testified before the grand jury that he
    recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the
    gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should
    provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He
    stated, ``And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have
    to give them whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.)
    This testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony and common sense.
        Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she discussed
    with the President the subpoena's request for her to produce gifts,
    including a hat pin. She told the President that it concerned her, (ML
    8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 871) and he said that it
    ``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122)
    Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe
    to Betty. But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms.
    Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me
    think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 872)
    Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky on her cellular
    phone and said, ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the
    President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs.
    154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875)
        Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts from Ms.
    Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she remembers is that
    Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581)
    She later conceded that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers
    on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A
    telephone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie
    did call her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. Lewinsky's
    meeting with the President. The only logical reason Ms. Currie called
    Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from the President is that the President
    told her to do so. He would not have given this instruction if he
    wished the gifts to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys.

                        Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie

        The President again testified falsely when he told the grand jury
    that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made
    a series of statements to Ms. Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC
    8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that
    she met with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, and
    he proceeded to make these statements to her:

        (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
        (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right?
        (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
        (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
        (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

    (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98
    GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
        Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements than
    questions, and that, as far as she understood, the President wanted her
    to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p.
    559)
        The President was asked specifically about these statements before
    the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he was ``trying to
    refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p.
    131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He added that he wanted to ``know what
    Betty's memory was about what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 506) and that he was ``trying to get as much
    information as quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc.
    105-311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's explanation is
    contrived and false.
        A person does not refresh his recollection by firing declarative
    sentences dressed up as leading questions to his secretary. If the
    President was seeking information, he would have asked Ms. Currie what
    she recalled. Additionally, a person does not refresh his recollection
    by asking questions concerning factual scenarios of which the listener
    was unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener knew
    were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always there when Ms.
    Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, acknowledged during her grand
    jury testimony that Ms. Lewinsky could have visited the President at
    the White House when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 65-
    66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that there were
    several occasions when the President and Ms. Lewinsky were in the Oval
    Office or study area without anyone else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs.
    32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 552-553)
        More importantly, the President admitted in his statement to the
    grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions.
    (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his
    own admission, his statement to Ms. Currie about never being alone with
    Ms. Lewinsky was false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie
    certainly could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or
    not.
        The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear
    everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury testimony.
    During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, he ensured
    everyone, including Ms. Currie, was excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53;
    H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why would someone refresh his recollection by
    making a false statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is
    obvious--he would not.
        Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was
    ``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently explaining that
    he made these statements because he did not have time to listen to
    answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-
    311, p. 508) But, if he was in such a hurry, why did the President not
    ask Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on
    the telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate explanation
    as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 minutes with Ms.
    Currie on January 18 to get her version of the events. In fact, Ms.
    Currie testified that she first met the President on January 18 while
    he was on the White House putting green, and he told her to go into the
    office and he would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70;
    H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, why did he
    repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ,
    pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560-561) The reason for these
    statements had nothing to do with time constraints or refreshing
    recollection; he had just finished lying during the Jones deposition
    about these issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary.

                       Testimony About Influencing Aides

        Not only did the President lie about his attempts to influence Ms.
    Currie's testimony, but he lied about his attempts to influence the
    testimony of some of his top aides. Among the President's lies to his
    aides, described in detail later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky
    did not perform oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him
    while he rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then disseminated
    to the media and attributed to White House sources. They were also
    disseminated to the grand jury.
        When the President was asked about these lies before the grand
    jury, he testified:

        ``And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's
    nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex
    with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I never
    would have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
        ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter
    further. So I said things that were true. They may have been
    misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and
    I'm sorry.''

    (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558)
        To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must believe that
    many of the President's top aides engaged in a concerted effort to lie
    to the grand jury in order to incriminate him at the risk of subjecting
    themselves to a perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative
    of the President's character that he never felt any compunction in
    exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he could conceal
    his own perjuries. Simply put, such a conspiracy did not exist.
        The above are merely highlights of the President's grand jury
    perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In order to keep
    these lies in perspective, three facts must be remembered. First,
    before the grand jury, the President was not lying to cover up an
    affair and protect himself from embarrassment, as concealing the affair
    was now impossible. Second, the President could no longer argue that
    the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow
    irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent Counsel and the
    grand jury had mandates to explore them. Third, he cannot claim to have
    been surprised or unprepared for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before
    the grand jury, as he spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses
    to such questions.

                             The President's Method

        Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to give the
    appearance of being candid, when actually his intent was the opposite.
    In addition, throughout the testimony, whenever the President was asked
    a specific question that could not be answered directly without either
    admitting the truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said,
    ``I rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and
    misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those lies in
    ``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg.
    139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591)

                         The House Committee's Request

        In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its inquiry to
    an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the House of
    Representatives submitted to the President 81 requests to admit or deny
    specific facts relevant to this investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although,
    for the most part, the questions could have been answered with a simple
    ``admit'' or ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of
    selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant untruths,
    artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. When he did answer,
    he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting in an obvious attempt to skirt
    the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct the due proceedings of the
    Committee.

                      The President Repeats His Falsities

        Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a lack of
    memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable memory, for
    his amazing ability to recall details.
        In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to ``White
    House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior testimony and that
    of others. He answered several of the requests by merely restating the
    same deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury. We will point
    out several false statements in this Brief.
        In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive and
    misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct the efforts of
    the House Committee. They had the effect of seriously hampering its
    ability to inquire and to ascertain the truth. The President has,
    therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry and an investigation before
    the Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the
    Judicial Branch of our constitutional system of government.

                        The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky

        After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office of
    President was marshaled to destroy the character and reputation of
    Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been ill-used by the President.
    As soon as her name surfaced, the campaign began to muzzle any possible
    testimony, and to attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted
    effort to obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed
    by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked.
        When the President testified at his deposition that he had no
    sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with Monica Lewinsky, he
    felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only other witness was on board. She
    had furnished a false affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he
    realized from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were taped
    conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he had to develop a
    new story, and he did. In addition, he recounted that story to White
    House aides who passed it on to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct
    that tribunal too.
        On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post published a
    story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes
    Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones'
    Lawyers.'' The White House learned the substance of the Post story on
    the evening of January 20, 1998.

                              Mr. Bennett's Remark

        After the President learned of the existence of the story, he made
    a series of telephone calls.
        At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a
    conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the
    Washington Post stating:

        ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with
    Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added,
    ``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.''

                                Additional Calls

        After that conversation, the President had a half hour conversation
    with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey.
        At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke to her
    for 20 minutes.
        He then called Bruce Lindsey again.
        At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan.
        After that, the President again conversed with Bruce Lindsey.
        This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which the
    President would soon inflict upon top White House aides and advisors.

                      The President's Statements to Staff

                                 erskine bowles
        On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with White
    House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two deputies, John
    Podesta and Sylvia Matthews.
        Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 9:00
    a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's immediate words as
    he and two others entered the Oval Office:

        And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said to the
    American people.
        He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual relationships
    with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. And
    when the facts come out, you'll understand.''

    (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the President
    made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded:

        I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I don't
    know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever they are, you
    ought to get them out. And you ought to get them out rignt now.''

    (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
        When counsel asked whether the President responded to Bowles'
    suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded:

        I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree with me.

    (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239)
                                  john podesta
    January 21, 1998
        Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the
    President on the morning of January 21, 1998.
        He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval
    Office that morning:

        A. And we started off meeting--we didn't--I don't think we said
    anything. And I think the President directed this specifically to Mr.
    Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not
    true.''
        Q. What else did he say?
        A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship with
    her, and that he never asked anybody to lie.

    (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310)
    January 23, 1998
        Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another
    discussion with the President:

        ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working on this
    draft and he said to me that he never had sex with her, and that--and
    that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he was
    extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.''

    Then Podesta testified as follows:

        Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more specific than
    sex, than the word ``sex.''
        A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
        Q. Okay, share that with us.
        A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate. Of,
    you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had
    sex with her in any way whatsoever----
        Q. Okay.
        A. That they had not had oral sex.

    (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) (Exhibit V)
                               sidney blumenthal
        Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called Sidney
    Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note how the President's
    lies become more elaborate and pronounced when he has time to concoct
    this newest line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and
    Mr. Podesta, he simply denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to
    Mr. Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his defense
    strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the aggressor; (2) he
    launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her as a
    ``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent victim being
    attacked by the forces of evil.
        Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 4, 1998
    testimony: (Chart U)

        And it was at this point that he gave his account of what had
    happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said,
    ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.'' He
    rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused
    pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'' She
    threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an
    affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she
    hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she
    wouldn't be the stalker anymore.

    (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
        And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal moments
    later:

        And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like
    somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a
    lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character
    in the novel Darkness at Noon.
        And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were
    you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of
    someone.''

    (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185)
        At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to
    describe the President's manner and demeanor during the exchange.

        Q. In response to my question how you responded to the President's
    story about a threat or discussion about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky,
    you mentioned you didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally
    the nature of your response to the President?
        A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I certainly
    believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he was pouring out
    his heart, and I believed him.

    (Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 192-193)
                                  betty currie
        When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she could not
    recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with the President
    on Tuesday, January 20, or Wednesday, January 21. But she did state
    that on one of those days, the President summoned her back to his
    office. At that time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday
    afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It was at that
    meeting that the President made a series of statements to Ms. Currie,
    to some of which she could not possibly have known the answers. (e.g.
    ``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98
    GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7;
    H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664)
        When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the same tone
    and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday session.
        Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned that she
    might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 Int., p. 8; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 536)

                            Motive for Lies to Staff

        It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff
    were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more
    important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate
    that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that
    this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had
    recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the
    Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys
    and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post
    journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky
    affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on
    Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to
    interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because
    the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of
    events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The
    President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called
    before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311,
    pgs. 557-557)
        In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely
    to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He
    said that he was ``sensitive about not exchanging information because I
    knew I was a potential witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to
    provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta
    had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc.
    105-316, p. 3332)
        In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White
    House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the
    effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and
    grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told
    them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the
    President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn,
    gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to
    base any decisions.

                                 Win, Win, Win

        President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-costs strategy
    calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case
    and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by
    Richard ``Dick'' Morris to the federal grand jury.
        Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on
    January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the
    turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations
    against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an
    overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive
    the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When
    Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President:

        ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new,
    it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to
    forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice
    or the various other things.' ''

    (Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929)
        Morris recalls the following exchange:

        Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' meaning the
    voters.
        WJC: Well, we just have to win, then.

    (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930)
        The President, of course, cannot recall this statement,
    (Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71)

                     The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky

        In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the public, and
    hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica
    Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky
    to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in
    and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and
    that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President
    employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its
    press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998:

        Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to
    destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky.
    Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker?
    (The Plain Dealer)

    Again:

        ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. Charles
    Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of
    the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played
    with a full deck in her other experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer)

    From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30:

        ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this
    thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and
    take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in
    which the President was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like
    the woman who followed David Letterman around.'' (NBC News)

    From another ``source'' on February 1:

        ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as
    `the stalker.' ''

    And on February 4:

        ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as
    `infatuated' with the President, `star struck' and even `a stalker'.''
    (Buffalo News)

    Finally, on January 31:

        ``One White House aide called reporters to offer information about
    Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was
    her nickname--`The Stalker.' ''
        ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be
    identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short,
    and was `A little bit weird.' ''
        ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between
    U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White
    House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as
    an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.''
        ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made
    unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the `troubled' product of
    divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her
    mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three
    famous opera singers.''
        ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George
    Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he
    ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup
    of the same coffee to `surprise him.' '' (Toronto Sun)

        This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy
    the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that
    these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of
    the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his
    deportment in the highest office in the land.
        On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury.
    He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides
    (Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called
    before the grand jury.

        Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after
    January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was
    looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that
    they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
        WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after
    that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but
    I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't
    want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you
    information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by
    and large, didn't talk to people about it.
        Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute.
    Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine
    Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's
    involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a
    sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
        WJC. No.
        Q. And you've told us that you----
        WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I
    meant by it when they started this deposition.
        Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it
    might have been misleading. Is that correct?
        WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do was to
    give them something they could--that would be true, even if misleading
    in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and
    let's deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous
    suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury,
    in other words.

    (WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560)
        As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained
    that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that
    when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The
    President stated that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual
    relations'' to be literally true because he was only referring to
    intercourse.
        However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied
    sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' The President
    told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he
    did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman.
        Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury
    appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, ``Talking
    Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This ``Talking
    Points'' document outlines proposed questions that the President may be
    asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The
    ``Talking Points'' purport to state the President's view of sexual
    relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    (Exhibit 17)
        The ``Talking Points'' state as follows:

        Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual
    relationship?
        A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I
    am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' discussion of what
    constitutes a sexual relationship.
        Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the
    President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the
    President, constitute a sexual relationship?
        A. Of course it would.

        The President's own talking points refute the President's ``literal
    truth'' argument.

                       Effect of the President's Conduct

        Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's deportment
    affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity
    and honor of the country.
        Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of
    the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take care that the laws
    be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he is required to take an oath
    to ``Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
    States.'' Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol,
    raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath.
        The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
    provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, liberty or
    property without due process of law.''
        The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the right of
    trial by jury shall be preserved.''
        Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and
    the equal protection of the laws.

                        The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights

        Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt
    that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong
    was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed
    essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in
    turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was
    not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the
    United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve
    and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-
    minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously right violations by
    someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to
    enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test.
    As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to
    petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by
    filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At
    this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due
    process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the
    defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates that right to a
    full and fair trial, which, in turn, means the right to call and
    question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her
    case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she
    actually get? None of the above.
        On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to
    zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' Paula Jones ``has a
    right to an orderly disposition of her claims.`` In accordance with the
    Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber
    Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to
    information regarding state or federal employees with whom the
    President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge
    Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to
    lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this
    ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint.
    The President's Answer stated: ``President Clinton denies that he
    engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other
    woman.''
        Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by
    perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit
    testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false
    and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the
    case, it would have been deprived of critical information.
        That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional
    proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the
    President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve,
    protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the ``sanctity of
    an oath'' means to the President.

                     The Effect on the Office of President

        Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the
    people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign
    matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the
    credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of
    a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a
    long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is
    seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our
    country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to
    confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States?
        Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound
    to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it
    affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it
    affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without
    which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a
    pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of
    justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the
    resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is,
    of necessity, devastating.

                            The Effect on the System

        Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath.
    Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the
    foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of
    obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely
    affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a
    lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain
    that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough
    pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So
    too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and
    unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of
    them, the system itself will implode.
        That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been
    indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under
    oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury
    in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they
    gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that
    they should not be charged because their motives may have been to
    protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the
    perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports;
    i.e., betting on college football games.

                          Disregard of the Rule of Law

        Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an
    attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law.
    Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights
    of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of
    the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of
    the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the
    United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the
    entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the
    Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those
    supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will
    collapse altogether.

                         Effect on the Judicial Branch

        The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth-seeking
    process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial
    Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies,
    half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers
    to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated
    his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative
    Branch.
        Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may
    not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the
    Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect
    on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that
    manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely
    destructive.

              The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal

        The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction
    and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that
    perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office.
    Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need
    not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties.

                                   Precedents

        In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three
    federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History
    of Impeachment Hearings Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the
    House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm.
    Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'')
    Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that
    perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor
    did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment
    proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and
    misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon,
    it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with
    the exercise of the judges' judicial powers.

                                  Judge Nixon

        In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and
    removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense
    stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal
    officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of
    Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge
    Nixon's.
        Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew
    Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley
    Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the
    prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend
    of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of
    Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever.
    Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again
    denied his involvement before that grand jury.
        After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on
    two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years
    in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge
    Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged
    him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury
    that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case with the
    prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative
    false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had ``nothing
    whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild
    case.'' The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false
    statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand
    jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03.
        The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House
    Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable
    offense:

        ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal
    process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his
    testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain
    on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he
    sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary
    citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial
    oath?''

    House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of
    Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the
    question even more directly:

        ``There are basically two questions before you in connection with
    this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles
    of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate
    on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and
    wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath.
    Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives
    Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on
    the bench.''

    135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
        The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of
    perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As
    Senator Carl Levin explained:

        ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that
    Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading
    and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I
    and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon
    and remove him from office.''

    135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin).

                                 Judge Hastings

        Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for,
    among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate
    convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge
    Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy
    stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr.
    William Borders to ``fix'' cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for
    cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his
    own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any
    participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted
    Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge
    Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of
    which were for lying under oath at his trial.
        The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report
    left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable:

        ``It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony
    charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to
    convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence
    were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the
    conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes,
    the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct
    that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster
    one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt
    conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from
    public office.''

    The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of
    Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.)
    also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings:

        ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high
    crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve
    than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be
    disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to
    attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy
    and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles,
    we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that
    we demand of everyone else.''

    134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers).

                                Judge Claiborne

        In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and
    removed from office for making false statements under penalties of
    perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax
    returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result,
    he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false
    statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206
    (a). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles
    of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal
    income tax filings were not impeachable was never even seriously
    considered. As the House Managers explained:

        ``[T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two Articles of
    Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax returns] are readily
    resolved. The Constitution provides that Judge Claiborne may be
    impeached and convicted for ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article
    II, Section 4. The willful making or subscribing of a false statement
    on a tax return is a felony offense under the laws of the United
    States. The commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge
    Claiborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate.''

    Proceedings of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of Judge
    Harry E. Claiborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986) (Claiborne
    Proceedings'') (emphases added).
        House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate,
    emphatically made the same point:

        ``Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public officials
    who respect the law, not in those who violate the trust that has been
    given to them when they are trusted with public office. Judge Harry E.
    Claiborne has, sad to say, undermined the integrity of the judicial
    branch of Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public
    confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne must be
    convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that of reducing
    confidence in the integrity of the judiciary].''

    132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino).
        The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator Albert
    Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and remove him from
    office:

        ``The conclusion is inescapable that Claiborne filed false income
    tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than negligently. . . .
    Given the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its
    constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. An
    individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no business
    receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens.
    More importantly, an individual quality of such reprehensible conduct
    ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers which the
    Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary.''

    Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986).

                          Application to the President

        To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents--and in
    particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment for, conviction,
    and removal for perjury--the only recourse for the President's
    defenders is to argue that a high crime or misdemeanor for a judge is
    not necessarily a high crime or misdemeanor for the President. The
    arguments advanced in support of this dubious proposition do not
    withstand serious scrutiny. (See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193)
        The Constitution provides that Article III judges ``shall hold
    their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. III, 1. Thus,
    these arguments suggest that judges are impeachable for ``misbehavior''
    while other federal officials are only impeachable for treason,
    bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors.
        The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and the
    National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in the 1990s
    both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 1974, the staff of
    the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a report which
    included the following conclusion:

        ``Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states
    that judges `shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the
    relevance of the ten impeachments of judges with respect to
    presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by some? It does
    not. The argument is that `good behavior' implies an additional ground
    for impeachment of judges not applicable to other civil officers.
    However, the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention and
    included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its
    expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and
    defines impeachment offenses as `Treason, Bribery, and other high
    Crimes and Misdemeanors.' ''

    Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess.,
    Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print 1974)
    (``1974 Staff Report'') at 17.
        The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal came to
    the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that ``the most plausible
    reading of the phrase `during good Behavior' is that it means tenure
    for life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification
    debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the
    assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through
    impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on Judicial
    Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on Judicial
    Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993) (footnote omitted).
        The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also argues
    against different impeachment standards for federal judges and
    presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to dismiss
    the articles of impeachment against him for failure to state
    impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was that ``[t]he
    standard for impeachment of a judge is different than that for other
    officers'' and that the Constitution limited ``removal of the judiciary
    to acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office.''
    Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment
    on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter
    cited as ``Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate
    Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986)
    (hereinafter cited as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings'').
        Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the term
    `good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is totally misplaced
    and virtually all commentators agree that that is directed to affirming
    the life tenure of judges during good behavior. It is not to set them
    down, differently, as judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. at
    81-82. He further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any support for
    the notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the
    United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II of the
    Constitution.'' Id. at 81.
        The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the Senate
    was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained therein because it
    later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62
    (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus rejected the claim that the
    standard of impeachable offenses was different for judges than for
    presidents.
        Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and
    misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely the
    President ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than
    judges. In the course of the 1980s judicial impeachments, Congress
    emphasized unequivocally that the removal from office of federal judges
    guilty of crimes indistinguishable from those currently charged against
    the President was essential to the preservation of the rule of law. If
    the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule of law as to make
    it intolerable that he remain in office, then how much more so does
    perjury committed by the President of the United States, who alone is
    charged with the duty ``to take Care that the Laws be faithfully
    executed.'' (See generally, Cooper Testimony at 194)
        It is just as devastating to our system of government when a
    President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in
    justifying an article of impeachment against President Nixon, the
    President not only has ``the obligation that every citizen has to live
    under the law,'' but in addition has the duty ``not merely to live by
    the law but to see that law faithfully applied.'' Impeachment of
    Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305,
    93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides that he
    ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const.
    Art. II, Sec. 3. When a President, as chief law enforcement officer of
    the United States, commits perjury, he violates this constitutional
    oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a
    nation ruled by laws and not men.

               Perjury and Obstruction Are as Serious as Bribery

        Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction
    and removal comes directly from the text of the Constitution. Because
    the Constitution specifically mentions bribery, no one can dispute that
    it is an impeachable offense. U.S. Const., Art. II, Sec. 4. Because the
    constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take it to
    mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically criminalize
    bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony in
    judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See
    also 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute),
    1512 (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the
    efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return for
    submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles might easily have
    been charged under these statutes. No one could reasonably argue that
    the President's bribing a witness to provide false testimony--even in a
    private lawsuit--does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.
    The plain language of the Constitution indicates that it is.
        Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a witness
    is illegal because it leads to false testimony that in turn undermines
    the ability of the judicial system to reach just results. Thus, among
    other things, the Framers clearly intended impeachment to protect the
    judicial system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and obstruction of
    justice are illegal for exactly the same reason, and they accomplish
    exactly the same ends through slightly different means. Simple logic
    establishes that perjury and obstruction of justice--even in a private
    lawsuit--are exactly the types of other high crimes and misdemeanors
    that are of the same magnitude as bribery.

                          High Crimes and Misdemeanors

        Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of ``high
    crimes and misdemeanors,'' much of the background and history of the
    impeachment process contradicts the President's claim that these
    offenses are private and therefore do not warrant conviction and
    removal. Two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of
    impeachment are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's
    defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts in this
    case compel the conviction and removal of President Clinton.
        Many have commented on the report on ``Constitutional Grounds for
    Presidential Impeachment'' prepared in February 1974 by the staff of
    the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The general principles concerning
    grounds for impeachment set forth in that report indicate that perjury
    and obstruction of justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key
    language from the staff report describing the type of conduct which
    gives rise to impeachment:
        ``The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--
    undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties
    and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental
    process, adverse impact on the system of government.''

    1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphasis added).
        Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the
    integrity of office.'' They unavoidably erode respect for the office of
    the President. Such offenses obviously involve ``disregard of [the
    President's] constitutional duties and oath of office.'' Moreover,
    these offenses have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system
    of government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on
    the due administration of justice--a core function of our system of
    government.
        The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment''
    prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in
    January of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive
    impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of office:
        It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for

    ``impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . . .
    Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of
    government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen to
    constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, the
    essential nexus to damaging the integrity of government may be found in
    acts which constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers
    of, official position. It may also be found in acts which, without
    directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of
    public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers
    that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free
    society.''

    Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential
    Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphasis added). The commission of perjury
    and obstruction of justice by a President are acts that without doubt
    ``undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of the [the
    President] that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a
    free society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law which
    is essential to the well-being of our constitutional system.
        That the President's perjury and obstruction do not directly
    involve his official conduct does not diminish their significance. The
    record is clear that federal officials have been impeached for reasons
    other than official misconduct. As set forth above, two recent
    impeachments of federal judges are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge
    Walter Nixon was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for
    committing perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury
    involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a business
    partner--a matter in which he had no official role. In 1986, Judge
    Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office
    for making false statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax
    returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his official
    responsibilities.
        Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution
    suggests that officials are subject to impeachment only for official
    misconduct. Perjury and obstruction of justice--even regarding a
    private matter--are offenses that substantially affect the President's
    official duties because they are grossly incompatible with his
    preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    Regardless of their genesis, perjury and obstruction of justice are
    acts of public misconduct--they cannot be dismissed as understandable
    or trivial. Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters;
    they are crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment,
    conviction, and removal are appropriate.
        The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings affirms
    that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the ranking member of
    the Judiciary Committee and one of the House managers in the Senate
    trial, stated that ``[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in
    the course of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence
    of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be
    justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of
    public office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 132
    Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
        Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate dismiss the
    articles of impeachment for failure to state impeachable offenses
    provides additional evidence that personal misconduct can justify
    impeachment. One of the arguments his attorney made for the motion was
    that ``there is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge
    Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in his official
    function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' (Senate Claiborne
    Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar
    Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3)
        Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it would be
    absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape,
    or perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from
    office by the U.S. Senate.'' (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81)
    Kastenmeier's response was repeated by the House of Representatives in
    its pleading opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to
    Claiborne Motion at 2)
        The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it later
    voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
    1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that private improprieties
    could be, and were in this instance, impeachable offenses.
        The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it relates to
    a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's official duties--a
    judge's personal tax returns--is an impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's
    false statements were also in regard to a matter distinct from his
    official duties. In short, the Senate's own precedents establish that
    misconduct need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal.

                                   Conclusion

        This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an institution,
    because if the President is not convicted as a consequence of the
    conduct that has been portrayed, then no House of Representatives will
    ever be able to impeach again and no Senate will ever convict. The bar
    will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to
    be concerned.
        Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to impeach
    President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. Can you imagine a
    future President, faced with possible impeachment, pointing to the
    perjuries, lies, obstructions, and tampering with witnesses by the
    current occupant of the office as not rising to the level of high
    crimes and misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can
    the standard be lowered without completely compromising the credibility
    of the office for all time?
        Dated: January 11, 1999.
                                       The United States
                                       House of Representatives

                                       Henry J. Hyde,
                                       F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                       Bill McCollum,
                                       George W. Gekas,
                                       Charles T. Canady,
                                       Stephen E. Buyer,
                                       Ed Bryant,
                                       Steve Chabot,
                                       Bob Barr,
                                       Asa Hutchinson,
                                       Chris Cannon,
                                       James E. Rogan,
                                       Lindsey O. Graham.
                                      Managers on the Part of the House
                                     ______

                                    APPENDIX

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]
    In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

      Appendix to Trial Memorandum of the Managers Appointed by the U.S.
                            House of Representatives

                               Table of Contents

                                     charts
        A. The President's Contacts Alone With Lewinsky
        B. The President's Telephone Contacts With Lewinsky
        C. Lewinsky's Gifts to The President
        D. The President's Gifts to Lewinsky
        E. 12/5/97 Facsimile Transmission of Witness List in Jones v.
    Clinton
        F. The December 19, 1997 Subpoena to Lewinsky in Jones v. Clinton
        G. December 19, 1997 Activities Following Lewinsky's Receipt of
    Subpoena
        H. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No.
    10 in Jones v. Clinton
        I. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No.
    11 in Jones v. Clinton
        J. December 28, 1997, The President's Final Meeting With Lewinsky
    and Concealment of Gifts
        K. Currie's Cell Phone Records for 12/28/97
        L. The President's Statements About Concealing Gifts
        M. Lewinsky's Draft Affidavit
        N. Lewinsky Final Affidavit dated January 7, 1998 Paragraph 8,
    Jones v. Clinton
        O. Filing Lewinsky's Affidavit and Motion to Quash (1/14/98-1/17/
    98)
        P. Mission Accomplished: Lewinsky Signs Her Affidavit and Is Hired
    By Revlon in New York (1/5/98-1/9/98)
        Q. The President's Involvement With Lewinsky's Job Search
        R. Jordan's Testimony About His Pre-Witness List Job Search Efforts
        S. Activity Following The President's Deposition (1/17/98-1/19/98)
        T. The President's Statements to Currie 1/18/98
        U. The President's Denial of Sexual Relations
        V. The President's 1/21/98 Denial of Sexual Relations to
    Blumenthal, Podesta and Morris
        W. The White House 1/24/98 ``Talking Points''
        X. The President's Claims That He Was Truthful With Aides
        Y. The Three Options of a Grand Jury Witness
        Z. The President's Grand Jury ``Statement''
                                     ______

                                   [Chart A]

                  THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS ALONE WITH LEWINSKY

                   Lewinsky White House Employee (7/95-4/96)

                                      1995
    11/15/95 (Wed): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in Oval
                Office study and hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual
                Encounter)
    11/17/95 (Fri): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in The
                President's private bathroom outside the Oval Office study.
                (Sexual Encounter)
    12/5/95 (Tues): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office and study. (No Sexual Encounter)
    12/31/95 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office and Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
                                      1996
    1/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the bathroom
                outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
    1/21/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway
                outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
    2/4/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study and in the adjacent hallway. (Sexual
                Encounter)
    2/19/96 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office. (No Sexual Encounter)
    3/31/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in hallway
                outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter)
    4/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway
                outside the Oval Office study and in the Oval Office study.
                (Sexual Encounter)
                                      1997
    2/28/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office private bathroom. (Sexual Encounter)
    3/29/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
    5/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office dining room, study and hallway. (No Sexual
                Encounter)
    7/4/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter)
    7/14/97 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in Heinreich's
                office. (No Sexual Encounter)
    7/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
    8/16/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (Sexual Encounter)
    10/11/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
    11/13/97 (Thurs): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
    12/6/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
    12/28/97 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval
                Office study. (No Sexual Encounter)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart B]

                THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONTACTS WITH LEWINSKY

    1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--first call to ML's home.
    1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at office.
    1/15 or 1/16/96 (Mon or Tue): Conversation, approx. 12:30 a.m.--ML at
                home.*
    Approx. 1/28/96 (Sun): Caller ID on ML's office phone indicated POTUS
                call.
    1/30/96 (Tues): Conversation--during middle of workday at ML's office.
    2/4/96 (Sun): Conversations--ML at office--multiple calls.
    2/7 or 2/8/96 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
    2/8 or 2/9/96 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--ML at home.*
    2/19/96 (Mon): Conversation--ML at home.
    Approx. 2/28 or 3/5/96: Conversation--approx. 20 min.--after chance
                meeting in hallway--ML at home.
    3/26/96 (Tues): Conversation--approx. 11 a.m.--ML at office.
    3/29/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 8 p.m.--invitation to
                movie.
    3/31/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 1 p.m.--Pres. ill.
    4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation----ML at home.
    4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation--ML at home--why ML left.
    4/12/96 (Fri): Conversation--ML at home--daytime.
    4/12 or 4/13/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home--after midnight.
    4/22/96 (Mon): Conversations--job talk--ML at home.
    4/29 or 4/30/96 (Mon or Tues): Message--after 6:30 a.m.
    5/2/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.*
    5/6/96 (Mon): Possible phone call.
    5/16/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.
    5/21/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
    5/31/96 (Fri): Message.
    6/5/96 (Wed): Conversation--ML at home--early evening.
    6/23/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
    7/5 or 7/6/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
    7/19/96 (Fri): Conversation--6:30 a.m.--ML at home.*
    7/28/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.
    8/4/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.*
    8/24/96 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home.*
    9/5/96 (Thur): Conversation--Pres. In Fla--ML at home.*
    9/10/96 (Tues): Message.
    9/30/96 (Mon): Conversation.*
    10/22/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.*
    10/23 or 10/24/96 (early am): Conversation--ML at home.
    12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--approx. 10-15 min.--ML at home.
    12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--later that evening--ML at home--approx.
                10:30 p.m.--Pres fell asleep.*
    12/18/96 (Wed): Conversation--approx. 5 min.--10:30 p.m.--ML at home.
    12/30/96 (Mon): Message.
    1/12/97 (Sun): Conversation--job talk--ML at home.*
    2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home--mid-day--11:30-12:00.
    2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--job talk--1:30 or 2:00 p.m.--ML at home.*
    3/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--three minutes--ML at work.
    4/26/97 (Sat): Conversation--late afternoon--20 min.--ML at home.
    5/17/97 (Sat): Conversations--multiple calls.
    5/18/97 (Sun): Conversations--multiple calls.
    7/15/97 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.
    8/1/97 (Fri): Conversation.
    9/30/97 (Tues): Conversation.*
    10/9 or 10/10/97 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--long, from 2 or 2:30 a.m.
                until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m.--job talk--argument--ML at home.
    10/23/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--end b/c HRC.
    10/30/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--interview prep.
    11/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--discuss re: ML visit.*
    12/6/97 (Sat): Conversation--approx. 30 min--ML at home.
    12/17 or 12/18/97 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--b/t 2:00 a.m. and 3:00
                a.m.--ML at home--witness list.
    1/5/98 (Mon): Conversation.

        *Conversation that involved and may have involved phone sex.
                                   [Chart C]

                        LEWINSKY GIFTS TO THE PRESIDENT

    10/24/95: Lewinsky (before the sexual relationship began) gives her
                first gift to The President of a matted poem given by her
                and other White House interns to commemorate ``National
                Boss' Day''. It is the only gift the President sent to the
                archives instead of keeping.
    11/20/95: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie.
    3/31/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Hugo Boss Tie.
    Christmas 1996: Lewinsky gives The President a Sherlock Homes game and
                a glow in the dark frog.
    Before 8/16/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie and a t-
                shirt from Bosnia.
    Early 1997: Lewinsky gives The President Oy Ve, a small golf book, golf
                balls, golf tees, and a plastic pocket frog.
    3/97: Lewinsky gives The President a care package after he injured his
                leg including a metal magnet with The Presidential seal for
                his crutches, a license plate with ``Bill'' for his
                wheelchair, and knee pads with The Presidential seal.
    3/29/97: Lewinsky gives The President her personal copy of Vox, a book
                about phone sex, a penny medallion with the heart cut out,
                a framed Valentine's Day ad, and a replacement for the Hugo
                Boss tie that had the bottom cut off.
    5/24/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Banana Republic casual shirt
                and a puzzle on gold mysteries.
    7/14/97: Lewinsky gives The President a wooden B, with a frog in it
                from Budapest.
    Before 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President The Notebook.
    8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique book on Peter the
                Great, the card game ``Royalty'', and a book, Disease and
                Misrepresentation.
    10/21/97 or 10/22/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Calvin Klein tie,
                and pair of sunglasses.
    10/97: Lewinsky gives The President a package Before filled with
                Halloween-related items, such as a Halloween pumpkin lapel
                pin, a wooden letter opener with a frog on the handle, and
                a plastic pumpkin filled with candy.
    11/13/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique paperweight that
                depicted the White House.
    12/6/97: Lewinsky gives The President Our Patriotic President: His Life
                in Pictures, Anecdotes, Sayings, Principles and Biography;
                an antique standing cigar holder; a Starbucks Santa Monica
                mug; a Hugs and Kisses box; and a tie from London.
    12/28/97: Lewinsky gives The President a hand-painted Easter Egg and
                ``gummy boobs'' from Urban Outfitters.
    1/4/98: Lewinsky gives Currie a package with her final gift to The
                President containing a book entitled The Presidents of the
                United States and a love note inspired by the movie
                Titanic.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart D]

                       THE PRESIDENT'S GIFTS TO LEWINSKY

    12/5/95: The President gives Lewinsky an autographed photo of himself
                wearing the Zenga necktie she gave him.*
    2/4/96: The President gives Lewinsky a signed ``State of the Union''
                Address.*
    3/31/96: The President gives Lewinsky cigars.
    2/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky a hat pin*, ``Davidoff'' cigars,
                and the book the Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman as belated
                Christmas gifts.
        The President gives Lewinsky a gold brooch.*
        The President gives Lewinsky an Annie Lennox compact disk.
        The President gives Lewinsky a cigar.
    7/24/97: The President gives Lewinsky an antique flower pin in a wooden
                box, a porcelain object d'art, and a signed photograph of
                the President and Lewinsky.*
    Early 9/97: The President brings Lewinsky several Black Dog items,
                including a baseball cap*, 2 T-shirts*, a hat and a dress.*
    12/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky the largest number of gifts
                including:
        1. a large Rockettes blanket,*
        2. a pin of the New York skyline,*
        3. a marblelike bear's head from Vancouver,*
        4. a pair of sunglasses,*
        5. a small box of cherry chocolates,
        6. a canvas bag from the Black Dog,*
        7. a stuffed animal wearing a T-shirt from the Black Dog.*

        (*Denotes those items Lewinsky produced to the OIC on 7/29/98).

                                   [Chart F]

                               LEWINSKY SUBPOENA

                                Jones v. Clinton

                               december 19, 1997
        The Jones v. Clinton subpoena to Lewinsky called for:

    (1) Her testimony on January 23, 1998 at 9:30 a.m.;
    (2) Production of ``each and every gift including but not limited to,
                any and all dresses, accessories, and jewelry, and/or hat
                pins given to you by, or on behalf of, Defendant Clinton;''
                and
    (3) ``Every document constituting or containing communications between
                you and Defendant Clinton, including letters, cards, notes,
                memoranda and all telephone records.''
                                     ______

                                   [Chart G]

                               DECEMBER 19, 1997

                                    (Friday)

             Lewinsky is Served with a Subpoena in Jones v. Clinton

    1:47-1:48 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan's office.
    3:00-4:00 p.m.: Lewinsky is served with a subpoena in Jones v. Clinton.
    --: Lewinsky telephones Jordan immediately about subpoena.
    3:51-3:52 p.m.: Jordan telephones The President and talks to Debra
                Schiff.
    4:17-4:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Social Office.
    4:47 p.m.: Lewinsky meets Jordan and requests that Jordan notify The
                President about her subpoena.
    5:01-5:05 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan; Jordan notifies The
                President about Lewinsky's subpoena.
    5:06 p.m.: Jordan telephones attorney Carter to represent Lewinsky.
    Later that Evening: The President meets alone with Jordan at the White
                House.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart H]

                               DECEMBER 23, 1997

                     Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 10

        Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name, address, and telephone
    number of each and every individual (other than Hillary Rodham Clinton)
    whom you had sexual relations when you held any of the following
    positions:

    a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
    b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
    c. President of the United States.

    (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present
    involving state or federal employees.)
        Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (as modified by
    direction of the Court): None.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart I]

                               DECEMBER 23, 1997

                     Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 11

        Interrogratory No. 11: Please state the name, address, and
    telephone number of each and every individual (other than Hillary
    Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual relations, when you
    held any of the following positions:

        a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
        b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
        c. President of the United States.

    (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present
    involving state or federal employees.)
        Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 11 (as modified by
    direction of the Court): None.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart J]

                               DECEMBER 28, 1997

                                    (Sunday)

    The President's Final Meeting with Lewinsky and The Concealment of the
                               Gifts to Lewinsky

    8:16 a.m.: Lewinsky meets The President at the White House at Currie's
                direction.

     The President gives Lewinsky numerous gifts.
     The President and Lewinsky discuss the subpoena, calling for,
                among other things, the hat pin. The President acknowledges
                ``that sort of bothered [him] too.''
     Lewinsky states to The President: ``Maybe I should put the
                gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to
                someone, maybe Betty [Currie].''

    3:32 p.m.: Currie telephones Lewinsky at home from Currie's cell phone.

    ``I understand you have something to give me.'' or
    ``The President said you have something to give me.''

    Later that Day: Currie picks up gifts from Lewinsky.

                                   [Chart L]

               THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT CONCEALING GIFTS

                                    12/28/97

        ``[Lewinsky]: And then at some point I said to him [The President],
    `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my
    house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of
    said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about
    that.' And left that topic.''--(Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 152)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart M]

                            AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #

        1. My name is Jane Doe # . I am 24 years old and I currently reside
    at 700 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20037.
        2. On December 19, 1997, I was served with a subpoena from the
    plaintiff to give a deposition and to produce documents in the lawsuit
    filed by Paula Corbin Jones against President William Jefferson Clinton
    and Danny Ferguson.
        3. I can not fathom any reason that the plaintiff would seek
    information from me for her case.
        4. I have never met Ms. Jones, nor do I have any information
    regarding the events she alleges occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May
    8, 1991 or any other information concerning any of the allegations in
    her case.
        5. I worked at the White House in the summer of 1995 as a White
    House intern. Beginning in December, 1995, I worked in the Office of
    Legislative Affairs as a staff assistant for correspondence. In April,
    1996, I accepted a job as assistant to the Assistant Secretary for
    Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense. I maintained that job
    until December 26, 1997. I am currently unemployed but seeking a new
    job.
        6. In the course of my employment at the White House, I met
    President Clinton on several occasions. I do not recall ever being
    alone with the President, although it is possible that while working in
    the White House Office of Legislative Affairs I may have presented him
    with a letter for his signature while no one else was present. This
    would have lasted only a matter of minutes.
        7. I have the utmost respect for the President who has always
    behaved appropriately in my presence.
        8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he
    did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me
    employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he
    did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual
    relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a sexual
    relationship with the President, was offered employment or other
    benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied
    employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The
    occasions that I saw the President, with crowds of other people, after
    I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996 related to
    official receptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S.
    Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were
    other people present on all of these occasions.
        9. Since I do not possess any information that could possibly be
    relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible
    evidence in this case, I asked my attorney to provide this affidavit to
    plaintiff's counsel. Requiring my deposition in this matter would cause
    unwarranted attorney's fees and costs, disruption of my life,
    especially since I am looking for employment, and constitute an
    invasion of my right to privacy.
        I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
    and correct.
                                                    Monica S. Lewinsky.
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss:
        Monica S. Lewinsky, being first duly sworn on oath according to
    law, deposes and says that she has read the foregoing Affidavit of Jane
    Doe # by her subscribed, that the matters stated herein are true to the
    best of her information, knowledge and belief.
                                                    Monica S. Lewinsky.

        Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of __________,
    1998.
                                             __________________________
                                                    Notary Public, D.C.
        My Commission expires: ________
                                     ______

                                   [Chart N]

                   FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #6 [LEWINSKY]

                                     1/7/98

    8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did
                not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not
                offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a
                sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other
                benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. I do not know
                of any other person who had a sexual relationship with the
                President, was offered employment or other benefits in
                exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied
                employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual
                relationship. The occasions that I saw the President after
                I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996,
                were official receptions, formal functions or events
                related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was
                working at the time. There were other people present on
                those occasions.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart O]

                        LEWINSKY'S AFFIDAVIT GETS FILED

                               (1/14/98-1/17/98)

                          january 14, 1998 (wednesday)
    7:45 p.m.: Bennett's firm (Sexton) leaves Carter telephone message.
    --: Carter faxes signed affidavit to Bennett's firm.
                          january 15, 1998 (thursday)
    9:17 a.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
    12:59 p.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message.
    --: Currie called by Newsweek.
    --: Lewinsky drives Currie to meet Jordan.
    --: Sexton telephones Carter: ``STILL ON TIME?''
    --: Carter telephones Court Clerk for Saturday (1/17/98) Filing of
                Affidavit and motion to quash.
                           january 16, 1998 (friday)
    2 a.m. (Approx.): Carter completes motion to quash Lewinsky's
                deposition.
        Carter sends by overnight mail motion to quash and affidavit to
                Bennett's firm and to the Court.
    11:30 a.m.: Sexton message to Carter: ``Please call.''
                          january 17, 1998 (saturday)
    --: Lewinsky Affidavit is submitted to the Court.
    --: The President is deposed.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart P]

     MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: LEWINSKY SIGNS AFFIDAVIT AND GETS A NEW YORK JOB

                                (1/5/98-1/9/98)

                                january 5, 1998
    Lewinsky meets with attorney Carter for an hour; Carter drafts an
                Affidavit for Lewinsky in an attempt to avert her
                deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton scheduled for
                January 23, 1998.
    Lewinsky telephones Currie stating that she needs to speak to the
                President about an important matter; specifically that she
                was anxious about something she needed to sign--an
                Affidavit.
    The President returns Lewinsky's call; Lewinsky mentions the Affidavit
                she'd be signing; Lewinsky offers to show the Affidavit to
                The President who states that he doesn't need to see it
                because he has already seen about fifteen others.
                                january 6, 1998
    11:32 a.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter.''
                Lewinsky meets Carter and receives draft Affidavit.
    2:08-2:10 p.m.: Jordan calls Lewinsky. Lewinsky delivers draft
                Affidavit to Jordan.
    3:14 p.m.: Carter again pages Lewinsky: ``Frank Carter at [telephone
                number] will see you tomorrow morning at 10:00 in my
                office.''
    3:26-3:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
    3:38 p.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich, Deputy Assistant to The
                President.
    3:48 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
    3:49 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky to discuss draft Affidavit. Both
                agree to delete implication that she had been alone with
                The President.
    4:19-4:32 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan.
    4:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
    4:34-4:37 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Carter.
    5:15-5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
    9:26-9:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
    10:00 a.m.: Lewinsky signs false Affidavit at Carter's Office.
    --: Lewinsky delivers signed Affidavit to Jordan.
    11:58 a.m.-12:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
    5:46-5:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House (Hernreich's Office).
    6:50-6:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House and tells The
                President that Lewinsky signed an Affidavit.
                                january 8, 1998
    9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's Office.
    9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
    --: Lewinsky interviews in New York at MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
                Inc. (MFH)
    11:50-11:51 a.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
    3:09-3:10 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
    4:48-4:53 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New
                York MFH Interview went ``Very Poorly.''
    4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ronald Perelman in New York, CEO of Revlon
                (subsidiary of MFH) ``to make things happen . . . if they
                could happen.''
    4:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky stating, ``I'm doing the best I
                can to help you out.''
    6:39 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Counsel's Office (Cheryl
                Mills), possibly about Lewinsky.
    Evening: Revlon in New York telephones Lewinsky to set up a follow-up
                interview.
    9:02-9:03 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan about Revlon interview in
                New York.
                                january 9, 1998
    --: Lewinsky interviews in New York with Senior V.P. Seidman of
                MacAndrews & Forbes and two Revlon individuals.
        Lewinsky offered Revlon job in New York and accepts.
    1:29 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
    4:14 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan to say that Revlon offered her a
                job in New York.
        Jordan notifies Currie: ``Mission Accomplished'' and requests she
                tell The President.
        Jordan notifies The President of Lewinsky's New York job offer. The
                President replies ``Thank you very much.''
    4:37 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Carter.
    5:04 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
    5:05 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
    5:08 p.m.: The President telephones Currie.
    5:09-5:11 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan.
    5:12 p.m.: Currie telephones The President.
    5:18-5:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky.
    5:21-5:26 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart Q]

              THE PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT WITH LEWINSKY JOB SEARCH

    ``Q: Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that this
                has happened [Carter had been fired]?
    [Jordan]: Thought they had a right to know.
    Q: Why?
    [Jordan]: The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got
                her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new
                counsel. I thought that was information that they ought to
                have. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/9/98 Tr. 45-46)
    ``Q: Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank Carter
                had been replaced?
    [Jordan]: Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew
                that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was
                interested in this matter. He is the source of it coming to
                my attention in the first place. . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury
                6/9/98 Tr. 58-59)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart R]

                  JORDAN'S PRE-WITNESS LIST JOB SEARCH EFFORTS

    ``[Jordan]: I have no recollection of an early November meeting with
                Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of
                it and I have no record of it.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 3/3/98
                Tr. 50)
              * * * * * * *
    ``Q: Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica Lewinsky a
                job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?
    [Jordan]: I think that's fair to say.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 Tr.
                76)
              * * * * * * *
    ``[Lewinsky]: [Referring to 12/6/97 meeting with the President]. I
                think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch with
                Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work
                out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job
                front].
    Q: Did the President say what he was going to do?
    [Lewinsky]: I think he said he would--you know, this was not sort of
                typical of him, to sort of say, `Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll
                get on it.' '' (Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 115-116)
              * * * * * * *
    ``Q: But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 11th, you
                are clear that at that point you had made a decision that
                you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.
    [Jordan]: There is no question about that.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98
                Tr. 95)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart S]

                                January 17, 1998

                                    saturday
     4:00 p.m. (approx): THE PRESIDENT finishes testifying under
                oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al.
     5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House.
     5:38 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
     7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home but does
                not speak with her.
     7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT places a call to Jordan's office.
     7:13 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks
                her to meet with him on Sunday.

                                January 18, 1998

                                     sunday
     6:11 a.m.: Drudge Report Released.
     --: The President learns of the Drudge Report and [Tripp]
                tapes.
     11:49 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
     12:30 p.m.: Jordan has lunch with Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey
                informs Jordan about the Drudge Report and [Tripp] tapes.
     12:50 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
     1:11 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
     2:15 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
     2:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT.
     5:00 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT meets with Currie, concerning his
                contacts with Lewinsky.
     5:12 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
     6:22 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
     7:06 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
     7:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills, White House
                Counsel's Office.
     8:28 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Call Kay.''
     10:09 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie at home.
     11:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks
                if she reached Lewinsky.

                                January 19, 1998

                         monday--martin luther king day
     7:02 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home at
                8:00 this morning.''
     8:08 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay .''
     8:33 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.''
     8:37 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.
                It's a social call. Thank you.''
     8:41 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Kay is at home. Please
                call.''
     8:43 a.m.: Currie telephones The President from home to say
                she has been unable to reach Lewinsky.
     8:44 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kate re:
                family emergency.''
     8:50 a.m. THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
     8:51 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Msg. From Kay. Please
                call, have good news.''
     8:56 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home.
     10:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from his office.
     10:35 a.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the White
                House.
     10:36 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at
                [number redacted].''
     10:44 a.m.: Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the White
                House.
     10:53 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter.
     10:58 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office.
     11:04 a.m.: Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the White
                House.
     11:16 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at
                [number redacted].''
     11:17 a.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey at the White House.
     12:31 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular
                phone.
     --: Jordan lunches with Carter.
     1:45 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home.
     2:29 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular
                phone.
     2:44 p.m.: Jordan enters the White House and over the course
                of an hour meets with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine Bowles, Bruce
                Lindsay, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm Emanuel and
                others.
     2:46 p.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter
                at [number redacted].''
     4:51 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
     4:53 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at home.
     4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at his office. Carter
                informs Jordan that Lewinsky has replaced Carter with a new
                attorney.
     4:58 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     4:59 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ruff, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:05 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Lindsey, White House
                Counsel's Office.
     5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House.
     5:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:14 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter concerning his termination
                as Lewinsky's attorney.
     5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's
                Office.
     5:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
     5:56 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office;
                Jordan informs The President that Carter was fired.
     6:04 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home.
     6:26 p.m.: Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide to THE
                PRESIDENT.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart T]

              THE PRESIDENT'S POST-DEPOSITION STATEMENTS TO CURRIE

                                    1/18/98

         ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
         ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
         ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
         ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
         ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do
    that.''--(Currie Grand Jury 7/22/98 Tr. 6-7; Currie Grand Jury 1/27/98
    Tr. 70-75)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart U]

                            THE PRESIDENT'S DENIALS

                                    1/21/98

        ``And it was at that point that he gave his account of what had
    happened to me [sic] and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He
    said, `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He
    rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused
    pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'
        She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had
    an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that
    she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then
    she wouldn't be the stalker any more.''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98
    Tr. 49)
        ``And he said, `I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like
    somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a
    lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character
    in the novel Darkness at Noon.'
        And I said to him, I said, `When this happened with Monica
    Lewinsky, were you alone? He said, `Well, I was within eyesight or
    earshot of someone.' ''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 Tr. 50)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart V]
        ``Q. Okay. Share that with us.
        ``A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of,
    you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had
    sex with her in any way whatsoever--
        ``Q. Okay.
        ``A. --that they had not had oral sex''--(John Podesta Grand Jury
    6/16/98 Tr. 92)
              * * * * * * *
        ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new,
    it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to
    forgive you [The President] for adultery, but not for perjury or
    obstruction of justice or the various other things.' ''--(Dick Morris
    Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 10, 12, 20)
              * * * * * * *
        ``And I said, `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the voters.'
    And he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to win, then.' ''--
    (Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 30)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart W]

                              ``TALKING POINTS'' *

                                January 24, 1998

              * * * * * * *
        ``Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the
    President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the
    President, constitute a sexual relationship?''
        ``A. Of course it would.''
              * * * * * * *
        * Produced by the White House pursuant to OIC Subpoena.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart X]

                THE PRESIDENT CLAIMS HE WAS TRUTHFUL WITH AIDES

        [President]: And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's
    nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex
    with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I would
    never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course.
        But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter
    further. So I said things that were true. They may have been
    misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and
    I'm sorry.--(The President Grand Jury 8/17/98 Tr. 106)
                                     ______

                                   [Chart Y]

                              GRAND JURY WITNESSES

        A person testifying before a federal grand jury has three options
    under the law:
              (1) To obey the oath and testify to the truth, the whole
            truth and nothing but the truth;
              (2) To lie;
              (3) To assert the Fifth Amendment or another legally
            recognized privilege.
                                     ______

                                   [Chart Z]

                   PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GRAND JURY TESTIMONY

        ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early
    1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These
    encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not
    constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at
    my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate
    intimate contact.
        These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early
    1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky
    that included inappropriate sexual banter.
        I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this
    conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
        While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I
    can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and
    others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold,
    this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
        I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions
    including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions
    about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood
    it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions
    concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and
    intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my statement.''
                                     ______

                               Table of Contents

                                    exhibits
    Telephone records
        (1) Summary chart, 12/19/97
        (2) Currie Cell phone records, 12/28/97
        (3) Summary chart, 1/6/98
        (4) Summary chart, 1/7/98
        (5) Summary chart, 1/15/98-1/16/98
        (6) Summary chart, 1/17/98
        (7) Summary chart, 1/18/98
        (8) Summary chart, 1/19/98
    Court Documents
        (9) Jones v. Clinton. Jan. 29, 1998 District Court Order regarding
    discovery
        (10) President Clinton's Answer to First Amended Complaint. Jones
    v. Clinton
        (11) In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3053 & 3059, U.S. Court of
    Appeals, District of Columbia
        (12) Jane Doe #6 (Lewinsky) Affidavit filed in Jones v. Clinton
        (13) ``Sexual Relations'' definition
    Miscellaneous
        (14) 1/18/98 Drudge Report
        (15) Jones' attorneys fax cover sheet of witness list to Bennett
        (16) White House ``Talking Points,'' January 24, 1998
        (17) LA Times 1/25/98 Article regarding White House ``Talking
    Points''
        (18) Response of William J. Clinton to Judiciary Committee
    Questions
        (19) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 138 L. 16-23 (From GJ Tape 2)
        (20) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 100 L. 20-25, Tr. 105 L. 19-
    25, Tr. 106 L. 1-12 (From GJ Tape 3)
        (21) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 75 L. 2-8, Tr. 76 L. 24-25,
    Tr. 77 L. 1-2, (From Dep. Tape 1)
        (22) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 52 L. 18-25, Tr. 53 L. 1-9,
    10-18, Tr. 58 L. 22-25, Tr. 59 L. 1-3, 7-16, 17-20 (From Dep. Tape 3)
        (23) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 78 L. 4-23, (From Dep. Tape
    4)
        (24) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 53 L. 22-25, Tr. 54 L. 1-7,
    20-25, Tr. 55 L. 1-3 (From Dep. Tape 5)
        (25) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 204 L. 5-14, (From Dep. Tape
    8)
        (26) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 9-11

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

    In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
            States

            TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                               Table of Contents

        I. INTRODUCTION
        A. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been
    Satisfied
        B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice
        C. Compound Charges and Vagueness
        II. BACKGROUND
        A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End
        B. The Paula Jones Litigation
        C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky
        D. Proceedings in the House of Representatives
        III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION
        A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of
    High Crimes and Misdemeanors
        1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question
    Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
        2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High
    Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
        a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an Intentionally High
    Standard for Removal
        b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were
    Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government
        3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not
    Alone State Impeachable Offenses
        a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon
        b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton
        4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm
    that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present
        a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
        b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations Would Forever
    Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and to Our Government
    of Separated Powers
        5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
        B. The Standard of Proof
        IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I
        A. Applicable Law
        B. Structure of the Allegations
        C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article I
        1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading
    statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his
    relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
        2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and
    misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the
    Jones case
        3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and
    misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements of his
    attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
        4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and
    misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to
    influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
    evidence'' in the Jones case
        V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II
        A. Applicable Law
        B. Structure of the Allegations
        C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II
        1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
    ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit
    in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and
    misleading''
        2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
    ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false
    and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in
    the Jones litigation
        3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged,
    or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to
    Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
        a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
        b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
        c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the
    President's Actions
        4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection
    with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an effort
    to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case
        a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge
        b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
        c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
        (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan
        (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment offer
        d. Conclusion
        5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to
    make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning
    Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
        6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating
    ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty
    Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
        7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed
    allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
        VI. THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A
    CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND VOTE
        A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in
    Specificity
        1. The Structure of Article I
        2. The Structure of Article II
        B. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate the Constitutional
    Requirement That Two-Thirds of the Senate Reach Agreement that Specific
    Wrongdoing Has Been Proven
        1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation
    of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
        a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence
    Requirement
        b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections
    that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single Accusation
        C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process
    Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations
        1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
        2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
        D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak
    Clearly and Intelligibly
        VII. THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY
        VIII. CONCLUSION

            TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                                I. Introduction

        Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left their
    homes and work places to travel to schools, church halls and other
    civic centers to elect a President of the United States. And on January
    20, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term
    of office for four years.
        The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the House of
    Representatives, is now gathered in trial to consider whether that
    decision should be set aside for the remaining two years of the
    President's term. It is a power contemplated and authorized by the
    Framers of the Constitution, but never before employed in our nation's
    history. The gravity of what is at stake--the democratic choice of the
    American people--and the solemnity of the proceedings dictate that a
    decision to remove the President from office should follow only from
    the most serious of circumstances and should be done in conformity with
    Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation and its
    people.
        The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the Senate
    fall far short of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they
    placed in the hands of the Congress the power to impeach and remove a
    President from office. They fall far short of what the American people
    demand be shown and proven before their democratic choice is reversed.
    And they even fall far short of what a prudent prosecutor would require
    before presenting a case to a judge or jury.
        Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-
    flying rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see clearly that the
    House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from
    office because he:
         used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe the
    frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky.
    There were, according to the House Managers, eleven such contacts over
    the course of approximately 500 days.
        Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the
    United States be removed from office because he used the phrase
    ``certain occasions'' to describe eleven events over some 500 days?
    That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do.
         used the word ``occasional'' to describe the frequency of
    inappropriate telephone conversations between he and Monica Lewinsky.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in
    between ten and fifteen such conversations spanning a 23-month period.
        Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the
    United States be removed from office because he used the word
    ``occasional'' to describe up to 15 telephone calls over a 23-month
    period? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to
    do.
         said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began in
    early 1996, while she recalls that it began in November 1995. And he
    said the contact did not include touching certain parts of her body,
    while she said it did.
        Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the
    United States be removed from office because two people have a
    different recollection of the details of a wrongful relationship--which
    the President has admitted? That is what the House of Representatives
    asks the Senate to do.
        The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples cited
    above, but the other allegations of wrongdoing are similarly
    unconvincing. There is the charge that the President unlawfully
    obstructed justice by allegedly trying to find a job for Monica
    Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about their relationship. This
    charge is made despite the fact that no one involved in the effort to
    find work for Ms. Lewinsky--including Ms. Lewinsky herself--testifies
    that there was any connection between the job search and the affidavit.
    Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. Lewinsky's statements to Ms.
    Tripp, was expressly repudiated by Ms. Lewinsky under oath.
        There is also the charge that the President conspired to obstruct
    justice by arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts that he had given
    her, even though the facts and the testimony contain no evidence that
    he did so. In fact, the evidence shows that the President gave her new
    gifts on the very day that the articles allege he conspired to conceal
    his gifts to her.
        In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to remove the
    President because he had a wrongful relationship and sought to keep the
    existence of that relationship private.
        Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse the
    President's actions. By his own admission, he is guilty of personal
    failings. As he has publicly stated, ``I don't think there is a fancy
    way to say that I have sinned.'' He has misled his family, his friends,
    his staff, and the Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. He hoped to avoid exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to
    protect his family and himself and to avoid public embarrassment. He
    has acknowledged that his actions were wrong.
        By the same token, these actions must not be mischaracterized into
    a wholly groundless excuse for removing the President from the office
    to which he was twice elected by the American people. The allegations
    in the articles and the argument in the House Managers' Trial
    Memorandum do not begin to satisfy the stringent showing required by
    our Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected President from office,
    either as a matter of fact or law.
     a. the constitutional standard for impeachment has not been satisfied
        There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal scholars
    and historians that the substance of the articles does not amount to
    impeachable offenses. On November 6, 1998, 430 Constitutional law
    professors wrote:

        ``Did President Clinton commit `high Crimes and Misdemeanors'
    warranting impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that
    the misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . .
    does not cross the threshold. . . . [I]t is clear that Members of
    Congress could violate their constitutional responsibilities if they
    sought to impeach and remove the President for misconduct, even
    criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high constitutional
    standard required for impeachment.''

        On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a joint
    statement warning that because impeachment had traditionally been
    reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive
    power, impeachment of the President based on the facts alleged in the
    OIC Referral would set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward,
    they will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished,
    at the mercy as never before of caprices of any Congress. The
    Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great
    national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges
    of the future.''
        We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise to the
    level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' in Section III,
    Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof.
          b. the president did not commit perjury or obstruct justice
        Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. Article II
    alleges obstruction of justice. Both perjury and obstruction of justice
    are statutory crimes. In rebutting the allegations contained in the
    articles of impeachment, this brief refers to the facts as well as to
    laws, legal principles, court decisions, procedural safeguards, and the
    Constitution itself. Those who seek to remove the President speak of
    the ``rule of law.'' Among the most fundamental rules of law are the
    principles that those who accuse have the burden of proof, and those
    who are accused have the right to defend themselves by relying on the
    law, established procedures, and the Constitution. These principles are
    not ``legalisms'' but rather the very essence of the ``rule of law''
    that distinguishes our Nation from others.
        We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance we can
    decipher in Section IV, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I,
    and in Section V, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article II.
                       c. compound charges and vagueness
        If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives has
    utterly failed in its constitutional responsibility to the Senate and
    to the President, that doubt vanishes upon reading the Trial Memorandum
    submitted by the House Managers. Having proferred two articles of
    impeachment, each of which unconstitutionally combines multiple
    offenses and fails to give even minimally adequate notice of the
    charges it encompasses, the House--three days before the Managers are
    to open their case--is still expanding, not refining, the scope of
    those articles. In further violation of the most basic constitutional
    principles, their brief advances, merely as ``examples,'' nineteen
    conclusory allegations--eight of perjury under Article I and eleven of
    obstruction of justice under Article II, some of which have never
    appeared before, even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary
    Committee (``Committee Report''), much less in the Office of
    Independent Counsel (``OIC'') Referral or in the articles
    themselves.\1\ If the target the Managers present to the Senate and to
    the President is still moving now, what can the President expect in the
    coming days? Is there any point at which the President will be given
    the right accorded a defendant in the most minor criminal case--to know
    with certainty the charges against which he must defend?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For example, the House managers add a charge that the President
    engaged in ``legalistic hair splitting [in his response to the 81
    questions] in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to
    deceive and obstruct'' the Committee. This charge was specifically
    rejected by the full House of Representatives when it rejected Article
    IV.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and has, in
    past proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles far less flawed
    than these. The constitutional concerns raised by the House's action
    are addressed in Section VI, The Structural Deficiencies of the
    Articles Preclude a Constitutionally Sound Vote.

                                 II. Background

                    a. the whitewater investigative dead-end
        The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the long-
    running Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the Special
    Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
    Columbia Court Circuit appointed Kenneth W. Starr as Independent
    Counsel to conduct an investigation centering on two Arkansas entities,
    Whitewater Development Company, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings and
    Loan Association.
        In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any expansion of
    jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state troopers who had once been
    assigned to the Governor's security detail, and ``[t]he troopers said
    Starr's investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including
    Paula Corbin Jones. . . .'' Woodward & Schmidt, ``Starr Probes Clinton
    Personal Life,'' The Washington Post (June 25, 1997) at A1 (emphasis
    added). ``The nature of the questioning marks a sharp departure from
    previous avenues of inquiry in the three-year old investigation. . . .
    Until now, . . . what has become a wide-ranging investigation of many
    aspects of Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of
    questions about Clinton's relationships with women. . . .'' \2\ One of
    the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater
    investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones case. One
    of the troopers interviewed declared, ``[t]hey asked me about Paula
    Jones, all kinds of questions about Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton
    and Paula together and how many times.'' \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Ibid. Trooper Roger Perry, a 21-year veteran of the Arkansas
    state police, stated that he ``was asked about the most intimate
    details of Clinton's life: `I was left with the impression that they
    wanted me to show he was a womanizer. . . . All they wanted to talk
    about was women.' '' Ibid. (Ellipsis in original).
        \3\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House Judiciary
    Committee, Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had conducted these
    interrogations and acknowledged that at that time, he had not sought
    expansion of his jurisdiction from either the Special Division or the
    Attorney General.\4\ Mr. Starr contended that these inquiries were
    somehow relevant to his Whitewater investigation: ``we were, in fact
    interviewing, as good prosecutors, good investigators do, individuals
    who would have information that may be relevant to our inquiry about
    the President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty Savings
    and Loan and the like.''\5\ It seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC
    was in fact engaged in an unauthorized attempt to gather embarrassing
    information about the President--information wholly unrelated to
    Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, but potentially
    relevant to the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Transcript of November 19, 1998 House Judiciary Committee
    Hearing at 377-378.
        \5\ Ibid. at 378.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         b. the paula jones litigation
        The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about events she
    said had occurred three years earlier, in 1991, when the President was
    Governor of Arkansas. Discovery in the case had been stayed until the
    Supreme Court's decision on May 27, 1997, denying the President
    temporary immunity from suit.\6\ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal
    team began a public relations offensive against the President, headed
    by Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Mr. Susan Carpenter-McMillan, and her
    new counsel affiliated with the conservative Rutherford Institute.\7\
    ``I will never deny that when I first heard about this case I said,
    `Okay, good. We're gonna get that little slimeball,' said Ms.
    Carpenter-McMillan.'' \8\ While Ms. Jones' previous attorneys, Messrs.
    Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata, had largely avoided the media, as
    the Jones civil suit increasingly became a partisan vehicle to try to
    damage the President, public personal attacks became the order of the
    day.\9\ As is now well known, this effort led ultimately to the Jones
    lawyers being permitted to subpoena various women, to discover the
    nature of their relationship, if any, with the President, allegedly for
    the purpose of determining whether they had information relevant to the
    sexual harassment charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
        \7\ Ms. Jones was described as having ``accepted financial support
    of a Virginia conservative group,'' which intended to ``raise $100,000
    or more on Jones's behalf, although the money will go for expenses and
    not legal fees.'' ``Jones Acquires New Lawyers and Backing,'' The
    Washington Post (October 2, 1998) at A1. Jones' new law firm, the
    Dallas-based Radar, Campbell, Fisher and Pyke, had ``represented
    conservatives in antiabortion cases and other causes.'' Ibid. See also
    Dallas Lawyers Agree to Take on Paula Jones' Case--Their Small Firm Has
    Ties to Conservative Advocacy Group,'' The Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2,
    1997) (Rutherford Institute a ``conservative advocacy group.'').
        \8\ ``Cause Celebre: An Antiabortion Activist Makes Herself the
    Unofficial Mouthpiece for Paula Jones.'' The Washington Post (July 23,
    1998) at C1. Ms. Carpenter-McMillan, ``a cause-oriented, self-defined
    `conservative feminist' '', described her role as ``flaming the White
    House'' and declared `` `Unless Clinton wants to be terribly
    embarrassed, he'd better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody that comes
    out and testifies against Paula better have the past of a Mother
    Teresa, because our investigators will investigate their morality.' ''
    ``Paula Jones' Team Not All About Teamwork,'' USA Today (Sept. 29,
    1997) at 4A.
        \9\ After Ms. Jones' new team had been in action for three months,
    one journalist commented: ``In six years of public controversy over
    Clinton's personal life, what is striking in some ways is how little
    the debate changes. As in the beginning, many conservatives nurture the
    hope that the past will be Clinton's undoing. Jones' adviser, Susan
    Carpenter-McMillan, acknowledged on NBC's `Meet the Press' yesterday
    that her first reaction when she first heard Jones' claims about
    Clinton was, `Good, we're going to get that little slime ball.' ''
    (Harris, ``Jones Case Tests Political Paradox,'' The Washington Post
    (Jan. 19, 1998) at A1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In January 1998, Ms. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of certain
    information she believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in
    the Jones case. At that time, the OIC investigation began to intrude
    formally into the Jones case: the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the
    week of January 12, and with her cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky
    discussing the Jones case and the President. Ms. Tripp also informed
    the OIC that she had been surreptitiously taping conversations with Ms.
    Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in exchange for her
    cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from federal
    prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from state
    prosecution.\10\ On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp wore a body
    wire and had taped conversations with Ms. Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC
    received jurisdiction from the Attorney General and formalized an
    immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp in writing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United States
    House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code
    Section 595(C), H.Doc. 105-316 (hereinafter ``Supp.'') at 3758-3759,
    4371-4373 (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 28, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled to take
    place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we now know, Ms. Tripp
    met with and briefed the lawyers for Ms. Jones the night before the
    deposition on her perception of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky
    and the President--doing so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had
    entrusted to her.\11\ She was permitted to do so even though she has
    been acting all week at the behest of the OIC and was dependent on the
    OIC to use its best efforts to protect her from state prosecution. At
    the deposition the next day, the President was asked numerous questions
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky by lawyers who already knew
    the answers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Baker, ``Linda Tripp Briefed Jones Team on Tapes: Meeting
    Occurred Before Clinton Deposition,'' The Washington Post (Feb. 14,
    1998) at A1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She was a
    peripheral player and, since her relationship with the President was
    concededly consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' case. Shortly after the
    President's deposition, Chief Judge Wright ruled that evidence
    pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Jones trial
    because ``it is not essential to the core issues in this case.'' \12\
    The Court also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones
    case, the Lewinsky evidence ``might be inadmissible as extrinsic
    evidence'' under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it involved
    merely the ``specific instances of conduct'' of a witness.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ Order, at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.)
    (Jan. 29, 1998).
        \13\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no case and
    granted summary judgment for the President. Although Judge Wright
    ``viewed the record in the light most favorable to [Ms. Jones] and
    [gave] her the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences,'' \14\ the
    Court ruled that, as a matter of law, she simply had no case against
    President Clinton, both because ``there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact'' and because President Clinton was ``entitled to a
    judgment as a matter of law.'' Id. at 11-12. After reviewing all the
    proffered evidence, the Court ruled that ``the record taken as a whole
    could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for'' Ms. Jones. Id. at
    39.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), Memorandum
    Opinion and Order (April 1, 1998), at 3 n.3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           c. the president's grand jury testimony about ms. lewinsky
        On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to the
    grand jury and specifically acknowledged that he had had a relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky involving ``improper intimate contact,'' and that he
    ``engaged in conduct that was wrong.'' App. at 461.\15\ He described
    how the relationship began and how he had ended it early in 1997--long
    before any public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury
    ``it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,'' App. at 533, and told the grand
    jurors, ``I take full responsibility for it. It wasn't her fault, it
    was mine.'' App. at 589-90.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of
    Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section
    595(c), H.Doc. 105-311 (hereinafter ``App.'') at 461 (House Judiciary
    Committee) (Sept. 18, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The President also explained how he had tried to navigate the
    deposition in the Jones case months earlier without admitting what he
    admitted to the grand jury--that he had been engaged in an improper
    intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Id. a 530-531. He further
    testified that the ``inappropriate encounters'' with Ms. Lewinsky had
    ended, at his insistence, in early 1997. He declined to describe,
    because of considerations of personal privacy and institutional
    dignity, certain specifics about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky,\16\ but
    he indicated his willingness to answer,\17\ and he did answer, the
    other questions put to him about his relationship with her. No one who
    watched the videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt that
    the President admitted to having had an improper intimate relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other
    information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my
    family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of
    the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these
    particular matters.'' App. at 461.
        \17\ ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other
    questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,
    questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations,' as I
    understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and
    questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of
    justice, and intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 461.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 d. proceedings in the house of representatives
        On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to the House
    of Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the President related to
    the Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion of the OIC, ``may constitute
    grounds for an impeachment.'' \18\ The allegations fell into three
    broad categories: lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and abuse
    of power.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in
    Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code,
    Section 595(c), at 1 (House Judiciary Committee) (printed September 11,
    1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The House Judiciary held a total of four hearings and called but
    one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee allowed the President's
    lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House
    presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses who testified
    that the facts, as alleged, did not constitute an impeachable offense,
    did not reveal an abuse of power, and would not support a case for
    perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable prosecutor would
    bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the
    Committee on behalf of the President, which is incorporated into this
    Trial Memorandum by reference.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Also incorporated by reference into this Trial Memorandum are
    the four prior submissions of the President to the House of
    Representatives: Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral of Office
    of Independent Counsel (September 11, 1998) (73 pages); Initial
    Response to Referral of Office of Independent Counsel (September 12,
    1998) (42 pages); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment
    (October 2, 1998) (30 pages); Submission by Counsel for President
    Clinton to the Committee on the House Judiciary of the United States
    House of Representatives (December 8, 1998) (184 pages).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted essentially
    along party lines to approve four articles of impeachment. Republicans
    defeated the alternative resolution of censure offered by certain
    Committee Democrats. Almost immediately after censure failed in the
    Committee, the House Republican leadership declared publicly that no
    censure proposal would be considered by the full House when it
    considered the articles of impeachment.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ See Baker & Eilperin, ``GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate
    Censure in House: Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article of Impeachment,''
    The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1998) at A1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, the House
    of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment: Article I,
    which alleged perjury before the grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to
    206 and Article III, which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a
    vote of 221 to 212. The full House defeated two other Articles: Article
    II, which alleged that the President committed perjury in his civil
    deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse of power. Consideration
    of a censure resolution was blocked, even though members of both
    parties had expressed a desire to vote on such an option.
        From beginning to end the House process was both partisan and
    unfair. Consider:
         The House released the entire OIC Referral to the public
    without ever reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or allowing the
    President's counsel to review it;
         The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee said he had
    ``no interest in not working in a bipartisan way''; \21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Associated Press (March 25, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         The Chairman also pledged a process the American people
    would conclude was fair; \22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ ``This whole proceeding will fall on its face if it's not
    perceived by the American people to be fair.'' Financial Times (Sept.
    12, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote of
    conscience on a motion to censure; \23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ ``The next House Speaker, Robert Livingston, said the coming
    impeachment debate should allow lawmakers to make a choice between
    ousting President Clinton and imposing a lesser penalty such as
    censure. The Louisiana Republican said the House can't duck a vote on
    articles of impeachment if reported next month by its Judiciary
    Committee. But an `alternative measure is possible' he said, and the
    GOP leadership should `let everybody have a chance to vote on the
    option of their choice.' '' Wall Street Journal (Nov. 23, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Members of the House were shown secret ``evidence'' in
    order to influence their vote--evidence which the President's counsel
    still has not been able to review.

       III. The Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof for Decision

    a. the offenses alleged do not meet the constitutional standard of high
                            crimes and misdemeanors
    1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question
            Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged
        It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the question
    whether the articles state an impeachable offense.\24\ That
    Constitutional question has not, in the words of one House Manager,
    ``already been resolved by the House.'' \25\ To the contrary, that
    question now awaits the Senate's measured consideration and independent
    judgment. Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this question has
    been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional obligation to
    ``try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. Art. Sec. 3, cl.7. In the words
    of John Logan, a House Manager in the 1868 proceedings:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ In the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the President's
    counsel answered (to at least one article) that the matters alleged
    ``do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this
    respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor the
    omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty
    in his office of President of the United States.'' 1 Trial of Andrew
    Johnson (1868) (``TAJ'') 53.
        \25\ See Statement of Rep. Bill McCollum: ``[A]re these impeachable
    offenses, which I think has already been resolved by the House. I think
    constitutionally that's our job to do.'' Fox News Sunday (January 3,
    1999).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``It is the rule that all questions of law or fact are to be
    decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the guilt or
    innocence of the accused. It is also the rule, that in determining this
    general issue senators must consider the sufficiency or insufficiency
    in law or in fact of every article of accusation.'' \26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Closing argument of Manager John H. Logan, 2 TAJ 18 (emphasis
    added). See also Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on
    Impeachment Issues at 25-26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (``Because the Senate acts
    as both judge and jury in an impeachment trial, the Senate's conviction
    on a particular article of impeachment reflects the Senate's judgment
    not only that the accused engaged in the misconduct underlying the
    article but also that the article stated an impeachable offense'').

    We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do not state
    wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses under our
    Constitution.
    2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High Crimes
            and Misdemeanors'' for Removal
                a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an
                        Intentionally High Standard for Removal
        The Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from
    office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
    Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Constitution,
    Art. II, section 4. The charges fail to meet the high standard that the
    Framers established.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ For a more complete discussion of the Standards for
    Impeachment, please see Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to
    the House Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives at
    24-43 (December 8, 1998); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment
    (October 2, 1998); and Impeachment of William Jefferson, President of
    the United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to
    Accompany H. Res. 611, H. Rpt. 105-830, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 332-39
    (citing Minority Report). References to pages 2-203 of the Committee
    Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Committee Report.'' References to
    pages 329-406 of the Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as
    ``Minority Report.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The syntax of the Constitutional standard ``Treason, Bribery or
    other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' (emphasis added) strongly
    suggests, by the interpretive principle noscitur a sociis,28
    that, to be impeachable offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be
    of the seriousness of ``Treason'' and ``Bribery.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ `` `It is known from its associates' . . . the meaning of a
    word is or may be known from the accompanying words.'' Black's Law
    Dictionary 1209 (4th ed. 1968).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard must be a
    very high one. Ours is a Constitution of separated powers. In that
    Constitution, the President does not serve at the will of Congress, but
    as the directly elected,\29\ solitary head of the Executive Branch. The
    Constitution reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the
    law independently of legislative will, is a necessary protection for a
    free people.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ Of course, that election takes place through the mediating
    activity of the Electoral College. See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, cl.
    2-3 and Amend. XII.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These elementary facts of constitutional structure underscore the
    need for a very high standard for impeachment. The House Managers, in
    their Brief, suggest that the failure to remove the President would
    raise the standard for impeachment higher than the Framers intended.
    They say that if the Senate does not remove the President, ``The bar
    will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to
    be concerned.'' But that standard is just a modified version of the
    plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which says
    a President can only be impeached and removed for ``Treason, Bribery,
    or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The Framers wanted a high bar.
    It was not the intention of the Framers that the President should be
    subject to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander
    Hamilton said in a warning against the politicization of impeachment:
    ``There will always be the greater danger that the decision will be
    regulated more by comparative strength of parties than by the real
    demonstrations of innocence or guilt.'' Federalist 65. Our system of
    government does not permit Congress to unseat the President merely
    because it disagrees with his behavior or his policies. The Framers'
    decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one reason they
    caused the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and
    Misdemeanors'' to appear in the Constitution itself. They chose to
    specify those categories of offenses subject to the impeachment power,
    rather than leave that judgment to the unfettered whim of the
    legislature.
        Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably viewed
    by the public as arising from one of those rare cases when the
    Legislature is compelled to stand in for all the people and remove a
    President whose continuation in office threatens grave harm to the
    Republic. Indeed, it is not exaggeration to say--as a group of more
    than 400 leading historians and constitutional scholars publicly
    stated--that removal on these articles would ``mangle the system of
    checks and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of
    public power.'' \30\ Removal of the President on these grounds would
    defy the constitutional presumption that the removal power rests with
    the people in elections, and it would do incalculable damage to the
    institution of the Presidency. If ``successful,'' removal here ``will
    leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the
    mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.'' \31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \30\ Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution (Oct.
    28, 1998) (``Statement of Historians''); see also Schmitt, ``Scholars
    and Historians Assail Clinton Impeachment Inquiry,'' The New York Times
    (Oct. 19, 1998) at A18.
        \31\ Statement of Historians.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected public
    official (together with the Vice-President), responsible to all the
    people. Therefore, when articles of impeachment have been exhibited,
    the Senate confronts this inescapable question: is the alleged
    misconduct so profoundly serious, so malevolent to our Constitutional
    system, that it justifies undoing the people's decision? Is the wrong
    alleged of a sort that not only demands removal of the President before
    the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also justifies the
    national trauma that accompanies the impeachment trial process itself?
    The wrongdoing alleged here does not remotely meet that standard.
                b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were
                        Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of
                        Government
        ``[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors'' refers to nothing short of
    Presidential actions that are ``great and dangerous offenses'' or
    ``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \32\ Impeachment was never
    intended to be a remedy for private wrongs. It was intended to be a
    method of removing a President whose continued presence in the Office
    would cause grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of
    government.\33\ Thus, ``in all but the most extreme instances,
    impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office, not private
    misconduct unrelated to public office.'' \34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ George Mason, 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention
    of 1787 550 (Rev. ed. 1966).
        \33\ As the 1975 Watergate staff report concluded ``Impeachment is
    the first step in remedial process--removal from office and possible
    disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment
    is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain
    constitutional government. . . . In an impeachment proceeding a
    President is called to account for abusing powers that only a President
    possesses.'' Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment,
    Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on
    Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1974) (``Nixon Impeachment
    Inquiry'').
        \34\ Minority Report at 337.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing wrongful
    public conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson wrote, ``our
    President . . . is amendable to [the laws] in his private character as
    a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.'' \35\ As such,
    impeachment is limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander
    Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction
    as ``those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or
    in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They
    are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
    POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society
    itself.'' 36
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ 2 Elliot, The Debate in the Several State Conventions on the
    Adoption of the Federal Constitution 480 (reprint of 2d ed.)
        \36\ The Federalist No. 65 at 331 (Gary Wills ed. 1982). As one of
    the most respected of the early commentators explained, the impeachment
    ``power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to
    the society in its political character.'' Story, Commentaries on the
    Constitution, Sec. 744. (reprint of 1st ed. 1833).

        The Framers ``intended that a president be removable from office
    for the commission of great offenses against the Constitution.'' \37\
    Impeachment therefore addresses public wrongdoing, whether denominated
    a ``political crime [  ] against the state,'' \38\ or ``an act of
    malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \39\ or a ``great offense [  ]
    against the federal government.'' \40\ Ordinary civil and criminal
    wrongs can be addressed through ordinary judicial processes. And
    ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box and by
    public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most serious public
    misconduct, those aggravated abuses of executive power that, given the
    President's four-year term, might otherwise go unchecked.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ John Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 94 (1978).
        \38\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment 61 (1973).
        \39\ Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal
    Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 724 (1987/1988).
        \40\ Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its
    Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1989).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone
            State Impeachable Offenses
        Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular will of
    the people, as evidence by an election, it must be used with great
    circumspection. As applicable precedents establish, it should not be
    used to punish private misconduct.
                a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President
                        Nixon
        Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then-President
    Nixon by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in
    1974. Three were approved and two were not. The approved articles
    alleged official wrongdoing. Article I charged President Nixon with
    ``using the powers of his high office [to] engage [  ] . . . in a
    course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct'' the
    Watergate investigation.\41\ Article II described the President as
    engaging in ``repeated and continuing abuse of the powers of the
    Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle of the rule of law
    in our system of government'' thereby ``us[ing] his power as President
    to violate the Constitution and the law of the land.'' \42\ Article III
    charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary Committee
    subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to ``preserve the
    integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability of Congress
    to act as the ultimate safeguard against improper Presidential
    conduct.'' \43\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United
    States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, H.
    Rep. 93-1305 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereinafter ``Nixon Report'') at 133.
        \42\ Nixon Report at 180.
        \43\ Id. 212-13.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee charged
    that President Nixon both ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to report
    certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal
    income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' \44\ The
    President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of
    perjury,\45\ and there was reason to believe that the underlying facts
    would have supported a criminal prosecution against President Nixon
    himself.\46\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \44\ Id. at 220. The President was alleged to have failed to report
    certain income, to have taken improper tax deductions, and to have
    manufactured (either personally or through his agents) false documents
    to support the deductions taken.
        \45\ Given the underlying facts, that act might have provided the
    basis for multiple criminal charges; conviction on, for example, the
    tax evasion charge, could have subjected President Nixon to a 5-year
    prison term.
        \46\ See Nixon Report at 344 (``the Committee was told by a
    criminal fraud tax expert that on the evidence presented to the
    Committee, if the President were an ordinary taxpayer, the government
    would seek to send him to jail'') (Statement of Additional Views of Mr.
    Mezvinsky, et al.)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the majority
    staff concluded that ``[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave
    step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously
    incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our
    government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the
    president office.'' \47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \47\ Nixon Impeachment Inquiry at 26 (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        And the minority views of many Republican members were in
    substantial agreement: ``the framers . . . were concerned with
    preserving the government from being overthrown by the treachery or
    corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is our judgment, based upon this
    constitutional history, that the Framers of the United States
    Constitution intended that the President should be removable by the
    legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system
    of government established by the Constitution.'' \48\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ Nixon Report at 364-365 (Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson,
    Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and
    Latta).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The legal principle that impeachable offenses required misconduct
    dangerous to our system of government provided one basis for the
    Committee's rejection of the fraudulent-tax-return charge. As
    Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter, the Constitution's phrase
    ``high crime signified a crime against the system of government, not
    merely a serious crime,''\49\ As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving
    an act which did not demonstrate public misconduct, was rejected by an
    overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12 margin.\50\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \49\ Id. (quoting with approval conclusion of Nixon Impeachment
    Inquiry).
        \50\ Nixon Report at 220.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander
                        Hamilton
        In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury Alexander
    Hamilton for alleged financial misdealings with a convicted swindler.
    Hamilton had made payments to the swindler and had urged his wife
    (Hamilton's paramour) to burn incriminating correspondence. Members of
    Congress investigated the matter and it came to the attention of
    President Washington and future Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison
    and Monroe.
        This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. Hamilton
    as Secretary of the Treasury.\51\ Even when it eventually became
    public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's appointment to high position in
    the United States Army. Although not insignificant, Hamilton's behavior
    was essentially private. It was certain not regarded as impeachable.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ See generally Rosenfeld, ``Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch,''
    The Los Angeles Times (September 18, 1980).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that
            Impeachable Offenses Are not Present
                a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here
        There is strong agreement among constitutional scholars and
    historians that the articles do not charge impeachable offenses. As
    Professor Michael Gerhardt summarized in his recent testimony before a
    subcommitte of the House of Representatives, there is ``widespread
    recognition [of] a paradigmatic case for impeachment.'' \52\ In such a
    case, ``there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable
    official and the latter's official duties.'' \53\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \52\ Statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt Before the House
    Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee
    Regarding the Background and History of Impeachment (November 9, 1998)
    at 13 (``Subcommittee Hearings'').
        \53\ Ibid. (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so far
    removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to
    weaken significantly the Presidency itself. As the more than 400
    prominent historians and constitutional scholars warned in their public
    statement: ``[t]he theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is
    unprecedented in our history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for
    the future of our political institutions. If carried forward, [the
    current processes] will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and
    diminished, at the mercy as never before of the caprices of any
    Congress.\54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \54\ Statement of Historians.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an
    extraordinary group of 430 legal scholars argued together that these
    offenses, even if proven true, did not rise to the level of an
    impeachable offense.\55\ The gist of these scholarly objections is that
    the alleged wrongdoing is insufficiently connected to the exercise of
    public office. Because the articles charge wrongdoing of an essentially
    private nature, any harm such behavior poses is too removed from our
    system of government to justify unseating the President. Numerous
    scholars, opining long before the current controversy, have emphasized
    the necessary connection of impeachable wrongs to threats against the
    state itself. They have found that impeachment should be reserved for:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ See Letter of 430 Law Professors to Messrs. Gingrich,
    Gephardt, Hyde and Conyers (released Nov. 6, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``offenses against the government''; \56\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \56\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 26.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``political crime against the state''; \57\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ Berger, Impeachment at 61.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``serious assaults on the integrity of the processes of
    government''; \58\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ Charles L. Black, Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39 (1974).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so egregious
    that [the President's] continuation in office is intolerable''; \59\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \59\ Labovitz Presidential Impeachment at 110.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \60\ bearing a
    ``functional relationship'' to public office; \61\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \60\ Rotunda, 76 Ky. L.J. at 726.
        \61\ Ibid.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``great offense[s] against the federal government''; \62\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \62\ Gerhardt, 68 Tex. L. Rev. at 85.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine the
    integrity of government.'' \63\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \63\ Committee on Federal Legislation of the Bar Ass'n of the City
    of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment 18 (1974).

    The articles contain nothing approximating that level of wrongdoing.
    Indeed the House Managers themselves acknowledge that ``the President's
    [alleged] perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official
    conduct.'' \64\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \64\ House Br. at 109.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations would
                        Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the
                        Presidency and to Our Government of Separated
                        powers
        These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about
    sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual
    misbehavior. These kinds of wrongs are simply not subjects fit for
    impeachment. To remove a President on this basis would lower the
    impeachment bar to an unprecedented level and create a devastating
    precedent. As Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., addressing this
    problem, has testified:
        ``Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel . . .
    revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send us on an
    adventure with ominous implications for the separation of powers that
    the Constitution established as the basis of our political order. It
    would permanently weaken the Presidency.'' \65\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \65\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Arthur
    Schlesinger, Tr. at 2).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger described must
    stop here. Professor Jack Rakove made a similar point when he stated
    that ``Impeachment [is] a remedy to be deployed only in . . .
    unequivocal cases where . . . the insult to the constitutional system
    is grave.'' \66\ Indeed, he said, there ``would have to be a high
    degree of consensus on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in both
    Houses to proceed.'' \67\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \66\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Professor Jack
    Rakove at 4).
        \67\ Subcommittee Hearings (Oral Testimony of Professor Rakove).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the House
    of Representatives. No civil officer--no President, no judge, no
    cabinet member--has ever been impeached by so narrow a margin as
    supported the articles exhibited here.\68\ The closeness and partisan
    division of the vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the
    charges.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \68\ The present articles were approved by margins of 228-206
    (Article I) and 221-212 (Article II). All prior resolutions were
    approved by substantially wider margins in the House of
    Representatives. See Impeachments of the following civil officers:
    Judge John Pickering (1803) (45-8; Justice Samuel Chase (1804) (73-32;
    Judge James Peck (1830) 143-49; Judge West Humphreys (1862) (no vote
    available, but resolution of impeachment voted ``without division,''
    see 3 Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2386);
    President Andrew Johnson (1868) (128-47; Judge James Belknap (1876)
    (unanimous); Judge Charles Swayne (1903) (unanimous); Judge Robert
    Archibald (1912) (223-1); Judge George English (1925) (306-62); Judge
    Harold Louderback (1932) (183-143); Judge Halsted Ritter (1933) (181-
    146); Judge Harry Claiborne (1986) (406-0); Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr.
    (1988) (417-0); Judge Alcee L. Hastings (1988) (413-3). The impeachment
    resolution against Senator William Bount in 1797 was by voice vote and
    so no specific count was recorded.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they have
    passed only by the narrowest, partisan margin, the future of our
    constitutional politics is in the balance. The very stability of our
    Constitutional government may depend upon the Senate's response to
    these articles. Nothing about this case justifies removal of a twice-
    elected President, because no ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are
    alleged.
    5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong
        The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an impeachable
    offense because (1) several federal judges have been impeached and
    removed for perjury, and (2) those precedents control this case. See
    House Br. at 95-105. That notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the
    qualitative differences among different allegations of perjury and the
    very basic differences between federal judges and the President.
        First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, while a very
    solemn task, implicates very different considerations than the
    impeachment of a president. Federal judges are appointed without public
    approval and enjoy life tenure without public accountability.
    Consequently, they hold their offices under our Constitution only
    ``during good behavior.'' Under our system, impeachment is the only way
    to remove a Federal judge from office--even a Federal judge sitting in
    jail.\69\ By contrast, a president is elected by the Nation to a term,
    limited to a specified number of years, and he faces accountability in
    the form of elections.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \69\ Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, during
    a recent judicial impeachment proceeding, cogently explained the unique
    position that Federal judges hold in our Constitutional system:
        ``The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position of
    trust and responsibility in our government: They are the only members
    of any branch that hold their office for life; they are purposely
    insulated from the immediate pressures and shifting currents of the
    body politic. But with the special prerogative of judicial independence
    comes the most exacting standard of public and private conduct . . .
    The high standard of behavior for judges is inscribed in article III of
    the Constitution, which provides that judges ``shall hold offices
    during good behavior. . . .'' (132 Cong. Rec. H4712 (July 22, 1986)
    (impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne) (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to the
    level of an impeachable offense depends necessarily on the particulars
    of that statement, and the relation of those statements to the
    fulfillment of official responsibilities. In the impeachment of Judge
    Harry Claiborne, the accused had been convicted of filing false income
    tax returns.\70\ As a judge, Claiborne was charged with the
    responsibility of hearing tax-evasion cases. Once convicted, he simply
    could not perform his official functions because his personal probity
    had been impaired such that he could no longer be an arbiter of others'
    oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct connection to the performance of
    his judicial tasks. The inquiry into President Nixon disclosed similar
    wrongdoing, but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an
    article of impeachment against the President on that basis. The case of
    Judge Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted of making perjurious
    statements concerning his intervention in a judicial proceeding, which
    is to say, employing the power and prestige of his office to obtain
    advantage for a party.\71\ Although the proceeding at issue was not in
    his court, his use of the judicial office for the private gain of a
    party to a judicial proceeding directly implicated his official
    functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for
    making perjurious statements at his trial for conspiring to fix cases
    in his own court.\72\ As with Judges Claiborne and Nixon, Judge
    Hastings' perjurious statements were immediately and incurably
    detrimental to the performance of his official duties. The allegations
    against the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) ``do not
    directly involve his official conduct,'' House Br. at 109, simply do
    not involve wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to foreclose effective
    performance of the Presidential office.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \70\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment
    Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-48 at
    291-98 (1986) (``Claiborne Proceedings'').
        \71\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment
    Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22
    at 430-440 (1989) (``Judge Nixon Proceedings'').
        \72\ See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment
    Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-18
    (1989).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial
    impeachment cases predating Watergate, observed that:

        ``For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial
    impeachment] cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for
    impeachment of a president. The practical reason was that it seemed
    inappropriate to determine the fate of an elected chief executive on
    the basis of law developed in proceedings directed at petty misconduct
    by obscure judges. The legal reason was that the Constitution provides
    that judges serve during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good behavior]
    clause made a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the
    application of these cases to presidential impeachment''.\73\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \73\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 92-93 (emphasis added).

    Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House Managers have
    only ``limited force when applied to the impeachment of a President.''
    \74\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \74\ Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Impeachment
    Issues at 26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (summarizing view of some commentators).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes from
    President Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, offered as a
    congressman in 1970 in connection with an effort to impeach Associate
    Justice William O. Douglas--that it is, in essence, ``whatever the
    majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be''--has been
    cited. Almost never noted is the more important aspect of then-
    Congressman Ford's statement--that, in contrast to the life-tenure of
    judges, because presidents can be removed by the electorate, ``to
    remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes of the
    magnitude of treason and bribery.'' \75\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \75\ 116 Cong. Rec. 11912, 11913, (1970).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            b. the standard of proof
        Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense,
    each Senator must confront the question of what standard the evidence
    must meet to justify a vote of ``guilty.'' The Senate has, of course,
    addressed this issue before--most recently in the trials of Judge
    Claiborne and Judge Hastings. We recognize that the Senate chose in the
    Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in the Hastings trial, not to
    impose itself any single standard of proof but, rather, to leave that
    judgment to the conscience of each Senator. Many Senators here today
    were present for the debate on this issue and chose a standard by which
    to test the evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new
    one. And none previously has had to face the issue in the special
    context of a Presidential impeachment.
        We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must treat a
    vote to impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the President from
    office and that a decision of such moment ought not to be based on
    anything less than ``clear and convincing'' evidence. That standard is
    higher than the ``preponderance of the evidence'' test applicable to
    the ordinary civil case but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt
    test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless, we felt that the clear
    and convincing standard was consistent with the grave responsibility of
    triggering a process that might result in the removal of a President.
    In fact, it had been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate
    Committee majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for
    President Nixon) twenty-four years ago.
        Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the Senate.
    Indeed, we submit that the gravity of the decision the Senate must
    reach should lead each Senator to go further and ask whether the House
    has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of proof as
    meaningless legal jargon with no application to the real world of
    difficult decisions. But it is much more than that. In our system of
    justice, it is the guidepost that shows the way through the labyrinth
    of conflicting evidence. It tells the factfinder to look within and
    ask: ``Would I make the most important decisions of my life based on
    the degree of certainty I have about these facts?'' In the unique
    legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects against
    partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that this grave
    decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a disciplining force to
    carry into the deliberations.
        This point is given added weight by the language of the
    Constitution. Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United States
    Constitution gives to the Senate ``the Power to try all Impeachments. .
    . . and no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
    thirds of the Members present.'' (Emphasis added.) Use of the words
    ``try'' and ``convicted'' strongly suggests that an impeachment trial
    is akin to a criminal proceeding and that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
    standard of criminal proceedings should be used. This position was
    enunciated in the Minority Views contained in the Report of the House
    Judiciary Committee on the impeachment proceedings against President
    Nixon (H. Rep. 93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct
    standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, Strom
    Thurmond and John Stennis.\76\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \76\ Claiborne Proceedings at 106-107.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is
    appropriate for judicial impeachments, it does not follow that it
    should be applied where the Presidency itself is at stake. With judges,
    the Senate must balance its concern for the independence of the
    judiciary against the recognition that, because judges hold life-time
    tenure, impeachment is the only available means to protect the public
    against those who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is
    on trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the Senate
    is asked, in effect, to overturn the results of an election held two
    years ago in which the American people selected the head of one of the
    three coordinate branches of government. It is asked to take this
    action in circumstances where there is no suggestion of corruption or
    misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our system of
    government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's term,
    when once again the people will judge who they wish to lead them. In
    this setting, the evidence should be tested by the most stringent
    standard we know--proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the
    American people be confident that this most serious of constitutional
    decisions has been given the careful consideration it deserves.

               IV. The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I

        The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I.
                               a. applicable law
        Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading
    statements, before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a statutory crime
    that is set forth in the United States Code at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623.\77\
    Before an accused may be found guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a
    prosecutor must prove all elements of the offense.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \77\ Section 1623 provides in relevant part:
        ``(a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or
    ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly
    makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other
    information . . . knowing the same to contain any false material
    declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
    than five years, or both.'' (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a) (1994)).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the criminal law context, Sec. 1623 requires proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an accused (1) while
    under oath (2) knowingly (3) made a false statement as to (4) material
    facts. The ``materiality'' element is fundamental: it means that
    testimony given to a grand jury may be found perjurious only if it had
    a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper the grand jury's
    investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419
    (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir.
    1997). If an answer provided to a grand jury has no impact on the grand
    jury's investigation, or if it relates to a subject that the grand jury
    is not considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being
    perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details that a
    grand jury is not investigating cannot as a matter of law constitute
    perjury, since such testimony by definition is immaterial. See, e.g.,
    United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where
    defendant admitted signing letter and testified to its purpose, his
    denial of actually writing letter was not material to grand jury
    investigation and was incapable of supporting perjury charge); United
    States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (details such as
    whether defendant ``paid the rent on her Washington apartment, as she
    testified that she did'' were ``not pertinent to the issue being
    tried;'' therefore, ``the false statement attributed to [defendant] was
    in no way material in the case in which she made it and did not
    constitute perjury within the meaning of the statute.'') In other
    words, mere falsity--even knowing falsity--is not perjury if the
    statement at issue is not ``material'' to the matter under
    consideration.
        An additional ``element'' of perjury prosecutions, at least as a
    matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury conviction cannot
    rest solely on the testimony of one witness. In United States v.
    Weiler, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945), the Supreme Court observed that
    the ``special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the
    evidence of a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries.''
    While Sec. 1623 does not literally incorporate the so-called ``two-
    witness'' rule, the case law makes clear that perjury prosecutions
    under this statute require a high degree of proof, and that prosecutors
    should not, as a matter of reason and practicality, try to bring
    perjury prosecutions based solely on the testimony of a single witness.
    As the Supreme Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest
    merely upon ``an oath against an oath.'' Id. at 609.
        Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former federal
    prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A panel of former
    federal prosecutors, some Republican, testified that they would not
    charge perjury based upon the facts in this case. For example, Mr.
    Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the Northern
    District of Illinois, told the Committee that ``the evidence set out in
    the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a
    responsible federal prosecutor.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial
    Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9,
    1998); see generally Minority Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan
    emphasized, ``because perjury and obstruction charges often arise from
    private dealings with few observers, the courts have required either
    two witnesses who testified directly to the facts establishing the
    crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the facts constituting the
    alleged perjury, that there be substantial corroborating proof to
    establish guilt.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for
    Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998). The other
    prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who served as an
    Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
    and as a Task Force Leader for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force,
    testified that ``it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury
    prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.''
    Id. A review of the perjury alleged here thus requires both careful
    scrutiny of the materiality of any alleged falsehood and vigilance
    against conviction merely on an ``oath against an oath.'' Weiler, 323
    U.S. at 609.
                        b. structure of the allegations
        Article I charges that the President committed perjury when he
    testified before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It alleges he
    ``willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the
    grand jury concerning ``one or more of the following: (1) the nature
    and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee;
    (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a
    Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and
    misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal
    judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to
    influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of
    evidence in that civil rights action.'' As noted above, the article
    does not provide guidance on the particular statements alleged to be
    perjurious, false and misleading. But by reference to the different
    views in the House Committee Report, the presentation of House Majority
    Counsel David Schippers, the OIC Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of
    the House Managers, we have attempted to identify certain statements
    from which members of the House might have chosen.
        Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury before the
    grand jury about the details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--
    including apparently such insignificant matters as mis-remembering the
    precise month on which certain inappropriate physical contact started,
    understating as ``occasional'' his infrequent inappropriate physical
    and telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months,
    characterizing their relationship as starting as a friendship, and
    touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for certain purposes during
    their intimate encounters.
        Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made
    perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he
    testified about certain responses he had given in the Jones civil
    deposition. The House Managers erroneously suggest that in the grand
    jury President Clinton was asked about and reaffirmed his entire
    deposition testimony, including his deposition testimony about whether
    he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2, 60. That is
    demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did in fact
    make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his deposition testimony,
    were truthful. Moreover, to the extent this subpart repeats allegations
    of Article II of the original proposed articles of impeachment, the
    full House of Representatives has explicitly considered and
    specifically rejected those charges, and their consideration would
    violate the impeachment procedures mandated by the Constitution.
        Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the grand
    jury when he testified about certain activities in late 1997 and early
    1998. They are based on statements about conduct that the House
    Managers claim constitutes obstruction of justice under Article II and
    in many respects track Article II. Compare Article I (3) (perjury in
    the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading
    statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with
    Article II (5) (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to
    make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and compare
    Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``corrupt
    efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery
    of evidence'') with Article II (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when
    he (3) ``engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal
    evidence,'' i.e., gifts; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony''
    of Betty Currie; (7) ``made false and misleading statements to
    potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to
    corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses''). These perjury
    allegations are without merit both because the obstruction charges upon
    which they are based are wrong and because the statements that
    President Clinton made in the grand jury about these charges are true.
    Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in this
    submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these overlapping
    allegations in the next section addressing Article II (obstruction of
    justice), and address them only briefly in this section.
             c. response to the particular allegations in article i
        The president testified truthfully before the grand jury. There
    must be no mistake about what the President said. He admitted to the
    grand jury that he had engaged in an inappropriate intimate
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months. He
    admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He
    admitted to the grand jury that he had misled his family, his friends
    and staff, and the entire Nation about the nature of that relationship.
    No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched the
    President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt that he had
    admitted to an ongoing physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        The article makes general allegations about his testimony but does
    not specify alleged false statements, so direct rebuttal is impossible.
    In light of this uncertainty, we set forth below responses to the
    allegations that have been made by the House Managers, the House
    Committee, and the OIC, even though they were not adopted in the
    article, in an effort to try to respond comprehensively to the charges.
    1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading
            statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of
            his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky
        (a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President specifically
    acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that
    involved ``improper intimate contact.'' App. at 461. He described how
    the relationship began and how it ended early in 1997--long before any
    public attention or scrutiny.
        In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the President
    read the following statement:

        ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early
    1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These
    encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not
    constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at
    my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate
    intimate contact.
        ``These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early
    1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky
    that included inappropriate sexual banter.
        ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this
    conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions.
        ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I
    can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and
    others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold,
    this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.
        ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions
    including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions
    about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood
    it to be denied at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions
    concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and
    intimidation of witnesses.''

    App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to this
    statement--but only when asked very specific questions about his
    physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and he otherwise responded
    fully to four hours of interrogation about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, his answers in the civil deposition, and his conduct
    surrounding the Jones deposition.
        The articles are silent on precisely what statements the President
    made about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that were allegedly
    perjurious. But between the House Brief and the Committee Report, both
    drafted by the Managers, it appears there are three aspects of this
    prepared statement that are alleged to be false and misleading because
    Ms. Lewinsky's recollection differs--albeit with respect to certain
    very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first, when the President
    admitted that inappropriate conduct occurred ``on certain occasions in
    early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because
    in the Managers' view, the first instance of inappropriate conduct
    apparently occurred a few months prior to ``early 1996,'' see House Br.
    at 53; second, when the President admitted to inappropriate conduct
    ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly
    committed perjury because, according to the House Committee, there were
    eleven total sexual encounters and the term ``on certain occasions''
    implied something other than eleven. see Committee Report at 34; and
    third, when the President admitted that he ``had occasional telephone
    conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included sexual banter,'' he
    allegedly committed perjury because, according to the House Committee
    (although not Ms. Lewinsky), seventeen conversations may have included
    sexually explicit conversation, ibid. Apart from the fact that the
    record itself refutes some of the allegations (for example, seven of
    the seventeen calls were only ``possible,'' according even to the OIC,
    App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky recalled fewer than seventeen, App. at
    744), simply to state them is to reveal their utter immateriality. \78\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \78\ Even the OIC Referral did not allege perjury based on these
    latter two theories and mentioned the first only briefly.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The President categorically denies that his prepared statement was
    perjurious, false and misleading in any respect. He offered his written
    statement to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC
    to obtain the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the
    salacious details of his relationship. It preceded almost four hours of
    follow-up questions about the relationship. It is utterly remarkable
    that the Managers now find fault even with the President's very painful
    public admission of inappropriate conduct.
        In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The Committee
    Report takes issue with the terms ``on certain occasions'' and
    ``occasional,'' but neither phrase implies a definite or maximum
    number. ``On certain occasions''--the phrase introducing discussion of
    the physical contacts--has virtually no meaning other than ``it
    sometimes happened.'' It is unfathomable what objective interpretation
    the Majority gives to this phrase to suggest that it could be false. An
    attack on the phrase ``occasional''--the phrase introducing discussion
    of the inappropriate telephone contacts--is little different.
    Dictionaries define ``occasional'' to mean ``occurring at irregular or
    infrequent intervals'' or ``now and then.'' \79\ It is a measure of the
    Committee Report's extraordinary overreaching to suggest that the
    eleven occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority over
    well more than a year did not occur, by any objective reading, ``on
    certain occasions.'' And since even the OIC Referral acknowledges that
    the inappropriate telephone contact occurred not ``at least 17 times''
    (as the Committee Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at
    8; House Br. at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month
    period,\80\ ``occasional'' would surely seem not just a reasonable
    description but the correct one.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \79\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) p. 803; see
    also Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary (1988) p. 812 (``occurring
    from time to time; infrequent''); Chambers English Dictionary (1988
    ed.) p. 992 (``occurring infrequently, irregularly, now and then'');
    The American Heritage Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.) (``occurring from time
    to time''); Webster's New World Dictionary (3d Coll. ed.) p. 937 (``of
    irregular occurrence; happening now and then; infrequent'').
        \80\ The OIC chart of contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President identifies ten phone conversations ``including phone sex''
    and seven phone conversations ``possibly'' including phone sex. App. at
    116-26.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise number of such
    encounters, it is of no consequence whatsoever to anything, given his
    admission of their relationship. This is precisely the kind of
    disagreement that the law does not intend to capture as perjury.
        The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally
    immaterial. Having acknowledged the relationship, the President had no
    conceivable motive to misstate the date on which it began. The Managers
    assert that the President committed perjury when he testified about
    when the relationship began, but they offer no rationale for why he
    would have done so.\81\ The President had already made a painful
    admission. Any misstatement about when the intimate relationship began
    (if there was a misstatement) cannot justify a charge of perjury, let
    alone the removal of the President from office. As Chairman Hyde
    himself stated in reference to this latter allegation, ``It doesn't
    strike me as a terribly serious count.'' Remarks of Chairman Hyde at
    Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \81\ The Committee Report did not adopt the baseless surmise of the
    OIC Referral, i.e., that the President lied about the starting date of
    his relationship because Ms. Lewinsky was still an intern at the time,
    whereas she later became a paid employee. For good reason. The only
    support offered by the Referral for this conjecture is a comment Ms.
    Lewinsky attributes to the President in which he purportedly said that
    her pink ``intern pass'' ``might be a problem.'' Referral at 149-50.
    But even Ms. Lewinsky indicated that the President was not referring to
    her intern status, but rather was noting that, as an intern with a pink
    ``intern pass,'' she had only limited access to the West Wing of the
    White House. App. at 1567 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98). Moreover, Ms.
    Lewinsky had in fact become an employee by late 1995, so even under the
    OIC theory the President could have acknowledged such intimate contact
    in 1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, after
    admitting that he had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, he maintained that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner
    that met the definition used in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at
    54. The President admits that he engaged in inappropriate physical
    contact with Ms. Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in
    activity that met the convoluted and truncated definition he was
    presented in the Jones deposition.\82\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \82\ At the deposition, the Jones attorneys presented a broad,
    three-part definition of the term ``sexual relations'' to be used by
    them in the questioning. Judge Wright ruled that two parts of the
    definition were ``too broad'' and eliminated them. Dep. at 22. The
    President, therefore, was presented with the following definition (as
    he understood it to have been amended by the Court):
        Definition of Sexual Relations--
        For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in ``sexual
    relations'' when the person knowingly engages in or causes--
        (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
    or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the
    sexual desire of any person;
        (2) contact between any part of the person's body or an object and
    the genitals and anus of another person; or
        (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and any part
    of another person's body.
        ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either directly or through
    clothing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is important to note that this Jones definition was not of the
    President's making. It was one provided to him by the Jones' lawyers
    for their questioning of him. Under that definition, oral sex performed
    by Ms. Lewinsky on the President would not constitute sexual relations,
    while touching certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent to
    arouse her would meet the definition. The President testified in the
    grand jury that [he] believed that oral sex performed on him fell
    outside the Jones definition. App. at 544.\83\ As strange as this may
    sound, a totally reasonable reading of the definition supports that
    conclusion, as many commentators have agreed.\84\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \83\ The Managers erroneously suggest that the President's
    explanation of his understanding of the Jones deposition definition of
    ``sexual relations'' is a recent fabrication rather than an accurate
    account of his view at the time of the deposition. House Br. at 54-55.
    To support this contention, the Managers, among other meritless
    arguments, point to a document produced by the White House entitled
    ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating that oral sex would
    constitute a sexual relationship for the President. Id. at 55. This
    document, however, was not created, reviewed or approved by the
    President and did not represent his views. It is irrelevant to the
    issue at hand for the additional reason that it does not speak by its
    own terms to the meaning of the contorted definition of ``sexual
    relations'' used in the Jones deposition.
        \84\ See, e.g., Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998 (Statement of
    Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg at 2) (``That definition defined certain
    forms of sexual contact as sexual relations but, for reasons known only
    to the Jones lawyers, limited the definition to contact with any person
    for the purpose of gratification.''); MSNBC Internight, August 12, 1998
    (Cynthia Alksne) (``[W]hen the definition finally was put before the
    president, it did not include the receipt of oral sex''); ``DeLay Urges
    a Wait For Starr's Report,'' The Washington Times (August 31, 1998)
    (``The definition of sexual relations, used by lawyers for Paula Jones
    when they questioned the president, was loosely worded and may not have
    included oral sex''); ``Legally Accurate,'' The National Law Journal
    (August 31, 1998) (``Given the narrowness of the court-approved
    definition in [the Jones] case, Mr. Clinton indeed may not have
    perjured himself back then if, say, he received oral sex but did not
    reciprocate sexually'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial
    details concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship.
    2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the
            Jones case
        First, it is important to understand that the allegation of Article
    I that the President ``willfully provided false and misleading
    testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . prior perjurious, false
    and misleading testimony he gave in'' the Jones deposition is premised
    on a misunderstanding of the President's grand jury testimony. The
    President was not asked to, and he did not, reaffirm his entire Jones
    deposition testimony during his grand jury appearance. For example,
    contrary to popular myth and the undocumented assertion of the House
    Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never even asked in the
    grand jury about his answer to the deposition question whether he and
    Ms. Lewinsky had been ``together alone in the Oval Office.'' Dep. at
    52-53,\85\ and he therefore neither reaffirmed it nor even addressed
    it. In fact, in the grand jury he was asked only about a small handful
    of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated below, his
    explanation of these answers were not reaffirmations or in any respect
    evasive or misleading--they were completely truthful, and they do not
    support a perjury allegation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \85\ The only questions the OIC asked the President about being
    alone with Ms. Lewinsky did not reference the deposition at all.
    Instead, the OIC asked the President to elaborate on his
    acknowledgement in his prepared statement before the grand jury that he
    had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, App. at 481, and to explain why he
    made a statement, ``I was never alone with her'' to Ms. Currie on
    January 18th. See, e.g., App. at 583.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority misses
    the mark is dramatically apparent when it is compared with the OIC's
    Referral. The OIC did not charge that the President's statements about
    his prior deposition testimony were perjurious (apart from the charge
    discussed above concerning the nature and details of his relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky).\86\ See OIC Ref. at 145. It would be remarkable to
    contemplate charges beyond those brought by the OIC, particularly in
    the context of a perjury claim where the OIC chose what to ask the
    President and itself conducted the grand jury session.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \86\ Specifically, the Referral alleges that the President lied
    when he testified (1) that ``he believed that oral sex was not covered
    by any of the terms and definitions for sexual activity used at the
    Jones deposition''; (2) that their physical contact was more limited
    than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony suggests; and (3) that their intimate
    relationship began in early 1996 and not late 1995. Id. at 148-49.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The House Managers point to a single statement made by President
    Clinton in the grand jury to justify their contention that every
    statement from his civil deposition is now fair game. House Br. at 60.
    Specifically, the House Managers rely on President Clinton's
    explanation in the grand jury of his state of mind during the Jones
    deposition: ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not
    particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mine
    field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I
    did.'' App. at 532. In addition to being a true statement of his belief
    as to his legal position, this single remark plainly was not intended
    as and was not a broad reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the
    statements the President made during the Jones deposition. Indeed,
    given that he told the grand jury that he had an intimate relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with her, no one who heard
    the grand jury testimony could have understood it to be the unequivocal
    reaffirmation that is alleged.
        The Managers charge that the President did not really mean it when
    he told the grand jury how he was trying to be literally truthful in
    the Jones deposition without providing information about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President had endeavored to
    navigate the deposition without having to make embarrassing admissions
    about his inappropriate, albeit consensual, relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to the line
    between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive testimony and (b)
    false testimony as he could without crossing it. He sought, as he
    explained to the grand jury, to give answers that were literally
    accurate, even if, as a result, they were evasive and thus misleading.
    We repeat: what is at issue here is not the underlying statements made
    by the President in the deposition, but the President's explanations in
    the grand jury of his effort to walk a fine line. Anyone who reads or
    watches that deposition knows the President was in fact trying to do
    precisely what he has admitted--to give the lawyers grudging,
    unresponsive or even misleading answers without actually lying. However
    successful or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no evidence
    that controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's
    intention.
        An examination of the statements that the President actually did
    make in the grand jury about his deposition testimony further
    demonstrates the lack of merit in this article. In the grand jury, the
    President only was asked about three areas of his deposition testimony
    that were covered in the failed impeachment article alleging perjury in
    the civil deposition.\87\ The first topic was the nature of any
    intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has already been addressed
    above.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \87\ The proposed article of impeachment alleging perjury in the
    civil deposition, like the two that are before the Senate, did not
    identify any specific instances of false testimony, but we have made
    our comparison with the Committee Report's elaboration of the
    deposition perjury article as it undoubtedly represents the largest
    universe of alleged perjurious statements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The second topic was the President's testimony about his knowledge
    of gifts he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony,
    the President had the following exchange with the OIC:

        Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was only two
    and a half weeks after you had given her these six gifts, you were
    asked, at page 75 in your deposition, lines 2 through 5, ``Well, have
    you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?'' And you answered, ``I
    don't recall.''
        And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually asked them,
    for prompting, ``Do you know what they were?''
        A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were,
    not that I don't recall whether I had given them. And then if you see,
    they did give me these specifics, and I gave them quite a good
    explanation here. I remembered very clearly what the facts were about
    The Black Dog. . . .

    App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not recall
    the exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and that he
    affirmatively sought prompting from the Jones lawyers is entirely
    consistent with his deposition testimony. This record plainly does not
    support a charge of perjury.
        The third and last topic was the President's deposition testimony
    that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying having a sexual
    relationship with the President was correct:

        Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement
    that she had no sexual relationship with him] was absolutely correct.
        A: I did. . . . I believe at the time that she filled out this
    affidavit, if she believed that the definition of sexual relationship
    was two people having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe
    that this is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it.
    . . .

    App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was truthful. As Ms.
    Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before any of this matter was
    public, this was in fact Ms. Lewinsky's definition of ``sex'' and
    apparently the President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape);
    see also App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no evidence
    whatever that the President did not believe this definition of sexual
    relations, and his belief finds support in dictionary definitions, the
    courts and commentators.\88\ Moreover, the record establishes that Ms.
    Lewinsky shared this view.\89\ Since the President's grand jury
    testimony about his understanding is corroborated both by dictionaries
    and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky, it simply cannot be
    labeled ``wrong'' or, more seriously, ``perjurious.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \88\ As one court has stated, ``[i]n common parlance the terms
    `sexual intercourse' and `sexual relations' are often used
    interchangeably.'' J.Y. v. D.A, 381 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. App. 1978).
    Dictionary definitions make the same point:
         Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st ed.
    1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
         Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 1996)
    at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse;
    coitus;''
         Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) at
    1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;''
         Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560,
    defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and
         Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1996)
    at 1775, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse;
    coitus.''
        \89\ Ms. Lewinsky took the position early on that her contact with
    the President did not constitute ``sex'' and reaffirmed that position
    even after she had received immunity and began cooperating with the
    OIC. For example, in one of the conversations surreptitiously taped by
    Ms. Tripp, Ms. Lewinsky explained to Ms. Tripp that she ``didn't have
    sex'' with the President because ``[h]aving sex is having
    intercourse.'' Supp. at 2664; see also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury
    testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stated that Ms. Lewinsky had said that
    the President and she ``didn't have sex''). Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed
    this position even after receiving immunity, stating in an FBI
    interview that ``her use of the term `having sex' means having
    intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). Likewise,
    in her original proffer to the OIC, she wrote, ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was
    comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the `sexual
    relationship' because she could justify to herself that she and the
    Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98
    Proffer).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in the grand
    jury about his civil deposition testimony.
    3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury about the statements of his
            attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition
        It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such as this
    one that even the OIC, which conducted the President's grand jury
    appearance, chose not to include in the Referral (presumably because
    there was no ``substantial and credible information'' to support the
    claim). Subpart (3) appears to allege that the President lied in his
    grand jury testimony when he characterized his state of mind in his
    civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky affidavit as
    meaning ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form.''
    Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the House Managers appear to base their
    perjury claim on President Clinton's grand jury statement that ``I'm
    not even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying.''
    House Br. at 62.
        The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's statement that
    he was ``not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange''
    because, it alleges, the ``videotape [of the deposition] shows the
    President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to
    his argument to Judge Wright.'' Ibid. While it is true that the
    videotape shows the President staring in what is presumably Mr.
    Bennett's direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was indeed
    ``paying close attention'' to the lengthy exchange. Notably absent from
    the videotape is any action on the part of the President that could be
    read as affirming Mr. Bennett's statement, such as a nod of the head,
    or any other activity that could be used to distinguish between a fixed
    stare and true attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The
    President was a witness in a difficult and complex deposition and, as
    he testified, he was ``focussing on [his] answers to the questions.''
    App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the common law has never seen a
    perjury charge based on so little.\90\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \90\ This allegation is nearly identical to the allegation of
    Article II(5), and, for the sake of brevity, it is addressed at greater
    length in the response to Article II, below.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading
            statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to
            influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the
            discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case
        The general language of the final proviso of Article I, according
    to the House Managers, is meant to signify a wide range of allegations,
    see House Br. at 60-69, although none were thought sufficiently
    credible to be included in the OIC Referral. These allegations were not
    even included in the summary of the Starr evidence presented to the
    Committee on October 5, 1998, by House Majority Counsel Schippers. They
    are nothing more than an effort to inflate the perjury allegations by
    converting every statement that the President made about the subject
    matter of Article II into a new count for perjury. As the discussion of
    Article II establishes, the President did not attempt to obstruct
    justice. Thus, his explanations of his statements in the grand jury
    were truthful.
        The House Brief asserts that the President committed perjury with
    respect to three areas of his grand jury testimony about the
    obstruction allegations. These claims are addressed thoroughly in the
    next section along with the corresponding Article II obstruction
    claims, and they are addressed in a short form here. The first claim is
    that the President committed perjury ``when he testified before the
    grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones'
    lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President, she should provide them.'' House Br. at 63. The House
    Managers contest the truthfulness of this statement by asserting that
    the President was responsible for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to
    Ms. Currie in late December. In other words, if the obstruction claim
    is true, they allege, this statement is not true. As is laid out in
    greater detail in the next section, the House Manager's view of this
    matter ignores a wealth of evidence establishing that the idea to
    conceal some of the gifts she had received originated with, and was
    executed by, Ms. Lewinsky. See e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98);
    Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
    App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 1481 (``LEWINSKY .
    . . suggested to the President that Betty Currie hold the gifts'')
    (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98).
        Second, the House Managers contend that the President provided
    perjurious testimony when he explained to the grand jury that he was
    trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he spoke with Betty Currie
    on January 18, 1998 about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br.
    at 65. The House Managers completely ignore the numerous statements
    that Ms. Currie makes in her testimony that support the President's
    assertion that he was merely trying to gather information. For example,
    Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with the OIC that ``Clinton
    then mentioned some of the questions he was asked at his deposition.
    Currie advised the way Clinton phrased the queries, they were both
    statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI
    302 1/24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue
    also supports the President's explanation of his questioning:

        Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the
    President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel
    pressured when he told you those statements?
        A: None whatsoever.
        Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about
    what he was doing?
        A: At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked
    or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
        Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say--because he
    would end each of the statements with ``Right?,'' with a question.
        A:  I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would
    say ``Right'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
        Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and
    you could either say whether it was true or not true?
        A: Correct.
        Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
        A: None.

    Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added).
        Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he
    was looking for information as a result of his deposition. There is no
    basis to doubt the President's explanation that his expectation of a
    media onslaught prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed,
    neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the only
    two participants in this conversation--conceivably supports the
    inference that he had any other intent. The House Managers' contention
    that the President's explanation to the grand jury was perjurious
    totally disregards the testimony of the only two witnesses with first-
    hand knowledge and has no basis in fact or in the evidence.
        Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton ``lied
    about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top
    aides.'' House Br. at 68. The basis for this charge appears to be the
    President's testimony that, although he said misleading things to his
    aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things
    that were true. Id. at 69. Once again, the record does not even
    approach a case for perjury. The President acknowledged that he misled;
    he tried, however, not to lie. It is a mystery how the Managers could
    try to disprove this simple statement of intent.

               V. The President Should be Acquitted on Article II

        The evidence does not support the allegations of Article II.
                               a. applicable law
        Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory crime that
    is set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, the ``Omnibus Obstruction
    Provision.'' In the criminal law context, Sec. 1503 requires proof of
    the following elements: (1) that there existed a pending judicial
    proceeding; (2) that the accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that
    the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct
    or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See,
    e.g., United States  v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989).
    False statements alone cannot sustain a conviction under Sec. 1503. See
    United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).\91\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \91\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 covers witness tampering. It is clear that
    the allegations in Article II could not satisfy the elements of
    Sec. 1512. That provision requires proof that a defendant knowingly
    engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct,
    or corrupt persuasion with intent to influence, delay, or prevent
    testimony or cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an
    official proceeding. It is clear from the case law that ``misleading
    conduct'' as contemplated by Sec. 1512 does not cover scenarios where
    an accused urged a witness to give false testimony without resorting to
    coercive or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., United States  v. Kulczyk,
    931 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction under Sec. 1512
    because ``there is simply no support for the argument that [defendant]
    did anything other than ask the witnesses to lie''); United States v.
    King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (``Since the only allegation in
    the indictment as to the means by which [defendant] induced [a witness]
    to withhold testimony was that [the defendant] misled [the witness],
    and since the evidence failed totally to support any inference that
    [the witness] was, or even could have been, misled, the conduct proven
    by the government was not within the terms of Sec. 1512.''). Deceit is
    thus the gravamen of an obstruction of justice charge that is
    predicated on witness tampering.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        b. structure of the allegations
        Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives alleges that
    the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the
    administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and
    through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme
    designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of
    evidence and testimony'' in the Jones case. The Article alleges that
    the President did so by engaging in ``one or more of the following
    acts'': the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky ``to
    execute a sworn affidavit . . . that he knew to be perjurious, false
    and misleading''; (2) ``corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give
    perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to
    testify personally'' in the Jones case; (3) ``corruptly engaged in,
    encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been
    subpoenaed'' in the Jones case, namely gifts given by him to Ms.
    Lewinsky; (4) ``intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job
    assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky between December 7, 1997 and January 14,
    1998, ``in order to corruptly prevent [her] truthful testimony'' in the
    Jones case; (5) ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and
    misleading statements'' to Judge Susan Webber Wright at the Jones
    deposition; (6) ``related a false and misleading account of events''
    involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a ``potential witness'' in the
    Jones case, ``in order to corruptly influence'' her testimony; and (7)
    made false and misleading statements to certain members of his staff
    who were ``potential'' grand jury witnesses, in order to corruptly
    influence their testimony.
        As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of the
    perjury allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges particular
    acts of obstruction while Article I (4) alleges that the President lied
    in the grand jury when he discussed those allegations.\92\ Both sets of
    allegations are unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of
    these charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the
    allegations in Article I (4).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \92\ Compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning
    alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to
    impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II (1)-(3), (6)
    (obstructing justice when he (1) ``encouraged witness . . . to execute
    a [false] sworn affidavit''; (2) ``encouraged a witness . . . to give
    perjurious, false and misleading testimony''; (3) ``engaged in,
    encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''; (6)
    ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty Currie). Compare also
    Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior
    false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a
    Federal judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by
    ``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a
    Federal judge).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. response to the particular allegations in article ii
    1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
            ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn
            affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious,
            false and misleading''
        Article II (1) alleges that the President ``corruptly encouraged''
    Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that
    he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.'' The House Managers
    allege that during a December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked
    the President what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones
    case and that the President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an
    affidavit.'' House Br. at 22. This admitted statement by the President
    of totally lawful conduct is the Managers' entire factual basis for the
    allegation in Article II (1).
        The Managers do not allege that the President ever suggested to Ms.
    Lewinsky she should file a false affidavit or otherwise told her what
    to say in the affidavit. Indeed they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky
    has repeatedly and forcefully denied any such suggestions:
         ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on
    their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718
    (2/1/98 Proffer).
         ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a
    job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
         ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that
    she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
         ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky
    to say anything or to lie. . . .'' App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
    98).
         ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various
    times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That
    wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
        In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence
    supporting their theory,\93\ the Managers offer their view that ``both
    parties knew the affidavit would have to be false and misleading in
    order to accomplish the desired result.'' House Br. at 22; see also
    Committee Report at 65 (the President ``knew [the affidavit] would have
    to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying''). But there is no
    evidence to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is
    true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President testified that, given the
    particular claims in the Jones  case, they thought a truthful, limited
    affidavit might establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to
    offer. The President explained to the grand jury why he believed that
    Ms. Lewinsky would execute a truthful but limited affidavit that would
    have established that she was not relevant to the Jones case:\94\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \93\ The myth that the President told Ms. Lewinsky to lie in her
    affidavit springs not from the evidence but from the surreptitiously
    recorded Tripp tapes. But as Ms. Lewinsky explained to the grand jury,
    many of the statements she made to Ms. Tripp--including on this
    subject--were not true: ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know
    at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to
    lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
        \94\ Indeed, the Committee Report alleges without support that the
    President lied to the grand jury when he indicated his belief that Ms.
    Lewinsky could indeed have filed a truthful but limited affidavit that
    might have gotten her out of testifying in the Jones case. Article I
    (4). This claim fails for the reasons discussed in the text.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what
    she says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no benefit
    in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual harassment. And
    if she defined sexual relationship in the way I think most Americans
    do, meaning intercourse, then she told the truth.'' App. at 474.
         ``You know, I believed then, I believe now, that Monica
    Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under
    reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit of what Linda Tripp
    did to her, would have given her a chance not to be a witness in this
    case.'' App. at 521.
         ``I believed then, I believe today, that she could execute
    an affidavit which, under reasonable circumstances with fair-minded,
    nonpolitically-oriented people, would result in her being relieved of
    the burden to be put through the kind of testimony that, thanks to
    Linda Tripp's work with you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have
    been put through. I don't think that's dishonest. I don't think that's
    illegal.'' App. at 529.
         ``But I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable
    that she could have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have
    disclosed the embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had,
    which had been over for many, many months by the time this incident
    occurred.'' App. at 568-69.
         ``I've already told you that I felt strongly that she
    could issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be
    factually truthful, that might get her out of having to testify. . . .
    And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit?
    Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? No, I did
    not.'' App. at 571.

    The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual
    solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President was
    consensual, and she knew nothing about the factual allegations of the
    Jones case.
        Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need not be
    false in order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a deposition:
         LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the affidavit was
    to avoid being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that one does this by giving a
    portion of the whole story, so the attorneys do not think you have
    anything of relevance to their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/
    29/98) (emphasis added).
         LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be as
    benign as possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 1421
    (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added).
         I thought that signing an affidavit could range from
    anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being
    deposed and so that that could range from anywhere between maybe just
    somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe
    having to deny any kind of a relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
    6/98) (emphasis added).
        The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have known that
    the President wanted her to lie because he never told her to fully
    detail their relationship in her affidavit and because an affidavit
    fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship would have
    been damaging to him in the Jones case. Committee Report at 65. The
    Managers wisely appear to have abandoned this argument.\95\ Ms.
    Lewinsky plainly was under no obligation to volunteer to the Jones
    lawyers every last detail about her relationship with the President--
    and the failure of the President to instruct her to do so is neither
    wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited, truthful affidavit
    might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not relevant to the Jones
    case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. Lewinsky could submit an
    affidavit in lieu of a deposition, as the President knew other
    potential deponents in the Jones case had attempted to do, in order to
    avoid the expense, burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones
    case was entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United
    States could face removal from office not because he told Monica
    Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged her to do so, but because he did not
    affirmatively instruct her to disclose every detail of their
    relationship to the Jones lawyers is simply not supportable.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \95\ The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky ``contextually
    understood that the President wanted her to lie'' because he never told
    her to file an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their
    relationship. Committee Report at 65. The only support cited for this
    ``contextual understanding'' obstruction theory advanced by the
    Committee Report was a reference back to the OIC Referral. The OIC
    Referral, in turn, advanced the same theory, citing only the testimony
    of Ms. Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie,
    he remained silent about what she should do or say, and by such
    silence, ``I knew what that meant.'' App. at 954 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98)
    (cited in Referral at 174). It is extraordinary that the President of
    the United States could face removal from office not because he told
    Ms. Lewinsky to lie, or said anything of the sort, but instead because
    he stayed silent--and Ms. Lewinsky thought she ``knew what that
    meant.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, at the
    time she executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly believed that
    her denial of a sexual relationship was accurate given what she
    believed to be the definition of a ``sexual relationship'':
         ``I never even came close to sleeping with [the President]
    . . . We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is having intercourse. That's
    how most people would--'' Supp. at 2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/
    97).\96\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \96\ A friend of Ms. Lewinsky's also testified that, based on her
    close relationship with her, she believed that Ms. Lewinsky did not lie
    in her affidavit based on her understanding that when Ms. Lewinsky
    referred to ``sex'' she meant intercourse. Supp. at 4597 (6/23/98 grand
    jury testimony of Ms. Dale Young). See also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury
    testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stating that Ms. Lewinsky had said that
    the President and she ``didn't have sex'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit
    with regard to the sexual relationship because she could justify to
    herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.''
    App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer).
         ``Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having sex'
    means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/
    98).
        The allegation contained in Article II(1) is totally unsupported by
    evidence. It is the product of a baseless hypothesis, and it should be
    rejected.
    2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he
            ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious,
            false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify
            personally'' in the Jones litigation
        Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky
    to give false testimony if and when she was called to testify
    personally in the Jones litigation. Again, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly
    denied that anyone told her or encouraged her to lie:
         ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on
    their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718
    (2/1/98 Proffer).
         ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a
    job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
         ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that
    she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
         ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky
    to say anything or to lie. . . . App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/
    98).
         ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various
    times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That
    wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added).
        The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky on
    December 17 to inform her that she had been listed as a potential
    witness in the Jones case, and that during this conversation, he ``sort
    of said, `You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or
    that you were bringing me letters.' '' House Br. at 22; App. at 843
    (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). Other than the fact that Ms. Lewinsky recalls
    this statement being made in the same conversation in which she learned
    that her name was on the Jones witness list, the Managers cite no
    evidence whatsoever that supports their claim that the President
    encouraged her to make such statements ``if and when called to testify
    personally in the Jones case.'' They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had
    discussed such explanations for her visits with the President in the
    past. Unremarkably, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been concerned
    about concealing their improper relationship from others while it was
    ongoing.
        Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements undercut
    their case:
         When asked what should be said if anyone questioned Ms.
    Lewinsky about her being with the President, he said she should say she
    was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or
    visiting Betty Currie (after she left the WH). There is truth to both
    of these statements. . . . [This] occurred prior to the subpoena in the
    Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis
    added).
         After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the Pres[ident], that
    she was identified as a possible witness in the Jones case, the
    Pres[ident] and Ms. L[ewinsky] discussed what she should do. The
    President told her he was not sure she would be subpoenaed, but in the
    event that she was, she should contact Ms. Currie. When asked what to
    do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could sign an
    affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. In
    general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to see Ms. Currie
    and, on occasion when working at the WH, she brought him letters when
    no one else was around. Neither of those statements untrue. App. at 712
    (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added).
         To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does not
    believe they discussed the content of any deposition that Ms.
    L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date. App. at 712 (2/1/98
    Proffer) (emphasis added).
         LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the issue in
    specific relation to the JONES matter, she and CLINTON had discussed
    what to say when asked about LEWINSKY's visits to the White House. App.
    at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (emphasis added).
        Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the President
    what to say if ``anyone'' asked about her visits, that the President
    said ``in general'' she could give such an explanation, and that they
    ``did not discuss the issue in specific relation to the Jones matter.''
        This is consistent with the President's testimony that he and Ms.
    Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at
    some point in the past,'' although he had no specific memory of that
    conversation. App. at 569. The President also stated in his grand jury
    testimony that he did not recall saying anything like that in
    connection with Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case:

        Q: And in that conversation, or in any conversation in which you
    informed her she was on the witness list, did you tell her, you know,
    you can always say that you were coming to see Betty or bringing me
    letters? Did you tell her anything like that?
        A: I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can tell you
    this. I absolutely never asked her to lie.

    App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this discussion was had
    in reference to testimony she may or may not have been called to give
    personally, and the Managers' implication is directly contradicted by
    Ms. Lewinsky's statement that she and the President did not discuss her
    deposition testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 (2/1/98
    Proffer) (``To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, she does not
    believe they discussed [in the December 17 conversation] the content of
    any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later
    date.'').
        In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony that she told the President she would deny the
    relationship and that the President made some encouraging comment.
    House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the President
    any such thing on December 17, or at any other time after she had been
    identified as a witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that that
    discussion did not take place after she learned she was a witness in
    the Jones case:

        Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions [about
    denying the relationship] after you learned that you were a witness in
    the Paula Jones case?
        A: I don't believe so. No.
        Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
        A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it would
    be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that would
    show me different, but I--it was 2:30 in the--I mean, the conversation
    I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 17th, which was----
        Q: The telephone call.
        A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I
    remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so.

    App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
        Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that neither of
    these so-called ``cover stories'' was untrue. In her handwritten
    proffer, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she asked the President what to say
    if anyone asked her about her visits to the Oval Office and he said
    that she could say ``she was bringing him letters (when she worked in
    Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left the White
    House).'' App. at 709 (Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer). Ms. Lewinsky expressly
    stated: ``There is truth to both of these statements.'' Id.  (emphasis
    added); see also App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``[n]either of those
    statements [was] untrue.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky
    testified to the grand jury that she did in fact bring papers to the
    President and that on some occasions, she visited the Oval Office only
    to see Ms. Currie:

        Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all?
        A: Yes.
        Q: All right. Tell us a little about that.
        A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of letters. . . .

    App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

    ``I saw Betty on every time that I was there . . . most of the time my
    purpose was to see the President, but there were some times when I did
    just go see Betty but the President wasn't in the office.''

    App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that those
    stories were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also Committee Report at
    66 (delivering documents to the President was a ``ruse that had no
    legitimate business purpose.''). In other words, while the so-called
    ``cover stories'' were literally true, such explanations might have
    been misleading. But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and
    obstruction cases, as is Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the statements
    were, in fact, literally true.
        The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported by the
    evidence and should be rejected.
    3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or
            supported a scheme to conceal evidence''--gifts he had given to
            Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case
        This allegation charges that the President participated in a scheme
    to conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky. It apparently
    centers on two events allegedly occurring in December 1997: (a) a
    conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two
    allegedly discussed the gifts the President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and
    (b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and
    storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not support the
    charge.
                a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President
        Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 1997,
    sometime shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas presents. App. at
    868 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the
    subject of gifts she had received from the President in relation to the
    Jones subpoena, and this was the first and only time that this subject
    arose. App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky Depo.
    8/26/98).
        The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one version of
    Ms. Lewinsky's description of that December 28 conversation:

    ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--maybe I
    should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to
    someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I
    don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' App.
    at 872 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).

        In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky has
    addressed this crucial exchange with prosecutors on at least ten
    different occasions, which we lay out in the margin for review.\97\ The
    accounts varied--in some Ms. Lewinsky essentially recalled that the
    President gave no response, but the House Managers, like the Committee
    Report and the OIC Referral, cite only the account most favorable to
    their case, failing even to take note of the other inconsistent
    recollections. But the important fact about Ms. Lewinsky's various
    descriptions of this conversation is that, at the very most, the
    President stated ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about it'' when Ms.
    Lewinsky raised the issue of the gifts. Even by the account most
    unfavorable to the President, the record is clear and unambiguous that
    the President never initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he
    tell or even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the gifts.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \97\ Those statements, from earliest to latest in time:
        1. Proffer (2/1/98): ``Ms. L then asked if she should put away
    (outside her home) the gifts he had given her or, maybe, give them so
    someone else.'' App. at 715.
        2. FBI 302 (7/27/98): ``LEWINSKY expressed her concern about the
    gifts that the President had given LEWINSKY and specifically the hat
    pin that had been subpoenaed by PAULA JONES. The President seemed to
    know what the JONES subpoena called for in advance and did not seem
    surprised about the hat pin. The President asked LEWINSKY if she had
    told anyone about the hat pin and LEWINSKY denied that she had, but may
    have said that she gave some of the gifts to FRANK CARTER. . . .
    LEWINSKY asked the President if she should give the gifts to someone
    and the President replied `I don't know.' '' App. at 1395.
        3. FBI 302 (8/1/98): ``LEWINSKY said that she was concerned about
    the gifts that the President had given her and suggested to the
    President that BETTY CURRIE hold the gifts. The President said
    something like, `I don't know,' or `I'll think about it.' The President
    did not tell LEWINSKY what to do with the gifts at that time.'' App. at
    1481.
        4. Grand Jury (8/6/98): ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you
    know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house
    somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I
    think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And
    left that topic.'' App. at 872.
        5. FBI 302 (8/13/97): ``During their December 28, 1997 meeting,
    CLINTON did not specifically mention which gifts to get rid of.'' App.
    at 1549.
        6. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``It was December 28th and I was there to
    get my Christmas gifts from him. . . And we spent maybe about five
    minutes or so, not very long, talking about the case. And I said to
    him, `Well, do you think' . . . And at one point, I said, `Well do you
    think I should--' I don't think I said `get rid of,' I said, `But do
    you think I should put away or maybe give to Betty or give someone the
    gifts?' And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something
    like, `I don't know,' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.''
    App. at 1121-22.
        7. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's
    name [at the December 28 meeting during which gifts were supposedly
    discussed] or did the President bring up Betty's name? THE WITNESS: I
    think I brought it up. The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's
    name because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. . .'' App.
    at 1122.
        8. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: You had said that the President
    had called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone
    there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed
    concern, the President really didn't say anything.'' App. at 1126.
        9. FBI 302 (8/24/98): ``LEWINSKY advised that CLINTON was sitting
    in the rocking chair in the Study. LEWINSKY asked CLINTON what she
    should do with the gifts CLINTON had given her and he either did not
    respond or responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what
    was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not
    have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566.
        10. FBI 302 (9/3/98): ``On December 28, 1997, in a conversation
    between LEWINSKY and the President, the hat pin given to Lewinsky by
    the President was specifically discussed. They also discussed the
    general subject of the gifts the President had given Lewinsky. However,
    they did not discuss other specific gifts called for by the PAULA JONES
    subpoena. LEWINSKY got the impression that the President knew what was
    on the subpoena.'' App. at 1590.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of the
    President's reaction depict the President as not even acknowledging her
    suggestion. Among those versions, ignored by the Committee Report and
    the Managers, are the following:
         ``And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was
    something like, `I don't know,' '' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no
    response.'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
         ``[The President] either did not respond or responded `I
    don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is
    certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in
    her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98)
    (emphasis added).
         ``The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name,
    because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . .'' App. at
    1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).
         ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you
    initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had
    a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed concern, the
    President didn't really say anything.'' App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/
    98) (emphasis added).\98\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \98\ Here a grand juror is restating Ms. Lewinsky's earlier
    testimony, with which Ms. Lewinsky appeared to agree (she did not
    dispute the accuracy of the grand juror's recapitulation).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially no
    discussion of gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no evidence of
    any ``scheme . . . designed to . . . conceal the existence'' of any
    gifts.
                b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts
        Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction by the
    President at his December 28 meeting with Monica Lewinsky, Article II
    (3) necessarily depends on the added assumption that, after the
    December 28 meeting, the President must have instructed his secretary,
    Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby
    consummating the obstruction of justice. As the following discussion
    will demonstrate, the record is devoid of any direct evidence that the
    President discussed this subject with Ms. Currie. At most, it
    conflicted on the question of whether Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky
    initiated the gift retrieval.
        We begin with what is certain. The record is undisputed that Ms.
    Currie picked up a box containing gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and placed
    them under her bed at home. The primary factual dispute, therefore, is
    which of the two initiated the pick-up. According to the logic of the
    Committee Report, if Ms. Currie initiated the retrieval, she must have
    been so instructed by the President. Committee Report at 69 (``there is
    no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the President'').
        But the facts are otherwise. Both Ms. Currie and the President have
    denied ever having any such conversation wherein the President
    instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. App. at
    502 (President Clinton GJ 8/17/98); Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). In
    other words, the only two parties who could have direct knowledge of
    such an instruction by the President have denied it took place.
        In the face of this direct evidence that the President did not ask
    Ms. Currie to pick up these gifts, the Committee Report's obstruction
    theory hinges on the inference that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky and
    must have done so at the direction of the President. To be sure, Ms.
    Lewinsky has stated on several occasions that Ms. Currie initiated a
    call to her to inquire about retrieving something. The Managers and the
    Committee Report cited the following passage from Ms. Lewinsky's grand
    jury testimony:

        Q: What did [Betty Currie] say?
        A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give me.'' Or,
    ``The President said you have something to give me.'' Along those
    lines. . . .
        Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I understand you
    have something to give me,'' or ``The President says you have something
    for me,'' what did you understand her to mean?
        A: The gifts.
    App. at 874 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). See also App. at 715 (2/1/98 Proffer)
    (``Ms. Currie called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres.
    had told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her.'').
        However, Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged that it was she who first raised
    the prospect of Ms. Currie's involvement in holding the gifts:

        A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the President
    bring up Betty's name?
        [MS. LEWINSKY]: I think I brought it up. The President wouldn't
    have brought up Betty's name because he really didn't--he really didn't
    discuss it.

    App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). And contrary to the Committee
    Report's suggestion that Lewinsky's memory of these events has been
    ``consistent and unequivocal'' and she has ``recited the same facts in
    February, July, and August,'' Committee Report at 69, Ms. Lewinsky
    herself acknowledged at her last grand jury appearance that her memory
    of the crucial conversation is less than crystal clear:

        A JUROR: . . . Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the
    President had told her to call?
        [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right now. I don't. I don't remember. . . .

    App. at 1141 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).
        Moreover, Ms. Currie has repeatedly and unvaryingly stated that it
    was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted Ms. Currie about the gifts, not the
    other way around. A few examples include:
         ``LEWINSKY called CURRIE and advised she had to return all
    gifts CLINTON had given LEWINSKY as there was talk going around about
    the gifts.'' Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98);
         ``Monica said she was getting concerned, and she wanted to
    give me the stuff the President had given her--or give me a box of
    stuff. It was a box of stuff.'' Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98);
         Q: . . . Just tell us for a moment how this issue first
    arose and what you did about it and what Ms. Lewinsky told you.
         A: The best I remember it first arose with a conversation.
    I don't know if it was over the telephone or in person. I don't know.
    She asked me if I would pick up a box. She said Isikoff had been
    inquiring about gifts.'' Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
         ``The best I remember she said that she wanted me to hold
    these gifts--hold this--she may have said gifts, I'm sure she said
    gifts, box of gifts--I don't remember--because people were asking
    questions. And I said, `Fine.' '' Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98);
         ``The best I remember is Monica calls me and asks me if
    she can give me some gifts, if I'd pick up some gifts for her.'' Supp.
    at 706 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).
        The Committee Report attempts to portray Ms. Currie's memory as
    faulty on the key issue of whether Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift
    retrieval by unfairly referencing Ms. Currie's answer to a completely
    different question. Ms. Currie was asked whether she had discussed with
    the President Ms. Lewinsky's ``turning over to [her]'' the gift he had
    given her. Ms. Currie indicated that she could remember no such
    occasion. ``If Monica said [Ms. Currie] talked to the President about
    it,'' she was then asked, ``would that not be true?'' Then, only on the
    limited question of whether Ms. Currie ever talked to the President
    about the gifts--wholly separate from the issue of who made the initial
    contact--did Ms. Currie courteously defer, ``Then she may remember
    better than I. I don't remember.'' Supp. at 584 (Currie GJ 5/6/98).
    Ironically, it is the substance of this very allegation--regarding
    conversations between Ms. Currie and the President--that Ms. Lewinsky
    told the grand jury she could not recall. (In later testimony,
    referring to a conversation she had with the President on January 21,
    Ms. Currie testified that she was ``sure'' that she did not discuss the
    fact that she had a box of Ms. Lewinsky's belongings under her bed.
    Supp. at 705 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).)
        To support its theory that Ms. Currie initiated a call to Ms.
    Lewinsky, the House Managers place great reliance on a cell phone
    record of Ms. Currie, calling it ``key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy
    recollection is wrong'' and which ``conclusively proves'' that ``the
    President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.'' House Br. at 33.
    There is record of a one-minute call on December 28, 1998 from Ms.
    Currie's cell phone to Ms. Lewinsky's home at 3:32 p.m. Even assuming
    Ms. Lewinsky is correct that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts on December
    28, her own testimony refutes the possibility that the Managers'
    mysterious 3:32 p.m. telephone call could have been the initial contact
    by Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts. To the contrary, the timing and
    duration of the call strongly suggest just the opposite. It is
    undisputed that Ms. Lewinsky entered the White House on the morning of
    December 28 at 8:16 a.m. App. at 111 (White House entry records). While
    no exit time for Ms. Lewinsky was recorded because she inadvertently
    left her visitor badge in the White House, she has testified that the
    visit lasted around an hour. App. at 870-72 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98).
    Consistent with this timing, records also indicate that the President
    left the Oval Office at 9:52 a.m., thus placing Ms. Lewinsky's exit
    around 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. App. at 111. Ms. Lewinsky has indicated on
    several occasions that her discussion with Betty Currie occurred just
    ``several hours'' after she left. App. at 875 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98);
    App. at 1395 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Ms. Lewinsky three times
    placed the timing of the actual gift exchange with Ms. Currie ``at
    about 2:00 p.m.'' App at 1127 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1396
    (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98); App. at 1482 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98).
    This, in light of undisputed documentary evidence and Ms. Lewinsky's
    own testimony, it becomes clear that the 3:32 p.m. telephone record
    relied upon by the Committee Report in fact is unlikely to reflect a
    call placed to initiate the pick-up.
        Apart from this conspicuous timing defect, there is another,
    independent reason to conclude that the 3:32 p.m. telephone call could
    not have been the conversation Ms. Lewinsky describes. The 3:32 p.m.
    call is documented to have lasted no longer than one minute, and
    because such calls are rounded up to the nearest minute, it quite
    conceivably could have been much shorter in duration. It is difficult
    to imagine that the conversation reflected in Ms. Lewinsky's statements
    could have taken place in less than one minute. Both Ms. Currie and Ms.
    Lewinsky have described the various matters that were discussed in
    their initial conversation: not only was this the first time the topic
    of returning gifts was discussed, which quite likely generated some
    discussion between the two, but they also had to discuss and arrange a
    convenient plan for Ms. Currie to make the pick-up.\99\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \99\ The OIC Referral, which took great pains to point out every
    allegedly incriminating piece of evidence, made no reference to this
    telephone record, perhaps because the OIC knew it tended not to
    corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's time line. In its place, the Referral rested
    its corroboration hopes in the following bizarre analysis: ``More
    generally, the person making the extra effort (in this case, Ms.
    Currie) is ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' Referral at
    170. Wisely, the House Managers chose not to pursue this groundless
    speculation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        What, then, to make of this call so heavily relied upon by the
    House Managers? The record is replete with references that Ms. Currie
    and Ms. Lewinsky communicated very frequently, especially during this
    December 1997-January 1998 time period. See, e.g., Supp. at 554 (Currie
    GJ 1/27/98) (many calls around Christmas-time). They often called or
    paged each other to discuss a host of topics, including Ms. Lewinsky's
    pending job search, Ms. Currie's mother's illness, and her contacts
    with Mr. Jordan. There is simply no reason to believe this call was
    anything other than one of the many calls and exchanges of pages that
    these two shared during the period.
                c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds
                        With the President's Actions
        Ultimately, and irrespective of the absence of evidence implicating
    the President in Ms. Lewinsky's gift concealment, the charge fails
    because it is inconsistent with other events of the very same day.
    There is absolutely no dispute that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky
    numerous additional gifts during their December 28 meeting. It must
    therefore be assumed that on the very day the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky were conspiring to hide the gifts he had already given to her,
    the President added to the pile. No stretch of logic will support such
    an outlandish theory.
        From the beginning, this inherent contradiction has puzzled
    investigators. If there were a plot to conceal these gifts, why did the
    President give Ms. Lewinsky several more gifts at the very moment the
    concealment plan was allegedly hatched? The House Managers OIC
    prosecutors, grand jurors, and even Ms. Lewinsky hopelessly searched
    for an answer to that essential question:

        Q: Although, Ms. Lewinsky, I think what is sort of--it seems a
    little odd and, I guess really the grand jurors wanted your impression
    of it, was on the same day that you're discussing basically getting the
    gifts to Betty to conceal them, he's giving you a new set of gifts.
        A: You know, I have come recently to look at that as sort of a
    strange situation, I think, in the course of the past few weeks. . . .

    App. at 887-88 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). See House Br. at
    34.
        The Committee Report fails to resolve this significant flaw in its
    theory.\100\ The report admits that Ms. Lewinsky ``can't answer'' why
    the President would in one breath give her gifts and in the next hatch
    a plan to take them back. But it cites only to Ms. Lewinsky's
    understanding of the relationship's pattern of concealment and how she
    contemplated it must apply to the gifts. It creates the erroneous
    impression that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky instructions to conceal
    the gifts in the December 28 meeting by quoting her testimony that
    ``from everything he said to me'' she would conceal the gifts. But we
    know that Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly testified that no such discussion
    ever occurred. Her reliance on ``everything he said to me'' must,
    therefore, reflect her own plan to implement discussions the two had
    had about concealing the relationship long before her role in the Jones
    litigation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \100\ Incredibly, not only does the Committee Report fail to offer
    a sensible answer to this perplexity, but without any factual or
    logical support it accuses the President of lying to the grand jury
    when he testified that he was not particularly concerned about the
    gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky and thus had no compunction about
    giving her additional gifts on December 28. Article I (4). For whatever
    reason, neither the Committee Report nor the OIC Referral acknowledges
    the most reasonable explanation for these events: as the President has
    testified repeatedly, he was not concerned about the gifts he had given
    Ms. Lewinsky.
         ``I was never hung up about this gift issue. Maybe it's
    because I have a different experience. But, you know, the President
    gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe more. I have always given a lot of
    gifts to people, especially if they give me gifts. And this was no big
    deal to me.'' App. at 495.
         ``this gift business . . . didn't bother me.'' App. at
    496.
         ``I wasn't troubled by this gift issue.'' App. at 497.
         ``I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have always
    been given gifts. I do not think there is anything improper about a man
    giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving a man a gift, that necessarily
    connotes an improper relationship. So, it didn't bother me.'' App. at
    498.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        What this passage confirms is that Ms. Lewinsky had very much in
    her mind that she would do what she could to conceal the relationship--
    a modus operandi she herself acknowledged well pre-dated the Jones
    litigation. That she took such steps does not mean that the President
    knew of or participated in them. Indeed, it appears that the entire
    gift-concealment plan arose not from any plan suggested by the
    President--which the Committee Report so desperately struggles to
    maintain--but rather more innocently from the actions of a young woman
    taking steps she thought were best.\101\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \101\ As the President has stated about this potentiality, ``I
    didn't then, I don't now see this [the gifts] as a problem. And if she
    thought it was a problem, I think it--it must have been from a, really
    a misapprehension of the circumstances. I certainly never encouraged
    her not to, to comply lawfully with a subpoena.'' App. at 497-98
    (emphasis added.)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In any event, the record evidence is abundantly clear that the
    President has not obstructed justice by any plan or scheme to conceal
    gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and logic and reason fully undercut
    any such theory.
    4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with
            Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an
            effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in
            the Jones case
        Again, in the absence of specifics in Article II itself, we look to
    the Committee Report for guidance on the actual charges. The Committee
    Report would like to portray this claim in as sinister a light as
    possible, and it alleges that the President of the United States
    employed his close friend Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job in
    New York to influence her testimony or perhaps get her away from the
    Jones lawyers. To reach this conclusion, and without the benefit of a
    single piece of direct evidence to support the charge, it ignores the
    direct testimony of several witnesses, assigns diabolical purposes to a
    series of innocuous events, and then claims that ``[i]t is logical to
    infer from this chain of events'' that the job efforts ``were motivated
    to influence the testimony of'' Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 71.
    Again, the evidence contradicts the inferences the Committee Report
    strives to draw. Ms. Lewinsky's New York job search began on her own
    initiative long before her involvement in the Jones case. By her own
    forceful testimony, her job search had no connection to the Jones case.
        Mr. Jordan agreed to help Ms. Lewinsky not at the direction of the
    President but upon the request of Betty Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-time
    friend. And bizarrely, the idea to involve Mr. Jordan (which arose well
    before Ms. Lewinsky became a possible Jones witness) came not from the
    President but apparently emanated from Ms. Tripp. In short, the facts
    directly frustrate the House Majority's theory.\102\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \102\ This allegation has gone through several iterations. As
    initially referred to the House of Representatives, the charge was that
    the President ``help[ed] Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York at a
    time when she would have been a witness against him'' in the Jones
    case. OIC Referral at 181. Faced with the significant evidence that Ms.
    Lewinsky's job efforts had originated long before she became involved
    in the Jones case and were in fact entirely unrelated to the Jones
    case, the Judiciary Committee Majority was forced to recraft this
    claim. Instead of implying a complete connection between the job search
    and the Jones ligitation, the article now oddly charges that the
    President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job
    assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky ``at a time when the truthful testimony
    of [Ms. Lewinsky] would have been harmful to him,'' Article II (5)
    (emphasis added)--thereby admitting that the initial effort was
    motivated by appropriate concerns.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This
                        Charge
        It is hard to overstate the importance of the fact that--by the
    House Managers', the Committee Report's and the OIC's own admission--
    there is not one single piece of direct evidence to support this
    charge. Not one. Indeed, just the contrary is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky
    and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified that there was never an
    explicit or implicit agreement, suggestion, or implication that Ms.
    Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for her silence or false
    testimony. One need look no further than their own testimony:

        Lewinsky: ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised
    a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98);
        ``There was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, or anyone else
    that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones affidavit before getting a job in
    New York. LEWINSKY never demanded a job from Jordan in exchange for a
    favorable affidavit. Nether the President nor JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY
    that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98).
        Jordan: ``As far as I was concerned, [the job and the affidavit]
    were two very separate matters.'' Supp. at 1737 (Jordan GJ 3/5/98).
        ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no''--in response to the question
    whether the job search and the affidavit were in any way connected.
    Supp. at 1827 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\103\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \103\ The only person who suggested any such quid pro quo was Ms.
    Tripp, who repeatedly urged Ms. Lewinsky to demand such linkage. App.
    at 1493 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/2/98 (``TRIPP told LEWINSKY not to sign the
    affidavit until LEWINSKY had a job.''). To appease Linda Tripp's
    repeated demands on this point, Ms. Lewinsky ultimately told Ms. Tripp
    that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't sign the affidavit until she
    had a job. But as she later emphasized to the grand jury, ``That was
    definitely a lie, based on something Linda had made me promise her on
    January 9th.'' App. at 1134 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98).

        This is the direct evidence. The House Managers' circumstantial
    ``chain of events'' case, House Br. 39-41, cannot overcome the hurdle
    the direct evidence presents.
                b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search
        By its terms, Article II(4) would have the Senate evaluate Ms.
    Lewinsky's job search by considering only the circumstances
    ``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1997.'' Article II(4). Although
    barely mentioned in the Committee Report's ``explanation'' of Article
    II(4), the significant events occurring before December 7, 1997 cannot
    simply be ignored because they are inconsistent with the Majority's
    theory. Without reciting every detail, the undisputed record
    establishes that the following facts occurred long before Ms. Lewinsky
    was involved in the Jones case:
        First, Ms. Lewinsky had contemplated looking for a job in New York
    as early as July 1997. App. at 1414 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (July 3
    letter ``first time [Lewinsky] mentioned the possibility of moving to
    New York''); App. at 787-788 (On July 4, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky wrote the
    President a letter describing her interest in a job ``in New York at
    the United Nations''); Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had been
    searching for a highly paid job in New York since the previous July.'')
    She conveyed that prospect to a friend on September 2, 1997. App. at
    2811 (Lewinsky e-mail).
        Second, in early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, then-Deputy
    Chief of Staff John Podesta asked U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson to
    consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. Supp. at 3404
    (Richardson GJ 4/3/98). Ms. Currie testified that she was acting on her
    own in this effort. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98).
        Third, around October 6, Ms. Tripp told Ms. Lewinsky that an
    acquaintance in the White House reported that it was unlikely Ms.
    Lewinsky would ever be re-employed at the White House. After this
    disclosure, Ms. Lewinsky ``was mostly resolved to look for a job in the
    private sector in New York.'' App. at 1543-44 (Lewinsky FBI 302) 8/13/
    98; see also App. at 1460 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (remarks by the
    Linda Tripp acquaintance were the ``straw that broke the camel's
    back'').
        Fourth, sometime prior to October 9, 1997, Ms. Tripp and Ms.
    Lewinsky discussed the prospect of enlisting Mr. Vernon Jordan to
    assist Ms. Lewinsky in obtaining a private sector job in New York. App.
    at 822-24 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); see also App. at 1079 (Lewinsky GJ 8/
    20/98) (``I don't remember . . . if [enlisting Jordan] was my idea or
    Linda's idea. And I know that that came up in discussions with her, I
    believe, before I discussed it with the President''). On either October
    9 or 11, Ms. Lewinsky conveyed to the President this idea of asking Mr.
    Jordan for assistance. Id.
        Fifth, in mid-October, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky purchased a book on jobs
    in New York. App. at 1462 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky
    completed and sent to Betty Currie at the White House a packet of jobs-
    related materials on October 15 or 16. Supp. at 735 (Lewinsky Tripp
    tape of 10/15/97 conversation).
        Sixth, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for a position
    with Ambassador Bill Richardson at the United Nations in New York.
    Ambassador Richardson was ``impressed'' with Ms. Lewinsky and, on
    November 3, offered her a position, which she ultimately rejected.
    Supp. at 3411 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3731 (Sutphen GJ 5/27/
    98). Ms. Currie informed the President that Ms. Lewinsky had received a
    job offer at the U.N. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ambassador
    Richardson never spoke to the President or Mr. Jordan about Ms.
    Lewinsky, and he testified emphatically and repeatedly that no one
    pressured him to hire her. Supp. at 3422-23 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98);
    Supp. at 3418 (same); Supp. at 3429 (same).
        Seventh, as of late October or November, Ms. Lewinsky had told Mr.
    Kenneth Bacon, her boss at the Pentagon, that she wanted to leave the
    Pentagon and move to New York. In a series of conversations, she
    enlisted his assistance in obtaining a private sector job in New York.
    Supp. at 11 (Kenneth Bacon FBI 302 2/26/98). In response, Mr. Bacon
    contacted Howard Paster, CEO of the public relations firm Hill &
    Knowlton about Ms. Lewinsky. Id.
        Eighth, in November, Ms. Lewinsky gave notice to the Pentagon that
    she would be leaving her Pentagon job at year's end. Supp. at 116
    (Clifford Bernath GJ 5/21/98).
        Ninth, Ms. Lewinsky apparently had a preliminary meeting with Mr.
    Jordan on November 5, 1997 to discuss her job search. During this
    twenty-minute meeting, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan discussed a list of
    potential employers she had compiled. App. at 1464-65 (Lewinsky FBI 302
    7/31/98). In that meeting, Ms. Lewinsky never informed Mr. Jordan of
    any time constraints on her need for job assistance. Supp. at 2647
    (Lewinsky-Tripp Tape of 11/8/97 conversation). Mr. Jordan had to leave
    town the next day. App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 Form 7/31/98). Ms.
    Lewinsky had a follow-up telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan around
    Thanksgiving wherein he advised her that he was ``working on her job
    search'' and instructed her to call him again ``around the first week
    of December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98); see also App.
    at 825 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (``And so Betty arranged for me to speak
    with [Jordan] again and I spoke with him when I was in Los Angeles
    before--right before Thanksgiving.'') \104\ Inexplicably, the Committee
    Report, the presentation by its chief counsel, and the Starr Referral
    all choose to ignore this key piece of testimony--that contact resumed
    in early December because Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan agreed (in
    November) that it would. See Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had
    no further contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time [early November to mid
    December].''); Schippers Dec. 10, 1998 Presentation at 38 (``Vernon
    Jordan, who, by the way, had done nothing from early November to mid-
    December.''); Referral at 182 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no contact with . . .
    Mr. Jordan for another month [after November 5].'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \104\ Mr. Jordan was then out of the country from the day after
    Thanksgiving until December 4. Supp. at 1804 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In sum, the record is clear that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to
    seek a job in New York many months before her involvement in the Jones
    case. She had asked her Pentagon boss to help, as well as Ms. Currie,
    who arranged indirectly for Ms. Lewinsky to interview with Ambassador
    Richardson at the United Nations. Mr. Jordan became involved in the job
    search at the request of Ms. Currie (apparently at the suggestion of
    Ms. Tripp) and, notwithstanding his travels in November, Supp. at 1811
    (Jordan GJ 5/5/98), kept in contact with Ms. Lewinsky with plans to
    reconvene early in December.
                c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case
        Article II ignores this background and merely alleges that efforts
    to aid Ms. Lewinsky's job search ``intensified and succeeded'' in
    December 1997. While not adopted in the article, the House Brief, the
    Committee Report, and the accompanying final presentation by Majority
    Counsel Schippers offer some guidance as to the meaning of the actual
    charge. They cite three events--Mr. Jordan's December 11 meeting with
    Ms. Lewinsky to discuss job prospects in New York, Ms. Lewinsky's
    execution of her Jones affidavit, and her receipt of a job--in an
    effort to portray Ms. Lewinsky's job search as sinister. But the full
    record easily dispels any suggestion that there were any obstructive or
    improper acts.

          (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan

        The House Managers and the Committee Report suggest that Mr. Jordan
    took action on Ms. Lewinsky's job search request only after, and
    because, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list on December 5
    and only after, and because, Judge Wright ordered the President to
    answer certain questions about ``other women'' on December 11. See
    House Br. at 21. Consider the Committee Report portrayal:

        ``[T]he effort to obtain a job for Monica Lewinsky in New York
    intensified after the President learned, on December 6, 1997, that
    Monica Lewinsky was listed on the witness list for the case Jones v.
    Clinton.\105\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \105\ Committee Report at 70. That portrayal flatly contradicts the
    Committee Report's earlier statement that on December 6 ``there was
    still no urgency to help Lewinsky.'' Committee Report at 10-11.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        ``On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon Jordan at
    the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan on December 11 to
    discuss specific job contacts in New York. Mr. Jordan then made calls
    to certain New York companies on Ms. Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan
    telephoned President Clinton to keep him informed of the efforts to get
    Ms. Lewinsky a job.'' Committee Report at 70.
        ``Something happened that changed the priority assigned to the job
    search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright
    ordered President Clinton to provide information regarding any state or
    federal employee with whom he had, proposed, or sought sexual
    relations. To keep Ms. Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical
    importance.'' Committee Report at 11.

        The unmistakable intention of this narrative is to suggest that,
    after the President learned Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list
    on December 6, he (1) contacted Mr. Jordan on December 7 to engage his
    assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, and only then did Mr. Jordan agree to meet
    with Ms. Lewinsky, and further, that (2) Mr. Jordan met with Ms.
    Lewinsky on December 11 and took concrete steps to help Ms. Lewinsky
    only after and as a result of Judge Wright's December 11 order. Both
    suggestions are demonstrably false.
        The President had nothing to do with arranging the December 11
    meeting between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. As the record indicates,
    after receiving a request from Ms. Currie on December 5 that he meet
    with Ms. Lewinsky, and telling Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call
    him, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan on December 8. Supp. at 1705
    (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). As noted above, that call had been presaged by a
    conversation between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky around Thanksgiving in
    which Jordan told her ``he was working on her job search'' and asked
    her to contact him again ``around the first week of December.'' App. at
    1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In the December 8 call, the two
    arranged for Ms. Lewinsky to come to Mr. Jordan's office on December
    11; on the same day, Ms. Lewinsky sent Mr. Jordan via courier a copy of
    her resume. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). At the time of that
    contact, Mr. Jordan did not even know that Ms. Lewinsky knew President
    Clinton. Id.
        In the intervening period before Ms. Lewinsky's December 11 meeting
    with Mr. Jordan, the President met with Mr. Jordan on December 7. As
    the Committee Report acknowledges, that meeting had nothing to do with
    Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 11. Yet the House Managers' Brief,
    like the Committee Report before it, states that ``the sudden interest
    [in helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job] was inspired by a court order
    entered on December 11, 1997'' in the Jones case.\106\ House Br. at 21.
    No evidence supports that supposition. The December 11 meeting had been
    scheduled on December 8. Neither the OIC Referral nor the Committee
    Report nor the Managers' Brief cites any evidence that the President or
    Mr. Jordan had any knowledge of the contents of that Order at the time
    of the December 11 meeting.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \106\ That Order authorized Paula Jones' attorneys to obtain
    discovery relating to certain government employees ``with whom the
    President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to
    have sexual relations.'' House Br. at 21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky shortly after 1:00 p.m. on
    December 11. Supp. at 1863 (Akin Gump visitor log); Supp. at 1809
    (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). In anticipation of that meeting, Mr. Jordan had
    made several calls to prospective employers about Ms. Lewinsky. Supp.
    at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). Mr. Jordan spoke about Ms. Lewinsky with
    Mr. Peter Georgescu of Young & Rubicam at 9:45 a.m. that morning, and
    with Mr. Richard Halperin of Revlon around 1:00 p.m., immediately
    before meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).
    Again, there is no evidence that any of this occurred after Mr. Jordan
    learned of Judge Wright's order.
        Although the Committee Report claims that a heightened sense of
    urgency attached in December which ``intensified'' the job search
    efforts, it ignores the sworn testimony of Mr. Jordan denying any such
    intensification: ``Oh, no. I do not recall any heightened sense of
    urgency [in December]. What I do recall is that I dealt with it when I
    had time to do it.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\107\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \107\ Mr. Jordan explained that not much activity occurred in
    November because ``I was traveling.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 9/5/98).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ``heightened urgency'' theory also is undermined by the simple
    fact that Mr. Jordan indisputably placed no pressure on any company to
    give Ms. Lewinsky a job and suggested no date by which Ms. Lewinsky had
    to be hired. The first person Mr. Jordan contacted, Mr. Georgescu of
    Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller, told investigators that Mr. Jordan
    did not engage in a ``sales pitch'' for Lewinsky. Supp. at 1222
    (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). Mr. Georgescu told Mr. Jordan that the
    company ``would take a look at [Ms. Lewinsky] in the usual way,'' Supp.
    at 1219 (Georgescu FBI 302 1/29/98), and that once the initial
    interview was set up, Ms. Lewinsky would be ``on [her] own from that
    point.'' Supp. at 1222 (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). The executive who
    interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at Burson-Marsteller stated that Ms.
    Lewinsky's recruitment process went ``by the book'' and, ``while
    somewhat accelerated,'' the process ``went through the normal steps.''
    Supp. at 111 (Berk FBI 302 3/31/98).
        At American Express, Mr. Jordan contacted Ms. Ursula Fairbairn, who
    stated that Mr. Jordan exerted ``no . . . pressure'' to hire Lewinsky.
    Supp. at 1087 (Fairbairn FBI 302 2/4/98). Indeed, she considered it
    ``not unusual for board members'' like Mr. Jordan to recommend talented
    people for employment and noted that Mr. Jordan had recently
    recommended another person just a few months earlier. Id. The person
    who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky stated that he felt ``absolutely no
    pressure'' to hire her and indeed told her she did not have the
    qualifications necessary for the position. Supp. at 3521 (Schick FBI
    302 1/29/98).
        Perhaps most telling of the absence of pressure applied by Mr.
    Jordan is the fact that neither Young & Rubicam/Burson-Marsteller or
    American Express offered Ms. Lewinsky a job.
        Similarly, at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon, where Ms. Lewinsky
    ultimately was offered a job (see below), Mr. Jordan initially
    contacted Mr. Halperin, who has stated that it was not unusual for Mr.
    Jordan to make an employment recommendation. Supp. at 1281 (Halperin
    FBI 302 1/26/98). Moreover, he emphasized that Mr. Jordan did not ``ask
    [him] to work on any particular timetable,'' Supp. at 1294 (Halperin GJ
    4/23/98), and that ``there was no implied time constraint or
    requirement for fast action.'' Supp. at 1286 (Halperin FBI 3/27/98.)
                (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment
                        offer
        The Committee Report attempts to conflate separate and unrelated
    acts--the signing of the affidavit and the Revlon job offer--to sustain
    its otherwise unsustainable obstruction theory. The Committee Report's
    description of these events is deftly misleading:

        ``The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false
    affidavit. She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day.
    She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to President Clinton that
    it had been signed and another mission had been accomplished.
        On January 8, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan
    with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. The interview went poorly.
    Afterwards, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Mr.
    Jordan, who had done nothing from early November to mid-December, then
    called the chief executive officer of MacAndrews & Forbes, Ron
    Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' Mr. Jordan
    called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. That evening,
    MacAndrews & Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told her that she would be
    given more interviews the next morning.
        The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for signing the
    false affidavit. After a series of interviews with MacAndrews & Forbes
    personnel, she was informally offered a job. Committee Report at 18
    (citations omitted).

        By this portrayal, the Committee Report suggests two conclusions:
    first, that Ms. Lewinsky was ``reward[ed]'' with a job for her signing
    of the affidavit; second, that the only reason Ms. Lewinsky was given a
    second interview and ultimately hired at Revlon was Mr. Jordan's
    intervention with Mr. Perelman. Once again, both conclusions are
    demonstrably false.
        Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky have testified under oath that there
    was no causal connection between the job search and the affidavit. The
    only person to draw (or, actually, recommend) any such linkage was Ms.
    Tripp. The factual record easily debunks the second insinuation--that
    Ms. Lewinsky was hired as a direct result of Mr. Jordan's call to Mr.
    Perelman. One fact is virtually dispositive: the Revlon executive who
    scheduled Ms. Lewinsky's January 9 interview and decided to hire her
    that same day never even knew about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman,
    or any interest Mr. Perelman might have in Ms. Lewinsky, and thus could
    not have been acting in furtherance of such a plan.
        Ms. Lewinsky initially interviewed with Mr. Halperin of MacAndrews
    & Forbes (Revlon's parent company) on December 18, 1997. (Mr. Jordan
    had spoken with Mr. Halperin on December 11.) Prior to interviewing Ms.
    Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin forwarded a copy of her resume to Mr. Jaymie
    Durnan, also of MacAndrews & Forbes, for his consideration. Supp. at
    1286-87 (Halperin FBI 302 3/27/98). Following his interview of Ms.
    Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin thought that she would likely be ``shipped to
    Revlon'' for consideration. Id.
        Mr. Durnan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume from Mr. Halperin in mid-
    December and, after reviewing it, decided to interview Ms. Lewinsky
    after the first of the year. (He was going on vocation the last two
    weeks of December). Supp. at 1053 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). When he
    returned from vacation, his assistant scheduled an interview with Ms.
    Lewinsky for January 7, 1998, but, because of scheduling problems, he
    rescheduled the interview for the next day, January 8, 1998. Supp. at
    1049 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Durnan's decision to interview Ms.
    Lewinsky was made independently of the decision by Mr. Halperin to
    interview her. Indeed, only when Mr. Durnan interviewed Ms. Lewinsky in
    January did he discover that she had had a December interview with Mr.
    Halperin. Id.
        It was this interview with Mr. Durnan that Ms. Lewinsky later
    described as having gone poorly in her view. App. at 926 (Lewinsky GJ
    8/6/98). The House Managers (``[t]he interview went poorly,'' House Br.
    at 38), the Committee Report (``The interview went poorly'', id. at
    21), and the OIC Referral (``The interview went poorly,'' id. at 184)
    all emphasize only Ms. Lewinsky's impression of the job interview--for
    obvious reasons: it tends to heighten the supposed relevance of the
    Jordan call to Mr. Perelman. In other words, under this theory, Ms.
    Lewinsky had no prospect of a job at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon until
    Mr. Jordan resurrected her chances with Mr. Perelman.
        Unfortunately, like so much other ``evidence'' in the obstruction
    case, the facts do not bear out this sinister theory. Mr. Durnan had no
    similar impression that his interview with Ms. Lewinsky had gone
    ``poorly.'' In fact, just the opposite was true: he was ``impressed''
    with Ms. Lewinsky and thought that she would ``fit in'' with MacAndrews
    & Forbes but ``there was nothing available at that time which suited
    her interests.'' Supp. at 1054 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Durnan
    therefore decided to forward Ms. Lewinsky's resume to Ms. Allyn Seidman
    of Revlon. After the interview, he called Ms. Seidman and left her a
    voicemail message about his interview with Ms. Lewinsky and explained
    that, while there was no current opening at MacAndrews & Forbes,
    ``perhaps there was something available at Revlon.'' Id.
        In the meantime, Mr. Jordan had called Mr. Perelman about Ms.
    Lewinsky. Mr. Perelman described this conversation as ``very low key
    and casual.'' Supp. at 3273 (Perelman FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Jordan
    ``made no specific requests and did not request'' him ``to intervene'';
    nonetheless, Mr. Perelman agreed to ``look into it.'' Id. Later that
    day, Mr. Durnan spoke to Mr. Perelman, who mentioned that he had
    received a call from Mr. Jordan about a job candidate. Mr. Perelman
    told Mr. Durnan ``let's see what we can do,'' Supp. at 3276 (Perelman
    FBI 302 3/27/98), but Mr. Durnan never concluded that hiring Ms.
    Lewinsky was ``mandatory.'' Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr.
    Perelman later called Mr. Jordan and said they would do what they
    could; Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency to Mr. Perelman. Supp. at 3276
    (Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98).
        By the time Mr. Durnan had discussed Ms. Lewinsky with Mr.
    Perelman, he had already forwarded her resume to Ms. Seidman at Revlon.
    Supp. at 1049-50 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). After speaking with Mr.
    Perelman, Mr. Durnan spoke with Ms. Seidman, following up on the
    voicemail message he had left earlier that day. Supp. at 1055 (Durnan
    FBI 302 3/27/98). Upon speaking to Ms. Seidman about Ms. Lewinsky,
    however, Mr. Durnan did not tell Ms. Seidman that CEO Perelman has
    expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Rather, he simply said that
    if she liked Ms. Lewinsky, she should hire her. Supp. at 1050 (Durnan
    FBI 302 1/26/98).
        For her part, Ms. Seidman has testified that she had no idea that
    Mr. Perelman had expressed interest in Ms. Lewinsky:

        Q: Did [Mr. Durnan] indicate to you that he had spoken to anyone
    else within MacAndrews or Revlon about Monica Lewinsky?
        A: Not that I recall, no.
        Q: Do you have knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Perelman spoke
    with anyone either on the MacAndrews & Forbes side or the Revlon side
    about Monica Lewinsky?
        A: No.

    Supp. at 3642 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). Rather, Ms. Seidman's
    consideration of Ms. Lewinsky proceeded on the merits. Indeed, as a
    result of the interview, Ms. Seidman concluded that Ms. Lewinsky was
    ``bright, articulate and polished,'' Supp. at 3635 (Seidman FBI 302 1/
    26/98), and ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman'' who would
    be a ``good fit in [her] department.'' Supp. at 3643 (Seidman Depo. 4/
    23/98). She decided after the interview to hire Ms. Lewinsky, and
    thereafter called Mr. Durnan ``and told him I thought she was great,''
    Id.
        In sum, Ms. Seidman made the decision to grant an interview and
    hire Ms. Lewinsky on the merits. She did not even know that Mr.
    Perelman had expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky or that Mr. Jordan
    had spoken to Mr. Perelman the day before. As amply demonstrated, the
    House Managers' Jordan-Perelman intervention theory just doesn't hold
    water.
                d. Conclusion
        From the preceding discussion of the factual record, two
    conclusions are inescapable. First, there is simply no direct evidence
    to support the job-for-silence obstruction theory. From her initial
    proffer to the last minutes of her grand jury appearance, the testimony
    of Ms. Lewinsky has been clear and consistent: she was never asked or
    encouraged to lie or promised a job for her silence or for a favorable
    affidavit. Mr. Jordan has been equally unequivocal on this point.
    Second, the ``chain of events'' circumstantial case upon which this
    obstruction allegation must rest falls apart after inspection of the
    full evidentiary record. Ms. Lewinsky's job search began on her own
    volition and long before she was ever a witness in the Jones case. Mr.
    Jordan's assistance originated with a request from Ms. Currie, which
    had no connection to events in the Jones litigation. No pressure was
    applied to anyone at any time. And Ms. Lewinsky's ultimate hiring had
    absolutely no connection to her signing of the affidavit in the Jones
    case. Viewed on this unambiguous record, the job-search allegations are
    plainly unsupportable.
    5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to
            make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge''
            concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit
        Article II (5) charges that the President engaged in an obstruction
    of justice because he ``did not say anything'' during his Jones
    deposition when his attorney cited the Lewinsky affidavit to Judge
    Wright and stated that ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner,
    shape, or form.'' Committee Report at 72. The rationale underlying this
    charge of obstruction of justice hinges on an odd combination of a
    bizarrely heightened legal obligation, a disregard of the actual record
    testimony, and a good does of amateur psychology. This claim is
    factually and legally baseless.
        The law, of course, imposes no obligation on a client to monitor
    every statement and representation made by his or her lawyer.
    Particularly in the confines of an ongoing civil deposition, where
    clients are routinely counseled to focus on the questions posed of them
    and their responses and ignore all distractions, it is totally
    inappropriate to try to remove a President from office because of a
    statement by his attorney. Indeed, the President forcefully explained
    to the grand jury that he was not focusing on the exchange between
    lawyers but instead concentrating on his own testimony:
         ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he was
    saying. I was thinking, I was ready to get on with my testimony here
    and they were having these constant discussions all through the
    deposition.'' App. at 476;
         ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to this
    exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.'' App. at 510;
         ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges
    between the lawyers all that carefully.'' App. at 510;
         ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made that
    statement that I was concentrating on the exact words he used.'' App.
    at 511;
         ``When I was in there, I didn't think about my lawyers. I
    was, frankly, thinking about myself and my testimony and trying to
    answer the questions.'' App. at 512;
         ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went
    on. I was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I was
    worried about my own testimony.'' App. at 513.
        The Committee Report ignores the President's repeated and
    consistent description of his state of mind during the deposition
    exchange. Instead, the Committee Report and majority counsel's final
    presentation undertake a novel exercise in video psychology, claiming
    that by studying the President's facial expressions and by noting that
    he was ``looking in Mr. Bennett's direction'' during the exchange, it
    necessarily follows that the President was in fact listening to and
    concentrating on every single word uttered by his attorney \108\ and
    knowingly made a decision not to correct his attorney.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \108\ It is upon this same fanciful methodology that the Committee
    Report premises the allegation of Article I (3) that the President lied
    to the grand jury in providing these responses. Citing the President's
    oft-criticized response about Mr. Bennett's use of the present tense in
    his statement ``there is no sex of any'' (``It depends on what the
    meaning of the word `is' is.'' App. at 510), the Committee Report
    claims that such parsing contradicts the President's claim that he was
    not paying close attention to the exchange. But contrary to the
    Committee Report's suggestion, the President's response to this
    question did not purport to describe the President's contemporaneous
    thinking at the deposition, but rather only in retrospect whether he
    agreed with the questioner that it was ``an utterly false statement.''
    Id. The President later emphasized that he ``wasn't trying to give . .
    . a cute answer'' in his earlier explanation, but rather only that the
    average person thinking in the present tense would likely consider that
    Mr. Bennett's statement was accurate since the relationship had ended
    long ago. App. at 513.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The futility of such an exercise is manifest. It is especially
    unsettling when set against the President's adamant denials that he
    harbored any contemporaneous or meaningful realization of his
    attorney's colloquy with the Judge. The theory is factually flimsy,
    legally unfounded, and should be rejected.
    6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false
            and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty
            Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony''
        There is no dispute that the President met with his secretary, Ms.
    Currie, on the day after his Jones deposition and discussed questions
    he had been asked about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers cast this
    conversation in the most sinister light possible and alleges that the
    President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness'' by
    pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of facts
    about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers claim that ``the President essentially
    admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true.''
    House Br. at 47. That is totally false. The President admitted nothing
    of the sort and the Managers cite nothing in support. The President has
    adamantly denied that he had any intention to influence Ms. Currie's
    recollection of events or her testimony in any manner. The absence of
    any such intention is further fortified by the undisputed factual
    record establishing that to the President's knowledge, Ms. Currie was
    neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones litigation at
    the time of the conversation. And critically, Ms. Currie testified
    that, during the conversation, she did not perceive any pressure
    ``whatsoever'' to agree with any statement made by the President.
        The President's actions could not as a matter of law support this
    allegation. To obstruct a proceeding or tamper with a witness, there
    must be both a known proceeding and a known witness. In the proceeding
    that the President certainly knew about--the Jones case--Ms. Currie was
    neither an actual nor prospective witness. As for the only proceeding
    in which Ms. Currie ultimately became a witness--the OIC
    investigation--no one asserts the President could have known it existed
    at that time.
        At the time of the January 18 conversation.\109\ Ms. Currie was not
    a witness in the Jones case, as even Mr. Starr acknowledged: ``The
    evidence is not that she was on the witness list, and we have never
    said that she was.'' Transcript of November 19, 1998 Testimony at 192.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \109\ Ms. Currie remembers a second conversation similar in
    substance a few days after the January 18 discussion, but still in
    advance of the public disclosure of this matter on January 21, 1998.
    Supp. at 561 (Currie GJ 1/27/98).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nor was there any reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play any role
    in the Jones case. The discovery period was, at the time of this
    conversation, in its final days, and a deposition of Ms. Currie
    scheduled and completed within that deadline would have been highly
    unlikely.
        Just as the President could not have intended to influence the
    testimony of ``witness'' Betty Currie because she was neither an actual
    nor a prospective witness, so too is it equally clear that the
    President never pressured Ms. Currie to alter her recollection. Such
    lack of real or perceived pressure also fatally undercuts this charge.
    Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into saying
    she was pressured to agree with the President's statements, Ms. Currie
    adamantly denied any such pressure. As she testified:

        Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the
    President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel
    pressured when he told you those statements?
        A: None whatsoever.
        Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about
    what he was doing?
        A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked
    or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
              * * * * * * *
        Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because he
    would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', with a question.
        A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would
    say ``Right'' and I could have said. ``Wrong.''
        Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and
    you could either say whether it was true or not true?
        A: Correct.
        Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
        A: None.

    Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). Ms. Currie explained that she felt no
    pressure because she basically agreed with the President's statements:

        Q: You testified with respect to the statements as the President
    made them, and, in particular, the four statements that we've already
    discussed. You felt at the time that they were technically accurate? Is
    that a fair assessment of your testimony?
        A: That's a fair assessment.
        Q: But you suggested that at the time. Have you changed your
    opinion about it in retrospect?
        A: I have not changed my opinion, no.

    Supp. at 667 (Currie GJ 7/22/98); see also Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302
    1/24/98) (``Currie advised that she responded ``right'' to each of the
    statements because as far as she knew, the statements were basically
    right.''); Supp. at 665 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (``I said `Right' to him
    because I thought they were correct, `Right, you were never really
    alone with Monica, right' '').
        What, then, to make of this conversation if there was no effort to
    influence Ms. Currie's testimony? Well, to understand fully the
    dynamic, one must remove the memory of all that has transpired since
    January 21 and place oneself in the President's position after the
    Jones deposition. The President had just faced unexpectedly detailed
    questions about Ms. Lewinsky. The questions addressed, at times, minute
    details and at other times contained bizarre inaccuracies about the
    relationship. As the President candidly admitted in his grand jury
    testimony, he had long thought the day would come when his relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky would become public:

        ``I formed an opinion early in 1996, once I got into this
    unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when it stopped, which I knew I'd
    have to do and which I should have done long before I did, that she
    would talk about it. Not because Monica Lewinsky is a bad person. She's
    basically a good girl. She's a good young woman with a good heart and a
    good mind. . . . But I knew that the minute there was no longer any
    contact, she would talk about this. She would have to. She couldn't
    help it. It was, it was part of her psyche.''

    App. at 575-76 (emphasis added). Now, with the questioning about Ms.
    Lewinsky in the Jones case and the publication of the first internet
    report article about Ms. Lewinsky, the President knew that a media
    storm was about to erupt. And erupt it did.
        So it was hardly surprising that the President reached out to Ms.
    Currie at this time. He was trying to gather all available information
    and assess the political and personal consequences that this revelation
    would soon have. Though he did not confide fully in Ms. Currie, he knew
    Ms. Currie was Ms. Lewinsky's main contact and thus could have
    additional relevant information to help him assess and respond to the
    impending media scrutiny. As the President testified:

        ``I do not remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie or
    when. I don't. I can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I
    first heard about this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the
    facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was. I remember
    that I was highly agitated, understandably, I think.''

    App. at 593. And further, ``[W]hat I was trying to determine was
    whether my recollection was right and that she was always in the office
    complex when Monica was there. . . . I thought what would happen is
    that it would break in the press, and I was trying to get the facts
    down.'' App. at 507-08 (emphasis added). As the President concluded:
    ``I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something that was
    untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I
    could.'' App. at 508.
        Ms. Currie's grand jury testimony confirms the President's
    ``agitated'' state of mind and information-gathering purpose for the
    discussion. She testified that the President appeared, in her words, to
    be ``shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just
    talking.'' Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). She described the
    President's remarks as ``both statements and questions at the same
    time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98).
        Finally, the inference that the President intended to influence Ms.
    Currie's testimony before she ever became a witness is firmly undercut
    by the advice the President gave to her when she ultimately did become
    a witness in the OIC investigation:

        ``And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to testify
    to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she had been through
    this loss of her sister, this horrible accident Christmas that killed
    her brother, and her mother was in the hospital. I was trying to do--to
    make her understand that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the
    grand jury. And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine,
    just go in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I
    remember.''

    App. at 593; see also App. at 508 (``I think Ms. Currie would also
    testify that I explicitly told her, once I realized you were involved
    in the Jones case--you, the Office of Independent Counsel--and that she
    might have to be called as a witness, that she should just go in there
    and tell the truth, tell what she knew, and be perfectly
    truthful.'').\110\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \110\ Only groundless speculation and unfounded inferences support
    the Committee Report's mirror allegation of Article I (4) that the
    President lied to the grand jury when he described his motivation in
    discussing these matters with Ms. Currie. That allegation should be
    rejected for the same reasons discussed more fully in the text of this
    section.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In sum, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the
    President--the only two participants in this conversation--supports the
    inference that the conversation had an insidious purpose. The
    undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor
    contemplated witness in the Jones case. And when Ms. Currie did
    ultimately become a witness in the Starr investigation, the President
    told her to tell the truth, which she did.
    7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed
            allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides
        This final allegation of Article II should be rejected out of hand.
    The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff, and the
    Nation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he has expressed
    his profound regret for such conduct. But this Article asserts that the
    President should be impeached and removed from office because he failed
    to be candid with his friends and aides about the nature of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. These allegedly impeachable denials
    took place in the immediate aftermath of the Lewinsky publicity--at the
    very time the President was denying any improper relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky in nearly identical terms on national television. Having made
    this announcement to the whole country on television, it is simply
    absurd to believe that he was somehow attempting corruptly to influence
    the testimony of aides when he told them virtually the same thing at
    the same time.\111\ Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the
    President spoke with these individuals regarding the allegations
    because of the longstanding professional and personal relationships he
    shared with them and the corresponding responsibility he felt to
    address their concerns once the allegations were aired. The Managers
    point to no evidence--for there is none--that the President spoke to
    these individuals for any other reason, and certainly not that he spoke
    with them intending to obstruct any proceeding.\112\ They simply assert
    that since he knew there was an investigation, his intent had to be
    that they relate his remarks to the investigators and grand jurors.
    House Br. at 80.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \111\ As the Supreme Court has held, to constitute obstruction of
    justice such actions must be taken `'with an intent to influence
    judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' United States v. Aguilar, 515
    U.S. 592, 599 (1995).
        \112\ The Committee Reports's allegation under Article I (4) that
    the President committed perjury before the grand jury when, in the
    course of admitting that he misled his close aides, he stated that he
    endeavored to say to his aides ``things that were true,'' App. at 557-
    60, without disclosing the full nature of the relationship is simply
    bizarre.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, there is no allegation that the President attempted to
    influence these aides' testimony about their own personal knowledge or
    observations. Nor is there any evidence that the President knew any of
    these aides would ultimately be witnesses in the grand jury when he
    spoke with them. None was under subpoena at the time the denials took
    place and none had any independent knowledge of any sexual activity
    between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, the only evidence these
    witnesses could offer on this score was the hearsay repetition of the
    same public denials that the members of the grand jury likely heard on
    their home television sets. Under the strained theory of this article,
    every person who heard the President's public denial could have been
    called to the grand jury to create still additional obstructions of
    justice.
        To bolster this otherwise unsupportable charge, the Managers point
    to an excerpt of the President's testimony wherein he acknowledged
    that, to the extent he shared with anyone any details of the facts of
    his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, they could conceivably be called
    before the grand jury--which for the sake of his friends the President
    wanted to avoid:

        ``I think I was quite careful what I said after [January 21]. I may
    have said something to all of these people to that effect [denying an
    improper relationship], but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any
    details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you
    into a witness or give you information that could get you in trouble. I
    just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about
    this.''

    App. at 647. The point was not that the President believed these people
    would be witnesses and so decided to mislead them, but rather that he
    decided to provide as little information as possible (consistent with
    his perceived obligation to address their legitimate concerns) in order
    to keep them from becoming witnesses solely because of what he told
    them.
        In conclusion, this Article fails as a matter of law and as a
    matter of common sense. It should be soundly rejected.

          VI. The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a
                          Constitutionally Sound Vote

        The Constitution prescribes a strict and exacting standard for the
    removal of a popularly elected President. Because each of the two
    articles charges multiple unspecified wrongs, each is
    unconstitutionally flawed in two independent respects.
        First, by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of
    Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with
    the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of
    two-thirds of the members. Since Senate Rules require that an entire
    article be voted as a unit, sixty-seven Senators could conceivably vote
    to convict while in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong
    committed--for example, they could completely disagree on what
    statement they believe is false--in direct violation of the
    Constitutional requirements of ``Concurrence'' and due process.
        Second, by charging perjury without identifying a single allegedly
    perjurious statement, and charging obstruction of justice without
    identifying a single allegedly obstructive action by the President, the
    House of Representatives has failed to inform the Senate either of the
    statements it agreed were perjurious (if it agreed), or of the actual
    conduct by the President that it agreed constituted obstruction of
    justice (again, if it agreed). The result is that the President does
    not have the most basic notice of the charges against him required by
    due process and fundamental fairness. He is not in a position to defend
    against anything other than a moving target. The guesswork involved
    even in identifying the charges to be addressed in this Trial
    Memorandum highlights just how flawed the articles are.\113\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \113\ The House Managers cannot constitutionally unbundle the
    charges in the articles or provide the missing specifics. This is
    because the Constitution provides that only the House of
    Representatives can amend articles of impeachment, and judicial
    precedent demonstrates that unduly vague indictments cannot be cured by
    a prosecutor providing a bill of particulars. Only the charging body--
    here, the House--can particularize an impermissibly vague charge.
        Indeed, Senate precedent confirms that the entire House must grant
    particulars when articles of impeachment are not sufficiently specific
    for a fair trial. During the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge Harold
    Louderback, counsel for the Judge filed a motion to make the original
    Article V, the omnibus or ``catchall'' article, more definite. 77 Cong
    Rec. 1852, 1854 (1933). The House Managers unanimously consented to the
    motion, which they considered to be akin to a motion for a bill of
    particulars, and the full House amended Article V to provide the
    requested specifics. Id. Thereafter, the Clerk of the House informed
    the Senate that the House had adopted an amendment to Article V. Id.
    Judge Louderback was then tried on the amended article. Judge
    Louderback was subsequently acquitted on all five articles. Impeachment
    of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report by Staff of
    the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d
    Sess., Appendix B at 55 (Feb. 1974).
        The power to define and approve articles of impeachment is vested
    by the Constitution exclusively in the House of Representatives. U.S.
    Const. Art I, Sec. 2, cl. 5. It follows that any alteration of an
    Article of Impeachment can be performed only by the House. The House
    cannot delegate (and has not delegated) to the Managers the authority
    to amend or alter the Articles, and Senate precedent demonstrates that
    only the House (not the Managers unilaterally) can effect an amendment
    to articles of impeachment.
        Case law is consistent with this precedent. When indictments are
    unconstitutionally vague, they cannot be cured by a prosecutor's
    provision of a bill of particulars, because only the charging body can
    elaborate upon vague charges. As the Supreme Court noted in Russell v.
    United States, 369 U.S. 749, 771 (1962):
        ``It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in these
    cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. But it is a
    settled rule that a bill of particular cannot save an invalid
    indictment . . . To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a
    subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the
    time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a
    basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury
    was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the
    basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the
    grand jury which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected
    by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be
    amended except by resubmission to the grand jury. . . .''
        See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214, 216 (1960)
    quoting Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (``If it lies within the
    province of a court to charging part to an indictment to suit its own
    notions of what it ought to have been or what they grand jury would
    probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested
    changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an
    indictment by a grand jury . . . may be frittered away until its value
    is almost destroyed.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The result is a pair of articles whose structure does not permit a
    constitutionally sound vote to convict. If they were counts in an
    indictment, these articles would not survive a motion to dismiss. Under
    the unique circumstances of an impeachment trial, they should fail:
      a. the articles are both unfairly complex and lacking in specificity
        A cursory review of the articles demonstrates that they each allege
    multiple and unspecified acts of wrongdoing.
    1. The Structure of Article I
        Article I accuses the President of numerous different wrongful
    actions. The introductory paragraph charges the President with (i)
    violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and
    defend the Constitution; (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed; (iii) willfully corrupting
    and manipulating the judicial process; and (iv) impeding the
    administration of justice.
        The second paragraph charges the President with (a) perjurious, (b)
    false, and (c) misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one
    or more'' of four different subject areas:
        (1) the nature and details of this relationship with a subordinate
    government employee;
        (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a
    Federal civil rights action brought against him;
        (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney
    to make to a federal judge in that action;
        (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and
    to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
        The third paragraph alleges that, as a consequence of the
    foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the people of
    the United States:
         undermined the integrity of his office;
         brought disrepute on the Presidency;
         betrayed his trust as President; and
         acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and
    justice.
        It is imperative to note that although Article I alleges
    ``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony concerning ``one or
    more'' of four general subject areas, it does not identify the
    particular sworn statements by the President that were allegedly
    ``perjurious,'' (and therefore potentially illegal), or ``false'' or
    ``misleading'' (and therefore not unlawful). In fact, contrary to the
    most basic rules of fairness and due process, Article I does not
    identify a single specific statement that is at issue.
        In sum, Article I appears to charge the President with four general
    forms of wrongdoing (violations of two oaths, manipulation of legal
    process, impeding justice), involving three (perjurious, false,
    misleading) distinct types of statements, concerning different subjects
    (relationship to Ms. Lewinsky, prior deposition testimony, prior
    statements of his attorney, obstruction of justice),\114\ resulting in
    four species of harms either to the Presidency (undermining its
    integrity, bringing it into disrepute) or to the people (acting in a
    manner subversive of the rule of law and to the manifest injury of the
    people). And it alleges all of this without identifying a single,
    specific perjurious, false or misleading statement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \114\ It appears that each of these topic areas includes various,
    unspecified allegedly perjurious, false and misleading statements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Absent a clear statement of which statements are alleged to have
    been perjurious, and which specific acts are alleged to have been
    undertaken with the purpose of obstructing the administration of
    justice, it is impossible to prepare a defense. It is a fundamental
    tenet of our jurisprudence that an accused must be afforded notice of
    the specific charges against which he must defend. Neither the Referral
    of the Office of the Independent Counsel, nor the Committee Report of
    the Judiciary Committee, nor the House Managers' Trial Memorandum was
    adopted by the House, and none of them can provide the necessary
    particulars. It is impossible to know whether the different statements
    and acts charged in the Referral, or the Report, or the Trial
    Memorandum, or all, or none, are what the House had in mind when it
    passed the Articles.
    2. The Structure of Article II
        Article II accuses the President of a variety of wrongful acts. The
    introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) violating his
    constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and defend the
    Constitution and (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take care
    that the laws be faithfully executed by (iii) preventing, obstructing
    and impeding the administration of justice by engaging (personally and
    through subordinates and agents) in a scheme designed to delay, impede,
    cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related
    to a Federal civil rights action.
        The second paragraph specifies the various ways in which the
    violations in the first paragraph are said to have occurred. It states
    that the harm was effectuated by ``means'' that are not expressly
    defined or delimited, but rather are said to include ``one or more'' of
    seven ``acts'' attributed to the President:
        (1) corruptly encouraging a witness to execute a perjurious, false
    and misleading affidavit;
        (2) corruptly encouraging a witness to give perjurious, false and
    misleading testimony if called to testify;
        (3) corruptly engaging in, encouraging or supporting a scheme to
    conceal evidence;
        (4) intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job
    assistance to a witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful
    testimony of that witness at a time when that witness's truthful
    testimony would have been harmful;
        (5) allowing his attorney to make false and misleading statements
    to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant questioning;
        (6) relating a false and misleading account of events to a
    potential witness in a civil rights action in order to corruptly
    influence the testimony of that person;
        (7) making false and misleading statements to potential witnesses
    in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence
    their testimony and causing the grand jury to receive false and
    misleading information.
        The third paragraph alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, the
    President has, to the manifest injury of the people of the United
    States:
         undermined the integrity of his office;
         brought disrepute on the Presidency;
         betrayed his trust as President; and
         acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and
    justice.
        As with the first article, Article II does not set forth a single
    specific act alleged to have been performed by the President. Instead,
    it alleges general ``encourage[ment]'' to execute a false affidavit,
    provide misleading testimony, and conceal subpoenaed evidence. This
    Article also includes general allegations that the President undertook
    to ``corruptly influence'' and/or ``corruptly prevent'' the testimony
    of potential witnesses and that he ``engaged in . . . or supported'' a
    scheme to conceal evidence. Again, the Senate and the President have
    been left to guess at the charges (if any) actually agreed upon by the
    House.
       b. conviction on these articles would violate the constitutional
    requirement that two-thirds of the senate reach agreement that specific
                           wrongdoing has been proven
    1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of
            the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process
                a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds
                        Concurrence Requirement
        Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``no person
    shall be convicted [on articles of impeachment] without the Concurrence
    of two thirds of the Members present.'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3, cl.
    6. The Constitution's requirement is plain. These must be
    ``Concurrence,'' which is to say genuine, reliably manifested,
    agreement, among those voting to convict. Both the committing of this
    task to the Senate and the two-thirds requirement are important
    constitutional safeguards reflecting the Framers' intent that
    conviction not come easily. Conviction demands real and objectively
    verifiable agreement among a substantial supermajority.
        Indeed, the two-thirds supermajority requirement is a crucial
    constitutional safeguard. Supermajority provisions are constitutional
    exceptions \115\ to the presumption that decisions by legislative
    bodies shall be made by majority rule.\116\ These exceptions serve
    exceptional ends. The two-thirds concurrence rule serves the
    indispensable purpose of protecting the people who chose the President
    by election. By giving a ``veto'' to a minority of Senators, the
    Framers sought to ensure the rights of an electoral majority--and to
    safeguard the people in their choice of Executive. Only the Senate and
    only the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence could provide that
    assurance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \115\ See e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2 (two thirds vote
    required to override Presidential veto); U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2,
    cl. 2 (two thirds required for ratification of treaties); U.S. Const.
    Art. V (two thirds required to propose constitutional amendments); U.S.
    Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2 (two thirds required to expel members of
    Congress).
        \116\ Madison referred to majority voting as ``the fundamental
    principal of free government.'' Federalist No. 58 at 248 (G. Wills ed.
    1982).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ``Concurrence'' required is agreement that the charges stated
    in specific articles have in fact been proved, and the language of
    those articles is therefore critical. Since the House of
    Representatives is vested with the ``sole Power of Impeachment,'' U.S.
    Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5, the form of those articles cannot be
    altered by the Senate. And Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and
    Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials (``Senate
    Rules'') provides that ``[a]n article of impeachment shall not be
    divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the
    trial.''
        It follows that each Senator may vote on an article only in its
    totality. By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for
    impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and
    misleading testimony in any ``one or more'' of four topic areas. But
    that prospect creates the very real possibility that ``conviction''
    could occur even though fewer than two-thirds of the Senators actually
    agree that any particular false statement was made.\117\ Put
    differently, the article's structure presents the possibility that the
    President could be convicted on Article I even though he would have
    been acquitted if separate votes were taken on individual allegedly
    perjurious statements. To illustrate the point, consider that it would
    be possible for conviction to result even with as few as seventeen
    Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because
    seventeen votes for one statement in each of four categories would
    yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict. The problem is even
    worse if Senators agree that there is a single perjurious statement but
    completely disagree as to which statement within the 176 pages of
    transcript they believe is perjurious. Such an outcome would plainly
    violate the Constitution's requirement that there be conviction only
    when a two-thirds majority agrees.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \117\ There remains the additional problem that the articles allege
    not specific perjurious statements, but perjury within a topic area.
    Perjury as to a category (rather than as to specific statements) is an
    incomprehensible notion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The very same flaw renders Article II unconstitutional as well.
    That Article alleges a scheme of wrongdoing effected through ``means''
    including ``one or more'' of seven factually and logically discrete
    ``acts.'' That compound structure is fraught with the potential to
    confuse. For example, the Article alleges both concealment of gifts on
    December 28, 1997, and false statements to aides in late January 1998.
    These two allegations involve completely different types of behavior.
    They are alleged to have occurred in different months. They involved
    different persons. And they are alleged to have obstructed justice in
    different legal proceedings. In light of Senate Rule XXIII's
    prohibition on dividing articles, the combination of such patently
    different types of alleged wrongdoing in a single article creates the
    manifest possibility that votes for conviction on this article would
    not reflect any two-third agreement whatsoever.
        The extraordinary problem posed by such compound articles is well-
    recognized and was illustrated by the proceedings in the impeachment of
    Judge Walter Nixon. Article III of the Nixon proceedings, like the
    articles here, was phrased in the disjunctive and charged multiple
    false statements as grounds for impeachment. Judge Nixon moved to
    dismiss Article III on a number of grounds, including on the basis of
    its compound structure.\118\ Although that motion was defeated in the
    full Senate by a vote of 34-63,\119\ the 34 Senators who voted to
    dismiss were a sufficient number to block conviction on Article III.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \118\ See Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the
    Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Hearings
    Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
    at 257, 281-84 (1989).
        \119\ Judge Nixon Proceedings at 430-32.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Judge Nixon (although convicted on the first two articles) was
    ultimately acquitted on Article III by a vote of 57 (guilty) to 40 (not
    guilty).\120\ Senator Biden, who voted not guilty on the article,
    stated that the structure of the article made it ``possible . . . for
    Judge Nixon to be convicted under article III even though two-thirds of
    the members present did not agree that he made any one of the false
    statements.'' \121\ Senator Murkowski concurred: ``I don't appreciate
    the omnibus nature of article III, and I agree with the argument that
    the article could easily be used to convict Judge Nixon by less than
    the super majority vote required by the Constitution.'' Id. at
    464.\122\ And Senator Dole stated that ``Article III is redundant,
    complex and unnecessarily confusing. . . . It alleges that Judge Nixon
    committed five different offenses in connection with each of fourteen
    separate events, a total of seventy charges. . . . [I]t was virtually
    impossible for Judge Nixon and his attorney's to prepare an adequate
    defense.'' \123\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \120\ Id. at 435-36.
        \121\ Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., id. at 459.
        \122\ See also Statement of Senator Bailey, Impeachment of Judge
    Harold Louderback, 77 Cong. Rec. 4238 (May 26, 1933) (respondent should
    be tried on individual articles and not on all of them assembled into
    one article).
        \123\ Statement of Senator Robert Dole, Judge Nixon Proceedings at
    457.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In his written statement filed after the voting was completed,
    Senator Kohl pointed out the dangers posed by combining multiple
    accusations in a single article:

        ``Article III is phrased in the disjunctive. It says that Judge
    Nixon concealed his conversations through `one or more' of 14 false
    statements.
        ``This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all, it
    means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two thirds of the
    Senate does not agree on which of his particular statements were false.
    . . .
        ``The House is telling us that it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on
    Article III even if we have different visions of what he did wrong. But
    that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the American
    people. Let's say we do convict on Article III. The American people--to
    say nothing of history--would never know exactly which of Judge Nixon's
    statements were regarded as untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more,
    this ambiguity would prevent us from being totally accountable to the
    voters for our decision.'' \124\

        \124\ Statement of Senator Herbert H. Kohl, id. at 449 (emphasis
    added). Senator Kohl did not believe that the constitutional question
    concerning two-thirds concurrence had to be answered in the Judge Nixon
    proceedings because he believed that the bundling problem created an
    unfairness (in effect, a due process violation) that precluded
    conviction. Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As noted, the Senate acquitted Judge Nixon on the omnibus article--very
    possible because of the constitutional and related due process and
    fairness concerns articulated by Senator Kohl and others.\125\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \125\ See also Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment:
    Modern Precedents, Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry,
    Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1998) (discussing Sen.
    Kohl's position).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The constitutional problems identified by those Senators are
    significant when a single federal judge (one of roughly 1000) is
    impeached. But when the Chief Executive and sole head of one entire
    branch of our government stands accused, those infirmities are
    momentous. Fairness and the appearance of fairness require that the
    basis for any action this body might take be clear and specific. The
    Constitution clearly forbids conviction unless two thirds of the Senate
    concurs in a judgment. Any such judgment would be meaningless in the
    absence of a finding that specific, identifiable, wrongful conduct has
    in fact occurred. No such conclusion is possible under either article
    as drafted.
                b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process
                        Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a
                        Single Accusation
        Even apart from the Constitution's clear requirement of
    ``Concurrence'' in Article I, section 3, the fundamental principles of
    fairness and due process that underlie our Constitution and permeate
    our procedural and substantive law compel the same outcome. In
    particular, the requirement that there be genuine agreement by the
    deciding body before an accused is denied life, liberty or property is
    a cornerstone of our jurisprudence.\126\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \126\ Judicial precedent is persuasive here on these due process
    and fairness questions. Indeed, in prior impeachment trials, the Senate
    has been guided by decisions of the courts, because they reflect
    cumulative wisdom concerning fairness and the search for justice.
    During the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Senator
    Specter stated:
        ``[T]he impeachment process relies in significant measure on
    decisions of the court and the opinion of judges . . . [T]he decisions
    and interpretations of the courts should be highly instructive to us.
    In our system of Government, it has been the courts that through the
    years have been called upon to construe, define and apply the
    provisions of our Constitution. Their decisions reflect our values and
    our evolving notions of justice . . . Although we are a branch of
    Government coequal with the judiciary, and by the Constitution vested
    with the `sole' power to try impeachments, I believe that the words and
    reasoning of judges who have struggled with the meaning and application
    of the Constitution and its provisions ought to be given great heed
    because that jurisprudence embodies the values of fairness and justice
    that ought to be the polestar of our own determinations.'' (S. Doc.
    101-18, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 740-41.)
        (As Senator Specter observed, judicial rules have been developed
    and refined over the years to assure that court proceedings are fair,
    and that an accused is assured the necessary tools to prepare a proper
    defense, including proper notice.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While in the federal criminal context due process requires that
    there be genuine agreement among the entire jury, see United States v.
    Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir. 1998), Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S.
    624 (1991) (plurality), in the impeachment context, that requirement of
    genuine agreement must be expressed by a two-thirds supermajority. But
    the underlying due process principles is the same in both settings.
    This basic principle is bottomed on two fundamental notions: (1) that
    there be genuine agreement--mutuality of understanding--among those
    voting to convict, and (2) that the unanimous verdict be understood (by
    the accused and by the public) to have been the product of genuine
    agreement.
        This principle is given shape in the criminal law in the well-
    recognized prohibition on ``duplicitous'' charges. ``Duplicity is the
    joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate
    offenses.'' United States v. UCO Oil, 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.
    1976.) In the law of criminal pleading, a single count that charges two
    or more separate offenses is duplicitous. See United States v. Parker,
    991 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hawkes, 753
    F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985).\127\ A duplicitous charge in an
    indictment violates the due process principle that ``the requisite
    specificity of the charge may not be compromised by the joining of
    separate offenses.'' Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991)
    (plurality).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \127\ See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a):
    ``Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or
    information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses
    charged . . . are of the same or similar charter or are based on the
    same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions
    connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.''
    (emphasis added).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More specifically, a duplicitous charge poses the acute danger of
    conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury; some jurors may find the
    defendant guilty of one charge but not guilty of a second, while other
    jurors find him guilty of a second charge but not the first. See United
    States v. Saleh, 875 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
    Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1979); Bins v. United States, 331
    F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).\128\ Our federal system of justice
    simply does not permit conviction by less than unanimous agreement
    concerning a single, identified charge. See United States v. Fawley,
    137 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (conviction requires unanimous agreement
    as to particular statements); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916,
    929 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversal required where no instruction was given
    to ensure that all jurors concur in conclusion that at least one
    particular statement was false); see also United States v. Gipson, 553
    F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to unanimous verdict violated
    by instruction authorizing conviction if jury found defendant committed
    any one of six acts proscribed by statute).\129\ The protection against
    conviction by less than full agreement by the factfinders is enshrined
    in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which dictates
    that ``[t]he verdict shall be unanimous.'' \130\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \128\ Each of the four categories charged here actually comprises
    multiple allegedly perjurious statements. Thus, the dangers of
    duplicitousness are increased exponentially.
        \129\ The Supreme Court has stated that ``[u]nanimity in jury
    verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.''
    Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); Apodaca v. Oregon,
    406 U.S. 404 (1972) (same).
        \130\ That rule gives expression to a criminal defendant's due
    process right to a unanimous verdict. See United States v. Fawley, 137
    F.2d 458, 4771 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the Constitution does not
    tolerate the risk of a less than unanimous verdict in the criminal
    setting, ``where the complexity of a case or other factors create the
    potential for confusion as to the
    legal theory or factual basis which sustains a defendant's conviction,
    a specific unanimity instruction is required.'' United States v.
    Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Beros,
    833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). Such instructions are required where
    the government charges several criminal acts, any of which alone could
    have supported the offense charged, because of the need to provide
    sufficient guidance to assure that all members of the jury were
    unanimous on the same act or acts of illegality. Id. at 88. As the
    Seventh Circuit recently concluded in a case alleging multiple false
    statements, ``the jury should have been advised that in order to have
    convicted [the defendant], they had to unanimously agree that a
    particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made.''
    Fawley, 137 F.2d at 470.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Thus, where the charging instrument alleges multiple types of
    wrongdoing, the unanimity requirement ``means more than a conclusory
    agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question;
    there is a requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal
    factual elements underlying a specified offense.'' United States v.
    Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).
    Accordingly, although there need not be unanimity as to every bit of
    underlying evidence, due process ``does require unanimous agreement as
    to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply that a violation
    has occurred.'' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990)
    (Blackmun, J., concurring). Such agreement is necessary to fulfill the
    demands of fairness and rationality that inform the requirement of due
    process. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 637.\131\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \131\ In our federal criminal process, a duplicitous pleading
    problem may sometimes be cured by instructions to the jury requiring
    unanimous agreement on a single statement, see Fawley, supra, but that
    option is not present here. Not only do the Senate Rules not provide
    for the equivalent of jury instructions, they expressly rule out the
    prospect of subdividing an article of impeachment for purposes of
    voting. See Senate Impeachment Rule XXIII. Nor is the duplicitousness
    problem presented here cured by any specific enumeration of elements
    necessary to be found by the factfinder. See, e.g., Santarpio v. United
    States, 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977) (duplicitous charge harmless
    because indictments adequately set out the elements of the federal
    crime; appellants were not misled or prejudiced). Article I does not
    enumerate specific elements to be found by the factfinder. To the
    contrary, the Article combines multiple types of wrong, allegedly
    performed by different types of statements, the different types
    occurring in multiple subject matter areas, and all having a range of
    allegedly harmful effects.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Where multiple accusations are combined in a single charge, neither
    the accused nor the factfinder can know precisely what that charge
    means. When the factfinder body cannot agree upon the meaning of the
    charge, it cannot reach genuine agreement that conviction is warranted.
    These structural deficiencies preclude a constitutionally sound vote on
    the articles.
     c. conviction on these articles would violate due process protections
                 prohibiting vague and nonspecific accusations
    1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges
        Impermissibly vague indictments must be dismissed, because they
    ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what he must be
    prepared to meet.' '' United States v. Russell, 369 U.S. 749, 764
    (1962) (internal quotation omitted). In Russell, the indictment at
    issue failed to specify the subject matter about which the defendant
    had allegedly refused to answer questions before a Congressional
    subcommittee. Instead, the indictment stated only that the questions to
    which the answers were refused ``were pertinent to the question then
    under inquiry'' by the Subcommittee. Id. at 752. The Court held that
    because the indictment did not provide sufficient specificity, it was
    unduly vague and therefore had to be dismissed. Id. at 773. The Supreme
    Court explained that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy for an
    unduly vague indictment, because only the charging body can elaborate
    upon vague charges:

        ``To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess
    as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned
    the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which
    the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to
    secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts
    not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grant jury which
    indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by the settled
    rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except
    by resubmission to the grand jury . . .''

    Id. at 771. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216
    (1960); see also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
    1954) (perjury count too vague to be valid cannot be cured even by bill
    of particulars); United States v. Tonelli, 557 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir.
    1978) (vacating perjury conviction where ``the indictment . . . did not
    `set forth the precise falsehood[s] alleged' '').
        Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited Articles present
    paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely to enable the
    accused to meet the accusations fairly. More than a century ago, the
    Supreme Court stated that ``[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal
    pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at
    common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient
    that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms
    as in the definition; but it must state the species--it must descend to
    particulars.'' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875).
    The Court has more recently emphasized the fundamental ``vice'' of
    nonspecific indictments: that they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the
    defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' Russell, 369 U.S.
    at 764.
        The Supreme Court emphasized in Russell that specificity is
    important not only for the defendant, who needs particulars to prepare
    a defense, but also for the decision-maker, ``so it may decide whether
    [the facts] are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
    should be had.'' Id. at 768 (internal citation and quotation marks
    omitted). An unspecific indictment creates a ``moving target'' for the
    defendant exposing the defendant to a risk of surprise through a change
    in the prosecutor's theory. ``It enables his conviction to rest on one
    point and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives
    the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by
    surmise and conjecture.'' Russell, 369 U.S. at 766. Ultimately, an
    unspecific indictment creates a risk that ``a defendant could . . . be
    convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even
    presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.'' Id. at 770.
    2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague
        Article I alleges that in his August 17, 1998 grand jury testimony,
    President Clinton provided ``perjurious, false and misleading''
    testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four subject
    areas. Article I does not, however, set forth a single specific
    statement by the President upon which its various allegations are
    predicated. The Article haphazardly intermingles alleged criminal
    conduct with totally lawful conduct, and its abstract generalizations
    provide no guidance as to actual alleged perjurious statements.
        Article I thus violates the most fundamental requirement of perjury
    indictments. It is fatally vague in three distinct respects: (1) it
    does not identify any statements that form the basis of its
    allegations,\132\ (2) it therefore does not specify which of the
    President's statements to the grand jury were allegedly ``perjurious,''
    which were allegedly ``false,'' and which were allegedly
    ``misleading,'' and (3) it does not even specify the subject matter of
    any alleged perjurious statement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \132\ One of the cardinal rules of perjury cases is that ``[a]
    conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623 may not stand where the indictment
    fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis
    of its falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine
    its verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality
    of those falsehoods.'' United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d
    Cir. 1977). Courts have vacated convictions for perjury in instances
    where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the precise
    falsehood(s) alleged.'' Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 200.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The first defect is fatal, because it is axiomatic that if the
    precise perjurious statements are not identified in the indictment, a
    defendant cannot possibly prepare his defense properly. See, e.g.,
    Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977). Indeed, in past impeachment
    trials in the Senate where articles of impeachment alleged the making
    of false statements, the false statements were specified in the
    Articles. For example, in the impeachment trial of Alcee L. Hastings,
    Articles of Impeachment II-XIV specified the exact statements that
    formed the basis of the false statement allegations against Judge
    Hastings.\133\ Similarly, in the impeachment trial of Walter L. Nixon,
    Jr., Articles of Impeachment I-III specified the exact statements that
    formed the basis of their false statement allegations.\134\ In this
    case, Article I falls far short of specificity standards provided in
    previous impeachment trials in the Senate.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \133\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment
    Trial Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 at 4-7
    (1989). See, e.g., Id. at 2 (Article II alleging that the false
    statement was ``that Judge Hastings and Wiliam Borders, of Washington,
    D.C., never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in
    United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings'').
        \134\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment
    Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22
    at 430-32 (1989). See, e.g., Id., at 432 (Article I alleging that the
    false statement was ``Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes
    never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As to the second vagueness defect, there is a significant legal
    difference between, on the one hand, statements under oath which are
    ``perjurious,'' and those, on the other hand, which are simply
    ``false'' or misleading.'' Only the former could form the basis of a
    criminal charge. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that
    ``misleading'' statements alone cannot form the basis of a prejury
    charge. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court
    held that literally true statements are by definition non-perjurious,
    and ``it is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the
    defendant] intended to mislead his examiner,'' since ``[a] jury should
    not be permitted to enage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer.
    . . was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.'' Id. at 358-60
    (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that ``the perjury statute is
    not to be loosely construed, nor the statute invoked simply because a
    wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner so long as the
    witness speakes the literal truth.'' Id. Thus, specification of the
    exact statements alleged to be prejurious is required, because ``to
    hold otherwise would permit the trial jury to inject its inferences
    into the grand jury's indictment, and would allow defendants to be
    convicted for immaterial falsehoods or for `intent to mislead' or
    `perjury by implication,' which Bronston specifically prohibited.''
    Slawik, 538 F.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added). Thus, if the House meant
    that certain statements were misleading but literally truthful, they
    might be subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense
    was not impeachable.
        The same is true for allegedly ``false'' answers, because it is
    clear that mere ``false'' answers given under oath, without more, are
    not criminal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the statute proscribing perjury
    before a federal grand jury, requires additional elements beyond
    falsity, including the defendant's specific intent to testify falsely
    and the statement's materiality to the proceeding. A defense to a
    perjury charge is therefore tied directly to the specific statement
    alleged to have been perjurious. Did the defendant know the particular
    answer was false? Was it material? \135\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \135\ Not surprisingly, courts have specifically held that because
    of these additional elements (the lack of which may undermine a perjury
    prosecution), a defendant must know exactly which statements are
    alleged to form the basis of a perjury indictment to test whether the
    requisite elements are present. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore,
    215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (``The accused is entitled under the
    Constitution to be advised as to every element in respect to which it
    is necessary for him to prepare a defense''). For example, because of
    the intent requirement, one potential defense to a perjury prosecution
    is that the question to which the allegedly perjurious statement was
    addressed was fundamentally ambiguous, as courts have held that
    fundamentally ambiguous questions cannot as a matter of law produce
    perjurious answers. See, e.g., Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 199; United States
    v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967). A separate defense to a perjury
    prosecution is that the statement alleged to have been perjurious was
    not material to the proceeding. Thus, ``false'' statements alone are
    not perjurious if they were not material to the proceeding. By not
    specifying which statements are alleged to be ``false'' or
    ``misleading,'' Article I precludes the President from preparing a
    materiality defense, and it also fails to distinguish allegedly
    criminal conduct from purely lawful conduct. As one court explained,
        ``It is to be observed that * * * it is not sufficient to
    constitute the offense that the oath shall be merely false, but that it
    must be false in some `material matter.' Applying that definition to
    the facts stated in either count of this indictment, and it would seem
    that there is an entire lack in any essential sense to disclose that
    the particulars as to which the oath is alleged to have been false were
    material in the essential sense required for purposes of an indictment
    for this offense.'' (United States v. Cameron, 282 F. 684, 692 (D.
    Ariz. 1922).).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Article I's third vagueness defect is that it does not specify the
    subject matter of the alleged perjurious statements. Instead, it simply
    alleges that the unspecified statements by the President to the grand
    jury were concerning ``one or more'' of four enumerated areas. The
    ``one or more'' language underscores the reality that the President--
    and, critically, the Senate--cannot possibly know what the House
    majority had in mind, since it may have failed even to agree on the
    subject matter of the alleged perjury. The paramount importance of this
    issue may be seen by reference to court decisions holding that a jury
    has to ``unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the
    indictment was falsely made.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458,
    471 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also discussion of unanimity
    requirement in Section VI.B, supra.
        Article II is also unconstitutionally vague. It alleges that the
    President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice * * *
    in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up
    and conceal'' unspecified evidence and testimony in the Jones case. It
    sets forth seven instances in which the President allegedly
    ``encouraged'' false testimony or the concealment of evidence, or
    ``corruptly influenced'' or ``corruptly prevented'' various other
    testimony, also unspecified. In fact, not only does Article II fail to
    identify a single specific act performed by the President in this
    alleged scheme to obstruct justice, it does not even identify the
    ``potential witnesses'' whose testimony the President allegedly sought
    to ``corruptly influence.''
        The President cannot properly defend against Article II without
    knowing, at a minimum, which specific acts of obstruction and/or
    concealment he is alleged to have performed, and which ``potential
    witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to influence. For example,
    it is clear that, in order to violate the federal omnibus obstruction
    of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, an accuser must prove that
    there was a pending judicial proceeding, that the defendant knew of the
    proceeding, and that the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the
    specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due
    administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d
    1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 729 F. Supp. 1380,
    1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990). Without knowing which ``potential witnesses'' he
    is alleged to have attempted to influence, and the precise manner in
    which he is alleged to have attempted to obstruct justice, the
    President cannot prepare a defense that would address the elements of
    the offense with which he has been charged--that he had no intent to
    obstruct, that there was no pending proceeding, or that the person
    involved was not a potential witness.
        It follows that the requisite vote of two-thirds of the Senate
    required by the Constitution cannot possibly be obtained if there are
    no specific statements whatsoever alleged to be perjurious, false or
    misleading in Article I or no specific acts of obstruction alleged in
    Article II. Different Senators might decide that different statements
    or different acts were unlawful without any concurrence by two-thirds
    of the Senate as to any particular statement or act. Such a scenario is
    antithetical to the Constitution's due process guarantee of notice of
    specific and definite charges and it threatens conviction upon vague
    and uncertain grounds. As currently framed, neither Article I nor
    Article II provides a sufficient basis for the President to prepare a
    defense to the unspecified charges upon which the Senate may vote, or
    an adequate basis for actual adjudication.
      d. the senate's judgment will be final and that judgment must speak
                            clearly and intelligibly
        An American impeachment trial is not a parliamentary inquiry into
    fitness for office. It is not a vote of no confidence. It is not a
    mechanism whereby a legislative majority may oust a President from a
    rival party on political grounds. To the contrary, because the
    President has a limited term of office and can be turned out in the
    course of ordinary electoral processes, a Presidential impeachment
    trial is a constitutional measure of last resort designed to protect
    the Republic.
        This Senate is therefore vested with an extremely grave
    Constitutional task: a decision whether to remove the President for the
    protection of the people themselves. In the Senate's hands there rests
    not only the fate of one man, but the integrity of our Constitution and
    our democratic process.
        Fidelity to the Constitution and fidelity to the electorate must
    converge in the impeachment trial vote. If the Senate is to give
    meaning to the Constitution's command, any vote on removal must be a
    vote on one or more specifically and separately identified ``high
    Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as set forth in properly drafted impeachment
    articles approved by the House. If the people are to have their twice-
    elected President removed by an act of the Senate, that act must be
    intelligible. It must be explainable and justifiable to the people who
    first chose the President and then chose him again. The Senate must
    ensure that it has satisfied the Constitution's requirement of a
    genuine two-thirds concurrence that specific, identified wrongdoing has
    been proven. The Senate must also assure the people, through the sole
    collective act the Senate is required to take, that its decision has a
    readily discernible and unequivocal meaning.
        As matters stand, the Senate will vote on two highly complex
    Articles of Impeachment. Its vote will not be shaped by narrowing
    instructions. Its rules preclude a vote on divisible parts of the
    articles. There will be no judicial review, no correction of error, and
    no possibility of retrial. The Senate's decision will be as conclusive
    as any known to our law--judicially, politically, historically, and
    most literally, irrevocable.
        Under such circumstances, the Senate's judgment must speak clearly
    and intelligibly. That cannot happen if the Senate votes for conviction
    on these articles. Their compound structure and lack of specificity
    make genuine agreement as to specific wrongs impossible, and those
    factors completely prevent the electorate from understanding why the
    Senate as a whole voted as it did. As formulated, these articles
    satisfy neither the plain requirement of the Constitution nor the
    rightful expectations of the American people. The articles cannot
    support a constitutionally sound vote for conviction.

                          VII. The Need for Discovery

        The Senate need not address the issue of discovery at this time,
    but because the issue may arise at a later date, it is appropriate to
    remark here on its present status. Senate Resolution 16 provides that
    the record for purposes of the presentation by the House Managers and
    the President is the public record established in the House of
    Representatives.\136\ Since this record was created by the House itself
    and is ostensibly the basis for the House's impeachment vote, and
    because this evidence has been publicly identified and available for
    scrutiny, comment, and rebuttal, it is both logical and fair that this
    be the basis for any action by the Senate. Moreover, Senate Resolution
    16 explicitly prohibits the President and the House Managers from
    filing at this time any ``motions to subpoena witnesses or to present
    any evidence not in the record.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \136\ S. Res. 16 defined the record for the presentations as
    ``those publicly available materials that have been submitted to or
    produced by the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of
    public hearings or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of
    Representatives or House Judiciary Committee pursuant to House
    Resolutions 525 and 581.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the event, however, that the Senate should later decide,
    pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, to allow the House
    Managers to expand the record in some way, our position should be
    absolutely clear. At such time, the President would have an urgent need
    for the discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these
    proceedings has he been able to subpoena documents or summon and cross-
    examine witnesses. He would need to use the compulsory process
    authorized by Senate Impeachment Rules V and VI\137\ to obtain
    documentary evidence and witness depositions. While the President has
    access to some of the grand jury transcripts and FBI interview
    memoranda of witnesses called by the OIC, the President's own lawyers
    were not entitled to be present when these witnesses were examined. The
    grand jury has historically been the engine of the prosecution, and it
    was used in that fashion in this case. The OIC sought discovery of
    evidence with the single goal of documenting facts that it believed
    were prejudicial to the President. It did not examine witnesses with a
    view toward establishing there was no justification for impeachment; it
    did not follow up obvious leads when they might result in evidence
    helpful to the President; and it did not seek out and document
    exculpatory evidence. It did not undertake to disclose exculpatory
    information it might have identified.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \137\ Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
    Impeachment Trials (Senate Manual 99-2, as revised by S. Res. 479 (Aug.
    16, 1986)). There is ample precedent for liberal discovery in Senate
    impeachment trials. For example, in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings,
    the Senate issued numerous orders addressing a range of pretrial issues
    over several months including:
         requiring the parties to provide witness lists along with
    a description of the general nature of the testimony that was expected
    from each witness months in advance of the scheduled evidentiary
    hearing;
         requiring the House Managers to turn over exculpatory
    materials, certain prior statements of witnesses, and documents and
    other tangible evidence they intended to introduce into evidence;
         requiring the production from the House Managers of other
    documents in the interest of allowing the Senate to develop ``a record
    that fully illuminates the matters that it must consider in rendering a
    judgment;''
         setting a briefing schedule for stipulations of facts and
    documents;
         setting a number of pretrial conferences;
         designating a date for final pretrial statements; and
         permitting a number of pre-trial depositions.
         Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the
    Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Hearings
    Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. at
    281, 286-87, 342-43, 606-07, 740.
        The need for discovery in this case is in fact greater than in
    prior impeachment proceedings. In all other impeachment trials, there
    were either substantive investigations by the House or prior judicial
    proceedings in which the accused had a full opportunity to develop the
    evidentiary record and cross-examine witnesses. See Id. at 163-64
    (pretrial memorandum of Judge Hastings).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Nor did the House of Representatives afford the President any
    discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be helpful in his
    defense. Indeed, the House called no fact witnesses at all, and at the
    few depositions it conducted, counsel for the President were excluded.
    Moreover, the House made available only a selected portion of the
    evidence it received from the OIC. While it published five volumes of
    the OIC materials (two volumes of appendices and three volumes of
    supplements), it withheld a great amount of evidence, and it denied
    counsel for the President access to this material. It is unclear what
    the criterion was for selecting evidence to include in the published
    volumes, but there does not appear to have been an attempt to include
    all evidence that may have been relevant to the President's defense.
    The President has not had access to a great deal of evidence in the
    possession of (for example) the House of Representatives and the OIC
    which may be exculpatory or relevant to the credibility of witnesses on
    whom the OIC and the House Managers rely.
        Should the Senate decide to authorize the House Managers to call
    witnesses or expand the record, the President would be faced with a
    critical need for the discovery of evidence useful to his defense--
    evidence which would routinely be available to any civil litigant
    involved in a garden-variety automobile accident case. The House
    Managers have had in their possession or had access at the OIC to
    significant amounts of non-public evidence, and they have frequently
    stated their intention to make use of such evidence. Obviously, in
    order to defend against such tactics, counsel for the President are
    entitled to discovery and a fair opportunity to test the veracity and
    reliability of this ``evidence,'' using compulsory process as necessary
    to obtain testimony and documents. Trial by surprise obviously has no
    place in the Senate of the United States where the issues in the
    balance is the removal of the one political leader who, with the Vice-
    President, is elected by all the citizens of this country.\138\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \138\ In another context, the Supreme Court has observed that ``the
    ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery
    which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information
    from which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility
    of surprise at trial.'' Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The need for discovery does not turn on the number of witnesses the
    House Managers may be authorized to depose.\139\ If the House Managers
    call a single witness, that will initiate a process that leaves the
    President potentially unprepared and unable to defend adequately
    without proper discovery. The sequence of discovery is critical. The
    President first needs to obtain and review relevant documentary
    evidence not now in his possession. He then needs to be able to depose
    potentially helpful witnesses, whose identity may only emerge from the
    documents and from the depositions themselves. Obviously, he also needs
    to depose potential witnesses identified by the House Managers. Only at
    that point will the President be able intelligently to designate his
    own trial witnesses. This is both a logical procedure and one which is
    the product of long experience designed to maximize the search for
    truth and minimize unfair surprise. There is no conceivable reason it
    should not be followed here--if the evidentiary record is opened.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \139\ It is not sufficient that counsel for the President have the
    right to depose the witnesses called by the Managers, essential as that
    right is. The testimony of a single witness may have to be refuted
    indirectly, circumstantially, or by a number of witnesses; it is often
    necessary to depose several witnesses in order to identify the one or
    two best.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Indeed, it is simply impossible to ascertain how a witness
    designated by the House Managers could fairly be rebutted without a
    full examination of the available evidence. It is also the case that
    many sorts of helpful evidence and testimony emerge in the discovery
    process that may at first blush appear irrelevant or tangential. In any
    event, the normal adversarial process is the best guarantor of the
    truth. The President needs discovery here not simply to obtain evidence
    to present a trial but also in order to make an informed judgment about
    what to introduce in response to the Managers' expanded case. The
    President's counsel must be able to make a properly knowledgeable
    decision about what evidence may be relevant and helpful to the
    President's defense, both in cross-examination and during the
    President's own case.
        The consequences of an impeachment trial are immeasurably grave:
    The removal of a twice-elected President. Particularly given what is at
    stake, fundamental fairness dictates that the President be given at
    least the same right as an ordinary litigant to obtain evidence
    necessary for his defense, particularly when a great deal of that
    evidence is presently in the hands of his accusers, the OIC and the
    House Managers. The Senate has wisely elected to proceed on the public
    record established by the House of Representatives, and this provides a
    wholly adequate basis for Senate decision-making. In the event the
    Senate should choose to expand this record, affording the President
    adequate discovery is absolutely essential.

                                VIII. Conclusion

        As the Senate considers these Articles of Impeachment and listens
    to the arguments, individual Senators are standing in the place of the
    Framers of the Constitution, who prayed that the power of impeachment
    and removal of a President would be invoked only in the gravest of
    circumstances, when the stability of our system of government hung in
    the balance--to protect the Republic itself from efforts to subvert our
    Constitutional system.
        The Senate has an obligation to turn away an unwise and unwarranted
    misuse of the awesome power of impeachment. If the Senate removes this
    President for a wrongful relationship he hoped to keep private, for
    what will the House ask the Senate to remove the next President, and
    the next? Our Framers wisely gave us a constitutional system of checks
    and balances, with three co-equal branches. Removing this President on
    these facts would substantially alter the delicate constitutional
    balance, and move us closer to a quasi-parliamentary system, in which
    the President is elected to office by the choice of people, but
    continues in office only at the pleasure of Congress.
        In weighing the evidence and assessing the facts, we ask that
    Senators consider not only the intent of the Framers but also the will
    and interests of the people. It is the citizens of these United States
    who will be affected by and stand in judgment of this process. It is
    not simply the President--but the vote the American people rendered in
    schools, church halls and other civic centers all across the land
    twenty-six months ago--that is hanging in the balance.
        Respectfully submitted.

    David E. Kendall                      Charles F.C. Ruff
    Nicole K. Seligman                    Gregory B. Craig
    Emmet T. Flood                        Bruce R. Lindsey
    Max Stier                             Cheryl D. Mills
    Alicia L. Marti                       Lanny A. Breuer
    Williams & Connolly                   Office of the White House Counsel
    725 12th Street, N.W.                 The White House
    Washington, D.C. 20005                Washington, D.C. 20502

        January 13, 1999.
                                     ______

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

    In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

    REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT
            WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

        The House of Representatives, through its Managers and counsel,
    replies to the Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to the
    Articles of Impeachment (``Answer''), as follows:

                                    Preamble

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in the Preamble to the Answer, including the sections
    entitled ``The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or
    Misdemeanors'' and ``The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct
    Justice.'' With respect to the allegations in the Preamble, the House
    of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in
    Articles I and II is true and that Articles I and II properly state
    impeachable offenses, are not subject to a motion to dismiss, and
    should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court
    of Impeachment.

                                   Article I

        The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in
    the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or
    wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton.
    With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article I, the House
    of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in
    Article I is true and that Article I properly states an impeachable
    offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be
    considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment.

                     First Affirmative Defense to Article I

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article I
    warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from
    holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                    Second Affirmative Defense to Article I

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that Article I is not
    unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson
    Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                     Third Affirmative Defense to Article I

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that Article I does not charge
    multiple offenses in one article.

                                   Article II

        The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in
    the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or
    wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton.
    With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article II, the House
    of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in
    Article II is true and that Article II properly states an impeachable
    offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be
    considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment.

                    First Affirmative Defense to Article II

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article II
    warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from
    holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton.

                    Second Affirmative Defense to Article II

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that Article II is not
    unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson
    Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him.

                    Third Affirmative Defense to Article II

        The House of Representatives denies each and every material
    allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives
    further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense,
    is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House
    of Representatives further states that Article II does not charge
    multiple offenses in one article.

                   Conclusion of the House of Representatives

        The House of Representatives further states that it denies each and
    every material allegation of the Answer not specifically admitted in
    this Replication. By providing this Replication to the Answer, the
    House of Representatives waives none of its rights in this proceeding.
    Wherefore, the House of Representatives states that both of the
    Articles of Impeachment warrant the conviction, removal from office,
    and disqualification from holding further office of President William
    Jefferson Clinton. Both of the Articles should be considered and
    adjudicated by the Senate.
        Respectfully submitted,
        The United States House of Representatives.
                                       Henry J. Hyde,
                                       F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                       Bill McCollum,
                                       George W. Gekas,
                                       Charles T. Canady,
                                       Stephen E. Buyer,
                                       Ed Bryant,
                                       Steve Chabot,
                                       Bob Barr,
                                       Asa Hutchinson,
                                       Chris Cannon,
                                       James E. Rogan,
                                       Lindsey O. Graham,
                                     Managers on the Part of the House.

                                       Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                       General Counsel.

                                       David P. Schippers,
                                           Chief Investigative Counsel.
                                     ______

     [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

    In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton

       REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TRIAL
               MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

                                I. Introduction

        The President's Trial Memorandum contains numerous factual
    inaccuracies and misstatements of the governing law and the Senate's
    precedents. These errors have largely been addressed in the Trial
    Memorandum of the House of Representatives filed with the Senate on
    January 11, 1999, and given the 24-hour period to file this reply, the
    House cannot possibly address them all here. The House of
    Representatives will address them further in its oral presentation to
    the Senate, and it reserves the right to address these matters further
    in the briefing of any relevant motions. However, President Clinton has
    raised some new issues in his Trial Memorandum, and the House of
    Representatives hereby replies to those issues.

                                   II. Facts

        The President's Trial Memorandum outlines what he claims are facts
    showing that he did not commit perjury before the grand jury and did
    not obstruct justice. The factual issues President Clinton raises are
    addressed in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
        A complete and impartial review of the evidence reveals that the
    President did in fact commit perjury before the grand jury and that he
    obstructed justice during the Jones litigation and the grand jury
    investigation as alleged in the articles of impeachment passed by the
    House of Representatives. The House believes a review of the complete
    record, including the full grand jury and deposition testimony of the
    key witnesses in this case, will establish that.
        The evidence which President Clinton claims demonstrates that he
    did not commit the offenses outlined in the Articles of Impeachment are
    cited in Sections IV and V of his Memorandum. Regarding Article I,
    President Clinton maintains that his testimony before the grand jury
    was entirely truthful. At the outset of his argument, he states that he
    told the truth about the nature and details of his relationship with
    Ms. Lewinsky, and he insists that any false impressions that his
    deposition testimony might have created were remedied by his admission
    of ``improper intimate contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky. However, his
    subsequent testimony demonstrates that this admission is narrowly
    tailored to mean that Ms. Lewinsky had ``sexual relations'' with him,
    but he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her, as he understood the
    term to be defined. In other words, he admitted only what he knew could
    be conclusively established through scientific tests. He denied what
    the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the testimony of a number of her
    confidantes, and common sense proves: that while she engaged in sexual
    relations with him, he engaged in sexual relations with her, regardless
    of how President Clinton attempts to redefine the term.
        Following this pattern, President Clinton discounts substantial
    evidence as well as common sense when he maintains that he testified
    truthfully in the grand jury about, among other things, his prior
    deposition testimony, his attorney's statements to Judge Wright during
    his deposition, and his intent in providing a series of false
    statements to his secretary after his deposition. Again, a complete
    review of the record and witness testimony reveals that President
    Clinton committed perjury numerous times in his grand jury testimony.
        In regard to Article II, President Clinton extracts numerous items
    of evidence from the record and analyzes them in isolation in an effort
    to provide innocent explanations for the substantial amount of
    circumstantial evidence proving his guilt. Yet when the record is
    viewed in its entirety, including the portions of President Clinton's
    deposition testimony concerning Ms. Lewinsky and his grant jury
    testimony, it demonstrates that President Clinton took a number of
    actions designed to prevent Paula Jones's attorneys, the federal
    district court, and a federal grand jury from learning the truth. These
    actions are described in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House.
        To the extent that President Clinton's Trial Memorandum raises
    issues of credibility, those issues are best resolved by live testimony
    subject to cross-examination. The Senate, weighing the evidence in its
    entirety, will make an independent assessment of the facts as they are
    presented, and a detailed, point-by-point argument of these matters is
    best resolved on the Senate floor. The House is confident that a
    thorough factual analysis will not only refute President Clinton's
    contentions, but will prove the very serious charges contained in the
    articles.

               III. The Articles Properly State Removal Offenses

            a. the offenses alleged are high crimes and misdemeanors
    1. The Senate Has Never Exercised Its Power To Dismiss an Article of
            Impeachment Except When the Official Impeached Has Resigned
        The House acknowledges that the Senate has the power to dismiss an
    article of impeachment on the ground that it does not state a removable
    offense. Beyond that, however, President Clinton completely ignores the
    Senate's precedents concerning the use of that power. In the fifteen
    cases in which the House has forwarded articles of impeachment to the
    Senate, the Senate has never granted a dispositive motion to preclude a
    trial on the articles with one exception. In the 1926 case of Judge
    George English, the Senate granted a motion to adjourn after Judge
    English resigned from office making a trial moot on the issue of
    removal. See Impeachment of George W. English, U.S. District Judge,
    Eastern District of Illinois, 68 Cong. Rec. 347-48 (1926). The Senate
    also granted a motion to adjourn in the 1868 trial of President Andrew
    Johnson, but only after a full trial and votes to acquit on three
    articles. III Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives
    Sec. 2443.
        In addition, the Senate has never granted a motion to dismiss or
    strike an article of impeachment. However, in the 1936 case of Judge
    Halsted Ritter, the House managers themselves moved to strike two
    counts of a multi-count article to simplify the trial, and the motion
    was granted. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898-99 (April 3, 1936). However, the
    remainder of the article was fully considered, and Judge Ritter was
    convicted on that article. The House managers in the 1986 Judge Harry
    Claiborne case made the only motion for summary judgment in the history
    of impeachment. Hearings of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee
    (Judge Harry Claiborne), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1986). They did so
    on the basis that Judge Claiborne had already been convicted of the
    charges in a criminal trial. Id. The Senate postponed a decision on the
    motion and never ruled on it, but it ultimately convicted Judge
    Claiborne. In short, the Senate precedents firmly establish that the
    Senate has always fulfilled its responsibility to give a full and fair
    hearing to articles of impeachment voted by the House of
    Representatives.
    2. The Constitutional Text Sets One Clear Standard for Removal
                a. There is Only One Impeachment Standard
        The Constitution sets one clear standard for impeachment,
    conviction, and removal from office: the commission of ``Treason,
    Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II,
    Sec. 4. The Senate has repeatedly determined that perjury is a high
    crime and misdemeanor. Simple logic dictates that obstruction of
    justice which has the same effect as perjury and bribery of witnesses
    must also be a high crime and misdemeanor. Endless repetition of the
    claim that this standard is a high one does not change the standard.
        President Clinton claims that to remove him on these articles would
    permanently disfigure and diminish the Presidency and mangle the system
    of checks and balances. President's Trial Memorandum at 18. Quite the
    contrary, however, it is President Clinton's behavior as set forth in
    the articles that has had these effects. Essentially, President Clinton
    argues that the Presidency and the system of checks and balances can
    only be saved if we allow the President to commit felonies with
    impunity. To state that proposition is to refute it. Convicting him and
    thereby reaffirming that criminal behavior that strikes at the heart of
    the justice system will result in removal will serve to strengthen the
    Presidency, not weaken it.
                b. Impeachment and Removal Are Appropriate for High Crimes
                        and Misdemeanors Regardless of Whether They Are
                        Offenses Against the System of Government
        President Clinton argues that impeachment may only be used to
    redress wrongful public misconduct. The point is academic. Perjury and
    obstruction of justice as set forth in the articles are, by definition,
    public misconduct. See generally House Trial Memorandum at 107-12.
    Indeed, it is precisely their public nature that makes them offenses--
    acts that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm
    become crimes when they enter that realm. Lying to one's spouse about
    an extramarital affair, although immoral, is not a crime. Telling the
    same lie under oath in a judicial proceeding is a crime. Hiding gifts
    given to an adulterous lover to conceal the affair, although immoral,
    is not a crime. When those gifts become potential evidence in a
    judicial proceeding, the same act becomes a crime. One who has
    committed these kinds of crimes that corrupt the judicial system simply
    is not fit to serve as the nation's chief law enforcement officer.
        Apart from that, the notion that high crimes and misdemeanors
    encompass only public misconduct will not bear scrutiny. Numerous
    ``private'' crimes would obviously require the removal of a President.
    For example, if he killed his wife in a domestic dispute or molested a
    child, no one would seriously argue that he could not be removed. All
    of these acts violate the President's unique responsibility to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed.
    3. President Clinton Cites Precedents That Do Not Apply Rather Than
            Relying on the Senate's Own Precedents Clearly Establishing
            Perjury as a Removable Offense
                a. President Clinton Continues To Misrepresent the
                        Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President
                        Nixon
        In his trial memorandum, President Clinton argues that the failure
    in 1974 of the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an article of
    impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud supports the claim
    that current charges against President Clinton do not rise to the level
    of impeachable and removable offenses. President's Trial Memorandum at
    21. The President's lawyers acknowledge the charge in the article
    against President Nixon of ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to
    report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his
    Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' Id. The
    President's lawyers go on to state that ``[t]he President had signed
    his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,'' Id., trying to
    distinguish away the Claiborne impeachment and removal precedent from
    1986, and by extension all the judicial impeachments from the 1980s
    which clearly establish perjury as an impeachable and removable
    offense.
        President Clinton's argument that a President was not and should
    not be impeached for tax fraud because it does not involve official
    conduct or abuse of presidential powers simply is unfounded based on
    the 1974 impeachment proceedings against President Nixon. Moreover, the
    fact that the President and his lawyers make this argument in defense
    of the President is telling. He effectively claims that a large scale
    tax cheat could be a viable chief executive.
        It is undisputed that the Judiciary Committee rejected the proposed
    tax fraud article against President Nixon by a vote of 26 to 12. A slim
    minority of Committee members stated the view that tax fraud would not
    be an impeachable offense. That minority view is illustrated by the
    comments of Rep. Waldie that in the tax fraud article there was ``not
    an abuse of power sufficient to warrant impeachment. . . .'' Debate on
    Article of Impeachment 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary
    Pursuant H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 548 (1974) (Statement
    of Rep. Waldie). Similar views were expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep.
    Mayne. Rep. Railsback took the position that there was ``a serious
    question,'' id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Railsback), whether
    misconduct of the President in connection with his taxes would be
    impeachable.
        Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their
    opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based his
    opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that these charges
    may be reached in due course in the regular process of law.'' Id. at
    549 (Statement of Rep. Thornton). Rep. Butler stated his view that the
    tax fraud article should be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound
    judgment would indicate that we not add this article to the trial
    burden we already have.'' Id. at 550 (Statement of Rep. Butler).
        The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of
    those who expressed a view in the debate in opposition to the tax fraud
    article based their opposition on the insufficiency of the evidence,
    and not on the view that tax fraud, if proven, would not be an
    impeachable offense.
        The comments of then-Rep. Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974
    directly contradict the view that Mr. Owens has expressed in recent
    testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. Although Mr. Owens in
    1974 expressed his ``belief'' that President Nixon was guilty of
    misconduct in connection with his taxes, he clearly stated his
    conclusion that ``on the evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's offenses were
    not impeachable. Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Owens). Mr. Owens spoke
    of the need for ``hard evidence'' and discussed his unavailing efforts
    to obtain additional evidence that would tie ``the President to the
    fraudulent deed'' or that would otherwise ``close the inferential gap
    that has to be closed in order to charge the President.'' Id. He
    concluded his comments in the 1974 debate by urging the members of the
    Committee ``to reject this article . . . based on that lack of
    evidence.'' Id.
        In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee stated
    the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax fraud to support
    the article against President Nixon. Wiggins: ``fraud . . . is wholly
    unsupported in the evidence.'' Id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Wiggins).
    McClory: ``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Id. at 531
    (Statement of Rep. McClory). Sandman: ``There was absolutely no intent
    to defraud here.'' Id. at 532 (Statement of Rep. Sandman). Lott: ``mere
    mistakes or negligence by the President in filing his tax returns
    should clearly not be grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 533 (Statement
    of Rep. Lott). Maraziti: discussing absence of evidence of fraud. Id.
    at 534 (Statement of Rep. Maraziti). Dennis: ``no fraud has been
    found.'' Id. at 538 (Statement of Rep. Dennis). Cohen: questioning
    whether ``in fact there was criminal fraud involved.'' Id. at 548
    (Statement of Rep. Cohen). Hungate: ``I think there is a case here but
    in my judgment I am having trouble deciding if it has as yet been
    made.'' Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Hungate). Latta: only ``bad
    judgment and gross negligence.'' Id. at 554 (Statement of Rep. Latta).
    Fish: ``There is not to be found before us evidence that the President
    acted wilfully to evade his taxes.'' Id. at 556 (Statement of Rep.
    Fish). Moorhead: ``there is no showing that President Nixon in any way
    engaged in any fraud.'' Id. at 557 (Statement of Rep. Moorhead).
        The group of those who found the evidence insufficient included
    moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, as well as
    Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. McClory, all of whom
    supported the impeachment of President Nixon.
        In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert that the
    House Judiciary Committee in 1974 determined that tax fraud by the
    President would not be an impeachable offense. The failure of the
    Committee to adopt the tax fraud article against President Nixon simply
    does not support the claim of President Clinton's lawyers that the
    offenses charged against him do not rise to the level of impeachable
    offenses.
        In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made that tax
    fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient evidence--would be an
    impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who later served as chairman of the
    Committee, said:

        ``No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty to
    establish now that evidence of specific statutory crimes and
    constitutional violations by the President of the United States will
    subject all Presidents now and in the future to impeachment.
              * * * * * * *
        ``No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and the laws
    of the United States from accountability for personal misdeeds any more
    than he is for official misdeeds. And I think that we on this Committee
    in our effort to fairly evaluate the President's activities must show
    the American people that all men are treated equally under the law.''

    (Debate on Articles of Impeachment, 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the
    Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 525, 554.)
        Professor Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large-scale tax
    cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' Charles Black, Impeachment: A
    Handbook, (Yale University Press, 1974) at 42. What is true of tax
    fraud is also true of a persistent pattern of perjury by the President.
    An incorrigible perjurer is not a viable chief magistrate.
                b. President Clinton Continues to Misrepresent The
                        Allegations Against Alexander Hamilton
        President Clinton continues to try to persuade the American public
    that the House of Representatives has impeached him for having an
    extramarital affair. See Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton
    to the Articles of Impeachment at 1 (``The charges in the two Articles
    of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of
    a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with
    Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.'') (emphasis added). In doing so, the
    President's lawyers refer to an incident involving then Secretary of
    the Treasury Alexander Hamilton being blackmailed by the husband of a
    woman named Maria Reynolds with whom he was having an adulterous
    affair. However, the President's lawyers omit the relevant
    distinguishing facts even as they cast aspersions upon Alexander
    Hamilton: none of Hamilton's ``efforts'' to cover up his affair
    involved the violation of any laws, let alone felonies. Indeed, the
    fact of the matter is that Hamilton was the victim of the crime of
    extortion.
        Never did Hamilton raise his right hand to take a sacred oath and
    then willfully betray that oath and the rule of law to commit perjury.
    Never did Alexander Hamilton obstruct justice by tampering with
    witnesses, urging potential witnesses to sign false affidavits, or
    attempt to conceal evidence from a Federal criminal grand jury.
        Again, the significance of the distinctions are glaringly obvious:
    it is apparent from the Hamilton case that the Framers did not regard
    private sexual misconduct as an impeachable offense. It is also
    apparent that efforts to cover up such private behavior outside of a
    legal setting, including even paying hush money to induce someone to
    destroy documents, did not meet the standard. Neither Hamilton's high
    position, nor the fact that his payments to a securities swindler
    created an enormous appearance problem, were enough to implicate the
    standard. These wrongs were real, and they were not insubstantial, but
    to the Framers they were essentially private and therefore not
    impeachable. David Frum, ``Smearing Alexander Hamilton,'' The Weekly
    Standard (Oct. 19, 1998) at 14.
        But the Alexander Hamilton incident President Clinton cites
    actually clarifies the precise point at which personal misconduct
    becomes a public offense. Hamilton could keep his secret only by a
    betrayal of public responsibilities. Hamilton came to that point and,
    at immense personal cost, refused to cross the line. President Clinton
    came to that point and, fully understanding what he was doing,
    knowingly charged across the line. President Clinton's public acts of
    perjury and obstruction of justice transformed a personal misconduct
    into a public offense.
    4. The Views of the Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars the
            President Cites Do Not Stand Up to Careful Scrutiny
        It speaks volumes that the most distinguished of the 400 historians
    referred to in President Clinton's trial brief is Arthur Schlesinger,
    Jr. Professor Schlesinger had a different view of impeachment 25 years
    ago. President Clinton himself asserts that ``the allegations are so
    far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here
    threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself.'' President's
    Trial Memorandum at 24. However, Schlesinger has written that:

        ``The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could punish
    the man without [ ] punishing the office. For, in the Presidency as
    elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to [do] good meant also the
    power to do harm, the power to serve the republic also the power to
    demand and defile it.''

    (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Easton Press edit.
    1973) (hereinafter ``Schlesinger'') at 415.)
        The statement of the 400 historians cited with approval in the
    President's trial memorandum makes the following statement: ``[t]he
    Framers explicitly reserved that step for high crimes and misdemeanors
    in the exercise of executive power.'' Statement of Historians in
    Defense of the Constitution, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 1998) at A15.
    The 400 historians then believe that commission of a murder or rape by
    the President of the United States in his personal capacity is not
    subject to the impeachment power of Article II, Section 4.
        President Clinton in his trial memorandum asserts that this case
    does not fit the paradigmatic case for impeachment. President's Trial
    Memorandum at 24. However, none of his predecessors ever faced
    overwhelming evidence of repeatedly lying under oath before a federal
    court and grand jury and otherwise seeking to obstruct justice to
    benefit himself--directly contradicting his oath to ``take care that
    the laws are faithfully executed.'' But as former Attorney General
    Griffin Bell, who served under President Carter, said before the House
    Judiciary Committee recently, ``[a] President cannot faithfully execute
    the laws if he himself is breaking them.'' Background and History of
    Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
    House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 203 (Comm. Print
    1998) (Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell).
        President Clinton goes on to state that to make the offenses
    alleged against him impeachable and removable conduct ``would forever
    lower the bar in a way inimical to the Presidency and to our government
    of separated powers. These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2)
    statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the
    fact of sexual misbehavior.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26. While
    President Clinton and his able counsel would like to define the case
    this way, what is at issue in the articles of impeachment before the
    Senate is clear: perjury and obstruction of justice committed by the
    President of the United States in order to thwart a duly instituted
    civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit against him as well as a
    subsequent grand jury investigation. While the President may think such
    allegations would forever lower the bar in terms of the conduct we
    expect from our public officials, we must square his opinion and that
    of his lawyers with the fact that his Justice Department puts people in
    prison for similar conduct. While the President's brief again quotes
    Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. for the proposition that we must not ``lower
    the bar,'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26, Schlesinger held a
    different view during the impeachment of President Nixon:

        ``If the Nixon White House escaped the legal consequences of its
    illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and their associates not
    suppose themselves entitled to do what the Nixon White House had done?
    Only condign punishment would restore popular faith in the Presidency
    and deter future Presidents from illegal conduct.''
    (Schlesinger at 418.)
    5. The President and Federal Judges are Impeached, Convicted, and
            Removed From Office Under the Same Standard
        President Clinton's argument that Presidents are held to a lower
    standard of behavior than federal judges completely misreads the
    Constitution and the Senate's precedents. See generally House Trial
    Brief at 101-06. The Constitution provides one standard for the
    impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of ``[t]the President,
    the Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States.'' U.S.
    Const. art II, Sec. 4. It is the commission of ``Treason, Bribery, or
    other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Id.  The Senate has already
    determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the cases of
    Judge Nixon, Judge Hastings, and Judge Claiborne.
        President Clinton argues that the standard differs because judges
    have life tenure whereas Presidents are accountable to the voters at
    elections. That argument fails on several grounds. The differing
    tenures are set forth in the Constitution, and there is simply no
    textual support for the idea that they affect the impeachment standard
    at all. If electoral accountability were a sufficient means of
    remedying presidential misconduct, the framers would not have
    explicitly included the President in the impeachment clause. Finally,
    even if this argument were otherwise valid, it does not apply to
    President Clinton because he will never face the voters again. U.S.
    Const. amend. XXII. Indeed, all of the conduct charged in the Articles
    occurred after the 1996 election.
        Then President Clinton rejects the Senate's own precedents showing
    that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the three judicial
    impeachments of the 1980s arguing that all of the lying involved there
    concerned the judges' official duties. That is true with respect to
    Judge Hastings, but completely false with respect to Judge Claiborne
    and Judge Nixon. Judge Claiborne was impeached and convicted for lying
    on his income tax returns, an entirely personal matter. President
    Clinton tries to explain this away by saying: ``Once convicted, [Judge
    Claiborne] simply could not perform his official functions because his
    personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an
    arbiter of others' oaths.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 29. The
    same is true of President Clinton. He ultimately directs the Department
    of Justice which must decide whether people are prosecuted for lying.
    If he has committed perjury and obstructed justice, how can he be the
    arbiter of other's oaths? As Professor Jonathan Turley put it:

        ``As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate authority
    over the Justice Department and the Administration's enforcement
    policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let
    alone prosecute, citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of
    justice under circumstances nearly identical to the President's. Such
    inherent conflict will be even greater in the military cases and the
    President's role as Commander-in-Chief.''

    (Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
    the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d
    Sess. at 274 (Comm. Print 1998) (Testimony of Professor Jonathan
    Turley).)
        In the same vein, President Clinton claims that Judge Nixon
    ``employ[ed] the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage
    for a party.'' President's Trial Brief at 29. In fact, Judge Nixon
    intervened in a state criminal case in which he had no official role.
    His ability to persuade the prosecutor to drop the case rested on his
    friendship with the state prosecutor--not his official position.
    President Clinton argues that it was Judge Nixon's intervention in a
    judicial proceeding that ties it to his official position. The same is
    true of President Clinton. He intervened in two judicial proceedings
    and his actions had the same effect as Judge Nixon's--to defeat a just
    result.
        As the person who ultimately directs the Justice Department--the
    federal government's prosecutorial authority--the President must follow
    his constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
    executed. U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 3. His special constitutional duty
    is at least as high, if not higher, than the judge's. Indeed, President
    Clinton acknowledged as much early in his Administration when
    controversy arose about the nomination of Zoe Baird and the potential
    nomination of Judge Kimba Wood to be Attorney General. Questions were
    raised about whether they had properly complied with laws relating to
    their hiring of household help. At that time, President Clinton said
    the Attorney General ``should be held to a higher standard than other
    Cabinet members on matters of this kind [i.e. strictly complying with
    the law].'' Remarks of President Clinton with Reporters Prior to a
    Meeting with Economic Advisers, February 8, 1993, 29 Weekly Compilation
    of Presidential Documents 160. If the Attorney General is held to a
    higher standard of compliance with the law, then her superior,
    President Clinton, must be also.
      b. the individual consciences of senators determines the burden of
                          proof in impeachment trials
        The Constitution does not discuss the standard of proof for
    impeachment trials. It simply states that ``the Senate shall have the
    Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const., Art I, Sec. 3, clause 5.
    Because the Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to
    look at the past practice of the Senate. Historically, the Senate has
    never set a standard of proof for impeachment trials. ``In the final
    analysis the question is one which historically has been answered by
    individual Senators guided by their own consciences.'' Congressional
    Research Service Report for Congress, Standard of Proof in Senate
    Impeachment Proceedings, Thomas B. Ripy, Legislative Attorney, American
    Law Division (January 7, 1999).
        President Clinton argues that the impeachment trial is similar to a
    criminal trial and that the appropriate standard should therefore be
    ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' That argument is not new: it has been
    made in the past, and the Senate has rejected it, as indeed, President
    Clinton acknowledges. He asserts, however, that the impeachment trial
    of a President should proceed under special procedures that do not
    apply to the trial of other civil officers. His arguments are
    unpersuasive.
    1. The Senate has Never Adopted the Criminal Standard of ``Beyond a
            Reasonable Doubt'' or Any Other Standard of Proof for
            Impeachment Trials
        The Senate has never adopted the standard of ``beyond a reasonable
    doubt'' in any impeachment trial in U.S. history. In fact, the Senate
    has chosen not to impose a standard at all, preferring to leave to the
    conscience of each senator the decision of how best to judge the facts
    presented.
        In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, counsel for the
    respondent moved to designate ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the
    standard of proof for conviction. Gray & Reams, The Congressional
    Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the
    Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5,
    Document 41, X (1987). The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion by
    a vote of 17-75. In the floor debate on the motion, House Manager
    Kastenmeier emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each
    member to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. 132 Cong. Rec.
    S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
        The question of the appropriate standard of proof was also raised
    in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings. In the Senate Impeachment Trial
    Committee, Senator Rudman said in response to a question about the
    historical practice regarding the standard of proof that there has been
    no specific standard, ``you are not going to find it. It is what is in
    the mind of every Senator. . . . I think it is what everybody decides
    for themselves.'' Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on
    the Articles Against Judge Alcee Hastings: Hearings before the Senate
    Impeachment Trial Committee (Part 1) 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75,
    (discussion involving Senator Lieberman and Senator Rudman).
    2. The Criminal Standard of Proof is Inappropriate for Impeachment
            Trials
        President Clinton argues that an impeachment trial is akin to a
    criminal trial and that, therefore, the criminal standard should apply.
    That assertion is, of course, at direct odds with his apparent
    opposition to the presentation of evidence through witnesses, another
    normal criminal trial procedure. The Senate Rules Committee rejected
    this analogy in 1974, stating, ``an impeachment trial is not a criminal
    trial,'' and advocating a clear and convincing evidence standard.
    Executive Session Hearings, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and
    Administration, ``Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment
    Trials'' 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (August 5-6, 1974). Indeed, it is
    undisputed that impeachable offenses need not be criminal offenses. See
    Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the
    Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th Cong.,
    2d Sess. at 14 (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998) (``Impeachable acts need
    not be criminal acts.'')
        Moreover, the result of conviction in an impeachment trial is
    removal from office, not punishment. As the House argued in the
    Claiborne trial, the reasonable standard was designed to protect
    criminal defendants who risked ``forfeitures of life, liberty and
    property'' (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174
    (1949)). This standard is inappropriate here because the Constitution
    limits the consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from
    office and disqualification from holding office in the future,
    explicitly preserving the option for a subsequent criminal trial in the
    courts. U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 6.
        In addition, as the House argued in the Claiborne trial, the
    criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by its
    nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more heavily than
    the interest of the individual defendant. Gray & Reams, The
    Congressional Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and
    Materials on the Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne,
    Volume 5, Document 41, X (1987). During the course of the floor debate
    on this motion in the Claiborne trial, Representative Kastenmeier
    argued for the House that the use of the criminal standard was
    inappropriate where the public interest in removing corrupt officials
    was a significant factor. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed.
    October 7, 1986).
    3. A President Who Is Impeached Should Not Receive Special Procedural
            Benefits That Do Not Apply in the Impeachment Trials of Other
            Civil Officers
        President Clinton argues that he should be exempted from the weight
    of historical practice and precedent and be given a special rule on the
    standard of proof. This argument is based on fallacious assertions, the
    first of which is that different constitutional standards apply to the
    impeachment of judges and presidents. See above at 14-16 and House
    Trial Memorandum at 101-06.
        President Clinton also employs inflammatory rhetoric to suggest
    that a presidential impeachment trial ought to be treated differently,
    explaining that the criminal standard is needed because ``the
    Presidency itself is at stake'' and because conviction would ``overturn
    the results of an election.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 32-33.
    The presidency is, of course, not at stake, though the tenure of its
    current office holder may be. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution
    ensures that impeachment and removal of a President would not overturn
    an election because it is the elected Vice President who would replace
    the President not the losing presidential candidate.
        Finally, President Clinton argues that the evidence should be
    tested by the most stringent standard because ``there is no suggestion
    of corruption or misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our
    system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the
    President's term.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. While the
    President might be expected to argue that he did not act corruptly, he
    cannot credibly assert that ``there is no suggestion of corruption,''
    because ``corrupt'' conduct is precisely what he is charged with in the
    articles of impeachment. Though not persuasive as an argument, this
    statement is significant in what it concedes--that corruption is among
    the ``conduct that places our system of government at risk.''
    President's Trial Memorandum at 33. Having acknowledged this, President
    Clinton cannot be heard to complain that the House has failed to charge
    him with conduct which rises to the level of an impeachable offense.

           IV. The Structure of the Articles is Proper and Sufficient

                a. the articles are not unconstitutionally vague
        President Clinton's trial memorandum argues that the two articles
    of impeachment are unfairly complex. To the contrary, the articles
    present the misdeeds of President Clinton and their consequences in as
    transparent and understandable a manner as possible.
        The first article of impeachment charges that President Clinton
    violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by willfully
    corrupting and manipulating the judicial process. He did this by
    providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a grand jury in
    regard to one or more of four matters. The deleterious consequences his
    actions had for the people of the United States are then described. The
    second article charges that President Clinton violated his enumerated
    constitutional responsibilities by a course of conduct that prevented,
    obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice. One or more of
    seven listed acts constitute the particulars of President Clinton's
    course of conduct. As in the first article, the deleterious
    consequences his actions had for the people of the United States are
    then described.
        To do as President Clinton requests would require separating out
    into a unique article of impeachment each possible combination of (a) a
    particular violation of his duties, (b) a particular wrongful act, and
    (c) a particular consequence of his actions. This would require 48
    different articles in the case of the first article and 84 in the case
    of the second. Such a multiplicity of articles is not required and
    would assist no one. Of course, if the president had violated fewer
    presidential duties, committed fewer misdeeds, and been responsible for
    fewer harmful consequences to the American people, the articles could
    have been drafted more simply.
        The trial memorandum then makes the contention that the two
    articles of impeachment are impermissibly vague and lacking in
    specificity in that they do not meet the standards of a criminal
    indictment. This contention clearly misses the mark. Impeachment is a
    political and not a criminal proceeding, designed, as recognized by
    Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest nineteenth century
    interpreter, ``not . . . to punish an offender'' by threatening
    deprivation of his life or liberty, but to ``secure the state'' by
    ``divest[ing] him of his political capacity''. J. Story, Commentaries
    on the Constitution (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) Sec. 803.
    Justice Story thus found the analogy to an indictment to be invalid:

        ``The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict
    form and accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in
    the form of the allegations; but always contain, or ought to contain,
    so much certainty, as to enable the party to put himself upon the
    proper defense, and also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of
    it, as a bar to another impeachment.''

    (Id. at Sec. 806).
        In explaining the impeachment process to the citizens of New York
    in Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton stated in more general terms
    that impeachment ``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either
    in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the
    construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the
    discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' The Federalist
    No. 65, at 398 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
        Can the president legitimately argue that he is unable to put on a
    proper defense? President Clinton has committed a great number of
    impeachable misdeeds. The House Judiciary Committee's committee report
    requires 20 pages just to list the most glaring instances of the
    president's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before a
    federal grand jury and it requires 13 pages just to list the most
    glaring incidents in the president's course of conduct designed to
    prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice. The House
    believes that President Clinton's attorneys have reviewed the committee
    report. They know exactly what he is being charged with, as is
    acknowledged in the president's trial memorandum. The memorandum states
    in its introduction that ``[t]ake away the elaborate trappings of the
    Articles and the high-flying rhetoric that accompanied them, and we see
    clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the
    President from office because he . . .'' President's Trial Memorandum
    at 2. In addition, in the House proceedings, the President filed three
    documents: a Preliminary Memorandum, an Initial Response, and a
    Submission by Counsel. The first two documents were printed together
    and ran to 57 pages. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the
    United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the Independent
    Counsel and Initial Response of the President of the United States to
    Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d
    Sess., H.Doc. No. 105-317 (1998). The third was printed and ran to 404
    pages. Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on
    the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th
    Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998). He was also given 30
    hours to present his case before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
    during which he called numerous witnesses. The Committee repeatedly
    asked President Clinton to provide it with any exculpatory evidence, an
    offer which he never accepted. Now President Clinton's Trial Memorandum
    to the Senate runs to 130 pages. Clearly, President Clinton has not
    suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles of impeachment.
        If he had, he would have availed himself of the opportunity to file
    a motion for a bill of particulars. He had that opportunity on January
    11, 1999, and he waived it. He should not now be heard to claim that he
    does not know what the charges are.
        Unlike the judicial impeachments of the 1980s, President Clinton
    has not committed a handful of specific misdeeds that can easily be
    listed in separate articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the
    whole melange of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives to
    impeach President Clinton, the Judiciary Committee looked to the only
    analogous case--that of President Nixon. In 1974, the Committee was
    also faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable length
    against a president who had committed a long series of improper acts
    designed to achieve an illicit end.
        The first article of impeachment against President Nixon charged
    that in order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of
    the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and obstruct
    the consequent investigation (and for certain other purposes), he
    engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or causing to be made
    false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative
    officers'', ``endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency'',
    and ``endeavoring to cause prospective defendants and individuals duly
    tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in
    return for their silence or false testimony.'' Impeachment of Richard
    M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd
    Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). The article did not list each false or
    misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, and did not
    list each prospective defendant and what they were promised.
        In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against President
    Clinton charge him with providing perjurious, false, and misleading
    testimony concerning four subjects, such as an his relationship with a
    subordinate government employee, and engaging in a course of conduct
    designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of
    justice, such course including four generals acts such as an effort to
    secure job assistance for that employee. An argument can be made that
    the articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted with
    more specificity than those against President Nixon. Unless President
    Clinton is arguing that the Senate should have dismissed the first
    article of impeachment against President Nixon (had the president not
    resigned), he has little ground to complain about the articles against
    himself. In short, President Clinton knows exactly what the charges
    are, and the Senate should now require him to account for his behavior.
       b. the articles do not improperly charge multiple offenses in one
                                    article
        President Clinton argues unpersuasively that the articles of
    impeachment are ``unconstitutionally flawed'' in two respects. First,
    he argues that ``by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House
    of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with
    the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of
    two-thirds of the members.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 101.
    Second, he argues that the articles do not provide him ``the most basic
    notice of the charges against him required by due process and
    fundamental fairness.'' Id. Both arguments are factually deficient,
    ignore Senate precedent and procedure, and are constitutionally flawed.
        The articles of impeachment allege that the President made ``one or
    more'' ``perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand
    jury'' and committed ``one or more'' acts in which he obstructed
    justice. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998). The articles of
    impeachment are modeled after those adopted by the House Committee on
    the Judiciary against President Nixon and were drafted with the rules
    of the Senate in mind. Senate Rules specifically contemplate that the
    House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner and prior
    rulings of the Senate have held that such drafting is not deficient and
    will not sustain a motion to dismiss.
        In 1986, the United States Senate amended the Rules of Procedure
    and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials. S. Res.
    479, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). As part of the reform, Rule XXIII,
    which deals generally with voting the final question, was amended to
    clarify the articles of impeachment are not divisible. Rule XXIII
    provides in relevant part that:

        ``An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose
    of voting thereon at any time during the trial. Once voting has
    commenced on an article of impeachment, voting shall be continued until
    voting has been completed on all articles of impeachment unless the
    Senate adjourns for period not to exceed one day or adjourns sine
    die.''

        The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, after thoroughly
    reviewing the impeachment rules, prior articles of impeachments, and
    prior Senate trials, decided that articles of impeachment should not be
    divisible. In drafting the amendment to Rule XXIII providing that
    articles of impeachment not be divided, the Senate was aware that the
    House may combine multiple counts of impeachable conduct in one article
    of impeachment. The Committee report explains the Senate's position:

        ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the divisions
    of an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the
    most judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a
    general manner and, in particular, with respect to the form of the
    articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.
    The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an
    impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the
    first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges
    alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of
    transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of
    Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had
    thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the'' enumerated
    specifications. The general review of the Committee at that time was
    expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division
    of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted
    specifications might ``be time consuming and confusing, and a matter
    which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will *
    * *.'' Accordingly, it was agreed to write into the proposed rules
    language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either
    the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person
    impeached was ``guilty'' or one or more of the enumerated
    specifications.''

    Amending the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting
    on Impeachment Trials, Report of the Comm. on Rules and Administration,
    S. Rept. 99-401, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 8 (1986) (emphasis added).
    Because the Senate was aware that multiple specifications of
    impeachment conduct may be contained in an article of impeachment, the
    Senate's rules implicitly countenance such drafting.
        The issue regarding whether articles of impeachment are divisible
    is not new to the Senate. In fact, the Senate's Committee on Rules and
    Administration reviewed the Senate's impeachment procedures in 1974 to
    prepare for a possible trial of President Richard Nixon. The Committee
    passed the exact same language as the Committee did in 1986 prohibiting
    the division of an article of impeachment. Because President Nixon
    resigned, the full Senate never considered the amendments.
        Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York submitted a statement to the
    Committee in 1974 addressing the divisibility issue and advised that
    Rule XXIII be amended to prohibit the division of an article of
    impeachment. His comments, as follows, are instructive:

        ``Rule XXIII provides for the yeas and nays to be taken on each
    article separately but does not set any order for a vote when there are
    several articles. In the [President] Johnson trial, this was done by
    order of the Senate and several votes were taken on the order. This
    procedure, setting a vote for final consideration, should be stated in
    the rules. Also the rule is silent about the division of any article.
    In the Johnson trial a division was requested and the Chief Justice
    attempted to devise one, but could not, and the article as a whole was
    submitted for a vote to the Senate. I believe articles should not be
    divided because this raises a further question of whether a two-thirds
    vote is required on each part of an article and whether the House
    action on the construction of a particular article can be changed
    without further action by the House. Thus the rule should provide for
    no division of an article by the Senate.''

    (Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials,
    Executive Session Hearings before the Comm. on Standing Rules and
    Administration, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 116 (August 5th and 6th, 1974)
    (emphasis added).)
        In addition to implicitly recognizing that articles of impeachment
    may contain multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the Senate
    has convicted a number of judges on such ``omnibus'' articles,
    including Judges Archbald, Ritter, and Claiborne. In the case of Judge
    Nixon, the Senate acquitted on the article, but refused to dismiss it.
        The most recent example, that of Judge Nixon in 1989, is
    instructive. Judge Walter L. Nixon filed a motion to dismiss on the
    grounds that Article III was duplicative, among other things. Senator
    Fowler, the chairman of the committee appointed to take evidence in the
    impeachment trial of Judge Nixon explained the reasons for denying
    Nixon's motion to refer the motion to dismiss to the full Senate:

        ``To the extent that the motion rests on the House's inclusion of
    fourteen distinct allegations of false statements in one article, we
    believe that Article III states an intelligible and adequately discrete
    charge of an impeachable offense by alleging that Judge Nixon concealed
    information concerning several conversations in which he had engaged by
    making ``one or more'' false statements to a grand jury. The House has
    substantial discretion in determining how to aggregate related alleged
    acts of misconduct in framing Articles of Impeachment and has
    historically frequently chosen to aggregate multiple factual
    allegations in a single impeachment article. The House's itemization of
    the fourteen particular statements whose knowing falsity it is alleging
    serves to give Judge Nixon fair notice of the contours of the charge
    against him without reducing the intelligibility of the article's
    essential accusation that Judge Nixon knowingly concealed material
    information from the government's law enforcement agents. Because the
    Committee believes that evidentiary proceedings may fairly be conducted
    on Article III as it is presently drafted, Judge Nixon's motion to
    refer his motion to dismiss Article III to the Senate at this time is
    denied.''

    (135 Cong. Rec. 19635-36 (September 6, 1989).)
        The full Senate eventually rejected Judge Nixon's motion to dismiss
    by a vote of 34 to 63. Mr. Manager Cardin persuasively summed up the
    argument against the motion to dismiss as follows:

        ``Judge Nixon argues, in his brief, that you must find all 14
    statements to be false to vote guilty on article III. But that is
    untrue. Read the article closely. The question posed by article III is,
    did Judge Nixon conceal information? Did he conceal information, first
    by one or more false or misleading statements in his interview, and
    then by one or more false and misleading statements in his grand jury
    testimony?
        ``You need not find all 14 statements to be false. The House is
    unanimously convinced that all 14 are complete and utter lies. We hope
    you will agree. But after considering the evidence, perhaps you will
    conclude that only 12 of the statements are false. It really does not
    matter. Just one intentionally false and misleading statement in the
    interview, or one in the grand jury, should be enough. Because if you
    conclude that Judge Nixon concealed information, whether by 1 false
    statement or 14, he should be removed from the bench. You should vote
    guilty on article III.
        ``And you need not necessarily agree on which statements are false,
    if you reach the conclusion that he concealed information. If two-
    thirds of the Senators present believe Judge Nixon lied, regardless of
    how each individual Senator reached that conclusion, he will properly
    be removed from office.
              * * * * * * *
        ``This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if you might
    differ on which particular statements are lies, the bottom line is that
    two-thirds of you will have agreed that he concealed information,
    rendering him unfit for office. That is what the Constitution
    requires.''

    (Id. at 26751.)
        Given the clear Senate precedent permitting articles of impeachment
    containing multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the
    President's attack on the construction of the articles is an attack on
    Senate rules and precedent. The President's concerns, if assumed to be
    valid, could be addressed simply by permitting a division of the
    question. Under the standing rules of the Senate, any Senator may have
    the same divided if ``the question in debate contains several
    propositions.'' Senate Rule XV. A question is divisible if it contains
    two or more separate and distinct propositions. The Senate, however,
    has made an affirmative decision to dispense with the regular order
    which governs bills, resolutions, and amendments thereto, and instead
    adopted a different procedure not permitting the division of articles
    of impeachment. The Senate has not acted unconstitutionally in the past
    regarding prior impeachments, and is not on a course to do so in the
    trial of President Clinton.
        The claim that President Clinton is not on notice regarding the
    charges is ludicrous. The Lewinsky matter is arguably the most reported
    and scrutinized story of 1998 and possibly of 1999. The facts of the
    case are contained in numerous documents, statements, reports, and
    filings. Specifically, President Clinton has had the following
    documents, among others, containing the facts and specifics of the
    case: (1) Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in
    Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code,
    Section 595(c), H.Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998); (2)
    Investigatory Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary with Respect to its
    Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rept. 105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October
    7, 1998); (3) Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of
    the United States, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Rept. 105-830 (Dec. 16,
    1998); and (4) Trial Memorandum of the United States House of
    Representatives. If all of these reports and the thousands of pages of
    documents are not enough, President Clinton will have the opportunity
    to review the presentation of the Managers on the Part of the House for
    up to twenty-four hours.

        V. President Clinton Completely Misstates the Record as to the
        Discovery Procedures That Were Available to Him in the House of
                                Representatives

        President Clinton's trial memorandum claimed to the Senate that,
    should it decide ``to allow the House managers to expand the record in
    some way . . . the President would have an urgent need for the
    discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these
    proceedings has been able to subpoena documents or summon or cross-
    examine witnesses.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 125 (emphasis
    added). The President also states that ``the House of Representatives
    [did not] afford the President any discovery mechanisms to secure
    evidence that might be helpful in his defense.'' Id.
        We will not address every discovery issue here since those issues
    will be resolved in the coming days; however, the Senate should know
    that these claims are absolutely false. In fact, the President's own
    brief refutes his claims. ``The Committee allowed the President's
    lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House
    presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses. . . .'' White
    House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on
    behalf of the President. . . .'' Id. at 13.
        The House Committee on the Judiciary repeatedly asked the
    President's attorneys to supply any exculpatory evidence to the
    Committee, both orally and in writing. They never did. When, at the
    last minute, the President's counsel requested witnesses, the Committee
    invited to testify every witness they requested. Aside from this,
    President Clinton nor his attorneys never asked to ``subpoena
    documents'' or ``summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' If President
    Clinton's argument is that the Committee did not provide his staff a
    stack of blank subpoenas, that is correct. However, neither the House
    of Representatives, nor the Senate, has the ability to ``turn over''
    its constitutionally based subpoena power to the executive branch.
        President Clinton's attorneys never asked to do the things they now
    claim they never had the ability to do. In fact, when minority members
    of the Committee publicly asked that Judge Starr be called as a
    witness, Judge Starr was called. In fact, President Clinton's attorney
    and minority counsel questioned Judge Starr for over two hours. Every
    Member of the Committee questioned him for at least five minutes each.
    Judge Starr was a witness, and he was cross-examined by David Kendall,
    President Clinton's private attorney. President Clinton's claims are
    just not accurate.
        President Clinton's attorneys raise the issue of fairness. They are
    entitled to their own opinion about the House's proceedings, but they
    are not entitled to rewrite history. The truth is that the Committee's
    subpoena power could have been used to subpoena documents or witnesses
    on behalf of the President if they had so requested. They did not. All
    they requested, is that lawyers, law professors, and historians testify
    before the Committee. In short, President Clinton's statements about
    what happened in the House completely misstate what occurred.

                                 VI. Conclusion

        For the reasons stated herein and in the Trial Memorandum of the
    United States House of Representatives, the House respectfully submits
    that the articles properly state impeachable offenses, that the Senate
    should proceed to a full trial on the articles, and that after trial,
    the Senate should vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton,
    remove him from office, and disqualify him from holding further office.
                Respectfully submitted,

                                       The United States
                                       House of Representatives.

                                       Henry J. Hyde,
                                       F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
                                       Bill McCollum,
                                       George W. Gekas,
                                       Charles T. Canady,
                                       Stephen E. Buyer,
                                       Ed Bryant,
                                       Steve Chabot,
                                       Bob Barr,
                                       Asa Hutchinson,
                                       Chris Cannon,
                                       James E. Rogan,
                                       Lindsey O. Graham,
                                     Managers on the Part of the House.

                                              Thomas E. Mooney,
                                                       General Counsel.
                                            David P. Schippers,
                                           Chief Investigative Counsel.
        Dated: January 14, 1999.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I would like to inform Members of the
    Senate and the parties in this case of my need to stand on
    occasion to stretch my back. I have no intention that the
    proceedings should be in any way interrupted when I do so.
        The Presiding Officer notes the presence in the Senate
    Chamber of the managers on the part of the House of
    Representatives and counsel for the President of the United
    States.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the
    managers for the House of Representatives have 24 hours to make
    the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you.
        The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde to begin
    the presentation of the case for the House of Representatives.
        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel
    for the President, and Senators, we are brought together on
    this solemn and historic occasion to perform important duties
    assigned to us by the Constitution.
        We want you to know how much we respect you and this
    institution and how grateful we are for your guidance and your
    cooperation.
        With your permission, we, the managers of the House, are
    here to set forth the evidence in support of two articles of
    impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. You
    are seated in this historic Chamber not to embark on some great
    legislative debate, which these stately walls have so often
    witnessed, but to listen to the evidence, as those who must sit
    in judgment.
        To guide you in this grave duty, you have taken an oath of
    impartiality. With the simple words ``I do,'' you have pledged
    to put aside personal bias and partisan interest and to do
    ``impartial justice.'' Your willingness to take up this calling
    has once again reminded the world of the unique brilliance of
    America's constitutional system of Government. We are here, Mr.
    Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, as advocates for the
    rule of law, for equal justice under the law and for the
    sanctity of the oath.
        The oath. In many ways, the case you will consider in the
    coming days is about those two words: ``I do,'' pronounced at
    two Presidential inaugurations by a person whose spoken words
    have singular importance to our Nation and to the great globe
    itself.
        More than 450 years ago, Sir Thomas More, former Lord
    Chancellor of England, was imprisoned in the Tower of London
    because he had, in the name of conscience, defied the absolute
    power of the King. As the playwright Robert Bolt tells it, More
    was visited by his family, who tried to persuade him to speak
    the words of the oath that would save his life, even while, in
    his mind and heart, he held firm to his conviction that the
    King was in error. More refused. As he told his daughter,
    Margaret, ``When a man takes an oath, Meg, he's holding his own
    self in his hands. Like water. And if he opens his fingers
    then--he needn't hope to find himself again . . .'' Sir Thomas
    More, the most brilliant lawyer of his generation, a scholar
    with an international reputation, the center of a warm and
    affectionate family life which he cherished, went to his death
    rather than take an oath in vain.
        Members of the Senate, what you do over the next few weeks
    will forever affect the meaning of those two words: ``I do.''
    You are now stewards of the oath. Its significance in public
    service and our cherished system of justice will never be the
    same after this. Depending on what you decide, it will either
    be strengthened in its power to achieve justice or it will go
    the way of so much of our moral infrastructure and become a
    mere convention, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.
        The House of Representatives has named myself and 12 other
    Members as managers of its case. I have the honor of
    introducing those distinguished Members and explaining how we
    will make our initial presentation. The gentleman from
    Wisconsin, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, will begin the
    presentation with an overview of the case. Representative
    Sensenbrenner is the ranking Republican member of the House
    Judiciary Committee, and has served for 20 years. In 1989,
    Representative Sensenbrenner was a House manager in the
    impeachment trial of Judge Walter L. Nixon, who was convicted
    on two articles of impeachment for making false and misleading
    statements before a federal grand jury.
        Following Representative Sensenbrenner will be a team of
    managers who will make a presentation of the relevant facts of
    this case. From the very outset of this ordeal, there has been
    a great deal of speculation and misinformation about the facts.
    That has been unfortunate for everyone involved. We believe
    that a full presentation of the facts and the law by the House
    managers--will be helpful.
        Representative Ed Bryant, from Tennessee, was a United
    States Attorney from the Western District of Tennessee. As a
    captain in the Army, Representative Bryant served in the Judge
    Advocate General Corps and taught at the United States Military
    Academy at West Point. Representative Bryant will explain the
    background of the events that led to the illegal actions of the
    President.
        Following Representative Bryant,  Representative Asa
    Hutchinson, from Arkansas, will give a presentation of the
    factual basis for article II, obstruction of justice.
    Representative Hutchinson is a former United States Attorney
    for the Western District of Arkansas.
        Next, you will hear from Representative Jim Rogan of
    California. Representative Rogan is a former California State
    judge and Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney.
    Representative Rogan will give a presentation of the factual
    basis for article I, grand jury perjury. This should conclude
    our presentation for today.
        Tomorrow, Representative Bill McCollum of Florida will tie
    all of the facts together and give a factual summation.
    Representative McCollum is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
    Crime, a former Naval Reserve Commander and member of the Judge
    Advocate General Corps.
        Following the presentation of the facts, a team of managers
    will present the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of
    justice and how it applies to the articles of impeachment
    before you. While the Senate has made it clear that a crime is
    not essential to impeachment and removal from office, these
    managers will explain how egregious and criminal the conduct
    alleged in the articles of impeachment is. This team includes
    Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania, Representative
    Steve Chabot of Ohio, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, and
    Representative Chris Cannon of Utah. Representative Gekas is
    the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and
    Administrative Law. And in 1989, Representative Gekas served as
    a manager of the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, who
    the Senate convicted on eight articles for making false and
    misleading statements under oath and one article of conspiracy
    to engage in a bribery. Representative Gekas is a former
    assistant district attorney. Representative Chabot serves on
    the Subcommittee on Crime and has experience as a criminal
    defense lawyer. Representative Barr is a former United States
    Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, where he
    specialized in public corruption. He also has experience as a
    criminal defense attorney. Representative Cannon has had
    experience as the Deputy Associate Solicitor General of the
    Department of the Interior and as a practicing attorney. That
    should conclude our presentation for Friday.
        On Saturday, three managers will make a presentation on
    Constitutional law as it relates to this case. There has been a
    great deal of argument about whether the conduct alleged in the
    articles rises to the level of removable offenses. This team's
    analysis of the precedents of the Senate and application of the
    facts of this case will make it clear that the Senate has
    established the conduct alleged in the articles to be removable
    offenses. In this presentation you will hear from
    Representative Charles Canady of Florida, Representative Steve
    Buyer of Indiana and Representative Lindsey Graham of South
    Carolina. Representative Canady is the Chairman of the
    Subcommittee on the Constitution and one of the leading voices
    on constitutional law in the House. Representative Buyer served
    in the United States Army as a member of the Judge Advocate
    General's Corps where he was assigned as Special Assistant to
    the United States Attorney in Virginia. He also served as a
    deputy to the Indiana Attorney General. Representative Graham
    served in the Air Force as a member of the Judge Advocate
    General's Corps and as a South Carolina Assistant Attorney.
        Following the presentation of the facts, the law of perjury
    and obstruction of justice and constitutional law, Mr. Rogan
    and myself will give you a final summation and closing to our
    initial presentation.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner is recognized.
        Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    counsel to the President, and Senators, in his third annual
    message to Congress on December 7, 1903, President Theodore
    Roosevelt said:

        No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we
    ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it.
    Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a
    favor.

        We are here today because President William Jefferson
    Clinton decided to put himself above the law--not once, not
    twice, but repeatedly. He put himself above the law when he
    engaged in a multifaceted scheme to obstruct justice during the
    Federal civil rights case of Paula Corbin Jones versus William
    Jefferson Clinton, et. al. He put himself above the law when he
    made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath
    during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998. In both
    instances, he unlawfully attempted to prevent the judicial
    branch of Government--a coequal branch--from performing its
    constitutional duty to administer equal justice under the law.
        The U.S. House of Representatives has determined that the
    President's false and misleading testimony to the grand jury
    and his obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit are high
    crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the Constitution.
    Should the Senate conduct a fair and impartial trial which
    allows each side to present its best case, then the American
    public can be confident that justice has been served,
    regardless of the outcome.
        We hear much about how important the rule of law is to our
    Nation and to our system of government. Some have commented
    that this expression is trite. But, whether expressed by these
    three words, or others, the primacy of law over the rule of
    individuals is what distinguishes the United States from most
    other countries and why our Constitution is as alive today as
    it was 210 years ago.
        The framers of the Constitution devised an elaborate system
    of checks and balances to ensure our liberties by making sure
    that no person, institution, or branch of Government became so
    powerful that a tyranny could ever be established in the United
    States of America.
        We are the trustees of that sacred legacy and whether the
    rule of law and faith in our Nation emerges stronger than ever
    or are diminished irreparably, depends upon the collective
    decision of the message each Senator chooses to send forth in
    the days ahead.
        The evidence you will hear relates solely to the
    President's misconduct, which is contrary to his constitutional
    public responsibility to ensure the laws be faithfully
    executed. It is not about the President's affair with a
    subordinate employee, an affair that was both inappropriate and
    immoral. Mr. Clinton has recognized that this relationship was
    wrong. I give him credit for that. But he has not owned up to
    the false testimony, the stonewalling and legal hairsplitting,
    and obstructing the courts from finding the truth. In doing so,
    he has turned his affair into a public wrong. And for these
    actions, he must be held accountable through the only
    constitutional means the country has available--the difficult
    and painful process of impeachment.
        Impeachment is one of the checks the framers gave to
    Congress to protect the American people from a corrupt or
    tyrannical executive or judicial branch of Government. Because
    the procedure is cumbersome and because a two-thirds vote in
    the Senate is required to remove an official following an
    impeachment trial, safeguards are there to stop Congress from
    increasing its powers at the expense of the other two branches.
    The process is long. It is difficult. It is unpleasant. But,
    above all, it is necessary to maintain the public's trust in
    the conduct of their elected officials--elected officials, such
    as myself and yourselves, who through our oaths of office have
    a duty to follow the law, fulfill our constitutional
    responsibilities, and protect our Republic from public
    wrongdoing.
        The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a separate and
    distinct process in the House and in the Senate. They did not
    expect the House and Senate to conduct virtually identical
    proceedings with the only difference being that conviction in
    the Senate requires a two-thirds vote. That is why the
    Constitution reserves the sole power of impeachment to the
    House of Representatives and the sole power to try all
    impeachments to the Senate. History demonstrates different
    processes were adopted to reflect very different roles.
        In the case of President Andrew Johnson, no hearings were
    held or witnesses called by the House on the President's
    decision to remove Secretary of War Stanton from office. The
    House first approved a general article of impeachment that
    simply stated that President Johnson was impeached for high
    crimes and misdemeanors. Five days later, a special House
    committee drew up specific articles. Eleven articles were
    passed by the House, all but two of which were based upon
    President Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office
    Act by his actions in removing Secretary of War Stanton. The
    trial was then conducted with witnesses in the Senate.
        In the case of President Nixon, the House Judiciary
    Committee passed three articles of impeachment based not upon
    their own investigation, but upon the evidence gathered by the
    Ervin Committee, the Patman Committee, the Joint Tax Committee,
    and material from the special prosecutor and various court
    proceedings. Nine witnesses were called at the end of the
    impeachment inquiry, five of them at the request of the White
    House, and their testimony was not at the center of the
    impeachment articles.
        In the Judge Walter Nixon impeachment in 1989, a trial with
    live witnesses was held even after the Senate rejected by less
    than a two-thirds vote a defense motion to dismiss one article
    of impeachment on the grounds that it did not constitute an
    impeachable offense.
        The House managers submit that witnesses are essential to
    give heightened credence to whatever judgment the Senate
    chooses to make on each of the articles of impeachment against
    President Clinton.
        The matter of how this proceeding will be conducted remains
    somewhat unsettled. Senate impeachment precedent has been to
    hold a trial. In every impeachment case, the Senate has heard
    from live witnesses. Should the President's counsel dispute the
    facts as laid out by the House of Representatives, the Senate
    will need to hear from live witnesses in order to reach a
    proper and fair judgment as to the truthful facts of this case.
        The House concluded the President made perjurious, false
    and misleading statements before the grand jury, which the
    House believes constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Our
    entire legal system is based upon the courts being able to find
    the truth. That's why witnesses must raise their right hand and
    swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
    truth. That's why there are criminal penalties for perjury and
    making false statements under oath. The need for obtaining
    truthful testimony in court is so important that the Federal
    sentencing guidelines have the same penalties for perjury as
    for bribery.
        The Constitution specifically names bribery as an
    impeachable offense. Perjury is the twin brother of bribery. By
    making the penalty for perjury the same as that for bribery,
    Congress has acknowledged that both crimes are equally serious.
    It follows that perjury and making false statements under oath,
    which is a form of perjury, be considered among the ``high
    crimes and misdemeanors'' the framers intended to be grounds
    for impeachment.
        The three judicial impeachments of the 1980s were all about
    lies told by a federal judge. Judge Claiborne was removed from
    office for lying on his income tax returns, Judge Hastings was
    removed for lying under oath during a trial, and Judge Nixon
    was removed for making false statements to a grand jury. In
    each case, the Senate showed no leniency to judges who lied.
    Their misconduct was deemed impeachable and more than two-
    thirds of the Senate voted to convict.
        If the Senate is convinced that President Clinton lied
    under oath and does not remove him from office, the wrong
    message is given to our courts, those who have business before
    them, and to the country as a whole. That terrible message is
    that we as a nation have set a lower standard for lying under
    oath for Presidents than for judges. Should not the leader of
    our country be held to at least as high a standard as the
    judges he appoints? Should not the President be obliged to tell
    the truth when under oath, just as every citizen must? Should
    not our laws be enforced equally? Your decision in this
    proceeding will answer these questions and set the standard of
    conduct of public officials in town halls and courtrooms and
    the Oval Office for generations.
        Justice is never served by the placing of any public
    official above the law. The framers rejected the British law of
    ``The King can do no wrong,'' when they wrote our basic law in
    1787. Any law is only as good as its enforcement, and the
    enforcement of the law against the President was left to
    Congress through the impeachment process.
        A Senate conviction of the President in this matter will
    reaffirm the irrefutable fact that even the President of the
    United States has no license to lie under oath. Deceiving the
    courts is an offense against the public. It prevents the courts
    from administering justice and citizens from receiving justice.
    Every American has the right to go to court for redress of
    wrongs, as well as the right to a jury trial. The jury finds
    the facts. The citizens on the jury cannot correctly find the
    facts absent truthful testimony. That's why it's vital that the
    Senate protect the sanctity of the oath to obtain truthful
    testimony, not just during judicial proceedings but also during
    legislative proceedings.
        Witnesses before Congress, whether Presidential nominees
    seeking Senate confirmation to high posts in the executive or
    judicial branches, federal agency heads testifying during
    investigative hearings, or witnesses at legislative hearings
    giving their opinions on bills are sworn to tell the truth.
    Eroding the oath to tell the truth means that Congress loses
    some of its ability to base its decisions upon truthful
    testimony. Lowering the standard of the truthfulness of sworn
    testimony will create a cancer that will keep the legislative
    branch from discharging its constitutional functions as well.
        Mr. Chief Justice, we are here today because William
    Jefferson Clinton decided to use all means possible--both legal
    and illegal--to subvert the truth about his conduct relevant to
    the federal civil rights suit brought against President Clinton
    by Ms. Paula Jones. Defendants in civil lawsuits cannot pick
    and choose which laws and rules of procedure they will follow
    and which they will not. That's for the trial judge to decide,
    whether the defendant be President or pauper.
        In this case, a citizen claimed her civil rights were
    violated when she refused then Governor Clinton's advances and
    was subsequently harassed at work, denied merit pay raises, and
    finally forced to quit. The court ruled she had the right to
    obtain evidence showing other women including Ms. Lewinsky, got
    jobs, promotions, and raises after submitting to Mr. Clinton,
    and whether other women suffered job detriments after refusing
    similar advances.
        When someone lies about an affair and tries to hide the
    fact, they violate the trust their spouse and family put in
    them. But when they lie about it during a legal proceeding and
    obstruct the parties from obtaining evidence, they prevent the
    courts from administering justice.
        That is an offense against the public, made even worse when
    a poor or powerless person seeks the protections of our civil
    rights from the rich or powerful.
        When an American citizen claims his or her civil rights
    have been violated, we must take those claims seriously. Our
    civil rights laws have remade our society for the better. The
    law gives the same protections to the child denied entry to a
    school or college based upon race as to an employee claiming
    discrimination at work. Once a hole is punched in civil rights
    protections for some, those protections are not worth as much
    for all. Many in the Senate have spent their lives advancing
    individual rights. Their successful efforts have made America a
    better place. In my opinion, this is no time to abandon that
    struggle--no matter the public mood or the political
    consequence.
        Some have said that the false testimony given by the
    President relating to sex should be excused, since as the
    argument goes: ``Everyone lies about sex.'' I ask the Senate to
    stop to think about the consequences of adopting that attitude.
    Our sexual harassment laws would become unenforceable since
    every sexual harassment lawsuit is about sex and much of
    domestic violence litigation is at least partly about sex. If
    defendants in these types of suits are allowed to lie about
    sex, justice cannot be done, and many victims, mostly women,
    will be denied justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice, the House has adopted two articles of
    impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. Each
    meets the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and each
    is amply supported by the evidence.
        Article I impeaches the President for ``perjurious, false
    and misleading'' testimony during his August 17, 1998,
    appearance before a grand jury of the United States in four
    areas.
        First, the nature and details of his relationship with a
    subordinate government employee;
        Second, prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he
    gave in a federal civil rights action brought against him;
        Third, prior false and misleading statements he allowed his
    attorney to make to a federal judge in that federal civil
    rights lawsuit;
        Fourth, his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of
    witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil
    rights action.
        The evidence will clearly show that President Clinton's
    false testimony to the grand jury was not a single or isolated
    instance which could be excused as a mistake but, rather, a
    comprehensive and calculated plan to prevent the grand jury
    from getting the accurate testimony in order to do its job.
    Furthermore, it is important to dispel the notion that the
    President's false testimony before the grand jury simply
    relates to details of the relationship between President
    Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky. These charges only make up a small
    part of article I. The fact is, the evidence will show that
    President Clinton made numerous perjurious, false and
    misleading statements regarding his efforts to obstruct
    justice.
        Before describing what the evidence in support of article I
    shows, it is also important to clearly demonstrate that the
    Senate has already decided that making false statements under
    oath to a federal grand jury is an impeachable offense.
        The last impeachment decided by the Senate, that of United
    States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the United
    States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
    involved the Judge's making false statements under oath to a
    federal grand jury, precisely the same charges contained in
    article I against President Clinton. Following an unanimous 417
    to 0 vote in the House, the Senate conducted a full trial and
    removed Judge Nixon from office on the two articles charging
    false statements to a grand jury by votes of 89 to 8 and 78 to
    19. The Senate was clear that the specific misconduct, that is,
    making false statements to a grand jury, which was the basis
    for the Judge's impeachment, warranted his removal from office
    and the Senate proceeded to do just that.
        These votes, a little more than nine years ago on November
    3, 1989, set a clear standard that lying to a grand jury is
    grounds for removal from office. To set a different standard in
    this trial is to say that the standard for judicial
    truthfulness during grand jury testimony is higher than that of
    presidential truthfulness.
        That result would be absurd. The truth is the truth and a
    lie is a lie. There cannot be different levels of the truth for
    judges than for presidents.
        The President's perjurious, false and misleading statements
    regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began early in his
    grand jury testimony. These statements included parts of the
    prepared statement the President read at the beginning of his
    testimony. He referred or reverted to his statement at least 19
    times during the course of his testimony.
        Further, the evidence will show the President made other
    false statements to the grand jury regarding the nature and
    details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at times when he
    did not refer to his prepared statement.
        Second, the evidence will show that the President piled
    perjury upon perjury when he provided perjurious, false and
    misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning prior
    perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in Ms. Paula
    Jones' case.
        On two occasions, the President testified to the grand jury
    that his deposition testimony was the truth, the whole truth,
    and nothing but the truth, and that he was required to give a
    complete answer to each question asked of him during the
    deposition. That means he brought to the grand jury his
    untruthful answers to questions at the deposition.
        Third, the evidence will show the President provided
    perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a Federal grand
    jury regarding his attorney's use of an affidavit he knew to be
    false during the deposition in Ms. Paula Jones' case before
    Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright.
        The President denied that he even paid attention to Mr.
    Bennett's use of the affidavit. The evidence will show he made
    this denial because his failure to stop his attorney from
    utilizing a false affidavit at a deposition would constitute
    obstruction of justice. The evidence will also show the
    President did not admit that Mr. Bennett's statement was false
    because to do so would be to admit that he had perjured himself
    earlier that day during the grand jury testimony, as well as at
    the deposition.
        Fourth, the evidence will show that the President provided
    perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury
    concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of
    witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in Ms. Paula
    Jones' civil rights action.
        The evidence will show that these statements related to at
    least four areas:
        First, his false statements relating to gifts exchanged
    between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The subpoena served on
    Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case required her to produce each and
    every gift she had received from the President. These gifts
    were not turned over as required by the subpoena but ended up
    under Ms. Betty Currie's bed in a sealed container. The
    President denied under oath that he directed Ms. Currie to get
    the gifts, but the evidence will show that Ms. Currie did call
    Ms. Lewinsky about them and that there was no reason for her
    doing so unless directed by the President.
        Second, the President made perjurious, false and misleading
    statements to the grand jury regarding his knowledge that the
    Lewinsky affidavit submitted at the deposition was untrue. The
    evidence will show that the President testified falsely on this
    issue on at least three separate occasions during his grand
    jury testimony. He also provided false testimony on whether he
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit.
        Third, the President made false and misleading statements
    to the grand jury by reciting a false account of the facts
    regarding his interactions with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie,
    who was a potential witness against him in Ms. Jones' case.
        The record reflects the President tried to coach Ms. Currie
    to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions should she
    be called as a witness. The evidence will show the President
    testified to the grand jury that he was trying to figure out
    what the facts were, but in reality the conversation with Ms.
    Currie consisted of a number of very false and misleading
    statements.
        Finally, the President made perjurious, false and
    misleading statements to aides regarding his relationship with
    Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President tried
    to have it both ways on this issue. He testified that his
    statements to aides were both true and misleading--true and
    misleading.
        The evidence will show that he met with four aides who
    would later be called to testify before the grand jury. They
    included Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. John Podesta, Mr. Erskine
    Bowles, and Mr. Harold Ickes. Each of them related to the grand
    jury the untruths they had been told by the President. I have
    recited this long catalogue of false statements to show that
    the President's false statements to the grand jury were neither
    few in number nor isolated but, rather, pervaded his entire
    testimony.
        There can be no question that the President's false
    statements to the grand jury were material to the subject of
    the inquiry. Grand juries are utilized to obtain sworn
    testimony from witnesses to determine whether a crime has been
    committed. The Attorney General and the Special Division of the
    United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    Circuit appointed an independent counsel pursuant to law and
    added areas of inquiry because they believed there was evidence
    that the President may have committed crimes. Grand jury
    testimony relevant to the criminal probe is always material to
    the issue of whether someone has committed a crime.
        Based upon the precedent in the Judge Nixon impeachment,
    the law, the facts, and the evidence, if you find the President
    made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath to
    the grand jury, I respectfully submit that your duty will be to
    find William Jefferson Clinton guilty with respect to article I
    and to remove him from office.
        Article II impeaches William Jefferson Clinton for
    preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of
    justice in the Jones case by either directly or through
    subordinates and agents engaging in a scheme to delay, impede,
    cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony
    relating to Ms. Jones' Federal civil rights action.
        As in the case of article I, the President's direct and
    indirect actions were not isolated mistakes but were
    multifaceted actions specifically designed to prevent Ms. Paula
    Jones from having her day in court.
        While the Senate determined in the Judge Nixon trial that
    the making of false statements to a Federal grand jury
    warranted conviction and removal from office, no impeachment on
    an obstruction of justice charge has ever reached the Senate.
        Therefore, this article is a matter of first impression.
    However, the impeachment inquiry of the House Judiciary
    Committee into the conduct of President Richard Nixon, as well
    as the relevant Federal criminal statutes, clearly shows
    President Clinton's actions to be within the definition of
    ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' contained in the Constitution.
        The first article of impeachment against President Nixon
    approved by the Judiciary Committee charged Mr. Nixon with
    ``engag(ing) personally and through his subordinates and agents
    in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and
    obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up,
    conceal and protect those responsible and to conceal the
    existence and scope of other unlawful activities.''
        The article charged that the implementation of the plan
    included nine separate areas of misconduct. Included among
    these were, one, making or causing to be made false and
    misleading statements to investigative officers and employees
    of the United States; two, withholding relevant and material
    evidence from such persons; three, approving, condoning,
    acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to the
    giving of false and misleading statements to such persons as
    well as in judicial and congressional proceedings.
        History shows us that President Nixon's resignation was the
    only act that prevented the Senate from voting on this article,
    and that the President's conviction and removal from office
    were all but certain.
        There are two sections of the Federal Criminal Code placing
    penalties on those who obstruct justice. Title 18, United
    States Code, section 1503, punishes ``whoever . . . corruptly,
    or by threats or force . . . obstructs, or impedes or endeavors
    to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of
    justice.''
        The courts have held that this section relates to pending
    judicial process, which can be a civil action. Ms. Jones' case
    fits that definition at the time of the President's actions as
    alleged in article II, as does the Office of Independent
    Counsel's investigation.
        Title 18, United States Code, section 1512, punishes,
    ``Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts
    to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
    person, with intent to . . . influence, delay or prevent the
    testimony of any person in an official proceeding . . . (or)
    cause or induce any person to . . . withhold testimony, or
    withhold a record, document, or other object from an official
    proceeding. . . .''
        The evidence will show that President Clinton's actions
    constituted obstruction of justice in seven specific instances
    as alleged in article II. Paragraph one alleges that on or
    about December 17, 1997, the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky,
    who would be subpoenaed as a witness in Ms. Jones' case two
    days later, to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew would be
    perjurious, false, and misleading.
        The evidence will show the President's actions violated
    both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
        Second, article II alleges that on or about that same day,
    the President corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give
    perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called
    to testify personally in that proceeding. Ms. Lewinsky, on the
    witness list at that time, could have been expected to be
    required to give live testimony in the Jones case and in fact
    she was subsequently subpoenaed for a deposition in that case.
        The evidence will show the President's actions violated
    both Federal criminal obstruction statutes.
        Third, article II alleges on or about December 28, 1997,
    the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a
    scheme to conceal evidence which had been subpoenaed in Ms.
    Jones' civil rights case. He did so by asking Ms. Betty Currie
    to retrieve evidence from Ms. Lewinsky that had been subpoenaed
    in the case of Jones v. Clinton.
        The evidence will show the President's actions violated the
    second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
        Fourth, article II alleges that beginning on or about
    December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January
    14, 1998, the President intensified and succeeded in an effort
    to secure job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in order to corruptly
    prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case at a time when
    her truthful testimony would have been harmful to him.
        While Ms. Lewinsky had sought employment in New York City
    long before the dates in question, helping her find a suitable
    job was clearly a low priority for the President and his
    associates until it became obvious she would become a witness
    in the Jones case. The evidence will clearly show an
    intensification of that effort after her name appeared on the
    witness list. This effort was ultimately successful and the
    evidence will show that the President's actions violated both
    Federal obstruction statutes.
        Fifth, article II alleges on January 17, 1998, the
    President corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and
    misleading statements to Judge Wright characterizing the
    Lewinsky affidavit in order to prevent questioning deemed
    relevant by the judge. The President's attorney, Robert
    Bennett, subsequently acknowledged such false and misleading
    statements in a communication to Judge Wright.
        The evidence will show the President's actions clearly
    violate the second Federal criminal obstruction statute.
        Sixth, article II alleges that on or about January 18, 20,
    and 21, 1998, the President related a false and misleading
    account of events relevant to Ms. Jones' civil rights suit to
    Ms. Betty Currie, a potential witness in the proceeding, in
    order to corruptly influence her testimony.
        The evidence will show that President Clinton attempted to
    influence the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, his personal
    secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to
    possible questions that might be asked of her if called to
    testify in Ms. Paula Jones' case. The President did this
    shortly after he had been deposed in the civil action.
        During the deposition, he frequently referred to Ms.
    Currie, and it was logical that, based upon his testimony, Ms.
    Currie would be called as a witness.
        The evidence will show that two hours after the completion
    of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie to ask her
    to come to the office the next day, which was a Sunday.
        When Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, she
    acknowledged the President made a series of leading statements
    or questions and concluded that the President wanted her to
    agree with him.
        The evidence will show the President's actions violated
    both statutes but, most particularly, section 1512.
        In United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77 at 82 (2d Cir.
    1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986), the United States
    Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said,

        The most obvious example of a section 1512 violation may be
    the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a
    false story as if the story were true, intending that the
    witness believes the story and testifies to it before the grand
    jury.

        If the President's actions do not fit this example, I'm at
    a loss to know what actions do.
        Seventh, and last, article II alleges on or about January
    21, 23, and 26, 1998, the President made false and misleading
    statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury
    proceeding in order to corruptly influence this testimony of
    those witnesses. The article further alleges these false and
    misleading statements were repeated by the witnesses to the
    grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and
    misleading information.
        The evidence will show that these statements were made to
    Presidential aides Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. Erskine Bowles,
    Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Harold Ickes. They all testified to
    the grand jury. By his own admission seven months later, on
    August 17, 1998, during his sworn grand jury testimony, the
    President said that he told a number of aides that he did not
    have an affair with Ms. Lewinsky and did not have sex with her.
    He told one aide, Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, that Ms. Monica
    Lewinsky came on to him and he rebuffed her. President Clinton
    also admitted that he knew these aides might be called before
    the grand jury as witnesses. The evidence will show they were
    called; they related the President's false statements to the
    grand jury; and that by the time the President made his
    admission to the grand jury the damage had already been done.
        This is a classic violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1512.
        The seven specific allegations of obstruction of justice
    contained in article II were designed to prevent the judicial
    branch of government, a separate and coequal branch, from doing
    its work in Ms. Paula Jones' lawsuit. Based upon the allegation
    of article I against President Nixon in 1974, as well as
    repeated and calculated violations of two key criminal
    obstruction statutes, William Jefferson Clinton committed an
    impeachable offense.
        In article II, the evidence is conclusive that President
    Clinton put himself above the law in obstructing justice, not
    once, not just a few times, but as a part of a extensive scheme
    to prevent Ms. Jones from obtaining the evidence she thought
    she needed to prove her civil rights claims.
        Complying with the law is the duty of all parties to
    lawsuits and those who are required to give truthful testimony.
    A defendant in a Federal civil rights action does not have the
    luxury to choose what evidence the court may consider. He must
    abide by the law and the rules of procedure. William Jefferson
    Clinton tried to say that the law did not apply to him during
    his term of office in civil cases were concerned. He properly
    lost that argument in the Supreme Court in a unanimous
    decision.
        Even though the Supreme Court decided that the President
    wasn't above the law and that Ms. Jones' case could proceed,
    William Jefferson Clinton decided--and decided alone--to act as
    if the Supreme Court had never acted and that Judge Wright's
    orders didn't apply to him. What he did was criminal, time and
    time again. These criminal acts were in direct conflict with
    the President's obligation to take care that the laws be
    faithfully executed.
        Based upon the repeated violations of Federal criminal law,
    its effect upon the courts to find the truth, and the
    President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
    executed, if you find that the President did, indeed, obstruct
    the administration of justice through his acts, I respectfully
    submit your duty will be to find William Jefferson Clinton
    guilty with respect to article II and to remove him from
    office.
        It is truly sad when the leader of the greatest nation in
    the world gets caught up in a series of events where one
    inappropriate and criminal act leads to another and another and
    another.
        Even sadder is that the President himself could have
    stopped this process simply by telling the truth and accepting
    the consequences of his prior mistakes. At least six times
    since December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton could have
    told the truth and suffered the consequences. Instead, he chose
    lies, perjury, and deception. He could have told the truth when
    he first learned that Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the
    Jones case. He could have told the truth at his civil
    deposition. He could have told the truth to Betty Currie. He
    could have told the truth when the news media first broke the
    story of his affair. He could have told the truth to his aides
    and cabinet. He could have told the truth to the American
    people. Instead, he shook his finger at each and every American
    and said, ``I want you to listen to me,'' and proceeded to tell
    a straight-faced lie to the American people.
        Finally, he had one more opportunity to tell the truth. He
    could have told the truth to the grand jury. Had he told the
    truth last January, there would have been no independent
    counsel investigation of this matter, no grand jury appearance,
    no impeachment inquiry, no House approval of articles of
    impeachment, and we would not be here today fulfilling a
    painful but essential constitutional duty. Instead, he chose
    lies and deception, despite warnings from friends, aides, and
    members of the House and Senate that failure to tell the truth
    would have grave consequences.
        When the case against him was being heard by the House
    Judiciary Committee, he sent his lawyers, who did not present
    any new evidence to rebut the facts and evidence sent to the
    House by the Independent Counsel. Rather, they disputed the
    Committee's interpretation of the evidence by relying on
    tortured, convoluted, and unreasonable interpretations of the
    President's words and actions.
        During his presentation to the House Judiciary Committee,
    the President's very able lawyer, Charles Ruff, was asked
    directly: Did the President lie during his sworn grand jury
    testimony?
        Mr. Ruff could have answered that question directly. He did
    not, and his failure to do so speaks a thousand words.
        Is there not something sacred when a witness in a judicial
    proceeding raises his or her right hand and swears before God
    and the public to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth? Do we want to tell the country that its leader
    gets a pass when he is required to give testimony under oath?
    Should we not be concerned about the effect of allowing
    perjurious, false, and misleading statements by the President
    to go unpunished on the truthfulness of anyone's testimony in
    future judicial or legislative proceedings? What do we tell the
    approximately 115 people now in Federal prison for the crime of
    perjury?
        The answers to all these questions ought to be obvious.
        As elected officials, our opinions are frequently shaped by
    constituents telling us their own stories. Let me tell you one
    related to me about the poisonous results of allowing false
    statements under oath to go unpunished.
        Last October while the Starr report was being hotly
    debated, one circuit court judge for Dodge County, WI,
    approached me on the street in Mayville, WI. He said that some
    citizens had business in his court and suggested that one of
    them take the witness stand and be put under oath to tell the
    truth. The citizen then asked if he could tell the truth ``just
    like the President.''
        How many people who have to come to court to testify under
    oath about matters they would like to keep to themselves think
    about what that citizen asked Judge John Storck? How will the
    courts be able to administer the ``equal justice under law'' we
    all hold so dear if we do not enforce the sanctity of that oath
    even against the President of the United States?
        When each of us is elected or chosen to serve in public
    office, we make a compact with the people of the United States
    of America to conduct ourselves in an honorable manner,
    hopefully setting a higher standard for ourselves than we
    expect of others. That should mean we are careful to obey all
    the laws we make, execute, and interpret.
        There is more than truth in the words, ``A public office is
    a public trust.''
        When someone breaks that trust, he or she must be held
    accountable and suffer the consequences for the breach. If
    there is no accountability, that means a President can set
    himself above the law for 4 years, a Senator for 6, a
    Representative for 2, and a judge for life. That, Mr. Chief
    Justice, poses a far greater threat to the liberties guaranteed
    to the American people by the Constitution than anything
    imaginable.
        For the past 11 months, the toughest questions I have had
    to answer have come from parents who wanted to know what to
    tell their children about what President Clinton did.
        Every parent tries to teach their children to know the
    difference between right and wrong, to always tell the truth,
    and when they make mistakes, to take responsibility for them,
    and to face the consequences of their actions.
        President Clinton's actions at every step since he knew Ms.
    Lewinsky would be a witness in Ms. Jones' case have been
    completely opposite to the values parents hope to teach their
    children.
        But being a poor example isn't grounds for impeachment.
    Undermining the rule of law is. Frustrating the court's ability
    to administer justice turns private misconduct into an attack
    upon the ability of one of the three branches of our government
    to impartially administer justice. This is a direct attack upon
    the rule of law in our country and a very public wrong that
    goes to the constitutional workings of our government and its
    ability to protect the civil rights of even the weakest
    American.
        What is on trial here is the truth and the rule of law.
    Failure to bring President Clinton to account for his serial
    lying under oath and preventing the courts from administering
    equal justice under law will cause a cancer to be present in
    our society for generations.
        Those parents who ask the questions should be able to tell
    their children that even if you are the President of the United
    States, if you lie when sworn to tell the truth, the whole
    truth and nothing but the truth, you will face the consequences
    of that action even when you won't accept the responsibility
    for it.
        How those parents will answer those questions is up to the
    U.S. Senate.
        While how today's parents answer those questions is
    important, equally important is what parents tell their
    children in the generations to come about the history of our
    country and what has set our government in the United States of
    America apart from the rest of the world.
        Above the President's dais in this Senate chamber appears
    our national motto: ``E pluribus unum''--``out of many, one.''
    When that motto was adopted more than 200 years ago, the First
    Congress referred to how 13 separate colonies turned themselves
    into one united nation.
        As the decades have gone by, that motto has taken an
    additional meaning. People of all nationalities, faiths,
    creeds, and values have come to our shores, shed their
    allegiances to their old countries and achieved their dreams to
    become Americans.
        They came here to flee religious persecution, to escape
    corrupt, tyrannical and oppressive governments, and to leave
    behind the economic stagnation and endless wars of their
    homelands.
        They came here to be able to practice their faiths as they
    saw fit--free of government dictates and to be able to provide
    better lives for themselves and their families by the sweat of
    their own brows and the use of their own intellect.
        But they also came here because they knew America has a
    system of government where the Constitution and laws protect
    individual liberties and human rights. Everyone--yes,
    everyone--can argue that this country has been a beacon for the
    individual citizen's ability to be what he or she can be.
        From countries where the rulers ruled at the expense of the
    people, they fled to America where the leaders were expected to
    govern for the benefit of the people.
        Throughout the years, America's leaders have tried to earn
    the trust of the American people, not by their words but by
    their actions.
        America is a place where government exists by the consent
    of the governed, and that means our Nation's leaders must earn
    and re-earn the trust of the people with everything they do.
        Whenever an elected official stumbles, that trust is eroded
    and public cynicism goes up. The more cynicism that exists
    about government, its institutions, and those chosen to serve
    in them, the more difficult the job is for those who are
    serving.
        That's why it is important--yes, vital--that when a cancer
    exists in the body politic, our job--our duty--is to excise it.
    If we fail in our duty, I fear the difficult and dedicated work
    done by thousands of honorable men and women elected to serve
    not just here in Washington but in our State capitals, city
    halls, courthouses and school board rooms, will be swept away
    in a sea of public cynicism. We must not allow the beacon of
    America to grow dim or the American dream to disappear with
    each waking morning.
        In 1974, the Congress did its painful public duty when the
    President of the United States broke the public trust.
        During the last decade, both Houses impeached and removed
    three Federal judges who broke their trust with the people.
        During the last 10 years, the House of Representatives
    disciplined two Speakers for breaking the rules and their trust
    with the public.
        Less than 6 years ago, this honorable Senate did the same
    to a senior Senator whose accomplishments were widely praised.
        In each case, Congress did the right thing to help restore
    the vital trust upon which our Government depends. It wasn't
    easy, nor was it always popular, but Congress did the right
    thing. Now this honorable Senate must do the right thing. It
    must listen to the evidence; it must determine whether William
    Jefferson Clinton repeatedly broke our criminal laws and thus
    broke his trust with the people--a trust contained in the
    Presidential oath put into the Constitution by the framers--an
    oath that no other Federal official must take, an oath to
    ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
        How the Senate decides the issues to be presented in this
    trial will determine the legacy we pass to future generations
    of Americans.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of those who have made
    America what it is.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of those who put their
    ``lives, fortunes and Sacred Honor'' on the line when they
    signed the Declaration of Independence.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of the framers of the
    Constitution whose preamble states that one of its purposes is
    ``to establish justice.''
        The Senate can follow the legacy of James Madison and the
    Members of the First Congress who wrote and passed a Bill of
    Rights to protect and preserve the liberties of the American
    people.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of those who achieved
    equal rights for all Americans during the 1960s in Congress, in
    the courts, on the streets, in the buses, and at the lunch
    counters.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of those who brought
    President Nixon to justice during Watergate in the belief that
    no President can place himself above the law.
        The Senate can follow the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt who
    lived and governed by the principle that no man is above the
    law.
        Within the walls of the Capitol and throughout this great
    country there rages an impassioned and divisive debate over the
    future of this Presidency. This Senate now finds itself in the
    midst of the tempest. An already immense and agonizing duty is
    made even more so because the whims of public opinion polls,
    the popularity and unpopularity of individuals, even questions
    over the strength of our economy, risk subsuming the true
    nature of this grave and unwelcome task.
        We have all anguished over the sequence of events that have
    led us to this, the conclusive stage in the process. We have
    all identified in our own minds where it could have and should
    have stopped, but we have ended up here, before the Senate of
    the United States, where you, the Senators, will have to render
    judgment based upon the facts.
        A scientist in search of the basic nature of a substance
    begins by boiling away what is not of the essence. Similarly,
    the Senate will sift through the layers of debris that shroud
    the truth. The residue of this painful and divisive process is
    bitter, even poisonous at times. But beneath it lies the
    answer. The evidence will show that at its core, the question
    over the President's guilt and the need for his conviction will
    be clear because at its core, the issues involved are basic
    questions of right versus wrong--deceptive, criminal behavior
    versus honesty, integrity, and respect for the law.
        The President engaged in a conspiracy of crimes to prevent
    justice from being served. These are impeachable offenses for
    which the President should be convicted. Over the course of the
    days and weeks to come, we, the House managers, will endeavor
    to make this case.
        May these proceedings be fair and thorough. May they embody
    our highest capacity for truth and mutual respect. With these
    principles as our guides, we can begin with the full knowledge
    our democracy will prevail and that our Nation will emerge a
    stronger, better place.
        Our legacy now must be not to lose the trust the people
    should have in our Nation's leaders.
        Our legacy now must be not to cheapen the legacies left by
    our forebears.
        Our legacy must be to do the right thing based upon the
    evidence.
        For the sake of our country, the Senate must not fail.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, and my distinguished colleagues from the bar, I am Ed
    Bryant, the Representative from the Seventh District of
    Tennessee. During this portion of the case, I, along with
    Representative Asa Hutchinson of Arkansas, Representative James
    Rogan of California, and Representative Bill McCollum of
    Florida, will present the factual elements of this case. Our
    presentation is a very broad roadmap with which, first, I will
    provide the history and background of the parties, followed by
    Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Rogan, who will review the articles of
    impeachment. Mr. McCollum will close with a summation of these
    facts and evidence.
        It is our intent to proceed in a chronological fashion,
    although by necessity there will be some overlap of the facts
    and circumstances arising from what I have called ``the four-
    way intersection collision'' of President William Jefferson
    Clinton, Ms. Paula Corbin Jones, Monica Lewinsky, and the U.S.
    Constitution.
        As a further preface to my remarks, permit me to say that
    none of us present here today in this hallowed Chamber relishes
    doing this job before us. But we did not choose to be involved
    in that reckless misconduct, nor did we make those reasoned and
    calculated decisions to cover up that misconduct which
    underlies this proceeding. However, this collision at the
    intersection, if you will, of the President, Ms. Jones, and Ms.
    Lewinsky, is not in and of itself enough to bring us together
    today. No. Had truth been a witness at this collision and
    prevailed, we would not be here. But when it was not present,
    even under an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and
    nothing but the truth in a judicial matter, the impact of our
    Constitution must be felt. Hence, we are together today--to do
    our respective duties.
        By voting these articles of impeachment, the House is not
    attempting to raise the standard of conduct to perfection for
    our political leadership. Such a person does not walk the world
    today. Everyone falls short of this mark every day.
        Political life is not so much about how an individual fails
    but, rather, how the person reacts to that failure. For
    example, a person campaigning for a political office admits
    wrongdoing in his past and says he will not do that again. Most
    people accept that commitment. He is elected. Thereafter, he
    repeats this wrongdoing and is confronted again. What does he
    do? He takes steps to cover up this wrongdoing by using his
    workers and his friends. He lies under oath in a lawsuit which
    is very important to the person he is alleged to have harmed.
    He then takes a political poll as to whether he should tell the
    truth under oath. The poll indicates the voters would not
    forgive him for lying under oath. So he then denies the truth
    in a Federal grand jury. If this person is the President of the
    United States, the House of Representatives would consider
    articles of impeachment. It did and voted to impeach this
    President.
        But do not let it be argued in these chambers that ``we are
    not electing Saints; we are electing Presidents.'' Rather, let
    it be said that we are electing people who are imperfect and
    who have made mistakes in life but who are willing to so
    respect this country and the Office of the President that he or
    she will now lay aside their own personal shortcomings and have
    the inner strength to discipline themselves sufficiently that
    they do not break the law which they themselves are sworn to
    uphold.
        Every trial must have a beginning and this trial begins on
    a cold day in January 1993.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        I, William Jefferson Clinton, do solemnly swear that I will
    faithfully execute the office of President of the United
    States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect
    and defend the Constitution of the United States. So help me
    God.

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. I had expected a video portion, but all
    of you heard the audio portion. As you can hear from the audio
    portion--perhaps some of you can see--William Jefferson Clinton
    placed his left hand on the Bible in front of his wife, the
    Chief Justice, and every American watching that day and
    affirmatively acknowledged his oath of office. On that very day
    and again in January of 1997, the President joined a privileged
    few; he became only the 42nd person in our Nation to make the
    commitment to ``faithfully execute'' the office of the
    President and to ``preserve, protect and defend the
    Constitution.'' He has the complete executive power of the
    Nation vested in him by virtue of this Constitution.
        As we progress throughout the day, I would ask that you be
    reminded of the importance of this oath. Before you is a copy
    of it and certainly available as anyone would like to look at
    it on breaks.
        William Jefferson Clinton is a man of great distinction. He
    is well-educated, with degrees from Georgetown University and
    Yale Law School. He has taught law school courses to aspiring
    young lawyers. He served as Governor and Attorney General for
    the State of Arkansas, enforcing the laws of that state. The
    President now directs our great Nation. He sets our agenda and
    creates national policy in a very public way. He is in fact a
    role model for many.
        President Clinton also serves as the Nation's chief law
    enforcement officer.
        It is primarily in this capacity that the President
    appoints Federal judges. Within the executive branch, he
    selected Attorney General Janet Reno and appointed each of the
    93 U.S. attorneys who are charged with enforcing all Federal,
    civil, and criminal law in Federal courthouses from Anchorage,
    AK, to Miami, FL, and from San Diego, CA, to Bangor, ME.
        Before you we have another chart which shows the schematics
    of the Department of Justice and how it is under the direct
    control of the President through his Cabinet, Attorney General
    and then down to such functions as the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
    Immigration, U.S. Marshals Office, Bureau of Prisons, and so
    many other very important legal functions this Federal
    Government performs.
        As protectors of our Constitution, the U.S. attorneys and
    their assistants prosecute more than 50,000 cases per year.
        Through these appointments and his administration's
    policies, the President establishes the climate in this country
    for law and order. Each and every one of these 50,000 cases
    handled by his U.S. attorneys is dependent upon the parties and
    witnesses telling the truth under oath. Equally as important in
    these proceedings is that justice not be obstructed by
    tampering with witnesses nor hiding evidence.
        Quoting from the November 9, 1998 Constitution Subcommittee
    testimony of attorney Charles J. Cooper, a Washington, DC
    attorney, he states:

        The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the
    crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses
    against our system of government, visiting injury immediately
    upon society itself, whether or not committed in connection
    with the exercise of official government powers. Before the
    framing of our Constitution and since, our law has consistently
    recognized that perjury primarily and directly injures the body
    politic, for it subverts the judicial process and this strikes
    at the heart of the rule of law itself.

        Professor Gary McDowell, the Director at the Institute for
    United States Studies at the University of London, also
    testified in the same hearing in reference to the influential
    writer William Paley, and this is also in chart form for those
    who would like to review it later. Paley saw the issue of oaths
    and perjury as one of morality as well as law. Because a
    witness swears that he will speak the truth, the whole truth
    and nothing but the truth, a person under oath cannot cleverly
    lie and not commit perjury. If the witness conceals any truth,
    Paley writes, that relates to the matter in adjudication, that
    is as much a violation of the oath as to testify a positive
    falsehood. Shame or embarrassment cannot justify his
    concealment of truth; linguistic contortions with the words
    used cannot legitimately conceal a lie or, if under oath,
    perjury.
        Professor McDowell concludes with a quote from Paley which
    accurately provides, I believe, the essence of a lie or
    perjurious statement:

        It is willful deceit that makes the lie; and we willfully
    deceive, where our expressions are not true in the sense in
    which we believe the hearer apprehends them.

        Neither has this U.S. Senate been silent on the issue of
    perjury. You have rightfully recognized through previous
    impeachment proceedings the unacceptable nature of a high
    government official lying under oath, even in matters initially
    arising from what some would argue here are merely personal. In
    1989, many of you present today, using the very same standard,
    which is section 4 of the Constitution, which is set forth
    there, for impeaching a Federal judge or the President,
    actually voted in support of a conviction and the removal of a
    U.S. district judge.
        Indeed, truth-telling is the most important judicial
    precept underpinning our great system of justice, a system
    which permits the courthouse doors to be open to all people,
    from the most powerful man in America to a young woman from
    Arkansas.
        On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones attempted to open that
    courthouse door when she filed a Federal sexual harassment
    lawsuit against President Clinton. The case arose from a 1991
    incident when she was a State employee and he was the Governor.
    Further details of the underlying allegations are not important
    to us today, but Ms. Jones' pursuit for the truth is worth a
    careful study.
        The parties first litigated the question of whether Ms.
    Jones' lawsuit would have to be deferred until after the
    President left office. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
    the President's contention and allowed the case to proceed
    without further delay.
        Ms. Jones sought and appropriately won ``her day in
    court.'' Incumbent with this victory, however, was the
    reasonable expectation that President Clinton would tell the
    truth.
        After all, this was the most important case in the whole
    world to Paula Corbin Jones.
        Notwithstanding this, the fact didn't happen that the
    President told the truth. Even after the President was ordered
    to stand trial, pursuing the truth for Ms. Jones remained an
    elusive task. The evidence will indicate that President Clinton
    committed perjury and orchestrated a variety of efforts to
    obstruct justice, all of which--all of which--had the effect of
    preventing the discovery of the truth in the Paula Jones case.
        During the discovery phase, Judge Susan Webber Wright of
    the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District Court of
    Arkansas ordered the President to answer certain historical
    questions about his sexual relations with either State or
    Federal employees.
        In part, Judge Wright said:

        The Court finds, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled
    to information regarding any individuals with whom the
    President had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have
    sexual relations and who were during the relevant time frame
    state or federal employees.

        Judge Wright validated Ms. Jones' right to use this
    accepted line of questioning in sexual harassment litigation.
    More often than not, these cases involve situations where ``he
    said/she said,'' and they produce issues of credibility and are
    often done in private. Because of this, they are really
    difficult for a victim to prove.
        Such standard questions are essential in establishing
    whether the defendant has committed the same kind of acts
    before or since--in other words, a pattern or practice of
    harassing conduct. The existence of such corroborative evidence
    or the lack thereof is likely to be critical in these types of
    cases. Both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    guidelines and the Federal Rules of Evidence permit this type
    of evidence. In short, a defendant's sexual history, at least
    with respect to other employees, is ordinarily discoverable in
    a sexual harassment lawsuit.
        To not expect a defendant in this type of litigation to
    speak the truth creates, in its worst case, a very real danger
    to the entire area of sexual harassment law which would be
    irreparably damaged and, in its best case, sends out a very
    wrong message. As such, the will and intent of Congress with
    regard to providing protection against sexual harassment in the
    workplace would be effectively undermined.
        The ``pattern and practice'' witnesses whom Paula Corbin
    Jones was entitled to discover should have included the name of
    Monica Lewinsky. But before I discuss the Ms. Lewinsky matter,
    I want to offer three matters of cause to each of you as jurors
    in this very important matter.
        No. 1, I do not intend to discuss the specific details of
    the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky. However, I do not
    want to give the Senate the impression that those encounters
    are irrelevant or lack serious legal implications. In fact,
    every day in the courtrooms all across America, victims of
    sexual harassment, of rape, assault, and abuse must testify in
    many public cases in order to vindicate their personal rights
    and society's right to be free of these intolerable acts.
        The President's lies about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky in
    the Oval Office also make these unseemly details highly
    relevant. If you are to accept the President's version about
    the relationship, you must in effect say to Ms. Lewinsky that
    she is the one who is disregarding the truth. But beyond this,
    his denials also directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony,
    not only directly contradict Ms. Lewinsky's testimony but also
    contradict eight of her friends and the statements by two
    professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared
    details of her relationship. By law, their testimony may serve
    as proper and admissible evidence to corroborate her side of
    this important story.
        No. 2, the evidence and testimony in this proceeding must
    be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. Please do
    not be misled into considering each event in isolation and then
    treating it separately. Remember, events and words that may
    seem innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on
    a sinister or even criminal connotation when observed in the
    context of the whole plot.
        For example, we all agree that Ms. Lewinsky testified, ``No
    one ever told me to lie . . .'' When considered alone, this
    statement would seem exculpatory. In the context of other
    evidence, however, we see that this one statement gives a
    misleading inference. Of course no one said, ``Now, Monica, you
    go down there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Based upon their
    previous spoken and even unspoken words, Ms. Lewinsky knew what
    was expected of her. Surely, if the President were to come to
    the Senate floor and give testimony during this proceeding, he
    would not tell you that he honestly expected her to tell the
    truth about their personal relationship. After all, the purpose
    of her filing the false affidavit was to avoid testifying in
    the Jones case and discussing the nature of their relationship.
    If she had told the truth in that affidavit instead of lying,
    she would have been invited to testify immediately, if not
    sooner.
        No. 3, throughout our presentation of the facts, especially
    as it relates to the various illegal acts, I ask you to pay
    particular attention to what I call the big picture. Look at
    the results of those various acts as well as who benefited.
    Please make a mental note now, if you can, and ask yourself
    always as you look at each one of these illegal acts that are
    presented to you: A. What was the result of that illegal act?
    B. Who benefited from that illegal act?
        I believe you will find that the evidence will show that
    while the President's ``fingerprints'' may not be directly on
    the evidence proving these illegal acts, the result of the acts
    usually inures to the benefit of the President and the
    President alone. Subordinates and friends alike are drawn into
    this web of deceit. The President is insulated. Crimes are
    committed. Justice is denied. The rule of law is suspended. And
    this President is the beneficiary.
        Some examples:
        No. 1, subpoenaed evidence disappears from Ms. Lewinsky's
    apartment and reappears under Ms. Currie's bed. What was the
    result of that? Who had the benefit of that?
        No. 2, Ms. Lewinsky files a false affidavit in the Jones
    case. What is the result of filing that false affidavit and who
    benefited from that?
        No. 3, the President's attorney files the Lewinsky
    affidavit, not knowing it was false, representing to the Court
    that ``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner,
    shape, or form,'' while the President sits in the deposition
    and does not object to that--very silently sits in the
    deposition. What was the result of that? And who benefited from
    that filing of the affidavit?
        No. 4, and finally, Ms. Lewinsky, after months of job
    searching in New York City, is offered a job with a Fortune 500
    company in New York City within 48 hours of her signing this
    false affidavit. Who shared the results of that with Ms.
    Lewinsky? And who obtained the benefit of that?
        Another example occurred in a meeting between the President
    and Ms. Lewinsky in July--on July 4, 1997, to be specific--
    when, as a part of their conversation, she mentioned she heard
    someone from Newsweek was working on a story about Kathleen
    Willey. The President has Ms. Lewinsky back for a visit on July
    14, some 10 days later, following his return from an overseas
    trip. She was questioned about the Willey story and
    specifically if Linda Tripp had been her source.
        Important to this point--important to this point--the
    President then asked Ms. Lewinsky to try to persuade Ms. Tripp
    to call White House Legal Counsel Bruce Lindsey. The President
    told her to notify Ms. Currie the following day, ``without
    getting into the details with her, even mentioning names with
    her,'' whether Ms. Lewinsky had ``mission accomplished'' with
    Linda. And as you will learn from Mr. Hutchinson, who will
    follow me with his presentation, this is very similar to the
    method of operation with another job the President requested be
    done, which in that case succeeded with a ``mission
    accomplished.'' I ask you to watch for that in Mr. Hutchinson's
    presentation.
        I want to now rewind the clock back to November of 1995. We
    are here in Washington where Ms. Lewinsky has been working at
    the White House since July of 1995.
        As you continue to listen to the evidence, from this point
    on November 15 forward, remember that Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President were alone in the Oval Office workplace area at least
    21 times. And I have a list of these, in chart form, beginning
    in November of 1995 and going through 1996 and into the early
    part of 1997, continuing through the year. During that time,
    they had at least 11 of the so-called salacious encounters
    there in the workplace at various times during the day and
    night: Three in 1995, five in 1996, and three in 1997.
        They also had in excess of 50 telephone conversations, most
    of which appear to have been telephone calls to and from Ms.
    Lewinsky's home. And I have a schedule of all these telephone
    calls to show you, the 50-plus telephone calls. Also, they
    exchanged some 64 gifts, with the President receiving 40 of
    these gifts and Ms. Lewinsky receiving 24 of these gifts. And
    again we have charts that reflect the receipt of both sets of
    gifts. And again these charts will be here in the front, always
    available for your inspection.
        We also note that their affair began on November 15.
    Interestingly, there is even a conflict here with the
    President. According to Ms. Lewinsky, they had never spoken to
    each other up to that point. Yet he asked an unknown intern
    into the Oval Office and kissed her and then invited her back
    to return later that day, when the two engaged in the first of
    the 11 acts of misconduct.
        The contradiction is in the statement that the President
    relied upon in his grand jury testimony that has been
    referenced earlier--very carefully worded--and that statement
    the President gave in testimony before the grand jury about
    meeting in this relationship. And he says, ``I regret that what
    began as a friendship came to include this conduct . . .''
    Almost as if it had evolved over a period of time. So there is
    very clearly a conflict there.
        As Ms. Lewinsky's internship was ending that year, she did
    apply and receive a paying job with the White House Office of
    Legislative Affairs. This position allowed her even more access
    to the Oval Office area. She remained a White House employee
    until April 1996 when she was reassigned to the Pentagon. The
    proof will show that Ms. Evelyn Lieberman, Deputy Chief of
    Staff at the time, believed that the transfer was necessary
    because Ms. Lewinsky was so persistent in her efforts to be
    near the President. Although Ms. Lieberman could not recall
    hearing any rumors linking her and the President, she
    acknowledged the President was vulnerable to these kinds of
    rumors. While Ms. Lewinsky tried to return to work in the White
    House, her absence was appreciated by those on the President's
    staff who wanted to protect him.
        After she began her job at the Pentagon in April, there was
    no further physical contact with the President through the 1996
    election and the remainder of that year. The two communicated
    by telephone and on occasion saw each other at public events.
    Their only attempt at a private visit in the Oval Office was
    thwarted because Ms. Lieberman was nearby. On December 17, she
    attended a holiday celebration at the White House and had a
    photograph made shaking hands with the President.
        However, the evidence establishes that in 1997, Ms.
    Lewinsky was more successful in arranging visits to the White
    House. This was because she used the discreet assistance of Ms.
    Currie, the President's secretary, to avoid the likes of Ms.
    Lieberman. Ms. Currie indicated she did not want to know the
    details of this relationship. Ms. Currie testified on one
    occasion when Ms. Lewinksy told her, ``As long as no one saw
    us--and no one did--then nothing happened.'' Ms. Currie
    responded, ``I don't want to hear it. Don't say any more. I
    don't want to hear any more.''
        Early on during their secret liaisons, the two concocted a
    cover story to use if discovered. Ms. Lewinksy was to say she
    was bringing papers to the President. The evidence will show
    that statement to be false. The only papers that she ever
    brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her
    duties or the President's. The cover story plays an important
    role in the later perjuries and the obstruction of justice.
        Ms. Lewinksy stated that the President did not expressly
    instruct her to lie. He did, however, suggest, indeed, the
    ``misleading'' cover story. When she assured him that she
    planned to lie about the relationship, he responded
    approvingly. On the frequent occasions that she promised that
    she would ``always deny'' the relationship and ``always protect
    him,'' for example, the President responded, in her
    recollection, ``That's good,'' or something affirmative, not
    ``Don't deny it.''
        The evidence will establish further that the two of them
    had, in her words, ``a mutual understanding'' that they would
    ``keep this private, so that meant deny it and . . . take
    whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken.'' When she and
    the President both were subpoenaed in the Jones case, Ms.
    Lewinksy anticipated that ``as we had on every other occasion
    and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny
    it.''
        In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton acknowledged
    that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do
    in a nonlegal context'' to hide their relationship and that he
    ``might well have said'' that Ms. Lewinsky should tell people
    she was bringing letters to him or coming to visit Ms. Currie.
    He always stated that ``I never asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
        But neither did the President ever say that they must now
    tell the truth under oath; to the contrary, as Ms. Lewinsky
    stated: ``It wasn't as if the President called me and said,
    `You know, Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to
    be really hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth
    and be humiliated in front of the entire world about what we've
    done,' which I would have fought him on probably,'' she said.
    ``That was different. By not calling me and saying that, you
    know, I knew what that meant,'' according to Monica Lewinsky.
        In a related but later incident that Mr. Hutchinson may
    refer to, Monica Lewinsky testified that President Clinton
    telephoned her at home around 2 o'clock or 3 o'clock in the
    morning on December 17, 1997--2:00 or 2:30 a.m. He told her
    that her name was on the list of possible witnesses to be
    called in the Paula Jones lawsuit. When asked what to do if she
    was subpoenaed, the President suggested that she could sign an
    affidavit. Ms. Lewinsky indicated that she was 100 percent sure
    that he had suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit.
    She understood his advice to mean that she might be able to
    execute an affidavit that would not disclose the true nature of
    their relationship.
        When Ms. Lewinsky agreed to that false affidavit, she told
    the President by telephone that she would be signing it and
    asked if he wanted to see it before she signed it. According to
    Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded that he did not, as he
    had already seen about 15 others.
        Concurrent with these events I just described, the evidence
    will further demonstrate that as Ms. Lewinsky attempted to
    return to work at the White House after the 1996 elections, she
    spoke with the President. According to Betty Currie, the
    President instructed Betty Currie and Marsha Scott, Deputy
    Director of Personnel, to assist in her return to the White
    House. In the spring of 1997, she met with Ms. Scott. She
    complained in subsequent notes to Ms. Scott and the President
    about no progress being made with her getting back to the White
    House. On July 3 of that year, she dispatched a more formal
    letter to the President--in fact, using the salutation, ``Dear
    Sir''--and raising a possible threat that she might have to
    tell her parents about why she no longer had a job at the White
    House if they did not get her another job. She also indicated a
    possible interest in a job in New York at the United Nations.
    The President and Ms. Lewinsky met the next day in what Ms.
    Lewinsky characterized as a ``very emotional'' visit, including
    the President scolding her, that it was illegal to threaten the
    President of the United States. Their conversation eventually
    moved on to other topics, though primarily her complaining
    about his failure to get her a job at the White House.
        Continuing with Ms. Lewinsky's effort to return to work
    near the President, there was a July 16 meeting and September 3
    telephone call with Ms. Scott. On the evening of September 30,
    the President advised Ms. Lewinsky that he would have Chief of
    Staff Erskine Bowles help with a job search, and Bowles later
    passed this on to John Podesta, although each recalled their
    involvement occurring earlier in the year.
        A few days later, however, her hopes of a job at the White
    House quickly ended. On October 6, she had a conversation with
    Linda Tripp, who told her that she would never return to the
    White House, according to a friend of hers on the staff.
    Learning this ``secondhand'' was, according to Ms. Lewinsky,
    the ``straw that broke the camel's back.'' She decided to ask
    the President for a job in New York with the United Nations and
    sent him a letter to that effect on October 7.
        During an October 11 meeting with the President, he
    suggested that she give him a list of New York companies which
    interested her. She asked if Vernon Jordan might also help.
    Five days later, she provided the President with her ``wish
    list'' and indicated that she was no longer interested in the
    U.N. position, although she did receive an offer on November 24
    and declined it on January 5, 1998.
        After this meeting with the President, arrangements were
    made through the President and Ms. Currie for Ms. Lewinsky to
    meet with Mr. Jordan. On the morning of November 5, 1997, Mr.
    Jordan spoke by telephone with the President about 5 minutes
    and later met with Ms. Lewinsky for the first time for about 20
    minutes. According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan told her he had
    spoken with the President, that she came highly recommended,
    and that ``We're in business.''
        However, the evidence reflects that Mr. Jordan took no
    steps to help Ms. Lewinsky until early December of that year
    after she appeared on the witness list in the Jones case.
    Actually, Mr. Jordan testified in his grand jury testimony that
    he had no recollection of even having met Ms. Lewinsky on
    November 5.
        When he was shown documentary evidence demonstrating that
    his first meeting with Ms. Lewinsky occurred in early November,
    he acknowledged that such meeting ``was entirely possible.''
    You can see that was not to be a high priority for Mr. Jordan
    at that time, until December.
        For many months, Ms. Lewinsky had not been able to find a
    job to her satisfaction--even without the perceived ``help'' of
    various people. Then in December of 1997, something happened
    which caused those interested in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in
    New York to intensify their search. Within 48 hours of her
    signing this false affidavit in the Paula Jones case, Ms.
    Lewinsky had landed a job with a prestigious Fortune 500
    Company.
        It is anticipated that attorneys for the President will
    present arguments which will contest much of the relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky. The President has maintained throughout
    the last several months that while there was no sexual
    relationship or sexual affair, in fact, there was some type of
    inappropriate, intimate contact with her. What has now been
    dubbed as ``legal gymnastics'' on the part of the President has
    made its appearance.
        Other examples followed. Within his definition of the word
    ``alone,'' he denies being alone with Ms. Lewinsky at any time
    in the Oval Office. He also questions the definition of the
    word ``is''--it depends on what the word ``is'' means in how
    you answer a particular question. Further, we would expect the
    President to continue to disavow knowledge of why evidence
    detrimental to his defense in the Jones case was removed from
    Ms. Lewinsky's apartment and hidden beneath Ms. Currie's bed or
    knowledge of how Ms. Lewinsky found herself with an employment
    offer in New York virtually at the same time she finally
    executed an affidavit in the Jones case.
        Unfortunately, for your search for the truth in these
    proceedings, the President continues today to parse his words
    and use ``legal hairsplitting'' in his defense. I cite for your
    consideration his Answer filed with this body just days ago.
    For instance:
        One. Responding in part to the impeachment article I, the
    President persists in a wrongheaded fashion with his legal
    hairsplitting of the term ``sexual relations,'' which permits
    him to define that term in such a way that in the particular
    salacious act we are talking about here, one person has sex and
    the other person does not. As a graduate of one of the finest
    law schools in America and as a former law professor and
    attorney general for the State of Arkansas, the President knows
    better. I have this statement here extracted out of the
    President's Answer to this proceeding.
        Two. Responding to both articles of impeachment, the
    President now would have you believe that he ``was not
    focusing'' when his attorney, Bob Bennett, was objecting during
    the deposition and attempting to cut off a very important line
    of questioning of the President by representing to Judge Wright
    that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit proved that there is no need to
    go into this testimony about the President's life. He said that
    this affidavit proves that ``there is absolutely no sex of any
    kind, in any manner, shape or form.'' Remember that this is the
    same President who now pleads that he lost his focus during
    this very important part of this deposition. This is the very
    same President who is renowned for his intelligence and his
    ability ``to compartmentalize,'' to concentrate and focus on
    whatever matter is at hand. And now he comes before this
    Senate, to each one of you, in his Answer, by and through his
    attorneys, and pleads that he simply wasn't paying attention at
    this very important point during his own deposition. In
    Tennessee, we have a saying for situations like that: ``That
    dog won't hunt.''
        Three. In his further response to article I, the President
    effectively admits guilt to obstruction. As I read this, his
    pleadings refer to the President himself, and he states that
    he, the President, ``truthfully explained to the grand jury his
    efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition without
    disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.'' So he said he
    did answer the questions in the Jones deposition in a way so as
    not to disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. At the
    bottom of the same page, he denies that he attempted ``to
    impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case.'' Think
    about this with me for a minute. Basically, the purpose of the
    Jones deposition of the President was to secure truthful
    testimony about these kinds of ``pattern and practice''
    witnesses, and therein discover the likes of Monica Lewinsky.
    That is the purpose of being there. The President admitted in
    his Answer that he purposely answered questions so as not to
    disclose his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Said another way,
    he intentionally answered questions to avoid the discovery of
    one of these female employees with whom he was sexually
    involved. That is precisely, folks, what impeding the discovery
    of evidence is.
        I ask you, if you get an opportunity, to look at this very
    closely.
        Four. In his answer to article II, the President ``denies
    that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit
    in the Jones case.'' When everything is said and done, Ms.
    Lewinsky had no motivation, no reason whatsoever to want to
    commit a crime by willfully submitting a false affidavit with a
    court of law. She really did not need to do this at that point
    in her life, but this 20-something-year-old young lady was
    listening to the most powerful man in the United States, whom
    she greatly admired, hearing him effectively instruct her to
    file a false affidavit to avoid having to testify about their
    relationship. And in order to do that, she had to lie about the
    physical aspects of their relationship. According to her, the
    President didn't even want to see that actual affidavit because
    he had seen 15 more just like it and as such he knew what it
    would be.
        Five. In an additional response to article II, the
    President answers and asserts that ``he believed that Ms.
    Lewinsky could have filed a limited and truthful affidavit that
    might have enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones
    case.'' That is an incredible statement. That is an incredible
    statement given the fact that the President knew firsthand of
    the extent of their sexual relationship, and he also knew that
    the Jones discovery efforts were specifically after that type
    of conduct. Even with the best of the legal hairsplitting, it
    is still difficult to envision a truthful affidavit from Ms.
    Lewinsky that could have skirted this issue enough to avoid
    testifying.
        And if you really think the President had this belief,
    don't you think he would have accepted Ms. Lewinsky's offer to
    review her affidavit and perhaps share this bit of wisdom he
    had with her before she signed it and lied? After all, in this
    answer he just filed, he says he had an out for her, a way for
    her to have the best of both worlds--not to have to lie and
    still avoid testifying in the Jones case. Why didn't he share
    that with her when she gave him the opportunity if he in fact
    had such an idea? I suggest that perhaps that is a recent idea.
        Even if, for some reason, you don't believe Ms. Lewinsky
    offered to share that affidavit with him, don't you think it
    still would have been in the President's best interest to give
    Ms. Lewinsky his thoughts before she violated the law with a
    completely false affidavit?
        Now, indeed, is the time to stop the legal gymnastics and
    hairsplitting and deal with these charges and facts
    appropriately.
        As a House manager, I believe I can speak for all of us out
    of a sense of fairness, and again request that we and the
    President be permitted to call witnesses. I submit that the
    state of the evidence is such that unless and until the
    President has the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
    witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to testify if he
    desires, there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the
    facts. A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it
    presently exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.
        While it has been the consistent defense of the White House
    to be inconsistent, it still comes as something of a surprise
    that the President has not made a stronger case for the calling
    of witnesses. Before now, he has aggressively sought the
    opportunity to challenge the truth and veracity of witnesses in
    these impeachment proceedings. During the hearings in the
    House, which many believe are analogous to a grand jury
    proceeding, the President's defenders and his attorneys
    consistently complained of the failure to call witnesses and
    the lack of fairness and due process. Almost every day, there
    were partisan attacks from the White House and its emissaries
    who were dispatched throughout the media talk shows with the
    same complaints of no witnesses.
        And always, our measured response was a calm assurance that
    there would be witnesses called during the trial phase in the
    Senate. Is there any doubt that our forefathers intended a two-
    step impeachment proceeding?
        The House would function as the grand jury and determine
    whether to charge--to impeach. Then you, as the trier of fact,
    would function as the jury to try the case and weigh the
    testimony of the fact witnesses. In recent days, some have
    publically asserted that the House is hypocritical because it
    didn't call some of the fact witnesses it now asks to call in
    the Senate. For the record, it must be noted that the House
    Judiciary Committee, out of an abundance of fairness, did allow
    the President's defense team 30 hours in which to present any
    witnesses that they could have chosen and they could have
    examined.
        But any allegation of hypocrisy certainly appears to miss
    the point that the writers of our Constitution never
    contemplated two separate trials for an impeachment proceeding.
    But now we would respectfully suggest is the time for
    witnesses.
        All Americans, including the President, are entitled to
    enjoy a private family life, free from public or governmental
    scrutiny. But the privacy concerns raised in this case are
    subject to limits, three of which I will briefly discuss here.
        The first limit was imposed when the President was sued in
    Federal court for alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in
    such litigation is often personal. At times, that evidence is
    highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge
    Wright noted at the President's January 1998 deposition, ``I
    have never had a sexual harassment case where there was not
    some embarrassment.'' Nevertheless, Congress and the Supreme
    Court have concluded that embarrassment-related concerns must
    give way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties
    to pursue their claims. Courts have long recognized the
    difficulties of proving sexual harassment in the work place,
    inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in
    private. To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on
    the ground that the evidence covered only ``personal'' or
    ``private'' behavior would frustrate the goals that Congress
    and the courts have sought to achieve in enacting and
    interpreting the Nations's sexual harassment laws. That is
    particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed--
    sexual relations in the workplace between a high official and a
    young subordinate employee--itself conflicts with those goals.
        The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required
    disclosure of the precise information that is in part the
    subject of this hearing today. A Federal judge specifically
    ordered the President, on more than one occasion, to provide
    the requested information about relationships with other women,
    including Ms. Lewinsky. The fact that Judge Wright later
    determined that the evidence would not be admissible at trial,
    and still later granted judgment in the President's favor, does
    not change the President's legal duty at the time he testified.
    Like every litigant, the President was entitled to object to
    the discovery questions and to seek guidance from the court if
    he thought those questions were improper. But having failed to
    convince the court that his objections were well founded, the
    President was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully.
    Perjury and attempts to obstruct the gathering of evidence can
    never be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless of
    the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.
        The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and
    other forms of obstruction of justice: ``In this constitutional
    process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply has no
    place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant
    affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.
    Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are
    therefore imperative.''
        The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case is
    civil or criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court
    considered a false statement made in a civil administrative
    proceeding: ``False testimony in a formal proceeding is
    intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a
    `flagrant affront' to truth-seeking function of adversary
    proceedings . . . Perjury should be severely sanctioned in
    appropriate cases.'' Stated more simply, ``perjury is an
    obstruction of justice.''
        The third limit is unique to the President. ``The
    Presidency is more than an executive responsibility. It is the
    inspiring symbol of all that is highest in American purpose and
    ideals.'' As the head of the Executive Branch, the President
    has the constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be
    faithfully executed.'' The President gave his testimony in the
    Jones case under oath and in the presence of a Federal judge, a
    member of a co-equal branch of government; he then testified
    before a Federal grand jury, a body of citizens who had
    themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In view of the
    enormous trust and responsibility attendant to his high Office,
    the President has a manifest duty to ensure that his conduct at
    all times complies with the law of the land.
        In sum, perjury and acts that obstruct justice by any
    citizen--whether in a criminal case, a grand jury
    investigation, a congressional hearing, a civil trial or civil
    discovery--are profoundly serious matters. When such acts are
    committed by the President of the United States, those acts are
    grounds for conviction and removal from his Office.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    there now be a recess of the proceedings for 15 minutes.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have just about 1
    minute and I will conclude.
        Mr. LOTT. I withhold my request.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you.
        As I reach the conclusion of my presentation, the time line
    is now in December of 1997. Following her November 5 meeting
    with Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky had no communication with him or
    the President for a month. Then in early December, the parties
    in the Jones case exchanged witness lists and Ms. Lewinsky was
    scheduled as a potential witness by the Jones attorneys. On or
    about that same day, Ms. Lewinsky attempted to make an
    uninvited visit to the White House and later that day was
    allowed in by the President. But it was during this time, in
    December of 1997, that some of the seams began to unravel for
    the President.
        I will conclude my remarks at this point and thank the
    Chief Justice and the Members of the Senate for their careful
    attention. My colleague from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson, will
    follow me now or at the end of any recess as may be necessary.

                                     RECESS

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, my apologies to the manager
    for the interruption at the end of his remarks.
        I renew my request of unanimous consent to take a 15-minute
    recess.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so
    ordered.
        [Thereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, recessed until 3:30 p.m.]
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are prepared now
    to go forward with the next manager's presentation.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I am
    Asa Hutchinson, a Member of Congress from the Third
    Congressional District of Arkansas. I am grateful for this
    opportunity, although it comes with deep regret, to be before
    you. I do want to tell you in advance that we have presented to
    you, on your tables, a selection of charts that I will be
    referring to here so everyone will have the advantage of being
    able to see at least in some fashion the charts to which I will
    be referring. And we will have the charts here as well.
        This is certainly a humbling experience for a smalltown
    lawyer. I learned to love and to respect the law trying cases
    in the courtrooms of rural Arkansas. The scene is different in
    this setting, in this historic Chamber with the Chief Justice
    presiding and Senators sitting as jurors. But what is at stake
    remains the same.
        In every case heard in every courtroom across this great
    country, it is the truth, it is justice, it is the law that is
    at stake. In this journey on Earth, there is nothing of greater
    consequence to devote our energies to than the search for the
    truth, to pursue equal justice, and to uphold the law. It is
    for those reasons that I serve as a manager. And as you, I hope
    that I can help in some way to bring this matter to a
    conclusion for our country. This afternoon I will be discussing
    the evidence and the testimony from witnesses that we do hope
    to call, and during my presentation I will be focusing on the
    evidence that demonstrates obstruction of justice under article
    II.
        You might wonder, well, why are we going to article II
    before we have covered article I on perjury? And the answer is
    that in a chronological flow, article II, the obstruction
    facts, precedes much of the perjury allegations. And so,
    following my presentation, Manager Rogan will present article I
    on perjury.
        The presentation I make will be based upon the record, the
    evidence, and the facts that have been accumulated. I want you
    to know that I am going to be presenting those facts, and from
    time to time I will argue those facts. I believe they are well
    supported in the record, but I urge each of you, if you ever
    find anything that you question, to search the record and
    verify the facts because I do not intend to misrepresent
    anything to this body. In fact, we will be submitting to each
    of your offices my presentation with annotations to the record,
    to the grand jury transcripts which will tie in the facts that
    I present to you. Again, I believe and trust you will find they
    are well supported.
        So let's start with obstruction of justice. Later on, there
    will be a full discussion of the law on obstruction of justice,
    but for our purposes, it is simply any corrupt act or attempt
    to influence or impede the proper functioning of our system of
    justice. It is a criminal offense, a felony, and it has
    historically been an impeachable offense.
        Let me first say, it is not a crime nor an impeachable
    offense to engage in inappropriate personal conduct, nor is it
    a crime to obstruct or conceal personal embarrassing facts or
    relationships. It might be offensive, but there are no
    constitutional consequences. But as we go through the facts of
    the case, the evidence will show in this case that there was a
    scheme that was developed to obstruct the administration of
    justice, and that is illegal. And the obstruction of justice is
    of great consequence and significance to the integrity of our
    Nation when committed by anyone but particularly by the Chief
    Executive of our land, the President of the United States.
        Mr. Bryant took us factually up to a certain point
    pertaining to the job search. This is chart No. 1 that you have
    before you. This puts it in perspective a little bit. Just for
    a brief review, go back in the calendar, back into October.
    That is when Ms. Lewinsky sends the President her wish list of
    jobs. And then shortly after that, Ms. Currie faxes Lewinsky
    the resume to Ambassador Richardson, and Ambassador Richardson
    gets involved in the job search.
        October 30, the President promised to arrange a meeting
    between Lewinsky and Jordan. This was set up in November. It
    was actually November 5. But preceding that, there was a job
    offer at the United Nations extended to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms.
    Lewinsky decided that she was not interested in a job at the
    United Nations; she wanted to go into the private sector. And
    so that was the purpose on November 5 of the meeting between
    Jordan and Lewinsky. That is when Mr. Jordan says, ``We're in
    business.'' But the facts will show that there was nothing
    really done in November, and that is when I will get a little
    bit more into my presentation, and then I will get into
    December when some things happened there that picked up speed
    on this issue.
        The obstruction, for our purposes, started on December 5,
    1997, and that is when the witness list from the Paula Jones
    case was faxed to the President's lawyers. At that point, the
    wheels of obstruction started rolling, and they did not stop
    until the President successfully blocked the truth from coming
    out in the civil rights case.
        These acts of obstruction included attempts to improperly
    influence a witness in a civil rights case--that is, Monica
    Lewinsky--the procurement and filing of a false affidavit in
    the case; unlawful attempts to influence the testimony of a key
    witness, Betty Currie; the willful concealment of evidence
    under subpoena in that case, which are the gifts of December
    28; and illegally influencing the testimony of witnesses--that
    is, the aides who testified before the grand jury--before the
    grand jury of the United States. Each of these areas of
    obstruction will be covered in my presentation today.
        As I said, it began on Friday, December 5, when the witness
    list came from the Paula Jones case. Shortly thereafter, the
    President learned that the list included Monica Lewinsky. This
    had to be startling news to the President because if the truth
    about his relationship with a subordinate employee was known,
    the civil rights case against him would be strengthened and it
    might have totally changed the outcome.
        But to compound the problem, less than a week later, Judge
    Wright, a Federal district judge in Arkansas, on December 11,
    issued an order, and that order directed that the President had
    to answer questions concerning other relationships that he
    might have had during a particular timeframe with any State or
    Federal employee. And when I say ``relationships,'' I am
    speaking of sexual relationships. So Judge Wright entered the
    order that is not in your stack, but I have it here. It was
    filed on December 11 in the district court in Arkansas and
    directs the President that he has to answer those questions
    within a timeframe, as Mr. Bryant said, which is typical in a
    civil rights case of this nature.
        The White House knew that Monica was on the witness list.
    The President knew it was likely she would be subpoenaed as a
    witness and that her truthful testimony would hurt his case.
        What did the President do? What he had to do was to make
    sure Monica Lewinsky was on his team and under control. And
    then on December 17, the President finally called Ms. Lewinsky
    to let her know she was on the list. This was a call between 2
    a.m. and 2:30 a.m. in the morning.
        Now, what happened in the time between the President
    learning Monica Lewinsky was on the list and when he notified
    her of that fact on December 17 is very important. The
    President, during that timeframe, talked to his friend, his
    confidante, and his problem-solver, Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan
    had come to the President's rescue on previous occasions. He
    was instrumental in securing consulting contracts for Mr. Webb
    Hubbell while Mr. Hubbell was under investigation by the
    independent counsel.
        Let me parenthetically go to that point, right before Mr.
    Hubbell announced his resignation from the Justice Department.
        During that timeframe, there was a meeting at the White
    House in which the President, the First Lady, and others were
    present. After that meeting, Vernon Jordan agreed to help
    obtain financial assistance for Mr. Hubbell. Mr. Jordan then
    introduced Mr. Hubbell to the ``right people.'' The
    introduction was successful and Mr. Hubbell obtained a $100,000
    contract. The ``right people'' that Mr. Jordan contacted
    happened to be the same ``right people'' for both Mr. Hubbell
    and ultimately for Monica Lewinsky, which is the parent company
    of Revlon. So the President was aware that Mr. Jordan had the
    contacts and the track record to be of assistance to the
    President in delicate matters.
        Now let's go back a little. Monica Lewinsky had been
    looking for a good-paying and high-profile job in New York,
    since the previous July, as I pointed out.
        She had been offered a job at the United Nations, but she
    wanted to work in the private sector. She was not having much
    success, and then in early November it was Betty Currie who
    arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan, which was ultimately on
    November 5. At this meeting, Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan
    for about 20 minutes.
        Now, let's refer to Mr. Vernon Jordan's grand jury
    testimony on that meeting that occurred on November 5. And you
    have that, and it should be your chart No. 2, or exhibit 2.
        As Mr. Jordan testified before the Federal grand jury on
    March 3, 1998, in reference to the November 5 meeting, he said:

        I have no recollection of an early November meeting with
    Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of it
    and I have no record of it.

        He goes on to testify, at page 76 of the grand jury
    testimony.
        Question:

        Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica
    Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours?

        His answer:

        I think that's fair to say.

        Now, let's stop there for a moment. What happened as a
    result of this meeting? No action followed whatsoever. No job
    interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts
    with Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jordan made no effort to find a job for
    Ms. Lewinsky for over a month. Indeed, it was so unimportant to
    him that he ``had no recollection of an early November
    meeting,'' and, in fact, he testified finding her a job was not
    a priority. And then you will see that during this timeframe
    the President's attitude was exactly the same.
        And so look at the same exhibit 2, the last item on that
    chart, where it refers to Monica Lewinsky's grand jury
    testimony. And there she is referring to a December 6 meeting
    with the President:

        I think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch
    with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work
    out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job
    front].

        And the question was:

        Did the President say what he was going to do?

        The answer:

        I think he said he would--you know, this was sort of
    typical of him, to sort of say, ``Oh I'll talk to him. I'll get
    on it.''

        So you can see from that that it was not a high priority
    for the President either. It was: Sure, I'll get to that. I
    will do that.
        It was clear from Monica Lewinsky that nothing was
    happening.
        But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What
    started out as a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed
    after Ms. Lewinsky became a witness; the judge's order was
    issued, again, on December 11. And at that time, the President
    talked personally--personally--to Mr. Jordan and requested his
    help in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job. And that would be, again,
    back on exhibit 2 on that chart, the third item of testimony
    there. Back to Mr. Jordan, his grand jury testimony, May 5,
    1998.
        The question is:

        But what is also clear is that as of this date, December
    11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a decision
    that you would try to make some calls to help get her a job.

        His answer:

        There is no question about that.

        Let's look at the chain of events. The witness list came
    in. The judge's order came in. That triggered the President to
    action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into action.
    That chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.
        Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--I hope to
    be able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his
    loyalties lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his
    eyes and determine the truthfulness of his statements. You must
    decide whether he is telling the truth or withholding
    information.
        And so let's go to exhibit 3 in your booklet. Again,
    recalling Mr. Jordan, he testifies about that meeting. He
    testifies, in his March 3, 1998, grand jury testimony:

        I am certain after the 11th that I had a conversation with
    the President and as a part of that conversation I said to him
    that Betty Currie had called me about Monica Lewinsky. And the
    conversation was that he knew about her situation which was
    that she was pushed out of the White House, that she wanted to
    go to New York and he thanked me for helping her.

        Remember what else happened on that day, again, the same
    day that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other
    relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.
        Now, let's go back again to Mr. Jordan's testimony. What
    does he say about the involvement of the President of the
    United States in regard to these jobs? You look at exhibit 4.
    That is in your booklet. This is, again, Vernon Jordan's grand
    jury transcript of June 9, 1998.
        Now, the question is on a different issue. The question is
    about why did he tell the White House that Frank Carter--Frank
    Carter was the attorney for Monica Lewinsky that Vernon Jordan
    arranged and introduced to Monica Lewinsky. He was hired. And
    at whatever point he was terminated, then Vernon Jordan
    notified the President. So the question relates to that:

        Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that
    this has happened, [Carter had been fired]?

        Answer:

        Thought they had a right to know.

        Question:

        Why?

        And here is the answer that is critical for my point:

        The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got
    her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new counsel.
    I thought that was information that they ought to have. . . .

        ``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.''
    Clear, straightforward testimony; no doubt about it.
        Then go on down to page 58 of his grand jury testimony of
    June 9.
        The question:

        Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank
    Carter had been replaced?

        Answer:

        Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew
    that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was interested
    in this matter. He is the source of it coming to my attention
    in the first place.

        ``He is the source of it coming to my attention in the
    first place.'' Remember, he had already met with Betty Currie.
    Nothing was happening in the November timeframe. Nothing was
    happening. Vernon Jordan--it was not a priority. Then the
    President of the United States called him and it became a
    priority. And that is who he was acting for in trying to get
    Monica Lewinsky a job.
        At this point we do not know all that the President was
    telling Vernon Jordan, but we do know that there were numerous
    calls back and forth between Mr. Jordan and the President.
    There were numerous calls being made by Mr. Jordan on behalf of
    Monica Lewinsky searching for a job, and that despite the fact
    that Monica Lewinsky did not know that she was witnessed--she
    did not know she was a witness--the President knew that she was
    a witness during his intensified efforts to get her a job.
        Now, the President's counselors have made a defense that
    the job search started before Monica Lewinsky was a witness and
    there was nothing wrong with that. My response to that is, it
    is true there is nothing wrong with a public official, under
    the right circumstances, helping someone get a job. And what
    might have started out being innocent, if you accept that
    argument, crossed the line whenever it was tied and
    interconnected with the President's desire to get a false
    affidavit from Monica Lewinsky, and whenever the job is out
    there and preparing the false affidavit, you will see that they
    are totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated; and that
    is where the line has crossed into obstruction.
        For example, when the President was waiting on Ms. Lewinsky
    to sign the false affidavit in the Jones case during the
    critical time in January, a problem developed. The job
    interviews were unproductive, despite the numerous calls by Mr.
    Jordan. On one particular day, Monica called Mr. Jordan and
    said the interview with Revlon did not go well. Mr. Jordan,
    what did he do? He picked up the phone to the CEO of--the
    president of the company, Mr. Perelman, to, as Vernon Jordan
    testified, ``make things happen--if they could happen.'' That
    is the request from Mr. Jordan to the CEO of a company, after a
    job interview with Monica Lewinsky did not go well.
        What happened? Things happened. He made things happen.
    Monica Lewinsky got a job. The affidavit was signed and the
    President was informed by Mr. Jordan, through Betty Currie,
    that the mission was accomplished.
        The question here is not why did the President do a favor
    for an ex-intern, but why did he use the influence of his
    office to make sure it happened? The answer is that he was
    willing to obstruct, impede justice by improperly influencing a
    witness in order to protect himself in a civil rights case.
        The next step in the obstruction is the false affidavit.
    This is directly related to the job mission. The President
    needed the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit,
    and that was assured by the efforts to secure her a job. Again,
    the President brought Ms. Lewinsky into the loop on December
    17. Over 10 days after the witness list was received by the
    President, the President was ready to tell Monica the news.
        That timeframe is important. He gets the witness list. He
    could have called Monica Lewinsky immediately, but he needed 7
    days because he needed to make sure the job situation was in
    gear. And in fact, the day after, if you look back on exhibit
    1, you will see that the day after the December 17 timeframe
    that she was informed that she was on the witness list, the
    next day she already had lined up job interviews for her. So
    she felt confident. But she was notified on December 17.
    Between 2 and 2:30 a.m., her phone rang. It was the President
    of the United States. The President said that he had seen the
    witness list in the case and her name was on it. Ms. Lewinsky
    asked what she should do if subpoenaed, and the President
    responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.''
        Well, how would this work? Both parties knew that the
    affidavit would need to be false and misleading in order to
    accomplish the desired result. Clearly, truthful testimony by
    Monica Lewinsky would make her a witness, would not keep her
    away from testifying. Only a false affidavit would avoid the
    deposition.
        So look at what I have marked as exhibit 4.1, which is just
    a review of the key dates on this job search. Again, November 5
    was the first meeting between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. In
    November nothing happened. According to Jordan, ``not a high
    priority.'' On December 5, the President receives the witness
    list. On the 11th, things intensify with Judge Wright's order.
    The 11th, the President talks to Mr. Jordan about the job for
    Monica. He gets into action. On the 17th, they are ready to
    tell Monica that she is on the witness list. And then, on the
    19th, she is actually served with a subpoena. Again, remember,
    after she was finally notified, it was the next day that she
    had the job interviews.
        Now we will spend some time on the December 17
    conversation, the day that Monica Lewinsky was notified that
    she was on the witness list. During that conversation, the
    President had a very pointed suggestion for Ms. Lewinsky that
    left no doubt about his purpose and the intended consequences.
    He did not say specifically, ``Go in and lie.'' This is
    something that you will hear, and Monica Lewinsky testified in
    her grand jury testimony: ``The President never told me to
    lie.''
        How do you tell people to lie? You can tell them the facts
    that they can use that would, in substance, be a false
    statement or you can say, ``Go in and lie and make up your own
    false testimony.'' The President chose to give her the ideas as
    to what she could testify to that would be false, but he never
    said the words, ``You need to go in and lie.'' So what he did
    say to her was, ``You know, you can always say you were coming
    to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
        That, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is a false
    representation, is a false statement that he is telling Ms.
    Lewinsky to utter. Remember, at this point the President knows
    she is a witness, and what does he do? As evidenced by the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky, he encourages her to lie: ``You
    can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were
    bringing me letters.''
        It should also be remembered that the President, when
    questioned about encouraging Monica Lewinsky to lie, has denied
    these allegations and therefore there is certainly a conflict
    in the testimony. It is our belief that Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony is credible and she has the motive to tell the truth
    because of her immunity agreement with the independent counsel,
    where she gets in trouble only if she lies, whereas the
    President has the motive to cover up and to testify falsely.
        In order to understand the significance of this statement
    made by the President, it is necessary to recall the cover
    stories that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously
    concocted in order to deceive those people who might inquire.
    It was to deceive those people that they worked with. The
    difference in the initial cover stories, though, to protect the
    President and Monica from an embarrassing personal
    relationship, from friends and coworkers and the media, now is
    in a different arena, with the pending civil rights case and
    Ms. Lewinsky being on the witness list.
        Despite the legal responsibilities, the President made the
    decision to continue the pattern of lying which ultimately
    became an obstruction of the administration of justice. We are
    still on December 17, when the President called Monica at 2
    a.m. on that particular day to tell her she was on the witness
    list, to remind her of the cover stories. Monica Lewinsky
    testified, when the President brought up the cover story, she
    understood that the two of them would continue their
    preexisting pattern of deception, and it became clear that the
    President had no intention of making his relationship with a
    subordinate Federal employee an issue in that civil rights
    case, no matter what the Federal courts told him he needed to
    answer. And he used lies, deceit, and deception to carry out
    that purpose.
        It is interesting to note that the President, when he was
    asked by the grand jury whether he remembered calling Monica
    Lewinsky at 2 a.m. on December 17, responded, ``No, sir, I
    don't, but it is quite possible that that happened.'' When he
    was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the
    cover stories of coming to see Betty or bringing letters, he
    answered, ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that
    night.''
        This is not a denial, and therefore I believe you should
    accept the testimony of Monica Lewinsky. If you say in your
    mind, well, I'm not going to believe her, then you should first
    give us the opportunity to present this witness so that you as
    jurors can fairly and honestly determine her credibility.
        As expected, 2 days later, on December 19, Ms. Lewinsky
    received a subpoena to testify in the Jones case. This sets
    about an immediate flurry of activity. There are a series of
    telephone calls between Ms. Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, the
    President, and his staff. You will see this pattern of
    telephone calls repeated and generated at any point in time
    when it appears that the truth may be told in the civil rights
    case.
        Now, let's look at exhibit 5, which is the activity on
    Friday, December 19. This is the day that Monica Lewinsky is
    served with a subpoena. Now, after Mr. Jordan is notified that
    Monica Lewinsky is served with a subpoena, what does he do? In
    the 3:51-3:52 notation, Jordan telephones the President and
    talks to Debra Schiff, his assistant. The subpoena is issued.
    Monica calls Jordan and Jordan immediately calls the President.
    ``Lewinsky meets with Jordan and requests that Jordan notify
    the President about her subpoena.'' This is at 4:47 p.m.
        Presumably, in the middle of that meeting, at 5:01 p.m.,
    the President of the United States telephones Mr. Jordan and
    Jordan notifies the President about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena.
        Then that is whenever he arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's
    attorney--``Jordan telephones attorney Carter''--for
    representation, and that night Vernon Jordan goes to the White
    House to meet privately with the President on these particular
    issues.
        Now, in that meeting--and I am speaking of the meeting that
    happened late that night at the White House--Mr. Jordan told
    the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and
    related to the President the substance and details of his
    meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. It wasn't a casual consideration;
    the details were discussed, including her fascination with the
    President and other such issues.
        This led Mr. Jordan to ask the President about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and the response by the
    President of the United States was the first of many denials to
    his friends and aides. The President stated in his deposition
    that he did not recall that meeting. But you should remind
    yourselves of the testimony and the description provided by
    Vernon Jordan when he said, ``The President has an
    extraordinary memory.'' In fact, we all know that he is world
    famous for that memory.
        Now, the subpoena had been delivered, but the testimony of
    Monica Lewinsky was not scheduled until January 23, and the
    President's deposition, which was even more critical, was not
    scheduled until January 17. So the President and his team had
    some time to work. The work was not the business of the Nation;
    it was the distraction and self-preservation in the civil
    rights case.
        Under the plan, Mr. Jordan would be the buffer; he would
    obtain an attorney--Mr. Carter--and that attorney would keep
    Mr. Jordan informed on the progress of the representation,
    including reviewing any copy of the affidavit, knowing about
    the motion to quash, and the general progress of the
    representation. All along the way, when Mr. Jordan gets
    information, what does he do with that? Mr. Jordan keeps the
    President informed both about the affidavit and the prospects
    of the job in New York, for which Ms. Lewinsky was totally
    dependent on the help of her friends in high places.
        Let me go back again. There is nothing wrong with helping
    somebody get a job. But we all know there is one thing
    forbidden in public office: We must avoid quid pro quo, which
    is: This is for that. But Vernon Jordan testified he kept the
    President informed on the status of the false affidavit, the
    job search, and the status of Ms. Lewinsky's representation.
    Why? Is this just idle chatter with the President of the United
    States or are these matters the President is vitally interested
    in and, in fact, coordinated? Mr. Jordan answers this question
    himself on page 25 of his grand jury testimony, where he
    testified, ``I knew the President was concerned about the
    affidavit and whether or not it was signed.'' That was his
    March 5, 1998, grand jury testimony. The President was
    concerned not just about the affidavit but specifically about
    whether it was signed.
        The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to make a
    false affidavit. He was so certain of the contents that when
    Monica Lewinsky asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no,
    that he had seen 15 of them. Besides, the President had
    suggested the affidavit himself, and he trusted Mr. Jordan to
    be certain to keep things under control. In fact, that was one
    of the main purposes of Mr. Jordan's continued communication
    with Monica Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter.
        Even though Mr. Jordan testifies at one point he never had
    any substantive discussions on the representation with Mr.
    Carter, he contradicts himself in his March 3 grand jury
    testimony where he states:

        Mr. Carter at some point told me--this is after January--
    that she had signed the affidavit, that he had filed a motion
    to quash her subpoena and that--I mean, there was no reason for
    accountability, but he reassured me that he had things under
    control.

        Mr. Jordan was aware of the substance of the drafting of
    the affidavit, the representation, the motion to quash, and
    even had a part in the redrafting. This was clearly important
    to Mr. Jordan and clearly important to the President.
        Now, let's go to the time when the false affidavit was
    actually signed, January 5, 1998. These will be exhibits 7, 8,
    and 9 in front of you. Let's go to January 5. This is sort of a
    summary of what happened on that day. Ms. Lewinsky meets with
    her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an hour. Carter drafts the
    affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky on the deposition. In the second
    paragraph, Ms. Lewinsky telephones Betty Currie, stating that
    she needs to speak to the President, that this is about an
    important matter; specifically, that she was anxious about
    something she needed to sign--an affidavit. Frank Carter drafts
    the affidavit she is concerned about. She calls the President.
    The President returns Ms. Lewinsky's call.
        Big question: Should the President return Ms. Lewinsky's
    call? He does, that day, quickly. Ms. Lewinsky mentions the
    affidavit she is signing and offers to show it to the
    President. That is where he says no, he had seen 15 others.
        Let's go to the next day. The next exhibit is January 6. On
    this particular day, Ms. Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit.
    At 2:08 to 2:10 p.m., she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr.
    Jordan. That is after she got it. She delivers it to Jordan.
    And then, at 3:26 p.m., Mr. Jordan telephones Mr. Carter. At
    3:38, Mr. Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich of the White House.
    At 3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about the draft affidavit,
    and, at 3:49, you will see in red that both agree to delete a
    portion of the affidavit that created some implication that
    maybe she had been alone with the President.
        So Mr. Jordan was very involved in drafting the affidavit
    and the contents of that.
        And then at 4:19, presumably in response to some of the
    calls by Jordan earlier in the day, the President telephones
    Mr. Jordan and they have a discussion. And then Mr. Jordan
    telephones Carter and the conversations go back and forth. At
    the end of the day, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. So
    the affidavit is still in the drafting process.
        Let's go to the next day, exhibit 9. Monica signs the
    affidavit here. At 10 a.m., Ms. Lewinsky signs a false
    affidavit in Mr. Carter's office. Then she delivers the signed
    affidavit to Mr. Jordan. And then what does he do? The usual.
    At 11:58, Mr. Jordan telephones the White House. At 5:46, Mr.
    Jordan telephones the White House. At 6:50, Mr. Jordan
    telephones the White House and tells the President that Ms.
    Lewinsky signed the affidavit.
        Is this important information for the President, to know he
    was vitally interested in it?
        The next day--exhibit 10--January 8. After it is signed,
    what is important? It was the other part of the arrangement,
    that she has the job interview with MacAndrews in New York. She
    had that job interview. The only problem was that it went
    poorly, very poorly. So at 4:48 p.m. on this particular day,
    Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New York
    interview went ``very poorly.''
        What does Mr. Jordan do? He telephones Ron Perelman, the
    CEO of Revlon, the subsidiary of MFH, to make things happen, if
    they could happen. What does he do next? Jordan telephones Ms.
    Lewinsky, saying, ``I'm doing the best I can to help you out.''
    And they set up another interview for the next day. Jordan
    telephones the White House Counsel's Office, and, in the
    evening, Revlon in New York telephones Ms. Lewinsky to set up a
    follow-up interview. They said the first interview didn't go
    well, but because Mr. Jordan intercedes--and why? Because the
    false affidavit has been signed and he wants to make sure this
    is carried out. At 9:02 p.m., Ms. Lewinsky telephones Jordan
    about the Revlon interview in New York, and presumably it went
    better on that particular day.
        Then on January 9--exhibit 11--it is confirmed that she has
    the job. Lewinsky is offered the Revlon job in New York and
    accepts.
        Lewinsky telephones Jordan. And then, at 4:14, Jordan
    notifies Currie, calls Betty Currie, and says ``Mission
    accomplished'' and requests that she tell the President. Jordan
    notifies the President of Lewinsky's job offer and says,
    ``Thank you, very much, Mr. President.'' And then that evening
    the President telephones Currie, and so on. But the President
    is notified that the job has been secured--``mission
    accomplished.''
        Let me ask you a question, after I have gone through these
    exhibits. Would Mr. Jordan have pushed for a second interview
    without cooperation on the affidavit? Would Monica Lewinsky
    have received the support and secured the job if she had said,
    ``I don't want to sign an affidavit; I am just going to go in
    there and tell the truth; whatever they ask me, I am going to
    answer; I am going to tell the truth.'' Does anyone in this
    room believe that she would have been granted the job if Mr.
    Jordan had not made that call to get that second interview, if
    she had not had help from her friends in high places?
        Now the affidavit has been signed. The job is secure.
    Monica Lewinsky is on the team, and the President of the United
    States is armed for the deposition.
        So let's move there.
        Just how important was Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit to
    the President's deposition? Let's look. What did the
    President's attorney, Robert Bennett, say about that affidavit
    to the Federal judge during the deposition? That false
    affidavit allowed Mr. Bennett, the attorney for Mr. Clinton,
    when talking about the question of the relationship between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky, to assert that `` . . . there is
    absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with
    President Clinton. . . .''
        That is a statement of Robert Bennett--his representation
    to the court about that relationship. It is a representation
    that he had to later, probably based upon his own professional
    embarrassment, withdraw and to correct that inaccurate part of
    the record.
        When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the
    President stated specifically the key paragraph of Ms.
    Lewinsky's affidavit was ``absolutely true.''
        Paragraph 8 of her affidavit states:

        I have never had a sexual relationship with the President.
    . . .

        If it enters your mind at this point as to what was meant
    by ``sexual relationship,'' please remember that this affidavit
    was drafted upon a common understanding of that phrase at that
    point and not based upon any definition used in the deposition
    of the President.
        I am sure it was the President's hope and belief that the
    false affidavit used in the deposition to bolster his own
    testimony would be the end of the matter, but that was not the
    case. We know in life that one lie leads to another. And so it
    is when we attempt to thwart the administration of justice--one
    obstruction leads to another.
        Now we move to another key witness, Betty Currie.
        By the time the President concluded his deposition, he knew
    there were too many details out about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. He knew that the only person who would probably be
    talking was Ms. Lewinsky herself. He knew the cover story that
    he had carefully created and that was converted into false
    statements in the affidavit was now in jeopardy and had to be
    backed at this point by the key witnesses, Monica Lewinsky and
    Betty Currie. After the deposition, the President needed to do
    two things: He had to contact Ms. Lewinsky to see if she was
    still on the team, but he also had to make sure that his
    secretary, Betty Currie, was lying to protect him. So let's
    look at how the concern became a frenzied and concerted effort
    to keep the holes plugged in the dike.
        Let's look at exhibits 12 and 13.
        What happened on the day the deposition--really the night
    of the deposition--on January 17. The President finishes
    testifying in the deposition around 4 p.m. At 5:38 p.m., the
    President telephones Mr. Jordan at home. And then, at 7:13, the
    President telephones Ms. Currie at home. At 7:02, the President
    places a call to Mr. Jordan's office. And then, at 7:13, he
    gets Ms. Currie at home, finally, and asks her to meet with him
    on Sunday. It is vitally important that he meet with Ms. Currie
    at this point because he knows his whole operation is coming
    unglued.
        So the next day, on January 18, which is exhibit 13, there
    is a whole flurry of activity.
        I am not going to go through all of them. You can see the
    frantic pace at the White House because at 6:11 in the morning,
    the President had some more bad news. The Drudge Report was
    released. And that created a greater flurry. Then between 11:49
    and 2:55 p.m., two phone calls were made between Mr. Jordan and
    the President.
        Then, at 5 p.m., we see the meetings. That is on the second
    page. At 5 p.m., Ms. Currie meets with the President. And the
    President then tells Ms. Currie to find Monica Lewinsky. The
    telephone calls were generated, and there was no success in
    that.
        Then, that evening the President calls Ms. Currie at home
    to try once again to see if she had found Monica.
        But it was on that day that there was that critical
    meeting--on that Sunday--in the Oval Office between Betty
    Currie and the President of the United States.
        For that reason, we need next to hear from Betty Currie,
    the President's personal secretary, as to what occurred during
    that most unusual meeting on Sunday following the deposition.
        Betty Currie testified in the grand jury that the President
    said that he had just been deposed and that the attorneys had
    asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. This is a
    violation of the judge's gag order. And the President made some
    comments that were not in line. But he had some choices to
    make, and he made the wrong choices.
        But let's look at exhibit 14, which covers the series of
    statements made to Ms. Currie. At this point there is the
    testimony of Betty Currie. She is reciting to the grand jury
    each of the statements the President made to her after his
    grand jury testimony.
        The first: ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
        Second: ``You were always there when Monica was there,
    right?''
        ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
        I am not going to read each one of those. You can read
    them. You have heard those as well.
        But the President is making those simple declaratory
    statements to her.
        There are three areas that are covered.
        First of all, the President makes a case that he was never
    alone with Monica Lewinsky.
        Second, he is making a point to her that ``she was the
    aggressor, not me.''
        The third point he is making, ``I did nothing wrong.''
        Those are the basic three points of those five statements
    that the President made to Betty Currie.
        During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony she was asked
    whether she believed that the President wished her to agree to
    the statements.
        Let's look at Betty Currie for a second. She is the
    classical reluctant witness. Where are her loyalties? How would
    you examine her testimony? Where is she uncomfortable in her
    testimony when she is asked the question? How does she shift in
    the chair? Those are the kind of ways you have to evaluate the
    truthfulness of the testimony, where their loyalties lie, and
    their demeanor.
        During the questioning she was clearly reluctant.
        She was asked a series of questions, and she finally
    acknowledges that the President was intending for her to agree
    with the statements that were made. She says, ``That is
    correct.'' And that is page 74 of Betty Currie's grand jury
    testimony.
        When the President testified in the August 17 grand jury,
    he was questioned about his intentions when he made those five
    statements to Ms. Currie in his office on that Sunday. And the
    President's explanation is as follows to the grand jury:
        The President:

        . . . I thought we were going to be deluged by the press
    comments. And I was trying to refresh my memory about what the
    facts were.

        Then he goes on to testify:

        So, I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something
    that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as
    quickly as I could.

        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have to determine
    what the purpose of those five statements to Betty Currie were.
    Were they to get information or were they to get her to falsely
    testify when she was called as a witness? Logic tells us that
    the President's argument is that he was just trying to refresh
    his memory. Well, so much of a novel legal defense argument.
        First, consider the President's options after he left the
    deposition.
        He could have abided by the judge's gag order and not said
    anything.
        Second, he could have called Betty Currie in and asked her
    an open-ended question: Ms. Currie, or Betty, what do you
    remember happened?
        The third option was to call her in and to make these
    declaratory statements, violate the judge's order, and tamper
    with the anticipated testimony of Betty Currie.
        That is the course that the President chose. He made sure
    it was a face-to-face meeting, not a telephone call. He made
    sure that no one else was present. He made sure that the
    meeting was on his territory and in his office where he could
    feel comfortable and he could utilize the power and prestige of
    his office to have the greatest influence on her future
    testimony.
        After Ms. Currie was in the President's office, he made
    short, clear, understandable, declarative statements telling
    Ms. Currie what the story was. He was not interested in what
    she knew. Why? Because he knew the truth, but he did not want
    Ms. Currie to tell the truth. The only way to ensure that was
    by telling her what to say, not asking her what she remembered.
    You do not refresh someone's memory by telling that person what
    he or she remembers, and you certainly do not make the
    declarative statements to someone regarding factual scenarios
    of which the listener was unaware.
        From the statements that were made to her, Betty Currie
    could not have had any possible knowledge about whether they
    were ever alone, as to whether she came on to him. No. This was
    not any attempt for the President to refresh his recollection.
    It was witness tampering, pure and simple.
        Understanding the seriousness of the President's attempting
    to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie, his attorneys have
    tried to argue that those statements could not constitute
    obstruction of justice because she had not been subpoenaed and
    the President did not know that she was a potential witness at
    this time. Well, the argument is refuted by both the law and
    the facts.
        The law is clear that a person may be convicted of
    obstructing justice if he corruptly influenced the testimony of
    a prospective witness. The witness does not actually have to
    give testimony. The witness does not have to be under any
    subpoena. The witness does not have to be on any witness list.
    And so the law is clear.
        Secondly, let's examine the defense in light of the facts.
    The President himself brought Ms. Currie into the civil rights
    case as a corroborating witness when he repeatedly used her
    name in the deposition, and just as significantly the President
    had to be concerned about a looming perjury charge against him
    in light of his false testimony in the deposition. At least six
    times in that deposition the President challenged the
    plaintiff's attorneys to question Ms. Currie about the
    particular issue.
        You don't have it in front of you, but you will see it when
    we distribute the copies of my remarks. I will go through those
    six times.
        At page 58 of the deposition, the President, when asked
    whether he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, said that he was not
    alone with her or that Betty Currie was there with Monica.
        At page 70, when asked about the last time the President
    saw Ms. Lewinsky, he falsely testified he only recalled that
    she was there to see Betty.
        At page 64, he told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty''
    whether Lewinsky was alone with him in the White House or not
    or with Betty in the White House between the late hours.
        At page 65 of the deposition, the President was asked
    whether Ms. Lewinsky sent packages to him, and he stated that
    Betty handled the packages.
        At page 72, the President was asked whether he may have
    assisted in any way with a job search. He said he thought Betty
    suggested Vernon Jordan talk to her.
        At page 74, he said Monica asked Betty to ask someone to
    talk to Ambassador Richardson. He asserted Betty as a
    corroborating witness at least six times in the deposition.
        There is no question that Ms. Currie was a prospective
    witness, and the President clearly wanted her to be deposed as
    a witness as his ``ask Betty'' testimony demonstrates.
        But there is another fact that, thus far, has been
    overlooked, and let me draw your attention to this.
        Two days before the President's deposition, Betty Currie
    receives a call from Michael Isikoff, a reporter with Newsweek
    magazine, inquiring about the records, the courier records of
    gifts going from Ms. Lewinsky to the President.
        You've got a news reporter for a national publication two
    days before the President's deposition talking to the
    President's secretary, saying, ``I need to see the courier
    records at the White House.'' What does Betty Currie do? She
    testified that she probably told the President this. Then she
    tells Bruce Lindsey, but she also goes to see Vernon Jordan.
    Why? Why would the secretary go see Vernon Jordan because she
    had a press inquiry? The reason is, as we see later on,
    remember, this is January 15. What happened on December 28 that
    we will get to a little bit later? On December 28 Betty Currie
    went and put those gifts under her bed. Why is she nervous?
    Because Mike Isikoff is calling about the gifts that are
    presently under her bed, and she is nervous. I would be
    nervous. And so she goes to see Bruce Lindsey. She goes to see
    Vernon Jordan: I need help. What do I do? And she probably told
    the President.
        It is all breaking loose, the house of cards is falling
    down, and she is either going to report to Mr. Jordan or to
    seek advice from him. Either way, she knows it is serious; it
    all has legal consequences. And she is a witness to it all.
        Not only does Betty Currie's testimony talk about this call
    from Michael Isikoff and going to see Vernon Jordan, but Vernon
    Jordan's testimony confirms the visit as well.
        The President claims he called Ms. Currie in to work on
    that Sunday night only to find out what she knew, but the
    President knew the truth about the relationship, and if he told
    the truth in deposition the day before, he would have had no
    reason to be refreshed by Betty Currie.
        More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's
    reaction, and the suggested lies clearly prove that the
    President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he
    was looking for corroboration for his false coverup, and that
    is why he coached her. He needed a witness for him, not against
    him.
        Now, let's go to exhibit 5, Betty Currie's testimony--
    excuse me, exhibit 15.
        This is Betty Currie's testimony before the grand jury on
    January 27, 1998. And Betty Currie is asked about this. Now,
    remember, it was on a Sunday that Betty Currie was first called
    into the White House to go through these five statements, this
    coaching by the President. And then she testified to the grand
    jury:

        Question: Did there come a time after that that you had
    another conversation with the President about some other news
    about what was going on? That would have been Tuesday or
    Wednesday--when he called you into the Oval Office?

        Betty Currie's answer:

        It was Tuesday or Wednesday. I don't remember which one this was,
    either. But the best I remember, when he called me in the Oval Office,
    it was sort of a recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--
    you know, ``I was never alone with her''--that sort of thing.
        Question: Did he pretty much list the same----
        Answer: To my recollection, sir, yes.
        Question: And did he say it in sort of the same tone and demeanor
    that he used the first time he told you on Sunday?
        Answer: The best I remember, yes, sir.

        And this needs to be emphasized. Not only was that witness
    coaching taking place on Sunday but it took place a couple days
    later. It was twice repeated by the President to Betty Currie.
    He needed to have her good and in line.
        This is more than witness tampering. It is witness
    compulsion of false testimony by an employer to a subordinate
    employee. This has nothing to do with facts, nothing to do with
    media inquiries. It has to do with keeping his team on board,
    keeping the ship from sinking, and hiding the facts that are
    important. At this point we are not talking about hiding
    personal facts from inquiring minds but an effort to impede the
    legitimate and necessary functioning of our court system.
        And now let's go to the Martin Luther King holiday, almost
    exactly a year ago, Monday, January 19. Again, you will see the
    example of the frantic search for Monica Lewinsky did continue.
        Exhibit 16. I am not going to go through all of this, but I
    just want to briefly show the frantic activity on this
    particular day.
        First of all, you will see Betty Currie is trying to
    fulfill her responsibility to get ahold of Ms. Lewinsky. She
    uses the pager system, and she says, ``Please call Kay at
    home.'' Now ``Kay'' is the code name that is used for Betty
    Currie. That is the agreed upon signal. And she uses three
    messages: ``Please call Kay. Please call Kay. Please call
    Kay.''
        Then she starts using different techniques to get her
    attention. ``It's a social call.'' And then she later uses it's
    a ``family emergency.'' Then she later uses it's ``good news.''
    She is using every means possible to get the attention of
    Monica Lewinsky. And then at 8:50 a.m. the President telephones
    Currie at home. At 8:56 a.m. the President telephones Jordan at
    home.
        Go on down to 10:56 a.m. ``The President telephones Jordan
    at his office.'' And so what is going on here? They are
    nervous; they are afraid; it is all breaking loose. They are
    trying to get ahold of Monica Lewinsky to find out what is
    going on, who she is talking to.
        Later that day things continued to destabilize for the
    President. At 4:54 p.m. Mr. Jordan learned from the attorney,
    Frank Carter, that he no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky, and
    so Mr. Jordan's link had been cut off. Mr. Jordan continued to
    attempt to reach the President or someone at the White House.
    Between 4:58 and 5:22 p.m., he made six calls trying to get
    ahold of someone at the White House, the President.
        When Mr. Jordan was asked about why he was urgently trying
    to get ahold of the White House, he responded, ``Because the
    President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job'' and he
    thought it was ``information they ought to have.'' Jordan
    finally reaches the President about 6 p.m. and tells him that
    Carter had been fired.
        Why this flurry of activity? It shows how important it was
    for the President of the United States to find Ms. Lewinsky.
    Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Monica, and it could
    not happen, it did not happen. Ms. Lewinsky was a co-
    conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Federal court
    and he was losing control over her. In fact, she ultimately
    agreed to testify truthfully, under penalty of perjury, in this
    matter. This was trouble for the President.
        Let's continue exploring the web of obstruction. But to do
    this we have to backtrack to what I have already referred to,
    and that was the incident on December 28, the episode with the
    gifts.
        On December 28, another brick in the wall of obstruction
    was laid. It was the concealment of evidence. Ms. Lewinsky
    testified that she discussed with the President the fact that
    she had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to
    produce gifts. And this is what Ms. Lewinsky was telling the
    President at the meeting with him on December 28. She testified
    before the grand jury that she recalled telling the President
    that the subpoena in question had requested a hatpin and other
    items, and this concerned her--the specificity of it. And the
    President responded it ``bothered'' him, too.
        Well, let's look at the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, which is
    exhibit 17. This is Lewinsky testifying about the meeting.

        And then at some point I said to him [the President],
    ``Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away
    outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe
    Betty.'' And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't
    know,'' or, ``Let me think about that,'' and left that topic.

        Not exactly the response you would hope for or expect from
    the President. But the answer led to action. Later that day Ms.
    Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said, ``I understand
    you have something to give to me,'' or, according to Ms.
    Lewinsky, ``The President said you have something to give me.''
    She wasn't exactly sure of the phrase but it was either, ``I
    understand you have something to give me,'' what Betty Currie
    said, or Betty Currie said, ``The President said you have
    something to give to me.''
        And so, ladies and gentlemen, if you accept the testimony
    of Monica Lewinsky on that point, you must conclude that the
    directive to retrieve the gifts came from the President. I will
    concede that there is a conflict in the testimony on this point
    with the testimony of Betty Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand
    jury testimony, had a fuzzy memory, a little different
    recollection. She testified that ``the best she can remember''
    Ms. Lewinsky called her. But whenever she was asked further,
    she said that maybe Ms. Lewinsky's memory is better than hers
    on that issue. But there is helpful evidence to clear up this
    discrepancy, or this inconsistency. Monica, you will recall, in
    her deposition said she thought that Betty had called her and
    she thought that the call came from her cell phone number.
        Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of
    Monica Lewinsky, but since then the cell phone record was
    retrieved. And you don't have it in front of you, but it will
    be available. The cell phone record was retrieved that showed,
    on Betty Currie's cell phone calls, a call was made at 3:32
    from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky. And this confirms the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the followup to get the gifts
    came from Betty Currie. The only way she would know about it is
    if the President directed her to go retrieve the gifts, as was
    discussed with Monica earlier.
        Now, the President will argue that Monica's timeline does
    not fit with the time of the cell phone call. But remember, the
    cell phone record was retrieved subsequent to both the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie before the grand
    jury, and therefore the record was not available to refresh the
    recollection or to make inquiry with him about that. Monica
    Lewinsky's time estimates as to when Betty Currie arrived to
    pick up the gifts was based upon her memory without the benefit
    of records.
        The questions raised by the President on this issue are
    legitimate and demonstrate the need to call the key witnesses
    to a trial of this case and to assess which version of the
    events is believable and substantiated by the corroborating
    evidence. This is certainly an area of testimony where the
    juror needs to hear from Betty Currie and Monica Lewinsky and
    to examine all of the circumstantial evidence and documentary
    evidence to determine the truth. It is my belief, based upon
    common sense and based upon the documentary evidence, that the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky is supported in the record and it
    leads to the conclusion that it was the President who initiated
    this retrieval of the gifts and the concealment of the
    evidence.
        There are many lawyers in this room, and you know that in
    Federal cases all across this country judges instruct juries on
    circumstantial evidence. We have presented to you a great
    amount of direct evidence, grand jury testimony, eyewitness
    testimony, documentary evidence. But juries can use
    circumstantial evidence as well. There is a typical line from
    the instruction that is given in Federal courts to Federal
    juries all across the land:

        The law makes absolutely no distinction between the weight
    or value to be given either to direct or circumstantial
    evidence. Nor is a greater degree of certainty required of
    circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.

        So I think it is incumbent upon you to evaluate the
    circumstances very carefully in addition to the testimony.
        Now, let's examine the key question for a moment. Why did
    Betty Currie pick up the gifts from Monica Lewinsky? Monica
    Lewinsky states that she did not request this and the retrieval
    was initiated by the call from Betty Currie. This was after the
    meeting with the President. Monica Lewinsky's version is
    corroborated by the cell phone record and the pattern of
    conduct on the part of Betty Currie. What do I mean by that? As
    a loyal secretary to the President, it is inconceivable that
    she would go to retrieve gifts that she knows the President is
    very concerned about and could bring down the whole house.
    Betty Currie, a subordinate employee, would not engage in such
    activity on such a sensitive matter without the approval and
    direction of the President himself.
        In addition, let's look further to the actions of Betty
    Currie. It becomes clear that she understands the significance
    of these gifts, their evidentiary value in a civil rights case,
    and the fact that they are under subpoena. She retrieves these
    items, and where does she place them? She hides them under her
    bed--significantly, a place of concealment.
        Now, let's look at the President's defense. The President
    stated in his response to questions 24 and 25, which were
    submitted from the House to the President, he was not concerned
    about the gifts. In fact, he recalled telling Monica that if
    the Jones lawyers request the gifts, she should just turn them
    over to them. The President testified he was ``not sure'' if he
    knew the subpoena asked for gifts.
        Now, why in the world would Monica and the President
    discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyer if Ms. Lewinsky
    had not told him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the
    other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would
    he give Monica more gifts on December 28? This seems odd. But
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she
    never questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but
    keep this private,'' and that means to take ``whatever
    appropriate steps need to be taken.'' That is from Monica's
    grand jury testimony of August 6.
        Why would the President even meet with Monica Lewinsky on
    December 28 when their relationship was in question and he had
    a deposition coming up? Certainly he knew he would be
    questioned about it. Certainly if Monica became a witness she
    would be questioned about the relationship, that she would be
    asked when was the last time you met with the President, and
    now they have to say December 28, if they were going to tell
    the truth.
        The answer is, the President knew that he had to keep
    Monica Lewinsky on the team and he was willing to take more
    risks so that she would continue to be a part of the conspiracy
    to obstruct the legitimate functions of the Federal court in a
    civil rights case.
        It should be remembered that the President has denied each
    and every allegation of the two articles of impeachment; he has
    denied each element of the obstruction of justice charges,
    including this allegation that he encouraged a scheme to
    conceal evidence in a civil rights case. This straightforward
    denial illustrates the dispute in the evidence and testimony.
    It sets the credibility of Monica Lewinsky, the credibility of
    Betty Currie, the credibility of Vernon Jordan, and others
    against the credibility of the President of the United States.
        How can you, as jurors, determine who is telling the truth?
    I have pointed to the corroborating evidence, the
    circumstantial evidence, as well as common sense supporting the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky. But let me ask you two questions:
    Can you convict the President of the United States without
    hearing personally the testimony of one of the key witnesses?
    The second question is: Can you dismiss the charges under this
    strong set of facts and circumstances without hearing and
    evaluating the credibility of key witnesses?
        Let me take this a step further and evaluate the
    credibility of the President. Let's first look back at his
    testimony on the December 28 meeting that he gave in his
    deposition. In that case, he seriously misrepresented the
    nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, and that was the gift
    exchange. First he was asked: ``Did she tell you that she had
    been served with a subpoena in this case?'' The President
    answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had been.''
        Again, this is his testimony in the deposition. He was also
    asked in the deposition if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky
    about the possibility of her testifying.'' His answer: ``I'm
    not sure,'' he said. He then added that he may have joked that
    the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever spoken
    to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation
    than that about it. . .''
        Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict his
    testimony but the President later had to answer questions in
    the grand jury about this same set of circumstances and the
    President directly contradicted himself. Speaking of this
    December 28 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course,
    that she had gotten a subpoena'' and they had a ``conversation
    about the possibility of her testifying.''
        I submit to this body that the inconsistencies of the
    President's own testimony, as well as common sense, seriously
    diminish his credibility on this issue.
        Now let's go forward, once again, to the time period in
    which the President gave his deposition in the Paula Jones
    case. The President testified under oath on January 17, and
    immediately thereafter, remember, he brought Betty Currie in to
    present a set of false facts to her, seeking her agreement and
    coaching her.
        But the President is fully convinced that he can get by
    with his false denials because no one will be able to prove
    what did or did not happen in the Oval Office. There were no
    witnesses, and it boils down to a ``he said, she said''
    scenario, and as long as that is the case, he believes he can
    win. If the President can simply destroy Monica Lewinsky's
    credibility in public and before the grand jury, then he will
    escape the consequences for his false statements under oath and
    obstruction in the civil rights case. Now, remember, this
    viewpoint, though, is all before the DNA tests were performed
    on the blue dress, forcing the President to acknowledge certain
    items.
        In order to carry out this coverup and obstruction, the
    President needed to go further. He needed not only Betty Currie
    to repeat his false statements but also other witnesses who
    would assuredly be called before the Federal grand jury and who
    would be questioned by the news media in public forums. And
    this brings us to the false statements that the President made
    to his White House staff and Presidential aides.
        Let's call Sydney Blumenthal and John Podesta to the
    witness stand. I concede they would be adverse witnesses. This
    is referred to in exhibit 18 that you have in front of you.
        First, the testimony of Sydney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal,
    to put this in perspective, is testifying about his
    conversations when the President called him in to go through
    these facts of what happened. So Mr. Blumenthal testified that
    ``it was at that point that he''--referring to the President--
    ``gave his account as to what happened to me and he said that
    Monica--and it came very fast. He said, `Monica Lewinsky came
    at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He rebuffed her. He
    said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a
    lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.' ''
        Look at this next line. ``She threatened him. She said that
    she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known
    as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if
    she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't
    be the stalker any more.''
        He talks about this character in a novel, and I haven't
    read that book. But the last line: ``And I said to him, I said,
    ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?' He
    said, `Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.' ''
        Let's go to John Podesta's testimony where he was called in
    the same fashion. The President talked to him about what is
    happening:

        Question: Okay. Share that with us.
        Answer: Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some
    spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said
    that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever.
        Question: Okay.
        Answer: --that they had not had oral sex.

        Very briefly, Dick Morris. You have heard this. I will
    refer to the last line: `` `They're just not ready for it,'
    meaning the voters. And he--the President--said, `Well, we just
    have to win, then.' ''
        As the President testified before the grand jury, he knew
    these witnesses would be called before the grand jury. At page
    106 of the President's testimony before the grand jury--I just
    want to confirm this point because it is important--he
    testified--the question was: ``You know that they''--and this
    is referring to John Podesta, Sydney Blumenthal and his aides--
    ``might be witnesses, you knew they might be called into the
    grand jury, didn't you?''
        His answer: ``That's right.''
        So there is no question these were witnesses going to
    testify before the grand jury. He was giving them false
    information, and he did not limit it to that. The false
    statements to them constitute witness tampering and obstruction
    of justice.
        I think there are two significant points in the statements
    the President made to his aides.
        First of all, the President, who wants to do away with the
    politics of personal destruction, indicates a willingness to
    destroy the credibility and reputation of a young person who
    worked in his office for what reason? In order to preserve not
    only his Presidency but, more significantly, to defeat the
    civil rights case against him. It is not a matter of saying he
    didn't do it because he could have simply uttered a denial, but
    he engaged in character assassination that he knew would be
    repeated to the Federal grand jury and throughout the public--
    she was a stalker, she threatened me, she came on to me--and it
    was repeated.
        Secondly, he makes it clear in his statements to John
    Podesta that he denies any sexual relations with Monica
    Lewinsky, including oral sex. There is no quibbling about
    definitions in this statement. It clearly reflects an attempt
    to deceive, lie, and obstruct our system of justice.
        In this case, at every turn, he used whatever means
    available to evade the truth, destroy evidence, tamper with
    witnesses, and took any other action required to prevent
    evidence from coming forward in a civil rights case that would
    prove a truth contrary to the President's interest. He had
    obstructed the administration of justice before the U.S.
    district court in a civil rights case and before the Federal
    grand jury. But as we move toward a conclusion, let's not focus
    just on the supporting cast we talked about, but we need to
    look at the direct and personal actions of the President.
        I want to look at exhibit 20. This just summarizes the
    seven pillars of obstruction. What did the President do that
    constitutes evidence of obstruction?
        No. 1, he personally encouraged a witness, Monica Lewinsky,
    to provide false testimony.
        No. 2, the President had direct involvement in assuring a
    job for a witness--underlining ``direct involvement.'' He made
    the calls, Vernon Jordan did, and it is connected with the
    filing of the false affidavit by that witness.
        No. 3, the President personally, with corrupt intentions,
    tampered with the testimony of a prospective witness, Betty
    Currie.
        No. 4, the President personally provided false statements
    under oath before a Federal grand jury.
        No. 5, by direct and circumstantial evidence the President
    personally directed the concealment of evidence under subpoena
    in a judicial proceeding.
        No. 6, the President personally allowed false
    representations to be made by his attorney, Robert Bennett, to
    a Federal district judge on January 17.
        No. 7, the President intentionally provided false
    information to witnesses before a Federal grand jury knowing
    that those statements would be repeated with the intent to
    obstruct the proceedings before that grand jury and that is the
    statements that he made to the aides.
        The seven pillars of this obstruction case were personally
    constructed by the President of the United States. It was done
    with the intent that the truth and evidence would be suppressed
    in a civil rights case pending against him. The goal was to
    win, and he was not going to let the judicial system stand in
    his way.
        At the beginning of my presentation, I tried to put this
    case into perspective for myself by saying that this proceeding
    is the same as to what takes place in every courtroom in
    America--the pursuit of truth, seeking equal justice, and
    upholding the law. All of that is true. But we know there is
    even more at stake in this trial. What happens here affects the
    workings of our Constitution, it will affect the Presidency in
    future decades, and it will have an impact on a whole
    generation of Americans. What is at stake is our Constitution
    and the principle of equal justice for all.
        I have faith in the Constitution of the United States, but
    the checks and balances of the Constitution are carried out by
    individuals--individuals who are entrusted under oath with
    upholding the trust given to us by the people of this great
    land. If I believe in the Constitution, that it will work, then
    I must believe in you.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I trust the
    Constitution of the United States. But today it is most
    important that I believe in you. I have faith in the U.S.
    Senate. You have earned the trust of the American people, and I
    trust each of you to make the right decision for our country.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we take another 15-minute break in the proceedings. And I urge
    the Senators to return promptly to the Chamber so we can begin
    after the 15-minute break.
        There being no objection, at 4:51 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 5:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to
    resume final presentation of the afternoon. Several Senators
    have inquired what will happen the balance of the day. I
    believe the presentation by Congressman Rogan will be the last
    of the day. It is anticipated we will complete today's
    presentation around 6:30 or 6:45.
        I yield the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the
    President, Members of the United States Senate, my name is
    Congressman James E. Rogan. I represent the 27th District of
    California.
        May I say at the outset that some of the facts and evidence
    you will hear in my presentation may sound familiar in light of
    the last presentation. Although at times the facts may appear
    to be a crossover, the relevance will be presented in a
    different light.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation offered the evidence
    as it relates to the obstruction of justice charge against the
    President in article II. I will be inviting this body to view
    the evidence within the framework of article I, perjury before
    the grand jury.
        On behalf of the House of Representatives and in the name
    of the people of the United States, I will be presenting to the
    Senate evidence against the President to demonstrate he
    committed perjury before a Federal grand jury as set forth in
    article I of the articles of impeachment.
        Article I of the impeachment resolution against President
    Clinton alleges that he committed perjury before the grand
    jury.
        On August 17, 1998, President Clinton swore to tell the
    truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence
    shows that contrary to that oath, the President willfully
    provided perjurious, false, and misleading statements to the
    grand jury in four general areas:
        First, he perjured himself when he gave a false accounting
    to the grand jury about the nature and details of his
    relationship with a 21-year-old intern, Ms. Monica Lewinsky,
    who was a subordinate Federal Government employee.
        Second, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he
    repeated previous perjured answers he gave under oath in a
    sexual harassment suit, which was a Federal civil rights action
    brought against him by Paula Jones.
        Third, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he
    repeated previous perjured answers to justify his attorney's
    false representations to a Federal judge in the Paula Jones
    sexual harassment lawsuit against him.
        Finally, he perjured himself before the grand jury when he
    testified falsely about his attempts to get other potential
    grand jury witnesses to tell false stories to the grand jury,
    and to prevent the discovery of evidence in Paula Jones' sexual
    harassment lawsuit against him.
        In a judicial proceeding, a witness has a very solemn
    obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth. Perjury is a serious crime because our judicial
    system can only succeed if citizens are required to tell the
    truth in court proceedings. If witnesses may lie with impunity
    for personal or political reasons, ``justice'' is no longer the
    product of the court system and we descend into chaos. That is
    why the U.S. Supreme Court has placed a premium on truthful
    testimony and shows no tolerance for perjury.
        More than 20 years ago, the Supreme Court addressed this
    very concept of perjury and its dangerous effect on our system
    of law. Listen to the words of the U.S. Supreme Court:

        In this constitutional process of securing a witness'
    testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured
    testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic
    concepts of judicial proceedings. . . . Congress has made the
    giving of false answers a criminal act punishable by severe
    penalties; in no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into
    the open where the law can deal with it.

        That is the framework under which the House of
    Representatives acted in impeaching the President of the United
    States and now respectfully urges this body to call the
    President to constitutional accountability.
        The key to understanding the facts of this case is to
    understand why the President was asked, under oath, questions
    about his private life in the first place.
        Despite the popular spin, it wasn't because Members of
    Congress, or lawyers from the Office of the Independent
    Counsel, or a gaggle of reporters suddenly decided to invade
    the President's privacy. No. This all came about because of a
    claim against the President from when he was the Governor of
    Arkansas.
        During the discovery phase of the Paula Jones sexual
    harassment case against the President, Federal Judge Susan
    Webber Wright ordered him to answer questions under oath
    relating to any sexual relationship he may have had while
    Governor and President with subordinate female Government
    employees. These orders are common in similar cases, and the
    questions posed to President Clinton are questions routinely
    posed to defendants in civil rights sexual harassment cases
    every single day in courthouses throughout the land.
        During the President's deposition in the Paula Jones case,
    he was asked questions about his relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky. The judge allowed these questions because they
    possibly could lead Ms. Jones to discover if there was any
    pattern of conduct to help prove her case. The President
    repeatedly denied that he had a sexual relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky.
        A few days later, the story about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky broke in the press. A criminal investigation began to
    determine whether the President perjured himself in the Paula
    Jones sexual harassment case and obstructed justice by trying
    to defeat her claim against him by corrupt means.
        On the afternoon of August 17, 1998, President Clinton
    raised his right hand and took an oath before the grand jury in
    their criminal investigation.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the
    testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the
    truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
    God?

        Note the incredibly solemn obligation of the oath the
    President took:

        Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
    give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth?

        When the President made that solemn pledge, he was not
    obliging himself to tell the grand jury the partial truth; he
    was not obliging himself to tell the ``I didn't want to be
    particularly helpful'' truth; he was not obliging himself to
    tell the ``this is embarrassing so I think I'll fudge on it a
    little bit'' truth. He was required to tell the truth, the
    whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and he made that pledge
    in the name of God.
        The attorneys for the Office of the Independent Counsel
    showed great deference to the President when they questioned
    him that day. The President's attorneys were allowed to be
    there with him during the entire proceeding so that he could
    confer with them at his leisure if he was unsure of how to
    respond to a question. As a matter of fact, the attorney who
    questioned the President encouraged him to confer with his
    lawyers if there arose in the President's mind any reason to
    hesitate before answering a question.
        The following exchange occurred at the beginning of the
    President's testimony. The President was told:

        Normally, grand jury witnesses, while not allowed to have
    attorneys in the grand jury room with them, can stop and
    consult with their attorneys. Under our arrangement today, your
    attorneys are here and present for consultation and you can
    break to consult them as necessary. . . . Do you understand
    that, sir?

        The President responded: ``I do understand that.''
        As a practical matter, the President had three options as
    he appeared before the grand jury to testify.
        First, the President could tell the truth about his true
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        However, the evidence will clearly show that the President
    rejected the option of telling the truth.
        Second, the President knew he could invoke his fifth
    amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
        The independent counsel's attorney explicitly reminded the
    President about his right to refuse to answer any question that
    might tend to incriminate him.
        The President was asked:

        You have a privilege against self-incrimination. If a
    truthful answer to any question would tend to incriminate you,
    you can invoke the privilege and that invocation will not be
    used against you. Do you understand that?

        The President's response was: ``I do.''
        The President knew he had the right to refuse to answer any
    incriminating questions and that no legal harm would have come
    to him for doing so.
        But he rejected this option, just as he rejected the option
    of telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
    truth.
        Instead, he selected a third path.
        He continued to lie about corrupt efforts to destroy Paula
    Jones' civil rights lawsuit against him.
        If a trial is permitted before this body where live
    witnesses can be called and where their credibility can be
    scrutinized, the evidence will show this distinguished body
    that the course the President charted was a course of perjury.
        Despite the President's unique level of judicial
    sophistication and expertise, the attorneys at the grand jury
    were careful to make sure the President understood his
    responsibilities to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth.
        They did this at the outset of his testimony, before any
    questions were asked that might tempt the President to lie
    under oath.
        And they specifically warned him that if he were to lie or
    intentionally mislead the grand jury, he could face perjury and
    obstruction of justice charges, both of which are felonies
    under Federal law.
        This exchange occurred before the President's testimony:

        Q: Mr. President, you understand that your testimony here
    today is under oath?
        A: I do.
        Q: And you understand that because you have sworn to tell
    the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that if
    you were to lie or intentionally mislead the grand jury, you
    could be prosecuted for perjury and/or obstruction of justice?
        A: I believe that's correct.
        Q: Is there anything that . . . I've stated to you
    regarding your rights and responsibilities that you would like
    me to clarify or that you don't understand?
        A: No, sir.

        Despite this ominous warning, the prosecutors continued
    emphasizing the need for the President to resist lying to the
    grand jury.
        Still intent on making sure the President understood his
    obligations, the attorneys further advised him:

        Q: Mr. President, I would like to read for you a portion of
    Federal Rule of Evidence 603, which discusses the important
    function the oath has in our judicial system.
        It says that the purpose of the oath is . . . calculated to
    awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind
    with the duty to tell the truth.
        Could you please tell the grand jury what that oath means
    to you for today's testimony?
        A: I have sworn an oath to tell the grand jury the truth,
    and that's what I intend to do.

        When the President said in that very last answer I just
    read that he swore an oath to tell the grand jury ``the
    truth,'' the prosecutor immediately followed up with this
    question. Here is what he was told.
        Question to the President:

        Q: You understand that [the oath] requires you to give the
    whole truth, that is, a complete answer to each question, sir?
        A: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I
    can.

        One would think these repetitive explanations would be
    enough to warn even the most legally unsophisticated witness
    about the need to treat a grand jury criminal investigation
    seriously, and the need to tell the whole truth at any cost.
        No reasonable person could believe at this point that the
    President did not understand his obligations.
        Yet, just to be sure, the attorneys again impressed on the
    President his solemn duty to tell the truth:
        Question to the President:

        Q: Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a
    deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
        A: I did take an oath then.
        Q: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to
    you then as it does today?
        A: I believed then that I had to answer the questions
    truthfully. That is correct.  . . .
        Q: And it meant the same to you then as it does today?
        A: Well, no one read me a definition then and we didn't go
    through this exercise then.
        I swore an oath to tell the truth, and I believed I was
    bound to be truthful and I tried to be.

        Having just received his ``refresher course'' on either
    ``taking the fifth'' and remaining silent, or telling the whole
    truth and nothing but the truth, the President acknowledged he
    was required to tell the truth when he gave answers to
    questions 8 months earlier in the Paula Jones sexual harassment
    civil rights lawsuit.
        Question to the President:

        Q: At the Paula Jones deposition, you were represented by
    Mr. Robert Bennett, your counsel, is that correct?
        A: That is correct.
        Q: He was authorized by you to be your representative
    there, your attorney, is that correct?
        A: That is correct.
        Q: Your counsel, Mr. Bennett, indicated . . . and I'm
    quoting, ``The President intends to give full and complete
    answers as Ms. Jones is entitled to have.''
        My question to you is, do you agree with your counsel that
    a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is, to use his words,
    entitled to have the truth?
        A: I believe that I was bound to give truthful answers,
    yes, sir.
        Q: But the question is, sir, do you agree with your counsel
    that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case is entitled to
    have the truth?
        A. I believe when a witness is under oath in a civil case,
    or otherwise under oath, the witness should do everything
    possible to answer the questions truthfully.

        Thus, the groundwork was laid for the President to testify
    under oath.
        He knew how the rules worked respecting testimony before
    the grand jury.
        If a question was vague or ambiguous, the President could
    ask for a clarification.
        If he was unsure how to answer, or indeed whether to answer
    a question, he could stop the questioning, take a break, and
    consult privately with his attorneys who were present with him.
        If giving an answer would tend to incriminate him, he could
    refuse to answer the question by claiming his fifth amendment
    rights.
        But if, after all of this, he decided to give an answer,
    the answer he gave was required to be the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth. And it was no different than
    the obligation when he testified in the Paula Jones
    deposition--the same oath, the same obligation.
        Let's look at how the President chose to meet his
    obligation.
        As noted in my opening remarks, the President's grand jury
    perjury is the basis for article I of the impeachment
    resolution. The evidence shows, and live witnesses clearly will
    demonstrate, that the President repeatedly committed perjury
    before the grand jury when he testified as a defendant in a
    sexual harassment civil rights lawsuit against him.
        He intentionally failed in his lawful obligation to tell
    the truth in four general areas. First, the President committed
    perjury before the grand jury when he testified about the
    nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky, a 21-year-old
    White House intern who, by definition, was a subordinate
    Government employee.
        On December 5, 1995, Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the
    Paula Jones witness list. Later, the President was ordered by
    Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright to answer questions about
    Monica Lewinsky because the President was a defendant in a
    sexual harassment case.
        At his deposition in the Paula Jones case, the President
    was shown a definition approved by Judge Wright of what
    constitutes sexual relations. I am going to read the definition
    that was presented to the President.
        And let me say at the outset that I am going to slightly
    sanitize it. You have in your materials, Members of this body,
    a copy of the actual definition that was given to you, so you
    will be able to understand precisely what was put before the
    President.
        Definition of sexual relations:

        For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in
    sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or causes
    contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any person
    with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
    person.

        Members of the Senate, just for clarification, I did not
    feel the need to actually relate to this body what those
    enumerated body parts are.
        After reviewing the deposition, the President then denied
    that he ever had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. As
    we have already seen, from the day in January when the
    President testified in the Jones deposition until the day he
    appeared in August for his grand jury testimony, he vehemently
    denied ever having a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
        Listen to the President addressing the American people on
    the subject of his credibility. The date is January 26, 1998, 5
    days after the Lewinsky story broke in the press.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        ``But I want to say one thing to the American people. I
    want you to listen to me. I'm going to say this again.
        ``I did not have sexual relations with that woman--Miss
    Lewinsky.
        ``I never told anybody to lie--not a single time. Never.
    These allegations are false. And I need to go back to work for
    the American people.
        ``Thank you.''

        Beginning in January 1998, the President went on an 8-month
    campaign, both under oath and in the press, denying any sexual
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky in any way, shape, or form.
    But 8 months after his deposition testimony and these
    passionate denials, the tide had turned against his story. By
    August, Monica Lewinsky was now cooperating with the office of
    the independent counsel. If she was telling the truth in her
    sworn testimony, then the President's January denial in the
    Paula Jones case would have been a clear case of him committing
    perjury and obstructing justice.
        Why? Because she was describing, in very graphic detail,
    conduct occurring between her and the President that clearly
    fit the definition of ``sexual relations'' as used in the Paula
    Jones deposition--conduct that he repeatedly denied under oath.
        So by the time the President sat down for his grand jury
    testimony to answer these questions under oath, he had put
    himself in a huge box. He could not continue the outright lie
    because Ms. Lewinsky had turned over her blue dress for DNA
    testing, and at the time of his grand jury testimony he didn't
    know what the results of that FBI test were. Under such
    circumstances, continuing the lie was too risky of a strategy
    even for the most accomplished of gamblers. But if he told the
    truth, his earlier perjury and obstruction of justice would
    have ended his Presidency. He was sure he would have been
    driven from office.
        Remember that the President had actually authorized that a
    poll be taken for him by Dick Morris, and the poll wasn't just
    taken on whether the American people would forgive him for
    adultery; the President asked Dick Morris to poll in two other
    areas. He asked Dick Morris to poll whether the American people
    would forgive him for perjury and obstruction of justice. When
    he got the poll results back, he learned that the American
    people would forgive him for the adultery but they would not
    forgive him for perjury or for obstruction of justice.
        Once he got the bad news from Dick Morris that his
    political career was over if he perjured himself, he told Dick
    Morris, ``We'll just have to win.'' So at his grand jury
    testimony, once the first question was asked about his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the President produced a
    prepared statement and read from it. This prepared statement he
    read to the grand jury on August 17, 1998, was the linchpin in
    his plan to ``win.''
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. President, were you physically intimate with Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. Mr. Bittman, I think maybe I can save you and the grand
    jurors a lot of time if I read a statement, which I think will
    make it clear what the nature of my relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky was and how it related to the testimony I gave, what I
    was trying to do in that testimony. And I think it will perhaps
    make it possible for you to ask even more relevant questions
    from your point of view. And, with your permission, I'd like to
    read that statement.
        Q. Absolutely. Please, Mr. President.
        A. When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions
    in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that
    was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual
    intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I
    understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998
    deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate
    contact.
        These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in
    early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with
    Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.
        I regret that what began as a friendship came to include
    this conduct. I take full responsibility for my actions. While
    I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can,
    because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself,
    and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the
    office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of
    these particular matters.
        I will try to answer to the best of my ability other
    questions, including questions about my relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term of
    sexual relations, as I understood it to be defined at my
    January 17th, 1998, deposition, and questions concerning
    alleged subordination of perjury, obstruction of justice and
    intimidation of witnesses.
        That . . . is my statement.

        Beyond that statement, the President generally refused to
    answer specific questions about his relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky. The President used that prepared statement as a
    substitute answer for specific questions about his conduct with
    Ms. Lewinsky 19 separate times during his testimony before the
    grand jury. The purpose of the prepared statement was to avoid
    answering the types of specific harassment lawsuit questions
    for which the U.S. Supreme Court and Judge Susan Webber Wright
    had earlier cleared the way. The evidence shows the President
    used this prepared statement in order to justify the perjurious
    answers he gave at his deposition which were intended to affect
    the outcome of the Paula Jones case. The fact that this
    statement was prepared in advance shows his intent to mislead
    the grand jury in this very area. Ironically, this prepared
    statement was supposed to inoculate the President from perjury.
    Instead, it opened him up to 19 more examples of giving
    perjurious, false, and misleading answers under oath.
        For example, in that prepared statement, the President said
    his sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky began in 1996, and not in
    1995, as Ms. Lewinsky had testified. This was not a mere slip
    of memory over a meaningless timeframe; there is a discrepancy
    in the dates for a reason. You see, under the President's
    version, in 1996 Monica Lewinsky was a paid White House
    employee. Under the facts as testified to by Ms. Lewinsky, when
    the relationship really began in 1995, she was not a paid
    employee at the White House; she was a young, 21-year-old White
    House intern.
        The concept of a President having a sexual relationship in
    the White House with a young intern less than half his age was
    a public relations disaster for the President, as everyone
    vividly remembers. It is clear that the President somehow
    viewed the concept as less combustible if he could take the
    ``young intern'' phrase out of the public lexicon. Yet in his
    deposition testimony, the President admitted he met her and saw
    her when she was an intern working in the White House in
    November 1995, during the Government shutdown. Monica Lewinsky
    confirmed this. In fact, she testified that the first time she
    ever spoke to the President was on November 15, 1995, during
    the Government shutdown. And she also said that the very first
    time that she ever spoke to the President was the same day he
    invited her back to the Oval Office and began a sexual
    relationship with her.
        It is obvious that the reference in the President's
    prepared statement to the grand jury that this relationship
    began in 1996 was intentionally false.
        The President's statement was intentionally misleading when
    he described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain
    occasions. Actually, they were alone in the White House at
    least 20 times and had at least 11 sexual encounters at the
    White House. The President attempted to use language that
    subtly minimized the number of times they were alone.
        The President's statement was intentionally misleading when
    he described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky
    as ``occasional.'' In fact, there are at least 55 documented
    telephone conversations between the President of the United
    States and the young intern. And without going into further
    graphic detail, the evidence shows that, at least on 17 of
    those occasions, those conversations included much more than
    mere sexual banter, as the President described it.
        The most unsettling part of that statement was uttered near
    the close. Listen to what the President said: ``I regret that
    what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.''
    ``Friendship.'' The very day the President met and spoke with a
    young White House intern for the first time was the day he
    invited her back to the Oval Office to perform sex acts on him.
        In fact, Monica Lewinsky said that after their sexual
    relationship was over a month old, she didn't even think the
    President knew her name. The President's statement about his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky beginning as a friendship is
    a callous and deceptive mischaracterization of how his
    relationship with this young woman really began.
        Thus, the President began his deposition testimony by
    reading a false and misleading statement to the grand jury. He
    then used that statement as an excuse not to answer specific
    questions that were directly relevant to allowing the grand
    jury to complete its criminal investigation. Had he given
    specific answers to specific questions about the true nature of
    his relationship, the grand jury would have been able to learn
    the whole truth about whether the President perjured himself
    and obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment
    civil rights lawsuit.
        Paula Jones had a legal and constitutional right to learn
    if the President, while as President or Governor, used his
    position of power and influence to get sexual favors from
    subordinate female employees in the workplace or to reward
    subordinate female employees for granting such favors to him.
    Instead, the President intentionally provided on 19 separate
    occasions a misleading statement instead of giving a true
    characterization of his conduct, as required by his oath.
        He had no legal or constitutional right to refuse to answer
    such questions without claiming a fifth amendment privilege and
    then allowing Judge Wright to make a determination as to
    whether the privilege applied. The President's preliminary
    statement delivered 19 times was an initial shot across the
    perjury bow offered by the President throughout his grand jury
    testimony. It showed a premeditated effort to thwart the grand
    jury's criminal investigation, to justify his prior wrongdoing,
    and to deny Paula Jones her constitutional right to bring
    forward her claim in a court of law.
        The President gave further perjurious, false, and
    misleading testimony regarding the nature and details of his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky. One of the ways the
    President tried to justify his perjurious answers in the Jones
    deposition about his relationship was to deconstruct the
    English language. Remember, the President was shown a copy of
    the definition of ``sexual relations'' that Judge Wright
    approved in his January deposition. This definition was
    directed by Judge Wright to be used as the guide under which
    the President was to answer questions about his relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky. After carefully reviewing that
    definition, the President said under oath that it did not apply
    to his relationship with her.
        It is important to remember that at the time the President
    testified that he never had sexual relations with Monica
    Lewinsky, this was not a risky perjury strategy. After all, he
    had successfully used Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a
    good job in New York, despite her questionable qualifications.
    She had filed a false affidavit in the Jones case denying a
    sexual relationship with the President. She and the President
    had previously agreed to comprehensive cover stories to deny
    the truth of their relationship if anyone ever confronted them
    about it. And the bevy of gifts the President had given to
    Monica were now nestled safely under Betty Currie's bed so that
    they would never be produced to or discovered by Mrs. Jones'
    attorneys in compliance with their subpoena to have those gifts
    produced.
        The perjury strategy was a safe bet in January at his
    deposition, but it soon turned upside down for the President.
    By the time of his grand jury testimony in August, the
    President knew things had changed drastically but not in his
    favor. In light of Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation with the
    independent counsel, the impending FBI report on the DNA
    testing on the blue dress, and the President's decision not to
    confess to his crime, the President needed to come up with some
    excuse. Here is how the President, at his August grand jury
    appearance, tried to explain away his January deposition denial
    of engaging in sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did you understand the words in the first portion of the
    [Jones deposition] exhibit, Mr. President, that is, ``For the
    purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual
    relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes . .
    .''?
        Did you understand, do you understand the words there in
    that phrase?
        A. Yes . . . I can tell you what my understanding of the
    definition is, if you want . . . My understanding of this
    definition is it covers contact by the person being deposed
    with the enumerated areas, if the contact is done with an
    intent to arouse or gratify. That's my understanding of the
    definition.
        Q. What did you believe the definition to include and
    exclude? What kinds of activities?
        A. I thought the definition included any activity by the
    person being deposed, where the person was the actor and came
    into contact with those parts of the bodies with the purpose or
    intent of gratification, and excluded any other activity. For
    example, kissing's not covered by that, I don't think.
        Q. Did you understand the definition to be limited to
    sexual activity?
        A. Yes, I understood the definition to be limited to
    physical contact with those areas of the body with the specific
    intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I understood it to be.
        Q. What specific acts did the definition include, as you
    understood the definition on January 17th, 1998?
        A. Any contact with the areas that are mentioned, sir. If
    you contacted those parts of the body with an intent to arouse
    or gratify, that is covered.
        Q. What did you understand . . .
        A. The person being deposed. If the person being deposed
    contacted those parts of another person's body with an intent
    to arouse or gratify, that was covered.

        If that answer sounds confusing to you, there is a reason
    for that. It was meant to be.
        What the President now was saying to the grand jury is that
    during their intimate relationship in the Oval Office, Monica
    Lewinsky had sexual relations with him; he didn't have sexual
    relations with her.
        Consider that for a minute.
        The President is asking everyone to believe that between
    the years 1995 and 1997, while Monica Lewinsky was engaged in a
    pattern of explicit availability for him as she described in
    her testimony, the President carefully avoided having any
    intimate contact with her as described in Judge Wright's very
    detailed definition.
        According to the President, since he never intimately
    touched her as described in the definition--she only touched
    him--then he was under no obligation to answer questions in the
    harassment suit about Monica Lewinsky as Federal Judge Susan
    Webber Wright ordered him to do under oath.
        Not only does the President's claim strain all boundaries
    of common sense; it is directly in conflict with Monica
    Lewinsky's detailed and corroborated accounts of their
    relationship.
        As if this ridiculous expansion of Judge Wright's
    definition of what constituted sexual relations wasn't enough,
    the President then decided to take his interpretation of the
    judge's definition one step further. He added a new element as
    to why he claimed the definition didn't apply to him.
        When asked again, at his grand jury testimony, what he
    thought the definition of sexual relations meant, here is the
    new twist that the President came up with.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. As I remember from the previous discussion this was some
    kind of definition that had something to do with sexual
    harassment. So, that implies it's forcing to me. And I--there
    was never any issue of forcing in the case involving--well, any
    of these questions they were asking me. They made it clear in
    this discussion I just reviewed that what they were referring
    to was intentional sexual conduct, not some sort of forcible
    abusive behavior.
        So I basically--I don't think I paid any attention to it
    because it appeared to me that that was something that had no
    reference to the facts that they admitted they were asking me
    about.

        The President now took the position that the definition
    didn't apply to him because it would only have applied if he
    forced himself on Monica Lewinsky. Remember the definition. And
    I will read it again:

        For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in
    sexual relations when the person knowingly engages in or
    causes--
        (1) contact with the [certain enumerated body parts] of any
    person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
    any person[.]

        As you can see, this straightforward definition did not
    include the subject of force or harassment.
        Yet when the independent counsel's attorney tried to
    clarify the President's newfound position, the President gave
    no ground. He simply plowed ahead with his new interpretation.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. I'm just trying to understand, Mr. President. You
    indicated that you put the definition in the context of a
    sexual harassment case . . .
        A. No, no, I think it was not in the context of sexual
    harassment. I just re-read those four pages, which obviously
    the grand jury doesn't have. But there was some reference to
    the fact that this definition apparently bore some--had some
    connection to some definition in another context and that this
    was being used not in that context, not necessarily in the
    context of sexual harassment.
        So I would think that this causes would be--means to force
    someone to do something. That's what I read it. That's the only
    point I'm trying to make. Therefore, I did not believe that any
    one had ever suggested that I had forced anyone to do anything
    and I did not do that. And so, that could not have had any
    bearing on any questions relating to Ms. Lewinsky.

        The evidence clearly shows from Monica Lewinsky's sworn
    testimony that the President deconstructed the English language
    to deny Paula Jones the opportunity to find out if other
    witnesses were out there who would help bolster her case
    against the President, and she was legally entitled to do that
    under our sexual harassment laws.
        No reasonable interpretation of the President's testimony
    could be made that he fulfilled his legal obligation to testify
    to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
        His statements were perjurious. They were designed to
    defeat Paula Jones' right to pursue her sexual harassment civil
    rights lawsuit against this President.
        And by the way, in his testimony, the President conceded
    that if Monica Lewinsky's recitation of the facts was true, he
    would have perjured himself both in his deposition testimony
    and in repeating his denials before the grand jury. Listen to
    this.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations
    with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition under that
    definition, correct?
        A. That's correct, sir.
        Q. If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of
    another person, would that be in--with the intent to arouse the
    sexual desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in definition one,
    would that be, under your understanding, then and now, sexual
    relations?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. Yes, it would?
        A. Yes, it would if you had a direct contact with any of
    these places in the body, if you had direct contact with intent
    to arouse or gratify, that would fall within the definition.
        Q. So you didn't do any of those three things with Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did
    not have sexual relations as I understood this term to be
    defined.

        So, who is telling the truth? The only way to really know
    is to bring forth the witnesses, put them under oath and give
    each juror, each Member of this body, the opportunity to make
    that determination of credibility because the record shows that
    Monica Lewinsky delivered consistent and detailed testimony
    under oath regarding many specific encounters with the
    President that clearly fell within the definition of sexual
    relations in the Jones deposition.
        Monica Lewinsky's memory and accounts of these incidents
    are amazingly corroborated by her recollection of dates, places
    and phone calls which correspond with the official White House
    entrance logs and phone records.
        Monica Lewinsky's testimony is further corroborated through
    DNA testing and the testimony of her friends and family
    members, to whom she made near contemporaneous statements about
    the relationship.
        Most importantly, Monica Lewinsky had every reason to tell
    the truth to the grand jury. She was under a threat of
    prosecution for perjury, not only for her grand jury testimony
    but also for the false affidavit she filed on behalf of the
    President in the Jones case.
        She knew then and she knows today that her immunity
    agreement could be revoked at any time if she lies under oath
    or if she lied under oath in the past. Truthful testimony was
    and remains a condition for her immunity from prosecution.
        By way of contrast, the President was under obligation to
    give complete answers. Instead, he offered false answers that
    violated his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth. And incidentally, during his grand jury
    testimony, the President actually suggested that he had a right
    to give less than complete answers. Why? Because he questioned
    the motives of Ms. Jones in bringing her lawsuit.
        If this standard is acceptable, what does that do to the
    search for the truth when an oath is administered in a
    courtroom to one who claims to question the ``motives'' of
    their opponent in a trial? This suggestion has no basis in law.
    And it is destructive to the truth-seeking function of the
    courts.
        The President's perjurious legal hairsplitting used to
    bypass the requirement of telling the complete truth denied
    Paula Jones her constitutional right to have her day in court
    and an orderly disposition of her claim in the sexual
    harassment case against the President.
        To dismiss this conduct with a shrug because it is ``just
    about sex'' is to say that the sexual harassment laws
    protecting women in the workplace do not apply to powerful
    employers or others in high places of privilege. As one wag
    recently noted, if this case is ``just about sex,'' then
    robbery is just a disagreement over money.
        Next, the President perjured himself before the grand jury
    when he repeated previous perjured answers he gave in the
    deposition of the Paula Jones case. In his grand jury testimony
    in August, the President admitted he had to tell the truth, the
    whole truth, and nothing but the truth when he testified in the
    Paula Jones deposition.
        The question to the President:

        Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 1998, in a
    deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is that correct, sir?
        A. I did take an oath then.
        Q. Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to
    you then as it does today?
        A. I believe then that I had to answer the questions
    truthfully; that is correct.

        When the President testified in his January deposition, he
    knew full well that Monica Lewinsky's affidavit filed in the
    case stating that they never had sexual relations was false.
    Yet when this affidavit was shown to him at the deposition, he
    testified that her false claim was, in his words, ``absolutely
    true.''
        He knew that the definition of ``sexual relations'' used in
    the earlier Jones deposition was meant to cover the same
    activity that was mentioned in Monica Lewinsky's false
    affidavit. Rather than tell the complete truth, the President
    lied about the relationship, the cover stories, the affidavit,
    the subpoena for gifts, and the search for a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        Later he denied to the grand jury in August that he
    committed any perjury during his January deposition. This
    assertion before the grand jury that he testified truthfully in
    the Jones case is in and of itself perjurious testimony because
    the record is clear he did not testify truthfully in January in
    the Paula Jones case. He perjured himself.
        Thus, when the President testified before the grand jury in
    August, he knew he had given perjurious answers in the January
    deposition. If the President really thought, as he testified,
    that he had told the truth in his January deposition testimony,
    he would not have related a false account of events to his
    secretary, Betty Currie, whom he knew, by his own admission,
    might be called as a witness in the Jones case; he would not
    have repeatedly denied he was unable to recall being alone with
    Monica Lewinsky; and he would not have told false accounts to
    his aides whom he knew, by his own admission, were potential
    witnesses in later proceedings.
        The evidence of perjury and obstruction of justice is
    overwhelming in this case. He continued to use illegal means to
    defeat Ms. Jones' constitutional right to bring her harassment
    case against him.
        Next, the President committed perjury before the grand jury
    when he testified that he did not allow his attorney to make
    false representations while referring to Monica Lewinsky's
    affidavit before the judge in the Jones case, an affidavit that
    he knew was false.
        Remember, at the Jones deposition in January 1998, Monica
    Lewinsky previously had filed a false affidavit that said, ``I
    have never had a sexual relationship with the President'' and
    that she had no relevant information to provide on the subject
    to Ms. Jones.
        When Ms. Jones' attorneys attempted to question the
    President about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the
    President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, objected to him even being
    questioned about the relationship.
        Mr. Bennett claimed that in light of Monica Lewinsky's
    affidavit saying that there was no sexual relationship between
    the two, and there never had been, that Paula Jones' lawyer had
    no good faith belief even to question the President about a
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
        Listen to what Mr. Bennett told Judge Wright in the
    deposition.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need
    some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object
    to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I
    don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith
    of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully
    aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an
    affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is
    absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form,
    with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in
    the questions----
        Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I
    do not know whether counsel is basing this question on any
    affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on
    other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably
    coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, Mr. Fisher is an
    officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good
    faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good
    faith basis for asking this question, he could later be
    sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in
    camera any good faith basis he might have.
        Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I
    would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness.
    In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness
    is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's)
    affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't
    know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's
    sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least
    have a good faith proffer.
        Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a
    good faith basis for asking the question.
        Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
        Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be
    willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal
    it to counsel.
        Mr. Bennett. Fine.
        Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to
    the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
        Judge Wright. All right.
        Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do
    that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is
    substantial basis.
        Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question.
    He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett,
    this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis
    can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the
    deponent, and the other party.

        May I say as an aside that by presenting that, I am in no
    way questioning the quality or the integrity of the President's
    attorney, Mr. Bennett, on that day. Mr. Bennett was doing his
    job as the President's lawyer. He had an affidavit from Monica
    Lewinsky that said none of this ever happened. And so I hope
    that none of you will assume that by my showing this deposition
    tape today I am trying to draw any unfair inference against the
    President's attorney on that date. But you can tell from what
    you have just observed that Mr. Bennett was using Monica
    Lewinsky's false affidavit in an attempt to stop questioning of
    the President about Ms. Lewinsky.
        What did the President do during that exchange? He sat
    mute. He did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even
    though the President knew that the affidavit upon which Mr.
    Bennett was relying was utterly false.
        Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's objection and allowed
    the questioning about Monica Lewinsky to proceed.
        Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read to the President
    the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied
    having a sexual relationship with the President. Mr. Bennett
    then asked the President, who was under oath, if Ms. Lewinsky's
    statement that they never had a sexual relationship was true
    and accurate.
        Listen to the President as he responds.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q: In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says this, ``I
    have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did
    not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not
    offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual
    relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits
    for reflecting a sexual relationship.''
        Is this a true and accurate statement as far as you know
    it?
        A: That is absolutely true.

        The President's answer: ``That is absolutely true.''
        When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury
    testimony 8 months later how he could have sat silently at his
    earlier deposition while his attorney made the false statement
    that ``there is no sex of any kind,'' in any manner, shape, or
    form, to Judge Wright, the President first said that he was not
    paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. Bennett's comments.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. President, I want to--before I go into a new subject
    area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr.
    Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the
    Paula Jones deposition--counsel is fully aware--it's page 54,
    line 5. ``Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky is filing,
    has an affidavit, which they were in possession of, saying that
    there was absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or
    form with President Clinton.'' That statement was made by your
    attorney in front of Judge Susan Webber Wright.
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Your--that statement is a completely false statement.
    Whether or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in
    any manner, shape or form with President Clinton'' was an
    utterly false statement. Is that correct?
        A. It depends upon what the meaning of the word ``is''
    means. If ``is'' means is, and never has been, that's one
    thing. If it means, there is none, that was a completely true
    statement. But as I have testified--I'd like to testify again--
    this is--it is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about
    his lawyer's statements instead of the other way around. I was
    not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was
    focusing on my own testimony.

        The President added to this explanation he was giving to
    the attorney questioning him. This is what the President said:

        And I'm not sure . . . as I sit here today that I sat there
    and followed all these interchanges between the lawyers. I'm
    quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges between
    the lawyers all that carefully. And I don't really believe,
    therefore, that I can say Mr. Bennett's testimony or statement
    is testimony and is imputable to me. I didn't--I don't know
    that I was really paying attention, paying that much attention
    to him.

        This denial of the President while his attorney was
    proffering a false statement to Judge Wright in an effort to
    keep the Paula Jones lawyers from even questioning the
    President about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky simply
    does not withstand the test of truth. The videotape of the
    President's January deposition shows the President paying very
    close attention to Mr. Bennett when Mr. Bennett was making the
    statement about ``no sex of any kind.''
        View again the video clip of the President during Mr.
    Bennett's argument that the Jones lawyers have no right to ask
    questions about Monica Lewinsky, only this time watch the
    President as he focuses on his lawyer speaking about one of the
    most important subjects he has ever faced in his entire life--
    the survival of his Presidency.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, excuse me, Mr. President, I need
    some guidance from the Court at this point. I'm going to object
    to the innuendo. I'm afraid, as I say, that this will leak. I
    don't question the predicates here. I question the good faith
    of counsel, the innuendo in the question. Counsel is fully
    aware that Ms. Jane Doe 6 [Monica Lewinsky] has filed, has an
    affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is
    absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form,
    with President Clinton, and yet listening to the innuendo in
    the questions----
        Judge Wright. No, just a minute, let me make my ruling. I
    do not know whether counsel is basing this question an any
    affidavit, but I will direct Mr. Bennett not to comment on
    other evidence that might be pertinent and could be arguably
    coaching the witness at this juncture. Now, I Mr. Fisher is as
    officer of this court, and I have to assume that he has a good
    faith basis for asking the question. If in fact he has no good
    faith basis for asking this question, he could later be
    sanctioned. If you would like, I will be happy to review in
    camera any good faith basis he might have.
        Mr. Bennett. Well, Your Honor, with all due respect, I
    would like to know the proffer. I'm not coaching the witness.
    In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness
    is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's (Monica Lewinsky's)
    affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't
    know, but I think when he asks questions like this where he's
    sitting on an affidavit from the witness, he should at least
    have a good faith proffer.
        Judge Wright. Now, I agree with you that he needs to have a
    good faith basis for asking the question.
        Mr. Bennett. May we ask what it is, Your Honor?
        Judge Wright. And I'm assuming that he does, and I will be
    willing to review this in camera if he does not want to reveal
    it to counsel.
        Mr. Bennett. Fine.
        Mr. Fisher. I would welcome an opportunity to explain to
    the Court what our good faith basis is in an in camera hearing.
        Judge Wright. All right.
        Mr. Fisher. I would prefer that we not take the time to do
    that now, but I can tell the Court I am very confident there is
    substantial basis.
        Judge Wright. All right, I'm going to permit the question.
    He's an officer of the Court, and as you know, Mr. Bennett,
    this Court has ruled on prior occasions that a good faith basis
    can exist notwithstanding the testimony of the witness, of the
    deponent, and the other party.

        By the way, lest there be any doubt in the minds of any
    Member of this body as to whom the President was looking at and
    focusing at, we are fully prepared to bring in a witness for
    you who was present at the deposition and who will draw a map
    for every Member of this body and show the location of the
    President and every other person around the table.
        Just in case the President's ``I wasn't paying any
    attention'' excuse didn't fly, the President, in his grand jury
    testimony, decided to try another argument on for size. He
    suggested that when Mr. Bennett made his statement about
    ``there is no sex of any kind,'' the President was focusing on
    the meaning of the word ``is.''
        He then said that when Mr. Bennett made the assertion that
    ``there is no sex of any kind,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only
    in the present tense, as if the President understood that to
    mean ``there is no sex'' because there was no sex occurring at
    the time Mr. Bennett's remark was made.
        The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning of
    the word `is' is.''
        And that if it means there is none, that was a completely
    true statement. Listen and watch again to the same video clip
    from the President's grand jury testimony that we saw a few
    moments ago. Only this time, pay close attention to the
    President's excuse as to why he did not have to comply with the
    truth, because in his mind there is some question as to what
    the meaning of the word ``is'' is.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. President, I want to, before I go into a new subject
    area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr.
    Bittman. The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the
    Paula Jones deposition ``counsel is fully aware''--it's page 54
    line 5.--``counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed,
    has an affidavit which they were in possession of saying that
    there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with
    President Clinton?'' That statement is made by your attorney in
    front of Judge Susan Webber Wright, correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. That statement is a completely false statement. Whether
    or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,
    the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in any
    manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,'' was an utterly
    false statement. Is that correct?
        A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If
    ``is'' means is, and never has been, that is one thing. If it
    means there is none, that was a completely true statement. But,
    as I have testified, and I'd like to testify again, this is--it
    is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about his lawyer's
    statements, instead of the other way around. I was not paying a
    great deal of attention to this exchange. I was focusing on my
    own testimony.

        In essence, here is what the President says in his own
    defense: I wasn't paying any attention to what my lawyer was
    saying when he offered the false affidavit on my behalf to the
    judge. However, if I was paying attention, I was focusing on
    the very narrow definition of what the word ``is'' is and the
    tense in which that was presented.
        Now, I am a former prosecutor, and that is like the
    murderer who says: I have an ironclad alibi. I wasn't at the
    crime scene; I was home with my mother eating apple pie; but if
    I was there, it is a clear case of self-defense.
        The President now asks this body of lawmakers to give
    acceptance to these ludicrous definitions of ordinary words and
    phrases. He asks you to believe this is what he really thought
    when he was asked if he ever had sexual relations with Monica
    Lewinsky, and when he was asked about her false affidavit.
        By the way, as to the President's ``tense'' argument that
    he presented about what the meaning of the word ``is'' is, this
    fails to take into account another important fact. The false
    affidavit of Monica Lewinsky that Mr. Bennett was waiving that
    day before the judge made no such distinction. Her affidavit
    never said in the present tense, ``I am not now having a sexual
    relationship with the President.'' Her affidavit said, ``I have
    never had a sexual relationship with the President.''
        The President perjured himself when he said that Mr.
    Bennett's statement that there was no sex of any kind was
    ``absolutely true,'' depending on what the meaning of the word
    ``is'' is.
        The President did not admit to the grand jury that Mr.
    Bennett's statement was false because to do so would have been
    to admit that the term ``sexual relations'' as used in Ms.
    Lewinsky's affidavit meant ``no sex of any kind.'' Admitting
    that would be to admit that he perjured himself previously in
    his grand jury testimony and in his deposition.
        Now, interestingly, Ms. Lewinsky doesn't bother attempting
    to match the President's linguistic deconstructions of the
    English language. After she was granted immunity, Monica
    Lewinsky testified under oath that the part of her affidavit
    denying a sexual relationship with the President was a lie.
        I read from page 204 of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony:

        Q. Let me ask you a straightforward question. Paragraph 8--

        Referring to her affidavit--

    at the start says, ``I have never had a sexual relationship
    with the President.'' Is that true?
        A. No.

        Thus, the President engaged in an evolving series of lies
    during his sworn testimony in order to cover previous lies he
    told in sworn testimony, and to conceal his conduct that
    obstructed justice in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit
    against him. He did this to deny Paula Jones her constitutional
    right to bring a case of sexual harassment against him and to
    sidetrack the investigation of the Office of Independent
    Counsel into his misconduct.
        Finally, the President committed perjury before the grand
    jury when he testified falsely about his blatant attempts to
    influence the testimony of potential witnesses and his
    involvement in a plan to hide evidence that had lawfully been
    subpoenaed in the civil rights action brought against him.
        This perjurious testimony breaks down into four categories:
        First, he made false and misleading statements to the grand
    jury concerning his knowledge of Monica Lewinsky's false
    affidavit.
        Second, he made false and misleading statements to the
    grand jury when he related a false account of his interaction
    with his secretary, Betty Currie, when he reasonably knew she
    might later be called before the grand jury to testify.
        Third, he made perjurious and misleading statements to the
    grand jury when he denied engaging in a plan to hide evidence
    that had been subpoenaed in the Jones civil rights case against
    him.
        Finally, he made perjurious and misleading statements to
    the grand jury concerning statements he made to his aides about
    Monica Lewinsky when he reasonably knew these aides might be
    called later to testify.
        Let's look briefly at the first area.
        The President made false and misleading statements before
    the grand jury regarding his knowledge of the contents of
    Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
        As we now know conclusively, Monica Lewinsky filed an
    affidavit in the Jones case in which she denied ever having a
    sexual relationship with the President, and that was a lie when
    it was filed.
        Remember, during his deposition in the Jones case, the
    President said that Ms. Lewinsky's denial of ever having a
    sexual relationship was ``absolutely true.''
        Monica Lewinsky later testified that she is ``100 percent
    sure'' that the President suggested she might want to sign an
    affidavit to avoid testifying in the case of Jones versus
    Clinton. In fact, the President gave the following testimony
    before the grand jury:

        And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an
    affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false
    affidavit? No, I did not.

        This testimony is false because it could not be possible
    that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit in
    the Jones case, an affidavit acknowledging a sexual
    relationship with the President, that would have helped her to
    avoid having to appear as a witness in the Paula Jones case.
        The attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking evidence of
    sexual relationships with the President and ones that the
    President might have had with other State or Federal employees.
        This information was legally obliged to be produced by the
    President to Paula Jones in her sexual harassment lawsuit
    against him to help prove her claim.
        Judge Susan Webber Wright had already ruled that Paula
    Jones was entitled to this information from the President for
    purposes of discovery.
        If Monica Lewinsky had filed a truthful affidavit that
    acknowledged a sexual relationship with the President, then she
    certainly could not have avoided having to testify in a
    deposition.
        The President knew this.
        His grand jury testimony on this subject is perjury.
        Next, the President provided false testimony concerning his
    conversations with his personal secretary, Betty Currie, about
    Monica after he testified in the Jones deposition.
        Recall Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation a short time
    ago. The President had just testified on January 17, 1998, in
    the Paula Jones deposition. He said he could not recall being
    alone with Monica Lewinsky and that he did not have a sexual
    relationship with her.
        After his testimony, on the very next day and in a separate
    conversation with her a few days later, President Clinton made
    statements to Ms. Currie that he knew were false.
        He made them to coach Ms. Currie and to influence her
    potential future testimony.
        He coached her by reciting inaccurate answers to possible
    questions that she might be asked if she were called to testify
    in the Paula Jones case.
        By the way, the President discussed his deposition
    testimony with Ms. Currie in direct violation of Judge Wright's
    order that he not discuss his testimony with anyone. Judge
    Wright warned the President at the deposition:

        Before he leaves, I want to remind him, as the witness in
    this matter, . . . that this case is subject to a Protective
    Order regarding all discovery, . . . [A]ll parties present,
    including . . . the witness are not to say anything whatsoever
    about the questions they were asked, the substance of the
    deposition, . . ., any details . . .

        After he coached her, the President wanted Betty Currie to
    be a witness.
        During his deposition testimony, the President did
    everything he could to suggest to the Jones lawyers they needed
    to depose Betty Currie. He did this by referring to her over
    and over again as the one with the information they needed for
    information about him and Monica Lewinsky.
        He stated to the Jones lawyer in his deposition, for
    example, that:

    . . . the last time he had seen Ms. Lewinsky was when she had
    come to the White House to see Ms. Currie; that Ms. Currie was
    present when the President had made a joking reference about
    the Jones case to Ms. Lewinsky; that Ms. Currie was his source
    of information about Vernon Jordan's assistance to Ms.
    Lewinsky; and that Ms. Currie had helped set up the meetings
    between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan regarding her move to New
    York.

        Because the President referred so often to Ms. Currie, it
    is obvious he wanted her to become a witness in the Jones
    matter, particularly if specific allegations of the President's
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky came to light.
        According to Ms. Currie, President Clinton even told her at
    some point that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky.
        Two and a half hours after he returned from the Paula Jones
    deposition, President Clinton called Ms. Currie at home and
    asked her to come to the White House the next day, a Sunday.
        Ms. Currie testified that it was rare for the President to
    ask her to come in on a Sunday.
        At about 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, January 18, Ms. Currie went
    to meet with President Clinton at the White House.
        Listen to what Betty Currie told the grand jury:

        He said that he had had his deposition yesterday, and they
    had asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. And I was a
    little shocked by that or--(shrugging). And he said--I don't
    know if he said--I think he may have said, ``There are several
    things you may want to know,'' or ``There are things--'' He
    asked me some questions.

        According to Ms. Currie, the President then said to her in
    rapid succession:

        You were always there when she was there, right? We were
    never really alone.
        You could see and hear everything.
        Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
        She wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.

        Ms. Currie indicated that these remarks were ``more like
    statements than questions.''
        Ms. Currie concluded that the President wanted her to agree
    with him.
        Ms. Currie also said that she felt the President made these
    remarks to see her reaction.
        Ms. Currie said that she indicated her agreement with each
    of the President's statements, although she knew that the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky had in fact been alone in the Oval
    Office and in the President's study.
        Ms. Currie also knew that she could not and did not hear or
    see the President and Ms. Lewinsky while they were alone.
        Ms. Currie testified that two or three days after her
    conversation with the President at the White House, he again
    called her into the Oval Office to discuss this.
        She described their conversation as ``sort of a
    recapitulation of what we had talked about on Sunday--you know,
    I was never alone with her--that sort of thing.''

        Q: [To Ms. Currie] Did he pretty much list the same?
        A: To my recollection, sir, yes.

        In his grand jury testimony, the President was asked why he
    might have said to Ms. Currie in their meeting on that Sunday:
    We were never alone together, right? You could see and hear
    everything.
        Here is how the President testified:

        [W]hat I was trying to determine was whether my
    recollection was right and that she was always in the office
    complex when Monica was there, and whether she thought she
    could hear any conversations we had, or did she hear any--I was
    trying to--I knew . . . to a reasonable certainty that I was
    going to be asked more questions about this. I didn't really
    expect you to be in the Jones case at the time. I thought what
    would happen is that it would break in the press, and I was
    trying to get the facts down. I was trying to understand what
    the facts were.

        The President told the grand jury that he was putting those
    questions to Betty Currie on that Sunday to refresh his
    recollection and trying to pin down what the facts were.
        Later, the President stated that he was referring to a
    larger area than simply the room where he and Ms. Lewinsky were
    located. He also testified that his statements to Ms. Currie
    were intended to cover a limited range of dates.
        Listen to the President's answer.

        A: [W]hen I said, we were never alone, right, I think I
    also asked her a number of other questions, because there were
    several times, as I'm sure she would acknowledge, when I either
    asked her to be around. I remember once in particular when I
    was talking with Ms. Lewinsky when I asked Betty to be in the,
    actually, in the next room in the dining room, and, as I
    testified earlier, once in her own office. But I meant that she
    was always in the Oval Office complex, in that complex, while
    Monica was there. And I believe that this was part of a series
    of questions I asked her to try to quickly refresh my memory.
    So, I wasn't trying to get her to say something that wasn't so.
    And, in fact, I think she would recall that I told her to just
    relax, go in the grand jury and tell the truth when she had
    been called as a witness.

        Now the President was treating the grand jury to his
    construction of what the word ``alone'' means to him.
        When asked he answered:

        It depends on how you define alone, and there were a lot of
    times when we were alone, but I never really thought we were.

        The President also was asked about his specific statement
    to Betty Currie that ``you could see and hear everything.'' He
    testified that he was uncertain what he intended by that
    comment:
        Question to the President:

        Q: When you said to Mrs. Currie, you could see and hear
    everything, that wasn't true either, was it, as far as you
    knew. . . .
        A: My memory of that was that, that she had the ability to
    hear what was going on if she came in the Oval Office from her
    office. And a lot of times, you know, when I was in the Oval
    Office, she just had the door open to her office. Then there
    was--the door was never completely closed to the hall. So I
    think there was--I'm not entirely sure what I meant by that,
    but I could have meant that she generally would be able to hear
    conversations, even if she couldn't see them. And I think
    that's what I meant.

        The President also was asked about his comment to Ms.
    Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had ``come on'' to him, but that he
    had ``never touched her.''
        Question to the President:

        Q: [I]f [Ms. Currie] testified that you told her, Monica
    came on to me and I never touched her, you did, in fact, of
    course, touch Ms. Lewinsky, isn't that right, in a physically
    intimate way?
        A: Now, I've testified about that. And that's one of those
    questions that I believe is answered by the statement that I
    made.
        Q: What was your purpose in making these statements to Mrs.
    Currie, if it weren't for the purpose to try to suggest to her
    what she should say if ever asked?
        A: Now, Mr. Bittman, I told you, the only thing I remember
    is when all this stuff blew up, I was trying to figure out what
    the facts were. I was trying to remember. I was trying to
    remember every time I had seen Ms. Lewinsky. . . . I knew this
    was all going to come out. . . . I did not know [at the time]
    that the Office of Independent Counsel was involved. And I was
    trying to get the facts and try to think of the best defense we
    could construct in the face of what I thought was going to be a
    media onslaught.

        Finally, the President was asked why he would have called
    Ms. Currie into his office a few days after the Sunday meeting
    and repeated the statements about Ms. Lewinsky to her.
        The President testified that although he would not dispute
    Ms. Currie's testimony to the contrary, he did not remember
    having a second conversation with her along these lines.
        Thus, the President referred to Ms. Currie many times in
    his deposition when describing his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        He himself admitted that a large number of questions about
    Ms. Lewinsky were likely to be asked in the very near future.
        The President reasonably could foresee that Ms. Currie
    either might be deposed or questioned or might need to prepare
    an affidavit.
        When he testified he was only making statements to Ms.
    Currie to ``ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain
    what Betty's perception was,'' this statement was false, and it
    was perjurious.
        We know it was perjury because the President called Ms.
    Currie into the White House the day after his deposition to
    tell her--not ask her, to tell her--that:

        he was never alone with Ms. Lewinsky;
        to tell her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them;
        and to tell her that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky.

        These were false statements, and he knew that the
    statements were false at the time he made them to Betty Currie.
        The President's suggestion that he was simply trying to
    refresh his memory when talking to Betty Currie is nonsense.
        What if Ms. Currie had confirmed these statements,
    statements the President knew were false? It could not in any
    way remind the President of what really happened in the Oval
    Office with Monica Lewinsky because the President already knew
    he was alone with Monica Lewinsky. The President already knew
    that obviously Ms. Currie could not always see him back in the
    Oval Office area with Monica Lewinsky. And the President
    already knew that he had an intimate sexual relationship with
    Monica Lewinsky.
        There is no logical way to justify his claim that he made
    these statements to Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection.
        The only reasonable inference from the President's conduct
    is that he tried to enlist a potential witness to back up his
    perjury from the day before at the deposition.
        The circumstances surrounding the President's statements
    clearly show, clearly show that he improperly sought to
    influence Ms. Currie's potential future testimony.
        His actions were an obstruction of justice and a blatant
    attempt to illegally influence the truthful testimony of a
    potential witness.
        And his later denials about it under oath were perjurious.
        Next, the President gave perjurious, false, and misleading
    testimony before the grand jury when he denied he was engaged
    in a plot to hide evidence that had been subpoenaed in the
    Paula Jones case.
        On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a
    subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
        The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in
    January, and the subpoena required her to produce each and
    every gift President Clinton had given her.
        Nine days after she received this subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky
    met with the President for about 45 minutes in the Oval Office.
        By this time, President Clinton knew that she had been
    subpoenaed in the case.
        At this meeting they discussed the fact that the gifts that
    he had given Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, including a
    hat pin--the first gift the President had ever given Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this
    meeting she said to the President,

        Well, you know, I--maybe I should put the gifts away
    outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe
    Betty.
        And he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't know''
    or ``Let me think about that.'' And left that topic.

        President Clinton provided the following explanation to the
    grand jury and to the House Judiciary Committee regarding this
    conversation:

        Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, ``what if they ask
    me about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know whether
    that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or earlier.
        Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told
    her ``that if they [the Jones Lawyers] asked her for gifts,
    she'd have to give them whatever she had. . . .''
        I simply was not concerned about the fact that I had given
    her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional gifts on December 28,
    1997.

        The President's statement that he told Ms. Lewinsky that if
    the attorneys for Paula Jones asked for the gifts, then she had
    to provide them, is perjurious.
        It strains all logic to believe the President would
    encourage Monica Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do so
    would have raised questions about their relationship and would
    go against all of their other efforts to conceal the
    relationship, including filing a false affidavit about their
    relationship. The fact that the President gave Monica Lewinsky
    additional gifts on December 28, 1998, doesn't exonerate the
    President. It demonstrates that the President never believed
    that Monica Lewinsky in light of all of their relationship, all
    of the cover stories, all of the plans that they had put
    forward, her willingness to subject herself to a perjury
    prosecution by filing a false affidavit, all of that was
    because he knew that Monica Lewinsky would never turn those
    gifts over pursuant to the subpoena. And as Ms. Lewinsky
    testified, she never questioned, as she said, ``that we were
    ever going to do anything but keep this quiet.''
        This meant that they would take, in her words, ``whatever
    steps needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet.
        By giving more gifts to Monica Lewinsky after she received
    a subpoena to appear in the Jones case, the President believed
    that Monica Lewinsky would never testify truthfully about their
    relationship.
        Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky said she could not answer why
    the President would give her more gifts on the 28th when he
    knew she had to produce gifts in response to the subpoena. She
    did testify, however, that----

        To me it was never a question in my mind and I--from
    everything he said to me, I never questioned him, that we were
    never going to do anything but keep this private, so that meant
    deny it and that meant do--take whatever appropriate steps
    needed to be taken, you know, for that to happen. . . . So by
    turning over these gifts, it would at least prompt [the Jones
    attorneys] to question me about what kind of friendship I had
    with the President. . . .

        After this meeting on the morning of December 28, Betty
    Currie called Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up
    gifts the President had given to Ms. Lewinsky.
        Monica Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury
    that a few hours after meeting with the President on December
    28, 1997, where they discussed what to do about the gifts he
    gave to her, Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky.
        Monica Lewinsky explained it to the grand jury as follows:

        Q. What did [Betty Currie] say?
        A. She said, ``I understand you have something to give
    me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give me.''
    Along those lines. . . .
        Q. When she said something along the lines of ``I
    understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The President
    says you have something for me,'' what did you understand her
    to mean?
        A. The gifts.

        Later in the day on December 28, Ms. Currie drove to Monica
    Lewinsky's home.
        Ms. Lewinsky gave Ms. Currie a sealed box that contained
    several gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President,
    including the hatpin that was specifically named in the Jones
    subpoena.
        As further corroboration, Monica Lewinsky had told the FBI
    earlier that when Betty Currie called her about these gifts, it
    sounded like Betty Currie was calling on her cell phone. Ms.
    Lewinsky gave her best guess on the time of day the call came
    on December 28.
        Although Ms. Lewinsky's guess on the hour the call came was
    a bit off, phone records were later produced revealing that
    Betty Currie in fact called Monica Lewinsky on her cell phone,
    just as Ms. Lewinsky had described it. The only logical
    conclusion is that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky about
    retrieving the President's gifts. There would have been no
    reason for Betty Currie, out of the blue, to return gifts
    unless instructed to do so by the President. Betty Currie
    didn't know about the gift issue ahead of time. Only the
    President and Monica Lewinsky had discussed it. There is no
    other way Ms. Currie could have known to call Monica Lewinsky
    about the gifts unless the President told her to do it.
        President Clinton perjured himself when he testified before
    the grand jury on this issue and reiterated to the House
    Judiciary Committee that he did not recall any conversation
    with Ms. Currie around December 28. He also perjured himself
    when he testified before the grand jury that he did not tell
    Betty Currie to take possession of the gifts that he had given
    Ms. Lewinsky.
        Question to the President:

        After you gave her the gifts on December 28th, did you
    speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up a
    box of gifts that were some compilation of gifts that Ms.
    Lewinsky would have----
        A. No, sir, I didn't do that.
        Q. --to give to Ms. Currie?
        A. I did not do that.

        The President had a motive to conceal the gifts because
    both he and Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts might
    raise questions about their relationship. By confirming that
    the gifts would not be produced, the President ensured that
    these questions would never arise. The concealment of these
    gifts from Paula Jones' attorneys allowed the President to
    provide perjurious statements about the gifts at his deposition
    in the Jones case.
        Finally, the President gave perjurious testimony to the
    grand jury concerning statements he gave to his top aides
    regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Here is a
    portion of his grand jury transcript, when the President
    testified about his conversation with key aides, once the
    Monica Lewinsky story became public.
        Question to the President:

        Q. Did you deny to them or not, Mr. President?
        A. . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I want
    to define language where I can say that. I also, frankly, do
    not want to turn any of them into witnesses because I--and sure
    enough, they all became witnesses.
        Q. Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't you?
        A. And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said,
    there is nothing go[ing] on between us. That was true. I said,
    I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And
    did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day
    giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do
    anything to complicate this matter further. So, I said things
    that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they
    were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.

        The President's testimony that day that he said things that
    were true to his aides is clearly perjurious. Just as the
    President predicted, several of the President's top aides were
    later called to testify before the grand jury as to what the
    President told them. And when they testified before the grand
    jury they passed along the President's false account, just as
    the President intended them to do.
        I will not belabor the point any further with the Members
    of this body because I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson ably
    presented that testimony.
        But we know from the evidence that Erskine Bowles, John
    Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, all came before the grand jury.
    They all provided testimony to the grand jury establishing that
    the President's comments to them were the truth. The President
    had them go in. The President gave them that information so
    false information would be shared with the grand jury so that
    the grand jury would never be armed with the truth. And when
    witnesses are called to come before this body, you will have an
    opportunity to make that determination.
        Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the United States Senate,
    posterity looks to this body to defend in a courageous way the
    public trust and take care that the basis of our Government is
    not undermined. On January 17, 1998, President Clinton, while a
    defendant in a civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit, gave
    sworn testimony in a deposition presided over by a Federal
    judge. In this deposition he raised his hand and he swore to
    tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
        On August 17, President Clinton testified before a Federal
    grand jury in a criminal investigation. At this appearance he
    raised his hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth. The evidence conclusively
    shows that the President rejected his obligations under oath on
    both occasions. He engaged in a serial pattern of perjury and
    obstruction of justice. These corrupt acts were done so he
    could deny a U.S. citizen, Ms. Paula Jones, her constitutional
    right to bring her claim against him in a court of law. In so
    doing, he intentionally violated his oath of office, his
    constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
    executed, and his solemn obligation to respect Ms. Jones'
    rights by providing truthful testimony under oath.
        The evidence reviewed by the House of Representatives and
    relied upon by our body in bringing articles of impeachment
    against the President was not political. It was overwhelming.
    He has denied all allegations set forth in these articles. Who
    is telling the truth? There is only one way to find out.
        On behalf of the House of Representatives, we urge this
    body to bring forth the witnesses and place them under oath. If
    the witnesses can make the case against the President, if the
    witnesses that make the case against the President--who,
    incidentally, are his employees, his top aides, his former
    interns, and his close friends--if all of these people in the
    President's universe are lying, then the President has been
    done a grave disservice. He deserves not just an acquittal; he
    deserves the most profound of apologies.
        But if they are not lying, if the evidence is true, if the
    Chief Executive Officer of our Nation used his power and his
    influence to corruptly destroy a lone woman's right to bring
    forth her case in a court of law, then there must be
    constitutional accountability, and by that I mean the kind of
    accountability the framers of the Constitution intended for
    such conduct and not the type of accountability that satisfies
    the temporary mood of the moment.
        Our Founders bequeathed to us a Nation of laws, not of
    polls, not of focus groups, and not of talk show habitues.
    America is strong enough to absorb the truth about their
    leaders when those leaders act in a manner destructive to their
    oath of office. God help our country's future if we ever decide
    otherwise.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the court stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and that
    all Members remain standing at their desks as the Chief Justice
    departs the Chamber. I further ask that after the court
    adjourns in a moment, the Senate will, while in legislative
    session, stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Thereupon, at 6:59 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, adjourned.

                                    ------

                            Friday, January 15, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:02 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer
        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Holy God, with awe and wonder we accept our
    responsibilities and our accountability to You. You are
    Sovereign of this land. When we commit our complexities to You,
    really seek Your guidance, You direct us. Make us attentive
    listeners, dedicated to the search for absolute truth. In the
    cacophony of voices, help us to hear Your voice.
        Dear Father, Your faithfulness never fails. You are
    consistent, reliable, and true. You expect nothing less from us
    for Your glory and for the good of America. To that end, fill
    this Chamber with Your presence and the minds of the Senators
    with Your gift of discernment. You are our Lord and Saviour.
    Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep
    silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States
    is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by
    the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there have been a number of
    inquiries from Senators and others about some clarification
    with regard to the approximate times or the times we would be
    meeting on Saturday and Tuesday, and also how the afternoon
    would proceed, so I will make some unanimous consent requests
    to clarify that and give you a brief rundown on what I think
    the schedule will be this afternoon.
      orders for saturday, january 16, 1999 and tuesday, january 19, 1999
        Mr. Chief Justice, as in legislative session, I ask
    unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business
    today it stand in adjournment until 10 a.m., on Saturday,
    January 16. I further ask that when the Senate reconvenes on
    Saturday, immediately following the prayer, the Senate resume
    consideration of the articles of impeachment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. I further ask unanimous consent that when the
    Senate completes its business on Saturday, it then adjourn over
    until Tuesday, January 19, at 9:30 a.m. I ask unanimous consent
    that on Tuesday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal
    of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed
    to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved
    for their use. I further ask consent that there then be a
    period for morning business until the hour of 11:30 a.m., with
    60 minutes under the control of the majority leader or his
    designee and 60 minutes under the control of the minority
    leader or his designee.
        I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday the Senate recess
    then from the hours of 11:30 a.m. until 1 p.m. for the weekly
    policy conferences. And I further ask consent that at 1 p.m.,
    on Tuesday, the Senate resume consideration of the articles of
    impeachment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    on Tuesday, following the conclusion of the presentation during
    the Court of Impeachment, the Senate recess until the hour of
    8:35 p.m., on Tuesday evening. And I ask consent that upon
    reconvening Tuesday evening the Senate proceed to the Hall of
    the House of Representatives in order to hear an address by the
    President regarding the State of the Union.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                               order of procedure
        Mr. LOTT. For the information of all my colleagues, then, I
    understand today's presentation is expected to continue until
    approximately 6 p.m., and there will be periodic breaks during
    the day to allow all Members to stand and stretch. I want to
    remind Senators to promptly return to their desks at the
    expiration of those 15-minute breaks in order that we can
    continue and complete at the earliest possible hour. I thank
    all Members for their cooperation.
        This afternoon we will hear from Congressman McCollum, take
    a 15-minute break, then hear from Congressmen Gekas, Chabot,
    and Cannon, and then take a break, and then Congressman Barr
    would complete the afternoon's presentations.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.
                                  the journal
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the
    managers for the House of Representatives have 18 hours 56
    minutes remaining to make the presentation of their case. The
    Senate will now hear you.
        The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum to
    resume the presentation of the case for the House of
    Representatives.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice, and my colleagues in the Senate, I drove
    in this morning to this Capitol. I drove up the George
    Washington Parkway, and I looked at the magnificent display of
    ice that was all over the trees, all over the grass, all over
    the foliage--a beautiful panorama.
        And just before I got to the 14th Street Bridge, I saw this
    incredible number of geese--I guess in the hundreds--that were
    lined up together between the highway and the Potomac River. It
    looked like they were an invading army. I thought of the awe of
    this, the awe of the beauty of it, the awe of Mother Nature,
    the awe of God. And I thought, also, of the awe of the
    responsibility we have to our children and our grandchildren
    about what we are commencing today. This is an awesome
    undertaking for all of us.
        I am here today to summarize for you what you heard
    yesterday. I do not want to bore you. I do not intend to do
    that. I am going to be as brief as I can. I am also here to
    help you digest the voluminous quantities of material that you
    have before you. There is a huge record out there. And I am
    also here to prepare you for the law discussion that is going
    to come after me about the law of the crimes of perjury and
    obstruction of justice and witness tampering.
        First of all, I want you to know I bear no personal
    animosity toward our President. But I happen to believe that if
    the President--if any President--commits the crimes of perjury,
    obstruction of justice, and witness tampering, he should not be
    allowed to remain in office, for if he is allowed to do so, it
    would undermine our courts and our system of justice.
        But that is for you to determine in the end, really, not
    me. That is my opinion. But you will have to weigh the
    evidence, you are going to have to hear the arguments, and
    ultimately make that decision. In fact, the first thing you
    have to determine is whether or not the President committed
    crimes. It is only if you determine he committed the crimes of
    perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering that you
    will move on to the question of whether he is removed from
    office. In fact, no one, none of us, would argue to you that
    the President should be removed from office unless you conclude
    he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed--
    not every one of them necessarily, but certainly a good
    quantity, and there are a whole bunch of them that have been
    charged.
        I would like to call your attention to a couple of things.
    First of all, I don't want to be a schoolteacher; I just want
    to relate my own experience to you so you can understand it. I
    have been involved with this a lot longer than most of you have
    probably been dealing with the details. I constantly have to
    refer back to things. Every time I read something, there is so
    much detail here, I learn something new.
        While I go over the evidence with you, we will summarize
    the evidence one more time. As you are deliberating, as you are
    thinking about it, I want to call a couple of places to your
    attention that are the easiest places to refer back to, to find
    the facts and evidence. First of all, there is the official
    report that is in the record of the House's consideration of
    this, the Judiciary Committee report. In that report, right in
    the first couple of pages, there is a table of contents. While
    a couple of the articles did not come over to you that are
    listed in here, there are detailed discussions you can get from
    this table of contents as to every single count and every
    single part of these articles so you can figure out what we are
    talking about today.
        Secondly, I would like to bring to your attention that
    there is a Starr Report, and I know that has been maligned by
    some people. This thing is so dogeared--I have underlined it,
    torn it apart, done all kinds of things with it. It is a good
    reference source. You can find from the footnotes where else to
    check it out. There are two parts. These are the appendices. In
    the first part, you can find the transcript of all the key
    depositions, all the key testimony, all of the evidence that we
    are talking about, and read it for yourselves.
        I don't want to leave here today having summarized this
    evidence, as long as I may take--and I don't want to take a
    long time, but I will take a little while--and have you go away
    and think, gosh, what all did McCollum or Hutchinson or Rogan
    or Bryant say yesterday? You can find and refresh yourself
    through that and through whatever information you have--trial
    briefs and all that you have.
        Let's look at what the record shows. President Clinton was
    sued by Paula Jones in a sexual harassment civil rights
    lawsuit. To bolster her case, she was trying to show that the
    President engaged in a pattern of illicit relations with women
    in his employment, where he rewarded those who became involved
    with him and disadvantaged those who rejected him, as Paula
    Jones did.
        Whatever the merits of that approach, on May 27, 1997, the
    U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a unanimous decision that ``like
    every other citizen''--and that is a quote--``like every other
    citizen, Paula Jones has a right to an orderly disposition of
    her claims.'' Then on December 11 of 1997, Judge Susan Webber
    Wright issued an order that said Paula Jones was entitled to
    information regarding any State or Federal employee with whom
    the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations,
    or sought to have sexual relations.
        The record shows that President Clinton was determined to
    hide his relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the Jones
    court. His lawyers will argue to you next week, I am sure, that
    he did everything to keep the relationship hidden and he did it
    in a legal way. They will say that he may have split a few
    hairs and evaded answers and given misleading answers but that
    it was all within the framework of responses and actions that
    any good lawyer would advise his client to do.
        They will also say if he crossed the line technically
    somewhere, he didn't do it knowingly or intentionally. Oh, how
    I wish that were true. We wouldn't be here today. But, alas,
    that is not so.
        If you believe the sworn testimony of Monica Lewinsky, if
    you believe her testimony that is in the record--and she is
    very credible--the President knowingly, intentionally, and
    willfully set out on a course of conduct in December 1997 to
    lie to the Jones court, to hide his relationship, and to
    encourage others to lie and hide evidence and to conceal the
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court. He engaged in
    a pattern of obstruction of justice, perjury, and witness
    tampering designed to deny the court what Susan Webber Wright,
    the judge in that court, had determined Paula Jones had the
    right to discover in order to prove her claim. If you believe
    the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, you cannot believe the
    President or accept the argument of his lawyers. You simply
    can't.
        The record is so clear on this that if you have any
    significant doubt about Monica Lewinsky's credibility or
    testimony, you should bring her in here and let us examine her
    face to face so you can judge her credibility for yourself.
        As you will hear explained later this afternoon, the same
    acts can constitute both the crimes of obstruction of justice
    and perjury, and the same acts can constitute the crimes of
    obstruction of justice and witness tampering. They are all cut
    from the same cloth. They are all crimes that obstruct the
    administration of justice and keep our courts from being able
    to get the evidence that they need to decide cases. Such
    obstruction is so detrimental to our system of justice that the
    Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for a greater punishment
    for perjury and obstruction of justice than they do for
    bribery.
        I want to show that to you. I know everybody can't see the
    chart. I think you have a handout of them. I will not show many
    charts today, but this is one about the sentencing guidelines.
    The guidelines rate these, in fact, in sequence. The most
    serious sentencing is a higher number; the lower number is the
    lower sentencing: Plain old vanilla bribery rights at a 10;
    other things are 8, 7, 4. Murder is way up there, much higher
    in the numbers. You will see that witness tampering is a 12,
    not a 10. Obstruction of justice is a 12, not a 10. Perjury is
    a 12, not a 10. All of them are the same. Interestingly enough,
    although I didn't put it on this chart, bribing a witness is
    different from plain vanilla bribery. If you try to bribe
    somebody in a business deal, that is one kind; if you go out
    and bribe a witness, that is another. Bribing a witness is also
    a 12.
        Now, I want to point that out right up front because the
    most important point that makes is that when you read the
    phrase in the Constitution that what is impeachable is treason,
    bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors, bribery is not
    considered by our court system. Pure bribery, plain old
    bribery, is not considered as serious in sentencing as perjury,
    witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and of course
    bribing a witness. They are all of the same cloth. Why? Because
    that interferes with the administration of justice. Because we
    can't have justice if people block the courts from getting at
    the truth. And if you go about doing it intentionally, you have
    committed these crimes.
        It should be pointed out that lies under oath in a court
    proceeding, whether or not they rise to the level of crimes of
    perjury, can be obstruction of justice. So when the President
    lied in the Jones deposition, this was part of the obstruction
    of justice charged under article II that is before you today,
    even though there is no separate count. And he lied a lot in
    that deposition. We will talk about that a little later. The
    fact that the House did not send you the article of impeachment
    for perjury in the Jones deposition does not keep you from
    considering the lies in that deposition as an obstruction of
    justice crime under article II that is before you. And you know
    that it is also incorporated in article I, because it is one of
    the four items specifically listed as the perjury that he lied
    about lying in the deposition.
        Now, having said that, think about all of this as one big
    obstruction, because perjury can be obstruction. Just plain
    lying can be obstruction. Witness tampering, by the way, is a
    separate crime because it is titled that way, but it is one of
    two separate obstruction of justice sections in the United
    States Criminal Code. It is just another version of obstruction
    of justice. So don't be confused. Witness tampering is
    obstruction of justice--literally, figuratively, and in every
    other way. But people think about it separately because it has
    a separate element, a lesser element of proof actually than
    obstruction of justice. But it is all part of the same fabric,
    again.
        To put the essence of all of this in a nutshell for you,
    think back on the evidence presented yesterday. I would suggest
    that President Clinton thought his scheme out well. He resented
    the Jones lawsuit. He was alarmed when Monica Lewinsky's name
    appeared on the witness list, and he was more alarmed when
    Judge Wright issued her orders signaling that the court would
    hear the evidence of other relationships. To keep his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the court, once Judge
    Wright issued her ruling, he knew he would have to lie to the
    court. To succeed at this, he decided that he had to get Monica
    Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, to try to avoid having her
    testify. And he needed to get her a job to make her happy, to
    make sure she executed that false affidavit, and then stick
    with her lies when she was questioned about it.
        Then the gifts were subpoenaed and he had to have her hide
    the gifts--the only tangible evidence of his relationship with
    her that would trigger questions. She came up with the idea of
    giving them to Betty Currie, and the President seized on it.
    Who would think Betty Currie should be called to produce the
    gifts? Nobody would. Then he would be free to lie in his
    deposition, and that is, of course, what he did. But after he
    did this, he realized that he had to make sure that Betty would
    lie and cover for him.
        He got his aides convinced to repeat the lies to the grand
    jury and to the public, and all of this worked--until the dress
    showed up. Then he lied to the grand jury to try to cover up
    and explain away his prior crimes.
        That is the case in a nutshell. That is why we are here
    today. That is what this evidence in the record shows, I
    believe, in an exceptionally compelling way.
        Now, let's review what happened and, as we do, I ask you to
    think back to what Mr. Bryant said to you yesterday. Always ask
    yourself, what are the results of the act and who benefited. I
    think you will find each time that it is the President who
    benefited. Now we are going to go over the facts.
        On December 5, 1997, a year ago, about a week before Judge
    Wright issued her order making it clear that the President's
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky was relevant to the Jones
    case, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the Jones witness list.
    The President learned this fact the next day, December 6. The
    President telephoned Monica Lewinsky at about 2 a.m. on
    December 17 and informed her about her name being on the
    witness list. That was about 10 days after he learned about it
    and about 5 days after Judge Wright's order. It was the order
    that made it clear that his relationship with Monica was
    discoverable by the Jones attorneys in that case.
        Long before this, though, long before the President was
    called to give a deposition or Monica Lewinsky was named on the
    witness list in the Jones case, the evidence shows she and the
    President had concocted cover stories. They had an
    understanding that she would lie about the relationship, and so
    would he, if anybody asked about it.
        During a telephone conversation on the 17th of December,
    the President told Monica she might be called as a witness, and
    he at that time suggested that she might file an affidavit to
    avoid being called as a witness to testify in person in that
    case. In the same conversation, they reviewed these cover
    stories that they had concocted to conceal their relationship.
    He brought them up. They went over them again.
        Why do you think they did that? In her grand jury
    testimony, Monica said the President didn't tell her to lie,
    but because of their previous understanding she assumed that
    they both expected that she would lie in that affidavit. In
    this context, the evidence is compelling that the President
    committed both the crimes of obstruction of justice and witness
    tampering right then and there on December 17.
        Now, Monica Lewinsky's testimony is so clear about this
    that the President's lawyers probably won't spend a lot of time
    with you on this; they didn't in the Judiciary Committee. I
    could be wrong, and they probably will just to show me I am
    wrong.
        I want us to look at this and specifically look at her
    testimony together because it is so compelling. On pages 123
    and 124 of her testimony--you can find it in Part 1 of the
    Starr Report. I know you can't see all of this that well back
    there, but you should have the charts. I point out in red on
    this chart the most important part of it. This is where she
    described the December 17 telephone conversation. I am going to
    read you part of it.
        She said here in red:

        At some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it was
    before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, he sort of said,
    ``You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you
    were bringing me letters,'' which I understood was really a reminder of
    things that we had discussed before.
        Question: So when you say things you had discussed, sort of ruses
    that you developed?
        Answer: Right. I mean, this was--this was something that--that was
    instantly familiar to me.
        Question: Right.
        Answer: And I knew exactly what he meant.
        Question: Had you talked with him earlier about these false
    explanations about what you were doing visiting him on several
    occasions?
        Answer: Several occasions throughout the entire relationship. Yes.
    It was the pattern of the relationship, to sort of conceal it.

        Now, let's look at another chart. Monica Lewinsky's August
    6 grand jury testimony, on pages 233 and 234. Both are from the
    August 6 grand jury testimony, where in the context of the
    affidavit she makes the now famous statement, ``No one asked or
    encouraged me to lie.'' She did say that, but let's look at how
    she said that:

        For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened was, you
    know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me
    either.

        ``. . . but no one discouraged me either.'' I don't know
    how many times anybody said that to you when they made their
    arguments, but that is what she said and the context.
        Later on, she says in her testimony on the same pages:

    . . . it wasn't as if the President called me and said, ``You know,
    Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to be really hard for
    us, we're going to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of
    the entire world about what we've done,'' which I would have fought him
    on probably. That was different. And by him not calling me and saying
    that, you know, I knew what that meant. . . .
        Question: Did you understand all along that he would deny the
    relationship, also?
        Answer: Mm-hmm. Yes.
        Question: And when you say you understood what it meant when he
    didn't say, ``Oh, you know, you must tell the truth,'' what did you
    understand that to mean?
        Answer: That--that--as we had on every other occasion and every
    other instance of this relationship, we would deny it.

        After reading this, if you believe Monica Lewinsky, can
    there be any doubt that the President was suggesting that she
    file an affidavit that contains lies and falsehoods that might
    keep her from ever having to testify in the Jones case and give
    the President the kind of protection he needed when he
    testified?
        And, of course, in that same December 17 conversation, the
    President encouraged Monica to use cover stories and tell the
    same lies as he expected her to do in the affidavit if and when
    she was called to testify live and in person. Both of those
    would be obstruction of justice and witness tampering. Taken
    together--encouraging her to file this false affidavit that she
    clearly describes here, and the encouraging of her to lie if
    she is ever called as a witness--both of these are counts 1 and
    2 of the obstruction of justice charge.
        If I don't leave you with any other impression walking away
    from here today, I want you to think about this. This is the
    clearest, boldest, most significant obstruction of justice
    charge. I don't see how anybody can walk away from it and
    explain it away. It is a pattern. It should not be looked at in
    isolation. Think about it. It is the kickoff to what really
    happened. It is why we got involved in this in the first place.
    The President had a scheme and he went through this process.
    And it all ties together with the rest of it.
        Two days later, Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed and
    contacted Vernon Jordan who put her in touch with Attorney
    Frank Carter. That is the attorney he picked out. As we all
    know, this very false affidavit that Frank Carter prepared--
    and, of course, knowing it was false when he prepared it, but
    Monica knew it and the President knew it--was filed just before
    the President's deposition in the Jones case January 17. The
    record shows that the President was kept abreast of the
    participation by Vernon Jordan and all of its contents, and
    Jordan advised the President when Monica signed the affidavit
    on January 7. He advised the President of that fact. Two days
    before Monica says in a conversation she asked the President if
    he wanted to see the draft affidavit, he replied--you recall
    from yesterday--he replied that he didn't need to see it
    because he had already seen ``15 others.''
        I doubt seriously he was talking about 15 other affidavits
    of somebody else and didn't like looking at affidavits anymore.
    I suspect and I would suggest to you that he was talking about
    15 other drafts of this proposed affidavit since it had been
    around the horn a lot of rounds.
        The circumstantial evidence makes it clear the President
    knew the context of the Lewinsky affidavit and he knew it was
    false.
        During the President's deposition in the Jones case on
    January 17, his attorney, Robert Bennett, at one point tried to
    stop the Jones lawyers from asking the President about his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky by pointing out the affidavit
    she had signed.
        I think we all remember that because there was a lot of
    that on TV up here yesterday. Mr. Bennett asserted at the time
    that the affidavit indicated ``there is no sex of any kind,
    manner, shape or form.'' That is what he said. After a warning
    from Judge Wright, Mr. Bennett stated, ``I'm not coaching the
    witness. In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the
    witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have
    not told him a single thing he doesn't know.'' The President
    did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even though he
    knew the affidavit was false. The judge allowed the questioning
    to proceed and later Mr. Bennett read to the President a
    portion of paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit in which
    she denied having a ``sexual relationship'' with the President
    and asked him if Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and
    accurate, to which the President responded, ``That is
    absolutely true.''
        I am not going back over and putting that on the screen
    again. But I do want to put up here before you what you have in
    front of you, paragraph 8 of Monica Lewinsky's affidavit.
        Paragraph 8 of her affidavit was absolutely false, and the
    President knew it.
        I want to go over that a little bit. What it says up here
    at the beginning of it is, ``I have never had a sexual
    relationship with the President. He did not propose that we
    have a sexual relationship,'' and so on. And we have a lot
    about that. But look at what it says down at the end of this.
    What is down at the end of this--you have it in front of you.
    It says down here, ``The occasions that I saw the President
    after I left my employment at the White House in April 1996
    were official receptions, formal functions, or events related
    to the United States Department of Defense, where I was working
    at the time. There were other people present on those
    occasions.''
        I just want to point out to you that paragraph 8, which was
    the subject of a lot of discussions, which the President
    certainly was fully aware of--which you watched where he was
    intensely responding, with regard to Mr. Bennett yesterday in
    that deposition--didn't just contain a lie about a sexual
    relationship where you quibble over a word, it is a full-
    fledged lie and a cover story about this. None of that is true.
    Monica Lewinsky saw him a lot of other times, and the President
    certainly knew that. They weren't all official events or
    anything else. This is a complete falsehood, paragraph 8, and
    the President knew it.
        At that point in time when he allowed his attorney on the
    day of the deposition to make a false and misleading statement
    to the judge--and the attorney didn't know that--but it was a
    false and misleading statement to the judge characterizing this
    affidavit, he knew better. And the President at that point in
    time committed the crime of obstruction of justice. And that is
    count 5 of article II.
        Now, the President's lawyers are going to argue that he sat
    silent because he wasn't paying attention, and he didn't hear
    or appreciate what Mr. Bennett was saying. We have already seen
    the video. And you know that he was looking so intently.
    Remember he was intensely following the conversation with his
    eyes. I don't know if you watched it on TV yesterday and
    observed that. It was played twice. I don't know how anybody
    can say this man wasn't paying attention. He certainly wasn't
    thinking about anything else. That was very obvious from
    looking at the video.
        The President's other defense also falls apart on its face.
    During his grand jury testimony, the President argued that when
    Mr. Bennett characterized the Lewinsky affidavit as indicating
    ``there is no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape or form''
    that it was a completely true statement because at that
    particular time, at that moment, when the statement was being
    made on January 17, 1998, there was no sex going on. That was
    when the President made his famous utterings to the jury, ``It
    depends on what the meaning of the word `is' is.'' That is when
    he said that. Of course the President knew perfectly well that
    the context of Mr. Bennett's discussions with the judge and
    characterization of the Lewinsky affidavit was referring to the
    denial in paragraph 8 of the affidavit that there had never
    been any sexual relationship at any time, not that there was no
    sex or sexual relationship going on on January 17, the day of
    the deposition.
        I implore you not to get hung up on some of the details. It
    is absurd, some of the arguments that are being made and have
    been made by the President and his attorneys to try to explain
    this.
        This is a perfect example of that. When we start looking
    around at this, you can't see the forest sometimes for the
    trees. The big picture is what you need to keep in mind, not
    the compartmentalized portion. There will be a lot of effort, I
    am sure, to try to go and pick at one thing or another. But
    this is an extraordinarily good example of how the argument
    failed when put in that situation. And we shouldn't play word
    games.
        When Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify, she was
    also subpoenaed to produce any gifts that the President had
    given her. When she met with Vernon Jordan the day she received
    the subpoena, she told him of her concerns about the gifts and
    she asked him to tell the President about the subpoena.
        Early in the morning on December 28, near the end of the
    year, they met, the President and Monica, in his office, and
    they exchanged gifts and discussed the gifts being subpoenaed.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky, she suggested that maybe she should
    put the gifts away outside of her house somewhere or give them
    to somebody like Betty Currie. She says he responded--the
    President responded--with an ``I don't know,'' or ``let me
    think about that.'' She was very clear that at no point did he
    ever give her the impression that she should turn the gifts
    over to the Jones attorneys.
        That is consistent with their cover stories--the one later
    and later in the perjury where the count discusses his lying to
    the grand jury. Consistent with their cover stories and all the
    plans for denying the relationship, her testimony in this
    regard is very believable.
        On the other hand, the President's testimony in front of
    the grand jury that encouraged her to turn all of the gifts
    over to the Jones attorneys is not believable. How can nobody
    believe that? When he said that to the grand jury, he committed
    perjury. When a few hours later, according to Monica Lewinsky,
    Betty Currie called her on the telephone and said, ``I
    understand you have something to give me,'' or maybe she said,
    ``the President said you have something to give me,'' and Betty
    Currie came over and got the gifts and took them back and hid
    them under her bed, at that moment, the President's crime of
    obstruction of justice, as described in count 3 of article II,
    was complete.
        Remember, by its nature, obstruction of justice charges in
    crimes are most frequently proven by circumstantial evidence.
    As somebody said here the other day, we don't tell people we
    are going to go out under the elm tree and lie and obstruct
    things. Usually it is a lot more circuitous than that. In the
    context of all that was going on at the time and the general
    truthfulness of Monica Lewinsky's testimony, and other
    respects, how can anyone come to any other conclusion than that
    the President collaborated with Monica and Betty to hide these
    gifts on December 28? How can they? The sequence is there.
        The President's lawyers may spend a lot of time attacking
    this particular obstruction of justice charge. They may
    question why the President would have given Monica Lewinsky
    more gifts on December 28 if he was expecting her to hide the
    gifts. Monica's explanation and her testimony is ``from
    everything he said to me,'' he expected her to conceal the
    gifts, including the ones being given that day. When Ms.
    Currie's call came, wasn't it the logical thing for Monica to
    conclude that this was the result of the President having
    thought about what to do with the gifts, which he said he was
    going to do, according to her, and deciding to have Ms. Currie
    hide them?
        That is the logical thing.
        The President's attorneys will no doubt also question the
    veracity of Ms. Lewinsky with regard to who made the phone
    call, since Ms. Currie's recollection isn't very good. And at
    first she says she recalls Monica made it. Of course, the phone
    records indicate that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky. That is
    the much more logical sequence.
        Also it doesn't make sense that the President's secretary,
    who is so close to him--think about it--that she would have
    taken the gifts and would have hidden them under her bed and
    never talked with the President about doing so before or after
    she did so. That doesn't make sense.
        It is also noteworthy that the President did everything he
    could in his January 17 deposition to conceal the true nature
    of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This is consistent
    with the arguments that he never intended the gifts be kept
    from the Jones attorneys. He never intended them to be given to
    the Jones attorneys. If he had intended to give these gifts to
    the Jones attorneys, or have them given, why would he have gone
    through this elaborate series of lies in that deposition?
    Common sense tells us if he knew these gifts were revealed,
    questions would be raised and his relationship revealed.
        So all the logic is there. I don't know how you refute it.
        Another obstruction count the President's attorneys are
    likely to spend time on is one concerning the job search. There
    is no question that Monica Lewinsky was looking for a job in
    New York a long time before we get to December of 1997 and when
    the affidavit and all of this took place, long before the
    President had reason to be concerned that she would have to
    testify or he would have to testify in the case. There is no
    question about that. That is not the issue. The question is
    whether or not the President intensified his efforts to get her
    a job and make sure she got one after it became clear to him
    that he would need her to lie, sign a false affidavit, and
    stick with her lies in any questioning. That is what counts.
    That is what is important. Did he intensify his efforts and
    really go after it? Was it part of that pattern I described to
    you earlier which Mr. Hutchinson described yesterday? That is
    what is important.
        In other words, as count 34 of article II alleges, did she
    make sure she was rewarded with sticking with him in a scheme
    of concealment in anticipation that this reward would keep her
    happy and keep her from turning on him? Did the President make
    sure Monica Lewinsky signed a false affidavit by getting her a
    job?
        The record shows that while she did give some interviews
    from earlier contacts, including one involving the job with the
    U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, no one of real influence
    around the President put on a full court press to get her a job
    and she had not had any success as of December 6.
        She had not been able to get in touch with Vernon Jordan in
    her recent efforts. He had met with her once in November, but
    as you recall from yesterday's discussions, something he didn't
    even have a good memory of. He certainly wasn't very focused on
    it, and she wasn't getting where she wanted to get.
        And so on December 6 she mentioned that fact to the
    President. Remember, that is one day after she was named on a
    witness list. In fact, that is the day that he learned or may
    have learned--we know he learned of her being on that witness
    list. The President met with Vernon Jordan the next day, but he
    apparently didn't mention Ms. Lewinsky, according to Jordan's
    testimony. The record shows that not only on December 11 did
    Mr. Jordan act to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job when he met with
    her and gave her a list of contact names on December 11, Mr.
    Jordan that same day made calls to contacts at MacAndrews &
    Forbes, the parent corporation of Revlon, and two other New
    York companies. He also telephoned the President to keep him
    informed of his efforts.
        Keep in mind that on this day, this very same day, December
    11, Judge Wright issued her order in the Jones case entitling
    Jones' lawyers to discover the President's sexual relations. Is
    that a mere coincidence?
        Later in December, Monica Lewinsky interviewed with New
    York-based companies that had been contacted by Mr. Jordan. She
    discussed her move to New York with the President during that
    meeting on December 28. On January 5, she declined a United
    Nations offer. On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false
    affidavit. The next day, on January 8, she interviewed in New
    York with MacAndrews & Forbes, but the interview went very
    poorly. Learning of this, Vernon Jordan, that very day, called
    Ronald Perelman, the chairman of the board of MacAndrews &
    Forbes. She was interviewed the next morning again, and a few
    hours later she received an informal offer. She told Jordan
    about it. He immediately told Betty Currie about it, and he
    personally told the President about it later.
        On January 13, her job offer at Revlon was formalized, and
    within a day or so President Clinton told Erskine Bowles that
    Ms. Lewinsky had found a job in the private sector. It was a
    big relief to him.
        Then her false affidavit was filed, and on January 17 the
    President gave a deposition relying on the false affidavit and
    using their cover stories to conceal their relationship.
        Was this full court press in December and early January to
    assure Monica Lewinsky had a job just a coincidence? Logical
    common sense says no; the President needed her to continue to
    cooperate in his scheme to hide their relationship, keeping her
    happy so he could control her and he would be assured that she
    had filed this false affidavit and testifying untruthfully if
    she was called. It is the only plausible rationale for this
    stepped-up job assistance effort at this particular time. In
    doing so, the President committed the crimes of obstruction of
    justice and witness tampering as set forth in count 4 of
    article II.
        Well, we have gone through quite a few of these, and I am
    trying to be brief with you, but I think each one of them is
    important. Each one of them entangles the President further in
    a web that fits together, and it is kind of sticky just like
    the one the spider weaves.
        During his deposition in the Jones case, the President
    referred to Betty Currie several times and suggested that she
    might have answers to some of the questions. He used the cover
    stories, the same ones he and Monica talked about, and he
    talked about Betty Currie a good deal because she was a part of
    those cover stories. When he finished the deposition, he
    telephoned Ms. Currie, and he asked her to come to his office
    the next day and talk with him. Betty Currie told the grand
    jury when she came in the next day the President raised his
    deposition with her and said there were several things he
    wanted to know, then rattled off what you heard yesterday in
    succession: You were always there when she was there, right? We
    never were really alone. You can see and hear everything.
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She
    wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do that.
        All of those weren't true. They were all falsehoods. They
    were all declaratory statements. They weren't questions. It is
    clear from the record that Ms. Currie always tried her best to
    be loyal to the President, her boss. That is normal. That is
    natural.
        In answering the questions in her testimony, she tried to
    portray the events and the President's assertions in the light
    most favorable to him, even though she acknowledges that she
    could not hear and see everything that went on between Monica
    and the President and that she wasn't actually present in the
    same room with them on any number of occasions, so they were
    alone. And she could not say what they might have been doing or
    saying.
        On January 20 or 21, the President again met with Ms.
    Currie and, according to her, recapitulated what he said on
    Sunday, a day or two before, right after the deposition. In the
    context of everything, it seems abundantly clear that the
    President was trying to make sure that Betty Currie
    corroborated his lies and cover stories from the deposition if
    she was ever called to testify in the Jones case or grand jury
    or any other court proceeding. That is what he was doing. In
    doing so, the President committed the crimes of witness
    tampering and obstruction of justice.
        Later, the President testified, rather disingenuously, in
    my judgment, that he was simply trying to refresh his memory
    when he was talking to Ms. Currie. Ms. Currie's confirmation of
    false statements that the President made in his deposition
    could not in any way remind him of the facts. They were
    patently untrue. The idea that he was trying to refresh his
    recollection is implausible.
        Recognizing the weakness of their client's case on this,
    the President's attorneys have suggested that he was worried
    about what Ms. Currie might say if the press really got after
    her. That is what we heard, at least over in the Judiciary
    Committee. Of course, it is possible the President was worried
    about the press. I would suspect so. But common sense says he
    was much more worried about what Betty Currie might say to a
    court, after he had just named her several times and talked
    about her, if she were called as a witness.
        As those who follow me will tell you, the arguments by the
    President's lawyers that Betty Currie wasn't on the Jones
    witness list at the time and the window of opportunity to call
    her as a witness in that case closed shortly thereafter is
    irrelevant. They are going to argue--they argued to us that
    Betty Currie's name wasn't on the witness list. That is a big
    deal, they say. They say. But it is irrelevant. It doesn't
    matter. Witness tampering law doesn't even require that a
    pending judicial proceeding be going on for it to be a crime.
    So whether her name was on the witness list or not makes no
    difference.
        There are two types of obstruction of justice. One does
    require a pending proceeding. I submit--and you will hear more
    about this later in the law--that in this instance the
    President committed both of them. He certainly should have
    anticipated that she would be called in the pending proceeding
    that was going on in the Jones case, but even if there was no
    pending proceeding--and you will, again, hear more about this
    later--for the witness tampering part of the obstruction of
    justice, it doesn't require there to have been an ongoing
    judicial proceeding.
        Within 4 or 5 days of his Jones deposition, the President
    not only explicitly denied the true nature of his relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky to key White House aides, he also
    embellished the story when he talked with Sidney Blumenthal. To
    Sidney Blumenthal, he portrayed Monica Lewinsky as the
    aggressor, attacked her reputation by portraying her as a
    stalker and presented himself as the innocent victim being
    attacked by the forces of evil. Certainly he wanted his denial
    and his assertions to be spread to the public by these aides,
    but at the same time he knew that the Office of Independent
    Counsel had recently been appointed to investigate the Monica
    Lewinsky matter. He knew that at the time.
        In the context of everything else that he was doing to hide
    his relationship, it seems readily apparent that his false and
    misleading statements to his staff members, whom he knew were
    potential witnesses before any grand jury proceeding, were
    designed in part to corruptly influence their testimony as
    witnesses. In fact, the President actually acknowledged this in
    his grand jury testimony, that he knew his aides might be
    called before the grand jury. And one of the aides testified he
    expected to be called. Sure enough, they were, and they
    repeated the false and misleading information he had given
    them. In this, the President committed the crimes of witness
    tampering and obstruction of justice as set forth in count 7 of
    article II.
        Now, that is the obstruction of justice. Let's briefly
    review the grand jury perjury for a minute.
        If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the
    grand jury and committed perjury. If you believe her--and I
    think this one is very important, not that they all aren't.
    There was the web of the obstruction that I just described and
    then there is the grand jury perjury on top of it. I told you
    earlier, perjury and just plain lying can all be obstruction of
    justice as well. But the grand jury part is much later. It is
    after the President had time to really reflect on all of this,
    a long time later.
        If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President lied to the
    grand jury and committed perjury in denying he had sexual
    relations with Monica Lewinsky even if you accept his
    interpretation of the Jones court's definition of sexual
    relations. That is really important. There isn't anything
    clearer in the whole darned matter than that. Just look at the
    President's grand jury testimony. And I am not going to go over
    all of that, but it is on pages 93 and 96 of his grand jury
    testimony. It is laid out in this chart which you have in front
    of you, and I encourage you to read every page of it carefully.
    Specifically, I call your attention to the fact--again, I am
    not going to read all of this--but they asked him about
    touching certain parts of the body that are defined in the
    definition that you have had repeated many times, publicly and
    otherwise. And two of those body parts he acknowledges, the
    breast and genitalia, were in fact part of the definition. And
    at the end of this--and I think this is very important; and I
    am going to read it because it is part of his testimony--he
    answers the question that is the compelling bottom line crime.
    This is where he perjured himself above all else:

        You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did not
    have sexual relations, as I understood this term to be defined.
        Q. Including touching her breasts, kissing her breasts, or
    touching her genitalia?
        A. That's correct.

        In her sworn testimony, Monica Lewinsky described nine
    incidents of which the President touched and kissed her breasts
    and four incidents involving contact with her genitalia. On
    these matters, Lewinsky's testimony is corroborated by the
    sworn testimony of at least six friends and counselors to whom
    she related these incidents contemporaneously.
        Again, if you believe the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, and
    it certainly is credible here--I think it is credible
    throughout but it is certainly credible, with all the
    corroboration you have in the record--there is nothing clearer
    in all of this, in all of this you have before you, than that
    the President committed the crime of perjury in testifying
    before the grand jury regarding the nature and details of his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
        On the other hand, there is plenty here to indicate the
    President cleverly created his own narrow definition of sexual
    relations to include only sexual intercourse, absent the
    explicit definition of the court, after he had already lied in
    responding to the interrogatories and other pleadings and
    perhaps even in the depositions themselves in the Jones case.
    In other words, you are free to deduce that he knew full well
    what most people would include as sexual relations, oral sex,
    and the other intimate activities that he was engaged in with
    Ms. Lewinsky, before he contrived his own definition. In that
    case, you don't even have to rely on Monica Lewinsky's
    testimony to conclude that he committed the crime of perjury in
    testifying before the grand jury on the nature of his
    relationship with her.
        There are other perjurious lies the President's grand jury
    testimony contains regarding the nature and details of his
    relationship with her. I am not going to outline all of those.
    I want to call your attention to one. The President's prepared
    statement, given under oath, said, ``I regret that what began
    as a friendship came to include this conduct.'' You may
    remember that from Mr. Rogan, I think, yesterday. ``I regret
    that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct.''
    That is what he said in the grand jury. The evidence indicates
    that he lied. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship with
    the President began with flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky
    showing the President her underwear, and just a couple of hours
    later they were kissing and engaging in intimacies. That is a
    little bit more than friendship. He lied when he said that to
    the grand jury.
        Before the grand jury, the President swore that he
    testified truthfully at his deposition. Remember, I told you I
    was going to come back to this. It is important because the
    Paula Jones deposition testimony is relevant to obstruction of
    justice but it is also relevant to the perjury here, because
    one of the portions of the perjury article that we have before
    us includes this issue of lying in the deposition. The perjury
    in this case is not the lying in the deposition, it is the
    lying to the grand jury about whether he lied in the
    deposition. He didn't have to have committed perjury. We didn't
    send you the perjury count over from the deposition. But if he
    lied--lying can be less than perjury. If he lied in the
    deposition, and then he told the grand jury that he didn't lie,
    he committed perjury in front of the grand jury.
        The evidence indicates that he did lie. He testified before
    the grand jury that ``my goal in this deposition was to be
    truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined
    to walk through the minefield of this deposition without
    violating the law and I believe I did.''
        Contrary to this testimony, the President was alone with
    Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, which he even
    conceded in his grand jury statement. So he lied in the
    deposition then when he said he wasn't alone with her.
        In the deposition, the President swore he could never
    recall being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. Lewinsky
    except when she was perhaps delivering pizza. The evidence
    indicates that he lied.
        The President swore, in the Jones deposition, that he could
    not recall gifts exchanged between Monica Lewinsky and himself.
    The evidence indicates that he lied.
        He swore, in the deposition, that he did not know whether
    Monica Lewinsky had been served a subpoena to testify in the
    Jones case at the last time that he saw her in December 1997.
    The evidence indicates that he lied.
        In his deposition, the President swore that the last time
    he spoke to Monica Lewinsky was when she stopped by before
    Christmas 1997 to see Betty Currie at a Christmas party. The
    evidence indicates that he lied.
        In his deposition in the Jones case, the President swore
    that he didn't know that his personal friend, Vernon Jordan,
    had met with Monica Lewinsky and talked about the case. The
    evidence indicates that he lied.
        The President, in his Paula Jones deposition, indicated
    that he was ``not sure'' whether he had ever talked to Monica
    Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to
    testify in the Jones case. Can anybody doubt the evidence
    indicates that he lied?
        The President, in his deposition, swore that the contents
    of the affidavit executed by Monica Lewinsky in the Jones case,
    in which she denied they had a sexual relationship, were
    ``absolutely true.'' The evidence indicates that he lied.
        In other words, when the President swore in the grand jury
    testimony that his goal in the Jones deposition was to be
    truthful but not particularly helpful, the evidence is clear
    that he lied and committed the crime of perjury, inasmuch as he
    had quite intentionally lied on numerous occasions in his
    deposition testimony in the Jones case. His intention, in that
    deposition, was to be untruthful. That is what it was all
    about, to be untruthful. So he committed the crime of perjury
    in front of the grand jury--big time.
        The third part of article I concerning grand jury perjury
    relates to his not telling the truth about false and misleading
    statements his attorney, Robert Bennett--unintentionally, Mr.
    Bennett, by the way, but nonetheless false and misleading
    statements--Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright during the
    President's Jones case deposition. We have been on that a lot.
    I don't want to bore you with going over all those details
    again, but this is the third part of the perjury count as well
    as an obstruction of justice count.
        During the President's deposition in the Jones case, Mr.
    Bennett, however unintentional on his part, misled the court
    when he said, ``Counsel [counsel for Ms. Jones] is fully aware
    that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in
    possession of saying that there is no sex of any kind, of any
    manner shape or form, with President Clinton . . .'' Judge
    Wright, as you recall again, interrupted Mr. Bennett and
    expressed her concern that he might be coaching the President,
    to which Mr. Bennett responded, ``in preparation of the witness
    for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms.
    Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he
    doesn't know . . .''
        In his grand jury testimony about these statements by Mr.
    Bennett to the judge in the Jones case, the President
    testified:

        I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he was saying. .
    . . I didn't pay much attention to this conversation which is
    why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the
    deposition . . . I don't believe I ever even focused on what
    Mr. Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started
    reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That
    moment, the whole argument just passed me by.

        In so testifying before the grand jury, the President lied
    and committed the crime of perjury. As you saw yesterday in the
    video, during this portion of that deposition when Mr. Bennett
    was discussing this matter with Judge Wright, the President
    directly looked at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his
    argument to Judge Wright. He lied about that to the grand jury.
    He committed perjury when he said that he wasn't paying
    attention and he didn't know what Mr. Bennett was saying.
        Several of the most blatant examples of grand jury perjury
    are found in that portion of his testimony cited in the fourth
    part, the last part of article I which goes to his efforts, the
    President's efforts, to influence the testimony of witnesses
    and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. The
    President swore during the grand jury testimony that he told
    Ms. Lewinsky that if the Jones lawyers requested the gifts
    exchanged between them, she should provide them. If you believe
    Monica Lewinsky's testimony, the President lied and committed
    perjury.
        In her grand jury testimony, Ms. Lewinsky discussed in
    detail the December 28 meeting where gifts were discussed which
    preceded by a couple of hours Ms. Currie coming to her
    apartment and taking the gifts and hiding them under a bed. As
    you recall, she said she raised with the President the idea of
    removing her gifts from her house and giving them to somebody
    like Betty Currie and that his response was something to the
    effect of, ``Let me think about that.''
        She went on to say that from everything he said to her,
    they were not going to do anything but keep these gifts
    private. In a separate sworn statement, she testified she was
    never under the impression from anything the President said
    that she should turn over the gifts to the Jones attorneys, and
    obviously she didn't have the idea that she should do that
    because she gave them all to Betty Currie to hide under the
    bed.
        When the President told the grand jurors that he was simply
    trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made a series of
    statements to Betty Currie the day after his deposition, he
    lied and committed perjury. As I have already pointed out to
    you today, the evidence is compelling that those statements,
    such as ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' were
    made to try to influence Betty Currie's possible testimony, so
    that she would corroborate his cover stories and other false
    statements and lies that he had given the previous day in the
    Jones deposition, if she was called as a witness.
        If you conclude that these series of statements constitute
    witness tampering and obstruction of justice, then you must
    also conclude that the President committed perjury when he
    asserted that the sole purpose of these statements to Betty
    Currie was to ``refresh'' his recollection. You have to. Even
    if you were to buy the President's counsel's suggestion these
    statements might have been made to influence her in order for
    her to corroborate him, not in actual testimony in a court case
    but with the press, which they have said again to us--I don't
    know if they will say it to you--you would still conclude he
    was lying when he said that this was simply only to refresh his
    own recollection.
        In the context of all of this, the idea that he was
    refreshing his recollection by firing off these declarative
    statements doesn't make sense. It just doesn't make sense. If
    you read the statements and think about them on their face,
    they are inherently inconsistent with refreshing his
    recollection.
        Also, the President told the grand jury that the things he
    told his top aides about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky
    may have been misleading but they were true. If you believe the
    aides testified truthfully to the grand jury about what the
    President told them about his relationship, the President told
    them many falsehoods, absolute falsehoods. So when the
    President described them under oath to the grand jury as
    truths, he lied and committed the crime of perjury.
        One example of this comes from Deputy Chief John Podesta in
    his testimony before the grand jury on January 23 that the
    President explicitly told him that he and Monica Lewinsky had
    not had oral sex. Another is Sidney Blumenthal. His testimony
    was that on January 23 the President told him that Monica
    Lewinsky ``came at me and made a sexual demand on me'' and that
    he rebuffed her. And also Blumenthal's testimony that the
    President told him that Lewinsky threatened him and said that
    she would tell people that they had had an affair and that she
    was known as a stalker among her peers.
        In short, the President lied numerous times before the
    grand jury, my colleagues. He lied numerous times under oath
    last August 17. He committed perjury numerous times under oath.
    He certainly wasn't caught by surprise by any of this, by any
    of the questions that were asked him during the grand jury
    appearance, and he was given a lot of latitude. He was given
    latitude normally that grand jury witnesses don't have--to give
    a prepared statement, to have his counsel present, to refuse to
    answer questions without taking the fifth amendment.
        It is hard to imagine a case where it is clear that the
    lies meet the threshold of the crime of perjury. But I will
    leave the discussion of the elements and the law to the next
    group that is going to come up here.
        The facts are clear that the President lied about having
    sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky even under his
    understanding of the definition of the Jones case if you
    believe Monica.
        He lied when he said he gave truthful testimony in his
    Jones deposition.
        He lied when he said he wasn't paying attention to his
    attorney's discussion of Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit
    during his deposition in the Jones case.
        He lied when he said he told Monica Lewinsky she should
    turn over the gifts to the Jones lawyers if they asked for
    them.
        He lied when he told the grand jury that he made the
    declaratory statements to Betty Currie to refresh his
    recollection.
        And he lied when he told the grand jury that he only told
    the truth to his White House aides, such as John Podesta who
    testified the President told him he had not had oral sex with
    Lewinsky, and to Sidney Blumenthal who testified he told him
    very exaggerated and highly untrue characterizations of Monica
    Lewinsky's role in all of this.
        These impeachment proceedings aren't before you because of
    one or two lies about a sexual relationship. This is not about
    sex. This is about obstruction of justice. This is about a
    pattern. This is about a scheme. This is about a lot of lies.
    This is about a lot of perjury. They are before you because the
    President lied again and again in a perjurious fashion to a
    grand jury and tried to get a number of people, other people,
    to lie under oath in the Jones lawsuit and to the grand jury
    and encouraged the concealment of evidence.
        In a couple of days the President's lawyers are going to
    have their chance to talk to you, and I suspect they will try
    to get you to focus on 10, 15, or 20, or 30, maybe even 100
    specific little details. They are going to argue that these
    details don't square with some of the facts about this
    presentation. But I would encourage you never to lose sight of
    the totality of this scheme to lie and obstruct justice; never
    lose sight of the big picture. Don't lose sight of the forest
    for the trees. It is easy to do because there are a lot of
    facts in this case.
        I suggest you avoid considering any of this stuff in
    isolation and treating it separately. The evidence and the
    testimony needs to be viewed as a whole. The weight, we call it
    in law--and you are going to hear that in a few minutes--the
    weight of the evidence in this case is very great, it is huge
    in its volume, that the President engaged in a scheme, starting
    in December 1997, to conceal from the court in the Jones case
    his true relationship with Monica Lewinsky and then cover up
    his acts of concealment which he had to know by that time were
    serious crimes.
        The case against the President rests to a great extent on
    whether or not you believe Monica Lewinsky. But it is also
    based on the sworn testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie,
    Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and corroborating witnesses.
    Time and again, the President says one thing and they say
    something entirely different. Time and again, somebody is not
    telling the truth. And time and again, an analysis of the
    context, the motivation, and all of the testimony taken
    together with common sense says it is the President who is not
    telling the truth. But if you have serious doubts about the
    truthfulness of any of these witnesses, I, again, as all my
    colleagues do, encourage you to bring them in here. Let's
    examine Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie and the
    other key witnesses, let you examine the testimony, invite the
    President to come, and judge for yourself their credibility.
        But on the record, the weight of the evidence, taken from
    what we have given you today, what you can read in all of these
    books back here, everything taken together is huge that the
    President lied. It is refutable, but it is not refutable if
    somebody doesn't come in here besides just making an argument.
        I don't know what the witnesses will say, but I assume if
    they are consistent, they'll say the same that's in here. But
    you have a chance to determine whether they are telling the
    truth. The only way you will ever know that, other than just
    accepting it if you think the evidence and the weight is that
    huge--and it may be--is by looking them in the eye and
    determining their credibility.
        I believe that when you finish hearing and weighing all of
    the evidence, you will conclude, as I have, that William
    Jefferson Clinton committed the crimes of obstruction of
    justice, witness tampering, and perjury, that these in this
    case are high crimes and misdemeanors, that he has done grave
    damage to our system of justice, and leaving him in office
    would do more, and that he should be removed from office as
    President of the United States.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    there now be a recess in the proceedings for 15 minutes. Please
    return to your positions within 15 minutes.
        There being no objection, at 2:11 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:30 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as all Senators return to the
    Chamber, I believe now we are going to go to a segment where we
    will hear from three of the managers, including Congressmen
    Gekas, Chabot, and Cannon, and then we will take another break
    shortly after 3:30.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
        Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the
    President, my colleagues from the House, and Members of the
    Senate, up to now you have been fully informed of the state of
    the record in this case in many different ways, in very many
    different tonalities uttered by the managers, who so
    magnificently, in my judgment, have woven the story that began
    in 1997 and has not ended yet.
        But the narrative that the managers were able to produce
    for you and put on the record has met, even as we speak, with
    commentary in the public that ``we have all known all of this
    before.'' The big difference is that now it is part of the
    history of the country. It is lodged in the records of the
    Senate of the United States. And together with the
    Congressional Record of the proceedings that preceded these in
    the House, we now have the dawning of the final chapters of
    this particular incident involving the President, in which you
    will have the final word. But that is what the importance is of
    what you have heard up until now--the complete record woven
    together, step by step, so that no one in this Chamber at this
    juncture does not know all the facts that are pertinent to this
    case. That is a magnificent accomplishment on the part of the
    managers.
        But the record is not yet complete, and that is where I and
    Representative Chabot, Representative Cannon, and
    Representative Barr come in, so that now we can take the next
    step in fulfillment of the record, and that is, to try to apply
    the statutory laws, the laws of our Nation as they pertain to
    the facts that you now have well ingrained into your
    consciences. To do that, we have to repeat some of the facts.
    Some of these matters overlap, and just as you have given your
    attention to the matters at hand up until now, your undivided
    attention is needed continuously.
        For instance, we cannot discuss even the application of
    these statutes to the facts unless we repeat the series of
    events that catapulted us to this moment in history. And we
    must begin, as you have heard countless times now on and off
    this floor, in my judgment, with the Supreme Court of the
    United States, with all due deference to the Chief Justice,
    because the Supreme Court at one point in this saga determined
    in a suit brought by Paula Jones that indeed an average, day-
    to-day, ordinary citizen of our Nation would have the right to
    have a day in court, as it were, even against the President of
    the United States. It is there that all of this began.
        That fellow American, Paula Jones--no matter how she may
    have been described by commentators and pundits and talking
    heads, et cetera--did have a bundle of rights at her command.
    Those rights went into the core of our system of justice to
    bring the President into the case as a defendant. That is an
    awesome and grand result of the Supreme Court decision at that
    juncture. This is what is being overlooked, in my judgment, as
    we pursue what we believe. If perjury indeed was committed--and
    the record is replete that it in fact was--and if indeed
    obstruction of justice was finally committed by the President
    of the United States--as the evidence abundantly demonstrates--
    then we must apply the rights of Paula Jones to what has
    transpired.
        We are not saying that the President--even though the
    weight of the evidence demonstrates it amply--should be
    convicted of the impeachment which has brought us to this floor
    just because he committed perjury or obstructed justice, but
    because as a result of his actions both in rendering falsehoods
    under oath, as the evidence demonstrates amply, or in
    obstructing justice, that because of his conduct, he attempted
    to, or succeeded in, or almost succeeded in--it doesn't matter
    which of these results finally emerges--and attempted to
    destroy the rights of a fellow American citizen. That is what
    the gravamen of all that has occurred up to now really is.
        In attempting to obstruct justice, we mean by that
    obstructing the justice of whom? It was an attempt, a bold
    attempt, one that succeeded in some respects, to obstruct the
    justice sought by a fellow American citizen. That is heavy.
    That is soul searching in its quality. That goes beyond those
    who would say, ``He committed perjury about sex. So what?''
    That goes beyond saying that, ``This is just about sex. So
    what? Everybody lies about sex.'' But when you combine all the
    features of the actions of the President of the United States
    and you see that they are funneled and tunneled and aimed and
    targeted toward obliterating from the landscape the rights of
    Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen, then you must take a
    second look at your own assertion that, ``So what? It's just a
    question of fact about sex.''
        Many of the Members of this Chamber and others have already
    acknowledged that the President has lied under oath. But then
    they are quick to add, ``So what?'' which is so disturbing in
    view of the results of what has happened in this case.
        Before the House of Representatives, as part of our record,
    we had a group of academicians, professors, testifying.
    Professor Higgenbotham--who, sadly I must relate, has passed
    away since his appearance--was trying to show how futile it was
    for us to even attempt to append perjury to an indictable,
    prosecutable offense, and that nowhere in the country is it
    prosecuted regularly, and that it is so trivial because it is
    based on sex. He went on to give an example of how trivial it
    is. I am paraphrasing it, but he said: Would you expect to
    indict the President of the United States for perjury if he
    lied about a 55-mile-an-hour speed limit, even though he was
    going 56? If he would say, ``I was only going 51,'' would you
    indict him on that?
        In the repartee that I had with him, at that juncture, I
    asked him, would he feel the same if, as a result of that
    perjurious testimony about only going 51 miles an hour, there
    was a victim in the case, that this might be a tort case, an
    ``involuntarily'' case, a negligence case in which someone died
    as a result of an automobile accident, and the issue at hand
    would be the speed limit, would he feel the same way if, as a
    result of the perjury committed as to the rate of speed, that
    someone's rights were erased in the case by virtue of that
    perjury, and the gentleman acknowledged that that made a
    difference.
        That is what the difference is here. The perjury per se,
    that being a phrase that we lawyers can adopt, the perjury per
    se is almost a given pursuant to the commentaries that we have
    heard from the people in and out of that Chamber. But when you
    add to it the terrible consequences of seeing a fellow citizen
    pursuing justice thwarted, stopped in her tracks, as it were,
    by reason of the actions of the President, that is what the
    core issue here is.
        To take it, then, from the status of what consequence it
    had to that fellow American citizen to the next step is, in my
    judgment, an issue to go to the determination of whether or not
    there was an impeachable offense. My colleagues will show you
    how the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of justice
    relates to this pattern of factual circumstance that we bring
    to you. But in the meantime we must recount, even at the risk
    of overlapping some of the testimony, that following the
    initial recognition by the President that there was going to be
    a witness list and that Monica Lewinsky would eventually
    appear, as she did, on that witness list, this occurred, which
    is little examined thus far in the world of the scandal in
    which we are all participants, and that is this: The first item
    of business on the part of the Jones lawyers in pursuing the
    rights of Paula Jones was to issue a set of interrogatories, a
    discovery procedure that is well recognized in our courts all
    over the land, and that a set of interrogatories arrived at the
    President's desk.
        At this juncture--this is way before the President appeared
    at the deposition about which you know everything now. The
    facts have been related to you in a hundred different ways, and
    you know that pretty well. I know you do. But did you know, can
    you fasten your attention for a moment knowing that this
    happened at the deposition a month before, on December 23,
    1997, when the President had in front of him interrogatories
    that asked, did he ever have sexual relations with anyone other
    than his spouse during the time that he was Governor of
    Arkansas or President of the United States? And there the
    President answered--or I think that the interrogatory stated:
    Name any persons with whom you have had sexual relations other
    than your wife. And the answer that the President rendered in
    those interrogatories under oath was none.
        I say to the ladies and gentlemen of the Senate that this
    was the first falsehood stated under oath which became a chain
    reaction of falsehoods under oath, and even without the oath,
    all the way to the nuclear explosion of falsehoods that were
    uttered in the grand jury in August of 1998.
        This little innocuous piece of paper called interrogatories
    was placed before the President presumably with or without
    counsel. Let's even presume with counsel. And it was a straight
    question, not with any definitions, no confusing colloquy
    between a judge and a gaggle of lawyers, no interpretation
    being put on any particular word in the interrogatories, but
    whether or not sexual relations had been urged or participated
    in by the President of the United States, and the answer was
    none in naming those persons.
        What does that mean to you? What does that not mean to you?
    That when confronted right at the outset with the phrase
    ``sexual relations'' that the President adopted and determined
    the common usage, well-understood definition of sexual
    relations that everybody in America recognizes as being the
    true meaning of sexual relations, meaning sex of any kind. Did
    not the President answer that under the common understanding
    that all of us entertain when we discuss, more so in the last
    year than ever before in our lives, the phrase ``sexual
    relations''? To me that is a telling feature of this case
    because when you leap over that and get to the depositions and
    everything that the President might have said in those
    depositions, as his counsel have repeatedly asserted to us were
    true, that he did not lie, that he did not commit perjury, that
    he did not evade the truth, that some of it was puzzling to
    them even, but it did not amount to perjury, what can they say
    about the statement one month before on December 23 in
    interrogatories?
        That is extremely important. That is my recollection. Yours
    is the one that will have to predominate, of course.
        But the weight that I put on it, I urge you to at least
    evaluate as you begin to level your weight on the evidence that
    has been presented.
        If that were not enough, on January 15, again before the
    deposition, another interrogatory--this one a request for
    documents--was submitted to the President, and again the
    question there was--you will see it in the record; it is in the
    record--the request of documents says to submit anything that
    pertained to Monica Lewinsky, the intern or employee, Monica
    Lewinsky, of whatever description--notes, gifts, whatever, and
    the President in that particular instance again said none. I am
    willing to give the President a reasonable doubt on that and
    even ask you, if you do not place as much weight on it as I do,
    to forget all about that. But the point is that these
    assertions under oath were made before the Jones deposition was
    ever even conceived, let alone undertaken on January 17.
        So he cannot, the President cannot use the lawyer talk and
    judge banter and the descriptions and definitions of sexual
    relations to cloud the answers that he gave at that time, and
    all of this in the continuous effort to destroy the rights of
    Paula Jones, a fellow American citizen.
        That brings up the question. If someone, a member of your
    family, or someone who is a witness to these proceedings has a
    serious case in which one's self, one's property, one's family
    has been severely damaged, would you suffer, without a whimper,
    perjurious testimony given against you? Would you, knowing down
    deep that at the end of the day it had caused you to lose your
    chance at retribution and a chance to be compensated for
    damages, to restore your family life?
        Isn't that what our system is all about? Isn't that what
    the adverse consequence is of the attempt to obliterate the
    Paula Jones civil suit?
        That is what it is, not that he committed perjury. So what?
    It is what the end result of that perjury might be that you
    should weigh. Skip over the fact that he committed perjury. We
    all acknowledge that it is said. But now tell me what that does
    to Paula Jones, or potentially could do to Paula Jones, or to
    one of you, or to one of your spouses, or to one of the members
    of your community who wants to have justice done in the courts.
        Obstruction of justice is obstruction of justice to an
    individual, to a family. You can take it from Paula Jones and
    telescope it upward to every community, in every courthouse,
    and every State and every community in our land, and there is a
    Paula Jones eager to assert certain rights and then confronted
    with someone who would tear them down by false testimony, by
    lies under oath.
        That is what the gravamen of all this really is.
        One more thing. The counsel for the President have
    repeatedly and very authoritatively, professionally asserted,
    as many of you have, that this is not an impeachable offense,
    for, after all, they say, an impeachable offense is one in
    which there is a direct attack on the system of government; not
    perjury, not obstruction of justice.
        So what, on those, they imply. They say it does not--
    perjury, especially about sex--attack the system of government.
    I must tell you that as an 8- or 9- or 10-year-old, I would
    accompany my mother to naturalization school three or four
    nights a week where my mother was intent on learning the
    English language and learning about the history of the United
    States, as the teachers for naturalization were preparing these
    prospective citizens. And she was so proud that she learned
    that the first President of the United States was George
    Washington, and was prepared to answer that question if it was
    posed to her in naturalization court. And she was so proud when
    I was testing her, preparing her. Each time I would say, ``Mom,
    what are the three branches of Government?'' And she would say,
    ``The `Exec' and the `legislate' and the `judish,' '' in her
    wonderful, lovable accent. She knew the system of government.
    And she did have to answer that in naturalization court. And
    she knew that one wall of the creed that protects our rights is
    the ``judish.'' She knew that the courthouse and the rights of
    citizens which are advanced in that courthouse are the system
    of government. Can anyone say that purposely attempting to
    destroy someone's case in the courthouse is not an attack on
    the system of government of our country?
        Mr. Chabot will elucidate on perjury.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Chabot.
        Mr. Manager CHABOT. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators,
    distinguished counsel for the President, I am Steve Chabot. I
    represent the First District of Ohio. Prior to my election to
    Congress, I practiced law in Cincinnati for about 15 years. As
    I stand before you today, I must admit that I feel a long way
    away from that small neighborhood law practice that I had.
    Though, while this arena may be somewhat foreign to me, the law
    remains the same. As one of the managers who represents the
    House, I am here to summarize the law of perjury. While today's
    discussion of the law may not be as captivating as yesterday's
    discussion of the facts, it is nevertheless essential that we
    thoroughly review the law as we move forward in this historic
    process. I will try to lay out the law of perjury as succinctly
    as I can without using an extraordinary amount of the Senate's
    time but beg you to indulge me.
        In the United States Criminal Code, there are two perjury
    offenses. The offenses are found in sections 1621 and 1623 of
    title 18 of the United States Criminal Code. Section 1621 is
    the broad perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to
    knowingly and willfully make a false statement about a material
    matter while under oath. Section 1623 is the more specific
    perjury statute which makes it a Federal offense to knowingly
    make a false statement about a material matter while under oath
    before a Federal court or before a Federal grand jury.
        It is a well-settled rule that when two criminal statutes
    overlap, the Government may charge a defendant under either
    one. As you know, the President's false statements covered in
    the first impeachment article were made before a Federal grand
    jury. Therefore, section 1623 is the most relevant statute.
    However, section 1621 is applicable as well.
        The elements of perjury. There are four general elements of
    perjury. They are: An oath, an intent, falsity, and
    materiality. I would like to walk you through each of those
    elements at this time.
        First, the oath.
        The oath need not be administered in a particular form, but
    it must be administered by a person or body legally authorized
    to do so. In this case, there has been no serious challenge
    made about the legitimacy of the oath administered to the
    President either in his civil deposition in the Jones v.
    Clinton case or before the Federal grand jury. Let's, once
    again, witness President Clinton swearing to tell the truth
    before a Federal grand jury.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        William Jefferson Clinton, Do you solemnly swear that the
    testimony you are about to give in this matter will be the
    truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
    God?

        The oath element has clearly been satisfied in this case.
        The next element is intent. To this day, the President has
    refused to acknowledge what the vast majority of Americans know
    to be true--that he knowingly lied under oath. The President's
    continued inability to tell the truth, the whole truth and
    nothing but the truth has forced this body, this jury, to
    determine the President's true intent.
        The intent element requires that the false testimony was
    knowingly stated and described. This requirement is generally
    satisfied by proof that the defendant knew his testimony was
    false at the time it was provided. As with almost all perjury
    cases, you will have to make a decision regarding the
    President's knowledge of his own false statements based on the
    surrounding facts and, yes, by circumstantial evidence. This
    does not in any way weaken the case against the President. In
    the absence of an admission by the defendant, relying on
    circumstantial evidence is virtually the only way to prove the
    crime of perjury.
        The Federal jury instructions which Federal courts use in
    perjury cases can provide helpful guidance in understanding
    what is meant by the requirement that the false statement must
    be made knowingly. Let me quote from the Federal jury
    instructions:

        When the word ``knowingly'' is used, it means that the
    defendant realized what he was doing and was aware of the
    nature of his conduct, and did not act through ignorance,
    mistake or accident.

        So as you reflect on the President's carefully calculated
    statements, remember the Federal jury instructions and ask a
    few simple questions: Did the President realize what he was
    doing, what he was saying? Was he aware of the nature of his
    conduct or did the President simply act through ignorance,
    mistake or accident?
        The answers to these questions are undeniably clear even to
    the President's own attorneys. In fact, Mr. Ruff and Mr. Craig
    testified before the Judiciary Committee that the President
    willfully misled the court. Let's listen to Mr. Ruff.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Ruff. I'm going to respond to your question. I have no
    doubt that he walked up to a line that he thought he understood
    reasonable people--and you maybe have reached this conclusion--
    could determine that he crossed over that line and that what
    for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive and
    misleading or evasive was in fact false.

        In an extraordinary admission, the President's own attorney
    has acknowledged the care, the intention, the will of the
    President to say precisely what he said.
        The President's actions speak volumes about his intent to
    make false statements under oath. For example, the President
    called his secretary, Betty Currie, within hours of concluding
    his civil deposition and asked her to come to the White House
    the following day. President Clinton then recited false
    characterizations to her about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky. As you have already heard, Ms. Currie testified that
    the President made the following statements to her:

        You were always there when she was there, right? We were
    never really alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica
    came on to me, and I never touched her, right? She wanted to
    have sex with me, and I can't do that.

        This is not the conduct of someone who believed he had
    testified truthfully. It is not the conduct of someone who
    acted through ignorance, mistake or accident. Rather, it is the
    conduct of someone who lied, knew he had lied, and needed
    others to modify their stories accordingly.
        Finally, it is painstakingly clear during the President's
    grand jury testimony that he, again, knows exactly what he is
    doing. Let's again watch the following excerpt from that
    testimony.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        . . . was an utterly false statement. Is that correct?
        A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.

        In this instance, and in many others that have been
    presented to you over the last 2 days, the facts and the law
    speak plainly.
        The President's actions and demeanor make the case that
    President Clinton knowingly and willfully lied under oath in a
    grand jury proceeding and in a civil deposition. The compelling
    evidence in this case satisfies the intent element required
    under both sections 1621 and 1623 of the Federal Criminal Code.
        The next element, falsity. The next element of perjury is
    falsity. In order for perjury to occur in this case, the
    President must have made one or more false statements.
    Yesterday my colleagues went through the evidence on this
    matter in great detail and clearly demonstrated that the
    President did, in fact, make false statements while under oath.
    Because of the evidence that was presented to date, without
    question the President's falsity and his false statements have
    been shown, so I am going to move forward to the final element
    of perjury, which is materiality.
        The test for whether a statement is material, as stated by
    the Supreme Court in Kungys v. United States, is simply whether
    it had a ``natural tendency to influence'' or was ``capable of
    influencing'' the official proceeding. The law also makes clear
    that the false statement does not have to actually impede the
    grand jury's investigation for the statement to be material.
        The law regarding the materiality of false statements
    before a grand jury is very straightforward. Because a grand
    jury's authority to investigate is broad, the realm of
    declarations regarded as material is broad. The President's
    false statements to the grand jury were material because the
    grand jury was investigating whether the President had
    obstructed justice and committed perjury in a civil deposition.
        Now let's look at potential legal smokescreens. The
    President's attorneys will try to distract you from the
    relevant law and facts in this case. To help you stay focused
    on the law, I would like to preview some of the arguments that
    may be made by the President's attorneys.
        Legal smokescreen No. 1, the Bronston case. You will
    probably hear opposing counsel argue that the President did not
    technically commit perjury, and appeal to the case of Bronston
    v. United States. This is a legal smokescreen. In the Bronston
    case, the Supreme Court held that statements that are literally
    truthful and nonresponsive cannot by themselves form the basis
    for a perjury conviction. This is the cornerstone of the
    President's defense. However, the Court also held that the
    unresponsive statements must be technically true in order to
    prevent a perjury conviction; such statements must not be
    capable of being conclusively proven false.
        As we have seen, none of the President's perjurious
    statements before the grand jury, covered in the first
    impeachment article, are technically true. So, when the
    President's counsel cites the Bronston case, remember the
    facts. Ask yourselves, are the President's answers literally
    true? And remember, to be literally true they must actually be
    true.
        It is also important to note that, consistent with the
    Bronston case, the response, ``I don't recall,'' is not
    technically true if the President actually could recall. The
    factual record in the case, consisting of multiple sworn
    statements contradicting the President's testimony and highly
    specific corroborating evidence, demonstrates that the
    President's statements were not literally true or legally
    accurate. On the contrary, the record establishes that the
    President repeatedly lied, he repeatedly deceived, he
    repeatedly feigned forgetfulness.
        There are other clear and important limitations on the
    Bronston case's scope. In United States v. DeZarn, handed down
    just 3 months ago by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
    court made an important ruling that is directly on point in
    this case. The court of appeals stated:

        Because we believe that the crime of perjury depends not
    only upon the clarity of the questioning itself, but also upon
    the knowledge and reasonable understanding of the testifier
    [President Clinton] as to what is meant by the questioning, we
    hold that a defendant may be found guilty of perjury if a jury
    could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence
    presented that the defendant knew what the question meant and
    gave knowingly untruthful and materially misleading answers in
    response.

        The Bronston case has further limitations. For example, in
    United States v. Swindall, the court held that the jury can
    convict for perjury even if the questions or statements
    involved are capable of multiple interpretations where only one
    interpretation is reasonable under the circumstances
    surrounding their utterances.
        In United States v. Doherty, the court held that the
    prosecution for perjury is not barred under Bronston,
    ``whenever some ambiguity can be found by an implausibly
    strained reading of the question'' posed. I would submit to
    this body that ``implausibly strained reading of the question''
    posed is precisely what confronts us time and again in the case
    of the President before the grand jury.
        Legal smokescreen No. 2, the two-witness rule. In the
    coming days you may hear opposing counsel argue that the
    President did not commit perjury by appealing to the so-called
    two-witness rule. Again, this is nothing but a legal
    smokescreen. This common law rule requires that there be either
    two witnesses to a perjurious statement or, in the alternative,
    that there be one witness and corroborating evidence of the
    perjury. Opposing counsel may suggest that, because there were
    not two witnesses present for some of the President's false
    statements, he did not technically commit perjury. Such an
    appeal to the two-witness rule is wrong for several reasons.
        First, the two-witness rule is not applicable under section
    1623, only under 1621. The language of 1623 expressly provides,
    ``it shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any
    particular number of witnesses or by documentary or other type
    of evidence.''
        Congress passed section 1623 back in 1970 to eliminate the
    two-witness requirement and to facilitate the prosecution of
    perjury and enhance the reliability of testimony before Federal
    courts and Federal grand juries. The legislative history
    establishes this as the fundamental purpose of the statute.
        Additionally, substantial evidence has been presented over
    the last 2 days to satisfy the requirements of the two-witness
    rule under section 1621. Remember, when the two-witness rule
    applies, it does not actually require two witnesses. Indeed, it
    requires either two witnesses or one witness and corroborating
    evidence. As you know, there is a witness to each and every one
    of the President's false statements and there is voluminous
    evidence which corroborates the falsehood of his statements.
        Finally, case law tells us that the two-witness rule is not
    applicable under certain circumstances, when the defendant
    falsely claims an inability to recall a material matter.
        Another possible legal smokescreen, the drafting of article
    I, article I being the first article of impeachment.
        As you know, impeachment article I says:

        Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully
    provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the
    grand jury . . .

        You may hear opposing counsel argue that section 1621 is
    the only applicable statute because the article of impeachment
    accuses the President of willfully committing perjury. This is
    another legal smokescreen.
        Following that reasoning, one could just as easily make the
    argument that 1623 was contemplated here because the term
    ``false'' does not appear in 1621 but does appear in 1623.
    However, that is not the point. The point is that the language
    of the impeachment article did not use these terms as terms of
    art as they are defined and used in various criminal statutes.
        While the article of impeachment does not draw a
    distinction between the standards, evidence has been presented
    over the last 2 days that demonstrates that the President did
    knowingly and willfully lie under oath regarding material
    matters before a grand jury, and that satisfies both 1623 and
    1621.
        Again, in the context of perjury law, the distinction
    between a knowing falsehood and a willful falsehood is almost a
    distinction without a difference. In American Surety Company v.
    Sullivan, the Second Circuit stated that ``the word `willful,'
    even in a criminal statute, means no more than the person
    charged with the duty knows what he is doing.''
        So that, in essence, is the law of perjury.
        Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, throughout this
    long and difficult process, apologists for the President have
    maintained that his actions might well have been reprehensible
    but are not necessarily worthy of impeachment and removal from
    office. I submit, however, that telling the truth under oath is
    critically important to our judicial system and that perjury,
    of which I believe a compelling case is being made, strikes a
    terrible blow against the machinery of justice in this country.
        The President of the United States, the chief law
    enforcement officer of this land, lied under oath. He raised
    his right hand and he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth,
    and nothing but the truth, and then he lied, pure and simple.
        Why is perjury such a serious offense? Under the American
    system of justice, our courts are charged with seeking the
    truth. Every day, American citizens raise their right hand in
    courtrooms across the country and take an oath to tell the
    truth. Breaking that oath cripples our justice system. By lying
    under oath, the President did not just commit perjury, an
    offense punishable under our criminal code, but he chipped away
    at the very cornerstone of our judicial system.
        The first Chief Justice of the United States of the Supreme
    Court, John Jay, eloquently stated why perjury is so dangerous
    over 200 years ago. On June 25, 1792, in a charge to the grand
    jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Vermont, the
    Chief Justice said:

        Independent of the abominable Insult which Perjury offers
    to the divine Being, there is no Crime more extensively
    pernicious to Society. It discolours and poisons Streams of
    Justice, and by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the
    Foundations of personal and public Rights--Controversies of
    various kinds exist at all Times, and in all Communities. To
    decide them, Courts of Justice are instituted--their Decisions
    must be regulated by Evidence, and the greater part of Evidence
    will always consist of the Testimony of witnesses. This
    Testimony is given under those solemn obligations which an
    appeal to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to
    be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would
    become insecure.

        Why has the President been impeached by the U.S. House of
    Representatives? Why is he on trial here today in the U.S.
    Senate? Because he lied under oath. Because he committed
    perjury. Because if the oaths cease to be held sacred, our
    dearest and most valuable rights will become insecure.
        During the course of this trial, Members of this
    distinguished body, the jurors in this case, will have to
    consider the law and the facts very carefully. It is a daunting
    task and an awesome responsibility, one that cannot be taken
    lightly. I humbly suggest to those sitting in judgment of the
    President that we must all weigh the impact of our actions, not
    only on our beloved Nation today, but on American history. It
    is my belief that if the actions of the President are
    ultimately disregarded or minimized, we will be sending a sorry
    message to the American people that the President of the United
    States is above the law. We will be sending a message to our
    children, to my children, that telling the truth doesn't really
    matter if you have a good lawyer or you are an exceptionally
    skilled liar. That would be tragic.
        Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, let us instead send a message
    to the American people and to the boys and girls who will be
    studying American history in the years to come that no person
    is above the law and that this great Nation remains an entity
    governed by the rule of law. Let us do what is right. Let us do
    what is just. Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Cannon.
        Mr. Manager CANNON. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators,
    distinguished counsel of the President, my name is Chris
    Cannon. I represent Utah's Third Congressional District.
        John Locke once said, ``Wherever law ends, tyranny
    begins.'' And speaking to our American experience, Teddy
    Roosevelt added, ``No man is above the law and no man is below
    it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to
    obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not as a
    favor.''
        This case is about the violation of law. My task is to
    clarify what the law states pertaining to obstruction of
    justice and what legal precedent is applicable to the charges
    against William Jefferson Clinton.
        While both the laws and the violations in this case are
    clear and direct, the presentation I am about to make will not
    be simple. I ask your indulgence and attention as I walk you
    through case history and statutory elements. I promise to be
    brief--probably less than a half-hour--and direct.
        I will present the legal underpinnings of the law of
    obstruction of justice. You should have before you the full
    text of this speech, including full citations to cases and
    copies of the charts I will use in this presentation.
        Article II of the articles of impeachment alleges that the
    President prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration
    of justice, both personally and through his subordinates and
    agents, and that he did so as part of a pattern designed to
    delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence
    and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought
    against him.
        Article II specifies seven separate instances in which the
    President acted to obstruct justice. The House believes the
    evidence in this case proves that each of the seven separate
    acts which comprise the President's scheme constitutes
    obstruction of justice.
        I would like to draw your attention at this time to the
    chart on my right, and the first page in your packet, which
    depicts elements of section 1503:

        (a) Whoever . . . corruptly . . . influences, obstructs or impedes;
    or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due administration
    of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
        (b) The punishment for an offense under this section is . . .
        (3) . . . imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under
    this title, or both.

        Section 1503 is often referred to as the general
    obstruction statute. It describes obstruction simply as an
    impact on the due administration of justice.
        Section 1503 deems it criminal to use force or threats, or
    to otherwise act corruptly, in order to influence, obstruct, or
    impede the due administration of justice.
        Federal court rulings clarify that it is not necessary for
    a defendant to succeed in obstructing justice. Again, I direct
    your attention to the chart, or the accompanying chart, in your
    package.
        Russell and Aguilar each ruled that it is not necessary
    that a defendant's endeavor succeed for him to have violated
    the law. Rather, simply attempting to influence, obstruct, or
    impede the due administration of justice violates the statute.
        Maggitt clearly stated, ``it is the endeavor to bring about
    a forbidden result and not the success in actually achieving
    the result, that is forbidden.''
        For the Government to prove a section 1503 crime, it must
    demonstrate that the defendant acted with intent. This can be
    shown through use of force, threats by the defendant, or by
    simply showing that the defendant acted ``corruptly.'' The
    following chart gives three case histories regarding the term
    ``acting corruptly.''
        Haldeman and Sprecher held that a defendant acts corruptly
    by having an evil or improper purpose or intent.
        Barfield defined ``acting corruptly'' as knowingly and
    intentionally acting in order to encourage obstruction.
        Sprecher also ruled the Government need not prove the
    actual intent of the defendant, but, rather, the intent to act
    corruptly can be inferred from that proof that the defendant
    knew corrupt actions would obstruct the justice being
    administered.
        Under section 1503, the Government must also prove that the
    defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due
    administration of justice. The statute is broadly applicable to
    all phases of judicial proceedings.
        Brenson described due administration of justice as
    ``providing a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings,
    regardless of the stage in which the improper activity
    occurs.''
        Section 1503 is also intended to protect the discovery
    phase of a judicial proceeding, stating that the phrase ``due
    administration of justice'' is intended to provide a ``free and
    fair opportunity to every litigant in a pending case in Federal
    court to learn what he may learn . . . concerning the material
    facts and to exercise his option as to introducing testimony of
    such facts.''
        The House believes that the facts of this case make it very
    clear that the President did, corruptly, impair the ability of
    a litigant in Federal court to learn all of the facts that she
    was entitled to learn. In doing so, the President committed
    obstruction of justice under section 1503.
        The other Federal crime which the President committed was
    witness tampering under section 1512 of title 18. Again, I
    refer you to the chart on my right, and to the second page in
    the package, which depicts the elements of the section.

        (b) Whoever knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person, or
    attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another
    person, with intent to--
        (1) influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an
    official proceeding; or
        (2) cause or induce any person to--
        (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a . . . document . . . or an
    object . . . from an official proceeding;
        . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for not more
    than ten years or both.

        Sections 1503 and 1512 differ in an important way. There
    does not need to be a case pending at the time the defendant
    acts to violate the law under section 1512. The statute
    specifically states that ``for the purpose of this section, an
    official proceeding need not be pending or about to be
    instituted at the time of the offense . . .'' for the crime to
    be committed.
        Putting it another way, a person may attempt to tamper with
    a witness and commit the crime of witness tampering before such
    a person is called as a witness and even before there is a case
    underway in which that person might be called to testify.
        For the Government to prove the crime of witness tampering,
    it must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to cause
    one of several results. The defendant can be convicted if he
    acted to influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any
    person in an official proceeding; or the defendant can be
    convicted if he acted to cause another person to withhold an
    object from an official proceeding.
        In the case before us, the evidence proves that the
    President endeavored to cause both of these results on several
    occasions. And the Government may show intent on the part of
    the defendant in several ways. It may prove the use of
    intimidation, physical force or threats; or it may prove intent
    by showing the use of corrupt persuasion or misleading conduct.
        In this case, the evidence shows that on several occasions
    the President acted corruptly to persuade some witnesses, and
    engaged in misleading conduct toward others, in order to
    influence their testimony and cause them to withhold evidence
    or give wrongful testimony. In each instance, the President
    violated the witness tampering statute.
        How does acting corruptly to persuade a witness differ from
    engaging in misleading conduct? Section 1515 in title 18
    states:

        (a) as used in section 1512 [the witness tampering section] . . .
    of this title and this section--
        (3) the term ``misleading conduct'' means--
        (A) knowingly making a false statement; or
        (B) intentionally omitting information from a statement and thereby
    causing a portion of such statement to be misleading, or intentionally
    concealing a material fact, and thereby creating a false impression by
    such statement; or
        (C) with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting
    reliance on a writing or recording that is false, forged, altered or
    otherwise lacking in authenticity;

        The difference between corruptly persuading a witness and
    engaging in misleading conduct toward the witness depends on
    the witness' level of knowledge about the truth of the
    defendant's statement.
        Rodolitz held that misleading conduct involves a situation
    ``where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as
    if the story were true, intending that the witness believe the
    story and testify to it before the grand jury.''
        Let me clarify this detail: If a defendant simply asks a
    witness to lie and the witness knows that he is being asked to
    lie, then the defendant is corruptly persuading the witness. In
    contrast, if a defendant lies to a witness, hoping the witness
    will believe his story, this is misleading conduct. They are
    different, but they are both criminal.
        Some may ask if it is necessary that the witness who is
    influenced or tampered with know that he or she might be called
    to testify? The answer is no.
        And both sections 1503 and 1512 answer this question:
        The witness tampering statute can be violated even if the
    victim has not been subpoenaed or listed as a potential witness
    in an ongoing proceeding.
        In Shannon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
    Circuit reviewed the conviction of a defendant under section
    1503 who had attempted to influence the testimony of a person
    who had not yet been subpoenaed or placed on a witness list. On
    appeal, the defendant argued that because the target of the
    obstruction had not yet become an official witness in the case,
    it was impossible for the defendant to have engaged in
    obstruction toward her. The court of appeals rejected that
    assertion. In affirming the conviction, the court held
    ``neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time
    of the offense nor must he or she actually give testimony at a
    later time. It is only necessary that there is a possibility
    that the target of the defendant's activities be called on to
    testify in an official proceeding.''
        The witness tampering statute can be violated even when no
    case is pending.
        Therefore, it will not always be clear to whom the
    defendant intended the individual to testify--and the statute
    does not require proof of this.
        In Morrison, the United States Court of Appeals for the
    District of Columbia explained that section 1512 is violated if
    the defendant asks a person to lie ``to anyone who asks.'' The
    court held that it is not necessary that the defendant even use
    the words ``testify'' or ``trial'' when he tries to influence
    the testimony of the other person. In such a case, there are no
    subpoenas, there are no witness lists.
        The mere attempt to influence the person to lie, if asked,
    is the crime.
        So, under either section 1503 or 1512, the fact that the
    target of a defendant's actions is not named as a witness, or
    whether the person is not ever called to be a witness, is
    immaterial.
        The focus of both statutes is on what the defendant
    believed.
        If the defendant believes that it is possible that some
    person might some day be called to testify at some later
    proceeding and then acted to influence, delay or prevent his or
    her testimony, the defendant commits the crime.
        Now, some have asserted that an obstruction of justice
    charge cannot, or should not, be made against the President
    because some of his acts occurred in the context of a civil
    trial. There is simply no merit to this view.
        There is no question that the obstruction and witness
    tampering statutes can be violated by acts that occur in civil
    proceedings. And, case law is consistent in upholding that any
    attempt to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration
    of justice in a civil proceeding violates section 1503.
        Lundwall, which I referred to earlier, is a perfect
    example, as it began as a civil case.
        The actual language of the witness tampering statute makes
    it clear that it also applies to civil cases.
        The statute provides for enhanced penalties in criminal
    proceedings--a provision that would be unnecessary if the law
    were only to apply to criminal cases.
        In short, the fact that some instances of the President's
    misconduct occurred in the course of a civil proceeding does
    not absolve him of criminal liability.
        As Mr. Barr will demonstrate, the President of the United
    States endeavored and did obstruct justice and tamper with
    witnesses in violation of the law of the United States.
        On numerous occasions he acted with an improper purpose
    with the intent to interfere with the due administration of
    justice in the Federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Paula
    Jones.
        President Clinton corruptly endeavored to persuade
    witnesses to lie. In some cases, he succeeded. In every case,
    he violated the law.
        President Clinton engaged in misleading conduct in order to
    influence the testimony of witnesses in judicial proceedings.
    He succeeded. In each case, he violated the law.
        President Clinton acted with an improper purpose to
    persuade a person to withhold objects from a judicial
    proceeding in which that person was required to produce them.
    He succeeded, and in so doing he violated the law.
        President Clinton made misleading statements for the
    purpose of deterring a litigant from further discovery that
    would lead to facts which the judge ordered relevant in a
    Federal civil rights case. In so doing, he obstructed the due
    administration of justice in that case and violated the law.
        Whether attempting to persuade a person to testify falsely,
    or to ignore court orders to produce objects; whether
    suggesting to an innocent person a false story in hopes that he
    or she will repeat it in a judicial proceeding; or testifying
    falsely in the hopes of blocking another party's pursuit of the
    truth--all these acts obstruct justice; all these acts are
    Federal felony crimes; all these acts were committed by William
    Jefferson Clinton.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    there now be a recess again of the proceedings for 15 minutes.
    Please return promptly to the Chamber.
        There being no objection, at 3:29 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 3:47 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready for the
    final subject today, from Manager Barr.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Barr.
        Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, learned counsel for the
    President, and fellow managers on behalf of the House of
    Representatives, I thank the Senate for the opportunity to
    appear today and to present this argument. The House, and I,
    especially, greatly appreciate the time and effort the Senate
    has taken on this most important and notable matter.
        You have heard the facts summarized by my colleagues. They
    have described for you the law of perjury and the law of
    obstruction. I will discuss several of the specific instances
    in which William Jefferson Clinton violated these laws as set
    forth in the articles of impeachment presented to you.
        The process facing you as jurors, of fitting the Federal
    law of obstruction of justice and of witness tampering and of
    perjury into the facts of the case against President William
    Jefferson Clinton, is not a case in which there is nor should
    be a great deal of difficulty. It is not a problem of fitting a
    round peg into a square hole. Quite the contrary. We have a
    case here, you have a case here, for consideration in which the
    fit between fact and law is as precise as the finely tuned
    mechanism of a Swiss watch or as seamless a process as the
    convergence and confluence of two great rivers such as flow
    through many of the cities which you represent. The evidence
    that President William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury and
    obstruction of justice is overwhelming. These are pattern
    offenses.
        I beg your attention to the following exposition of facts
    and law. But before commencing, I would like to address three
    issues that have come up during the course of the proceedings,
    which I believe might be helpful for all of us to keep in mind
    as we proceed not only through today's final presentations but
    tomorrow's and those that will be made by learned counsel for
    the President.
        First, by way of background on the process--that is, the
    process that brings us, the House managers, to the well of this
    great body and the trial of the President of the United States
    of America--as has been indicated previously by one of my
    colleague House managers, and as everyone here knows full well,
    the responsibilities, the jurisdiction, and the process between
    the House of Representatives and the Senate is very different
    in all three of those respects. Therefore, while coming as no
    surprise to all of you, all of us in this room, but perhaps to
    some in America, the steps that each body takes, and should
    take and must take, are very different.
        Just as one example, one might ask, ``Why were no witnesses
    called in the House of Representatives?'' A valid question. It
    deserves a valid answer. That valid answer can be found not
    simply in impeachment proceedings and the history thereof, but
    also in the day-in/day-out proceedings in our Federal courts
    and in our State courts. It can be found in the difference
    between the body which has responsibility and jurisdiction for
    charging a crime and the jurisdiction and responsibility of the
    body that has responsibility for trying a crime, or an alleged
    crime. The House of Representatives, though it is not in every
    respect like a grand jury, operates much more like a grand jury
    than a petit jury. As something akin to a grand jury, we had in
    mind--and I know you have in mind--being very mindful and
    knowledgeable about the difference in procedure between the
    House and Senate on matters of impeachment, that frequently in
    court cases presented to Federal grand juries--and I suspect
    similarly to State grand juries--the evidence to the grand
    jurors themselves is not presented through a long array, a
    repetitive array of witnesses themselves--witnesses, that is,
    with firsthand knowledge of each and every fact, which would
    later be proved at trial. Rather, it is the more standard
    procedure--certainly in Federal courts, with which I am more
    familiar--for the Government to present its case to the grand
    jury by way of summary witnesses. Normally, that would mean
    case agents that have been working with the assistant U.S.
    attorneys, or with the U.S. attorney, in gathering and
    evaluating the evidence that will eventually be brought to bear
    in the trial of the case.
        If one were to be a fly on the wall of a Federal grand
    jury, one would normally see witnesses for the Government that
    would come in and discuss the general parameters and the
    specific evidence of the case that they would present in court,
    frequently summarizing the actual evidence that would be
    presented in court by the witnesses themselves. That is the
    standard operating procedure. That is not to say that there is
    also not presented voluminous written evidence, documentary
    evidence. That is frequently the case as well. Nor is that to
    say that there are not, from time to time, cases presented to
    Federal grand juries in which there are actual witnesses with
    firsthand knowledge.
        I will simply make a point of which we are all aware. I
    think as we begin, or in anticipation of your process of
    sifting through all of this procedure, this evidence, all of
    this law, we should keep in mind that our job in the House was
    to approach it necessarily very different from the way you
    approach your job as jurors, as triers of fact. We, in fact,
    presented to the House of Representatives, through the work on
    our Judiciary Committee, a large volume of evidence presented
    to us and through us to the House of Representatives as the
    charging body, not the trier of fact body; that is, to
    essentially summarize and discuss through the words, through
    the opinions of the independent counsel, as akin to the chief
    investigative officer in a grand jury in Federal district
    court, through the words of many expert witnesses, as it were,
    who placed all of that in context.
        We did not want to usurp your duty, your responsibility
    given to you by the Constitution as the trier of fact. We are
    not that presumptuous. It is your responsibility, it is your
    solemn duty to be the trier of fact. That is very different
    from our solemn duty, which I believe the House performed
    admirably in essentially reaching the conclusion that there is
    probable cause to convict the President of perjury and
    obstruction of justice. And we did so in a way that is mindful
    and respectful of your responsibilities, that carried out our
    responsibilities, and that is familiar to citizens all across
    this land, because it is essentially the same process that
    operates in Federal courts where you see also, as here, a very
    clear distinction between the body that charges the crime, the
    grand jury, and the body that tries the crime--that is, the
    jury, and in this case it is the Senate of the United States of
    America.
        A second point that may very well come up, perhaps, in the
    presentation of the defense by the President's learned counsel,
    which although very familiar to those of us, as there are many
    in this Chamber with a legal background, but which I think also
    is important to keep in mind as you reflect on and later
    deliberate on the evidence itself in this case, is that there
    are, indeed, two types of evidence. In virtually every case,
    whichever finds its way to a court of law and results in a
    trial, both types of evidence are found, used, considered, and
    form the basis, legitimately, for the eventual rendering of a
    decision by a jury. Those two types of evidence are direct and
    circumstantial.
        Frequently--and I know this from actual experience--defense
    lawyers will attack the Government's case, and one of the
    standard attacks that they level against the Government's case
    is that it is based on circumstantial evidence. You even hear
    that by the folks out there today--not in this room--that are
    saying, ``Oh, all we are seeing is circumstantial evidence, and
    that is not as good as direct evidence.''
        Now, to the layperson who is unfamiliar with the ways of
    our laws, our courts, and the work of this great body, that may
    have some currency, it may have some surface appeal. They may
    say, ``Well, that commentator was right, and that White House
    spokesman was right. If all they are doing is talking about
    circumstantial evidence, they can't have a very strong case,
    because if they had a strong case, they would have direct
    evidence.''
        Well, the fact of the matter is, it is a principle of long
    and consistent standing in every Federal court in our land, and
    I suspect every State court in our land, and as directed by
    every Federal judge to every Federal jury taking evidence that
    circumstantial evidence is to be, and shall not be afforded any
    less weight than direct evidence. And triers of fact are
    directed by judges in every case not to accord less weight to
    one type of evidence as opposed to the other. That is, in the
    words of one of my fellow managers, a smokescreen, a red
    herring if somebody raises as a defense in a case--this case or
    other cases--that the case is weakened somehow because there is
    a reliance on circumstantial evidence and it is not found
    solely on direct evidence.
        That is a very important principle. I would appreciate your
    indulgence in that small foray into some basic precepts that I
    think all of us, certainly most of you included, need to keep
    in mind.
        Finally, there is one other sort of process argument that
    one hears sort of floating around in the ether out there that I
    think also is important for all of us to keep in mind; that is,
    facts and the law do bear repeating--not endless, not
    pointless, but appropriate repetition. Even today, even
    yesterday in the first round of presentations to this body,
    there was in fact repetition of certain facts, certain aspects
    of the law. That is not presented to you simply to emphasize a
    point, simply to make it appear stronger because we say it five
    times instead of two. There is a very important reason for
    appropriate repetition.
        For example, in a case such as this where you have two sets
    of laws alleged to have been violated--perjury laws and
    obstruction of justice laws--each one of those has several
    different elements. And, in addition to that, it is legitimate,
    as presenters of facts in the law, for managers, for
    prosecutors, or plaintiffs' attorneys to take a particular
    fact, a particular note, and use it to illustrate several
    different points. For example, one particular fact may provide
    evidence of motive. It may also provide one of the substantive
    elements of perjury or obstruction of justice, or it may go to
    the state of mind of a declarant, a witness. It may provide
    important evidence with regard to a course of conduct, prior
    knowledge, and the list goes on.
        That is why, Senators, frequently in the course of these
    particular presentations--and, again, no different from the
    course of presentation in Federal and, I suspect, State courts
    throughout the land--in trials there necessarily is and should
    be, in order to responsibly present all of the evidence in all
    of its elements, certain repetition. Our job as managers is to
    make sure we do not abuse that necessity and that we do not in
    fact offer repetitive notion, repetitive references, without
    having a very clear and specific purpose, such as I mentioned,
    for that process.
        Finally, before turning to that merger of the law and the
    facts, which I believe will illustrate conclusively that this
    President has committed and ought to be convicted on perjury
    and obstruction of justice, I would respectfully ask that you
    remember that, under the law of impeachment based on our
    Constitution, proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    President committed each and every element of one or more
    violations of provisions of the Federal Criminal Code has never
    been required to sustain a conviction in any prior impeachment
    trial in the Senate. However, I can say confidently that I
    speak for all House managers in relating to you our belief that
    the record and the law applicable to these two articles of
    impeachment clearly establish that President William Jefferson
    Clinton did in fact violate several provisions of title 18 of
    the United States Code--that is the criminal code--including
    perjury, obstruction, and tampering with witnesses.
        At this point, a lawyer would face, a fortiori--I will say
    at this point that it therefore goes without saying that indeed
    exists under every historical standard, every historical
    benchmark which this Chamber has used--that there is more than
    sufficient grounds on which you might face a conviction as to
    both articles.
        Beginning then in looking at the facts and the law, both of
    which you have heard through the words and exhibits of my
    colleagues and the evidence that you already have, let us look
    first at the submission of the false affidavit in the Jones
    case.
        We believe the evidence presented clearly establishes that
    on December 17, 1997, the President encouraged a witness in a
    Federal civil rights action brought against him, that witness
    being Monica Lewinsky, to execute a sworn affidavit in that
    proceeding which he knew to be perjurious, false, and
    misleading. As other managers have outlined, Monica Lewinsky
    filed a sworn affidavit in the Jones case that denied the
    relationship between her and the President. That affidavit was
    false.
        Ms. Lewinsky testified under oath before the grand jury
    that the scheme to file this false affidavit was devised or
    hatched during a telephone conversation with the President on
    December 17, 1997, a call the President initiated to Ms.
    Lewinsky at 2 or 2:30 a.m. ostensibly to give her the bad news
    that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident
    but apparently, since it consumed the vast majority of the time
    of that conversation, more importantly, for the President to
    tell Ms. Lewinsky her name was on the witness list filed in the
    Jones case and to thereafter discuss during that conversation
    the President's suggestion to her that she could file an
    affidavit in the Jones case in order for the purpose of
    avoiding having to testify in that case--not to cover up but in
    order to avoid having to testify in an ongoing legal proceeding
    in U.S. district court.
        She testified that both she and the President understood
    from their conversation they would continue their pattern of
    covering up. She testified she knew that if she filed a
    truthful affidavit the Jones lawyers would certainly have
    deposed her in that case.
        The testimony of Mr. Vernon Jordan confirms the President
    knew Ms. Lewinsky planned to file a false affidavit. He stated
    that, based on his conversations with the President, that the
    President knew in advance that Ms. Lewinsky planned to execute
    an affidavit denying their relationship and that he later
    informed the President Ms. Lewinsky had signed in fact that
    false affidavit.
        For his part, the President denies asking Ms. Lewinsky to
    execute a false affidavit. Instead, as he asserted in his
    response to the House Judiciary Committee's request for
    admission, he seeks to have you now believe he sought simply to
    have Ms. Lewinsky execute an affidavit that will ``get her out
    of having to testify.''
        While being factually correct, this statement reflects a
    legal impossibility. The President has admitted Ms. Lewinsky
    was the woman with whom he indeed had an improper intimate
    relationship while President. And he has admitted he was very
    concerned over the great personal embarrassment and humiliation
    he feared would have occurred if that relationship had been
    revealed in the Jones case. Yet, he would have you believe he
    cannot remember a call he made to that woman about that case
    which occurred at 2 o'clock in the morning. His statement is
    not credible, and the reason it is not credible is because it
    is not true.
        As Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony corroborates, the
    President knew what Ms. Lewinsky planned to allege in her
    affidavit, yet the President took no action to stop her from
    filing it. As you have heard in earlier presentations, the
    President's lawyer, Mr. Robert Bennett, stated in court
    directly to Judge Wright, when he presented the false
    affidavit, ``There is absolutely no sex of any kind in any
    manner, shape or form,'' and that the President was ``fully
    aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.'' The President took no
    action to correct his lawyer's misstatement.
        As you have also heard, the President, in his grand jury
    testimony, tried to disingenuously dissect the words of his
    attorney to remove his conduct from further examination, even
    though obviously, and by any reasonable interpretation or
    inference of the definition given the President, his conduct
    with Ms. Lewinsky was covered. And he disavowed knowledge of
    his lawyer's representations by claiming he was not paying
    attention. That canard has been most ably disposed of in prior
    presentations both through the words of the managers and the
    videotape presentations.
        Later in the deposition, when Mr. Bennett read to the
    President the portion of the affidavit in which Ms. Lewinsky
    denies their relationship and asked him ``is that a true and
    accurate statement as far as you know it,'' the President
    answered, ``That is absolutely true.'' This statement is
    neither credible nor true. It is perjury.
        The inescapable conclusion from this evidence is that the
    President has lied, and continues to lie, about the affidavit.
    His continued false statements and denials about the affidavit
    bolster the conclusion of our managers that, in fact, he was
    part of the scheme to file the false affidavit. The evidence
    supports Ms. Lewinsky's account that such a scheme did in fact
    exist between them. The evidence and all reasonable inferences
    drawn therefrom do not support the President's denial--
    inferences, I respectfully add, that in your deliberations, as
    in the deliberations of any jury, are to be and should be based
    on common sense and deliberated in terms of the light of your
    experiences in judging human behavior.
        Moreover, in engaging in this course of conduct, referring
    here to the words of the obstruction statute found at section
    1503 of the Criminal Code, the President's actions constituted
    an endeavor to influence or impede the due administration of
    justice in that he was attempting to prevent the plaintiff in
    the Jones case from having a ``free and fair opportunity to
    learn what she may learn concerning the material facts
    surrounding her claim.'' These acts by the President also
    constituted an endeavor to ``corruptly persuade another person
    with the intent to influence the testimony they might give in
    an official proceeding.'' Such are the elements of tampering
    with witnesses found at section 1512 of the Federal Criminal
    Code.
        Ms. Lewinsky knew full well her only hope of not having to
    testify was to file an affidavit that did not truthfully
    reflect her relationship with the President. The President also
    knew that if she had filed a true affidavit, without any doubt,
    it would have caused the Jones lawyers to seek her further
    testimony--something both coconspirators desperately sought to
    avoid.
        In encouraging her to file an affidavit that would prevent
    her from having to testify, President Clinton was, of
    necessity, asking her to testify falsely in an official
    proceeding. He was attempting to prevent, and in fact did
    prevent, the plaintiff in that case from discovering facts
    which may have had a bearing on her claim against the
    President. His motive was improper in the language of the law,
    that is, corrupt. And his actions did influence the testimony
    of Ms. Lewinsky as a witness in the pending official proceeding
    in U.S. district court.
        Under both sections of the Federal Criminal Code, that is,
    1503, obstruction, and 1512, obstruction in the form of witness
    tampering, the President's conduct constituted a Federal crime
    and satisfies the elements of those statutes.
        With regard to the issue of perjury before the grand jury
    concerning the affidavit, we as managers would show that when
    asked before the grand jury whether he had instructed Ms.
    Lewinsky to file a truthful affidavit, President Clinton
    testified, ``Did I hope she would be able to get out of
    testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to
    execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.''
        The evidence, however, clearly establishes that the
    President's statement constitutes perjury, in violation of
    section 1623 of the U.S. Federal Criminal Code for the simple
    reason the only realistic way Ms. Lewinsky could get out of
    having to testify based on her affidavit would be to execute a
    false affidavit. There was no other way it could have happened.
    The President knew this. Ms. Lewinsky knew this. And the
    President's testimony on this point is perjury within the clear
    meaning of the Federal perjury statute. It was willful, it was
    knowing, it was material, and it was false.
        Let us reflect and see also, members of the jury, how the
    use of cover stories and the development thereof ties in the
    facts and the law that constitute a basis on which you might
    properly find a conviction on perjury and obstruction of
    justice.
        We, as managers, believe that the evidence presented to you
    also establishes that on December 17 the President encouraged a
    witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to
    give perjurious, false and misleading testimony when called to
    testify personally in that proceeding. This was, in essence,
    the conspiracy--18 U.S.C. 371--to commit both obstruction and
    perjury.
        Throughout their relationship, the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky, understandably, wished to keep it secret, and they
    took steps to do that, steps that ultimately turned out to be
    and constitute criminal acts. For some time, in fact until Ms.
    Lewinsky testified under oath and under a grant of immunity,
    their efforts were remarkably successful, all things
    considered--all circumstances considered. Associates and
    employees testified in support of the President's stories, and
    even several Secret Service officers testified to the grand
    jury that they understood Ms. Lewinsky to be in the Oval Office
    to ``pick up papers.'' Yet, as Ms. Lewinsky testified, her
    White House job never required her to deliver papers or obtain
    the President's signature on any documents. It was all a sham.
    It was all a cover story. It was all a conspiracy to obstruct.
        Ms. Lewinsky testified later, after she left the White
    House job to work at the Pentagon, that phase 2 of the coverup
    went into effect. The two coconspirators began to use Ms.
    Currie as a source of clearance into the White House. This was
    so even though the purpose of Ms. Lewinsky's visits were almost
    always to simply see the President. As my colleagues have told
    you, on December 17, during that 2 a.m., or perhaps it was
    2:30, telephone conversation placed by the President to Ms.
    Lewinsky, he told her her name appeared on the witness list in
    the Jones case. She testified that at some point in the
    conversation the President told her, ``You know, you can always
    say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me
    letters.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that she understood this to
    be ``really a reminder of things that they had discussed
    before.'' She said it was instantly familiar to her. He knew,
    or, ``I knew,'' she says--that is, Ms. Lewinsky knew--``exactly
    what he meant.'' And so, I respectfully submit, do all of us
    here know exactly what the President meant.
        When the President, then, was questioned before the Federal
    grand jury if he ever had said something like that to Ms.
    Lewinsky, he admitted that, well, ``I might . . . have said
    that. Because I certainly didn't want this to come out, if I
    could help it. And I was concerned about that.''
        A cover story--which this was--between two teenagers trying
    to steal a date without their parents' knowledge is one thing.
    Such would not constitute a crime. It would be something we
    might even wink at, as long as it didn't happen too often.
    However, we are not here dealing with two love-struck teenagers
    trying to circumvent their parents' watchful eyes. We are
    dealing here with the President of the United States of America
    and a subservient employee concocting and implementing a scheme
    that, while perhaps not illegal in its inception--simply trying
    to keep the relationship private--did in fact deteriorate into
    illegality once it left the realm of private life and entered
    that of public obstruction.
        However--and this is critical in terms of establishing the
    illegality or convictability of the President's actions--the
    situation at the time of that early morning phone call from the
    President to Ms. Lewinsky was very different from that facing
    the President during any earlier discussions of a cover story.
        Now, in early December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky had been
    officially named as a witness in a pending judicial proceeding.
    She was now under an obligation to give complete and truthful
    testimony and he, the President, was under a legal obligation
    at that time not to tamper with her or her possible testimony.
    This is precisely where private lies become public obstruction.
    This is, in fact, the bright line between childlike pranks and
    deadly serious obstruction of our legal system. The President
    and Ms. Lewinsky at that point entered the big leagues, and the
    President, a highly skilled lawyer, knew it, which is why he
    went to such lengths to continue the coverup for so many
    months.
        The President knew that if Ms. Lewinsky were to testify
    that she only brought papers to the President or to see the
    President's secretary, her testimony would have been neither
    complete nor truthful. Yet, the President encouraged her to
    give that untruthful testimony and, in so doing, he broke the
    law of obstruction of justice. And, in lying about it, he
    compounded the problem by breaking the law of perjury.
        As Mr. Cannon made clear, with regard to section 1503, the
    general Federal obstruction statute of the criminal code, a
    person commits the crime of obstruction of justice when he
    attempts to influence the due administration of justice, which
    includes all aspects of any civil or criminal case, including
    pretrial discovery.
        Mr. Clinton's encouragement to Ms. Lewinsky to tell
    something other than the truth certainly would have influenced
    the discovery process in the Jones case. Courts have
    consistently held that civil discovery is every bit a part of
    the due administration of justice, protected by the obstruction
    statutes, as any other aspect of any other civil or criminal
    case. And, as Mr. Cannon also made clear with regard to section
    1512 of the Federal Criminal Code, a person commits witness
    tampering when he attempts to influence another person to give
    false testimony in an official proceeding.
        Mr. Clinton did encourage Ms. Lewinsky to give false
    testimony about her reasons for being in the White House with
    the President. By encouraging her to lie, the President
    committed the crime of obstruction of justice under section
    1503 and the crime of witness tampering under section 1512 of
    the Federal Criminal Code.
        You have also, Members of the Senate, heard about the
    President's statements to Ms. Currie on January 18, and then
    again on the 20th or 21st. The President spoke with her in what
    was clearly, demonstrably, unavoidably, another potential
    witness to be influenced in the civil rights case. The
    President did this in this case by relating to Ms. Currie false
    and misleading accounts of events about that case as to which
    he was going to testify, had testified, and, again, with the
    intent that his recitation of the so-called facts would in fact
    corruptly influence her testimony.
        As the managers have previously described to you, the
    evidence in this case shows that on that Saturday, January 17,
    only 2\1/2\ hours after the President had been deposed in the
    Jones case, he called his secretary at home and asked her to
    come to the White House the next day, a Sunday. She testified--
    Ms. Currie, that is--testified this was very unusual. It was
    rare for the President to call and ask her to come in on a
    weekend, but of course she did--the next day, Sunday, January
    18, 1998, at about 5 p.m.
        She testified to the grand jury that during her meeting
    with the President he said to her, ``There are several things
    you may want to know.'' He then proceeded to ask her a number
    of questions in succession. You were presented evidence of
    these five statements by other managers. I will only emphasize
    that it was at that time and in that way, in that manner, that
    the President led Ms. Currie through a series of statements and
    determinate questions to establish a set of facts describing
    his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at the White House that
    supported his false testimony.
        As you have heard, Ms. Currie stated under oath she
    indicated her agreement with each of the President's
    statements, even though she knew that the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky had, in fact, been alone in the Oval Office and in the
    President's study. Prosecutors frequently see this pattern. It
    is not unknown to prosecutors, Federal or State. You frequently
    see this pattern of agreeing to things that the person knows
    are not true, where you have a dominant person suggesting
    testimony to another person who is in a subordinate
    relationship. This, I submit, is yet another bright line
    between a private lie and public obstruction.
        During the President's grand jury testimony he was asked
    about his statements to Ms. Currie. He testified he was trying
    to determine whether his recollection was accurate. As he put
    it, ``I was trying to get the facts down. I was trying to
    understand what the facts were.'' This fits the same pattern of
    a classic obstruction of prosecution, in which a defendant
    suggests a story to someone in the hopes that they will later
    testify consistent with that earlier suggestion. Indeed, when
    defendants in Federal courts defend against obstruction
    prosecutions in those type cases, they frequently rely on the
    very same defense the President raises here--that he was merely
    and oh-so-innocently encouraging the other person to tell the
    truth.
        You may want to see, as an example of an unsuccessful
    effort at such a defense, the case of United States v. O'Keefe,
    a Fifth Circuit case from 1983. In that case, Mr. O'Keefe did
    not ask someone to lie. He did not even say, ``I suggest you
    lie.'' Rather, as is almost always the case in white-collar
    obstruction prosecutions, his words, along with their setting
    and their context, suggested a certain story--in that case as
    well as this, a false story. Just as Mr. O'Keefe did not
    expressly ask someone to lie, Mr. Clinton never asked someone
    to lie. He didn't have to. He was too smart for that, and he
    had witnesses who, at that time at least, were willing, ready,
    and able to do his bidding. The President lied to the grand
    jury when he made these statements mischaracterizing his
    earlier statements to Ms. Currie, just as he tampered with her
    as a likely witness 9 months earlier, in January.
        The President's assertion--that he simply was trying to
    understand what the facts were--lacks even colorable
    credibility, when one considers that he had already testified.
    It was obviously too late to try to recollect what the
    ``facts'' were. If in fact one accepts that, then he is
    admitting he didn't testify to what the facts were under oath
    at the deposition, because he didn't say, ``I don't know; I
    have to ask Ms. Currie.'' He testified under oath as to what
    the facts purportedly were. Then he would have us believe that
    he had to, after the fact of the deposition, go back and find
    out what the facts were from somebody else.
        That is an argument that cannot be made with a straight
    face.
        In any event, Ms. Currie could not have told him what the
    true facts were, because he alone knew what they were.
        The defenses and explanations the President's defenders
    raise to justify why the President would make factual
    assertions to Ms. Currie about the circumstances of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, right after his testimony, are
    many. For example, one administration witness who appeared
    before the House Judiciary Committee actually suggested that
    such ``coaching'' is proper as a method whereby an attorney
    ``prepares'' a client or witness for testimony.
        Of course, such a suggestion in this case would be
    ludicrous. President Clinton obviously did not and could not
    represent Ms. Currie as her attorney. Yet, it is this sort of
    explanation, straining credulity, that illustrates the lengths
    to which the President's defenders have gone to try to explain
    away the obvious--that there was no legitimate reason why the
    President made the statements to Ms. Currie after his grand
    jury testimony, other than to ``suggest'' to her what her
    testimony should be. In Federal criminal trials, defendants go
    to jail for such obstruction. In the case before you, we submit
    this clearly forms a proper basis on which to convict this
    President of obstruction of justice for witness tampering and
    subsequent perjury.
        Please keep in mind also, it is not required that the
    target of the defendant's actions actually testify falsely. In
    fact, the witness tampering statute can be violated even when
    there is no proceeding pending at the time the defendant acted
    in suggesting testimony. As the cases discussed by Manager
    Cannon demonstrate, for a conviction under either section 1503,
    obstruction, or 1512, obstruction by witness tampering, it is
    necessary only to show it was possible the target of the
    defendant's actions might be called as a witness. That element
    has been more than met under the facts of this case.
        It was not only likely Ms. Currie would be called, the
    President's own testimony, deliberate testimony to the grand
    jury, pretty much guaranteed that she would be called. He
    wanted her called so she could then buttress his false
    testimony. His actions clearly, we believe, violated both the
    general obstruction statute and the witness tampering statute
    in these particulars in this regard.
        With regard to the obstruction regarding the subpoena for
    the President's gifts to Ms. Lewinsky, let us look at the
    merger of the facts and the law, as has been discussed. While
    the witness tampering statute makes it a crime to attempt to
    influence the testimony of a person, it also makes it a crime
    to influence a person to withhold an object from an official
    proceeding; in other words, to tamper with evidence. The facts
    of this case, we as House managers believe, clearly show the
    President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a
    scheme with Monica Lewinsky and possibly others to conceal
    evidence that had been subpoenaed lawfully in the Jones case.
        On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was served with a
    subpoena in the Jones case requiring her to produce each and
    every gift given to her by the President. Then, on December 28,
    Ms. Lewinsky again met with the President in the Oval Office,
    at which time they exchanged gifts. They also discussed the
    fact that the lawyers in the Jones case had subpoenaed all the
    President's gifts to Ms. Lewinsky and especially a hatpin. The
    hatpin apparently had sentimental significance to both of them,
    in that it was the very first gift the President gave to Ms.
    Lewinsky. During that conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the
    President whether she should put the gifts away outside her
    house or give them to someone, maybe Betty.
        At that time, according to Ms. Lewinsky's sworn testimony,
    the President responded, ``Let me think about that.''
    Apparently he did, because later that day, that very same day,
    only a few hours after Ms. Lewinsky and the President had met
    to discuss what to do with the gifts, Ms. Currie called Ms.
    Lewinsky, setting in motion the great gift exchange.
        According to Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie said, ``I understand
    that you have something to give me,'' or ``[t]he President said
    you have something to give me.'' In her earlier proffer, or
    offer of evidence, to the independent counsel, prior to her
    testimony before the grand jury, Ms. Lewinsky said Ms. Currie
    had said the President had told her--that is, Ms. Currie--that
    Ms. Lewinsky wanted her to hold on to something for her.
        After their conversation at the Oval Office, Ms. Currie
    drove to Ms. Lewinsky's apartment for only the second time in
    her life. There she picked up a box sealed with tape and on
    which was written ``Please, do not throw away.'' Ms. Currie
    then took the box, drove to her home, and placed the box under
    her bed.
        In her grand jury testimony, Ms. Currie testified that she
    and Ms. Lewinsky did not discuss the content of the box, nor
    did she open it when she got it to her home, but she knew--she
    ``understood'' what was in the box--that it contained the gifts
    from the President to Ms. Lewinsky. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky
    testified Ms. Currie was not at all confused, surprised, or
    even interested when she handed the box over to her.
        The legal impact, the legal import, of this is that there
    is no question that if the gifts had actually been produced to
    the Jones lawyers, they would have established a significant
    relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Knowledge
    of the gifts, at a minimum, would have caused the Jones lawyers
    to inquire further as to the nature of the relationship between
    the President and Ms. Lewinsky.
        Her failure to turn over the gifts as required by the
    lawful subpoena served on her was, in the words of the witness
    tampering statute, the withholding of an object from an
    official proceeding. We believe the evidence shows, clearly
    establishes, that the President corruptly persuaded Ms.
    Lewinsky to withhold these objects from the lawful proceedings
    in the Jones case.
        In his grand jury testimony, the President asserted he
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony directly contradicts that. Importantly, all other
    evidence of subsequent acts corroborates her testimony, not the
    President's. For one thing, the gifts were never turned over.
    In fact, Ms. Lewinsky testified she was never under any
    impression, from anything the President said, that she should
    turn over the gifts to the attorneys for Ms. Jones. Quite the
    opposite.
        While the President asserts he never spoke about this
    matter with Betty Currie, he would have us believe that his
    personal and confidential secretary would, on a Sunday, drive
    to the home of the woman with whom he was having an
    inappropriate intimate relationship, take possession of a
    sealed box which she believed to contain gifts given by the
    President, hide the box under the bed in her home, never
    question the person giving her the box, and never even mention
    to the President she had received the box of gifts.
        The President's position, as he would have you believe, is
    not credible. It defies the evidence. It defies any reasonable
    interpretation or inference from the evidence. It defies common
    sense. And it stands in defiance of Federal law.
        The only reasonable interpretation of the facts is that,
    following the discussion between the President and Ms. Lewinsky
    earlier in the day on December 28, the President decided Ms.
    Lewinsky had actually come up with a pretty good suggestion:
    The gifts should be put away outside of her home.
        As jurors, you may reasonably presume, based on the
    evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, along with
    common sense, that it was the President who directed Ms. Currie
    to call Ms. Lewinsky to tell her she understood she ``had
    something for her.'' And that happened to be evidence under
    lawful subpoena in a civil proceeding in a U.S. district court.
        Ms. Currie would have no independent reason to even
    consider such a course of action on her own. She had never,
    other than one time in her life, ever driven to Ms. Lewinsky's
    home. She did so on this Sunday not because she developed a
    sudden hankering to do so or because she routinely visited
    interns at their homes--she didn't--or because she had a
    vision; she did it because the President would have asked her
    to do it.
        Now, the President further points out that Ms. Currie has
    testified that Ms. Lewinsky called her to arrange to pick up
    the gifts, rather than the other way around. In fact, although
    Ms. Currie has testified inconsistently as to whether Ms.
    Lewinsky called her or she called Ms. Lewinsky, she actually
    deferred to Ms. Lewinsky's superior knowledge of the facts.
        However, even if one were to accept, for purposes of
    argument, that it was Ms. Lewinsky who initiated the call, the
    President's avowal that he had no knowledge of or involvement
    with the hiding or the transfer of the gifts is still not
    plausible. It is totally unreasonable to presume that the
    private secretary to the President of the United States would
    drop what she was doing, travel to the home of a former intern,
    pick up a box, and hide it in her home simply because the
    former intern demanded that she do so. All of this had to have
    been done--reasonably, plausibly, credibly was done--because of
    communication directed and an understanding between the
    President and his personal secretary.
        There is one more point on this. Ms. Lewinsky testified she
    met with the President for 45 minutes on December 28, at which
    time they discussed the fact that she had been subpoenaed,
    along with the need to conceal the gifts. The President's
    testimony directly conflicts with hers on this point.
        First, the evidence, however, establishes that his
    professed inability to remember whether she and the gifts had
    been subpoenaed is unbelievable and false.
        Please keep in mind when evaluating the circumstantial
    evidence to determine whether a false statement was made
    intentionally, the most important evidence to consider is the
    existence of a motive to lie. It is the calculated falsehood,
    combined with a clear motive to lie, that leads, day in and day
    out in Federal court proceedings, to the conclusion that false
    statements were intentional.
        Also, we urge you to bear in mind that the law will not
    allow a person to testify, ``I don't recall,'' or, ``I'm not
    sure,'' when such answers are unreasonable under the
    circumstances.
        Former U.S. Representative Patrick Swindall attempted this
    course of action when he appeared before a Federal grand jury
    in the Northern District of Georgia in 1988. His evasive and
    false answers to the grand jury provided the basis for his
    subsequent conviction.
        Feigned forgetfulness or feigned assertions that grand jury
    questions are ambiguous and therefore cannot be answered
    cannot, and in fact in Federal proceedings do not, shield
    defendants from criminal liability for perjury or impeding the
    conduct of a Federal grand jury; nor should such efforts be
    allowed to shield President Clinton from conviction on these
    two articles of impeachment as to these facts.
        The President, a man of considerable intelligence and
    gifted with an exceptional memory--as somebody described, ``a
    prodigious memory''--can and should be inferred to have clearly
    understood what he was doing, as well as the logical and
    reasonable consequences of his actions, as well as the
    questions put to him by the independent counsel in the grand
    jury questioning.
        And he had a clear motive to falsely state to the grand
    jury that he could not recall that he knew on December 28 that
    Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called
    for her to produce the gifts, for to have acknowledged such
    would have helped establish a motive on his part for
    orchestrating the concealment of the gifts.
        And as we have also seen and understand, there is no doubt
    the President's statement of feigned forgetfulness was material
    not only to the matters before the Jones case but to matters
    subsequently before the grand jury.
        Now, the President's counsel may very well argue the fact
    that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on that
    same day--that is, December 28--as proof of the President's
    assertions that he didn't know there was anything wrong going
    on here. Their argument, if they make it, cannot be sustained
    in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The evidence
    in fact points to a much more plausible explanation. The
    additional gifts given that day demonstrate the President's
    continued confidence that Ms. Lewinsky would keep to their
    earlier agreement to conceal their relationship.
        It is also plausible that the additional gifts were
    intended as a further gesture of affection by the President to
    Ms. Lewinsky to help ensure she would not testify against him.
    Such a fact pattern also finds its way to those of us who have
    a prosecutorial background in Federal courts on a regular
    basis.
        We have heard about the job search and its relationship to
    perjury and obstruction. Let me tie the facts related to job
    search and the law applicable thereto together. We believe, as
    managers, that the evidence shows that, beginning on or about
    December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January
    14 of last year, the President intensified and succeeded in an
    effort to secure job assistance for a witness in a Federal
    civil rights case brought against him in order to corruptly
    prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that
    proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that
    witness would have been harmful to him.
        Monica Lewinsky is, if nothing else, a persistent witness.
    After she was transferred out of the White House, and after
    being rebuffed repeatedly by others to secure assistance from
    the President in gaining a job that met her expectations and
    wishes, she decided to change tack. She wrote directly to the
    President, asked for, and received a meeting in which she asked
    him to find her a job in New York.
        The day before the President filed his answers to the
    interrogatories in the Jones case, as Manager Gekas discussed,
    the President asked Ms. Currie to set up a meeting for Ms.
    Lewinsky with Mr. Vernon Jordan. Two days after he filed his
    answers, in which he refused to answer whether he had ever had
    any extramarital relationships in the context of his public
    jobs, that meeting in fact occurred. But Mr. Jordan made no
    particular effort to assist Ms. Lewinsky at that time. In fact,
    as he later testified, he had no recollection of the meeting.
    There was, of course, at that early stage, no urgency.
        The situation, however, changed dramatically in early
    December, 1997. On December 6, the President became aware that
    Ms. Lewinsky had been named as a witness in the Jones case.
    Early that day, she had thrown a tantrum at the White House
    northwest gate when she was unable to meet with the President
    when she wanted. Despite the President's initial anger over Ms.
    Lewinsky's behavior and over the acts of some of the Secret
    Service officers a mere 5 days later, Ms. Lewinsky, in fact,
    secured a second meeting with Mr. Vernon Jordan. But this time,
    unlike previously, this powerful Washington lawyer jumped for
    the former intern. He immediately placed calls to three major
    corporations on her behalf.
        On December 11, Judge Wright ordered the President to
    answer Paula Jones' interrogatories. On December 17, the
    President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky she file the affidavit and
    continue to use their cover stories in the event she was asked
    about her relationship with the President. The next day she had
    two interviews in New York City arranged by Mr. Jordan. On
    December 22, Ms. Lewinsky met with an attorney at a meeting
    arranged by Mr. Jordan. The following day she had another job
    interview arranged by Mr. Jordan.
        On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed the false affidavit and
    proudly showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan. The next day,
    Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan with
    MacAndrews & Forbes in New York City, an interview that
    apparently went poorly. To remedy this, she called Mr. Jordan
    and so informed him. Mr. Jordan then called the CEO of
    MacAndrews & Forbes, Mr. Ron Perelman to, in Mr. Jordan's
    words, ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' After Mr.
    Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman, Ms. Lewinsky was called and told
    that she would be interviewed again the very next morning. That
    following day she was reinterviewed and immediately offered a
    job. She then called Mr. Jordan to tell him and he passed the
    information on to Ms. Currie. ``Tell the President, mission
    accomplished.''
        Now, what are you as jurors entitled to conclude from all
    of this as a matter of law and of fact? Until it became clear
    that Ms. Lewinsky would be a witness in the Jones case, little
    was done to help her with her job search. Once she was listed
    as a witness, things changed dramatically and rapidly. Just
    days after she is listed on the Jones witness list, she gets a
    second meeting with one of the most influential men in
    Washington. But, unlike their first meeting, Mr. Jordan now
    makes three calls on her behalf to get her a job interview. A
    week later the President proposed the affidavit. The next day,
    Ms. Lewinsky has two job interviews in New York. A few days
    later, Mr. Jordan arranges for an attorney to represent her.
    The next day she has another job interview. Two weeks later she
    signed the affidavit. The next day she has another interview.
        ``Mission accomplished.'' Obstruction accomplished. Another
    potentially embarrassing witness in the bag.
        Were Ms. Lewinsky to get a job and move to New York, this
    would help the President substantially in two very important
    ways. First, it would presumably create a happy and probably
    compliant witness, one willing, if not eager, to support the
    President's false testimony. Second, it would make Ms. Lewinsky
    much more difficult, if not impossible, to reach as a witness
    in the Jones case. In fact, this is precisely what the
    President himself suggested to Ms. Lewinsky during their
    December 28 meeting, according to her sworn testimony.
        To put it plainly, but respectfully, if that is not
    obstruction by witness tampering, one would be hard pressed to
    find a fact pattern that was.
        This aspect of the case against the President is extremely
    important. She gets the job. And what did the President get?
    The key affidavit to throw the Jones lawyers off the trail and
    possibly a witness outside the practical reach of the
    attorneys, much like the absent witnesses we have seen in large
    numbers in the campaign financing investigations.
        The President's efforts were designed to and did obstruct
    justice and tamper with a witness. And his actions, we submit,
    were criminal under both sections 1503 and 1512 of the Federal
    Criminal Code.
        The President's false statements to his senior aides. Here,
    too, the facts and the law come together and would form the
    basis, we respectfully submit, for a conviction on articles of
    impeachment. All that needs to be shown to prove a violation of
    the statute is that the defendant engaged in misleading conduct
    with another person to influence their testimony. Misleading
    conduct is not a term of art for which there is no definition.
    It is specifically defined in the Federal Criminal Code as
    section 1515. When you, as jurors, properly apply these
    definitions to the terms of section 1512, the tampering
    statute, and then turn your attention to the facts in this case
    wherein the President repeatedly and deliberately gave false
    explanations to aides he knew or should reasonably have known
    would be witnesses in Federal judicial proceedings, the
    conclusion he violated this statute is, we respectfully submit,
    unavoidable. I point to one case previously mentioned, the
    O'Keefe case as particularly, perhaps, applicable to
    deliberations on this matter.
        Finally, statements by the President and his lawyer
    concerning the affidavit during the Jones deposition. The
    obstruction statute may also be violated, as you know, by a
    person who gives false testimony. In the Jones case, the
    President allowed his attorney to make false and misleading
    statements to a Federal judge. This part of the obstruction
    scheme was accomplished by characterizing as true the false
    affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in order to prevent questioning
    by the Jones lawyers, testimony which had already been deemed
    relevant by the judge in that case. The President's lawyer, as
    you have heard, objected to the innuendo of certain questions
    asked of the President, and at that point during the deposition
    pointed out that Ms. Lewinsky had signed an affidavit denying
    the relationship with the President. He then made the famous
    statement about there being no relationship in any way, shape
    or form or kind.
        Following this statement, Judge Wright warned Mr. Bennett
    about making an assertion of fact in front of the witness--that
    is, in front of the President--in which he replied:

        I am not coaching the witness. In preparation of the
    witness for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of
    [the] affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he
    doesn't know.

        The President's lawyer did not know what an understatement
    that was.
        Later, on September 30, 1998, long after the deposition and
    after the full evidence of Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the
    President became public, Mr. Bennett wrote to Judge Wright to
    inform her that she should not rely upon the statements he made
    during the President's deposition because parts of the
    affidavit were ``misleading and not true.'' ``Misleading and
    not true.'' Sounds like perjury. Sounds like obstruction.
        Which brings us full circle, full circle from a false
    affidavit confirming earlier concocted cover stories, through a
    web of obstruction, to a letter from a distinguished lawyer
    forced to do what no lawyer wants to do, but every honorable
    lawyer must do when confronted with clear evidence their client
    has misled a court, and that is to correct a record of falsity
    even to the detriment of their client.
        What we have before us, Senators and Mr. Chief Justice, is
    really not complex. Critically important, yes, but not
    essentially complex. Virtually every Federal or State
    prosecutor--and there are many such distinguished persons on
    this jury--has prosecuted such cases of obstruction before in
    their careers--perhaps repeatedly--involving patterns of
    obstruction, compounded by subsequent coverup perjury. The
    President's lawyers may very well try to weave a spell of
    complexity over the facts of this case. They may nitpick over
    the time of a call or parse a specific word or phrase of
    testimony, much as the President has done. We urge you, the
    distinguished jurors in this case, not to be fooled.
        Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I object to the use and the
    continued use of the word ``jurors'' when referring to the
    Senate sitting as triers in a trial of the impeachment of the
    President of the United States.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the following:
        First, article I, section 3, of the Constitution says the
    Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments--not
    the courts, but the Senate.
        Article III of the Constitution says the trial of all
    crimes, except in the cases of impeachment, shall be by jury--a
    tremendous exculpatory clause when it comes to impeachments.
        Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the
    writings in ``The Federalist Papers,'' especially No. 65 by
    Alexander Hamilton, in which he is outlining the reasons why
    the framers of the Constitution gave the Senate the sole power
    to try impeachments. I won't read it all, but I will read this
    pertinent sentence:

        There will be no jury to stand between the judges who are
    to pronounce the sentence of the law and the party who is to
    receive or suffer it.

        Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the 26
    rules of the Senate, adopted by the Senate, governing
    impeachments. Nowhere in any of those 26 rules is the word
    ``juror'' or ``jury'' ever used.
        Next, Mr. Chief Justice, I base my objection on the
    tremendous differences between regular jurors and Senators
    sitting as triers of an impeachment. Regular jurors, of course,
    are chosen, to the maximum extent possible, with no knowledge
    of the case. Not so when we try impeachments. Regular jurors
    are not supposed to know each other. Not so here. Regular
    jurors cannot overrule the judge. Not so here. Regular jurors
    do not decide what evidence should be heard, the standards of
    evidence, nor do they decide what witnesses shall be called.
    Not so here. Regular jurors do not decide when a trial is to be
    ended. Not so here.
        Now, Mr. Chief Justice, it may seem a small point, but I
    think a very important point. I think the framers of the
    Constitution meant us, the Senate, to be something other than a
    jury and not jurors. What we do here today does not just decide
    the fate of one man. Since the Senate sits on impeachment so
    rarely, and even more rarely on the impeachment of a President
    of the United States, what we do here sets precedence. Future
    generations will look back on this trial not just to find out
    what happened, but to try to decide what principles governed
    our actions. To leave the impression for future generations
    that we somehow are jurors and acting as a jury----
        Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, I call for the regular order
    and I ask, as a parliamentary point, whether it is appropriate
    to argue what I understand is a statement as to the proper
    reference relative to Members of the Senate. This is not a
    motion. And if it is a motion, it is nondebatable, as I
    understand it.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I think you may state your
    objection, certainly, but not argue. The Chair is of the view
    that you may state the objection and some reason for it, but
    not argue it on ad infinitum.
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I was stating the reason
    because of the precedents that we set, and I do not believe it
    would be a valid precedent to leave future generations that we
    would be looked upon merely as jurors, but something other than
    being a juror. That is why I raise the objection.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair is of the view that the
    objection of the Senator from Iowa is well taken, that the
    Senate is not simply a jury; it is a court in this case.
    Therefore, counsel should refrain from referring to the
    Senators as jurors.
        Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Manager BARR. I thank the Court for his ruling. We urge
    the distinguished Senators who are sitting as triers of fact in
    this case not to be fooled. We urge you to use your common
    sense, your reasoning, your varied and successful career
    experiences, just as any trier of fact and law anywhere in
    America might do. Just as other triers of fact and law do, so,
    too, have each of you sworn to decide these momentous matters
    impartially. Your oath to look to the law and to our
    Constitution demands this of you. As this great body has done
    on so many occasions in the course of our Nation's history, I
    and all managers are confident you will neither shrink from nor
    cast aside that duty.
        Rather, I urge and fully anticipate that you will look to
    the volume of facts and to the clear and fully applicable
    statutes and conclude that William Jefferson Clinton, in fact
    and under the law, violated his oath and violated the laws of
    this land and convict him on both articles of impeachment. Even
    though such a high burden--that is, proof of criminal
    violations--is not strictly required of you under the law of
    impeachment, in fact, such evidence is here. That higher burden
    is met.
        Perjury is here; obstruction is here in the facts and the
    law which forms the basis for the articles of impeachment in
    the House which we believe properly would form the basis for
    conviction in the Senate. Perjury and obstruction, we
    respectfully ask you to strike down these insidious cancers
    that eat at the heart of our system of Government and laws.
    Strike them down with the Constitution so they might not fester
    as a gaping wound poisoning future generations of children,
    poisoning our court system, and perhaps even future generations
    of political leaders.
        Just as Members of both Houses of Congress have
    unfortunately over the years been convicted and removed from
    office for perjury and obstruction, and just as Federal judges
    have been removed from life tenure for perjury and obstruction,
    so must a President; so sadly should this President.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and thank you, Members of the
    U.S. Senate sitting here as jurors of fact and law in the trial
    of President William Jefferson Clinton.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
                                    ------

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I remind all who are
    participants in these proceedings that we will begin at 10 a.m.
    on Saturday, January 16, and we are expected to conclude
    sometime between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. I had earlier indicated
    concluding as late as 5 p.m. I understand that we will conclude
    between 3 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. Therefore, pursuant to the
    previous consent agreement, I ask unanimous consent that the
    Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.
        There being no objection at 5:10 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday, January
    16, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                    ------

                           Saturday, January 16, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 10:01 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Gracious God, You have given us magnificent promises to
    claim for today. You have told us that if we wait on You, we
    will renew our strength. You have assured us that You will use
    our minds to think clearly in response to Your inspiration.
    Courage is offered, patience provided, and wisdom engendered.
        In this quiet moment, grant the Senators Your power to
    persevere, Your peace for equipoise, Your judgment for the
    evaluation of the facts presented, and Your will to guide their
    decisions. As You have blessed us with this day, we praise You
    that You will show the way. Through our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that
    the House managers intend to extend their presentation until
    approximately 3 p.m., with a lunch break at approximately 12:40
    or 12:45.
        I remind all Senators to remain standing at their desks
    each time the Chief Justice enters and departs the Chamber. We
    want to maintain the very best decorum.
        One other point. We had been scheduled to go from 10:05
    straight through until 12:40, but we will probably take a very
    short 10-minute break after the presentation by Manager Graham.
    It will be very important that Members tend to business and
    return promptly to the Chamber so that we can complete activity
    as early as possible this afternoon.
        I yield the floor, Mr. Chief Justice.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the
    managers for the House of Representatives have 15 hours 37
    minutes remaining to make the presentation of their case. The
    Senate will now hear you. The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr.
    Manager Buyer.
        Mr. Manager BUYER. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I thank
    the Senators, and the counsel for the President.
        I am Steve Buyer, the House manager from the Fifth District
    of Indiana. I thank all of you for your attention the past
    several days. It has not been easy for the House managers to
    argue from a dry record. I ask for your patience. The House
    managers are prepared to call witnesses and offer to develop
    the evidence as the trial proceeds.
        This morning, the managers on the part of the House are
    going to present why the offenses you have been hearing over
    the course of the last several days require the President's
    removal from office. I will discuss why the offenses attack the
    judicial system which is a core function of the Government, and
    how perjury and obstruction of justice are not private acts.
    These are public crimes and therefore quintessential
    impeachable offenses, for the President's premeditated assault
    on the administration of justice must be interpreted as a
    threat to our system of government.
        I will be followed by Mr. Manager Graham of South Carolina
    who will discuss the precedents in impeachment cases, and then
    he will be followed by Mr. Manager Canady. He will discuss how
    the felonies constitute high crimes and misdemeanors as
    envisioned by the Founding Fathers and why they warrant his
    removal from office.
        While this is day 3 of our presentation, it is important
    for the Senate to be fully informed as to the facts, the law
    and the consequences. Please indulge me for a quick reiteration
    of the facts.
        On May 27, 1997, nine Justices of the Supreme Court of the
    United States unanimously ruled that Ms. Jones could pursue her
    Federal civil rights actions against William Jefferson Clinton.
    On December 11, 1997, U.S. District Court Judge Susan Webber
    Wright ordered President Clinton to provide Ms. Jones with
    answers to certain routine questions relevant to the lawsuit.
        Acting under the authority of these court orders, Ms. Jones
    exercised her rights, rights every litigant has under our
    system of justice. She sought answers from President Clinton to
    help prove her case against him, just as President Clinton
    sought and received answers from her. President Clinton used
    numerous means, then, to prevent her from getting truthful
    answers.
        On December 17, 1997, President Clinton encouraged a
    witness to file a false affidavit in the case and to testify
    falsely if she were called to testify in this case. Why?
    Because her truthful testimony would have helped Ms. Jones and
    hurt his case.
        On December 23, 1997, he provided under oath false written
    answers to Ms. Jones' questions. On December 18, 1997,
    President Clinton began an effort to get the witnesses to
    conceal evidence that would have helped Ms. Jones. Throughout
    this period, he intensified efforts to provide the witness with
    help in getting a job to ensure that she carried out his
    designs.
        On January 17, 1998, President Clinton provided under oath
    numerous false answers to Ms. Jones' questions during that
    deposition in the civil case. In the days immediately following
    the deposition, President Clinton provided a false and
    misleading account to another witness, his secretary, Betty
    Currie, in hopes that she would substantiate the false
    testimony he gave in the deposition.
        All of these unlawful actions denied Ms. Jones her rights
    as a litigant, subverted the fundamental truth-seeking function
    of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
    Arkansas, and violated President Clinton's constitutional oath
    to ``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
    United States.'' And, further, it violated his constitutional
    duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
        Beginning shortly after his deposition, President Clinton
    became aware that the Federal grand jury empaneled by the U.S.
    District Court for the District of Columbia was investigating
    his unlawful actions before and during his civil deposition.
    President Clinton made numerous false statements to potential
    grand jury witnesses in hopes that they would repeat these
    statements to the grand jury.
        On August 17, 1998, President Clinton appeared before the
    grand jury by video under oath and he provided numerous false
    answers to questions asked. These actions impeded the grand
    jury's investigation; it subverted the fundamental truth-
    seeking function of the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Columbia, and they also violated President Clinton's
    constitutional oath to ``preserve, protect, and defend the
    Constitution of the United States'' and his constitutional duty
    as the Chief Executive Officer to ``take care that the laws be
    faithfully executed.''
        You will hear next week, perhaps, from the President's
    lawyers that the offenses charged by the House are not
    impeachable; in other words, that even if the allegations as
    set forth in the articles of impeachment are true, so what?
    See, the House managers have begun to refer to this as the ``so
    what'' defense. I am not offended by the ``so what'' defense,
    because if that is all you have, then try it. You see, there
    are only a few basic ways that you can actually defend a case.
    You can defend a case on the facts, you can defend a case on
    the law, you can defend a case on the facts and the law.
        We hear in this case--we hear very often--that the facts
    are indefensible. And you also hear that if you are not going
    to call witnesses on the facts, then I guess you better argue
    on the law. So, then, what is the argument on the law? What you
    do, then, in the defending of a case, is you argue procedure,
    you attack the prosecutor, you attempt to confuse those who sit
    in judgment on the laws so you don't follow your precedent. You
    go out and obtain, from your political allies and friends in
    the academic world, signatures on a letter saying that the
    offenses as alleged in the articles of impeachment do not rise
    to the level of an impeachable offense. This ``rise to the
    level'' has somehow become the legal cliche of this case. You
    have all so often heard it and some have even spoken it.
        The House managers chose not to go out into the academic
    world and obtain signatures on our own letter that would have
    said why the offenses are impeachable. We then would have had
    this war of dueling academics. They have a letter of 400
    signatures. We get a letter of 400 signatures. They add 500 to
    it; now they have 900. We go out and get 1,000. We chose not to
    do that. Do you know why? Because the House managers have the
    precedents of the Senate on our side. We have the precedents of
    the Senate. Mr. Manager Graham will discuss those precedents.
        If I am prosecuting a defendant for perjury and obstruction
    of justice in White County Superior Court before Judge Bob
    Mrzlack in Monticello, IN, and I have this perjury and
    obstruction of justice case on a Thursday, and I know that the
    judge has three other cases--he has a case on Monday, he has a
    case on Tuesday, and he has a case on Wednesday--I am going to
    watch what the judge is going to do because I am curious with
    regard to the precedent.
        So, on Monday of that week Judge Mrzlack tries a case of a
    public official for perjury, and I watch what he does. He
    convicts him for perjury. On Tuesday, he tries a public
    official for obstruction of justice, and he convicts him. On
    Wednesday, Judge Mrzlack tries a public official for grand jury
    perjury, and he convicts him. My case now comes up on Thursday
    for a public official for obstruction of justice and grand jury
    perjury and perjury on top of perjury. I would say, based on
    the precedents, it is not looking good for the defendant whom I
    am about to prosecute.
        The White House lawyers are hoping that those of you in
    this Chamber who have voted to remove Federal judges for
    similar offenses in the past have a feigned memory. And if you
    don't have a feigned memory, then we will try to confuse you--
    they will attempt to confuse you on the law.
        So, when I hear the ``so what,'' it is the position of the
    House that what the President did does matter; that by his
    actions, the President did commit high crimes and misdemeanors.
    The House is prepared to establish that the President, William
    Jefferson Clinton, willfully and repeatedly violated the rule
    of law and abused the trust placed upon him by the American
    people.
        Now let me address how the offenses charged in the articles
    of impeachment attack the judicial system. The offenses as
    charged in the articles of impeachment against our system of
    government are the core of the concept of high crimes and
    misdemeanors. Perjury and obstruction of justice are,
    therefore, quintessential impeachable offenses. Indeed, it is
    precisely their public nature that makes them offenses. Acts
    that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm
    become crimes when they enter the judicial realm. Lying to
    one's spouse about an extramarital affair is not a crime; it is
    a private matter. But telling that same lie under oath before a
    Federal judge, as a defendant in a civil rights sexual
    harassment lawsuit, is a crime against the state and is
    therefore a public matter.
        Hiding gifts given to conceal the affair is not a crime; it
    is a private matter. But when those gifts are the subject of a
    court-ordered subpoena in a sexual harassment lawsuit, the act
    of hiding the gifts becomes a crime against the state called
    obstruction of justice and is, therefore, a public matter. Our
    law has consistently recognized that perjury subverts the
    judicial process. It strikes at our Nation's most fundamental
    value--the rule of law.
        In ``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' Sir William
    Blackstone differentiated between crimes that ``more directly
    infringe the rights of a public or commonwealth taken in its
    collective capacity, and those which, in a more peculiar
    manner, injure individuals or private subjects.'' This book was
    widely recognized by the Founding Fathers, such as James
    Madison. He described Blackstone's work at the time as ``a book
    which is in every man's hand.'' Blackstone's private category
    contained crimes such as murder, burglary, and arson. In the
    public category, however, he cataloged crimes that could be
    understood as an assault upon the state. Within a subcategory
    denominated ``offenses against public justice,'' Blackstone
    included the crimes of perjury and bribery. In fact, in his
    catalog of public justice offenses, Blackstone placed perjury
    and bribery side by side.
        When you read the impeachment clause in the Constitution,
    article II, section 4, ``The President, Vice President and all
    Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from
    Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
    or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' what did they mean
    when they thought ``other high crimes''? I submit to you that
    perjury and obstruction of justice fits in this category of
    ``other high crimes.'' Perjury and bribery are side by side.
        If, when William Jefferson Clinton sat at the table in the
    civil deposition in the Jones v. Clinton case and, as alleged
    in the record, perjured himself, speaking hypothetically, if he
    had then offered Judge Susan Webber Wright a cash bribe, there
    would be no question in this body what you must do. But what I
    am saying unto all of you is that there is no difference here,
    and that is the pain of this case. There is no difference
    between a cash bribe or sitting before a Federal judge and
    perjuring one's self, whether it be in the underlying civil
    deposition or, in fact, in the grand jury perjury. Perjury and
    bribery are side by side. Mr. Manager Canady will develop that
    further.
        The Constitution also recognizes that truth-telling under
    oath is central to the maintenance of our Republic.
        We are all familiar with the Constitution. This is in its
    handwritten glory. The founders took such pride in the oath
    that it is mentioned in the Constitution on five separate
    occasions, not the least of which is the President's own oath
    to defend the Constitution. Article I, section 3, sets forth
    the requirement that the Senate be under oath when trying cases
    of impeachment, and I witnessed as that occurred. Article II,
    section 1, specifically prescribes the oath which must be taken
    before our President enters on the execution of his office.
        The right against self-incrimination under the Constitution
    derives in some measure from the Republic's interest in
    preserving the truth-telling oath. Forced testimony is
    forbidden because it might lead many to violate their most
    solemn obligations and, over time, weaken the essential civic
    norm of the fidelity to that oath--fidelity.
        The framers took the significance of the oath very, very
    seriously. The crime of perjury was among the few offenses that
    the first Congress outlawed by statute as they met, and that
    affirms the framers' view of the seriousness. In 1790, in a
    statute entitled ``An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
    Against the United States,'' Congress made the crime of perjury
    punishable by imprisonment of up to 3 years, a fine of up to
    $800, disqualification from giving future testimony and
    ``stand[ing] in the pillory for one hour.'' Today, we don't
    force individuals convicted of perjury to stand in the pillory
    for up to 1 hour.
        Today, perjury is punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment
    in a Federal penitentiary if you perjure yourself in a Federal
    jurisdiction. Likewise, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted
    the extent to which perjury subverts the judicial process and,
    thus, the rule of law. For example, in 1976, in a case of
    United States v. Mandujano, the Supreme Court emphasized:

        Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to
    the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective
    restraints against this type of egregious offense are,
    therefore, imperative. Hence, Congress has made the giving of
    false answers a criminal act punishable by severe penalties. In
    no other way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open
    where law can deal with it.

        Moreover, it is obvious that any testimony given to a grand
    jury must be truthful, for the grand jury process is, in fact,
    the truth-seeking process of our criminal justice system. As
    the Supreme Court stated in 1911 in the case of Glickstein v.
    the United States:

        It cannot be conceived that there is power to compel the
    giving of testimony where no right exists to require that the
    testimony shall be given under such circumstances and
    safeguards as to compel it to be truthful.

        Indeed, giving false material testimony to a grand jury,
    perjuring one's self, totally destroys the value of one's
    testimony and interferes with the ability of a grand jury to
    accomplish its mission which, again, is to find the truth.
    Perjury before a grand jury is a crime against our system of
    Government and the American people, and in the case before us,
    this is a case of perjury upon perjury.
        Before the grand jury, President Clinton testified that the
    testimony that he gave in the underlying civil case of Jones v.
    Clinton in a civil deposition, that it was truthful. We submit
    that that is a lie. So what we have is perjury on perjury.
        You may hear the President's lawyers remark that the view
    of the founders is quaint, not really applicable to these
    settings today. Let's look at a few very recent examples to see
    if the view of the seriousness of telling the truth under oath,
    as envisioned by the Founding Fathers, has changed any here
    today.
        In the case of the United States v. Landi in the Eastern
    District of Virginia in 1997, the defendant was convicted on
    two counts of perjury: one for lying in a declaration she made
    during a civil forfeiture case, and the other for lying to the
    grand jury in a related criminal investigation. Here is what
    the judge said in this case:

        . . . the defendant committed perjury on two separate
    occasions. There can be no question of it being done by
    mistake, and perjury is perhaps one of the most serious
    offenses that can be committed against the court itself. And
    the court does not believe that it's appropriate to consider
    probation in the case of somebody who's been convicted of
    perjury.

        In a second case, United States v. Vincent Bono in the
    District of New Hampshire in 1998, the defendant was found
    guilty of lying before a grand jury in trying to cover his
    stepson's involvement in a robbery that the grand jury was
    investigating. Here is what the judge had to say about lying
    before a grand jury:

        As a [matter of policy], they--

        Meaning Congress--

    they don't want people lying to grand juries. They particularly
    don't want people lying to grand juries about criminal
    offenses. They particularly don't want people lying to grand
    juries about criminal offenses that are being investigated.
    They don't like that. And Congress has said we as a people are
    going to tell you if you do that, you're going to jail and
    you're going to jail for a long time. And if you don't get the
    message, we'll send you to jail again. Maybe others will. But
    we're not going to have people coming to grand juries and
    telling lies because of their children or their mothers or
    fathers or themselves. It's just not acceptable. The system
    can't work that way.

        In another case in United States v. Ronald Blackley in the
    District of Columbia in 1998, the defendant was the former
    chief of staff to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of
    Agriculture. The defendant was found guilty at trial on three
    counts of making false statements to the grand jury in
    connection with his official duties. Here is what the judge had
    to say in this case:

        In my view, providing a false statement under oath is a
    serious offense. The fact that the proceeding is civil or
    administrative does not make the crime less serious. We cannot
    fairly administer any kind of system of justice in this country
    if we do not penalize those who lie under oath.
        The defendant stands before me as a high-ranking Government
    official convicted of making false statements under oath. This
    is such a serious crime that it demands an even longer term of
    imprisonment in this court's view. This court has a duty to
    send a message to other high-level Government officials that
    there is a severe penalty to be paid for providing false
    information under oath. There is a strong reason to deter such
    conduct and to dispel all of the nonsense that's being publicly
    discussed and debated about the seriousness of lying under oath
    by Government officials. A democracy like ours depends on
    people having trust in our Government and its officials.

        There are many other cases, and you can go to your Lexis
    and Westlaw and research them. These three cases make it very
    clear that lying under oath is as serious today in the 106th
    Congress as it was in 1790 in the First Congress when it
    enacted the perjury statute. The First Congress recognized the
    seriousness of perjury and its attack on the judicial system.
        Now I would like to discuss article II, which is the
    obstruction of justice, and how it is an attack on our judicial
    system. In either a criminal or a civil case, obstruction
    undermines the judicial system's ability to vindicate legal
    rights. If it is allowed to go unchecked, then the system will
    become a farce and ultimately a test of which side is better at
    using underhanded methods. Accordingly, Federal courts have
    called the Federal obstruction of justice statute ``one of the
    most important laws ever adopted'' in that it prevents the
    ``miscarriage of justice.''
        This is ``Black's Law Dictionary.'' ``Black's Law
    Dictionary'' defines ``obstruction of justice'' as ``[i]mpeding
    or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who
    have duties or powers of administering justice therein.'' It is
    very clear. Not only is obstruction of justice, on its own, a
    crime in the Federal Code, but, in addition, the Federal
    Sentencing Guidelines--the Federal Sentencing Guidelines--
    increase the sentence of a convicted defendant who has
    ``willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or
    impede, the administration of justice during the investigation,
    prosecution, or sentencing'' of his offense. The commentary on
    the Guidelines specifically lists as examples of obstruction
    actions the House alleges that President Clinton has committed,
    including ``committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn
    perjury'' and ``destroying or concealing or directing or
    procuring another person to destroy or conceal evidence that is
    material to an official investigation or judicial proceeding. .
    . .''
        Yesterday, you learned from Mr. Manager McCollum of
    Florida, when he discussed that that perjury and obstruction of
    justice is punished more severely in the Federal Sentencing
    Guidelines than bribery. As I stated earlier, Blackstone put
    bribery and perjury side by side.
        At a hearing on the background and history of impeachment
    as part of the House impeachment inquiry, we were privileged to
    have the testimony of Judge Griffin Bell, an individual who has
    highly distinguished himself in public service. Judge Bell was
    appointed to the Federal bench by President John Kennedy, and
    he served as the U.S. Attorney General under President Carter.
    Judge Bell said that, ``I have thought about this a great deal.
    This is a serious matter. Trifling with the Federal courts is
    serious. And I guess I am biased because I used to be a Federal
    judge. But I cannot imagine that it wouldn't be a serious crime
    to lie in a Federal grand jury or to lie before a Federal
    judge, and that is where I come down.''
        Judge Bell went on to say, ``And all the civil rights cases
    that I was in in the South depended on the integrity of the
    Federal court and the Federal court orders and people telling
    the truth and fairness. Truth and fairness are the two
    essential elements in a justice system, and all of these
    statutes I mentioned, perjury, tampering with a witness,
    obstruction of justice, all deal in the interests of truth. If
    we don't have truth in the judicial process and in the court
    system in our country, we don't have anything. We don't have a
    system.''
        As you can see, according to Judge Bell, ``truth and
    fairness'' are the two cornerstones of our judicial system.
    President Clinton violated both of these bedrock principles.
        Finally, Judge Bell spoke to the issue, if a President ever
    was convicted of a felony. Judge Bell stated:

        If the President were indicted and convicted of a felony,
    such as perjury or obstruction of justice or witness tampering,
    before impeachment proceedings began, would anyone argue that
    he should continue to be President? I don't think so. If the
    President were subsequently indicted and convicted of a felony,
    which [Judge Bell believes] the Constitution clearly allows,
    [he went on to say] would anyone argue that he should continue
    to be President? I don't think so.

        He stated this:

        A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if he
    himself is breaking them.

        Judge Bell hit it right on the head. Judge Bell said:

        A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if he
    himself is breaking them. The statutes against perjury,
    obstruction of justice and witness tampering rest on
    vouchsafing the element of truth in judicial proceedings--civil
    and criminal--and particularly in the grand jury. Allegations
    of this kind are grave indeed.

        To borrow the words of constitutional scholar Charles J.
    Cooper:

        The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, like the
    crimes of treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses
    against our system of government, visiting injury immediately
    on society itself, whether or not committed in connection with
    the exercise of official government powers.

        I believe all of you should have these charts at your
    table.

        In a society governed by the rule of law, perjury and
    obstruction of justice simply cannot be tolerated because these
    crimes subvert the very judicial processes on which the rule of
    law so vitally depends.

        It is no exaggeration to say that our Constitution and the
    American people entrust to the President singular
    responsibility for the enforcing of the rule of law. Perjury
    and obstruction of justice strike at the heart of the rule of
    law. A President who has committed these crimes has plainly and
    directly violated the most important executive duty. The core
    of the President's constitutional responsibilities is his duty
    to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' And
    because perjury and obstruction of justice strike at the rule
    of law itself, it is difficult to imagine crimes that more
    clearly or directly violate this core Presidential
    constitutional duty.
        When President Clinton had the opportunity to personally
    uphold the rule of law, to uphold the truth-seeking function of
    the courts, to uphold the fairness in a judicial proceeding, he
    failed. Far from taking care that the laws be faithfully
    executed, if a President is guilty of perjury and obstruction
    of justice, he has himself faithlessly subverted the very law
    that the rest of us are called upon to obey.
        You may hear arguments that perjury and obstruction don't
    really have much consequence in this case because it was a
    private matter and, therefore, not really a serious offense. I
    would like to arm you with the facts. The courts do not
    trivialize perjury and obstruction of justice.
        According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in 1997, 182
    Americans were sentenced in Federal court for committing
    perjury. Also in 1997, 144 Americans were sentenced in Federal
    court for obstruction and witness tampering.
        In State jurisdictions all across the country take the
    matter very seriously. I have chosen one State, the State of
    California, which brought 4,318 perjury prosecutions in 1997.
    There are now at least 115 persons serving sentences for
    perjury in Federal prisons. Where is the fairness to these
    Americans if they stay in jail and the President stays in the
    Oval Office?
        If the allegations in the independent counsel's referral
    were made against a sitting Federal judge, would not the Senate
    convict? If William Jefferson Clinton were a sitting judge
    instead of the President, would not the Senate convict? While
    my colleague, Mr. Manager Graham, will look into this further,
    let's look briefly at precedent for the moment. When we bring
    up the issues regarding the impeachment of former Federal
    judges Mr. Claiborne and Mr. Nixon, one standard was used: high
    crimes and misdemeanors. The Senate said the one standard that
    applies to the President and Vice President will also apply to
    these Federal judges and other civil officers.
        In the defense of Judges Claiborne and Nixon, the defense
    lawyers at the time in the trial in the Senate argued that
    Federal judges should be treated differently from the
    President, that they could not be impeached for private
    misbehavior because it was extrajudicial. The Senate rejected
    that proposition as incompatible with common sense and the
    orderly conduct of government. You rejected that argument, the
    very same argument that we are about to hear, perhaps, from the
    White House defense team. And I believe this Senate will uphold
    its precedent, the precedent that Federal judges and the
    President should be treated by the same standard--impeachment
    for high crimes and misdemeanors.
        Also, do not be tempted to believe the argument that lying
    under oath about sex doesn't matter, that it is private. I
    covered that earlier, but I want to bring it to your attention
    as some of the House managers did yesterday regarding American
    law. It makes rape a crime, domestic violence a crime, sexual
    harassment a civil rights violation, libel, a compensable
    offense. Without the protections of perjury and obstruction,
    none of the rights of the victims of such cases could be
    vindicated. That is why the courts take these matters so
    seriously.
        If the President's lawyers try to tell you that this case
    is simply about an illicit affair, I believe that it demeans
    our civil rights laws. If, indeed, the President is successful
    in trying to make everyone believe that this case is only about
    an illicit affair, what will the message be from those in this
    hallowed body who have in the past been passionate advocates of
    our civil rights laws, whether it be by race, gender, religion,
    or disability? If the evidence-gathering process is unimportant
    in Federal civil rights sexual harassment lawsuits--remember,
    that was the underlying basis of this case--what message does
    that send to women in America?
        There are some important questions we need to ask. Are
    sexual harassment lawsuits, which were designed to vindicate
    legitimate and serious civil rights grievances of women across
    America, now somewhat less important than other civil rights?
    Which of our civil rights laws will fall next? Will we soon
    decide that the evidence-gathering process is unimportant with
    respect to vindicating the rights of the disabled under the
    Americans with Disabilities Act? Will the evidence-gathering
    process become unimportant with respect to vindicating the
    voting rights of those discriminated against based on race or
    national origin? Who will tell the hundreds of Federal judges
    across the Nation that the evidence-gathering process in these
    cases is now unimportant?
        Consider postal worker Diane Parker who was convicted of
    perjury and sentenced to 13 months in prison for making a false
    material declaration during the discovery deposition in a
    sexual harassment lawsuit. Judge Lacey Collier said: ``One of
    the most troubling things in our society today is people who
    raise their hand, take the oath to tell the truth, and then
    fail to do that. . . . This, I hope, is sufficient punishment
    for you,'' the judge stated. The judge went on to say, ``But
    more importantly, I hope that it is a deterrence to others. So
    your story can be taken far and wide to demonstrate to others
    the seriousness of the responsibility of telling the truth in
    court proceedings.''
        The Senate must now determine whether it is acceptable or
    whether it is appropriate to set a precedent to have an
    individual serve as President of the United States when that
    individual has committed, is alleged to have committed, serious
    offenses against our system of government while holding that
    office.
        While we have been discussing how perjury and obstruction
    of justice are attacks on our judicial system, we must
    recognize how the judicial system is a core function of the
    government. When Mr. Manager Henry Hyde speaks of the rule of
    law protecting us from the knock on the door at 3 a.m., what,
    exactly, was he referring to? In totalitarian societies, rulers
    may drag the ruled off to prison at any time for any reason.
    Our system differs because we require our leaders to go through
    a judicial procedure before they put someone in prison or
    otherwise violate their individual rights. The President's
    offenses assault the administration of this judicial procedure.
    As such, they constitute an assault on the core function of the
    government and repudiate our most basic social contract. A core
    function of the government derives its role from the social
    contract that our civilized society has under which the
    fundamental exchange of rights takes place between those of us
    as individuals and unto the government.
        We give up our individual rights to exercise brute force to
    settle our personal disputes. That is a situation where chaos
    reigns and the strongest most often prevails. Instead, we
    submit to the power delegated to the State under which the
    individual then submits to the governmental processes as part
    of the social contract. Indeed, when conflict arises in our
    society, we as individuals are compelled via the social
    contract to take disputes to our third branch of government--
    the courts. The judicial branch then peacefully decides which
    party is entitled to judgment in their favor after a full
    presentation of the truthful evidence.
        Implicit in the social contract that we enter as a
    civilized society is the principle that the weak are equally
    entitled as the strong to equal justice under the law. Despite
    the tumbling tides of politics, ours is a government of laws,
    not of men. It was the inspired vision of our Founding Fathers
    that the judicial, legislative, and executive branch of
    Government would work together to preserve the rule of law. The
    U.S. Constitution requires the judicial branch to apply the law
    equally and fairly to both the weak and the strong.
        Once we as a society--and particularly our leaders--no
    longer submit to the social contract and no longer pay
    deference to the third branch of Government, which is equally
    as important as the legislative and executive branches of
    Government, we then begin to erode the rule of law and begin to
    erode the social contract of the great American experiment.
        That, I believe, is why Judge Bell stated, ``A President
    cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is breaking
    them.''
        The administration of justice is a core function of the
    Government precisely because of the importance we place on the
    fair resolution of disputes and on whom and for how long a
    person will be denied liberty for violating our criminal laws.
    Any assault on the administration of justice must be
    interpreted as a threat to our system of Government. Our
    President, who is our chief executive and chief law enforcement
    officer, and who alone is delegated the task under our
    Constitution to ``take care that the laws be faithfully
    executed,'' cannot and must not be permitted to engage in such
    an assault on the administration of justice.
        The articles of impeachment adopted by the House of
    Representatives establish an abuse of public trust and a
    betrayal of the social contract in that the President is
    alleged to have repeatedly placed his personal interests above
    the public interest and violated his constitutional duties. For
    if he is allowed to escape conviction by the Senate, we would
    allow the President to set the example for lawlessness. We
    would allow our President to serve as an example of the erosion
    of the concept of the social contract embraced and embodied in
    our Constitution. I don't believe the Senate will allow that to
    happen.
        As you undertake your examination of the facts, the law,
    and your precedents, the Senate must weigh carefully its
    judgment, for the consequences are deeply profound, not for the
    moment but for the ages. Should the Senate choose to acquit, it
    must be prepared to accept a lower standard, a bad precedent,
    and a double standard. However, should the Senate choose to
    convict, it would be reinforcing high standards for high
    office, maintaining existing precedents, and upholding the
    principle of equal justice under the law.
        I think it is important to pause here and reflect upon the
    constitutional duties of the President of the United States. I
    agree with the defense argument that this has not been alleged
    as a dereliction of the President's exercise of executive
    powers. So let me talk about his executive duties.
        The President is reposed with a special trust by the
    American people. The President is a physical embodiment of
    America and the hope and freedom for which she stands. When the
    President goes abroad, he is honored as the head of a sovereign
    nation; our Nation is acknowledged, not just the individual who
    occupies the Office of the Presidency. When he walks into a
    room and receives a standing ovation, the ovation is not that
    of the individual, it is for the Nation he represents.
        The President has a constitutional role as Commander in
    Chief. The President plays a unique and indispensable role in
    the chain of command. In Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton
    stated:

        Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction
    of war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which
    distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.

        It is universally agreed that the President, in his role as
    Commander in Chief, is not an actual member of the military.
    However, as the ``single hand'' that guides the actions of the
    armed services, it is incumbent that the President exhibit
    sound, responsible leadership and set a proper example when
    acting as Commander in Chief.
        That leadership is also at the core of the issue before us.
    In order to be an effective leader, an effective military
    leader, the President must exhibit the traits that inspire
    those who must risk their lives at his command. These traits
    include honor, integrity, and accountability.
        Admiral Thomas Moorer, a former Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, submitted testimony to the House impeachment
    inquiry. Admiral Moorer stated it this way:

        Military leaders also serve as role models for honorable
    and virtuous conduct.

        Veracity and truthfulness are important components of a
    leader's character. In order to have the trust of their
    subordinates, military leaders must have honor and be truthful
    in all things. That trust, that bond between the leaders and
    the led, is an essential element of any successful military
    organization.
        The President's own self-inflicted wounds have called his
    credibility into question. While a President's decisions are
    always critiqued, a President receives the benefit of the doubt
    in the decisionmaking process that he always places the
    interests of the Nation above his own. But by William Jefferson
    Clinton's present diminished veracity, he has now forfeited
    that benefit and has invited doubt into the decisionmaking
    process.
        The lack of trust in the President's motives, his veracity
    and his judgment is inherently corrosive and can only have a
    detrimental effect on our military credibility overseas. This
    corrosion is difficult to measure, for it cannot be quantified
    easily in a readiness report or training exercise. But in
    squadbays and wardrooms around the world, and at bases in the
    United States, there can be heard whispers and conversations of
    those who know that had they merely been accused of the same
    offense, their careers would have ended long ago.
        This is the intangible effect that the President's actions
    have had on our military. We cannot ignore the fact that the
    Commander in Chief's conduct sets a poor example for the men
    and women in the military. Worse, we cannot ignore the idea
    that to acquit the President would create a double standard.
        The Constitution directs this body to provide advice and
    consent to the President's nominations for military officers.
    It is your singular responsibility to set high standards of
    conduct for these officers, and you have done that. The Senate
    has in the past--and you will likely again do so in the
    future--rejected those whose moral and legal misconduct makes
    them unsuitable to be officers in the military.
        Let me indulge in a hypothetical. An officer is nominated
    by the President for promotion to the rank of major. After the
    list is submitted, but before the Senate's confirmation, an
    investigation of the individual's background results in a
    report that mirrors the allegations in the Office of
    Independent Counsel's referral. After a very careful review of
    the Uniform Code of Military Justice, this captain, after
    having committed similar offenses as are in the Office of
    Independent Counsel's referral, could be charged with article
    105, false swearing, and face up to 3 years; he could be
    charged in article 107, false official statement, facing up to
    5 years; he could be charged with article 131, perjury--
    probably several times--and face up to 5 years; he could be
    charged with article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer; he
    could be charged with article 134, prevent seizure of property,
    and face up to 1 year imprisonment; he could be charged with
    article 134, soliciting another to commit an offense, with a
    penalty of up to 5 years; he could be charged with article 134,
    subornation of perjury, and face confinement up to 5 years; he
    could be charged with article 134 again, obstructing justice,
    and face 5 years. I could probably come up with about four
    others, but I won't get into the salacious details.
        Needless to say, the Senate would insist on this
    hypothetical officer's removal from the promotion list. You
    would do that. The Service would certainly relieve him of his
    duties.
        In every warship, every squadbay, and every headquarters
    building throughout the U.S. military, those of you who have
    traveled to military bases have seen the picture of the
    Commander in Chief that hangs in the apex of the pyramid that
    is the military chain of command.
        You should also know that all over the world military
    personnel look at the current picture and know that, if accused
    of the same offenses as their Commander in Chief, they would no
    longer be deserving of the privilege of serving in the
    military.
        Some would say that what I just talked about doesn't
    matter--that in the military they live under different
    standards--they live under these high standards. They say words
    like ``duty,'' ``honor,'' ``country.'' They are instilled with
    core values and core virtues--that really doesn't matter in
    this case--that the President really doesn't have to follow
    those types of high standards--that it elevates some form of
    high standards, if he stands accused of high crimes--it really
    is not high crimes; it was about a private matter--that they
    don't rise to the level needed to remove the President from
    office.
        I remind you of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In his farewell
    address at West Point, Gen. Douglas MacArthur stated, when he
    referenced the words I spoke of, ``duty'' and ``honor'' and
    ``country,'' and the high principles:

        The unbelievers will say they are but words, but a slogan,
    but a flamboyant phrase. Every pedant, every demagogue, every
    cynic, every hypocrite, every troublemaker, and I am sorry to
    say, some others of an entirely different character, will try
    to downgrade them to the extent of mockery and ridicule.

        The ideal object must be held high even though we recognize
    that as humans we are not perfect. No matter how great we
    aspire, we are human and we will occasionally fail. But there
    must be the pursuit of such high ideals. We cannot degrade our
    standards as a people. By a conviction in the Senate of the
    President of the United States you will be upholding a high and
    lofty standard, not only for America, but in particular for
    those military leaders, rather than setting low standards for
    the President and a high lofty standard for military leaders.
        Let me turn to the President's responsibility to see that
    ``the laws are faithfully executed.'' According to scholar
    Philip B. Kurland, it was probably George Washington rather
    than the Constitution who is responsible for our hierarchy of
    Cabinet officers that has been taken for granted over the
    years. And we have heard of the President as the chief law
    enforcement officer of the land, and we can find it in the
    Constitution. So we have to give credit to George Washington
    and how he put together the Cabinet. And we have accepted it
    over time. It has been accepted by custom, practice, and
    legislation that the executive branch is an entity for which
    the President is responsible both to Congress and to the
    public.
        Mr. Kurland stated:

        The whole of the executive branch acts subordinately to the
    command of the President in the administration of Federal laws,
    so long as they act within the terms of those laws. Their
    offices confer no right to violate the laws, whether they take
    the form of constitution, statute, or treaty.

        The President's Departments of Treasury and Justice seek to
    bring to account those who disturb our ``domestic
    tranquility,'' those who seek to disturb our ``domestic
    tranquility,'' whether they be the drugpushers or unabombers,
    gangsters, mobsters, church arsonists, violators of individual
    rights. Dedicated men and women of the FBI, DEA, Customs,
    Secret Service, BATF, INS, and the U.S. Marshals Office pursue
    them methodically, thoughtfully, firmly, doggedly, applying the
    law while risking their lives to uphold the rule of law for our
    peace and security. They seek to ensure equal justice under the
    law for everyone.
        In the book, ``The Imperial Presidency,'' Professor Arthur
    Schlesinger, Jr. states:

        The continuation of a lawbreaker as chief magistrate would
    be a strange way to exemplify law and order at home or to
    demonstrate American probity before the world.

        By a conviction, the Senate will be upholding the high
    calling of law enforcement in protecting the rule of law and
    equal justice under the law.
        ``Equal justice under law''--that principle so embodies the
    American constitutional order that we have carved it in stone
    on the front of the Supreme Court building right across the
    street. The carving across the street shines like a beacon from
    the highest sanctum on those of us in the Capitol, the home of
    the legislative branch, and it shines right down Pennsylvania
    Avenue to the White House, the home of the executive branch. It
    illuminates our national life and reminds those other branches
    that despite the tumbling tides of politics, ours is a
    government of laws and not of men. It was the inspired vision
    of our founders and framers, again, that the judicial,
    legislative, and executive branches would work together to
    preserve the rule of law.
        But ``equal justice under law'' amounts for much more than
    a stone carving. Although we can't see it or hear it, this
    living, breathing force has very real consequences in the lives
    of every citizen every day in America. It allows Americans to
    claim the assistance of the government when someone has wronged
    us--even if the person is stronger or wealthier or more popular
    than we are. In America, unlike other countries, when an
    average citizen sues the Chief Executive of our Nation, they
    stand equal before the bar of justice. The Constitution
    requires the judicial branch of our Government to apply the law
    equally to both. That is the living consequence of ``equal
    justice under law'' that shines brightly across our country.
        The President of the United States must work with the
    judicial and the legislative branches to sustain that force. He
    is the temporary trustee of that office. But, unfortunately and
    sadly, William Jefferson Clinton worked to defeat it and to
    bring darkness upon that grand illumination. When he stood
    before the bar of justice, he acted without authority to award
    himself. Even if he believed in his heart that the case against
    him was politically motivated, he simply assumed unto himself
    that he had by virtue of his power special privileges that he
    could be clever, create his own definitions of words in his own
    mind--create what C.S. Lewis called ``verbicide.'' He murdered
    the plain spoken English language so he could come up with
    these definitions in his own mind, state them, and then say,
    ``Well, I never committed perjury because this is what I meant
    by this word,'' even though it fails the reasonableness test,
    and it is absurd that no one would believe his own definitions.
    He assumed these special privileges, and then lied and
    obstructed justice to gain advantage in a Federal civil rights
    action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
    Arkansas. And he did so then again when a Federal grand jury
    began to investigate that lawlessness. And he did it before the
    grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of
    Columbia. His resistance brings us to this most unfortunate
    juncture for which you sit in judgment.
        So ``equal justice under law'' lies at the heart of this
    matter. It rests on three essential pillars: an impartial
    judiciary, an ethical bar, and a sacred oath. If litigants
    profane the sanctity of the oath, ``equal justice under law''
    loses its protective force.
        The House, as does the Senate, has the responsibility to
    uphold the Constitution. We have all taken our oaths to defend
    the Constitution. The Founding Fathers created a system of
    checks and balances, a system of accountability between the
    functions of Government. I believe, as I am sure you do, that
    the Founding Fathers knew the nature of the human heart.
    Sometimes, as much as we try, we fail, in that the human heart
    does in fact struggle at times between good and evil. We
    recognize that no person has perfect virtue and that we each
    have our human failings. And the founders could foresee a time
    when corruption could invade the institutions of Government,
    and they provided the means to address it. The impeachment
    proceeding is one such means. We are seeking to defend the rule
    of law.
        America, again, is a government of laws, not of men. What
    protects us from that knock on the door in the middle of the
    night is the law. What ensures the rights of the weak and the
    powerless against the powerful is the law. What provides the
    rights to the poor against the rich is the law. What upholds
    the rightness of the minority view against the popular but
    wrong is the law. As former President Andrew Jackson wrote,
    ``The great can protect themselves, but the poor and the humble
    require the arm and shield of the law.''
        When our Nation began its journey in history over 200 years
    ago, the United States was nearly unique in depending on the
    rule of law as opposed to, at that time, the rule of kings and
    czars and chieftains and monarchs. Now that our unique, grand
    American experiment has proved unto the rest of the world a
    success, others now seek to follow us. They seek to follow. And
    we have seen in the crumbling of the Soviet Union that the
    former Soviet nations, now infant republics, look and turn to
    us. They turn to us, a government ruled by law.
        For the sake of ourselves and the sake of generations yet
    unborn, we, and in particular you who sit in judgment in the
    Senate, must preserve the rule of law.
        I will leave you with the words of the first President of
    the Senate and the second President of our Nation, John Adams.
    He said:

        Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes,
    our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot
    alter the state of facts and evidence.

        I believe John Adams was right. Facts and evidence. Facts
    are stubborn things. You can color the facts. You can shade the
    facts. You can misrepresent the facts. You can hide the facts.
    But the truthful facts are stubborn; they won't go away. Like
    the telltale heart, they keep pounding, and they keep coming,
    and they won't go away. What is also stubborn are the
    precedents of the Senate.
        I will now yield the floor for Manager Graham of South
    Carolina to discuss the precedents of the Senate.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. I sense the need for a 10-minute break, but, I
    say to my colleagues, please tend to your business and return
    promptly so that we can get started with the proper decorum.
        There being no objection, at 11:15 a.m., the Senate
    recessed until 11:29 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to
    begin with Manager Graham. I have been asked about any changes
    in the schedule. It depends on how things move forward. I will
    ask for consent to change it, depending on how things developed
    from this point, Mr. Chief Justice.
        I yield the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I think I
    broke the code there. When I hear stomachs growling, I know it
    will be time to wrap this up.
        This is an unbelievable occasion for all of us. I am
    Lindsey Graham from South Carolina. We talk about civil rights.
    I am a child of the South and I will give you my views on civil
    rights and how we progressed in this country, but I am going to
    talk to you a bit about some decisions this body has made
    regarding the crime of perjury and obstruction of justice and
    the impeachment clause in the Constitution as it applies to
    Federal judges. I am not so presumptuous to tell you I know
    more about what you did than you did. I am going to try to
    highlight some of the things that you did that I think served
    this country well in this area. But before we get there, a
    couple of observations.
        As I was walking over through the Rotunda today, there was
    a group of Japanese tourists there, and I stopped and talked.
    My dad, who is now deceased, was a World War II veteran, and it
    struck me, 50 years plus, how resilient this world is. My dad's
    generation I don't think would have ever envisioned 50 years
    ago that his son, one, would be a Congressman, which is a great
    thing about this country, and two, would be stopping and
    talking to Japanese tourists in the Capitol of the United
    States.
        So when we talk about the consequences of this case, no
    matter what you decide, in my opinion, this country will
    survive. If you acquit the President, we will survive. If you
    convict him, it will be traumatic, and if you remove him, it
    will be traumatic, but we will survive.
        This has been billed as a constitutional drama, by some of
    the pundits, that is called a snoozer. I can understand that a
    little bit. I am the 12th lawyer you have had to listen to, and
    I think my colleagues have done a very good job. But it is a
    very long and tedious process in many ways. It is hard to sit
    here and listen to 12 lawyers talk to you. But you have done a
    wonderful job, I think. I am very proud of the U.S. Senate. You
    have paid great attention.
        But the fact that people call this boring is not a bad
    thing to me. I think it shows the confidence we have achieved
    in 200 years as a Republic that people can go on about their
    business, and they are upset. I know my phone rings a lot, and
    your phone rings a lot, about what to do. But there is a
    calmness in this country in the midst of something so important
    like this that tells me we have done it right for a long time.
        How many countries would love the chance to be bored when
    their government is in action? How many countries fear that the
    government won't work for them; that to get it right, you have
    to pick up a gun? That happens every day throughout this world.
    And the fact that we can come together and talk about something
    so important and the country can go on and people not be so
    anxious about their personal lives and their freedoms and their
    properties and their jobs is a compliment to every generation
    that has ever served this Republic.
        Tom Brokaw has a book out called ``The Greatest
    Generation,'' and I recommend you read it because we will be
    talking about that in a moment. But let's talk about some of
    this country's imperfections. Mr. Buyer talked very eloquently
    about the rule of law and how it makes us so different and how
    it is something that people literally do die for and have died
    for.
        But let me tell you, as a lawyer, it is not a perfect legal
    system. If you are a poor person and you are charged with a
    crime, you are likely to get a public defender right out of law
    school and, hopefully, that public defender will do the best he
    can or she can. But it is not a perfect system. Don't ever
    think it is.
        Civil rights have been advanced a lot in my lifetime, but
    we have a long way to go in South Carolina. I think we have a
    long way to go in this Nation. In my lifetime, I started school
    with no black person in my class. By the sixth grade--I think
    it was the sixth grade--integration hit in my area, and I can
    remember my mom and dad being scared to death about what it
    would do and what it would mean. But we made it, and we are
    better off as a country.
        We are here to judge our President. We are here to say
    whether or not he is guilty, to begin with, of some serious
    offenses that are colored by sex, and there is absolutely no
    way to get around that, and I know it is uncomfortable to
    listen to.
        My father and mother owned a restaurant, a beer joint, I
    guess is what we would say in South Carolina. I can remember
    that if you were black, you came and you had to buy the beer
    and you had to go because you couldn't drink it there. That is
    just the way it was, is what my dad said. I always never quite
    understood that. My dad and mom were good people, but that is
    just the way it was. That is not the way it is now, and we are
    better off for that.
        Sexual harassment cases are always uncomfortable to listen
    to. That is just the way it is. It used to be in this country,
    not long ago, there was really no recourse if you were sexually
    harassed. We have changed things for the better.
        The reason we are here today is not because somebody wanted
    to look into the personal life of the President for no good
    reason. We are here today because somebody accused him when he
    was Governor of picking her out of a crowd, asking her to come
    to a hotel room, and, if you believe her, did something very
    crude and rude that you wouldn't want to happen to anybody in
    your family. Only God knows what happened there. That case has
    been settled. The parties know and God knows. We will never
    know.
        Let me just say this. I am proud of my country where a low-
    level employee can sue the Governor of their State and, if that
    Governor becomes President, they can still sue.
        The Supreme Court said 9 to 0--a shutout legally--``Mr.
    President, you will stand subject to this suit.'' We are going
    to talk about, is this private or public conduct, does this go
    to the heart of being President, or is this just some private
    matter for which he could be prosecuted after he gets out of
    office? Is this really a big deal about being President?
        I contend, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, it became a
    big deal about being President when he raised the defense:
    ``You can't sue me now because I am the President, I am a busy
    man, I have a lot going on.'' He used his office, or tried to,
    to avoid the day in court, but the Supreme Court said, ``No,
    sir, you will stand subject to suit under some reasonable
    accommodation.'' And we are here today.
        If I had been on the Supreme Court, I don't know if I would
    have ruled that way. There is not much chance of that happening
    any time soon, if you are worried about that. I don't think
    that is going to be in my future. [Laughter.]
        I may not have ruled that way, and we in Congress, if we
    don't like the way all this has come out, can change that law,
    we can change that ruling by law. But it is the law of the
    land, because the Chief Justice and his colleagues said so.
        What did our President do? He tried to say, ``You can't sue
    me because I am President.'' He participated in that lawsuit
    because he was told to, and I would argue, ladies and
    gentlemen, that we all assumed he would play fair. Now isn't
    there a lot of doubt about that?
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, what if he had not
    shown up? What if he refused to answer any court order? What if
    he had said, ``I am not going to play, that is it; I am not
    going to listen to you, judicial branch''? You know the remedy
    to resolve problems like that when Presidential conduct gets
    out of bounds. Do you know where that remedy lies? It lies with
    us, the U.S. Congress. When a President gets out of bounds and
    doesn't do as he or she should do constitutionally--and I would
    argue that every President and every citizen has a
    constitutional duty not to cheat another citizen, especially
    the President--and they get out of bounds, it is up to us to
    put them back in bounds or declare it illegal.
        And how do we do that? How do we regulate Presidential
    misconduct when it is done in a Presidential fashion? Through
    the laws and powers of impeachment. That is why we are here
    today.
        It is going to take team work on our part to get this
    right, because I will argue to you in a moment that the
    President of the United States, through his conduct, flouted
    judicial authority and decisionmaking over him. When he chose
    to lie, when he chose to manipulate the evidence to witnesses
    against him and get his friends to lie for him, he, in fact, I
    think, vetoed that decision.
        It's worse than if he had not shown up at all. Is that out
    of bounds? That is what we are going to be talking about today.
    And we have some guidance as to what really is in or out of
    bounds for high Government officials. What is a high crime? How
    about if an important person hurts somebody of low means? It is
    not very scholarly, but I think it is the truth. I think that
    is what they meant by ``high crimes.'' It doesn't have to be a
    crime. It is just when you start using your office and you are
    acting in a way that hurts people, you have committed a high
    crime.
        When you decide that a course of conduct meets the high
    crimes standard under our Constitution for the President, what
    are we doing to the Presidency? I think we are putting a burden
    on the Presidency. And you should consider it that way, that if
    you determine the conduct and the crimes in this case are high
    crimes, you need to do so knowing that you are placing a burden
    on every future occupant of that office and the office itself.
    So do so cautiously, because one branch of the Government
    should never put a burden on another branch of the Government
    that is not fair and they can't bear.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you decide from the
    conduct of this President that henceforth any officeholder who
    occupies the office of President will have this burden to
    bear--let me tell you what it is: don't lie under oath to a
    Federal grand jury when many in the country are begging you not
    to--can the occupant bear that burden?
        I voted against article 2 in the House, which was the
    deposition perjury allegations against the President standing
    alone. I think many of us may have thought that he didn't know
    about the tapes, that he and Ms. Lewinsky thought they had a
    story that was going to work, and he got caught off guard, and
    he started telling a bunch of lies that maybe I would have lied
    about, maybe you would have lied about, because it is personal
    to have to talk about intimate things; and our human nature is
    to protect ourselves, our family; that is just human nature.
        But, ladies and gentlemen, what he stands charged of in
    this Senate happened 8 months later, after some Members of this
    body said, ``Mr. President, square yourself by the law. Mr.
    President, if you go into that Federal grand jury and you lie
    again, you're risking your Presidency.'' People in this body
    said that. Legal commentators said that. Professor Dershowitz
    and I probably don't agree on a lot. I think he would probably
    agree with that statement. That would be one thing on which we
    would agree. He said--and he is a very smart, passionate man;
    and I like passionate people even if I don't agree with them--
    even he said that if you go to a grand jury and you lie as
    President, that ought to be a high crime.
        So within the context in which you are going to decide this
    case, you have to understand human failings, because if you
    don't do that, you are not being fair. And I know you want to
    be fair.
        Human failings exist in all of us. Only when it gets to be
    so premeditated, so calculated, so much ``my interest over
    anybody else'' or ``the public be damned,'' should you really,
    really start getting serious about what to do. That happened in
    August, in my opinion, ladies and gentlemen. After being begged
    not to lie to the grand jury and end this matter, he chose to
    lie.
        That is the burden you will be placing on the next
    President: ``Don't do that. Don't lie under oath when you are a
    defendant in a lawsuit against an average citizen. Have the
    courage to apply the law in a fair manner to yourself.''
        Mr. Buyer talked about values and courage. Let me say
    something about President Clinton that I believe. I believe he
    does embrace civil rights for our citizens. I believe he has
    been an articulate spokesman for the civil rights for our
    citizens. I believe that may be one of the hallmarks of his
    Presidency. And I am not here to tell you that he doesn't. I am
    here to tell you that when it was his case, when those rights
    had to be applied to him, he failed miserably.
        It is always easy to talk about what other people ought to
    do. The test of character is the way you judge people with whom
    you disagree: Don't cheat in a lawsuit by manipulating the
    testimony of others. Don't send public officials and friends to
    tell your lies before a Federal grand jury to avoid your legal
    responsibilities. Don't put your legal and political interests
    ahead of the rule of law and common decency.
        If you find that these are high crimes, that is the burden
    you are placing on the next officeholder. If they can't meet
    that burden, this country has a serious problem. I don't want
    my country to be the country of great equivocators and
    compartmentalizers for the next century. And that is what this
    case is about, equivocation and compartmentalizing.
        What I have described to you as the conduct of the
    President being a high crime I think is just his job
    description. We are asking no more of him than to be the chief
    law enforcement officer of the land--follow your job
    description. A determination that this conduct is a high crime
    is no burden that cannot be borne in a reasonable fashion by
    future occupants.
        Why did I talk about constitutional teamwork? I am a child
    of the South. The civil rights litigation in matters that came
    about in the sixties was threefold: There was legislation
    passed in Congress, there were judicial decisions that were
    rendered, and the executive branch came in to help out.
    Remember when Governor Wallace was standing in the door of the
    University of Alabama? Remember how he was told to step aside?
        What went on? It was a constitutional dance of magnificent
    proportions. You had litigation that was resolved for the
    individual citizen so they could go in and acquire the rights,
    full benefits, of a citizen of that State; you had legislation
    coming out of this body; and you had defiance against the
    Federal Government from the State level; and you had the
    President and the executive branch federalizing the National
    Guard. And, ``Governor Wallace, step aside.''
        It was 9-0 that Bill Clinton had to be a participant in the
    lawsuit, and he chose to cheat in every manner you can cheat in
    a lawsuit. His conduct needs to be regulated, and it needs to
    be brought to bear under the Constitution. If you put him in
    jail after his office, that would not solve the constitutional
    problem he created. The constitutional conduct exhibited by the
    Executive, when he was told by the judicial branch, ``You've
    got to participate in a lawsuit,'' was so far afield of what is
    fair, what is decent, that it became a high crime, and it
    happened to be against a little person.
        The Senate has spoken before about perjury and obstruction
    of justice and how it applies to high Government officials. And
    those Government officials were judges.
        Before we start this analysis, it is important to know--and
    some of you know this better than I will ever hope to know the
    history of this Senate, the history of this body and how it
    works and why it works--that when a judge is impeached in the
    United States of America, the same legal standard--treason,
    bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors--is applied to
    that judge's conduct as it is to any high official, just like
    the President. So we are comparing apples to apples.
        In Judge Claiborne's trial, they seized upon the language,
    ``Judges shall hold their office during good behavior.'' And
    the defense was trying to say, unlike the President and other
    Government officials, high Government officials, the
    impeachment standard for judges is ``good behavior.'' That is
    the term. It's a different impeachment standard. You know these
    cases better than I know these cases, and you said, ``Wrong.''
    The good behavior standard doesn't apply to why you will be
    removed. It is just a reference to how long you will have your
    job.
        Our President can serve for two terms. A judge serves for
    life, conditioned on good behavior. What gets you out of office
    is whether or not you violate the constitutional standard for
    impeachment, which is treason, bribery, or other high crimes
    and misdemeanors.
        So as I talk to you about these cases and what you as a
    body did, understand we are using the same legal standard, not
    because I said so, but because you said so. Judge Claiborne was
    convicted and removed from office by the Senate 90-7. For what?
    Filing a false income tax return under penalties of perjury.
    One thing they said in that case was, ``I'm a judge and filing
    false income tax returns has nothing to do with me being a
    judge and I ought not lose my job unless you can show me or
    prove that I did something wrong as a judge.'' They were saying
    cheating on taxes has nothing to do with being a judge.
        Do you know what the Senate said? It has everything to do
    with being a judge. And the reason you said that is because you
    didn't buy into this idea that the only way you can lose your
    job as a high Government official under the Constitution is to
    engage in some type of public conduct directly related to what
    you do every day. You took a little broader view, and I am
    certainly glad you did, because this is not a country of high
    officials who are technicians. This is a country based on
    character, this is a country based on having to set a standard
    that others will follow.
        This is Manager Fish:

        Judge Claiborne's actions raise fundamental questions about
    public confidence in, and the public's perception of, the
    Federal court system. They serve to undermine the confidence of
    the American people in our judicial system . . . Judge
    Claiborne is more than a mere embarrassment. He is a disgrace--
    an affront--to the judicial office and to the judicial branch
    he was appointed to serve.

        That is very strong language. Apparently, you agreed with
    that concept because 90 of you voted to throw him out. What did
    he do? He cheated on his taxes by making false statements under
    oath.
        Now we will talk more about public versus private. Senator
    Mathias, about this idea of public versus private:

        It is my opinion . . . that the impeachment power is not as
    narrow as Judge Claiborne suggests. There is neither historical
    nor logical reason to believe that Framers of the Constitution
    sought to prohibit the House from impeaching . . . an officer
    of the United States who had committed treason or bribery or
    any other high crime or misdemeanor which is a serious offense
    against the government of the United States and which indicates
    that the official is unfit to exercise public responsibilities,
    but which is an offense which is technically unrelated to the
    officer's particular job responsibilities.''

        This hits it head on:

        Impeachable conduct does not have to occur in the course of
    the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence of
    misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be
    justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise
    of public office. That, of course, is the situation in this
    case.
        It would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had
    committed murder, mayhem, rape or perhaps espionage in his
    private life, could not be removed from office by the U.S.
    Senate.

        The point you made so well was that we are not buying this.
    If you are a Federal judge and you cheat on your taxes and you
    lie under oath--it is true that it had nothing to do with your
    courtroom in a technical sense, but you are going to be judging
    others and they are going to come before you with their fate in
    your hands, and we don't want somebody like you running a
    courtroom because people won't trust the results.
        Judge Walter Nixon, convicted and removed from office for
    what? Perjury before a grand jury. What was that about? He
    tried to fix a case for a business partner's son in State
    court. He went to the prosecutor who was in State court and
    tried to fix the case. When they investigated the matter, he
    lied about meeting with the prosecutor. He lied about doing
    anything related to trying to manipulate the results. He was
    convicted and he was thrown out of office by the U.S. Senate.
        I guess you could say, what has that got to do with being a
    Federal judge? It wasn't even in his court. It has everything
    to do with being a high public official because if he stays in
    office, what signal are you sending to anybody else sent to his
    courtroom or anybody else's courtroom?
        The question becomes, if a Federal judge can be thrown out
    of office for lying and trying to fix a friend's son's case,
    can the President of the United States be removed from office
    for trying to fix his case? That is not a scholarly work but
    that is what happened. He tried to fix his case. He tried to
    turn the judicial system upside down, every way but loose. He
    sent his friends to lie for him. He lied for himself. Any time
    any relevant question came up, instead of taking the honorable
    way out, he lied and dug a hole, and we are all here today
    because of that.
        I am not going to go over the facts again because you have
    been bombarded with the facts. If you believe he committed
    perjury and if you believe he obstructed justice, the reason he
    did it was to fix his case. And you have some records to rely
    upon to see what you should do with somebody like that.
        Judge Hastings: This Federal judge was convicted and
    removed from office by the U.S. Senate. But do you know what is
    interesting about this case to me? He was acquitted before he
    got here. He was accused of conspiring with another person to
    take money to fix results in his own court. He gave testimony
    on his own behavior. The conspirator was convicted but he was
    acquitted.
        Do you know what the U.S. Senate and House said? We believe
    your conduct is out of bounds and we are not bound by that
    acquittal. We want to get to the truth, and we don't want
    Federal judges about whom we have a strong suspicion or
    reasonable belief are trying to fix cases in their court.
        The point I am trying to make is you don't even have to be
    convicted of a crime to lose your job in this constitutional
    Republic if this body determines that your conduct as a public
    official is clearly out of bounds in your role. Thank God you
    did that, because impeachment is not about punishment.
    Impeachment is about cleansing the office. Impeachment is about
    restoring honor and integrity to the office. The remedy of
    prosecuting William Jefferson Clinton has no effect on the
    problem you are facing here today, in my opinion.
        Every case was tried before it got here with different
    results. Two of them were convicted; one of them was acquitted.
    You had a factual record to go upon. I urge you, ladies and
    gentlemen of the U.S. Senate, that cannot happen in this case
    unless we have a trial in the true sense of the word. The
    evidence is compelling and overwhelming, but it has only been
    half told. The learned counsel for the President will have
    their chance, and they are excellent lawyers.
        If this were a football game, we would be almost at half
    time. Please, please wait, because I have sat where they are
    sitting, dying to say something. I know there are things they
    want to tell you about what we have said that may put this in a
    different light. That is coming, and it ought to come.
        But there is another thing that you will have to decide:
    Has the factual record been developed enough that I can acquit
    with good conscience or that I can convict and remove with good
    conscience? In these judge cases, there was a full-blown trial.
    Because we can't prosecute the President criminally, we can't
    do the things that happened in the judge cases, so we don't
    have that record. I just submit that to you for your wisdom.
    None of this matters unless you believe he committed the
    offense. And I am not going to go over that again.
        You know the facts pretty well. If there is any doubt,
    let's call witnesses and let's develop them fully and leave no
    doubt on the table, and make sure that history will judge us
    well. Everybody--the House and the President--will have a fair
    shot at proving their case, that these high crimes occurred.
        I don't believe, ladies and gentlemen, that when you look
    at the totality of what the President did and prior precedents
    of the Senate, the fact that he was told by the Supreme Court
    to go into this litigation matter and he cheated so badly, that
    you would consider these not to be high crimes. Because you are
    not placing a burden on this office that the office can't bear,
    I think that will be resolved, I hope and pray, in a bipartisan
    fashion.
        If we can do nothing else for this country, let us state
    clearly that this conduct is unacceptable by any President.
    These are, in fact, high crimes. They go to the core of why we
    are all here as a Nation and to the rule of law, the rules of
    litigation. He cheated, and you have to put him back in bounds,
    remove him. Determining this as a high crime puts it back into
    bounds.
        This is a hard question. I am not going to tell you it is
    not. I do not want to be where you are sitting. I think the
    evidence will be persuasive that he is guilty. The logic of
    your past rulings and just fundamental fairness and decency,
    and helping the Supreme Court enforce their rules, if nothing
    else, will lead you to a high-crime determination.
        But we are asking you to remove a popular President. I
    don't know why all this occurred. And we have a popular
    President. I know this. The American people are fundamentally
    fair, and they have an impression about this case from just
    tons and tons and tons of talk, tons and tons and tons of
    speaking. One in five, they tell me, are paying close attention
    to this. The question you must ask is: If every American were
    required to do what I have to do, sit in silence and listen to
    the evidence, would it be different? You are their
    representatives; they will trust you. This is a cynical age,
    but I am optimistic that whatever you do, this country will get
    up and go to work the next day, and they will feel good, no
    matter what it is.
        To set aside an election is a very scary thought in a
    democracy. I do not agree with this President on most major
    policy initiatives. I did not vote for this President. But he
    won; he won twice. To undo that election is tough.
        Let me give you some of my thoughts. How many times have
    you had to go to a child, a grandchild, or somebody who works
    for you, and give them a lecture that goes along the lines:
    Don't do as I do, do as I say. Isn't that a miserable
    experience? The problem with keeping this President in office,
    in my opinion, is that these crimes can't be ignored by anybody
    who looks at the evidence. They can be explained away, they can
    be excused; but they have far-reaching consequences for the
    law. And in his role as chief law enforcement officer of the
    land, how can we say to our fellow citizens that this will not
    be 20 months of ``don't do as I do, do as I say.'' What effect
    will that have? I think it would be devastating.
        This case is the butt of a thousand jokes. This case is
    requiring parents and teachers to sit down and explain what
    lying is all about. This case is creating confusion. This case
    is hitting America far harder than America knows it has been
    hit. It is tempting to let the clock tick, but I suggest to
    you, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you believe he is a
    perjurer, that he obstructed justice in a civil rights lawsuit,
    the question is not, Should he stay? It is, what if he stays?
    If you believe this President committed perjury before a grand
    jury when he was begged not to, and people in this body told
    him, ``Don't do it, because your political career is at
    stake,'' and if you believe he obstructed justice in a civil
    rights lawsuit, don't move the bar anymore. We have moved the
    bar for this case a thousand times.
        Remember how you felt when you knew you had a perjurer as a
    judge, when you knew you had somebody who had fundamentally run
    over the law they were responsible for upholding. Remember how
    you felt when you knew that judge was so out of bounds that you
    could not put him back in court, even though it was unrelated
    to his court, because you would be doing a disservice to the
    citizens who would come before him. A judge has a duty to take
    care of the individuals fairly who come before the court. The
    President, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, has a duty to
    see that the law applies to everyone fairly--a higher duty in
    the Constitution. You could not live with yourself, knowing
    that you were going to leave a perjurer as a judge on the
    bench.
        Ladies and gentlemen, as hard as it may be, for the same
    reasons, cleanse this office. The Vice President will be
    waiting outside the doors of this Chamber. Our constitutional
    system is simple and it is genius all at the same time. If that
    Vice President is asked to come in and assume the mantle of
    Chief Executive Officer of the land and chief law enforcement
    officer of the land, it will be tough, it will be painful, but
    we will survive and we will be better for it.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Canady.
        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    counsel, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I am
    Representative Charles Canady of the 12th District of Florida,
    and I rise now to conclude the argument that my two fellow
    managers have begun and to address the fundamental question now
    before the Senate: Do the offenses charged against the
    President rise to the level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors''
    under the Constitution?
        Are these crimes--perjury before a federal grand jury and
    obstruction of justice--offenses for which the President has
    properly been impeached by the House of Representatives and for
    which he may now properly be convicted by the Senate? Or are
    these serious felony offenses for which a Chief Executive may
    not constitutionally be called to account by either the House
    or the Senate?
        To properly answer these questions, it must be understood,
    as my fellow manager Mr. Buyer has argued, that perjury and
    obstruction of justice are serious offenses against the system
    of justice. To properly answer these questions, it must also be
    understood--as my fellow manager Mr. Graham has discussed--that
    the Senate has already determined that as a serious offense
    against the system of justice, perjury is proper grounds for
    removal from office.
        There are several additional points that I now ask you to
    consider as you deliberate on the momentous issue you must
    decide.
        First, I will argue that restricting the impeachment
    process to crimes involving the abuse of Presidential power is
    contrary to common sense. This is a key point in this case. The
    President's defense hinges to a large extent on his claim that
    the offenses charged against him do not involve official
    misconduct.
        I will then review the history and purpose of the
    impeachment process to show that its fundamental object is to
    maintain the supremacy of law against the misconduct of public
    officials. After reviewing the background of the impeachment
    process, I will briefly discuss the prevailing views on the
    seriousness of perjury at the time the Constitution was
    adopted, and show that perjury and obstruction of justice are
    akin to bribery in their purpose and effect.
        To conclude, I will discuss the proper role of the Senate
    in exercising the removal power--emphasizing three essential
    points:
        First, that the removal power is designed to preserve,
    protect, and strengthen our Constitution by setting a standard
    of conduct for public officers.
        Second, that the Senate should not establish a lower
    standard of integrity for the President than the standard it
    has already established for Federal judges.
        Third, that the Senate should not allow a President who has
    violated his constitutional duty and oath of office, and made
    himself a notorious example of lawlessness, to remain in
    office.
        The President's lawyers have argued that the ``Constitution
    requires proof of official misconduct'' for impeachment and
    conviction, and that removal from office is not proper for
    crimes that do not involve an abuse of the power of office.
    This view is endorsed by various academics who have signed a
    letter in support of the President. The Senate must now decide
    if this is a proper interpretation of the Constitution.
        In deciding this question, you should be guided by common
    sense and good judgment. It is by no means an abstruse and
    mysterious matter of constitutional law.
        Nor is it a new question before the Senate. It has been
    decided in the recent judicial impeachments which Mr. Graham
    has discussed. And it is a question which arose 200 years ago
    in the course of the first impeachment trial conducted by the
    Senate.
        At that trial in January of 1799, as the Senate met in
    Philadelphia, an argument was made by counsel for the
    respondent, Senator Blount of Tennessee, that the impeachment
    power was properly exercised only with respect to ``official
    offenses.'' Although Senator Blount escaped conviction on other
    grounds, the response to his claim that only official
    misconduct could justify impeachment and removal remains
    noteworthy. Robert Goodloe Harper of South Carolina, one of the
    House managers--and who, incidentally, subsequently served as a
    Member of this Senate representing the State of Maryland--
    refuted that claim by asking a simple question:
        ``Suppose a Judge of the United States were to commit a
    theft or perjury; would the learned counsel say that he should
    not be impeached for it? If so, he must remain in office with
    all his infamy. . . .''
        Two hundred years to the month after Robert Goodloe Harper
    posed that question to the Senate, a very similar question is
    before the Senate today. Shall a President--if found guilty of
    perjury and obstruction of justice--be removed, or must he
    ``remain in office with all his infamy'' ?
        Although a judge who commits crimes may be subjected to
    criminal penalties and prevented from discharging judicial
    functions, he can be divested of his office only by impeachment
    and removal. The tenure of a President will necessarily expire
    with the passage of time, but most scholars of constitutional
    law agree that while he remains in office he is immune from the
    processes of the criminal law. So long as he is President, the
    only mechanism available to hold him accountable for his crimes
    is the power of impeachment and removal. Unless that power is
    exercised, no matter what crime he has committed, he must
    ``remain in office with all his infamy.''
        The argument of the President's lawyers that no criminal
    act by the President subjects him to removal from office unless
    the crime involves the abuse of his power is an argument
    entailing consequences which--upon a moment's reflection--this
    body should be unwilling to accept.
        Would a President guilty of murder be immune from the
    constitutional process of impeachment and removal so long as
    his crime involved no misuse of official power? Would a
    President guilty of sexual assault or child molesting remain
    secure in office because his crime did not involve an abuse of
    office?
        In support of their position, the President's lawyers have
    vigorously argued that a President who committed tax fraud--a
    felony offense not involving official misconduct--would not be
    subject to impeachment and removal. They erroneously cite the
    decision of the House Judiciary Committee rejecting an article
    of impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud. The
    record of the House proceedings establishes that the tax fraud
    article against President Nixon was rejected due to
    insufficient evidence that he was in fact guilty of tax fraud.
    The House Judiciary Committee never determined that tax fraud
    by a President would not be grounds for impeachment.
        But, leaving aside the inaccurate characterization of the
    House Judiciary Committee's action, the claim of the
    President's lawyers that a President could commit tax fraud and
    remain immune from impeachment and removal is quite telling. It
    reveals a great deal about the sort of standard they would set
    for the conduct of the President of the United States.
        The claim that tax fraud--a felony--does not rise to the
    level of a high crime or misdemeanor was, as you have heard,
    unequivocally rejected by the Senate in 1986 in the case of
    Judge Harry Claiborne, who was removed from office for filing
    false income tax returns.
        Then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr., summarized the judgment of
    the Senate that Judge Claiborne should be removed from office.
    The comments of Senator Gore bear repeating:

        It is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its
    constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title.
    An individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no
    business receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of
    honest citizens.

        Of course, the rationale expressed by Senator Gore for the
    conviction of Judge Claiborne for his criminal tax offenses
    applies with equal--if not greater--force to similar offenses
    committed by the President of the United States. Professor
    Charles Black, Jr., in his essay on the law of impeachment,
    recognized the appropriate application of these principles to
    the office of the Presidency. Professor Black said, ``A large-
    scale tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.''
        I respectfully submit to the Senate that the argument of
    the President's lawyers concerning tax fraud by a President is
    not a viable argument.
        Who can seriously argue that our Constitution requires that
    a President guilty of crimes such as murder, sexual assault, or
    tax fraud remain in his office undisturbed? Who is willing to
    set such a standard for the conduct of the President of the
    United States? Who can in good conscience accept the
    consequences for our system of government that would
    necessarily follow? Could our Constitution possibly contemplate
    such a result? What other crimes of a President will we be told
    do not rise to the level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors?''
    These are grave questions that must be addressed by this
    Senate. The President's defense requires that these questions
    be asked and answered.
        Contrary to the claims of the President's lawyers, there is
    not a bright line separating official misconduct by a President
    from other misconduct of which the President is guilty. Some
    offenses will involve the direct and affirmative misuse of
    governmental power. Other offenses may involve a more subtle
    use of the prestige, status and position of the President to
    further a course of wrongdoing. There are still other offenses
    in which a President may not misuse the power of his office,
    but in which he violates a duty imposed on him under the
    Constitution.
        Such a breach of constitutional duty--even though it does
    not constitute an affirmative misuse of governmental power--may
    be a very serious matter. It does violence to the English
    language to assert that a President who has violated a duty
    entrusted to him by the Constitution is not guilty of official
    misconduct. Common sense indicates that official misconduct has
    indeed occurred whenever a President breaches any of the duties
    of his office.
        As we have been reminded repeatedly, the Constitution
    imposes on the President the duty to ``take care that the laws
    be faithfully executed.'' The charges against the President
    involve multiple violations of that duty. A President who
    commits a calculated and sustained series of criminal offenses
    has--by his personal violations of the law--failed in the most
    immediate, direct, and culpable manner to do his duty under the
    Constitution.
        In their defense of the President, his lawyers, in essence,
    contend that a President may be removed for misusing
    governmental power, but not for corruptly interfering with the
    proper exercise of governmental power. This argument exalts
    form over substance. It unduly focuses on the manner in which
    wrongdoing is carried out and neglects to consider the actual
    impact of that wrongdoing on our system of government. Whether
    the President misuses the power vested in him as President or
    wrongfully interferes with the proper exercise of the power
    vested in other parts of the Government, the result is the
    same: the due functioning of our system of government is in
    some respect hindered or defeated.
        There is no principled basis for contending that a
    President who interferes with the proper exercise of
    governmental power--as he clearly does when he commits perjury
    and obstruction of justice--is constitutionally less
    blameworthy than a President who misuses the power of his
    office. A President who lies to a Federal grand jury in order
    to impede the investigation of crimes is no less culpable than
    a President who wrongfully orders a prosecutor to suspend an
    investigation of crimes that have been committed. The purpose
    and effect of the personal perjury and of the wrongful official
    command are the same: the laws of the United States are not
    properly enforced.
        Although neither the Senate nor the House has ever adopted
    a fixed definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' there
    is much in the background and history of the impeachment
    process that contradicts the narrow view of the removal power
    advanced by the President's lawyers.
        There is no convincing evidence that those who framed and
    ratified our Constitution intended to limit the impeachment and
    removal power to acts involving the abuse of official power.
        The key phrase defining the offenses for which the
    President, Vice President and other civil officers of the
    United States may be removed--``treason, bribery or other high
    crimes and misdemeanors''--simply does not limit the removal
    power in the way suggested by the President's lawyers.
        The truth is as we have heard already today, that treason
    and bribery may be committed by an official who does not abuse
    the power of his office in the commission of the offense. A
    President might, for example, pay a bribe to a judge presiding
    over a case to which the President is an individual party. Or a
    judge might commit an act of treason without exercising any of
    the powers of his office in doing so. By the express terms of
    the Constitution those offenses would be impeachable. And there
    is no reason to impose a restriction on the scope of ``other
    high crimes and misdemeanors'' that is not imposed on treason
    and bribery.
        Although having a means for the removal of officials guilty
    of abusing their power was no doubt very much in the minds of
    the framers, the purpose of the removal power was not
    restricted to that object.
        To properly understand the purpose of the impeachment
    process under our Constitution, consideration must be given to
    use of impeachment by the English Parliament. Impeachment in
    the English system did not require an indictable crime, but the
    proceeding was nevertheless of a criminal nature: punishment
    upon conviction could extend to imprisonment and even death. It
    was a mechanism used by the Parliament to check absolutism and
    to establish the supremacy of the Parliament. Through
    impeachment, Parliament acted to curb the abuses of exalted
    persons who would otherwise have free reign. Impeachment was
    used by the Parliament to punish a wide range of offenses:
    misapplication of funds; abuse of official power; neglect of
    duty; corruption; encroachment on the prerogatives of the
    Parliament; and giving harmful advice to the Crown. In the
    English practice, ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' included all
    of these.
        During the impeachment of Lord Chancellor Macclesfield in
    1725, Serjeant Pengelly summed up the purpose of impeachment.
    It was, he said, for the ``punishment of offenses of a public
    nature which may affect the nation.'' He went on to say that
    impeachment was also for use in ``instances where the inferior
    courts have no power to punish the crimes committed by ordinary
    rules of justice . . . or in cases . . . where the person
    offending is by his degree raised above the apprehension of
    danger from a prosecution carried on in the usual course of
    justice; and whose exalted station requires the united
    accusation of all the Commons.''
        In the case of Warren Hastings--which was proceeding at the
    time the Constitution was framed--Edmund Burke described the
    impeachment process as ``. . . a grave and important proceeding
    essential to the establishment of the national character for
    justice and equity.''
        As the British legal historian Holdsworth has written, the
    impeachment process was a mechanism in service of the ``ideal .
    . . [of] government in accordance with law.'' It was a means by
    which ``the greatest ministers of state could be made
    responsible, like humble officials, to the law.'' According to
    Holdsworth:
        ``. . . [T]he greatest services rendered by this procedure
    to the cause of constitutional government have been, firstly,
    the establishment of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility
    to the law, secondly, its application to all ministers of the
    crown, and thirdly and consequently the maintenance of the
    supremacy of the law over all.''
        Thus the fundamental purpose of the impeachment process in
    England was ``the maintenance of the supremacy of the law over
    all.'' Those who were impeached and called to account for
    ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' were those who by their
    conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law.
        This English understanding of the purpose of impeachment
    serves as a backdrop for the work of the Framers of our
    Constitution. Despite some important differences in the
    functioning of impeachment in England and the United States,
    the fundamental purpose of impeachment remained the same:
    defending the rule of law.
        The records of the proceedings of the Constitutional
    Convention also shed light on the meaning of ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors,'' and the underlying purpose of the impeachment
    mechanism. The primary focus of the relevant discussions at the
    Convention was on the need for some means of removing the
    President. Early in the proceedings with respect to
    impeachment, the Committee of the Whole agreed to make the
    President removable ``on impeachment and conviction of
    malpractice or neglect of duty,'' although concerns were
    expressed that impeachment would give the legislative branch
    undue control over the executive, and violate the separation of
    powers.
        In the course of the proceedings, James Madison stated that
    ``some provision was needed to defend the community against the
    President if he became corrupt, incapacitated, or perverted his
    administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression.''
        Arguing for a means of removing the President, George Mason
    said, ``No point is of more importance than that the right of
    impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above
    Justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who can commit
    the most extensive injustice?''
        Before the Convention settled on the language that was
    ultimately adopted, a proposal was considered that would have
    limited impeachable offenses to treason and bribery. An effort
    was made to broaden this proposal by including
    ``maladministration'' as an impeachable offense. Madison
    objected. He objected that the inclusion of a term as ``vague''
    as maladministration would result in the President having
    tenure during the pleasure of the Senate. As a compromise, the
    term ``maladministration'' was dropped and ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors'' was substituted. From this course of proceedings
    it can reasonably be concluded that poor administration--at
    least if it does not involve corrupt motives--is not a
    sufficient ground for impeachment.
        In the debate concerning the Constitution in the various
    state ratification conventions, the grounds for impeachment
    were with some frequency said to include abuse or betrayal of
    trust and abuse of power. ``Making a bad treaty'' was also
    frequently mentioned as justifying impeachment. At the Virginia
    Convention, Governor Randolph spoke of ``misbehavior'' and
    ``dishonesty,'' and James Madison gave two examples of
    impeachable conduct: pardoning a criminal with whom the
    President was in collusion, and summoning only a few Senators
    to approve a treaty.
        One of the most extensive recorded discussions of
    impeachment occurred at the North Carolina ratification
    convention in remarks made by James Iredell. Iredell, who later
    served as a Justice of the Supreme Court, spoke of the
    supremacy of the law under the system of government proposed by
    the Constitution. He said:

        No man has an authority to injure another with impunity. No
    man is better than his fellow-citizens, nor can pretend to any
    superiority over the meanest man in the country. If the
    President does a single act, by which the people are
    prejudiced, he is punishable himself. . . . If he commits any
    misdemeanor in office, he is impeachable . . .

        Iredell also expressed the view that impeachment may be
    used only in cases where there is some corrupt motive. He said:

        . . . [W]hen any man is impeached, it must be for an error
    of the heart, and not of the head. . . . Whatever mistake a man
    may make, he ought not to be punished for it, nor his posterity
    rendered infamous. But if a man be a villain, and wilfully
    abuse his trust, he is to be held up as a public offender, and
    ignominiously punished. . . . According to these principles, I
    suppose the only instances in which the President would be
    liable to impeachment, would be where he had received a bribe,
    or acted from some corrupt motive or other.

        Iredell's comments buttress the view that impeachment is
    not to be used as a political weapon to resolve differences of
    policy between the legislative branch and the executive branch.
    Impeachment is not an appropriate remedy for errors--even
    serious errors--in the administration of government.
        To justify impeachment, there must be ``some corrupt
    motive,'' a willful ``abuse of trust,'' an ``error of the
    heart.'' You will note there is nothing in Iredell's comments
    to suggest that a President who engaged in a corrupt course of
    conduct by obstructing justice and committing perjury would be
    immune from impeachment and removal.
        Another major discussion of impeachment during the debate
    over ratification occurs in the Federalist No. 65, to which
    reference has already been made in those proceedings, where
    Alexander Hamilton describes the impeachment process as ``a
    method of national inquest into the conduct of public men'' and
    discusses the powers of the Senate ``in their judicial
    character as a court for the trial of impeachments.''
        Now, before I discuss his views of impeachment, I would
    like to say a word in defense of Alexander Hamilton--who is a
    widely acknowledged champion of our Constitution, widely
    acknowledged as one of the most eloquent expositors and
    defenders of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the reputation of
    Hamilton has in recent days been traduced. It is unjust to the
    memory of this great man to compare his personal sins with the
    crimes of President Clinton. When Hamilton was questioned about
    his affair he told the truth. He took responsibility for his
    conduct. There is no evidence that he ever engaged in acts of
    corruption. He never lied under oath. He never obstructed
    justice. Notwithstanding the efforts of his lawyers, President
    Clinton by no means benefits from a comparison with Hamilton.
        In ``The Federalist,'' Hamilton writes of the Senate:

        The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which
    proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words
    from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a
    nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated
    political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately
    to the society itself.

        Hamilton recognized that the focus of the impeachment power
    is on the ``misconduct of public men'' or the ``abuse or
    violation of some public trust.'' Impeachment is a remedy
    against officials for ``injuries done . . . to the society
    itself.''
        Despite the claims of the President's lawyers, the comments
    of Hamilton do not support the view that a President can be
    impeached and removed only for an abuse of power. The
    ``misconduct of public men,'' and ``the abuse or violation of
    some public trust'' to which Hamilton refers are not restricted
    to offenses involving the misuse of official power. The
    ``misconduct of public men'' encompasses a whole range of
    wrongful deeds committed by those who hold office when those
    offenses are committed. The ``public trust'' is violated
    whenever a public officer breaches any duty he has to the
    public. ``Injuries done . . . to the society itself'' similarly
    may occur as the result of misconduct that does not involve the
    misuse of the powers of office.
        I submit to the Senate that the English precedents, the
    records of the Constitutional Convention debates, and the
    general principles set forth by Hamilton, Iredell, and others
    in the debate over ratification do not provide a definitive
    list of high crimes and misdemeanors. But they do provide broad
    guidance concerning the scope of the impeachment power. The
    theme running through all these background sources is that the
    impeachment process is designed to provide a remedy for the
    corrupt and lawless acts of public officials.
        Not surprisingly, those who have been on the receiving end
    of impeachment proceedings have been quick to argue for a
    restrictive meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    President Clinton's lawyers follow in that well-established
    tradition.
        They attempt to minimize the significance of the charges of
    perjury and obstruction of justice against the President. In
    essence, they argue that treason and bribery are the
    prototypical high crimes and misdemeanors, and that the crimes
    charged against the President are insufficiently similar in
    both their nature and seriousness to treason and bribery.
        But, as the comments of my fellow manager, Mr. Buyer, have
    made clear, the crimes set forth in the articles of impeachment
    are indeed serious offenses against our system of justice. They
    were certainly viewed as serious offenses by those who drafted
    and ratified the Constitution.
        As Mr. Buyer has mentioned, in his discussion of ``offenses
    against the public justice,'' Sir William Blackstone--whose
    work James Madison said was in ``every man's hand'' during the
    creation of the Constitution--listed the offenses of perjury
    and bribery side-by-side, immediately after he listed treason.
    In 1790, the First Congress adopted a statute entitled ``An Act
    for the punishment of certain crimes against the United
    States'' making perjury a crime punishable as a felony. Nothing
    could be clearer: perjury is a crime against the United States;
    it is not a private matter.
        As Mr. Chabot noted yesterday, John Jay, the first Chief
    Justice of the United States, said that ``there is no crime
    more extensively pernicious to Society'' than perjury.
    According to Jay, perjury ``discolors and poisons the Streams
    of Justice, and by substituting Falsehood for Truth, saps the
    Foundations of personal and public Rights. . . . [I]f oaths
    should cease to be held sacred, our dearest and most valuable
    Rights would become insecure.'' Given this understanding that
    was current at the time the Constitution was adopted, it is
    impossible to support the conclusion that perjury and the
    related offense of obstruction of justice are somehow trivial
    offenses that do not rise to the same level as the offense of
    bribery which is enumerated in the Constitution.
        Moreover, perjury and obstruction of justice are by their
    very nature akin to bribery. When the crime of bribery is
    committed, money is given and received to corruptly alter the
    course of official action. When justice is obstructed, action
    is undertaken to corruptly thwart the due administration of
    justice. When perjury occurs, false testimony is given in order
    to deceive judges and juries and to prevent the just
    determination of causes pending in the courts. The fundamental
    purpose and the fundamental effect of each of these offenses--
    perjury, obstruction of justice and bribery alike--is to defeat
    the proper administration of government. They all are crimes of
    corruption aimed at substituting private advantage for the
    public interest. They all undermine the integrity of the
    functions of government.
        The use of the impeachment process against misconduct which
    undermines the integrity of government is a central focus of
    two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of
    impeachment, and I would humbly bring these reports to your
    attention. I commend them to you for your consideration. One of
    the reports was prepared by the staff of the Nixon impeachment
    inquiry. The other was produced by the Bar of the City of New
    York. Both of these reports have gained bipartisan respect over
    the last 25 years for their balanced and judicious approach.
    They provide a well-informed analysis of the key issues related
    to impeachments. In doing so they stand in stark contrast to
    the recent pronouncements by some academics which substitute
    political opinion for scholarly analysis.
        A review of these two important documents from 1974
    supports the conclusion that the articles before the Senate set
    forth compelling grounds for the conviction and removal of
    President Clinton.
        There has been a great deal of comment on the report on
    ``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment''
    prepared in February 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment
    inquiry. Those who assert that the charges against the
    President do not rise to the level of ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors'' have pulled some phrases from that report out of
    context to support their position. In fact, the general
    principles concerning grounds for impeachment and removal set
    forth in that report indicate that perjury and obstruction of
    justice are high crimes and misdemeanors.
        Consider this key language from the staff report describing
    the type of conduct which gives rise to the proper use of the
    impeachment and removal power:
        In the report, they said:

        The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the
    conduct--undermining the integrity of office, disregard of
    constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of power,
    abuse of the governmental process, adverse impact on the system
    of government.

        The report goes on to state:

        Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the
    nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously
    incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles
    of our government or the proper performance of constitutional
    duties of the presidential office.

        Perjury and obstruction of justice, I submit to you,
    clearly ``undermine the integrity of office.'' I ask you, if
    these offenses do not undermine the integrity of office, what
    offenses would?
        Their unavoidable consequence is to erode respect for the
    office of the President and to interfere with the integrity of
    the administration of justice. Such offenses are ``seriously
    incompatible'' with the President's ``constitutional duties and
    oath of office,'' and with the principles of our government
    establishing the rule of law. Moreover, they are offenses which
    have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system of
    government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an
    assault on the due administration of justice--which is a core
    function of our system of government. Perjury has the same
    purpose and effect.
        The second report, to which I have referred, the thoughtful
    report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment'' prepared by
    the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in January
    of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive
    impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of
    government. The report summarizes the proper basis for
    impeachment and removal in this way. It says:

        It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for
    impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes. . . .
    Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of
    government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen
    to constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our
    view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of
    government may be found in acts which constitute corruption in,
    or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may
    also be found in acts which, without directly affecting
    governmental processes, undermine that degree of public
    confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers
    that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free
    society.

        Perjury and obstruction of justice--serious felony offenses
    against the United States--by a President are acts of
    corruption which without doubt ``undermine that degree of
    public confidence in the probity of the [the President] that is
    essential to the effectiveness of government in a free
    society.'' Such acts are ``high crimes and misdemeanors''
    because they inevitably subvert the respect for law which is
    essential to the well-being of our constitutional system.
        A similar point is made by a contemporary commentator who
    has argued:

        . . . [T]here are certain statutory crimes that, if
    committed by public officials, reflect such lapses of judgment,
    such disregard for the welfare of the state, and such lack of
    respect for the law and the office held that the occupants may
    be impeached and removed, for lacking the minimal level of
    integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the
    responsibilities of office.

        Such a lack of the minimal level of integrity necessary for
    the proper discharge of the duties of the Presidency is
    evidenced by the commission of the statutory crimes of perjury
    and obstruction of justice.
        Contrary to the claim that has been made by some, the issue
    before the Senate is not whether the offenses of this President
    will destroy our Constitution. We all know that our system of
    government will not come tumbling down because of the corrupt
    conduct of William Jefferson Clinton. Our Republic will survive
    the crimes of this President. No one doubts that. Of course,
    the same could be said of all the other Federal officials who
    have been impeached and removed from office. And the same might
    be said of the crimes--serious as they were--of President
    Richard Nixon.
        But the removal power is not restricted to offenses that
    would directly destroy our Constitution or system of
    government. The removal power is not so limited that it can be
    brought into play only when the immediate destruction of our
    institutions is threatened.
        On the contrary, the removal power should be understood as
    a positive grant of authority to the Senate to preserve,
    protect and strengthen our constitutional system against the
    misconduct of federal officials when that misconduct would
    subvert, undermine, or weaken the institutions of our
    government. It is a power that has the positive purpose of
    maintaining the health and well-being of our system of
    government.
        This power--the awesome power of removal vested in the
    Senate--carries with it an awesome responsibility. This power
    imposes on the Senate the responsibility to exercise its
    judgment in establishing the standards of conduct that are
    necessary to preserve, protect, and strengthen the Constitution
    which has served the people of the United States so well for
    more than two centuries.
        Thus, the crucial issue before the Senate is what standard
    will be set for the conduct of the President of the United
    States. In this case, the Senate necessarily will establish
    such a standard. And make no mistake about it: the choice the
    Senate makes in this case will have consequences reverberating
    far into the future of our Republic. Will a President who has
    committed serious offenses against the system of justice be
    called to account for his crimes, or will his offenses be
    regarded as of no constitutional consequence? Will a standard
    be established that such crimes by a President will not be
    tolerated, or will the standard be that--at least in some
    cases--a President may ``remain in office with all his infamy''
    after lying under oath and obstructing justice?
        Regardless of the choice the Senate makes--whether it
    acquits or convicts the President--a standard will be
    established, and that standard will become an important part of
    our constitutional law of this Nation. The institutions of our
    Government will either be strengthened or weakened as a result.
    And if the Senate acquits this President, the conduct of future
    Presidents will inevitably be affected in ways that we cannot
    now confidently predict.
        I would now like to take a very few minutes to examine some
    of the other specific arguments that have been made that this
    is not a proper case for use of the removal power.
        Some have suggested that in setting a standard in this case
    the Senate should be guided by the popularity of the President.
    It is urged that a popular President--regardless of the
    offenses he may have committed--should not be removed from
    office. Such a view finds no support however, in our
    Constitution. On the contrary, the framers understood that a
    popular President might be guilty of crimes requiring his
    removal from office.
        That is why they included the power of impeachment and
    removal in the Constitution. And that, no doubt, is why they
    specifically provided that an impeached official who was
    convicted and removed might also be perpetually disqualified
    ``to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under
    the United States.''
        The potential threat posed to our institutions by
    Presidential misconduct would, in fact, be heightened by the
    popularity of the offending President. The harmful influence
    and example of a popular President would pose a far greater
    danger to the well-being of our Government than the influence
    and example of an unpopular President.
        Moreover, the very framework of our Constitution
    establishing a representative democracy is at odds with the
    notion that the institutions of our Government should respond
    mechanically to the changing tides of public opinion. The
    Senate, in particular, was designed to act on the basis of the
    long-term best interests of the Nation rather than short-term
    political considerations.
        When he was tried by the Senate 130 years ago, President
    Andrew Johnson was overwhelmingly unpopular. If the Senate had
    used Presidential popularity as a guide in the Johnson case,
    there is no doubt that he would have been convicted and removed
    from office. Yet today there is widespread agreement that such
    action by the Senate would have been an abuse of the
    constitutional process, and those who refused to use
    Presidential popularity as their guide are hailed as great
    statesmen and heroes. Those Senators who then stood against the
    tide of public sentiment today are revered as champions of
    constitutional government.
        A popular President guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors
    should no more remain in office than an unpopular President
    innocent of wrongdoing should be removed from office. Under the
    standards of the Constitution, popularity is not a sufficient
    guide.
        Nor should the Senate be swayed by the claims that setting
    a standard adverse to this President will weaken the
    institution of the Presidency. Describing the role of
    impeachment under our Constitution, Arthur M. Schlesinger,
    Jr.--who I will candidly admit takes a different view of the
    matter today--wisely observed that:

        The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could
    punish the man without punishing the office. For, in the
    Presidency as elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to do
    good meant also the power to do harm, the power to serve the
    republic also the power to demean and defile it.

        Rather than weakening the Presidency, the removal from
    office of a President who has violated his constitutional duty
    and oath of office will reestablish the integrity of the
    Presidency. Setting a standard against the acts of perjury and
    obstruction of justice committed by President Clinton will
    reaffirm the dignity and the honor of the Office of Chief
    Executive under our Constitution. That will strengthen--not
    weaken--the institution of the Presidency.
        It has even been argued that the impeachment and removal of
    President Clinton would result in the virtual alteration of our
    system of government. It is contended that following the
    constitutional process in this case would move us toward a
    transformation of our Constitution: a quasi-parliamentary
    system, with the President serving at the pleasure of the
    legislative branch, would replace the framework based on the
    separation of powers.
        I am, frankly, reluctant to dignify this argument by
    responding to it. President Nixon was driven from office for
    his crimes under threat of impeachment and removal. The
    disruption of the framework of our Government did not ensue.
    President Clinton may be removed from office for his crimes.
    The constitutional system will remain sound.
        Who has so little confidence in the durability of the
    institutions of our Government that he would allow a President
    guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice to remain in
    office simply on the basis of a fanciful and irrational fear of
    the supposed consequences of his removal?
        The Constitution contains wise safeguards against the
    misuse of the impeachment and removal power. As a practical
    matter, as we all know, the requirement of a two-thirds vote
    for conviction virtually ensures that a President will only be
    removed when a compelling case for removal has been made. And
    the periodic accountability to the people of Members of both
    the House and the Senate serves as a check on the improvident
    use of the impeachment power for unworthy or insubstantial
    reasons. Those who would abuse the power of impeachment and
    removal will be deterred by the certain knowledge that they
    ultimately must answer to the people.
        But, of course, the ultimate safeguard against the abuse of
    this power is in the sober deliberation and sound judgment of
    the Senate itself. The framers of the Constitution vested the
    removal power and responsibility in the Senate because, as
    Hamilton observed, they ``thought the Senate the most fit
    depositary of this important trust.'' The Senate was, in the
    view of the framers, uniquely qualified to exercise the ``awful
    discretion, which a court of impeachment must necessarily
    have.'' As Hamilton explained:

        Where else, than in the Senate could have been found a
    tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent?
    What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in
    its own situation, to preserve unawed and uninfluenced the
    necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the
    representatives of the people, his accusers.

        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, this is the great trust
    which the Constitution has reposed in you. It is a trust you
    exercise not only for those who elected you but for all other
    Americans, including generations yet unborn.
        As you carry out this trust, we do not suggest that you
    hold this President or any President to a standard of
    perfection. We do not assert that this President or any
    President be called to account before the Senate for his
    personal failings or his sins. We will leave the President's
    sins to his family and to God. Nor do we suggest that this
    President or any President should be removed from office for
    offenses that are not serious and grave.
        But we do submit that when this President, or any
    President, has committed serious offenses against the system of
    justice--offenses involving the stubborn and calculated choice
    to place personal interest ahead of the public interest--he
    must not be allowed to act with impunity.
        Mr. Manager Graham has reviewed the recent precedents of
    the Senate, establishing that offenses such as those committed
    by this President are grounds for removal from office. Those
    precedents, which were set in the impeachment trials of Federal
    judges, are rejected as totally irrelevant by the President's
    lawyers. They urge that a lower standard of integrity be
    established in this case for the President of the United States
    than the standard which the Senate has already established for
    Federal judges.
        But the Constitution contains a single standard for the
    exercise of the impeachment and removal power. You have heard
    it before, but I will repeat. Article II, section 4, provides:

        The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the
    United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
    and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
    Misdemeanors.

        And there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting that
    criminal offenses which constitute high crimes and misdemeanors
    if committed by one Federal official will not be high crimes
    and misdemeanors if committed by another Federal official.
    There is nothing in the Constitution to suggest that the
    President should be especially insulated from the just
    consequences of his criminal conduct.
        Justice Joseph Story warned long ago against countenancing
    ``so absolute a despotism of opinion and practice, which might
    make that a crime at one time, or in one person, which would be
    deemed innocent at another time, or in another person.''
        The Senate should heed the warning of Justice Story and
    refuse to arbitrarily establish a different standard for
    judging William Jefferson Clinton than the standard it has
    imposed already on others brought before the bar of the Senate
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
        The Senate has never accepted the view that a separate
    standard applies to the impeachment and removal of Federal
    judges. Indeed, the Senate has specifically rejected attempts
    to establish such a separate standard for judicial officers.
    Every judge who has been impeached and removed from office has
    been found guilty of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
    misdemeanors.
        Contrary to the argument advanced by some, the
    constitutional provision that judges ``shall hold their offices
    during good Behaviour'' does not establish any authority to
    remove a judge for misconduct other than for those offenses
    involving treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
    misdemeanors. Rather than establishing a standard for removal,
    the ``good behavior'' clause simply provides for life tenure
    for all article III judges. To accept the ``good behavior''
    clause, I would caution you to accept it as a separate basis
    for the removal of Federal judges would pose a serious threat
    to the independence of the judiciary under our Constitution.
        Members of the Senate, the integrity of the administration
    of justice depends not only on the integrity of judges, but
    also on the integrity of the President. A President who has
    committed perjury and obstruction of justice is hardly fit to
    oversee the enforcement of the laws of the United States. As
    Professor Jonathan Turley has pointed out:

        As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate
    authority over the Justice Department and the Administration's
    enforcement policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can
    legitimately threaten, let alone prosecute, citizens who have
    committed perjury or obstruction of justice under circumstances
    nearly identical to the President's. Such inherent conflict
    will be even greater in the military cases and the President's
    role as Commander-in-Chief.

        It would indeed be anomalous for the Senate to now hold the
    President of the United States to a lower standard of integrity
    than the standard applied to members of the judiciary. There is
    no sensible constitutional rationale for such a lower standard.
        Who could successfully defend the view that in the
    framework established by our Constitution the integrity of the
    Chief Executive is of less importance than the integrity of any
    one of the hundreds of Federal judicial officers? It is the
    President who appoints Justices of the Supreme Court and all
    other Federal judges. It is the President who appoints the
    Attorney General. It is the President who appoints the Director
    of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the President who
    has the unreviewable power to grant pardons.
        The power of the President far surpasses the power of any
    other individual under our Constitution. The authority and
    discretion vested in him under the Constitution and laws is
    great and wide-ranging. The requirement that he act with
    integrity and that he be a person of integrity is essential to
    the integrity of our system of government.
        Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, Alexander
    Hamilton wrote that ``an inviolable respect for the
    Constitution and the Laws'' is the ``most sacred duty and the
    greatest source of security in a Republic.'' Hamilton
    understood that respect for the Constitution itself grows out
    of a general respect for the law. And he understood the
    essential connection between respect for the law and the
    maintenance of liberty in a Republic. Without respect for the
    law, the foundation of our Constitution is not secure. Without
    respect for the law, our freedom is at risk. Thus, according to
    Hamilton, those who ``set examples which undermine or subvert
    the authority of the laws lead us from freedom to slavery. . .
    .''
        Early in this century, Justice Brandeis spoke of the harm
    to our system of Government which occurs when officials of the
    Government act in a lawless manner. Justice Brandeis said:

        Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
    officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that
    are commands to the citizens. In a government of laws,
    existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to
    observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
    omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole
    people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
    becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
    every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.

        To conclude, I would observe in the case before it now, the
    Senate must decide if William Jefferson Clinton as President
    will be ``subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
    commands to the citizens.'' It is no answer that he may one day
    after leaving office perhaps be called to account in a criminal
    court proceeding somewhere. Justice delayed is justice denied.
    Because he has taken and violated the oath as President,
    William Jefferson Clinton is answerable for his crimes to the
    Senate here and now.
        Will he as President be vindicated by the Senate in the
    face of crimes for which other citizens are adjudicated felons
    and sent to prison? Or will this Senate, acting in accordance
    with the provisions of the Constitution, bring him as President
    into submission to the commands of the law? Will the Senate
    give force to the constitutional provision for impeachment and
    removal which Justice Story said ``compels the chief
    magistrate, as well as the humblest citizen, to bend to the
    majesty of the laws''?
        ``For good or ill'' William Jefferson Clinton ``teaches the
    whole people by [his] example'' as President. The President is
    not only the head of Government but also the head of State. As
    President he has a unique ability to command the attention of
    the whole Nation. In his words and his deeds he represents the
    American people and the system of government in a way that no
    other American can. Great honor and respect accrue to him by
    virtue of the high office he holds. The influence of his
    example is far-reaching and profound.
        By his conduct, President William Jefferson Clinton has set
    an example the Senate cannot ignore. By his example he has set
    a dangerous and subversive standard of conduct. His calculated
    and stubbornly persistent misconduct while serving as President
    of the United States has set a pernicious example of
    lawlessness--an example which by its very nature subverts
    respect for the law. His perverse example has the inevitable
    effect of undermining the integrity of both the office of
    President and the administration of justice.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I humbly submit to you
    that his harmful example as President must not stand. The
    maintenance in office of a President guilty of perjury and
    obstruction of justice is inconsistent with the maintenance of
    the rule of law.
        In light of the historic purpose of impeachment, the
    offenses charged against the President demand that the Senate
    convict and remove him. He must not ``remain in office with all
    his infamy.'' Our Constitution requires that this President who
    has shown such disrespect for the truth, such disrespect for
    the law, and such disrespect for the dignity of his high office
    be brought to justice for his high crimes and misdemeanors.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if there is no objection, I
    ask unanimous consent that the court of impeachment proceedings
    stand in recess for one hour. We will return at 2:10 p.m.
        There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:11 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to
    proceed now with the next manager. I believe it is Mr. Manager
    Gekas.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
        Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, the President's
    counsel, Members of the House who form our group of managers,
    and Members of the Senate, we bring you to what now may be the
    culmination of the work and effort of the managers and of the
    House of Representatives for, and what is fast closing in to
    be, your final consideration. And that is true--the moment of
    truth is fast approaching.
        That moment of truth will swoop down on you at some point
    in the near future, at which time the millions of words that
    have been spoken thus far, the thousands of pages of documents,
    hundreds of exhibits, and dozens of individuals who have been
    involved in the preparation, annotation, and accumulation of
    all the data and evidence--all of that will be funneled into
    that last moment you will have right before you cast that final
    vote. That is an awesome moment in the history of this Chamber,
    in the personal history of your own careers in public service,
    and of your own life, as well, your personal life, your
    surroundings, your family, all that means anything and
    everything to you. That moment of truth encompasses all of that
    in one fell swoop at that final time that is upon us.
        We would not have even had to contemplate this, nor would
    you have had to, if very early on in the factual situation that
    arose in this case President Clinton had faced his moment of
    truth. As I pointed out yesterday, that first moment of truth
    that faced the President in the legal proceedings that were to
    engulf him at a later point was his answers, the answers that
    affixed to that first set of interrogatories under oath. The
    moment of truth was staring him right in the face, and if he
    would have acknowledged it at that moment, had paid faith and
    allegiance to that moment, we would not be arguing here today,
    nor would we have even heard of a possible impeachment inquiry.
    But the President chose to sweep away that moment of truth that
    was at hand and proceeded down the course that has led us to
    this moment.
        In the words of our colleagues who made magnificent
    presentations of the facts and law to you, the words ``truth''
    and ``fairness'' were some of the strongest and most profound
    that we heard in various degrees in touching upon various
    subjects that were important to our presentation. When I heard
    my colleagues emphasize those words, it dawned on me that the
    element of fairness is something which I submit to you and
    certify to you that these managers, the members of the
    committee who prepared this case, exalted in making certain
    would apply to their endeavors and to all that we would present
    to you--fairness.
        When the record of the independent counsel, the referral,
    reached our doorsteps back in September of 1997 and we first
    read the details and allegations contained therein, we did not,
    as some people began to accuse and to orate, adopt 100 percent
    of what the independent counsel said were the allegations and
    accept them as fact, and then move on and skip from September
    to this moment, not having used our intellect, our sympathies,
    our sense of right, our sense of wrong, our sense of fairness,
    our elements of truth, our experience, our own intellect, and
    our own consciences. We didn't set all of those aside and take
    the referral of Kenneth Starr and make that the final moment
    that precedes your moment of truth. Everyone should know that.
    But it is not recognized. We have been pilloried many times
    over the course of these proceedings on the notion that we
    simply adopted that referral and walked with it into the Senate
    Chamber.
        One thing has to be said right at the outset. When I saw
    one allegation of the independent counsel that was encompassed
    around the question of executive privilege, an allegation that
    the assertion by President Clinton of executive privilege in
    the context of all that had transpired in this case constituted
    an abuse of power, I must tell you that that hit me right
    between the eyes. I could not, by even just reading it, accept
    it at face value. From that moment until this, I had serious,
    grave doubts that we should embark upon a course in which we
    would somehow denigrate the issue and privilege known as
    ``executive privilege.''
        As I worried about this and as I moved on through the
    process, trying to do my duty, along with everyone else, there
    came a time in the deliberations of our committee, our managers
    group, that we felt--and we acted on that feeling--that
    executive privilege is something that is owed to the President,
    and that we cannot fairly strip that away from him or in any
    way diminish the power and the usability of executive
    privilege. We felt that that was a trapping and a power of the
    Executive, of the President of the United States, which, no
    matter how it is exerted, or thereafter possibly set aside by
    the court, which is always a possibility, and history has shown
    that it has occurred.
        Nevertheless, the exertion of it, the assertion of it, the
    use of it, the feel for it that the President of the United
    States must have and should have in the first instance, to
    assert it, should not be a part of our criticism, our
    projection of this case.
        We felt pretty strongly about it, and we took action on
    that front by deciding among ourselves that one of the proposed
    articles--and that was bound to reach you if we had not acted
    as we did--we decided that we were going to remove that from
    the allegations in any of the articles of impeachment and not
    refer to it, except in the context in which I am referring to
    it, which is reporting to you what happened with that
    particular issue.
        We did that in the face of the knowledge that in all our
    readings, in all our literature, we noted that when President
    Nixon attempted to use executive privilege, it was soundly
    criticized, and part of the impeachment process carried his
    alleged abuse of executive privilege as one of the tenets of
    that proceeding. And the report shows executive privilege as
    being ill-used by President Nixon.
        But here is the point. The managers and I and every Member
    of the Senate, every individual who is with us here today
    reveres the Office of the Presidency. We respect the Office of
    the Presidency. The Presidency is we. The Presidency is
    America. The Presidency is the banner under which we all work
    and live and strive in this Nation. We revere the Presidency.
    Any innuendo, or any kind of impulse that anyone has to
    attribute any kind of motivation on the part of these men of
    honor who have prepared this case for you today on any whim on
    their part other than to do their constitutional duty should be
    rebuffed at every conversation, at every meeting, at every
    writing that will ultimately flow from the proceedings upon
    which we have embarked. We revere the Presidency. As a matter
    of fact, when next week we face the prospect of the President
    of the United States entering the House of Representatives to
    deliver his State of the Union message, we will greet the
    President. We will accord him the respect for the office which
    he holds. He is our President. He occupies the Presidency. And
    we will honor that. And so should we all.
        But we are capable of and must, in the face of the solemn
    duty that we have, compartmentalize in the purest sense in
    greeting the President and applauding his entrance into the
    State of the Union message. As we will accord him that
    privilege, we do not set aside the impeachment inquiry. We do
    not set aside the serious charges that are hoisted against him
    at that juncture, because we will resume the consideration of
    them in due course. But in the meantime, we compartmentalize
    ourselves as Americans recognizing that he holds the most
    powerful, most respected, and most admired office on the face
    of the globe. That is part of our duty, as it is our duty to
    impart our knowledge and our work, our theories, and our
    analysis to the impeachment proceedings which are at hand.
        ``These are times that try men's souls,'' someone said. It
    was not my mother. And it is true. But anyone who can feel that
    the final votes that will take place on the part of each
    individual Member of the Senate, that a vote for conviction is
    based on a distaste for Bill Clinton, hatred of Bill Clinton--
    that kind of vote for conviction should never be recognized or
    countenanced, and history will condemn any individual who does
    that. And if the votes at the last moment, at this moment of
    truth, are based on an admiration of President Clinton, of
    friendship with President Clinton, a deep tie to and with the
    President, on family and community and national matters, a vote
    of acquittal should not be based on that. But only the Senate
    and each individual conscience will determine how that final
    vote is cast.
        We cannot account for the friendship or enmity that might
    exist with and for President Clinton. All we can do is to do
    the job that was thrust upon us, that was placed in our hands
    by a statute that this Congress created--that independent
    counsel statute. The Congress said that we had to listen to the
    referral, to accept the referral. The Congress said that we
    must look towards whatever recommendations might be contained
    in that. It was the Congress, our Congress--many of you who
    voted for that statute--which mandated that we consider all of
    this. We did not simply walk around one day and seize upon a
    moment of deep thought and say: Let's impeach the President;
    let's find something upon which we can base a full 6 months'
    inquiry into the President's actions in front of a court.
        This was a duty, much as it is your duty to stay here and
    listen to what I am saying. The duty I have of presenting it to
    you and speaking to you is born of the same statute and of the
    same process and of the same constitutional background that we
    all share.
        So it worries me and us that any awkward motivation would
    be attributed to any one of us or collectively to us. And once
    you render your vote, I am not going to question whether it was
    done out of blind loyalty or enmity or friendship with the
    President; I am going to judge it as an American citizen, a
    Member of the House of Representatives, a Member of Congress,
    an interested community leader, and, last but not least, as a
    pure American citizen eager to do one's duty.
        As the moment of truth approaches, there is only one
    speaker left for us in the Senate Chamber here to contemplate,
    and that is the summation to be given by the esteemed chairman
    of our committee. You should know, as we all feel, that the
    most stringent duty that he ever performed, the gentleman from
    Illinois, was to manage the managers. But he did that just as
    well and as profoundly as he has approached every single facet
    of this case. For as he sums up, know for a certainty that he
    brings to the podium our collective thoughts, our collective
    emotions, our passions for our work and our duty, and with an
    eye towards serving you, as we serve our constituents, as we
    serve the Congress, as we serve America. We are 20 minutes
    closer now to that moment of truth. Keep in mind your own
    histories, the history of your relationship with your
    colleagues in the Congress, and above all, the duty to the
    United States.
        Mr. Hyde.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel for the
    President, distinguished Members of the Senate, 136 years ago,
    at a small military cemetery in Pennsylvania, one of Illinois'
    most illustrious sons asked a haunting question--whether a
    nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition
    that all men are created equal can long endure. America is an
    experiment never finished. It is a work in progress. And so
    that question has to be answered by each generation for itself,
    just as we will have to answer whether this Nation can long
    endure.
        This controversy began with the fact that the President of
    the United States took an oath to tell the truth in his
    testimony before the grand jury, just as he had on two prior
    occasions sworn a solemn oath to preserve, protect, and defend
    the Constitution and to faithfully execute the laws of the
    United States.
        One of the most memorable aspects of this proceeding was
    the solemn occasion wherein every Senator in this Chamber took
    an oath to do impartial justice under the Constitution.
        But I must say, despite massive and relentless efforts to
    change the subject, the case before you Senators is not about
    sexual misconduct, infidelity or adultery--those are private
    acts and none of our business. It is not even a question of
    lying about sex. The matter before this body is a question of
    lying under oath. This is a public act.
        The matter before you is a question of the willful,
    premeditated, deliberate corruption of the Nation's system of
    justice, through perjury and obstruction of justice. These are
    public acts, and when committed by the chief law enforcement
    officer of the land, the one who appoints every United States
    district attorney, every Federal judge, every member of the
    Supreme Court, the Attorney General--they do become the concern
    of Congress.
        That is why your judgment, respectfully, should rise above
    politics, above partisanship, above polling data. This case is
    a test of whether what the Founding Fathers described as
    ``sacred honor'' still has meaning in our time: two hundred
    twenty-two years after those two words--``sacred honor''--were
    inscribed in our country's birth certificate, our national
    charter of freedom, our Declaration of Independence.
        Every school child in the United States has an intuitive
    sense of the ``sacred honor'' that is one of the foundation
    stones of the American house of freedom. For every day, in
    every classroom in America, our children and grandchildren
    pledge allegiance to a nation ``under God.'' That statement is
    not a prideful or arrogant claim. It is a statement of
    humility: all of us, as individuals, stand under the judgment
    of God, or the transcendent truths by which we hope, finally,
    to be judged.
        So does our country.
        The Presidency is an office of trust. Every public office
    is a public trust, but the Office of President is a very
    special public trust. The President is the trustee of the
    national conscience. No one owns the Office of President, the
    people do. The President is elected by the people and their
    representatives in the electoral college. And in accepting the
    burdens of that great office, the President, in his inaugural
    oath, enters into a covenant--a binding agreement of mutual
    trust and obligation--with the American people.
        Shortly after his election and during his first months in
    office, President Clinton spoke with some frequency about a
    ``new covenant'' in America. In this instance, let us take the
    President at his word: that his office is a covenant--a solemn
    pact of mutual trust and obligation--with the American people.
    Let us take the President seriously when he speaks of
    covenants: because a covenant is about promise-making and
    promise-keeping. For it is because the President has defaulted
    on the promises he made--it is because he has violated the
    oaths he has sworn--that he has been impeached.
        The debate about impeachment during the Constitutional
    Convention of 1787 makes it clear that the Framers of the
    Constitution regarded impeachment and removal from office on
    conviction as a remedy for a fundamental betrayal of trust by
    the President. The framers had vested the Presidential office
    with great powers. They knew that those powers could be--and
    would be--abused if any President were to violate, in a
    fundamental way, the oath he had sworn to faithfully execute
    the Nation's laws.
        For if the President did so violate his oath of office, the
    covenant of trust between himself and the American people would
    be broken.
        Today, we see something else: that the fundamental trust
    between America and the world can be broken, if a Presidential
    Perjurer represents our country in world affairs. If the
    President calculatedly and repeatedly violates his oath, if the
    President breaks the covenant of trust he has made with the
    American people, he can no longer be trusted. And, because the
    Executive plays so large a role in representing the country to
    the world, America can no longer be trusted.
        It is often said that we live in an age of increasing
    interdependence. If that is true, and the evidence for it is
    all around us, then the future will require an even stronger
    bond of trust between the President and the Nation because with
    increasing interdependence comes an increased necessity of
    trust.
        This is one of the basic lessons of life. Parents and
    children know this. Husbands and wives know it. Teachers and
    students know it, as do doctors and patients, suppliers and
    customers, lawyers and clients, clergy and parishioners: the
    greater the interdependence, the greater the necessity of
    trust; the greater the interdependence, the greater the
    imperative of promise-keeping.
        Trust, not what James Madison called the ``parchment
    barriers'' of laws, is the fundamental bond between the people
    and their elected representatives, between those who govern and
    those who are governed. Trust is the mortar that secures the
    foundations of the American house of freedom. And the Senate of
    the United States, sitting in judgment in this impeachment
    trial, should not ignore, or minimize, or dismiss the fact that
    the bond of trust has been broken, because the President has
    violated both his oaths of office and the oath he took before
    his grand jury testimony.
        In recent months, it has often been asked--so what? What is
    the harm done by this lying under oath, by this perjury? Well,
    what is an oath? An oath is an asking almighty God to witness
    to the truth of what you are saying. Truth telling--truth
    telling is the heart and soul of our justice system.
        I think the answer would have been clear to those who once
    pledged their sacred honor to the cause of liberty. The answer
    would have been clear to those who crafted the world's most
    enduring written constitution.
        No greater harm can be done than breaking the covenant of
    trust between the President and the people; among the three
    branches of our Government; and between the country and the
    world.
        For to break that covenant of trust is to dissolve the
    mortar that binds the foundation stones of our freedom into a
    secure and solid edifice. And to break that covenant of trust
    by violating one's oath is to do grave damage to the rule of
    law among us.
        That none of us is above the law is a bedrock principle of
    democracy. To erode that bedrock is to risk even further
    injustice. To erode that bedrock is to subscribe, to a ``divine
    right of kings'' theory of governance, in which those who
    govern are absolved from adhering to the basic moral standards
    to which the governed are accountable. We must never tolerate
    one law for the ruler and another for the ruled. If we do, we
    break faith with our ancestors from Bunker Hill, Lexington and
    Concord to Flanders Field, Normandy, Iwo Jima, Panmunjom,
    Saigon and Desert Storm.
        Let us be clear: The vote that you are asked to cast is, in
    the final analysis, a vote about the rule of law.
        The rule of law is one of the great achievements of our
    civilization. For the alternative to the rule of law is the
    rule of raw power. We here today are the heirs of 3,000 years
    of history in which humanity slowly, painfully and at great
    cost, evolved a form of politics in which law, not brute force,
    is the arbiter of our public destinies.
        We are the heirs of the Ten Commandments and the Mosaic
    law: a moral code for a free people who, having been liberated
    from bondage, saw in law a means to avoid falling back into the
    habit of slaves. We are the heirs of Roman law: the first legal
    system by which peoples of different cultures, languages,
    races, and religions came to live together in a form of
    political community. We are the heirs of the Magna Carta, by
    which the freeman of England began to break the arbitrary and
    unchecked power of royal absolutism. We are the heirs of a long
    tradition of parliamentary development, in which the rule of
    law gradually came to replace royal prerogative as the means
    for governing a society of free men and women. Yes, we are the
    heirs of 1776, and of an epic moment in human affairs when the
    founders of this Republic pledged their lives, fortunes and,
    yes, their sacred honor, to the defense of the rule of law. We
    are the heirs of a tragic civil war, which vindicated the rule
    of law over the appetites of some for owning others. We are the
    heirs of the 20th century's great struggles against
    totalitarianism, in which the rule of law was defended at
    immense cost against the worst tyrannies in human history. The
    ``rule of law'' is no pious aspiration from a civics textbook.
    The rule of law is what stands between all of us and the
    arbitrary exercise of power by the state. The rule of law is
    the safeguard of our liberties. The rule of law is what allows
    us to live our freedom in ways that honor the freedom of others
    while strengthening the common good.
        Lying under oath is an abuse of freedom. Obstruction of
    justice is a degradation of law. There are people in prison for
    just such offenses. What in the world do we say to them about
    equal justice if we overlook this conduct in the President?
        Some may say, as many have said in recent months, that this
    is to pitch the matter too high. The President's lie, it is
    said, was about a ``trivial matter;'' it was a lie to spare
    embarrassment about misconduct on a ``private occasion.''
        The confusing of what is essentially a private matter, and
    none of our business, with lying under oath to a court and a
    grand jury has been only one of the distractions with which we
    have had to deal.
        Senators, as men and women with a serious experience of
    public affairs, we can all imagine a situation in which a
    President might shade the truth when a great issue of the
    national interest or the national security was at stake. We
    have all been over that terrain. We know the thin ice on which
    any of us skates when blurring the edges of the truth for what
    we consider a compelling, demanding public purpose.
        Morally serious men and women can imagine circumstances, at
    the far edge of the morally permissible, when, with the gravest
    matters of national interest at stake, a President could shade
    the truth in order to serve the common good. But under oath,
    for a private pleasure?
        In doing this, the Office of President of the United States
    has been debased and the justice system jeopardized.
        In doing this, he has broken his covenant of trust with the
    American people.
        The framers also knew that the Office of President of the
    United States could be gravely damaged if it continued to be
    unworthily occupied. That is why they devised the process of
    impeachment by the House and trial by the Senate. It is, in
    truth, a direct process. If, on impeachment, the President is
    convicted, he is removed from office--and the office itself
    suffers no permanent damage. If, on impeachment, the President
    is acquitted, the issue is resolved once and for all, and the
    office is similarly protected from permanent damage.
        But if, on impeachment, the President is not convicted and
    removed from office despite the fact that numerous Senators are
    convinced that he has, in the words of one proposed resolution
    of censure, ``egregiously failed'' the test of his oath of
    office, ``violated the trust of the American people,'' and
    ``dishonored the office which they entrusted to him,'' then the
    Office of the Presidency has been deeply and perhaps
    permanently damaged.
        And that is a further reason why President Clinton must be
    convicted of the charges brought before you by the House and
    removed from office. To fail to do so, while conceding that the
    President has engaged in egregious and dishonorable behavior
    that has broken the covenant of trust between himself and the
    American people, is to diminish the Office of President of the
    United States in an unprecedented and unacceptable way.
        Senators, please permit me a word on my own behalf and on
    behalf of my colleagues of the House. It is necessary to
    clarify an important point.
        None of us comes to this Chamber today without a profound
    sense of our own responsibilities in life, and of the many ways
    in which we have failed to meet those responsibilities, to one
    degree or another. None of us comes before you claiming to be a
    perfect man or a perfect citizen, just as none of you imagines
    yourself perfect. All of us, Members of the House and Senate,
    know that we come to this difficult task as flawed human
    beings, under judgment.
        That is the way of this world: flawed human beings must,
    according to the rule of law, judge other flawed human beings.
        But the issue before the Senate of the United States is not
    the question of its own Members' personal moral condition. Nor
    is the issue before the Senate the question of the personal
    moral condition of the Members of the House of Representatives.
    The issue here is whether the President has violated the rule
    of law and thereby broken his covenant of trust with the
    American people. This is a public issue, involving the gravest
    matter of the public interest. And it is not affected, one way
    or another, by the personal moral condition of any Member of
    either House of Congress, or by whatever expressions of
    personal chagrin the President has managed to express.
        Senators, we of the House do not come before you today
    lightly. And, if you will permit me, it is a disservice to the
    House to suggest that it has brought these articles of
    impeachment before you in a mean-spirited or irresponsible way.
    That is not true.
        We have brought these articles of impeachment because we
    are convinced, in conscience, that the President of the United
    States lied under oath; that the President committed perjury on
    several occasions before a Federal grand jury. We have brought
    these articles of impeachment because we are convinced, in
    conscience, that the President willfully obstructed justice and
    thereby threatened the legal system he swore a solemn oath to
    protect and defend.
        These are not trivial matters. These are not partisan
    matters. These are matters of justice, the justice that each of
    you has taken a solemn oath to serve in this trial.
        Some of us have been called ``Clinton-haters.'' I must tell
    you, distinguished Senators, that this impeachment is not, for
    those of us from the House, a question of hating anyone. This
    is not a question of whom we hate. It is a question of what we
    love. And among the things we love is the rule of law, equal
    justice before the law, and honor in our public life. All of us
    are trying as hard as we can to do our duty as we see it--no
    more and no less.
        Senators, this trial is being watched around the world.
    Some of those watching, thinking themselves superior in their
    cynicism, wonder what it is all about. But others know.
        Political prisoners know that this is about the rule of
    law--the great alternative to arbitrary and unchecked state
    power.
        The families of executed dissidents know that this is about
    the rule of law--the great alternative to the lethal abuse of
    power by the state.
        Those yearning for freedom know that this is about the rule
    of law--the hard-won structure by which men and women can live
    by their God-given dignity and secure their God-given rights in
    ways that serve the common good.
        If they know this, can we not know it?
        If, across the river in Arlington Cemetery, there are
    American heroes who died in defense of the rule of law, can we
    give less than the full measure of our devotion to that great
    cause?
        I wish to read you a letter I recently received that
    expresses my feelings far better than my poor words:

        Dear Chairman Hyde: My name is William Preston Summers. How are you
    doing? I am a third grader in room 504 at Chase Elementary School in
    Chicago. I am writing this letter because I have something to tell you.
    I have thought of a punishment for the president of the United States
    of America. The punishment should be that he should write a 100 word
    essay by hand. I have to write an essay when I lie. It is bad to lie
    because it just gets you in more trouble. I hate getting in trouble.
        It is just like the boy who cried wolf, and the wolf ate the boy.
    It is important to tell the truth. I like to tell the truth because it
    gets you in less trouble. If you do not tell the truth people do not
    believe you.
        It is important to believe the president because he is a important
    person. If you can not believe the president who can you believe. If
    you have no one to believe in then how do you run your life. I do not
    believe the president tells the truth anymore right now. After he
    writes the essay and tells the truth, I will believe him again.
                                                       William Summers.

        Then there is a P.S. from his dad:

        Dear Representative Hyde: I made my son William either write you a
    letter or an essay as a punishment for lying. Part of his defense for
    his lying was the President lied. He is still having difficulty
    understanding why the President can lie and not be punished.
                                                         Bobby Summers.

        Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, on June 6, 1994, it was the
    50th anniversary of the Americans landing at Normandy. I went
    ashore at Normandy, walked up to the cemetery area, where as
    far as the eye could see there were white crosses, Stars of
    David. And the British had a bagpipe band scattered among the
    crucifixes, the crosses, playing ``Amazing Grace'' with that
    peaceful, mournful sound that only the bagpipe can make. If you
    could keep your eyes dry you were better than I.
        But I walked to one of these crosses marking a grave
    because I wanted to personalize the experience. I was looking
    for a name but there was no name. It said, ``Here lies in
    Honored Glory a Comrade in Arms Known but to God.''
        How do we keep faith with that comrade in arms? Go to the
    Vietnam Memorial on the National Mall and press your hands
    against a few of the 58,000 names carved into that wall, and
    ask yourself, How can we redeem the debt we owe all those who
    purchased our freedom with their lives? How do we keep faith
    with them? I think I know. We work to make this country the
    kind of America they were willing to die for. That is an
    America where the idea of sacred honor still has the power to
    stir men's souls.
        My solitary--solitary--hope is that 100 years from today
    people will look back at what we have done and say, ``They kept
    the faith.''
        I am done.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
                                    ------

             ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, pursuant to the previous
    consent agreement, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate
    stand in adjournment under that order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. The
    Senate, under the previous order, stands adjourned until 9:30
    a.m., Tuesday, January 19, at which time it will reconvene in
    legislative session. Under that same order, the Senate will
    next convene as a Court of Impeachment on Tuesday, January 19,
    at 1 p.m. The Senate stands adjourned.
        Thereupon, at 2:53 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, adjourned to reconvene in legislative session on
    Tuesday, January 19, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.
                                    ------

                           Tuesday, January 19, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate reconvened sitting as a Court of Impeachment at
    1 p.m.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the Articles of
    Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that
    the White House presentation today will last approximately 2\1/
    2\ hours--maybe a little more, maybe a little less. I therefore
    suggest that a short recess be taken in approximately an hour,
    around 2 o'clock, to allow the Chief Justice and all Members to
    have a brief break.
        I remind all Senators to remain standing at their desk each
    time the Chief Justice enters or departs the Chamber. If there
    is a need for another break, I will keep an eye on the White
    House counsel to see if they need a break, and we will act
    accordingly.
        Of course, I remind Senators again, tonight please be in
    the Chamber at 8:35 so we can proceed to the joint session.
        I thank my colleagues and yield the floor. I believe we are
    ready to begin.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the
    counsel for the President have 24 hours to make the
    presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you. The
    Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Ruff to begin the presentation of
    the case for the President.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate,
    distinguished managers, William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty
    of the charges that have been preferred against him. He did not
    commit perjury; he did not obstruct justice; he must not be
    removed from office.
        Now, merely to say those words brings into sharp relief
    that I and my colleagues are here today in this great Chamber
    defending the President of the United States. For only the
    second time in our Nation's history, the Senate has convened to
    try the President of the United States on articles of
    impeachment.
        There is no one who does not feel the weight of this
    moment. Nonetheless, our role as lawyers is much as it would be
    in any other forum. We will not be able to match the eloquence
    of the 13 managers who spoke to you last week. We will try,
    however, to respond to the charges leveled against the
    President as directly and candidly as possible, and to present
    his defense as clearly and as cogently as we are able. We seek
    on his behalf no more than we know you will give us--a fair
    opportunity to be heard, a fair assessment of the facts and the
    law, and a fair judgment. We will defend the President on the
    facts and on the law and on the constitutional principles that
    must guide your deliberations. Some have suggested that we fear
    to do so. We do not.
        I begin with a recitation of some of the events that have
    brought us here today. Although many of them may be familiar,
    they merit some discussion because they form the backdrop
    against which you must assess the evidence.
        I will then move to a discussion of the constitutional
    principles that, we submit, should guide your consideration of
    these matters and, finally, to an overview of the allegations
    contained in the articles, with a view toward focusing your
    attention on what we believe to be the principal legal and
    factual flaws in the case presented by the managers.
        My colleagues will follow tomorrow and the following day
    with a more detailed analysis of the facts underlying the
    articles. At the end of our presentation, we will have
    demonstrated beyond any doubt that there is no basis on which
    the Senate can or should convict the President of any of the
    charges brought against him.
        Let me begin with a brief recital of the essential events
    in the Paula Jones litigation which underlie so much of what we
    have been discussing for the last week.
        On May 6, 1994, Paula Jones sued President Clinton in the
    U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. She
    claimed that then-Governor Clinton had made, in 1991, some
    unwelcomed overture to her in an Arkansas hotel room and that
    she suffered adverse employment consequences and was
    subsequently defamed.
        After the Supreme Court decided in May 1997 that civil
    litigation against the President could go forward while he was
    in office, the case was remanded to the district court, and
    over the fall and winter of 1997, the Jones lawyers deposed
    numerous witnesses. And inevitably, despite the strict
    protective order entered by Judge Wright, and continuing
    exhortation to counsel not to discuss any aspect of the case
    with the press, information flowed from those depositions into
    the public forum clearly with only one purpose--to embarrass
    the President.
        The principal focus of the discovery being conducted by the
    Jones lawyers during this period was not on the merits of their
    client's case. They devoted most of their time and their energy
    to attempt to pry into the personal life of the President. Mr.
    Bennett, the President's counsel, objected to those efforts on
    the grounds they had no relevance to Ms. Jones' claims and
    intended to do nothing other than to advance the agenda of
    those who were supporting the Jones lawsuit. The Jones lawyers,
    however, pursued their efforts to inquire into the President's
    relations with other women, and on December 11, 1997, Judge
    Wright issued an order allowing questioning regarding only
    ``any individuals with whom the President had sexual relations
    or proposed or sought to have sexual relations and who were
    during the relevant timeframe a State or Federal employee.''
        Then on December 5, 1997, the Jones lawyers placed on their
    witness list the name of Monica Lewinsky. And on December 19,
    she was served with a subpoena for her deposition to be
    scheduled in January.
        Consistent with rulings issued by Judge Wright in
    connection with the Jones lawyers' efforts to secure the
    testimony of a number of other women, some have sought to avoid
    testifying by submitting affidavits to the effect that they had
    no knowledge relevant to Ms. Jones' lawsuit, or that they
    otherwise do not meet the test that Judge Wright had
    established before permitting this invasive discovery to go
    forward.
        On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky did execute such an
    affidavit, and her lawyer provided copies to the lawyers for
    Ms. Jones and for the President on January 15.
        The Jones lawyers deposed the President on January 17,
    1998. They began the deposition by proffering to him a
    multiparagraph definition of the term ``sexual relations'' that
    they intended to use in questioning him. There followed an
    extended debate among counsel and the court concerning the
    propriety and the clarity of that definition. Mr. Bennett
    objected to its use, arguing that it was unclear, that it would
    encompass conduct wholly irrelevant to the case, and that it
    was unfair to require the President to apply a definition that
    he had never seen before to each question he was asked. Indeed,
    Mr. Bennett urged the lawyers for Ms. Jones to ask the
    President specific questions about the conduct, but they
    declined to do so.
        Judge Wright acknowledged the overbreadth of the
    definition, but she ultimately determined that the Jones
    lawyers could use the heavily edited version of the definition
    that left in place only the two lines of paragraph 1, of which
    you are already familiar. Immediately after the extended legal
    skirmishing, the Jones lawyers began asking him about Monica
    Lewinsky.
        Mr. Bennett objected, questioning whether counsel had a
    legitimate basis for their inquiry in light of Ms. Lewinsky's
    affidavit denying a relationship with the President. Judge
    Wright overruled that objection and permitted the Jones lawyers
    to pursue their inquiry. Four days later, the independent
    counsel's investigation became a public matter.
        On January 29, responding to a request by independent
    counsel to bar further inquiry related to Ms. Lewinsky, Judge
    Wright ruled that evidence relating to her relationship with
    the President would be excluded from the trial. She reaffirmed
    this ruling on March 9, stating that the evidence was not
    ``essential to the core issues in this case of whether the
    plaintiff herself was the victim of sexual harassment, hostile
    work environment, or intentional infliction of emotional
    distress.'' On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright--
        I apologize for the logistical problem. Why don't I just
    hold it.
        On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted summary judgment in
    favor of President Clinton dismissing the Jones suit in its
    entirety. She ruled that no evidence that Ms. Jones had offered
    or that her lawyers had discovered made out any viable claim of
    sexual harassment or intentional infliction of emotional
    distress. Importantly, Judge Wright ruled that evidence of any
    pattern or practice of comparable conduct by the President was
    not important to the case.
        I want to take just a moment to read the relevant portions
    of Judge Wright's opinion, not to demean in any sense
    plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment or to suggest that we
    must be other than vigilant to protect the rights of all
    citizens, but simply to bring into slightly sharper focus the
    role that the President's deposition played in the real Jones
    litigation. Judge Wright wrote:

        Whatever relevance such evidence may have to prove other
    elements of plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do
    with the issue presented by the President's and Ferguson's
    motions for summary judgment--i.e. whether plaintiff herself
    was the victim of alleged quid pro quo or a hostile work
    environment or sexual harassment; whether the President and
    Ferguson conspired to deprive her of her civil rights or
    whether she suffered emotional distress so severe in nature
    that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
    Whether other women may have been subjected to workplace
    harassment and whether such evidence has allegedly been
    suppressed does not change the fact that plaintiff has failed
    to demonstrate that she has a case worthy of submitting to a
    jury.

        Ms. Jones appealed Judge Wright's decision to the Eighth
    Circuit. Arguments were heard on October 20, 1998, and on
    November 13, 1998, before the decision was rendered, Ms. Jones
    and the President settled the case.
        Briefly then, to what was happening on the front of the
    independent counsel's office. In mid-January 1998, Linda Tripp
    had brought to the independent counsel information that she had
    been gathering surreptitiously for months about Ms. Lewinsky's
    relationship with the President and her involvement in the
    Jones case. And thus, began the penultimate chapter.
        As you will see, Ms. Tripp's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky
    and her role in these matters was more than merely a backdrop
    to the succeeding events. Independent counsel met with Ms.
    Tripp and formally granted her immunity from Federal
    prosecution and promised to assist her in securing immunity
    from State prosecution where she had been illegally taping the
    telephone calls with Ms. Lewinsky. On January 13, Ms. Tripp
    agreed to tape a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky under FBI
    auspices. And on January 15, armed with that tape, the
    independent counsel's office first contacted the Department of
    Justice to seek permission from the Attorney General to expand
    its jurisdiction to cover the investigation that had already
    begun. On January 16, that permission was granted by the
    special division of the court of appeals.
        Now, the President's deposition was scheduled to take place
    the very next day--Saturday, January 17. On the 16th, Ms. Tripp
    invited Ms. Lewinsky to have lunch with her at the Pentagon
    City Mall. There she was greeted by four FBI agents and
    independent counsel lawyers and taken to a hotel room where she
    spent the next several hours. Ms. Tripp was in the room next
    door for much of that time. When she left that evening, she
    went home to meet with the Jones lawyers with whom we know she
    had been in contact for many months in order to brief them
    about her knowledge of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky
    and the President so that they, in turn, could question the
    President the next morning.
        As the independent counsel himself has acknowledged, Ms.
    Tripp was able to play this oddly multifaceted role. Because it
    was part of her immunity agreement, the OIC could have
    prevented her from talking about Ms. Lewinsky. They
    inexplicably chose not to.
        The existence of the OIC investigation was made public on
    January 21 in an edition of the Washington Post with the all-
    consuming focus of media coverage for the ensuing 8 months.
        On August 17, the President's deposition was taken by the
    independent counsel for use by the grand jury, and on September
    9, there was delivered to the House of Representatives a
    referral of Independent Counsel Starr containing what purported
    to be the information concerning acts ``that may constitute
    grounds for impeachment.'' The referral was accompanied by some
    19 boxes of documents, grand jury transcripts, and a videotape
    of the grand jury testimony.
        The referral was made public by the House on September 11.
    On September 21, additional materials were released, along with
    the President's grand jury videotape that was then played
    virtually nonstop on every television station in the country
    during that day.
        The committee held a total of 4 days of hearings, one for
    preliminary presentations by the majority and minority counsel,
    one for testimony by Independent Counsel Starr, and two in
    which the President was permitted to call witnesses and present
    his defense.
        In addition, the constitutional subcommittee held the one
    hearing on the standards for impeachment, and the committee
    convened in its oversight capacity to hear witnesses on the
    meaning of perjury. The committee called no fact witnesses.
        Despite numerous efforts to extract from the committee some
    description of the specific charges against which the President
    would have to defend himself, it was not until approximately
    4:30 on December 9, as I was completing my testimony before the
    committee, that any such notice was provided, and then it came
    in the form of four draft articles of impeachment.
        Three days later, the committee reported out those
    articles, and on December 9 the House completed its action,
    referring to the Senate article I, the charge of perjury in the
    grand jury; defeated article II, which alleged perjury in the
    Jones deposition; exhibited article III, which charged
    obstruction of justice; and defeating article IV, which alleged
    false statements to the House of Representatives.
        And so we are here. But before moving on, let me pause on
    an important procedural point. Although the Senate has asked
    that the parties address the issue of witnesses only after
    these presentations are completed, the managers spent much of
    their time last week explaining to you why, if only witnesses
    could be called, you would be able to resolve all of the
    supposed conflicts in the evidence. Tell me, then, how is it
    that the managers can be so certain of the strength of their
    case? They didn't hear any of these witnesses. The only witness
    they called, the independent counsel himself, acknowledged that
    he had not even met any of the witnesses who testified before
    the grand jury. Yet, they appeared before you to tell you that
    they are convinced of the President's guilt and that they are
    prepared to demand his removal from office.
        Well, the managers would have you believe that the
    Judiciary Committee of the House were really nothing more than
    grand jurors, serving as some routine screening device to sort
    out impeachment chaff from impeachment wheat. Thus, as they
    would have it, there was no need for anything more than a
    review of the cold record prepared by the independent counsel;
    no need for them to make judgments about credibility or
    conflicts. Indeed, they offered you a short lesson in grand
    jury practice, telling you that U.S. attorneys do this thing
    all the time, that calling real, live witnesses before a grand
    jury is the exception to the rule. Well, it has been a few
    years since I served as U.S. attorney for the District of
    Columbia, so there may have been a change in the way
    prosecutors go about their business, but I don't think so.
        And so what lesson can be learned from the process followed
    by the House? I suggest that what you have before you is not
    the product of the Judiciary Committee's well-considered,
    judicious assessment of their constitutional role. No, what you
    have before you is the product of nothing more than a rush to
    judgment.
        And so how should you respond to the managers' belated plea
    that more is needed to do justice? You should reject it. You
    have before you all that you need to reach this conclusion:
    There was no basis for the House to impeach, and there is no,
    and never will be any, basis for the Senate to convict.
        Now, the managers have not shown, and could not on this
    record or any record prove, that the President committed any of
    the offenses alleged in any of the articles. But even if they
    could, these offenses would not warrant your deciding to remove
    the President from office.
        In this regard, an impeachment trial is unlike any other.
    You are the judges of the law and the facts and the appropriate
    sanctions. Before casting a vote of guilty or not guilty, you
    must decide not only whether the President committed the acts
    with which he is charged but whether those acts so seriously
    undermined the integrity of our governmental structure that he
    must be removed from office.
        I want to deal here for just a moment with an argument that
    was advanced in the press by one of the managers, and that is
    that the question whether the offenses described in the
    articles are impeachable is not really before you, that it has
    already been decided by the House. As the manager put it in a
    press interview, ``Are these impeachable offenses, which I
    think has already been resolved by the House? I think
    constitutionally that's our job to do.''
        Now, I trust, in light of last week's extended discussion,
    that the managers no longer press that notion, for it was
    remarkable in at least three respects. First, it is entirely
    inconsistent with the ``don't worry about it; this is just a
    routine procedural process; leave the difficult decisions to
    the Senate'' argument so frequently heard during the
    proceedings in the House. Second, it is an argument that rings
    hollow coming from those who did not even debate the
    constitutional standards or seek any consensus on what those
    standards should be. And third, and most importantly, it
    arrogates to the House the critical constitutional judgment
    which is yours alone.
        Far be it for me, or indeed anyone else, to instruct this
    body on its constitutional role, but I do think it would help
    us all to be reminded of the words of Alexander Hamilton in
    Federalist No. 65, because impeachment necessarily deals with
    injuries done immediately to society. Alexander Hamilton wrote:

        The prosecution of them for this reason will seldom fail to
    agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it
    into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused.
    In many cases it will connect itself with the preexisting
    factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities,
    influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in
    such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the
    decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of
    the parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
    guilt.
        The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply
    concerns the political reputation and existence of every man
    engaged in the administration of public affairs speak for
    themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightfully in a
    government resting entirely on the basis of periodical
    elections will as readily be perceived, when it is considered
    that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that
    circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most
    cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account can
    hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards
    those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

        And then:

        The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit
    depositary of this important trust.

        Now, the President may be removed from office only upon
    impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery or other
    high crimes and misdemeanors. The offenses charged here, even
    if supported by the evidence, do not meet that lofty standard,
    a standard that the framers intentionally set at this
    extraordinarily high level to ensure that only the most serious
    offenses and in particular those that subverted our system of
    government would justify overturning a popular election.
    Impeachment is not a remedy for private wrongs. It is a method
    of removing someone whose continued presence in office would
    cause grave danger to the Nation. Listen to the words of 10
    Republican Members of the 1974 Judiciary Committee, one of whom
    now sits in this body.
        After President Nixon's resignation, in an effort to
    articulate a measured and a careful assessment of the issues
    they had confronted, they reviewed the historical origins of
    the impeachment clause and wrote:

        It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history,
    that the framers of the United States Constitution intended
    that the President should be removable by the legislative
    branch only for serious misconduct, dangerous to the system of
    government established by the Constitution. Absent the element
    of danger to the State, we believe the delegates to the Federal
    convention of 1787, in providing that the President should
    serve for a fixed elective term rather than during good
    behavior or popularity, struck the balance in favor of
    stability in the executive branch.

        Where did this lesson in constitutional history come from?
    It came directly from the words of the framers in 1787.
    Impeachment was no strange, arcane concept to them. It was
    familiar to them as part of English constitutional practice and
    was part of many State constitutions. It is therefore not
    surprising that whether to make provision for impeachment of
    the President became the focus of contention, especially in the
    context of concern whether in our new republican form of
    government the legislature ought to be entrusted with such a
    power. On this latter point, perhaps foretelling the notion
    that impeachment ought to be a matter of constitutional last
    resort, Benjamin Franklin noted that it at least had the merit
    of being a peaceful alternative to revolution.
        Governor Morris, one of the principal moving forces behind
    the language that ultimately emerged from the convention,
    believed that provision for impeachment should be made but that
    the offenses must be limited and carefully defined. His concern
    was very clearly for the corrupt President who may be bribed by
    a greater interest to betray his trust, as he wrote, and ``no
    one ought to say that we ought to expose ourselves to the
    danger of seeing the first magistrate in foreign pay without
    being able to guard against it by displacing him.''
        Drafts as they emerged from the convention moved through
    one that authorized impeachment for treason or bribery or
    corruption, and then the more limited treason or bribery, until
    the critical debate of December 8, 1787, when, pointing to
    their then-current example of the impeachment of Warren
    Hastings, George Mason moved to add the word
    ``maladministration'' to that definition. It was in the face of
    objections from James Madison and Morris, however, that this
    term was too vague and would be the equivalent to tenure during
    the pleasure of the Senate, that Mason withdraw his proposal
    and the convention then adopted the language ``other high
    crimes and misdemeanors against the State.'' As Morris put it,
    ``an election every 4 years will prevent maladministration.''
        There is no question that the framers viewed this language
    as responsive to Morris' concerns that the impeachment be
    limited and well defined. To argue, then, as the managers do,
    that the phrase ``other crimes and misdemeanors'' was really
    meant to encompass a wide range of offenses that one might find
    in a compendium of English criminal law simply flies in the
    face of the clear intent of the framers who carefully chose
    their language, knew exactly what those words meant, and knew
    exactly what risks they intended to protect against.
        Looking back on this drafting history, the 1974 minority
    report described the purpose of the framers in these words:

        They were concerned with preserving the Government from
    being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man.

        Now, the managers have made fun of the notion that hundreds
    of distinguished scholars and historians expressed their
    opinion that the offenses with which the President has been
    charged are not high crimes or misdemeanors. Indeed they
    suggested--not too subtly--that they must have signed those
    letters because they were political supporters of the
    President. To quote them, ``You go out and obtain from your
    political allies and friends in the academic world--to sign a
    letter saying the offenses alleged in the articles of
    impeachment do not rise to the level of impeachable offenses.''
        Well, as I understand the managers' position, it is that
    Garry Wills sold his intellectual soul because he is a
    political supporter of the President; Stephen Ambrose sold his
    political soul--his intellectual soul--because he is a
    political supporter of the President; C. Vann Woodward sold his
    intellectual soul because he is a political supporter of the
    President.
        Is it possible, instead, that distinguished scholars of all
    political persuasions thought it important to offer their
    professional opinion on a matter of the greatest historical and
    legal import because they cared about our country? Because they
    cared that the constitutional process not be debased?
        Perhaps, if the majority members of the full Judiciary
    Committee had paused for even a moment to consider these
    issues, if they had taken even a few hours to debate the
    question of what constitutional standards apply, one might now
    give greater credence to the belated constitutional exposition
    that they have offered here. Instead, perhaps the majority was
    convinced by their own rhetoric, by the oft-repeated mantra
    that impeachment is merely a preliminary step in the process
    and that the House need not be concerned with its weighty
    constitutional duty and saw little reason to explore the
    constitutional underpinning of that duty. Or perhaps they
    understood that a full and candid explanation would reveal that
    the proposed articles had no constitutional underpinning at
    all.
        Now, the central premise of the managers' argument appears
    to be this: Perjury is an impeachable offense no matter the
    forum or the circumstances in which it is committed. Second,
    judges have recently been convicted and removed on the basis of
    articles charging that they committed perjury. The President
    committed perjury, therefore the President must be removed as
    well.
        That premise is simple but wrong. The first leg on which it
    rests was removed by the House itself when it voted to defeat
    article II, alleging perjury in a civil deposition, and the
    House thus rejected the committee's core argument that perjury
    in a civil deposition warrants impeachment as much as perjury
    in any other setting. Thus, as to the committee's view that the
    constitutional standard for impeachment requires that all
    perjury be treated alike, the House concluded no, and properly
    so.
        And as to the committee's view that it makes no difference
    whether perjury occurs in one forum or another, in a private or
    an official proceeding, again the House said no, and properly
    so.
        What, then, of the managers' argument that the Senate's
    recent conviction of three judges requires a conviction on the
    articles before you today? Again, they simply have it wrong,
    both as a matter of Senate precedent and as a matter of
    constitutional analysis. They argue that because a judge is
    obliged to faithfully carry out the law just as the President
    is, each must be removed if he commits perjury or obstructs
    justice. Judges and Presidents, and one would presume, all
    other civil officers if you follow their argument to its
    logical conclusion, including Assistant Secretaries and others,
    must in their view be removed from office if the Senate finds
    that they committed either offense--removed without a second
    thought. But judges are different. Indeed, every civil officer
    other than the President of the United States is different.
    They are different because before deciding whether to impose
    the ultimate sanction of removal the Senate must weigh in the
    balance dramatically different considerations.
        First, the answer to the ultimate impeachment question--
    that is, whether the conduct charged so undermines the
    official's capacity to perform his constitutional duties that
    removal is required despite the institutional trauma it may
    cause--must be very different for one of 900 or 1,000 judges
    with lifetime tenure who can only be removed by impeachment
    than it is for one person elected every 4 years by the people
    to serve as the head of the executive branch. Surely the
    managers recognize that the Senate here faces a far different
    question, a far different constitutional issue than it did, for
    example, when it asked whether Judge Nixon, convicted and
    imprisoned for perjury, should be permitted to retain his
    office; or whether Judge Hastings, who lied about taking a
    bribe to fix a case before him, should remain on the bench.
        Indeed, a telling rejoinder to the House managers' argument
    comes from President Ford. On many occasions, we have all seen
    cited his statement in 1970, in connection with the proposal to
    impeach Associate Justice William O. Douglas, that impeachment
    is, in essence, whatever the majority of the House of
    Representatives considers it to be. But no one really notes the
    more important part of President Ford's statement 29 years ago.
    I am going to read it to you:

        I think it is fair to come to one conclusion, however, from
    our history of impeachments. A higher standard is expected of
    Federal judges than of any other civil officers of the United
    States. The President and the Vice President and all persons
    holding office at the pleasure can be thrown out of office by
    the voters at least every 4 years. To remove them in midterm--
    it has been tried only twice and never done--would, indeed,
    require crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery.

        The Senate must ask here whether the conduct charged
    against President Clinton would, in its nature, be inconsistent
    with a decision to allow him to continue to perform the duties
    of his office, just as you would ask, if you had a judge before
    you or another civil officer before you, whether the charges
    are similarly inconsistent with the notion that he or she
    should be allowed to continue to perform those duties.
        As former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino,
    who surely understood the difference between impeaching a
    President and impeaching a judge, explained during the
    Claiborne proceedings before this body:

        The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position
    of trust and responsibility in our government. They are the
    only members of any branch that hold their office for life.
    They are purposely insulated from the immediate pressures and
    shifting currents of the body politic. But [he said] with the
    special prerogative of judicial independence comes a most
    exacting standard of public and private conduct.

        A similar theme can be found running through the debate in
    very recent years over a proposal to establish a process other
    than impeachment for the removal of judges who fail to live up
    to the good behavior standard. Both the proponents of the
    proposal and the legal opinion offered in support of it
    emphasize that the standard to which judges must adhere is
    stricter than the impeachment standard, noting that ``the terms
    treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors are
    narrower than the malfeasance in office and failure to perform
    the duties of the office which may be grounds for forfeiture of
    office held during good behavior.''
        Thus, whether weighing the constitutional or governmental
    implications of removal or asking whether the accused can be
    expected to perform his duties, the Senate has always
    recognized that the test will be different depending on the
    office that the accused holds.
        This analysis is wholly consistent with the framers' intent
    in drafting the impeachment clause that removal of a President
    by the legislature must be an act of last resort when the
    political process can no longer protect the Nation. Nothing in
    the cases brought before the Senate in the last 210 years
    suggests a different result.
        The managers also attribute to the President the argument
    that impeachment can never reach personal conduct. That is not
    our position. As I told the Judiciary Committee on December 9
    when I testified before them, not all serious misconduct
    flowing from one of the President's official roles is
    impeachable; neither is all serious misconduct flowing from his
    personal conduct immune from impeachment. Judgments must be
    made and they must be based on the core principles that inform
    the framers' decision.
        But the managers would, in effect, ask you to eschew making
    these judgments. They speak of perjury and obstruction of
    justice in general terms and they argue that they are offenses
    inimical to the system of justice.
        No one here would dispute that simplistic proposition. But
    the managers will not walk with you down the difficult path.
    They will not speak of facts, of differing circumstances and
    differing societal interests. They will not because they do not
    appear to recognize that those questions must be asked.
        Perhaps the one exception to this was in the very last
    moment of Chairman Hyde's closing when he suggested, with what
    might to many seem almost an inverted logic, that a lie to
    spare embarrassment about misconduct on a private occasion is
    more deserving of removal than a lie about, as he described it,
    important matters of state.
        Although I submit that conclusion might have struck the
    framers as somewhat odd, one can certainly conceive of acts
    arising out of personal conduct that would warrant conviction
    and removal, but you cannot ignore the circumstances in which
    the conduct occurs or abandon the core principle that
    impeachment should be reserved for those cases in which the
    President's very capacity to govern is called into question.
        Perjury about some official act may indeed be a
    constitutionally acceptable basis for impeachment. Perjury
    about a purely private matter should, at the very least, lead
    this body to question whether, no matter how seriously we take
    the person's violation, for example, of the witness' oath, the
    drastic remedy of removal from office is the proper response.
    Indeed, in a sense, that is the message sent by the House when
    it defeated article II.
        The principle that guides your deliberations, I suggest,
    must not only be faithful to the intent of the framers, it must
    be consistent with the governmental structure that they gave us
    and the delicate relationship between the legislative branch
    and the executive branch that is the hallmark of that
    structure. It must, above all, reflect the recognition that
    removal from office is an act of extraordinary proportions, to
    be taken only when no other response is adequate to preserve
    the integrity and viability of our democracy.
        On this point--and here I will fend off the wrath or maybe
    the scorn of the managers by quoting not a scholar or a
    professor but, rather, a witness called by the majority members
    of the Judiciary Committee to testify as an expert on the issue
    of perjury, a witness who had served on the Judiciary Committee
    in 1974. Judge Charles Wiggins told the members of the
    committee this:

        When you are called upon, as I think you will be called
    upon, to vote as a Member of the House of Representatives, your
    standard should be the public interest. And I confess to you
    [said Judge Wiggins] that I would recommend that you not vote
    to impeach the President.

        Beyond the impression of what constitutes an impeachable
    offense, each Senator must also confront the question of what
    standard the evidence must meet to justify a vote of guilty.
        We recognize that the Senate has chosen in the Claiborne
    proceedings, and elsewhere, not to impose on itself any single
    standard of proof, but rather to leave that judgment to the
    conscience of the individual Senator. Many of you were present
    for debate on that issue and chose a standard for yourselves.
    Many of you come to the issue afresh. And none of you,
    thankfully, has had to face the issue in the setting of a
    Presidential impeachment.
        Now, we argued before the Judiciary Committee that it must
    treat a vote to impeach as a vote to remove and that that
    judgment ought not be based on anything less than a clear and
    convincing standard, a standard, indeed, adopted by the
    Watergate committee 25 years ago. Surely no lesser standard
    should be applied here. Indeed, we submit to you that given the
    gravity of the decision you must reach, each of you should go
    further and ask whether the House has established guilt beyond
    a reasonable doubt. And this submission is made even more
    compelling by the managers' own position in which they made
    clear to you last week that proof of criminal conduct, in their
    view, was required to justify conviction.
        Now, lawyers and laymen too often, I think, treat the
    standard of proof as meaningless legal jargon, with no real
    application to the world of difficult decisions. But I suggest
    to you that it is much more than that. It is the guidepost that
    shows you the way through the labyrinth of conflicting
    evidence. It tells you to look within yourself and ask, Would I
    make the most important decisions of my life based on the level
    of certainty I have about these facts, and in the unique legal
    political setting of an impeachment setting that protects
    against partisan overreaching and it assures the public that a
    grave decision is being made with due care? It is the
    disciplining force I think that you will carry with you into
    your deliberations.
        And let me say that even if the clear and convincing
    standard is that which you apply for judicial impeachments, it
    does not follow that it should be applied where the Presidency
    itself is at stake. With judges, the Senate must weigh and
    balance its concern for the independence of the judiciary
    against the recognition that, because a judge is appointed for
    life, impeachment is the only available method for removing
    from office those who are corrupt.
        On the other hand, when a President is on trial, the
    balance is very different. Here you are asking, in effect, to
    overturn the will of the electorate, to overturn the results of
    an election held 2 years ago in which the American people
    selected the head of one of the three coordinate branches of
    Government.
        Moreover, you have been asked to take this action in
    circumstances where, even taking the darkest view of the
    managers' position, there is no suggestion of corruption or
    misuse of office or any other conduct that places our system of
    Government at risk in the 2 remaining years of this President's
    term, when once again the people will get the chance to decide
    who should lead them. In this setting, we submit, you should
    test the evidence by the strictest standard you know.
        I want to talk for a few minutes about what we see as the
    constitutional deficiency of the articles you have before you.
    When the framers took from English practice the parliamentary
    weapon of impeachment, they recognized that the form of the
    Government that they had created, with its finely tuned balance
    among the branches, was inconsistent with the parliamentary
    dominance inherent in the English model. They chose, therefore,
    to build a quasi-judicial impeachment process, one that had,
    admittedly, political overtones but that carried with it the
    basic principles of due process embodied in the Constitution
    they had written.
        Among those principles is the sixth amendment's guarantee
    that the accused shall have the right to be informed of the
    nature and cause of the accusation against him. That right has
    been recognized to have special force in perjury cases, where
    it is the rule uniformly enforced by the courts that an
    indictment must inform the defendant specifically what false
    statement he is alleged to have made.
        This is not some mere technicality; it is the law. It is
    the law because our courts have recognized that if a criminal
    charge is to be based on the words uttered by a fallible human
    being, he must be allowed to defend the truthfulness of the
    specific words he used and not be convicted on the basis merely
    of some prosecutor's summary or interpretation. This is not
    some legal nicety that the House of Representatives can ignore,
    as it has many other elements of due process. This is not an
    argument we raise with this body merely in passing as a
    lawyer's gambit. This is an important principle of our
    jurisprudence. And I suggest that it is one that this body must
    honor. There is not a court anywhere--from highest to lowest--
    that would hesitate, if they were confronted with an indictment
    written like these articles, to throw it out.
        Indeed, if you want some evidence of how others have
    perceived this issue, look to the Hastings and Nixon cases, in
    both of which, the articles charging impeachment specifically
    stated the false statements that they were accused of having
    made.
        Why, if the House understood the importance of specificity
    in those cases, did it not understand the, if anything, greater
    importance of telling the President of the United States what
    he was charged with? If you compare the closing argument of
    majority counsel and the majority report filed by the committee
    and the trial brief filed by the House and the presentation of
    the managers last week, you will begin to understand what has
    happened here.
        I challenge any Member of the Senate--indeed, any manager--
    to identify the charges that the House authorized them to
    bring. Just to take one example, we do not know to a certainty
    that the House decided--or we do know with certainty that the
    House decided not to charge perjury in the civil deposition.
    Yet, to listen to the managers' presentation last week, one
    would be hard put to conclude that they understood that. They
    have, in essence, treated these articles as empty vessels, to
    be filled with some witch's brew of charges considered, charges
    considered and abandoned, and charges never considered at all.
        Both article I and article II are constitutionally
    deficient for other reasons as well. In particular, each
    charge's multiple offenses is therefore void, in the criminal
    justice vernacular, for duplicity because in a criminal case,
    and here as well, lumping multiple offenses together in one
    charging document creates a risk that a verdict may be based
    not on a unanimous finding of guilt as to any particular charge
    but, instead, may be composed of multiple individual judgments.
    And that risk is in direct violation of the requirement of the
    Constitution that this body agree by a two-thirds majority
    before the President may be removed.
        Now, the House responds to the President's concerns in this
    regard by arguing that, well, the amendment of Senate rule 23,
    which prohibits division of the articles, somehow addresses
    this concern and that our argument would undermine the Senate's
    own rules. But that is not so. Rule 23 was approved to permit
    the most judicious and effective handling of the questions
    presented to the Senate. It cannot be that the Senate, in
    passing that rule--and you know surely better than I--decided
    to purchase efficiency in impeachment proceedings at the price
    of violating the Constitution, the mandate to ensure a two-
    thirds vote for removal.
        Now, 3 years after the revision of rule 23, in the trial of
    Judge Nixon, this very issue was presented. And Senator Kohl
    captured that problem. Although the first and second articles
    of impeachment alleged that Judge Nixon had committed specific
    violations of the perjury statute, the third article was a
    catchall, alleging that he made ``one or more'' of 14 different
    false statements. And I would note for you that that language,
    ``one or more,'' was identical to the language specifically
    inserted into article I at the request of Congressman Rogan
    during the Judiciary Committee proceedings.
        In addressing the propriety of such a charging device,
    Senator Kohl said:

        The managers should not be allowed to use a shotgun or
    blunderbuss. We should send a message to the House. Please do
    not bunch up your allegations. Charge each act of wrongdoing in
    a separate count. Such a change would clarify things and allow
    for a cleaner vote on guilt or innocence.

        Senator Dole, who surely knew something about Senate rules
    and precedent, certainly didn't think that rule 23 bound the
    result in that Nixon case. He first voted to dismiss article
    III and then later voted to acquit Judge Nixon because it was
    redundant, complex, and confusing. Thirty-three Senators joined
    Senator Dole in voting to dismiss the article, and a total of
    40 voted to acquit when it came to a judgment of guilt or
    innocence.
        Senators Kohl, Biden, and Murkowski each spoke about the
    danger posed by this formulation. And I will look once more to
    Senator Kohl:

        This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all,
    it means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two-thirds
    of the Senate does not agree in which his political statements
    were false. The House is telling us that it is OK to convict
    Judge Nixon on article III even if we have different visions of
    what he did wrong. But that is not fair to Judge Nixon, to the
    Senate, or to the American people.

        Those Senators were not acting in derogation of Senate
    Rules or precedents. They were acting in the spirit of fairness
    to the accused and in the very best tradition of American due
    process.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that counsel has
    indicated he is ready to take a break, so I ask unanimous
    consent that we take a brief 15-minute recess.
        There being no objection, at 2:02 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:21 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we will continue now
    with a further statement from Counsel Ruff.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Ruff to
    continue his presentation.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        My first question is: Is it working?
        Thank you, very much. I apologize for the mechanical
    difficulties earlier. I could quickly go back over the first
    hour. [Laughter.]
        I want now to move to an overview of the articles of
    impeachment themselves. As I said, as I came to the end of the
    first hour, these articles are constitutionally defective. They
    are also unsupported by the evidence. As we have noted, both
    articles are framed in the broadest generalities and pose
    multiple different defenses. Nothing contained in the Judiciary
    Committee's majority report, or in the trial brief, or in the
    presentation of the managers, cures the constitutional
    infirmity that infects these articles. Nonetheless, in framing
    our defense, they provide the only way through this uncharted
    landscape.
        We have divided our substantive response to the articles
    into three parts.
        Tomorrow, Mr. Craig will address the charges in Article I--
    that the President committed perjury before the grand jury.
        Second, Ms. Mills will address those parts of Article II
    that charge the President with obstructing justice by causing
    concealment of gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and that he
    engaged in witness tampering in his conversations with Ms.
    Currie.
        Third, Mr. Kendall will address the remaining allegations
    of obstruction on Thursday, and then we will close by hearing
    from Senator Bumpers.
        Before I move to an overview of the articles and the
    response that you will hear over the next couple of days, I
    want to suggest to you an approach to one of the most difficult
    questions that you face: How does one sitting in judgment on a
    case like this test the reliability of what he or she hears in
    the proceedings? Let me offer one test.
        Those of you who have practiced on one side or the other in
    the criminal justice system know that the system places a
    special responsibility on a prosecutor--a burden to be open,
    candid, and forthcoming in his arguments, and most importantly,
    in representing the facts so that when a prosecutor recites the
    facts he is not expected to ignore the unfavorable ones. He is
    expected to be open with judge and jury. Of course, he can make
    an argument as to why a particular fact is really not so
    important, but he can neither conceal it nor misrepresent it.
    When you hear a prosecutor, or a team of prosecutors, misstate
    a fact or not tell you the whole story, you should wonder why.
    You should ask yourself whether the misstatement is an error,
    or whether it signals some underlying flaw in the prosecution's
    case, or some problem that they are trying to conceal. And you
    ought to be particularly skeptical when the fact that is
    concealed or isn't fully revealed is claimed by the prosecutors
    themselves to be crucial to their case.
        We all sometimes speak with less than complete care, and we
    are justly criticized when we make mistakes. If I tell you
    something inadvertently that proves to be wrong, I expect to be
    held to account for that. And similarly, we must hold the
    managers accountable for their mistakes.
        Last week, for example, you will recall that Mr. Manager
    Sensenbrenner told you that during my coming before the
    Judiciary Committee, in his words,

        Charles Ruff was asked directly: Did the President lie
    during his sworn grand jury testimony? And Mr. Ruff could have
    answered that question directly. He did not, and his failure to
    do so speaks 1,000 words.

        Just to be certain that the record is straight, let me read
    to you from the transcript of that Judiciary hearing.

        Representative Sensenbrenner: The oath that witnesses take
    require them to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
    but the truth. I seem to recall that there were a lot of
    people, myself included, when asked by the press what advice
    would we give to the President when he went to the grand jury,
    was to just tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth.
        Mr. Ruff: He surely did.
        Representative Sensenbrenner: Did he tell the truth, the
    whole truth, and nothing but the truth when he was in the grand
    jury?
        Mr. Ruff. He surely did.

        I am certain that Mr. Sensenbrenner would not intentionally
    mislead the Senate. But his error was one of inadvertence. But,
    in any event, now the record is clear.
        Of considerably more importance than this momentary lapse
    are the many substantive flaws that we will point out to you in
    the coming days--sometimes pure errors of fact, sometimes
    errors of interpretation, sometimes unfound speculation. My
    colleagues will deal with many of these flaws at greater length
    as they discuss the specific charges against the President. But
    I will give you some examples as I read appropriate points in
    my overview today, because I want you to have in mind
    throughout our presentation, and indeed throughout the rest of
    the proceedings, this one principle: Beware of the prosecutor
    who feels it necessary to deceive the court.
        Let me begin with article I.
        Our system of justice recognizes the difficulties inherent
    in testifying under oath, and it affords important protections
    for the witness who may be charged with perjury, and thus the
    Judiciary Committee's dissatisfaction with the President's
    answers because they thought they were narrow, or even
    hairsplitting, in some sense reflect the dissatisfaction with
    the rules that have been applied for centuries in prosecuting
    this offense.
        Further, it requires proof that a defendant knowingly made
    a false statement about a material fact. The defendant must
    have had a subjective intent to lie. The testimony that is
    provided as a result of confusion, mistake, faulty memory, or
    carelessness, or misunderstanding is not perjury. The mere fact
    that the recollection of two witnesses may differ does not mean
    that one is committing perjury. Common sense and the stringent
    requirements of the law dictate what law is required. As the
    Supreme Court has noted,

        Equally honest witnesses may well have different
    recollections of the same event, and thus, a conviction for
    perjury ought not to rest entirely upon an oath against an
    oath.

        This is the rationale for the common practice of
    prosecutors to require significant corroborating evidence
    before they bring a perjury case. Indeed, the Department of
    Justice urges that its prosecutors seek independent
    corroboration, either through witnesses or corroborating
    evidence of a quality to assure that a guilty verdict is really
    well founded.
        This isn't merely the argument we make as we are acting for
    the President. The bipartisan and former Federal prosecutors
    from whom you will hear will testify that neither they nor any
    reasonable prosecutor could charge perjury based upon the facts
    in this case.
        Tom Sullivan, former U.S. Attorney for the Northern
    District of Illinois, told the committee that the evidence set
    out would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a responsible
    Federal prosecutor.
        Richard Davis, a former colleague of mine on the Watergate
    special prosecution force, testified that no prosecutor would
    bring this case of perjury because the President acknowledged
    to the grand jury the existence of an improper relationship and
    argued with prosecutors questioning him that his acknowledged
    conduct was not a sexual relationship as he understood the
    definition of that term used in the Jones deposition. And that
    is where you need to begin your focus as you look at the charge
    that the President perjured himself in the grand jury in August
    of last year.
        Any assessment of that testimony must begin with one
    immutable fact. He admitted that he had, in his words,
    inappropriate, intimate contact with Monica Lewinsky. No one
    who was present for that testimony, has read the transcript, or
    watched the videotape could come away believing anything other
    than that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual
    conduct. Indeed, even the prosecutors, who surely cannot be
    accused of being reluctant to find Presidential misconduct,
    contended not that the President had lied about the nature of
    his relationship but only about the details. Yet, the managers,
    in their eagerness to find misconduct where none had found it
    before, have searched every nook and cranny of the grand jury
    transcript and sent forward to you a shopping list of alleged
    misstatements, obviously in the hope that among them you will
    find one with which you disagree. But they hope in vain. The
    record simply will not support a finding that the President
    perjured himself before the grand jury.
        Now, much of the questioning by the prosecutors and much of
    the grand jury testimony about which the House now complains so
    vociferously dealt with the President's efforts to explain why
    his answers in the Jones deposition, certainly not pretty,
    were, in his mind, truthful, albeit narrowly and artfully
    constructed.
        We are not here to talk to you today about the President's
    testimony in the Jones deposition. We do seek to convince you
    that before the grand jury the President was open, candid,
    truthful.
        Now, the managers begin by asking you to look at the
    prepared statement that the President offered at the very
    beginning of his grand jury appearance. Before the President
    actually began his testimony, his lawyer, Mr. Kendall, spoke to
    Mr. Starr and told him that at the first moment at which there
    was an inquiry concerning the detailed nature of the
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he wished to make a prepared
    statement, and he was permitted to do so. That statement
    acknowledged the existence of an intimate relationship, but it
    did not discuss the specific physical details in what I think
    we will all understand to have been an effort to preserve the
    dignity of the office.
        Now, the House has charged that this statement was somehow
    a ``premeditated effort to thwart the OIC's investigation.''
    That is errant nonsense. Even independent counsel saw no such
    dark motive in this statement.
        Now, first, the managers advance the baseless charge that
    the President intentionally placed the beginning of his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in 1996 rather than 1995 as she
    testified. Interestingly, they don't even purport to offer any
    support for this charge other than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony,
    and they offer not even the somewhat odd explanation originally
    offered by the independent counsel to explain why the
    President, having admitted the very worst things a father and
    husband can conceivably admit, would have shifted the time by 3
    months.
        Next, the managers assert that the President's admission
    that he engaged in wrongful conduct ``on certain occasions''
    was false because the President actually engaged in such
    conduct some 11 times, and they assert as well that when the
    President admitted he had occasional telephone conversations
    that included inappropriate discussions, that was false because
    they had actually had 17 such phone conversations.
        Now, the President gave his best recollection of the
    frequency of those contacts. Ms. Lewinsky gave hers. Assuming
    that the majority is correct in its assumption that there were
    11 or 17, can anyone imagine a trial in this court or in any
    other court in which the issue of whether ``certain occasions''
    by definition could not mean 17 and ``occasionally'' could not
    refer to 11 would be the issue being litigated?
        Even the independent counsel, again, who could, of course,
    have pressed the President for specific numbers had they
    thought it important, did not take issue with this testimony.
        Thus, the perjury charge in article I again comes down to
    the same allegations contained in the independent counsel's
    referral, that the President lied to the grand jury about two
    things--his subjective, his personal subjective understanding
    of the definition used in the Jones deposition and, second, he
    lied when he denied that he engaged in certain details of
    inappropriate conduct.
        Now, to conclude that the President lied to the grand jury
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, you must determine--
    forgive me--that he touched certain parts of her body, but for
    proof you have only her oath against his oath.
        Those among you who have been prosecutors or criminal
    defense lawyers know that perjury prosecutions, as rare as they
    are, would never be pursued under evidence available here. And
    those among you who could not bring that special experience at
    least bring your common sense and are equally able to assess
    the weakness of the case that would rest on such a foundation.
        Common sense also is enough to tell you that there cannot
    be any basis for charging a witness with perjury on the ground
    that you disbelieve his testimony about his own subjective
    belief in a definition of a term used in a civil deposition.
    Not only is there no evidence to support such a charge here, it
    is difficult to contemplate what evidence the managers might
    hope to rely on to meet that burden.
        Now, it is worth noting that Mr. Bennett, at the time of
    the deposition, pressed the Jones lawyers to ask the President
    specific questions about his conduct rather than rely on this
    confusing definition that they proffered. In fact, when the
    President was asked in the grand jury whether he would have
    answered those questions, he said, of course, if the judge had
    ruled them appropriate, he would have answered truthfully. But
    the Jones lawyers persisted in their somewhat strange cause,
    strange unless one asked whether, armed with Ms. Tripp's
    intelligence, they purposely sought in some fashion to present
    the independent counsel a record that would permit just the
    sort of dark interpretation both he and the managers have
    proffered.
        I point you to one thing. If you seek evidence that the
    President took the definition he was given seriously, and he
    responded carefully to the questions put to him, even if they
    required the most embarrassing answers, one need only look to
    the painful admission that he did have relations with another
    woman and he testified to the grand jury the definition
    required that he make that admission. Here is what he said to
    the grand jurors:

        I read this carefully, and I thought about it. And I
    thought about what ``contact'' meant, and I thought about
    [other phrases] and I had to admit under this definition that I
    had actually had relations with Gennifer Flowers.

        Now, undeterred in its search for some ground on which to
    base the charge that the President lied to the grand jury,
    article I abandons even the modest level of specificity found
    in the independent counsel's referral and advances the claim:

        The President gave perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony regarding prior statements of the same nature he made
    in his deposition.

        There can be no stronger evidence of the constitutional
    deficiency of this article than this strangely amorphous charge
    as a deficiency that becomes even more obvious when you finally
    stumble across the theory on which the managers rely. To the
    extent one can determine what the Judiciary Committee had in
    mind when it drafted this clause, it appears that they intended
    to charge the President with perjury before the grand jury
    because he testified that he believed--believed--that he had,
    in his words, ``worked through the minefield of the Jones
    deposition without violating the law.'' And that they hoped to
    support that charge by reference to various allegedly false
    statements in his deposition as charged in article II.
    Unhappily for the managers, however, the House rejected article
    II and it is not before you in any form. Moreover, there is not
    a single suggestion in the committee debate--or, more
    importantly, in the House debate--that those voting to impeach
    the President believed that this one line that I have quoted to
    you from the President's grand jury testimony, somehow absorbed
    into article I his entire deposition testimony.
        If there is to be any regard for constitutional process,
    the managers cannot be allowed to rely on what the Judiciary
    Committee thought were false statements encompassed in a
    rejected article II to flesh out the unconstitutionally
    nonspecific charges of article I. The House vote on article II
    foreclosed that option for all time.
        Now, article I next alleges that the President lied to the
    grand jury about the events surrounding certain statements made
    by Mr. Bennett during the Jones deposition. Specifically, the
    managers charge that the President was silent when Mr. Bennett
    characterized the Lewinsky affidavit as meaning there was no
    sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form with President
    Clinton, and that the President then gave a false explanation
    to the grand jury when he testified that he wasn't really
    paying attention when his lawyer said that.
        Now, as we noted earlier, Mr. Bennett argued to Judge
    Wright that, in light of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a
    relationship, the Jones lawyers had no good-faith basis for
    questioning the President about her. The President was not
    involved in the lengthy back and forth among the judge, the
    Jones lawyers, and Mr. Bennett. He said nothing. When he was
    asked in the grand jury about Mr. Bennett's statement, he said,
    ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what Mr. Bennett
    was saying.''
        Now, the managers assert that this is false because the
    videotape shows that the President was in fact paying
    attention. But a fairer view of the videotape, I suggest to
    you, shows the President looking, indeed, in Mr. Bennett's
    direction, and in the direction of the judge, but giving no
    sign that he was following the discussion. He didn't nod his
    head. He didn't make facial expressions. There was nothing to
    reflect an awareness of the substance of what was happening,
    much less what was said in Mr. Bennett's statement.
        Now, I don't know how large a group this would be, but any
    of you who has ever represented a witness or been a witness in
    a deposition will readily understand the President's mindset,
    that the lawyers and the judge debated these issues, and you
    will understand, too, that to charge him with perjury for
    having testified falsely about his own state of mind with
    nothing more to rely on than a picture would strain credulity
    in any prosecutor's office and flies past the bounds of
    constitutional reason in this Chamber.
        I move, now, to the allegations in Article II charging the
    President with obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit and
    in the grand jury investigation. I want to talk first about
    what has become known as the concealment of gifts theory. The
    allegation that the President participated in some scheme to
    conceal certain gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky centers on
    two events allegedly occurring on December 28, 1997: First,
    conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in the
    White House in which the two discussed the gifts, at least
    briefly, that he had given to Ms. Lewinsky; and, B, Ms.
    Currie's picking up a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and
    storing them under her bed.
        The managers, as was true of the majority report--and the
    independent counsel role before that--build their theory in
    this case not on seven pillars of obstruction but on seven
    shifting sand castles of speculation. Monica Lewinsky met with
    the President on December 28, 1997, sometime shortly before 8
    a.m., to exchange Christmas presents. According to Ms.
    Lewinsky, they briefly discussed the subject of gifts she had
    received from the President in connection with her receipt some
    days earlier of the subpoena in the Jones case, and this was
    the first and the only time, she says, in which the subject was
    ever discussed.
        Now, the managers quote one conversation of Ms. Lewinsky's
    description of that December 28 version as follows:

        At some point I said to him, well, you know, should--maybe
    I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give
    them to someone, maybe Betty. And he sort of said--I think he
    responded ``I don't know,'' or ``let me think about that,'' and
    left that topic.

        But the Senate should know that in fact Ms. Lewinsky has
    discussed this very exchange on at least 10 different occasions
    and that the very most she alleges in any of them is that the
    President said, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think about it,''
    when she raised the issue of the gifts. Indeed, in many of her
    versions she said, among other things, there really was no
    response, that the President did not respond, that she didn't
    have a clear image in her mind what to do next. She also
    testified that Ms. Currie's name did not come up because the
    President really didn't say anything. And, most importantly, in
    not a single one of her multiple versions of this event did she
    say that the President ever initiated any discussion about the
    gifts, nor did he ever suggest to her that she conceal them.
        Now, there being no evidence of obstruction in that
    conversation, the managers would have you believe that after
    Ms. Lewinsky left the White House that day, the President must
    have told Betty Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky.
    But there is absolutely no evidence that that discussion ever
    occurred. The only two parties who would have knowledge of it,
    the President and Ms. Currie, both denied it ever took place.
        Now, in the absence of any such evidence, the managers have
    relied on Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that Ms. Currie placed a
    call to her and told her--depending on Ms. Lewinsky's version--
    either that the President had said to Betty Ms. Lewinsky had
    something for her or merely that she, Ms. Currie, understood
    that Ms. Lewinsky had something for her.
        In this regard, it is important to remember that Ms.
    Lewinsky herself testified that she was the one who first
    raised with the President the notion that Ms. Currie could hold
    the gifts. And it is important to recognize that, contrary to
    the managers' suggestion to you that Ms. Lewinsky's memory of
    this event has always been consistent and--``unequivocal,'' I
    think was their word--she herself acknowledged at her last
    grand jury appearance that her memory of the crucial
    conversation is less than crystal clear. To wit:

        A Juror: Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the
    President had told her to call?
        Ms. Lewinsky: Right now, I don't remember.

        And now we come to the first example I promised you of
    prosecutorial--what shall we call it?--fudge. Starting from the
    premise that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky and told her
    that she understood she had something for her and then went to
    pick up a sealed box containing some of the gifts she had
    received, Ms. Lewinsky had received from the President, first
    the independent counsel concluded, and then the majority report
    concluded, and now the managers have concluded, that the
    President must have instructed Ms. Currie to go pick up these
    gifts--to call Ms. Lewinsky and make the arrangements. So that
    they determined that when Ms. Currie said it was Ms. Lewinsky
    who called her, Ms. Currie was mistaken or, if you listen
    carefully, maybe worse. And when the President testified that
    he didn't tell Ms. Currie to call Ms. Lewinsky, he was--well,
    just worse. And this surmise is made absolutely certain, in the
    view of the managers, because a newly discovered, unknown even
    to independent counsel, cell phone record shows that Ms. Currie
    called Ms. Lewinsky at 3:32 p.m. on December 28 and that must
    be the call that Ms. Lewinsky remembered.
        Let's look now at how the majority counsel for the
    committee put it in his closing argument to the Judiciary
    Committee. I have put his words up on the chart, and you all
    should have it in front of you as well:

        There is key evidence [said majority counsel] that Ms.
    Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong. Monica said that she
    thought Betty called from her cell phone. Well, look at this
    record. [Show it to you later.] This is Betty's cell phone
    record. It corroborates Monica Lewinsky and proves conclusively
    that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several hours
    after she had left the White House. Why did Betty Currie pick
    up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky? The facts strongly suggest the
    President directed her to do so.

        There is a slight problem with the majority counsel's
    epiphany, as it has been passed down to the managers and then
    to you. For you see--and here is the cell phone record--it
    reflects that at 3:32 p.m. on December 28, from Arlington, VA,
    to Washington, DC--that is Ms. Lewinsky's number--there was a
    call of a minute, it says here. And then we have to ask, Does
    this timing fit with the rest of the testimony?
        Well, the answer is, no, it doesn't, because on three
    separate occasions, Ms. Lewinsky testified that Ms. Currie came
    over to pick up the gifts at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, an
    hour and a half before the phone call. It is not as though we
    have been hiding the ball on this, Senators. We discussed this
    issue at length in our trial brief, and the managers do seem to
    have recognized at least some of the problem, because they have
    told you, albeit without the slightest evidentiary support,
    that maybe Ms. Lewinsky just miscalculated a little bit. Well,
    maybe she just miscalculated a little bit three times. Look at
    the record:
        FBI interview, July 27: ``Lewinsky met Currie on 28th
    Street outside Lewinsky's apartment at about 2 p.m. and gave
    Currie the box of gifts.''
        FBI interview, August 1: ``Lewinsky gave the box to Betty
    Currie when Currie came by the Watergate about 2 p.m.''
        Grand jury testimony, 3 weeks later: ``I think it was
    around 2 p.m. or so, around 2:00 in the afternoon.''
        The managers speculate that if only the independent counsel
    had had this phone record when they were interviewing Ms.
    Lewinsky, they could have refreshed her recollection. Having
    been one, I can tell you, that's prosecutor speak for ``if we'd
    only known about that darn record, we could have gotten her to
    change her testimony.''
        But the managers have one other problem that they didn't
    address. The phone record--if we can go back to that for a
    moment--the phone record shows a call lasting 1 minute. All of
    us who have cell phones know that really means it lasted well
    short of a minute, because the phone company rounds things up
    to the nearest minute, just to help us all with our
    bookkeeping. [Laughter.]
        So now it will be necessary not only for Ms. Lewinsky's
    memory to be refreshed about the hour of the pickup, but to
    explain how the arrangements for it could have been made
    between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie in somewhere between 1 and
    60 seconds.
        Putting these factual difficulties aside, this charge must
    fail for another reason. As you all know from presentations
    earlier, the President gave Ms. Lewinsky several gifts on the
    very day that they met, December 28. Faced with having to
    explain why on the day that the President and Monica Lewinsky
    were conspiring to conceal gifts from the Jones' lawyers the
    President gave her additional ones, the managers surmised that
    the real purpose was because it was part of a subtle effort to
    keep Ms. Lewinsky on the team, but in truth the only reasonable
    explanation for these events is the one the President gave to
    the grand jury. He was simply not concerned about gifts. He
    gave a lot, he got a lot, and he saw no need to engage in any
    effort to conceal them.
        The President did not urge Ms. Lewinsky to conceal the
    gifts he had given her and, of course, he did not lie to the
    grand jury about that subject.
        The next point I want to discuss with you is the statements
    the President made to Betty Currie on the day after the Jones
    deposition, January 18 of last year. There is no disputing the
    record, no conflict in testimony that the President did meet
    with his secretary, Betty Currie, on the day after the Jones
    deposition and they discussed Monica Lewinsky.
        The managers cast this conversation, this recitation, this
    series of statements and questions put by the President to Ms.
    Currie in the most sinister light possible and allege that the
    President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness''
    by pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of
    the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        President Clinton has adamantly denied that he had any such
    intention, and that denial is fortified by the undisputable
    factual record establishing that Betty Currie neither was an
    actual or a contemplated witness in the Jones litigation, nor
    did she perceive that she was being pressured in any respect by
    the President to agree with what he was saying.
        First, Ms. Currie's status as a witness in the only
    proceeding the President knew about at that moment, the Jones
    case, Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor a prospective
    witness. As to the only proceeding in which she ultimately
    became a witness, no one would suggest, managers, no one else
    would suggest the President knew that the independent counsel
    was conducting an investigation into his activities.
        In the entire history of the Jones case, Ms. Currie's name
    had not appeared on any of the witness lists, nor was there any
    reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play a role in the Jones
    case. Discovery was down to its final days. The managers
    speculate that the President's own references to Ms. Currie
    during his deposition meant she was sure to be called by the
    Jones lawyers. Yet, in the days, weeks following the
    deposition, the Jones lawyers never listed her, never contacted
    her, never added her to any witness list. They never deposed
    her; they never noticed the deposition.
        Indeed, when the independent counsel interviewed the Jones
    lawyers, they apparently neglected to ask whether they had ever
    intended to call Betty Currie as a witness. One can be sure
    that if such an intent existed, they would have asked and it
    would have been included in the referral.
        Moreover, it is a sure bet that the Jones lawyers already
    knew about Betty Currie and her relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky. Why? Because we know from her own recorded telephone
    conversations that Ms. Tripp had been in contact with the Jones
    lawyers for months, and we know that she spent the evening
    before the President's deposition telling them everything she
    knew.
        It didn't take a few references to his secretary by the
    President to trigger a subpoena for Betty Currie if they had
    ever wanted to do that, and they never did. Nor did the
    President ever pressure Ms. Currie to alter her recollection.
    Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into
    saying she was pressured to agree with the President, Ms.
    Currie adamantly denied it.
        Let me quote just briefly a few lines of her grand jury
    testimony:

        Question: Now, back again to the four statements that you
    testified the President made to you that were presented as
    statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those
    statements?
        Answer: None whatsoever.
        Question: That was your impression, that he wanted you to
    say--because he would end each of the statements with
    ``Right?'', with a question.
        Answer: I do not remember that he wanted me to say
    ``Right.'' He would say ``Right'' and I could have said,
    ``Wrong.''
        Question: But he would end each of those questions with a
    ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not
    true?
        Answer: Correct.
        Question: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your
    boss?
        Answer: None [whatsoever].

        Now, to understand on a human level why the President
    reached out to Betty Currie on the day after his deposition,
    you need only to understand that he had just faced unexpected
    detailed questions about his worst nightmare. As he candidly
    admitted to the grand jury, he had long feared that his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would ultimately become public.
    Now, with questioning about her in the Jones case, publication
    of the first Internet article, the day of reckoning had
    arrived. The President knew that a media storm was about to
    erupt. And it did.
        Now, if you are looking for evidence on which to base an
    inference about the President's intentions with respect to Ms.
    Currie's testimony, look what he said to her when he knew that
    she was going before the grand jury.

        And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to
    testify to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she
    had been through this loss of her sister, this horrible
    accident Christmas that killed her brother, and her mother was
    in the hospital. I was trying to do--to make her understand
    that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the grand jury.
    And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine, just go
    in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I
    remember.

        The President of the United States did not tamper with a
    witness.
        Now next, the managers argue that Mr. Clinton corruptly
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to submit a false affidavit to the
    Jones lawyers and to lie if she were ever deposed. But the
    uncontroverted evidence refutes that charge. Indeed, Ms.
    Lewinsky herself has repeatedly and forcefully denied that
    anyone ever asked her to lie. There is no way to get around
    that flat denial, even with the independent counsel's addition
    of the word ``explicitly.'' There was no explicit, implicit, or
    any other direction to Ms. Lewinsky to lie. Indeed, the only
    person to whom Ms. Lewinsky said anything inconsistent with her
    denial was the ubiquitous Ms. Tripp. And, as Ms. Lewinsky later
    told the grand jury:

        I think I told her that, you know, at various times the
    President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't
    true.

        Left with this record, the managers resort to arguing that
    Ms. Lewinsky understood that the President wanted her to lie,
    that he could not have wanted her to file an affidavit
    detailing their relationship. But the only factual support for
    this theory recited by the majority is the testimony of Ms.
    Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie,
    he remained silent about what she should have to say or do, and
    by such silence she said, ``I knew what he meant.''
        The very idea that the President of the United States
    should face removal from office, not because he told Monica
    Lewinsky to lie or anything of this sort, but because he was
    silent and Ms. Lewinsky ``knew what he meant,'' is, I suggest,
    more than troubling.
        So to bolster their flawed ``I knew what he meant'' theory,
    the managers assert that the President knew the affidavit would
    have to be false in order for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying.
    But the evidence here, too, is that the President repeatedly
    testified that Ms. Lewinsky could and would file a truthful
    affidavit. And, of course, Ms. Lewinsky herself has made it
    clear that her definition of the critical term that might be
    used in such an affidavit was consistent with the President's.
        Further testimony from Ms. Lewinsky herself repudiates any
    suggestion that she was ever encouraged by anyone to lie if she
    were deposed in the Jones case. In a colloquy with a grand
    juror, she explicitly and unequivocally rejected the notion
    that President Clinton encouraged her to deny the relationship
    after she learned she was a witness. Referring to discussions
    about the so-called cover stories that the managers allege were
    to be used in her testimony, a grand juror asked her:

        It is possible that you had these discussions after you
    learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
        Answer: I don't believe so, no.
        Question: Can you exclude that possibility?
        Answer: I pretty much can.

        The managers would have you conclude the contrary from a
    brief snippet of the conversation on December 17 in which Ms.
    Lewinsky said that at some point, ``I don't know if it was
    before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, the
    President sort of said, `Well, you know, you can always say you
    were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'
    ''
        But Ms. Lewinsky told the FBI when she was interviewed,
    ``To the best''--this is the FBI talking--``To the best of Miss
    Lewinsky's memory, she does not believe they discussed''--in
    this December 17 conversation--``the content of any deposition
    that Miss Lewinsky might be involved in at a later date.'' And
    she told the grand jury the same thing. Describing the very
    same December 17 conversation, she testified that she and the
    President did not discuss the idea of her denying their
    relationship.

        Ms. Lewinsky: I really don't remember it. I mean, it would
    be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that
    would show me different, but it was 2:30, and, I mean, the
    conversation I'm thinking of mainly would have been December
    17, which was--
        A juror interjects: The telephone call?
        Ms. Lewinsky: Right. And it was, you know, 2, 2:30 in the
    morning. And I remember the gist of it, and I really don't
    think so.

        And it is on that basis that the managers suggest that the
    President obstructed justice.
        Fourth, article II alleges that the President obstructed
    justice by denying to his closest aides he had a sexual
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky, the very same denial he made
    to his family and his friends and to the American people. These
    allegedly impeachable denials took place in the immediate
    aftermath of the public revelation of the Lewinsky matter, at
    the very time that the President was denying that relationship
    to the entire country on national television. Having made the
    announcement to the whole country, it is simply absurd, I
    suggest to you, to believe that he was somehow attempting
    corruptly to influence his senior staff when he told them
    virtually the same thing at the same time.
        Now, the managers do not allege--as they could not--that
    the President attempted to influence the aides' testimony about
    what they themselves knew concerning his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky--had they seen her in a particular place; had they
    talked to her; had they talked to the President about it before
    all of this broke.
        Indeed, the only evidence these aides had was the very same
    denial that the entire American people had. Indeed, every
    member of the grand jury had probably seen this denial by the
    President on their own television sets. Under the theory
    proffered by the managers, in essence, every person who heard
    the President's denial could have been called to the grand jury
    and ordered to create still an additional charge of obstruction
    of justice.
        The point here was not that the President believed that his
    staff would be witnesses and somehow wanted to influence their
    testimony. As he explained to the grand jury, what he was
    trying to do was avoid being a witness. But, of course, he had
    to say something to them. He had to say, in the aftermath of
    January 21, something to reassure them. And he told them
    exactly what he told every one of you, everyone in the gallery,
    and everyone who watched television in those days following
    January 21.
        And let me just make this one point. There is absolutely no
    conflict in the evidence here, despite the managers' somewhat
    puzzling suggestion that the Senate's deliberations would
    somehow be aided if two of the senior staff members could be
    called as witnesses. Not only is there no conflict in the
    evidence, there is absolutely no basis for the charge that the
    President was in any way seeking to influence the testimony of
    his staff before the grand jury.
        Now we come to the last of the obstruction charges. The
    managers ask you to find that the President of the United
    States employed his friend, Vernon Jordan, to get Monica
    Lewinsky a job in New York, to influence her testimony, or
    perhaps in a somewhat forlorn effort to escape the reach of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to hide from the Jones
    lawyers and the 8 million people who live in that city.
        There is, of course, absolutely no evidence to support this
    conclusion, and so the managers have constructed out of sealing
    wax and string and spiders' webs a theory that would lend to a
    series of otherwise innocuous and, indeed, exculpatory events,
    a dark and sinister past.
        The undisputed record establishes the following: one, that
    Lewinsky's job search began on her own initiative; two, the
    search began long before her involvement in the Jones case;
    three, the search had no connection to the Jones case; four,
    Vernon Jordan agreed to help her, not at the direction of the
    President but at the request of Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-
    time friend; five, the idea to solicit Mr. Jordan's assistance
    again came not from the President but from Ms. Tripp.
        As I thought about this aspect of it, I have to say I was
    reminded of Iago and Desdemona's handkerchief. But we will pass
    on that.
        Both Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified
    that there was never an agreement, a suggestion, an
    implication, that Ms. Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for
    her silence or her false testimony. As Mr. Jordan succinctly
    put it, ``Unequivocally, indubitable, no.''
        It was only to appease Ms. Tripp that Ms. Lewinsky
    ultimately told her that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't
    sign the affidavit until she had a job. But as she told the
    grand jury, ``That was definitely a line based on something
    that Linda had made me promise on January 9.''
        Now while the managers dismiss as irrelevant Ms. Lewinsky's
    job search before December, the fact is, Ms. Lewinsky
    contemplated looking for a job in New York as early as July
    1997, and her interest was strengthened in early October when
    Ms. Tripp told her it was unlikely she would ever get another
    job in the White House. It was then Ms. Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky
    discussed the prospect of having Vernon Jordan help her get a
    job in New York and Ms. Lewinsky mentioned that idea to the
    President.
        Later in October, as part of this ongoing search,
    Ambassador Richardson agreed to interview Ms. Lewinsky at the
    suggestion of then-Deputy Chief of Staff Podesta who had been
    asked to help by Ms. Currie. And Ambassador Richardson offered
    her a job and she had that job in hand throughout the
    supposedly critical December timeframe, didn't actually turn it
    down until early January. And, further, in late October or
    early November, she actually went to her boss at the Pentagon
    and asked for his help to find a job.
        Meanwhile, now we come to what, for the managers, is the
    very heart of the case. On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky had a
    preliminary meeting with Mr. Jordan and they discussed a list
    of potential employers. And although the managers then contend
    that nothing happened from November 5, that first meeting,
    until December 11, signifying, as they see it, that it must
    have been Ms. Lewinsky's appearance on the witness list that
    galvanized Mr. Jordan into action, that is simply false.
        Ms. Lewinsky had a followup telephone conversation with Mr.
    Jordan around Thanksgiving in which he told her he was working
    on the job search and he asked her to call him in the first
    week of December. The President learned Ms. Lewinsky was on the
    Jones witness list sometime on December 6. He met with Mr.
    Jordan the very next day, December 7. But oddly, if one adopts
    the managers' view, there was no discussion of Ms. Lewinsky or
    the Jones case, much less job searches. Then on December 8, Ms.
    Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan's office and made her appointment to
    meet with him on December 11.
        Now the President absolutely had nothing to do with that
    call or that appointment and Mr. Jordan denies that there was
    any intensified effort to find Ms. Lewinsky a job. He said,
    ``Oh, no, I do not recall any heightened sense of urgency in
    December, but what I do recall is that I dealt with it when I
    had time to do it.''
        Now for my second example of prosecutorial fudging. The
    managers have devoted much attention to the magic date of
    December 11, arguing vigorously that it was on that day that
    getting the job for Ms. Lewinsky suddenly became a matter of
    high priority for the President and hence to Mr. Jordan. Why is
    that so? Well, again, I will let the majority counsel for the
    Judiciary Committee tell you in his own words during his
    closing argument.
        Again, you should have this before you if you can't see the
    chart.

        But why the sudden interest, why the total change in focus
    and effort? Nobody but Bettie Currie really cared about helping
    Ms. Lewinsky throughout November, even after the President
    learned that her name was on the prospective witness list. Did
    something happen to move the job search from a low to a high
    priority on that day? Oh, yes, something happened. On the
    morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered
    that Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any
    State or Federal employee with whom the President had sexual
    relations or proposed or sought to have sexual relations. To
    keep Monica on the team was now of critical importance.
    Remember, they already knew that she was on the witness list,
    although nobody bothered to tell her.

        That same theme was picked up last week by Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson, both in his recitation of events of that day and in
    the exhibits he showed you. If I am lucky, we will place on the
    easel to my right the exhibit that Manager Hutchinson used.
        You will see the order that this exhibit places on the
    critical events of November and December. November 5 meeting,
    the no-job-search action; the President receives a witness
    list. And then of special interest, December 11, first event,
    ``Judge Wright order permitting questions about Lewinsky.''
    Too, on December 11, the ``President and Jordan talk about job
    for Monica.''
        Now, let me ask you to focus on what Mr. Hutchinson told
    you about the events of December 11. Sounding somewhat like
    majority counsel, he asks:

        And so, what triggered--let's look at the chain of events.
    The judge--the witness list came in, the judge's order came in,
    that triggered the President into action and the President
    triggered Vernon Jordan into action. That chain reaction here
    is what moved the job search along . . . remember what else
    happened on that day [December 11] again. That was the same day
    that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other
    relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.

        Now, it appears to me that the manager was suggesting--
    again, with not a great deal of subtlety--that Vernon Jordan,
    one of this country's great lawyers and great citizens, was
    prepared to perjure himself to save the President.
        So let's just imagine the managers' examination of Mr.
    Jordan in this Chamber that would let you make your own
    judgment about his truthfulness.
        Question: Mr. Jordan, isn't it a fact that you met with Ms.
    Lewinsky on December 11 to help get her a job?
        Answer: Yes.
        Question: And isn't it a fact that before and after you met
    with her, you made calls to potential employers in New York?
        Answer: Yes.
        Question: Isn't it true that the reason for all of this
    activity on December 11 was that Judge Wright had on that very
    day issued an order authorizing the Jones lawyers to depose
    certain women like Miss Lewinsky?
        Answer: No.
        Question: What do you mean ``no''? Isn't it true that the
    judge had issued an order before you met with Ms. Lewinsky and
    before you made the calls?
        Answer: I had no knowledge of any such order. The fact that
    Ms. Lewinsky was a potential witness had nothing to do with my
    helping. I made an appointment to see her 3 days earlier.
        Question: Well, isn't it a fact that Judge Wright filed her
    order on December 11 before you met with Ms. Lewinsky?
        Answer: Well, actually no.
        Let me show you the official report of the judge's
    discussion with the lawyers in the Jones case on that date. You
    have this before you as well. There's a conference call between
    the judge and the lawyers, which is memorialized in a formal
    document prepared by a clerk and on file in the case in
    Arkansas. It notes that the conference call began at 5:33 p.m.
    central standard time. If I have my calculations right, that is
    6:33 p.m. in Washington.
        I want to stop here for a second so that you know where Mr.
    Jordan was when that happened. Let me see the next chart.
        By the way, this is Mr. Jordan testifying:

        I was actually on a plane for Amsterdam by the time the
    judge issued her order.

        So he testified in the grand jury.

        I left on United flight 946 at 5:55 from Dulles Airport and
    landed in Amsterdam the next morning.

        So the conference call begins at 6:33 eastern standard
    time. The court takes up another variety of matters, and the
    judge didn't even tell the lawyers that she was going to issue
    an order on the motion to compel these various depositions
    until the very end of the call, around 7:45 eastern standard
    time, and the clerk would actually fax them a copy at that
    point.
        So we return to Mr. Jordan's mythical testimony. To
    summarize, let me show you something that tells you what the
    real sequence of events was on December 11. Vernon Jordan makes
    a possible job call at 9:45, and another at 12:49, and another
    at 1:07; he meets with Ms. Lewinsky from 1:15 to 1:45; he gets
    on his plane at 5:55 in the afternoon, and an hour or so later
    the lawyers are informed that the judge had issued her order.
        In fact--just as a little filler--the President is out of
    town and returns to Washington at 1:10 a.m. And actually, Judge
    Wright's order is filed not on the 11th, but on the 12th.

        Question: Oh, I see. Well, never mind.

        Now, do any of you think that you need to look Mr. Jordan
    in the eye and hear his tone of voice to understand that the
    prosecutors have it wrong and have had, at least since the
    majority counsels' closing argument?
        You will also learn from us--but not from the managers--
    that Mr. Jordan placed no pressure on any company to give Ms.
    Lewinsky a job. Indeed, two other companies he called didn't
    even offer her a job.
        Just as the managers dramatically mistake the record
    relating to Mr. Jordan's efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky find a
    job, so, too, do they invent a nonexistent link between a call
    Mr. Jordan made ultimately to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of
    MacAndrews and Forbes, Revlon's parent, and the offer Ms.
    Lewinsky finally received from Revlon with her signing of the
    affidavit in the Jones case. We will demonstrate beyond any
    question, once again, that conclusions the managers have drawn
    are simply false.
        Again, I'll begin with the fact that both Mr. Jordan and
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that there was no such link between the
    job and the affidavit, and the only person to ever suggest such
    a link was, once again, Ms. Tripp. Now, I presume that it is
    not the managers' intention to suggest that we bring Ms. Tripp
    before you to explore her motivation for making that
    suggestion.
        Next, take Ms. Lewinsky's interview with a MacAndrews
    official, which she described as ``having gone poorly''--a
    characterization adopted by the managers for obvious reasons--
    because it suggests that there was a desire on their part to
    heighten the supposed relevance of the call Mr. Jordan made to
    Mr. Perelman. In other words, under their theory, Ms.
    Lewinsky's job prospects at MacAndrews and Forbes, or Revlon,
    were caput until Vernon Jordan made the call and resurrected
    her chances.
        Unfortunately, like so much of the obstruction case, the
    facts do not bear out this convenient theory. In fact, the man
    who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at MacAndrews was impressed with
    her, and because there was nothing available in his area, he
    sent her resume to Revlon where she was hired by someone who
    did not know about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman.
        So much for obstruction by job search.
        That, then, is an overview of the charges contained in
    these articles. You will hear about them in greater detail than
    I could offer you today when my colleagues speak in the next
    two days. I want to bring my presentation to a close.
        We are not here to defend William Clinton, the man. He,
    like all of us, will find his judges elsewhere. We are here to
    defend William Clinton, the President of the United States, for
    whom you are the only judges. You are free to criticize him, to
    find his personal conduct distasteful; but ask whether this is
    the moment when, for the first time in our history, the actions
    of a President have so put at risk the Government the framers
    created that there is only one solution. You must find not
    merely that removal is an acceptable option, that we will be OK
    the day after you vote; you must find that it's the only
    solution, that our democracy should not be made to sustain two
    more years of this President's service. You must put that
    question because the one thing that our form of Government
    cannot abide is the notion that impeachment is merely one more
    weapon a Congress can use in the process between the
    legislative and executive branches.
        Let me be very clear. We do not believe that President
    Clinton committed any of the offenses charged by the managers.
    And for the reasons we will set out at length over the next two
    days, we believe the managers have misstated the record, have
    constructed their case out of tenuous extrapolations, without
    foundation, and have at every turn assumed the worst without
    the evidence to support this speculation.
        You put these lawyers in a courtroom and they win 10 times
    out of 10.
        But suppose we are wrong. Suppose that you find that the
    President committed one or more of the offenses charged. Then
    there remains only one issue before you. Whatever your feelings
    may be about William Clinton, the man, or William Clinton, the
    political ally or opponent, or William Clinton, the father and
    husband, ask only this: Should William Clinton, the President,
    be removed from office? Are we at that horrific moment in our
    history when our Union could be preserved only by taking the
    step that the framers saw as the last resort? I am never
    certain how to respond when an advocate on the other side of a
    case calls up images of patriots over the centuries sacrificing
    themselves to preserve our democracy. I have no personal
    experience with war. I have only visited Normandy as a tourist.
    I do know this: My father was on the beach 55 years ago, and I
    know how he would feel if he were here. He didn't fight, no one
    fought, for one side of this case or the other. He fought, as
    all those did, for our country and our Constitution. As long as
    each of us--the managers, the President's counsel, the
    Senators--does his or her constitutional duty, those who fought
    for the country will be proud.
        We, the people of the United States, have formed a more
    perfect Union. We formed it. We nurtured it. We have seen it
    grow. We have not been perfect. And it is perhaps the most
    extraordinary thing about our Constitution--that it thrives
    despite our human imperfections.
        When the American people hear the President talk to
    Congress tonight, they will know the answer to the question,
    ``How stands the Union?'' It stands strong, vibrant, and free.
        I close as I opened 2 hours ago, or 2\1/2\ hours ago.
    William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of the charges that
    have been brought against him of committing perjury. He didn't
    obstruct justice. He must not be removed from office.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
                                    ------

                                     RECESS

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a moment the Senate will
    recess until 8:35 this evening, at which time the Senate will
    proceed as a body over to the House of Representatives as a
    joint session to receive a message from the President.
    Following the joint session, the Senate will adjourn until 11
    o'clock tomorrow morning.
        The Leader's Lecture Series is scheduled for tomorrow
    evening at 6 o'clock in the Old Senate Chamber with former
    President George Bush as guest speaker.
        I now ask that the Senate stand in recess under the
    previous order.
        There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:33 p.m.,
    recessed until 8:35 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. Crapo).
                                    ------

                       OPENNESS ON THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise today in strong
    support of opening Senate deliberations to the public during
    the course of the impeachment trial against President Clinton.
    I will therefore support the motion to be offered by Senators
    Harkin and Wellstone to suspend the rules in order to open
    these proceedings to public scrutiny.
        In this trial, the U.S. Senate is charged by the
    Constitution with deciding whether to remove from office a
    President twice elected by the American people. Although I am
    certain that every member of the Senate will undertake this
    Constitutional responsibility with the utmost gravity and
    perform ``impartial justice'' as our oath commands, I am
    concerned that the American people will be shut out of this
    process at some of its most crucial moments.
        America's great experiment in democracy trusts the people
    to elect a President in a process that consists of months of
    public discussion, primaries, caucuses, debates, and finally an
    election open to everyone who chooses to participate. In stark
    contrast, the Senate's rules preclude the public from seeing
    its deliberations on whether an impeachment case will be
    dismissed, whether witnesses will be called or further evidence
    introduced, and even the ultimate debate regarding the guilt or
    innocence of the President. In short, Mr. Chief Justice, the
    Constitution trusts the people to elect a President, but our
    current Senate impeachment rules do not trust them to have even
    the most passive involvement in our deliberative process, even
    when the debate might result in overturning the people's
    judgment in a national election.
        Let me take a moment to describe again for my colleagues
    how our current impeachment rules work. The Senate is not only
    the trier of fact in this case, but it also acts as the
    ultimate arbiter of law. It can overturn the Chief Justice's
    rulings on evidentiary questions and make decisions, which
    cannot be appealed to any court, on motions. But the Senate's
    impeachment rules, which were first drafted in connection with
    the Andrew Johnson impeachment and most recently revisited in
    1986, do not permit the Senate to debate any of the decisions
    that it must make, except in closed session. In fact, the rules
    provide that decisions on evidentiary rulings are to be made
    with no debate whatsoever.
        Other motions can be debated, but only in private. So, for
    example, we expect that after the presentations are made on
    both sides, a motion will be made to dismiss the case against
    the President. Under our current rules, the House managers and
    the President's lawyers will argue that motion, but the Senate
    cannot debate it in open session. In fact, if a majority of the
    Senate wants to preclude debate entirely, it can do that by
    simply voting against a motion to take the Senate into private
    session for deliberations. Thus, before we vote on what could
    be a dispositive motion in this case, our only options are to
    discuss it behind closed doors or not discuss it at all.
        I think this is wrong. We need a chance to debate this
    motion as Senators. I want to hear from my colleagues before I
    vote, not just afterward on television. I intend to carefully
    and respectfully entertain my colleagues' arguments, and I
    refuse to rule out the possibility that a well-reasoned
    argument offering a different perspective will influence my
    decision. But the American people also deserve to hear what we
    say to each other as we debate this motion. I see little to be
    gained from closing these deliberations and much to be lost. We
    must do everything we can to ensure public confidence in our
    fairness and impartiality. How can we expect the public to have
    faith in us if we close the doors at the very moment when we
    finally will speak on the dispositive questions of this
    historic trial?
        Opponents of openness argue that in the only Presidential
    impeachment trial in our Nation's history, that of Andrew
    Johnson, the Senate's deliberations were closed. While it may
    be tempting to rely on the precedent of the one previous
    Presidential impeachment trial, which occurred one hundred and
    thirty years ago, I believe we should take a fresh look at this
    issue. In particular, we should consider how drastically the
    rules of the Senate and the composition of the Senate have
    changed.
        The Senators who presided over President Johnson's
    impeachment were not elected by the American people directly,
    but were chosen by the various State legislatures, and thus
    were not directly responsive to the popular will. Today, we as
    Senators represent the citizens of our state directly and we
    are accountable to them at the ballot box. Furthermore, until
    1929, the Senate debated nominations and treaties in closed
    sessions; and until 1975, many committee sessions took place in
    private. Today, all of our proceedings are open to the public,
    except in rare cases involving national security. The rules
    governing membership in the Senate as well as the openness of
    Senate proceedings have consistently evolved throughout our
    history toward greater public involvement. The rules governing
    impeachment trial deliberations must move in that direction as
    well.
        Opening these proceedings as Senators Harkin and Wellstone
    have proposed will make the American public feel more involved
    in the process. With the percentage of voters who cast their
    ballot on election day declining in each succeeding election
    and polls showing that the public feels increasingly alienated
    from the political process; and with people openly questioning
    the relevance of their elected representatives and the Congress
    as a whole to their daily lives, we must lay open to the
    American people our deliberations on the most crucial decision
    short of declaring war that the Constitution ultimately
    entrusts to us. Democracy can only flourish when the people
    feel that they have a stake in the process. Conducting our
    impeachment deliberations in private sends the message that
    when the really important decisions need to be made, the
    American public is not welcome to observe. This is precisely
    the wrong message to send.
        Thus far in the impeachment process, there has been little
    to celebrate. Most Americans have concluded that the House of
    Representative's inquiry was plagued by partisanship. Many fear
    that the Senate will do the same. With the eyes of the country
    upon it, the Senate has an opportunity to restore America's
    trust in the constitutional process. Open deliberations will
    enhance the public's understanding and discussion of this case.
    It may even serve to chip away some of the pervasive cynicism
    in our country as Americans watch how their elected
    representatives conduct themselves during consideration of the
    articles. I trust that my colleagues will reach their decisions
    on the merits after careful, reasoned and informed
    consideration of the evidence and the arguments presented. If
    my trust in my colleagues is justified, our deliberations will
    be thoughtful, high-minded, vigorous, and non-partisan. And if
    we have that deliberation in the open, it will be remembered as
    one of the Senate's finest hours.
                                    ------

                          Wednesday, January 20, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

                           OPEN SENATE DELIBERATIONS

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I take the floor today with
    my colleague and friend from Minnesota, Senator Wellstone, to
    speak about an issue that is going to be coming up here in the
    next several days that is going to have an importance to all of
    the American people and, indeed, to future generations. That is
    the issue of whether or not the Senate, in its deliberations on
    the impeachment of President Clinton, will do it in secret or
    will do it in public; will do it behind closed doors, behind a
    curtain of secrecy, or do it openly so that the American people
    know what we are doing. I want to take just a few minutes to
    lay out the case for why I believe it should be open.
        Last week, Mr. Chief Justice, I raised an objection during
    the trial to the continued use of the word ``jurors,'' as it
    pertains to Senators sitting in a Court of Impeachment. I did
    that for a number of reasons, because we are not jurors. We are
    more than that. We are not just simply triers of fact. We are
    not just simply finders of law. But sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, we have a broad mandate, an expansive role to
    play. We have to take everything into account, everything from
    facts--yes, we have to take facts into account--we have to take
    law into account, but we also have to take into account a broad
    variety of things: how the case got here; what it is about; how
    important it is; how important is this piece of evidence
    weighed against that; what is the public will; how do the
    people feel about this; what will happen to the public good if
    one course of action is taken over another. These are all
    things we have to weigh, and that is why I felt strongly that
    Senators, in our own minds and in the public minds, should not
    be put in the box of simply being a juror.
        One other aspect of that is if, in fact, we are jurors, the
    argument went, then juries deliberate in secret and, therefore,
    if we are a jury, we should deliberate in secret. Now that we
    know we are not jurors, I believe that argument has gone away.
    I believe that we are, in fact, mandated by the Constitution to
    be more than that.
        I paraphrase an article that appeared in the Chicago
    Tribune by Professor Steven Lubet--he is a professor of law at
    Northwestern University--in which he pointed out that the
    Constitution does not allow us the luxury of being simply
    jurors. We have to decide; we have to judge.
        I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Lubet's article be printed
    in the Record.
        There being no objection, the article was ordered to be
    printed in the Record, as follows:

                   [From the Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1999]

                            Stop Calling Them Jurors

                               (By Steven Lubet)

        Some day soon, the actual impeachment trial of William Jefferson
    Clinton will begin, with 100 United States senators sitting in
    judgment. The senators, in anticipation of the event, keep referring to
    themselves as a jury. On a recent edition of ``Larry King Live,'' for
    example, no fewer than six of them (three Republicans and three
    Democrats) virtually chanted the mantra that it was their duty to act
    as ``impartial jurors.'' It is tempting to agree.
        After all, they have been sworn to do justice, they are going to
    consider evidence and the resulting verdict must be either conviction
    or acquittal.
        But in fact, the senators are not jurors, and the repeated use of
    that term is dangerously misleading.
        In an ordinarily trial, the decision-making responsibility is
    divided between judge and jury. The judge makes rulings of law, while
    the jury's function is severely limited to determination of facts. In
    other words, the jury only decides ``what happened'' while the judge
    decides almost everything else. That is not the case with impeachment.
    Article I of the Constitution confers on the Senate the ``sole power to
    try all impeachments.'' That power is comprehensive--including law,
    facts and procedure--and it is to be exercised in its entirety by the
    Senate itself.
        (It is true that the chief justice is called upon to ``preside''
    over presidential impeachments, but only because the vice president--
    who is ordinarily the Senate's presiding officer--is disqualified by an
    obvious conflict of interest. The chief justice does not sit as a judge
    in any ordinary sense, but more as a moderator or chair. He holds no
    binding legal or decisional power.)
        And if there were any doubt, Article III of the Constitution
    actually makes this explicit, providing that ``the trial of all crimes,
    except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.'' So, what are the
    senators, if not jurors? In fact, they are all judges, or if you
    prefer, members of the court of impeachment, each one delegated full
    power to decide every issue involved in the case.
        This distinction is crucial. President Clinton's most fervent
    detractors have argued that the House of Representatives, in exercise
    of its own constitutional power, has conclusively determined the
    ``impeachability'' of the alleged offenses, leaving the senatorial jury
    the limited task of deciding whether the charges are true. But that is
    wrong. The Senate's role is not at all confined to the ascertainment of
    facts. Under the Constitution, the senators need not--they may not--
    defer to the House of Representatives on the critical question of
    ``impeachability.''
        Thus, the Senators must decide not only whether Clinton lied to the
    grand jury, but also whether so-called ``perjury about sex''
    constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor of sufficient gravity to
    justify removing this president from office.
        It is easy to understand why a senator would want to be a juror.
    The persona is so engaging: modest, contemplative, nearly anonymous--
    the humble citizen called to civic duty. But the constant references to
    senators-as-jurors can only serve to diminish their role and distract
    them from the expansive nature of their duty. It is not their job, as
    it would be a jury's, simply to decide some facts and then move on. The
    Constitution does not allow them that luxury.
        The senators are not determining just one case; their concern must
    be far greater than the fate of a single man. Rather, they are setting
    a legal and political precedent that may well guide our Republic for
    the next 130 years. Future generations will look back upon this Senate
    for direction whenever potential impeachments arise. Our descendants
    will not want to know only what happened, but also what principles
    govern the removal of the president. And so, the senators cannot merely
    decide--they have to judge.

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, a couple of other things
    regarding openness. The hallmark of our Republic and of our
    system of government is openness and transparency. The history
    of this Senate has been one of opening the doors. The first
    three sessions of the U.S. Senate were held in secret behind
    closed doors, the whole sessions. Up until 1929, all
    nominations and treaties were debated behind closed doors. In
    1972, 40 percent of all the committee meetings were done behind
    closed doors. In fact, up until 1975, many conference
    committees, and still committee meetings, were held behind
    closed doors.
        We have washed all that away. We have found through the
    years that the best political disinfectant is sunshine. I
    believe we are a better Senate, a better Congress and a better
    country for opening the doors and letting people see what we do
    and how we reach the decisions we reach.
        Mr. Chief Justice, there has been a spate of editorials
    recently regarding opening up the trial. I quote one from the
    Washington Post dated January 14. It says:

        It seems only right . . . that the Senate should be
    expected to debate in public any charge for which it is
    demanding of the president a public accounting.
        This is not to prevent senators from caucusing in private
    or even meeting unofficially, as senators did last week in
    crafting the procedural compromise that will govern the trial.
    Confidential contacts of this sort can certainly be
    constructive. But when the Senate meets as the Senate and
    considers arguments in its official trial proceedings, it
    should not do so behind closed doors. Absent the most unusual
    of circumstances, it should conduct its deliberations openly,
    thereby ensuring that the final adjudication of Mr. Clinton's
    case is as transparently accountable as possible.

        The New York Times basically said the same thing. The Los
    Angeles Times, the Des Moines Register and Roll Call. I think
    Roll Call basically said it best when they said:

        . . . this is not a court trial. . . . It is inherently a
    political proceeding. . . . Their constituents [our
    constituents], the citizens of America, have a right to see how
    they perform and to fully understand why they decided to retain
    or remove their elected President.

        I ask unanimous consent that all of these editorials be
    printed in the Record.
        There being no objection, the material was ordered to be
    printed in the Record, as follows:

                   [From the Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1999]

                                 An Open Trial

        Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.) have
    announced that they will move to suspend certain portions of the
    Senate's impeachment rules to permit the full Senate trial of President
    Clinton to be conducted in the public's view. As the more than 100-
    year-old rules stand now, testimony can be taken with the cameras on
    and the doors open unless a majority votes to close the session, but
    any time the senators debate a motion and, for that matter, when they
    consider the final articles, they will do so in secret. This is exactly
    the wrong way to conduct a trial whose purpose is to pass public
    judgment on the conduct of the president. The Harkin-Wellstone proposal
    to do the whole trial in public offers a far better approach.
        The desire to avoid public argument is understandable, particularly
    in a case as filled with salacious material as the Clinton trial must
    necessarily be. But it is not the job of the Senate to protect citizens
    from the rationale for the Senate's actions, nor are senators entitled
    to be shielded from the embarrassment of discussing out loud the tawdry
    evidence at issue in this case.
        The often drawn analogy between senators and jurors, whose
    deliberations are kept secret, also fails to offer a persuasive reason
    to conduct secret debates. Jurors, after all, did not seek public
    office and are not permitted, as their trials are progressing, to go on
    talk shows to discuss their own consideration of the evidence. The
    senators are, in this proceeding, acting as far more than simple
    jurors, and it makes little sense for this most solemn obligation of
    the Senate to face less sunshine than does a routine legislative
    matter. It seems only right, rather, that the Senate should be expected
    to debate in public any charge for which it is demanding of the
    president a public accounting.
        This is not to prevent senators from caucusing in private or even
    from meeting unofficially, as senators did last week in crafting the
    procedural compromise that will govern the trial. Confidential contacts
    of this sort can certainly be constructive. But when the Senate meets
    as the Senate and considers arguments in its official trial
    proceedings, it should not do so behind closed doors. Absent the most
    unusual of circumstances, it should conduct its deliberations openly,
    thereby ensuring that the final adjudication of Mr. Clinton's case is
    as transparently accountable as possible.
                                     ______

                    [From the New York Times, Jan. 13, 1999]

                                Open the Senate

        Since the trial of President Andrew Johnson in 1868, the Senate has
    conducted its debates on procedures and even the final verdict of
    impeachments in closed session. The time has come for that tradition to
    be altered, at least for the trial of President Clinton. Two Democratic
    Senators, Tom Harkin and Paul Wellstone, have announced that they will
    seek to change the rule on closed debates after the opening
    presentations begin tomorrow. Whatever would be gained by allowing
    senators to deliberate privately, the overriding requirements is for
    the American public to see and judge firsthand whether justice is being
    done.
        Some senators argue that the closed session last Friday, at which
    Democrats and Republicans worked out a compromise on trial procedures,
    showed that privacy can serve a constructive purpose. But the Harkin-
    Wellstone proposal would not preclude the Senate's adjourning and
    meeting outside the chamber at caucuses like the one last week. The
    principle that should prevail is simply that proceedings that could
    lead to the removal of a President should be conducted in open session,
    especially since many Americans have questions about the fairness of
    the House impeachment proceedings. Closing the Senate's deliberations
    on so grave a matter would undermine public confidence and be an
    affront to citizens' rights to observe the operations of government.
        Senators love their customs and ceremonies, but their institution's
    commanding trend has been toward openness. At the time of the nation's
    founding, all Senate sessions were closed. Until 1929, the Senate
    debated nominations and treaties in closed sessions. Until the reforms
    of the 1970's, many Congressional hearings and meetings were in closed
    session. No one would seriously argue that these old practices should
    have been preserved. As for impeachment trials, it is worth noting that
    they were open most of the 19th century. Privacy was adopted only for
    the trial of President Johnson.
        Some senators seem to believe that they should be regarded as
    jurors in a trial, and therefore allowed a measure of confidentiality.
    But the senators have privileges not available to regular juries. They
    may ask questions, speak publicly about the process and make motions.
    It is within their power to change the rules on closing the session,
    which would take a two-thirds majority to be adopted. If openness
    drives senators toward partisanship or prolixity, as some fear, let
    public scrutiny serve as the governor on their excesses.
                                     ______

                  [From the Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1999]

                             Keep Trial Fully Open

        Unless the Senate changes one of its rules for conducting President
    Clinton's impeachment trial, the public will not be allowed to witness
    crucial parts, including a possible climactic debate on whether to
    convict Clinton on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. The
    Senate should change this archaic rule; the trial's inestimable
    national importance demands that the proceedings be completely open.
        For guidance in the trial, which opens Thursday, the Senate is
    relying on rules adopted in 1868, when Andrew Johnson became the first
    and until now the only president to be tried for alleged high crimes
    and misdemeanors. One of those rules compels ``the doors to be closed''
    whenever senators debate among themselves, something they are allowed
    to do only when deciding procedural issues--such as whether witnesses
    should be called--or when they reach a verdict. Otherwise, by the rules
    of 1868, the senators must sit in silence as House prosecutors present
    the case against Clinton and White House lawyers defend him. Any
    questions the senators have must be submitted in writing to the chief
    justice, who may or may not choose to ask them.
        The precedents embedded in the Johnson trial rules should not be
    put aside lightly. Without them the Senate could find itself mired in
    prolonged and divisive arguments over how to proceed. But no precedent
    is sacred. Times change and rules must change with them. Congress has
    many times discarded procedures and traditions that came to be seen as
    inimical to the need for free discussion in an open society. For
    example, as Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.)
    note, in the earliest days of the republic all of Congress' proceedings
    were secret. Until 1929 nomination hearings were conducted behind
    closed doors. Until 1975 many committee sessions similarly took place
    outside public scrutiny.
        The Senate of Andrew Johnson's day was a far different place from
    the Senate of today. Its members were not chosen by the electorate--
    that did not come until 1913--but rather were appointed by state
    legislatures and so were not directly answerable to the popular will.
    And much of the Senate's business was routinely conducted in secret.
        Today, except when matters of national security are being
    discussed, Congress' sessions are open--in the sunshine, as they say in
    the Capital. If ever there was an occasion when the sun should be
    allowed fully to shine in, it is in the Clinton impeachment trial.
        A two-thirds vote is needed to change Senate rules. Harkin and
    Wellstone, the major proponents of full openness, know the difficulty
    of getting 65 colleagues to agree with them. But they are leading a
    fair and just cause. Put simply, Americans have a right to witness this
    process in all its facets. The people's representatives in the Senate
    now have the responsibility to assure that right.
                                     ______

                        [From Roll Call, Jan. 14, 1999]

                                No Secret Trial

        Imagine the spectacle. On, say, March 5, cameras are turned on in
    the Senate and the roll is called on the articles of impeachment
    against President Clinton. The votes are taken, the decision is made--
    and then there is a mad rush for Senators to explain why they voted as
    they did. But their actual deliberations prior to the voting remain
    secret.
        There is not even an official record kept, so reconstructing one of
    the most portentous debates in American history depends on the memories
    and notes of Senators and staffers.
        This secrecy scenario is exactly what's in store unless the Senate
    changes its rules, as proposed by Sens. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Paul
    Wellstone (D-Minn.), to open the impeachment trial to the media and the
    public.
        In fact, it will take strong action from Senate leaders to open the
    trial, since changing Senate rules requires a two-thirds vote. We urge
    Democratic and Republican leaders to exercise their influence to
    prevent their institution from being accused of conducting a ``secret
    trial.''
        The allegation could turn out to be true. Senate rules call not
    only for final deliberations on impeachment to be conducted in secret,
    but any deliberations. This means that motions to dismiss the case and
    consideration of whether to call witnesses might be done in secret and
    with no subsequent printing of the proceedings in the Congressional
    Record. All but arguments by House managers and the President's
    lawyers, witness testimony, if any, and the actual vote could take
    place behind a shroud.
        Some Senators say they would not have been able to reach their
    bipartisan agreement on procedure last Friday if the session had been
    open. If statesmanship requires secrecy--which we doubt--then
    arrangements can be made for informal closed discussions. But all
    substantive discussions should be open. We have some sympathy for the
    view that some subject matter conceivably could be so sexually explicit
    that Senators will be ashamed to be seen discussing it in public. But
    it's not worth closing off almost the entire Clinton trial over this
    possibility.
        Conceivably--if this is what it takes to sway skittish Senators--
    the rules could be altered to permit some discussion to be held in
    closed session with a record kept. But the House debate on impeachment
    could have been rated PG-13, and let's face it: The Clinton case record
    is already so raunchy that there's little that schoolchildren haven't
    already heard. So the proceedings ought to be open.
        It will be argued: In court trials, jury deliberations are
    conducted in secret. But this is not a court trial. It is inherently a
    political proceeding. The ``jurors'' are not ordinary citizens unused
    to the glare of publicity. They will be up for reelection and judged
    partly on the basis of how they handle this case. Their constituents,
    the citizens of America, have a right to see how they perform and to
    fully understand why they decided to retain or remove their elected
    President.

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, let me take off a little bit
    on one aspect of this. Some people say, ``Well, there is a
    benefit to Senators meeting quietly, privately to discuss
    these.'' I believe that, and I would not, in any way, want to
    close, for example, some of the caucuses that we have--the
    occupant of the Chair remembers we had the closed caucus
    between the two parties to reach an agreement under which we
    are operating. I think there is a benefit to that, as the
    Washington Post article pointed out. That is fine, as we meet
    unofficially off the floor amongst ourselves to discuss things.
    But when the Senate meets as the Senate, as soon as that
    opening prayer is given by the Chaplain, this place should be
    open, and the trial should be open.
        Next, I believe that unless we open this trial up, we are
    going to sow the seeds of confusion, misinformation, suspicion
    and unnecessary conflict. Here is why I say that. As some wag
    once said, there is nothing secret about any secret meeting
    held here in Washington.
        Think, if you will, of a closed session of the Senate. The
    galleries are cleared, the cameras are shut off, reporters are
    gone, and we engage in debate on whatever issue we are going to
    debate. The debate is over. We open the galleries again, and
    100 Senators rush out of here and they see all the reporters
    standing out here.
        What happens? ``Well, what happened, Senator?''
        ``Well, don't quote me, not for attribution, but guess what
    this Senator said; guess what that Senator said?''
        And so you get 100 different versions of what happened here
    on the Senate floor.
        I believe that will sow a lot of confusion, misinformation
    and unnecessary conflict. If the doors are open and if we
    debate in the open, there is no filter, it is unfiltered, and
    the public can see how and why we reached the decisions we
    reached.
        The press, quite frankly, obviously, as perhaps is their
    nature, is quick to pick up on conflict and rumor. I believe if
    we follow the rules to close the doors of this trial it will
    turn it more into a circus than anything else. If we open the
    debate, I don't believe we will have any problems.
        I was interested in an op-ed piece that was in the New York
    Times by former Senator Dale Bumpers. I read it, and there is a
    part in there I think really hits home. Former Senator Bumpers
    said:

        In a visit with Harry Truman in his home in Missouri in
    1971, he admonished me to always put my trust in the people.
    ``They can handle it,'' he said.

        ``They can handle it.'' I believe the American people can
    handle it, too. I believe they can handle any debate, any
    discussion, any deliberation that we have on the Senate floor.
    Not only can they handle it, I believe they have a right to it.
        So Senator Wellstone and I will, at the first opportunity,
    when the first motion is made to dismiss the case, if that
    motion is made--obviously the debate about that under the rules
    would be held in secret--we intend at that point to offer a
    preferential motion that the debate, the discussion in the
    Senate on the motion to dismiss be held openly, to suspend the
    rules.
        Obviously, that is a hurdle. To suspend the rules requires
    a two-thirds vote. It means that two-thirds of the Senate would
    have to vote to suspend the rules. As a further kind of
    anomaly, the motion to open up the Senate, to open up our
    debate and deliberation, the debate on that has to be held in
    private under the rules, strange as it may seem. And so we will
    at that point ask unanimous consent that the debate and
    discussion on whether we will open up the debate on the motion
    to dismiss be held openly. Of course, one Senator can object,
    and then we would have to go into a secret debate on our motion
    to open up the deliberation and the debate. And so that will
    happen sometime soon.
        Another issue has been raised, Mr. Chief Justice--I would
    just like to cover it and then I am going to yield the floor to
    Senator Wellstone. The point has been raised, well, you know,
    if Senators start debating this and it gets in the open, then
    they get in front of the cameras, and, why, then this thing can
    go on and on and on because Senators--you know, we Senators
    like to talk, we can talk forever. Under the rules of the
    Senate, when we go into debate and deliberation on any motion,
    each Senator can be recognized only for 10 minutes--only for 10
    minutes. And I think a lot of people are forgetting about that.
        Lastly, I remember in January of 1991 when I sat at the
    desk on that side over there and Senators had just been sworn
    in; housekeeping motions were being made. One motion was being
    made by the majority leader at that time that the Senate recess
    or adjourn--I forget--adjourn to a date certain--I think it was
    for the State of the Union--but during that period of time,
    that we would not have been in session, and the time would have
    run out on whether or not we would use force to get the Iraqis
    out of Kuwait, the gulf war.
        I stood at that time and raised an objection to the Senate
    recessing or adjourning over to that point. And I raised an
    objection that enabled us to have an open and public debate on
    whether or not we would authorize the President of the United
    States to conduct military operations in the gulf. We had that
    debate. And I think it was one of the Senate's finest hours.
    Even those with whom I disagreed I thought were eloquent and
    forceful in their arguments. We had the debate, we had the
    vote, and then we moved on. And I think the American people
    were better for that debate because it was held in the open.
        Mr. Chief Justice, if we in the Senate can debate whether
    or not to send our sons and daughters off to distant lands to
    fight and die in a war--something that touches every single
    American citizen--if we can debate that in open and in public,
    then in the name of all that is right about our Republic and
    our country and our openness and our system of government, why
    can we not debate and deliberate in the open something else
    that touches every American citizen? And that is, why or if the
    President of the United States should or should not be removed
    from office. If we can debate it openly, the issue of war, then
    certainly we can debate an issue in the open, the issue of
    whether or not the President would be removed from office.
        I yield the floor.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, let me, first of all,
    thank my colleague, Senator Harkin. We have been working very
    hard on this. There are other Senators who support this
    motion--Senator Leahy, Senator Feingold, Senator Boxer, and
    Senator Lieberman. And I know Senator Hutchison has indicated
    interest in this question. This will be a very important vote
    coming up next week.
        First, let me just, if I could, say that I feel very
    honored to be speaking from Dale Bumpers' desk. I don't think
    there is anybody who could match his oratory, but I am sure
    lucky to have this desk and this long cord. And Dale Bumpers,
    wherever you are, I will do my very best to try to carry on in
    your tradition, or at least give it everything that I have.
        Mr. Chief Justice, next week before the Senate goes into
    its own deliberations on this question of whether to dismiss
    charges, we will take this one step at a time. We most
    definitely will try to move forward with a motion to suspend
    the rules so that the Senate deliberations will not be in
    closed session. We also would like to make sure that the very
    debate as to whether our deliberations are in closed session or
    secret session be open to the public. And we will, on the floor
    of the Senate, make every effort possible to keep that debate
    in the open.
        I am going to be very brief and just make the following
    arguments because there are some very, very good people who do
    a lot of work when it comes to interpretation of the rules. I
    will say, since the Parliamentarian is here, that Bob Dove has
    been eminently fair. He has treated all of us from both
    political parties with the utmost respect.
        My own feeling about this is that this trial has been
    momentous. I personally wish that it had not come over from the
    House. I have always made my point that I believe the House
    overreached on the impeachment charges. But they are here in
    the Senate.
        I think here are the following questions: If in fact we as
    a Senate are going to go into deliberations over whether to
    dismiss the charges against the President, or later on whether
    we will have witnesses, or later on whether the President shall
    be removed, I cannot imagine that the U.S. Senate would go into
    closed session. I cannot imagine that our deliberations and our
    debate and the arguments we make would not be open to the
    public.
        The public isn't going to believe in this political process
    if we go into secret or closed session. The public is not going
    to have trust in what we are doing if they don't get a chance
    to evaluate our debate and what we are saying and why we
    reached the conclusions we reached.
        I really do believe that if there is to be healing in our
    country--and I certainly pray that there will be--it would be a
    terrible mistake for the U.S. Senators, Democrats or
    Republicans, to cut the public out. The part of the public that
    is looking at the proceedings right now, that is evaluating the
    arguments that are being made--and there are people who have
    made very good arguments on both sides of the question--to then
    say to them, ``Listen, when it comes to now the Senate, the
    U.S. Senate, going into our own deliberations and making our
    own decisions, you, the public, you're cut out of it,'' this
    goes against the very essence of accountability. It goes
    against the very essence of what a representative democracy is
    about.
        Some of these rules go back to 1868. That was a time when
    the U.S. Senators were not even directly elected. They were
    elected by State legislatures. The 17th amendment changed all
    that in 1913 as part of the Progressive movement and the
    progressive change in the country. The idea was that the U.S.
    Senators would be a part of representative democracy, directly
    elected by the people, accountable to the people.
        This is a huge decision we are going to be making in the
    U.S. Senate. And I think it will be a terrible mistake for the
    U.S. Senate to go into closed session, to cut the public out,
    to not let people have the opportunity to hear what we are
    saying in the debate.
        It is really quite amazing, if you think about it. People
    will know what our votes are--dismissal of charges, witnesses,
    whether the President should be removed from office--and
    somewhere there will be a transcript of the proceedings, but I
    don't think they will even be published. There will not even be
    a public record of what U.S. Senators--the Senator from
    Arkansas or the Senator from Minnesota or the Senator from
    Iowa--had to say in this debate.
        I just say to all of my colleagues, I hope that, No. 1, you
    will agree to a unanimous-consent agreement that in our
    discussion or our debate whether or not we go into closed
    session, that it be open to the public. What an irony it would
    be if, in the very debate about whether or not our
    deliberations will be open or closed, our deliberations were
    closed. It seems to me that debate ought to be open to the
    public.
        Second, I certainly hope that we will have the two-thirds
    vote that it will take to suspend the current rule that says we
    must be in closed session.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I think it is important for the public
    right now to be engaged in this process. I hope people will be
    calling their Senators, because I really do believe that part
    of our deliberations, part of our modus operandi as Senators,
    whatever States we represent, should be to stay in touch with
    people. Of course, we reach our own independent judgment. We
    reach our own independent judgment about the facts, about the
    charges.
        Then there is another question, the threshold question,
    about whether or not these charges rise to the level of
    removing a President from office.
        I think part of what we are about as Senators is to try to
    stay in close touch with the public, with people in our States,
    whatever decision we make. It can be a matter of individual
    conscience, but I think it is terribly important that we
    operate as a representative body, as the U.S. Senate, as a part
    of representative democracy of the United States of America. We
    can't on this question, we can't on these questions, if we go
    into closed session.

                                     recess

        Thereupon, the Senate, in legislative session, recessed
    until 1:05 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, reassembled when called to order by the Chief
    Justice.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Senators may be seated, and the Deputy
    Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
        The Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Loretta Symms, made
    proclamation as follows:
        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that
    the White House counsel presentation today will last until
    sometime between 5 and 6 o'clock.
        I have been informed that Mr. Greg Craig and Ms. Cheryl
    Mills will be making today's presentations. As we have done
    over the past week, we will take a couple of short breaks
    during the proceedings. I am not exactly sure how we will do
    that. We will keep an eye on everybody, the Chief Justice, and
    counsel. I assume that after about an hour, hour and 15
    minutes, we will take a break; then we will take another one in
    the afternoon at some point so we will have an opportunity to
    stretch.
        I remind all Senators, again, to remain standing at your
    desks each time the Chief Justice enters and departs the
    Chamber.
        As a further reminder, on a different subject, the Leader's
    Lecture Series continues tonight, to be held at 6 p.m. in the
    Old Senate Chamber. Former President George Bush will be our
    guest speaker.
        I yield the floor, and I understand that Counsel Greg Craig
    is going to be the first presenter.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Journal of the proceedings of the
    trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, counsel
    for the President have 21 hours 45 minutes remaining to make
    the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Craig.
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen
    of the Senate, distinguished managers from the House, good
    afternoon. My name is Greg Craig and I am special counsel to
    the President. I am here today on behalf of President Clinton.
    I am here to argue that he is not guilty of the allegations of
    grand jury perjury set forth in article I.
        I welcome this opportunity to speak for President Clinton.
    He has a strong and compelling case, one that is based on the
    facts in the record, on the law, and on the Constitution. But
    first and foremost, the President's defense is based on the
    grand jury transcript itself. I urge you to read that
    transcript and watch the videotape. You will see this President
    make painful, difficult admissions, beginning with his
    acknowledgment of an improper and wrongful relationship with
    Monica Lewinsky.
        You will see that the President was truthful. And after
    reading, seeing, hearing, and studying the evidence for
    yourselves, not relying on what someone else says it is, not
    relying on someone else's description, characterization, or
    paraphrase of the President's testimony, we believe that you
    will conclude that what the President did and said in the grand
    jury was not unlawful, and that you must not remove him from
    office.
        I plan to divide my presentation into three parts:
        First, to tell you how really bad this article is, legally,
    structurally, and constitutionally, and to argue that it falls
    well below the most basic, minimal standards and should not be
    used to impeach and remove this President or any President from
    office; second, to address the various allegations directly;
    and third, to give you a few larger thoughts in response to
    some of the arguments from last week.
        At the conclusion you will have had much more than 100
    percent of your minimum daily requirements for lawyering, for
    which I apologize.
        Article I accuses the President of having given perjurious,
    false, and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning
    one or more of four different subject areas:
        First, when he testified about the nature and details of
    the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky;
        Second, when he testified about his testimony in the Jones
    deposition;
        Third, when he testified about what happened during the
    Jones deposition when the President's lawyer, Robert Bennett,
    made certain representations about Monica Lewinsky's affidavit;
        And, fourth, when he testified about alleged efforts to
    influence the testimony of witnesses and impede the discovery
    of evidence.
        It is noteworthy that the second and third subject areas
    are attempts to revisit the President's deposition testimony in
    the Jones case. There was an article that was proposed alleging
    that the President also committed perjury in the Jones case in
    the Jones deposition. That article was rejected by the House of
    Representatives, and there were very many good reasons for the
    House to take that action. Those allegations have been
    dismissed, and you must not allow the managers to revive them.
    Last week they tried to do that. The managers mixed up and
    merged two sets of issues--allegations of perjury in the grand
    jury and allegations of perjury in the Jones case. These are
    very different matters. And I think the result was confusing
    and also unfair to the President.
        You will notice that the third and the fourth subject areas
    correspond to, coincide, and overlap with many of the
    allegations of obstruction of justice in article II. This
    represents a kind of double charging that you might be familiar
    with if you have either been a prosecutor or a defense lawyer.
    One is, the defendant is charged with the core offense; second,
    the defendant is charged with denying the core offense under
    oath. This gives the managers two bites at the apple, and it is
    a dubious prosecutorial practice that is frowned upon by most
    courts.
        The upshot, though, of this with respect to subparts 3 and
    4 of this first article is that if you conclude, as I trust you
    will, that the evidence that the President engaged in
    obstruction of justice is insufficient to support that charge,
    it would follow logically that the President's denial that he
    engaged in any such activity would be respected, and he would
    be acquitted on the perjury charge. Simply put, if the
    President didn't obstruct justice, he didn't commit perjury
    when he denied it.
        But the most striking thing about article I is what it does
    not say. It alleges the perjury generally. But it does not
    allege a single perjurious statement specifically. The majority
    drafted the article in this way despite pleas from other
    members of the committee and from counsel for the President
    that the article take care to be precise when it makes its
    allegations. Such specificity, as many of you know, is the
    standard practice of Federal prosecutors all across America.
    And that is the practice recommended by the Department of
    Justice in the manual distributed to the U.S. attorneys who
    enforce the criminal code in Federal courts throughout the
    Nation.
        Take a look at the standard form. It is exhibit 5 in the
    exhibits that we handed to you. This is given to Federal
    prosecutors. This is the model that they are told to use to
    allege perjury in a criminal indictment in Federal court. There
    is a very simple reason why prosecutors identify the specific
    quotation that is alleged to be perjury, and why it is included
    in a perjury indictment. If they don't quote the specific
    statement that is alleged to be perjurious, courts will dismiss
    the indictment, concluding that the charge of perjury is too
    vague and that the defendant is not able to determine what
    precisely he is being charged with.
        The requirement that a defendant be given adequate notice
    of what he is charged with carries constitutional dimensions,
    and the failure to provide that notice violates due process of
    law. This is something that applies to all criminal defendant
    offenses when they are charged. And you can understand why that
    kind of notice is required. Imagine a robbery indictment that
    failed to indicate who or what was robbed and what property was
    stolen. How could you possibly defend against the charge that
    you just stole something but you don't know what it is and it
    is nothing specific? Imagine a murder indictment without
    identifying a victim.
        But this requirement is even more stringent for perjury
    prosecution. Description, paraphrase, or summary of testimony
    that is alleged to be perjurious are not acceptable. The
    quotation must be there, or the definition should be so close
    that there can be no doubt as to what is intended. In the past,
    when the House returned articles of impeachment alleging
    perjury with respect to Federal judges, you will see that the
    House has followed this practice. And if you go back to
    American history and review the articles that allege perjury
    and that have been approved by the House and the Senate, you
    will find that the statements that are alleged to be perjurious
    are specifically identified in the article.
        Let me read from article I from the resolution of
    impeachment against Judge Walter Nixon. ``The false or
    misleading statement was in substance that the Forest County
    District Attorney never discussed this case with Judge Nixon.''
    There is no doubt about that. That is very clear. From the
    Alcee Hastings articles of impeachment, the false statement
    was, in substance, that Judge Hastings and William Borders
    never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in
    United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings.
        Why is it that in this case--surely the most serious
    perjury trial in American history--the House decided that
    specific allegations just aren't necessary? The failure of the
    House to be specific in its charge of perjury in fact violated
    the President's right to due process and fundamental fairness.
    And, as you will see as I go through the procedural history of
    these allegations, it puts us and the President at a
    significant disadvantage when we try to respond to the
    allegations that are now set forth in this article.
        But there is yet another reason why this vagueness and lack
    of specificity is so very dangerous, and it raises a
    constitutional question that only this body can resolve.
        Article I, section 2, clause 5, of the Constitution states,
    ``The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
    impeachment''--``the sole power of impeachment.''
        By failing to be specific in this article as to what it is
    precisely that the President said that should cause him to be
    removed from office, the House has effectively and
    unconstitutionally ceded its authority under this provision of
    the Constitution to the managers, who are not authorized to
    exercise that authority. By bringing general charges in this
    article, the House Judiciary Committee, and then the House of
    Representatives generally, gave enormous discretion, power, and
    authority to the floor managers and their lawyers to decide
    what precisely the President was going to be charged with. They
    didn't have that authority under the Constitution. Only the
    House of Representatives has that authority. They have been
    allowed to pick and to choose what allegations will be leveled
    against the President of the United States.
        It would be extremely dangerous to the integrity of the
    process if the House leveled such general charges against the
    President, creating ``empty vessels,'' to use Mr. Ruff's term,
    to be filled by lawyers and floor managers. And this article, I
    think, will take on more importance as we take a closer look at
    the charges themselves and we see what kind of ``witches'
    brew''--to use Mr. Ruff again--what kind of content was poured
    into these vessels, and find out where they came from and why
    and when.
        I would like to talk about how these charges have been a
    moving target for us throughout this entire process. On
    September 9, when Kenneth Starr submitted his referral to the
    House of Representatives, he claimed that there was substantial
    and credible information to suggest that the President
    committed perjury in the grand jury on three separate
    occasions. To his credit, the Starr referral was moderately
    specific. We could understand what they were talking about in
    those allegations.
        On October 5, when House majority counsel David Schippers
    first made his representation to the House Judiciary Committee,
    he discarded two of Mr. Starr's theories and invented a new one
    of his own. And he included only two counts in his presentation
    alleging perjury in the grand jury. Those two counts were
    unbelievably broad and included no specifics whatsoever.
        On November 19, Mr. Starr appeared before the House
    Judiciary Committee and gave a 2-hour opening statement. In
    that statement he delivered one or two sentences on the subject
    of grand jury perjury.
        Then, on December 9, when the committee majority released
    its four proposed articles of impeachment, the article that
    alleged perjury in the grand jury, which is the one we have
    before us today, failed to tell us or the American people what
    words the President actually used that should cause the
    Congress to remove him from office.
        As you know, these proposed articles were released just as
    Mr. Ruff and the President's defense were being completed. In
    fact, it may have been 2 or 3 minutes before he completed his
    final argument before the committee. So we had no advance
    notice and no chance to discuss these articles, to respond to
    them, or in any way to react. In truth, I must say that because
    of the vagueness of the articles that were ultimately returned,
    had we been given such advance notice, it would not have made
    much difference because, simply put, there is a stunning lack
    of specificity in article I.
        So where do we look for guidance? How do we know what to
    defend against in this case? After the Judiciary Committee had
    completed its deliberations, after the Members had voted to
    send four articles of impeachment to the full House, the
    majority issued its report on December 16th, only 3 days before
    the House took its final vote. It was never debated by, let
    alone approved by, the House of Representatives, and thus this
    report has no formal standing in these proceedings. But until
    the managers filed their trial brief and made their
    presentations just last week, the majority report, written by
    Mr. Schippers and his staff, was our only place to go to look
    for guidance as to what those four subparts of this first
    article really meant.
        Now, when it comes to perjury before the grand jury, the
    majority report argued that the President had not made two, not
    three, but a whole host of perjurious statements before the
    grand jury, some statements that were not contained in the
    Starr referral and had never been identified, charged,
    discussed, or debated by the Members during the impeachment
    inquiry.
        For example, the majority report alleged that the prepared
    statement that the President made and delivered to the grand
    jury at the start of his testimony admitting his relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky was ``perjurious, false, and misleading,'' an
    astonishing allegation that went far beyond anything that
    Kenneth Starr had claimed, and a claim that no member of the
    Judiciary Committee had ever made in the course of the
    committee's deliberations.
        Obviously, we had no opportunity whatsoever to respond to
    this allegation before the committee or before the House; the
    allegation was never debated or discussed by members of the
    committee, nor was it discussed during the debate in the
    Chamber of the House.
        The majority report also alleged that the President
    committed perjury in the grand jury when he testified that his
    ``goal in the [Jones] deposition was to be truthful,'' and when
    he said that he believed he had managed to complete his
    testimony in that deposition ``without violating the law.''
        Again, this allegation was brand new to us, never before
    made by Starr, not included in the Schippers closing argument,
    never mentioned by Chairman Hyde or by anyone else in the
    committee, never addressed by the President's counsel, never
    debated by members of the committee, never discussed on the
    floor.
        The majority report made many other new allegations of the
    same kind and pedigree--all new, undiscussed, untested. They
    had not come, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, these
    allegations did not come from Starr's referral, nor did they
    come from any evidence that had been gathered in the course of
    the impeachment inquiry, nor had they ever been unveiled during
    the impeachment inquiry to allow the President's counsel to
    respond, or the members of the Judiciary Committee to debate
    them. To our knowledge, many of these allegations were never
    discussed or debated by the members of the committee. And if
    you read the closing arguments of the members of the House
    Judiciary Committee, you will search in vain for any specific
    reference to any of these new allegations, the terms of which
    are the subject of article I.
        Then we found ourselves in the Senate, our only guide being
    the articles themselves, which, as you know, are general, and
    the majority report, which has no formal standing but which was
    filled with allegations and theories, and which had never been
    discussed much less adopted.
        As the trial in the Senate began--just 3 days before the
    managers were scheduled to open their case, on January 11th--
    the House managers filed their trial brief. We discovered that
    the allegations of grand jury perjury against the President
    were still changing, still expanding, still increasing in
    number.
        The trial brief made eight proffers, incredibly presented
    ``merely as examples'' that still in general terms describe
    instances where the President allegedly provided ``perjurious,
    false, and misleading testimony'' to the grand jury.
        But, we were warned, these proffers were only ``salient
    examples'' of grand jury perjury. The House managers said,
    ``The [examples set forth in the trial brief] are merely
    highlights of the grand jury perjury. There are numerous
    additional examples.'' And when we heard Mr. Manager Rogan's
    presentation, we realized that the trial brief was absolutely
    right; Mr. Rogan unveiled allegations that had not been
    included even in the trial brief.
        The uncertainty, fluidity, the vagueness of the charges in
    this case and the unwillingness of the prosecutors ever to
    specify and be bound by the statements that are at issue has
    been an aspect of this process that, I submit, has been
    profoundly unfair to this President. It is also
    unconstitutional, from the arguments I gave you.
        The articles had come to include specific allegations of
    grand jury perjury that did not come from the Starr referral
    and that never would have been approved by the House had the
    House been required to review them.
        There is one other element of unfairness that Mr. Ruff
    referred to. Even as the House managers have consistently tried
    to stretch the scope of article I to cover allegations never
    considered by the House, they have tried to twist the scope of
    article I to cover allegations specifically rejected by the
    House.
        Now, let me be clear here. I am not charging the managers
    with going beyond the record of the case. These new allegations
    come from the record in the case. They are not beyond the
    record. They are in the record. But the Starr referral did not
    find it suitable to make these allegations, and they were not
    made in a timely way before the House Judiciary Committee and,
    I would submit, in a timely way before the House of
    Representatives.
        I go back to this second element of unfairness that has to
    do with the Jones article. When that Jones article was
    rejected, we would argue that rejection should have been
    recognized for what it was, a clear instruction from the House
    of Representatives not to argue that the President should be
    impeached and removed because of his testimony in the Jones
    deposition. But the managers have sought to merge the Jones
    testimony with the grand jury testimony, to confuse these two
    events, to blend and blur them together.
        The Senate must understand that these two events were
    different in every way. In the President's testimony in the
    Jones case, the President was evasive, misleading, incomplete
    in his answers, and, as I said to the House Judiciary
    Committee, maddening. But in the Federal grand jury, President
    Clinton was forthright and forthcoming. He told the truth, the
    whole truth and nothing but the truth for 4 long hours, and the
    American people saw that testimony and they know that President
    Clinton, when he appeared before the grand jury, did not deny a
    sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--he admitted to one.
        They know that he did not deny that he was alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky; he repeatedly acknowledged that he had been alone
    with her on many occasions.
        The managers argued that the Jones testimony is relevant
    because, they say, the President perjured himself when he told
    the grand jury that his testimony in the Jones case was
    truthful, and it wasn't, say the managers. That
    characterization of the President's testimony, they say, is
    simply not accurate. What he said was, ``My goal in this
    deposition was to be truthful but not particularly helpful . .
    . I was determined to walk through the minefield of this
    deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.''
    These are opinions. He is characterizing his state of mind.
        The House managers, on the basis of this testimony, must
    not be allowed to do what the House of Representatives told
    them they could not do, which is to argue about the President's
    testimony in the Jones case. Even if you believe that the
    President crossed the line in his Jones deposition, you cannot
    conclude that he should be removed for it.
        He was not impeached for it. This case is about the grand
    jury and the grand jury alone.
        Now, in fact, the vagueness and uncertainty as to the
    specific allegations of perjury, whether in the grand jury or
    in the Paula Jones deposition, have created enormous confusion
    in the public about the President's conduct and about his
    testimony. This confusion, I think, has done enormous damage to
    the President, because out of this confusion has emerged a
    wholly inaccurate conventional wisdom about what President
    Clinton said when he testified in the grand jury. And that
    conventional wisdom is based on certain common
    mischaracterizations of the President's testimony.
        Last December 8, I gave an opening statement in the
    President's defense before the committee. And when it came time
    for me to talk about the charges of perjury, I urged the
    members of the committee to open their minds, and because of
    widespread misinformation about the facts, to focus on the
    record. I make the same plea to you again today. Keep an open
    mind and look at the real record. Read the transcript. Watch
    the videotape. Do not rely upon anyone else's version.
        We speak from some disappointing experience on this issue.
    Over and over again, inaccurate descriptions of the President's
    grand jury testimony have been launched into the public
    debate--sometimes innocently, sometimes negligently. But the
    result has been the same. The President's critics have created
    a conventional wisdom about the President's grand jury that is
    based on myth and not reality. There has been a merging of the
    President's testimony in the Jones deposition with that of his
    testimony in the grand jury, and this dynamic has been unfair
    to the President.
        We are at No. 6 with the exhibits. Let me just cite a few
    examples. There are many more available, but they are from
    people and sources that are familiar with the case and close to
    the evidence, and some coming from the presentations of just
    last week.
        At the conclusion of the impeachment inquiry conducted by
    the Judiciary Committee, the final arguments before the votes
    were taken in front of the committee, Congressman McCollum
    stated:

        The President gave sworn testimony in the Jones case in
    which he swore he could not recall being alone with Monica
    Lewinsky and that he had not had sexual relations with her.
        He repeated those assertions a few months later to the
    grand jury, and the evidence shows he lied about both.

        That is not an accurate characterization of the President's
    testimony before the grand jury. In the majority report,
    written by the majority counsel, the author stated repeatedly
    that President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he
    did not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. Members of the
    Senate, those descriptions of the President's grand jury
    testimony are absolutely false. When he appeared before the
    grand jury, the President admitted--he did not deny--an
    inappropriate, intimate, wrongful, personal relationship with
    Ms. Lewinsky. When he made this admission there was no doubt in
    anyone's mind what he meant. It meant, and the whole world knew
    that it meant that the President of the United States had
    engaged in some form of sexual activity or sexual contact with
    Ms. Lewinsky.
        In his appearance on a national news program on CNN
    television, this is another example: Over the New Year's
    weekend Mr. Manager Graham was asked for the most glaring
    example of the President's alleged perjury before the grand
    jury. And he said:

        I think when the President said he wasn't alone with her,
    he lied.

        That characterization of the President's grand jury
    testimony is not true. There can be absolutely no doubt that
    during his grand jury testimony, the President acknowledged--he
    did not deny, he repeatedly acknowledged--that he had been, on
    certain occasions, alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He acknowledged
    that fact in the opening sentence of his prepared statement to
    the grand jury. Let me read it. Let me read you the first words
    in the President's opening statement to the grand jury:

        When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in
    early 1996, and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that
    was wrong.

        ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky,'' that is what the
    President of the United States said. That is what the
    transcript says. And no amount of eloquence or lawyerly skill
    from the managers can change that fact. Facts are stubborn.
        He also engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the prosecutors
    about how many times he thought he had been alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky. And there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that he
    answered that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky on frequent
    occasions. He was asked, and he answered, and he said yes, and
    he made clear what he meant. He went on to say:

        I did what people do when they do the wrong thing. I tried
    to do it where nobody else was looking at it. I'd have to be an
    exhibitionist, not to have tried to exclude everyone else.

        These are not the words of someone who is trying to hide
    the fact of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. And it is
    difficult to understand how reading these words, as well as the
    long and detailed testimony in front of the grand jury, how one
    can think or contend that the President repeated or ratified in
    his deposition before the grand jury about not ever being
    alone.
        In the managers' trial brief issued just 3 days before they
    made their presentation, the brief makes the following
    statement. This is mischaracterization No. 4.

        [The President] falsely testified that he answered
    questions truthfully at his deposition concerning, among other
    subjects, whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky.

        Members of the Senate, as I just outlined in connection
    with Manager Graham's statement, this characterization of the
    President's grand jury testimony is misleading. The lawyers for
    the Office of the Independent Counsel asked many questions and
    engaged in extensive colloquy with the President about being
    alone with Ms. Lewinsky. But they never asked him to explain,
    affirm, defend, or justify his testimony about that same topic
    in the Jones deposition. And he did not do so.
        Members of the Senate, if justice is to be done, these
    misstatements and mischaracterizations must not be allowed to
    stand and must not be allowed to influence your judgment as you
    look at the evidence. So, please look at the real record. It is
    the record of the President's testimony, not the Jones
    deposition--his testimony before the grand jury that should be
    the Senate's sole concern.
        Now, it is timely, I think, to talk a little bit about
    legalisms and technicalities and hairsplitting because those
    who have engaged in this process over the past months in this
    enterprise of defending the President have also been the
    subject of much criticism. The majority counsel accused us of
    ``legal hairsplitting, prevarication and dissembling,'' and
    urged the Members of the Senate and the House to pay no
    attention to the ``obfuscations and legalistic pyrotechnics of
    the President's defenders.'' And during his presentation just
    last week on January 15, Congressman McCollum implored you
    ``not to get hung up on some of the absurd and contorted
    explanations of the President and his attorneys.''
        To the extent that we have relied on overly legal or
    technical arguments to defend the President from his attackers,
    we apologize to him, to you, and to the American public. We do
    the President no earthly good if, in the course of defending
    him, we offend both the judges, the jurors, and the American
    public. And Mr. Ruff had it just right when he expressed his
    concern to the members of the Judiciary Committee that our
    irresistible urge to practice our profession should not get in
    the way of securing a just result in this very grave proceeding
    for this very specific client.
        But, when an individual--any individual--is accused of
    committing a crime such as perjury, the prosecutors must be put
    to their full proof. Every element of the crime must be proven.
    And if a criminal standard is going to be used here it must be
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Now, the managers have taken it upon themselves directly
    and aggressively to accuse this President of criminal activity.
    They say that this criminal activity is at the heart of the
    effort to remove him from office. As Congressman McCollum said
    to you last week:

        The first thing you have to determine is whether or not the
    President committed crimes. If he didn't obstruct justice or
    witness tamper or commit perjury, no one believes [no one
    believes] he should be removed from office.

        Allegations of legal crimes invite, indeed they call out
    for legal defenses. And you will not be surprised to learn that
    in defending the President of the United States, we intend and
    we will use all the legal defenses that are available to us, as
    they would be available to any other citizen of this country.
        Teddy Roosevelt, quoted earlier in this proceeding, said it
    best: ``No man is above the law and no man is below the law
    either.'' In fact, the mere act of alleging perjury, as those
    of you in this body know who have tried perjury cases, the mere
    act of alleging perjury invites precisely the kind of
    hairsplitting everyone seems to deplore. If it is the will of
    the Congress to change the crime of perjury, to modify it, to
    eliminate certain judicially created defenses to that offense,
    so be it. But the crime of perjury has developed the way it has
    for some very good reasons, and it has a long and distinguished
    pedigree.
        Its essential elements are well and clearly established,
    and Manager Chabot's presentation was clear on those points,
    although you will not be surprised to learn that I disagree
    with his conclusions. Courts have concluded that no one should
    be convicted of perjury without demonstrating that the
    testimony in question was, in fact, false; that the person
    testifying knew it to be false; and that the testimony involved
    an issue that is material to the case, one that could influence
    the outcome of the matter one way or another.
        In addition, courts and prosecutors are in general
    agreement that prosecutions for perjury should not be brought
    on the basis of an oath against an oath. The Supreme Court has
    spoken on this issue, holding that a conviction for perjury
    ``ought not to rest entirely upon an oath against an oath.''
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, when we presented our
    case to the Judiciary Committee last December, we invited five
    experienced prosecutors to examine the record of this case and
    to give us their views as to whether they would bring charges
    of perjury and obstruction of justice against the President
    based on that record. These five attorneys are five of the
    best, the most experienced, the most tested prosecutors the
    country has ever seen. Three served as high officials in
    Republican Departments of Justice; two served during Democratic
    administrations. All were in agreement that no responsible
    prosecutor would bring this case against President Clinton.
        I would like to run the tape recordings of testimony from
    two of the individuals who testified, Tom Sullivan, former U.S.
    attorney from the Northern District of Illinois, as he
    describes the law of perjury, and Richard Davis, an experienced
    trial lawyer with prosecutorial experience in the Department of
    Justice and the Department of the Treasury.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Sullivan. . . . The law of perjury can be particularly
    arcane, including the requirements that the government prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony
    to be false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged
    false testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or
    uncertainty about what the question or answer meant must be
    construed in favor of the defendant.
        Both perjury and obstruction of justice are what are known
    as specific intent crimes, putting a heavy burden on the
    prosecutor to establish the defendant's state of mind.
    Furthermore, because perjury and obstruction charges often
    arise from private dealings with few observers, the courts have
    required either two witnesses who testified directly to the
    facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies
    to the facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be
    substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt. Responsible
    prosecutors do not bring these charges lightly.

        The next testimony you will hear is from Richard Davis, who
    is Acting Deputy Attorney General--excuse me, he was assistant
    from the Southern District of New York, task force leader for a
    Watergate special prosecution force and Assistant Secretary of
    Treasury for Enforcement and Operations from 1977 to 1981.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Davis. . . . In the context of perjury prosecutions,
    there are some specific considerations which are present when
    deciding whether such a case can be won. First, it is virtually
    unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the
    conflicting testimony of two people. The inherent problems in
    bringing such a case are compounded to the extent that any
    credibility issues exist as to the government's sole witness.
        Second, questions and answers are often imprecise.
    Questions sometimes are vague, or used too narrowly to define
    terms, and interrogators frequently ask compound or
    inarticulate questions, and fail to follow up imprecise
    answerers. Witnesses often meander through an answer, wandering
    around a question, but never really answering it. In a perjury
    case, where the precise language of a question and answer are
    so relevant, this makes perjury prosecutions difficult, because
    the prosecutor must establish that the witness understood the
    question, intended to give a false, not simply an evasive
    answer, and in fact did so. The problem of establishing such
    intentional falsity is compounded, in civil cases, by the
    reality that lawyers routinely counsel their clients to answer
    only the question asked, not to volunteer, and not to help out
    an inarticulate questioner.

        Legalistic though some of these legal defenses may be,
    these are the respectable and respected, acceptable and
    expected defenses available to anyone charged with this kind of
    a crime. So to accuse us of using legalisms to defend the
    President when he is being accused of perjury is only to accuse
    us of defending the President. We plead guilty to that charge,
    and the truth is that an attorney who failed to raise these
    defenses might well be guilty of malpractice.
        But putting the legal defenses aside, it is not a
    legalistic issue to point out that the President did not say
    much of what he is accused of having said. It is not legalistic
    to point out that a witness did not say what some rely on her
    testimony to establish. And it is not too legalistic to point
    out that a President of the United States should not be
    convicted of perjury and removed from office over an argument,
    a dispute about what is and what is not the commonly accepted
    meaning of words in his testimony.
        I would like to make one additional point about the Office
    of the Independent Counsel and the Starr prosecutors. They, as
    you know, have had a long and difficult relationship with the
    White House. It has been intense, adverse, frequently hostile.
    They were the ones who conducted the interrogation of the
    President before the grand jury. These attorneys from the
    Office of Independent Counsel were identified by Mr. Starr as
    being experienced and seasoned and professional.
        In the referral that they sent over to the House of
    Representatives, they make three allegations of grand jury
    perjury, and the managers, based on my analysis of Mr. Rogan's
    speech, appear to have adopted two of those allegations.
        What is most remarkable is the fact that the managers make
    many, many allegations of grand jury perjury that the
    independent counsel declined to make, that were not included in
    the referral.
        Think about it for a moment. The lawyers working for the
    Office of the Independent Counsel, they were in charge of this
    investigation. They were the ones who called the President.
    They were the ones running the grand jury. It was their grand
    jury. They conducted the questioning of the President. They
    picked the topics. They asked the follow-up questions.
        You should remember one additional fact. Their standard for
    making a referral is presumably much lower than the standard
    you would expect from the managers in making a case for the
    removal of the President in an article of impeachment. The
    Independent Counsel Act calls upon the independent counsel to
    make a referral when there is credible and substantial
    information of potential impeachable offenses.
        They looked at the record, the same record that the
    managers had, and they did make a referral and they did send
    recommendations to the House of Representatives.
        But these lawyers, Mr. Starr and his fellow prosecutors,
    did not see fit to allege most of the charges that we are
    discussing today. It is fair for us to assume that the Office
    of Independent Counsel considered and declined to make the very
    allegations of perjury that the House managers presented to you
    last week. Apparently, the managers believe that Ken Starr and
    his prosecutors have been simply too soft on the President.
        This should cause the Members of the Senate some concern
    and some additional reason to give very careful scrutiny to
    these charges. When you do, you will find the following: The
    allegations are frequently trivial, almost always technical,
    often immaterial and always insubstantial. Certainly not a good
    or justifiable basis for removing any President from office.
        Finally, as we go through the allegations and the evidence
    that I will be discussing, please ask yourself, What witness do
    I want to hear about this issue? Will live witnesses really
    make a difference in the way that I think about this? Are they
    necessary for this case and this article to be understood and
    resolved?
        Subpart 1 has to do with testimony about the nature and
    details of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. And, once
    again, because article I does not identify with any specificity
    what the President said in the grand jury that is allegedly
    perjurious, the House managers have been free to include
    whatever specific allegations they--not the House of
    Representatives--have seen fit to level against the President.
        And we have been left to guess--so this is my guesswork--we
    have been left to guess what the specific allegations are. And
    we have done so. And we have tried to identify the precise
    testimony at issue based on the managers' trial brief and on
    Mr. Manager Rogan's presentation.
        Now, as you will see in these allegations of subpart 1, it
    is the managers who resort to legalisms, who use convoluted
    definitions and word games to attack the President. It is the
    managers who employ technicalities and legal mumbo jumbo, who
    distort the true meaning of words and phrases in an effort to
    convict the President. And we are the ones who must cry
    ``Foul.'' We are the ones who must point out what the managers
    are trying to do here. They seek to convict the President and
    remove him from office for perjury before a grand jury by
    transforming wholly innocent statements about immaterial issues
    into what are alleged to be ``perjurious, false and
    misleading'' testimony.
        I begin with what is identified in the majority report as
    ``direct lies.'' First, the managers claim that the President
    perjured himself before the grand jury, that he told a direct
    lie and should be removed from office because in his prepared
    statement he acknowledged having inappropriate contact with Ms.
    Lewinsky on ``certain occasions.'' This was a ``direct lie,''
    say the managers, because, according to Ms. Lewinsky, between
    November 15, 1995, and December 28, 1997, they were alone at
    least 20 times and had, she says, 11 sexual encounters. To use
    the words ``on certain occasions'' in this context is,
    according to the managers, ``perjurious, false and
    misleading.''
        Now, this particular chart was not included in Mr. Starr's
    referral, and it was not debated by the members of the
    Judiciary Committee in the House of Representatives.
        The managers also say that the President lied to the grand
    jury and should be removed from office because the President
    acknowledged that ``on occasion'' he had telephone
    conversations that included sexual banter--this is also in the
    prepared statement--when the managers say the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky had 17 such telephone conversations over a 2-year
    period of time. To use the words ``on occasion'' in this
    context, it is, according to the managers, a ``direct lie'' to
    the grand jury for which the President should be removed from
    office. Now, this charge was not included in Mr. Starr's
    referral. It was not debated by the members of the House
    Judiciary Committee. And it was not debated on the floor of the
    House.
        In responding to these two charges, it may make some sense
    to begin with the dictionary definition of ``occasional'' to
    satisfy ourselves that the President's statement is, in fact, a
    more than reasonable and actually an accurate use of that word
    under the circumstances.
        Now, there are 774 days in the time span between November
    1995 and December 1997. I submit that it is not a distortion,
    it is not dishonest to describe their activity, which Ms.
    Lewinsky claims occurred on 11 different days--from our
    examination of her testimony, we can only locate 10, but she
    says 11--as having occurred ``on certain occasions.'' Look at
    the calendar.
        Now, that phrase, ``on certain occasions,'' carries no
    inference of frequency or numerosity. It sort of means it
    happened every now and then. And the same could be said for the
    use of the words ``on occasion'' when they were talking about
    telephone conversations to describe 17 telephone conversations
    that included explicit sexual language.
        Now, as you consider the second allegation having to do
    with the phone calls, you might also read the grand jury
    testimony of Ms. Lewinsky herself on August 20, 1998, at page
    1111. There a grand juror asks her, how much of the time, and
    how often--when she was on the phone with the President--did
    they engage in these kinds of graphic conversations. Ms.
    Lewinsky answered, ``Not always. On a few occasions.'' The
    managers are trying to remove the President from office when he
    used the words ``on occasions,'' when Ms. Lewinsky described
    that frequency or that event precisely the same way.
        There is simply no way that the President's use of the
    words ``on certain occasions'' or ``on occasion'' can be used
    as an effort to mislead or deceive the members of the grand
    jury or to conceal anything. There is simply no way that a
    reasonable person can look at this testimony and conclude--or
    agree with the managers--that it is a ``direct lie.'' What
    message do the managers send to America and to the rest of the
    world when they include these kinds of allegations as reasons
    to remove this President from office?
        It is hard to take the charges seriously when in each case
    they boil down to arguments of semantics. Does anyone here
    really believe that Members of the House of Representatives
    would have voted to approve these allegations as the basis for
    impeaching and removing this President if they had been given
    the chance with specific, identified perjurious testimony in a
    proposed article of impeachment? But here we are in the well of
    the Senate defending the President of the United States against
    allegations that the managers believe and have seriously argued
    should cause the President to be removed from office and even
    prosecuted and convicted in a criminal court.
        The President is also accused of lying before the grand
    jury--and the managers have asked you to convict him and remove
    him from office--because, in the prepared statement that he
    read to the grand jury in August, he acknowledged that he
    engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain
    occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' The managers call
    this a ``direct lie'' because the President did not mention
    1995. And in their trial memorandum they write: ``Notice [the
    President] did not mention 1995. There was a reason: On three
    `occasions' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual
    contact with the President.''
        Now, this was one allegation that the Office of the
    Independent Counsel did include in its referral to the House.
    And this charge was, in fact, discussed and debated by the
    members of the Judiciary Committee when they conducted their
    impeachment inquiry. Let me show you what two members of that
    committee--now managers for the House in this trial--thought
    about this particular charge of perjury when Congressman Barney
    Frank ridiculed it during the debate.
        The chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Hyde--we are
    missing an exhibit here; I think it is No. 10--said, ``It
    doesn't strike me as a--as a terribly serious count.''
    Congressman Canady, in his closing argument in the final stage
    of that proceeding, said, ``I freely acknowledge that
    reasonable people can disagree about the weight of the evidence
    on certain of the charges. For example, I think there is doubt
    about the allegations that the President willfully lied
    concerning the date his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began.''
        This allegation involves an utterly meaningless disparity
    in testimony about dates that are of absolutely no consequence
    whatsoever. The most likely explanation here is that there was
    an honest difference in recollection. There is no dispute about
    the critical facts that Ms. Lewinsky was young, very young, too
    young, when she got involved with President Clinton. But her
    age didn't change between November 1995 and January 1996. Her
    birthday is in July. She was 22 years old in November and 22
    years old in January, despite the fact that every manager
    persists in stating, erroneously--not perjuriously,
    erroneously--that she was 21 years old when she first became
    involved with the President. Nothing of any importance in the
    case took place between December 1995 and January 1996. She was
    an intern in the early stage of that period, and she became a
    Government employee. So it did not change the relationship that
    she had with the President. It modified her title. Any dispute
    over this immaterial issue is silly.
        It is unreasonable to argue, as we heard from the House
    managers last week, that if you believe Ms. Lewinsky and
    disbelieve the President on this issue as to which date was the
    date that they began the relationship and had the inappropriate
    contact, that you must convict the President and remove him
    from office.
        I confess, I find myself in agreement with Congressman Hyde
    when he says this allegation is not serious, not ``terribly
    serious.'' And I agree with Congressman Canady when he suggests
    ``there is'' room for ``doubt'' as to whether the President had
    any real reason or motive to lie about these things.
        I truly wonder if the House of Representatives, had it been
    identified as a specific statement for them to consider, would
    have made and included this allegation in the articles of
    impeachment aimed at removing President Clinton from office.
        Is this conflict in testimony really such a serious issue
    that, if you find the President is mistaken, he should be
    removed from office? And is it important enough to require the
    testimony of live witnesses? Is it material of anything of
    interest to the grand jury at the time this testimony was
    given? I don't think so.
        Now, between the time of the vote in the House and the time
    that the managers filed their trial brief, the managers came up
    with another allegation of perjury and put it into the mix.
    They argue that this element of the President's grand jury
    testimony should also cause him to be removed from office. This
    allegation involves the President's statement that there was
    some period of friendship with Ms. Lewinsky that led to
    inappropriate contact. But it is immaterial, unimportant, and
    fundamentally frivolous as an allegation. And it was not,
    needless to say, included in the Starr referral. I am sure the
    attorneys in the Office of Independent Counsel knew about this
    statement and chose not to include it. It was never discussed
    by the members of the Judiciary Committee during the
    impeachment inquiry. We never heard about it, never saw it,
    never had a chance to deal with it. It was never mentioned on
    the floor of the House of Representatives.
        According to my examination--which may be flawed--my
    thinking is that it made its first appearance in the matter
    only after the House of Representatives voted on the articles
    of impeachment when the managers filed their trial brief. Does
    anyone really believe that the House of Representatives would
    have voted to approve this allegation as a basis for convicting
    and removing this President from office?
        Then the managers turn to what, in the majority report,
    they call ``the heart of the perjury''; that is, the
    President's grand jury testimony that his encounters with Ms.
    Lewinsky did not constitute ``sexual relations'' as defined by
    the Jones lawyers in the Jones deposition.
        Before dealing with this allegation, however, it is
    important to understand that in the course of his testimony the
    President was required to deploy two different definitions of
    ``sexual relations.'' One was his own and the other was the
    definition supplied to him by the Jones lawyers and modified by
    Judge Susan Webber Wright during his deposition.
        First, if you turn to exhibit No. 11, you will find the
    President's definition, his own personal definition, as
    reported to the grand jury.
        Next, let me direct your attention to the transcript of the
    telephone conversation between Monica Lewinsky--I am talking
    here about exhibit 12--Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, where
    Ms. Lewinsky explained her definition of ``sexual relations.''
    This conversation occurred, incidentally, many weeks before Ms.
    Lewinsky executed her affidavit for the Jones case.
        Finally, look at the dictionaries and read their
    definitions. You can see that in exhibit 13.
        By the way, exhibit 12, which includes Ms. Lewinsky's
    definition, is confirmed by other parts of the record where she
    talks to other individuals, FBI agents. She refers to this
    understanding and this definition in her proffer. So it is not
    just the one telephone conversation to establish what Monica
    Lewinsky says she thought at that time the definition was.
        Although some might think that the President's definition
    is unduly limited and that both of them are splitting hairs,
    there is some reasonable basis and there is reputable authority
    to support their view. It seems clear that Ms. Lewinsky could
    think, and probably did think and reassure herself at the time
    she wrote and executed her affidavit, that the affidavit she
    submitted in the Jones case was, in fact, accurate. And thus,
    knowing Ms. Lewinsky's view of that situation and sharing her
    definition, the President could reasonably say, ``Absolutely,
    yes,'' when Mr. Bennett asked the President if Ms. Lewinsky's
    affidavit stating she had never had sexual relations with the
    President was true.
        How can you accept the argument of the House managers that
    the President should be removed from office because his
    definition, which is the dictionary definition, does not
    comport with theirs?
        We are going to play the videotape. We are going to talk
    about the definition that was the second definition that was
    given to the President in the Jones deposition, which is also
    the subject of grand jury testimony, and we are going to play
    14 minutes of that videotape at the beginning of the
    President's appearance, or at the time he was first handed the
    definition and sits at the table.
        This may be a good time to take a break because it will be
    a 14-minute span of time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we take a 10-minute recess at this time. I urge the Senators to
    relax a moment but come right back to the Chamber so we can
    proceed.
        There being no objection, at 2:06 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:24 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we will be
    proceeding with Mr. Counsel Craig's video perhaps, or do you
    have something before that?
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. I have a little bit of production.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Craig.
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Exhibit No. 14 in your collection of exhibits is the
    definition that the President was handed when he went into his
    deposition testimony--to give his deposition testimony. There
    are two or three things I would like to say about this exhibit
    before we go to the videotape.
        The first is this: Many of the President's critics have
    accused the President of himself coming up with this tortured
    and convoluted definition so that he could get away with
    denying having sex with Ms. Lewinsky; that he was the one that
    came up with a bizarre and surreal definition that would give
    him some plausible deniability and allow him to conceal his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from the Jones lawyers. But in
    truth this definition was not his idea, not his work product,
    not his own definition. And it is unfair and inaccurate to
    saddle him with inventing such a silly and truncated
    definition, and the event that flows from that.
        My second point is this: The mere fact that the lawyers in
    Jones felt the need to use a definition for sexual relations
    is, by itself, standing alone, evidence to support the notion
    that at least they recognized that the precise meaning of the
    term can and does differ from person to person. It is precisely
    then, when there is some uncertainty or ambiguity about the
    meaning and common usage of words, that lawyers turn to create
    a definition in an effort to have clarity, uniformity and
    common understanding. And the very fact that the lawyers in
    Jones seem to think that a definition was needed means that
    without such a definition there is no commonly accepted, no
    universally agreed upon meaning of this phrase. And what is or
    is not included within the ambit of that definition becomes an
    argument and nothing more--certainly not perjury.
        The third point to remember before we watch the President
    as he first sees this piece of paper is this:
        To understand what is going on in the President's mind at
    the time he testified about this definition during the Jones
    deposition, you must look at what was deleted as well as
    looking at that part of the definition that was left behind.
        You will see that in the third paragraph of the definition
    there is the description which, in fact, more closely
    approximates what went on between Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President within the first paragraph. And this part of the
    definition was deleted by the judge.
        There is an additional point. On the tape you will hear the
    President's lawyer, Mr. Bennett--and Mr. Ruff referred to this
    yesterday--urging the Jones lawyers to abandon this definition,
    to leave it behind, and ask direct questions of the President
    as to what he did. The record would certainly have been clearer
    for all of us if he had followed Mr. Bennett's advice. And
    there is another voice that you will hear in addition to Mr.
    Bennett--Mr. Fisher, who was the Jones lawyer, the judge, Judge
    Wright, and the voice of the lawyer of the President's
    codefendant in the case of Danny Ferguson.
        Let me just briefly tell you what to look for. The
    President first saw this definition when he entered the room
    and sat down to testify--not before. You will see him as he
    sits there and he is handed a piece of paper with the
    definition typed on it. Neither he nor his lawyer had ever seen
    that definition before. He was then required to sit down to
    study it, and to understand it.
        And if you look at the next exhibit, this is what he says
    about what he thought and did later in the grand jury. I think
    this is the definition, exhibit No. 15. You will watch him as
    he says this.

        I might also note that when I was given this and began to
    ask questions about it, I actually circled number one. This is
    my circle here. I remember doing that so I could focus only on
    those two lines, which is what I did.

        This was the actual deposition exhibit with his circle
    around No. 1.
        Let us remember finally what his testimony is about his
    intentions in this deposition. ``My goal is to be truthful, but
    I didn't want to help them.''
        Let's watch what happened.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. Good morning.
        Q. My name is Jim Fisher, sir, and I'm an attorney from Dallas,
    Texas, and I represent the Plaintiff, Paula Jones, in this case. Do you
    understand who I am and who I'm representing today?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And do you understand, sir, that your answers to my questions
    today are testimony that is being given under oath?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And your testimony is subject to the penalty of perjury; do you
    understand that, sir?
        A. I do.
        Q. Sir, I'd like to hand you what has been marked Deposition
    Exhibit 1. So that the record is clear today, and that we know that we
    are communicating, this is a definition of a term that will be used in
    the course of my questioning, and the term is ``sexual relations.'' I
    will inform the Court that the wording of this definition is patterned
    after Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Would you please take whatever time
    you need to read this definition because when I use the term ``sexual
    relations,'' this is what I mean today.
        Mr. Bennett. Is there a copy for the Court?
        Mr. Fisher. Would you pass that, please?
        Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, as an introductory matter, I think this
    could really lead to confusion, and I think it's important that the
    record be clear. For example, it says, the last line, ``contact means
    intentional touching, directly or through clothing,'' I mean just for
    example, one could have a completely innocent shake of the hand, and I
    don't want this record to reflect--I think we're here today for Counsel
    for the Plaintiff to ask the President what he knows about various
    things, what he did, what he didn't do, but I, I have a real problem
    with this definition which means all things to all people in this
    particular context, Your Honor.
        Mr. Bristow. Your Honor, I think the wording of that is extremely
    erroneous. What this, what the deposing attorney should be looking at
    is exactly what occurred, and he can ask the witness to describe as
    exactly as possible what occurred, but to use this as an antecedent to
    his questions, it would put him in a position, if the President
    admitted shaking hands with someone, then under this truncate
    deposition--or definition, he could say or somehow construe that to
    mean that that involves some sort of sexual relations, and I think it's
    very unfair. Frankly I think it's a political trick, and I've told you
    before how I feel about the political character of what this lawsuit is
    about.
        Mr. Fisher. Your Honor, may I respond?
        Judge Wright. You may.
        Mr. Fisher. The purpose of this is to avoid everything that they
    have expressed concern about. It is to allow us to be discreet and to
    make the record crystal clear. There is absolutely no way that this
    could ever be construed to include a shaking of the hand.
        Mr. Bennett. Well, Mr. Fisher, let me refer you to paragraph two.
    It says ``contact between any part of the person's body or an object
    and the genitals or anus of another person.''
        What if the President patted me and said I had to lose ten pounds
    off my bottom? I--you could be arguing that I had sexual relations with
    him. Your Honor, this is going to lead to confusion. Why don't they ask
    the President what he did, what he didn't do, and then we can argue in
    Court later about what it means.
        Judge Wright. All right, let me make a ruling on this. It appears
    that this really is not the definition of contact under Rule 413
    because Rule 413 deals with nonconsensual contact. This definition
    would encompass contact that is consensual, and of course the Court has
    ruled that some consensual contact is relevant in this case, and so let
    the record reflect that the Court disagrees with counsel that this is
    not, about it being the definition under Rule 413. It's not. It is more
    in keeping with, however, the Court's previous rules, but I certainly
    agree with the President's Counsel that this, the definition number two
    is too encompassing, it's too broad, and so is definition number three.
    Definition number one encompasses intent, and so that would be, but
    numbers two and three is just, are just too broad.
        Mr. Fisher. All right, Your Honor.
        Judge Wright. And number one is not too broad, however, so I'll let
    you use that definition as long as we understand that that's not Rule
    413, it's just the rule that would apply in this case to intentional
    sexual contact.
        Mr. Fisher. Yes, Your Honor, and had I been allowed to develop this
    further, everyone would have seen that Deposition Exhibit 2 is actually
    the definition of sexual assault or offensive sexual assault, which is
    the term in Rule 413.
        Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, I object to this record being filled with
    these kinds of things. This is going to leak. Why don't they ask--they
    have got the President of the United States in this room for several
    hours. Why don't they ask him questions about what happened or didn't
    happen?
        Judge Wright. I will permit him to refer to definition number one,
    which encompasses knowing and intentional sexual contact for the
    purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. I'll permit that. Go
    ahead.
        Q. All right, Mr. President, in light of the Court's ruling, you
    may consider subparts two and three of Deposition Exhibit 1 to be
    stricken, and so when in my questions I use the term ``sexual
    relations,'' sir, I'm talking only about part one in the definition of
    the body. Do you understand that, sir?
        A. I do.
        Q. I'm now handing you what has been marked Deposition Exhibit 2.
    Please take whatever time you need to read Deposition Exhibit 2.
        Mr. Bennett. Your Honor, again, what I am very worried about, Your
    Honor, is first of all, this, this, this appears to be a--I mean what I
    don't want to do is have him being asked questions and then we don't,
    we're all ships passing in the night. They're thinking of one thing,
    he's thinking of another. Are we talking criminal assault? I mean this
    is not what a deposition is for, Your Honor. He can ask the President,
    what did you do? He can ask him specifically in certain instances what
    he did, and isn't that what this deposition is for? It's not to sort of
    lay a trap for him, and I'm going to object, to the President answering
    and having to remember what's on this whole sheet of paper, and I just
    don't think it's fair. It's going to lend to confusion.
        Judge Wright. All right, do you agree with Mr. Bennett?
        Mr. Bristow. I had one other point to add Your Honor.
        Judge Wright. All right.
        Mr. Bristow. This is almost like in a typical automobile accident
    where the plaintiff's counsel wants to ask the defendant were you
    negligent. That's not factual.
        Judge Wright. Mr. Fisher, do you have a----
        Mr. Fisher. Yes, Your Honor. What I'm trying to do is avoid having
    to ask the President a number of very salacious questions and to make
    this as discreet as possible. This definition, I think the Court will
    find, is taken directly from Rule 413 which I believe President Clinton
    signed into law, with the exception that I have narrowed subpart one to
    a particular section, which would be covered by Rule 413, and I have
    that section here to give the President so that there is no question
    what is intended. This will eliminate confusion, not cause it.
        Mr. Bennett. Your honor, I have no objection where the appropriate
    predicates are made for them to ask the President , did you know X, yes
    or no, what happened, what did you do, what didn't you do. We are--
    acknowledge that some embarrassing questions will be asked, but then we
    will know what we're talking about, but I do not want my client
    answering questions not understanding exactly what these folks are
    talking about.
        Now, Your Honor, I told you that the President has a meeting at
    four o'clock, and we've already wasted twenty minutes, and Mr. Fisher
    has yet to ask his first factual question.
        Judge Wright. Well, I'm prepared to rule, and I will not permit
    this definition to be understood. Quite frankly there's several
    reasons. One is that the Court heretofore has not proceeded using these
    definitions. We have used, we've made numerous rulings or the Court has
    made numerous rulings in this case without specific reference to these
    definitions, and so if you want to know the truth, I don't know them
    very well. I would find it difficult to make rulings, and Mr. Bennett
    has made clear that he acknowledges that embarrassing questions will be
    asked, and if this is in fact an effort on, on the part of Plaintiff's
    Counsel to avoid using sexual terms and avoid going into great detail
    about what might or might not have occurred, then there's no need to
    worry about that, you may go into the detail.
        Mr. Bennett. If the predicates are met, have no objection to the
    detail.
        Mr. Fisher. Thank you, Your Honor.
        Judge Wright. It's just going to make it very difficult for me to
    rule, if you want to know the truth, and I'm not sure Mr. Clinton knows
    all these definitions, anyway.

        Did you hear that last statement from the judge? ``I'm not
    sure Mr. Clinton knows all these definitions, anyway.''
        Now, before the grand jury the President discussed at some
    length and in great detail his interpretation of the definition
    that he was asked to apply during that deposition--the
    definition that he was asked to apply. And he gave lengthy and
    sustained answers. And when you read the grand jury testimony,
    as I urge you to do, you will see that they are consistent and
    they are logical and there is reason behind his conclusion that
    his activities with Ms. Lewinsky simply did not fall within
    that definition.
        There is no mystery, no deception, no lying, no effort to
    conceal his view. His view is there for all to see. It is also
    reported from these limited excerpts from the grand jury
    testimony. It is a plain statement of his understanding. And to
    argue that the President, when he conveyed his understanding of
    that definition, doesn't really believe his argument, and to
    contend that he is committing perjury when he told the grand
    jury that he genuinely believed his interpretation of the
    definition--that is just speculation about what is in his mind
    and it is not the stuff or fuel of a perjury prosecution.
        Now, I would like to return very briefly to the group of
    experienced prosecutors who gave their opinion about the
    President's testimony before the grand jury on this issue. They
    said that the President's interpretation was a reasonable one
    under the circumstances, but the managers claim that the
    President's explanation of the Jones definition, his
    interpretation, his understanding, and his argument with the
    lawyers from the Office of Independent Counsel, are the heart
    of the perjury.
        Let's hear what the prosecutors said about this and read
    the transcript of their testimony when they testified before
    the House Judiciary Committee. And first we will listen to Tom
    Sullivan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Sullivan. Thank you very much, Mr. Hyde. It's clear to
    me that the president's interpretation is a reasonable one,
    especially because the words which seem to describe oral sex--
    the words which seem to describe directly oral sex were
    stricken from the definition by the judge. In a perjury
    prosecution, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that the defendant knew when he gave the testimony, he
    was telling a falsehood. The lying must be knowing and
    deliberate. It is not perjury for a witness to evade or
    obfuscate or answer nonresponsively. The evidence simply does
    not support the conclusion that the president knowingly
    committed perjury, and the case is so doubtful and weak that a
    responsible prosecutor would not present it to the grand jury.

        We have one more excerpt from his testimony.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Sullivan. . . . In perjury cases, you must prove that
    the person who made the statement made a knowingly false
    statement. Now, where I think the defect in this prosecution
    is, among others--and I don't think it would be brought,
    because it's ancillary to a civil deposition--is to establish
    that the president knew what he said was false. When he
    testified in his grand jury testimony, he explained what his
    mental process was in the Jones deposition, and he said the two
    definitions that would describe oral sex had been deleted by
    the trial judge from the definition of sexual relations and I
    understood the definition to mean sleeping with somebody. I
    don't want to get to particular here.
        Rep. Lofgren. Thank you.
        Mr. Sullivan. But that is where this case, in my opinion,
    wouldn't go forward even if you found an errant prosecutor who
    would want to prosecute somebody for being a peripheral witness
    in a civil case that had been settled. That's my answer to
    that.

        The managers place great emphasis and weight on the
    conflict in the testimony between President Clinton and Ms.
    Lewinsky over some specific intimate details related to their
    activity. There is a variance between the President's testimony
    and Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about the details of what they
    did. What do they disagree about? Not about whether the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky had a wrongful relationship--the
    President admitted that before the grand jury. Not about
    whether the President and Ms. Lewinsky were alone together--the
    President admitted that before the grand jury. Not about
    whether, when they were alone together, their relationship
    included inappropriate, intimate contact--the President
    admitted that before the grand jury. Not about whether they
    engaged in telephone conversations that included sexual
    banter--the President admitted that before the grand jury. Not
    about whether the President and Ms. Lewinsky wanted to keep
    their wrongful relationship a secret--the President admitted
    that before the grand jury.
        The difference in their testimony about their relationship
    is limited to some very specific, very intimate details. And
    this is the heart of the entire matter, this disparity in their
    testimony. The true nub of the managers' allegation that the
    President committed perjury is that he described some of the
    contact one way and she describes it another.
        Not surprisingly, the managers choose to believe Ms.
    Lewinsky's description of these events. And so, even in the
    absence of any evidence to the contrary, other than Ms.
    Lewinsky's own recollection of these events, the managers have
    concluded that the President lied under oath about the details
    of his sexual activity, that he somehow shortchanged the grand
    jury, and should be removed from office.
        The possibility that the question of whether the President
    of the United States should be removed from his office--the
    fact that that might hinge on whether you believe him or her on
    this issue is a staggering thought. Ordinarily when dealing
    with disparity in testimony such as this, prosecutors will have
    nothing to do with it. Only two people were there. And, in
    truth, the real importance of the disparity in their testimony
    is questionable. Not all disparities or discrepancies in
    testimony are necessarily appropriate subjects for perjury
    prosecutions.
        According to those experienced prosecutors who testified
    before the Judiciary Committee, there are two more points to be
    made about this. First, this is a classic oath on oath--he
    says, she says--swearing match, that, under ordinary custom and
    practice at the Department of Justice, never would be
    prosecuted without substantial corroborative proof. Such proof,
    say these experienced prosecutors, does not consist of
    testimony of friends and associates of Ms. Lewinsky who tell
    the FBI that Ms. Lewinsky contemporaneously told them about the
    activity, if it was going on. But the managers claim that these
    contemporaneous statements corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony.
        That claim is specious. Statements that Ms. Lewinsky makes
    to other people are not viewed as independent corroborative
    evidence. They come from the same source. They come from Ms.
    Lewinsky, as the source that gave that testimony to the grand
    jury. And no court and no prosecutor would accept the notion
    that such statements, standing alone, satisfy the requirement
    of substantial corroborative proof when there is a swearing
    match.
        Now, let's see what the experienced prosecutors have to say
    about this issue and that claim.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Rep. Wexler. . . . What is the false statement?
        Mr. Sullivan. Well, if you--it could be one of two. It
    could be when he denied having sexual relations and I've
    already addressed that, because he said, ``I was defining the
    term as the judge told me to define it and as I understood
    it,'' which I think is a reasonable explanation. The other is
    whether or not he touched her--touched her breast or some other
    part of her body, not through her clothing, but directly. And
    he says, ``I didn't,'' and she said, ``I (sic) did,'' so it's
    who-shot-John. It's, it's, you know, it's a one on one. The
    corroborative evidence that the prosecutor would have to have
    there, which is required in a perjury case--you can't do it one
    on one, and no good prosecutor would bring a case with, you
    know, I say black, you say white--would be the fact that they
    were together alone and she performed oral sex on him. I think
    that is not sufficient under the circumstances of this case to
    demonstrate that there was any other touching by the president
    and therefore he committed this--you know, he violated this--
    and committed perjury.

        Now the testimony from Richard Davis on this same point,
    and then we will move to subpart 2.
        [The text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Davis. . . . I will now turn to the issue of whether,
    from the perspective of a prosecutor, there exists a
    prosecutable case for perjury in front of the grand jury. The
    answer to me is clearly no. The president acknowledged to the
    grand jury the existence of an improper intimate relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky, but argued with the prosecutors
    questioning him, that his acknowledged conduct was not a sexual
    relationship as he understood the definition of that term being
    used in the Jones deposition. Engaging in such a debate,
    whether wise or unwise politically, simply does not form the
    basis for a perjury prosecution. Indeed, in the end, the entire
    basis for a grand jury perjury prosecution comes down to Monica
    Lewinsky's assertion that there was a reciprocal nature to
    their relationship, and that the president touched her private
    parts with the intent to arouse or gratify her, and the
    president's denial that he did so. Putting aside whether this
    is the type of difference of testimony which should justify an
    impeachment of a president, I do not believe that a case
    involving this kind of conflict between two witnesses would be
    brought by a prosecutor, since it would not be won at trial.
        A prosecutor would understand the problem created by the
    fact that both individuals had an incentive to lie--the
    president to avoid acknowledging a false statement at his civil
    deposition, and Miss Lewinsky to avoid the demeaning nature of
    providing wholly unreciprocated sex. Indeed, this incentive
    existed when Miss Lewinsky described the relationship to the
    confidantes described in the independent counsel's referral.
    Equally as important, however, Mr. Starr has himself questioned
    the veracity of one witness, Miss Lewinsky, by questioning her
    testimony that his office suggested she tape record Ms. Currie,
    Mr. Jordan, and potentially the president. And in any trial,
    the independent counsel would also be arguing that other key
    points in Miss Lewinsky's testimony are false, including where
    she explicitly rejects the notion that she was asked to lie and
    that assistance in her job search was an inducement for her to
    do so.

        The conclusion is clear: To make this case in any courtroom
    would be very difficult for a prosecutor. They point out that
    it is difficult, if not impossible, to put on a successful
    prosecution if the chief witness is deemed by the prosecutors
    to be unreliable on some issues, but presented as totally
    truthful on others.
        Now let's move to subpart 2, and it is exhibit No. 18. The
    allegations of perjury here have to do with testimony that he
    gave at the grand jury about his deposition in the Jones case.
    And I begin by repeating a point that I made a little earlier,
    that the House of Representatives did not vote to approve the
    article that alleged that President Clinton committed perjury
    during his deposition in the Jones case. As I said before,
    there was good reason for that.
        What are the reasons? There are many reasons. The
    President's testimony in the Jones deposition involved his
    relationship with a witness who was ancillary to the core
    issues of the Jones case. She was a witness in the case. She
    wasn't the plaintiff in the case, and she was ancillary to the
    core issues in the case, someone whose testimony was thereafter
    held to be unnecessary and perhaps inadmissible by Judge Susan
    Webber Wright, someone whose truthful testimony would have
    been, in any event, of marginal relevance since her
    relationship with the President was entirely consensual. And,
    as you know, this was a case that ultimately was found to have
    no legal or factual merit. It was dismissed by the judge, and
    it is now being settled by the parties.
        Moreover, the President was caught by surprise in that
    deposition and asked questions about matters that the Jones
    lawyers already knew the answers to. As you heard yesterday,
    the Jones lawyers had been briefed the night before by Linda
    Tripp. So they were asking questions of President Clinton in
    the course of this deposition about the relationship to which
    they already had the answers. That kind of ambush is profoundly
    unfair, and it is one reason that Congressman Graham said that
    he voted against this article in committee--the surprise. He
    was the only Republican to do so. He was the only Republican to
    vote against any article, and the decision of the House to
    follow Congressman Graham's leadership and to reject this
    article showed great wisdom and judgment.
        But apparently that is not to be the end of the matter when
    it comes to allegations of perjury in the Jones deposition. In
    subpart 2 of article I, the managers seek to reintroduce the
    issue of the President's testimony in the case by alleging that
    when the President testified before the grand jury, he
    testified falsely when he said that he tried to testify
    truthfully in the Jones deposition. Congressman Rogan, Mr.
    Manager Rogan has claimed that the President's answers ratified
    and reaffirmed and put into issue all of his answers in the
    Jones deposition when he testified that he believed he did not
    violate the law in the Jones deposition.
        ``This is perjurious testimony,'' said Manager Rogan,
    ``because the record is clear''--I am quoting--that he did not
    testify truthfully in the deposition, and by that bootstrapping
    mechanism, we are now in a litigation about whether every
    single statement that the President made in the Jones
    deposition was or was not truthful to determine whether or not
    the President's testimony that he was truthful is or is not
    truthful.
        But, in fact, President Clinton did not ratify, he did not
    reaffirm his Jones testimony when he testified before the grand
    jury, and you will see that when you read the transcript of his
    testimony. Quite the contrary is true. If you look at that
    transcript carefully, you will find that without admitting
    wrongdoing, the President elaborated, he modified, he amended
    and he clarified his testimony in Jones. And when Mr. Schippers
    made his closing argument to the House Judiciary Committee, I
    think he used the truthfulness, on one occasion, of the
    President's testimony before the grand jury to support his
    argument that the President lied in Jones.
        But actually the specific wording of subpart 2 gives us no
    specific information and is not illuminating, and we turn to
    the managers' trial brief to ascertain precisely what the
    argument is. There the managers allege that the President
    falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully at his
    deposition concerning, among other things, whether he had been
    alone with Ms. Lewinsky. I begin by saying, again, this
    allegation was not included in the Starr referral. Why? Because
    it is based on a total misconception of the President's grand
    jury testimony.
        As I referred to earlier, this is exhibit No. 7, I believe,
    and it shows you some evidence--this is not the complete
    evidence of his testimony about being alone. The prosecutors
    asked the President many questions about being alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky, but they never asked him about the Jones testimony.
    They asked him about whether he was alone; he never was asked
    about the Jones testimony:
        ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain
    occasions,'' it says right there--``When I was alone . . .''

        Let me ask you, Mr. President, you indicate in your
    statement that you were alone with Ms. Lewinsky. Is that right?
        Yes, sir.
        How many times were you alone with Ms. Lewinsky?
        Let me begin with the correct answer. I don't know for
    sure. But if you would like me to give an educated guess, I
    will do that. . . .

        And then you will see over two or three pages of testimony
    he tries to recall times and incidents when he was alone with
    Ms. Lewinsky.
        And so the prosecutor says, ``So if I could summarize your
    testimony, approximately 5 times you saw her before she left
    the White House, approximately 9 times after she left the
    employment?'' ``I know there were several times in '97,'' the
    President said. ``I would think that would sound about right.''
        This is not a man denying that he was alone with Ms.
    Lewinsky, but he was not asked about his testimony on that
    topic when he testified in the Jones case.
        Now, the managers further allege that the President's
    testimony before the grand jury that he testified truthfully at
    his deposition was a lie. In fact, his testimony there that
    they quote as being false was this: ``My goal in this
    deposition was to be truthful but not particularly helpful.''
    ``My goal in this deposition to be truthful,'' they say, is
    false. ``I was determined to walk through the minefield of this
    deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.''
    His statement that ``I believe I did,'' they say, means that
    everything that he said in the Jones deposition was true. The
    President's statement that he set a goal and believes--
    believes--he has met it is, according to the managers,
    perjurious for which he should be removed from office.
        And it is through this device that the managers seek to
    achieve, by indirection, what they were specifically forbidden
    to do by the direct vote of the House of Representatives. By
    claiming that the President's assertions in the grand jury were
    false when he described his state of mind--``I believed,'' ``I
    tried,'' ``I was determined,'' ``my goal was''--the managers
    seek to put all of the President's evasive and misleading
    testimony in the Jones deposition in issue. That effort, I
    submit, should be rejected.
        Let me cite one rather painful example in support of the
    President's testimony that he, in fact, tried to answer
    accurately when he testified in the grand jury. He was asked
    whether or not he ever had sexual relations with Gennifer
    Flowers, and he answered, ``Yes,'' that he had, under the
    definition of sexual relations being used in the Jones case. He
    later said that he would rather have taken a whipping in public
    than to acknowledge that relation because he knew it would be
    leaked to the public, which it was.
        Now, if he didn't care about telling the truth in that
    deposition, if he went into that deposition with the intention
    of denying anything and everything that was embarrassing, if he
    really had decided in his own mind that whatever the Jones
    lawyers asked him, he was not going to be truthful about it, he
    never would have testified the way he did about Gennifer
    Flowers.
        Now, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, the President does
    not claim--and he never was asked in front of the grand jury,
    and he never asserts in front of the grand jury--that all his
    testimony in the Jones deposition was truthful. His statement
    was that he tried to be accurate, that his goal was to be
    truthful, but that statement is not a broad reaffirmation of
    the accuracy of all his testimony, despite the House managers'
    desire to characterize it as such. Those were accurate
    descriptions of the President's state of mind at the time he
    testified.
        The real issue here is not the truth of the underlying
    statements made by the President in the Jones deposition but
    the President's explanation of those statements, whether his
    description of his efforts to walk this fine line that he gave
    to the grand jury was accurate. Whether you agree or disagree
    with the President's view that he was or was not successful in
    his undertaking not to break the law and to be lawful, that
    argument is an argument. And it is not a secret argument. He
    has that out there open for everybody to see. That argument is
    hardly a proper subject for a perjury claim. And his simple
    restatement of his legal position to the members of the grand
    jury is hardly the stuff of a perjury prosecution.
        Actually, if you look at the President's grand jury
    testimony, you will see that he provided much more complete,
    much more accurate, much more reliable testimony about many of
    the topics covered in Jones. And the notion that he reaffirmed,
    confirmed, or ratified his Jones testimony is just unsupported
    by the evidence.
        It would be astonishing to think that the Senate would
    conclude that the President should be removed from office
    because in the grand jury he gave voice to a legal opinion and
    stated his own personal belief that his testimony in the Jones
    deposition did not break the law.
        I submit to you that if that was the case, the Office of
    the Independent Counsel would have included that in the
    referral, and they did not. In fact, let me just say right now
    none of the rest of the allegations that we are going to be
    discussing in the article that we are talking about today are
    included in the Starr referral. The rest are entirely the
    product of the managers.
        Subpart 3, which is the exhibit No. 19. This has to do with
    the President's testimony about statements he allowed his
    attorney to make to a Federal judge in the Jones case. And you
    saw the tape of that testimony last week.
        According to the trial memorandum, the President remained
    silent during the Jones deposition at a time when his counsel,
    Mr. Bennett, made false and misleading representations to the
    court about Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Pointing to the Lewinsky
    affidavit, Bennett stated that Ms. Lewinsky had filed an
    affidavit ``saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind
    in any manner, shape or form with President Clinton.'' And when
    asked by the Independent Counsel about this moments before the
    grand jury, the President testified that he hadn't paid much
    attention, that he was thinking about his testimony. And he
    says this four or five times. This is not just once; he says
    this four or five times. He is emphatic that he didn't pay
    attention and the words went by him.
        Now, in support of their claim that the President lied when
    he said he was not paying attention, the House managers point
    to the videotape record of the President's testimony which
    shows, they argue, that the President was ``looking directly at
    Mr. Bennett, [and] paying close attention to his argument to
    Judge Wright.''
        This allegation, not included in the Starr Report, is even
    more curious than the previous one because it is based on a
    novel legal theory which jeopardizes all lawyers in this
    building, which is that a client has an enforceable obligation
    to correct his attorney's alleged misstatements. And if he
    doesn't make those corrections, he--the client--will be held
    liable to charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.
        The charge is that the President misled the grand jury when
    he said that he was not paying attention. While the videotape
    shows that the President was looking in Bennett's direction,
    there is nothing that can be read in his face or in his body
    language to show that he is listening to, understanding, or
    affirming Mr. Bennett's statement--no nod of the head, no
    movement at all, no comment, nothing.
        What happens is this: Mr. Bennett makes his comment and is
    interrupted by the judge. She says, ``No, just a minute, let me
    make my ruling,'' before Mr. Bennett has a chance to complete
    his argument. And after interrupting Mr. Bennett, the judge
    makes a lengthy observation, followed by an intensive exchange
    among all counsel and the judge. The moment is fleeting. It
    goes by very, very quickly.
        The moment occurs not at the beginning of the deposition,
    but well into it, after President Clinton has in fact been
    subjected to questions about Monica Lewinsky. Mr. Clinton, as
    you know, has been surprised by the direction the case has
    taken and the fact that the exclusive focus of these questions
    is on Lewinsky. He did not know this was coming. He did not
    expect it. As he put it in his grand jury testimony, ``I had no
    way of knowing that they would ask me all these detailed
    questions. I did the best I could to answer them.''
        At that moment, because the questions had focused on Ms.
    Lewinsky--to the exclusion of everything and everybody else,
    including the Jones case--questions about the Jones case didn't
    occur until much, much later and near the end of the
    deposition. The President must have realized that the Jones
    attorneys probably knew about his relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky. He obviously had not taken any steps to prepare to
    answer questions about that relationship and he was clearly
    caught off guard.
        It is not farfetched to think at that moment his mind was
    flooded with thoughts about how to get through the deposition.
    It is not implausible to think at that moment the President was
    preoccupied, watching his lawyer do his job, and not listening
    carefully and not tracking word by word the substance of the
    exchange.
        Those of you who have practiced law and have represented
    individuals under stress at depositions know that this can
    happen. Is it really reasonable to think that you can tell
    beyond a reasonable doubt what is going on in the President's
    mind by looking at the videotape? And if you can and you are
    convinced he has heard, does he have any obligation to say
    anything? If he doesn't, then this case, this allegation,
    amounts to nothing.
        It is hard to believe that the House managers--if it did, I
    think the Starr people would have brought it--it is hard to
    believe that the House managers believe that the Senate should
    conclude that the President committed perjury and should be
    removed from his office on the basis of his silence, his
    failure to speak.
        Now, there is a second allegation associated with this
    incident, one that Congressman Rogan asserted in his
    presentation, but is not discussed in the trial memorandum.
    This has to do with the President's now famous testimony about
    Mr. Bennett's statement about Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. It
    depends upon what the meaning of ``is'' is. Let's talk about
    that just a minute.
        While raising questions about the good faith of the Jones
    attorney in asking questions about Ms. Lewinsky--this is in the
    Jones deposition--while raising questions about the good faith
    of the Jones attorneys and asking questions about Ms. Lewinsky
    and not knowing if these same lawyers actually know the answers
    to the questions, Mr. Bennett said, referring to the Jones
    lawyers, ``Counsel is fully aware that [Ms. Lewinsky] has filed
    an affidavit . . . saying that there is absolutely no sex.''
    ``There is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape
    or form with President Clinton.''
        Now, during his grand jury testimony, the independent
    counsel reads that statement to the President. He gets
    President Clinton to agree that the statement was made by the
    President's attorney in front of Judge Wright. And here is what
    the independent counsel says to President Clinton in the grand
    jury after reading Mr. Bennett's words:

        That statement is a completely false statement. Whether or
    not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,
    the statement that there is ``no sex of any kind, manner shape
    or form with President Clinton'' was an utterly false
    statement.

        And he asks the President, ``Is that correct?'' At that
    point, pausing just a moment for reflection, President Clinton
    gives his opinion and explains that opinion.
        To understand the President's argument, you must know first
    that there has been no inappropriate contact with Ms. Lewinsky
    at the time of that deposition for, according to his
    recollection, almost a year; according to hers, 10 months. So
    it is not in dispute at that moment in time and for previous
    months there has been. And there is no sexual relationship
    currently, even though there had been one in 1995, 1996, and in
    the early part of 1997, some months back.
        Now, the President makes a political mistake here and gives
    in to his instinct to play his own lawyer, to be his own
    advocate. You may find it frustrating, you may find it
    irritating, when you watch him do this, but he is not
    committing perjury; he is committing the offense of nit-picking
    and arguing with the prosecutors. He is arguing a point, and so
    he says that whether Mr. Bennett's statement is false depends
    on what the meaning of ``is'' is. Mr. Bennett's statement is
    true if ``is'' means an ongoing relationship, but Mr. Bennett's
    statement is false if ``is'' means at any time ever in time.
        Now the President's answer to Mr. Bennett's question and
    the statements that follow it amount to an annoying argument
    over the interpretation of what Mr. Bennett said, focused on
    the tense of the verb. And the President is being his own
    lawyer. The grounds he has argued are fully stated, fully
    explained. There is no mystery. He is not concealing anything.
    Making this argument is not perjury.
        There is one final point to make about this incident
    because, again, I think there was a mischaracterization of what
    the President actually said in the grand jury. He didn't say
    that at the time Mr. Bennett made that statement in the Jones
    deposition, he caught the word ``is'' and recognized, ``Ah-ha,
    I've got an exit. That makes it accurate.'' Quite to the
    contrary. He is clear in front of the grand jury when he says
    that he didn't even notice this issue until he was reviewing
    the transcript in preparation for his grand jury testimony. He
    is clear in pointing out the argument that he is making is one
    that he just discovered.
        Let me quote from that portion of his testimony which
    appears on pages 512 and 513 which make it clear that he wasn't
    ever claiming that he spotted that verb tense at the time in
    the Jones deposition and his silence or his answer was based on
    spotting the verb tense then. This is something he discovered,
    noticed, and, as a lawyer, argued in the grand jury. ``I never
    even focused on that''--meaning that issue of a verb tense--
    ``until I read it in this transcript in preparation for this
    testimony . . .'' ``I wasn't trying to give you a cute answer
    that I obviously wasn't involved in anything improper in the
    deposition. I was trying to tell you generally speaking in the
    present tense if someone said that, that would be true. But I
    don't know what Mr. Bennett had in mind. I don't know.''
        Now, the President was open and honest and obvious in what
    he was arguing, and that is precisely what he was doing on this
    occasion. He was arguing a point that, as a technical matter,
    Bennett's statement could be read as being accurate.
        I point out again that this particular allegation was not
    included in Mr. Starr's referral. An argument that is
    identified as an argument, the grounds of which are clear to
    all, is not the basis for a perjury prosecution.
        Subpart 4 of this article has to do with false and
    misleading testimony about the President's efforts, allegedly,
    to influence witnesses and to impede discovery in Jones. Now,
    as I have said before, at the beginning of my presentation, the
    fourth category of allegedly perjurious, false, and misleading
    grand jury testimony overlaps with article II of allegations of
    obstruction of justice.
        I will say right now that Cheryl Mills will be appearing
    here when I have completed and David Kendall tomorrow to
    present the arguments on article II, why the President should
    not be found guilty and is not guilty of the allegations of
    obstruction of justice in article II.
        According to the managers' trial brief, making this
    argument that he also perjured himself about these matters,
    they claim these lies are the most troubling as the President
    used them in an attempt to conceal his criminal actions. One
    begins with a self-evident proposition--at least, to us--that
    the President did not obstruct justice, and we hope you agree
    with us by the end of the day tomorrow when we explain the
    evidence. But his explanation, if that is so, of what he did or
    didn't do to the grand jury were always truthful. Put another
    way, if the President didn't obstruct justice, he also didn't
    commit perjury when he denied it.
        According to the managers, the general language of this
    provision of subpart 4 is supposed to include a wide range of
    allegations, so we have some subparts of the subpart. But none
    of these allegations, let me say, ladies and gentlemen of the
    Senate, none of these was included or thought sufficiently
    credible to be included in the OIC referral, nor were these
    allegations included in Mr. Schippers' initial presentation to
    the Judiciary Committee. They are nothing more than an effort
    to inflate the number of perjury allegations by converting
    every answer that the President gave to the grand jury about
    the subject matter of article II into a new count of perjury,
    the double billing, if you will. All of these allegations are
    more properly part of our defense on the obstruction of justice
    allegation. But I will try to respond briefly to the allegation
    of perjury, his testimony about Monica Lewinsky's false
    affidavit. This grows out of the President's conversation with
    Ms. Lewinsky, allegedly, on December 17, in which he is said to
    have corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to execute a sworn
    affidavit that he knew to be perjurious, false, and misleading.
        In that famous late-night telephone conversation, Ms.
    Lewinsky asked the President what she could do if she were
    subpoenaed in the Jones case. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the
    President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.''
    That is what Ms. Lewinsky's recollection is.
        Now, in the grand jury, the President was repeatedly
    questioned about this conversation and he repeatedly answered
    emphatically. This is another example where it is not once or
    twice, it is three or four times. He truly thought he said that
    she could have sworn out an honest affidavit. The managers
    claim that when he said that--that he thought that she could
    swear out an honest affidavit--the President perjured himself.
        Now, the President's testimony in the grand jury on this
    point is not in any way cautious or qualified. He makes similar
    statements on four different occasions during that testimony,
    concluding with this tape:

        I have already told you that I felt strongly that she could
    issue--that she could execute an affidavit that would be
    factually truthful, that might get her out of having to
    testify. And did I hope she would be able to get out of
    testifying on the affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to
    execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.

        Now, the heart of the managers' argument is that there was
    no way that an honest affidavit can achieve what the President
    and Ms. Lewinsky both wanted to have achieved, which was to
    avoid her having to testify. And so the managers claim the
    President's statement that he thought she could make out an
    honest affidavit and avoid testifying in the Jones case about
    her relationship with the President is perjury.
        Once again, the managers claim that the President is guilty
    of perjury because he is testifying falsely about his state of
    mind. It wasn't true, they argued, that he really thought she
    could make out and sign and execute an honest affidavit; he
    could not have thought that; he wanted and expected her to lie
    in that affidavit, and that is why he suggested, ``Well, you
    can always file an affidavit.''
        Now, Ms. Lewinsky's inappropriate contact with the
    President was consensual. An affidavit being sought in a case
    involving allegations of sexual harassment that says there was
    no harassment, no effort to impose unwanted sexual overtures,
    would have been an affidavit that Ms. Lewinsky could honestly
    execute--an affidavit stating that she had never been on the
    receiving end of any unwanted sexual overtures from the
    President and that she had never been harassed.
        Second, both Ms. Lewinsky and the President had a
    definition of ``sexual relations'' that would have allowed Ms.
    Lewinsky, in her own mind, honestly and accurately, in their
    view, to swear an affidavit that she had never had sexual
    relations--meaning what she meant in the exhibits we
    distributed--with the President. She would have thought that
    was a factual and accurate affidavit, and so would the
    President at that time.
        Third, it is clear that Ms. Lewinsky understood that it was
    not necessary to volunteer information in an affidavit, but, on
    the contrary, she would try to give only that small but true
    portion of the whole story. She talks about this at some length
    in her telephone conversation with Linda Tripp. In her words,
    the goal of an affidavit is to be as benign as possible, to
    avoid being deposed. She is her own operator; she knows what
    she is doing.
        Please recognize what the managers are trying to do here.
    In article II, they accuse the President of obstructing justice
    by suggesting that Ms. Lewinsky should file an affidavit,
    knowing full well that the affidavit would have to be false.
    And when the President, under oath in the grand jury, denies
    that he believed that the affidavit would have to be false,
    they accuse him of perjury.
        The two allegations are inextricably intermingled, and if
    you conclude, as you should, that there is no evidence to
    support the underlying allegation, that the underlying offense
    is based on nothing but pure conjecture, you will conclude that
    the perjury charge is nothing more than an attempt to get two
    bites at the same apple.
        The second element is the President's testimony about the
    gifts. The managers' trial brief says that the President
    committed perjury when he testified that he told Ms. Lewinsky
    that if the Jones lawyers requested the gifts that he had given
    to her, she should provide them. Atypically, the brief quotes
    the President's precise language which is at issue in this
    particular allegation:

        And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she would
    have to give them whatever she had. That's what the law was.

        This testimony, the managers claim, is false. They say he
    never said that, and that when he said it in the grand jury, he
    is guilty of perjury.
        Now, the only evidence offered to support the allegation
    that the President testified falsely before the grand jury on
    this topic is, A, that Ms. Lewinsky raised a question with the
    President as to what she should do with the gifts. You have
    heard a lot of testimony about that, which only establishes one
    thing--that the topic came up. That is totally consistent with
    the President's testimony and has no bearing whatsoever on
    whether the President did or did not say what he claims to have
    said.
        The second piece of evidence is that Ms. Currie ended up
    picking up the gifts and taking them home with her, which, no
    matter how you might try to spin that, simply cannot be
    construed as evidence showing that the President perjured
    himself when he told the grand jury that he had given this
    advice to Ms. Lewinsky. ``Tinkers to Evers to Chance.''
        This allegation is all conjecture and there is no evidence.
    It is really astonishing that the managers would seriously
    include it in their case. Kenneth Starr did not, and it was not
    discussed or debated by the House Judiciary Committee.
        The majority's report makes another entirely different
    allegation about this matter. There, the House Republicans cite
    the President's denial--this is a denial, not an affirmation.
    The first has to do with testimony in front of the grand jury
    that he said something to Monica Lewinsky. The second has to do
    with a denial that he ever instructed Ms. Currie to pick up the
    gifts. From the transcript of the President's grand jury
    testimony, I quote:
        Question: After you gave Monica Lewinsky the gifts on
    December 28, did you speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and
    ask her to pick up a box of gifts that were some compilation of
    gifts that Ms. Lewinsky would have----
        Answer: No, sir, I didn't do that.
        Question: --to give to Ms. Currie?
        Answer: I did not do that.

        According to the majority's report, this testimony was
    perjurious, false, and misleading. The problem is, this
    allegation is similar to the problem with the previous one,
    only greater. In the first allegation, there is no one who
    testified that the President did not say what he testified
    under oath he said, and in this allegation there is no one who
    testified that the President said what he testified under oath
    he did not say.
        In other words, the House managers offer you this argument:
    Nobody says the President made this statement; we just think he
    did; so we are charging him with perjury for denying it, and
    you should remove him from office, despite the absence of
    evidence.
        Again, this was not included in the Starr referral, and we
    wonder how this kind of an allegation can seriously be brought
    against the President of the United States.
        The President's testimony about his January 18 conversation
    with Ms. Currie: The President's meeting and conversation with
    Betty Currie on Sunday, January 18, is an essential element in
    the allegation of obstruction as set forth in article II, and
    you will learn more about that from Cheryl Mills today. Because
    the Office of Independent Counsel spent so much time on this
    matter during President Clinton's grand jury testimony--they
    examined the President on this topic on four separate occasions
    during that 4-hour session--it was inevitable that the managers
    would find some way, somehow to include his testimony about
    this matter in article I. Just parenthetically, this too is an
    allegation that the Office of Independent Counsel did not see
    fit to make in its Referral to the House.
        And so, once again, we begin with a question: What is it
    precisely that the President said that is at the heart of this
    allegation of perjury? In his presentation last Thursday,
    Congressman Rogan quoted lengthy passages from a number of
    President Clinton's answers on the subject but failed to
    identify anything specific. Finally Congressman Rogan said
    this:

        When [the President] testified he was only making
    statements to Ms. Currie to ascertain what the facts were,
    trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was, this statement
    was false, and it was perjurious. We know it was perjury
    because the president called Ms. Currie into the White House
    the day after his deposition to tell her--not to ask her, to
    tell her--that he was never alone with Monica Lewinsky. To tell
    her that Ms. Currie could always hear or see them, and to tell
    her that he never touched Monica Lewinsky. These were false
    statements, and he knew that the statements were false at the
    time he made them to Betty Currie.

        But that is not true; the President clearly asked her
    questions as well as made declarative statements.
        I confess to some confusion about what perjury Congressman
    Rogan is really alleging here.
        It seems to me that he has moved from the world of perjury
    in article I to the world of obstruction, which is Cheryl and
    David's article II.
        The trial brief is more specific. They claim that the
    testimony was false when the President went in and said that he
    was ``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts
    were;'' when he said that he wanted to ``know what Betty's
    memory was about what she heard;'' and when he said he was
    ``trying to get as much information as he could.'' The purpose
    of the meeting and the conversation, according to the trial
    brief, was to influence Betty Currie's testimony, not to gather
    information.
        In truth, the President gave a number of different reasons
    to the grand jury for seeking out Betty Currie and talking to
    her about Monica Lewinsky, and it is totally plausible to
    conclude that the last thing on the President's mind at that
    particular moment was Betty Currie's potential role as a
    witness in a Federal court.
        More simply, the facts are that in making this particular
    allegation, the managers have come up with two, three, or four
    different statements by the President that they claim are
    perjurious which makes it a total distortion of the President's
    answer. There were many questions, and many answers, and then
    the reasons he gave for seeking out Betty Currie. Kenneth Starr
    made no such claim in his referral.
        Finally, the President's testimony about allegations that
    he influenced his aides; to influence; that he lied to his
    aide--let me get it right. The allegation is that when the
    President testified in front of the grand jury and denied that
    he misled his aides or told them false things, that it was
    ``perjurious, false and misleading testimony'' because he was
    really trying to use them to obstruct justice and influence the
    grand jury. The President testified in much greater detail on
    this topic about the details about his conversation with his
    aides than the managers suggest. And he never said that he only
    told them ``true things.''
        In fact, if you look at that testimony--and I urge you to
    do so; it is another topic that will take up some time--the
    President acknowledged that he misled an aide and he apologized
    for it. And he testified that actually he couldn't remember
    much of what he told his aide. He never challenged or denied
    what John Podesta said that he told him. He told the grand
    jury. He told them. And he never challenged Sidney Blumenthal's
    version of what he said to Mr. Blumenthal. There is absolutely
    no evidence to suggest that the President intended to deceive
    the grand jury on this matter because he never denied saying
    what they said he told them about his relationship. And that is
    what he told them. It was not just true things. He told them
    inaccurate things. He did not give the testimony that
    Congressman Rogan claims that he gave. He did not say that he
    did not mislead his aides. He said that he had, in fact, misled
    his aide. He does say that he tried to tell true things, but he
    does not conceal the nature of the true things he is talking
    about.
        So you can make up your own mind whether you agree with his
    characterization that there are true things. He described them
    for all to see and understand. For example, he says that he
    told his aides, ``I never had sex with her,'' as it was defined
    in his mind. You may disagree with his characterization of what
    he told them as being a true thing, but he certainly doesn't
    conceal the basis of his belief that it is true. He also said
    that he was not involved with Ms. Lewinsky in any sexual way.
    And he explains by use of the present tense he thought that was
    a true thing.
        But the materiality of this alleged perjury is really a
    mystery. That the President misled his aide is not an issue.
    That his aides became witnesses before the grand jury and that
    the President knew they would probably be called, it is simply
    not in dispute. Nor does the President dispute the testimony of
    Podesta and Blumenthal. The only issue here is whether the
    President, when he discussed Monica Lewinsky with these aides,
    was seeking to influence the grand jury's proceedings by giving
    his aides false information. This is not a perjury challenge.
    This is a subject to be dealt with in the context of article II
    and obstruction of justice.
        What does it all add up to? Mr. Ruff had it right. Beneath
    the surface of this article, this first article, there is
    really a witches' brew of allegations pulled from all corners
    of Bill Clinton's grand jury testimony. He is alleged to have
    lied to the grand jury when he used innocent words to tell
    about his improper contacts with Ms. Lewinsky. Truly, these are
    frivolous allegations. He is alleged to have lied about the
    date his improper activity with Ms. Lewinsky began, and whether
    it was preceded by any period of friendship. These, too, are
    frivolous allegations. The President didn't claim he said that,
    but even if he did, the allegations are of no import. He is
    alleged to have lied when he explained his understanding of the
    Jones definition and testified that his genuine belief was that
    the definition did not include the activity that he and Ms.
    Lewinsky had engaged in.
        Experienced prosecutors say that his interpretation was
    reasonable. He is alleged to have lied about the intimate
    details of his activity with Ms. Lewinsky. She says one thing;
    he says another. This is precisely the kind of oath against
    oath swearing match that is never prosecuted in the real world.
    Given the President's overall testimony before the grand jury,
    of what real significance is this disagreement? He is accused
    of ratifying his every sentence in the Jones deposition. And by
    saying that his goal was to be truthful, he is said to have
    lied. But no one should be charged with perjury for asserting
    innocence or proclaiming that he was trying to be truthful,
    particularly when all the evidence supports his claim.
        And finally, he is accused of lying about a variety of
    actions aimed at concealing his improper and embarrassing
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky when each one of those actions
    was motivated by nothing more than his desire to protect
    himself and his family from embarrassment, if not destruction.
        Think just for a moment and ask yourself whether these
    allegations about this testimony is really an effort to
    vindicate the rule of law, or is it something else? Ask
    yourself what coming generations will think about these
    charges. If you convict and remove President Clinton on the
    basis of these allegations, no President of the United States
    will ever be safe from impeachment again--and it will happen--
    and people will look back at us, and they will say we should
    have stopped it then before it was too late. Don't let this
    happen to our country.
        Before I conclude, I would like to respond to one specific
    argument that we heard last week. One of the arguments most
    frequently employed to urge the President's removal is that in
    the United States of America no one is above the law; that if
    the Senate does not take action against the President and
    convict him and remove him from office, we will not be keeping
    faith with that principle.
        Members of the Senate, I could not disagree more with that
    formulation of this issue. The principle that ``No one is above
    the law'' is sacred. The idea that the wealthy or the powerful
    or the famous should receive preferential treatment under the
    law--treatment that is different from that accorded to the poor
    and the weak--is anathema to everything that is great and good
    and special about the United States. It is anathema to our
    values and to our national ideals.
        I agree with Mr. Hyde. Our fathers and grandfathers--going
    back to the American Revolution--fought and died to defend the
    principle of ``equal justice under law.'' This principle is not
    only at the core of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, it is part of
    the very foundation of our civic society.
        But the framers, in their genius, did not design or intend
    the awesome power of impeachment and removal for the purpose of
    vindicating the rule of law. They believed that the power of
    impeachment and removal should be used for a different
    purpose--to protect the body politic, to protect the Government
    itself from a President whose conduct was so abusive as to
    constitute an assault on, a threat to the entire system.
        We are all rereading the Constitution. We are all looking
    at ``The Federalist Papers'' again. And when we do that, we
    realize that the framers of the Constitution considered the
    question of what to do when the highest officials of
    Government, the President or the Vice President, are charged
    with misconduct. And back then they made an important
    distinction that we should recognize and respect today between
    conduct in official capacity and conduct in private capacity.
    They created two different ways of dealing with these two very
    different kinds of conduct. Impeachment was to protect the
    country from abuse of official power by an out-of-control
    President or by someone who was so abusive and assaultive on
    the system of Government that he had to be removed to protect
    the Government.
        The criminal justice system was to vindicate the rule of
    law, and the clearest indication that one is not meant to be a
    substitute for the other can be found in article I, section 3,
    clause 7 of the Constitution:

        Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further
    than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and
    enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable
    and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment,
    according to Law.

        If the President's conduct in his official capacity is so
    grave as to be a serious assault upon the system of Government,
    so serious as to subvert our constitutional order, so serious
    as to require the Nation to be protected from the damage that
    he would do if he were to continue in office, the remedy is
    impeachment and removal by a political process.
        If, however, the President's conduct does not implicate the
    office or the powers of the Presidency, the remedy is a legal
    process involving prosecution, conviction, and punishment in
    the courts. In this fashion the principle is vindicated that
    ``no man is above the law,'' for in the criminal justice system
    the President will be treated like any other citizen and
    accountable to the rule of law.
        The great scholar and justice, James Wilson, said it best
    when he wrote:

        Far from being above the laws, [the President] is amenable
    to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his
    public character by impeachment.

        And more recently, just last November, Senator Specter made
    the same point with equal eloquence when he proposed:

        . . . abandoning Impeachment and, after the President
    leaves office, holding him accountable in the same way any
    other person would be; through indictment and prosecution for
    any Federal crimes established by the evidence.

        President Clinton should not be above the law, he is not
    above the law, and he will not be above the law. As Senator
    Specter rightly stated, the criminal justice system stands
    ready to perform that function and to hold the President
    accountable at some later date. And like any other citizen,
    William Jefferson Clinton can be prosecuted for any crimes he
    is alleged to have committed throughout his term of office.
        It would be a profound mistake with lasting consequences
    for the Members of this body, in the throes of a highly charged
    impeachment trial, to conclude that only the Senate rather than
    the criminal justice system should be the chosen instrument of
    the Constitution to fulfill that principle. It is not up to the
    Senate to remove the President from office for private conduct
    that does not involve abuse of Presidential power and does not
    seriously disrupt the President's capacity to function as Chief
    Executive of the United States. And it would be folly to think
    that to vindicate the rule of law in the United States the
    Senate is obliged to reverse a national election and remove a
    President from office before the completion of his term. If
    there is sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal prosecution,
    this President, when he returns to private life, can be
    indicted, prosecuted, and tried and, if convicted, punished
    like any other citizen.
        I end by making a point that should never be far from our
    thoughts as we continue through this trial. There is no moment
    in our national public life more sacred than the ritual of
    casting one's vote in a Presidential election. It is amazing,
    almost miraculous, that so powerful and transforming an event
    can occur so quietly in a great and populous nation. The act is
    invisible to outside eyes. On one designated day, millions of
    Americans go to their local polling places--to schools,
    firehouses, police stations, and municipal buildings throughout
    the Nation--to cast their vote for President. It is a moment of
    high purpose, the only political act that we perform together
    as a nation.
        And so it is that we believe, short of a declaration of
    war, there is nothing more serious for our elected
    representatives to contemplate than, through the process of
    impeachment, to undo the results of a national election and to
    remove the man chosen by the American people to be their
    President.
        Over the past week, we have heard many speeches about the
    Constitution and the rule of law and the many sacrifices that
    the American people have made throughout their history to
    defend their rights and their freedoms. Surely, among the most
    important of those rights and freedoms is the right--freely,
    fairly, and openly--to cast one's vote in a Presidential
    election and have the results of that election respected and
    obeyed.
        Can anyone imagine anything more damaging to the
    Constitution of the United States than for a Presidential
    election to be reversed for conduct that the vast majority of
    the American people does not believe warrants the President's
    removal from office?
        In the entire history of the United States, we have never
    been at this juncture before. We have never come so close to
    the final act of removing an elected President than we are at
    this moment in time.
        William Jefferson Clinton was elected freely, fairly, and
    openly by the American people to be President. We dare not
    reverse that decision without good and just cause. And we dare
    not take that step unless the people who spoke agree that such
    drastic action is justified. The damage to our political
    discourse for years, decades, would be terrible to contemplate.
        In the course of this impeachment process, we have also
    devoted a good deal of time and attention to a discussion of
    precedents that involve the impeachment and removal of Federal
    judges. For the President, we have argued that when it comes to
    applying constitutional standards for impeachment, judges are
    different. We think that the Constitution implicitly recognizes
    that distinction.
        I would like to change the focus for a moment and look at
    the way we think the legislative branch of our Government also
    recognizes that distinction. History shows, I think, that it
    has been easier for Congress to impeach and remove a Federal
    judge from office than to discharge a Member of the House or
    Senate, and maybe that is as it should be. When confronted with
    misconduct by one of its Members, Congress has rarely been
    willing to negate the popular will as expressed in
    congressional elections. In truth, the Congress has, for the
    most part, simply declined to take that step.
        Perhaps rightly so, because of the greater deference paid
    to elected, as opposed to appointed, officials or judges.
    Perhaps because Presidents and Senators and Representatives are
    periodically elected to defined terms, as opposed to life
    terms, the Congress has chosen to rely upon the public to work
    its will through the electoral system. That deference is
    warranted, I submit, and it should be a factor in your
    deliberations.
        In 210 years of history and throughout 105 Congresses, only
    4 Members of the House have ever been expelled by that body. As
    for the Senate, 15 Senators--the first in 1797, the remaining
    14 during the Civil War.
        My point is a simple one. Because of the sanctity of
    elections and the regularity of elections, and because of the
    heavy burden that must be carried before reversing the will of
    the people, decisions to remove elected officeholders have been
    and should be, at least in some degree, based on factors that
    are different than the ones used for judges appointed for life
    and who serve for good behavior. By its own conduct throughout
    its own history, Congress seems to agree with this point.
        I come from the State of Vermont, and if you have been to
    Vermont, you know that wherever you go across that State, from
    the smallest squares in the smallest towns to the larger parks,
    and what we like to think of as our cities, you come across
    monuments celebrating the American Union. One of the things
    that Vermont children learn first is that we were and are the
    14th State of the Union and that our forebears fought to create
    this Nation and to preserve it.
        So we in our history have shown that there are two things
    that we care about: We care about our American Union and we
    care about equal rights for all citizens under the law. And one
    of the rights that is most precious to every American is the
    right to choose our leaders in free elections. That right, the
    equal right to vote with confidence that the outcome will be
    respected, is fundamental to our values, to our national unity
    and identity.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you must do your duty
    as you see it, as you see the law and facts and the evidence.
    But, truly, these articles do not justify the nullification of
    the American people's free choice in a national election. I
    appeal to you, do not turn your back on those millions of
    Americans who cast their votes in the belief that they, and
    they alone, decide who will lead this country as President. Do
    not throw our politics into the darkness of endless
    recrimination. Do not inject a poison of bitter partisanship
    into the body politic which, like a virus, can move through our
    national bloodstream for years to come with results none can
    know or calculate.
        Do not let this case and these charges, as flawed and as
    unfair as they are, destroy a fundamental underpinning of
    American democracy, the right of the people, and no one else,
    to select the President of the United States.
        William Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of obstruction of
    justice. He is not guilty of perjury. He must not be removed.
        Thank you very much.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     RECESS

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we recess the proceedings now. We will begin promptly at 5
    minutes after 4.
        There being no objection, the Senate, at 3:53 p.m.,
    recessed until 4:07 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe we are
    ready to resume with the presentation of Counsel Cheryl Mills.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Ms. Counsel Mills.
        Ms. Counsel MILLS. Mr. Chief Justice, managers from the
    House of Representatives, Members of the Senate, good
    afternoon. My name is Cheryl Mills, and I am deputy counsel to
    the President. I am honored to be here today on behalf of the
    President to address you.
        Today, incidentally, marks my 6-year anniversary in the
    White House. I am very proud to have had the opportunity to
    serve our country and this President.
        It is a particular honor for me to stand on the Senate
    floor today. I am an Army brat. My father served in the Army
    for 27 years. I grew up in the military world, where
    opportunity was a reality and not just a slogan. The very fact
    that the daughter of an Army officer from Richmond, VA, the
    very fact that I can represent the President of the United
    States on the floor of the Senate of the United States, is
    powerful proof that the American dream lives.
        I am going to take some time to address two of the
    allegations of obstruction of justice against President Clinton
    in article II: First, the allegation related to the box of
    gifts that Ms. Lewinsky asked Ms. Currie to hold for her;
    second, the allegation related to the President's conversation
    with Ms. Currie after his deposition in the Jones case.
    Tomorrow my colleague, Mr. Kendall, will address the remaining
    allegations of obstruction of justice.
        Over the course of the House managers' presentation last
    week, I confess I was struck by how often they referred to the
    significance of the rule of law. House Manager Sensenbrenner,
    for example, quoted President Theodore Roosevelt stating, ``No
    man is above the law and no man is below it. . . .'' As a
    lawyer, as an American, and as an African American, it is a
    principle in which I believe to the very core of my being. It
    is what many have struggled and died for, the right to be equal
    before the law without regard to race or gender or ethnicity,
    disability, privilege, or station in life. The rule of law
    applies to the weak and the strong, the rich and the poor, the
    powerful and the powerless.
        If you love the rule of law, you must love it in all of its
    applications. You cannot only love it when it provides the
    verdict you seek. You must love it when the verdict goes
    against you as well. We cannot uphold the rule of law only when
    it is consistent with our beliefs. We must uphold it even when
    it protects behavior that we don't like or is unattractive or
    is not admirable or that might even be hurtful. And we cannot
    say we love the rule of law but dismiss arguments that appeal
    to the rule of law as legalisms or legal hairsplitting.
        I say all of this because not only the facts but the law of
    obstruction of justice protects the President. It does not
    condemn him. And the managers cannot deny the President the
    protection that is provided by the law and still insist that
    they are acting to uphold the law. His conduct, while clearly
    not attractive, or admirable, is not criminal. That is the rule
    of law in this case.
        So as my colleagues and I discuss obstruction of justice
    against the President, we ask only that the rule of law be
    applied equally, neutrally, fairly, not emotionally or
    personally or politically. If it is applied equally, the rule
    of law exonerates Bill Clinton.
        That said, I want to begin where Manager Hutchinson left
    off this weekend during a television program. The evidence does
    not support conviction of the President on any of the
    allegations of obstruction of justice. On the record now before
    the Senate, and that which was before the House, Manager
    Hutchinson said, ``I don't think you could obtain a conviction
    or that I could fairly ask for a conviction.'' We agree. We
    agree. There are good reasons for Manager Hutchinson's
    judgment. And the most important, the evidence in the record
    and the law on the books, does not support the conclusion that
    the President obstructed justice.
        Now, I know that Manager McCollum begged you in his
    presentation to not pay attention to details when the
    President's case was put forward. He went so far as to implore
    you not to get hung up on some of the details when the
    President and his attorneys try to explain this stuff--``The
    big picture is what you need to keep in mind, not the
    compartmentalization.'' Manager McCollum was telling you, in
    effect, not to pay attention to the evidence that exonerates
    the President--``Don't pay attention to the details that take
    this case out of the realm of activities that are prohibited by
    the law.''
        But the rule of law depends upon the details because it
    depends upon the facts and it depends upon the fairness of the
    persons called to judge the facts. I want to walk through the
    big picture and I want to walk through the facts.
        I first want to discuss the real story, and then I want to
    focus on all those inconvenient details, or what Manager Buyer
    called those stubborn facts that didn't fit the big picture
    that the House managers want you to see.
        Manager Barr suggested the fit between the facts and the
    law against the President in this case is as precise as the
    finely tuned mechanism of a Swiss watch. But when you put the
    facts together, they don't quite make out a Swiss watch; in
    fact, they might not even make good sausage.
        So what is the big picture? The big picture is this: The
    President had a relationship with a young woman. His conduct
    was inappropriate. But it was not obstruction of justice.
    During the course of their relationship, the President and the
    young woman pledged not to talk about it with others. That is
    not obstruction of justice. The President ended their
    relationship before anyone knew about it. He ended it not
    because he thought it would place him in legal jeopardy; he
    ended it because he knew it was wrong. That is not obstruction
    of justice.
        The President hoped that no one would find out about his
    indiscretion, about his lapse in judgment. That is not
    obstruction of justice, either. One day, however, long after he
    had ended the relationship, he was asked about it in an
    unrelated lawsuit, a lawsuit whose intent, at least as
    proclaimed by those who were pursuing it, was to politically
    damage him. That was their publicly announced goal. So he knew,
    the President knew that his secret would soon be exposed. And
    he was right.
        It was revealed for public consumption, written large all
    over the world against his best efforts to have ended the
    relationship and to have put right what he had done wrong. That
    is the real big picture. That is the truth. And that is not
    obstruction of justice.
        So let's talk about the allegation of obstruction of
    justice, about the box of gifts that Ms. Currie received from
    Ms. Lewinsky. I want to begin by telling you another true
    story, the real story of the now famous gifts.
        It takes place on December 28, 1997. On that day the
    President gave Ms. Lewinsky holiday gifts. During her visit
    with the President, Ms. Lewinsky has said that she raised the
    subpoena that she had received from the Jones lawyers on the
    19th and asked him, what should she do about the gifts. The
    President has said he told her, whenever it was that they
    discussed it, that she would have to give over whatever she
    had. He was not concerned about the gifts because he gives so
    many gifts to so many people. Unbeknownst to the President,
    however, Ms. Lewinsky had been worrying about what to do with
    the gifts ever since she got the subpoena. She was concerned
    that the Jones lawyers might even search her apartment so she
    wanted to get the gifts out of her home.
        After Ms. Lewinsky's visit with the President, Ms. Currie
    walked her from the building. Then or later, either in person
    or on the phone, Ms. Lewinsky told Ms. Currie that she had a
    box of gifts that the President had given her that she wanted
    Ms. Currie to hold because people were asking questions. In the
    course of that conversation, they discussed other things as
    well. Ms. Currie agreed to hold the box of gifts. After their
    discussion, Ms. Lewinsky packed up some but not all of the
    gifts that the President had given her over time. She kept out
    presents of particular sentimental value as well as virtually
    all of the gifts he had given her that very day on the 28th.
        Ms. Currie went by Ms. Lewinsky's home after leaving work,
    picked up the box that had a note on it that said, ``Do not
    throw away,'' and she took it home. Ms. Currie did not raise
    Ms. Lewinsky's request with the President because she saw
    herself as doing a favor for a friend. Ms. Currie had no idea
    the gifts were under subpoena.
        So Ms. Lewinsky's request hardly struck her as criminal.
        This story that I just told you is obviously very different
    from the story presented by the House managers. How can I tell
    such a story that is so at odds with that which has been
    presented by the House managers? The answer lies in the
    selective reading of the record by the House managers. But
    theirs is not the only version of the facts that needs to be
    told. So what details did they downplay or discard or disregard
    in their presentation to create allegations of obstruction of
    justice?
        To be fair, the House managers acknowledged up front that
    their case is largely circumstantial. They are right. Let's
    walk through the House managers' presentation of the key events
    which they gave to you last week. Let's look at exhibit 1 which
    is in the packet that has been handed out to you.
        First key fact: On December 19, Monica Lewinsky was served
    with a subpoena in the Paula Jones case. The subpoena required
    that she testify at that deposition in January 1998 and also to
    produce each and every gift given to her by President Clinton.
        Second event: On December 28, Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President met in the Oval Office to exchange Christmas gifts,
    at which time they discussed the fact that the lawyers in the
    Jones case had subpoenaed all of the President's gifts.
        Third key fact: During the conversation on the 28th, Ms.
    Lewinsky asked the question whether she should put away outside
    her home or give to someone--maybe Betty--the gifts. At that
    time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the President responded, ``Let
    me think about it.''
        Fourth fact they presented to you: That answer led to
    action. Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call at 3:32 p.m.
    from Ms. Currie who said, ``I understand you have something to
    give me or that the President has said you have something for
    me.'' It was the President who initiated the retrieval of the
    gifts and the concealment of the evidence.
        Fifth event they presented: Without asking any questions,
    Ms. Currie picked up the box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, drove
    to her home, and placed the box under her bed.
        That is what the House managers told you last week. Now,
    let's go through their story piece by piece. On December 19,
    Monica Lewinsky was served with a subpoena in the Jones case.
    The subpoena required her to testify at a deposition in January
    1998, and also to produce each and every gift given to her by
    the President. This statement is factually accurate. It does
    not, however, convey the entire state of affairs. Ms. Lewinsky
    told the FBI that when she got the subpoena she wanted the
    gifts out of her apartment. Why? Because she suspected that
    lawyers for Jones would break into her apartment looking for
    gifts. She was also concerned that the Jones people might tap
    her phone. Therefore, she wanted to put the gifts out of reach
    of the Jones lawyers, out of harms way. The managers entirely
    disregarded Ms. Lewinsky's own independent motivations for
    wanting to move the gifts.
        Let's continue. On December 28, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President met in the Oval Office to exchange Christmas gifts,
    at which time they discussed the fact that the lawyers in the
    Jones case had subpoenaed all of the gifts from the President
    to Ms. Lewinsky. During conversation on December 28, Ms.
    Lewinsky asked the President whether she should put away the
    gifts out of her house some place, or give them to someone,
    maybe Betty. At that time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, the
    President said, ``Let me think about it.''
        The House managers have consistently described the December
    28 meeting exactly this way, as did the majority counsel for
    the House Judiciary, as did the Office of Independent Counsel.
    It has been said so often that it has become conventional
    wisdom. But it is not the whole truth. It is not the full
    record. Ms. Lewinsky actually gave 10 renditions of her
    conversation with the President. All of them have been outlined
    in our chart. Invariably, the one most cited is the one least
    favorable to the President. But even in that version, the one
    that is least favorable to the President, no one claims he
    ordered, suggested, or even hinted that anyone obstruct
    justice. At most, the President says, ``Let me think about
    it.'' That is not obstruction of justice.
        But what about the nine other versions? Some of the other
    versions which I have never heard offered by the House
    managers, versions that maybe you, too, have never heard, are
    the ones that put the lie to the obstruction of justice
    elevation.
        Let's look at exhibit 2 which is in your material. You may
    have never heard, for example, this version of their
    conversation. This is Ms. Lewinsky speaking:

        It was December 28th and I was there to get my Christmas
    gifts from him . . . and we spent maybe about 5 minutes or so,
    not very long, talking about the case. And I said to him,
    ``Well, do you think'' . . . and I don't think I said get rid
    of, but I said, ``Do you think I should put away or maybe give
    to Betty or give someone the gifts?'' And he--I don't remember
    his response. It was something like, ``I don't know,'' or
    ``hmm'' or there was really no response.

        You also may not have heard this version. This is a juror
    speaking, a grand juror speaking to Ms. Lewinsky:

        The Juror: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the
    President bring up Betty's name?

        And this is at the meeting on the 28th:

        Ms. Lewinsky: I think I brought it up. The President
    wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he really
    didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . . .

        And you probably have not heard this version:

        Lewinsky advised that Clinton was sitting in a rocking
    chair in the study. Lewinsky asked Clinton what she should do
    with the gifts Clinton had given her and he either did not
    respond or responded ``I don't know''. Lewinsky is not sure
    exactly what was said, but she is certain that whatever Clinton
    said, she had no clear image in her mind of what to do next.

        Why haven't we heard these versions? Because they weaken an
    already fragile circumstantial case. If Ms. Lewinsky says that
    the President doesn't respond at all, then there is absolutely
    no evidence for the House managers' obstruction of justice
    theory, even under their version of events. So these versions
    get disregarded to ensure that the House managers' big picture
    doesn't get cluttered by all those details. It is those facts,
    those stubborn facts, that just don't fit.
        But the most significant detail the managers disregard
    because it doesn't fit is the President's testimony. The
    President testified that he told Ms. Lewinsky that she had to
    give the Jones lawyers whatever gifts she had. Why? As the
    House managers predicted we would ask, because it is a question
    that begs to be asked, why would the President give Ms.
    Lewinsky gifts if he wanted her to give them right back? The
    only real explanation is he truly was, as he testified,
    unconcerned about the gifts. The House managers want you to
    believe that this gift giving was a show of confidence; that he
    knew Ms. Lewinsky would conceal them. But then why, under their
    theory, ask Ms. Currie to go pick them up? Why not know that
    Ms. Lewinsky is just going to conceal them? Better still, why
    not just show her the gifts and tell her to come by after the
    subpoena date has passed?
        It simply doesn't make sense. The President's actions
    entirely undermine the House managers' theory of obstruction of
    justice.
        But let's continue with their version of events. That
    answer, the ``Let-me-think-about-it'' answer, that answer led
    to action. Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call at 3:32 p.m.
    from Ms. Currie who said, ``I understand you have something to
    give me or the President said you have something to give me.''
    It was the President who initiated the retrieval of the gifts
    and the concealment of the evidence.
        Here is where the House managers have dramatically
    shortchanged the truth because the whole truth demands that Ms.
    Currie's testimony be presented fairly.
        In telling their story, the managers do concede that there
    is a conflict in the testimony between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms.
    Currie, but they strive mightily to get you to disregard Ms.
    Currie's testimony by telling you that her memory on the issue
    of how she came to pick up the gifts was ``fuzzy''--fuzzy. In
    particular, Manager Hutchinson told you:

        I will concede there is a conflict in the testimony on this
    point with Ms. Currie. Ms. Currie, in her grand jury testimony,
    had a fuzzy memory, a little different recollection. She
    testified that, the best she can remember, Ms. Lewinsky called
    her, but when she was asked further, she said that maybe Ms.
    Lewinsky's memory is better than hers on that issue.

        That is what the House managers want you to believe about
    Ms. Currie. That is not playing fair by Ms. Currie. It is not
    playing fair by the facts. Why? Because Ms. Currie was asked
    about who initiated the gift pick-up five times. Her answer
    each time was unequivocal--5 times. From the first FBI
    interview just days after the story broke in the media, to her
    last grand jury appearance, Ms. Currie repeatedly and
    unwaveringly testified that it was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted
    her about the gifts.
        Her memory on this issue is clear. What does she say? Let's
    look at exhibit 3, the first time she is asked:

        Lewinsky called Currie and advised she had returned all
    gifts Clinton had given to Lewinsky, as there was talk going
    around about the gifts.

        The second time:

        Monica said she was getting concerned and she wanted to
    give me the stuff the President had given her, or give me a box
    of stuff. It was a box of stuff.

        Third time, and this was a prosecutor asking Ms. Currie the
    question:

        Just tell us for a moment how this issue first arose, and
    what you did about it, and what Ms. Lewinsky told you.
        Ms. Currie: The best I remember, it first arose with
    conversation. I don't know if it was over the phone or in
    person; I don't know. She asked me if I would pick up a box.
    She said Isikoff had been inquiring about the gifts.

        The fourth time:

        The best I remember, she said she wanted me to hold these
    gifts--hold this--I'm sure she said gifts, a box of gifts--I
    don't remember--because people were asking questions, and I
    said fine.

        The fifth time:

        The best I remember is, Monica called me and asked me if
    she can give me some gifts, if I would pick up some gifts for
    her.

        The last time, the fifth time, when a grand juror
    completely misstated Ms. Currie's testimony regarding how the
    gift exchange was initiated by suggesting that the President
    had directed her to pick up the gifts, Ms. Currie was quick to
    correct the juror:

        Question. Ms. Currie, I want to come back for a second to the box
    of gifts and how they came to be in your possession. As I recall your
    earlier testimony the other day, you testified that the President asked
    you to telephone Ms. Lewinsky, is that correct?
        Answer. Pardon? The President asked me to telephone Ms. Lewinsky?
        Juror. Is that correct?
        Ms. Currie. About?
        Juror. About the box of gifts. I am trying to recall and understand
    exactly how the box of gifts came to be in your possession.
        Ms. Currie. I don't recall the President asking me to call about a
    box of gifts.
        Juror. How did you come to be in possession of the box of gifts?
        Ms. Currie. The best I remember, Ms. Lewinsky called me and asked
    me if she can give me the gifts--if I would pick up some gifts for her.

        The record reflects that Ms. Currie's testimony on this
    issue was clear--five times--every time she was asked.
        What, then, are the managers talking about when they say
    that Ms. Currie concedes that Ms. Lewinsky might have a better
    memory than herself on this issue? They are talking about
    something a little different; that was whether she, Ms. Currie,
    had told the President that she had picked up the box of gifts
    from Ms. Lewinsky. Let's put it in context. After being asked
    the same question for the fourth time and reiterating for the
    fourth time that Ms. Lewinsky contacted her about the gifts,
    the prosecutor asked Ms. Currie:

        Well, what if Ms. Lewinsky said that Ms. Currie spoke to
    the President about receiving the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky?

        Ms. Currie responds:

        Then she may remember better than I. I don't remember.

        Not once did Ms. Currie equivocate on the central fact Ms.
    Lewinsky asked her to retrieve the gifts. The President
    testified, consistent with Ms. Currie's testimony, that he
    never asked Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky.
    So why is Ms. Currie's testimony distorted and discounted by
    the House managers?
        They are asking you to make one of the most awesome
    decisions the Constitution contemplates. They owe you, they owe
    the President, they owe the Constitution, and they owe Betty
    Currie an accurate presentation of the facts.
        But what about that supposedly corroborating cell phone
    call from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky on December 28? The
    managers highlighted this call, which they claim is the call in
    which Ms. Currie told Ms. Lewinsky that she understood she had
    something for her, the gifts. This, they say, is the linchpin
    that closes the deal on their version of the facts.
        What the managers downplay, as Mr. Ruff discussed
    yesterday, is the fact that this call to arrange the pickup of
    the gifts comes after the time Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly
    testified that the gifts were picked up by Ms. Currie. In
    citing the cell phone record as corroboration, they also
    disregard Ms. Currie's testimony that she picked up the gifts
    leaving from work on her way home; that would have been from
    Washington to Arlington. That is inconsistent with the call
    from Arlington.
        Most significantly, the managers purposely avoided telling
    you about the length of the call. As Mr. Ruff pointed out
    yesterday, the call is for 1 minute, or less. According to Ms.
    Lewinsky's own testimony, when she spoke to Ms. Currie to
    arrange the gift pickup, they talked about other matters, as
    well as the box. They had a conversation. That is a lot of
    talk: I have a box. When can you come pick it up? Where do you
    want me to meet you? And other chitchat. That is a lot of talk
    for a call that lasts 1 minute, or less. It is all but
    inconceivable that all this took place in the call. Since Ms.
    Currie placed a call to Ms. Lewinsky, though, the House
    managers want you to believe that.
        What next? The House managers told you, without asking any
    questions, Ms. Currie picked up the box of gifts from Ms.
    Lewinsky, drove to her home, which, incidentally, is
    inconsistent with their theory because she is going in the
    wrong direction. She is supposed to be going to the hospital--
    if she picked up the gifts, on their theory--and she placed the
    box under her bed. Then they posit this question: Why would Ms.
    Currie pick up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky? Why on earth would
    she do such a thing? Their answer: She must have been ordered
    to pick up the gifts by the President. They conclude, without
    any testimonial report, that there would be no reason for Betty
    Currie, out of the blue, to retrieve the gifts, unless
    instructed to do so by the President. Why else would she do it?
        Well, the record before you offers the answer. As Ms.
    Currie told the FBI during her first interview in January of
    1998, Ms. Lewinsky was a friend. She had been helpful and
    supportive when she was dealing with some very painful personal
    tragedies. Ms. Currie enjoyed what she saw as a motherly
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. They would often talk about
    each other's families, about their own activities, and other
    chitchat. Why does she agree to hold the box of gifts for Ms.
    Lewinsky? Because she is a friend. And that is not obstruction
    of justice.
        Now, think about the story as I told it to you, and about
    the different story the managers presented. Ms. Lewinsky was
    concerned about the gifts after receiving a subpoena from the
    Jones lawyers. She was worried they might search her apartment
    and she wanted to get the gifts out of her home. She met with
    the President, and what does he do? He gives her more gifts--
    more gifts.
        When she asked what to do about the gifts, at most she
    says, ``Let me think about it.'' Those are the words that
    Lewinsky has acknowledged on several occasions, that he may
    have said nothing.
        Ms. Lewinsky is still concerned about the gifts. She
    decides to put them away, keeping the gifts that have
    sentimental value, and giving to her lawyer the gifts she
    thinks the Jones lawyers are looking for, and giving to Ms.
    Currie those items that she really would like back but that she
    can live without. She tells Ms. Currie that she has some gifts
    from the President that she wants her to hold because there is
    talk going around about the gifts. Ms. Currie picks them up
    after work on her way home.
        This story is consistent with the President's lack of
    concern about the gifts. The managers have tried to deflect the
    inexplicable contradiction created by their own theory. They
    want you to believe the President would really give Ms.
    Lewinsky gifts only to take them back on the very same day. Of
    course he wouldn't. No one would.
        The only explanation they can conjure is torture: The
    President gave her gifts which he intended to take back that
    same afternoon to show his confidence that she would conceal
    the relationship. The facts clearly do not support their
    version of events. To believe the managers' version of events,
    you must not only disbelieve the President, you must also
    disbelieve Ms. Currie.
        Ms. Currie has said that the President did not ask her to
    pick up the gifts. Ms. Currie has said that Ms. Lewinsky asked
    her to pick up the gifts. The managers have downplayed Ms.
    Currie's credibility in this incident. They have urged you to
    think of her as acting as ``a loyal secretary to the
    President.''
        Of course she is loyal. But it is, may I say, an insult to
    Betty Currie and to millions of other loyal Americans to
    suggest that loyalty breeds dishonesty. If Ms. Currie was
    dishonest, why would she have told the counsel about the
    conversation between the President and her that the managers
    have recounted as being so damaging? Why would she have said
    anything at all about that conversation? Why? Because she is
    honest. And loyalty and honesty are not mutually exclusive.
    Betty Currie is a loyal person, and Betty Currie is an honest
    person.
        These are the facts. That is not obstruction of justice.
        I believe I can best sum up by using the words of Manager
    Buyer who quoted President John Adams. ``Facts are stubborn
    things. Whatever may be our issues, or inclinations, or the
    dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of the
    facts and the evidence.''
        Those stubborn facts. Manager Buyer went on to say, ``I
    believe John Adams was right.'' Facts and evidence. Facts are
    stubborn things. You can color the facts, like calling Ms.
    Currie's memory fuzzy. You can shade the facts by not telling
    you the length of that supposed corroborating phone call. You
    can misrepresent the facts by giving only 1 of 10 versions of
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about the President's response to her
    question about the gifts. You can hide the facts, like not
    telling you of Ms. Lewinsky's personal motivation for wanting
    the gifts. But the truthful facts are stubborn; they won't go
    away. Like the telltale heart, they keep pounding. And they
    keep coming. They won't go away. Those stubborn, stubborn
    facts. They show that this was not obstruction of justice.
        I now will talk about the President's conversation with Ms.
    Currie on January 18. It is not difficult to understand these
    events if you have lived a life in which you are the subject of
    extraordinary media attention and extraordinary media scrutiny.
    Most American lives are not like that. Our jobs and our
    personal lives are not usually the subject for daily media
    consumption. As Senators, you obviously know well what that
    life is like.
        On January 18, the President talked to Ms. Currie about the
    Jones deposition and in particular about his surprise at some
    of the questions the Jones lawyers had asked about Ms.
    Lewinsky. In the course of their conversation, the President
    asked Ms. Currie a series of questions and made some statements
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, all of which seemed
    to seek her concurrence, or reaction, or her input.
        The managers' theory is that the President, by his
    comments, corruptly tried to influence Ms. Currie's potential
    testimony in the Jones case in violation of the obstruction of
    justice law. They acknowledge that the President knew nothing
    about the independent counsel's investigation. So they have
    focused on the Jones case as the place to lodge their
    obstruction of justice allegation. Ms. Currie was not scheduled
    to be a witness in that case. And, as you will see, the
    President had other things on his mind.
        Before I go into the facts surrounding these conversations,
    I want to first focus briefly on the law, as the managers did
    in their presentation. There are two relevant obstruction of
    justice statutes: 18 U.S.C. 1503, which is the general
    obstruction of justice statute; and 18 U.S.C. 1512, the more
    specific statute which prohibits witness tampering.
        There are differences between these two statutes, but for
    our purpose their essential elements are similar. Both require
    the Government to prove that the person being accused, one,
    acted knowingly; two, with specific intent; three, to corruptly
    affect and influence, in 1503, and corruptly persuade, in 1512,
    either the due administration of justice, under 1503, or the
    testimony of a person in an official proceeding, under 1512, to
    try to persuade the testimony of a person in an official
    proceeding. For conviction, each and every element must be
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to
    prove even one element, the jury is obliged to acquit. In this
    case, none of the elements is present.
        First, a little more about the law. You have to do more
    than make false statements to someone who might or might not
    testify in a judicial proceeding to obstruct justice. In United
    States v. Aguilar, an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
    quoted by the House managers, the Supreme Court addressed the
    Government's requirement and showed that the defendant knew his
    actions were likely to affect a judicial proceeding. There, the
    U.S. district court judge was accused and convicted of lying to
    an FBI agent about a conversation with another judge and about
    what he said about his knowledge of some wiretapping. The
    Supreme Court reversed the conviction under 1502, the general
    obstruction of justice statute, holding that the facts were
    insufficient to make the case. They said in this material:

        We do not believe that uttering false statements to an
    investigative agent--and that seems to be all that was proved
    here--who might or might not testify before a grand jury is
    sufficient to make out a violation of the catch-all provision
    of 1503.  . . . But what use will be made of false testimony
    given to an investigative agent who has not been subpoenaed or
    otherwise directed to appear before the grand jury is far more
    speculative. We think it cannot be said to have the ``natural
    and probable effect'' of interfering with the due
    administration of justice.

        In responding to the defendant's criticism of the Court's
    holding, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, under the defense
    theory:

        A man could be found guilty of violating 1503 if he knew of
    a pending investigation and lied to his wife about his
    whereabouts at the time of the crime, thinking that an FBI
    agent might interview her and that she might in turn be
    influencing her statements to that agent about her husband's
    false accounts of where he was.

        The intent to obstruct justice is indeed present, but the
    man's culpability is a good deal less clear from the statute
    than we would usually require in order to impose criminal
    liability.
        So I want to begin by focusing on the ``corruptly
    persuade'' elements of witness tampering. What does it mean to
    corruptly persuade? The term is vague, and the legislative
    history on the specific point is not very clear. We do know it
    means more than harassing, which is described as badgering or
    pestering conduct, since 1512 makes intentional harassment a
    misdemeanor a lesser offense of ``corruptly persuade,'' which
    is a felony. The U.S. Attorneys' Manual gives some guidance. A
    prosecution under 1512 would require the Government to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt, one, an effort to threaten, force or
    intimidate another person and; two, an intent to influence the
    person's testimony. Thus, ``corruptly persuade'' for career
    prosecutors requires some element of threat or intimidation or
    pressure.
        Keeping that overview in mind, let's look at the facts. On
    January 17, 1998, the President called Ms. Currie after his
    deposition and asked her to meet with him the following day. On
    January 18, the President and Ms. Currie met, and the President
    told her about some of those surprising questions he had been
    asked in his deposition about Ms. Lewinsky. In the course of
    their conversation, according to Ms. Currie, the President
    posed a series of questions and made statements including: You
    were always there when she was there, right? We were never
    really alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica came on
    to me, and I never touched her, right? And she wanted to have
    sex with me, and I can't do that.
        Our analysis of this issue could stop here. There is no
    case for obstruction of justice. Why? There is no evidence
    whatsoever of any kind of threat or intimidation. And as we
    discussed, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual indicates that without a
    threat or intimidation, there is no corrupt influence. Without
    corrupt influence, there is no obstruction of justice. But the
    evidence reveals much more. Not only does the record lack any
    evidence of threat or intimidation, the record specifically
    contains Ms. Currie's undisputed testimony which exonerates the
    President of this charge. This is Ms. Currie's testimony and is
    the fourth exhibit in the materials.
        Question to Ms. Currie:

        Now, back again to the four statements that you testified
    the President made to you that were presented as statements,
    did you feel you were pressured when he told you those
    statements?
        None whatsoever.
        Question: What did you think, or what was going through
    your mind about what he was doing?

        Ms. Currie:

        At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word
    shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just
    talking.
        Question: That was your impression, that he wanted you to
    say--because he would end each of the statements with
    ``Right?,'' with a question.

        Ms. Currie:

        I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He
    would say, ``Right?'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
        Question: But he would end each of these questions with a
    ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not
    true.
        Correct.
        Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
        None.

        The evidence on this issue is clear. There was no effort to
    intimidate or pressure Ms. Currie, and she testified that she
    did not feel pressured. Betty Currie's testimony unequivocally
    establishes that the managers' case lacks any element of threat
    or intimidation. There is no evidence, direct or
    circumstantial, that refutes this testimony. This is not
    obstruction of justice.
        But let's not stop there. Let's look at the intent element
    of the obstruction of justice laws--in other words, whether the
    President had the intent to influence Ms. Currie's supposed
    testimony, or potential testimony.
        In an attempt to satisfy this element of the law, the
    managers overreached in their presentation to create the
    appearance that the President had the necessary specific
    intent. They argue that, based upon the way he answered the
    questions in the Jones deposition, he purposely referred to Ms.
    Currie in the hopes that the Jones lawyers would call her as a
    corroborating witness. Therefore, according to their theory, he
    had the specific intent.
        The facts belie their overreaching. The House managers
    suggested to you that the President increased the likelihood
    that Ms. Currie would be called as a witness by challenging the
    plaintiff's attorney to question Ms. Currie. A review of the
    transcript, however, shows that the President's few references
    to Ms. Currie were neither forced nor needlessly interposed.
    They were natural, appropriate; they were responsive. Indeed,
    the only occasion when he suggested the Jones lawyers speak to
    Ms. Currie is when they asked if it was typical for Ms. Currie
    to be in the White House after midnight. He understandably
    said, ``You have to ask her.'' Hardly a challenge. It is a
    reasonable response to an inquiry about someone else's
    activities.
        The managers' conjecture about the President's state of
    mind, however, fails on an even more basic level. If you
    believe the managers' theory, if you believe that the President
    went to great lengths to hide his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, then why on Earth would he want Ms. Currie to be a
    witness in the Jones case? If there was one person who knew the
    extent of his contact with Ms. Lewinsky, it was Ms. Currie.
    While she did not know the nature of his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, Ms. Currie did know and would have testified to Ms.
    Lewinsky's visits in 1997, the notes and messages that Ms.
    Lewinsky sent the President, the gifts that Ms. Lewinsky sent
    the President, and the President's support of the efforts to
    get Ms. Lewinsky a job. With just that information, it would
    have only been a matter of time before the Jones lawyers
    discovered the relationship--not that they needed Ms. Currie's
    testimony; they didn't need it for any of this. Ms. Tripp was
    already on the December 5, 1997, witness list, and she was
    already scheduled for a deposition.
        So why would the President want her to testify? The answer
    is simple. He didn't. The President was not thinking about Ms.
    Currie becoming a witness in the Jones case. Indeed, she is the
    last person the President would have wanted the Jones lawyers
    to question. And even if the Jones lawyers had wanted to
    question Ms. Currie, it is highly unlikely they would have been
    allowed to do so, given the posture of the case at that time.
        Judge Wright ordered the parties in August of 1997 to
    exchange names and addresses of all witnesses no later than
    December 5, 1997. Ms. Currie was not on their final witness
    list. Moreover, the cutoff date for all discovery was January
    30. By the time the President's deposition was over, it was
    really too late to call Ms. Currie as a witness.
        Finally, you need to remember that in the context of the
    Jones case Ms. Currie was, at best, a peripheral witness on a
    collateral matter that the court ultimately determined was not
    essential to the core issues in the case. She had only
    knowledge of a small aspect of a much larger case--all the more
    reason not to view her as a potential witness.
        The President was not thinking about Ms. Currie becoming a
    witness in the Jones case. So what was the President thinking?
    The President explained to the grand jury why he spoke to Ms.
    Currie after the deposition. It had nothing to do with Ms.
    Currie being a potential witness. That was not his concern. The
    President was concerned that his secret was going to be exposed
    and the media would relentlessly inquire until the entire story
    and every shameful detail was public. The President's concern
    was heightened by an Internet report that morning that he spoke
    to Betty which alluded to Ms. Lewinsky and to Ms. Currie and to
    issues that the Jones lawyers had raised. The President was
    understandably concerned about media inquiries, a concern
    everyone who lives and serves in the public eye likely can
    understand.
        In trying to prepare for what he saw as the inevitable
    media attention, he talked to Ms. Currie to see what her
    perceptions were and what she recalled. He talked to her to see
    what she knew.
        Remember, some of the questions that the Jones lawyer asked
    the President were so off base. For example, they asked him
    about visits from Ms. Lewinsky between midnight and 6 a.m.
    where Ms. Currie supposedly cleared her in. The President
    wanted to know whether or not Ms. Currie agreed with this
    perception or whether she had a different view, whether she
    agreed that Ms. Lewinsky was cleared in when he was present or
    had there been other occasions that he didn't know about. He
    also wanted to assess Ms. Currie's perception of the
    relationship. He knew the first person who would be questioned
    about media accounts, particularly given that she was in the
    Internet report, was going to be Ms. Currie.
        The House managers did the President a disservice in
    suggesting in the end that his five pages of testimony about
    why he spoke to Ms. Currie ultimately amounts to a four-word
    sound bite to refresh his recollection. He obviously said a lot
    more.
        Why did they say that? Because they needed to establish
    intent, and the testimony and the facts do not show intent.
    That is the truth. That is all of the facts.
        The President's intent was never to obstruct justice in the
    Jones case. It was to manage a looming media firestorm, which
    he correctly foresaw. As the President told the grand jury, ``I
    was trying to get the facts and trying to think of the best
    defense we could construct in the face of what I thought was
    going to be a media onslaught.''
        He was thinking about the media. That is the big picture.
    That is not obstruction of justice.
        In the end, of course, you must make your own judgments
    about whether the managers have made a case for convicting the
    President of obstructing justice on either of these
    allegations. We believe they have not, because the facts, those
    stubborn facts, don't support the allegations. Neither does the
    rule of law. We are not alone in that conclusion.
        We want to share with you some of the remarks from a
    bipartisan panel of prosecutors who spoke to the House
    Judiciary panel, some of which you saw earlier with Mr. Craig.
    I have taken a very brief clip of their testimony that dealt
    with allegations of obstruction of justice against the
    President for, as you will see, then Representative and now
    Senator Schumer focused in on one of the two allegations that I
    address today.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Sullivan. Mrs. Currie testified that she did not feel
    that the president came and asked her some questions in a
    leading fashion--``Was this right? Is this right? Is this
    right?''--after his deposition was taken in the Jones case. And
    she testified that she did not feel pressured to agree with him
    and that she believed his statements were correct----
        Rep. Schumer. Correct, right.
        Mr. Sullivan [continuing]. And agreed with him. He--the quote is,
    ``He would say, `Right,' and I could have said, `Wrong,' '' Now that is
    not a case for obstruction of justice. It is very common for lawyers,
    before the witness gets on the stand, to say, ``Now you're going to say
    this, you're going to say this, you're going to say this.''
        Rep. Schumer. Right.
        Mr. Sullivan. Now it doesn't make a difference if you've got two
    participants to an event and you try to nail it down, so to say.
        Rep. Schumer. Do all of you agree with that, with the Currie--the
    Currie----
        Mr. Weld. Yeah.
        Rep. Schumer. And on the other two, the Lewinsky parts of this, is
    there----
        Mr. Davis. I think to some----
        Rep. Schumer. I mean, I don't even understand how they could--how
    Starr could think that he would have a case, not with the president of
    the United States, but with anybody here, when it seems so natural and
    so obvious that there would be an overriding desire not to have this
    public and to have everybody--have the two of them coordinate their
    stories--that is, the president and Miss Lewinsky--if there were not
    the faintest scintilla of any legal proceeding coming about. It just
    strikes me as an overwhelming stretch. Am I wrong to characterize it
    that way? You gentlemen all have greater experience than I do.
        Mr. Davis. I think you're right. And also, the problem a prosecutor
    would face would be that in these cases, there is relationship between
    these people unrelated to the existence of the Paula Jones case--the
    relationship. And that's the motivation----
        Rep. Schumer. Correct.
        And Mr. Weld, do you disagree with--do you agree with that?
        Rep. Sensenbrenner. The gentleman's time--the gentleman's time----
        Rep. Schumer. Could I just ask Mr. Weld for a yes or no----
        Rep. Sensenbrenner. I'm sorry, Mr. Schumer. Mr. Schumer----
        Rep. Schumer [continuing]. For a yes or no answer to that?
        Can you answer that yes or no, Governor?
        Mr. Weld. I think it's a little thin, Mr. Congressman.
        Rep. Schumer. Thank you.
        Mr. Noble. Again, it's a specific-intent crime, and the question
    is, what was the President thinking when he said this? We can look at
    his words and try and analyze his words. But Ms. Currie says that she
    didn't believe he was trying to influence her and that if she'd said
    something different from him, if she believed something different from
    him, she would have felt free to say it. So for that reason, I believe,
    you just don't have the specific intent necessary to prove obstruction
    of justice with regard to the comment that you just asked me.

        Manager Hutchinson is keeping very good company. He, like
    the other prosecutors, does not believe the record before you
    establishes obstruction of justice. We agree.
        Before I close, I do want to take a moment to address a
    theme that the House managers sounded throughout their
    presentation last week--civil rights. They suggested that by
    not removing the President from office, the entire house of
    civil rights might well fall. While acknowledging that the
    President is a good advocate for civil rights, they suggested
    that they had grave concerns because of the President's conduct
    in the Paula Jones case.
        Some managers suggested that we all should be concerned
    should the Senate fail to convict the President, because it
    would send a message that our civil rights laws and our sexual
    harassment laws are unimportant.
        I can't let their comments go unchallenged. I speak as but
    one woman, but I know I speak for others as well. I know I
    speak for the President.
        Bill Clinton's grandfather owned a store. His store catered
    primarily to African Americans. Apparently, his grandfather was
    one of only four white people in town who would do business
    with African Americans. He taught his grandson that the African
    Americans who came into his store were good people and they
    worked hard and they deserved a better deal in life.
        The President has taken his grandfather's teachings to
    heart, and he has worked every day to give all of us a better
    deal, an equal deal.
        I am not worried about the future of civil rights. I am not
    worried because Ms. Jones had her day in court and Judge Wright
    determined that all of the matters we are discussing here today
    were not material to her case and ultimately decided that Ms.
    Jones, based on the facts and the law in that case, did not
    have a case against the President.
        I am not worried, because we have had imperfect leaders in
    the past and will have imperfect leaders in the future, but
    their imperfections did not roll back, nor did they stop, the
    march for civil rights and equal opportunity for all of our
    citizens.
        Thomas Jefferson, Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, John
    F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr.--we revere these men. We
    should. But they were not perfect men. They made human errors,
    but they struggled to do humanity good. I am not worried about
    civil rights because this President's record on civil rights,
    on women's rights, on all of our rights is unimpeachable.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, you have an enormous
    decision to make. And in truth, there is little more I can do
    to lighten that burden. But I can do this: I can assure you
    that your decision to follow the facts and the law and the
    Constitution and acquit this President will not shake the
    foundation of the house of civil rights. The house of civil
    rights is strong because its foundation is strong.
        And with all due respect, the foundation of the house of
    civil rights was never at the core of the Jones case. It was
    never at the heart of the Jones case. The foundation of the
    house of civil rights is in the voices of all the great civil
    rights leaders and the soul of every person who heard them. It
    is in the hands of every person who folded a leaflet for
    change. And it is in the courage of every person who changed.
    It is here in the Senate where men and women of courage and
    conviction stood for progress, where Senators--some of them
    still in this chamber; some of them who lost their careers--
    looked to the Constitution, listened to their conscience, and
    then did the right thing.
        The foundation of the house of civil rights is in all of us
    who gathered up our will to raise it up and keep on building. I
    stand here before you today because others before me decided to
    take a stand, or as one of my law professors so eloquently
    says, ``because someone claimed my opportunities for me, by
    fighting for my right to have the education I have, by fighting
    for my right to seek the employment I choose, by fighting for
    my right to be a lawyer,'' by sitting in and carrying signs and
    walking on long marches, riding freedom rides and putting their
    bodies on the line for civil rights.
        I stand here before you today because America decided that
    the way things were was not how they were going to be. We, the
    people, decided that we all deserved a better deal. I stand
    here before you today because President Bill Clinton believed I
    could stand here for him.
        Your decision whether to remove President Clinton from
    office, based on the articles of impeachment, I know, will be
    based on the law and the facts and the Constitution. It would
    be wrong to convict him on this record. You should acquit him
    on this record. And you must not let imagined harms to the
    house of civil rights persuade you otherwise. The President did
    not obstruct justice. The President did not commit perjury. The
    President must not be removed from office.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                            Leader's Lecture Series

        Mr. LOTT. Once again, I invite all Senators to attend the
    Leader's Lecture Series this evening at 6 p.m. in the Old
    Senate Chamber. I have already announced former President
    George Bush will be the speaker.
                                    ------

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate now stand in adjournment under the previous order.
        There being no objection, the Senate, at 5:14 p.m. sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, January
    21, 1999, at 1 p.m.
                                    ------

                           Thursday, January 21, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:01 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Dear God, You know what we need before we ask You but, in
    the asking, our minds and hearts are prepared to receive Your
    answer. In this impeachment trial, we have learned again that
    really listening over a prolonged period of time is hard work.
    Often it is difficult to hear what is being said because of
    differing convictions. Dissonance causes discordant static.
    Sometimes our preconceptions about what we think will be said
    keep us from hearing what actually is said. Thank You for the
    commitment of the men and women of this Senate to serve You and
    our Nation by accepting the demanding responsibility of
    listening for and evaluating truth. Grant them renewed energy,
    sensitive audio nerves, and discerning minds. For Your glory
    and the good of America. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Today, we will conclude the presentation of the
    White House counsel. I understand that the presentation will
    last approximately 4\1/2\ hours. As we have done previously, we
    will take periodic breaks throughout the proceedings, with the
    first one coming in approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. I
    believe that will be approximately midway in the presentation
    of Mr. Counsel Kendall. Then we would probably take at least
    one more break so that the Senators and Chief Justice would
    have a chance to stretch and so we will have some logical break
    in the presentations. As a reminder, we will convene tomorrow
    at 1 p.m. to resume consideration of the articles.
        At this point, I ask the indulgence of the Chief Justice
    and all Senators as we take up some routine matters before we
    resume consideration of the articles. These have been
    precleared.
                                    ------

                          UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent, notwithstanding the
    consideration of the articles, that it be in order at this time
    to conduct several routine legislative matters.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                    ------

             MEASURES READ FOR THE FIRST TIME--S. 269, 270, AND 271

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there are three bills at the
    desk. I ask unanimous consent the bills be considered read the
    first time. I further ask consent the bills be read a second
    time en bloc, and I object to my own request.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. The bills will be read a second time on the next
    legislative date, as I understand it.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The leader is correct.
        The bills read the first time are as follows:

        S. 269, a bill to state the policy of the United States
    regarding the deployment of a missile defense system capable of
    defending the territory of the United States against limited
    ballistic missile attack;
        S. 270, a bill to improve pay and retirement equity for
    members of the Armed Forces; and for other purposes;
        S. 271, a bill to provide for education flexibility
    partnerships.
                                    ------

                     amending paragraph 1(m)(1) of rule xxv

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed
    to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 28 which changes the
    words ``Handicapped individuals'' to ``Individuals with
    disabilities'' in Rule XXV.
        I further ask consent the resolution be agreed to and the
    motion to reconsider be laid upon the table.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Without objection, it is so ordered.
        The resolution (S. Res. 28) was agreed to, as follows:

                                   S. Res. 28

        Resolved, That paragraph 1(m)(1) of Rule XXV is amended as
    follows:
        Strike ``Committee on Labor and Human Resources'' and
    insert in lieu thereof ``Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
    and Pensions''.
        Strike ``Handicapped individuals'' and insert in lieu
    thereof ``Individuals with disabilities''.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        Mr. LOTT. I believe we are prepared for the concluding
    presentation by the White House counsel.
        I yield the floor, Mr. Chief Justice.

                                  THE JOURNAL

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date. Under the
    provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the counsel for the
    President have 18 hours and 9 minutes remaining to make their
    presentation of their case.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Counsel Kendall.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, managers from the House of Representatives, good
    afternoon. I am David Kendall of the law firm of Williams &
    Connolly. Since 1993 it has been my privilege to represent the
    President in the tortuous and meandering Whitewater
    investigation which, approximately a year ago, was transformed
    in a remarkable way into the Lewinsky investigation.
        I want to address this afternoon certain allegations of
    obstruction of justice contained in article II of the articles
    of impeachment. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner remarked that no
    prior article allegation of obstruction of justice has ever
    reached this Chamber. So this is a case of first impression.
        Deputy Counsel Cheryl Mills yesterday addressed the parts
    of article II pertaining to gifts and the President's
    conversations with Ms. Currie. I will cover, this afternoon,
    the remaining five subparts of article II. The evidence plainly
    shows that the President did not obstruct justice in any way
    and there is nothing in this article which would warrant his
    removal from office.
        As I begin, I want to thank you for your open minds, for
    your attention, for your withholding judgment until you have
    heard all of our evidentiary presentation. There are a lot of
    myths about what the evidence is in this case. Some of them are
    misunderstandings based upon erroneous media reports, some
    spring from confusion in the evidence itself, and some are the
    result of concerted partisan distortion.
        I want to talk to you this afternoon about what the record
    is and what the evidence actually shows. I apologize to you in
    advance if the process is tedious. What I think I have to
    request from you is your common sense and some uncommon
    patience. But the evidence--those stubborn facts--is critically
    important to inform your ultimate vote on these articles. I
    will do my best to avoid repetition and lawyer talk--although I
    am a lawyer.
        In our trial memorandum, we gave you the citations to the
    evidence I am going to be referencing, so you can check the
    facts there. I want to say that I welcome your scrutiny.
        My presentation this morning consists of six parts. I would
    like, if I could, to give you those as milestones. I want to
    make some remarks generally about evidence, and then I want to
    consider the specific evidence which is relevant to each of the
    five subparts I am going to be talking about. I am going to do
    them out of numerical order but what I hope is in a logical
    order. I am going to cover article 1 first, then article 2,
    then article 5, article 7, and article 4. Ms. Mills, yesterday,
    has already covered 3 and 6.
        First of all, a few words about evidence. We have heard a
    great deal about the rule of law in the various presentations
    of the House managers. But what is at issue here--and I think
    Mr. Manager Graham made this point very well--it is a solemn
    obligation, which is constitutionally committed to this body.
    Your decision, whatever it is, is not going to have some kind
    of domino effect that ineluctably leads to that midnight knock
    at the door. The rule of law is more than rhetoric. It means
    that in proceedings like these, where important rights are
    being adjudicated, that evidence matters, fairness matters,
    rules of procedural regularity matter, the presumption of
    innocence matters, and proportionality matters. The rule of law
    is not the monopoly of the House managers, and it ought to be
    practiced in these proceedings, as well as talked about in
    speeches.
        We have heard a lot of pejorative rhetoric about legal
    hairsplitting that the President and his legal team have
    engaged in. As a member of that legal team, I paid attention to
    that rhetoric. But as I sat there listening to the various
    presentations, they struck me as somewhat odd, because one of
    the hallmarks of the rule of law is careful procedures and
    explicit laws which try to define rights for every citizen.
        It is not legal hairsplitting to raise available defenses,
    or to point out gaps in the evidence, or to make legal
    arguments based upon precedent, however technical and
    politically unpopular some of those arguments may be. And I
    think it is particularly important in a proceeding like this
    where the charge is an accusation of a crime. Mr. Manager
    McCollum was quite explicit in his argument that the first
    thing you have to determine here is whether the President
    committed any crimes.
        I am going to try to focus on the facts and the evidence
    concerning obstruction of justice. I don't think there is a
    need for me to go into the law; we have set forth the relevant
    legal principles in our trial memorandum. Mr. Ruff and Ms.
    Mills very ably covered some of the governing principles, and
    Ms. Mills played some videotape excerpts of experts, and the
    law on obstruction of justice is relatively settled. Indeed,
    our primary disagreement with the very able House managers
    concerns the evidence and what it shows.
        Now, in December the Judiciary Committee of the House of
    Representatives reported four articles of impeachment to the
    floor. Two of those--one alleging perjury in the President's
    January 17, 1998, deposition in the Paula Jones case, and one
    alleging abuse of power--were specifically considered by the
    House and just as specifically rejected, although the House
    managers had very cleverly attempted to weave into their
    discussion of the two articles that were adopted some of the
    rejected allegations.
        Now, on the chart, article II alleges that the President
    has, in some way, impeded or covered up the existence of
    evidence relevant to the Paula Jones case. That is the whole
    focus of this article. It focuses on the alleged impact on the
    Paula Jones case. It is important because when we get to
    subpart (7), we will see that there is no way the allegations
    there could be a part of this article or impact the Paula Jones
    case.
        The President supposedly accomplished this obstruction of
    justice through--and here I quote--``one or more of the
    following acts . . .''
        Here, I think I should observe that this ``one or more''
    menu, as it were, is plainly defective in a constitutional
    sense because, as we have pointed out in our answer and in our
    trial memorandum, and as Mr. Ruff has made clear in his
    presentation, such a format makes it impossible to assure that
    the constitutionally required two-thirds of Senators voting
    concur on any particular ground that is alleged. Since the
    Senate rules provide that you can't split up this menu--you
    have to cover all seven allegations together--it would be
    possible for the President to be convicted without that
    requisite two-thirds majority, because you might get 9 or 10
    votes in favor of the article based on each of the 7 different
    grounds.
        The Constitution, of course, gives the House of
    Representatives the sole power of impeachment and has exercised
    that power to adopt article II. However, several of the
    allegations about what the President did to obstruct justice,
    supposedly in the House managers' presentation, are nowhere
    contained in these seven subparts; they are simply not there.
        For example, you heard repeatedly about the President's use
    in his deposition of the term ``alone''--was he ever alone with
    Ms. Lewinsky. The managers claim that that somehow obstructed
    justice. The allegation that this consisted of an impeachable
    offense, however, was rejected when the House of
    Representatives voted down one of the four articles alleging
    deposition perjury.
        You have also heard reference to the President's allegedly
    false and misleading answers to the 81 interrogatories sent to
    the President in November by the House Judiciary Committee.
    Again, an article based upon those interrogatory answers was
    voted down in the House of Representatives.
        I would like you to bear in mind an image which Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson and Counsel Ruff share in some way. You will see
    that they didn't share it entirely. Mr. Manager Hutchinson
    referred to the ``seven pillars of obstruction.'' Mr. White
    House Counsel Ruff referred to the seven ``shifting sand
    castles of speculation.'' It won't surprise you that I agree
    with Mr. Ruff's characterization. But the important point is
    that there are 7 grounds in this article; there are not 8,
    there are not 19, there are 7 charges. That is what the House
    enacted and that is what we are going to address and rebut.
        Before considering the five subparts of article II that I
    am going to be addressing, I would like to say a few words
    about the different kinds of evidence you are going to have to
    consider. There is, first, direct evidence. Now, this isn't the
    most probative kind of evidence, because it is the least
    ambiguous. It comes directly from the five senses of the
    witness. For example, when the witness testifies about
    something the witness did, that is direct evidence.
        From the House managers' very skillful presentation, you
    would not be aware of the large amount of direct evidence which
    is in the record which refutes and contradicts the allegations
    of obstruction of justice. I am going to cover that in detail
    this afternoon.
        The second kind of evidence is what the law calls
    circumstantial, and this describes any evidence which is
    probative only if a certain conclusion or inference is drawn
    from the evidence. Circumstantial evidence is admissible, but,
    by its definition, it is to some degree ambiguous because it is
    not direct. Its probative power--or its value--depends upon the
    strength of the inference you can logically draw from it.
        Let me give you an example. You walk out of your house in
    the morning and you see the sidewalk is completely wet. You
    might conclude that it has rained the night before and you
    might be reasonably confident in that conclusion. However, were
    your sharp eyes to focus further and observe your neighbor's
    sprinkler sitting right by the sidewalk, dripping from the
    sprinkler head, you might want to revise your conclusion.
        Circumstantial evidence is often subject to several
    different interpretations, and for this reason it has to be
    viewed very carefully. As one court has stated,
    ``Circumstantial evidence presents a danger that the trier of
    fact may leave logical gaps in the proof offered and draw
    unwarranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree.''
        If a criminal charge is to be based on conclusions drawn
    from circumstantial evidence rather than on direct evidence,
    those conclusions have to be virtually unavoidable. Most of the
    obstruction case presented--and they have recognized this, and
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson recognized it on Saturday--is based on
    circumstantial evidence, and that evidence is, at best,
    profoundly ambiguous. They told you that they have painted a
    picture with circumstantial evidence. I think what they have in
    fact done is given you a Rorschach test.
        I would like to now turn to the five subparts of article I
    which I intend to cover. And I want to describe, as to each,
    the relevant direct evidence in the record, the circumstantial
    evidence, and the portions of the managers' presentation which
    do not in fact constitute either kind of evidence but in fact
    represent speculation, theorizing, and hypothesis. What I
    believe you will find is that the direct evidence disproves the
    charges of obstruction and the managers have had to rely on
    contradictory and unpersuasive circumstantial evidence to try
    to make their case.
        Subpart (1) of article II alleges that the President
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to execute an affidavit in the Paula
    Jones case ``that he knew to be perjurious, false and
    misleading.'' The House managers allege that during a December
    17 telephone conversation Ms. Lewinsky asked the President what
    she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones case and the
    President responded, ``Well, maybe you could sign an
    affidavit.'' And that is a statement the President does not
    dispute making.
        It is hard to believe, but this statement of the President
    to Ms. Lewinsky, advising her of the possibility of totally
    lawful conduct, is the House managers' entire factual basis for
    supporting the first allegation in subpart (1). The managers
    don't claim that the President advised her to file a false
    affidavit. That is not what subpart (1) alleges. And there is
    no evidence in the record anywhere to support such an
    allegation. Nor do the managers allege he even told her,
    advised her, urged her, or suggested to her what to put in her
    affidavit. The charge which the managers have spun out of this
    single statement by the President is refuted by the direct
    evidence.
        First of all, Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and forcefully
    denied any and all suggestion that the President ever asked her
    to lie. In her proffer--and a proffer, of course, is an offer
    made to a prosecutor to try to get immunity--she made in her
    own handwriting on February 1, 1998, she stated explicitly
    that, ``Neither the President nor anyone on his behalf asked or
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie.''
        In an FBI interview conducted on July 27, she made two
    similar statements. And you see them up here on the chart:
    ``Neither the President or Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she
    had to lie.''
        ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky
    to say anything or to lie.''
        And it was the FBI agent who transcribed those two
    comments.
        I would like to focus upon the fact that she told the FBI
    the President never directed her ``to say anything or to lie.''
        I think that is particularly telling as the direct evidence
    in the context of this allegation that the President supposedly
    urged her to file an affidavit that he knew would be false.
        Finally, in Ms. Lewinsky's August 20 grand jury testimony,
    she stated--and she had to volunteer to do it--``No one ever
    asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my
    silence.''
        ``No one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a
    job for my silence.''
        Is there something difficult to understand here?
        It is interesting to see how the House managers try to
    establish that somehow the President asked Ms. Lewinsky to file
    a false affidavit. But their argument essentially begs the
    question. They argue that the President in fact somehow
    encouraged her to lie because both parties knew the affidavit
    would have to be false and misleading to accomplish the desired
    result.
        But again there is no evidence to support this conjecture,
    and in fact the opposite is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the
    President have testified repeatedly that, given the particular
    claims being made in the Jones case, they both honestly believe
    that a truthful, albeit limited, affidavit might--``might''--
    establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to offer in
    the way of testimony in the Jones case.
        The President explained in his grand jury testimony on at
    least five occasions in response to the prosecutor's question
    that he believed Ms. Lewinsky could execute a truthful but
    limited affidavit that would have established there was no
    basis for calling her as a witness to testify in the Jones
    case.
        For example, the President told the grand jury:

        But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what she
    says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no
    benefit in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual
    harassment. And if she defined sexual relationship in the way I
    think most Americans do . . . then she told the truth.

        Or again, the President told the grand jury:

        I've already told you that I felt strongly that she could
    issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be
    factually truthful, that might get her out of having to
    testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able to get out of
    testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to
    execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.

        It is important to bear in mind that the Paula Jones case
    was a sexual harassment case, although it turned out to be
    legally groundless, and it involved allegations of
    nonconsensual sexual solicitations. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship
    to the President had been consensual. She knew nothing
    whatsoever about the allegations in the Jones case. There is no
    evidence in the record that she had ever been in Arkansas in
    her life. And in any event, the Jones case arose out of factual
    allegations dating from May of 1991 when the President was
    Governor of Arkansas, long before Ms. Lewinsky had even met the
    President.
        Now, it is not simply the President who believed that in
    the circumstances here Ms. Lewinsky could have filed an
    affidavit which could have been truthful and which might have
    gotten her released from testifying in a Jones case deposition.
    Ms. Lewinsky also has testified that she might have been able
    to file a truthful affidavit which would have accomplished that
    purpose. For example, she told the FBI in an interview after
    she obtained immunity on July 29 that she had told Linda Tripp
    that the purpose of an affidavit was to avoid being deposed,
    and that she thought one could do this by giving only a portion
    of the whole story so the Jones lawyers would not think the
    person giving the affidavit added anything of relevance to
    their case.
        Again, in the same interview with the FBI, Ms. Lewinsky
    stated that the goal of such an affidavit was to be as benign
    as possible so as to avoid being deposed.
        Again, in her grand jury testimony on August 6, Ms.
    Lewinsky testified that:

        I thought that signing an affidavit could range from
    anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me
    from being deposed and so that there could range from anywhere
    between maybe just somehow somehow mentioning, you know,
    innocuous things.

        It is not disputed that the President showed no interest in
    viewing a draft of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, did not review it,
    and, according to Ms. Lewinsky, said he did not need to see it.
    This fact is obviously exculpatory. If the President were truly
    concerned about what was going into Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit,
    surely he would have wanted to review it prior to his
    summation.
        Now, to counter this inference, the House managers offer
    speculation. Mr. Manager McCollum tried to downplay the
    significance of this fact by asking you to engage in sheer
    surmise. He said on Friday:

        I doubt seriously [the President] was talking about 15
    other affidavits of somebody else and didn't like looking at
    affidavits anymore. I suspect and I would suggest to you that
    he was talking about 15 other drafts of this proposed affidavit
    since it had been around the Horn a lot of rounds.

        Well, as the able House manager himself stated, this
    suggestion is mere suspicion, speculation; it flies in the face
    of Ms. Lewinsky's direct testimony. There is evidence of only a
    few drafts, and there is no evidence that the President ever
    saw any draft.
        Now, Ms. Lewinsky was under no obligation to volunteer to
    the Paula Jones lawyers every last detail about her
    relationship with the President, and the fact that the
    President did not advise her or instruct her to do so is
    neither wrong nor an obstruction of justice. The fact is that
    the limited truthful affidavit might have established that Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony was simply not relevant to the Jones case.
        The President knew and had told Ms. Lewinsky that a great
    many other women he knew who had been subpoenaed by the Paula
    Jones lawyers had tried to avoid the burden, the expense, and
    the humiliation of a deposition by filing an affidavit in
    support of a motion to quash the deposition subpoena and by
    arguing in the affidavit that the subpoenaed woman had no
    relevant evidence for the Jones case. The Jones lawyers were
    casting a very wide net for evidence that they could use to
    embarrass the President. The discovery cutoff in the case was
    fast approaching--that is the point at which you can't take any
    more discovery--and there was some chance both Ms. Lewinsky and
    the President felt that she could escape deposition through an
    accurate but limited affidavit.
        Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that
    at the time she executed her affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly
    could believe, honestly believed that she could deny a sexual
    relationship given what she believed to be the definition of
    that term. In an audiotape conversation which Linda Tripp,
    secretly recorded, Ms. Lewinsky declared:

        I never even came close to sleeping with the President. We
    didn't have sex.

        Again, I would remind you of Mr. Craig's presentation
    yesterday concerning Ms. Lewinsky's understanding of the term
    ``sexual relations,'' which was the same as the President's.
        There is another part of the chronology here--and a
    circumstantial evidence case often rests heavily on
    chronology--that the House managers simply ignore in their
    attempt to fit some of the facts into a sinister pattern. Ms.
    Lewinsky's name appeared on the Paula Jones witness list which,
    the managers tell us accurately, the President's lawyers
    reviewed with him on Saturday, December 6. She was one of a
    great many people named on the witness list.
        Now, if the President's concern was so intense about the
    appearance of her name on the list, would he have waited until
    December 17 to talk to her? There is no explanation for this
    delay, which is consistent with intense concern on the
    President's part, except that her appearance with a lot of
    others was not particularly troubling to him. The main reason
    for his phone call on December 17 to Ms. Lewinsky, the
    unrebutted evidence shows, is that he wanted to tell Ms.
    Lewinsky that Betty Currie's brother had died. Indeed, 3 days
    after that telephone call, Ms. Lewinsky attended the funeral of
    Ms. Currie's brother on December 20.
        Now, insofar as you want to draw inferences from the
    chronology of events in December, this long delay is
    circumstantial evidence that the President felt no particular
    urgency either to alert Ms. Lewinsky that her name was on the
    witness list or make any suggestions to her about an affidavit.
    Remember her repeated testimony, which is direct evidence: No
    one ever asked her to lie.
        Now, subpart (2) of article II alleges that the President
    obstructed justice by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky, in that same
    late night telephone call--two of these articles rest on that
    same telephone call--to give perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony if and when she was called to testify personally in
    the Jones litigation.
        Now, it was interesting to me that a couple of days ago the
    House managers released a response to our presentation, and
    they concede here that the President and Ms. Lewinsky did not
    discuss the deposition that evening of December 17 because
    Monica--they call her Monica--had not been subpoenaed.
        Well, that is true. There was no deposition subpoena
    received by Ms. Lewinsky until 2 days later. Now, the lawyers
    in the room know something about what witness lists are and
    what they contain that the civilian part of the world may not
    know. As lawyers get ready to go to trial, and the judge
    requires them to put their witnesses on the witness list, you
    put every witness you can think of who might conceivably be
    relevant--from Mr. Aardvark to Ms. Zanzibar. All of them go on
    the witness list. And that is what had happened here. It wasn't
    until you get something like a subpoena for a deposition that
    you know a witness is really going to be a significant player
    in the trial.
        Well, let's look at the allegations here. And remember,
    these allegations focus on December 17, 2 days before Ms.
    Lewinsky is going to receive her subpoena. I think you
    logically begin with the direct evidence, and the direct
    evidence is the testimony of the two people involved in the
    telephone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky and the President. Ms.
    Lewinsky has repeatedly stated that no one ever urged her to
    lie and that this plainly applies to this December 17
    conversation. She said, in her handwritten proffer that I had
    on the chart earlier, that the President did not ask her or
    encourage her to lie. She made that statement when talking to
    the independent counsel, when her fate was in the hands of the
    independent counsel, when her immunity agreement could be
    broken and she could be prosecuted. She has, nevertheless,
    continued to maintain that nobody asked her ever to lie. She
    said in the July 27 FBI interview neither the President nor Mr.
    Jordan ever told her she had to lie, and she said that in her
    grand jury testimony.
        It is interesting to hear all the ways that the House
    managers--and they are very skillful--try to minimize the
    importance of this direct evidence. You would think Ms.
    Lewinsky's statements under oath were irrelevant to this case.
    She gave this testimony, for the most part, when she was
    subject to prosecution for perjury. It simply cannot be blandly
    dismissed because it was given under this threat. Indeed, Mr.
    Manager Hutchinson--and I would like to quote him--shares this
    same belief with me. He told you, standing right here, ``that
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is credible and she has the motive to
    tell the truth because of her immunity agreement with the
    independent counsel, where she gets in trouble only if she
    lies.''
        Likewise, the President has consistently insisted he never
    asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie. In his grand jury testimony last
    August, he said that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked
    about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in the
    past,'' if anybody inquired about their relationship, although
    he had no specific memory of such a conversation. And he
    testified that they did not talk about this in connection with
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case.
        He was asked by one of the prosecutors:

        In that conversation, [on December 17] or in any
    conversation in which you informed her she was on the witness
    list, did you tell her, you know, you can always say that you
    were coming to see Betty or bringing me letters? Did you tell
    her anything like that?
        [The President:] I don't remember. She was coming to see
    Betty. I can tell you this. I absolutely never asked her to
    lie.

        There is, thus, no direct testimony from anybody that on
    December 17 the President asked Ms. Lewinsky to lie if called
    to testify in the Jones case. Here the House managers don't
    really even rely on circumstantial evidence to refute the
    direct testimony of the two relevant witnesses. They rely,
    instead, on what they assert is logic. They claim that while
    the President maybe didn't specifically tell her to lie, he
    somehow suggested that she give a false account of their
    relationship. What you should infer, according to them, is
    based upon what they may have said about their relations at
    other times, previous times to this late night December 17
    phone call, the President somehow suggested that she say the
    same thing at her deposition, something like, ``You know, you
    can always say you were coming to see Betty, or that you were
    bringing me letters.''
        Their claim boils down, however, to the inferences to be
    drawn from the uncontested fact that in the past, before this
    time, before this December 17 phone call, the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky had discussions about what she should say if asked
    about the visits to the Oval Office.
        Both have acknowledged that. Not surprisingly, at the time
    these conversations occurred they were both concerned to
    conceal their improper relationship from others while it was
    going on. Cover stories are an almost inevitable part of every
    improper relationship between two human beings. By its very
    nature, the relationship is one that has to be concealed; and,
    therefore, misleading cover stories inevitably accompanied that
    relationship.
        Now, to say that is not to excuse it or to exonerate it or
    justify it; but, rather, to emphasize that the testimony about
    ``visiting Betty'' or ``bringing me letters'' is in the record,
    but it is not linked in any way to the December 17 phone call
    or to any testimony or affidavit with regard to the Jones case.
    Here again, I want to go to the direct evidence that is
    relevant on count 2, because it undercuts the managers'
    suggestion that this discussion of the cover stories actually
    occurred in the context of discussion about the Paula Jones
    case.
        Now, here on a chart we have a blowup of part of Ms.
    Lewinsky's handwritten proffer to the independent counsel on
    February 1, which makes it clear that she does recall having a
    discussion with the President in which he said that if anyone
    questioned her about visiting him, she should say she was
    either bringing him letters or visiting Betty Currie. But Ms.
    Lewinsky states, ``there is truth to both of these
    statements.'' It was a cover story but there was some truth in
    it.
        She also went out of her way in this proffer to emphasize
    that, while she did not recall precisely when the discussions
    about cover stories occurred, they occurred ``prior to the
    subpoena in the Paula Jones case.'' That is what you see in her
    paragraph 11. Her paragraph 11 refers back to paragraph 2. And
    her point is that, while she and the President did have these
    discussions, it was not in the context of her testimony.
        In paragraph 4 also, as you see from the chart or from your
    handout, as to the contents of any possible testimony, Ms.
    Lewinsky wrote that to the best of her recollection she did not
    believe she discussed the content of any deposition during the
    December 17 conversation with the President.
        Now, in an FBI interview on July 31, after she had received
    immunity from the independent counsel, the FBI agent noted what
    Ms. Lewinsky had told him:

        Lewinsky advised, though they did not discuss the issue in
    specific relation[ship] to the Jones matter, she and Clinton
    had discussed what to say when asked about Lewinsky's visits to
    the White House.

        This is direct evidence. Nobody denies that there was
    discussion of cover stories early in the relationship, but
    there is no evidence that it occurred in connection in any way
    with the Jones case.
        Again, despite Ms. Lewinsky's direct and unrefuted
    testimony about the December 17 telephone call, the House
    managers asked you to conclude that the President must have
    asked her to testify falsely, because she had, by her own
    account, on prior occasions, assured the President that she
    would deny the relationship.
        Think for a moment about that: They ask you to accept their
    speculation, in the face of contradictory evidence from both
    parties, and use that as a basis on which to remove the
    President. Again, Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the
    President anything about denying their relationship on December
    17, or at any other time, after she had been identified as a
    witness. Indeed, she testified in the grand jury that that
    discussion did not take place after she learned she was a
    witness in the Jones case. And, again, we have her grand jury
    testimony displayed on the chart. A grand juror is asking a
    question.
        Question:

        Is it possible that you also had these discussions [about
    cover stories denying the relationship] after you learned that
    you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
        [Ms. Lewinsky]: I don't believe so.

        A juror--and these jurors were very good at questioning
    witnesses throughout this proceeding:

        Can you exclude that possibility?
        [Ms. Lewinsky]: I pretty much can. I really don't remember
    it.

        Direct testimony given when Ms. Lewinsky was covered by an
    immunity agreement that can only be divested by her perjuring
    herself.
        There is another thing that I think is relevant here, and
    that is that Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that while
    these were cover stories, they were not untrue. In her
    handwritten proffer, as you have seen, she stated that she
    asked the President what to say if anyone asked her about her
    visits. He said you could mention Betty Currie or bringing me
    letters. And she added there was truth to both of these
    statements and that ``[n]either of those statements [was]
    untrue.'' Indeed, she testified to the grand jury that she did,
    in fact, bring papers to the President and that on some
    occasions, she visited the Oval Office only to see Ms. Currie.
        Question by a grand juror:

        Did you actually bring the President papers at all?
        Yes.
        All right. Tell us a little bit about that.
        It varied. Sometimes it was just actually copies of letters
    . . .

        Again, in her August 6, 1998, grand jury appearance, Ms.
    Lewinsky testified:

        I saw Betty every time that I was there . . . most of the
    time my purpose was to see the President, but there were some
    times when I did just go see Betty but the President wasn't in
    the office.

        Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie were friends, and they did have
    a separate social relationship.
        The managers assert that these stories were misleading, and
    the House committee report on the articles of impeachment
    declared that these stories about Ms. Currie and delivering
    papers was a ``ruse that had no legitimate business purpose.''
    In other words, while the so-called stories were literally
    true, the explanations might have been misleading. But the
    literal truth here, while it may appear legalistic and
    hairsplitting, is, in fact, a defense to both the perjury and
    the obstruction of justice charges under the rule of law. While
    the President and Ms. Lewinsky had discussed cover stories
    while their improper relationship was in progress, there is
    simply no evidence that they discussed this at any time when
    Ms. Lewinsky was a witness in the Jones case.
        The next subpart I want to consider is subpart (5). Subpart
    (5) alleges that at the deposition, the President allowed his
    attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal
    judge characterizing an affidavit in order to prevent
    questioning deemed relevant by the judge.
        It alleges obstruction solely because the President did not
    say anything when his attorney, Mr. Bennett, cited Ms.
    Lewinsky's affidavit in an unsuccessful argument to Judge
    Wright that evidence concerning Ms. Lewinsky should not be
    admitted at that point because it was irrelevant to the Jones
    case. At one point, Mr. Bennett, the President's lawyer, states
    that, according to the affidavit, ``there is no sex of any kind
    in any manner, shape or form.''
        This claim, which also is presented in the perjury section,
    as Mr. Craig pointed out, is deficient as an allegation of
    obstruction, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
        But I will say one thing. The direct evidence on this point
    is uniquely available because there is only one witness who can
    testify about what was in his thoughts at a given moment, and
    the President has testified at great length in his grand jury
    testimony about what he was thinking at this point.
        The President told the grand jury that he was simply not
    focusing closely on the exchange between the lawyers, but was
    instead concentrating on his own testimony.
        He said:

        I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he [Mr.
    Bennett] was saying. I was thinking. I was ready to get on with
    my testimony here and they were having these constant
    discussions all through the deposition.

        And again the President testifies:

        I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on. I
    was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I
    was worried about my own testimony.

        I think Mr. Craig provided you with a background yesterday
    that I won't repeat here, but I would refer you to about what
    was on the President's mind at the time.
        Mr. Manager McCollum made a very polished and articulate
    presentation to you, and he predicted that the President's
    lawyers were going to argue that the President sat in silence
    because he wasn't paying attention. We have, indeed, argued
    this, and it is the truth based upon what the President has
    testified he was thinking about. But Mr. McCollum went on to
    argue that there was circumstantial evidence available from the
    videotape of the President at this deposition.
        He stated:

        We've already seen the video. And you know that he was
    looking so intently. Remember, he was intensely following the
    conversation with his eyes. I don't know how anybody can say
    this man wasn't paying attention. He certainly wasn't thinking
    about anything else. That was very obvious from looking at the
    video.

        We all saw the video during the House managers'
    presentations, and we saw a lot of the President at the
    deposition yesterday when Mr. Craig played the first part of
    it. If you observe the President throughout the time you have
    seen him on the video in the deposition, you will conclude that
    the look on his face was no different from what it was during
    other discussions or arguments of counsel about evidentiary or
    procedural matters. The videotape does not, fairly considered,
    indicate that the President was, in fact, focusing on the
    lengthy colloquy among the lawyers or that he knowingly made a
    decision not to correct his own lawyer.
        The President has received a great deal of criticism,
    because at one point in his grand jury testimony, when asked
    about Mr. Bennett's statement, the President responds to the
    prosecutor that whether Mr. Bennett's statement is true depends
    on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. That is, ``there is
    no sex of any kind.''
        That has gotten its share of laughs. But when you read the
    President's grand jury transcript in context, this was a
    serious matter, and it is apparent that the President was not
    in any way describing what was in his own mind at the time of
    the deposition, but he rather was discussing Mr. Bennett's
    statement from the vantage point of the President's later grand
    jury testimony. He is interpreting what his own lawyer was
    saying. Mr. Craig pointed this out yesterday.
        That interpretation is not perjury in article I, and it is
    not obstruction of justice in article II. What the exchange was
    was that the President, in response to one of the prosecutors,
    explains why, on one reading Mr. Bennett's statement, it may
    not be false.
        Now, it may be hairsplitting and it may be professorial and
    it may be technical, but the important thing is it is a
    retrospective assessment. The President is not talking about
    himself. He is talking about how to construe Mr. Bennett's
    statement. And what he says is, there is a way in which Mr.
    Bennett's statement at the deposition is accurate; that is, if
    Mr. Bennett was referring to the relationship between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky on that date, it was an accurate
    statement because the improper relationship was over a long
    time earlier.
        Now, the relevant point here is that the President's
    disquisition on the word ``is'' and its meaning was not an
    attempt to explain his own thinking at the time of the
    deposition, but was rather his later interpretation of what Mr.
    Bennett had said at the deposition.
        In light of the President's direct unequivocal testimony,
    this speculation about what was in his mind is simply baseless,
    and there is, in fact, no evidence to support the charge
    leveled in subpart (5) of article II.
        There is another reason to reject the charge; and that is,
    that the law imposes no obligation on the client to monitor his
    or her lawyer's every statement and representation.
    Particularly in a civil deposition, in which the client is
    being questioned, clients are routinely advised to focus on the
    questions posed, think carefully about the answer, answer only
    the question asked and ignore distractions. And sometimes, sad
    to say, the statements of one's own lawyer can be a
    distraction. And those of you who are lawyers and have defended
    people in depositions know that that is the advice you give the
    client.
        There was good reason for the President to be thinking
    about his own testimony and leave the legal fencing to the
    lawyers, because whatever else may be said about him, there can
    be no doubt that the Jones case itself was a vehicle for
    partisan attack on the President and that he was going to be
    facing a series of hostile and difficult questions at the
    deposition.
        Now, Judge Wright ultimately ruled that, giving Ms. Jones
    every benefit of the doubt, she had failed both legally and
    factually to present allegations that merited going to trial.
    But while it was legally meritless, while it was going on, the
    case did impose a significant toll on the President both
    personally and politically.
        And let's be clear about one other thing while we are
    looking at this deposition and while you review the
    significance of the President listening in silence to Mr.
    Bennett's conduct. As Mr. Craig described yesterday, Judge
    Wright, in fact, interrupted Mr. Bennett in mid sentence as he
    was describing Ms. Jones' affidavit. She didn't allow him to
    complete his objection in which he cited the Lewinsky
    affidavit. She quickly interjected--and this is sometimes what
    judges do to the most learned of lawyers--she quickly
    interjected and said, ``No, just a moment, let me make my
    ruling.'' And then she proceeded to allow the very line of
    questioning that Mr. Bennett was trying to prevent. So the
    President's silence, whatever motivated it, had absolutely no
    impact on the conduct of the Jones deposition.
        And also let's be clear about one other thing: Nothing
    about this interchange between Mr. Bennett and Judge Wright
    blocked the ability of the Jones lawyers to obtain information
    about the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky because
    the Jones lawyers had been briefed the night before in great
    detail by Ms. Linda Tripp. Ms. Tripp had already gotten her own
    immunity agreement from the Office of Independent Counsel and
    had set up a lunch with Ms. Lewinsky at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel
    the day before the deposition, Friday, January 16. And at that
    lunch, of course, Ms. Lewinsky was apprehended by the Office of
    Independent Counsel and held for the next 12 hours. In the
    meantime, however, Ms. Tripp goes back to her home where she
    meets with the Jones lawyers that Friday night before the
    deposition and loads them up with all the information she has
    obtained from her illegal, secret audiotaping of Ms. Lewinsky.
    That is why they were able to ask the questions they did with
    such specificity and conviction.
        Indeed, there is one point in the examination of the
    President where he says to the Jones lawyer who is examining
    him, Mr. Fisher--he asked the question. And Fisher says, ``Sir,
    I think this will come''--he asked a question about ``Can you
    tell me why you are asking these specific questions?'' and
    Fisher replies, ``Sir, I think this will come to light shortly,
    and you'll understand.''
        Well, how ironic that I am making a presentation today on
    January 21 because it did come to light--just as Mr. Fisher
    knew it would; just as Ms. Tripp knew it would--it came to
    light 1 year ago exactly when the story broke in the Washington
    Post. This fleeting exchange between Mr. Bennett and Judge
    Wright before she overruled his objection could not and didn't
    have any impact on the Jones lawyers' conduct.
        Now, I want to look briefly at one other part of subpart
    (5) because it continues to make one other allegation: Such
    false and misleading statements at the deposition by Mr.
    Bennett allegedly were subsequently acknowledged by Mr. Bennett
    in a communication with the judge.
        Now, if you look at Mr. Bennett's letter, however, that is
    not at all what the letter says. Mr. Bennett wrote to the judge
    on September 30 of last year. This is after the referral had
    come to Congress and after the House of Representatives had
    seen fit to release Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony. Mr.
    Bennett does not, as the article alleges, acknowledge that he
    himself made false and misleading statements or that the
    President, either by his word or silence, made such statements.
    What Mr. Bennett does do in this letter, as you can see, is
    call the court's attention to the fact that Ms. Lewinsky
    herself had testified before a Federal grand jury in August.
    And--contrary to her earlier statements--she stated that
    portions of her affidavit were, according to her, false and
    misleading. Mr. Bennett's letter, bringing this to the judge's
    attention, was a matter of professional obligation and
    responsibility. It in no way is evidence supporting subpart
    (5).
        Take a break?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Kendall, indicating that
    he is about halfway through his presentation----
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. LOTT. I would, then, ask unanimous consent we have a
    temporary recess for 15 minutes.
        There being no objection, at 2:09 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:30 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the Senate is ready
    to proceed now with the presentation by Counsel Kendall.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Counsel Kendall.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Subpart (7)--we have two more subparts to go. I will take
    them out of order. Subpart (7) of article II alleges that the
    President obstructed justice when he relayed or told certain
    White House officials things about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky that were false and misleading. This is another
    example of double billing in the two articles. This charge is
    leveled in article I, and it appears here in article II.
    Yesterday, Mr. Craig explained why these statements didn't
    constitute perjury, and I would like to take just a few minutes
    this afternoon to explain why they don't constitute an
    obstruction of justice, either.
        First of all, and most obviously, there is no way--I said
    this in the beginning--there is no way that the statements of
    the aides could be in any way part of a scheme to deny Ms.
    Jones evidence. I think on this ground alone subpart (7) fails,
    because if you look at what is alleged in article II, it is
    that the President obstructed justice in order to delay,
    impede, et cetera, existence of testimony related to Ms. Jones'
    lawsuit. There is no way here that whatever the President said
    to an aide could have done that.
        The statements, which this subpart (7) addresses, were
    statements that the President made very shortly after the
    Lewinsky publicity had broken to Mr. Bowles, Mr. Podesta, Mr.
    Blumenthal and Mr. Ickes, none of whom were witnesses in the
    Paula Jones case. They were on none of the witness lists, and
    they had no evidence at all relevant to the Paula Jones case
    since they had been working for the President. They weren't
    working for the President when he was Governor of Arkansas in
    May of 1991, and they weren't individuals subject to discovery.
    So these four aides just had no evidence whatsoever that they
    could contribute to the Paula Jones case.
        But there is another more fundamental reason why this
    article is flawed as a matter both of the evidence and the law.
    The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff,
    and the Nation about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky. And he has
    expressed profound regret for that conduct. Subpart (7),
    however, alleges that he should be impeached and removed from
    office simply because he failed to be candid with these
    particular four White House aides and misled them about the
    nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        These allegedly impeachable denials to the four aides
    occurred, as I said, right after the publicity broke. And one
    of them occurred on January 21, last year, and then also on the
    23rd and the 26th. This was at the very time the President
    denied he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky in nearly
    identical terms on national television to whoever throughout
    the United States happened to be watching at that time.
        Having made this denial to the entire country, it simply is
    absurd to regard it any differently when made to four aides in
    the White House directly and person-to-person rather than
    through the medium of television. The President talked to these
    individuals about the Lewinsky matter because of his personal
    relationship and his direct professional exposure to them on a
    daily basis. He spoke to them, however, misleadingly in an
    attempt to allay their concern once the allegations about Ms.
    Lewinsky become public.
        No discovery here--never yet found a place in which
    discovery would benefit the case for either side--but no
    discovery here is going to illuminate the record in any way.
    These four witnesses have testified before the independent
    counsel's grand jury on several occasions.
        I think it is important to observe also that there is no
    way this interchange between the President and his aides could
    have affected evidence because his statements to them were
    hearsay which they would have reported accurately to the grand
    jury when asked. And by ``hearsay,'' all they can testify to is
    what the President told them, and they could do that
    accurately. But their own testimony, based on whatever
    knowledge or observation or direct sensory evidence they might
    have, was not affected in any way by the President's statement.
    None of these aides had any independent knowledge of the
    relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky and,
    therefore, the only evidence they do offer would be a hearsay
    repetition of what the President had told them. And that was
    the same public denial that he had told everyone, including,
    presumably, any member of the grand jury who had his or her
    television set on on that Monday, January 26.
        But under the strained theory--you really have to focus on
    this--under this theory, any citizen of the United States who
    heard that denial could form the basis for an allegation of
    impeachable conduct and removal of the President from office.
        I think this subpart (7) of article II fails for a number
    of reasons not related to the Paula Jones case, and it violates
    common sense.
        Let me turn to subpart (4). This subpart alleges that the
    President obstructed justice when he intensified and succeeded
    in an effort to secure job assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order
    to corruptly prevent her truthful testimony. The claim here is
    of a quid pro quo, a ``this for that.'' His job assistance was
    allegedly in order to prevent her truthful testimony.
        I want to note a couple of things here. First of all, this
    word ``intensified'' is a pretty slippery word. It doesn't say
    ``originated'' or ``began.'' It says ``intensified.'' And that
    allegation implicitly tries to avoid the thrust of its own
    logic. It recognizes that the job search Ms. Lewinsky was
    conducting had begun long before there was any connection to
    the Paula Jones case. And the undisputed facts are going to
    reveal that Vernon Jordan and others were trying to help her
    long before she appeared on the list of witnesses Ms. Jones was
    considering calling.
        The second thing I want to emphasize is the quid pro quo
    nature of the allegation. Quid pro quo is a good Latin term
    meaning ``this for that.'' ``In order to'' is the allegation of
    subpart (4). The job assistance was ``in order to'' prevent Ms.
    Lewinsky's truthful testimony.
        Well, I want to review the evidence a bit because there is
    not only no evidence in the record; there is a lot of
    contradictory evidence, both direct and circumstantial. We have
    heard a great deal in the various presentations about Mr.
    Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. But I was surprised to sit
    right over there through 11 hours 52 minutes, by my watch, of
    the House managers' very able presentation, and I heard almost
    nothing about what actually happened in New York City as a
    result of Mr. Jordan's efforts. But when we review the
    evidence--and it is all right here. Don't worry, I am not going
    to review every page of it. But it is all here. When we review
    this evidence which is available--all you have to do is read
    it--we get a very different picture from what we got from the
    able House managers. There is no secret about it, nor is there
    any conflict in the testimony of these witnesses. There is no
    need for further discovery here, as I will show, because the
    testimony is consistent.
        Now, the proof that is in the record is that there was no
    corrupt linkage, no assistance whatsoever which was designed
    and focused to get Ms. Lewinsky to do anything--nothing which
    tied the job assistance to what was going on in the Jones case.
    Mr. Jordan did help open doors, and Ms. Lewinsky went through
    those doors, and she either succeeded or failed on her own
    merits. Two of the companies declined to offer her a job, and
    at the third she did get an entry-level job, which she received
    on her own merits.
        There was no fix, no quid pro quo, no link to the Jones
    case. And also there was no urgency to Mr. Jordan's assistance
    to her. He started assisting her well before she showed up on
    the Jones witness list, and he helped her whenever he could,
    consistent with his own heavy travel schedule. There is the
    allegation of a quid pro quo, but there is nothing in the
    evidence to support the ``pro'' part of it.
        What the House managers have tried to do--and they are
    skillful prosecutors, they are able, they are experienced, they
    are polished, and they know what they are doing--they have
    tried to juxtapose unrelated events and, by a selective
    chronology, tried to establish causation between two wholly
    unrelated sets of events. And there an old logical fallacy--you
    have had enough Latin today--that just because something comes
    after something, it was caused by the preceding event. It is
    like the rooster crowing and taking credit for the sun coming
    up. When you look at the House managers' case, there is a lot
    of that going on, because we will see there is no real
    existence of causal connection and we will also see that a lot
    of the chronology you have been given is erroneous.
        As I said earlier, there is no evidence, either direct or
    circumstantial, to support this quid pro quo allegation.
        Now, let's start with the direct evidence, the most logical
    place to begin. It could not be more unequivocal. Let's start
    with Ms. Lewinsky. First of all, her New York job search began
    on her own initiative long before any involvement in the Jones
    case. Moving to New York was her own idea, and it was one she
    raised in July of 1997. This geographical move did not affect
    in any way her exposure to a subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
        Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course, a
    witness can be subpoenaed in any Federal district, no matter
    where the case is pending. And, indeed, a great many of the
    depositions in the Paula Jones case took place outside the
    State of Arkansas. For this reason, Mr. Manager Barr's
    assertion that the President wanted Ms. Lewinsky to go to New
    York because it would ``make her much more difficult, if not
    impossible, to reach as a witness in the Jones case'' is
    entirely untenable; she was just as vulnerable to subpoena in
    New York as she was in Washington. And, indeed, she was already
    under subpoena in January when she was finalizing her move.
    This contention just does not withstand scrutiny.
        Now, Ms. Lewinsky testified:

        I was never promised a job for my silence.

        You can't get any plainer than that. She testified that her
    job search had no relation to anything that she might do in the
    Jones case. In her July 27 interview with the FBI, the FBI
    agent recorded her statement that there was no agreement with
    the President, with Mr. Jordan, or anyone else that she had to
    sign a Jones affidavit before getting a job in New York. She
    told the FBI agent explicitly that she had never demanded from
    Mr. Jordan a job in exchange for a favorable affidavit and
    neither the President nor Mr. Jordan nor anyone else had ever
    made this proposition to her.
        Now, Mr. Jordan, who is an eloquent and exceedingly
    articulate man, took care of that claim in his own grand jury
    testimony. He was asked about any connection between the job
    search and the affidavit. He said there was absolutely none. He
    said, on March 5, as far as he was concerned these were two
    entirely separate matters. And in his grand jury appearance on
    May 5 he was asked whether the two were connected, and Mr.
    Jordan said, ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no.''
        The President has likewise testified that there was no
    connection between the Jones case and Ms. Lewinsky's job
    search. He told the grand jury:

        I was not trying to buy her silence or get Vernon Jordan to
    buy her silence. I thought she was a good person. She had not
    been involved with me for a long time in any improper way,
    several months, and I wanted to help her get on with her life.
    It is just as simple as that.

        Quid pro quo? No. The uncontested facts bear out these
    categorical denials of the three most involved people. Ms.
    Lewinsky began looking for a job in July of 1997, and the event
    which hardened her resolve to move to New York was a report by
    her ostensible good friend, Ms. Linda Tripp, on or about
    October 6 that one of Ms. Tripp's friends at the National
    Security Council said that Ms. Lewinsky would never ever get a
    job in the White House again.
        Now, it turns out that this disclosure, like so much else
    Ms. Tripp said, is false. Ms. Tripp's NSC friend said no such
    thing. But it did have a profound impact on Ms. Lewinsky, who
    described it as the straw that broke the camel's back. It was
    plain to her then that she was never going to be able to get
    another White House job.
        Mr. Jordan's assistance of Ms. Lewinsky began about a month
    before Ms. Lewinsky learned--about 6 weeks before she learned
    she was a possible witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky
    testified that she had discussed with Linda Tripp sometime in
    late September or early October the idea of asking for Mr.
    Jordan's assistance, and Ms. Lewinsky indicated she could not
    recall if it were her idea or Linda Tripp's idea, but in any
    event Mr. Jordan became involved sometime later at the
    direction not of the President but of Ms. Currie, who was a
    long-time friend of Mr. Jordan and who had discussed with Ms.
    Lewinsky her job search. Now, Ms. Currie had previously
    assisted Ms. Lewinsky in making contact with Ambassador Bill
    Richardson at the U.N. Ms. Lewinsky's first meeting was with
    Mr. Jordan on November 5, and Ms. Lewinsky testified that the
    meeting lasted about 20 minutes and that they had discussed a
    list of possible employers she was interested in. She never
    told Mr. Jordan that there was any time constraint on his
    assistance, and both she and Mr. Jordan traveled a great deal
    out of the country and in the country in that November-December
    period.
        Now, Mr. Jordan testified unequivocally that he never, at
    any time, felt any particular pressure to get Ms. Lewinsky a
    job. This is plain and powerful and unrebutted testimony. He
    was asked in the grand jury if you recall any ``kind of a
    heightened sense of urgency by Ms. Currie or anyone at the
    White House'' about helping Ms. Lewinsky during the first half
    of December?
        And he replied, ``Oh, no, I do not recall any heightened
    sense of urgency. What I do recall is that I dealt with it as I
    had time to do it.''
        Now, let me just pause here and observe that if there had
    been any improper motive or any sinister effort to silence Ms.
    Lewinsky, it would have been extremely easy for the President
    to have arranged for her to be hired at the White House. If
    there were some corrupt intent to silence her, that was an
    obvious solution because she very much wanted to go back to
    work at the White House. It mattered to her a great deal. But,
    while she was interviewed a couple of times by White House
    officials in the summer of 1997, those interviews never
    resulted in a job offer. The fix was not in. There was no
    corrupt effort to bring Ms. Lewinsky back, give her a White
    House job or, indeed, transfer her in any way from her Pentagon
    job.
        Now, she continued her job search efforts with the
    assistance of some of the White House people. In late October
    or early November, she told her boss at the Pentagon, Mr.
    Kenneth Bacon, that she wanted to leave and move to New York
    City. She enlisted his assistance in trying to help her get a
    private sector job, and he helped her because she had done good
    work for him. He had a positive impression and testified that
    he wanted to do whatever he could for her.
        In November of 1997, her supervisor at the Pentagon
    indicated that Ms. Lewinsky gave notice of an intention to quit
    her Pentagon job at the year end.
        Now, before we get to the private sector firms that Ms.
    Lewinsky went to, I want to pause and make the point that she
    had a United Nations delegation job in her back pocket. Back
    pocket is a male image--perhaps in her purse. She had it in her
    hand and available, all during this period.
        In early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, Mr.
    Podesta--John Podesta, who was then the White House Deputy
    Chief of Staff--had asked Ambassador Bill Richardson to
    consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. The Ambassador
    testified that he did not take this as a ``pressure call.'' He
    said ``there was no pressure anywhere by anybody'' to hire Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, without
    contradiction, that she was acting on her own, as Ms.
    Lewinsky's friend, in trying to help her.
        Now, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for the U.N. position on
    October 31 with Ambassador Richardson. And he, through his
    staff, offered her a job on November 3. Ambassador Richardson
    testified to the grand jury that he never spoke to the
    President or Mr. Jordan about Ms. Lewinsky, that he was
    impressed by her, that he made the offer on the merits, and
    that no one had pressured him to hire her.
        He testified specifically to the grand jury on April 30:

        This was my decision to hire her. I did not do it under any
    pressure or anything. I felt that she would be suitable for the
    job, and I didn't feel I had to report to anybody. It's not in
    my nature. I don't take pressure well on personnel matters. I'm
    a Cabinet member. I don't have to account for anything. This
    was mine, my choice, my decision. And I stand behind it.

        He also declared:

        What I did was routine.

        This fact was highly significant, because although this job
    was not precisely the job Ms. Lewinsky wanted, it was a job in
    New York, and she kept this open until January 5 when she
    finally turned it down. Now, it was Mr. Manager Bryant who
    referred to this in passing--just kind of walked around it. He
    disparaged it in the way a good trial lawyer does--recognize it
    is there, but then move around and away from it. But it is an
    important fact and it tears a very large hole in their
    circumstantial evidence case. Because she had in her hand, I
    will say, this job offer all through this period of November
    and December and into January. It wasn't precisely what she
    wanted but it was a good job. It was in New York City. And
    there was no urgent necessity for her, connected with her
    private sector job search. Once again, quid pro quo? No.
        Now, there is a lot of further direct evidence concerning
    her job search. And this is contained in a great many
    interviews in grand jury transcript from the people at the
    various New York firms Mr. Jordan contacted on Ms. Lewinsky's
    behalf. Again, there is simply no direct evidence whatsoever
    from any of these people of any kind of quid pro quo treatment.
    While Mr. Jordan made the contacts on her behalf, there was no
    urgency about them. There was no pressure, and they were wholly
    unrelated to the Jones case.
        Let's recognize the obvious here. The President's relation,
    improper relation with Ms. Lewinsky, had been over for many
    months. He continued to see her from time to time. He did what
    he could to be of assistance to her as she sought employment in
    New York because, as he testified, she was a good person, and
    he was trying to help her get on with her life.
        Mr. Jordan was able to open some doors, but once open,
    there was no inappropriate pressure. He really opened three
    doors for her: at American Express, at Young & Rubicam, and at
    Revlon. And she batted one for three. And actually in job
    searches, as in baseball, I, at least, will take that batting
    average any day of the week. But she succeeded on her own once
    she was through the door. And her getting through the door had
    no relation to the Paula Jones case.
        Let's, first of all, take a look at what happened with
    American Express and see whether in direct or circumstantial
    evidence there is any evidence of a quid pro quo here. The
    independent counsel conducted a very large number of interviews
    and also summoned a great many witnesses from each of these
    three sets of companies. Mr. Jordan was a member of the
    American Express board of directors, and he telephoned a Ms.
    Ursula Fairbairn, the executive vice president of human
    resources at American Express on December 10 or 11. And he told
    Ms. Fairbairn that he wanted to send her the resume of a
    talented young woman in Washington, to see whether she matched
    up to any openings at American Express.
        Ms. Fairbairn told the FBI that it was not at all unusual
    for American Express board members or other company officers to
    recommend young people for employment. Ms. Fairbairn said Mr.
    Jordan did not, in fact, mention any White House connection
    that the applicant had, and he exerted no pressure at all on
    her to hire the applicant. Ms. Fairbairn recalled that Mr.
    Jordan made another employment recommendation about 2 months
    earlier and indicated this was simply not an unusual request.
        Now, the Office of Independent Counsel also--you see it on
    the chart--interviewed Thomas Schick at American Express. He is
    the executive vice president for corporate affairs and
    communications.
        Ms. Fairbairn had sent the name and resume to Mr. Schick
    because she thought that is where Ms. Lewinsky might fit in,
    and he interviewed Ms. Lewinsky on December 23 in Washington.
    He decided after this interview not to hire Ms. Lewinsky
    because he felt she was lacking in experience and he also
    thought that American Express was probably not the right kind
    of company for her, given what she had told him she was
    interested in at the interview, and that she probably would be
    better off going to a public relations firm.
        The decision not to hire, he told the FBI, was entirely his
    own. He felt no pressure to either hire or not hire Ms.
    Lewinsky and never talked to Mr. Jordan at any time during this
    process. Once again, quid pro quo? No.
        The second company--actually two companies. It is Young &
    Rubicam and Burson-Marsteller. Mr. Jordan called Peter
    Georgescu, the chairman and CEO of Young & Rubicam, the large
    New York advertising agency. Mr. Jordan had no formal
    connection with the company, but he had been a friend of Mr.
    Georgescu's for over 20 years.
        Mr. Georgescu was interviewed by investigators of the
    Office of Independent Counsel and said that sometime in
    December 1997, Mr. Jordan had telephoned him and had asked him
    to take a look at a young person from the White House for
    possible work in the New York area.
        Mr. Georgescu had responded, ``We'll take a look at her in
    the usual way.'' And he stated that that was a kind of a code
    between him and Mr. Jordan, and it meant that if there was an
    opening for which she was qualified, she would be interviewed
    and hired, but there would be no special treatment. He
    testified that Mr. Jordan understood that, and he also said
    that Mr. Jordan did not engage in any kind of sales pitch about
    Lewinsky.
        Mr. Georgescu said that he then initiated an interview on
    behalf of Ms. Lewinsky, but his own involvement was arm's
    length, and that she succeeded or failed totally on her own
    merits.
        He recalled that Mr. Jordan had made another similar
    request on a previous occasion, and he said that he and Mr.
    Jordan frequently exchanged opinions about people in the
    advertising business on an informal basis.
        As a result of this telephone call, Ms. Lewinsky was
    interviewed by another person, a Ms. Celia Berk, who was the
    managing director of human resources at Burson-Marsteller, a
    public relations firm that was a division of Young & Rubicam.
    According to Ms. Berk, this interview was handled ``by the
    book,'' and while Ms. Lewinsky's interviews were a little bit
    accelerated, they went through the normal steps.
        Ms. Berk testified that nobody put any pressure on her. She
    said that while both she and the director of corporate practice
    at Burson-Marsteller, Erin Mills, and another corporate
    practice associate, Ziad Toubassy, had all liked Ms. Lewinsky
    and felt she was well qualified, the chairman of the corporate
    practice group, Mr. Gus Weill, had decided not to hire
    Lewinsky.
        Ms. Mills testified that the procedure under which Ms.
    Lewinsky was considered involved nothing out of the ordinary.
    Not a single one of these witnesses testified there was any
    urgency connected with Mr. Jordan's request.
        Ms. Mills also told the FBI that despite the fact that Ms.
    Lewinsky had been referred by the chairman of Young & Rubicam,
    their consideration of her was entirely objective. She thought
    that Ms. Lewinsky was poised and qualified for an entry-level
    position, but Mr. Weill decided to take a pass. Once again,
    quid pro quo? No.
        Mr. Jordan was a member of the board of directors of
    Revlon, a company wholly owned by MacAndrews & Forbes Holding
    company, and Mr. Jordan's law firm had done legal work for both
    of these companies.
        The corporate structure here is complicated, but I will be
    talking basically about two firms: Revlon--I think we all know
    what Revlon does--and its parent company, MacAndrews & Forbes
    Holding.
        Mr. Jordan telephoned his old friend, Mr. Richard Halperin,
    at the holding company on December 11 and said that he had an
    interviewee or he had an applicant that he wanted to recommend,
    and he gave Mr. Halperin some information about her. Mr.
    Halperin testified to the grand jury that it wasn't unusual for
    Mr. Jordan to call him with an employment recommendation. He
    had done so at least three other times that Mr. Halperin could
    recall.
        On this occasion, Mr. Jordan told Mr. Halperin on the
    telephone that Ms. Lewinsky was bright, energetic,
    enthusiastic, and he encouraged Mr. Halperin to meet with her.
    Mr. Halperin didn't think there was anything unusual about Mr.
    Jordan's request, and he testified that in the telephone call
    Mr. Jordan did not ask him to consider Ms. Lewinsky on any
    particular timetable, no acceleration of any kind. Indeed, far
    from there being some heightened sense of urgency, Mr. Halperin
    explicitly told the FBI that there was no implied time
    constraint or requirement for fast action.
        Ms. Lewinsky came up to New York City and she interviewed
    with Mr. Halperin on December 18, 1997. Mr. Halperin described
    her as follows: As a ``typical young, capable, enthusiastic
    Washington, DC-type individual.'' I don't know if that is
    pejorative or not----
        [Laughter.]
        Who described her primary interest as being in public
    relations. He and Ms. Lewinsky talked about the various
    companies that MacAndrews & Forbes controlled, and Ms. Lewinsky
    identified Revlon as a company that she would like to be
    considered at, and Mr. Halperin decided to send her there for
    an interview.
        Mr. Halperin sent her resume to another person at the
    holding company--not at Revlon, at the holding company--to a
    Mr. Jaymie Durnan who was a senior vice president there. He got
    the resume in mid-December, and he decided to interview her in
    early January.
        You have at the holding company two sets of interviews of
    Ms. Lewinsky going on. When he returned in early January, Mr.
    Durnan also scheduled an interview. He met with Ms. Lewinsky on
    January 8. His decision was made entirely independently of Mr.
    Halperin's decision, and he wasn't even aware Mr. Halperin had
    seen Ms. Lewinsky when he met with her on January 8.
        Mr. Durnan met with Ms. Lewinsky in the morning and he
    thought--now there is his view; and you are going to get two
    views of this interview--Mr. Durnan thought she was an
    impressive applicant for entry-level work. He was impressed
    with her, particularly by her work experience at the Pentagon,
    he told the FBI. He felt she would fit in with the parent
    company, but there were not any openings there.
        Based upon what she had said her interests were, he decided
    to send her resume over to Revlon, because he thought it
    matched up well with her interests. He sent the resume over,
    and he left a message--and now we are going to come to a Revlon
    person--he left a message with Ms. Allyn Seidman, who was the
    senior vice president of corporate communications at Revlon.
        Now cut to Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky had had a very good
    interview with Mr. Halperin, both she and Mr. Halperin thought.
    However, for reasons the record doesn't make clear, Ms.
    Lewinsky's impression of the Durnan interview was dismal. She
    thought the interview had not gone well. She thought it had
    gone poorly. She described herself as being upset and
    distressed. She had no idea of his positive reaction to her.
    And this is not just a late analysis. He had already sent the
    resume. He sent the resume over to Revlon immediately after
    their interview. But in any event, Ms. Lewinsky was afraid it
    had gone poorly, that she had embarrassed Mr. Jordan. So she
    called up Mr. Jordan.
        And on that same day--later--January 8, Mr. Jordan spoke,
    by telephone, to the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, his friend,
    Mr. Ronald Perelman. He mentioned to Mr. Perelman that Ms.
    Lewinsky had interviewed at MacAndrews & Forbes, but he made no
    specific request and he did not ask Mr. Perelman to
    specifically intervene in any way.
        Later that day--and I know this is complicated--Mr. Durnan
    happened to speak--Mr. Durnan is the second interviewer that
    Ms. Lewinsky happened to speak to--happened to speak to Mr.
    Perelman, and Perelman mentioned he had a call from Mr. Jordan
    about a job candidate. Perelman then said to Durnan, ``Let's
    see what we can do.'' And Durnan indicated he already, on his
    own initiative, had been working on this, had talked to Ms.
    Lewinsky, had sent her resume over to Revlon.
        Mr. Perelman, later that day, phoned Mr. Jordan back to say
    everything is all right, she appeared to be doing a good job,
    the resume was over at Revlon. Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency,
    no time constraints. Mr. Perelman didn't say anything out of
    the ordinary had happened, because it had not.
        Now, later that same day, after speaking to Mr. Perelman,
    Mr. Durnan phoned Ms. Seidman at Revlon, and sent the resume
    over earlier in the day. He didn't say that Mr. Perelman had
    mentioned Ms. Lewinsky to him. He simply said to Ms. Seidman:
    Look, I sent you a resume. I have met with the young woman. If
    you think she is good, you should hire her.
        According to Mr. Durnan, Mr. Perelman never said or implied
    that Ms. Lewinsky had to be hired. And indeed, Mr. Durnan had
    already interviewed her and formed a positive impression.
    According to Ms. Seidman, who is at Revlon, Mr. Durnan gave her
    a similar account that he gave to the grand jury. He said she
    ought to interview Ms. Lewinsky, make her own decision, hire
    her if she thought she was a good candidate only.
        The record is crystal clear that Ms. Seidman over at Revlon
    had no knowledge that Mr. Perelman had ever spoken to anyone
    about Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Seidman testified that she made an
    independent assessment of Ms. Lewinsky. She interviewed her the
    next day. She told the grand jury that she found Ms. Lewinsky
    to be ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman who was
    very eager. I liked that in my department.''
        At the conclusion of the interview, she intended to make an
    offer to Ms. Lewinsky, but it was contingent on the opinion of
    two other people--a Ms. Jenna Sheldon, who is the manager of
    human resources at Revlon, and Ms. Nancy Risdon, who is the
    manager of public relations for corporate affairs. Ms. Seidman
    testified that after they both interviewed Ms. Lewinsky, Ms.
    Risdon told her that she found her very impressive, and Ms.
    Sheldon had also been very impressed. Ms. Risdon told the FBI
    that she had been impressed with Ms. Lewinsky who, although she
    had no public relations experience, was ``bright and
    articulate.'' On the basis of all this, Ms. Seidman decided to
    offer Ms. Lewinsky an entry-level job as public relations
    administrator. The offer was made, and Ms. Lewinsky accepted.
    And, I repeat, the record evidence is uncontradicted that the
    fix was not on at all in this process.
        This was the third company Ms. Lewinsky had interviewed
    with, and on this series of interviews she was successful.
    Nobody in any of these companies suggested there was any quid
    pro quo link. The only person--the only person--in this record
    who talked about trying to have Ms. Lewinsky use signing of the
    affidavit as leverage to get a job was none other than Linda
    Tripp, that paragon of fateful friendship.
        On the audiotapes, it is Ms. Tripp who frequently urges Ms.
    Lewinsky not to sign an affidavit until she has a job in New
    York. It is not clear if Ms. Tripp knew about the U.N. job that
    Ms. Lewinsky had. On the audiotape, Ms. Lewinsky sometimes
    professes agreement with Ms. Tripp's advice, saying she will
    not sign an affidavit until she has a job. But, as Ms. Lewinsky
    testified to the grand jury--and, again, Ms. Lewinsky is
    testifying under the threat of perjury, which will blow away
    her immunity agreement--she was lying to Ms. Tripp when she
    said she would wait to sign the affidavit until she got a job.
        As Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand jury, her statement
    to Ms. Tripp about Mr. Jordan assisting her in a quid pro quo
    sense was not true. She said it only because Ms. Tripp was
    insisting that she promise her not to do this. But, in fact,
    the affidavit was already signed when Ms. Lewinsky made that
    promise. Once again, quid pro quo? No. That is some of the
    direct evidence.
        Let's look at the circumstantial evidence, the alleged
    circumstantial evidence. The quid pro quo theory rests on
    assumptions about why things happened and, on the facts, about
    when things happened. The former requires logic, but the second
    is a matter of fact.
        I mentioned previously that article II of the subpart (4)
    here uses the word ``intensified.'' It didn't say that the job
    search began as an effort to silence Ms. Lewinsky. It only says
    that it ``intensified'' as a result of that process.
        The original charge made by the independent counsel--and it
    is there in the independent counsel's referral at page 181--was
    an allegation that the President helped Ms. Lewinsky obtain a
    job in New York at a time when she would have been a witness
    against him. However, the House committee looked at the
    evidence I think in the five volumes and, even though they have
    not referred to it here very much, decided that that theory
    would not get off the runway. So they revised their claim and
    gave us a kind of wimpified version, alleging not initiation
    but intensification.
        Now, under the right circumstances, it is plain that
    helping somebody find a job is a perfectly acceptable thing to
    do. There is nothing wrong with it. Mr. Manager Hutchinson told
    you that--and I quote here--``There is nothing wrong with
    helping somebody get a job. But we all know there is one thing
    forbidden in public office: we must avoid quid pro quo, which
    is: This for that.''
        Now, he went on to assert that the President's conduct
    ``crossed the line,'' as he put it, when the job search
    assistance became ``tied and interconnected''--those are his
    words--with the President's desire to get a false affidavit.
    And then he went on to say, ``You will see''--that is a
    prediction that Mr. Manager Hutchinson made to you--``You will
    see that they are totally interconnected, intertwined,
    interrelated; and that is where the line has crossed into
    obstruction.''
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson pointed to a critical event for
    their quid pro quo theory, and that is the entry on December
    11, 1997, by Judge Wright, the judge in the Paula Jones case,
    of an order pertaining to discovery in the Paula Jones case.
    This is the critical event, according to the managers. But
    let's look closely at this so-called ``critical event'' because
    it's the only claim--only factual claim--the managers make of
    some causal relationship between the job search and the Jones
    case. And that claim is dead wrong; and it is demonstrably dead
    wrong.
        The managers have argued that what brought Mr. Jordan into
    action to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job, what really jump-
    started the process, was Judge Wright's December 11 order. And
    that order concerned discovery of relationships the President
    had--allegedly had--during the search period of time with women
    who were State or Federal employees.
        In the House, Chief Counsel Schippers powerfully made the
    point about how important this December 11 order was. ``. . .
    why the sudden interest,'' he asked, ``why the total change in
    focus and effort?'' Nobody but Betty Currie really cared about
    helping Ms. Lewinsky throughout November, even after the
    President learned that her name was on the prospective witness
    list. Did something happen [that moved] the job search from a
    low to a high priority on that day?
        Oh, yes, something happened. On the morning of December 11,
    1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that Paula Jones was
    entitled to information regarding these other women.
        Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson, again, emphasized the impact
    of this December 11 order was dramatic. He stood here and told
    you that the President's attitude suddenly changed, and what
    started out as a favor for Betty Currie in finding Ms. Lewinsky
    a job dramatically changed into something sinister after Ms.
    Lewinsky became a witness.

        And so what triggers [this is Manager Hutchinson]--let's
    look at the chain of events: The judge--the witness list came
    in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the President
    into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan into
    action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job search
    along . . . remember what else happened on that [December 11]
    again. That was the same day that Judge Wright ruled that the
    questions about other relationships could be asked by the Jones
    attorneys.

        Mr. Manager Hutchinson presented in his very polished and
    able presentation a chart. It was exhibit 1. I have taken the
    liberty of borrowing it for our own purposes. You see the key
    is outlined in detail what happened on December 11. The very
    first item is that ``Judge Susan Webber issues order allowing
    testimony on Lewinsky.'' The second meeting between Lewinsky
    and Jordan, ``leads provided/recommendation calls placed,'' and
    then, later, the ``President and Jordan talk about a job for
    Lewinsky.''
        That is what the chart says. But when you look at the
    uncontested facts, this isn't even smoke and mirrors. It is
    worse.
        First of all, Ms. Lewinsky entered Mr. Jordan's building
    for their meeting at 12:57 on December 11. As we see here from
    the chart, the entry chart of Mr. Jordan's law firm, Ms.
    Lewinsky's name is misspelled, and she identified this as her
    entry into the law firm. But this did not spring from,
    magically, the entry of the judge's order. It was scheduled 3
    days earlier, on December 8. And even that telephone call was
    pursuant to an agreement made between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr.
    Jordan two weekends before then. It had nothing, whatever, to
    do with the judge's order.
        Indeed, after her first meeting with Mr. Jordan on November
    5, Ms. Lewinsky testified that she had a follow-up conversation
    by telephone with Mr. Jordan around Thanksgiving, and he
    advised her he was working on the job search as he had time for
    it. He asked her to call him back in early December. Mr. Jordan
    testified he was out of the country from the day after
    Thanksgiving until December 4. He also testified that on
    December 5--this is before the witness list--Ms. Currie called
    and reminded him that Ms. Lewinsky was expecting his call. He
    asked Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call him. She does so on
    December 8 and they agreed to meet at Mr. Jordan's office on
    December 11.
        So this meeting, this sinister meeting, was arranged by
    three people who had no knowledge whatever about the Paula
    Jones witness list at the time they acted. Now, Ms. Lewinsky
    herself was also out of Washington for most of the period from
    Thanksgiving to December 4, first in Los Angeles and then
    overseas.
        Inexplicably, but I think significantly, because it says
    something about the strength of the case, the House managers
    ignore this key piece of testimony that when the meeting was
    set up it is uncontradicted. The point is that the contact
    between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky resumed in December not
    because of something having to do with the order, but because
    they had agreed it would. The gap is attributable--the gap in
    timing--to Mr. Jordan's travel schedule.
        Let's look at when this discovery order was entered. It
    was, in fact, entered late in the day of December 11 after the
    conclusion of a conference call among all the counsel in the
    Paula Jones case. We have here on the chart a blowup of the
    clerk's minutes.
        It is a great accommodation to lawyers when in a case a
    judge will have conference telephone calls because it means you
    don't have to travel to a different city. There were a number
    of these held in the Jones case. This was a conference call
    that began, as the clerk's minutes indicate, at 5:33 p.m.
    Little Rock time, in the afternoon. That would be 6:33 in
    Washington, DC. It ended at 6:50 p.m. in Little Rock, or 7:50
    in Washington, DC.
        Quite late in the conference call Judge Wright took up
    other matters and advised counsel that an order on the
    plaintiff's motion to compel testimony had been filed and
    Barry--Barry Ward, the judge's clerk--will fax a copy of the
    order on that motion to compel counsel. So, some time after
    7:50 p.m. counsel get the witness list. Notice that this
    proceeding is so late in the day, I don't know if you can see
    it, but when the clerk's minutes are filed, they are filed not
    on December 11, but on December 12.
        Finally, while we don't even have evidence of a telephone
    call between the President and Mr. Jordan--we are back now to
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart No. 1--we don't have any
    evidence that the President, in fact, ever placed a call to Mr.
    Jordan on this date. The President was out of the city. But if
    the call occurred, it must have occurred by 5:55 p.m.
        Let's, again, look at this chart. December 11 is so
    important that the managers have put it on the chart twice. It
    is the only date on the chart that appears twice. ``The
    President and Jordan talk about a job for Lewinsky.'' Clearly
    what they are telling you is that first you get the order. That
    energizes, that jump starts the process, and then the President
    talks to Vernon Jordan. As I said, if a call occurred on that
    day, the earliest you could have had any knowledge of the order
    would have been 7:50 p.m.
        There is a problem, though, when you think that maybe the
    President and Vernon Jordan talked on this date, even if we
    don't have evidence of it. And the problem is that at 7:50
    p.m., Mr. Vernon Jordan was high over the Atlantic Ocean in an
    airplane. He was on his way to Amsterdam. He testified that ``I
    left on United Flight 946 at 5:55 from Dulles Airport.'' That
    is where Mr. Jordan was on the evening of December 11. He had
    taken off even before the conference call.
        This makes no sense. The managers' theory just makes no
    sense. His meeting with Ms. Lewinsky and his calls on her
    behalf had taken place earlier in the day. The President could
    not have spoken to him about the entry of Judge Wright's
    discovery order. The entry of that order had nothing whatever
    to do with Mr. Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky. This claim
    of a causal relation totally collapses when you look at the
    evidence.
        The charts purporting to show causation are also riddled
    with errors. I only want to show a few of them. Again, we
    borrowed the chart from Mr. Manager Hutchinson, his chart No.
    7. Now he showed you this chart and it purports to be an
    account of what happened on January 5, 1998. You see how the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky appear to be conferring about the
    affidavit that she is going to be filing in the Jones case. But
    when you look at the real facts, the chart becomes a fiction.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you:

        Let's go to January 5th. This is a sort of summary of what
    happened on that day.
        Ms. Lewinsky meets with her attorney, Mr. Carter, for an
    hour. Carter drafts the affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky just a few
    minutes later . . .

        And Mr. Manager Hutchinson continued:

        Frank Carter drafts the affidavit. She is so concerned
    about it, she calls the President. The President returns Ms.
    Lewinsky's phone call.

        Now, the suggestion here--and this is our old
    circumstantial evidence problem--the suggestion from this fact
    pattern is that Ms. Lewinsky obtained a draft affidavit from
    her lawyer, Mr. Carter, on January 5, and then in a call with
    the President later that day she offered it to him for his
    review.
        Possible? Yes. True? No. The facts here simply do not bear
    out this chart. Why is that? Well, it is because Mr. Carter's
    grand jury testimony is very clear that he drafted the
    affidavit on the morning of January 6, and he even billed for
    it on that morning. He did not draft it, and Ms. Lewinsky did
    not have it, on January 5. There is no causation here, no
    linkage. The theory on this chart doesn't stand up. And if I
    may take something else from the House managers--not simply
    their chart, but to borrow Mr. Manager Bryant's expression--
    ``that dog won't hunt.''
        Ms. Lewinsky could not have offered to show the President a
    draft affidavit she herself could not have had on January 5.
    The idea that the telephone call on that day is about that
    affidavit is sheer, unsupported speculation and, even worse, it
    is speculation demolished by fact.
        Let's kick the tires of another exhibit. Chart No. 8, which
    was shown to you by Mr. Manager Hutchinson, purports to
    describe the events of January 6. Again, it sets forth a chain
    of events which makes it look as though Mr. Jordan was himself
    intimately involved in drafting Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Mr.
    Manager Hutchinson told you, when he showed you this chart--and
    I want to quote his exact words:

        The next exhibit is January 6. On this particular day, Ms.
    Lewinsky picks up the draft affidavit. At 2:08 to 2:10 p.m.,
    she delivers that affidavit. To whom? Mr. Jordan. . . . At
    3:48, he telephones Ms. Lewinsky about the draft affidavit, and
    at 3:49--you will see in red--both agree to delete a portion of
    the affidavit that created some implication that maybe she had
    been alone with the President.
        So Mr. Jordan was very involved in the drafting of the
    affidavit and the contents of that.

        That is the theory proposed by the chart. That is the
    hypothesis they offer on the basis of the circumstantial
    evidence. But there are problems that absolutely destroy that
    because when we look beyond the suggestive juxtaposition and
    consider material overlooked by the managers, a very different
    picture emerges.
        The key ``fact'' that chart 8 tries to establish is the
    statement that at 3:49 Mr. Jordan telephoned Ms. Lewinsky to
    discuss the draft affidavit, and they allegedly agreed ``to
    delete an implication that she had been alone with the
    President.''
        There is a very serious difficulty with this ``theory.''
    The chart blithely states that ``both agree[d] to delete [the]
    implications that she had been alone with the President.'' But
    that is not what the evidence shows.
        Ms. Lewinsky testified that she spoke to Mr. Jordan because
    she had concerns about the draft affidavit. According to her
    testimony, when asked whether Mr. Jordan agreed with what were
    clearly Ms. Lewinsky's ideas about changes in the affidavit,
    Ms. Lewinsky said, ``Yes, I believe so.''
        Mr. Jordan recalled the conversation in which Ms. Lewinsky
    raised the subject of her draft affidavit. He remembered her
    saying that she ``had some questions about the draft of the
    affidavit.'' But his testimony was emphatic that he was ``not
    interested in the details,'' that the ``problems she had with
    what had been drafted for her signature [were] for her to work
    out with her counsel,'' and that ``you [Ms. Lewinsky] have to
    talk to your lawyer about it.'' And Ms. Lewinsky did talk to
    her lawyer about it.
        The record is perfectly clear about that. Indeed, it could
    not be clearer, although you would not know this from chart 8,
    that the idea of deleting the reference to her being alone with
    the President came from her own lawyer, Mr. Carter. He
    testified to the grand jury--this is the lawyer who actually
    drafted the affidavit. He was referring to a passage about Ms.
    Lewinsky being alone with the President, and he said:

        Paragraph 6 has in its [draft] form as the last part of the
    last sentence ``and would not have been a `private meeting,
    that is not behind closed doors'. . . .''

        According to Mr. Carter:

        This paragraph was modified when we sat down in my office
    [on January 7], the day after the events described on chart 8.

        Mr. Carter further testified that ``before the meeting on
    the 7th, it was my opinion that I did not want to give Paula
    Jones' attorney any kind of a hint of a one-on-one meeting.
    What I told Monica was, `If they ask you about it, you will
    tell them about it. But I'm not putting it in the affidavit. I
    am not going to give them that lead to go after in the
    affidavit, because my objective is not to have you be deposed.'
    ''
        It is clearly Mr. Carter who deleted the reference to being
    alone with the President. The bottom line is that the
    insinuations on that chart just don't survive scrutiny.
        I want to say a final thing about all the charts involving
    circumstantial evidence. You remember how many telephone calls
    were up on these charts. I am going to let you in on a little
    secret--a secret that a lot of you who are lawyers know. It is
    pretty easy to get telephone call records and to identify
    telephone calls. But it is a common trick to put them up, even
    though you don't know what is going on in the telephone calls,
    and ask people to assume some insidious relationship between
    events and the telephone call. No matter how many telephone
    calls are listed on the chart, you don't know, without
    testimony, what was happening in that phone call, unless the
    mere existence--and there are cases where the mere existence of
    a phone call is probative, but not in these cases. Here they
    are trying to weave a web, and no particular call is of
    significant importance.
        The incontrovertible evidence shows that, in fact, Mr.
    Jordan spoke to the President on many, many, many occasions. He
    was a friend; he has been a friend of the President since 1973,
    and a call between them was a common occurrence. When asked in
    the grand jury if Mr. Jordan believed that the pattern of
    telephone calls to the President was ``striking,'' Mr. Jordan
    replied, ``It depends on your point of view. I talk to the
    President of the United States all the time, and so it's not
    striking to me.''
        Mr. Jordan also testified that he never had a telephone
    conversation with the President in which Ms. Lewinsky was the
    only topic.
        The House managers ask you to believe, simply on faith,
    that if two things happen on the same day, they are related.
    This relation may be logical, but it is not necessarily
    factual. I just want to make this point with a couple of
    telephone calls. Take Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart for
    January 17, 1998, the day of the President's deposition in the
    Jones case.
        This chart suggests that there are two calls between Mr.
    Jordan and the President after the President had concluded his
    deposition. One call is at 5:38, and the other is at 7:02. The
    chart does not tell you several important things. First, these
    two calls each lasted 2 minutes. Second, and more
    significantly, Mr. Jordan testified to the grand jury as to
    both telephone conversations:

        On Saturday, the 17th, in the two conversations I had with
    the President of the United States, we did not talk about
    Monica Lewinsky or his testimony in the deposition.

        Mr. Jordan was asked:

        Or [about] the questions asked of him in the deposition?

        And he replied:

        That is correct.

        In another exchange, the prosecutors asked Mr. Jordan:

        Did the President ever indicate to you [in the January 17
    telephone conversations] that Monica Lewinsky was one of the
    topics that had come up?

        Jordan replied:

        He did not.

        The prosecutors asked:

        Did the President ever indicate to you [in these two
    conversations] that your name had come up in the deposition as
    it related to Monica Lewinsky?

        And Mr. Jordan answered:

        He did not.

        The managers, in the absence of evidence that anyone
    endeavored to obtain Ms. Lewinsky a job in exchange for her
    silence, indeed, in the face of direct testimony of all of
    those involved that this did not happen, ask you to simply
    speculate. They ask you to speculate that since they have
    thrown a lot of telephone calls up there, they must have some
    sinister meaning. And they ask you to speculate that a lot of
    those phone calls must have been about Ms. Lewinsky, and they
    ask you to speculate further that in one of those unidentified,
    unknown phone calls, somebody must have said, ``Let's get Ms.
    Lewinsky a job in exchange for her silence.''
        There is no evidence for that. It is not there. It is just
    a theory.
        With regard to all this evidence about the job search, when
    you look at these dates, when you have the right chronology in
    mind, and when you look at the relevant and uncontested facts,
    these facts are there; they don't have to be discovered: There
    is no--no--evidence of wrongdoing of any kind in connection
    with Ms. Lewinsky's job search effort in New York City. This is
    not a case of the managers' presentation resting on even
    circumstantial as opposed to direct evidence. They don't even
    have circumstantial evidence here. All they have is a theory
    about what happened, which isn't based on any evidence either
    direct or circumstantial.
        Nothing in this evidence is really contested when you get
    right down to it; strictly as a matter of who said what to whom
    when. When lawyers ask you to ``keep your eye on the big
    picture,'' when they ask you, ``don't lose the forest for the
    trees,'' or ``don't get lost in the details,'' that is usually
    because the details--the stubborn facts--refute and contradict
    the big picture.
        So it is here. You can keep adding zero to zero to zero for
    a very long time, and indeed forever, and you will still have
    zero. The big picture here just doesn't exist. And no matter
    how many times the House managers keep making the assertion,
    there is just no evidence of any kind.
        I realize that it has taken us a good bit of time and
    painstaking--perhaps even painful--attention for each one of
    you to walk through these facts in a lawyerly manner. I am also
    keenly aware of the old saying that when all is said and done
    with a lawyer, there is more said than done. But we needed to
    take a look carefully and specifically at this evidentiary
    material with regard to these five grounds in the same way that
    Ms. Mills took you through very specifically yesterday with
    regard to the other two grounds to try and dispel the popular
    misconception that we were either unwilling or unable to rebut
    the facts. We have rebutted the facts.
        The simple fact is that there is no evidence indirectly to
    support the allegation that the President obstructed justice in
    his December 17 telephone call with Ms. Lewinsky, in his
    statements to his aides, in his statements to Betty Currie with
    relation to gifts, or the job search. It sometimes has been
    claimed by the managers that we have adopted a ``so what''
    defense trying to take lightly or to justify the improper
    actions that are at the root of this case. Well, Senators, with
    all respect, that argument is easy to assert, but it is false,
    a straw man asserted, only to be knocked down.
        We have tried in our presentations the last few days and
    today to treat the evidence in a fair and a candid and a
    realistic way about the facts as the record reveals them. We
    have tried to show you that the core charges of obstruction of
    justice and perjury cannot be proven. We are not saying that
    the alleged conduct doesn't matter. We are saying that perjury
    didn't occur, and obstruction of justice didn't happen.
        We haven't tried to sugar-coat or excuse conduct that is
    wrong. I think that Mr. Manager Buyer used the right phrase
    when he referred to ``self-inflicted wounds.'' There is no
    doubt that there are self-inflicted wounds here, wounds that
    are very real and very painful and very troubling. There is
    just no question about that. The question before you is whether
    these self-inflicted wounds rise to such a level of lawless and
    unconstitutional conduct that they leave you no alternative, no
    choice but to assume the awesome responsibility for reversing
    the results of two national elections.
        On that question, what the situation demands is not
    eloquence, which the very able managers have in abundance, but
    rather a relentless focus on the facts, the law, and the
    Constitution, all of which are on the side of the President.
        It is a great honor for me to stand here. This body has
    been called ``the anchor of the Republic.'' And it is that
    constitutional ability, that political sanity, that is needed
    now. There is a story, which is perhaps apocryphal, that when
    Thomas Jefferson returned from France where he served as
    Ambassador while his colleagues were writing the Constitution,
    that he met with George Washington, and he asked Washington why
    they had found it necessary to create the Senate. Washington is
    said to have silently removed the saucer from his teacup and
    poured the tea into the saucer and told Jefferson that like the
    act he had just performed, the Senate would be designed to cool
    the passion of the moment. Historically, this place has been
    really a haven of sanity, balance, wisdom in debating
    controversial issues which have been passionately felt, with
    candor, with courage, and civility.
        So once again, I think it is your responsibility, and yours
    alone, committed to you by the Constitution, to make a very
    somber judgment. The President has spoken powerfully and
    personally of his remorse for what he has done.
        Others have pointed out the poisonous partisanship that led
    the other body to argue for impeachment on the most narrowly
    partisan vote in its history.
        I think that the bipartisan manner, however, in which you
    have conducted this impeachment trial is a welcome change from
    the events of the last year.
        We ask only that you give this case and give this country
    constitutional stability and the political sanity which this
    country deserves. The President did not commit perjury, he did
    not obstruct justice, and there are no grounds to remove him
    from office.
        Thank you.

                                     recess

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we recess the proceedings for 15 minutes, but that Senators be
    prepared to resume at 5 minutes after 4, because we have to
    hear the eloquence of one of our former colleagues.
        There being no objection, at 3:49 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 4:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe the
    Senate is prepared now to hear the final presentation to be
    made by White House counsel, and at the conclusion of that, I
    will have a brief wrapup, a statement to make about how we hope
    to proceed on Friday and generally on Saturday. I will do that
    at the close of this presentation. I yield the floor, Mr. Chief
    Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel Bumpers
    to continue the presentation in the case of the President.
        Mr. Counsel BUMPERS. Mr. Chief Justice, my distinguished
    House managers from the House of Representatives, colleagues, I
    have seen the look of disappointment on many faces, because I
    know a lot of people really thought they would be rid of me
    once and for all.
        [Laughter.]
        I have taken a lot of ribbing this afternoon. But I have
    seriously negotiated with some people, particularly on this
    side, about an offer to walk out and not deliver this speech in
    exchange for a few votes.
        [Laughter.]
        I understand three have it under active consideration.
        [Laughter.]
        It is a great joy to see you, and it is especially pleasant
    to see an audience which represents about the size of the
    cumulative audience I had over a period of 24 years.
        [Laughter.]
        I came here today for a lot of reasons. One was that I was
    promised a 40-foot cord. I have been shorted 28 feet. Chris
    Dodd said he didn't want me in his lap. I assume he arranged
    for the cord to be shortened.
        I want to especially thank some of you for your kind
    comments in the press when it received some publicity that I
    would be here to close the debate on behalf of the White House
    counsel and the President.
        I was a little dismayed by Senator Bennett's remark. He
    said, ``Yes, Senator Bumpers is a great speaker, but he was
    never persuasive with me because I never agreed with him.''
        [Laughter.]
        I thought he could have done better than that.
        [Laughter.]
        You can take some comfort, colleagues, in the fact that I
    am not being paid, and when I finish, you will probably think
    the White House got their money's worth.
        [Laughter.]
        I have told audiences that over 24 years, I went home
    almost every weekend and returned usually about dusk on Sunday
    evening. And you know the plane ride into National Airport,
    when you can see the magnificent Washington Monument and this
    building from the window of the airplane--I have told these
    students at the university, a small liberal arts school at
    home, Hendrix--after 24 years of that, literally hundreds of
    times, I never failed to get goose bumps.
        The same thing is true about this Chamber. I can still
    remember as though it was yesterday the awe I felt when I first
    stepped into this magnificent Chamber so full of history, so
    beautiful. And last Tuesday, as I returned, after only a short
    3-week absence, I still felt that same sense of awe that I did
    the first time I walked in this Chamber.
        Colleagues, I come here with some sense of reluctance. The
    President and I have been close friends for 25 years. We fought
    so many battles back home together in our beloved Arkansas. We
    tried mightily all of my years as Governor, and his, and all of
    my years in the Senate when he was Governor, to raise the
    living standard in the delta area of Mississippi, Arkansas and
    Louisiana, where poverty is unspeakable, with some measure of
    success; not nearly enough.
        We tried to provide health care for the lesser among us,
    for those who are well off enough they can't get on welfare,
    but not making enough to buy health insurance. We have fought
    about everything else to improve the educational standards for
    a State that for so many years was at the bottom of the list,
    or near the bottom of the list, of income, and we have stood
    side by side to save beautiful pristine areas in our State from
    environmental degradation.
        We even crashed a twin engine Beech Bonanza trying to get
    to the Gillett coon supper, a political event that one misses
    at his own risk. We crashed this plane on a snowy evening at a
    rural airport off the runway, sailing out across the snow,
    jumped out--jumped out--and ran away unscathed, to the dismay
    of every politician in Arkansas.
        [Laughter.]
        The President and I have been together hundreds of times at
    parades, dedications, political events, social events and in
    all of those years and all of those hundreds of times we have
    been together, both in public and in private, I have never one
    time seen the President conduct himself in a way that did not
    reflect the highest credit on him, his family, his State and
    his beloved Nation.
        The reason I came here today with some reluctance--please
    don't misconstrue that, it has nothing to do with my feelings
    about the President, as I have already said--but it is because
    we are from the same State, and we are long friends. I know
    that necessarily diminishes to some extent the effectiveness of
    my words. So if Bill Clinton, the man, Bill Clinton, the
    friend, were the issue here, I am quite sure I would not be
    doing this. But it is the weight of history on all of us, and
    it is my reverence for that great document--you have heard me
    rail about it for 24 years--that we call our Constitution, the
    most sacred document to me next to the Holy Bible.
        These proceedings go right to the heart of our Constitution
    where it deals with impeachment, the part that provides the
    gravest punishment for just about anybody--the President--even
    though the framers said we are putting this in to protect the
    public, not to punish the President.
        Ah, colleagues, you have such an awesome responsibility. My
    good friend, the senior Senator from New York, has said it
    well. He says a decision to convict holds the potential for
    destabilizing the Office of the Presidency. And those 400
    historians--and I know some have made light about those
    historians, are they just friends of Bill?
        Last evening, I went over that list of historians, many of
    whom I know, among them C. Vann Woodward. In the South we love
    him. He is the preeminent southern historian in the Nation. I
    promise you--he may be a Democrat, he may even be a friend of
    the President, but when you talk about integrity, he is the
    walking personification, exemplification of integrity.
        Well, colleagues, I have heard so many adjectives to
    describe this gallery and these proceedings--historic,
    memorable, unprecedented, awesome. All of those words, all of
    those descriptions are apt. And to those, I would add the word
    ``dangerous,'' dangerous not only for the reasons I just
    stated, but because it is dangerous to the political process.
    And it is dangerous to the unique mix of pure democracy and
    republican government Madison and his colleagues so brilliantly
    crafted and which has sustained us for 210 years.
        Mr. Chief Justice, this is what we lawyers call ``dicta''--
    this costs you nothing. It is extra. But the more I study that
    document, and those 4 months at Philadelphia in 1787, the more
    awed I am. And you know what Madison did--the brilliance was in
    its simplicity--he simply said: Man's nature is to get other
    people to dance to their tune. Man's nature is to abuse his
    fellow man sometimes. And he said: The way to make sure that
    the majorities don't abuse the minorities, and the way to make
    sure that the bullies don't run over the weaklings, is to
    provide the same rights for everybody. And I had to think about
    that a long time before I delivered my first lecture at the
    University of Arkansas last week. And it made so much sense to
    me.
        But the danger, as I say, is to the political process, and
    dangerous for reasons feared by the framers about legislative
    control of the Executive. That single issue and how to deal
    with impeachment was debated off and on for the entire 4 months
    of the Constitutional Convention. But the word ``dangerous'' is
    not mine. It is Alexander Hamilton's--brilliant, good-looking
    guy--Mr. Ruff quoted extensively on Tuesday afternoon in his
    brilliant statement here. He quoted Alexander Hamilton
    precisely, and it is a little arcane. It isn't easy to
    understand.
        So if I may, at the expense of being slightly repetitious,
    let me paraphrase what Hamilton said. He said: The Senate had a
    unique role in participating with the executive branch in
    appointments; and, two, it had a role--it had a role--in
    participating with the executive in the character of a court
    for the trial of impeachments. But he said--and I must say
    this; and you all know it--he said it would be difficult to get
    a, what he called, well-constituted court from wholly elected
    Members. He said: Passions would agitate the whole community
    and divide it between those who were friendly and those who had
    inimical interests to the accused; namely, the President. Then
    he said--and these are his words: The greatest danger was that
    the decision would be based on the comparative strength of the
    parties rather than the innocence or guilt of the President.
        You have a solemn oath, you have taken a solemn oath, to be
    fair and impartial. I know you all. I know you as friends, and
    I know you as honorable men. And I am perfectly satisfied to
    put that in your hands, under your oath.
        This is the only caustic thing I will say in these remarks
    this afternoon, but the question is, How do we come to be here?
    We are here because of a 5-year, relentless, unending
    investigation of the President, $50 million, hundreds of FBI
    agents fanning across the Nation, examining in detail the
    microscopic lives of people--maybe the most intense
    investigation not only of a President, but of anybody ever.
        I feel strongly about this because of my State and what we
    have endured. So you will have to excuse me, but that
    investigation has also shown that the judicial system in this
    country can and does get out of kilter unless it is controlled.
    Because there are innocent people--innocent people--who have
    been financially and mentally bankrupt.
        One woman told me 2 years ago that her legal fees were
    $95,000. She said, ``I don't have $95,000. And the only asset I
    have is the equity in my home, which just happens to correspond
    to my legal fees of $95,000.'' And she said, ``The only thing I
    can think of to do is to deed my home.'' This woman was
    innocent, never charged, testified before a grand jury a number
    of times. And since that time she has accumulated an additional
    $200,000 in attorney fees.
        Javert's pursuit of Jean Valjean in Les Miserables pales by
    comparison. I doubt there are few people--maybe nobody in this
    body--who could withstand such scrutiny. And in this case those
    summoned were terrified, not because of their guilt, but
    because they felt guilt or innocence was not really relevant.
    But after all of those years, and $50 million of Whitewater,
    Travelgate, Filegate--you name it--nothing, nothing. The
    President was found guilty of nothing--official or personal.
        We are here today because the President suffered a terrible
    moral lapse of marital infidelity--not a breach of the public
    trust, not a crime against society, the two things Hamilton
    talked about in Federalist Paper No. 65--I recommend it to you
    before you vote--but it was a breach of his marriage vows. It
    was a breach of his family trust. It is a sex scandal. H.L.
    Mencken one time said, ``When you hear somebody say, `This is
    not about money,' it's about money.''
        [Laughter.]
        And when you hear somebody say, ``This is not about sex,''
    it's about sex.
        You pick your own adjective to describe the President's
    conduct. Here are some that I would use: indefensible,
    outrageous, unforgivable, shameless. I promise you the
    President would not contest any of those or any others.
        But there is a human element in this case that has not even
    been mentioned. That is, the President and Hillary and Chelsea
    are human beings. This is intended only as a mild criticism of
    our distinguished friends from the House. But as I listened to
    the presenters, to the managers, make their opening statements,
    they were remarkably well prepared and they spoke eloquently--
    more eloquently than I really had hoped.
        But when I talk about the human element, I talk about what
    I thought was, on occasion, an unnecessarily harsh, pejorative
    description of the President. I thought that the language
    should have been tempered somewhat to acknowledge that he is
    the President. To say constantly that the President lied about
    this and lied about that--as I say, I thought that was too much
    for a family that has already been about as decimated as a
    family can get. The relationship between husband and wife,
    father and child, has been incredibly strained, if not
    destroyed. There has been nothing but sleepless nights, mental
    agony, for this family, for almost 5 years, day after day, from
    accusations of having Vince Foster assassinated, on down. It
    has been bizarre.
        I didn't sense any compassion. And perhaps none is
    deserved. The President has said for all to hear that he
    misled, he deceived, he did not want to be helpful to the
    prosecution. And he did all of those things to his family, to
    his friends, to his staff, to his Cabinet, and to the American
    people. Why would he do that? Well, he knew this whole affair
    was about to bring unspeakable embarrassment and humiliation on
    himself, his wife whom he adored, and a child that he
    worshipped with every fiber of his body and for whom he would
    happily have died to spare her or to ameliorate her shame and
    her grief.
        The House managers have said shame, an embarrassment is no
    excuse for lying. The question about lying--that is your
    decision. But I can tell you, put yourself in his position--and
    you have already had this big moral lapse--as to what you would
    do. We are, none of us, perfect. Sure, you say, he should have
    thought of all that beforehand. And indeed he should have, just
    as Adam and Eve should have, just as you and you and you and
    you and millions of other people who have been caught in
    similar circumstances should have thought of it before. As I
    say, none of us is perfect.
        I remember, Chaplain--the Chaplain is not here; too bad, he
    ought to hear this story. This evangelist was holding this
    great revival meeting and in the close of one of his meetings
    he said, ``Is there anybody in this audience who has ever known
    anybody who even comes close to the perfection of our Lord and
    Saviour, Jesus Christ?'' Nothing. He repeated the challenge
    and, finally, a little-bitty guy in the back held up his hand.
    ``Are you saying you have known such a person? Stand up.'' He
    stood up. ``Tell us, who was it?'' He said, ``My wife's first
    husband.''
        Make no mistake about it: Removal from office is
    punishment. It is unbelievable punishment, even though the
    framers didn't quite see it that way. Again, they said--and it
    bears repeating over and over again--they said they wanted to
    protect the people. But I can tell you this: The punishment of
    removing Bill Clinton from office would pale compared to the
    punishment he has already inflicted on himself. There is a
    feeling in this country that somehow or another Bill Clinton
    has gotten away with something. Mr. Leader, I can tell you, he
    hasn't gotten away with anything. And the people are saying:
    ``Please don't protect us from this man.'' Seventy-six percent
    of us think he is doing a fine job; 65 to 70 percent of us
    don't want him removed from office.
        Some have said we are not respected on the world scene. The
    truth of the matter is, this Nation has never enjoyed greater
    prestige in the world than we do right now. I saw Carlos Menem,
    President of Argentina, a guest here recently, who said to the
    President, ``Mr. President, the world needs you.'' The war in
    Bosnia is under control; the President has been as tenacious as
    anybody could be about Middle East peace; and in Ireland,
    actual peace; and maybe the Middle East will make it; and he
    has the Indians and the Pakistanis talking to each other as
    they have never talked to each other in recent times.
        Vaclav Havel said, ``Mr. President, for the enlargement of
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there is no doubt in my
    mind that it was your personal leadership that made this
    historic development possible.'' King Hussein: ``Mr. President,
    I've had the privilege of being a friend of the United States
    and Presidents since the late President Eisenhower, and
    throughout all the years in the past I have kept in touch, but
    on the subject of peace, the peace we are seeking, I have
    never, with all due respect and all the affection I held for
    your predecessors, known someone with your dedication, clear-
    headedness, focus, and determination to help resolve this issue
    in the best way possible.''
        I have Nelson Mandela and other world leaders who have said
    similar things in the last 6 months. Our prestige, I promise
    you, in the world, is as high as it has ever been.
        When it comes to the question of perjury, you know, there
    is perjury and then there is perjury. Let me ask you if you
    think this is perjury: On November 23, 1997, President Clinton
    went to Vancouver, BC. And when he returned, Monica Lewinsky
    was at the White House at some point, and he gave her a carved
    marble bear. I don't know how big it was. The question before
    the grand jury, August 6, 1998:

        What was the Christmas present or presents that he got for
    you?
        Answer: Everything was packaged in the Big Black Dog or big
    canvas bag from the Black Dog store in Martha's Vineyard and he
    got me a marble bear's head carving. Sort of, you know, a
    little sculpture, I guess you would call, maybe.
        Was that the item from Vancouver?
        Yes.

        Question, on the same day of the same grand jury:

        When the President gave you the Vancouver bear on the 28th,
    did he say anything about what it means?
        Answer: Hmm.
        Question: Well, what did he say?
        Answer: I think he--I believe he said that the bear is
    the--maybe an Indian symbol for strength--you know, to be
    strong like a bear.
        Question: And did you interpret that to be strong in your
    decision to continue to conceal the relationship?
        Answer: No.

        The House Judiciary Committee report to the full House, on
    the other hand, knowing the subpoena requested gifts, is that
    giving Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28 seems odd. But
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals why he did so. She said that
    she ``never questioned that we would not ever do anything but
    keep this private, and that meant to take whatever appropriate
    steps needed to be taken to keep it quiet.''
        They say:

        The only logical inference is that the gifts, including the
    bear symbolizing strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms.
    Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship, even in the
    face of a Federal subpoena.

        She just got through saying ``no.'' Yet, this report says
    that is the only logical inference. And then the brief that
    came over here accompanying the articles of impeachment said,
    ``On the other hand, more gifts on December 28th . . .'' Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony reveals her answer. She said that she
    ``never questioned that we were ever going to do anything but
    keep this private, and that meant to take whatever appropriate
    steps needed to be taken to keep it quiet.''
        Again, they say in their brief:

        The only logical inference is that the gifts, including the
    bear symbolizing strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms.
    Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship even in the face
    of a Federal subpoena.

        Is it perjury to say the only logical inference is
    something when the only shred of testimony in the record is,
    ``No, that was not my interpretation. I didn't infer that''?
    Yet, here you have it in the committee report and you have it
    in the brief. Of course, that is not perjury.
        First of all, it is not under oath. But I am a trial lawyer
    and I will tell you what it is; it is wanting to win too badly.
    I have tried 300, 400, maybe 500 divorce cases. Incidentally,
    you are being addressed by the entire South Franklin County,
    Arkansas Bar Association. I can't believe there were that many
    cases in that little town, but I had a practice in surrounding
    communities, too. In all those divorce cases, I would guess
    that in 80 percent of the contested cases perjury was
    committed. Do you know what it was about? Sex. Extramarital
    affairs. But there is a very big difference in perjury about a
    marital infidelity in a divorce case and perjury about whether
    I bought the murder weapon, or whether I concealed the murder
    weapon or not. And to charge somebody with the first and punish
    them as though it were the second stands our sense of justice
    on its head.
        There is a total lack of proportionality, a total lack of
    balance in this thing. The charge and the punishment are
    totally out of sync. All of you have heard or read the
    testimony of the five prosecutors who testified before the
    House Judiciary Committee--five seasoned prosecutors. Each one
    of them, veterans, said that under the identical circumstances
    of this case, they would never charge anybody because they
    would know they couldn't get a conviction. In this case, the
    charges brought and the punishment sought are totally out of
    sync. There is no balance; there is no proportionality.
        But even stranger--you think about it--even if this case
    had originated in the courthouse rather than the Capitol, you
    would never have heard of it. How do you reconcile what the
    prosecutors said with what we are doing here? Impeachment was
    debated off and on in Philadelphia for the entire 4 months, as
    I said. The key players were Gouverneur Morris, a brilliant
    Pennsylvanian; George Mason, the only man reputedly to be so
    brilliant that Thomas Jefferson actually deferred to him--he
    refused to sign the Constitution, incidentally, even though he
    was a delegate because they didn't deal with slavery and he was
    a strict abolitionist. Then there was Charles Pinckney from
    South Carolina, a youngster at 29 years old; Edmund Randolph
    from Virginia, who had a big role in the Constitution in the
    beginning; and then, of course, James Madison, the craftsman.
    They were all key players in drafting this impeachment
    provision.
        Uppermost in their minds during the entire time they were
    composing it was that they did not want any kings. They had
    lived under despots, under kings, and under autocrats, and they
    didn't want anymore of that. And they succeeded very admirably.
    We have had 42 Presidents and no kings. But they kept talking
    about corruption. Maybe that ought to be the reason for
    impeachment, because they feared some President would corrupt
    the political process. That is what the debate was about--
    corrupting the political process and ensconcing one's self
    through a phony election; maybe that is something close to a
    king.
        They followed the British rule on impeachment, because the
    British said the House of Commons may impeach and the House of
    Lords must convict. And every one of the colonies had the same
    procedure--the House and the Senate. In all fairness, Alexander
    Hamilton was not very keen on the House participating. But here
    were the sequence of events in Philadelphia that brought us
    here today. They started out with maladministration and Madison
    said, ``That is too vague; what does that mean?'' So they
    dropped that. They went from that to corruption, and they
    dropped that. Then they went to malpractice, and they decided
    that was not definitive enough. And they went to treason,
    bribery, and corruption. They decided that still didn't suit
    them.
        Bear in mind one thing: During this entire process, they
    are narrowing the things you can impeach a President for. They
    were making it tougher. Madison said, ``If we aren't careful,
    the President will serve at the pleasure of the Senate.'' And
    then they went to treason and bribery. Somebody said that still
    is not quite enough, so they went to treason and bribery. And
    George Mason added, ``or other high crimes and misdemeanors
    against the United States.'' They voted on it, and on September
    10 they sent the entire Constitution to a committee they called
    the Committee on Style and Arrangement, which was the committee
    that would draft the language in a way that everybody would
    understand--that is, well crafted from a grammatical
    standpoint. But that committee, which was dominated by Madison
    and Hamilton, dropped ``against the United States.'' And the
    historians will tell you that the reason they did that was
    because they were redundant, because that committee had no
    right to change the substance of anything, and they would not
    have dropped it if they had not felt that it was redundant.
    Then they put it in for good measure. And we can always be
    grateful for the two-thirds majority.
        This is one of the most important points of this entire
    presentation. First of all, the term ``treason and bribery''--
    nobody quarrels with that. We are not debating treason and
    bribery here in this Chamber. We are talking about other high
    crimes and misdemeanors. And where did ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors'' come from? It came from the English law. And
    they found it in English law under a category which said
    distinctly ``political'' offenses against the state.
        Let me repeat that. They said ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors'' was to be because they took it from English law
    where they found it in the category that said offenses
    distinctly ``political'' against the state.
        So, colleagues, please, for just one moment, forget the
    complexities of the facts and the tortured legalisms--and we
    have heard them all brilliantly presented on both sides. And I
    am not getting into that.
        But ponder this: If high crimes and misdemeanors was taken
    from English law by George Madison, which listed high crimes
    and misdemeanors as ``political'' offenses against the state,
    what are we doing here? If, as Hamilton said, it had to be a
    crime against society or a breach of the public trust, what are
    we doing here? Even perjury, concealing, or deceiving an
    unfaithful relationship does not even come close to being an
    impeachable offense. Nobody has suggested that Bill Clinton
    committed a political crime against the state.
        So, colleagues, if you are to honor the Constitution, you
    must look at the history of the Constitution and how we got to
    the impeachment clause. And, if you do that, and you do that
    honestly, according to the oath you took, you cannot--you can
    censor Bill Clinton, you can hand him over to the prosecutor
    for him to be prosecuted, but you cannot convict him. You
    cannot indulge yourselves the luxury or the right to ignore
    this history.
        There has been a suggestion that a vote to acquit would be
    something of a breach of faith with those who lie in Flanders
    field, Anzio, Bunker Hill, Gettysburg, and wherever. I did not
    hear that. I read about it. But I want to say, and,
    incidentally, I think it was Chairman Hyde who alluded to this
    and said those men fought and died for the rule of law.
        I can remember a cold November 3 morning in my little
    hometown of Charleston, AR. I was 18 years old. I had just
    gotten one semester in at the university when I went into the
    Marine Corps. So I was to report to Little Rock to be inducted.
    My, it was cold. The drugstore was the bus stop. I had to be
    there by 8 o'clock to be sworn in. And I had to catch the bus
    down at the drugstore at 3 o'clock in the morning. So my mother
    and father and I got up at 2 o'clock, got dressed, and went
    down there. I am not sure I can tell you this story. And the
    bus came over the hill. I was rather frightened anyway about
    going. I was quite sure I was going to be killed, only slightly
    less frightened that Betty would find somebody else when I was
    gone.
        The bus came over the schoolhouse hill and my parents
    started crying. I had never seen my father cry. I knew I was in
    some difficulty. Now, as a parent, at my age, I know he thought
    he was giving not his only begotten son, but one of his
    begotten sons. Can you imagine? You know that scene. It was
    repeated across this Nation millions of times. Then, happily, I
    survived that war, saw no combat, was on my way to Japan when
    it all ended. I had never had a terrible problem with dropping
    the bomb, though that has been a terrible moral dilemma for me
    because the estimates were that we would lose as many as a
    million men in that invasion.
        But I came home to a generous government which provided me,
    under the GI bill, an education in a fairly prestigious law
    school, which my father could never have afforded. I practiced
    law in this little town for 18 years, loved every minute of it.
    But I didn't practice constitutional law. And I knew very
    little about the Constitution. But when I went into law school,
    I did study constitutional law, Mr. Chief Justice. It was very
    arcane to me. And trying to read ``The Federalist Papers,'' de
    Tocqueville, all of those things that law students are expected
    to do, that was tough for me, I confess.
        So after 18 years of law practice, I jumped up and ran for
    Governor. I served as Governor for 4 years. I guess I knew what
    the rule of law was, but I still didn't really have much
    reverence for the Constitution. I just did not understand any
    of the things I am discussing and telling you. No. My love for
    that document came day after day and debate after debate right
    here in this Chamber.
        Some of you read an op-ed piece I did a couple of weeks ago
    when I said I was perfectly happy for my legacy, that during my
    24 years here I never voted for a constitutional amendment. And
    it isn't that I wouldn't. I think they were mistaken not giving
    you fellows 4 years.
        [Laughter.]
        You are about to cause me to rethink that one.
        [Laughter.]
        The reason I developed this love of it is because I saw
    Madison's magic working time and time again, keeping bullies
    from running over weak people, keeping majorities from running
    over minorities, and I thought about all of the unfettered
    freedoms we had. The oldest organic law in existence made us
    the envy of the world.
        We have also learned that the rule of law includes
    Presidential elections. That is a part of the rule of law in
    this country. We have an event, a quadrennial event, in this
    country which we call a Presidential election, and that is the
    day when we reach across this aisle and hold hands, Democrats
    and Republicans, and we say, win or lose, we will abide by the
    decision. It is a solemn event, a Presidential election, and it
    should not be undone lightly or just because one side has the
    clout and the other one doesn't.
        And if you want to know what men fought for in World War
    II, for example, in Vietnam, ask Senator Inouye. He left an arm
    in Italy. He and I were with the Presidents at Normandy, on the
    50th anniversary, but we started off in Anzio. Senator
    Domenici, were you with us? It was one of the most awesome
    experiences I have ever had in my life. Certified war hero. I
    think his relatives were in an internment camp. So ask him,
    what was he fighting for? Or ask Bob Kerrey, certified Medal of
    Honor winner, what was he fighting for? Probably get a quite
    different answer. Or Senator Chafee, one of the finest men ever
    to grace this body and certified Marine hero of Guadalcanal,
    ask him. And Senator McCain, a genuine hero, ask him. You don't
    have to guess; they are with us, and they are living, and they
    can tell you. And one who is not with us in the Senate anymore,
    Robert Dole, ask Senator Dole what he was fighting for. Senator
    Dole had what I thought was a very reasonable solution to this
    whole thing that would handle it fairly and expeditiously.
        The American people are now and for some time have been
    asking to be allowed a good night's sleep. They are asking for
    an end to this nightmare. It is a legitimate request. I am not
    suggesting that you vote for or against the polls. I understand
    that. Nobody should vote against the polls just to show their
    mettle and their courage. I have cast plenty of votes against
    the polls, and it has cost me politically a lot of times. This
    has been going on for a year, though.
        In that same op-ed piece, I talked about meeting Harry
    Truman my first year as Governor of Arkansas. I spent an hour
    with him--an indelible experience. People at home kid me about
    this because I very seldom make a speech that I don't mention
    this meeting. But I will never forget what he said: ``Put your
    faith in the people. Trust the people. They can handle it.''
    They have shown conclusively time and time again that they can
    handle it.
        Colleagues, this is easily the most important vote you will
    ever cast. If you have difficulty because of an intense dislike
    of the President--and that is understandable--rise above it. He
    is not the issue. He will be gone. You won't. So don't leave a
    precedent from which we may never recover and almost surely
    will regret.
        If you vote to acquit, Mr. Leader, you know exactly what is
    going to happen. You are going to go back to your committees.
    You are going to get on with this legislative agenda. You are
    going to start dealing with Medicare, Social Security, tax
    cuts, and all those things which the people of this country
    have a nonnegotiable demand that you do. If you vote to acquit,
    you go immediately to the people's agenda. But if you vote to
    convict, you can't be sure what is going to happen.
        James G. Blaine was a Member of the House when Andrew
    Johnson was tried in 1868, and 20 years later he recanted. He
    said, ``I made a bad mistake.'' And he said, ``As I reflect
    back on it, all I can think about is that having convicted
    Andrew Johnson would have caused much more chaos and confusion
    in this country than Andrew Johnson could ever conceivably have
    created.''
        And so it is with William Jefferson Clinton. If you vote to
    convict, in my opinion, you are going to be creating more havoc
    than he could ever possibly create. After all, he has only 2
    years left. So don't, for God's sake, heighten the people's
    alienation, which is at an all-time high, toward their
    Government. The people have a right, and they are calling on
    you to rise above politics, rise above partisanship. They are
    calling on you to do your solemn duty, and I pray you will.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                               order of procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that concludes the
    White House presentation. I remind all Senators we will
    reconvene tomorrow beginning at 1 p.m. On Friday, under the
    provisions of Senate Resolution 16, we will begin the question-
    and-answer period for not to exceed 16 hours. The majority will
    begin the questioning, and as we go forward in that process, we
    will alternate back and forth across the aisle. I have
    discussed this proposition, obviously, with Senator Daschle,
    and we have discussed it in our conferences. We looked at a
    number of alternatives, but we thought this would be a fair way
    to proceed, that we would begin from this side with a Senator
    who will be named and go to the other side, back and forth.
        We think this provides fairness. I hope all Members will
    entrust the Chief Justice to be fair during this portion of the
    deliberations and for the managers and counsel to, of course,
    be succinct in their answers and respond to the question that
    is actually asked.
        At this time, I anticipate approximately 5 hours of
    questions and answers being used tomorrow, Friday. We will then
    reconvene on Saturday at 10 a.m. and again resume questioning,
    alternating back and forth. We have not set any definite time
    for Saturday. We will need to see how the questions go. We
    don't really know whether we will need 5 hours or 10 hours or
    the full 16. But if we reach a point on Saturday where we need
    to conclude the day's proceedings and we feel there are still
    more questions that will need to be asked, then after
    communication on both sides of the aisle we will decide how to
    go forward.
        It is my hope that we can complete this questioning period
    during the day Friday and Saturday and conclude it Saturday. I
    hope the Senators will be thoughtful in their questions. They
    must be in writing. Please be brief with your written
    presentation. Dissertations will not be appreciated in writing
    at this point. We will do our best, Mr. Chief Justice, to deal
    with the question of repetition or redundancy and try to have
    some process that Senator Daschle and I will use to get the
    Senators' questions to the Chief Justice.
        I thank all Senators for their attention during the past 2
    weeks, both in the presentation of the case by the House
    managers and the presentation by the White House counsel.
    Obviously, the Senators have been here, attentive. We have
    listened. I think we have learned a great deal, and I
    appreciate the way the Senate has conducted itself.
        [The following notice of intent was received on Wednesday,
    January 20, 1999:]

    Notice of Intent To Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin
                                 and Wellstone

        In accordance to Rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I (for
    myself and for Mr. Wellstone) hereby give notice in writing that it is
    my intention to move to suspend the following portions of the Rules of
    Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials
    in regard to debate by Senators on any motion to dismiss, any motion to
    subpoena witnesses and/or to present any evidence not in the record
    during the trial of President William Jefferson Clinton:
        (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
        (2) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate shall
    direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions. A
    motion to close the doors may be acted upon without objection, or, if
    objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by the
    yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record''; and
        (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except when the
    doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case'' and ``, to
    be had without debate''.

                                     ______

                       adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow
        Mr. LOTT. I move the Senate stand in adjournment under the
    previous order.
        The motion was agreed to and, at 5:10 p.m., the Senate,
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Friday,
    January 22, 1999, at 1 p.m.

                                    ------

                            Friday, January 22, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:03 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                    ------

                                     prayer
        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Spirit of the living God, fall afresh on us. We need Your
    strength. The wells of our own resources run dry. We need Your
    strength to fill up our diminished reserves--silent strength
    that flows into us with artesian resourcefulness, quietly
    filling us with renewed power. You alone can provide strength
    to think clearly and to decide decisively.
        Bless the Senators today as they trust You as Lord in the
    inner tribunal of their own hearts. You are Sovereign of this
    land, but You are also Sovereign of the inner person inside
    each Senator. May these hours of questions bring exposure of
    truth and resolution of uncertainties. O God of righteousness
    and grace, guide this Senate at this decisive hour. You are our
    Lord and Saviour. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators may be seated. The Sergeant at
    Arms will make the proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep
    silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States
    is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by
    the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States.
                                  the journal
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the
    Senate is provided up to 16 hours during which Senators may
    submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on
    the part of the House of Representatives, or counsel for the
    President. The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                               order of procedure
        Mr. LOTT. This afternoon, the Senate will begin the
    question-and-answer period for not to exceed 16 hours, as
    provided in Senate Resolution 16. I have consulted several
    times about this procedure with Senator Daschle and others, and
    we have determined that the majority will begin the questioning
    process with the first question, and we will then alternate
    back and forth.
        As I noted yesterday, this has not been done in quite a
    while, so we will just have to go forward in a way that we feel
    is fair and comfortable. We ask that you give the benefit of
    the doubt to us in how we send the questions up to the Chief
    Justice. Senator Daschle and I will try to make sure that the
    time stays pretty close to even as we go through the day. Of
    course, the Chief Justice, I am sure, will make sure the
    deliberations and the answers are fair. We hope the answers
    will be succinct and that they will respond to the questions.
        One question that has arisen from Senators on both sides
    is, can we direct a question to both sides, the White House
    counsel and the House managers, simultaneously, and the answer
    is no. Under our rules, we will direct the question to one side
    or the other, and our questions for either side may go to
    either one of the parties, but only one can answer that
    question.
        Of course, there is the possibility for a followup question
    that might be directed to one side or the other. We will just
    deal with that as we go forward.
        I expect, for the information of all Senators, that we will
    go approximately 5 hours today. I don't know how many questions
    we can get done in an hour, but I suspect by 6 o'clock on
    Friday we will have exhausted a series of questions that will
    entitle us to a break at that point. But, again, we will just
    have to see how we feel about it. We would not stop, obviously,
    in the middle of a question.
        We will resume again on Saturday at 10 a.m., alternating
    between both sides. The schedule at this point is undecided. We
    need to see how many questions are left that Senators really
    feel need to be asked and, again, we will have to see how the
    day progresses.
        I did have Senators come up to me yesterday and talk to me
    about we need some reasonable limit on that. But I am thinking
    in general terms of not going beyond 4 o'clock on Saturday. We
    will converse and make those announcements after consultation
    as we go forward today or during the day even tomorrow.
        I hope we can complete our questioning period by the close
    of business tomorrow, but if we go with the times I basically
    mentioned, we are talking about 10 hours, not 16. So we will
    have to consult and determine if we ask the basic questions or
    if we want to continue it later or even over on Monday.
        I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, that completes the
    explanation I wanted to give at this time.
        I do have the first question prepared to send to the Chief
    Justice, but I thought perhaps he has some further business he
    might want to address before I do that.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I would like to advise counsel on
    both sides that the Chair will operate on a rebuttable
    presumption that each question can be fully and fairly answered
    in 5 minutes or less.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I do send the first question
    to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Allard, Bunning, Coverdell and
    Craig ask the House managers:

        Is it the opinion of the House Managers that the President's
    defense team, in the presentation, mischaracterized any factual or
    legal issue in this case? If so, please explain.

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    colleagues, and Members of the Senate, first of all, let me
    thank you for the opportunity to respond to questions. We hope
    we can do that in a succinct manner today.
        There are a number of mischaracterizations in statements
    that we disagree with that the President's defense team made. I
    will not attempt to cover all of these. I would like to
    highlight just a few of these, and perhaps might, in a short
    manner, exceed the rebuttal presumption of 5 minutes.
        Mr. Craig made the argument on behalf of the President that
    this is a lot about an oath versus oath perjury case. Article I
    is the perjury allegation--one word against another person's
    word, ``he said, she said.'' However, we submit that there was
    not discussed in their presentation the fact that there is
    ample corroboration which is provided for under the law as it
    being necessary.
        But we believe factually there was much corroboration; that
    is, another person or other evidence to support the fact that
    the President did commit the perjury, and particularly those
    aspects of the perjury charge that deal with the personal
    relationship that Ms. Lewinsky and the President had.
        Very clearly, White House records and phone logs, along
    with Ms. Lewinsky's incredible recollection of particular names
    and events, and the circumstances surrounding these particular
    occasions, that have already been highlighted in the past--and
    we all know about those types of telephone conversations. And
    she was very clear in the facts. The people have all
    corroborated her on her presence in the White House at certain
    times.
        No. 2, the Secret Service testimony that placed her inside
    the Oval Office, on occasion alone; the fact that there have
    been contemporaneous statements made by Ms. Lewinsky describing
    the details of this relationship--and as we all know, the law
    permits this contemporaneous statement--to, in this case, at
    least eight friends and two professional counselors detailing
    the particular relationship while it was ongoing.
        The blue dress is very clearly corroboration, and the DNA
    testing that resulted from that. Also, the transfer of Ms.
    Lewinsky from the White House, and the later surreptitious
    efforts with Ms. Currie to sneak her back into the White House,
    again, indication that efforts had been made to move her, to
    relocate her, away from the President to protect him from those
    circumstances.
        Also, the President's prepared statement in the grand jury
    is another example that was not mentioned. And in particular, I
    highlight the statement that he made that would lead you to
    believe this relationship evolved over a period of time, and
    being that he was sorry that what had started out as a
    friendship turned into this type of relationship, where, in
    fact, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is very clear that that
    relationship began immediately, the very first day that he
    actually spoke to her.
        Mr. Ruff's statement that the managers' case was misleading
    is also incorrect, I believe. He used words like ``fudging the
    facts,'' ``a witches' brew,'' and ``be wary of a prosecutor who
    feels like he must deceive the court.'' This comes as somewhat
    of a surprise to many of us at this table who know that Mr.
    Ruff is familiar with the facts of this case.
        Just last month, when he testified before the Judiciary
    Committee, he said: I have no doubt that the President walked
    up to that line that he thought he understood. Reasonable
    people--reasonable people--and you may have reached that
    conclusion that he could have crossed over that line and that
    what for him was truthful but misleading or nonresponsive or
    misleading and evasive was in fact false.
        He didn't tell you in his presentation that just a month
    ago he took the position that reasonable people can disagree,
    and yet before this Senate, and the audience that we have
    watching, he asserts that anyone who would accuse his client of
    perjury is guilty of ``fudging the facts,'' ``brewing a
    witches' brew,'' and ``deception.'' And even Mr. Craig,
    unfortunately, borrowed many of those same words in that
    characterization. It may be good theater, but it is simply not
    the case that these managers are engaged in that type of
    practice before the Senate and the American people.
        White House Counsel Cheryl Mills spoke in a similar manner
    and tone to this House about inconvenient and stubborn facts--
    oh, those stubborn facts. In her meticulous presentation, she
    passed over--she completely missed--the second occasion wherein
    President Clinton attempted to coach Ms. Currie.
        Did anyone hear about the second event? As carefully as she
    tried to make innocent the wrongful effort of the President to
    tamper with the potential witness, she just as carefully
    skirted the entire similar episode 2 or 3 days after the first
    one where he again tampered with her testimony. According to
    Ms. Currie, spoke with her, just recapitulating. Remember that
    in our presentation?
        Likewise, in her review of witness tampering, she
    mischaracterized the law stating that an actual threat was
    required. 18 U.S.C. 1503 states that obstruction of justice
    occurs when a person corruptly endeavors to influence the
    testimony of another person. And ``corruptly'' has been
    interpreted by the District Court in the District of Columbia
    to mean acting for an improper purpose.
        Clearly, this was an improper purpose when the President
    was trying to get her to testify falsely, but a threat is not a
    part of the law and not needed.
        I will quickly mention two more.
        Mr. Ruff stated the President gave the same denial to his
    aides that he gave to his country and family. You recall him
    specifically saying that he said nothing different to the
    American public and his family than he told the aides whom we
    talked about--John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal.
        That's not right. ``He told''--the President told Mr.
    Podesta--and this is Mr. Podesta talking--``He told me that he
    never had sex with her and that he never asked--you know, he
    repeated the denial. But he was extremely explicit in saying he
    never had sex with her in any way whatsoever, that they had not
    had oral sex.''
        He told Mr. Blumenthal an entirely different story, that
    ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.
    [And I, the President,] rebuffed her.'' He said that ``I've
    gone down that road before [and] . . . caused pain for a lot of
    people and I'm not going to do that again.''
        ``She threatened him.'' Ms. Lewinsky threatened the
    President. And ``[s]he said that she would tell [other] people
    [that she] had an affair, that she was known as a stalker among
    her peers, and that she hated [that], and if she had an affair
    . . . [with the President] she wouldn't be . . . anymore.''
        That is not the story that he told the American people and
    his family. These are embellishments that are very important
    because he anticipated that they would go into the grand jury
    and repeat those misstatements.
        And finally, the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky. White House
    defense lawyers spoke so eloquently about the procurement of
    this affidavit--as he glided through how the President believed
    that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a truthful affidavit
    while still skirting their sexual relationship sufficiently to
    avoid testifying in the Paula Jones case.
        This is an important issue. As it was specifically raised
    in the answer before this Senate, the President's lawyers
    brought this statement into this Senate as part of their answer
    that he could have advised her that she could have filed an
    affidavit that would have been truthful while still at the same
    time denying a sexual relationship sufficiently that she would
    not be called as a witness.
        I know opposing counsel makes light of the hairsplitting
    and the legal gymnastics that people have talked about here,
    but that is an incredible statement that you can do the twister
    enough to go into a deposition where the purpose of being there
    is to discover this type of information, who you might have had
    an affair with, and have her tell a truthful affidavit and
    still not to be able to testify.
        Had she told a truthful affidavit, she would have been
    immediately called. Plus, the President was given an
    opportunity by Ms. Lewinsky to review the affidavit.
        Remember the statement that he didn't need to, he had seen
    15 just like it? If he had that ``out'' for her where she could
    have told the truth and still not been able to testify, don't
    you think he owed it to her to cause her not to have to commit
    perjury in that affidavit--which she did--not to have to commit
    a crime? Wouldn't he have shared that with her if he had that
    information at that time?
        I suggest that he didn't. I have others that I would like
    to talk to, but in the interest of time and fairness, I will
    stop my presentation at this point.
        I thank the Senate.
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I recognize the minority leader.
        Mr. DASCHLE. Can I inquire as to the length of time that
    response took.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Approximately 9 minutes.
        Senator Sarbanes asks:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question from
    Senators Allard, Bunning, Coverdell, and Craig?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        It may be that I will need to call on some of my colleagues
    to be of assistance here, but let me begin, and we will strive
    mightily to stay within the rebuttal of 5 minutes.
        Mr. Manager Bryant began by suggesting that there really is
    corroboration on the key issue that he focussed on, which as
    you know, is the nature of the specific details of the
    relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. And he
    suggested that among the corroborating matters that he would
    point to were her recollection of events, which is alleged to
    be detailed; records reflecting that she was, indeed, in the
    White House on particular days; Secret Service records; DNA
    testing. None of those have anything to do with the essential
    issue that Congressman Bryant raised, because nobody disputes
    the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was in the White House engaged in
    inappropriate conduct with the President on a particular day.
        The only point that I think the manager raises that is new
    and needs to be addressed is this notion that contemporary,
    consistent statements made to third parties about these events
    are somehow corroborative of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in this
    regard. And as all of you who had the pain of suffering through
    an evidence course will know, or have had the pain of trying
    lawsuits in which this issue arises, so-called prior consistent
    statements are not, in fact, viewed as some corroborating
    evidence that can be introduced by the prosecutors in this
    Senate; for they know, and I am sure those of you who suffered
    through these pangs know, as well, that the law rejects the
    notion that merely because you tell the same story many times
    it is corroborative of the underlying credibility of the
    witness' version, and that there are only certain very limited
    areas in which prior consistent statements are, in fact,
    admissible.
        A couple of others and I will turn this briefly over to Ms.
    Mills.
        Manager Bryant suggests that I have somehow gone too far in
    suggesting that the prosecutors here have, in my words,
    ``engaged in fudging.'' I have never suggested that the entire
    presentation is so, and I made very clear in my comments to the
    Senate the other day the specific examples which I think we
    documented quite fully. But beyond that, let me go back to his
    reference to my earlier testimony before the House Judiciary
    Committee in which I did, indeed, in response to questions,
    comment that the President may well have walked up to the line
    believing he didn't cross it, but that reasonable people might
    conclude otherwise.
        The only problem with that example, as broached by Mr.
    Manager Bryant, is that I was talking there--and the record is
    very clear--I was talking about his testimony in the Jones
    deposition which, as everyone in this room will fully
    understand, is not before you because the House of
    Representatives specifically decided that the President's
    testimony in the Jones deposition was not a basis for
    impeachment.
        With that, without having used, I hope, all of my time, Mr.
    Chief Justice, I will allow Ms. Mills, if she would, to come
    forward and respond specifically to the point raised with
    respect to her presentation.
        Ms. Counsel MILLS. Thank you.
        I just want to address briefly two issues that the House
    managers raised. With regard to the statute on obstruction of
    justice, with respect to witness tampering, the House managers
    focused on 1512, with respect to Ms. Currie which does require
    a threat or intimidation and, indeed, specifically addressed
    that--they wanted to focus on 1512--when they were addressing
    her and the situation where the President spoke with her.
        With regard to 1503, though, to the extent the House
    managers suggest that the President's actions and his
    conversation with Ms. Lewinsky violated 1503, I think probably
    you all might recall from my presentation that we discussed the
    Aguilar case in which it is clearly necessary that you have a
    nexus between the actual conduct and the official proceeding
    that would be going forward. In that case, we had a judge who
    lied to an FBI agent who indicated that this might come up in a
    grand jury proceeding, and Mr. Chief Justice, in his opinion,
    indicated that was insufficient to find the nexus that was
    necessary to violate 1503.
        If you all have my package, you can look back. I provided
    you with a specific quotation. So in this instance, we clearly
    wouldn't have the nexus between the President's conversation
    with Ms. Currie, who was not yet a witness. There was no
    suggestion that she was going to be a witness in the Jones
    case; indeed, no one even mentioned that fact to him, as you
    actually did have in Aguilar.
        In addition, with regard to both statutes, the specific
    intent is not fulfilled. That is something we spoke about when
    I gave my presentation before.
        With regard to the President's conversation with Ms.
    Currie, which happened on the 18th and again on a subsequent
    day, in that instance it also happened prior to all of the
    media attention and other matters that came out. So in effect,
    all of the same issues apply because there was no--at that
    point--no indication that the independent counsel was involved
    in this matter, and the President still was concerned about the
    Jones proceeding; indeed, he was concerned that the media
    attention would be significant, and he was accurate as it began
    to grow and grow.
        Thank you.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, we send our next question to
    the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Enzi and Coverdell ask the
    House managers:

        Please elaborate on whether the President's defense team failed to
    respond to any allegations made by the House managers.

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, as to the areas that were not covered
    by the President's defense team, I think that my fellow Manager
    Bryant already mentioned one, but I thought it was significant
    that in the questioning of Ms. Currie, or the statements made
    to Betty Currie after the President's deposition on January 17
    where he brought her into the office and he went through that
    series of questions--``I was never alone, right,'' and that
    series of questions everybody is so familiar with, they
    discussed that primarily in the terms that she was not a
    witness. But during 3 days of presentation they never discussed
    the fact that it was 2 days later that the same series of
    questions or statements or coaching were addressed to Ms.
    Currie.
        So the President's defense that, ``Well, I was just trying
    to refresh my recollection on the facts so I could respond to
    media inquiries,'' does not make sense in light of the fact
    that it was done on one day--the series of questions. But Betty
    Currie testified that 2 days later she was called into the
    office, the same series of statements, declarations, coaching
    was made to her, and the only possible explanation for that is
    that the President was trying to make a very clear statement to
    her--``This is what I remember; this is what I want you to
    do,'' and for 3 days, for 3 days of presentations, the
    President's defense lawyers never, never mentioned that.
        I want to come back to what Ms. Mills just said because
    this was a big issue in the presentation of Mr. Ruff. In fact,
    I have the quotes here. I hope that will be turned over to you.
    But whenever Betty Currie was questioned, they say, well, she
    wasn't a witness. There was never any clue she was going to be
    a witness, that the Jones lawyers never anticipated she was
    going to be a witness, and that it was never put at all on the
    witness list. That's very significant.
        I just want to drive this point home. This is Mr. Ruff--
    talk about prosecutorial fudging; how about defense fudging?
    Mr. Ruff said this:

        Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor prospective witness.
        In the entire history of the Jones case, Ms. Currie's name had not
    appeared on any witness list, nor was there any reason to suspect that
    Ms. Currie would play a role in the Jones case.
        Discovery was down to its final days.

        That was Counsel Ruff.

        Yet, in the days and weeks following the deposition, the Jones
    lawyers never listed her, never contacted her, never added her to any
    witness list.

        That was the presentation of Mr. Ruff, and it was also that
    of Ms. Mills. Yet, if you look at the facts in the Jones case,
    the deposition was concluded on January 17. There was a holiday
    on the 18th. In fact, on January 22, within 5 days of the
    deposition, a subpoena was issued for Betty Currie. Within 5
    days, a subpoena was issued for Betty Currie, and, in fact, on
    the 23rd, there was a supplement to the witness list by the
    Jones lawyers, which included Betty Currie's name as 163. This
    was served on Mr. Bennett and the other lawyers for the
    President.
        In addition, I have--which I will distribute to you--the
    actual subpoena that was issued for Betty Currie, as I
    indicated, on January 22, and the proof of service in which
    Betty Currie was served as a witness in that case on January
    27--the proof of service. So the statements by Mr. Ruff that
    there was never any indication that the Jones people knew she
    was going to be a witness is totally not within the record. In
    fact, it is clear that the subpoena was issued; it was served.
        Whenever that deposition of the President was over, both
    the President left there and the Jones lawyers left there
    knowing immediately that Betty Currie was going to be a
    witness. She had to be a witness, with the President asserting,
    ``ask Betty, ask Betty, ask Betty,'' so many times during that
    deposition. That is why the President came back and had to deal
    with Betty Currie being a witness, and the Jones lawyer went
    out and immediately amended the witness list so as to do that,
    and then issued a subpoena, which was served on Betty Currie.
    That is the record. Those are the facts. We will distribute
    this to you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Levin asks White House counsel:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Let me
    respond very briefly to Manager Hutchinson's last remarks,
    because I owe him indeed an explanation and he is correct in
    one respect. I did not accurately reflect the fact that after
    the January 21 story in the Washington Post, the Jones lawyers
    did, in fact, attempt to track the entire independent counsel
    investigation. And I think Mr. Hutchinson will tell you, they
    indeed issued a long list of subpoenas. For that misleading
    statement, I apologize, and I trust we will hear equally candid
    assessments from the managers. But more importantly, let me
    return to the substance of that issue because it is important
    to note, without the chart being up there, that indeed, at the
    moment, which is the critical moment, when the President was
    talking about Betty Currie, whether it be on the 18th or on the
    20th or 21st--the 21st, you remember, is when the story breaks.
    The answer is the same. He had no reason to believe at that
    stage--and that is the critical stage because that is what's in
    his mind and that is what you have to ask if you are talking
    about obstruction of justice or witness tampering--at that
    stage, he had no more reason to know that Ms. Currie was going
    to be a witness than he did, as we explained it, both I and Ms.
    Mills, in our earlier presentations.
        The fact that the Jones lawyers, once this story became a
    matter of public knowledge, which it did on the 21st,
    thereafter dumped a series of subpoenas and deposition notices
    literally in the closing days of discovery does not bear on the
    question of what was in the President's mind, which is the
    critical moment for testing his intent, at the moment when he
    first had his conversations with Betty Currie.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Thurmond, Grassley, Chafee and
    Craig direct to the House managers:

        President Clinton has raised concerns about whether the articles of
    impeachment are overly vague and whether they charge more than one
    offense in the same article. How do you respond to this concern?

        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the
    Senate, I will be pleased to do my best to address this
    question.
        The President has made two claims against the forum in
    which the articles of impeachment have been drafted. I submit
    to you that neither of these claims has any merit, and I will
    be pleased to address both claims as briefly as I can.
        First, the President claims that the two articles of
    impeachment are vague and lack specificity and, therefore,
    prevent him from knowing with what he has been charged.
        Second, the President asserts that the articles are flawed
    because they charge multiple offenses in a single article. With
    respect to the first claim, it is clear in the President's
    trial memorandum and his presentation here that President
    Clinton and his counsel know exactly what he is being charged
    with. And I submit to you that if President Clinton had
    suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles, he could
    have filed a motion for a bill of particulars. He did not
    choose to do so.
        Moreover, articles of impeachment have never been required
    to be drafted with the specificity of indictments. After all,
    this proceeding is not a criminal trial. If it were, then we,
    as the prosecutors, would not only be entitled to call
    witnesses, but would be required to call them to prove our
    case. We would certainly not be put in the position of
    defending the appropriateness of witnesses.
        President Clinton wants all the benefits of a criminal
    trial without bearing any of its burdens. Impeachment is a
    political and not a criminal proceeding. That has been clear
    from the institution of this proceeding in our Constitution. As
    recognized by Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest
    interpreter during the 19th century, ``Impeachment is designed
    not to punish an offender by threatening deprivation of his
    life, liberty, or property, but to secure the State by
    divesting him of his political capacity.'' Justice Story thus
    found the analogy of articles of impeachment to an indictment
    to be invalid. I quote what Justice Story had to say, which is
    directly pertinent to this question:

        The articles need not and indeed do not pursue the strict form and
    accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in the form
    of the allegations, but ought to contain certainty as to enable the
    party to put himself upon the proper defense, and also in the case of
    acquittal, to avail himself of it as a bar to another impeachment.

        Indeed Alexander Hamilton had commented on the same point
    in ``The Federalist.'' We have heard many references to
    Federalist No. 65, and in this trial today I will refer once
    again to what Alexander Hamilton said in ``The Federalist'' on
    this particular point. There Alexander Hamilton stated that
    impeachment proceedings:

        . . . can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the
    delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction
    of it by the judges, as in common cases served to limit the discretion
    of courts in favor of personal security.

        By that, he means in criminal cases. I think this statement
    from Alexander Hamilton refutes the argument of the President's
    counsel directly.
        I also point out that unlike the judicial impeachments in
    the 1980s, President Clinton has not committed a handful of
    specific misdeeds that can be easily listed in separate
    articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the whole
    assortment of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives
    to impeach the President, the Judiciary Committee looked to the
    more analogous case, that of President Nixon. In 1974, in the
    proceedings with respect to President Nixon, the committee also
    was faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable
    length against a President who had committed a series of
    improper acts designed to achieve an illicit end.
        The first article against President Nixon charged that in
    order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of
    the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and
    obstruct the consequent investigation and for certain other
    purposes, he engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or
    causing to be made false or misleading statements to lawfully
    authorized investigative officers, endeavoring to misuse the
    Central Intelligence Agency, and endeavoring to cause
    prospective defendants and individuals, duly tried and
    convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration in
    return for their silence or false testimony.
        The articles did not--I repeat ``did not''--list each false
    or misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA,
    and did not list each respective defendant and what they were
    promised. That is the record. Anyone who is familiar with the
    Nixon case--President Nixon case--is familiar with those facts.
        In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against
    President Clinton charged him with providing perjurious, false,
    and misleading testimony concerning four subjects, such as
    sexual relations with a subordinate government employee,
    engaging in a course of conduct designed to prevent, obstruct,
    impede the administration of justice, which of course included
    four general acts, such as an effort to secure job assistance
    for that employee.
        I submit to you that an argument can be made that the
    articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted
    with more specificity than the articles that were drafted
    against President Nixon.
        I will do my best to briefly address the second claim which
    has been asserted by the President's lawyers against the form
    of the articles of impeachment; that is, that they are invalid,
    charging multiple offenses in one article. The articles of
    impeachment allege that President Clinton made one or more
    perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury
    and committed one or more acts in which he obstructed justice.
        Once again, these articles are modeled after the articles
    adopted by the House Committee on the Judiciary against
    President Nixon and were drafted with the rules of the Senate.
    Specifically in mind, the Senate rules explicitly contemplate
    that the House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner
    and prior rules of the Senate have held that such drafting is
    not sufficient and will not support a motion to dismiss.
        Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the
    Senate When Sitting On Impeachment Trials now states that an
    article of impeachment ``shall not be divisible for the purpose
    of voting thereon at any time during trial.'' When the Senate
    Committee on Rules and Administration amended rule XXIII in
    1986, it explained that. And I quote this at length. And this
    goes right to the heart of the matter. This is what the Rules
    Committee in its report said. It said:

        The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the division of
    an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the most
    judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a
    general matter and, in particular, with respect to the form of the
    articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon.
    The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an
    impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the
    first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges
    alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of
    transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of
    Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had
    thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the enumerated
    specifications. . . . [I]t was agreed to write into the proposed rules
    language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either
    the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person
    impeached was `guilty' of one or more of the enumerated
    specifications.''

        The Senate rules themselves, thus, specifically contemplate
    that an article of impeachment may include multiple
    specifications of impeachable conduct as in the case of
    President Nixon. The Senate itself has recognized the articles
    against President Nixon as an appropriate model to be followed.
    The House has, in the articles now before the Senate, simply
    followed that model.
        Moreover, I point out in conclusion that the Senate has
    convicted a number of judges on such omnibus articles,
    including Judges Archibald, Louderback and Claiborne.
        I submit to the Members of the Senate that the articles of
    impeachment against President Clinton present his offenses and
    their consequences in an appropriately transparent and
    understandable manner. They are not constitutionally deficient.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is sent by Senators Dodd
    and Leahy:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question by
    Senators Thurmond, Grassley, Chafee, and Craig; particularly what would
    have stopped or limited the House in specifying precisely the
    statements on which the articles were based?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. In our case, we are talking about an
    allegation of perjury. In the Nixon case--in the 1974 Nixon
    case--he was not charged with perjury. I think our argument was
    that perjury is a different kind of thing. You have to be very
    specific in what you charge, and you have to be very clear as
    to what the statement is when you are charging perjury. And
    that is the tradition of our criminal justice system and of our
    jurisprudence.
        The danger here is that if you do not, if you are overly
    broad, as we contend in article I, that at any given moment you
    can fill the vessel with what your meaning is.
        Let me give you a little history of these allegations of
    grand jury perjury against the President.
        The Starr referral had three allegations. The Starr
    referral was September 9. Mr. Schippers, when he made his
    presentation to the Judiciary Committee, had two allegations.
    One was different. He incorporated one of Starr's. When Starr
    appeared and testified on November 19 in front of the Judiciary
    Committee, he almost spent no time on this at all--one or two
    sentences. But he added a new charge, which was that the
    President was not truthful when he testified that he had been
    truthful in the deposition.
        Then, we appeared and made our representations and our
    defense on behalf of the President on the basis of what Mr.
    Starr had written in his referral and what Mr. Schippers had
    presented to the Judiciary Committee and in addition to what
    Mr. Starr had said when he appeared. But then when Mr.
    Schippers gave his closing argument the following day, we saw
    the new articles. We had, by my count, 10 allegations from Mr.
    Schippers. Two had to do with the definition of sexual
    relations. Three had to do with the prepared statement. Two had
    to do with things that were never alleged again and never
    surfaced again in the course of the case. And they had to do
    with Mr. Bennett and his proffer of the Lewinsky affidavit.
        Then, on December 16 we had a whole new additional
    collection of reports of allegations. And on January 11, the
    file brief here set forth eight examples.
        Just to highlight the danger of not being specific, of not
    tying yourself to a definition, let me compare, for example,
    the trial brief that was submitted by the House managers 3 days
    before Mr. Rogan made his presentation.
        The precise statement that the President is accused of
    testifying falsely in front of a grand jury was that he was
    lying when he said that the reason he was seeing Betty Currie
    was to refresh his recollection. In the trial brief--they make
    that reference one, two, three, four times--that the statement
    that is specific here in the trial brief is he lied when he
    said he was going to refresh his recollection. That is not even
    mentioned in Mr. Rogan's presentation. He changes it. And he
    says he lied when he said he wanted to ascertain what the facts
    were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was--a very
    different statement requiring a very different defense. And 2
    days before, 3 days before we even hear the allegations on the
    floor of the Senate, we still don't know precisely what they
    are.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, if I may absorb
    whatever rebuttal time is still available to us, may I for just
    a moment, sir?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Sure.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you.
        I want to talk briefly about two aspects of Manager
    Canady's presentation.
        First of all, he asks why didn't we seek a bill of
    particulars. Let me remind all the Senators, although I don't
    think any of you were here at the time of the trial of Judge
    Louderback who also saw a bill of particulars, and the House of
    Representatives at the time made it clear that the managers do
    not have the authority to rewrite the articles, though they
    certainly have, I suggest, attempted to do so on the fly, but
    that it would have required a remand to the House of
    Representatives in order to have a bill of particulars to judge
    what they themselves meant when they had passed these articles.
        Second, just very briefly, I spoke to the issue of
    multiplicity, duplicity, the other day, and the question of
    whether the rule XXIII revision makes any difference. As I
    pointed out--and I won't embarrass him any further--one Member
    of this body spoke at length about the importance of not
    loading up multiple offenses into one count well after the
    revision of rule XXIII, clearly with no sense that this body
    had been precluded from dealing with the critical issue of
    whether a two-thirds vote can sensibly be taken on an article
    that contains multiple and, particularly as my colleague, Mr.
    Craig, indicated, multiple nonspecific violations.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Thompson and Grassley,
    Thurmond, Allard, Frist, Burns, and Inhofe direct this question
    to the President's counsel:

        If the President were a Federal judge accused of committing the
    same acts of perjury and obstruction of justice and the Senate found
    sufficient evidence that the acts alleged were committed, should the
    Senate vote to convict?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. This will sound halfhearted, but it is
    not. I am glad you asked that question. This really goes right
    to the heart of the managers' argument here, which is that
    there is no difference in the consideration of the impeachment
    process between an allegation against a Federal judge and an
    allegation against the President of the United States.
        I will not repeat the extended discussion of this subject
    of a few days ago, but let me try to summarize very briefly. It
    is absolutely crystal clear from the history of the drafting of
    the impeachment clause that the concern of the framers was, Is
    there such action as to subvert our Government that we can no
    longer persist in permitting, in their case, the President of
    the United States to remain in office? That question must be
    dramatically different when you ask it about the conduct of 1
    of 1,000 judges.
        Beyond that, it is also clear that there has been extended
    debate in many forums and at many times in the past 210 years
    about, indeed, just what the standard is for the impeachment of
    judges.
        I hesitate to do this, and I do it apologetically, Mr.
    Chief Justice, but the Chief Justice himself in an earlier time
    and an earlier guise spoke to this issue and made it clear--
    this during his tenure as assistant attorney general for the
    Office of Legal Counsel--when the issue was being debated
    whether there was a nonconstitutional, nonimpeachment device
    for disposing of judges alleged to have engaged in misconduct
    that may not fall within the high crimes and misdemeanors
    provision of the impeachment clause, that, indeed, the good
    behavior standard for judges was something far broader than the
    standard to be applied under the high crimes and misdemeanors
    standard. And, indeed, that debate was resumed many years later
    in the context of a further effort to establish a
    nonconstitutional device for removing judges.
        That history, and just the core question, do you ask the
    same questions about the trauma the Nation suffers when you are
    removing a judge and you are removing a President, the answer
    must be no. You must ask, What is the nature of the perjury
    that has been committed? What is the nature of the offense that
    has been committed? What is the factual setting in which it
    occurs? And, ultimately, does it so subvert the accused's
    ability to perform the duties of his office that you must
    remove him?
        That question for Judge Nixon, convicted and imprisoned,
    has to be different from--``different'' is much too mild a
    word--stunningly different from the question you ask against
    the backdrop of our history when you ask whether the President
    of the United States should be removed and the will of the
    electorate overturned.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Dorgan and Baucus and Schumer
    to the President's counsel:

        In Counselor Ruff's presentation, he set forth a time line that
    undermined the managers' theory that Judge Wright's December 11
    discovery letter triggered an intensification of the President's and
    Jordan's efforts to assist Lewinsky in finding a job. In response to
    Mr. Ruff's presentation, the managers handed out a press release
    outside the Senate Chamber asserting that it was the December 5
    issuance of the witness list in the Jones case and not the judge's
    discovery order on the 11th that triggered the intensification of the
    job search. It does not appear consistent with assertions made by the
    House managers in their trial brief and oral presentations. Please
    comment.

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. It was the assertion very clearly
    voiced in Mr. Manager Hutchinson's presentation and very
    clearly made in the trial brief of the House managers that it
    was, indeed, the December 11 order that--I used the word
    ``jump-started'' yesterday--that catalyzed, that pushed
    forward, the job search.
        If you look at page 21 of the House managers' brief, you
    see them say this sudden interest was inspired by a court order
    entered on December 11, 1997. Now, their position could not
    have been clearer until we began our presentations, and then,
    all of a sudden, it wasn't the December 11 order; it was,
    instead, the December 5 witness list.
        There are a number of things to be said about that. One of
    them is that they have very clearly said that there was no
    urgency at all after the witness list arrived to help Ms.
    Lewinsky. They have said that Mr. Jordan met with the President
    on December 5 but that meeting had nothing to do with Ms.
    Lewinsky. This was in the majority report at page 11. They said
    that very clearly.
        Because it has been clear that the December 11 order was
    entered at a time when Mr. Jordan was flying to Europe, he
    could not have known about it. He had met with Ms. Lewinsky
    earlier that day. And, indeed, that December 11 meeting had
    sprung from actions taken by Ms. Lewinsky in a phone call with
    Mr. Jordan in November. They agreed that when Mr. Jordan
    returned to the country, they would set up a meeting. They did
    that on December 5, or she tried to get in touch on December 5.
    They finally succeeded in getting in touch on December 8, and
    that was not at a time she knew she was on the witness list.
        So the point is these were two entirely separate chains of
    events going forward--the job search and the witness list. And
    nothing supports the intensification theory presented by the
    managers, certainly not this new, ``Well, it wasn't the
    December 11th order; it was the December 5th order.''
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Ashcroft and Hatch--is there
    anyone on the floor who can't hear me? This is for the House
    managers:

        The White House makes much of the fact that Vernon Jordan was on a
    flight to Holland on December 11 before Judge Wright ruled that
    afternoon that other women who may have had relationships while in
    President Clinton's employ were relevant to the Jones suit. However,
    the President was faxed a witness list on December 5 and actually
    reviewed it no later than the 8th. Thus, isn't the White House argument
    that the President had no incentive to assist Ms. Lewinsky's job search
    until December 11 just a red herring?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And I
    appreciate the opportunity to respond here.
        Just let me say, by way of preface, that we are lawyers. We
    are trying to do three things at once. Usually you have an
    opening statement where you outline where you want to go in a
    case, then you have a presentation of the evidence, then you
    have a closing argument. And we are trying to do it all at the
    same time.
        It is for that reason, as I said at the very beginning of
    my presentation, that you need to pay attention to the record
    and to the facts. That is what you depend upon. And I get
    carried away in my argument. I am arguing, just as they are
    arguing their theory of the case. We are both arguing a point
    of view here, and it is up to you to make the determination.
        I have great respect for these counselors. They are
    admirable. They are doing a great job for their client, and
    they are presenting their theory of the case. We are arguing
    our point of view, and it is the facts that make the
    determination.
        Let me go back to--and you have it in front of you--my
    presentation, exhibit C, which I guess is the third exhibit,
    which is really the White House exhibit that Mr. Ruff had up
    here for a number of days, because they were really trying to
    hammer home this statement that I made in my presentation. I
    hope you all have that.
        Mr. GRAMM. Just tell us.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I will tell it to you then. Thank
    you.
        Exhibit C--which I hope you have; we asked them to
    distribute that--is a statement that Mr. Ruff portrayed, from
    me, which in my presentation I said: ``The judge--the witness
    list came in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the
    President into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan
    into action.''
        There are two things that I am pointing to as the trigger
    mechanisms for the job search intensification. One of them is
    the witness list that comes in on December 5, that the
    President knows about, at the latest, on December 6. The other
    thing that intensified that effort was the judge's order on
    December 11.
        They went through this long circumstance of Mr. Jordan
    being in Holland and the time of the phone call with the judge
    and all of that, showing that the judge's order of December 11
    could not have triggered any action on the 11th. There is no
    question about that. That is obvious from the facts, as it was
    obvious when I made my presentation. The meetings on the 11th,
    with Vernon Jordan and Monica Lewinsky, were triggered by the
    witness list coming on the 5th, that the President knew about
    on the 6th, that he discussed with Vernon Jordan as well.
        We say that the judge's order of the 11th, which was filed
    that day--the only thing that was filed on the 12th was their
    memorandum of that telephone conversation--that triggered
    additional action down the road. The job search was not over;
    the activity continued into January. And, so, that all put
    pressure on the ultimate fact, in January when the job was
    obtained, the false affidavit was filed.
        Now let me just point to a couple of other things along
    that line. We need to look at this because they basically make
    the point that there is not any connection between the false
    affidavit--and that is my characterization--that was filed, and
    the job search. But if you look at the testimony of Vernon
    Jordan, and that is exhibit--I think they are giving them out
    now--F, that I am presenting to you, the sworn testimony of
    Vernon Jordan which was on March 3 of 1998, he testifies in
    answer to a question:

        Counselor, the lady comes to me with a subpoena in the Paula Jones
    case that I know, as I have testified here today was about sexual
    harassment. . . . you didn't have to be an Einstein to know that that
    was a question that had to be asked by me at that particular time
    because heretofore this discussion was about a job.

        And then he says, ``The subpoena changed the
    circumstances.'' And I think this is important, that Mr.
    Jordan, who is filled with common sense, says you don't have to
    be an Einstein. You don't have to be learned, like Mr. Ruff or
    any of the other White House counsel, to apply common sense.
    Common sense tells you that whenever he knew about the
    subpoena, it escalated to a new arena and obviously the witness
    list would have the same impact.
        And, so, Mr. Jordan himself makes the connection, the job
    search was one thing but whenever she became a witness in the
    Jones case, that changed everything. That changed the
    circumstances. Let me tell you, that is a friend of the
    President who is making that statement.
        We have to take this picture, that they were related as
    they were going two tracks, they became interconnected and
    became one track.
        The final point--and this was raised on the job search
    issue--that the call by Mr. Jordan to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of
    the parent company of Revlon, really had no impact on Monica
    Lewinsky getting a job because there is a misinterpretation as
    to how well she did on the interview. But if you look back to
    the testimony, the grand jury testimony, there was a
    connection, because Mr. Jordan calls Mr. Perelman and, as he
    characterized it: Make it happen if it can happen. Mr. Perelman
    then calls Mr. Durnan, and then Mr. Durnan calls Ms. Seidman,
    who was actually doing the interview the next day with Monica
    Lewinsky.
        So the person who was going to make the decision whether to
    hire Monica Lewinsky got the word down through the channel
    before that interview took place and before the decision was
    made. And of course the important thing is: What was the
    intent? Not the result, but the intent. I think you can see
    that there was an intent to make sure that Monica Lewinsky was
    taken care of. Again she was on board, part of the team, before
    she actually would have to give testimony or the President
    would have to give testimony.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Boxer, and it
    is to counsel for the President:

        In light of the concession of Manager Hutchinson that Judge
    Wright's order had no bearing on the ``intensity'' of the job search,
    can you comment on the balance of his claim on the previous question?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, can I object to
    the form of the question? That was not properly characterizing
    what I just stated.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Can the managers object to a question?
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I withdraw my objection.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Parliamentarian says they
    can only object to an answer, not to a question, which is kind
    of an unusual thing but----
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I was going to remark
    that they can if they have the courage.
        I want to link up my response to Manager Hutchinson's most
    recent comments with the previous discussion about vagueness.
    If there was ever a moving target, we have just seen it in
    motion: Well, it really wasn't December 11, because now we know
    it didn't happen on December 11, so let's go to December 19, or
    maybe January 8, and somewhere in there we are going to find
    the right answer.
        I suggest to you that is reflective of both the difficulty
    we have had in coming to grips with these charges and,
    candidly, the difficulty that the House might have had figuring
    out what those charges really were.
        Let me just respond briefly to Mr. Manager Hutchinson's
    argument. And let me focus, first, on another portion of his
    presentation in which he states, and there--and he is referring
    now to Ms. Lewinsky--she is referring to a December 6 meeting
    with the President in which, as you will recall, she has
    testified that there was a brief discussion about her efforts
    to get a job through Mr. Jordan and the President sort of
    vaguely said, ``Yes, I'll do something about that.'' This is
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson's characterization of that moment.
    December 6, you will recall, is the day after the witness list
    comes out and the day on which she learns of it:

        So you can see from that that it was not a high priority for the
    President either. It was, ``Sure, I'll get to that, I will do that.''
    But then the President's attitude suddenly changed. What started out as
    a favor for Betty Currie dramatically changed after Ms. Lewinsky became
    a witness and the judge's order was issued again on December 11.

        But to the extent the managers now seek to drag the
    intensification process back into the December 5 or 6 period,
    which is when Ms. Lewinsky went onto the witness list, you must
    look at what they say.
        Page 11, majority brief, Mr. Jordan met President Clinton
    the next day, December 7, but they didn't discuss the job at
    all. It is absolutely clear that the President knew that Ms.
    Lewinsky was on the witness list when he met with Mr. Jordan on
    December 7, and yet the issue of Monica Lewinsky didn't even
    surface.
        I am getting some help here.
        ``The first''--``the first,'' their words, page 11,
    majority brief, majority report--``The first activity
    calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually get a job took place
    on December 11. There was no urgency.''
        It is possible, of course, as their trial brief reflects,
    to bob and weave and dodge around the facts here, but their
    trial brief says:

        There was obviously--

        Referring to the period after she appears on the witness
    list--

        There was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky.

        And even they acknowledge that the December 7 meeting with
    Mr. Jordan was unrelated to Ms. Lewinsky.
        But let me point, because I think this really goes to the
    heart of it, to what the managers ask you to think about in
    this context in which now, whether we call it a confession or
    simply an acknowledgment, what they asked you to do when you
    heard the recitation about the December 11 events. We now know
    Mr. Jordan is flying over the Atlantic at the critical moment,
    and here is what Mr. Manager Hutchinson asks you to do with
    Vernon Jordan, distinguished citizen, distinguished lawyer:

        Now, if we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--which I hope to be
    able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his loyalties
    lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his eyes and determine
    the truthfulness of his statements. You must decide whether he is
    telling the truth or withholding information.

        There is only one message there: Vernon Jordan must have
    been lying or at least there is enough question about his
    credibility and his honesty and his decency to explore whether
    he was lying. If you predicate that question on the, shall we
    say, erroneous recitation of events on December 11, you need to
    know nothing more about what the time line and the chronology
    and the managers' theory of this case is all about.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Sessions,
    Gramm of Texas, Smith of New Hampshire, Inhofe, Allard, and
    Roberts. It is directed to the House managers:

        In defense of the President, Ms. Mills has repeatedly stated, and
    has just reiterated, that the crime of witness tampering requires some
    element of threat, intimidation or pressure. Isn't it true that section
    1512(b) criminalizes anyone who corruptly persuades or engages in
    misleading conduct with the intent to influence the testimony of any
    person in an official proceeding? Please explain.

        Mr. Manager BARR. Mr. Chief Justice, we appreciate the
    question from the Senators, since it bears on a number of
    different questions and a great deal of the evidence that you
    all have heard in this case.
        One can talk around the law, one can talk about the law,
    one can ignore the law and, as we have seen, one can break the
    law, but one has to deal with the law in court and in these
    proceedings. And that is why throughout these proceedings the
    Senators have heard us, as the House managers on behalf of the
    House of Representatives, and as the presenters of this case
    against the President, refer repeatedly and explicitly to the
    actual language of the statutes which form the basis for the
    articles of impeachment against President William Jefferson
    Clinton.
        Counsel Mills has, in fact, misrepresented the law of
    tampering with witnesses as set forth very explicitly in
    section 1512 of title 18 of the United States Code. In her
    arguments 2 days ago, Ms. Mills quite expressly stated that one
    of the elements that a prosecutor must charge and that must be
    found here, if, indeed, article II, which is obstruction of
    justice, should lie as the basis for a conviction thereon, one
    must find that tampering under 1512 requires threats or
    coercion. Nothing could be further from the truth.
        Now, if, in fact, Ms. Mills had stated to this body that
    one of the bases, one of several bases on which a prosecutor or
    we, as House managers, could, indeed, show this body that
    tampering with a witness would lie, includes, as an
    alternative, as an option, threats or coercion, she would have,
    instead of being misleading, been absolutely correct. That was
    not her position.
        Section 1512 of the United States Code expressly does not
    require threats of force, intimidation or coercion. It may be
    based on the person corruptly persuading another person or
    engaging in misleading conduct toward another person, both of
    which are terms, the definitions for which are not found in the
    ether, but are found, yet further reading, in title 18. Neither
    of them requires threats, intimidation or coercion.
        Moreover, in considering whether or not section 1512 or,
    indeed, its companion section, 1503, also obstruction of
    justice under the U.S. Criminal Code, which also does not
    require for a conviction to lie thereon threats of force,
    intimidation or coercion, but also may be and is based on
    corruptly influencing, those terms are expressly defined and
    dealt with not only in the definitional provisions of title 18,
    and including specifically definitions that apply to these
    provisions, these sections, but also in the case law.
        We respectfully direct the attention of the Senators in
    reviewing the law of obstruction of justice and the law of
    tampering with witnesses to some of the very cases cited by the
    attorneys for the President in their effort to deflect
    attention away from these particular provisions of the law as
    they apply to the conduct of the President.
        For example, in her presentation, Presidential Counsel
    Mills relied on the Supreme Court case of United States v.
    Aguilar in her statements. In that case, the Court held that a
    lie told to a criminal investigator was insufficient to prove
    witness tampering.
        What Ms. Mills failed to disclose, however, was that the
    Court's decision in that case, in that Aguilar case, was based
    on a specific finding not applicable to the facts of this case
    that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant
    could have even thought that the investigator was a potential
    witness at the time that he lied to him.
        The overwhelming body of evidence in this case, as we have
    heard yet this morning, most recently in response to questions,
    is that not only could the President, and the President did in
    fact reasonably presume, indeed almost invite, the lawyers in
    the Jones case to subpoena Ms. Currie as a witness, but we have
    found, contrary to the prior misleading statements of Counsel
    Ruff, she was, in fact, subpoenaed and called as a witness.
        Therefore, we believe that on both arguments raised by
    counsel for the President seeking to deflect attention away
    from and render inapplicable both obstruction provisions, 1503
    and 1512, because they, one, require--as we have shown they do
    not--but they would argue they require coercion, threats,
    intimidation or force or, two, they are inapplicable because
    the President could not have reasonably believed or did not
    know that Ms. Currie was a witness, could reasonably be
    expected to be a witness at the time the coercion took place.
        I yield for 1 minute to House Manager Graham.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I believe the House managers' time has
    expired.
        Mr. Manager BARR. I will not yield to House Manager Graham.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Byrd, to the President's
    counsel:

        Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist essay No. 65, states that ``The
    subjects of impeachment are ``those offenses which proceed from the
    misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or
    violation of some public trust.'' Putting aside the specific legal
    questions concerning perjury and obstruction of justice, how does the
    President defend against the charge that, by giving false and
    misleading statements under oath, such ``misconduct'' abused or
    violated ``some public trust''?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this, too, goes to the
    very heart of the deliberations in which you must engage at the
    end of these proceedings. As I have tried to make clear in my
    earlier arguments, it is not enough simply, I think, to ask
    does a particular generic form of misconduct, however serious
    it may be, lead inexorably to the conclusion that the President
    of the United States has committed an impeachable offense?
        As the framers made clear, and I think the history that lay
    behind their deliberations and the history that has followed
    make clear, when we speak of the kind of political--in caps,
    which is what it was in Federalist 65--offenses against the man
    in his public role, we speak of offenses which this body must
    ultimately judge as being so violative of his public
    responsibilities that our system cannot abide his continuing in
    office.
        Let us assume for a moment--and we will disagree with each
    and every element of the accusation--but let us assume for a
    moment that this body were to conclude that the President lied
    in the grand jury about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    That in and of itself does not lead to the judgment, and in our
    view must not lead to the judgment, that he needs to be removed
    from office. It must give you pause. You must think carefully
    about it.
        But ultimately you must ask, despite our rejection of any
    such conduct--whether it be a judge or a President or any other
    civil officer--have the framers instructed us to remove from
    his office, and overturn the will of the electorate, a
    President who, admittedly, if you conclude that he did violate
    the law in this regard, has violated a public trust in the
    broadest sense, as each of us does who serves the public, if we
    do anything other than that which are our properly assigned
    responsibilities, and do them with the utmost of integrity?
    Each of us violates that trust if we don't meet that standard.
        But the one thing we can be certain of is that the framers
    understood the frailties with which they were dealing. They
    understood the nature of the offense that had been the
    background of impeachment proceedings in England. And certainly
    the framers, in their debate, made it clear that it has to be
    at the highest level of public trust--the breach of the public
    trust that is embodied in the words ``treason,'' ``bribery,''
    ``selling your office'' and similar other high crimes and
    misdemeanors.
        And so all I ask the Senators in this regard is not to
    simply leap, as the managers would have you do it, from the
    definition of the offense or the statute governing their
    conduct, but to ask the constitutional question, as I know you
    will, the framers' question. If we have not convinced you on
    the facts, I hope we will convince you that the framers would
    have asked: Is our system so endangered that we must not only
    turn the President over to the same rule of law that any other
    citizen would be put under, after he leaves office, but must we
    cut short his term and overturn the will of the Nation? And in
    our view, in the worst case scenario, you can find the answer
    to that question must still be no.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Lott asks the House managers:

        Do the managers wish to respond to the answer just given by the
    President's counsel?

        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, we will briefly respond to the response just given by
    counsel for the President. We believe that the response and the
    position taken by the counsel for the President here really
    involves two great errors. One error is in establishing a
    standard of conduct for the Presidency that is too low. The
    other error is in attempting to minimize the significance of
    the offenses that this President has been charged with and
    which we submit to you the evidence supports the charges.
        Now, we do not submit that any President--this President,
    whoever it may be--should be impeached and removed from office
    for trivial or insubstantial offenses. We believe that an
    essential part of the focus of your inquiry must be on whether
    there was a serious, corrupt intent involved in the underlying
    conduct.
        A President should not be impeached and removed from office
    for a mistake of judgment. He should not be impeached and
    removed for a momentary lapse. Instead, he should be impeached
    and removed if he engages in a conscious and deliberate and
    settled choice to do wrong, a conscious and deliberate and
    settled choice to violate the laws of this land.
        We submit that he must be impeached and removed if he does
    that, because in doing so he has violated his oath of office
    and in doing so he has turned away from the unique role which
    he has under our Constitution, as the Chief Executive, charged
    with ensuring that the laws be faithfully executed. He steps
    aside from that role and takes on the role of one who attacks
    the rule of law. And it is for that reason that we believe this
    President should be removed. And we further submit the attempt
    to minimize the significance of the conduct of this President
    does a disservice to the laws of this land.
        The attempt to minimize this course of conduct, which
    started out as an effort to deprive a plaintiff in a civil
    rights case of her just day in court, is a serious course of
    conduct, a course of conduct which brings disrespect on the
    Office of the Presidency and, indeed, undermines the integrity
    of the Office of the Presidency, the integrity of the judicial
    system. And it is for all of those reasons that we submit to
    you the President's counsels' efforts to persuade you that this
    course of conduct is not impeachable are not persuasive and
    should not be accepted by the Senate in this case.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Torricelli and Rockefeller ask,
    to the President's counsel:

        The House managers have made the overly broad argument that
    ``[n]othing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution
    suggests officials are subject to impeachment only for official
    conduct.'' Can this unbending argument be reconciled with the following
    statement from Justice James Wilson: ``Our President . . . is amenable
    to [the laws] in his private character as a citizen, and in his public
    character by impeachment''--and with the standard adopted by a
    bipartisan majority in the Watergate proceedings?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I could
    probably simply say no, given the articulate framing of that
    question, and I would have said as much as needed to be said.
        I think the managers have, in their strawman-building role,
    tried to suggest that our position somehow is so distant from
    constitutional realities and the realities of the operations of
    our Government that we could not conceive of a situation in
    which private conduct, no matter how egregious, would lead to
    removal. Of course, that is not the case. None of us could
    contemplate a setting in which even personal conduct--and I
    need not go through any examples--was so egregious that the
    people simply could not contemplate the notion of a President
    remaining in office.
        But other than that, if there is one message that comes
    out, not only of Judge Wilson but of the entire debate of 1787
    and all of the commentary since then, it is that, indeed, the
    focus of attention must be--and this goes back to, in large
    measure to Senator Byrd's question--must be on the public
    character of the man; the political, in a broader sense,
    character of the man; and of his acts.
        And if you look back at the 1974 writings of the House
    Judiciary Committee, both majority and minority, this is not a
    partisan view. They make it absolutely clear that the House
    then believed something which they must either not believe
    today or have ignored as they engaged in their discussions,
    which is that the test to be applied is whether the President
    in this case has so abused the public trust, so abused the
    powers of his office, that he goes to the very heart of what
    the framers had in mind in 1787 when they carefully confined
    and carefully limited the range of activity that could lead to
    contemplation of removal, and that is not a range of activity
    that, with all due respect, touches anywhere near the conduct
    that you have before you today.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Nickles asks the House managers:

        President's counsel stated the President did not commit perjury.
    Please respond.

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I trust that the
    presumption of 5 minutes is a rebuttable one, correct? I will
    do my best not to have to go beyond the time. I thank the
    Senator for the question.
        First, just as a predicate, obviously in 5 minutes I could
    not do a comprehensive review on the perjury aspects of this
    case, so let me just start with a preliminary issue and we can
    move on with different questions and revisit the issue at
    another time. If anybody wants a lesson in legal schizophrenia,
    please read the President's trial brief on this very subject.
    They skirt the issue by saying nowhere in the President's grand
    jury deposition did he ever affirm the truth of his civil
    deposition testimony. But they won't come out and say he lied,
    they won't come out and say he perjured himself, and they try
    to ignore the actual fact of when the President was asked
    questions about his oath that he took during the grand jury.
        I read, therefrom:
        Question to the President:

        You understand the oath required you to give the whole truth that
    is a complete answer to each question, sir.
        Answer: I will answer each question as accurately and fully as I
    can.

        Question to the President:

        Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth, on January 17, 1998, in a deposition in the
    Paula Jones litigation, is that correct, sir?
        Answer: I did take an oath there.
        Question: Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the same to
    you then as it does today?
        Answer: I believed then that I had to answer the questions
    truthfully, that's correct.

        The colloquy goes on. It is in your materials.
        They attempt to say that that somehow inoculates the
    President from having to admit that he perjured himself during
    the Paula Jones deposition.
        But let's take a quick look at some of the answers he gave
    during the Paula Jones deposition that he affirmed in his grand
    jury testimony that we now know is false.
        Question to the President:

        If she [Monica Lewinsky] told someone she had a sexual affair with
    you beginning in November 1995, would that be a lie?
        Answer: It certainly would not be the truth.
        Question: I think I used the term ``sexual affair;'' and so the
    record is completely clear, have you ever had sexual relations with
    Monica Lewinsky as that term is defined in deposition exhibit No. 1?
        Answer: I have never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.
    I've never had an affair with her.

        Then they go on to ask:

        Is it true that when Monica Lewinsky worked at the White House, she
    met with you several times?
        Answer: I don't know about ``several times.'' There was a period
    when the Republican Congress shut the government down. The whole White
    House staff was being run by interns. She was assigned to work back in
    the Chief of Staff's Office. We were all working there. I saw her on
    two or three occasions then. And then when she worked at the White
    House I think there were one or two times when she brought some
    documents down to me.
        Question: At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky in the hallway
    between the oval office and the kitchen area?
        Answer: I don't believe so unless we were walking back to the
    dining room with pizzas. I just don't remember. I don't believe we were
    in the hallway, no.

        This colloquy goes on and on. I invite the Senate to review
    the President's deposition testimony.
        He clearly was giving answers that were false. They were
    not part of the record. He wasn't doing it to protect himself
    from embarrassment; he was doing it to defeat Paula Jones'
    sexual harassment case. When the President testified in August
    before the grand jury, he never denied the truth of those
    testimonies. He refused to admit he lied during the deposition.
    He reiterated the truth of those because he knew he would be
    subject to perjury.
        The question for the President's counsel is this, and it is
    a simple question: Did the President lie under oath on January
    17 when he was asked questions about the nature of his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky? Did he lie when the U.S.
    Supreme Court had said Paula Jones had a right to proceed in a
    sexual harassment case? Did he lie when Judge Susan Webber
    Wright ordered him to answer those basic questions under oath?
    And if the answer to that question is yes, then we have an
    incredible admission; if the answer is no, I invite them to
    point to the record where that is demonstrated.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. To the President's counsel from Senators
    Conrad and Torricelli:

        The House of Representatives rejected two proposed articles of
    impeachment, including an article of alleged perjury in the Jones
    deposition. Do you believe that the Senate may, consistent with its
    constitutional role, convict and remove the President based on the
    allegations under the rejected articles, including the allegations of
    perjury?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, article II was
    defeated. But more importantly, article I specifically
    incorporates by reference, or tries to incorporate by
    reference, all the elements of article II. And the House of
    Representatives, when they voted to reject article II, I think,
    voted also to eliminate these issues about which you have just
    heard.
        We predicted--and our prediction has come true--that the
    managers would like to argue this case. If you look at the
    majority point that comes out before the vote occurs on all
    four articles and you go to article I and try to find out where
    in article I they define those perjurious statements that
    compose subpart (2), the civil deposition, you will see in the
    majority report they say go look at article II--which is the
    argument about the civil deposition--and the House of
    Representatives specifically voted to take out all those
    accusations and allegations of misconduct with respect to the
    civil deposition.
        I have testified, as did Mr. Ruff, before the Judiciary
    Committee on this issue. I said that the President's responses
    in the Jones deposition were surely evasive, that they surely
    were incomplete, that they surely were intended to mislead; and
    it was wrong for him to do all that. But they were not
    perjurious.
        If you want to try a perjury case about all of the things
    and the statements that the House of Representatives did not
    want to accuse him of, that would be inconsistent, I think,
    with your duty as members of this court. You cannot impeach the
    President on the issues that are included in article II. He was
    not impeached; you cannot remove.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we have had an equal
    number of questions, although the timing may not be exactly
    equal.
        I ask unanimous consent that we take a 15-minute recess at
    this point.
        There being no objection, at 2:41 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 3:01 p.m.; whereupon the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready to
    resume the questions, and I believe this will be question No.
    16. We send the question to the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Santorum, Smith of Oregon, and Thomas to the House managers:

        Please respond to the presentation made by counsel to the
    President, including the argument made by Mr. Craig, to the effect that
    the rejection of article II had the effect of eliminating that portion
    of article I. Did the House conclude that lying in a civil deposition
    is not impeachable, but that lying to the grand jury about whether the
    witness lied in a civil deposition is impeachable?

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators
    for the question and for the opportunity to rebut the
    presentation a few minutes ago by counsel for the President,
    Mr. Craig.
        In his response he asks the Senate to do specifically what
    none of the attorneys can do in their presentations, and that
    is go beyond the record. Specifically, Mr. Craig is asking the
    Senate to make assumptions as to why the House of
    Representatives defeated what was then known as article II, a
    stand-alone article of impeachment that the President lied
    during the civil deposition. And he goes so far in his
    presentation to say because the House of Representatives
    defeated what was then article II, the Senate should not
    consider any of the language relating to the President's
    perjury during the civil deposition.
        First, I ask the Senate not to make those assumptions
    because if there was any reasonable inference to be drawn, it
    would be that it was cumulative. Why is it cumulative? Why did
    the House not want this to be a stand-alone article? It is
    cumulative because, if Mr. Craig would read article I, he would
    see that one of the allegations of perjury is that the
    President committed perjury in the grand jury when he
    referenced his civil deposition answers and reiterated those to
    the grand jury. And so the House made a decision not to use a
    separate stand-alone article. But I respectfully submit to this
    body that that is the only inference that can be drawn.
        The other thing I want to mention briefly about Mr. Craig's
    presentation on that issue is what I found to be a startling
    admission on his part. Assuming, of course, that the Senate is
    going to look at article I as it was drafted and passed by the
    House and is presented to you dealing with civil deposition
    perjury, Mr. Craig said that the President's testimony in the
    Jones case was evasive and incomplete.
        He goes even further in his testimony, or statement to the
    Senate a couple days ago, and I am quoting. He said, ``The
    President's testimony in the Jones case, the President was
    evasive, misleading, incomplete in his answers.''
        That begs the question. What kind of oath did the President
    take in the civil deposition? Did he take an oath, did he raise
    his hand and swear to tell the truth, the evasive truth, and
    nothing but the evasive truth? Did he take an oath to tell the
    truth, the misleading truth, and nothing but the misleading
    truth? Did he take an oath to tell the truth, the incomplete
    truth, and nothing but the incomplete truth? Because, if he
    did, if that was the language that the President used when he
    took his oath and testified, then perhaps Mr. Craig's position
    is well taken. But a brief review of the oath that the
    President took clearly states that he took an oath and was
    obliged under the law to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth--not the incomplete or misleading truth,
    the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
        And so this body has to make a determination when they
    review that testimony, both given during the civil deposition
    and reiterated during the grand jury, whether the President
    fulfilled his legal obligation in a sexual harassment lawsuit.
    And if he did, then clearly that should be stricken, and you
    should not consider that. But if he did not, if you find that
    in fact he testified, as Mr. Craig says he testified,
    incompletely, evasively, and misleadingly, then I believe this
    body has an obligation to cast a vote accordingly.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Reed of Rhode Island asks the
    White House counsel:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question.

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Manager Rogan asked you not to make assumptions about
    what the actions of the House mean, and then proceeded to make
    a series of assumptions about what the House might have meant.
        The problem with Mr. Manager Rogan's analysis is twofold:
    One, he and his colleagues in the House on the Judiciary
    Committee drafted these four articles. They believed, at least
    20 of the majority believed, that it should be an impeachable
    offense, as he now puts it: did the President fulfill his
    obligation in the Jones deposition? You don't need to make a
    lot of assumptions to understand merely on the face of the
    action that was taken that the full House said, no, it is not,
    even if we were to conclude, as the House Judiciary majority
    wishes us to conclude, an impeachable offense.
        And so the managers have had to find a way to drag back
    into article I all of the problems that they see in the
    President's testimony in the Jones deposition. The problem is
    that--and you can listen to it in the language that Mr. Manager
    Rogan has used not only today but earlier and that is used in
    the brief filed by the House managers--that the President, in
    his words, referenced and reiterated his testimony in the Jones
    case. Senators, that is not so.
        They try to hook onto a statement, as best we are able to
    tell in searching their position and their writings on the
    subject, the managers hook onto a statement in which the
    President said, I tried to walk through the minefield of the
    Jones deposition without violating the law and think I did.
    And, on that frail hook--which is clearly a statement of the
    President's state of mind about whether he succeeded or didn't
    succeed in testifying without violating the law in the Jones
    case--on that hook they hang every single item. They didn't
    tell us what they were--but they hang every single item that
    the House rejected out of hand in article II.
        Wholly apart from the inadequacy of the predicate that they
    lay, if there was ever an example of a situation that Mr. Craig
    talked about earlier and that I talked about on Tuesday, in
    which I challenge anybody in this room to tell me how you would
    have known coming into this Chamber what it was that the
    managers were alleging with respect to the Jones deposition,
    this is it.
        Look at the trial brief. If you look at Manager Rogan's
    presentation of the other day, if you listened to his
    presentation today, where, amongst all that, do we pick and
    choose to find the statements? Even if you agree with Mr.
    Manager Canady that it is all right just to sort of generally
    charge, as a constitutional proposition--and I firmly disagree
    with that. I don't care under what level you are operating--the
    lowest trial court in the country--nobody would ever say: Now,
    Mr. Defendant, I want you to understand that you are being
    charged with what you'll find at page, whatever it is, of the
    majority report where we refer you over to this list of other
    things that was rejected by--just let us say the grand jury--
    and somewhere in there you are going to find the charges to
    which we ask you to respond.
        The bottom line is, you can go down that list. Some of them
    you will never hear mentioned in this Chamber--haven't heard
    them mentioned yet. I defy anybody in this Chamber, including
    the managers, to justify asking the President of the United
    States to defend against a reference from one page of a brief
    to another in order to tell the charges of which he stands
    accused.
        If you read his grand jury testimony, you see he addressed
    a number of issues that he addressed in the Jones deposition.
    He clarified. He elaborated. He told the truth in the grand
    jury. Not once was he ever asked by the independent counsel and
    all his lawyers there who had been pursuing this investigation
    for 7 months when they had him in the grand jury--not once did
    they ask him this simple question: Is everything you testified
    to in the Jones deposition true? Or, go down the list and say:
    Is what you testified to on page 6, or page 8, or page 87 true?
        And when they got through with that deposition, 4 hours,
    professional prosecutors, and they went back and spent from
    August 18 to September 9, when they sent their referral up,
    looking back, using a fine-tooth comb on that transcript, and
    they went back and said--where are the violations? Even they
    don't say that there is some sort of wholesale importation of
    the Jones deposition into the grand jury. And, yet, not the
    House but the Judiciary Committee majority report and the
    managers, with that big, vacant, empty spot in the middle, the
    rejection of article II by the House of Representatives, would
    have you believe that, indeed, what the independent counsel's
    office didn't believe happened and didn't force to make happen,
    did happen. And they are asking you to remove the President
    from office on that kind of logic.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Shelby and Snowe
    to the House managers.

        There has been much debate regarding the nature of the offenses
    that fit within the definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    When employing this phrase in the Constitution, the framers relied on
    precedents supplied by Colonial and English common law to provide
    context and meaning. Please explain whether or not the offenses charged
    in the two Articles fit within the types of impeachable offenses
    contemplated by the framers as they interpreted Colonial and English
    common law precedent.

        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the
    Senate, I will be happy to respond to this question because it
    is a question that goes to the heart of the matter that is
    before us.
        On Saturday I made a presentation which focused on the
    history of the impeachment process in Great Britain and the way
    in which that serves as a backdrop for the work of the framers.
    I would like to refer you, again, to a document to which I made
    reference during the course of the proceedings on Saturday.
    This is a document which has also been referred to repeatedly
    by counsel for the President. It is the report prepared by the
    staff of the impeachment inquiry in the case of President Nixon
    entitled ``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential
    Impeachment.''
        I believe that in that report they grapple with the very
    issue that you have now raised. And in characterizing the
    background of impeachment and characterizing the things that
    the framers focused on both in the course of the Constitutional
    Convention and in the ratification debates and also--it goes a
    little beyond your question--the course of impeachment
    proceedings over the last 200 years in the House of
    Representatives and in the Senate, they came to this
    conclusion, and this is what they said. They said:

        The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--
    undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties
    and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental
    process, adverse impact on the system of government.

        They went on to say:

        Impeachment was evolved by Parliament to cope with both the
    inadequacy of criminal standards''--and one of the issues that they
    were concerned with was whether there had to be a criminal violation in
    order for there to be a high crime or misdemeanor, and they concluded,
    I believe rightly, that there need not be a criminal offense, but they
    said, ``Impeachment was evolved by Parliament to cope with both the
    inadequacy of criminal standards and the impotence of courts to deal
    with the conduct of great public figures.

        They concluded, then, by saying:

        Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation--
    which all of us in this Chamber concede--it is to be predicated only
    upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form
    and principles of our government or the proper performance of
    constitutional duties of the Presidential office.

        That is the standard which they set forth, which I believe
    encapsulates the whole history of the experience of the English
    Parliament, as well as the discussions in the Constitutional
    Convention and the ratification debates as well as anything I
    have seen.
        Let me point out that this was a product of the staff of
    the Rodino committee. This is not something that the House
    managers here today have come up with to support our case; it
    is there as part of the record.
        Let me refer to another part of that particular report,
    which I think gets to the essence of the matter here. They
    said, ``Each of the thirteen American impeachments''--of
    course, there have been more impeachments since the time this
    was written--``involved charges of misconduct incompatible with
    the official position of the officeholder. This conduct falls
    into three broad categories.''
        I think that this is a very sensible division of the types
    of conduct that may fall--the types of conduct that constitute
    high crimes and misdemeanors.

        (1) exceeding the constitutional bounds of the powers of the office
    in derogation of the powers of another branch of government; (2)
    behaving in a manner grossly incompatible with the proper function and
    purpose of the office; and (3) employing the power of the office for an
    improper purpose or for personal gain.

        I submit to you, in conclusion, that what we have before
    the Senate in this case is conduct that clearly falls within
    the scope of category 2, which I just read, which I will
    repeat--``behaving in a manner grossly incompatible with the
    proper function and purpose of the office''--for the very
    reasons I explained a few moments ago. When the President of
    the United States, who has taken an oath of office to support
    and defend the Constitution, who has a constitutional duty to
    take care that the laws be faithfully executed, engages in a
    calculated course of criminal conduct, he has, in the most
    direct, immediate, and culpable manner, violated his oath of
    office, breached his duty under the Constitution, and for that
    reason has behaved in a way that is grossly incompatible with
    the proper function and role of the high office to which he has
    been entrusted--which has been entrusted to him by the people
    of the United States.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Bingaman to
    White House counsel:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the Managers in their response to the previous question?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, let me make
    a couple of points, if I might. The question that was put to
    the managers started by asking what we can learn from looking
    back into English roots of impeachment and how that might bear
    on the decisions that you face in the coming days.
        I will not, in any sense, hold myself out as a scholar or
    at least enough of one to be able to answer the question with
    any specificity, but I do know enough about the parliamentary
    form of government and its experience with impeachment to know
    that a couple of lessons can be drawn from it.
        First, that impeachment was a developing tool over the
    course of the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th centuries as a weapon
    in the battle between the Parliament and the Crown. It was one
    of the ways--indeed, one of the very few ways--the Parliament
    could reach out and remove the King's ministers or the Queen's
    ministers, and that was really where the battleground was.
        Even in that setting, when it was an avowed political tool,
    history, I think, will tell us that Parliament did ask itself,
    Was the conduct of the minister at issue--whoever that minister
    might be--so subversive of the constitutional form of
    government that removal of the minister, or in some cases even
    more severe sanctions, was necessary?
        If you transport that into the experience of the framers,
    it does two things, I believe: One, it tells you what the
    framers knew of the seriousness of the offenses that had to be
    addressed through impeachment and what the need for impeachment
    was as the ultimate solution to the ultimate problem.
        But it also tells you very clearly that the framers did not
    want to bring that English experience in wholesale because they
    recognized it for what it was, which was, indeed, a weapon in
    the battle between the Parliament and the Crown, and the
    government that they had created needed balance among the
    legislature and the executive and the judicial branch. The use
    of impeachment, as it was reflected over the four or five
    centuries that had been developed, was not consistent with what
    these framers were creating. And so they very carefully chose,
    and the debates reflect that, to limit the scope of impeachment
    and to use it as they viewed it: only as a matter of
    constitutional last resort.
        In doing so, they foretold, I think, the positions staked
    out both by the majority and the minority at the time of
    Watergate. And let me pause here just for a moment to say that
    I will not go into detail respecting the conduct engaged in by
    former President Nixon, except to say and suggest to you that
    it is so far distant from anything that has been charged here
    that it doesn't belong in the same sentence, paragraph, or
    certainly article.
        But if you look at what came out of the House Judiciary
    Committee in 1974, I agree entirely with the theme of the
    majority staff report at the time, as did the minority. Their
    theme was the theme that I hope I have sounded, probably too
    often, over the last few days. And I am going to read to you
    again--I apologize to you--something I read to you earlier,
    which is the minority view on the meaning of impeachment:

        It is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that
    the framers of the United States Constitution intended that the
    President should be removable but by the legislative branch only for
    serious misconduct dangerous to the system of Government established by
    this Constitution. Absent the element of danger to the State, we
    believe the delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787--

        I will skip over a little language here--

    struck the balance in favor of stability in the executive branch.

        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Grassley, Smith of New
    Hampshire, Bunning and Craig ask the House managers:

        In your presentation, you made the case that the Senate should call
    witnesses. In light of the White House's response to this argument, do
    you still hold this position? Please elaborate.

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice and Senators, the
    House definitely holds to the position that we should call
    witnesses. But I think the issue here is what has been related
    to us in anything we have heard in the past few days by the
    White House counsel that would say we don't need them, or I
    think just the contrary, what have we heard that says we are
    more likely to need them, or you are more likely to need them.
    First of all, I would like to point out to you that the White
    House counsel is trying to have it both ways.
        They have been arguing to you on a lot of technicalities of
    the law, the criminal law, for the last few days, and that is
    understandable.
        As I said to you a few days ago, I think this is a two-
    stage process. We, the managers, do. You have to determine if
    the President committed crimes, and if he did, should he be
    removed from office: two separate questions. They have argued
    to you that you should use the standard, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, which is a criminal standard, and I might add that
    standard is only for facts, it is not for whether you remove;
    it isn't to determine law.
        You wear the hat as finders of fact as well as the judges,
    finders of the law, and so forth. But if you choose to use that
    standard, you need to know that it doesn't mean it excludes any
    doubt. You probably need to hear a jury instruction, which we
    can provide at some reasonable point for you, about how a
    Federal court would charge a jury about that.
        The point I am making is that they have claimed that, and
    they claim there is a lack of specificity in the charges. We
    are not in court in the sense of a real trial here. We don't
    have to be specific like that. The whole history of the
    articles of impeachment that have come over here in the past on
    judges have never gotten down into the technical specificity of
    a courtroom and been thrown out because they were not exactly
    right.
        My point is they have built up a whole case about we ought
    to follow these rules and have a criminal proceeding and judge
    the crimes on that basis, and yet they have said you wouldn't
    have witnesses or we shouldn't call witnesses.
        In any criminal trial, you are going to call witnesses; you
    need to judge their credibility. I want to walk through what
    else they have said to you in the last couple of days that
    makes that point very clear with regard to testimony, with
    regard to judging who you believe or who you don't believe and
    how important that is.
        First of all, let's just take a few glimpses, but as we do
    this, remember the big picture is the scheme the President has
    engaged in. The whole basis for our discussion today in each of
    these two articles of impeachment involves the questions of the
    President trying to thwart the Jones court will, trying to hide
    evidence from the court and planning not to tell the truth in
    that deposition in January. Whether that is over here on a
    perjury count or not is irrelevant. It is critical to this case
    for both obstruction of justice and perjury that you accept and
    understand, as I think clearly you do from listening to all of
    this, that the President lied many times in that deposition in
    the Jones case because he didn't want them to get the facts,
    the true facts of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
        In that process of looking at that, he needed Monica, if
    you recall, to file a false affidavit. He needed to obscure the
    fact that there were gifts there. He needed to obscure the
    trail that led to him in any detailed relationship with her.
        So let's take, for example, the gift-exchange discussion
    counsel had out here a couple of days ago with us. They were
    pointing out to you--the White House counsel--that on December
    28, that Monica Lewinsky, in her grand jury testimony,
    testified that the President said to her--with respect to what
    she should do about those gifts, and she raised giving them to
    maybe Betty Currie--I don't know or let me think about that.
        The counsel said, well, let's go back and look at 10
    different times where she said about that subject all kinds of
    different ways. I submit to you that her grand jury testimony,
    after she got the immunity to testify, is clearly the most
    credible. We presented that to you, and that is what the
    President said.
        It is significant what he said, because that is part of
    your chain you have to lead down the road to figure out whether
    or not he had the requisite intent to influence the outcome of
    what was done with the gifts.
        The reality of this is that when you look at it, you have
    to question her testimony; you have to question her
    believability. You ought to bring her out here. She should be
    brought out here, if they are going to challenge her like this,
    and give an opportunity for us to examine her on both sides and
    determine what is her best testimony about that, if that is
    important to you, and apparently it is to White House counsel.
        The same thing is true of the questions with regard to Ms.
    Currie and the phone call dealing with the question of coming
    over to get the gifts. There White House counsel is saying, in
    essence, Ms. Lewinsky is not telling the truth; Ms. Currie is.
    If you don't have them here to listen to, who are you going to
    believe? I suspect if Ms. Lewinsky came out here, that 1-minute
    phone conversation, which was not part of the Starr referral--
    we discovered that subsequent to that--would be something she
    could comment on and explain, and maybe Ms. Currie could, too.
    But we do not have that. And they made a big to-do over that in
    the last couple days.
        Last, but not least, what I put up on the chart here is
    dealing with this affidavit. This affidavit is very important.
    It is a central part of the obstruction of justice. It is the
    very first obstruction of justice and the question of
    truthfulness. And who you believe in this pattern is very, very
    important.
        The White House counsel have been arguing the last few days
    that, indeed, with regard to the cover stories, that there was
    no discussion of cover stories in a timely way during the
    December 17 phone conversation when the President suggested
    Monica Lewinsky file an affidavit, and that the cover story
    idea somehow isn't tied into the issue of putting into her head
    that she should tell a lie.
        I call your attention to what I read to you the other day.
    It is up here on this board. And I refer it back to you on the
    chart. This is one of the charts where she testified before the
    grand jury--Monica Lewinsky did:

        At some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it was
    before or after the subject of the affidavit came up--

        I don't know if it was before or after, but it was during
    that conversation on December 17 when the affidavit did come
    up--

        he sort of said, ``You know, you can always say you were coming to
    see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' Which I understood
    was really a reminder of things that we had discussed before.

        And she went on to say the famous quote: ``And I knew
    exactly what he meant [by this].''
        And if you remember--I read that to you the other day--she
    also said: ``It was the pattern of the relationship, to sort of
    conceal it.''
        I am not going to put the other board up here, but in the
    same context they have been saying, with respect to this
    affidavit issue again, ``No one asked me to lie.'' Remember
    that was repeated over and over and over again. And I, again,
    point out to you that you need to bring her in here, I think,
    based on what they are saying and arguing, to find out for
    yourself if she is going to corroborate this.
        She said in the grand jury testimony:

        For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened was, you
    know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me
    either.

        And she went on to say: ``And by him not calling me and
    saying that''--that she shouldn't lie; I didn't read the whole
    paragraph--``I knew what [he] meant.''
        ``Did you understand all along that he would deny the
    relationship also?''
        She says: ``Mm-hmmm. Yes.''
        The question: ``And when you say you understood what it
    meant when he didn't say, `Oh, you know, you must tell the
    truth,' what did you understand that to mean?''
        She says: ``That--that--as we had on every other occasion
    and every other instance of this relationship, we would deny
    it.''
        If you believe her, then the President is not telling the
    truth. The affidavit clearly is something he was trying to get
    her to file falsely. It makes sense that he would, because he
    relied on it in the deposition. He patterned it after the cover
    stories in the affidavit--what he had to say--the lies he told
    about the relationship. It makes common sense to me.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. McCollum, I think you have answered
    the question.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you very much.
        My point is, you ought to bring the witnesses.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question from Senator Bryan to the
    White House counsel:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question,
    focusing on the need for witnesses and the time likely required to
    prepare for and conduct discovery?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, the first question
    to ask about the need to call witnesses is, What would the
    witnesses add? That has not been described. What you have heard
    are vague expressions of credibility and hope. You have not
    heard specifically what these witnesses would add. And the
    answer to that is, they would add nothing to what is not
    already there.
        Yesterday, I held up the five volumes of testimony,
    thousands and thousands of pages. You have it before you. Now,
    those five volumes represent 8 or 9 months of activity by the
    independent counsel. The independent counsel called many, many,
    many witnesses, many, many, many times. They proceeded with no
    limitation on their budget, on their resources. They turned
    things upside down. And they repeatedly--I think abusively--but
    they repeatedly called witnesses--like Ms. Currie, Mr. Jordan,
    Ms. Lewinsky--back to the grand jury for repeated interviews.
    It is all right there. And the managers have really told you
    nothing that could be added to this record.
        Second, they have not made a representation about what the
    witnesses would really say that is different. And the reason
    they have not is that they themselves don't know. They
    themselves have done no investigation. They don't know what
    these witnesses would say. They are hoping that maybe something
    will turn up.
        What they have done is they have taken those five volumes,
    and more, from the independent counsel. And I am reminded of
    the old bureau that many newspapers had called ``Rewrite.''
    That was not a bureau which did independent reporting. When an
    editor read something that was incomprehensible, he or she
    would say, ``Get me Rewrite.'' So what the House has done is
    gotten ``Rewrite'' to write up its own report. They cannot tell
    you--they can tell you what they hope--they cannot make a
    representation or a proffer to you about what any witnesses
    would say.
        Their third, and really their only argument, is the
    credibility argument--got to see these witnesses. In point of
    fact, in the real world, when you have witnesses, their stories
    often differ in some ways. They differ not because anybody is
    lying; they differ only because people don't always have
    precisely the same recollection of things. That doesn't mean
    that looking at them will add anything other than getting for
    you the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th account of what some witnesses
    said.
        For example, in our trial brief, we quote--and Mr. McCollum
    referred to this--at pages 66 to 67, 11 accounts that Ms.
    Lewinsky has given on the gift exchange. I do not think you are
    going to learn anything from a 12th account. And by the way,
    with respect to the question of she might have testified
    differently after she got immunity, 9 out of 11 of these
    accounts were given, as you will see from the dates and the
    testimony, after she got immunity. Calling witnesses will add
    nothing to the record now before you. All the major witnesses
    have testified, and their testimony is right there.
        In response to the question of how long it will take, I
    must tell you, we have never had a chance to call witnesses
    ourselves, to examine them, to cross-examine them, to subpoena
    documentary evidence--at no point in this process. It would be
    malpractice for any lawyer to try even a small civil case, let
    alone represent the President of the United States when the
    issue is his removal from office, without an adequate
    opportunity for discovery.
        I think if they are going to begin calling witnesses, and
    going outside the record, which we have right now--I think the
    record is complete; and we are dealing with it as best we can
    without having had an ability ourselves to subpoena people and
    cross-examine them and depose them--but I think you are looking
    realistically at a process of many months to have a fair
    discovery process.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Chafee. It
    is to the House managers:

        The White House defense team makes a lot out of Monica Lewinsky's
    statement that she delivered the presents to Betty Currie around 2:00
    or 2:30 and about the fact that the phone call came from Betty Currie
    at 3:32. Isn't it reasonable to assume that Ms. Currie meant that she
    delivered the presents to Ms. Currie in the afternoon?
        If the President was unconcerned about the presents, as he said in
    his grand jury testimony, why didn't he simply tell Ms. Lewinsky not to
    worry about it?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Let me just broadly review the whole gift issue and the
    discrepancy in the testimony.
        First of all, I want to go back to Mr. Ruff's presentation
    during the last 3 days.
        He argued that I unfairly characterized Betty Currie as
    having a fuzzy memory whenever she was unclear. And she was
    clear that it was her memory that Monica Lewinsky called to
    initiate the retrieval of the gifts. And, of course, that is in
    conflict with the testimony of Monica Lewinsky.
        Further, they argue that Monica Lewinsky's time sequence as
    to when she went to pick up the gifts, when Betty Currie went
    to pick up the gifts, destroys her credibility. Her time
    sequence does not fit. Let's look at her testimony on this
    particular point. This is what Betty Currie has testified to,
    and this is exhibit H-A in your folder on my presentation;
    exhibit A. These are statements of Betty Currie in her
    deposition testimony about when she picked up the gifts.
        The first one is her testimony on January 27, 1998. She was
    asked when she picked up the gifts, and she said, ``Sometime in
    the last 6 months;''
        In May she was asked when she picked up the gifts, and she
    said, ``A couple of weeks'' [after the December 28 meeting]; in
    the May 6 testimony, it was after the 28th meeting; and then in
    her last testimony, July 22, in the ``fall maybe.''
        That is Betty Currie's testimony. Contrast that to that of
    Monica Lewinsky.
        This is her recollection as to when Betty Currie came to
    pick up the gifts. You will see that she has testified in her
    proffer of February 1, ``Later that afternoon''; July 27, she
    said Currie called ``several hours after leaving the White
    House;'' ``about 2 o'clock''; ``Later in the day''; and August
    6, called ``several hours'' after Lewinsky left the White
    House. Her memory is fairly good about this.
        The question is, the cell phone call, which really
    corroborates what Monica Lewinsky said, that it was Betty
    Currie who called to retrieve the gifts, and said the President
    said, ``You have something for me,'' or something to that
    effect. That came about 3:30. The cell phone record was
    retrieved after Monica Lewinsky's testimony.
        Does this destroy her credibility, particularly in contrast
    to that of Betty Currie? I think it reflects that you are
    trying to remember--you remember that it was a call
    specifically from Betty Currie to retrieve the gifts. At the
    time, she said it was in the afternoon. I think it corroborates
    her because she has never had an opportunity to look at the
    cell phone record--neither has Betty Currie--to refresh her
    recollection and trigger it and see what that produces.
        That is on the gift issue.
        They say, What would it add to call witnesses? How are you
    going to determine the truthfulness of this issue? Juries
    across the country do it by calling witnesses.
        In this particular case, it should be noted that all other
    testimony of Betty Currie--I think her last one was about July
    27 before the grand jury--all of it preceded the testimony of
    William Jefferson Clinton which was in August before the grand
    jury. The point is, because of the rush, the push, the
    independent counsel didn't call anybody back to the grand jury
    to re-question them after the information received from William
    Jefferson Clinton.
        So there are a lot of unanswered questions, perhaps, that
    were generated by his testimony. The 1-minute call was raised:
    How in the world could this be expressed in 1 minute--the
    conversation that Betty Currie called to retrieve the gifts? If
    you look at Monica Lewinsky's description of that call--excuse
    me, let me read from her grand jury transcript. She was asked
    about the call, and her answer was:

        What I was reminded a little bit, jumping back to the July 14th
    incident where I was supposed to call back Betty the next day, but not
    getting into the details with her that this was along the same lines:

        Question to Monica Lewinsky:

        Did you feel any need to explain to her what was going to happen?

        Her answer:

        No.

        In other words, this was a cell phone call. It was a
    cryptic call. It was about retrieving gifts that were under
    subpoena. It was a short conversation. It doesn't take a minute
    to say, ``The President indicated you had something for me''--
    Monica knows what she is talking about--``Come over,'' and that
    is the end of the conversation--certainly it would not take 1
    minute.
        So all of the evidence is consistent with Monica's
    testimony.
        But let's look at the big picture on the gifts. The
    evidence was concealed under the bed. It was evidence that was
    concealed in a civil rights case; secondly, it was under
    subpoena; thirdly, the President knew it was under subpoena;
    and fourthly, Monica Lewinsky's testimony indicates that it
    was, the call from Betty Currie, at the direction of the
    President--and I am arguing there, a little; please understand
    that--which initiated the retrieval of the evidence that was
    under subpoena.
        That is the big picture on this. I believe we have made our
    case on that, and I believe it is strong, and I think it also
    justifies the hearing of the testimony to resolve the remaining
    conflict.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is to the President's counsel from
    Senators Leahy, Schumer, and Wyden:

        Notwithstanding the previous response by the House manager, does
    not the evidence show:
        (a) Ms. Lewinsky's testimony; it was her idea to give the gifts to
    Betty Currie?
        (b) the President's testimony; that he never told Betty Currie to
    retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky?
        (c) Betty Currie's testimony; that it was Ms. Lewinsky, not the
    President, who asked her to pick up the gifts? And,
        (d) the fact that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts
    on the very morning that he is alleged to have asked for them back?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I am not sure I
    managed to capture all four subpoints of that question but I
    will do my best.
        It is interesting that the managers now suggest that the
    great discovery of the 3:32 phone call that was so much the
    heart and soul of Mr. Schippers' presentation and ultimately of
    theirs is really just a slight glitch in the timetable.
        Yes, it is perfectly possible, I suppose, that Ms. Lewinsky
    could have just missed by an hour and a half, but she did say,
    three times, once under oath, and twice to the FBI, which is
    almost the same, that it was 2 o'clock, not 3:30.
        So if you are going to ask, consistency, good memory, as
    Ms. Lewinsky is supposed to have on this matter, she was
    consistent, but you have to ask, if it really happened at 2
    o'clock as she recalled, what is the meaning of the 3:32 call?
        Putting aside that dispute, the question itself reflects
    the essence of our position on this. First of all, there are
    only two people present at the moment in which, theoretically,
    the managers would have that the President urged Betty Currie
    to go off and pick up the gifts. The President of the United
    States and Betty Currie, they both testified, flatly, that such
    a conversation did not occur. Do the managers really anticipate
    if Ms. Currie were brought into the well of the Senate and
    looked straight in the eye by one of the prosecutors on this
    team, she would say, ``You got me, I had it wrong. The
    President really did tell me to do something but I have
    testified straightforwardly and honestly''?
        He didn't say, as my colleague Mr. Kendall indicated--that
    is wish and hope, and it has no basis in the allegation.
        And, of course, the managers have thought up a good excuse
    for why it is that the President is giving Ms. Lewinsky more
    gifts on the very day when he is conspiring with her to hide
    them: That somehow it is a gesture, a message being sent, that
    because of these gifts she is someone who is being roped into a
    conspiracy of silence.
        Aside from the fact that there is not one single--not one
    single--iota of evidence to support that wishful thinking, is
    it really likely, even given the managers' perception of this
    matter, that by giving Ms. Lewinsky the bear that my brief but
    important colleague Senator Bumpers referred to yesterday, and
    a pin of the New York skyline, and a couple of other things,
    including a Radio City Music Hall scarf--I may have missed
    some--that some great message was being sent to Ms. Lewinsky,
    that this collection of ``valuable'' items was a message to
    keep the faith, stay inside a conspiracy? I don't think so.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire about the time
    that has been used on each side?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I will ask the Parliamentarian.
        The counsel for the White House has consumed 57 minutes.
    The counsel for the managers have consumed 54 minutes.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe we have a question at the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers, proposed by Senators Snowe, Ashcroft, Enzi, Burns,
    Smith of New Hampshire, and Craig:

        At the end of the Jones deposition, Judge Wright admonished the
    parties that, ``This case is subject to a protective order regarding
    all discovery, and all parties present, including the witness, are not
    to say anything whatsoever about the questions they were asked, the
    substance of the deposition . . . any details, and this is extremely
    important to this court.'' Within hours of Judge Wright's admonition to
    all parties not to discuss details of the deposition, didn't the
    President telephone Betty Currie to ask her to make a rare Sunday visit
    to the Oval Office?

        Before answering, the Chair wishes to make a correction in
    response to the inquiry from the majority leader. The time used
    by the House managers is 64 minutes, rather than 54 minutes.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. I trust that doesn't mean I have to sit
    down, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. It is not retroactive.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Maybe I should quit while I am ahead.
        I thank the Senators for their question. That is absolutely
    true, and we know that because Betty Currie testified to that.
    She said it was very rare to receive a phone call from the
    President to ask her to come down to the White House on Sunday.
    A day after the President testified in a deposition, when he
    was specifically admonished by the judge that he was not to
    discuss the deposition, he was not to detail it with anybody,
    he was not to go into any of those factors, the President
    called Betty Currie down to the White House and he made some
    specific statements to her. He said to her:

        I was never really alone with Monica, right?
        You were always there when Monica was there, right?
        Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?
        She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

        When the President was asked 8 months later:

        Why did you call Betty Currie down to the White House and pose not
    questions, but statements to her?

        When he was asked why he called Betty Currie down to the
    White House and said that to her, this is how the President
    responded:

        I was trying to figure out what the facts were. I was trying to
    remember.

        That is patently false because in August when the President
    testified, embarrassment was no longer on the table. The
    President was admitting that he had, as he called it, an
    improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. So why did he call
    Betty Currie down there? He called her down there that day
    after the deposition, in violation of the judge's order,
    because throughout his deposition he kept referring to Betty
    Currie as the fountain of information. If you read the
    deposition testimony, you see the President reiterating over
    and over, ``Monica came to see Betty,'' and, ``You would have
    to ask Betty.'' He made innumerable references to Betty Currie.
        That was his invitation to the Jones lawyers to depose
    Betty Currie, and we know from Mr. Manager Hutchinson's
    presentation earlier that that is what happened. Betty Currie
    ended up with a subpoena from the Jones lawyers, and the
    President could not waste any time; he had to make sure, with
    discovery closing, that he got to Betty Currie right away, to
    make sure that the story was straight.
        How can one possibly say that he was posing the statements
    to Betty Currie to remember, when the President knew that in
    fact he was alone with Monica, that Betty wasn't always there
    with him when Monica was in the Oval Office with him? She would
    not be able to tell him that Monica came on to him and not the
    other way around. This is patently ludicrous. There is no
    reasonable explanation.
        Mr. Chief Justice, if I have a minute left, I would like to
    yield to Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you. Just a quick point on
    that, because there was a question raised that the testimony of
    Betty Currie in that circumstance was that she, I believe, did
    not feel pressured. The President's counsel makes a big issue
    of that, as if this is a fatal defect. It is not a fatal
    defect.
        In fact, it is really irrelevant because the issue is
    witness tampering, obstruction of justice. The question is the
    President's intent, not how Betty Currie felt under that
    circumstance. She can characterize what she wishes. To me, it
    is an example like, if you as a lawmaker are presented a bribe
    of $100,000 to cast your vote in a particular way, you might
    not be tempted in the slightest. You might say, ``Go your own
    way.'' But it is still attempted bribery, attempted obstruction
    of justice. So that is a critical question. This is one element
    of obstruction of justice where each element has been met. The
    proof is clear, without any question of a doubt, as well as the
    rest of it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to White House
    counsel from Senator Kennedy:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual assertions
    made by the managers in their response to the previous question?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Let me
    start by actually responding briefly to the question that was
    asked, which is whether in fact the President violated the gag
    order. I think it is important that we be very direct and
    candid on this so the record is clear.
        There is no question that a gag order was issued, that it
    had been in existence for some 3 months, and it applied to the
    parties and lawyers. It is important, I think, to understand
    the purpose for which it was entered.
        During the months of litigation in the Jones case, we have
    seen a veritable flood of leakage out of the deposition, all of
    which was adverse to the President. The judge made very clear
    that her concerns were revelations to the press.
        I think it is fair to say that even if one might argue that
    the President talking to his secretary on the day after a
    deposition was somehow talking to a person that he should not
    after his deposition, I suggest that any person covered by--
    certainly a party covered by a gag order, particularly the
    President of the United States, is free to speak with those
    from whom he needs assistance in the preparation of his
    defense. That, of course, is at least in part what the
    President has said here.
        But let me be very clear that, to the extent the President
    overstepped his bounds in terms of this gag order, that is a
    matter of concern that the judge could take up, or the parties
    could take up. And as far as I know--probably because their
    sense of shame would not permit it--the parties on the other
    side of the Jones case have never suggested that this was a
    problem. Indeed, it was not a problem until we heard about it
    recently in this Chamber.
        More specifically, with respect to the substance of Mr.
    Manager Rogan's response, and Manager Hutchinson's response, my
    colleague, Ms. Mills, told you what the essential human dynamic
    was that was going on with the President, who had just gone
    through a deposition in which his worst fears were being
    realized--his life, in terms of his relations with his family,
    was beginning to unravel. He could see it coming. He could see
    the press coming at him. They were already on the Internet.
    There was no question in his mind that his worst fears of
    public disclosure were about to be realized.
        Put yourselves in a comparably traumatic human situation
    and ask whether you wouldn't reach out to have this kind of
    conversation with the one person you knew who was the most
    familiar with the facts that Monica Lewinsky had, indeed, been
    in and out of the White House, exchanged gifts, and done all
    the other things that Betty knew about, even though she didn't
    know about the primary extent of their relationship. But ask
    yourself also whether, in fact, under any circumstances, either
    on the 18th of January when the first conversation occurred, or
    on the 20th of January when we believe the second conversation
    occurred, if there is really any reason to believe that the
    President had somehow invited Jones lawyers to make Betty
    Currie a witness, because, as my colleague, Ms. Mills, put it
    most sharply and most clearly, the last thing in the world the
    President of the United States wanted to do was to invite
    anybody to depose or have testify the one woman who knew that,
    indeed, there had been gifts exchanged, and visits, and
    letters. It simply doesn't make sense.
        Lastly, let me, I suppose, just ask as the question has
    been put to you on a couple of occasions, what is it that would
    come from calling witnesses in the case? Ms. Currie has
    testified not just once, but a multiple of occasions about the
    events, no new facts had come out, and the only thing that you
    would hear would be a repetition of the bottom-line assessment.
    I could have said wrong when he said right and I was under no
    pressure whatsoever.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Gramm of Texas and
    Smith of New Hampshire to White House counsel:

        If you said that our oath to impartial justice required us
    to allow the President to have a handful of witnesses to defend
    himself, don't you believe that all 100 Senators would say
    ``yes''? How can we do impartial justice by turning around and
    denying the House that same right?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Senators, the answer to that question, I think, is really
    very straightforward and easy and the fog of some of the
    discussion which has been had on the subject over the last days
    and weeks ought not to get in the way of this.
        The House of Representatives, at least as they are
    described by the managers they sent to you--I don't know how to
    put this gently--violated their constitutional responsibility
    in the handling of this matter. They characterized themselves
    as nothing more than a grand jury, nothing more than a
    screening device between the allegations transported to them by
    the independent counsel, and the ultimate vote a month and 3
    days ago. They felt, as they have reiterated constantly during
    that process, that they knew everything they needed to know not
    to make the judgment; that it was worth sending on to the
    Senate for them to think about. But they knew everything they
    needed to know, as you heard them say so eloquently and so
    forcefully here, to remove the President of the United States
    from office. Now they are saying to you, ``Well, maybe not.
    There really isn't enough here to make that important critical
    judgment.''
        So having abandoned--not to put it too sharply--what I view
    and I think most would view as their obligation to do the right
    constitutional thing a month ago, they turn to us and say,
    ``Well, protect our managers rights to just add a little bit
    and see if we can make it, and then we will turn to you and see
    if you want to call witnesses in response.''
        Senators, I really think they should have done it right the
    first time. And they have told you--not back then, but they
    have told you now--that they have done it right, because
    otherwise they wouldn't, as a matter of their responsibility,
    be able to stand in the well of this Senate and urge you to
    remove the President of the United States. How could they make
    that recommendation if they had any uncertainty? If they didn't
    believe what was in those five volumes was sufficient under the
    day, they couldn't. They couldn't.
        Our rights are these for the President of the United
    States: He is entitled to ask you whether, when the House of
    Representatives voted to impeach him, they had enough evidence
    to make one of the most serious constitutional judgments that
    is entrusted to them. And it can't be that because they didn't
    do it right then, that you and we are now asked to extend this
    process just so that maybe if they go to the right person and
    ask the right question, or find the right document something
    will emerge that translates those five volumes into something
    that really is a constitutional basis for the removal of the
    President.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Feingold to the
    House managers.

        In light of the allegations in the articles of impeachment
    that the President is guilty of providing ``perjurious''
    statements to a grand jury and has ``obstructed . . . the
    administration of justice,'' is the appropriate burden of proof
    for these particular articles ``beyond the reasonable doubt,''
    as it would be in an ordinary criminal proceeding? Should a
    Senator vote to convict the President based on his allegedly
    committing these Federal statutory crimes if each of the
    elements of the crimes have not been proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt?

        Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. And I say
    to Mr. Ruff, I violated no oath nor the Constitution, and I
    think the House managers, in fact, followed the Constitution
    when we served the articles of impeachment. I also note, for
    historical note as well, Mr. Ruff, you know that in the
    impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the House didn't even hold
    a single hearing.
        So I just want to be very up front and fair here.
        With regard to the question that was asked by the
    gentleman, the Constitution does not discuss the standard of
    proof for impeachment trials. It simply states that the Senate
    shall have the power to try all impeachments. Because the
    Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to look
    at past practice of the Senate.
        Historically, the Senate has never set a standard of proof
    for impeachment trials. In the final analysis to the question,
    one which historically has been answered by individual Senators
    guided by your individual conscience. You will note that
    earlier one of the White House counsel stood up--and they like
    to talk to you about criminal statutes and cite that it
    requires the proof beyond a reasonable doubt. That is not so.
    This argument has been rejected by the Senate historically.
        For instance, in the impeachment trial of Judge Harry
    Claiborne, at that time the counsel for Judge Claiborne moved
    to designate beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard of proof
    for conviction. The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion
    by a vote of 17 to 75. You rejected that as a standard of
    proof.
        In the floor debate on the motion, the House managers
    emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each Member
    to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. And during
    the impeachment of Judge Hastings, Senator Rudman, in response
    to a question about the historical practice regarding this
    standard of proof that there has been no specific standard,
    ``You are not going to find it. It is what is in the mind of
    every Senator, and I think it is what everybody decides for
    themselves.''
        The criminal standard of proof again is inappropriate for
    impeachment trials. The result of conviction in an impeachment
    trial is removal from office, not punishment. As the House
    argued in the trial of Judge Claiborne, the reasonable doubt
    standard was designed to protect criminal defendants who risked
    forfeitures of life, liberty, and property. This standard is
    inappropriate here because the Constitution limits the
    consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from
    office and disqualification from holding office in the future,
    explicitly preserving in the Constitution the option for a
    subsequent trial in the courts.
        In addition, the House argued in the Claiborne trial the
    criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by
    its nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more
    heavily than the interest of the individual. Again, the
    criminal standard of proof, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt, is
    inappropriate in an impeachment trial and, Senators, you are to
    be guided by your own conscience in your decision.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The President's counsel are asked by
    Senators Thompson, Snowe, Enzi, Frist, Craig, DeWine, and
    Hatch:

        Four days after the President's Paula Jones testimony,
    wherein he testified under oath about Ms. Lewinsky, why would
    Dick Morris conduct a poll on whether the American people would
    forgive the President for committing perjury and obstruction of
    justice?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I couldn't find any volunteers.
        [Laughter.]
        You know, I think the honest answer has two pieces to it. I
    don't have a clue, and it ultimately--although I know it rings
    all sorts of bells and the use of that name conjures up all
    sorts of images, and that is why I am sure it finds its way
    into this process from the managers' side. But if you look at
    the record, other than the value that may come to the managers
    of making reference to that conversation--and I have no idea
    whether the conversation ever occurred or not--it seems to me
    of absolutely no relevance whatsoever because, as far as I am
    able to represent to you, and if the conversation occurred,
    there is nothing in this record that suggests that it had any
    impact on the conduct of the President or any other person. We
    know that he did wrong. We know that he misled the American
    people when he said that he had not had relations with Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        I am not sure what a conversation with Mr. Morris, if it
    occurred, or a poll, if it was asked for, or what the
    motivation behind that poll means once you come to grips with
    the fact that the President of the United States was deceiving
    his family, his child, his wife, his colleagues, and the
    American people in that period in January.
        Beyond that puzzlement about relevance, other than the
    surmise that there must be some dark linkage between the poll
    and some legal issue before you--and I haven't seen it--I am
    really otherwise unable to answer your question.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Lieberman asks the House
    managers:

        The House managers argue that the President should be
    removed from office because of the inconsistency between his
    actions and the President's duty to faithfully execute the
    laws. Given that any criminal act would arguably be at odds
    with the President's duty to execute the law, is it your
    position that the President may be impeached and removed for
    committing any criminal act, regardless of the type of crime it
    is? If the President were convicted of driving while
    intoxicated, would that be grounds for removal? What if he were
    convicted of assault?

        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Excellent
    question.
        The answer is no, I would not want my President removed for
    any criminal wrongdoing. I would want my President removed only
    when there was a clear case that points to the right decision
    for the future of the country. Just remember this. Our past is
    America's future in terms of the law. I would not want my
    President removed for trivial offenses, and that is the heart
    of the matter here.
        I think I know why he took a poll. I think I know very well
    what he was up to: That his political and legal interests were
    so paramount in his mind, the law be damned and anybody who got
    in his way be damned.
        Those are strong statements, but I think they are borne out
    by the facts in this case, and that is what I would look for. I
    would look for a violation of the law that is the dark side of
    politics. I would look for something like Richard Nixon did.
    Richard Nixon lost faith with the American electoral process.
    He believed his enemies justified being cheated; that when his
    people broke into the other side's office, when confronted with
    that wrongdoing, he legitimized it. He didn't trust the
    American people to get it right, and he went out in shame.
        My belief is that this President did not trust the American
    legal system to vindicate his interest without cheating. My
    belief is that when he went back to his secretary, it is not
    reasonable that he was trying to refresh his memory and get his
    thoughts together. My belief is that he tried to set up a
    scenario that was going to make a young lady pay a price if she
    ever decided to cooperate with the other side. I believe he did
    not need to refresh his memory whether or not Monica Lewinsky
    wanted to have sex with him and he couldn't. I don't believe he
    was refreshing his memory when he asked his secretary: I never
    touched her, did I?
        I believe that you should only remove a President who, in a
    calculated fashion, puts the legal and political interests of
    himself over the good of the Nation in a selfish way, that you
    only should remove a President who, after being begged by
    everybody in the country, don't go into a grand jury and lie,
    and he in fact lied. Nothing trivial should remove my
    President. We need to try this case, ladies and gentlemen,
    because you need to know who your President is.
        Thank you.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I would like to note that in the response to the
    previous question, question probably No. 28, that it was not
    filed by the managers; it was filed by a group of Senators.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. With that, I ask unanimous consent that we take
    another brief recess of 15 minutes.
        There being no objection, at 4:18 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 4:40 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief Justice,
    I had indicated that we will probably go 5 hours today, which
    would take us to approximately 6 o'clock. But I think we will
    certainly go for at least another hour or so, perhaps not quite
    all the way to 6 o'clock, but we will talk to each other and
    look for a signal from the Chief Justice about exactly when to
    end the day's proceedings.
        At this point, Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready
    for the next question. I believe the previous question came
    from Senator Lieberman; therefore, I send the next question to
    the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Thompson
    and Snowe, to the House managers:

        Do the managers wish to respond to the answer given by the
    President's counsel with regard to the poll taken by Dick
    Morris?

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Just before we recessed, there was a question directed to
    the President's defense attorneys regarding the Dick Morris
    poll. One of the responses to it was that it was basically
    irrelevant. I think it is one of the more important things that
    has occurred in this case, because--and I think it is very
    important--because we get a look inside that window that is
    blocked for the most part throughout these proceedings. We
    really get an eye into the minds that are working here. Not
    only does it say volumes about a person who has to take a poll
    and decide whether or not to tell the truth, it also provides a
    great deal of information toward the actual state of mind, the
    actual willfulness, the actual intent of the actor in this case
    who has had the poll taken.
        Let me just read briefly from the referral regarding this
    incident. It talks about how Mr. Morris tells the President
    that this country has a great capacity for forgiveness and we
    should consider tapping into it. The President responds,
    ``Well, what about that legal thing, you know, the legal thing,
    you know, Starr and the perjury and all?'' And they go on and
    have a discussion and decide to take a poll that night. Now
    this is January 21.
        And in all fairness to the President, it is not clear from
    the record that I have that he had had a conversation with
    Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta that day, before this
    effort--the poll was taken, and the results reported that same
    day, late that evening--or whether the conversation with Mr.
    Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal occurred afterwards. Those are the
    ones, in essence, where he questioned what went on, and also
    with Mr. Blumenthal fairly well attempted to discredit Ms.
    Lewinsky, too. And you will see how that may or may not tie in,
    again, depending on the chronology. But certainly all those
    events happened the same day.
        Mr. Morris takes the poll and reports later that day, later
    that evening, the same evening, the 21st, the results of that,
    and basically says the voters are willing to forgive the
    President for adultery but not for the perjury or the
    obstruction of justice. And then according to Mr. Morris, the
    President answers, ``Well, we['ll] just have to win, then.''
    And later the next day the President has a followup
    conversation with Mr. Morris, in the evening, and says that he
    is considering holding a press conference to blast Monica
    Lewinsky out of the water. But Mr. Morris urges caution. He
    says, ``Be careful.'' According to Mr. Morris, he warned the
    President not to be too hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there's
    some slight chance that she may not be cooperating with Starr,
    and we don't want to alienate her by anything we're going to
    put out.''
        That is chilling. It truly is chilling that our chief law
    enforcement officer, the person who sends our soldiers off as
    Commander in Chief, to possibly die, the person who appoints
    the Federal judges, nominates Supreme Court Justices, appoints
    U.S. attorneys around the country who try 50,000 cases a year,
    has that mentality. And it goes to the state of mind here. And
    the willfulness and the intentions, from that point forward,
    certainly are reflected in the perjury and the efforts to
    continue the obstruction, the pattern, the overall pattern--not
    just one little incident.
        I urge you, Senators, as you consider this, to consider it
    carefully. As I said in my opening remarks, do not isolate
    little facts here and there and take the spins. But in every--
    every--alleged act, ask yourselves the two questions--whether
    it is the hiding of the gifts, the filing of the false
    affidavit, letting Bob Bennett use that false affidavit while
    sitting still, talking to Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta
    about what did not really happen, the job search--ask them,
    every one of those, What was the result, what was the result of
    those actions?
        I think in every case you will see that something occurs to
    block the Paula Jones case, the discovery of evidence, the
    receipt of truthful testimony. Ask yourselves the second
    question: Who benefits from that? And I will guarantee you
    every time, in every one of those instances, it is the
    President who benefits, who derives the effect of that. He is
    either the luckiest man in the world because of this and having
    people willing to commit crimes for him or he is somewhere in
    the background orchestrating this.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senators Leahy, Harkin,
    Dorgan, and Reid of Nevada, to the President's counsel:

        In his opening remarks to the Senate, Manager McCollum
    stated, ``I don't know what the witnesses will say, but I
    assume if they are consistent, they'll say the same thing
    that's in here,'' referring to the 60,000 page record currently
    before the Senate. I see no reason to call witnesses to provide
    redundant testimony.
        Could you comment on Mr. McCollum's statement and clarify
    also the timetable which might have to be considered for
    discovery if witnesses are called?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, I think, as I said
    in an earlier question, that the answers the witnesses would
    provide are already contained in the five volumes of testimony.
    As I am sure you are aware, when I say five volumes, that is
    not really five volumes, because on many of the pages the grand
    jury transcript is shrunk, called a miniscript, so you get 6
    pages of testimony per page. Your eyesight may fail you before
    you get through. The witness testimony is there. I don't think
    calling the witnesses again will add anything to that.
        In terms of a discovery schedule, it is hard to say,
    because we have had no opportunity to shape the record. We
    don't know what we will need. We would need documents. We would
    need testimony. One deposition could lead to another. I think
    we are talking a matter of a few months to finally get through
    it.
        But I think the real question is, What questions are there
    that have not been asked? I think if you ask that question,
    What questions are there that have not been asked, you will
    find there are no questions. In fact, there are questions that
    have been asked a number of times.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you that the independent
    counsel didn't have a chance to ask questions after the
    President's testimony. Indeed he did. You will see that Ms.
    Lewinsky was examined after the President testified, both in
    the grand jury and in FBI interviews. I don't think that
    witness interviews or further evidentiary proceedings will add
    in any measurable way to the record before you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers by Senators Hatch, Thompson, DeWine, and Warner:

        The unanimous consent agreement pending before the Senate
    permits the filing of a motion to dismiss next week. What legal
    standard should the Senate apply, and applying that standard to
    this case, what specific acts of Presidential misconduct would
    a Senator deem unworthy of impeachment by voting for a motion
    to dismiss?

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate,
    the President wants all of the protections of the criminal
    trial beyond a reasonable doubt, standard of proof, strict
    pleadings, but yet deny us the right to call any witnesses.
        In the House we did not call witnesses and there is a
    reason. There are several reasons for that. First of all, we
    were operating under time constraints which were self-imposed
    but I promised my colleagues to finish it before the end of the
    year. I didn't want it to drag out. We had an election
    intervene, we had Christmas, but we did--because we had 60,000
    pages of sworn testimony, transcripts, depositions, grand jury
    testimony, and we had a lower threshold.
        The threshold in the House was for impeachment, which is to
    seek a trial in the Senate. We could not try the case in the
    House. The Constitution gives the Senate the exclusive right to
    try the case. All we could do was present evidence sufficient
    to convince our colleagues that there ought to be a trial over
    here in the Senate. And we did that.
        But now that we are over here--by the way, we were roundly
    criticized for not producing any witnesses. And I might add,
    Mr. Kendall has said repeatedly they did not have a fair
    discovery process; they didn't have any witnesses and weren't
    permitted to cross-examine.
        I want to tell you, repeatedly--repeatedly--I invited the
    President's lawyers, the staff of the Democrats on the House
    Judiciary Committee: Any witnesses you want, call them; give me
    their names and we will bring them in and you can cross-examine
    them to your heart's content.
        No, they never did. Finally, they brought in some
    professors and Mr. Ruff testified, Mr. Craig testified. But
    they didn't want, in fact, any witnesses. That is the last
    thing they wanted. They had full opportunity to call them, and
    I really, really, bristle when they say, ``You were unfair.''
    We wanted to be fair. We tried to be fair because we understand
    you need a two-thirds vote to remove the President. We needed
    Democratic support. So far we had none. That is OK. Let the
    process play itself out. But we were fair.
        And when Mr. Kendall says they had no opportunity, he means
    they didn't avail themselves of an abundant opportunity to call
    witnesses.
        A motion in lieu of a trial should provide that all
    inferences, all fact, questions, be resolved in favor of the
    respondent, the House managers. I don't think that is going to
    happen. I think by dismissing the articles of impeachment
    before you have a complete trial, you are sending a terrible
    message to the people of the country. You are saying, I guess
    perjury is OK, if it is about sex; obstruction is OK, even
    though it is an effort to deny a citizen her right to a fair
    trial. You are going to say that even when judges have been
    impeached for perjury--and, by the way, the different standards
    between judges and the President: This country can survive with
    a few bad judges, a few corrupt judges; we can make it; but a
    corrupt President, survival is a little tougher there. So there
    is a difference, and the standard ought to be better and more
    sensitive for the President because the President is such an
    important person.
        Look, the consequences of cavalier treatment of our
    articles of impeachment, your articles of impeachment: You
    throw out the window the fact that the President's lies and
    stonewalling have cost millions of dollars that could have been
    obviated. The damage to sexual harassment laws--you think they
    are not going to be damaged? They are, seriously, making it
    more difficult to prosecute people in the military or elsewhere
    for perjury who lie under oath. Those are serious consequences.
        I know--oh, do I know--what an annoyance we are in the
    bosom of this great body, but we are a constitutional
    annoyance, and I remind you of that fact.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Durbin to
    counsel for the President:

        Can you comment on Manager Hyde's contention that the
    President was free to call witnesses before the House, but that
    the House did not have the time to do so, or to call any
    witnesses?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think it is
    important to understand the reality of what is going on in the
    House. Most of you know something of it by simply the virtue of
    press coverage. But let me tell you what it was like from the
    perspective of the President.
        From the very first moment when we began to speak with
    representatives of the Judiciary Committee--whether senior
    staff or the chairman, who is always gracious--the one thing we
    said was, ``Please tell us what we are charged with, please.''
    And we went from Mr. Schippers' extensive opening discussion of
    15 possible violations of law to an ever-shifting body.
        It wasn't until I was within literally a few minutes of
    completing my testimony on December 9 that we were ever honored
    with anything that looked like a description of the violations
    that the President was charged with, and those came in the form
    of hard draft articles of impeachment.
        I think, indeed, if you will all remember back--if any of
    you were watching that day--I was actually given a draft copy
    of those articles just as I was completing my testimony, and
    then they were snatched back because it was premature for the
    President's counsel at 4:30 in the afternoon on December 9 to
    know what the President was charged with.
        One thing you generally like to know as a litigator in any
    forum, before you start thinking about producing exculpatory
    evidence, as we were asked to do, or thinking about calling
    witnesses, is to sort of know what you have to defend against.
    In any forum, whether it is criminal or civil or legislative,
    the accused generally has that right.
        Beyond that, as you all know--indeed, as Mr. Manager Hyde
    has indicated--we were operating on a very fast track. We
    asked, for example, when the issue arose as to whether or not
    the staff of the committee would take depositions, whether we
    would be entitled to be present, because we knew that none of
    them was on the calendar to be called in any open hearing, and
    we were denied that opportunity, theoretically because under
    the policies of the committee it was not appropriate for the
    President's counsel to be present at the only opportunity that
    certain witnesses would ever have to testify under oath.
        It seems odd to me, when you come right down to it, that we
    should be accused of failing in our duty, with the burden on
    the House Judiciary Committee to make its case and our right to
    respond, that the House, having determined never to call a
    witness who knew anything firsthand, we should somehow be
    charged with having to fit into this discovery process.
    Discovery is very different, as all of you understand, from
    calling a witness--whoever it may be--in public, before the
    full Judiciary Committee, and having the opportunity to
    examine. We were excluded from whatever true discovery process
    might have been involved, and left only with this notion that,
    in the absence of any specific charges, we were to call
    witnesses to defend ourselves. I suggest to you that in any
    setting that we are used to, whether those of you who are
    litigators or those of you who are simple observers of the
    justice system, that is a very long process, indeed.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Nickles to
    the House managers:

        Which of the President's statements not already discussed
    today do you believe to be of particular importance to the
    perjury charge?

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I thank
    the Senator for the question. I will keep one eye on the clock
    and stay within the 5-minute rule, so obviously I won't be able
    to give a comprehensive list of that which we submit to the
    Senate is perjurious. Let me try to get through at least one or
    two.
        One example that I invite the Senate's attention to is the
    answers the President gave in the grand jury about his attorney
    using Monica Lewinsky's false affidavit. Bear in mind, again,
    the predicate facts for this. Judge Susan Webber Wright, in the
    deposition, had ordered the President to answer questions
    relating to whether he ever had sexual relationships with
    subordinate female employees in the workplace as Governor or as
    President, because that is fair game in any sexual harassment
    suit. Victims of harassment in the workplace are entitled to
    discover that information.
        The President was able to get Monica Lewinsky to file a
    false affidavit in the Jones deposition. And when that
    affidavit was in hand and filed, as soon as the attorney for
    Paula Jones asked the first question about Monica Lewinsky, the
    President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, put forth that affidavit and
    objected to the attorneys even asking the question. He said,
    ``There is no good-faith belief that this question should be
    asked because of the affidavit.'' And the President did
    absolutely nothing to correct the record.
        When this came up in the grand jury, the President was
    asked about the affidavit and the statement that Mr. Bennett
    made to Judge Wright that ``there was no sex of any kind, in
    any manner, shape or form.'' And the attorney, Mr. Bittman, at
    the grand jury, referred to that and said to the President,
    ``That statement is a completely false statement,'' and asked
    the President to explain. This was the President's answer:

        It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If
    the--if he--if ``is'' means is and never has been, that is
    not--that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a
    completely true statement.

        Then the President went on to say:

        I was not paying a great deal of attention to this
    exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.

        Rather than simply give a truthful and complete answer to
    the grand jury in their criminal investigation, the President
    gave a bifurcated answer that essentially invited the grand
    jury to accept one of two explanations.
        Explanation No. 1: I wasn't paying attention to my attorney
    when he said that. I was busy thinking of other things.
        Or, if you don't like that explanation: I was paying such
    specific attention to what my attorney was saying that I
    focused on the tense of what the word ``is'' meant--as if to
    suggest when Mr. Bennett said that there is no sex of any kind,
    he meant there was no sex that day because he was there being
    deposed before Judge Wright. Under either scenario, the
    President absolutely failed in his obligation to provide the
    grand jury conducting a criminal investigation into possible
    obstruction in the Paula Jones case--he failed in his
    obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth.
        You have seen the evidence just from the initial
    presentation. No. 1, when the President said he wasn't paying
    attention, that was negated by watching the videotape. The
    President was paying very close attention. Why was he paying
    such close attention? Because the fate of his Presidency hung
    on the answer to that question. This is the most important
    question in the President's political life. Is he going to have
    to disclose information that he thought would help destroy his
    Presidency?
        You don't even have to accept the representation from the
    videotape to know the President testified falsely, because Mr.
    Bennett did us the favor of not asking us simply to rely on
    watching the President pay attention to the testimony. Mr.
    Bennett then read the President the portion of Ms. Lewinsky's
    affidavit in which she denied having a sexual relationship with
    the President, and he asked the President if Ms. Lewinsky's
    statement was true and accurate. The President said, ``That is
    absolutely true.''
        On August 6, Monica Lewinsky, incidentally, testified
    before the grand jury, and she didn't play these games with the
    grand jury, like ``it all depends what `is' means,'' or ``I
    wasn't paying attention.'' She was asked a straightforward
    question:

        Paragraph 8 of the affidavit says, ``I have never had a
    sexual relationship with the President.'' Is that true?

        Answer by Monica Lewinsky:

        No.

        Mr. Chief Justice, I see my time has expired. I will be
    happy to invite additional questions relating to additional
    specific examples.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is to the President's counsel from
    Senator Schumer and Senator Kerrey of Nebraska:

        Isn't it true that the alleged perjurious statements have
    changed in number and substance since the OIC first delivered
    its referral to the House, and that the referral, Mr.
    Schippers' presentation before the House, the majority report,
    the trial brief, and the managers' statements before this body
    contain different allegations of what constitutes the alleged
    perjurious statements?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. The answer
    to that question is, yes. They were changing right up until the
    time we met, the very first day of this trial when Mr. Manager
    Rogan made his presentation. What he said when he described
    perjurious statements alleged against the President was
    different from what was appearing in the trial brief before.
    And that was the end of a long period of time where every time
    we heard what the allegations were, at least when it came to
    the issue of perjury, they changed.
        There were allegations added; there were allegations
    subtracted. Two of the allegations that Mr. Schippers presented
    when he made his statement to the Judiciary Committee were
    withdrawn. So it was a process where we never had a chance to
    sit down, as you should in a very serious and fair and
    evenhanded exercise, and focus on what precisely it was that
    the President said in the grand jury that was perjurious.
        As to the specifics of the allegation that we have been
    discussing just now, when I first opened this discussion, I
    said it is very important to look at the record. Do not allow
    anyone to misrepresent the record because you are setting up
    the President's statement and saying that is perjurious, when
    the President's statement may well be something very different
    in the record.
        When Mr. Rogan first made his argument on this issue, he
    misrepresented the record as to what the President said in this
    case. I tried to correct him about what the President actually
    said. He never claimed, at the moment these questions were
    being asked back and forth, that he thought about the current
    tense. Even as I was speaking, Mr. Rogan was out talking to the
    television cameras, saying precisely the same thing. Now we
    have this same misrepresentation the third time.
        I will say it one more time. He answered the question. He
    wasn't focusing on it. He answered that four times the same
    way. It was not a bifurcated answer; it was one answer. He was
    not paying attention at that particular moment. It moved very
    quickly; the moment was passed and they were into the judge
    talking and debating with the lawyers. That was his answer.
    There was no other answer.
        Then, at the grand jury some 7 months later, he was read
    that statement by the special prosecutor. The question was,
    ``And this statement was false, isn't that true?'' The answer
    the President gave was that, well, in fact, it depends on the
    meaning of the word ``is.''
        He didn't claim that that was what he was thinking at the
    time in the Jones deposition. He said very clearly, ``I never
    even focused on that issue until I read it in this transcript
    in preparation for this testimony.'' It is on page 512, Mr.
    Rogan. ``I never focused on that issue until I read it in this
    transcript in preparation for this testimony.'' There was not a
    bifurcated answer. He answered directly. He wasn't focusing on
    it.
        That is a problem we have had throughout this case when it
    comes to the perjury allegation. It was a problem we had with
    the earlier one. If you don't have the specific statement
    quoted, it is impossible to defend it. It is unfair.
        Thank you very much.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question from Senator Lott to the
    House managers:

        Do you wish to respond to the answers just given by the
    President's counsel?

        Mr. Counsel ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I am not sure if I
    wish to respond or I feel the need to respond. But in either
    event I will take advantage of the opportunity. I thank the
    Senator for posing the question.
        Try as they might, the facts are clear. The President, in
    his August deposition, attempted to justify away, attempted to
    explain away his perjurious conduct on January 17 when he was
    deposed. And I am not going to stand and quibble with Mr. Craig
    over this beyond what was already noted.
        What I prefer to respond to is the bigger question that the
    White House attorneys have raised on a number of occasions--the
    idea that the President has been treated unfairly because he
    hasn't had sufficient notice as to what the allegations are
    against him.
        Contemplate that for just one moment. Because, were that to
    be true, the President of the United States would have to be
    not a human. He would be an ostrich with his neck so far down
    in the sand--that which every schoolchild now in America knows,
    that which every person in America with a television or a radio
    or Internet access knows, and is obvious to everybody which
    they claim is not obvious to the President.
        When the President of the United States testified at the
    deposition and before the grand jury--that brought us into late
    August of 1998, about a month after that--the Office of
    Independent Counsel filed a report. The binder was about 445
    pages. The written document was a little more than 200 pages.
    But within the four corners of that report are all of the
    allegations, are all of the facts, and all of the circumstances
    that were forwarded to the House of Representatives for review.
    The House Judiciary Committee, specifically at the request of
    the White House and at the request of our Democrat caucus, did
    not go beyond the four corners of Judge Starr's report. Not
    only did the President have the benefit of Judge Starr's
    report, he also had the benefit of the written report from the
    House Judiciary Committee--same facts, same circumstances,
    nothing changed.
        And, by the time we came to the Senate to try this case,
    the President had the benefit of the resolution passed by this
    body that said at the initial presentations ``we will not go
    beyond the record already established''--the record that was
    established in the Office of Independent Counsel report, in the
    committee's report, and in our hearings. For a party to be
    aggrieved, as the White House counsel suggests, to have been
    given no notice, it is amazing to me how within minutes of
    Judge Starr's report being filed they had already filed a
    response. I believe there were two supplemental responses
    within 48 or 72 hours. They have always beaten us to the punch
    on the response. They have an army of lawyers here able to
    stand up on a moment's notice and respond. I just do not
    understand how they can make the case fairly that this is all
    now a product of a surprise; that they have not been given a
    proper opportunity to review the facts. They have seen these
    facts since Judge Starr submitted his report to Congress some 5
    months ago. The facts haven't changed. The circumstances
    haven't changed. The quotations haven't changed. The
    transcripts haven't changed. Nothing has changed except their
    attempt to wiggle out from under the truth.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Boxer,
    Schumer and Kohl to the President's counsel:

        To the best of your knowledge, has the United States
    Department of Justice ever brought a perjury prosecution where
    the alleged perjury was inferred from the direction in which
    the defendant was looking?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, the answer is, not to
    my knowledge. I will not go further than that because somebody
    in the army of people on the other side might dodge one up, but
    I doubt it very much.
        If I may impose on the kindness of the authors of that last
    question, I will take just a moment to comment briefly on Mr.
    Manager Rogan's rejoinder to our response to whatever--
    particularly because Mr. Manager Rogan has been a judge,
    prosecutor, and others have as well, it does seem mildly odd to
    me that the answer to the question your charges aren't known or
    are vague is, look at that pile. You will find them right in
    there. You fellows, you guys did a good job responding to what
    you could. So you must be perfectly well prepared to defend
    against whatever charges we bring. I don't think there is a
    judge anywhere in the United States, from the highest court or
    the lowest court, who would accept either explanation from a
    prosecutor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers by Senators Hatch and Burns:

        The President's lawyers cite in their brief Professor
    Michael Gerhardt for the proposition that for an act to be
    impeachable there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an
    impeachable official and the latter's official duties. But
    isn't it true that Professor Gerhardt also stated that
    impeachment may lie for conduct unrelated to official duties if
    such conduct is outrageous and harms the reputation of the
    office?

        And this citation is to the testimony of Mr. Gerhardt.

        Would the House managers care to respond to this?

        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, I do appreciate the opportunity to respond to this
    point. I think this is a very important point.
        I have a great deal of respect for Professor Gerhardt. He
    has said a number of different things on this subject. But the
    point in the question is directly on point.
        I would also like to quote something else that Professor
    Gerhardt has said that I made reference to without specifically
    naming him as the source in this statement which I gave to the
    Senate on Saturday.
        He said in a law review article, which he wrote a few years
    back:

        There are certain statutory crimes that if committed by
    public officials reflect such lapses of judgments with such
    disregard for the welfare of the state, and such lack of
    respect for the law and the office held that the occupants may
    be impeached and removed for lacking the minimal level of
    integrity and judgment sufficient to discharge the
    responsibilities of office.

        I believe that what Professor Gerhardt makes reference to
    there is exactly what we have before the Senate in this case.
    What we have before the Senate in this case is a case where the
    President of the United States has engaged in a course of
    conduct involving violations of the criminal law. By doing so,
    he has evidenced a lack of respect for the law, that
    demonstrates a lack of the minimal level of integrity that we
    are entitled to expect of the Chief Executive of the United
    States, of the person who, under our system, is given the
    preeminent responsibility to take care that the laws will be
    faithfully executed.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Dodd to
    the counsel for the President:

        Given the election of a President of the United States is
    the most important and solemn political act in which we as
    citizens engage, how much weight should the Senate give to the
    fact that conviction and removal by the Senate of the President
    would undo that decision?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. That question, of course, goes right to
    the heart of what the framers were thinking, and the standards
    that I suggest every sensible analyst of this problem has
    arrived at, whether they might be called supporters or
    opponents of the President. There is one critical issue that
    everyone has to address, which is that removal and undoing the
    will of the people.
        Mr. Manager Graham acknowledged that that's what we were
    all about here, whether we should undo an election. But if you
    go back to the very basic debates of the framers in 1787, and
    you recall both Mr. Manager Canady and I talked about the
    moment in time in which it was suggested by Mr. Mason that
    perhaps the scope of the standard for impeachment could be
    broadened, and the response made then and clearly the principle
    underlying everything that the framers spoke about in 1787 was:
    We cure almost all our problems with an elected official
    through the electoral process.
        And even if you look at what President Ford had to say 29
    years ago on the subject, which I also cited to you as he spoke
    about the difference between judges and Presidents, he said for
    the House to impeach and the Senate to remove the President or
    Vice President as opposed to a judge in midterm would require
    proof of the most serious offenses, and we know that those most
    serious offenses, the only ones the framers contemplated as a
    basis for overturning the will of the people, were those that,
    as the minority said in 1974 in its report on the subject, were
    a danger to the state--a danger to the state. That is all that
    can justify overturning the voice of the people.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Lott. It
    is addressed to the House managers:

        Didn't the framers of the Constitution understand in 1787
    that the conviction and removal from office of a President
    would, under the system they devised, reverse the result of a
    national election by elevating, not a President's Vice
    Presidential running mate, as we would do today, but the person
    who had received the second highest number of electoral votes?

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, the statement has been
    made with some fervor that if the President were removed upon a
    finding of conviction of the articles or an article of
    impeachment, it would reverse a national election. I just
    respectfully say that is not true. The election is provided for
    in the Constitution and so is impeachment. They are processes
    of equal constitutional validity. And should the Senate remove
    the President, Bob Dole will not become President, Jack Kemp
    will not become Vice President, but Mr. Gore will move up to be
    President, and the same party, the same programs, I dare say,
    will continue. It will not reverse an election; it will fulfill
    a constitutional process that our Founding Fathers were wise
    enough to provide for.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Edwards asks the House managers:

        Are there any statements contained in the exhibits used
    during the managers' presentations or omissions from those
    exhibits that you believe, in the interest of fairness or
    justice, should be corrected at this time? If so, please do so
    now.

        Mr. Manager BUYER. Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to our
    own exhibits?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Perhaps I should ask Senator Edwards.
        Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to their
    exhibits.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, I would be happy
    to take advantage of the 5 minutes, but I have talked to the
    other managers and we are not aware of any corrections that
    need to be made on any of our exhibits we have offered to the
    Senate.
        Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Massachusetts.
        Mr. KERRY. I simply ask whether or not that answer was in
    fact fully responsive to the question. I believe the question
    also asked whether or not there were any omissions.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian advises me this is a
    nondebatable period and the inquiry is out of order, and I so
    rule.
        This is from Senator Roberts. It is directed to the House
    managers.

        Given the fact that the White House characterizes the
    assistance that Monica Lewinsky received as ``routine,'' does
    the record reflect that any other White House interns other
    than Monica Lewinsky received the same level of job assistance
    from Vernon Jordan, John Podesta, Betty Currie, and then-
    Ambassador Richardson?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, if I might, as far
    as we know as House managers, in the record the only comments
    about assisting anybody else other than Monica Lewinsky, of any
    nature, were made in testimony by Vernon Jordan. He did assist
    other people. But I don't believe there is anything, to the
    best of our knowledge and recollection--of course, we have a
    lot of paperwork here--that he referred to assisting another
    intern or anyone in a like position. And certainly there was no
    indication that the kind of intensity of that assistance
    occurred in the kind of manner in which the proceedings did
    with developing her job opportunities, that is, somebody in
    this direct involvement with the President, or certainly nobody
    with a close relationship and interest on the part of the
    President. There certainly was nothing in the record to show
    that, and that is, of course, central to this entire case as
    far as the job search part of this obstruction of justice is
    concerned.
        Thank you.
        Mr. ROBERTS addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Kansas.
        Mr. ROBERTS. I had directed that question, sir, to the
    White House counsel. It was my intent to direct it to White
    House counsel. I do not know what the proper procedure would be
    at this time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection to the White
    House counsel answering the question at this time?
        Without objection, the White House counsel may answer.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. This may be
    a moment worth noting in the proceedings because in essence I
    think we are in agreement with Mr. Manager McCollum.
        I would perhaps only do this, and that is, to note with
    some greater emphasis Mr. Jordan's testimony, which we will be
    glad to highlight if we have another opportunity here, that
    indeed he has regularly and frequently assisted young people,
    and not-so-young people, in finding jobs.
        Again, I couldn't tell you whether any of them had been an
    intern at any time. I would only note that, of course, Ms.
    Lewinsky was not an intern at the time Mr. Jordan was helping
    her, but rather was an employee of the Pentagon.
        But beyond that, and perhaps with somewhat greater emphasis
    on Mr. Jordan's emphasis on behalf of young people in the city,
    I am in essential agreement with Manager McCollum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Dodd
    and Levin to the House managers:

        On page 11 of House committee report accompanying H. Res.
    611, the report states that Judge Susan Webber Wright issued
    her order ``on the morning of December 11th.'' Will the
    managers now acknowledge that the report was factually
    incorrect? Yes or no?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. If I
    look back at the facts of this--of course, I have explained
    earlier today that the action on the 11th was initiated or
    triggered by the witness list that came in on December 5, that
    the President knew about it at the latest on December 6.
        On the 11th, Judge Wright entered an order in that case
    which allowed the Jones lawyers an opportunity to ask questions
    about the prior relationships with other Federal employees or
    State employees.
        Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Connecticut.
        Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, as one of the authors of the
    question, a yes or no answer was requested and I object to the
    answer.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair has not tried to police the
    responsiveness of the answers to the questions, so I am going
    to overrule that objection.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I am not trying to be evasive at
    all to the Senator, but I did want to lay the groundwork for
    this and also to get my thoughts so that I would be as accurate
    as possible.
        The order that Judge Wright entered was on December 11. I
    do not know the precise time. I believe it was in the afternoon
    that it was entered, and it was followed by the telephone call
    with the participants. So I believe that it was entered in the
    afternoon of the 11th, and not in the morning of the 11th.
        And, of course, that was not in my presentation. My
    presentation referred to the order being entered on December
    11, and that the action on the 11th, of course, was triggered
    by the witness list on December 5.
        I think that completely answers that question. If there is
    some other--I would be happy to respond to anything more
    specific on that issue.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers from Senators Domenici, Frist, McCain and Warner.

        What is the historical significance and legal import of
    taking an oath for performance in public office? What is the
    historical significance and legal import of taking an oath to
    tell the truth in a legal proceeding? Please discuss whether
    oath-taking in such circumstances is a public matter.

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate,
    the taking of an oath is a formalization, a solemnization of
    truth. You call upon God to witness to the truth of what you
    are saying. In the long march of civilization, the oath has
    taken the place of trial by fire, trial by combat, trial by
    ordeal. It says, in the most sober way: You can trust me. You
    can believe in me. It is verbal honesty. Our legal system
    depends on it and our justice system depends on it. The oath
    underscores our humanity. The oath is an aspect of our sacred
    honor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Kerry of
    Massachusetts to the counsel for the President:

        Is it fair to say that the articles and manager
    presentations stress the Jones perjury allegations rejected by
    the House, because they cannot credibly, on the law, satisfy
    the elements and argue perjury in the grand jury investigation?

        Mr. Manager RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I am a little bit
    troubled at answering that question, not because I don't feel
    strongly about what the answer is but I do not want to suggest
    in any way that the motivation of the managers is less than
    professional and appropriate. But I do think that, indeed, they
    know, as they think through the proof that they have or that
    they even might ever contemplate, that the President of the
    United States, when he began his grand jury testimony by making
    the most painful admission a human being could ever make, and
    thereafter did his best--albeit in the face of tough and
    probing and repetitive questioning for 4 hours--did his best to
    tell the truth.
        That they had a very difficult, indeed virtually
    impossible, task to persuade any dispassionate trier of fact
    and law that he had intentionally given false testimony, and
    you can see that evidenced, I think most clearly, if you look
    at some of the first allegations made as to what constitutes
    perjury--things like the use of the words ``on certain
    occasions'' or ``occasionally'' to describe a battle over
    whether 11 or 20 or 17 fit within that description. It does
    seem fair to say that they would not be fighting those battles
    in this Chamber if they had any real confidence in their cause
    on article I, and thus they do seek, for whatever tactical or
    other purpose, to try to bring in those things which so many of
    their colleagues rejected out of hand in the House of
    Representatives.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers from Senators Hatch, Thompson and DeWine:

        In her presentation to the Senate, Ms. Mills emphasized
    that Ms. Lewinsky testified on ten different times about the
    subject of gifts. Did she ever testify that the President told
    her that she must turn over the gifts because that is what the
    law requires?
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, in response to
    that question the answer is no, she did not. As a matter of
    fact, that was and is the central point on the part of the gift
    question. At no time, she says, did the President instruct her
    to turn those gifts over. I think that is a telling point. In
    fact, it is a telling point throughout the entire process of
    the scheme and all the things that happened and why you have to
    follow, in my judgment, Senators, the issue of this whole
    process through the scheme that was devised at the beginning,
    all the way to the end.
        The President was going to ultimately lie to conceal from
    that court in the Jones case, the truth of his relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky and, therefore, he had to set it up for
    the affidavit, the gifts, et cetera. At no point in time, she
    says in her testimony, did he ever ask her to come clean. Until
    the time the affidavit was discussed, on the night of December
    17, he never suggested she tell the truth there. If you
    remember we put that up here several times to you. Even though
    he may not have directly told her to lie, he certainly gave her
    every indication, she said, from the standpoint of the
    background that they had had before and what he said that night
    about the cover stories.
        And with regard to the gifts, the same thing is true. She
    gave him an opportunity on the day of December 28. Whether
    there are 10 statements or however many there might be--and
    they say there are 10; I trust the judgment of the White House
    counsel--there were 10 different statements, the most
    significant of which, of course, is the grand jury testimony
    she gave on the subject of what happened that day when she
    discussed the gifts with the President because that is when her
    recollection had been best refreshed. She had been over it a
    lot of times. She had much preparation for that, and I submit
    to you that barring bringing her in--which we of course suggest
    you do, and let us ask her to confirm all of this again--you
    must assume the logical thing to do is to assume the grand jury
    testimony, the most perfected testimony you have, is the most
    accurate and most reliable, and on that occasion particularly
    she emphasizes the fact that with regard to the gifts there
    certainly was no request by the President that she reveal those
    gifts.
        Now, of course he says he did. He says he did later. But
    that is absolutely contradicted by her testimony.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senator Reid of Nevada sends this
    question for White House counsel:

        Would you please comment on any of the legal or factual
    assertions made by the managers in their response to the
    previous question?

        Ms. Counsel MILLS. There is, obviously, a conflict in the
    testimony between the President, who said he directed Ms.
    Lewinsky to turn over whatever she had, and Ms. Lewinsky's
    statements. I would just like to read to you, given the House
    managers' reference that we must credit her grand jury
    testimony, the version of her grand jury testimony, which you
    all will no doubt remember it as one of the ones I read to you
    that was never presented by the House managers, and that is on
    August 20, 1998, after the President had testified:
        It was December 28th. I was there to get my Christmas gifts
    from him, and we spent about 5 minutes or so, not very long,
    talking about the case. And I said, ``Well, do you think''--and
    at one point I said, ``Well, do you think I should?'' And I
    don't think I said, ``Get rid of, but do you think I should put
    away, give to Betty or someone the gifts''--and he--I don't
    remember his response. I think it was something like ``I don't
    know'' or hmm or there was really no response.

        On that same day when she was asked that same question, if
    it is her grand jury testimony that is to be addressed, she
    also said:

        A Juror. Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the
    President bring up Betty's name?
        The Witness. I think I brought it up. The President
    wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he didn't--he
    didn't really discuss it.

        All of those are in her grand jury testimony. So her grand
    jury testimony is the testimony that states he might not have
    given any response. So, to the extent the House managers'
    theory is that ``Let me think about it'' leads to obstruction
    of justice, her grand jury testimony does not state that.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators Specter, Helms, Abraham,
    Ashcroft, and Stevens direct this question to the President's
    counsel:

        President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he
    was merely trying to ``refresh'' his memory when he made these
    statements to Betty Currie. How can someone ``refresh'' their
    recollection by making statements they know are false?

        Ms. Counsel MILLS. I think one of the things I tried to
    address in addressing what the President's testimony was with
    respect to his conversation with Ms. Currie was obviously he
    was understandably concerned about the media attention that he
    knew was impending. And in particular, as he walked through the
    questions, he was thinking about his own thoughts and seeking,
    as I think I talked about, concurrence or input or some type of
    reaction from Ms. Currie.
        I think in making those statements, he was asking questions
    to see what her understanding was based on some of the
    questions that had been posed to him by the Jones lawyers,
    because some of them were so off base. And so he was asking
    from Ms. Currie essentially what her perception was, what her
    thoughts were.
        I think as you walk through each one of those questions, he
    was expressing what his own thoughts and feelings were with
    regard to this and was seeking some concurrence or affirmation
    from her. I think he was agitated. I think he was concerned. He
    knew what was going to happen, and I think that is why he posed
    the question in the way that he did.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. A question from Senator Bayh to counsel
    for the President:

        Can you comment on the importance of ``proportionality'' to
    the rule of law?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. How much time do we have? Thank you,
    Senator.
        I think proportionality, in all its many guises, is an
    issue that has given us some pause, going well back into the
    investigative phase of this matter, and I think many who have
    watched and who have made their lives and careers as
    professional prosecutors, indeed many who have been criminal
    defense lawyers or just plain sensible citizens watching, have
    asked whether the resources and

    the energy and the time devoted to this matter and the manner
    in which it has been treated at every stage before it ever got
    to the House of Representatives does, in fact, reflect an
    appropriate assessment of the conduct being investigated and
    the seriousness of the conduct, which is not ever to suggest
    that we condone perjury or obstruction of justice.
        We all recognize, if those offenses have been committed,
    they are worth pursuing. But one only need look at the
    testimony and the professional prosecutors who testified before
    the Judiciary Committee to get a sense of what the world of
    professional prosecutors would do faced with these kinds of
    allegations in this kind of setting, and that really is the
    key: How many prosecutors would ever reach into the middle of
    an ongoing civil litigation and bring these kinds of charges?
        The proportionality, obviously, has other implications and
    certainly goes right to the heart of the role played by this
    body. That is, what is the proportional response to whatever
    you think of the President as a man, whatever you think of his
    conduct. Even if you should conclude--although we do not
    believe you should--that he violated the law in some respect,
    what is the constitutionally proportional response to your
    judgment. And there you go right back to the essence of what
    the framers were talking about, which is responding with the
    ultimate sanction only when the ultimate problem is posed to
    you.
        I suggest, as I have on too many occasions, I fear, that if
    that is the proportionality question you are asking--and all
    must at some point ask that question--the answer has to be
    clear, that no one ever thought in 1787 and, I suggest to you,
    in the intervening 212 years that it would be a proportional
    response to the conduct alleged here to remove a President.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we have reached a
    point where we can take a break. I think we have had responses
    to approximately 50 questions today. Now we will have a chance
    to assess, on all sides, what additional questions might be
    needed to be asked tomorrow. I remind my colleagues that we are
    scheduled to resume at 10 a.m. on Saturday.
        notice of intent to suspend the rules of the senate by senator
     hutchison, senator specter, senator lieberman, senator hagel, senator
                           collins, and senator snowe
        In accordance with Rule V of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I
    (for myself and for Mr. Specter, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Hagel, Ms. Collins,
    and Ms. Snowe) hereby give notice in writing that it is my intention to
    move to suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and
    Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials for the final
    deliberation on the articles of impeachment of the trial of President
    William Jefferson Clinton:
        (1) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate shall
    direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions. A
    motion to close the doors may be acted upon without objection, or, if
    objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by the
    yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the Record''; and
        (2) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except when the
    doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case'' and ``, to
    be had without debate''.

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. If there is nothing further, I move we adjourn,
    Mr. Chief Justice.
        The motion was agreed to and, at 5:49 p.m., the Senate,
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday,
    January 23, 1999, at 10 a.m.

                           Saturday, January 23, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 10:05 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Almighty God, You have taught us to seek and maintain
    unity. You've also taught us that this unity is so precious
    that we should be willing to sacrifice anything in order to
    maintain it--except the truth. Help us to affirm the great
    undeniable truths that twine the bond of oneness: We are one
    Nation under Your sovereignty; our patriotism binds us together
    inseparably; our commitment to the Constitution is unswerving.
    In these bonds that cannot be broken, this Senate has been able
    to deal with the arguments, issues, and opinions of this
    impeachment trial. Continue to inspire the Senators with
    civility as they work through answers to the questions raised
    today.
        Refresh and rejuvenate those who may be weary or burdened.
    Dear God, preserve the unity of this Senate for its future
    leadership of our beloved Nation. In Your holy Name. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Deputy Sergeant at Arms will make
    the proclamation.
        The Deputy Sergeant at Arms, Loretta Symms, made
    proclamation as follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, there
    are 11 hours 54 minutes remaining during which Senators may
    submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on
    the part of the House of Representatives, or the counsel for
    the President.
        The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        And thank you, Chaplain, for your opening prayer. I know we
    all listened and appreciated the admonitions that were given in
    that prayer.

                               Order Of Procedure

        I want to say, again, I appreciate the participation of all
    the Senators yesterday. Fifty questions were asked, I think a
    lot of good questions, and obviously good responses. We have a
    considerable amount of time left for questions. But, again, it
    is our intent to go today as long as the Senators feel that
    they have a need for further questions. It is up to 16 hours;
    it doesn't require 16 hours. So I think we should go forward
    and try to ask the needed questions, and then get a sense of
    where we are as we go through the day.
        But at any rate, it would be our intent not to go later
    than 4 p.m. We hope to take a 1-hour lunch break sometime
    around 12 or 12:30, but it will depend on how the questions are
    going. We will also take a break here in an hour, hour and a
    half, something like that.
        Following today's session, the Senate will reconvene on
    Monday at 1 p.m. and resume consideration of the articles of
    impeachment. All Members will be notified of the details of
    Monday's schedule, and beyond that, once we have had an
    opportunity for a consultation between Senator Daschle and
    myself and we get a feel for exactly what Senate Resolution 16
    provides in terms of activities on Monday and Tuesday. In a
    continuing effort to make this as bipartisan and as fair as
    possible, you will note yesterday while we alternated back and
    forth, some of the questions were directed from this side to
    the President's counsel and the reverse. I am sure that will
    happen again some today. We began the first question yesterday
    and you concluded; so today we would reverse that. Senator
    Daschle will ask the first question and then we will go through
    the process until we complete those questions, with us ending
    with the last question sometime today.
        With that, Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is directed to the House
    managers from Senator Reid of Nevada.

        Would you please tell us whether you provided notice to
    counsel for the President, or to any official of the United
    States Senate, of the managers' discussions with the Office of
    Independent Counsel regarding an informal interview of Ms.
    Lewinsky, and the intention of the Office of Independent
    Counsel to file a motion in court to compel Ms. Lewinsky to
    meet with the managers? If you provided no such notice to
    counsel for the President or the Senate, please tell us why
    not.

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice and Senators,
    distinguished colleagues, no, the answer to your question. I am
    not aware of any such notice that was provided as described in
    the question.
        I would like to make some clarification on this in terms of
    the witness, Monica Lewinsky--potential witness. As we have
    been in an evolving discussion over the last few weeks in terms
    of if we are allowed to call witnesses by the Senate, who those
    witnesses might be, what our list might look like, obviously,
    the name of Monica Lewinsky comes up as a potentially very
    important witness to these proceedings.
        As many of us in this Chamber have had experience in the
    law, we very much would like to talk to some of these
    witnesses. The core group that we have considered, however,
    are, in essence, in the White House control; they are either
    employed by the White House or close friends and associates of
    the White House. I am sure the White House, with the attorneys,
    would be very willing to cooperate with us in making those
    people available.
        However, Ms. Lewinsky presents a very unique situation in
    that she is geographically some other place. I am not sure
    where she is--Los Angeles, New York, maybe Washington. But she
    has attorneys we have to deal with. It would be very critical,
    as any attorney in this body knows, that before you actually
    call a witness, and a witness of that importance to this
    proceeding, that before you produce her for that testimony,
    that you talk to her. It was intended to be a conversation to
    discuss it with her.
        I have personally not seen the immunity agreement that she
    has, but we understand there is a cooperation proceeding and
    that that agreement is between her, her attorneys, and the
    independent counsel, the OIC--not Congress, not the managers,
    not the Senate. So we have no duty, no legal standing, as I
    understand it, to go in and enforce that agreement, were she
    not to want to meet with us and cooperate pursuant to the terms
    of those agreements, to the agreement.
        We did contact the OIC to arrange that meeting, and once we
    understood that the attorneys did not want to cooperate and
    furnish their client to meet with us, we asked the OIC to
    pursue, further, the effort to have Ms. Lewinsky come in and
    meet with us on an informal basis as, again, anyone would do in
    preparation for calling a witness at a trial.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Fitzgerald, Hatch, Mr. Smith of Oregon, and Senator Thurmond,
    directed to the House managers.

        How do you address the White House's argument that removal
    is a disproportionate remedy for the alleged acts of perjury
    and obstruction of justice and should there be any particular
    concern about establishing a precedent that a President can
    commit felonies while in office and remain President of the
    United States?

        Mr. Manager BUYER. I think the proportionality question
    yesterday was very good in that there is a psychology to be
    used in judicial decisions. I think there are different factors
    that will influence that decisionmaking process and the ideals
    that you, as a sitting judge and juror, will use to strive to
    attain them. It is important, I think, also, to have
    reasonableness and just solutions if you are going to
    individualize the case, as some may hope to do.
        I think as a society, if you take a step backward, we are
    kind of caught in two diverse trends at the moment. You have
    one trend whereby judges like to seek individualized solutions
    to particularized cases; and the other trend is we will apply
    the law to individualized cases.
        So, let me give you two best examples of both of those.
    With regard to the best example of individualized solutions to
    a particular case would be our juvenile justice system. That is
    where the court would come in and use a variety of means
    because reformation is, in fact, the goal, and that is what we
    do in the juvenile court system.
        As a side note of that, I think in society, with regard
    to--it could be an act of a firing, it could be an
    administrative hearing for removal, it could even be a Governor
    who had an employee who had an illicit affair and it was a
    political appointee and that Governor decided, maybe he decided
    applying the proportionality that he remove his own political
    appointee for having an affair. So the individualization can
    occur out there.
        The other example I will comment on is the justice
    according to law, and that other trend out there caught in our
    society--a legislature is not only here in Washington but
    across in our State jurisdictions; you have legislatures that
    are beginning to take some of the decisionmaking processes away
    from judges and they are saying, specifically, in Federal
    sentencing guidelines, as an example, that if in fact a person
    is convicted of a particular crime or possession of cocaine,
    the legislature is now telling these judges exactly: This is,
    in fact, what your sentence will be.
        So, we are kind of caught, I want you to know, as you are
    sitting as judges and jurors, in this diverse trend that is
    occurring in our society. I know as you listen to lectures even
    from the Supreme Court Justices, they are well aware of these
    trends, and so you are sitting and you have to come in your own
    conscience on how best to make that particular decision. I will
    note, though, that we have stressed the latter. We have
    stressed that the rule of law and its importance to our society
    not only to serve the public and social interests, but you are
    the guardian. When, in fact, there are crimes against the
    State, who is there to serve the public interest? Especially
    if, in fact, it is the President, the Vice President, a
    judicial officer, or other civil officers. Here where you have
    the President of the United States who has been accused of
    perjury and obstruction of justice, which are crimes against
    the State, and as Blackstone said, ``are side by side with
    bribery,'' who is the guardian, then, of the public interest?
    So in the question of proportionality, it is you; it is you.
        So when Mr. Craig began by arguing that this trial is not
    about vindicating the rule of law, that only criminal courts
    are charged with that duty, I would respectfully submit that
    the President's counsel is confusing the punishment of a
    particular criminal case or controversy in a court with your
    duty as Congress to ensure that future officers entrusted with
    power granted by the people may not, by their offices,
    eviscerate the proper administration of justice which is a
    cornerstone of our Republic.
        I now yield to Mr. Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I know I have a minute. Great minds can
    differ on this one: Can you have a high crime, and for the good
    of the nation removal is not appropriate? I was asked that
    yesterday, and I kind of wanted to make a case about why I
    think this is not true. This is a great question.
        The problem we have here is that you run into the judge
    cases. When you find that a judge perjured himself, you remove
    the judge. The President is different than the judge; I will
    certainly concede that. But we don't want, I think, in the use
    of proportionality, to create a standard that doesn't make any
    sense, that confuses people. The law loves repentance. Baptists
    love repentance. I am a Baptist. In my church, everybody gets
    saved about every other week. The idea that if you will come
    forward and admit you are wrong, you will get a different
    result, is loved in the law.
        Another thing to consider about proportionality is the
    impact on society. I think you should consider that. I think
    very much you should consider, even if this is a high crime,
    the impact on our society, if you decided to make the ultimate
    punishment. The death penalty of a political crime is removal
    from office. I started that train of thought 3 months ago.
    Impeachment is equivalent to the political death penalty. Every
    felony doesn't allow you to have a death penalty. What I hope
    you will be able to do, as a wise body, is not leave this
    confusion behind--whether or not it is a crime.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, it can be a high crime,
    and you then have to decide the impact on society. But if you
    leave us confused about whether or not this is a crime, the
    impact on society is far greater than if you make the decision
    that it is a crime, but proportionally it is not what the death
    penalty would call for. It would not be a political death
    penalty case. Thank you very much.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Leahy to
    the House managers:

        Did any of the managers consult with any Member of the
    Senate before seeking aid from Kenneth Starr to speak with Ms.
    Lewinsky? Did you discuss whether this violated the Senate's
    100-0 vote on trial procedure?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. The
    question is a valid question to ask. We did not consult with
    any Senators about this. We don't think that what we wanted to
    do, to talk to Ms. Lewinsky, has anything to do with the rule
    you passed. We don't want to violate those rules and we don't
    think we have.
        As anybody who knows, if you have a witness that you are
    going to produce, you have a right to prepare that witness. It
    is as plain and simple as that.
        I have practiced a lot of trial law before I came to
    Congress, and a number of you have. If you are going to have a
    deposition given, it is going to be your witness. You are going
    to go down and try to talk to that witness and prepare that
    witness. You have a right and obligation to do that. It has
    nothing to do with the formal proceeding of taking the
    deposition, which is covered by the rules that you have passed,
    as to how and when depositions will be taken, and it has
    nothing to do with the issue of her testimony actually here,
    where the opposing counsel would have a right to be present. It
    has everything to do with the right of anyone to prepare their
    witness, to get to know their witness, to shake hands, say
    hello, to put a face on that. It is normal practice to do this.
        We see in no way how that abrogates this rule, or in any
    way violates what you have set forth. As a matter of fact, we
    think we would have been incompetent and derelict as presenters
    of the witnesses, if we get a chance to present them, if we
    couldn't talk to her. We tried to do this some time ago. We
    suggested to her attorneys that it would be appropriate to
    quietly have this discussion, to meet her, as you normally
    would. I think they were apprehensive. They wanted a court
    order, I guess, to force this to occur, and that is why we
    eventually have gone to do that.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Lott and
    Thurmond to the House managers:

        Please give specific examples of conflicting testimony or
    an incomplete record where the calling of witnesses would prove
    beneficial to the Senate.

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Good
    morning, everyone. I want to echo what my colleagues have
    said--that we are trying to be prepared. We are trying to move
    through this process expeditiously. But we do believe that we
    need to call witnesses; and secondly, that we should be
    prepared, without any delay, to proceed forward in the event we
    are granted that opportunity.
        One of the reasons that the calling of witnesses is
    important is because there exist conflicts in the testimony.
    The White House counselors, the President of the United States,
    has denied each and every allegation under the two articles
    that have been submitted to this body. I focused on the
    obstruction of justice, and each of the seven elements of the
    obstruction of justice has been denied by the President. This
    puts it all in issue.
        For example, let's start with the issue of lying to the
    aides. The President said he was truthful with his aides, Mr.
    Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal. Yet, if you look at the
    testimony of John Podesta, where he says the President came in
    and denied having sex of any kind with Ms. Lewinsky and goes
    into the details of that, that is in direct conflict with the
    testimony of the President of the United States. The same thing
    is true of the testimony of Mr. Blumenthal versus the testimony
    of the President of the United States.
        Another conflict in the testimony is between the President
    and Ms. Lewinsky--in a number of different areas. First of all,
    in regard to the gifts, the President said, ``And I told her
    that if they asked for gifts, she had to give them.'' That is
    the President's testimony. Yet, Ms. Lewinsky says that in that
    conversation the President said, when asked about the gifts,
    ``Give them to Betty.'' Then he says, ``I don't know,'' or
    ``Let me think about it.'' Again, that is a direct conflict
    between Monica Lewinsky and the President.
        In regard to Monica Lewinsky, he was coaching her testimony
    or suggesting to her that ``Maybe you can sign an affidavit,''
    or ``You can always say you were coming to see Betty, or that
    you were bringing me letters.'' This is the testimony of Monica
    Lewinsky. What does the President say regarding that? He said
    that he never talked to her about a cover story in a legal
    context. In other words, it is a denial of obstruction of
    witness tampering, in contrast to the testimony of Monica
    Lewinsky. Obviously, there is a conflict in the details of the
    relationship.
        There is a conflict between the testimony of Monica
    Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan in three different areas. Ms.
    Lewinsky said she shared with Mr. Jordan some details of the
    relationship. Mr. Jordan says that was not accurate. Ms.
    Lewinsky says in a particular meeting that Mr. Jordan--where
    they discussed about notes she had been keeping, Mr. Jordan
    said, ``Go home and make sure they're not there.'' But Mr.
    Jordan denies that.
        In another area, on the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky says that
    she brought to Mr. Jordan the affidavit, and he assisted in
    making some corrections. Mr. Jordan does not recall that. So
    there are conflicts between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan.
        There are conflicts between Ms. Currie and the President in
    regard to the coaching incident. Ms. Currie said the statements
    were made and taken in the sense that ``the President wished me
    to agree with the statement.'' The President says, ``I was
    trying to get as much information as quickly as I could.''
    Obviously, Betty Currie testified before the grand jury before
    the President did, and there were never any follow-up
    questions. I would want to ask her: What did you say in
    response? Did you provide any information that the President
    was soliciting at that particular moment, according to the
    defense he has asserted? So there is conflict there.
        There is a conflict between the President and a witness
    that we would offer from the deposition. The President denies
    that he focused on what Attorney Bennett was stating in
    reference to the false affidavit. I believe that we can offer a
    witness--it could be in the form of an affidavit or
    deposition--that would testify that he was focusing, paying
    attention.
        So there is clear conflict in the record that can only be
    established through the presenting of additional questions or
    additional witnesses.
        The need for witnesses is so basic and fundamental to our
    truth-seeking system of justice in this country that words fail
    me in making the case that we should call witnesses and then
    you should permit it in this proceeding.
        We are sympathetic totally with the timeframe and the time
    constraint of the U.S. Senate, and for that reason we will
    prepare our witness list, we will accommodate a quick session.
    The White House counselor said this is going to drag on for
    months. If it drags on for months, it is because they want it
    to drag on for months. We will do all that we can to end this
    in a timely fashion, and the American people and the U.S.
    Senate need to understand that.
        Why are the White House counselors so concerned about
    witnesses? Many of these witnesses are friendly to them. We are
    in a truth-seeking endeavor, and I would respectfully submit
    that the calling of witnesses would help resolve the conflicts
    that I have recited.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Dodd to
    the counsel for the President:

        Do you believe that a fundamental question of fairness and
    due process has been raised by the failure of the House
    managers to notify you of the proposed Lewinsky interview or by
    your exclusion from that interview? And do you wish also to
    respond to Mr. Hutchinson's comments?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I will use
    most of my time on the first part of that question and try to
    perhaps weave in a few comments on the second part.
        I am not going to seek here this morning to vindicate the
    interests of this body; that is for others. But I do think it
    useful to speak for a bit about the interests of the accused,
    the President of the United States.
        It is odd as I think we listen to the managers explain what
    they were seeking to do to put that in the context of what we
    know was actually happening here. It was suggested that they
    wanted to just have a conversation like any lawyer getting
    ready for a trial would want to have a conversation with a
    witness before he or she put the witness into a deposition or
    on trial--that it was sort of normal for a trial lawyer to do
    this.
        I think one of the managers suggested they just wanted to
    say ``hello'' to put a face on it. And they even suggested that
    counsel for Ms. Lewinsky wanted a court order to force their
    client to testify. Well, as we will all see once the record is
    made available to everyone, that last point is sheer nonsense.
        But I suggest that earlier suggestions that just a friendly
    little chat was all they were looking for is belied by the
    notion of what we have here is the managers using their
    ``institutional role'' to get the independent counsel to join
    with them and use the authority that he has under the immunity
    agreement to threaten Ms. Lewinsky with jail, to threaten her
    with violation of her immunity agreement, and opening up the
    prospect of prosecution if they do not meet in a friendly
    little conversation, just say hello, just like to meet you,
    gathering with the managers.
        Can you imagine what that little conversation is going to
    look like, held in the independent counsel's office, with the
    people there who have the capacity to put Ms. Lewinsky in jail,
    while there is this friendly little conversation, just say
    ``hello,'' normal everyday discussion between the trial lawyer
    and the witness he would like to get to know?
        From the perspective of my client for the moment, putting
    aside the rules which you all agreed on as to how we ought to
    proceed, can we really say that is just normal, just OK, to
    have one side using the might and majesty of the independent
    counsel's office, threatening a witness with violation of an
    immunity agreement if she doesn't agree to fly across the
    country and meet for this friendly little chat? I think not.
        I don't know whether I have a minute or two left. But on
    the issue of conflicts, this is, of course, something that has
    been the subject of much discourse over the last few days. Let
    me just take a couple of examples put to you by Manager
    Hutchinson.
        On the issue of the statements made by the President, Mr.
    Podesta, and Mr. Blumenthal, there is no conflict in the
    testimony here. The President indeed said that he was trying to
    keep his aides from becoming witnesses. He even said that he
    didn't even remember his conversation with Mr. Podesta but he
    took as true--this is what he said to the grand jury--he
    accepted as true that Mr. Blumenthal said this is what that
    conversation sounded like. Mr. Podesta said that is what the
    conversation was. There was no conflict. The President indeed
    adopted in the grand jury what those people would say. And of
    course he didn't put them into the grand jury in order to
    repeat something or to mislead the grand jury as to their
    knowledge of what they told him. They testified truthfully in
    the grand jury when they recited their conversations with the
    President.
        But I want to move just a second to something you have
    never heard before in the entire days that we have been sitting
    here. We heard little hints about how Vernon Jordan might be a
    liar because of what he said about December 11. All of a sudden
    just 5 minutes ago, this body heard for the first time he not
    only may be a liar about the job search, he may be a liar about
    destroying evidence. Words fail me.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Abraham
    to the President's counsel:

        Is it your position that Ms. Lewinsky was lying in her
    grand jury testimony, her grand jury deposition, and her FBI
    interviews when she said that the President engaged in conduct
    with her that constituted ``sexual relations'' even under his
    narrow interpretation of the term in the Jones deposition? Is
    it your position that she was also lying when she gave
    essentially the same account contemporaneously with the
    occurrence of the events to her friends and counselors?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Senator, our position is not that she is
    lying. Our position is that there are two different versions of
    what happened, and there is a discrepancy.
        In my presentation to the Senate, I acknowledged that there
    was a disparity between what the President had recounted and
    what Ms. Lewinsky said happened when it came to recalling and
    reporting these specific rather graphic and intimate details
    concerning their activities. I pointed out that, with respect
    to other essential elements of the relationship, there was no
    disagreement that they acknowledge that there was a
    relationship, that they tried to conceal it. But I also
    suggested--and I suggest to you today--that not every
    disagreement, not every discrepancy, is the foodstuff or the
    subject of a perjury charge.
        I also made the observation that perhaps this kind of
    conflict of testimony as to who touched who, when, where, and
    why, was not the kind of conflict that this institution would
    want to resolve through testimony on the floor. If you have any
    doubts about that point, I would suggest you read Ms.
    Lewinsky's August 20 testimony before the grand jury which is
    very complete and entirely and vigorously dedicated to
    eliciting every single gritty detail of what went on between
    them. I said also that I thought that this disagreement, this
    disparity, was of questionable materiality. Let me explain why.
        On January 29, Judge Wright ruled that Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony about her relationship with President Clinton was
    unnecessary and maybe even inadmissible; that she had had no
    information relating to the core issues of the case. She made
    that ruling after all the allegations about that relationship
    had been made public. And the judge knew what had been reported
    in the newspapers and what was generally understood about it at
    that point. She had been there when the President testified
    about this. And she concluded that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony was
    not required, at least for the Paula Jones case. In truth, Ms.
    Lewinsky was an ancillary or peripheral witness in the Paula
    Jones case. She had absolutely no firsthand knowledge about
    what happened in the Excelsior Hotel when Ms. Jones claimed
    that then-Governor Clinton made an unwelcome sexual overture to
    her. Ms. Lewinsky had nothing to add or subtract, no ability to
    testify about that issue.
        So on the issue of the materiality to the Jones case as to
    the truth of what actually happened between them, it is clear
    it is of questionable, if any, materiality whatsoever. She was
    a peripheral witness on issues not having to do with the core
    issues of the case, and the case had no legal merit.
        Please recall that the judge concluded that the case had no
    legal or evidentiary merit. Please also remember that the Jones
    lawyers, when they were asking these questions of President
    Clinton, presumably knew the answers to these questions about
    the relationship because they had been fully briefed the night
    before.
        Now, as to the question of the materiality of this
    testimony and this issue of who touched whom, when, where and
    why, to the grand jury, let me just say this: The House
    managers claim that one or the other must be lying because both
    cannot be correct. They argue that if you believe Monica
    Lewinsky on this issue, you must disbelieve Bill Clinton, and
    if you disbelieve Bill Clinton, you must conclude that he
    knowingly perjured himself when he denied under oath having
    this kind of contact with Ms. Lewinsky.
        Now, this direct issue was addressed by the panel of expert
    prosecutors that we brought to testify before the Judiciary
    Committee, and they all agreed that this kind of issue would
    never be the subject of a perjury prosecution. I would urge you
    to go back and look at some of the testimony that they gave to
    the Judiciary Committee. They talked about the oath-on-oath
    issue, they talked about what is independent corroborative
    evidence and what is not, and they concluded that no
    reasonable, though responsible, prosecutor would bring this
    kind of case based on that kind of an issue.
        We are not arguing with the managers about the law. We are
    not arguing with the managers about the disparity. We are
    talking about prosecutorial practices, what in reality would be
    a criminal prosecution, and I submit to you that no reasonable,
    no responsible prosecutor would bring this kind of a case based
    on that kind of evidence.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Daschle
    addressed to counsel for the President:

        Do you believe that it is a requirement of due process and
    fairness that you be allowed to participate in the Lewinsky
    witness debriefing sought by the managers, and do you believe
    that the House would have asked for the same right if the White
    House had attempted to interview Ms. Lewinsky?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, that question raises
    an interesting mix of issues, because I think in one respect
    the House managers are correct, that once the Senate determines
    that it is prepared to go forward--I trust it will not--but if
    it does determine that it is prepared to go forward in some way
    with respect to the depositions of witnesses, at that point,
    with the Senate having made that decision, it would be
    appropriate for both sides to seek a voluntary, consensual,
    typical opportunity to meet with any witness in a setting that
    doesn't involve having the prosecutor with life and death
    authority over that witness doing the debriefing or being
    present while you talk to the witness.
        Thus, although I will take the opportunity of offering to
    sit in on any meeting between the managers and the independent
    counsel and any witness, because I would certainly like to know
    what the mood and the atmosphere of that process really sounded
    like, the issue here, I think, is not so much whether it would
    be nice to sit in on that meeting but whether there can be any
    hope for due process, fairness and opportunity for both sides,
    or certainly my side--I won't speak for the managers--to have
    an opportunity for a reasonable, fair and open discussion
    voluntarily with any witness who will talk with us, not--not to
    be too rhetorical about this--with the looming presence of the
    prosecutors sitting in the room with us.
        As everyone who practices in this district knows, indeed,
    it is a matter of law that a prosecutor may never interfere
    with the access of any witness to defense counsel. I can't
    think of much more interference than being required to sit in
    the room with the prosecutor and with another prosecutor while
    that kind of discussion goes on.
        So the answer is, fairness, no. But if it is my only
    opportunity to meet with Ms. Lewinsky, I will take it. But I
    trust that as a matter of due process it will not be.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators DeWine,
    Collins and Murkowski to the House managers:

        With all of the conflicting testimony that exists on the
    record between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie, for example,
    how are we to resolve the questions of perjury and obstruction
    of justice without observing the demeanor of witnesses?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I do not think there is any way to
    resolve the conflicts in their testimony without calling
    witnesses. You can read the transcripts and you can look at
    those and you can try to determine whether there is any
    corroborating evidence, how you can believe it, make some of
    those kinds of evaluations. But particularly whoever you are
    looking at, whether it is Monica Lewinsky or Betty Currie,
    there are followup questions and there is the demeanor that
    allows you to determine who is telling the truth and who you
    believe.
        And in contrast, Mr. Ruff tries to make the point that
    somebody is lying here, and maybe somebody is lying, but a
    jury--in this case the Senators--can look at this and say,
    well, someone is not recalling the same way, someone is more
    believable because their recollection is better, it is
    corroborated, or you could conclude that someone is lying. It
    doesn't always break down that simply, but you have to evaluate
    that. And that is how you resolve it.
        But let me just come back--I think what we see here today
    is the White House counsel do not want to talk about the facts.
    They do not want to talk about this case. They do not want to
    talk about obstruction of justice; just like in the House, they
    want to talk about the process. They want to talk about
    everything that is going on except for the case of obstruction
    of justice. And it probably will be the news story later on
    today, the questions that they have raised about this.
        But the fact is, it is very simple that they have access to
    Betty Currie. Every time the President has talked to and tried
    to coach Betty Currie, I don't think the President invited the
    independent counsel in when this was under investigation, or
    the Paula Jones lawyers. I don't think that happened. I don't
    think that--at least from the news clips, when I saw Betty
    Currie hugging the President, I don't think he invited the
    House managers in. I didn't necessarily expect him to. But we
    have to be prepared.
        And I will just tell you right now, so nobody is surprised,
    if we get to call Vernon Jordan, I don't want to delay the U.S.
    Senate in order to be prepared for that, so I confess today
    that I called up William Hundley, the lawyer for Vernon Jordan,
    to visit with him.
        Now, I hope that if you talk to any witnesses, that if you
    feel it is fair, that you will give us a chance to join with
    you in that. But, obviously, this is an adversary process we
    are engaged in, and I think that we today in this question and
    answer session that you all so graciously extended to us should
    focus on the obstruction of justice charges because that is
    what you have to determine--on the perjury allegation, because
    that is what we have to determine today.
        I thank the Chief Justice and the Senators.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Kohl and
    Edwards to the House managers:

        Throughout this trial both sides have spoken in
    ``absolutes''; that is, if the President engaged in this
    conduct, prosecutors claim he must be convicted and removed
    from office, while the President's lawyers argue that such
    conduct does not in any way rise to an impeachable offense. It
    strikes many of us as a closer call. So let me ask you this:
    Even if the President engaged in the alleged conduct, can
    reasonable people disagree with the conclusion that, as a
    matter of law, he must be convicted and removed from office--
    yes or no?

        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Absolutely. And this is a hard case in
    a couple of areas, and I think it is an easy case in many
    areas.
        The Constitution reads that upon conviction, the person
    shall be removed. You have to put it in the context of the
    judge cases, because that is where it gets to be hard for this
    body. Because of the precedents of the body when you apply the
    same legal standard of high crimes and misdemeanors to the fact
    that a judge who was convicted of perjury was removed by the
    body, and you conclude in your mind that the President
    committed perjury, you have a dynamic you have to work through.
        Mr. Bumpers says there is perjury, then there is perjury. I
    would suggest to you that the allegations of perjury and
    obstruction of justice in this case are not trivial. It is not
    about a speeding ticket or a trivial matter. It is about the
    activity of the President when he was defendant in a lawsuit, a
    sexual harassment lawsuit, when he was told by the Supreme
    Court you have to play and you have to play fairly.
        If you determine that he committed the crime of perjury and
    you determine that he committed the crime of obstruction of
    justice, based on the precedents of the Senate I think you
    would have a hard time saying under the situation of this case
    that that is not a high crime. But I would be the first to
    admit that the Constitution is silent on this question about
    whether or not every high crime has to result in removal.
        If I was sitting where you are, I would probably get down
    on my knees before I made that decision. Because the impact on
    society is going to be real either way. If you find this
    President guilty in your mind, from the facts, that he is a
    perjurer and that he obstructed justice, you have to somehow
    reconcile continued service in light of that event.
        I think it is important for this body to not have a
    disposition plan that doesn't take in consideration the good of
    this Nation. I have argued to you that when you found that a
    judge was a perjurer, you couldn't in good conscience send him
    back in the courtroom because everybody that came in that
    courtroom thereafter would have a real serious doubt.
        I will argue to you that when you find this President
    guilty of perjury, if you do, that he has violated his oath and
    that by a consequence of that, some public trust has been lost.
    And I would show to you the body of evidence from this
    question, ``Do you trust William Jefferson Clinton?''--the
    American people will tell you--three out of four say no. But
    the American people will also tell you that I understand what
    happened here and some want him removed and some don't. And you
    have to consider what is best for this Nation.
        I will yield to Mr. Buyer in a second, but the point that I
    am trying to make, not as articulately as I can, is that I know
    how hard that decision is. It has also been hard for me.
        It has never been hard to find out whether Bill Clinton
    committed perjury or whether he obstructed justice. That
    ``ain't'' a hard one for me. But when you take the good of this
    Nation, the upside and the downside, reasonable people can
    disagree on what we should do.
        Mr. Manager BUYER. I would just like to remind all of you
    that the impeachment process is intended to cleanse the
    executive or the judicial office when it is plagued with such a
    cancer as perjury or obstruction of justice, which violates the
    oath required to hold those high offices.
        Now, what may be turning in the gut of some of you are the
    precedents of the Senate, when in fact you have turned out of
    office, you have exercised your judgments of proportionality
    when these judges violated their oaths and had committed
    perjury, you said they shall be removed from office.
        Now there are some that are going, well, I am uneasy in
    this case with the President. That is what may create a little
    problem here. I would suggest to you that you actually have
    findings of fact; that the Senate has findings of fact that the
    President, in fact--he lied or he did not lie or he committed
    an obstruction; that you actually have findings of fact. And
    then you can move beyond to the questions of application of the
    law.
        But when the Senate has performed such a cleansing and
    removed Judges Nixon, Claiborne and Hastings, all three of them
    impeached for perjury in some form--and in Judge Hastings' case
    even though he had been acquitted of the criminal case--the
    Congress, in particular the Senate, you have a duty to preserve
    the integrity of public office, and that is what impeachment
    was precisely designed to do.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Voinovich, Jeffords and Chafee to the House managers:

        In her interviews with the Office of the Independent
    Counsel, Ms. Lewinsky stated that on January 5, 1998, the
    President told her not to worry about the affidavit because he
    had seen 15 others. Did the President mean that he had seen
    previous drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, or did the
    President mean that he had seen drafts of other affidavits that
    were in some way connected to the Paula Jones matter?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. You can
    take that either way. But I believe in the context--and I
    presented this to you the other day--in which the President
    uttered those words, that the most logical conclusion is that
    he had seen 15 other drafts of hers. If you remember, she was
    discussing with him the issue of whether he wanted to see this
    particular draft of her affidavit. And at that particular
    moment he said, ``No, I don't want to. I have seen 15 others.''
        Technically speaking, he could have seen 15 other
    affidavits in his life somewhere back in Arkansas, who knows?
    But it strikes me that the logical conclusion, the commonsense
    conclusion in the context of everything else that you see this
    President was intent on and had in his mind, and the interest
    that he had already shown from all the conversations that he
    had had with Vernon Jordan and others to make sure that this
    affidavit was on track, and knowing that he was going to
    testify in a few days himself in the Jones case, and rely on it
    and in fact did go in and tell the same cover stories that were
    in this affidavit to the court, untruthfully, that the
    probabilities are pretty good, that common sense says that he
    was saying he had seen 15 other drafts of this version of this
    affidavit. But that is for you to decide. That is a judgment
    call for the triers of fact. Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Leahy to
    counsel for the President:

        Could you reply to the statement just made by Manager
    McCollum?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, on Thursday
    afternoon I went over, in perhaps tedious detail, the facts
    relating to the affidavits. I pointed out that there was no way
    in which--there was no evidence that the President saw any
    affidavit draft. Mr. Manager McCollum just now, I think,
    admitted that he has only a speculation. He doesn't have any
    record evidence. The President denied seeing any affidavit
    draft. I pointed out in the managers' chart 7 that their theory
    about when Ms. Lewinsky could have gotten an affidavit was
    simply wrong because their theory was she got it on January 5.
    This is a single affidavit draft. The evidence plainly shows
    that she could not have gotten it until January 6. There is
    simply nothing in the record--and the independent counsel
    interviewed Ms. Lewinsky extensively, both in interviews and
    before the grand jury--and there is simply no evidence
    whatsoever that the President saw any drafts or, indeed, that
    there were 15 drafts.
        Let me say a word about whether or not we are addressing
    the facts. I am not going to frighten you. I am not going to go
    back through the obstruction of justice evidence. But I think
    if you will remember the presentation--first by Mr. Craig who
    addressed in detail the evidence with regard to perjury, then
    if you will recall what Ms. Mills said addressing two of the
    seven allegations of obstruction of justice, and with what I
    said to you on Thursday afternoon for almost 3 hours--and I
    thank you for your uncommon patience; you were attentive all
    the way through that exercise--you know that we have addressed
    the facts. What we had yesterday, what Mr. Ruff has already
    addressed, is a, again, I will use the word ``remarkable''
    occurrence involving the independent counsel.
        We have addressed the facts, and there is simply nothing to
    support in all this record, this heavy, long record, that the
    President had any review of any affidavit or, indeed, that
    there were more than one or two drafts of Ms. Lewinsky's
    affidavit.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators DeWine,
    Santorum, and Fitzgerald to the President's counsel:

        If we are to assume that the various allegations as to
    obstruction of justice are in fact true, is it your contention
    that if the President tampered with witnesses, encouraged the
    hiding of evidence, and corruptly influenced the filing of a
    false affidavit by a witness, that these acts do not rise to
    the level of an impeachable offense?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this is something I
    won't have an opportunity to say very often, but I believe that
    Mr. Manager Graham has, in fact, stated for you the essential
    of the role that this body must play. We will probably differ
    as to what the right answer to the question is, but as to the
    process and as to the question that must be asked, I think he
    stated it well.
        I believe that the facts do not support the conclusions
    that are embodied in the question. But not only can reasonable
    people differ on the facts, but reasonable people may differ on
    the outcome. And if, indeed, reasonable people can differ,
    doesn't that mean, by the very statement of that proposition,
    that this body cannot meet its constitutional heavy mandate,
    which is to determine whether or not, whatever conduct you
    believe the President committed, as outlined by these managers
    over the last many days--can you legitimately determine that he
    ought to be removed from office.
        And all I can do, I suppose, is to remind you, as I have
    too frequently, I am sure, that if you try to put yourself in
    the minds and the hearts of the men who created our system of
    Government, they wanted to know only really one answer to one
    question, as framed in many different ways, but the essence
    remains the same: Is there a sufficient danger to the state--
    danger to the state--to warrant what my colleagues across the
    aisle here have called the political death penalty. And I think
    the answer to that is no.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator
    Wellstone to counsel for the President:

        To what extent should the views of the American people be
    taken into account in considering whether a President should be
    removed from office?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think that the
    answer to that question is not the polls that you read in the
    newspapers or that you see on your evening news, whatever those
    numbers may be; that is only one clue as to what the American
    people are thinking. And each of you knows the people in your
    jurisdiction far better than any polltaker does and that
    certainly I do.
        But surely one way to test the ultimate question that I
    just described in response to the last inquiry from the
    Republican side of the House, is to ask yourself, on the basis
    of experience over the last year, on the basis of your
    experience in the political--and by that I mean political in
    the very best constitutional sense of the term as used by
    Alexander Hamilton--as to your sense of the political structure
    of this country and what the people are saying to you and what
    your sense of their needs is: Do they need the kind of
    cleansing that Manager Buyer spoke about?
        I think the answer to that, if you look within the body of
    people you are most familiar with, must be no. This isn't to
    say that it is a popularity contest, that we ought to go out
    and have a referendum or another poll before you all decide on
    this. But surely the sense of the people, the will of the
    people, the belief of the people in this President's ability to
    govern must educate each of you, not mandate a result, but
    surely guide the result that you reach in this proceeding.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Collins
    to the House managers:

        The President's counsel has made much of Ms. Lewinsky's
    statement that no one ``promised'' her a job for her silence.
    She did not testify, however, that no one promised her a job in
    return for a false affidavit--or, for that matter, that no one
    implied that she would get a job for her cooperation. Can you
    think of any reason why we should not call Ms. Lewinsky to help
    clarify such ambiguous testimony?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. That
    is an excellent question and really goes to the heart of some
    of the disputes.
        I think as you read the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, as you
    read some of the other areas of testimony, questions come to
    your mind. You would like to follow up, you would like to ask
    her a question, and that one comes out and flags you that that
    is a question that would like to be asked: No one promised her
    a job for her silence, and that is the testimony that she gave
    in response to a question in the grand jury.
        But I believe this is a case in which actions speak louder
    than words. I think that actions and what took place and the
    commonsense understanding of what is happening here demonstrate
    the case that there was a false affidavit that was obtained and
    that was in conjunction with the obtaining of a job for Monica
    Lewinsky.
        So I think that is a natural question, and I think that
    also if you read, if you look at the testimony of Monica
    Lewinsky, I think it is clear that the case is made that she
    was encouraged to lie and she was also encouraged to sign a
    false affidavit and she was also provided a job coincidentally
    at the same time.
        I would like to take the opportunity, if I might, Mr. Chief
    Justice, in further answering a question that was raised
    earlier; it was on the false affidavit. That is, I think,
    related to the question as well.
        During Mr. Kendall's presentation a few days ago, he made
    this statement:

        The idea that the telephone call [between Lewinsky and
    Clinton on January 5] is about that affidavit is sheer,
    unsupported speculation and, even worse, it is speculation
    demolished by fact.

        This is the statement that Mr. Kendall gave the other day
    on this floor, as cited in the Congressional Record,
    summarizing his presentation that the idea that Clinton and
    Lewinsky talked about the affidavit ``is sheer, unsupported
    speculation and . . . demolished by fact.''
        Well, the record demonstrates that Monica Lewinsky's
    testimony is that she had a conversation with the President on
    the telephone in which she asked questions about the affidavit.
    She was concerned about signing that affidavit. And according
    to Ms. Lewinsky, the President said, ``Well, you could always
    say the people in Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped
    you get it.'' And that is in reference to a paragraph in the
    particular affidavit.
        Now, my question to Mr. Kendall is, Would you agree, Mr.
    Kendall, that your assertion that there is no support for it in
    the Record is that you are totally rejecting the testimony of
    Monica Lewinsky as totally unbelievable? And once again you
    have a conflict that is presented in the testimony, and there
    is only one way to resolve it, and that is to hear from the key
    witnesses.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator
    Lautenberg to counsel for the President:

        Could you reply to the question put by the manager?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, let me address the
    first part of Mr. Manager Hutchinson's response; and that is,
    whether the statement by Ms. Lewinsky that ``Nobody ever
    promised me a job for my silence'' covered other possible
    promises to her. And it is quite clear, when you read all the
    interviews that were done of her by the independent counsel,
    all the grand jury testimony, that she unequivocally testified
    there were no promises made to her, there were no assistances
    given to her, that were in any way conditioned upon her
    testifying a certain way or giving a certain kind of affidavit.
    And she is unequivocal about that.
        Now, in the statement that she made that I quoted, she does
    not say nobody ever did these other things, but she said that
    in her previous testimony. She uses the offer of a job as
    simply a proxy for anything that would connect the assistance
    she would receive with testifying in a certain way. There is
    simply no evidence anywhere in the record. And the independent
    counsel covered that with her in detail. She felt compelled to
    volunteer her statement at the end of the process because they
    had left some innuendo in the record that she had been provided
    assistance. But her testimony is unequivocal. I have quoted it.
        Now, the only testimony in the record about linking the job
    to some assistance in the Jones case comes from the Linda Tripp
    audiotapes. And, again, Ms. Lewinsky could not be clearer in
    her grand jury testimony what she told Linda Tripp was false.
    There was no connection there whatsoever. Her proffer, which I
    put up on the board, was quite unconditional. And this you have
    in your materials. This is in her own handwriting: Neither the
    President nor Mr. Jordan nor anyone on their behalf asked or
    encouraged her to lie.
        So with regard to the first part of Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson's question, there is simply no evidence, again, that
    any kind of assistance to Ms. Lewinsky was conditioned on her
    performance in any way in the Jones case.
        Now, with regard to the affidavit, I stand on what I said
    before you on Thursday. And I want to be very clear about what
    Mr. Hutchinson's presentation was in chart No. 7 that I was
    responding to. And I think it is quite important to recall
    yesterday that a question was addressed to the House managers
    whether there were any statements contained in their exhibits
    which contained misrepresentations or omissions that, in the
    interest of fairness to justice, they would like to correct;
    and Mr. Manager Hutchinson said, ``We are not aware of any
    corrections that need to be made on any of our exhibits offered
    to the Senate.''
        I would simply rest on the presentation. I am not going to
    take you through, again, the many errors in the charts. Those
    were not refuted in any way. They rested on their charts. I
    leave that to your judgment.
        But with regard to chart 7, what Mr. Manager Hutchinson
    told you almost a week ago was that chart 7 was a summary of
    what happened on January 5: Ms. Lewinsky meets with her
    attorney, Mr. Carter, for an hour; Carter drafts the affidavit
    for Ms. Lewinsky; she calls the President; the President
    returns Ms. Lewinsky's call; and then they had a discussion
    about this draft affidavit.
        The point of my demonstration through Mr. Carter's
    testimony and through his billing records was in fact that the
    affidavit had been drafted the next day. They could not have
    had a discussion about the affidavit on that date. And I think
    the record is quite clear on that.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Lott to
    the House managers:

        Do you have any comment on the answer given by the
    President's counsel with regard to the views of the American
    people?

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    Senators, this is a fascinating question. Edmund Burke was
    asked that once, and he said that a member of Parliament owes
    the highest degree of fidelity to his constituents, but he
    doesn't owe his conscience to anybody.
        We have, or we have not, a representative democracy. We are
    not delegates who are sent here to weigh our mail every day and
    then to vote accordingly. Our work here is not an ongoing
    plebiscite. We are elected to bring our judgment, our
    experience, and our consciences with us here.
        I have always believed--and I believe more firmly than
    ever; and this experience confirms me in that belief--there are
    issues of transcendent importance that you have to be willing
    to lose your office over. I can think of several that I am
    willing to lose my office over--abortion is one; national
    defense is another; strengthening, not emasculating, the
    concept of equal justice under the law. My life is devoted, as
    a lawyer--I have been on the Judiciary Committee; this is my
    25th year--and equal justice under the law is what moves me and
    animates me and consumes me. And I am willing to lose my seat
    any day in the week rather than sell out on those issues.
        Despite all the polls and all the hostile editorials,
    America is hungry for people who believe in something. You may
    disagree with us, but we believe in something.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we recess the proceedings for 15 minutes.
        There being no objection, at 11:19 a.m., the Senate
    recessed until 11:36 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. We will go
    approximately another hour, if questions are still available--
    and I assume they will be--and then we will break for about an
    hour for lunch.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Biden to
    the House managers:

        If a Senator believes that the President may have lied to
    the American people, his family and his aides, and that some of
    his answers before the grand jury were misleading or half-
    truths, but that he could not be convicted in a court of law
    for either perjury or obstruction of justice, is it the opinion
    of the House managers that his actions still justify removing
    the President from office?

        Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I have
    taken two public oaths in my career in the service of the
    people of this great land. One was as a Member of Congress; the
    other was as a U.S. attorney. As a U.S. attorney, it was my job
    on behalf of the people of the United States to prosecute cases
    against individuals and other entities that violated the
    Criminal Code of the United States of America. That Criminal
    Code, as you are well aware, includes the offenses of perjury
    and obstruction of justice.
        That Criminal Code does not include the offenses of lying
    to one's family. That is not what brings us here today. What
    brings us here today is the belief by the House of
    Representatives in lawful public vote that this President
    violated, in numerous respects, his oath of office and the
    Criminal Code of the United States of America--in particular,
    that he committed perjury and obstruction of justice.
        I can tell you, as a U.S. attorney serving under two
    Presidents, that I would prosecute these cases, because I did
    prosecute such cases. I prosecuted cases against people,
    including members of the body from which we as managers come,
    who appeared before grand juries and lied, who appeared before
    grand juries and misled grand juries, people who obstructed
    justice, people who tampered with witnesses in precisely the
    same way that this President has committed perjury, tampered
    with witnesses and obstructed justice.
        We respectfully submit to the Senators of the United States
    of America assembled here today that these are prosecutable
    cases, that they are cases that have been prosecuted, and that
    the question before this body, we respectfully submit, in the
    House of Representatives' articles of impeachment, is not that
    the President lied to his family. What is before this body, we
    respectfully submit, as contained in the two articles of
    impeachment passed by the House of Representatives, is that
    this President violated his oath of office and committed the
    offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice, which we firmly
    believe on behalf of the people of the United States of America
    provide a sufficient basis on which this body, exercising its
    deliberative power and its legitimate jurisdiction, may find
    that this President, as people in courts of law similarly but
    not identically situated are indeed found guilty and removed
    from positions of trust, as this President ought to be for
    committing the perjury and obstruction of justice--not lying to
    his family.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Snowe,
    Mack, Chafee, Burns, and Craig to the House managers:

        Before Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed in the Jones case, the
    President refused on five separate occasions--November 3,
    November 10, November 12, November 17, and December 6--to
    produce information about gifts from Lewinsky. The President's
    counsel argued the President was unconcerned about these gifts.
    If that is the case, why didn't he produce these gifts in
    November and December?

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators
    for the question. This case needs to be looked at for the
    mosaic that it is.
        There is a reason why the President never produced gifts.
    There is a reason why the President continued to give Ms.
    Lewinsky gifts. It is because he believed that she would never
    produce them. We know that from her testimony.
        In my presentation to the Senate a week ago, I quoted from
    the transcript where she said, ``Nobody ever asked me to lie.''
    But then she also said there was never any doubt but that
    ``we'' would deny the relationship if asked.
        We see that throughout the entire proceeding. We see that
    before Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on the list--on December
    5--on the witness list. And we especially see it after. In
    fact, Monica Lewinsky went to the President and said, ``I've
    been subpoenaed. They are asking for gifts. What should I do?
    Maybe I should give them to Betty.'' And the President said,
    ``Let me think about that.'' And we all know by now that within
    a few hours Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky and came and
    retrieved the gifts, not to give them to the Jones lawyers
    pursuant to the subpoena, not to cooperate with the sexual
    harassment lawsuit; she took the gifts and she put them under
    her bed.
        Members of this body, it begs common sense for any
    interpretation of that conduct to be somehow cooperative with
    the legal proceedings in the sexual harassment case. Every
    piece of this puzzle, when put together, demonstrates a very
    clear pattern of obstructing justice, not to cover up personal
    affairs, not to cover up an indiscretion, but to destroy Paula
    Jones' rights under the sexual harassment laws of this country
    to have her day in court. That is the ultimate question that
    this body is going to have to address.
        Yes, reasonable minds can differ on this case as to whether
    the President should be removed office. But reasonable minds
    can only differ if those reasonable minds come to the
    conclusion that enforcement of the sexual harassment laws in
    this country are less important than the preservation of this
    man in the office of the Presidency. And that is the ultimate
    question that this body is going to have to answer. What is
    more important--the survival of Bill Clinton's Presidency in
    the face of perjury and obstruction of justice, or the
    protection of the sexual harassment laws in this country?
        And imagine, every victim in the workplace will be waiting
    for your answer.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Daschle to the
    House managers:

        Will you agree to arrange to have prepared a verbatim,
    unedited transcript of any debriefing which may occur with Ms.
    Lewinsky for immediate distribution to the Senate? And will you
    agree also to provide for the inclusion of any such debriefing
    of representatives of the Senate, one selected by the majority
    and one by the minority?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the
    Senate, it is not our intent to be doing a deposition, a formal
    presentation, a preparation for the Senate, if we talk to Ms.
    Lewinsky. It is our intent to do what any good attorney would
    do in preparing to go to trial, presuming--we don't know that
    you are going to allow us to have witnesses--but presuming we
    are going to be able to depose and have witnesses, and that is
    to meet with the witness, talk with the witness, and prepare
    the witness. And any good attorney who does that is going to
    meet his or her witness in their own confidences, in their own
    quiet respite. We discover things that way. We are not
    prepared. No. The answer to your question is no, we are not
    prepared to say we are going to give you our work product,
    which is what that would be.
        ``Work product'' is a technical term of law which, for
    anybody who is out in the public, is what lawyers do all the
    time. And they work on their case, and they prepare what they
    are going to do, and then they present it. That is the system
    we have.
        Somebody said--I think it was Mr. Hutchinson who said
    earlier--this is an adversarial position. The White House
    counsel will have their chance to talk to witnesses that they
    are going to present; we will have our chance to talk to ours.
    Then there is the opportunity for the depositions, which is
    what comes next, which is the formal proceedings when we both
    have a chance to talk with them. Then, of course, if you let us
    call them as witnesses here, they will be here, and they will
    get cross-examined, and examined, and all the questions you can
    imagine will be asked. That is the traditional American system
    of justice.
        So, no, we would not give you our work product notes. We
    have no idea what would be in them. We don't think that is
    appropriate. We think that a lot is being made out of this. We
    attempted to do this a couple of weeks ago. We would have liked
    to have talked to her earlier. It has not worked, that we have
    been permitted to, for reasons that we are not sure. But the
    reality is, this is the normal process. We would talk to any
    other witness despite however the White House counsel wants to
    argue about it. They do the same thing.
        I yield what time I have left to Mr. Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I would like to echo the work product
    analogy.
        But let me just say this as directly as I know how to say
    it--that if this body as a whole believes we are going to do
    anything improper, then whatever rule you need to fashion to
    make sure we don't, you do it, because nobody should ever doubt
    whether a witness comes into this body in this case with
    anything other than testimony that was truthful. If you want to
    go down the road of the atmosphere that people were approached
    and how they were treated about being witnesses, let's go down
    that road together. Let's bring in people in this body and
    let's see how they were approached when they were asked to
    participate in this trial, what the atmosphere and the mood
    was, when it comes to their time to be identified as witnesses.
        So I would just say as strongly as I know how that if you
    have any doubt about us and what we are up to, you fashion
    rules so we do not create an unfairness in this body; but
    please, when we ask for witnesses and we raise doubt about how
    people may have been treated, that you give us the same
    opportunity to explore the moods and atmosphere of those
    witnesses.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is to the House managers
    from Senators Murkowski, Gregg, Grams, Thomas, Crapo, Thompson
    and Hatch:

        The President's counsel rely upon the President's
    statements in many instances. Therefore, the President's
    credibility is at issue. Is the President's credibility
    affected by the fact that, until the DNA evidence surfaced, the
    President denied any improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the Senators.
        First, I don't think it was a compliment to me from my
    colleagues that as soon as the issue of DNA came up, they all
    pointed to me and told me to come up and answer the question. I
    will do my best.
        Obviously, as the triers of fact, Members of this body
    individually will have to make determinations respecting
    credibility of the President as well as the other witnesses. It
    is indisputable, however, that from January 1998, when he spoke
    at the deposition, until August 17, when he made a quasi-
    admission before the grand jury, there were intervening factors
    that required him to change his position.
        We saw from the moment the story first broke in the press
    about Monica Lewinsky the President making denials in the most
    emphatic of ways, and not only doing it repeatedly himself but
    sending out his Cabinet and his aides and his friends to do it
    on his behalf. That continued up until the eve of the
    deposition. Was it because the President suddenly had a change
    of heart? Was it because his conscience was suddenly bearing
    down upon him? Or were there other reasons? Well, let's see.
        Just before his deposition testimony, Monica Lewinsky
    decided to cooperate with the Office of Independent Counsel.
    Monica Lewinsky suddenly turned over a blue dress. And that is
    fascinating because, as you know from the record and you have
    heard from the presentations, the President was prepared to
    take Monica Lewinsky and trash her in a very public way until
    the dress was turned over to the FBI. Remember what he said to
    Sidney Blumenthal. He called her a stalker. He said that she
    was threatening him. But he no longer could make these
    presentations publicly or privately once he knew there was
    potential physical evidence.
        So I think there are a number of factors Members of this
    body can look at with respect to credibility just from the cold
    record. But if that is not enough, if Members of this body are
    not satisfied that they are able to resolve these issues of
    credibility, then the way to handle this is to follow the
    dictates of the Constitution and our Framers who understood the
    value of trial and bringing witnesses forward, placing them
    under oath and giving the triers of fact the opportunity to see
    the witnesses, to hear their testimony, to gauge their
    credibility.
        That is what the purpose of a trial is for. And the House
    managers entrust this body to make sure that at the end of the
    day this is more than a proceeding; this is an arena where the
    truth will be determined not just for our time but for history.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Murray to
    counsel for the President:

        Could you reply to the comments of Manager Rogan?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. The existence of DNA or any other
    evidence or any other events before the President's grand jury
    testimony had no bearing whatsoever on his determination which
    he carried out on that day in the middle of August to answer
    the grand jurors' questions truthfully. He did so. It may be
    that the managers can speculate about, well, there must have
    been some reason why in the middle of August, after some months
    of denying to the Nation and his family any misconduct, he
    changed his mind and told the truth. But there was one reason
    why he did that. Because he went before the grand jury for the
    United States District Court of the District of Columbia and
    told the truth.
        Now, it has been suggested by many of the managers over the
    last day that the President was somehow anxious to--or
    contemplated the prospect of, as they put it, trashing Ms.
    Lewinsky. This issue was raised yesterday and has been raised
    again by Mr. Manager Rogan. I think it is time to set that
    record straight.
        Mr. Manager Bryant yesterday, as he was discussing the Dick
    Morris issue, purported to recite from the independent
    counsel's referral and purported to describe a conversation
    between the President and Mr. Morris in which, to quote from
    Mr. Manager Bryant, ``According to Morris, the President warned
    him''--that is, Mr. Morris, he warned the President--excuse me.
    Let me start before that.

        Later the next day, the President has a followup
    conversation with Mr. Morris, in the evening, and says that
    he--

        That is, the President--

    is considering holding a press conference to blast Monica
    Lewinsky out of the water. But Mr. Morris urges caution. He
    says, ``Be careful.''

        And that he warned the President not to be too hard on her.
        Well, 180 degrees off from that description, let me read
    you what, in fact, the independent counsel's office referral
    says, and I am sure it was just a slip of the read that you
    heard yesterday.

        The President had a followup conversation with Mr. Morris
    during the evening of January 22nd, 1998--

        This is page 127 of the independent counsel's referral--

    when Mr. Morris was considering holding a press conference to
    ``blast Monica Lewinsky `out of the water.' '' The President
    told Mr. Morris to ``be careful.'' According to Mr. Morris, the
    President warned him not to ``be too hard on [Ms. Lewinsky]''.
    . .

        Close. Close. One hundred eighty degrees off. Beyond that,
    let me be very clear about one proposition which has been a
    subtheme running through some of the comments of the managers
    over the last many days. The White House, the President, the
    President's agents, the President's spokespersons, no one has
    ever trashed, threatened, maligned or done anything else to
    Monica Lewinsky--no one.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Hutchison of Texas, Snowe, Allard, Collins and Hatch to the
    House managers:

        The counsel for the President have said that the heart of
    this case is private consensual sex. A tenet of sexual
    harassment law, however, is that the implied power relationship
    between a supervisor (in this case, the President), and a
    subordinate (in this case an intern), is enough to constitute
    sexual harassment.
        This is well settled in military law and is developing
    along this line in the civilian sector. In your view, how might
    acquittal of this case affect laws regarding sexual harassment?

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, the law of sexual
    harassment is a relatively new genre. If somebody wanted to
    make a case before the Congress had stepped in and improved
    upon the law, it essentially reduced women in the workplace,
    for instance, who had been harassed into what has been referred
    to as a ``he said-she said'' type of argument, and so the law
    has improved upon that type of argument because the law
    recognizes today that sometimes there can be evidence of a
    pattern of conduct, and that conduct is relevant to prove how
    somebody may have behaved.
        Consider what would happen if victims of the workplace get
    a message from the Congress of the United States that what the
    President did with Paula Jones, or allegedly did with Paula
    Jones, is of no constitutional significance here. It would send
    a message to every woman in the workplace that if they have a
    complaint against an employer who is attempting to use a
    position of power and authority to pursue improper advancement,
    the message would be that you might as well just keep quiet
    about it because the person can lie in court and suffer no
    recrimination. First, they will probably never be discovered,
    because most of the time DNA evidence doesn't suddenly appear,
    but even if DNA evidence does appear to corroborate the victim,
    the message is that as long as he is appropriately apologetic
    and the lie was, after all, only about sex, it is of no import
    with respect to removing them from their job or having them
    suffer any legal consequences. I think that would be a horrible
    message.
        The reason the law allows this pattern-of-conduct evidence
    is because sexual harassers operate in a unique way. They get
    their victims alone. They typically don't commit these crimes
    under the glare of klieg lights or in front of television
    cameras or where witnesses can testify. They get their victims
    alone for one reason--because they know through intimidation
    and fear one of two things will happen. Through intimidation or
    fear, the victim will submit; or through intimidation or fear,
    the victim will not submit but will keep their mouth shut about
    it.
        What is the message to these victims who do brave losing
    their job, being destroyed publicly, having their reputations
    destroyed? What is the message to them if, when they come
    forward and they want to pursue their case, we take the legal
    view that somebody can perjure himself, somebody can lie,
    somebody can obstruct justice, somebody in the greatest
    position of power in our country can take whatever steps are
    necessary to destroy that woman's claim in a court of law where
    she is entitled to pursue it if at the end of all of this we
    say: Well, you know, he was embarrassed, he did lie but it was
    only about sex? Lies in sexual harassment cases, Members of the
    Senate, are always only about sex.
        The question before this body is, what type of validity are
    we going to give these laws and what sort of message are we
    going to send to victims in the workplace? I pray that we can
    put personal relationships aside with respect to how people
    individually feel about this President personally and how they
    feel about his administration and focus on what is the ultimate
    conclusion legally and what is the precedent that would be set
    if we turned a blind eye to this sort of conduct.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators Boxer,
    Feinstein, Landrieu, Mikulski and Murray to counsel for the
    President.

        Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed the relationship was other
    than consensual and was not Ms. Jones' case dismissed as having
    no claim recognized by law?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. No. And yes. Indeed, as Mr. Manager Rogan
    has told you, and others before him on the managers' side, our
    sexual harassment laws and our civil rights laws are of
    critical importance to all of us. My colleague, Ms. Mills,
    spoke eloquently on that subject a couple of days ago.
        But it is important to understand, I believe, with no sense
    at all that we are in any way diminishing the importance of
    those laws and of the rights of every American citizen to seek
    justice under those laws, that we are talking about a case in
    which the trial judge determined that on all the evidence that
    had been gathered and all the claims that plaintiff had made
    and all the discovery that had been taken, there was no case.
    That is justice. That is the way the system works. The
    plaintiff brings the claim, the process moves ahead, and a
    judge ultimately makes the decision. And this didn't have
    anything to do with what President Clinton said in his
    deposition on January 17. What the judge ruled was, first, that
    that evidence was irrelevant to her consideration; and then
    ultimately, in April of last year, that there simply was no
    case.
        We accept the results of the justice system whether they go
    against us or whether they go for us. In either event, it is
    justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Thompson
    to the House managers:

        Is there any reason to believe that there is any
    relationship between the President telling Mr. Blumenthal that
    Ms. Lewinsky was a stalker and expressing his frustration about
    not being able to get his story out with the fact that shortly
    thereafter negative stories about Ms. Lewinsky, including the
    allegation that she was a stalker, began to appear in news
    articles quoting sources at the White House?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Well, I appreciate that question.
    And thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Because I made a note of Mr.
    Ruff's statement that no one--and I believe he specified the
    President, his aides, or no one has ever trashed or spoken
    ill--used some other words--of Monica Lewinsky. It really
    caught me as striking, in light of the sworn grand jury
    testimony of Sidney Blumenthal. And, of course, he is
    testifying as to what the President told him. And, of course,
    in that conversation the President told Sidney Blumenthal, as
    described by Mr. Blumenthal, that: Monica Lewinsky came at me
    and made a sexual demand on me. I rebuffed her. The President
    said: I have gone down that road before, I have caused pain for
    a lot of people. I am not going to do that again. She,
    referring to Monica Lewinsky, threatened the President. This is
    the President's statement. It goes on and describes it; she was
    known as a stalker.
        In my understanding that is trashing, that is speaking ill,
    that is being very critical and doing everything you can to
    basically destroy her reputation.
        Now, why was he telling Sidney Blumenthal that? Was he
    trying to use Sidney Blumenthal to get the message out to the
    public and to the grand jury, who might hear this, that she is
    not a believable person? That the whole idea is that she came
    on to him, that threatened the President of the United States?
    I think--I don't understand Mr. Ruff's representation to the
    Senators that no one, including the President or aides, has
    ever trashed Monica Lewinsky.
        Now, I think it is important also, at that particular point
    in time, the President knew that Sidney Blumenthal and John
    Podesta would be a witness before the grand jury. That was his
    testimony. That is what the President of the United States
    admitted to. He said he knew that they were going to be
    witnesses. And, clearly, that constitutes obstruction of
    justice; when he knows that they are going to be a witness, he
    gives them false information knowing they are going to repeat
    it to the grand jury, and that is an element of one of the
    pillars of obstruction.
        I want to come back to some things that have been said
    about the Jones case. First of all, it has been characterized
    as a ``no win'' case--that Judge Susan Webber Wright issued
    that order.
        Well, if the truth had been known, what we know now about
    the relationship, about the pattern of conduct, would that have
    made a difference? And, of course, when those facts came out it
    was right before a decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of
    Appeals that might have reversed Judge Wright's order that the
    President of the United States made a decision he could settle
    this case for eight hundred and something thousand dollars.
        What would have happened? Maybe Paula Jones would not have
    had to have gone through that many years of litigation if the
    truth had just come out.
        But there was a pattern of obstruction of justice, of
    lying, of coaching witnesses, of tampering with witnesses,
    which ultimately led to a defeat of that case and the truth not
    coming out. But when it came out, it made a difference; it made
    a difference for that plaintiff in that civil rights case.
        Senator Hutchison asked a question about whether the power
    of the position makes the difference in sexual harassment
    cases. Let me assure you, if there is any chief executive
    officer of any company, whether it was consensual or not, with
    an intern or a young person half of the officer's age and
    whether it was--whatever they termed it at that point, whether
    it was a subordinate employee--and that is the key language,
    ``subordinate employee,'' then, yes, Senator, it does make a
    difference, and that is the crux of many cases that are brought
    into court to protect women against sexual harassment in the
    workplace. I think it is a linchpin of this act that this
    Congress passed. So I think that when you look at the overall
    picture, there is that pattern of obstruction of justice.
        Senator Biden asked a question, Would any prosecutor bring
    this case forward? Let me tell you, it would be easier--and I
    say this with great deference to the Senate--but it would be
    easier to win a conviction beyond any reasonable doubt, and I
    could win a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in a court in
    this country on obstruction of justice because I know that
    common sense permeates a jury panel whenever they hear this
    case and the perjury--they are not going to buy, they are not
    going to accept what ``is'' is. They understand what these
    words mean, and common sense will apply. And I know that common
    sense exists in the Senate of the United States.
        But let me assure you that this is a case that I would
    bring forth without any hesitation, and I believe the proof
    would demonstrate a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Kennedy to
    the counsel for the President:

        Could you reply to Mr. Hutchinson's allegations?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I think it important, because the
    question put to the House managers, Mr. Chief Justice, was
    whether there was some effort or some relationship between Ms.
    Lewinsky and a series of articles or stories that supposedly
    appeared in the early days following the revelation of this
    investigation--I think it is important to recognize what the
    real facts are here.
        This was the point made at the very end of my testimony
    before the House Judiciary Committee on December 9. One of the
    members of that committee spoke at great length and quite
    heatedly about what he believed to have been a plan to
    disseminate unfavorable information in the press, and he
    submitted for the record a number of newspaper articles.
        The articles that he submitted, which were largely spun off
    of one Associated Press story, did not contain two--at least
    two--statements that made it very clear that the accusation
    that there was some effort on the part of the White House to
    disseminate disparaging information were simply false.
        In an Associated Press story of January 31, which was used
    by a member of the House Judiciary Committee as one of his
    examples of how the White House was supposedly coordinating
    such an attack, there was omitted the following portion. This
    is a statement by Ann Lewis, who is the White House
    communications director:

        To anyone who was saying such things about Ms. Lewinsky,
    either it reflected a lack of coordination or thought or adult
    judgment. We are not going down that road. It is not the issue.
    A discussion of other people is not appropriate.

        That is on January 31. Retrospectively, when Ms. Lewinsky
    had already begun to cooperate with the independent counsel,
    the Los Angeles Times wrote the following:

        From the beginning, the White House has been careful about
    what it has said of Ms. Lewinsky. The week the Lewinsky story
    broke in January, Clinton's press secretary, Mike McCurry,
    signaled the tone the White House would take by deflecting
    questions about whether the 24-year-old intern was less than
    stable.

        Mr. McCurry:

        ``I can't imagine anyone in a responsible position at the
    White House would be making such an assertion. I've heard some
    expressions of sympathy for what clearly someone who is a young
    person would be going through at a moment like this.'' And
    McCurry quickly signaled that the marching orders had not
    changed once Lewinsky made a deal with the independent counsel,
    Kenneth Starr, for immunity from prosecution.

        I think it is important that the record be clear that the
    stories about which the managers were asked in their last
    question simply never reflected any plan, coordinated or
    uncoordinated, to do anything other than treat Ms. Lewinsky
    with respect.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question doesn't show which
    Senators are submitting it.
        Mr. LOTT. Senator Hatch.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Hatch:

        Isn't it true that Chief Federal District Judge Johnson
    ruled today--in an order that she authorized to be released to
    the public--that Ms. Lewinsky's immunity agreement, which
    requires her ``to make herself available for any interviews
    upon reasonable requests,'' compels her to submit to an
    interview with the House? What light does this shed on the
    earlier debate on this matter?

        I am sorry, it is addressed to the House managers.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I think certainly
    having come from an experience of practicing law and learned so
    much over the years and trying cases and putting together cases
    in an ethical and appropriate fashion, to come into a political
    proceeding, and as we have dealt with this, and I think as the
    lawyers to my left had to deal with the same type of situation,
    in a political realm, not just in the Senate, but months and
    weeks before we came in to here, is very difficult.
        What we have seen this morning is a completely innocent
    standard practice of sitting down with a potential witness
    before you have to list your witnesses Monday and deciding
    whether or not you want to use her.
        They have talked about lawyers committing malpractice by
    not taking depositions. I submit it would be close to that if
    you don't talk to a witness before you call that witness.
    Certainly, while the OIC has had communication with her over
    some time, we have not. We have not had contact with any of
    these witnesses.
        I alluded earlier to the White House and the other
    witnesses that work for the White House that we might be
    looking at calling. I must presume by this conversation in this
    area of questioning that they have not had any contact about
    this case with Ms. Currie and Mr. Podesta and Mr. Blumenthal,
    and even a friend of the White House, Mr. Vernon Jordan. We are
    not asking we be privy to every time they say hello in the
    hallway to these people or may sit down and talk with them. We
    understand the realities of life. We simply just wanted that
    crazy idea that maybe we ought to talk to a witness before we
    decide whether or not we want to list that witness.
        I think to answer that question--and I will sit down--Judge
    Johnson clearly vindicated this right to do that, to accomplish
    that through the immunity agreement. I apologize if we have
    offended the Senators. We certainly didn't intend to do that.
    We certainly didn't intend to break any rules about this, and
    we don't think we did.
        Certainly, if we are going to go down that road, and if you
    see it is appropriate that we have a rule you can agree on, we
    would be happy to abide by that, but we would simply like equal
    treatment with the other witnesses, also with the White House
    and their attorneys. Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is to the House managers
    from Senators Collins and Feingold:

        On the basis of the President's and Betty Currie's
    testimony concerning their conversation on Sunday, January 18,
    1998, have each of the elements of obstruction of justice under
    18 U.S.C., section 1503, or witness tampering under 18 U.S.C.,
    section 1512, been met? We are particularly interested in your
    analysis of whether the Senate can infer that President Clinton
    intended to corruptly influence or persuade Ms. Currie to
    testify falsely and the weight to be given Ms. Currie's
    testimony in that regard.

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. The answer is that, under 18 U.S.C.
    section 1503, there is a case for witness tampering in the
    conversation between President Clinton and Betty Currie.
        I want to refer you to a case, United States v. Shannon,
    which is an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case decided
    October 12, 1987. And for you lawyers here, it has been
    Shepardized. It is good law, and it really puts this into
    perspective.
        In the case, the defendant contended that the evidence did
    not support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. section 1503 because
    the Government did not prove that the witness in this case,
    Gray, was ever a witness before the grand jury or that the
    defendant knew that that person was going to be a witness
    before the grand jury. And this is what the court said:

        This argument is . . . without merit. A conviction under
    section 1503 for attempting to influence a witness is
    appropriate so long as there is a possibility that the target
    of the defendant's activities will be called upon to testify in
    an official proceeding.

        Now, this gentleman, this defendant, Mr. Shannon, went to
    jail. He made the defense that, ``Well, I didn't--you know,
    that person was never called as a witness, it was never an
    official proceeding,'' and it didn't fly. He was convicted. It
    was affirmed by the court and, presumably, he went to jail.
    Now, that is the law of the land in the criminal courts of our
    country. And so there would be a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
    section 1503.
        In this case you have much more because, as I pointed out
    yesterday in reference to Betty Currie, Betty Currie was
    clearly a witness. They left that deposition knowing she would
    be a witness. The Jones attorneys went back and immediately
    worked on issuing a subpoena for her because they had to have
    her because the President asserted her name continually through
    that. The President knew she was going to be a witness. He came
    back and engaged in one conversation where he coached her
    testimony. He tampered with her testimony. It wasn't enough, so
    2 days later he brought her back in again and did the exact
    same thing. The legal question is, As a prospective witness, is
    she covered under the obstruction of justice statute? The
    answer is, yes, because other people go to jail for exactly the
    same thing.
        But I think we need to take a step back a moment. This U.S.
    Senate is not bound by the strictures of the U.S. Criminal
    Code. If I came in here today and said, ``Well, under the
    criminal procedures of the land, I'm entitled to bring
    witnesses and I'm entitled to cross-examine, and I'm entitled
    to do this, and we need to follow the criminal procedure
    code,'' you would say, ``No. This is the Senate of the United
    States.'' And you would rightfully say that. You set your own
    rules in this.
        And the same thing is true with the criminal law of the
    land. I think that we make a criminal case for obstruction of
    justice that can be prosecuted, as other people are in every
    courtroom in this land. But that is not the burden here. The
    issue is, Is this an impeachable offense? And something that is
    much higher is at stake, and that is the public trust, the
    integrity of our Government, much more than in United States v.
    Shannon. And that is what you are dealing with.
        So we can debate the criminal code all day--and we win all
    that--but we have to talk about the public trust, the integrity
    of our system. And that is what our country needs you to win
    for them.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Thurmond
    and Bunning to the counsel for the President:

        If there was no case and the White House accepted the
    results of the justice system, why then did the President pay
    nearly $1 million to Paula Jones?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I say this with all due respect, truly.
    As I think everyone knows in this Chamber, and outside this
    Chamber, who has practiced law, litigated difficult cases, the
    judgment of a defendant to settle a case, to pay whatever sum
    may be required to settle it, is, in all candor, I think, for
    all of us, not reflective of any belief that he was wrong, that
    the other side was right. It reflects in this case, very
    candidly, a judgment by the President, which he has stated
    publicly, that in the midst of the many matters that he is
    responsible for, including, I must say, this matter, as well as
    all those matters of state on which he spends his time and to
    which he devotes his energy, he could no longer spend any of
    that time and any of that energy on the Jones case.
        I am so hesitant to say this, but I really believe--please
    take it in the spirit it is meant--that to ask whether the
    settlement of this case reflects substantively on the merits of
    Ms. Jones' claim is not fair. The merits of Ms. Jones' claim
    were decided by Judge Wright. She concluded that there were
    none. And I really do believe that to ask whether the
    President's decision to settle is somehow a reflection on the
    merits, contrary to those reached by Judge Wright, is simply
    not the case.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the White House
    counsel from Senators Johnson and Leahy:

        A few minutes ago, Manager Hutchinson stated that he would
    be more confident of obtaining a conviction for obstruction of
    justice in a court than he is in the Senate. Can that statement
    be reconciled with the following exchange that occurred on the
    Sunday program ``This Week'' on January 17, 1999, in which
    Manager Hutchinson was asked, ``On the case that you have
    against the President on obstruction of justice, not the
    perjury, would you be confident of a conviction in a criminal
    court,'' and Manager Hutchinson said, ``No, I would not''?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice----
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. It's addressed to the President's--is it
    the President's counsel? It is addressed to the President's
    counsel.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I believe under your ruling
    yesterday I can't object to questions.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. That is correct.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I would----
        Mr. LEVIN. Objection.
        Mr. REID. Objection.
        Mr. LEVIN. I object to this, if he is unable to object, to
    make an objection in any other form.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian advises me that the
    manager may make an objection to the question being answered.
        Mr. REID. Nothing being answered.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I have second thoughts, frankly. That
    ruling is based on a very Delphic, almost incomprehensible
    statement that Salmon Chase made during the trial of Andrew
    Johnson. And I think the correct response is that the managers
    do not have a right to object to a question by the Senator. So
    I rule the objection out of order.
        Mrs. BOXER. Regular order.
        Ms. Counsel MILLS. I just wanted to address, for a second,
    Manager Hutchinson's comments with regard to 1503. And he cited
    a 1987 case. In 1995, I think, as we talked a little bit about,
    and the House managers had discussed, Aguilar came down. And in
    that case the issue was, Was there sufficient nexus between the
    actual conduct of the person involved and the proceeding? And
    in particular, I am just going to read to you for 1 minute from
    the case law.

        The Government argues that respondent ``understood that his
    false statements would be provided to the grand jury'' and that
    he made [these] statements . . . to thwart the grand jury
    investigation and not just the FBI investigation. . . . The
    Government supports its argument with . . . the transcript . .

        They go through the discussion that was between the judge
    and the agent in which the judge specifically asked whether or
    not he was a target for the grand jury investigation, and the
    agent responded:

        There is a grand jury meeting. Convening I guess that's the
    correct word. . . . [E]vidence will be heard . . . I'm sure on
    this issue.

        So, in other words, the person making the statement knew at
    that point that there was potentially the possibility that his
    testimony would be presented to the grand jury, and the court
    ruled, as I talked to you a little bit about during my
    presentation before, that that was an insufficient nexus for
    there to prove a violation of 1503.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Helms and
    Stevens to the House managers.

        Do you have any comment upon the answer just given by the
    President's counsel?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        First, I want to thank Ms. Mills for the courtesy she
    extended to me just a moment ago. And in our exchange, and Mr.
    Chief Justice, what I started to state my objection was, was
    really not to the question at that point, but I was just going
    to make the reference to the anticipated answer that the
    statement on ``This Week with Sam and Cokie'' was not exactly a
    part of this record. We are to be debating the facts of this
    case, and Ms. Mills was kind enough not to go into that. I
    think she was going to make the point that the answer I made
    was in reference to the need to call witnesses; that how
    confident can you be in any case without calling a witness so
    the jury can hear it?
        Let me go back to what Ms. Mills said. She did cite the
    United States v. Aguilar, and I wish the Chief Justice--since
    he wrote the opinion--could give us a lecture on that
    particular decision. I feel maybe we should not be talking
    about this. But I read that opinion as totally consistent with
    the United States v. Shannon and that the law is clear, that if
    this body were to apply 18 U.S.C., section 1503, that a
    conviction would obtain, but again this is a body gathered for
    the purpose of consideration of an impeachable offense.
        I also yield to Mr. Graham on that point.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. This is Saturday at 12:30 and a lot of
    people are probably watching with interest what is going on.
    Let's talk about the law just for a moment in a way that we all
    can understand when this thing is over with.
        It is a long time since I have been in law school, but I
    liked the exchange between the professor and the students
    because you kind of understood what the law was about at the
    end of the day. Witness tampering is designed--the statute is
    designed to do what? As Senator Bumpers and I would say in
    Arkansas and South Carolina, ``messin' with people.'' We can
    elevate that a little bit and say that the witness tampering
    statutes that we are talking about here are designed to make
    sure we get to the truth. Section 1512 is in the conjunctive,
    part (b): ``Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical
    force.''
        That is one thing you don't want to happen here. You never
    want anybody to go up to a potential witness and threaten
    through force or intimidation to tell something that is not
    true. So that is out of bounds. That is illegal.
        Or ``corruptly persuades''--now, what does that mean? There
    are some cases that talk about what that means. That means if
    the person has an intent, an evil intent or an improper purpose
    to persuade somebody without force or intimidation, that that
    is a crime.
        Or listen to this: ``Engages in misleading conduct toward
    another person with the intent to influence or prevent the
    testimony of any person in an official proceeding.''
        What are we getting to there, ladies and gentlemen? What
    the law says, if you go to a person who likes you, who is your
    friend, who trusts you, and you try to get them to tell a
    story--through misleading them--that is not true, that is a
    crime.
        The marvelous thing about the law is that it is based in
    common sense. It is very obvious to us we don't want somebody
    to tell a story that is not true. It is also obvious to us that
    we don't want to take personal relationships and misuse them to
    get false testimony out into a courtroom.
        So if you go back to your secretary--who trusts you, who
    likes you, who admires you--and you try to mislead them by
    telling a scenario that is not true, and you believe that they
    may appear in court one day, what you have done is very wrong,
    because what you have done is you have planted the seed of a
    lie in a way that we say is illegal.
        So, if you believe the President of the United States was
    not refreshing his memory when he told Betty Currie, ``She
    wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that. I never
    touched her, did I, Betty?'' If you believe that is not to
    refresh his memory, if you believe that was misleading, and you
    believe that he had reason to believe she was going to be a
    witness because of his own conduct, then he is guilty.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Kerrey of
    Nebraska to the counsel for the President.

        Could you elaborate on your comments about the settlement
    of the Jones case, focusing on the reality, for example, that
    corporations in this country routinely settle cases they regard
    as utterly without merit, simply to spare the costs of defense,
    public embarrassment, and for other reasons?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, I think far better
    than I did, the Senator from Nebraska has already elaborated on
    my answer. I think all of us who have been involved, either as
    lawyers or as parties, unhappily, in litigation know the burden
    that it imposes, and one can only imagine--I am barely able
    to--a special burden that it places on a President to be
    immersed in this kind of litigation.
        We take, I think, as a basic understanding in our
    jurisprudence that, as a matter of law, the settlement of a
    case is not probative of any belief on either side about the
    strengths or weaknesses, but what it is, as a matter of law, is
    probably less relevant than what it is to this body or to the
    American public's perception.
        But underlying the law about what one can do in litigation
    in using a decision to settle is, I think, a commonsense
    judgment that everybody, whether it be a large corporation or
    individual or the President of the United States, makes a
    judgment about where his or her resources should be expended--
    and I don't mean simply resources in terms of dollars, although
    they are secondly important--but resources in terms of energy,
    time, worry, interference with the day-to-day business that all
    of us have to conduct.
        And I think it is fair to say that it is those factors,
    those very commonsense factors, the ones we would all weigh, in
    different circumstances at different settings if we were caught
    up in litigation, that inform your judgment about what you
    should or, in my judgment, should not take from the fact that
    the President settled this case.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Nickles,
    Warner, Helms, Inhofe, and Thurmond to counsel for the
    President.

        Members of the armed services are presently removed from
    service for improper sexual conduct and/or for perjury. If the
    President is acquitted by the Senate, would not it result in a
    lower standard of conduct for the Commander in Chief than the
    other 1.3 million members of the armed services?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, this, of course, is a
    question legitimately asked but I also think legitimately
    answered no. We all understand entirely what rules are imposed
    on members of the armed services. Indeed, every member of the
    Federal civil service, every member of a private company, when
    they engage in certain conduct, may be sanctioned for it.
        In the military, I understand--as do the Senators who have
    much greater personal and institutional experience with our
    Armed Forces than I--the importance of maintaining due order
    and discipline in the armed services, and also the importance
    of believing that nothing that the Commander in Chief does or
    says should ever undermine the strength of our Armed Forces,
    their cohesiveness, or their belief in the rules and integrity
    of the rules that govern them.
        But, that said, I do not believe, as a matter of what will
    flow from an acquittal of the President, who is, indeed,
    Commander in Chief, that that will in fact undermine the good
    order and discipline of the Army. But if I am wrong in some
    fashion about that, if my understanding of the process is
    flawed--and it may well be--we, nonetheless, have to ask the
    question which I think is implicit in the question that was put
    to me: Because of the rules that apply to members of the Armed
    Forces, does it follow that because a sergeant, or a
    lieutenant, or a general, or an admiral will suffer in his
    career, that we must go back to the framers who wrote the
    impeachment clause and say they must have expected that the
    Commander in Chief, the President, would be removed for the
    same conduct? They had an Armed Forces then. Indeed, they were
    probably more intimately involved with that, having just come
    through the Revolution, than Presidents and leaders of the
    country have been in the following 210 years. They surely
    understood that there was a constitutional and societal
    difference between the President in his role as Commander in
    Chief and the President in his role as the leader of the
    country, on the one hand, and those to whom rules of discipline
    had to apply in order to secure the strongest and best Armed
    Forces that we could secure.
        It is, in a sense, I suppose, not an easy answer to give,
    because members of the Armed Forces put their lives on the
    line, and we want them to feel that they are being treated
    fairly. But at the end of the day, it cannot be that the
    President of the United States is removable for conduct that
    would adversely affect a career of a member of the military.
        There may be occasions on which the President engages in
    such horrific conduct that he ought to be removed, and the same
    would happen to an admiral, or a general, or the Chief of Staff
    of the Joint Chiefs, or the highest military member that you
    can contemplate. But that doesn't mean that this conduct is
    transposed from the world of the military into the world of the
    Constitution in such a way that the President, even if he is
    our Commander in Chief, should be removed from office, because
    I think that judgment would be inconsistent with the judgment
    made by the framers.

                                     RECESS

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest that this would be
    an excellent time to take a 1-hour break for lunch.
        There being no objection, at 12:44 p.m., the Senate
    recessed until 1:45 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice, we are ready momentarily to begin with
    the questioning period again. I believe the first question will
    come through Senator Daschle.
        I do want to say to our colleagues that any Senator is
    entitled to propound a question on both sides, and so we will
    give you every opportunity to do that. Again, it is our intent
    to go today not later than 4 o'clock, and if additional time is
    needed for questions, it will have to go over until Monday. We
    have some questions that have already been propounded that we
    would like to put to one side or the other, but at some point I
    think we will have a sense that maybe the basic questions have
    been asked.
        So if any Senator on either side feels strongly about a
    particular question, he or she may want to be thinking about
    how and when they insist that it be offered. But I think a lot
    of ground has been covered. I hope that within a reasonable
    period of time the questions that Senators have will be given
    and we will have a response, and then we will make a decision
    on how to proceed from there.
        I yield, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Bingaman
    to counsel for the President.

        When Samuel Dash resigned as adviser to the independent
    counsel, he wrote in the letter of resignation that he was
    doing so because the independent counsel had become an advocate
    and had ``unlawfully intruded on the power of impeachment which
    the Constitution gives solely to the House.''
        In using his power to assist one party to the pending
    impeachment trial before the Senate, do you believe he has
    unlawfully intruded on the power of the Senate to try
    impeachments?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, the
    independent counsel statute gives the independent counsel in
    some sense almost unbounded power to investigate the President
    and other high officials of Government. It does not give him
    and has never given him unbounded power even to the extent that
    he has become immersed in the impeachment proceedings in the
    House. For the statute itself says not you shall become the
    436th Member of the House, not that impeachment is vested in
    the independent counsel, but that impeachment is vested in the
    House and trial in the Senate.
        We were, obviously, dismayed at the role that the
    independent counsel chose to follow rather than simply sending
    information to the House that might bear on possible
    impeachable offenses but, rather, to drive his van up to the
    building and unload unscreened, undiluted boxes of information
    which thereafter made their way, at least in part, into the
    public domain.
        But surely it was a shock to all of us, at least on this
    side, to learn yesterday evening that playing a role in the
    House proceedings had now become a role in this Chamber, that
    the independent counsel was using not only his powers of
    coercion but calling on the U.S. district court to assist him
    and, in turn, enabling the managers not simply, as they would
    have it, to do a little work product, to do a little meeting
    and greeting, to do a little saying hello and a little chatting
    with someone who may be a witness before this body but, rather,
    saying to this witness: I hold your life in my hands and I'm
    going to transfer that power to the managers for the House of
    Representatives.
        The managers have said we are engaged in an adversary
    process here, and they themselves have talked long and loud
    today about letting them play out the process that any lawyer
    would play out preparing for trial. Well, no other lawyer that
    I know of gets to have a prosecutor sitting in a room with him
    and saying to the witness: Talk to these people or your
    immunity deal is gone and you may go to jail.
        Now, we have been accused by Manager Hutchinson and others
    of always talking about process, of always falling back on
    process. Well, I suggest, Senators, that process is what our
    justice system is all about. Process is what we have always
    relied on to protect everyone against the vaunted power of the
    state in this case; not just the managers, but the state
    embodied in the independent counsel.
        But in this case it is more than just a call for due
    process, for fairness, because it is going to have a direct and
    immediate impact on the facts as we learn them, as they learn
    them, and most importantly as you learn them. Can you imagine--
    can you imagine what it is going to be like for Monica Lewinsky
    to be sitting in a room with the 13 managers, or however many
    there are, and the independent counsel, and his lawyers,
    knowing the threat that she is under, knowing how she got into
    that room? Can we have any reason to believe that what comes
    out of that process will be the fair, unvarnished truth? Or
    will she, of necessity, be looking over her shoulder and saying
    I better not put one foot wrong because the independent counsel
    is sitting there watching, and he has already told me that this
    deal is gone if I don't cooperate with the House managers.
        Process and truth, they are inextricably linked, but not--
    not if the independent counsel moves to that side of the room
    and becomes the moving force in the development of the truth
    and the facts as this body is entitled to know them.
        Accuse us of talking about process if you will; accuse us,
    if you will, of falling back on process. We do it proudly
    because process is what this is all about, because process
    leads to truth. But not that way.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Specter, Frist, Smith of New Hampshire, Inhofe, Lugar,
    Brownback, Roth, and Crapo to counsel for the President:

        In arguing that an impeachable offense involves only a
    public duty, what is your best argument that a public duty is
    not involved in the President's constitutional duty to execute
    the laws? At a minimum, doesn't the President have a duty not
    to violate the laws under the constitutional responsibility to
    execute the laws?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. It can't be. It can't be that if the
    President violates the law and thus violates his duty
    faithfully to carry out the laws, he is removed from office.
    Because that would literally encompass virtually every law,
    every regulation, every policy, every guideline that you could
    imagine that he is responsible for carrying out in the
    executive branch. If that were so, it would have been very
    simple for the framers to say the President shall be impeached
    for treason, bribery and failure to carry out his oath
    faithfully to execute the laws. They wrote that. They could
    have incorporated it into the impeachment clause if they had
    wished, and they chose not to.
        So that if, in fact, you suggest that a failure to
    faithfully execute the laws inevitably leads to a decision that
    an impeachable and removable offense has been committed, I
    suggest with all respect that you have simply eliminated the
    impact of the words ``treason, bribery and other high crimes
    and misdemeanors.''
        Now, you may well judge within that setting--that is,
    within that constitutional standard ``other high crimes and
    misdemeanors''--that some particular violation of law warrants
    removal. But it surely can't be, just looking back at what the
    framers did and what the words themselves mean, that any
    violation, even if you were to find one, must lead you to
    conclude that having therefore violated his responsibility to
    faithfully execute the laws, removal must follow.
        The framers knew what the other parts of the Constitution
    said, and they specifically chose the words they chose,
    intending that they cover only the most egregious violations of
    the public law and public trust that they could conceive of.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is from Senator Graham to counsel
    for President Clinton:

        In the event the Senate determines the removal of the
    President is not warranted, are there any constitutional
    impediments to the following action: (1) a formal motion of
    censure; (2) a motion other than censure incorporating the
    Senate's acknowledgement and disapproval of the President's
    conduct; (3) a motion requiring a formal Presidential apology
    or any other statement accepting the judgment of the Senate; or
    (4) a motion requiring the President to state that he will not
    accept a pardon for any previous criminal activities.
        Assuming that one or more of the above actions are
    constitutional, are there any other serious policy concerns
    about the advisability of the Senate formally adopting a
    legislative sanction of the President that falls outside the
    scope of the constitutional sanction of removal from office?

        Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Texas.
        Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I would like the record to show
    that that was Senator Graham of Florida. [Laughter.]
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The record may so show.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Senator Gramm, my apologies. I assumed
    since Senator Daschle sent it up it was probably from this
    side, but I am glad you clarified the record.
        That question probably requires much more constitutional
    learning to answer in great detail than I possess, but let me
    give it a try. And the easiest one for me to answer is the
    fourth part: Would it be appropriate, in some fashion, for the
    President formally to state that he would not accept a pardon?
        I have stated formally on behalf of the President in
    response to a very specific question by the House Judiciary
    Committee that he would not, and, indeed, we have said in this
    Chamber, and we have said in other places, that the President
    is subject to the rule of law like any other citizen and would
    continue to be on January 21, 2001, and that he would submit
    himself to whatever law and whatever sanction or whatever
    prosecution the law would impose on him. He is prepared to
    defend himself in that forum at any time following the end of
    his tenure. And I committed on his behalf, and I have no doubt
    that he would so state himself, that he would not seek or
    accept a pardon.
        I will not even begin to tread on the territory that is the
    Senate's jurisdiction and the issues that it takes unto itself,
    much less give it advice about what it is possible or not
    possible to do, except to venture this. I see no constitutional
    barrier, certainly, to the Senate's passing a censure motion in
    whatever form it chooses--whether adopting language from the
    articles or creating language of its own. We might at the end
    of the day disagree with you about whether the language is
    justified or whether it accurately reflects the facts, but
    there is nothing in the Constitution, I believe, that prevents
    this body from undertaking that task.
        With respect to a formal acknowledgment, there I suppose
    the interplay between the legislative and the executive branch
    becomes more tenuous. But to the extent that whatever the
    Senate chooses to say in such a document needs to be
    acknowledged or recognized by the President, that can be done
    without entrenching on the separation of powers in that special
    uncertain area between the legislative and executive branches.
    I have no doubt that some process can be worked out that meets
    the Senate's needs. I say this all in the sort of vast limbo of
    hypothesis, because obviously I am answering both somewhat off
    the cuff and without knowing what language we are talking
    about.
        But the core position, as we see it, is that nothing stands
    in the way of this body from voicing its sentiments. Indeed, I
    have said in the House of Representatives that I thought a
    censure was an appropriate response, and the President has said
    he is prepared to accept the censure. I have no doubt, although
    that was said in the context of the proceedings in the House,
    it surely is applicable as well to anything that this body
    chooses to do.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Thompson
    to the House managers:

        Do you have any comment on the answer given by the
    President's counsel with regard to the Office of Independent
    Counsel?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, thank
    you for that question. It is our judgment--and I think a fair
    judgment--that we should be allowed and are permitted, under
    any of the rules normal to this, to request of the Office of
    Independent Counsel the opportunity to talk to Monica Lewinsky,
    which we otherwise apparently were not going to be able to have
    as a normal course of preparation.
        It makes me wonder--with all of the complaints that are
    going on here from the White House attorneys about this and
    their desire not to have witnesses--what they are afraid of.
    Are they afraid of our talking to Monica Lewinsky? Are they
    afraid of the deposition of Monica Lewinsky? Are they afraid of
    what she might say out here? I don't think they should be, but
    they appear to be.
        We are not doing anything abnormal. We are exercising our
    privileges, our rights. If it were a prosecutor and you had a
    prosecutorial arm, which you do in the case of the Independent
    Counsel Office, that had an immunity agreement, as there is in
    this case, you certainly would not hesitate if you had a
    recalcitrant witness who you needed to call to utilize that
    immunity agreement and have the opportunity to discuss the
    matter with that witness, and you certainly would not hesitate
    if you needed to use that immunity agreement to assure truthful
    testimony in any proceeding that was going on.
        After all, that is the purpose of the immunity agreement.
    It means that the witness is probably much more likely to be
    telling the truth than under any other circumstances, which is
    why counsels frequently argue immunity agreements as a reason
    why a particular witness is more credible than he or she might
    otherwise be if it were not for that agreement.
        So I think there is an awful lot being said today about our
    meeting that we want to have with Ms. Lewinsky to prepare her
    as a witness. I want to tell you all it is being done, in my
    judgment, with all due respect to those who are doing it,
    principally because of the concerns they don't want us to have
    that opportunity or they want to cast some aspersion or doubt,
    or whatever.
        We are not about to do anything improper. We can assure you
    of that. We would never do that. We are going to follow regular
    order and do this as good counsels would do in good faith, and
    in no way would we wish to do it otherwise, nor have we. Thank
    you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question of Senator Baucus to
    the House managers:

        In view of the direct election of the President, his
    popularity, and short duration of his term, and in view of the
    fact that, as House Manager Graham stated, ``reasonable people
    can differ in this case,'' please explain, precisely, how
    acquitting the President will result in an immediate threat to
    the stability of our Government.

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen
    of the Senate, I don't think anyone contends that if the
    President is acquitted that suddenly it is apocalypse now or
    the Republic will be threatened from without or from within. I
    think erosion can happen very slowly and very deliberately. The
    problem that I have is with this office being fulfilled by
    someone who has a double responsibility.
        The first responsibility is to take care that the laws be
    faithfully executed. He is the only person in the country, in
    the world, who has that compact with the American people. The
    other, of course, is his oath to preserve, protect and defend
    the Constitution. He is the national role model, he is the man,
    he is the flagbearer in front of our country. He is the person,
    his office is the person every parent says to their little
    child, ``I hope you grow up and be President of the United
    States some day.'' We do nothing as important as raising our
    kids, and the President is the role model for every kid in the
    country.
        When you have a President who lies and lies and lies under
    oath--and that is the key phrase, ``under oath.'' I don't care
    about his private life or matters that are not public. But when
    he takes an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, nothing
    but the truth and then lies and lies and lies, what kind of a
    lesson is that for our kids and our grandkids? What does it do
    to the rule of law?
        Injustice is a terrible thing. The longer you live, the
    more you can encounter it. Injustice, abuse, oppression, and
    the law is what protects you; the law, having resort to an
    objective standard of morality in action. And when you are
    sworn to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, how
    do you reconcile the conduct of perjury and obstruction of
    justice with that obligation?
        I have a suggestion. Let's just tear it out of the
    Constitution. Tear out that ``take care to see that the laws
    are faithfully executed.'' It is wrong. It is an example we are
    setting for millions of kids that if the President can do it,
    you can do it. What do you say to master sergeants who have
    their careers destroyed because they hit on an inferior member
    of the military? We are setting the parameters of permissible
    Presidential conduct for the one office that ought to gleam in
    the sunlight. And the kids, that is what moves me, the kids.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Nickles,
    Warner, Crapo, Helms, Inhofe, and Thurmond to the House
    managers:

        Would you like to comment on the remarks of Counsel Ruff
    concerning the impact of an acquittal of the President accused
    of improper sexual conduct and/or perjury and obstruction on
    the Armed Forces?

        Mr. Manager BUYER. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to thank
    the Senators for the question, because I believe it is also
    insightful.
        The question of double standards or establishing lower
    standards, I believe, is extraordinarily important. The defense
    asserted--and it is hard for me to believe--but they are asking
    you to set a higher standard for judges and a lower standard
    for a President who nominates them to you, asking you--they
    think that we can set a higher standard for law enforcement,
    yet establish a lower standard for the Chief Executive or the
    chief law enforcement officer who has the duty to faithfully
    see that the laws are executed; set a higher standard for
    military personnel, and then a lower standard for the Commander
    in Chief who must make the painful decisions to send them into
    battle.
        Now, the precedents in impeachment trials here in the
    Senate, the judgment of the Armed Services Committee and the
    Senate regarding the standards for promotion, have been
    otherwise than that which Mr. Ruff has asserted.
        We must confront the fact that the President is the
    Commander in Chief. And I believe that it is perfectly
    acceptable of the American people to demand of the military the
    highest standard, which also means that those who find
    themselves in positions of responsibility in the Pentagon who
    are in civilian leadership must also live by such exemplary
    conduct and standards. The high character of military officers
    is a safeguard of the character of a nation.
        The Senate, which must ratify the officers' promotion list,
    has repeatedly found that anything less than exemplary conduct
    is therefore unworthy of a commission or further promotion. I
    recall when I first came to Congress in 1992, there were many
    making a big to-do over Tailhook. Remember? And it was serious.
    There are still remnants around of Tailhook because there are
    still those who are screening the officers' promotion. If you
    were within 100 miles of Tailhook, look out for your career.
    That needs to be put to bed.
        Then I was given a duty to ensure that after Aberdeen broke
    and the sexual misconduct in the military--whether it was at
    Fort Jackson, Aberdeen, or at other places--I spent 18 months
    out on the road to ensure that the policies of the military
    were fair and the treatment of equal dignity in the workplace
    among men and women. We cannot forget that.
        You see, we also must recognize and must be candid with the
    harsh reality that the officers and NCOs are human and not
    without fault, folly, and failings. I believe, though, it is
    the aspirations of high ideals that are important for each of
    us, but more so to the military in order to keep the trust and
    the public faith in the military. You see, a soldier, a sailor,
    an airman or marine is prepared to lay down his or her life to
    defend the Constitution. And it is the devotion and the
    fidelity to the oath without mental reservation that is the
    epitome of character.
        Now, the President is not and should not be subject to the
    Uniform Code of Military Justice. And I concur with Mr. Ruff
    when he made that point. And the President is not an actual
    member of the military. But we have a unique system in the
    world. We have that civilian control of the military, and it
    works. But we also must recognize and be cognizant that the
    President, however, is at the pinnacle, he is at the top of the
    chain of command. And that is what I learned about, being on
    the road for 18 months, and How do we make corrections? and How
    do you set the proper dignity in the workplace?
        It doesn't matter if it is your own office or, in fact, if
    you are the President as Commander in Chief. Whoever leads you
    sets the tenor of those who must follow. You see, the message
    is that the military personnel do look to the Commander in
    Chief to set the high standard of moral and ethical behavior.
    The military personnel are required to set a high standard of
    conduct in order to set the example to those they lead.
    Adherence to high standards is the fabric of good order and
    discipline. When military leaders fall short of this ideal,
    then there is confusion and disruption in the ranks. And today
    many do see a double standard. There is a double standard
    because the Commander in Chief has allegedly conducted himself
    in a manner that would be a court-martial offense for military
    personnel having been accused of the very same thing.
        The President's actions have had an intangible and coercive
    impact upon military personnel. To turn a blind eye and a deaf
    ear to it would be shame on us. The question soldiers and
    sailors ask is: I took an oath to swear to tell the truth. And
    I also took an oath to uphold the Constitution. How can this
    President take the same oath and not be truthful and remain in
    office? If I were to have done what the President did, I would
    be court-martialed.
        You see, we also have to recognize that each of the
    services are recruiting young people all across the Nation. At
    boot camp they infuse these young people with the moral values
    of honor, courage and commitment, and they're teaching self-
    restraint, discipline and self-sacrifice. Military leaders are
    required to provide a good example to those young recruits, yet
    when they look up the chain of command, all the way to the
    Commander in Chief, they see a double standard at the top.
    Again, it is the President who sets the tone and tenor in the
    military, just as he does for law enforcement.
        I believe the President has violated this sacred trust
    between the leaders and those he was entrusted to lead. I also
    spoke in my presentation that it was the President's self-
    inflicted wounds that have called his own credibility into
    question not only in his decisionmaking process, but with
    regard to security policies.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair has the view that you have
    answered the question.
        Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Torricelli and Kohl to the President's counsel:

        At the outset of the House proceedings, a member of the
    majority, now a manager, stated: ``The solemn duty that
    confronts us requires that we attain a heroic level of
    bipartisanship and that we conduct our deliberations in a fair,
    full and independent manner. . . . The American people deserve
    a competent, independent, and bipartisan review of the
    Independent Counsel's report. They must have confidence in the
    process. Politics must be checked at the door.''
        In evaluating the case against the President, should the
    Senate take into account: (a) the partisan nature of the
    proceedings in the House, or (b) the public's ``lack of
    confidence'' in the proceedings thus far?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, I think that this
    body has to take into consideration what brought these articles
    here, and that is the action both of the independent counsel
    and the House of Representatives. I think when fairly
    considered, when you look at the actions of both, you find an
    absence of fairness and bipartisanship.
        The independent counsel investigated this case for 8
    months. It developed every bit of evidence it could that was
    negative, derogatory, or prejudicial, and it put them into
    those five volumes. It did not pursue exculpatory leads. It did
    not follow up evidence that might lead to evidence of
    innocence. And it downplayed, when it came to write the
    referral, significant testimony which was exculpatory or
    helpful.
        I think the independent counsel's process was really
    epitomized by Ms. Lewinsky's statement that nobody asked her to
    lie or had promised her a job for silence. You see, the
    independent counsel didn't bring out that testimony. In fact,
    it came out when the independent counsel was through examining
    Ms. Lewinsky in the grand jury. I want to read you a very short
    part of that, page 1161 of the appendix.
        Independent counsel prosecutor says, ``We don't have any
    further questions,'' and a grand juror pipes up, ``Could I ask
    one?''

        Monica, is there anything that you would like to add to
    your prior testimony, either today or the last time you were
    here, or anything that you think needs to be amplified on or
    clarified? I just want to give you the fullest opportunity.

        Here is what Ms. Lewinsky says:

        I would. I think because of the public nature of how this
    investigation has been and what the charges aired, that I would
    just like to say that no one ever asked me to lie and I was
    never promised a job for my silence. And that I'm sorry. I'm
    really sorry for everything that's happened.

        Now, we requested the independent counsel, before he sent
    the referral to the House of Representatives, for an
    opportunity to review that. We were denied this.
        I think if you compare what happened here with what
    happened in 1974 when Special Prosecutor Jaworski sent a
    transmission of evidence to the House Judiciary Committee, the
    comparison is very revealing. Then Special Prosecutor Jaworski
    sent only a road map of the evidence, a description of what was
    in the record. Judge Sirica reviewed that at a hearing where
    White House counsel were present. Judge Sirica then said it was
    a fair, impartial summary and transmitted it on to the House
    Judiciary Committee. Here, without review either by the
    presiding judge or the grand jury, a referral was sent to the
    House that was a one-sided, unfair prosecutorial summary.
        When the House managers speak of the need for discovery,
    they have no such need. Everything prejudicial that could be
    found through an unlimited budget and seemingly endless
    investigation has been found and put there, tied up with a red
    ribbon for you.
        In terms of bipartisanship in the House, I think that
    speaks for itself. I don't think this was a bipartisan process.
    I don't think it was a bipartisan result. I think, though, it
    rests with this body to try the case. It is clear under the
    Constitution that this body has the power, the sole power, to
    try impeachment. The Chief Justice in the Nixon case made that
    very clear.
        I am not going to comment on the independent counsel's
    assistance to the House manager with Ms. Lewinsky. I think that
    is for you to decide whether that is consonant with how you
    decide the case ought to be tried. But I think that the
    presentation of the articles to this body has been neither fair
    nor bipartisan.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Lott to
    the House managers:

        Do you have any comment on the answer just given by the
    President's counsel?

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate,
    I welcome this opportunity to fill in a considerable gap in the
    record.
        Mr. Counsel Kendall said earlier today or perhaps
    yesterday--it was yesterday--``We never had a chance to call
    witnesses ourselves, to examine them, to cross-examine them, to
    subpoena documentary evidence, at no point in this process.''
        On October 5, 1998, the House Judiciary Committee passed
    House Resolution 581 by voice vote, the impeachment inquiry
    procedure, which included the right to call witnesses for the
    President.
        On October 21, the House Judiciary Committee staff met with
    Mr. Ruff, Mr. Kendall, and Mr. Craig. At that time, the
    Judiciary Committee staff asked the White House to provide any
    exculpatory information, provide a list of any witnesses they
    wanted to call, without result.
        On November 9, the House Judiciary Committee wrote to
    Messrs. Ruff, Kendall, and Craig and again informed them of the
    President's right to call witnesses.
        On November 19, Independent Counsel Starr testified 12
    hours before the House Committee on the Judiciary. President's
    counsel was given the opportunity to question the independent
    counsel. He did not ask a single question relating to the facts
    of the independent counsel's allegations against the President.
    Now, the Democrats have Mr. Kendall, they had Abbe Lowell; we
    had Dave Schippers. That is not an invidious comparison.
        On November 25, I wrote a letter to the President asking
    the President, among other things, to provide any exculpatory
    information and inform the committee of any witnesses it wanted
    to call, without success.
        On December 4, two working days before the presentation of
    the President to the Judiciary Committee, counsel for the
    President requested to put on 15 witnesses. The White House was
    allowed to present all 15 witnesses. Not a single one of those
    was a fact witness.
        Lastly, I quote from a letter from Mr. Kendall to Mr.
    Bittman. It is in volume III, part 2 of 2, page 2326:

        That you now request we submit exculpatory evidence is
    perfectly consonant with the occasionally ``Alice in
    Wonderland'' nature of this whole enterprise. I am not aware of
    anything that the President needs to exculpate.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senator Leahy to
    the White House counsel:

        The managers argued in response to a previous question that
    would set a bad example for the military to acquit the
    President. Given that argument, how could you reconcile the
    statement by Manager Hyde after Caspar Weinberger was pardoned
    by President Bush of multiple criminal violations, including
    perjury, that, ``I'm glad the President had the chutzpa to do
    it. The prosecution of Weinberger was political in nature, an
    effort to get at Ronald Reagan. I just wish us out of this
    mess, the 6 years and this $30 or $40 million that has been
    spent by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh''?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. The question, in virtually every respect,
    speaks for itself.
        But I would make this point because I think it fleshes out
    a bit my earlier answer and responds in some fashion to the
    argument made by the managers on this very issue. I was
    probably too lawyerly, as is my wont, in responding to the
    earlier question on this issue by Senators Warner and Thurmond,
    because I think the one point that needs to be made in the
    context of Senator Leahy's question which goes to the
    leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the issue of what it
    means to undertake the removal of a President, the distinction
    that I think we all need to hold on to that I probably glided
    over too rapidly in my earlier answer, is that the President of
    the United States is elected by the people of the United
    States.
        He appoints the Secretary of Defense; he appoints the
    officers in the military; he appoints the judges. And the
    Senate plays a role in that process by approving his choices,
    or occasionally not approving his choices. But there is only
    one person who is put in his job with the voice of the people,
    and however we may be concerned, as rightly we should, if that
    person oversteps the bounds either of his office or his
    personal conduct, to say that there is some one-to-one, or any
    other number you can think of, comparison between the impact of
    enforcing the law on those civilian and military personnel who
    serve our country and the very different question of whether
    the voice of the people will be stilled by removing the
    President is the point on which I think this body needs to
    focus.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Kyl and
    Mack to counsel for the President:

        Mr. Ruff said President Clinton was never asked in the
    grand jury whether everything he testified to in the Jones
    deposition was true. If he were asked, would he say it was all
    true? Would the President be willing to answer an interrogatory
    from the Senate asking that question?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Senator, it is true that he testified
    that he tried to be truthful in the Jones deposition, that it
    was his purpose to be accurate in the Jones deposition. He
    tried to navigate his way through a minefield without violating
    the law, and believes that he did. There is no statement in
    that testimony in the grand jury that reaffirms, ratifies, and
    confirms all of his testimony in the Jones deposition.
        Now, we would be happy to take questions and get responses
    to you, consult the President, if you would like to submit
    them.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Murray
    to the White House counsel:

        Has Ms. Lewinsky ever claimed that she was sexually
    harassed by the President?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, Ms. Lewinsky has
    made no such claim. What happened between the President and her
    was improper, but it was consensual. To say that does not
    excuse it or sugarcoat it or justify it, but it does, I think,
    put it in the proper context. She has never claimed that she
    has any evidence at all relevant to sexual harassment by the
    President. When the President--and I went through this on
    Thursday in respect to the obstruction of justice allegation,
    about the President stating that she could file an affidavit.
    The President and Ms. Lewinsky reasonably believe that she
    could have filed a limited but truthful affidavit.
        And I think you have to look to the fact that the Jones
    case was not a class action. It was a suit only about what Ms.
    Jones claimed happened in May 1991 in a Little Rock hotel room.
    The December 11 ruling on discovery was a ruling not only on
    admissibility, but discovery. The President believed that an
    affidavit--a truthful affidavit--might be successful--not that
    it would, but that it might be.
        Now, in filing such an affidavit, in preparing it, no
    particular form was necessary. There was nothing to dictate
    what had to go in and what had to go out of it. There were many
    witnesses on the witness list. The end of discovery was
    approaching, and there was at least some chance, they thought,
    that a factual affidavit, which was limited, might accomplish
    the purpose. And I think this is confirmed by the fact that
    when Judge Wright considered whether to order Ms. Lewinsky's
    deposition, she issued a ruling on January 29 saying that the
    deposition would not go forward because evidence from Ms.
    Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Paula Jones trial
    because it was both irrelevant to the court allegations and it
    was inadmissible as extrinsic evidence of other facts.
        So I think that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing whatsoever to
    offer on the critical issue in the Paula Jones case, which was
    an issue of sexual harassment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question by Senator Shelby to
    the House managers:

        Would a verdict of not guilty be a stronger message of
    vindication for the President than a motion to dismiss, or, in
    the alternative, a motion to adjourn? And what are the
    constitutional implications, if any, if a motion to dismiss
    prevailed, short of concluding the trial?

        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate,
    there are various options. It is really a misdirected question,
    if I may say, to ask us to suggest the consequences of
    solutions to this dilemma that we are in. I think the beauty--
    and that is not the word--I think the advantage of proceeding
    with the articles of impeachment is it is consonant with the
    Constitution. It is simple; it is clean: either guilty or not
    guilty.
        The consequences of that verdict, of course, are up to any
    individual who casts a vote. Now, I have heard the word
    ``censure'' sometime before. You gentlemen and ladies do
    anything you want to do. It is your power, it is your
    authority, it is in your yard, but you have to deal with the
    Constitution, no matter what you do.
        You have a problem of a bill of attainder, a problem of the
    separation of powers, and you have a problem that any censure,
    to be meaningful, has to at least damage the President's
    reputation; and that becomes, in my judgment, a bill of
    attainder, but that, again, is up to you. The consequences, I
    don't think, will harm us, whatever you do. We have done our
    best. We have lived up to our responsibility under the
    Constitution, and all we ask is that you live up to your
    responsibilities under the Constitution and give us a trial. I
    am sure you will.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the President's
    counsel from Senator Levin:

        Monica Lewinsky has explicitly said in her handwritten
    proffer that ``no one encouraged'' her to lie. Yet, House
    Manager Asa Hutchinson claimed to the Senate, using inferences,
    that Ms. Lewinsky was ``encouraged'' to lie. Do the House
    managers argue that such inferences are as credible as Ms.
    Lewinsky's direct testimony to the contrary?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I think Senator Levin's question goes to
    the heart of much of what we have been saying for the last few
    days. If, in fact, you look at the five volumes stacked up in
    front of my colleague, Mr. Kendall, you will see Ms. Lewinsky
    say not just once, but many times, in essence: I was never told
    to, never encouraged to lie, never traded an affidavit for a
    job, never did any of the things that lie at the very heart of
    the managers' case. And so what do we have, then? We have the
    managers trying to snatch a bit of evidence here, a bit of
    speculation there, or a bit of extrapolation over there, and
    say, well, she really didn't mean it when she said several
    times quite directly, ``Nobody ever told me or encouraged me to
    lie.''
        It is possible, of course, whenever one deals with
    circumstantial evidence, to make reasonable leaps from that
    evidence to some viable conclusion. But I think most courts
    that we are familiar with--and those of you who practice law
    are familiar with--would have a good deal of difficulty in
    concluding that if I take a little bit here and a little bit
    there and a little bit over there, pull them all together into
    some vast speculation about what was really in someone's mind,
    and on the other side I have the person saying what is in her
    mind and saying the opposite, I don't think that case would
    ever get to the jury.
        And maybe it is one of the things that worries me just a
    little bit about the normal, everyday--we do it all the time in
    conference between the managers and the independent counsel and
    Ms. Lewinsky--that maybe in that setting, to the independent
    counsel gently patting Ms. Lewinsky on the back and telling her
    it is time to cooperate, maybe the message will become closer
    to their side and their speculation, don't stay where you were,
    which is what you told the grand jury, the FBI, and us under
    oath and not under oath on multiple occasions, which is,
    indeed, ``Nobody told me to, nobody encouraged me to lie.''
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Bond to
    the House managers:

        When Ms. Mills described the President's testimony before
    the Jones grand jury, she said the President was ``surprised''
    by questions about Ms. Lewinsky. What evidence is there of the
    President's knowledge that Lewinsky questions would be asked?
    Is there evidence that he knew in advance the details of the
    Lewinsky affidavit which his counsel presented at the Jones
    deposition?

        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        There are numerous evidences in the record to show that the
    President was not surprised about the questions pertaining to
    Monica Lewinsky at the January 17 deposition. First of all, in
    regard to the affidavit testimony of Monica Lewinsky--I believe
    it was January 6--5th or 6th--it is that she discussed that
    with the President, signing that affidavit, and the content of
    the affidavit. That is whenever he made his statement, ``I
    don't need to see it. I have seen 15 of them.''
        Again, we don't know what he is referring to in reference
    to that ``15.'' But clearly, according to Monica Lewinsky's
    testimony, she went over the contents of that, even though she
    might not have had it in hand, with the President.
        Also, circumstantially, there is a conversation between Mr.
    Jordan and the President during this time.
        But in addition, let me just recall something I made
    reference to in my presentation--that a few days before the
    President's deposition testimony, that it was Michael Isikoff
    of a national publication who called Betty Currie and asked
    about courier records on the gifts. This startled Betty Currie,
    obviously, because the gifts at that point were under her bed.
    As she recalled, she probably told the President that. And then
    second, she went to see Vernon Jordan about that issue.
        All of that leads you to believe, clearly, that the
    President fully knew that when he went into the deposition on
    January 17, that he would be asked time and time again about
    the specifics of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
        So I think that addresses part of that question.
        Let me remark on what Mr. Ruff just said--I am just
    constantly amazed--about our effort to interview witnesses,
    because yesterday Mr. Ruff--I believe it was; it might have
    been Mr. Kendall; excuse me if I have the attribution wrong--
    but criticized us, saying they want to call witnesses but they
    have no clue what these witnesses would say. Do you recall
    that? That was the argument yesterday. And so, if we make an
    effort to determine what these witnesses would say, then we are
    criticized for trying to find out what they would say.
        So I think that again it is more convenient to talk about
    what the managers are doing, what the process is, rather than
    the facts of obstruction.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the White House
    counsel from Senator Kennedy:

        Would you please respond to Manager Hyde's suggestion that
    an acquittal would send a bad message to the children of the
    country, and to Manager Hyde's statements regarding the
    fairness of the process in the House of Representatives?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you for that
    question.
        Children--what do we tell the children? Well, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, that is not an academic question for
    me and for my wife. I assume that is the case for many, many
    families all over this country. We happen to have quite a few
    children, and they are very young; they are under 12. And we
    talk about what is going on here. We talk about how important
    it is to tell the truth, and we talk about how wrong it was for
    the President of the United States not to tell the truth. And
    we think that we have learned a lot by going through that
    process. We have talked about what President Clinton did and
    why it was wrong.
        With all due respect to the chairman of the House Judiciary
    Committee, I and my wife--and I don't think many parents when
    they raise their children rely every day on messages or
    resolutions from the Congress of the United States to tell them
    that it is important to teach children the importance of truth
    telling.
        I am a little bit disappointed in the inference of the
    argument that those of us who oppose impeachment, for the
    reasons that you understand, somehow are sending a message to
    kids that it is OK not to tell the truth. I am a little bit
    disappointed in that argument, because I don't think that is
    the way the parents of this country feel. That is certainly not
    the way I feel. And I don't believe that impeachment is a
    question of what you tell your children about truth telling. Of
    course you tell your children to tell the truth. Of course you
    tell your children the difference between right and wrong. I am
    surprised that it is an issue here.
        The second part of your question, Senator: I went through
    that House of Representatives experience, and I must say that I
    was disappointed in it, because we had been promised
    bipartisanship. When the Office of Independent Counsel sent its
    referral to the House of Representatives, White House counsel
    did not have access to that document before it was released to
    the world. When the Office of Independent Counsel sent its
    60,000 pages, 19 boxes of evidence, to the House of
    Representatives, we were not given access, the way Members of
    the Judiciary Committee were, to all that material. We were
    given access to a very limited amount of material in the course
    of that process. In fact, much of that material we never had
    access to on behalf of the President.
        We were disappointed that there was no actual discussion of
    the constitutional standards for impeachment before they went
    forward to vote on an impeachment inquiry. We thought that was
    the cart before the horse.
        We were disappointed and we regretted that grand jury
    materials provided with promises of confidentiality were dumped
    into the public with salacious material, unfiltered by the
    House of Representatives and the Judiciary Committee, and we
    saw party line vote after party line vote after party line vote
    over and over and over again in the Judiciary Committee. We
    were disappointed that the depositions went forward without our
    participation. We were disappointed there was no definition of
    the scope of the inquiry. We were disappointed that there was
    no term of time, no limitation on either the scope or the time
    of this inquiry. And we were disappointed that there was no
    adequate notice of the charges.
        There were two events that happened near the end of this
    process that I think were particularly disappointing to us. One
    was that while the debate was underway on the House floor,
    Members of the House of Representatives were taken into the
    evidence room and shown evidence that was not in this record,
    that had not been included in the discussion in the House
    Judiciary Committee, that had never been shown to counsel for
    the President, that was not in the referral and became a factor
    in the decisionmaking at least of some Members of the House--
    unfairly so, I think.
        And finally, we were disappointed that the Members of the
    House of Representatives were denied the right and the
    opportunity to vote for censure. They were promised the right
    to vote their conscience. They were told they could vote their
    conscience. And if they had been given that right to vote their
    conscience, we might not be here today. We might have had the
    resolution of censure and this thing might have been resolved,
    and that was the greatest disappointment of all.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Bennett, Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Roth, Specter and
    McConnell to the House managers:

        Would each of the managers who have been prosecutors prior
    to being elected to the House of Representatives please state
    briefly whether he believes he would have sought an indictment
    and obtained a conviction of an individual who had engaged in
    the conduct of which the President is accused?

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I know there are
    several, probably not only at our table, but all across this
    Senate, who have had some experience somewhere in prosecution
    of cases. I would just briefly say that--and I think it has
    probably been said very well today more eloquently than I will
    say it, not only from some of the people on our side, but even
    some of the people on the President's side have talked about
    this same concept of justice and the rule of law--it is so
    important in our system of justice that the American people
    have confidence in that.
        And one of the ways that I found in my experience that
    confidence sometimes suffered were phone calls that
    occasionally you would receive where there had been an
    allegation that someone in an elected office or some public
    official in particular had, allegedly again, committed a crime
    or perhaps been charged with a crime with allegations of
    coverup because of who that person was--there was not equal
    justice out there, people were being treated differently and
    specially. And that happens, that comes with our territory. We
    are very visible people. Certainly the President of the United
    States is the most visible of us.
        As I said in my opening remarks, he is a role model for
    many people. And certainly when these kinds of allegations come
    up against the President, people raise these kinds of thoughts
    and complaints.
        As a prosecutor, I would find this type of charge
    particularly of concern not only because of the perjury, which
    is so important because, as I said earlier, too, truth
    underpins our whole system, but I find it equally compelling as
    a prosecutor that a person of this visibility, of this
    responsibility not only commits a crime himself, but he brings
    someone else into that. He ensnares another person, actually
    other people into this, the coverup, the obstruction part--
    Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan, all the White
    House people that we have talked about. He brings other people
    into this and causes other people to commit crimes. I would
    view that even more seriously because of the fact that he made
    other people commit types of crimes. And because of that, I
    think as a prosecutor, were this another person, a John Doe of
    some visibility, a local district attorney, a local mayor or
    someone like that, there would be no doubt that the allegations
    would have to go to court.
        And I might add in line with this that we have heard of
    this selecting the President out of this process by saying,
    well, we should not consider him like we would a Federal judge
    or like a general that we are talking about maybe promoting to
    head the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a captain for promotion to
    major or really anyone else here. It almost seems that--yes, he
    is different, but it almost seems that we want to treat him
    like a king because he is the only person we have got here, and
    because he is the only one, we can't look at him like a
    thousand judges or 200 generals or other public officials.
        I think that is a fallacious argument. If the facts are
    there, no matter if this man is the President, to me that is
    what the Constitution is about. I think they set up this
    process to avoid a king and a kingdom.
        I will yield time to Mr. McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. I will be much briefer in answering
    that question, Mr. Chief Justice.
        I served as a military judge advocate for 4 years on active
    duty, 20 more years in the Reserves. I was a prosecutor,
    defense attorney and military judge. I think this is a very
    compelling case on the evidence. I would never hesitate to take
    this to trial if I were prosecuting the crimes of perjury,
    obstruction of justice, or any of the military offenses that
    might be included in here. But just on the criminal charges
    which are in the UCMJ, I would certainly do so if given the
    opportunity for all the reasons and then some that Mr. Bryant
    gave.
        Mr. Manager BARR. Mr. Chief Justice, to me this is not a
    hypothetical question in any sense of the word. As a United
    States attorney under two Presidents, I had the opportunity not
    only to contemplate bringing such cases based on the evidence
    and the law but actually having the responsibility of carrying
    those cases out and prosecuting them, including a case that
    probably cost me a primary election in the Republican Party for
    prosecuting a Member of Congress for precisely the activity
    which brings us here today; that is, perjury, misleading a
    grand jury.
        So the answer to the question, Mr. Majority Leader, is not
    only yes but absolutely yes.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I know we have run out of time. The
    facts and law support it, and the answer is yes. And may I add
    that Mr. Rogan who has certainly prosecuted, Mr. Lindsey
    Graham, and Mr. Gekas, all would--if you would like to join in
    that. Otherwise, we all would affirm that the answer is yes.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question to the President's
    counsel from Senators Boxer and Johnson.

        The managers repeatedly assert that if the Senate acquits
    President Clinton, the Senate will be making the statement that
    the President of the United States should be held above the
    law. If, as the managers concede, President Clinton may be held
    accountable in court for the charges alleged in the House
    articles regardless of the outcome of the Senate trial, how
    could a Senate vote to acquit the President be characterized as
    a vote to place him above the law?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. I suppose the one quote that has been
    heard most often throughout these proceedings in the House and
    in this body is Theodore Roosevelt's, and I won't repeat it
    except to go to the heart of this question. The fact that we
    are having this trial in this Chamber, the fact that we had an
    impeachment proceeding in the House, is itself part of our rule
    of law. The President is immersed in the application of the
    rule of law at this very moment. And the rule of law, as I
    think my colleague, Ms. Mills, said, is neither a sword nor a
    shield, depending on your perspective. We are all subject to it
    and we live with its outcome, if it is fair and is consistent
    with the system of justice that we have developed in the last
    210 years.
        And, so, the verdict here, if it is ``not guilty'' as I
    trust it will be, or if this trial is ended appropriately
    through some other legal motion or mechanism, as long as it is
    done within the rule of law, will have met all of our
    obligations. And most importantly, it will have ensured that
    the President is treated neither above nor below.
        But certainly the one issue that is raised in this question
    is important to focus on, because this is not a situation in
    which the President walks away scot-free no matter what
    happens, not to mention the personal pain and the pain that has
    been suffered in going through this process. The President has
    said, and I have said on his behalf, that he will not use his
    powers, or ask anyone else to use their powers, to protect him
    against the application of the rule of law. Moreover, just in
    case it has slipped anyone's mind--and it has occasionally been
    misstated in other forums--the statute that has allowed the
    independent counsel to pursue the President for the last 4-plus
    years specifically provides that he retains jurisdiction over
    the President for a year after the President has left office.
        So there can be no argument that, oh, this will just fall
    into the cracks, or this will disappear into the ether
    somewhere. The President will be at risk. We trust that
    reasonable judgments will be made and a determination will be
    reached that it is not appropriate to pursue him. But that,
    too, will be pursued under the rule of law to which he is
    subject.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Campbell, Hagel and Specter to the House managers:

        White House counsel have several times asserted that the
    grand jury perjury charge is just a ``he says, she says'' case
    and that we cannot consider corroborating witnesses you cite.
    What is it about the President's grand jury testimony that
    convinces you he should be removed from office?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, that question goes
    to the heart of what we are here about today. We have had a
    great deal of discussion about a lot of peripheral questions
    and issues, but the fact of the matter is, the simplest portion
    of this deals with grand jury perjury, and I assume the
    question principally is directed to the first of four points
    under the grand jury perjury article, because, for example, the
    second point with respect to the President having the goal or
    the intent of being truthful--which he said he did in the grand
    jury in the Jones deposition--there isn't a ``he says, she
    says'' question.
        That is just very simple. The President lied multiple times
    in that civil deposition, and if he said in the grand jury to
    the grand jurors, ``My goal was to be truthful,'' it is pretty
    self-evident that that was a lie and he perjured himself. So
    that is not a ``he says, she says.''
        But the question that the counsel over here has tried to
    bring up several times, saying the part with respect
    particularly to Monica Lewinsky saying that the President
    touched her in certain parts of her body which would have been
    covered by the Jones definition of sexual relations, and the
    President who said explicitly in his grand jury testimony, ``I
    didn't touch those parts,'' and, ``Yes, I agree that would have
    been and is part of the definition of sexual relations in the
    Jones case''--that is, whether you believe her or him, and they
    say that is a ``he says, she says,'' and it is not.
        But even if it were, you could listen to it and accept it.
    I think there is some confusion about the law. The law of grand
    jury perjury does not require two witnesses. Nor does it
    require the corroborating testimony of anybody else. It does
    not. That is why, in 1970, it was changed, and most
    prosecutions today for perjury, including people who are in
    Federal prison today for perjury in civil cases for lying about
    matters related to sex--and there are several, a couple of whom
    testified before us in the Judiciary Committee during our
    process and hearings--are based upon that 1970 law that does
    not require any corroboration.
        In this case, you have Monica Lewinsky, who is a very
    credible witness by other reasons, so that you don't even have
    to get to those corroborating witnesses on those points. No. 1,
    she was under immunity under the threat of prosecution when she
    testified that way. No. 2, she has consistent statements
    throughout, many times over. She didn't say she had sexual
    intercourse with him. She could have made that up, but she
    didn't. Everything she says is believable about that portion of
    it. And third, and not last in all of this, is that she did
    make very contemporaneous statements to at least six other
    people who were her friends and counselors, describing in
    detail exactly the same thing she testified to under oath
    before the grand jury in this respect.
        Now they say, the counselors here, you can't consider that
    under the Federal Rules of Evidence because that is,
    presumably, hearsay. Well, there are at least three exceptions
    to that hearsay rule which could be brought out in a courtroom.
    They have gone about trying to carefully say we have never said
    that Monica Lewinsky lied.
        I remember, I think it was Mr. Kendall or maybe it was Mr.
    Craig up there a little earlier, saying when asked that
    question, ``Did she lie in this instance or in any other?'' and
    they say it is just a different version of the truth. If she is
    saying it as explicitly as she is about this nine times or four
    times or whatever, and the President is saying I never did
    that, I don't see how they can fudge around, challenging her
    truthfulness and credibility.
        That is what they have been doing. And in any courtroom I
    have ever been in, once that has occurred you can certainly
    bring in her prior consistent statements, and you don't even
    have to go with the rules of evidence on this. You are not
    bound by those rules of evidence. And common sense says she had
    no motive to be lying to her friends in those numerous
    telephone conversations or her meetings with her counselors
    when she described in detail these things the President says he
    didn't do, because all of those statements occurred, all of
    those discussions occurred before she ever was knowingly on a
    witness list or likely to have to testify in any other way.
        She is very credible. Those prior consistent statements are
    very believable, and I submit to you they would be admissible
    in a court in the kind of contest that would be involved in a
    situation like this. It goes to the very heart of what we are
    here about--grand jury perjury, the simplest, clearest one. The
    President lied. Monica Lewinsky told the truth about it. And it
    is profound and it is important and it is critical to this
    case. And that is the principal one of the perjuries that we
    have been drawing your attention to because it is so clear.
    Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Dorgan
    to counsel for the President:

        How can the House claim that its function is accusatory
    only, when the articles it voted call for the President's
    removal?

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. This, of course, takes us back to the
    very heart of the argument that raged for a small time here
    yesterday and on previous days, the notion that the House of
    Representatives viewed itself during the month of December as
    merely--I won't even say that it rose in their mind to the
    level of an accusatory body that we would think of when we
    think of the grand jury, but to a body whose job it was, as one
    of the managers said at one point, simply to find probable
    cause to believe that the President had committed these acts.
        Perhaps there has been some extraordinary transposition
    from the mood and the tenor of the comments made during those
    days when the Judiciary Committee was doing its work to the
    days when these managers have appeared in the well of the
    Senate, something that has transformed the mere probable cause
    screening finding that they allegedly viewed as the role of the
    House and the Judiciary Committee into the certainty that you
    hear today.
        It is a good question, as to how, then, given the role they
    saw for themselves, they could go so far, not only to seek the
    removal of the President but, indeed, to add in all their
    prosecutorial vigor something that has never been sought
    before, a bar against holding any future office, at the level
    of certainty that they must have achieved given the standard
    that they held themselves to. What happened between December 19
    and today that allows these managers to come before you not
    saying, ``Well, we were certain then and we're more certain
    now,'' or ``We only found probable cause back in 1998, but in
    1999 we are sufficiently certain that we ought to shut down the
    public will as expressed in the elections of 1996.''
        I haven't yet found an answer to that question.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Bond,
    Brownback, Campbell, Hagel, Lugar, Hutchison of Texas, Roth and
    Stevens. It is directed to the House managers:

        After everything you have heard over the last several weeks
    from the President's counsel, do you still believe that the
    facts support the charges of obstruction of justice alleged in
    the articles of impeachment? Specifically, what allegations of
    improper conduct has the President's counsel failed to
    undermine?

        The question is also from Senators Specter and McConnell.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. First
    of all, why is obstruction of justice important to begin with?
    I think back on an opportunity I had at a hearing once to
    question a member of the Colombian drug cartel. I asked him:
    ``What is the greatest weapon that law enforcement has that you
    fear?''
        His answer was very quickly, ``Extradition.''
        I said, ``Explain. Why is extradition feared?''
        He said, ``Because in Colombia, you can fix the system, but
    in America you can't.''
        That is why I think the obstruction of justice charge is so
    important to the administration of justice. Money, position,
    power does not corrupt, should not corrupt the administration
    of justice.
        The question is, Where has the President attacked,
    counselors attacked credibly the allegations of obstruction?
    The first one is that the President personally encouraged a
    witness, Monica Lewinsky, to lie. This is on December 17 at 2
    a.m. in the morning when the President calls Monica to tell her
    that she is a witness on the list--2 a.m. in the morning. At
    that time, of course, she is nervous, she is a witness and
    asked, ``Well, what am I going to say?'' And the President
    offers, according to Monica Lewinsky, you can always say you
    came to see Betty or you came to deliver papers.
        The President's counselor attacked this by saying, ``Well,
    remember what Monica said, `I was never told to lie.' '' I
    refer you to a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Tranakos,
    1990. The law is that the request to lie need not be a direct
    statement. As the court held:

        The statute prohibits elliptical suggestions as much as it
    does direct commands.

        That is common sense. That is logic. That is what a jury
    applies--common sense. And here, of course, in this case,
    Monica Lewinsky testified that she was told, in essence, to
    lie. The President didn't say, ``Monica, I need you to go in
    and lie for me.'' He told her the cover story in a legal
    context that she could use that would cover for him that, in
    essence, would be a lie. We all know that is what it is.
        Of course, the President says--well, he denies that. Of
    course, he said, I never told her to use the cover stories in a
    legal context, directly in conflict, but clearly the
    President's counselors have not attacked that obstruction of
    justice.
        The second one is the jobs and the false affidavit. They
    say there is absolutely no connection in these two, none
    whatsoever. Of course, I pointed out the testimony of Vernon
    Jordan who testified it doesn't take an Einstein to know that
    whenever he found out she was a witness, she was under
    subpoena, that the subpoena changed the circumstances. That is
    the testimony of Vernon Jordan. They say there is no
    connection. Vernon Jordan, the President's friend, says the
    circumstances change whenever you are talking about getting a
    job with somebody who is also under subpoena in a case that is
    very important to the President of the United States.
        Of course, Vernon Jordan also indicated the President's
    personal involvement when he testified before the grand jury in
    June. He said he was interested in this matter: ``He''--
    referring to the President--``was the source of it coming to my
    attention in the first place.''
        He further testified: ``The President asked me to get
    Monica Lewinsky a job.''
        The President was personally involved in the obtaining of a
    job. He was personally concerned about the false affidavit, and
    Vernon Jordan acknowledges that when those are combined, the
    circumstances are different.
        The third area of obstruction is tampering with the
    witness, Betty Currie, on January 18 and January 20 when the
    questions were posed after the deposition. The President's
    counselor challenged this and said, well, she wasn't a witness.
    Even the Jones lawyers never had any clue that she was going to
    be a witness in this case. The President couldn't know that she
    was going to be a witness.
        They hoped that we would never find the subpoena, because
    Mr. Ruff made that statement early on, which he very
    professionally expressed regret that he made that
    misrepresentation, but we found the subpoena. We found the
    subpoena that was actually issued a few days after the
    deposition for Betty Currie. She was a witness; she was not
    just a prospective witness. She was there, she had to be ready
    to go and the President knew this and the Jones lawyer knew it.
    So that stands. The pillar of obstruction stands.
        The false statements to the grand jury--that has been
    covered. There have never been any holes that have been poked
    into that, but it was to continue the coverup of the false
    statements that were made in the civil rights case.
        Another area of obstruction was December 28 when the gifts
    were retrieved, and this has been challenged. I will admit, as
    I always have, that there is a dispute in the testimony. But I
    believe the case is made through the circumstances, the
    motivation, the testimony of Monica Lewinsky as to what Betty
    Currie said when she called and the corroborating evidence. I
    don't believe they have poked a hole in that. I believe it
    stands. We would like to hear the witnesses to make you feel
    more comfortable in resolving that conflict and determine the
    credibility of those witnesses.
        But the gifts that were subpoenaed were evidence in a
    trial; they were needed in a civil rights case. The President
    knew they were under subpoena; he had the most to gain, and
    they were retrieved. And I believe the testimony indicates that
    it was based upon the actions of Betty Currie that would have
    been directed by the President.
        There are other areas of obstruction, including the
    President allowing his attorney, Robert Bennett, to make false
    representations to the Federal district judge in the
    deposition. The President's defense is that there is no proof
    whatsoever that he was paying any attention. We offered the
    videotape that shows he is believed to be looking at the
    attorney, but we would offer a witness in that regard to show
    that he was attentive. That is simply something that can be
    substantiated.
        We believe that you can evaluate that, that he was paying
    attention, but that is an element of obstruction because he was
    allowing his attorney to make a false representation to the
    court that was totally untrue, that would aid in the coverup
    and that was presented.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Hutchinson, I think you have
    answered the question.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I thank the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senator Levin to
    counsel for the White House:

        In their brief to the Senate, the House managers said that
    there was ``no urgency'' to help Ms. Lewinsky until December
    11, 1997, and that on that day ``sudden interest was inspired''
    by a court order, which the House managers had represented was
    issued in the morning of December 11, before the Vernon Jordan/
    Monica Lewinsky meeting that afternoon.
        It took some doing yesterday to get the House managers to
    finally acknowledge that the court order was not issued in the
    morning, but in the afternoon of December 11. Why were the
    House managers so reluctant to make that acknowledgment?

        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, well, I think they
    were reluctant to make the acknowledgement because they were in
    cement due to their trial brief, which at page 20, as the
    question indicates, said, as to this particular time period
    after the December 6 meeting, ``There was obviously''--there
    was obviously--``still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky.'' They
    thought that they had a chronology that was consistent with the
    inference of causation. But when you look at the true time of
    the events, that dissolves.
        Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson used a word repeatedly, a
    phrase I would like to call your attention to, as he was
    summarizing the evidence. He used the phrase: ``In essence.''
    Now, that is another phrase that is kind of a weasel word. When
    you hear that, it means that the evidence isn't really quite
    there, but if you look at the big picture maybe you can see
    what is there ``in essence.'' It doesn't work here. It doesn't
    work because of the evidence.
        Just a week ago, Mr. Manager Hutchinson, on this
    obstruction of justice question, was asked very clearly: ``On
    the case that you have against the President on obstruction of
    justice, not the perjury, would you be confident of a
    conviction in a criminal court?'' And he said, ``No, I would
    not.''
        Now, I am not going to walk through each and every element
    that he identified. I think we have repeatedly dealt with them.
    And I am not going to step on your patience to do that again
    each time.
        I would like to make two points. That is, in terms of
    encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to lie, were these cover stories an
    attempt to encourage her to lie? As I tried to indicate, there
    is testimony in the record that at a certain time in the
    relationship these cover stories were discussed. There is not
    any evidence, however, from Ms. Lewinsky, the President, or
    anyone else, that these were discussed in connection with the
    testimony, in connection with the affidavit. You remember Ms.
    Lewinsky, when asked if she could exclude that possibility,
    said, ``I pretty much can.''
        Now, the testimony that Mr. Hutchinson mentioned with Mr.
    Jordan on December 19, you remember he quoted Mr. Jordan. He
    said the discovery of the subpoena at that point changed the
    circumstances. Well, it did, but just in the opposite way that
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson would have you infer, because when Mr.
    Jordan discovered, on December 19, that Ms. Lewinsky had a
    subpoena, was going to testify in the Jones case as a witness,
    unless she could get it quashed, he went to her and went to the
    President to seek assurance that the job assistance he was
    engaging in could not at any time be said to be improper
    because of the presence of an improper relationship. Both
    parties assured him there was no such relationship. This
    observation by Mr. Jordan cuts just the opposite way.
        Thank you.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                               Order Of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I do have another question I
    will send to the desk momentarily, but I would like the
    Senators to know that we have had some 104 or 105 questions now
    that have been asked. I believe that is correct--104. Senator
    Daschle and I conferred. We want to thank the Senators for
    their participation and their questions. We do want to make it
    clear we are not seeking questions.
        [Laughter.]
        So don't feel like you need to help us by sending them
    down. But under your rights as Senators, under the Senate
    Resolution 16 and the rules we are proceeding under, every and
    each Senator is entitled to submit a question if he or she
    feels it is important, but I hope that it will be one that you
    think really is essential that has not been touched on
    somewhere already in the answers to the questions and also
    would hope--and that the Record be made clear--that we, in a
    bipartisan way, have tried very hard to make sure that this
    proceeding here and the question period, and all we have done,
    has been fair both to the President's counsel and the House
    managers. And we will continue to work in that vein.
        With that observation, and if we do need to continue going
    forward with questions, we would have to give some
    consideration to taking a break and going longer, although I
    had indicated I hoped we could quit at 4. Maybe after this
    question and, if necessary, one or two more, we could end for
    the day and then get together and see if we need more time on
    Monday for additional questions.
        I send the next question to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is a question from Senators
    Cochran, Roth, Campbell and Frist to the House managers:

        The President's counsel has suggested that the Senate has
    considered a ``good behavior'' standard in impeachment cases
    involving Federal judges. The removal of judges seems to have
    been based by the Senate on the impeachment power whose
    standard for removal is the same for both Federal judges and
    executive branch officials. Is the counsel for the President
    asking us to use a different test for removal of this President
    than we did in the case of Judge Walter Nixon? Please explain.

        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, I appreciate the opportunity to answer this question.
    It is an important question. It is true that counsel for the
    President are asking that you use a different standard in this
    case than the standard you have already established, not in
    just one case but, in fact, in a series of cases involving
    Federal judges who were before the Senate in the 1980s. There
    was a succession of three cases in the Senate, all dealing with
    the question of whether a Federal judge who had lied under oath
    should be removed from office because the Federal judge had
    lied under oath. In all three cases, the Senate decided that
    the Federal judge should be convicted and removed.
        The President's counsel have the burden of establishing
    that those recent and very clear precedents of the Senate
    should not apply to this case where the President is charged
    with lying under oath, and they attempt to do that in a number
    of ways. But I suggest, as you evaluate their attempt to
    distinguish away those precedents, that you look first and last
    to the Constitution.
        The Constitution should be your guide. And I suggest to you
    that there is nothing in the Constitution which establishes a
    different standard for the President--for any reason. There is
    not something in the Constitution that says he is subject to a
    different standard because he is elected. That argument had
    been advanced. If you look in the Constitution, you simply will
    not find that. And to argue for a different standard because
    the President is elected, I submit to you, is to impose
    something on the Constitution that is entirely alien to the
    document itself.
        The Constitution contains a single standard for the
    application of the impeachment and removal power. I have read
    it before, but I will read it again. Article II, section 4
    provides:

        The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
    United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for,
    and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
    Misdemeanors.

        Now, reference was made in the question, and reference has
    been made by the President's counsel, to the good behavior
    clause. That is found in article III, section 1. That clause
    does not alter the standard I have just read to you, however.
    Rather than creating an altered standard for removal of Federal
    judges, the good behavior clause merely establishes that the
    term of office for judicial officers is life.
        I wouldn't ask you to take my word for this. Let me refer
    again to the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon impeachment
    inquiry. There they asked the question: ``Does Article III,
    Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that judges `shall
    hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the relevance
    of the . . . impeachments of judges with respect to
    presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by
    some?'' That is essentially the question before the Senate now.
    Their answer was: ``It does not.'' It does not. ``. . .  the
    only impeachment provision''--they go on to say--``discussed in
    the [Constitutional] Convention and [indeed] . . . in the
    Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its expressed
    terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges. . . .''
        I would go on to note, it is very interesting that at the
    Constitutional Convention, on August 27, 1787, an attempt was
    made to amend the good behavior clause by adding a provision
    for the removal of judges by the executive on the application
    by the Senate and House of Representatives. Now, this proposal,
    which was offered by John Dickinson, was based on the English
    parliamentary practice of removal of judges by address, a
    practice also utilized by several American States. And under
    this process, judges could be removed for misconduct, falling
    short of the level of seriousness that would justify
    impeachment.
        Now, the proposal offered by Dickinson was overwhelmingly
    rejected. It was overwhelmingly rejected by the Convention.
    Thus, the sole provision for removal and the sole standard for
    removal is that which I have referred to in article II, section
    4.
        Now, mention has been made, and I want to respond to this,
    because mention has been made of efforts of Congress to
    establish a separate procedure for the removal of Federal
    judges, a procedure separate and apart from the impeachment and
    removal process.
        Specific mention has also been made of testimony given in
    1970 by the Chief Justice, who was then an assistant attorney
    general, regarding a proposal to establish a separate removal
    procedure. The testimony given by the Chief Justice at that
    time related to the constitutionality of the provisions of the
    bill relating to the removal of judges by methods other than
    impeachment.
        Now, my own view, quite candidly, is that such a removal
    procedure raises serious constitutional questions--serious
    questions about maintaining the independence of the judiciary.
    Putting that question aside, and regardless of the standards
    that might be applied in such a separate removal procedure, it
    is clear that the single constitutional standard for
    impeachment and removal would remain the same. That is what is
    in the Constitution. That can't be changed by any statute or
    anything set up apart from the constitutional procedures.
        One thing I want to say as I move toward concluding my
    response: It should be recognized that some specific acts might
    be a breach of duty if done by a judge but not a breach of duty
    if done by the President of the United States. That is an
    important distinction that we all should bear in mind. For
    example, it would be serious misconduct for a judge to engage
    in repeated ex parte meetings with parties who have an interest
    in a matter pending before that judge; but it is typical for
    the President to engage in such ex parte meetings with persons
    who have an interest in matters on which he will decide. For a
    judge, such conduct constitutes a breach of duty; for the
    President, it does not constitute a breach of duty.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Canady, I think you have answered
    the question.
        This question from Senator Harkin is to counsel for the
    President:

        There are three contradictions in the record: One, who
    touched whom on what parts of the body; two, when the
    relationship began; three, who called whom to get the gifts,
    Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky.
        How will these witnesses clear up the contradiction?

        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, Senator Harkin, it is
    difficult for me to explain how, after you have gotten 19
    interviews, 2 grand jury appearances, and 1 deposition to cover
    that precise territory, any further kind of inquiry along those
    lines would be of any help.
        The House managers have argued that they need to call
    witnesses for the purposes of resolving inconsistencies,
    conflicts, and discrepancies in testimony. And they have, in
    fact, identified Monica Lewinsky in particular as having given
    testimony in conflict with the testimony of the President, with
    Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan.
        But it would be well to remember that the lawyers for the
    Office of Independent Counsel certainly are not seeking to
    elicit testimony that is favorable to the President, that those
    lawyers have already done a great deal of this precise kind of
    inquiry at some great length. Those lawyers--no friends of the
    President--have already explored inconsistencies, they have
    already tested memory, they have already laboriously and at
    great length subjected these witnesses to searching scrutiny,
    and their work is available for all to see in the record of
    this case before the Senate today.
        Let me be very specific and very concrete. Monica Lewinsky
    was interviewed by the lawyers for the Office of Independent
    Counsel or testified before the grand jury on 20 different
    occasions after Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan had given their
    testimony before the grand jury. And contrary to the assertions
    of the House managers, Monica Lewinsky was interviewed six
    times and testified twice--one time before the grand jury and
    once in a sworn deposition after the President had given his
    testimony before the grand jury on August 17.
        On August 19, she was interviewed by the FBI and by lawyers
    for the special counsel. She testified before the grand jury--
    Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury on August 20. She
    was interviewed by lawyers and FBI agents for the independent
    counsel on August 24. She was interviewed on August 26. She
    appeared for a deposition held in the conference room of the
    Office of Independent Counsel on August 26. She was interviewed
    pursuant to her immunity agreement with independent counsel and
    FBI agents on September 5. She was also interviewed--excuse me;
    that was September 3. She appeared and listened to tapes with
    the FBI present on many occasions during the period September 3
    through September 6. She appeared and was interviewed by
    special counsel, independent counsel, on September 7 and
    September 5 and September 6.
        So it raises a question as to whether or not the desire to
    interview Monica Lewinsky stems from a desire to resolve
    conflicts that she has with other people, because certainly
    these occasions gave the lawyers for the independent counsel an
    opportunity to do so.
        I would simply submit that within the bounds of ethical
    behavior, I am sure, because I respect the professionalism of
    the House managers, but I would suspect that one of the reasons
    they want to inquire of Ms. Lewinsky is not to resolve
    discrepancies and disputes, it is to perhaps challenge her
    testimony when it is helpful to the President and perhaps
    bolster her testimony when it is not helpful to the President.
    The House managers are not neutral investigators, neutral
    interrogators.
        It raises questions about what the managers' true purpose
    is in calling Vernon Jordan and Betty Currie forward as
    witnesses, what they want to inquire about if they conduct an
    interview of them. I suggest that this is also a bit of a
    fishing expedition, looking for evidence that will be damaging
    to the President.
        We are not afraid of witnesses, but we do want fairness,
    and we don't think it is fair in this process. If you are going
    to have a real trial, then we want to have a real defense, and
    to have a real defense requires real discovery and real
    opportunity to have access to documents and witnesses and
    evidence that has been in the custody and the control of the
    House of Representatives, that has never been made available to
    us, that is in the custody and control of the Office of
    Independent Counsel, that has not been made available to us.
        I suggest, as we have seen from the statements made by the
    managers to this body yesterday and today about Vernon Jordan
    suggesting--actually suggesting that he did not tell the truth
    when he testified numerous times before the grand jury, which
    is an outrageous suggestion, and suggesting, which happened
    today--implying that he destroyed evidence, which not even the
    independent counsel had suggested, they seek to do nothing more
    than to attack, attack, attack the best friend of the President
    of the United States, and his personal secretary.
        That is the reason they want to talk to these people. I
    think it is an improper reason. It is wanting to win too much.
    I don't think the U.S. Senate should be part of it.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This question is from Senators Hagel,
    Abraham, and Hatch to the House managers:

        White House counsel has indicated their opposition to
    calling witnesses, asserting that calling witnesses would not
    shed light on the facts and would unnecessarily prolong the
    proceedings. But it is the responsibility of the Senate to find
    the truth. And if any Senators reasonably believe that hearing
    witnesses would assist in finding the truth, why shouldn't they
    be called?

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        ``Methinks thou doth protest too much.'' I think that is
    what White House counsel has been doing. I don't know why, but
    they, frankly, don't want witnesses. They don't want what you
    normally have in a trial. We can paint this with any kinds of
    colors you want to have, but a trial without witnesses, when it
    involves a criminal accusation, a criminal matter, is not a
    true trial; it really isn't. It is not what I think of, and I
    guarantee it is not what any of my friends sitting over here
    who have been counsel, prosecutors and defense lawyers, think
    of. It is remotely conceivable, but certainly not where you
    have had the inferences and the conclusions that we draw
    logically from the entire sequence of events that are painted
    from the very day when the President got word of Monica
    Lewinsky being on the witness list, and all the way through his
    testimony in the Jones case, all the way through the grand jury
    testimony, when they challenge every inference that you should
    logically draw from the record, and then suggest that, oh, but
    we should not have anybody in here; so you who are going to
    judge ultimately whether our representations are persuasive or
    not about those inferences, whether you should be able to
    judge--and I think you should--what the witnesses actually are
    saying.
        I will give you one illustration. I don't know how many
    times--two or three times--I put up here on the board, or I
    have said to you--and I know a couple of my colleagues said to
    you--that during the discussion with regard to the affidavit
    that Monica Lewinsky had in front of the grand jury, she
    explicitly said: No, the President didn't tell me to lie, but
    he didn't discourage me either. He didn't encourage me or
    discourage me.
        You need to have her say that to you. They have even been
    whacking away at that, confusing everything they can, talking
    about the job searches at the same time they are talking about
    the affidavit, what she said here, there, or anywhere else.
    Witnesses are a logical thing. There are a lot of conflicts
    that are here.
        When we get to the point--which we presume we will get that
    opportunity to do--to argue our case on why we should have
    witnesses, maybe Monday or perhaps Tuesday--I think that even
    though you have a motion to dismiss, we will get that chance--
    we will lay out a lot of these things. There are a lot of them
    out there. But the point is, overall, you need to have the
    witnesses to judge what any trier of fact judges about any one
    of these.
        I would be happy to yield to Mr. Graham or Mr. Rogan if
    they wish--neither one. That is fair enough.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it now approaches the hour
    that we had indicated we would conclude our work on Saturday.
    There may still be some questions that Senators would like to
    have offered. I have talked to Senator Daschle.
        One suggestion made is that maybe on Monday we would ask
    that questions could be submitted for the Record in writing. I
    think that is a common practice. We don't want to cut it off.
    At this point, I would not be prepared to do that. But I would
    like to suggest that we go ahead and conclude our business
    today, and if there is a need by a Senator on either side to
    have another question, or two or three, we will certainly
    consult with each other and see how we can handle that, perhaps
    on Monday, and even see if it would be appropriate to prepare a
    motion with regard to being able to submit questions for the
    Record, which would be answered. We would not want to abuse
    that and cause that to be a protracted process.
        In view of the time spent here--in fact, we have had around
    106 questions, and we are about 10 hours into this now--I think
    we should conclude for this Saturday. We will resume at 1 p.m.
    on Monday and continue in accordance with the provisions of S.
    Res. 16. I will update all Members as to the specific schedule
    when it becomes clear.

                          Unanimous Consent Agreement

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that in the Record
    following today's proceedings there appear a period of morning
    business to accommodate bills and statements that have been
    submitted during the day by Senators. I thank my colleagues for
    their attentiveness during the proceedings.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                    ------

               ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. MONDAY, JANUARY 25, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that the Senate stand in
    adjournment under the previous order.
        Mr. HARKIN. I object.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate stand
    in adjournment under the previous order.
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I seek recognition.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion to
    adjourn.
        The motion was agreed to and, at 3:55 p.m., the Senate,
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment adjourned until Monday,
    January 25, 1999, at 1 p.m.

                            Monday, January 25, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Dear God, we are moved by Your accessibility to us and our
    accountability to You. We hear Your promise sounding in our
    souls, ``Be not afraid, I am with you.'' We place our trust in
    Your problem-solving power, Your conflict-resolving presence,
    and Your anxiety-dissolving peace. So we report in to You for
    duty. What You desire, You inspire. What You guide, You
    provide.
        This is Your Nation; we are here to serve You. Just as
    Daniel Webster said that the greatest conviction of his life
    was that he was accountable to You, we press on with a
    heightened awareness that You are the unseen Lord of this
    Chamber, the silent Listener to every word that is spoken, and
    the Judge of our deliberations and decisions.
        Bless the Senators with the assurance that Your work, done
    with total trust in You and respect for each other, will not
    lack Your resources. Surpass any impasse with divinely inspired
    solutions. You are our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, there
    are 6 hours 33 minutes remaining during which Senators may
    submit questions in writing directed to either the managers, on
    the part of the House of Representatives, or the counsel for
    the President.
        The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               order of procedure

        Mr. LOTT. As is obvious by the absence of the managers and
    counsel, and a number of the Senators, the two parties are
    still meeting in conference at this time. I believe we are
    close to reaching an agreement which would outline today's
    impeachment proceedings. It will probably be an hour or so
    before we can complete that because we need to explain it in
    detail to our respective conferences, and also make sure that
    we reduce it to writing so we understand exactly what we are
    agreeing to.
        I will in a moment ask that the Senate stand in recess
    until 2 p.m. I apologize for any inconvenience to Senators and
    the Chief Justice. But I think that what we are discussing in
    the long run would save some time and lead us to a fair
    procedure through the balance of the day and how we begin
    tomorrow.

                                     recess

        Therefore, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate
    stand in recess until 2 p.m.
        Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to
    object----
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from New Hampshire.
        Mr. GREGG. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a parliamentary
    inquiry that I would like to share.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian says it takes
    unanimous consent.
        Mr. GREGG. I ask unanimous consent to----
        Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object, I believe that if
    it is going to be made, Mr. Chief Justice, if it requires
    unanimous consent, that it would be wise if it can be done at a
    time when both leaders are on the floor.
        Mr. GREGG. I withdraw the unanimous consent.
        There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:06 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my understanding that
    the question and answer period is now completed. In a moment I
    will propound a unanimous consent agreement that will outline
    the next steps in this process.

                          unanimous-consent agreement

        Mr. LOTT. In the meantime, I would ask unanimous consent
    that Senators be allowed to submit statements and introduce
    legislation at the desk today. I further ask unanimous consent
    that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in
    adjournment until 1 p.m. on Tuesday to resume the articles of
    impeachment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Ms. MIKULSKI. Reserving the right to object, I note that
    the Democratic leader is not in the Chamber.
        May I inquire, has this been cleared?
        Mr. LOTT. I just want to observe, Mr. Chief Justice, that
    there are still some discussions underway. You will note that
    Senator Daschle is not here, and unless there is objection to
    what I just did, I am prepared to note the absence of a quorum
    so that we can have time for Senators to return to the Chamber.
        Ms. MIKULSKI. Point of clarification for the majority
    leader. Did the Senator say that we would come in tomorrow at 1
    p.m.?
        Mr. LOTT. I did. If I might respond, Mr. Chief Justice,
    there had been some discussion about coming in earlier, but
    because of a number of conflicts, I understand, from the House
    managers and concerns that we would need that time to continue
    to have discussions, we thought we would go ahead and come in
    at 1. But let me add that if during the process of the day
    there is a decision that we need to change that to either
    earlier or later, we could revise that request. This is just to
    move the process forward, as we have announced each day we
    would come in at 1 except on Saturday. But if there is a need
    to change the time, we will certainly be prepared to consider
    that request.
        Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I had earlier asked a couple
    of unanimous consent requests, but the Democratic leader was
    not on the floor, and it was not officially objected to or
    officially ruled as not having been objected to. So I am going
    to assume that is all null and void, and we are going to start
    over again.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The requests are withdrawn.
        Mr. LOTT. Now, to repeat what we had earlier discussed and
    to make sure Members understand it, it is our understanding and
    our agreement that the question and answer period is now
    completed.

       order for submission of statements and introduction of legislation

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that Senators be allowed
    to submit statements and introduce legislation at the desk
    today.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                               order of procedure

        Mr. LOTT. With regard to the time that will be involved
    today and the time that we will come in on Tuesday, we will
    have further discussions on that, and we will have a consent
    request on that later in the day or at the close of business.
        Now I have a unanimous-consent request that will allow us
    to have a clear understanding and an orderly procedure for the
    balance of the day. I have discussed this with my counterpart
    on the other side of the aisle, both conferences have had a
    chance to talk about it, and I think it is a fair way to
    proceed, where we would have a chance to discuss the issues
    that are before us and get us to a conclusion of this part of
    the impeachment proceedings in a logical way.

                           unanimous-consent request

        Mr. LOTT. First, Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent
    that today, following the conclusion of the arguments by the
    managers and the counsel on the motion to dismiss--and I note
    that the next order of business is 2 hours equally divided, 1
    hour on each side, on a motion to dismiss when and if it is
    filed by any Senator--it be in order for Senator Harkin to make
    a motion to open all debate pursuant to his motion timely filed
    and that the Senate proceed immediately to the vote pursuant to
    the impeachment rules.
        I further ask that following that vote, if defeated, it be
    in order to move to close the session for deliberations on the
    motion to dismiss, as provided under the impeachment rules, and
    the Senate proceed to an immediate vote.
        I further ask that if the Senate votes to proceed to closed
    session, those deliberations must conclude by the close of
    business today, notwithstanding the 10-minute rule allocated
    under the impeachment rule.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. HARKIN. I object.
        Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
        Mr. HARKIN. Reserving the right to object.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, does he reserve the right to
    object or did he object?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me the Senator
    does not have the right to reserve the right to object.
        Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
        Mr. HARKIN. I just have a modification that I would like to
    discuss with the leader, a brief modification of that, that
    would not engender an objection.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, so we can proceed with this in
    an appropriate manner, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          unanimous-consent agreement

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request as
    previously outlined, with one change; that is, that it say in
    the first sentence ``unanimous consent that following the
    conclusion of the arguments by the managers and the counsel
    today on the motion to dismiss, that it be in order for Senator
    Harkin to make a motion to open that debate.'' Instead of
    ``all,'' the word is ``that'' debate.
        With that and no other changes, I renew that request.
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I reserve the right to
    object.
        OK, I don't have any----
        Mr. LOTT. The reservation is withdrawn, I believe.
        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, welcome to the operations of
    the U.S. Senate.
        I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call
    be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, was the unanimous consent
    agreement agreed to?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Not yet.
        Mr. LOTT. I renew my request.
        Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I and Senator Collins, the
    junior Senator from Maine, ask unanimous consent that when the
    Senate considers the anticipated motion to dismiss, that it
    shall vote on two separate questions: First, whether to dismiss
    article I of the articles of impeachment; and, second, whether
    to dismiss article II.
        Mr. GRAMM. I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. There is a pending request for unanimous
    consent by the majority leader, who has not surrendered the
    floor.
        Mr. LOTT. Under his reservation, if the Senator would yield
    to me, I believe if we can get this agreed to, he can make his
    request and then it can be ruled on.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the floor if the Senator would
    like to proceed in that fashion.
        I renew my request, again, for the unanimous consent as
    outlined earlier.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? In the absence of an
    objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request, along
    with the junior Senator from Maine--the unanimous consent
    request that when the Senate proceeds to vote on the
    anticipated motion to dismiss, that the question be divided
    into a separate vote on article I of the articles of
    impeachment, and then a separate vote on article II of the
    articles of impeachment.
        Mr. GRAMM. I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, now, if I could, I will
    outline the result of our efforts there. I thank Senator
    Daschle and my colleagues on his side of the aisle and this
    side of the aisle for trying to come up with a process that is
    fair and that would give us an opportunity today to debate this
    important issue. It is never easy to get 100 Senators to agree
    on a method to proceed, so I think this was a good
    accomplishment. I thank one and all.
        I understand that now Senator Byrd will offer the motion to
    dismiss. For the information of all Members, once that motion
    is offered, there will then be 2 hours for debate. The House
    managers will be recognized to open the debate, and following
    that will be the White House arguments. Then the House managers
    will be recognized again for closing remarks. At that point,
    the consent agreement would apply.
        I anticipate taking our first break at the conclusion of
    the first 2 hours of arguments by the managers and White House
    counsel, unless there is an urgent need to do so earlier. Then
    we will go forward with this agreement, which will require a
    vote on the Harkin motion to open the debate, the vote on the
    amendment to close debate on the motion to dismiss, and then
    the debate which would go on, the 10-minute rule
    notwithstanding, until the close of business today.
        I yield the floor.
        Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    West Virginia.

                               motion to dismiss

        Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chief Justice, I send a motion in writing to
    the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, moves that the
    impeachment proceedings against William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States, be, and the same are, duly
    dismissed.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to Rule XXI of the Senate Rules
    on Impeachment, the managers on the part of the House of
    Representatives and the counsel for the President each have up
    to 1 hour to argue the motion.
        The Chair recognizes the House managers.
        Mr. Manager CANADY. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, on behalf of the House of Representatives, I rise to
    speak in opposition to the motion to dismiss. During the hour
    allotted to the managers, I will offer a few introductory
    comments concerning why adoption of the motion would be
    inconsistent with constitutional standards and harmful to the
    institutions of our Government. Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Graham, and
    Mr. Gekas will present arguments concerning the facts and the
    law, and then Mr. Hyde will close.
        At the outset, I must urge you to consider the fact that
    this motion to dismiss is without precedent. The Senate has
    never--not once in the more than 200-year history of our
    Constitution--dismissed a proceeding against an official who
    remained in office after impeachment by the House of
    Representatives. I humbly urge you not to depart from the
    Senate's well-established practice of fully considering cases
    of impeachment and rendering a judgment of either conviction or
    acquittal.
        In the midst of the great differences between the
    President's counsel and the House managers, there actually is
    at least a little common ground. Both sides agree that the
    impeachment and removal power is designed to protect the well-
    being of the institutions of our Government. But there is a
    critical difference that divides us, as is obvious from the
    argument that has gone before.
        The managers have argued that this power--the power of
    impeachment and removal--is a positive power granted by the
    Constitution to maintain the integrity of Government, a power
    to preserve, protect, and strengthen our constitutional system
    against the misconduct of officials that would subvert,
    undermine, or weaken the institutions of our Government.
        The President's lawyers, on the other hand, advance a much
    narrower view of the role of the impeachment power in
    protecting our institutions. Their case rests on the argument
    that it is a power to be used only in response to conduct
    threatening devastating harm to the system of Government--at
    least when it is used against a President.
        But I submit to you that Alexander Hamilton did not
    contemplate that the impeachment process would be so restricted
    when he spoke of it as a ``method of national inquest into the
    conduct of public men.'' And James Iredell did not have such a
    narrow view in mind when he spoke of the accountability through
    impeachment of anyone who ``willfully abuses his trust.''
    Iredell did not have such a limited view when he spoke of the
    impeachment of a President who, as he said, ``acted from some
    corrupt motive or other.''
        Under the standards urged by the President's lawyers, the
    misdeeds of Richard Nixon would not be the threshold for
    impeachment and removal. What he did was corrupt. The legal
    rights of citizens were treated with contempt. President Nixon
    showed an egregious lack of respect for the law. But all these
    misdeeds did not threaten the sort of ruinous harm to the
    system of Government that the President's lawyers argue would
    be required to justify conviction and removal. After all, the
    core charges against President Nixon related to the coverup of
    a third-rate burglary.
        Members of the Senate, as you consider the motion to
    dismiss, I ask you to pause and reflect on the consequences of
    the standard advocated by the President's lawyers. Consider the
    consequences for the system of justice of allowing the
    President's dangerous example of lawlessness to stand. Consider
    the consequences for the Presidency itself.
        I respectfully submit to you that the standard advocated by
    President Clinton's lawyers will debase and degrade the
    institution of the Presidency. I know that is not the intention
    of the President's lawyers, but it is the necessary consequence
    of their position.
        Only 42 men have held the office of President of the United
    States. Some of them have been ordinary men of limited talent.
    A handful of our Presidents have been great men. Most have been
    capable men who brought special skills to the office. No matter
    what our individual judgments may be concerning President
    Clinton, it is clear that he is one of the most intellectually
    gifted and politically skilled men to hold the office of
    President.
        He was raised to this great eminence--the most powerful
    office in the greatest Nation in the history of the world--an
    unparalleled opportunity, honor and privilege. And in this
    position of eminence and honor, and in this position of trust,
    what did he do? He made a series of choices that has brought us
    to this day. He made the choice to violate the law--and he made
    that choice repeatedly. He knew what he was doing. He reflected
    on it. Perhaps he struggled with his conscience. But when the
    time came to decide, he deliberately and willfully chose to
    violate the laws of this land. He chose to turn his back on the
    very law he was sworn to uphold. He chose to turn his back on
    his solemn oath of office. He chose to turn his back on his
    constitutional duty.
        As you deliberate on this motion, I ask you to consider
    what William Jefferson Clinton has done to the integrity of the
    great office he holds as a trust. I ask you to consider the
    harm he has caused, the indignity he has brought to the
    institution of the Presidency.
        Some have asked of us, ``Where is the compassion and where
    is the spirit of forgiveness?'' Let me say that I, for one,
    believe in forgiveness. Without forgiveness, what hope would
    there be for any of us? But forgiveness requires repentance; it
    requires contrition. And so I must ask, where is the
    repentance? Where is the contrition?
        It is true that the President has expressed regret for his
    personal misconduct. But he has never--he has never--accepted
    responsibility for breaking the law. He has never taken that
    essential step, as the argument advanced so vigorously by his
    counsel makes clear. He has refused to accept responsibility
    for breaking the law. He has stubbornly resisted any effort to
    be held accountable for his violations of the law, for his
    violations of his constitutional oath, and his violation of his
    duty as President. To this day, he remains adamantly
    unrepentant. And, of course, under our system of justice, even
    sincere repentance, which is so lacking here, does not
    eliminate all accountability.
        In the discussion thus far, the debate has brought the
    concept of proportionality to the fore from time to time. You
    have been urged to reject your own precedents--the clear
    precedents establishing that crimes such as lying under oath
    justify conviction and removal. The principle of
    proportionality, it has been urged, requires that the rule you
    have applied to Federal judges not be applied to the President
    of the United States.
        I will be the first to concede that removing a President of
    the United States is, without doubt, a more momentous decision
    than removing one of the hundreds of Federal judges who hold
    office in this country. When the Chief Executive is removed,
    the gravity of the matter undeniably reaches a higher level.
    But it is also true--and it must not be forgotten--that when
    the President engages in a calculated and sustained course of
    conduct involving obstruction of justice and perjury, the
    gravity of the consequences for the Nation also reaches a far
    higher level. Such lawless conduct by the President does
    immeasurably more to subvert public respect for the law than
    does the misconduct of any Federal judge or any other Federal
    official.
        As has been pointed out more than once, the Constitution
    contains a single standard for impeachment and removal of all
    civil officers; there is not one standard for the President and
    another standard for everyone else. There is nothing in the
    Constitution that requires you--or allows you--to set a lower
    standard of integrity for the President than the standard you
    have set for other officials who have been convicted and
    removed by your solemn action.
        Although they can point to nothing in the Constitution, the
    President's lawyers assert that the President is simply
    different because he is elected. So let me say this. The Senate
    itself has established a standard of integrity for its own
    elected Members that President Clinton could not meet. As
    recently as 1995, an elected Senator resigned under imminent
    threat of expulsion for offenses that included acts similar to
    the acts of obstruction of justice committed by President
    Clinton.
        Senator Robert Packwood was elected, yet he was on his way
    to certain expulsion. Listen to what the Senate Select
    Committee on Ethics had to say about Senator Packwood's
    conduct. He was guilty, the committee found, of:

    . . . withholding, altering and destroying relevant evidence .
    . . conduct which is expressly prohibited by 18 United States
    Code, section 1505. . . . Senator Packwood's illegal acts
    constitute a violation of his duty of trust to the Senate and
    an abuse of his position as a United States Senator, reflecting
    discredit upon the United States Senate.

        The statute referred to by the committee in the Packwood
    case is closely analogous to the obstruction of justice statute
    the President has violated. Senator Packwood unlawfully sought
    to impede the discovery of evidence. President Clinton has done
    the same thing. For his violation of the law, Senator Packwood,
    an elected Senator, was judged worthy of expulsion from the
    Senate.
        But the President's lawyers argue the President should be
    held to a lower standard of integrity than the standard you
    have set for yourselves as Members of the Senate. According to
    them, the Constitution establishes a lower standard of
    integrity for the President than the standard for Senators, a
    lower standard than the standard for Federal judges, and a
    lower standard than the standard for members of the Armed
    Forces of the United States.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I submit to you that
    the President's lawyers, honorable as they are, are simply
    wrong. They advocate an arbitrary standard that would insulate
    the President from the proper accountability for his misconduct
    under our Constitution. Our Constitution does not establish a
    lower standard of integrity for the President of the United
    States.
        The Senate, I respectfully submit to you, should follow the
    well established precedents. The Senate should reject the
    motion to dismiss.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, how much time
    has expired?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Twelve minutes.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, in my former life, when I tried cases,
    the defense counsel would routinely offer a motion to dismiss,
    and my clients would always ask me how they could argue to
    dismiss a case before we had a chance to put on our evidence. I
    would always explain that there was more than sufficient
    evidence to get this case to a jury and they didn't have to
    worry.
        We all know that granting a motion to dismiss is a weapon
    that is rarely used in court. It is a severe remedy that cuts
    off an individual's right to seek justice in court. For that
    reason, a motion to dismiss must fail if there is any
    substantial evidence to support the case. In addition, as you
    evaluate evidence under a motion to dismiss, the facts are to
    be considered in a way that is most favorable to the
    respondent--in this case the House managers.
        For example, if there is a dispute between the testimony of
    Ms. Lewinsky and the President in consideration of this, I
    would urge you to--and believe that under proper rules you
    should--consider that in the favor of the theory of the
    articles of impeachment.
        It has been explained to me many times that standard
    courtroom rules do not apply in the U.S. Senate. But, still,
    granting a motion to dismiss by the Senate has the same
    effect--to cut short the trial and avoid the development of the
    facts--as it would in any State court case. In this case of
    impeachment, the House of Representatives found that there was
    substantial evidence to support these articles. And the Senate
    should not summarily dismiss the charges.
        I might add that, despite Mr. Ruff's references, the House
    standard for the articles of impeachment was not simply
    probable cause. My colleagues on the Judiciary Committee looked
    at a much higher standard of clear and convincing evidence.
        But, coming back to the Senate, to dismiss the case would
    be unprecedented from a historical standpoint, because it has
    never been done before; it would be damaging to the
    Constitution, because the Senate would fail to try the case; it
    would be harmful to the body politic, because there is no
    resolution of the issues of the case; but, most importantly, it
    would show willful blindness to the evidentiary record that has
    thus far been presented.
        An appropriate question, you might ask, is: How should you
    decide whether this motion should be granted? I would contend
    that you should decide this issue based upon the facts that you
    have before you in the record and not on any other criteria. A
    motion to dismiss should not be granted because you do not
    think there are presently enough votes for conviction.
        Let me assure you that I want this over. As Bruce Lindsey,
    sitting over here, will probably attest, this is bad for me
    politically. I am from Arkansas, the State Bill Clinton
    dominated politically for years, and certainly its most
    influential politician. But we do have our responsibilities,
    and I happen to believe that we should follow the process which
    is dictated by the Constitution and the facts.
        I know I am making legal arguments to this Court of
    Impeachment, in which I understand you make your own rules, and
    I respect that. But, as opposing counsel pointed out on many
    occasions, there are reasons for these rules of procedure and
    they have relevance to your deliberations today. Again, your
    decision should be based upon the facts, and so let's discuss
    the facts.
        Does the record support the charges of obstruction of
    justice and perjury? To look at this from a different angle,
    because we talked about it at length, let's examine how the
    President responded to critical developments in the Federal
    civil rights case in which he was a defendant.
        First, how did he handle those people he knew to be
    witnesses? The President did not want them to testify, and, if
    they did testify, he did not want them to testify truthfully.
    Two of those witnesses were Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie.
        Clearly, he did not want them to testify in the Federal
    civil rights case and, likewise, his lawyers today do not want
    those witnesses to testify before this body.
        Now, let's look at what happened when the President learned
    that Monica Lewinsky was on the witness list. Very quickly, it
    was December 5 that the witness list came in. He learned about
    it probably the next day, December 6. Monica Lewinsky visited
    with him and said Vernon Jordan was not doing very much on the
    job front. The President's response is, okay, I will talk to
    him. I will get on it.
        Now, Ms. Lewinsky assumed that was a brushoff, but he was
    serious about it because he later learned that day that at the
    latest--he learned later that day that Monica was on the
    witness list when he met with the lawyers.
        After that, the next day, he meets with Vernon Jordan at
    the White House. And even though Mr. Jordan says he thinks it
    was unlikely that the job situation was discussed, Mr. Jordan
    makes it clear that he ultimately went to work to get Ms.
    Lewinsky a job at the direction of the President. According to
    Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony on June 9, he testified,
    ``The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job.'' That
    is undisputed. He had testified to the same grand jury, ``He,''
    referring to the President, ``is the source of it coming to my
    attention in the first place.''
        And so as the result of the President's request, Vernon
    Jordan got to work, met with Ms. Lewinsky, assisted her in
    securing key job interviews, and kept the President informed.
    The job search became critical when she was put on the witness
    list on December 5, and the December 11 order of Judge Wright
    served to reinforce the urgency of the matter.
        Now, all of this was happening when the President knew she
    was a witness in the civil rights case, but the individuals
    affected by the President's unlawful scheme of obstruction may
    not have been privy to his plans. He kept Ms. Lewinsky in the
    dark about her being a witness until he had the job search well
    underway. And Mr. Jordan indicates that he was simply trying to
    get Ms. Lewinsky a job at the direction of the President
    without any clue that she was a witness until she got the
    subpoena on December 19.
        Now, the President kept his information about Ms. Lewinsky
    being on the list away from her until he called her at 2 a.m.
    in the morning on December 17 to let her know the news.
        So how does the President handle witnesses in the judicial
    system that are a danger to him? He wanted to make sure that
    they were taken care of and cooperative in concealing the truth
    from the courts.
        The next critical step for the President to assure that Ms.
    Lewinsky sticks with her predesigned cover stories was that she
    would not deviate from that even though they were now in the
    court system. Vernon Jordan testified in the grand jury that
    ``it didn't take an Einstein to know when she was under
    subpoena the circumstances changed,'' and, of course, that is
    clear.
        When Ms. Lewinsky was placed on the witness list, the truth
    became a threat to the President. He tried to avoid the truth
    at all costs and was willing to obstruct the legal processes of
    the judicial system in order to protect himself. The
    obstruction started with the job favors and then continued
    through the December 17 conversation with the President when
    the President encouraged her to keep using the cover stories
    even though she would be under oath as a witness, encouraged
    her to sign a false affidavit, and then on December 28,
    according to the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the President sent
    Betty Currie to retrieve items of evidence for the purpose of
    concealment and with the obvious effect of obstructing the
    truth.
        Despite the concerted effort of the President in keeping
    Monica Lewinsky from being a truthful witness, the President
    was not yet home free. He still had to go through the hurdle of
    his own deposition on January 17. And even though he knew there
    were going to be questions about Monica Lewinsky, he was
    hopeful that the false affidavit, the representations of his
    attorney, Robert Bennett, and the President's own affirmation
    of the false affidavit would be sufficient to prevent
    questioning about Ms. Lewinsky. But it didn't work. Despite
    this effort, the Federal district court judge ordered the
    President to respond to the questions. At that point he had a
    choice. He could tell the truth under oath, or he could provide
    false statements. He chose the latter, and that decision forced
    a continued pattern of obstruction.
        During the deposition, he asserted the name of Betty Currie
    at least six times, and by doing so he dared the plaintiff's
    lawyers to question Ms. Currie as a witness. They knew it, and
    he knew it. When the Jones lawyers returned from the
    deposition, they immediately set about issuing a subpoena for
    Betty Currie. And what did the President do? He immediately set
    about attempting to assure that Betty Currie would not state
    the truth when called as a witness.
        They defended that she wasn't a witness, she wasn't a
    prospective witness, but yet we produced the subpoena that she
    was a prospective witness, and they wanted her to testify, and
    everyone knew it. The President called her at home, arranged
    for her to come in the next day, and put her through the
    questioning: He was never alone with Monica, trying to
    establish that; that Monica was the aggressor and that the
    President did nothing wrong. That is what he was trying to
    accomplish through his questioning of Betty Currie.
        Can you imagine how uncomfortable Betty Currie was, must
    have felt on that occasion, being called in to see her boss,
    then having the President recreate a fictional account in order
    to prevent the truth from coming out in a court of law? But
    once was not enough, and 2 days later Ms. Betty Currie was
    brought in for the same series of questions. The message was
    clear. You have to cover for the President even though the
    purpose was unlawful.
        And so we see a pattern developing. When it comes to a
    witness, whether it is Monica Lewinsky or Betty Currie, the
    choice is made. The President encouraged the witness to lie,
    and the President chose to impede the administration of justice
    rather than assuring that the laws be faithfully executed.
        But the President had one final choice, and that was in his
    grand jury testimony in August. At this point, the
    embarrassment of the relationship was public, and that could no
    longer serve as an excuse not to tell the truth. But, once
    again, the President chose not to abide by his oath but to
    evade the truth and provide false statements; not to protect
    his family, not to preserve the dignity of the Presidency, but
    to prevent the grand jury from knowing the truth in their
    investigation and to continue the coverup began during the
    truth-seeking process in the civil rights case.
        I do not have time to cover all the facts, but they are
    more than substantial, they are compelling, and they are
    convicting.
        Let me leave you with some questions. First of all, who
    asked Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job? The answer?
    It was the President.
        Secondly, who suggested that Monica Lewinsky sign an
    affidavit to avoid testifying in the civil rights case, which
    by its nature had to be false? The answer? It was the
    President. Who obstructed the truth when Monica Lewinsky was
    subpoenaed as a witness? It was the President. Who impeded the
    gathering of evidence when the Federal court subpoena called
    for the production of gifts? The answer? It was the President.
    Who tampered with the testimony of Betty Currie when it was
    clear she was a witness in the case? It was the President. Who
    took an oath and failed to tell the truth before the courts of
    our land? It was the President.
        I state these facts with sadness, but these facts are true.
    The motion should be defeated.
        I thank the Senate. On behalf of the managers, Mr. Chief
    Justice, I reserve the remainder of the time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes counsel
    for the President.
        Ms. Counsel SELIGMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, distinguished House managers, good
    afternoon. My name is Nicole Seligman. I am a member of the law
    firm of Williams & Connolly here in Washington, DC. I have been
    privileged to represent President Clinton as personal counsel
    since 1994.
        I am honored to stand before you today to argue in support
    of the motion to dismiss the impeachment proceedings that has
    been offered by the senior Senator from West Virginia, Senator
    Byrd.
        The Constitution reposes in this body and nowhere else the
    sole authority to try impeachments. It has placed in your hands
    alone the decision whether to dismiss now or to go forward.
    There is no judicial review. There is no judicial guidance
    other than that which each of you, in your wisdom, may choose
    to apply by analogy from judicial experience. There are no
    particular rules of civil or criminal procedure that you must
    follow. The Constitution has freed you from that. It has wisely
    placed in your hands alone the ability to make a sound judgment
    in the manner you think best for the reasons you think best,
    based on your wisdom and experience, as to what is best for
    this Nation at this moment in the proceedings.
        We submit to you that the moment has arrived where the best
    interests of the Nation, the wise prescription of the framers,
    and the failure of the managers' proof, all point to dismissal.
    You have listened. You have heard. The case cannot be made. It
    is time to end it.
        Without presuming to infringe on the constitutional
    authority that is yours alone, and without repeating at undue
    length the arguments that you heard over the past few weeks, I
    do want to set out briefly the reasons that we believe to be
    some of the grounds on which an early and fair disposition of
    this difficult matter might rest. There are at least four such
    grounds. Each one stands by itself as sufficient reason to vote
    for the motion of Senator Byrd.
        The first ground is the core constitutional issue before
    you, the failure of the articles to charge impeachable
    offenses. They do not do so. They do not allege conduct that,
    if proven, violated the public trust in the manner the framers
    intended when they wrote the words ``treason, bribery, or other
    high crimes and misdemeanors.'' For absent an element of
    immediate danger to the state, a danger of such magnitude that
    it cannot await resolution by the electorate in the normal
    cycle, the framers intended restraint. There is no such danger
    to the state here. No one has made that claim, or could, or
    would. A vote for the motion is a vote for constitutional
    stability.
        Impeachment was never meant to be just another weapon in
    the arsenal of partisanship. By definition, a partisan split
    like that which accompanied these articles from the House of
    Representatives creates doubt that makes plain a constitutional
    error of the course that we are on. As Senator William Pitt
    Fessenden wrote 130 years ago on a great and decisive
    historical occasion, the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson:

        Conviction upon impeachment should be free from the taint
    of party and leave no ground for suspicion upon the motives of
    those who inflict the penalty.

        His words echoed those of Alexander Hamilton who, in the
    much quoted Federalist 65, had warned, in his words, of ``the
    greatest danger that the decision''--that is the decision by
    the Senate--``will be regulated more by the comparative
    strength of the parties than by the real demonstrations of
    innocence or guilt.''
        Now, Mr. Manager Graham has candidly acknowledged that
    reasonable people could disagree about the propriety of
    removal. He said they absolutely could. We suggest to you that
    there can be no removal when even the prosecutor agrees that
    such reasonable doubts exist. If reasonable people can
    disagree, we suggest to you that reasonable Senators should
    dismiss. The constitutional standard for impeachment is not met
    here.
        The second and third grounds we offer to you relate to the
    deeply flawed drafting of the articles by the House of
    Representatives. They have left the House managers free to fill
    what Mr. Ruff described as ``an empty vessel,'' to define for
    the House of Representatives what it really had in mind when it
    impeached the President. But that is not a role that the
    Constitution allows to be delegated to the House managers. It
    is not a role that the Constitution allows them to fill. It is
    a role that is explicitly and uniquely reserved to the full
    House of Representatives which, under our Constitution, has the
    sole power to impeach.
        The articles also are unconstitutionally defective for yet
    another reason, because each article combines a menu of
    charges, and the managers invite the Members of this body to
    convict on one or more of the charges they list. The result is
    the deeply troubling prospect that the President might be
    convicted and removed from office without two-thirds of the
    Senate agreeing on what the President actually did. Such a
    result would be in conflict with the requirement that the
    President cannot be convicted unless two-thirds of this body
    concurs. The requirement of a two-thirds supermajority is at
    the core of the constitutional protection afforded the
    President and the American people. The Founding Fathers were
    wise to guarantee that protection, and it has protected the
    Presidency for more than two centuries. The House must not be
    allowed to erode that protection today. The articles, as
    drafted, are unconstitutional.
        The fourth ground for the motion is based on the facts. Mr.
    Manager McCollum has twice asserted that this body must first
    determine whether the President committed crimes, and then move
    on to the question of removal from office. Recognizing that
    each Senator is free to choose the standard of proof that his
    or her conscience dictates, we submit that if the question is,
    as the managers would have it, whether the President has
    committed a crime, that standard should be proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt. And it is clear that such a standard, that
    is, proof to the level of certainty necessary to make the most
    significant decisions you face in life, cannot possibly be met
    here. The presentations last week demonstrated that the record
    is full of exculpatory facts and deeply ambiguous
    circumstantial evidence that will make it impossible for the
    managers to meet this standard or, in fact, any standard that
    you might in good conscience choose to apply here.
        The managers have, with great ingenuity, spun out theories
    of wrongdoing that they have advanced repeatedly, persistently,
    passionately. But mere repetition, no matter how dogged, cannot
    create a reality where there is none. The factual record is
    before you. We submit that it does not approach the kind of
    case that you would need to justify the conviction and removal
    of the President from office. And calling witnesses is not the
    answer. All the evidence you need to make your decision is
    before you, documented in thousands of pages of testimony given
    under oath or to the FBI agents and Mr. Starr's prosecutors
    under penalty of law.
        These, then, are the four grounds for the motion to
    dismiss. I know many of these arguments are not new to you, and
    I will try to be brief as I review them.
        The question before this body requires solemnity on all of
    our parts. It inevitably creates no small measure of
    apprehension. In our Nation's political history, in our legal
    history, it is fair to say that few decisions of such
    overwhelming magnitude have been confronted by this body. There
    could be no matter more clearly placed in your hands alone by
    the Constitution, and on its resolution rests more than the
    political fate of William Clinton; there rests the course of
    our democracy in the coming years of the new century and for
    untold years thereafter.
        Constitutional history confirms that the decision before
    you was meant to be significant and difficult to make. It
    demonstrates that only the most extraordinary of charges
    warrants the most extraordinary of outcomes. Any question, any
    doubt, must be resolved in favor of the electoral will, for it
    is the will of the people, the people who have all sovereignty
    in our law, that in the end is the foundation of our democracy.
    And we submit that the doubt here is pervasive: Doubt about
    whether the charged conduct, efforts to conceal a private
    personal embarrassment, could reasonably be deemed a violation
    against the state at all, let alone a violation so severe as to
    compel removal; doubt about the constitutionality of the
    articles as drafted; doubt about the sufficiency of the
    managers' case; and that doubt upon doubt upon doubt makes a
    vote to dismiss the only fair choice.
        Let me turn then to the fundamental constitutional
    argument.
        The impeachment power was meant to remove the President of
    the United States from office only for the most serious abuses
    of official power or for misbehavior of such magnitude that the
    collective wisdom of the people would compel immediate
    discharge. One of America's leading professors of
    constitutional law, Professor Akhil Amar of the Yale Law
    School, has framed the problem poignantly and concisely,
    stating:

        The question to ask is whether [President Clinton's]
    misconduct is so serious and malignant as to justify undoing a
    national election [and] canceling the votes of millions.

        We know the answer. It was provided by Charles Black in his
    classic book on impeachment when he wrote that:

        Impeachment and removal should be reserved only for
    offenses that so seriously threaten the order of political
    society as to make pestilent and dangerous the continuance in
    power of their perpetrator.

        James Madison made much the same point two centuries
    earlier, stating that an impeachment provision of some kind was
    ``indispensable'' because a President's ``loss of capacity or
    corruption . . . might be fatal to the Republic.''
        The statements and writings of the framers of our
    Constitution and centuries of scholarship and the meaning of
    that brief but so significant phrase, ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors,'' enable us to establish with solid assurance
    that the conduct charged against the President does not amount
    to an impeachable offense.
        Our argument today is a simple one: Ordinary civil and
    criminal wrongs may be addressed through ordinary civil and
    criminal processes, and ordinary political wrongs may be
    addressed at the ballot box or by public opinion. Only the most
    serious public misconduct, aggravated abuse of Executive power,
    is meant to be addressed through exercise of the Presidential
    impeachment power.
        The conduct here arises out of a private lawsuit. Let me
    talk for a moment about that lawsuit which is the backdrop for
    these proceedings.
        The Jones case arose out of an alleged incident that
    predated the President's first term as President. The charges
    at issue here arise out of the President's conduct in that
    lawsuit. No charge relates to his official conduct as
    President. Indeed, as we know, the Supreme Court told President
    Clinton that he could not delay defending the Jones lawsuit
    until he was out of office. And when it ruled that way, the
    Court emphasized just this very point. It made clear that he
    might have been able to delay or avoid the lawsuit if it had
    related to his official conduct, because the law provides
    various immunities for such lawsuits; but precisely because it
    related to his private actions, it would be allowed to go
    forward.
        In drawing that conclusion, interestingly, the Supreme
    Court actually looked to the wisdom of James Wilson, a framer,
    a Supreme Court Justice, and a constitutional commentator, and
    cited the distinction he drew between a President's acts
    performed in his ``public character,'' for which he might be
    impeached, according to Justice Wilson, and acts performed in
    his private character, to which the President is answerable, as
    any other citizen, in court.
        We agree that there might be extreme cases where private
    conduct would so paralyze the President's ability to govern
    that the impeachment power must be exercised, where the
    certainty of guilt and the gravity of the charge would leave no
    choice. But charges arising out of the President's efforts to
    keep an admittedly wrongful relationship secret are, by no
    analysis, of that caliber.
        Some have suggested that making this argument is the same
    as arguing that the President is above the law. That simply is
    not so. The often repeated statement that no man--or woman, I
    should add--is above the law is, of course, true. Once he
    leaves office, the President is as amenable to the law as any
    citizen, including for private conduct during his term of
    office. As my colleagues, Mr. Ruff and Mr. Craig, argued to you
    last week, if a grand jury should choose to consider charges
    against this President, his status as a former President will
    not prevent that consideration.
        But here is the point: Impeachment is not meant to punish
    an individual; it is a protection for the people; in Alexander
    Hamilton's words, a remedy for great ``injuries done to the
    society itself.'' It is, as your 19th century predecessor,
    Senator Garrett Davis, pointed out in the Andrew Johnson
    proceedings, ``the extreme remedy . . . intended for the worst
    political disorders of the executive department.''
        The House managers appear to argue that the President must
    be removed nonetheless, because to do otherwise places him
    above the law. But there is one thing that can be said with
    certainty about the impeachment power. Although it may have
    that result, it is not meant to punish the man, to set an
    example, or to provide a ``cleansing'' of the political
    process; it is meant to protect the state. If it is punishment
    the House managers seek, they are in the wrong place, in the
    wrong job, at the wrong time, and for the wrong reasons.
        A question has arisen whether, as a general matter, any
    violation of law demands removal because it would be a
    violation of the President's duty to take care that the laws be
    faithfully executed or a breach of the public trust. But,
    again, the history of the clause makes clear that the framers
    intentionally chose not to make all crimes or even all felonies
    impeachable.
        I suggest we would all agree that, in the broadest possible
    sense, a proven violation of criminal law is a violation of a
    public trust. But the framers consciously elected not to make
    impeachment the remedy for ``all crimes and misdemeanors.''
    When the framers wished to address all crimes, they knew how to
    do it, and they did it. In article IV, section 2, the
    Constitution states that, ``A Person charged in any State with
    Treason, Felony, or other Crime'' is susceptible to
    extradition--``or other crime.'' The framers knew how to say
    it, but they didn't say it about impeachment, because that is
    not what they meant.
        Some also have argued that the experience of judicial
    impeachments in this body undermines this argument. They claim
    that judges have been removed for purely private conduct and
    that a President should be treated no differently. This
    argument completely misses the mark as well.
        By constitutional design, judges are very different from a
    President. Presidents are elected for a fixed term, while
    Federal judges serve with life tenure. Presidents are elected
    by the people in one of the great periodic exercises of
    national will, and their tenure is blessed as the choice of the
    people.
        Judges, on the other hand, are appointed and confirmed by
    the representatives of the people, but their selection does not
    represent a direct expression of the will of the people.
    Judges' tenure is conditioned on good behavior, while that of a
    President is not. And there is an obvious reason for this
    distinction. Life tenure, which was designed to assure judicial
    independence, plainly becomes a problem in the event of a judge
    who is not fit to serve. A President may be voted out by the
    people, a judge may not; hence the good behavior requirement
    and the duty upon the Congress to enforce it in those
    exceptional cases where it must be enforced.
        It is possible to debate forever whether the good behavior
    clause represents an independent basis for impeachment or
    whether, in the case of judges, it is a factor to be weighed
    when this body exercises its sound judgment to decide what
    constitutes a high crime or misdemeanor. But there is no need
    to resolve that dispute here. Either way, it is clear, as the
    Watergate impeachment inquiry report established, that the term
    ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' is given content by the
    context of the charge and the office at issue. Because of
    issues of legitimacy, accountability, and tenure, the framers
    decided that Federal judges needed the additional check of the
    good behavior clause--language they left out of the articles
    creating Congress and the Presidency.
        And the Presidency is, of course, different. Alexander
    Hamilton said, in Federalist 79, that a judge could be
    impeached for malconduct. But in the words of the Watergate
    Impeachment Inquiry Report--a report I remind you that Mr.
    Manager Canady has commended to your consideration--
    Presidential impeachment is distinctive. The report stated--and
    I quote, because it is an important quote--``Because
    impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, it
    is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible
    with either the constitutional form and principles of our
    government or the proper performance of the constitutional
    duties of the presidential office. . . . The facts must be
    considered as a whole in the context of the office,'' the
    report concludes. The office matters. For judges, the good
    behavior standard comes in one way or the other. For the
    President, the standard is different.
        As I mentioned, Mr. Manager Graham candidly acknowledged
    last Saturday that reasonable people could disagree as to
    whether this President should be removed from office, even if
    they believe he acted as charged--reasonable people could
    disagree. In this connection, consider, if you will, the words
    of Senator William Pitt Fessenden, written 130 years ago.
    Senator Fessenden was one of the seven brave Republicans who
    crossed party lines to vote against the conviction of President
    Johnson in his 1868 impeachment trial. He wrote--and I quote--
    ``the offense for which a Chief Magistrate is removed from
    office . . . should be of such a character as to commend itself
    at once to the minds of all right thinking men as, beyond all
    question, an adequate cause.'' Think about that phrase--
    ``beyond all question.'' Where there is room for reasonable
    disagreement, there is no place for conviction.
        If many in this Chamber and in this Nation believe that
    these charges do not meet the bar of high crimes and
    misdemeanors, then the question must be asked, Why prolong this
    process?
        I would like to turn briefly now to two grounds for
    dismissal based on the manner in which the House drafted these
    articles. The first is that each of the articles contain
    several quite different charges. The House compounded its
    charges. It is tempting to ask how, in a matter of such
    importance, we can urge what might appear to be a procedural,
    highly technical argument like this one.
        There are several answers to that. The first is that it is
    neither ``procedural'' nor ``highly technical.'' It goes to the
    very heart of our constitutional protections and raises
    concerns about fairness and the appearance of fairness in this
    proceeding as so many Senators have so eloquently noted in the
    past when the issue has arisen.
        As Senator Kohl stated in the Judge Nixon impeachment
    matter, in which a similar omnibus article was defeated--and I
    quote:

        The House is telling us it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on
    Article III even if we have different visions of what he did
    wrong. But that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to
    the American people. Let's say we do convict on Article III.
    The American people--to say nothing of history--would never
    know exactly which of Judge Nixon's statements we regarded as
    untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, this ambiguity would
    prevent us from being totally accountable to the voters for our
    decision.

        As the Senator said, that is an unacceptable outcome, one
    that was ``not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the
    American people.''
        Judge Nixon was acquitted on this article. We suggest to
    you that the House is now asking this Senate to convict
    President Clinton on just such articles. And that is not fair
    either to President Clinton, to this Senate, or to the American
    people.
        The second response is that--even if this troubling problem
    were procedural--fair, constitutional procedures go to the
    heart of the rule of law. As the Supreme Court has stated,
    ``The history of liberty has largely been the history of
    observance of procedural safeguards.'' It would, indeed, be
    ironic if, in the course of this proceeding in which the
    vindication of the rule of law has so often been invoked, this
    body were to ignore an important procedural flaw.
        The legal basis for this argument is by now well known.
    Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that on
    articles of impeachment ``no Person shall be convicted without
    the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.'' This
    requirement is plain. There must be, in the language of the
    Constitution, ``Concurrence,'' which is to say, genuine,
    reliably manifested agreement among those voting to convict.
        Without clarity on exactly what the President would be
    convicted for, there can be no concurrence. These requirements
    of concurrence and a two-thirds vote are the twin safeguards of
    the framers' plain intent to assure that conviction not come
    easily.
        And let there be no doubt, these articles present textbook
    examples of a prosecutorial grab bag. Look at article II,
    which, by its terms, charges obstruction of the Jones
    litigation. It presents six topics related to the Jones
    litigation and one related to the very separate issue of grand
    jury obstruction. The first six acts alleged are unrelated in
    time or alleged intent to the seventh. Under no conceivable
    theory are they part of the same scheme, and no one ever has
    claimed them to be. But as it is drafted, and as it must be
    voted on by this body, under the Senate rules, the article
    would allow certain Senators to convict on obstruction of the
    Jones case and others on grand jury obstruction. That is not
    concurrence in a vote on an article, as the Constitution
    demands it. An indictment against any American drafted like
    these articles could not go near the jury. It would be
    dismissed. And no lesser standard should apply here.
        A second fatal flaw in the drafting is their complete lack
    of specificity, which makes it impossible to know precisely
    what the President is alleged to have done wrong. This defect
    is most troublesome in the article I perjury charges, which
    never simply state what the President said that was allegedly
    perjurious. The defect is a plain and obvious constitutional
    one: The House of Representatives has unconstitutionally
    neglected its ``sole'' power to impeach and delegated to the
    House managers that which cannot constitutionally be
    delegated--the power to decide what the House meant. The result
    has been what can charitably be described as a fluid approach
    to the identification of charges against the President. The
    House majority and its managers have sought to add, delete,
    amend, expand and contract the list as this matter has
    proceeded from Mr. Starr, to the committee, to the full House,
    to this body.
        They also, mystifyingly, have insisted on couching their
    charges as examples. How on Earth can an accused defend against
    examples? Where is the notice? Where is the due process? And no
    sooner was this very concern raised here by Mr. Ruff than they
    did it again. This is quite extraordinary.
        In response to Mr. Ruff's challenge, the managers put out a
    press release, on January 19, purporting to list allegedly
    perjurious statements on which you are to vote. And what did
    they say? They offered more examples. They said in response--
    and I quote--``Here are four examples of perjurious statements
    made to the grand jury:''
        Ladies and gentlemen, almost 40 years ago, the Supreme
    Court made clear that this kind of charging is unacceptable.
    When an indictment leaves so much to the imagination of
    individuals, other than the constitutionally designated
    charging body, it must be dismissed. Again, no lesser standard
    should apply here.
        Our fourth ground for dismissal is based on the facts. The
    evidence, in the tens of thousands of pages before you,
    establishes that the case against the President cannot be
    proven with any acceptable degree of certainty. The record is
    filled with too much that is exculpatory, too much that is
    ambiguous, too much from the managers that requires unfounded
    speculation.
        A very brief look at the articles and the facts makes clear
    that in light of the uncontested exculpatory facts, such as the
    direct denials from Ms. Currie, from Mr. Jordan, and from Ms.
    Lewinsky of various alleged misconduct, the managers cannot
    possibly meet their burden of proof here. Look briefly at
    article I. Much of it challenges the President's assertions of
    his own state of mind, his understanding of the definition
    given to him, his understanding of the meaning of a word, his
    legal opinion of his Jones testimony, his mindset during
    statements of his lawyer, Robert Bennett. The managers offer
    speculation and theories about these matters, but you are not
    here to try speculation and theories. You are here to try
    facts. And the facts do not support their theories.
        Other claims in article I are so insubstantial as to be
    frivolous and unworthy of the time and attention of this
    historic body. Certain answers about the particulars of the
    admitted intimate relationship between the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky--whether their admitted inappropriate encounters were
    properly characterized as occurring on ``certain occasions'' is
    but one example--could not possibly have had any bearing on the
    Starr investigation. These answers were even irrelevant,
    immaterial, to Mr. Starr.
        Remember, in the grand jury the President admitted to the
    relationship, admitted it was improper, admitted it occurred
    over time, admitted he had sought to hide it, admitted he had
    misled his wife, his staff, his friends, the country. But how
    it began, exactly when it began, how many intimate encounters
    there were, whether there were 11 or 17 or some other number,
    and with what frequency, these are details irrelevant to the
    Starr investigation, and I must say, irrelevant to your
    decision whether to remove the freely elected President of the
    United States.
        There has been much discussion about the Jones deposition
    here and whether it, too, is a part of article I. The point is
    a simple one. The House of Representatives exercised its
    constitutional authority, and in a bipartisan vote defeated an
    article of impeachment based on the answers in the Jones
    deposition. Those answers are not before you and the managers'
    sleight of hand cannot now put them back into article I. The
    article charges only the statements made in the grand jury
    about that deposition. The managers ask you to look at one
    response: The President's lawyerly assertion that the Jones
    deposition was not legally perjurious, however frustrating or
    misleading, and to read that as an affirmation of every answer
    he gave. But the grand jury testimony must be read as a whole.
        What did the President convey during that testimony?
    Certainly not that he was standing behind every word in the
    Jones deposition as the whole truth. He spent 4 hours in the
    grand jury explaining that testimony--adding to it, clarifying
    it, discussing the confusing deposition questions and answers,
    and pointing out his efforts to be literally truthful, if not
    forthcoming, explaining what he had tried to do, the line he
    had tried to walk, however successfully or unsuccessfully. He
    laid it all out. He was not asked by Mr. Starr to reaffirm or
    adopt the earlier testimony, and he did not reaffirm or adopt
    it.
        This brings us to the last issue in article I, the so-
    called touching issue. My colleague, Mr. Craig, has talked at
    length about the legal and practical obstacles to a case based
    on an oath against an oath. Whether compelled by law or
    practice, the rule reflects the commonsense proposition that
    there will always be a reasonable doubt as to the truth when
    the case rests merely on an oath against an oath. That is why
    seasoned prosecutors said in the House of Representatives that
    they would never bring such a case. That is why you need no
    more information to conclude that conviction on that basis will
    not be possible.
        The evidence also undermines the allegations of article II.
    My colleagues, Ms. Mills and Mr. Kendall, made a detailed
    review of the allegations in each of the seven subparts of
    article II. They went over the evidence in great detail, and I
    am certainly not going to repeat that here. They pointed to the
    significant amount of direct evidence in the record that
    controverts the claims made in this article, most notably the
    consistent statements by Ms. Lewinsky that no one ever asked,
    suggested, or encouraged her to lie, and that no one ever
    promised her a job for her silence.
        They demonstrated that with regard to the transfer of
    gifts, the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie has
    consistently been inconsistent, but that even Ms. Lewinsky has
    acknowledged it was she who was concerned about the gifts and
    who raised the issue with the President. And the fact that the
    President gave Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28 simply
    cannot be reconciled with any theory of the managers' case.
        Ms. Mills reviewed the evidence concerning the President's
    conversation with Ms. Currie on the Sunday after the Paula
    Jones deposition. However ill-advised that conversation might
    have been under the circumstances, it was not criminal. The
    President was motivated by his own anxieties and by a desire to
    find out what Ms. Currie knew in anticipation of the media
    storm he feared would break, as it surely did. Contrary to the
    suggestion of Mr. Manager Hutchinson, Ms. Currie had not yet
    been subpoenaed at the time of that conversation. Ms. Currie
    was not on any Jones case witness list at the time of the
    conversation. She testified that she felt absolutely no
    pressure to change her account during that conversation. She
    never testified that she felt uncomfortable--again, contrary to
    the suggestion of Mr. Manager Hutchinson. She was not a
    witness. There was no pressure. There is a completely
    reasonable explanation.
        Let me be clear here: There is no evidence that the
    President ever asked Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit or
    told her to give false testimony if she appeared as a witness.
    Both believed Ms. Lewinsky could file a limited but true
    affidavit that might--might--avoid a deposition in the Jones
    case. While the two had discussed cover stories to explain Ms.
    Lewinsky's visits, Ms. Lewinsky never testified that they
    discussed the cover stories in the context of the possibility
    of her testifying personally, as article II alleges.
        Now you have heard in detail from Mr. Craig and Mr. Kendall
    about the fleeting moment in the Jones deposition when Mr.
    Bennett tried unsuccessfully to prevent the President being
    questioned about Ms. Lewinsky by citing her affidavit. The
    judge immediately overruled the objection. It did not obstruct
    in any way the Jones lawyers' ability to question the
    President.
        The statement had no effect. And the tape of the President
    cannot disprove the President's testimony that he wasn't paying
    attention. He doesn't comment, concur, or even nod. With a weak
    case at hand, the managers have tried to turn a blank stare
    into a high crime.
        The last subpart of article II is flawed in many respects:
    The article alleges obstruction of the Jones case, but the
    President's misleading statements to his White House aides
    about Ms. Lewinsky had no effect on that case at all. In any
    event, the effect of the President's statements on his aides
    was no different than on the millions of Americans who had
    heard and seen the President make similar denials on
    television.
        And finally, the subpart claims obstruction of the grand
    jury, whereas the whole point of article II is alleged
    obstruction of the Jones case. As I asked before, what is it
    doing here?
        As to Ms. Lewinsky's job search, all the managers have
    presented is a theory, a hypothesis in search of factual
    support.
        The direct evidence is clear and uncontradicted. Ms.
    Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, the President, and people at the New York
    City companies Ms. Lewinsky contacted all testified that there
    was no relation of any of the job search activity to the Jones
    case--none. Not a single witness supports the managers' theory.
    As we demonstrated, their core theory that the job assistance
    intensified after the Court's December 11 order was based on
    plain and simple error. And without that support, the theory
    collapsed.
        No doubt, the managers' response will be that that is why
    witnesses are needed, to help the managers make their case. But
    witnesses will not fill the void in the evidence:
        First, because the evidence, as we have shown, is
    overwhelmingly uncontested. If there is no dispute, why do
    witnesses have to be questioned at all? House Majority Counsel
    Schippers himself made this point when speaking of the very
    same transcripts and FBI interviews that you all have before
    you. He stated to the Judiciary Committee: ``As it stands, all
    of the factual witnesses are uncontradicted and amply
    corroborated.''
        Second, because the actual disagreements--for example, what
    was in the President's mind in his deposition?--are about
    conclusions that must be drawn from the undisputed evidence,
    not disputes in the evidence itself. More evidence will not
    inform a judgment on the President's state of mind.
        Third, because those witnesses with testimony pertinent to
    the charges have already repeated their testimony again and
    again and again--in some instances, 5 or 10 times--over and
    over and over to FBI agents, to prosecutors, to grand jurors.
    Experienced career prosecutors, trying to make their best case
    against the President, questioned scores of witnesses. They
    compiled tens of thousands of pages of evidence. They
    questioned Ms. Lewinsky on at least 22 separate occasions. They
    questioned Mr. Jordan on at least five occasions. They
    questioned Ms. Currie on at least eight occasions. On one day
    alone--July 22, 1998--prosecutors asked Ms. Currie more than
    850 questions, and that was only 1 of her 5 appearances before
    the grand jury or FBI agents. And they did, in fact--contrary
    to the suggestion of the managers--question witnesses,
    including Ms. Lewinsky, after the President's testimony to the
    grand jury.
        These witnesses whom I have mentioned, who were questioned
    repeatedly, are not alone. They could not possibly add to their
    testimony, or amend it, in any significant way that could alter
    the judgment you could make today. Yet, it is the hope that
    these witnesses will be forced to change their testimony, to
    provide evidence where there now is none, that drives the
    current desire to question them.
        Let me make a few final points about this witness issue.
    ``Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already
    concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no
    purpose at all.'' That is our argument, but those are not my
    words, they are the words of Mr. Manager Gekas, spoken just
    last fall, talking about this same factual record you have
    before you. And Mr. Manager Gekas was correct.
        ``We had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand jury,
    from depositions, from statements under oath. That is testimony
    that we can believe and accept. Why re-interview Betty Currie
    to take another statement when we already have her statement?
    Why interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under
    oath, and with a grant of immunity that, if she lied, she would
    forfeit?'' Again, that is our argument, but, again, those are
    not my words, those are the words of Chairman Hyde. He, too,
    was correct. Those words apply with equal force today. The
    witnesses are on the record. Their testimony is known. There is
    no need to put them through the ordeal of testimony again.
        The House managers, no doubt, will answer that that was
    then, this is now. But that is not good enough. The House had a
    constitutional duty to gather and assess evidence and testimony
    and come to a judgment as to whether it believed the President
    should be removed from office--not to casually and passively
    serve as a conveyor belt between Ken Starr and the U.S. Senate,
    not to ask this body to do the work the House failed to do.
        The actual power to remove the President resides here, of
    course. But the power to take that first step rests with the
    House. And the House exercised it: The articles explicitly find
    that certain conduct occurred and that that conduct warrants
    ``removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy
    any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States.'' If there was any doubt about the testimony on which
    they based their judgment in reaching that conclusion, such
    doubt should have been resolved before any Member rose to say
    ``aye'' to an article of impeachment calling, for the first
    time in 130 years, for the Senate to decide on the removal of
    the President.
        The President did not obstruct justice. The President did
    not commit perjury. The President must not be removed. The
    facts do not permit it.
        Now, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I hope I have
    outlined clearly for you some of the many valid grounds on
    which you might base a decision to vote for the motion offered
    by Senator Byrd.
        On constitutional grounds, the matters simply don't meet
    the test of high crimes and misdemeanors, as specified by the
    framers or interpreted by hundreds of historians. As a matter
    of law, these articles are defective. In a court, they would be
    dismissed in a heartbeat for vagueness and for being
    prosecutorial grab bags.
        The evidence itself, after being gathered in what may be
    one of the largest criminal investigations in this country's
    history, fails to offer a compelling case and is based largely
    on weak inferences from circumstantial evidence. Each of these
    is reason enough to end this trial now, without further
    proceedings.
        As Senator Bumpers said more personally and eloquently than
    I could hope to, the President has been punished; he is being
    punished still--as a man, as a husband, as a father, as a
    public figure. Beyond his family, you have been reminded that
    the criminal law will still have jurisdiction over Bill Clinton
    the day he leaves office. And while I am confident the case
    would have no merit in a court of law, that is the venue in
    which justice may be sought against an individual.
        So the sole question you are faced with is the most
    important one: Do you, for the first time in 210 years of our
    freedom, set aside the ultimate expression of a free people and
    exercise your power to remove the one national leader selected
    by all of us?
        If you don't believe this body should remove the President,
    or if you believe that no amount of requestioning of witnesses
    or torturing facts will change enough minds to garner the two-
    thirds majority necessary to remove the President, or if you
    simply have heard enough to make up your mind, then the time to
    end this is now.
        The President has expressed many times how very sorry he is
    for what he did and for what he said. He knows full well that
    his failings have landed us in this place, and he is doing all
    he can to set right what he has done wrong.
        The entire Nation--indeed the world--is now looking to this
    body, to this Chamber, to this floor, for sound judgment; and
    we are asking you not to answer a serious personal wrong with a
    grievous constitutional wrong. When we ask you to vote for
    Senator Byrd's motion to dismiss, we do not mean that nothing
    ever happened, that this is no big deal--and that is where we
    lawyers have done a disservice to the language--because this is
    a big deal. It is a very big deal. Punishment will be found
    elsewhere. Judgment will be found elsewhere. Legacies will be
    written elsewhere. None of that will be dismissed. None of that
    can ever be dismissed.
        We ask you to end this case now so that a sense of
    proportionality can be put back into a process that seems long
    ago to have lost all sense of proportionality. We also ask you
    to end the case now so that the family members and others who
    did no wrong can be spared further public embarrassment.
        We also ask you to end this case now so that the poisonous
    arrows of partisanship can be buried and the will of the people
    can be done--allowing all of you to spend your full days on the
    most pressing issues of the country.
        You have heard the charges in full; heard the defense. Now
    is the time to define how the national interests can best be
    served--by extending this matter indefinitely or ending it now.
    We submit that it is truly in the best interest of this Nation
    to end this ordeal in this Chamber at this time and in this
    way.
        Thank you.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire? Is there further presentation
    from the White House counsel, or will the time be used for
    concluding remarks by the House managers?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The White House counsel has 6 minutes
    remaining; the managers have reserved 36 minutes.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. There will be no further presentation,
    Mr. Chief Justice.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. In view of that, Mr. Chief Justice, I understand
    the White House counsel will have no further presentation to
    make, so what is left would be the concluding remarks by the
    House managers. I would like for us, when that is concluded, to
    go right into the votes.
        In view of that, I think it would be a good idea to take a
    15-minute break at this point. And I ask unanimous consent for
    that.
        There being no objection, at 4:12 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 4:38 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe we are ready now for
    the closing part of the argument by the House managers on the
    motion to dismiss.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the House managers.
    Mr. Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
    Senators. My fellow Manager Graham has extended me a few
    minutes before he comes up here just to allow me to respond to
    a couple of factual assertions by the White House counselors
    during the recent presentation. I know that there was a
    reference made to the impeachment proceedings of former
    President Nixon, and there were various articles that were
    considered. But one of them that I don't believe was talked
    about was obstruction of justice. And I believe that the
    Senators in this Chamber would agree that obstruction of
    justice has historically been a basis for impeachment of public
    officials because of the impact that it has on the
    administration of justice. And that was historically true
    during the time of the impeachment of President Nixon. It was
    an issue during that time and it should be no less of a concern
    this year, in 1999.
        Now, when I listen to a defense attorney make a
    presentation, oftentimes I will listen to what they didn't
    cover as much as what they did cover. And you always have to go
    back to that because many times that points to a big gap of
    something they just can't explain. As I listened to the
    presentation, of course they addressed the assertion that Ms.
    Betty Currie was, in fact, not a witness at the time the
    President called her in and went through the questioning of her
    after his deposition on January 17. But, yet, it has been
    clearly established that she was a known witness at the time.
    Now, they hoped, they prayed, they wished, they counted for the
    fact that that subpoena would never be uncovered. But the
    subpoena was uncovered. The fact was established that she was
    put on the witness list and that she was a known witness at the
    time. But the fact is, it does not matter. She was a
    prospective witness, and that was what the President did when
    he came back and talked to her.
        But what has never been addressed--has never been
    addressed--is why in the world did the President believe he
    needed to talk to her a second time. It was one time the
    questioning, but 2 days later she was brought in and taken
    through the same paces. The answer was, ``Well, he explained
    it.'' Well, he tried to explain why he did it the first time;
    he was trying to get information. There could be no explanation
    for the second instance of which she was called in and
    questioned. She was a witness, she was a known witness and she
    had to be talked to, and it was done twice.
        Another thing that I do not recall ever being mentioned--
    they argue that, ``Well, there is no evidence of favors on a
    job search,'' and I believe that is not supported by the
    record. How many times has the President's attorneys discussed
    the description and the report by Mr. Vernon Jordan to the
    President, ``Mission accomplished''? I do not believe they have
    ever discussed that particular terminology. I do not believe
    they have ever discussed the terminology, the call from Mr.
    Vernon Jordan to Mr. Perelman saying, ``Make it happen if it
    can happen.''
        So I think there are some gaps in their defense; and,
    clearly, you understand that the facts have supported each of
    the allegations of obstruction that we have set forth.
        They argue that, ``Well, there was no evidence of any false
    affidavit.'' Whether it is evidence that an affidavit was
    encouraged by the President of the United States, he suggested
    the affidavit and, as of necessity, it would have to be false
    if it was going to be accomplishing the intended purpose.
        They are asking you in this motion to dismiss to ignore the
    evidence that we have presented, to ignore the testimony, the
    documentary evidence, to ignore common sense and simply to
    accept the denials of the President of the United States. That
    is not what a motion to dismiss is about. We ask that we move
    forward to consider the full development of these facts.
        I yield to Mr. Graham.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. How much
    time do we have left?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers have 32 minutes
    remaining.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. To my
    colleagues, my chairman wants 11 minutes. So, for my own sake,
    please let me know when we get close.
        [Laughter.]
        We meet again to discuss a very, very important event in
    our Nation's history. To dismiss an impeachment trial under
    these facts and under these circumstances would be
    unbelievable, in my opinion, and do a lot of damage to the law
    and to the ultimate decision this body has to make: whether or
    not Bill Clinton should be our President.
        As I understand the general nature of the law, the facts
    and the law break our way for this motion. What I would like to
    discuss with you is whether or not a reasonable person could
    believe that Bill Clinton should not be our President and the
    facts that have been presented rise to the level of creating
    serious doubts about whether he is a criminal, not just a bad
    man who did bad things. For he is a good man in some ways, as
    all of us are, and he has done some things that everybody in
    this body will condemn roundly.
        America needs no more lectures about Bill Clinton's
    misconduct, about his inappropriate relationship. We need no
    more lectures about his sins. We all have those. We need to
    resolve, Is our President a criminal? That is harsh, but the
    facts bear out those statements.
        When you dismissed the judges for perjury and filing
    statements under oath, some of you said some very harsh things
    about those judges, not because you are harsh people, but
    because their conduct warranted it.
        One thing I am not going to do--and I will quit this job
    before I do this--I am not going to run over anybody's
    conscience when they are exercising it as they deem appropriate
    for the good of this Nation. My name has been brought up a
    couple of times about whether or not reasonable people can
    disagree with me and still be reasonable about what we should
    do in this case. I have told you the best I can that there is
    no doubt these are high crimes, in my opinion. This is a hard
    decision for our country, but when I first spoke to you, I
    thought we would be better off if Bill Clinton left office, and
    I want the chance to prove to you why. Give me a chance to
    prove to you why I believe that, why my colleagues voted our
    conscience to get this case to where it should be, not swept
    under a rug, but in a trial to a disposition.
        I have lost no sleep worrying about the fact that Bill
    Clinton may have to be removed from office because of his
    conduct. I have lost tons of sleep thinking he may get away
    with what he did. But the question was: Could you disagree with
    Lindsey Graham and be a good American, in essence? Absolutely.
    You can disagree with me on abortion, and Mr. Hyde, and I am
    not going to trample on who you are, because I know that the
    liberal wing of the Democratic Party and the moderate wing of
    the Republican Party have different views than I do.
        But I didn't come up here to run you down. I came up here
    to build my country up the way I think it needs to be built up.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, if you will listen to
    our case, if you will let us explain why we have lost no sleep
    asking for this President to be removed and why we voted to get
    it here and you disagree with me at the end of the day, I will
    never ever say you don't love your country as much as I do.
    That is what that statement was meant to convey, and it will
    convey that until I am dead and gone.
        The idea that 130 years ago a Senator took a vote and made
    a statement that the only way you can remove a President is it
    has to be unquestionable in anybody's mind tells me he sure
    thought a lot of himself. I am glad to see that stopped in the
    Senate. One hundred thirty years later, we don't have people
    like that anymore. What that conveyed to me was that a person
    made a hard decision and tried to create a standard that slams
    somebody else who came out differently.
        I hope that is not what this is all about. He goes down in
    history, but I wouldn't want that as part of my epitaph, that
    when I voted my conscience, I reached a level that if you
    didn't go where I was, there is something wrong with you.
        What did Bill Clinton do, and why are we all here? Are we
    here because of Ken Starr, because of Lindsey Graham, because
    of--why are we here? We are here because William Jefferson
    Clinton, in my opinion--we are here because on our watch in the
    House, the President of the United States, when he was a
    defendant in a lawsuit, instead of trusting the legal system to
    get it right, did everything possible, in my opinion, to
    undermine the rule of law, including going to a grand jury in
    August of last year and committing perjury after people in this
    body and prominent Americans said, ``Stop it.'' And now we are
    here to say, ``Well, we really didn't mean it. The motion to
    dismiss means we're sort of just kidding, Mr. President.''
        If you believe he is not guilty of these offenses based on
    this stage of the trial, then you ought to grant the motion to
    dismiss, but you will be changing the law as we know it today.
    We haven't had a chance to present our case, really, and all
    the facts should break our way. You can believe this if you
    would like. They stood up here and argued that the conversation
    between President Clinton and his secretary, Betty Currie, was
    to find out what she knew to refresh his memory. If you think
    that when the President goes to Betty Currie and makes the
    following statement, ``Monica wanted to have sex with me and I
    couldn't do that,'' that he is trying to figure out what she
    knew and is trying to refresh his memory, you can do that. I
    would suggest that ``ain't'' reasonable. If you believe that he
    wanted to figure out whether he was alone or not with her and
    he had to ask Betty, that is not reasonable. That is a crime.
        Let me tell you the subtleties of this case, things that
    really tell you a lot about why we are here--William Jefferson
    Clinton. Before we get into the subtleties of this case,
    Senator Bumpers made a very eloquent speech about the ups and
    the downs of this case and about his relationship with the
    President and how close it was, and the human nature of what is
    going on here. But here is what he said:

        You pick your own adjective to describe the President's
    conduct. Here are some that I would use: indefensible,
    outrageous, unforgivable, shameless.

        How about illegal?
        And he says:

        I promise you the President would not contest any of those
    or any others.

        When you put in the word ``illegal,'' everything is a big
    misunderstanding.
        Take this case to a conclusion, so America will not be
    confused as to whether or not their President committed crimes.
    There will be people watching what we do here, and they will be
    confused as to whether or not the conversation between
    President Clinton and Ms. Currie was illegal or not. Let us
    know. That is so important.
        Let us know--when he went to Monica Lewinsky and talked
    about a cover story--if that is what we want to go on here
    every day. And a trial 20 months from now does us no good,
    because this happened when he was President, ladies and
    gentlemen. This happened when he raised the defense, ``You
    can't sue me because I'm President.''
        And what did he do after that defense was taken away from
    him by the Supreme Court? He went back to somebody who is very
    loyal to him, somebody who admires him, somebody whom you and I
    pay her salary--his secretary. And he put her in a situation,
    through misleading her, that she was going to pass on his lies.
    That is not what we pay her to do. He put her in a situation
    where she was going to incur legal costs because he cared more
    about himself than he did his secretary. He put his Cabinet
    members, he put the people who work for him, in a horrible
    spot.
        The subtleties of this case. Let me tell you one of the
    subtleties of this case. And this was read by the defense in
    this case:

        The President had a followup conversation with Mr. Morris
    during the evening of January 22, 1998, when Mr. Morris was
    considering holding a press conference to blast Monica Lewinsky
    out of the water. The President told Mr. Morris to be careful.
    According to Mr. Morris, the President warned him not to be too
    hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there's some slight chance that
    she may not be cooperating with Starr and we don't want to
    alienate her by anything we're going to put out.''

        And they were trying to tell you that ``ain't'' bad, that
    is a good thing. The best you can get from that statement is
    the President, when approached with the idea of blasting her,
    said, ``Let's wait.''
        The subtleties in this case. Who is this young lady? His
    consensual lover. But this case started not about consensual
    loving. This case started about something far from consensual
    loving. This case started about something like a Senator who
    ran into problems with you all. And if you will let us develop
    our case, you may have a hard time reconciling those two
    decisions. But that is up to you.
        Please don't dismiss this case. For the good of this
    country, for the good of the law, let us get to what happened
    here.
        John Podesta--the subtleties of this case--he talked to him
    about what happened, and he said, ``I had no relationship with
    her whatever.'' Everybody who went into that grand jury, who
    talked to Bill Clinton, was lied to. And they passed those lies
    on to a Federal grand jury. You know what? In America that is a
    crime, even if you are President. And you need to address
    whether that happened or not. Don't dismiss this case.
        But you know what is even more subtle is that John Podesta,
    somebody who is very close to him, once he said nothing
    happened, felt the need to ask one more question--and pardon me
    for saying this--``Does that include oral sex?'' That says a
    lot about what Mr. Podesta thinks about Mr. Clinton, because he
    felt he had to go one step further, and in his grand jury
    testimony he tells us the President took that behavior off the
    table.
        Some of you are worried about the perjury charge in this
    case. Let me tell you right now, you should have no worries,
    because you have a dilemma on your hands that is easy to
    resolve in terms of whether or not the President committed
    perjury in the grand jury. If you believe that he was truthful
    when he said, ``I never lied,'' or, ``I was always truthful to
    my subordinates, to the people that work for me, to my aides,''
    then when he told John Podesta, ``Our relationship did not
    include oral sex,'' he was being truthful. If he was being
    truthful to John Podesta, he lied through his teeth about
    everything else in the grand jury when he approached the grand
    jury with the idea that, ``Our relationship was of one kind of
    sex but not the other.'' He told John Podesta it wasn't there
    at all.
        You pick the lie, but it is there. And if you can reconcile
    that, you are better than I am. That is up to you all. And does
    it really matter? So what? I think it matters a great deal if
    you are suing for sexually harassing somebody, and they are on
    to the fact that you can't control yourself enough to stop it 4
    or 5 years after you are sued, and you are doing it in the
    White House with somebody half your age. I think that would
    matter. Maybe that is the difference between getting bamboozled
    in court and having to pay $850,000.
        People are going to be confused if we don't bring this case
    to a conclusion. I suggest to you, it matters a great deal,
    that any major CEO, any low-level employee of any business in
    the country, would have been tossed out for something like
    that. But I know he is the President. Electing somebody should
    not distance them from common decency and the rule of law to
    the point that, when it is all over with, you don't know what
    you have left in this country.
        Is that what you want to do in this case? Just to save this
    man, to ignore the facts, to have a different legal standard,
    to make excuses that are bleeding this country dry?
        The effect of this case is hurting us more than we will
    ever know. Do not dismiss this case. Find out who our President
    is. Come to the conclusion, not that it was just bad behavior,
    it was illegal behavior. Tell us what is right. Tell us what is
    wrong. Give us some guidance. Under our Constitution, you don't
    impeach people at the ballot box, you trust the U.S. Senate.
    And I am willing to do that. Rise to the occasion for the good
    of the Nation.
        Thank you very much.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Do the House managers have any
    additional presentation?
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Yes. I am sorry. Mr. Chief Justice, I
    now yield to Manager Hyde.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
        Mr. Manager HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Ruff, and counsel, and distinguished Senators, I want
    to be very candid with you, and that may involve diplomatic
    breaches because I am parliamentarily illiterate. But
    nonetheless, I looked at this motion to dismiss and I was
    astounded, really. If the Senate had said something similar to
    the House, it would certainly have received such treatment as
    comports with comity, and I don't know enough about comity to
    wave that flag, but I don't want to waive my rights to raise
    that issue, anyway.
        I know Black's Law Dictionary is a resource book for all of
    us, but I looked in the Thesaurus about ``dismiss'' and I came
    up with ``disregard, ignore, brush off.'' I just am surprised
    that this motion is here now before we conclude the case.
        Some years ago when I was trying lawsuits, I appeared
    before a judge in Chicago. My opponent was an oldtimer who was
    just mean--a good lawyer, but he was mean--and the judge
    interrupted him in one tirade, and he said, ``Counsel, I have a
    lot of respect for you. I wish you had a little respect for
    this court.'' I sort of feel that way. I sort of feel that we
    have fallen short in the respect side because of the fact that
    we represent the House, the other body, kind of blue-collar
    people, and we are over here trying to survive with our
    impeachment articles.
        The most salient reason for defeating this motion is
    article I, section 3 of the Constitution which says that the
    Senate shall have the sole power to try--to try--all
    impeachments. Now, a trial, as I understand it, is a search for
    truth, and it should not be trumped by a search for an exit
    strategy.
        It seems to me this motion elevates convenience over
    constitutional process and by implication ratifies an unusual
    extension of sovereign immunity. If these articles are
    dismissed, all inferences in support of the respondents, in
    support of us, the managers, should be allowed; and if you
    allow all reasonable inferences in our favor, what kind of a
    message does it send to America to dismiss the articles of
    impeachment? Charges of perjury, obstruction of justice are
    summarily dismissed--disregarded, ignored, brushed off. These
    are charges that send ordinary folk to jail every day of the
    week and remove Federal judges. But I can see this President is
    different. But if the double standard is to flourish on Capitol
    Hill, I don't think we have accomplished a great deal.
        Yes, it is cumbersome. These proceedings are archaic in
    many ways. The question period was something out of the Old
    Bailey, I guess. I don't know. But democracy is untidy. I will
    stipulate that. It is untidy. But it is also a blessing.
    Impeachment and trial by the Senate were devised by our framers
    to make this difficult process as definitive as possible.
        ``Let's get the matter behind us.'' That is a mantra. That
    is a cliche. We all say it. You won't get it behind you if you
    dismiss this without voting on the articles. You guarantee
    contention. You will never get it behind us. Vote these
    articles up or down. That is the only way we really get it
    behind us.
        What this is--this motion--is a legal way of saying, ``so
    what'' to the charges that we levied here. Now, look at what
    these charges are. So what that the President violated his oath
    of office and willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial
    process for his personal gain and exoneration. So what that
    President Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false, and
    misleading testimony to the grand jury on several topics. So
    what that the President corruptly encouraged a witness in a
    Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a
    sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be
    perjurious, false, and misleading. So what that the President
    encouraged a witness to lie to the grand jury and conceal
    evidence. So what that the President has undermined the
    integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the
    Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted
    in a manner subversive to the rule of law and justice, to the
    manifest injury of the people of the United States.
        That is an awful lot to dismiss with a brushoff, to ignore
    with a mere ``so what.''
        No, it may be routine. We certainly don't have enough
    experience in these impeachment matters, and thank God for
    that. It may be routine to file a motion to dismiss. But I take
    very seriously a motion to dismiss, especially when it is
    offered by the very distinguished Senator who did that. But, in
    a bipartisan way, I hope some Democrats will support the
    rejection of this motion, as difficult as it is, because I
    don't think this whole sad, sad, drama will end--we will never
    get it behind us until you vote up or down on the articles. And
    when you do, however you vote, we will all collect our papers,
    bow from the waist, thank you for your courtesy, and leave and
    go gently into the night. But let us finish our job.
        Thank you.
        Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
        Mr. LOTT. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe, under the agreement we entered into,
    the next order of business, then, would be the vote on the
    motion by Senator Harkin to go into open session; is that
    correct?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The managers have used their time. The
    Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Harkin.

                          motion to suspend the rules

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, in accordance with rule V of
    the Senate Standing Rules, Mr. Wellstone and I filed a notice
    of intent to move to suspend the rules solely regarding the
    debate by Senators on the motion to dismiss, so Senators can
    have open rather than a closed debate on this issue.
        This motion is offered on behalf of myself and Senators
    Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye,
    Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb,
    Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer,
    Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski.
        My motion is at the desk. However, Mr. Chief Justice, I
    send a corrected copy of my motion to the desk. There were two
    typos in it; I want to have it corrected.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. If it is appropriate at this point, I ask the
    Senators if they would remain at their desks so we can go
    through this vote, and I ask unanimous consent, since we are
    all here, to reduce the time for the vote from 15 minutes to 10
    minutes.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Is there objection to the Senator from Iowa modifying his
    motion?
        Without objection, it is modified.
        The clerk will report the motion.
        The legislative clerk read the motion, as modified, as
    follows:

        I move to suspend the following portions of the Rules and
    Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
    Impeachment Trials in regard to debate by Senators on a motion
    to dismiss during the trial of President William Jefferson
    Clinton:
        (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
        (2) The following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate
    shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
    decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon
    without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall
    be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be
    entered on the record''; and
        (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except
    when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that
    case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask for the yeas and nays.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there a sufficient second?
        There is a sufficient second.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on agreeing to the
    motion. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 43, nays 57, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 2]

                 [Subject: Harkin motion to suspend the rules]

                                    YEAS--43

    Akaka
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Schumer
    Specter
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--57

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Baucus
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lincoln
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Rockefeller
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sarbanes
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Are there any other Senators wishing to
    vote or change their vote? If not, on this vote the yeas are
    43, and the nays are 57. Two-thirds of the Senators voting, and
    a quorum being present, not having voted in the affirmative,
    the motion is rejected.
        Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Nevada.
        Mr. REID. May we have order in the Chamber, please?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                            order for closed session

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move that we now go into closed
    session for the purpose of Senators debating the motion to
    dismiss.
        The motion was agreed to.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair, pursuant to rule XXXV, now
    directs the Sergeant at Arms to clear the galleries, close the
    doors of the Chamber, and exclude all the officials of the
    Senate not sworn to secrecy.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we take a 10-minute break for the purposes of closing the doors
    and preparing for the debate.
        There being no objection, at 5:23 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 5:50 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.

                                 closed session

        [At 5:50 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The
    proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until
    9:51 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                                  open session

        Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now
    return to open session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                             order for adjournment

        Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate
    adjourns, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 12 noon on
    Tuesday, and I further ask consent that during the remainder of
    the trial it be in order for Members to submit unanswered
    questions to the Chair.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
        Without objection, it is so ordered.

                                    program

        Mr. NICKLES. On tomorrow, we will resume and begin debate
    on the motion to subpoena. I now ask unanimous consent that the
    time for argument be reduced to 4 hours, equally divided, as
    provided for under Senate Resolution 16.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? It is so ordered.
        Mr. NICKLES. Mr. Chief Justice, for the information of all
    colleagues, tomorrow we will begin the debate at 12 noon
    instead of 1 o'clock.
                                    ------

                           adjournment until tomorrow

        Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand
    in adjournment as under the previous order.
        There being no objection, at 9:51 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Tuesday, January 26,
    1999, at 12 noon.

              SUPPORT OF THE WELLSTONE-HARKIN ``SUNSHINE'' MOTION

        Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise today in strong
    support of the Wellstone-Harkin motion. This motion would allow
    open Senate debate during the impeachment trial. Mr. Chief
    Justice, the American people should not be excluded from one of
    the most important Senate deliberations in United States
    history.
        The result of the debates and discussions over the next
    days or weeks could require the removal of the President of the
    United States for the first time in our Nation's 222 year
    history. In our deliberations, my colleagues and I will
    contemplate no less than reversing the outcome of an election
    in which nearly 100 million Americans cast their vote. Such a
    significant decision, a decision with such profound
    consequences, should not be reached behind closed doors.
        I believe my constituents and all Americans deserve to hear
    Senate deliberations from Senators--not leakers and speculators
    and commentators.
        From my earliest days as a Baltimore social worker to my
    tenure as a United States Senator, I have lived by the
    principle that the public has a right to know and a right to be
    heard. This principle is no less important when a Presidential
    Impeachment trial is underway. It is more important than ever.
        Now, some of my colleagues have said that these
    deliberations should be closed because we are jurors and
    jurors' deliberations are kept secret in a court of law. But
    let me tell you that this Senate tribunal cannot be compared to
    a simple court of law. Of course, the law is the foundation for
    our work in the Senate. But as my colleague from Iowa, Senator
    Harkin, noted during the trial, we are more than jurors.
        We are representatives of our Nation. We are given
    responsibilities to deliberate on matters of public importance
    and vote in the public interest. Never was that more true than
    in the Senate trial in which we are now engaged.
        The U.S. Senate is, ultimately, the public's institution--
    not ours. It is for them we work and it is to them we owe our
    continued service. I hope and believe we serve the institution
    well and that our stewardship gives credit and credence to the
    wisdom of our Founding Fathers. By keeping our deliberations
    open, we will do service to the American public we serve, this
    institution we cherish, and those Founding Fathers we revere.
        I absolutely will not support closing the doors to the
    public and hope that my colleagues will join me in supporting
    the sunshine motion.

                           Tuesday, January 26, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 12:02 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Gracious God, You not only guide our steps, You order our
    stops for quiet times of prayer. We hear Your words spoken
    through the psalmist. ``Be still and know that I am God; I will
    be exalted among the nations, I will be exalted in the
    earth''--Psalm 46:10. Help us absorb the true meaning of these
    words translating the original Hebrew. You call us to let up,
    leave off, let go, and truly know that You are God. You are in
    control. We cannot be still inside until we reaffirm that You
    are in control of us, this Nation, and this Senate. We exalt
    You El Shaddai, all-sufficient one; Adonai, our Lord; Jehovah-
    raah, our Shepherd who guides; Jehovah-rapha, who heals our
    bodies and our relationships; Jehovah-shammah, God who is here.
    Strengthen the Senators as they seek to exalt You, as these
    pages of American history are written during this trial. You
    bless the Nation that exalts You! Through Him who taught us to
    seek first Your kingdom and Your righteousness. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, we are now
    prepared to hear arguments regarding the subpoenaing of
    witnesses and the taking of their depositions. I understand the
    House managers will submit the list and begin their argument;
    the White House counsel will then state their arguments, with
    the House managers making the final closing statement. This
    period has been limited to 4 hours instead of the 6 hours that
    had been earlier indicated.
        I also expect a motion may be offered again to close the
    session with regard to deliberations by the Senators. I need
    some further consultation with Senator Daschle to confirm that.
    It could be that we could work it out without having to do the
    recorded vote. Therefore, votes could occur this evening--
    probably between 4:30 and 5 o'clock.
        As always, we expect to take a break after about an hour
    and a half in the proceedings, and it may be a little bit
    longer than usual, so that if Senators are not able to grab a
    quick bite, they might be able to grab a little something in
    the cloakroom during that first break. So it might be a little
    longer than ordinary. I expect that will occur sometime around
    1:30, approximately.
        Before we begin, since I see that there are still a few
    Senators not in the Chamber, I suggest the absence of a quorum,
    Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. If all Senators, counsel, and managers would
    return to their desks, I believe we are ready to begin.
        Mr. Chief Justice, again, just for the information of all
    Senators, what happens next is I believe that a manager will be
    recognized on behalf of the House to present a motion with
    regard to subpoenaing witnesses and then the presentations will
    begin first by the House managers and then by the White House
    counsel and then closed by the House managers to be spread over
    4 hours, but that at approximately 1:30 we will take a break so
    that we can assess how to proceed the remainder of the day and
    perhaps even get a bite to eat if Senators hadn't had that
    opportunity. It won't be an extended break but it will be
    longer than normal.
        I believe we are ready to proceed, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant
    on behalf of the House managers.

          Motion for Appearance of Witnesses and Admission of Evidence

        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a motion to
    present.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The manager will send the motion to the
    desk. The clerk will read the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        Motion of the United States House of Representatives for
    the appearance of witnesses at a deposition and to admit
    evidence not in the Record.
        Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by
    and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully
    submits to the United States Senate its motion for the
    appearance of witnesses at a deposition and to admit evidence
    not in the record in connection with the Impeachment Trial of
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.
        The House moves that the Senate authorize and issue
    subpoenas for the appearance of the following witnesses at a
    deposition for the purpose of providing testimony related to
    the Impeachment Trial:
        1. Monica S. Lewinsky;
        2. Vernon Jordan; and
        3. Sidney Blumenthal.
        Further, the House moves that the Senate admit into
    evidence the following material not currently in the record:
        1. the affidavit of Barry Ward, Law Clerk to the Honorable
    Susan Webber Wright, U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern
    District of Arkansas;
        2. the sworn declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, and
    attachments thereto; and
        3. certain telephone records which document conversations
    between Monica S. Lewinsky and William Jefferson Clinton,
    including a 56-minute exchange on December 6, 1997.
        Additionally, the House petitions the Senate to request the
    appearance of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
    United States, at a deposition, for the purpose of providing
    testimony related to the Impeachment Trial.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to Senate Resolution 16, as
    modified by the order of January 25, the managers on the part
    of the House of Representatives and counsel for the President
    each have 2 hours to present their arguments on this motion.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Senate, we are here
    today to argue for the presentation of witnesses, and I want to
    state at the outset a couple of observations of mine regarding
    this.
        The House managers have always understood the Senate's
    sense of the rules on these matters, and we don't question that
    fact. But I think it is important, to set the record clear here
    today, to say at the outset that we have always believed, and
    we still do believe, that 10 or 12 witnesses are what we should
    have and should have been permitted to call to prove our case.
    We have estimated that this could be done in a matter of 2
    weeks at the outside, including all cross-examination. That is
    what we think the normal order would have been; it is what we
    think it should have been. But we have been told again and
    again, and we believe it is true, that if we made such a
    request it would not be approved. And a few weeks ago we
    thought--maybe even a few days ago--that we could submit a list
    of maybe five or six witnesses and there would be a reasonable
    chance that for deposition they would be approved and maybe two
    or three of them actually could be presented live in the
    Chamber.
        Now we have been led to believe--and we think it is an
    accurate assessment--that in order to get a vote to approve the
    opportunity to take depositions alone, whether or not anyone is
    called, we cannot submit more than two or three witnesses to
    you.
        That is what we have done today. We have submitted a motion
    for simply three witnesses: Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and
    Sidney Blumenthal.
        The two people who know the most about this are Monica
    Lewinsky and President William Jefferson Clinton, and while we
    have not submitted to you today the name of President Clinton
    in our motion, we strongly urge, if you allow us to have
    witnesses, which we believe you should, that you, in addition--
    or even if you don't--on your own call President Clinton here
    to testify. We think that it is exceedingly important that you
    have an opportunity, we have an opportunity for you to examine
    him and these other witnesses to get at the truth of this
    matter and to end all the speculation that would resolve this
    matter and let you draw the proper inferences and conclusions.
        I will simply say that I am going to make a brief outline
    of the matter of why we should have witnesses for you, the
    three we are asking for, and I will be followed in order, so
    you can get some sequence to this, by Manager Bryant, who will
    discuss in detail the reason why we think it is appropriate to
    call specifically Monica Lewinsky; Manager Hutchinson, who will
    discuss Mr. Jordan as a witness; and Manager Rogan, who will
    discuss Mr. Blumenthal.
        If our motion is granted--I want to make this very, very
    clear--at no point will we ask any questions of Monica Lewinsky
    about her explicit sexual relations with the President, either
    in deposition or, if we are permitted, on the floor of the
    Senate. They will not be asked. That, of course, assumes that
    White House counsel does not enter into that discussion, and we
    doubt that they would.
        Secondly, we do not see why the entire process of deposing
    and calling all of these witnesses right here live would have
    to take more than just a very few days, 2, 3, 4, 5, maybe early
    next week at the latest. There is no reason why it has to be
    longer than that. We absolutely reject the argument that some
    were making--and I do not know why they were making it--that
    somehow, if we have a single witness out here, it is going to
    mean weeks and weeks of protracted delay in this trial.
        That is not so, and certainly not so with the three
    witnesses we are asking you today to permit us to present.
        I also want to address the argument that has been made by
    some that witnesses should only be permitted if there is new
    evidence.
        Now, the managers believe that we will present to you new
    evidence with the witnesses that we have asked you to let us
    depose. Think through this with me for one moment. Under the
    rules you have set up, if we take depositions, which we are
    required to do, of every one of these witnesses, at the end of
    the day when those depositions are completed, all the new
    evidence that we could imagine certainly will be--from those
    three witnesses--in those depositions, and the argument will be
    made, I am sure, that there is no reason to have a live witness
    out here at all.
        That had to be a preconceived notion by somebody who
    thought of that in the first place. If that is the argument,
    that should not be the standard. It should be one of the
    standards but not the standard, not the sole standard. There is
    a lot more to a witness, and the reason why you need to have a
    witness out here, than simply new evidence.
        In real criminal trials, virtually all witnesses are
    deposed before they are brought to trial, and then the counsel
    on each side decide which witnesses they will call. They are
    called. They are examined. They are cross-examined. And unless
    a witness is deceased or laid up or there is some other
    extraordinary reason why that witness isn't there, especially a
    key witness, then the witness normally is here live.
        It is especially true in a case such as this where much of
    the evidence, not necessarily all of it--there is quite a bit
    of direct evidence--is circumstantial and requires you to draw,
    as many finders of fact do all across this country every day,
    inferences and conclusions that involve the credibility of the
    witness, that involve the way it is said, that involve
    inflections and spontaneity of the witness, the exchange of the
    counsel asking the question and the witness, and a description
    and flavor of which you simply can't get without having the
    person here to observe.
        That is what jurors do all the time. I think it is
    especially important, as well, because there is conflicting
    testimony.
        I do not suppose we have a stand here today, but you have
    in front of you a credibility of witness instruction I think we
    passed out. We would like for you to keep it. It is a
    credibility of witness instruction that is longer than that. I
    just excerpted a part of it and put it up here on this board. I
    know you can't all see that but you should have this sheet. If
    you don't, please ask for it. This is a jury instruction that
    is given in the District of Columbia. It is something that is
    given as a part of our Federal system. And it is important, I
    think, for this particular paragraph, to read it, to understand
    it, because you wouldn't even write this jury instruction if
    you didn't expect to have live witnesses:

        In reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of any
    witness, you may consider any matter that may have a bearing on
    the subject.

        That is part of the instruction.

        You may consider the demeanor and behavior of the witness.

        I think that is important. It is the third paragraph you
    look at, the bottom paragraph.

        You may consider the demeanor and the behavior of the
    witness on the witness stand; the witness' manner of
    testifying; whether the witness impresses you as a truthful
    person; whether the witness impresses you as having an accurate
    memory and recollection; whether the witness has any motive for
    not telling the truth; whether the witness had a full
    opportunity to observe the matters about which he or she has
    testified; whether the witness has any interest in the outcome
    of this case or friendship or hostility toward other people
    concerned with this case.

        Demeanor, manner, truthfulness, how the witness impresses
    you. If you don't have that witness here, and it is a critical
    witness, there is no way as a trier of fact you can make those
    judgments fairly. There just isn't any way. We think that it is
    terribly critical, not only that we are permitted to depose
    these witnesses, but with respect particularly to Monica
    Lewinsky and perhaps all three of them, that we be permitted to
    bring those witnesses here at the end of the day and examine
    them and let the President's counsel examine them.
        The arguments of the President's counsel have been, to some
    extent, to you and to me--and I have heard it repeated several
    times--that somehow circumstantial evidence is not that
    important, that it is somehow inferior to direct evidence. I am
    not going to pass out a jury instruction on that again. You
    have already heard us talk about that. The reality is the jury
    instruction, if we passed one out to you today, would say
    exactly what we said before: Circumstantial evidence is given
    the same weight, the same weight as direct evidence. Inferences
    have to be drawn.
        I don't know any case in this country in a criminal
    matter--or rarely; I should not say ``any.'' I suppose there is
    a confession that always you get once in a while and you read
    about it in the paper. But in almost every criminal case, you
    have to draw inferences; there has to be circumstantial
    evidence of some sort. There is nothing wrong with that. The
    President's counsel has said that somehow the nature of the
    evidence means that you should automatically acquit him. I just
    don't buy that at all.
        What are inferences? Let's put inferences up for a second
    so you can look at that. Inferences are on this side. This is
    another jury instruction. I don't know if you have this one,
    but we will give it to you. This is another one that is given
    out:

        An inference is a deduction or a conclusion which you . . .
    as finders of facts--are permitted to draw . . . from the facts
    which have been established by either direct or circumstantial
    evidence. In drawing inferences you should exercise your common
    sense. . . . You are permitted to draw from the facts which you
    find to be proven, such reasonable inferences as would be
    justified in light of your experience.

        A few days ago, one of the White House counsel, Mr.
    Kendall, attempted to make you think it was very difficult to
    prove a crime by circumstantial evidence. You may remember Mr.
    Kendall told the story about a fellow who came out of his house
    one morning and he saw his driveway was wet and he immediately
    thought it must have rained last night. But, Mr. Kendall said,
    this man noticed right after that that his neighbor's water
    sprinkler was dripping and he thought, well, maybe the water
    sprinkler caused it to be wet. And he used that illustration--
    ended the story right there--of how difficult circumstantial
    evidence is and how likely you might draw the wrong conclusion
    from inferences.
        Mr. Kendall didn't allow you to proceed with the next
    commonsense step that shows how powerful circumstantial
    evidence can be. Let's suppose the man got up in the morning,
    he walked out of his house, he saw that his driveway was wet,
    and he thought maybe it had rained. He immediately observed the
    water sprinkler was dripping. He thought, well, maybe the water
    sprinkler caused it and he looked down the street then and
    looked at not only his neighbor's sidewalk where it was wet as
    well as his, and the driveway, but he looked at his neighbor's.
    And he looked at several others all around his neighborhood and
    they were dry.
        The obvious conclusion from circumstantial evidence is the
    neighbor's water sprinkler caused his sidewalk or his driveway
    to be wet and it didn't rain. It is a kind of a reasonable,
    commonsense, inferential, circumstantial conclusion you are
    allowed to draw. You are the finders of fact. I think that that
    suggestion was wrong.
        But this is why we need witnesses. You need to be able to
    see the temperament; you need to be able to have the
    background; you need to be able to have the feel or the flavor
    to draw those inferences properly.
        In the impeachment case before you, you have both direct
    and circumstantial evidence that the President engaged in a
    pattern of obstruction, perjury, and witness tampering designed
    to deny the court in the Jones case what Judge Wright had
    determined Ms. Jones had a right to discover in order to prove
    her claim. You have to use your common sense to get at this.
    Seeing, hearing, and observing those live witnesses is
    important.
        If you remember, at the outset of this case, at the outset
    of these proceedings, I tried to draw your attention to what
    this was about in a nutshell. Some have said it is a theory of
    the case. The White House wants to call it speculation. It is
    not speculation. From all the evidence--especially once you
    have heard Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan and Sidney
    Blumenthal, I think adding the flavor that you need to have,
    adding the body language you need to observe, adding the
    credibility that you need to establish in this--I think that is
    the proper inference and the proper conclusion you need to
    draw.
        What was that nutshell? I won't bore you with going into
    every detail again, but I want to remind you what the record,
    we think, shows and that this additional witness presentation
    would augment and thus be very important. It shows the
    President had a well-thought-out scheme. He resented the Jones
    lawsuit. He was alarmed when Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on
    the witness list and even more alarmed when Judge Wright issued
    her order signaling the court would hear the evidence of the
    relationship.
        To keep his relationship with Monica Lewinsky from the
    court once it was apparent to him he was going to have to
    testify, he knew he would have to lie to the court. To succeed
    at this, he decided he had to get Monica Lewinsky to file a
    false affidavit to try to avoid her testifying. He needed to
    get her a job to make her happy, to make sure she executed the
    affidavit and then stick with her lies if questioned.
        Then the gifts were subpoenaed. He had to have her hide the
    gifts, the only tangible evidence that could link him to her.
    She came up with the idea of giving them to Betty Currie and
    the President seized on that. Who would think to ask Betty?
    Then he would be free to lie to the court in the deposition.
    But after this, he realized he had to make sure Betty would lie
    and cover for him. He got his aides convinced to repeat his
    lies to the grand jury and the public, and all this worked
    until the dress showed up. Then he lied to the grand jury to
    try to cover up and explain away his prior crimes.
        The President knowingly, intentionally, and willfully set
    out on a course of conduct in December 1997 to lie to the Jones
    court, to hide his relationship, and to encourage others to lie
    and hide evidence to conceal the relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky from the court.
        That is the straightforward case that we presented. It is
    there. But it is very important that you recognize this is not
    speculation but it is supported by the evidence. But it needs
    to have the witnesses here.
        I am not going to go into every one of the articles. I am
    not going to go over all that again. You have them in front of
    you. But you know there are four provisions, four different
    provisions of the perjury article, and there are seven counts
    in the obstruction article. In addition to the seven counts, we
    believe you have the right to consider the lies the President
    made in the Paula Jones civil deposition as a part of his
    obstruction of justice, as written in the body of that article.
        Why do I raise what is there on the table? Well, you can
    find the President guilty of any one of the perjury or
    obstruction of justice charges. In our judgment, if you find
    him guilty of any one, you can convict him and you can remove
    him from office. We think that is appropriate. We think that
    you should, that every one of them rises to that level.
        I want to make a point to you, too, for example, about the
    first perjury, about the nature and details of his relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky. Let's just say for a minute, so you will
    get this one clear, if I could beg your indulgence, there were
    a lot of questions raised out here about particular statements
    that might be perjurious, some of which may have sounded a
    little bit more stretched to you than others did. But the body
    and the gravamen of that is that they are all grand jury
    perjury about that relationship. Cumulatively, that is what you
    are voting on. You are not voting on each and every one of
    these, particularly ``the'' singular lie that hangs the
    President of the United States. And there are four--there are
    three more in addition to that to look at. So, please, look at
    all of them.
        We also strongly believe that each of these constitutes
    high crimes and misdemeanors. It is very hard for us to
    conceive that there is a different standard for impeaching the
    President and impeaching a judge. We know that has been argued
    to you out here, but it is very hard for us to conceive of
    this. On the other hand, I am aware that many of you believe,
    and I am sure some of you at least do--I hope it is not many,
    but I said many--that no matter whether or not the President is
    guilty of the perjury and obstruction of justice, everything
    that is in here in great detail, everything we have told you,
    that none of that rises to the level of a high crime and
    misdemeanor and that the President should not be removed from
    office.
        On the other hand, I think that the majority of you do
    believe that, if the President committed all of this, surely it
    would rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors. How
    can you leave in office a man who is President of the United
    States who has so intentionally, through his scheme that he has
    concocted to deny the court justice, denied information to a
    person who is trying to plead their case, gone through it
    systematically and lied again and again and again and then
    intentionally and calculatingly, lied to the grand jury about
    it again?
        It is very hard to conceive of that. But I also suspect
    that most of you at the end of the day will question some of
    these, and as I said earlier, you don't have to conclude that
    he commited all of them to convict him, certainly not to find
    him guilty of the charges but somewhere in between. Is it 50
    percent of them? Is it seven-eighths of them? How many of them
    does it take? What is the weight for some of you? Each one of
    you will be judging this differently.
        But in that process, there is no doubt in my mind that you
    need to go through the process of looking and hearing from
    these witnesses to make that decision. If you have a doubt, not
    in your own mind--maybe some of you have no doubt at all that
    he is guilty of any and all of these crimes, but if you think
    one of your colleagues does have that doubt at this moment, for
    gosh sakes, let's let the witnesses come here and let us have
    the chance to erase that doubt in the way you normally do in a
    trial.
        For a few of the criminal charges under the articles of
    impeachment, under both of them, it is our judgment that the
    President's guilt is so clear and convincing and compelling
    that we don't think any witnesses are needed to be called in
    deposition or in person.
        First, contrary to the impressions that the White House
    counsel would like to leave you, it should be clear to anybody
    reading the record that the President committed perjury before
    the grand jury when he said that he never touched certain body
    parts of Ms. Lewinsky, which touching, the President admitted,
    would clearly be within the definition of sexual relations in
    the Jones case.
        Ms. Lewinsky testified that he touched these parts on a
    number of different occasions in a manner clearly within the
    President's understanding of that definition. The record
    contains testimony from at least six different friends and
    counselors with whom Ms. Lewinsky spoke and described these
    details contemporaneously as they occurred.
        White House counsel has repeatedly tried to dismiss this
    absolutely clear perjury by claiming that Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony is uncorroborated and, therefore, you couldn't prove
    perjury to the court. They say again and again and again that
    it is a ``he says-she says'' situation.
        This is a gross misstatement of the law. Even if there were
    no corroborating witnesses--and there are in this case--a
    person could be and would be convicted of perjury before any
    court in this country based on the evidence that is in this
    record now. We don't have to bring anything else in here, and
    we are not planning to do so to prove that.
        The law covering grand jury perjury, which has been on the
    books since 1970, does not require a corroborating witness and
    does not require corroborating evidence. There are more than
    100 people serving in Federal prison today who have been
    convicted under this 1970 grand jury statute for perjury where
    it is one person's word against another, several of them for
    lies about sexual relations.
        All you need to convict is to accept that Monica Lewinsky
    had no motive to lie about this, the President did, and you
    have to draw the inferences you logically can from the chain of
    events that are in this record. But even though you don't need
    any corroborating testimony, there is corroborating testimony.
    There are the six people--friends and counselors--with whom she
    talked contemporaneously about this. Again, the White House
    counselors have tried to persuade you, wrongly, that you should
    not consider this, that this would not be admissible--these
    corroborating witnesses--in any courtroom in the country, they
    say, and that is not true.
        There are at least three exceptions to the hearsay rule
    which would, in all probability, permit those prior consistent
    statements to come in and corroborate that testimony.
        The bottom line is the perjury of the President in this
    case is as plain as day on the record, and we don't need to
    call any witnesses on this matter. And we also believe there
    are a number of other perjuries in that grand jury, that I am
    not going to go into detail about, that are just as plain on
    the record. We don't need to call witnesses that he perjured
    himself when he told the grand jury it was his goal to be
    truthful in the Jones deposition. That is what he told the
    grand jury--it was his goal to be truthful.
        The record is replete with many lies that he told in that
    deposition and, in the face of telling the grand jury that his
    goal was to be truthful, he committed perjury.
        Nor do we believe that any witness needs to be called to
    further establish the President's guilt of the crime of
    obstruction of justice and witness tampering in the case where
    he met Betty Currie on the day after his Jones deposition and
    suggested to her all those false declaratory statements that we
    have been over so many times in here.
        Betty Currie's testimony in this matter is undisputed on
    the record. The White House counsel's argument that the
    President was just refreshing his memory is absurd on its face.
        The same is true of the obstruction of justice and perjury
    charges related to allowing his attorney during the Jones
    deposition to make false and misleading statements with regard
    to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and then lying about not even
    paying attention to the attorneys' exchange with the judge on
    this matter. The record is clear. You watched the videotape on
    it. Inferences are perfectly appropriate to be drawn from body
    language. You saw it on the videotape. You saw it. No more
    witnesses are needed. The President committed these crimes.
        On the other hand, we believe we need to bring in witnesses
    to resolve conflicting testimony to give you a true picture of
    the President's scheme to lie and conceal evidence for the
    other obstruction of justice charges and certainly for the last
    perjury charge. They are more complex. They are more dependent
    on circumstantial evidence and inferences you logically have to
    draw. And that is why you need to hear from Monica Lewinsky,
    Vernon Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, to tell you about these
    things themselves.
        When you do, you are just plain going to get a different
    flavor; you are going to feel the sense of this. We believe you
    will find at the end of the day, once you have done that, even
    though you don't need to use this standard, that the President
    is guilty of the entire scheme we presented to you in every
    detail beyond a reasonable doubt.
        Remember, you don't need to convict him to find him guilty
    of all of the crimes we have suggested by any stretch of the
    imagination. You don't need to use the beyond a reasonable
    doubt standard. That is not required of you. But we can
    understand why many of you or some of you might.
        The reality is that you are in a position where you need to
    make these determinations, and to make them you need to have
    the witnesses. In any courtroom where you are going to
    certainly judge something beyond a reasonable doubt, you need
    to assess the credibility of the witnesses where you have
    conflicting testimony.
        One point in that regard, too, is, we have heard White
    House counsel say a number of times that somehow the fact that
    there is so much conflicting testimony makes our case weaker.
    That is not so. Again, unless the bad guy admits he is guilty,
    when you go to trial in a criminal case, you always have
    conflicting testimony, at least you certainly have the accused
    denying it, and very, very frequently, most often, you have a
    lot of other people who are conflicting.
        The fact that there is conflict is something for the triers
    of fact to resolve but, again, resolve by listening to the
    witnesses, checking their demeanor, watching their body
    language, determining their credibility, feeling the case-flow,
    seeing how it fits together, and watching.
        I am not going to be the one describing what Monica
    Lewinsky is going to show you if she comes in here. I am going
    to tell you, even if we depose her, having had the opportunity
    to talk with this intelligent and very impressionable young
    woman the other day, she will convey this story to you in a way
    that it cannot be conveyed off a piece of paper. It just cannot
    be done.
        I suppose that is why the White House counselors are so
    afraid of our calling any witnesses. They don't want you to
    have the opportunity to get the full flavor if not only you let
    us take the depositions but you at least let us call her live
    here on the floor, preferably with our other two witnesses as
    well.
        They know that the written record conceals this. There is
    no way to lift that out. There is no way for you to see the
    relationship, how she responds to the questions, how she
    answers, how she conducts herself in making very apparent what
    the President's true meaning and intent was.
        If you remember, a lot of this is his state of mind. In the
    not too distant future, Monica Lewinsky is going to be free of
    the gag order and is going to go out and talk to people freely.
    She should. At that point in time, she is going to have the
    public judging her, and they are going to be judging this case,
    as will history, and I suggest that the public at that point in
    history as well will be judging you and not judging the Senate
    well if it doesn't let her come here and testify.
        Let me briefly turn to the last thing I want to do. I want
    to describe the three additional pieces of new evidence we
    would like admitted in this motion.
        First is the affidavit of Barry W. Ward who had been a law
    clerk to Judge Wright during the consideration of the Jones
    case. None of this, I think, should be controversial, but we do
    have it, and I want to cover it briefly. In his affidavit, he
    attests to the fact that at President Clinton's deposition in
    the Jones case, he, Mr. Ward, was sitting at the conference
    table next to Judge Wright; that he was able to observe the
    colloquy between the judge and Mr. Bennett.
        You recall, Mr. Bennett was engaged in this colloquy about
    the affidavit of Monica Lewinsky. And that is what you saw, the
    film footage of the President and the questions. Was the
    President observant? Was he watching? Was he keen? That
    affidavit goes to that point. It is the testimony of Mr. Ward
    with regard to the fact that the President was observant.
        Secondly, we have a piece of new evidence, and that is the
    declaration of the Jones attorney, T. Wesley Holmes, and the
    attached copies of the subpoena in that case, the subpoena in
    that case to Betty Currie, dated January 22, 1998, along with
    proof of service, dated January 27, 1998.
        Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Vermont.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, parliamentary inquiry. It is
    my understanding that Senate Resolution 16 says----
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont is advised it
    takes unanimous consent to allow a parliamentary inquiry in the
    proceeding.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I object to the references
    the manager is making to new information. It is my
    understanding that from Senate Resolution 16, the material
    outside the record may only be presented in connection with a
    motion to expand the record. This new information--we have
    skirted it already with the Lewinsky interview this weekend,
    but now the latest that Mr. Manager McCollum states, I would
    say respectfully, expands that record and, indeed, we are not
    at that point.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. I think the motion that the
    managers have made is a motion to authorize the presentation of
    evidence that is not in the record. And so I think that is a
    fair comment. I overrule the objection.
        Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Chief Justice.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The attachments to Mr. Holmes' declaration is the proof of
    the subpoena being issued to Betty Currie on January 22, 1998,
    along with service in the Jones case on January 27, 1998, and a
    copy of the supplemental witness list, including the name of
    Betty Currie, which was served on January 23, 1998. And in his
    declaration, Mr. Holmes explains that Ms. Currie was subpoenaed
    because of testimony given by President Clinton in his
    deposition and because of reliable information which the
    attorneys had received to this effect--that Ms. Currie was an
    instrumental person in facilitating Monica Lewinsky's meetings
    with the President and central to their ``cover story,'' as Mr.
    Holmes refers to it. He explicitly denies that any ``Washington
    Post'' article played any part in the decision of the Jones
    attorneys to subpoena Ms. Currie.
        The third and final piece of new evidence that we ask you
    to take in and accept is a declaration and accompanying
    documents with regard to a telephone conversation showing that
    a conversation occurred on December 6 for 56 minutes between
    the President and Ms. Lewinsky, which we believe is what it
    shows. Obviously, the phone records show the phone records. And
    they state what they are. But we suggest to you that that is
    relevant information because it confirms what we think the
    testimony in the record otherwise would lead you to believe.
        At this point in time, having given you an overview and
    having given you this amount of new evidence, I want to turn
    the microphone over and yield to my colleague, Mr. Bryant, the
    rest of the time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire as to
    our time remaining?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Just under 90 minutes.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Distinguished Senators, a recent letter from Manager Hyde
    to Senator Daschle stated that it has always been the position
    of the House managers that a trial with the benefit of relevant
    witnesses is in the best interest of the Senate and the
    American people. The defense attorneys for the President, as
    well as others in this body, have publicly stated that they do
    not want witnesses.
        Through the question-and-answer session that we have just
    participated in over the last few days, some in this body have
    made it clear that they would prefer a few sharply focused
    witnesses limited only to the most relevant evidence. We heard
    this. And as a result of our submission this morning, you will
    see that we have proposed three witnesses.
        Now, as background, we have brought this down from some 15
    witnesses that we initially thought we would like to call. We
    eliminated, obviously, many witnesses that we would still like
    to call. But with respect for this body, and certainly the
    sensitivity that we feel, we heard that three witnesses would
    be probably the best situation.
        I think from, again, the tone of the questions, the
    directness of many of the questions, we did get that message
    clearly. And from these three witnesses we believe we have the
    broadest coverage of the two articles of impeachment.
        Within the obstruction article, there are in essence seven
    so-called counts, seven instances that we allege. With these
    three witnesses, we manage to cover six of those seven, with
    the one that we don't quite cover being the tampering with
    Betty Currie. As you will note, she is not on that list. But,
    again, bringing this down to three, we had to eliminate some
    witnesses we would have preferred to call.
        Also, based on what we have read and what we have heard, it
    is clear that a very few have already determined that even
    assuming the truth of the articles of impeachment--the perjury
    and obstruction of justice--they are insufficient to convict
    this President of high crimes and misdemeanors. Since each of
    you, as Senators, must consider this matter and vote your own
    conscience with impartial justice, that is apparently your
    individual decision, although, with all due respect, I would
    suggest a premature decision before all the proof and all the
    arguments are made.
        One example of not having heard a complete case is Ms.
    Lewinsky. She is probably the most relevant witness, that is,
    aside from the President himself, who so far has indicated
    through his counsel that he will not testify; and I might add
    also has not answered the questions that at least some Senators
    sent to the White House for his answering, based on his
    attorney's statement that he would be willing to answer
    questions.
        So with that aside, Ms. Lewinsky is probably the most
    important witness left. Wouldn't you at least want to see and
    hear from her on this? As the triers of fact, wouldn't you want
    to observe the demeanor of Ms. Lewinsky and test her
    credibility--as I say, look into the eyes and test the
    credibility of these witnesses? Compare her version of the
    testimony to the contested events. Remember, the President's
    attorneys, in numerous ways, in their vigorous defense of the
    President, have challenged Ms. Lewinsky's version of the facts.
        I believe the majority of other Senators have not yet
    reached a final determination, and it is to you now that I make
    this further proposition. If there is one witness you and the
    American people honestly do need to hear, it is Ms. Lewinsky.
    As you probably read in the newspapers, her lawyers don't want
    her to testify. They are good lawyers, and they don't want to
    have her out here.
        Despite the protestations of the White House and their
    attorneys during the House hearings that they wanted to hear
    fact witnesses, we now know absolutely and without a doubt the
    White House does not want to hear Ms. Lewinsky--does not want
    you to hear Ms. Lewinsky, and Ms. Lewinsky, if the truth be
    known, probably does not want to come in here and testify.
        These are not our witnesses. We didn't get this case in a
    brown envelope. We sort of didn't have any choice in selecting
    the witnesses. The witnesses are all out there--basically White
    House employees, friends of the White House, or former
    employees. These are not going to be our friends if they come
    in and testify. They are not going to be sympathetic to us,
    although we can anticipate that they would tell the truth. And
    that certainly would be our belief with Ms. Lewinsky if she
    were called.
        We believe she understands her responsibility, despite any
    feelings that she might have about the President or the job
    that he is doing as President; that she understands the
    responsibility to tell the truth.
        Senators, she does have a story to tell. Given the link
    that she has, that common thread that she has in most of the
    charges of these articles of impeachment, I suggest that she
    should be permitted to testify.
        A closure of this case is necessary, and without the direct
    presentation by Ms. Lewinsky, we all--political and public--
    would be denied the complete picture that she should be able to
    give us to better sort this out. As Manager Graham said
    yesterday, please don't leave us all hanging for the answers we
    so dearly need.
        Is this good, is it bad, or is it ugly? We managers believe
    that it is bad, ugly, and illegal. We all like to talk about
    the Constitution, and it is a great document. The opportunity
    to confront witnesses is present in that Constitution, and it
    can be argued that this principle of confrontation of witnesses
    against you should apply to these proceedings. While we realize
    that confrontational right is one that belongs to the criminal
    defendant in the Constitution, in this case apparently any
    right to confront Ms. Lewinsky and other witnesses is being
    waived by the President and his lawyers since they don't want
    to call witnesses in these proceedings.
        Isn't it time, though, for the rest of us to make that
    choice that we do want to see and hear some witnesses? Her
    testimony, in particular, would be extraordinarily enlightening
    in resolving factual disputes about the very felonies of which
    we ask you to convict the President of the United States--
    perjury and obstruction of justice. These particular charges go
    to the very heart of our co-equal branch of government, the
    Judiciary. Members of the Senate, in terms of the impact on our
    judicial system in the search for truth, there is no difference
    between a person lying, which is perjury, and a person paying
    another person to lie, which is bribery. The bribery is in the
    Constitution and the perjury is not specifically mentioned.
        In terms of this proposition of proportionality, is the
    106th Senate prepared to have as its record of sexual
    harassment laws that perjury about sex is not illegal? After
    all, that is what this whole proportionality argument is about,
    that if it is about sex it is OK to lie. Because Senator
    Bumpers said that upwards of 80 percent of his divorce cases
    from his Arkansas practice of law involve lying, that does not
    legitimize perjury, nor should it provide any authority for
    this Senate to somehow legitimize perjury if it is just about
    sex.
        We allege that the President, in a reasoned and in a
    calculated manner, prevented Paula Jones from obtaining
    truthful testimony and evidence that might have helped her
    lawsuit. At the time the President attempted his coverup
    efforts, he, obviously, felt the disclosure of that information
    in the Paula Jones case would be material and helpful to her.
    The President not only committed himself to illegal actions but
    he enlisted others to assist, some knowingly and others perhaps
    unknowingly.
        Ms. Lewinsky is one of these who, interestingly enough,
    might fit into both categories of knowing and unknowingly at
    different times. She would be able to share with this Senate
    the so-called tone and tenor of her conversations with the
    President. Who else can do that but she or the President?
        This tone and tenor and observing her demeanor and
    listening to her talk about that filing of the affidavit and
    those things, how the President talked to her and how she read
    what he said and exactly what he did say, are all very
    important because, as we know in Washington and so many other
    places where there is a lot of power and prestige, and so
    forth, there are actions that can be prompted without even a
    direct specific order. Things can get done without it being
    said but just by the tone and tenor, the gestures, the
    appearance, and so forth, of certain things. Often these direct
    words, as I said, are not necessary. And Ms. Lewinsky can tell
    you about some of these occasions.
        An appropriate examination--and an appropriate cross-
    examination, I might add; let's don't limit the White House
    attorneys here--of Ms. Lewinsky on the factual disputes of the
    affidavit and their cover story, wouldn't that be nice to hear?
    The concealment of gifts--what really happened there and the
    job search--why did she get the job within 48 hours of the
    affidavit, after months of unsuccess?--wouldn't it be nice to
    hear Ms. Lewinsky's version of this when it is so important to
    the overall case of obstruction of justice?
        These are just a few examples where the Senate could be
    helped by her testimony, and it very well could be dispositive.
    It is even possible that she could help the President in some
    ways. But I assure you that she is an impressive young lady,
    and I suspect that she still very much does admire the
    President and the work that he is doing for this country. Yet
    she would be a person who in all likelihood would be
    forthcoming.
        If you have not made up your mind and, indeed, if you have
    further interest in resolving many of the facts here, I do
    commend Ms. Lewinsky for your consideration. It would be my
    intent to lead her through direct examination, the perjury
    charge, as it is alleged with the President, by having her
    simply affirm those provisions of her written testimony which
    are the ones that are generally referred to as salacious,
    without specifically mentioning those words.
        On the more complicated obstruction of justice, the pattern
    of obstruction of justice which does not involve these
    salacious details and matters, they will be addressed more
    specifically. It would be my intent for immediate clarification
    and to dissolve discrepancies and different inferences that
    have been drawn by House managers and defense counsel for the
    President to ask her about the December 28 transfer of Ms.
    Lewinsky's gifts from the President--transfer to Ms. Currie,
    particularly the cellular telephone call that has been put into
    issue by the defense team, about her conversation with the
    President and her offer to allow him to review this false
    affidavit before she submitted it to her lawyer and eventually
    to the court, and his comment that he didn't need to review it
    because he had seen 15 others just like it. Wouldn't you like
    to know what are we talking about--15 others? Fifteen drafts or
    15 other types of affidavits in other cases?
        She would also be asked about her job interviews and her
    discussions with the President about these job interviews over
    a period of time, which are very important, her discussions
    with Vernon Jordan, and specifically why she felt that the
    interview she did with Revlon the day after she signed the
    affidavit, her impression that it went poorly, whereas we
    heard--not testimony but statements in the presentation of
    White House lawyers that, in fact, it didn't go poorly, it went
    very well, but she felt it went so poorly that she went
    immediately out to call Vernon Jordan. Why? Why not have her
    come in and tell us why she did that.
        There will, of course, be other matters of record that she
    can clarify. Being available to the White House defense team,
    certainly she will be vigorously cross-examined. I am sure that
    might also clarify other matters.
        It is my feeling that a fair and comprehensive examination
    without interruption could be conducted of Ms. Lewinsky in 2 to
    4 hours, and depending on the length of cross-examination by
    White House attorneys, we may not need any redirect
    examination.
        While defense counsel for the President and others for the
    President--I heard it so many times, I am not sure exactly who
    said this so I don't want to attribute it to defense counsel,
    and maybe they haven't even said it, but there has been word
    out of the White House that if we call one witness, we might as
    well settle into a siege here in the Senate; we will be here
    for months and months and months. I suggest it is an outrageous
    statement that we will need that amount of time to pursue this
    case if witnesses are called.
        We are confident that, basically, in its best case is an
    attempt to discourage you from calling witnesses, and in its
    worst case, unfortunately, is a veiled threat that they will be
    dilatory and drag this out for months and months if the Senate
    would so allow.
        The House managers are establishing a good-faith effort to
    cut our witnesses, as I said, down to three people, and to
    commit to reasonable times of examination with the assurance
    that we will finish this as quickly as we can and we will hope
    and perhaps the Senate their defense team.
        Witnesses can be called and a fair trial could be
    accomplished if all concerned would agree. Would the Senate
    consider requesting the President's defense team to also select
    three or fewer witnesses in an effort to move this process
    along? As to the depositions, while they are important, if they
    are solely for the purpose of discovery, I ask, why would the
    White House need to discover what Vernon Jordan has to say,
    what Betty Currie has to say, or Sidney Blumenthal, or John
    Podesta--any of these witnesses? They would have to take Monica
    Lewinsky's deposition, but any other discovery deposition, it
    seems to me, they have complete access to already.
        As I close, I want to leave you with some words that have
    been of some comfort to me, and I think we have all needed some
    comfort at times during these proceedings. It is a very short
    quote of the opening remarks of Judiciary Committee Chairman
    Peter Rodino in 1974. Again, in part, he said:

        We know that the very real security of this Nation lies in
    the integrity of its institutions and the informed confidence
    of its people.

        He talked about the Nixon hearings.

        We will conduct our deliberations in that spirit. It has
    been said that our country, troubled by too many crises in
    recent years, is too tired to consider this one. In the first
    year of the Republic, Thomas Paine wrote, ``Those who expect to
    reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the
    fatigue of supporting it.''

        Back to Rodino:

        Now for almost 200 years, Americans have undergone the
    stress of preserving their freedom and the Constitution that
    protects it. It is now our turn.

        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I respectfully ask you
    to permit the House managers to call these three named
    witnesses and add this additional evidence.
        I thank you. I yield to Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, my responsibility is to address the
    testimony of Vernon Jordan and the need to call him as a
    witness in this case.
        Before I go into the details, let me just reflect for a
    moment on the Senate trial process. I said many days ago that I
    had confidence in the U.S. Senate, and I thought that at this
    particular juncture it might be good if I reassure you that I
    still have confidence in the U.S. Senate. When I think about
    the trial process that we are going through, I have to
    compliment you on the fact that you have structured a
    bipartisan process. I think that is important because you gave
    this process credibility. So you did the right thing, and I,
    for one, am pleased with what you were able to accomplish in
    that endeavor.
        Now, whenever you achieve a bipartisan process, you have to
    make compromises along the way. And the result is a format that
    is not particularly helpful to the trial managers, the House
    managers, who wish to call witnesses. We have struggled through
    that. But notwithstanding the present difficulty, I still
    compliment you and thank you for what you have done in
    achieving that bipartisan consensus. I think back to that
    meeting that I and some other managers had early on with the
    bipartisan group of Senators from this body--and I now look at
    some from both sides of the aisle--and I went in there with
    this high-minded thought that we could make a case for
    witnesses because of what the other managers have described as
    the tone and demeanor of witnesses. Well, that was quickly
    brushed aside by them saying, ``No, no, no, we want to hear
    about what conflicts exist in the testimony; just tell us what
    the conflicts are because that is a strong case for calling
    witnesses.'' Well, that threw me back on my heels. So I went
    back and, as you know, in the question and answer session I
    addressed the question of conflicts. I think we did a good job
    of outlining the conflicts between various witnesses.
        Well, then I was informed that, ``We really are not as
    interested in the conflicts because the conflicts exist in the
    current transcript. Therefore, really, we want to know what new
    information and what dynamic these witnesses can add.'' That
    threw me a curve. So we looked at this again and we tried to
    make a case.
        I'm going to show you what new dynamics and questions can
    be asked. Ultimately, when you take the depositions, many of
    those questions are going to be answered. So you come back full
    circle to where we started in the beginning--that ultimately I
    hope witnesses are called so you can evaluate their
    credibility, determine their demeanor, and assess the truth in
    this case. I think that is important. I know people talk about
    me as being a former Federal prosecutor. Actually, at one time,
    I confess, I represented a defendant in a murder case. This
    gentleman was charged with murder, and the prosecution in Logan
    County, Arkansas--near Senator Bumpers' hometown--decided they
    wanted to handle one of the key witnesses by deposition, as
    that person was out of State. I objected and objected because I
    thought that witness ought to be in the courtroom. The judge
    overruled me and said, ``You can go take the deposition and the
    defense counsel will be there to cross-examine.'' So we
    traipsed off to the other State and took this witness'
    deposition, and she made a lousy witness. I said she would not
    be believed for anything because of the way she appeared. Well,
    we brought the transcript back to the courtroom. The
    prosecution, over my objection, put the transcript into the
    record and, all of a sudden, that cold transcript was
    believable--particularly when they had it read by another
    witness that didn't look anything like the original lady. My
    client was convicted, but that case was reversed in the
    Arkansas supreme court because the court said it was important
    that the jury look into the eyes of the witness, see the
    demeanor of that witness, and determine the credibility.
        So ultimately, we come back to that same point--that
    somehow you are going to have to resolve the conflicts. I know
    of only one way to do it. We have tried to be extraordinarily
    helpful and cooperative with the U.S. Senate. I came in with
    this idea that we were going to present this case with 14 or 15
    witnesses. Clearly, that is off the table. We narrowed it down
    to three witnesses. That was tough to decide. But we believe
    that represents the basic heart of the obstruction of justice
    case and gets to at least six of the seven elements so that you
    can evaluate them. But we want to assist you, clearly, in
    getting to the truth but also to bring this matter to a
    conclusion fairly and as expeditiously as possible.
        Let's look to Mr. Vernon Jordan. Should he be called as a
    witness in this case? His testimony goes to the heart of one of
    the elements of obstruction of justice, that is, the job search
    and the false affidavit, and the interconnection between those.
    I have tried, during my presentation of this case, to present
    portions of his testimony--excerpts, if you will, from his
    testimony. But you will see that he has testified five times
    before the Federal grand jury. I have read all of this. I am
    not going to ask for a show of hands, but how many of you have
    read all of this? And so you have had to rely upon a trial by
    ordeal by lawyers--rather than a trial by witnesses because I
    have had to present the testimony of Vernon Jordan in excerpt
    fashion with limited quotes here and there--as the defense
    counsel has done. That makes it difficult because the problem
    is, one, you are hearing it from her, but, second, it is not a
    story; it is excerpts, and there is no way you can assess the
    truth because of that.
        Look at the times Mr. Jordan has testified before the grand
    jury: March 3, 1998; March 5, 1998; May 28, and June 9; the
    last time he ever testified was June 9, 1998. Let's look at
    what has happened since then, since Mr. Jordan last testified
    before the grand jury. I believe these charts are in front of
    you.
        On July 22, Ms. Currie testified before the grand jury. So
    any of the facts we gain from Ms. Currie were not utilized in
    the last examination of Vernon Jordan.
        August 6, what happened on that date? Ms. Lewinsky
    testified before the grand jury and she revealed some new facts
    during that time that Mr. Jordan never had an opportunity to
    explain, respond to, or answer. I will go into that. One of
    them is about disposing of notes. The second one is about
    drafting the affidavit. And, of course, by that time the DNA on
    the dress had been revealed.
        Then the next thing that happened was the President's
    revelation to the Nation that this relationship did exist. Then
    he testified before the grand jury. All of the facts revealed
    from those instances were not revealed at the time Vernon
    Jordan last testified before the grand jury.
        Obviously, any lawyer would understand there are naturally
    questions that arise from each of those incidents that could be
    posed to Mr. Jordan. Why has that not been done? Quite frankly,
    I have talked to, as I mentioned the other day, the attorney
    for Mr. Jordan. I have not talked to Mr. Jordan personally. I
    think that clearly the Senate does not want us to do that until
    we get past this next hurdle. But those are the things that
    need to be resolved.
        Let me address briefly three areas of conflicts in
    testimony between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky that point up
    other areas of questioning that would be appropriate and he
    should have the opportunity to explain.
        I have been accused of being harsh to Mr. Jordan, and I
    don't mean to be that way. There have been certain things that
    have been stated by witnesses in this case that ought to be
    explained, that ought to be asked of Mr. Jordan. But we need to
    have good answers to these questions. We need to know those
    answers.
        The first conflict--I will get to that--is between Mr.
    Jordan's testimony and Ms. Lewinsky's testimony about whether
    Mr. Jordan knew the true nature of the relationship with the
    President.
        In Mr. Jordan's testimony of May 28, he was asked a
    question: ``You're saying no one to your recollection ever
    suggested or alleged a sexual relationship prior to the 18th of
    January between Monica Lewinsky and the President?'' The
    answer: ``That is correct.''
        That was on May 28. Ms. Lewinsky was asked the same series
    of questions months later--in August of 1998--and she
    testified, ``And I remarked that I really didn't look at him as
    the President'' that, ``I saw him more as a man and reacted to
    him more as a man and got angry at him like a man and just a
    regular person. Mr. Jordan asked me what I got angry at the
    President about. So I told him when he doesn't call me enough
    or see me enough.''
        Another statement:

        And so after we had the conversation I was just talking
    about with Mr. Jordan, he said to me, ``Well, you know what
    your problem is,'' and I said, ``What?'' He said, ``Don't deny
    it,'' and he said, ``You're in love. That's what your problem
    is.''

        This is Monica Lewinsky referring to what Mr. Jordan had
    said.
        So clearly those are relevant questions that need to be
    readdressed to Mr. Jordan because they were raised by Ms.
    Lewinsky in subsequent testimony; they have never been asked to
    him in that fashion.
        There is a conflict in the testimony between Mr. Jordan and
    Ms. Lewinsky about whether the subpoena was discussed at the
    December 22 meeting. Mr. Jordan testified in March that ``we
    did not talk about the subpoena. She wanted to know about her
    job. That was the purpose of her coming.'' And the question
    was: ``Anything beyond that?'' The answer was: ``No.''
        And that is March 6, 1998. Ms. Lewinsky testified to the
    contrary.
        Let's turn our attention then to December 22, which is the
    day she met with Frank Carter: ``And I think you said you were
    going to meet with Mr. Jordan.'' Answer: ``So I came to see Mr.
    Jordan earlier, and I also wanted to find out if he had in fact
    told the President that I had been subpoenaed.''
        That was her testimony which is in direct conflict--that
    the subpoena was discussed on the same day that she went to see
    Mr. Carter about the representation.
        Where is the relevance in this?
        If you recall, Mr. Jordan said it didn't take an Einstein
    to figure out that, whenever you combine whenever she got the
    subpoena, it changed the circumstances.
        Here you have three problems. You have a job search, you
    have a witness in court, and if you combine that with the
    knowledge of a relationship, those are three dynamite issues
    that should cause alarm--not just one change of circumstances
    but it elevates it to a higher level of danger because of the
    correlation between each of those three separate facts, each of
    these conflicts. The testimony of Monica Lewinsky goes to those
    key fundamental issues, and Mr. Jordan has never been asked
    sufficiently about those areas.
        The third conflict--this is key--is the testimony of Monica
    Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan testified that he never talked to Ms.
    Lewinsky about Linda Tripp. That is his March 5, 1998,
    testimony. But Ms. Lewinsky testifies in her August 6 testimony
    about a meeting with Mr. Jordan on December 31.
        This is the third exhibit. I will read that:

        And I met Mr. Jordan for breakfast on . . . the morning of
    [December] 31st, at the Park Hyatt Hotel. And in the course of
    the conversation I told him that I had had this friend, Linda
    Tripp . . . and I was a little bit concerned because she had
    spent the night at my home a few times and I thought--I told
    Mr. Jordan, I said, well, maybe she's heard some--you know--I
    mean, maybe she saw some notes lying around. And Mr. Jordan
    said, ``Notes from the President to you?'' And I said, ``No,
    notes from me to the President.'' And he said, ``Go home and
    make sure they're not there.''

        This is Ms. Lewinsky's testimony of August 6 before the
    grand jury.
        And before anything is said, I am not accusing anyone of
    anything, but let me tell you, it would be significant if Mr.
    Jordan is asked a question if that is a true statement and he
    says yes. It is significant to the case. If he says no, that is
    significant because there is a clear conflict in the testimony
    of Ms. Lewinsky. And her testimony goes to the heart of the
    issue. If he says, ``I don't remember,'' which is a third
    alternative--by the way, I hate giving these prospective
    witnesses all my questions--but if he says, ``I don't
    remember,'' that does not put the issue in dispute with Ms.
    Lewinsky and establishes really her recollection of the
    incident.
        So I could go through more, I could go through more
    conflict with Ms. Lewinsky about whether Mr. Jordan saw the
    unsigned draft copy of her affidavit, a key issue in this case.
    Ms. Lewinsky testifies one way. Mr. Jordan did not have the
    benefit of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony when he was asked earlier
    in the grand jury. So that needs to be addressed with him.
        There is a conflict with Ms. Lewinsky on whether they
    discussed the contents of the affidavit--not just whether they
    saw the signed affidavit but whether the contents were
    discussed. The question to Mr. Jordan was: ``Did you ever
    discuss with Ms. Lewinsky what she was going to include in the
    affidavit?'' Answer: ``I was not Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer. The
    answer to that is no.''
        But he goes on and elaborates on that. Ms. Lewinsky
    testified that she and Jordan did have a conversation about
    deleting a certain sentence in the affidavit and reworking
    that.
        That is what I just covered on the contents of the
    affidavit.
        Let me just go to one other on the conflict where the
    affidavit was discussed at their last meeting. Mr. Jordan
    testified in March that she came into the office:

        She gave me a tie. I said, ``Monica, I am really busy,
    thank you.'' And she thanked me, and she is gone.

        ``Any subsequent conversation?'' The answer: ``No.''
        Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is:

        I stopped in to see him for five minutes to thank him for
    giving me the job, and I gave him a tie.

        She further testified:

        I believe I showed him a copy of the affidavit.

        Clear conflict, very important, once again showing a
    connection between the job, the false affidavit, and, of
    course, if you tie in the other aspect about the relationship,
    it gets very significant and something that needs to be further
    inquired about.
        So there are some of the conflicts between the testimony
    and an area that we need to inquire of Mr. Jordan about.
        The notes to the President that Ms. Lewinsky said she had a
    conversation with him about, that has never been addressed to
    Mr. Jordan whatsoever.
        The December 19 meeting we need to explore more with Mr.
    Jordan. This is the meeting when Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed.
    She called Mr. Jordan. He says, ``Come over.'' She goes over
    there to meet with Mr. Jordan, and during that meeting,
    according to the telephone logs, Mr. Jordan received a call
    from the President of the United States. Mr. Jordan has
    testified that he told the President that Ms. Lewinsky got
    subpoenaed.
        That appears to be exactly during the meeting--the
    conversation he is having with Ms. Lewinsky.
        I think appropriate questions to Mr. Jordan are: Did you
    excuse Ms. Lewinsky from the meeting? Did you have a private
    conversation with the President about the subject that you were
    talking to Ms. Lewinsky about? And when you renewed your
    conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, did you in fact tell her about
    your conversation with the President? If Ms. Lewinsky was not
    told about that conversation, I think there is some
    significance there, that things were going on that people were
    compartmentalizing and not sharing with the other interested
    parties, and I think that is significant and that needs to be
    explored. His involvement with reviewing the affidavit needs to
    be developed, and the conflicts, his knowledge of the nature of
    the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        So all of these need to be further explored. There are a
    number of unanswered questions.
        One final area. I obviously have a number, but I don't want
    to belabor this point. There was testimony I mentioned about
    Mr. Isikoff and how Betty Currie felt compelled to see Mr.
    Jordan about Mr. Isikoff inquiring about the courier records on
    the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the President. There is some
    indication that that information might have been shared with
    Mr. Frank Carter because Ms. Lewinsky testified that she
    received a page from Mr. Carter, her attorney, about the
    Isikoff call, the Isikoff request. How did that information get
    to Mr. Carter? I think there are some legitimate questions that
    should be asked.
        So we would respectfully ask the Senate to permit us to
    call Mr. Jordan as a witness, to depose him. But, further, we
    hope we will be able to call him so that you can evaluate the
    conflicts that I am sure exist now, that very likely will exist
    later on as well. The story needs to be told. The truth should
    be determined. Justice should be accomplished. That is done not
    through lawyers up here talking, it is not done through
    transcripts but through witnesses. Edmund Burke said that to
    fail to hear the evidence is to fail to hear the cause. I know
    that you have transcripts, but I would contend to you that to
    fail to hear these witnesses is in essence to fail to hear the
    cause.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, could I inquire about the
    balance of the time remaining for the House managers?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes. The managers have 52 minutes
    remaining.
        Mr. LOTT. Do they intend to use more of their time now?
        Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that we
    take a 30-minute break at this point.
        There being no objection, at 1:22 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 1:59 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                          Unanimous-Consent Agreement

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a unanimous consent
    request to propound. We have discussed this with Senator
    Daschle and it has been cleared.
        I ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion of
    the arguments by the managers and the White House counsel today
    on the motion to subpoena witnesses, it be in order at that
    point only for Senator Harkin or Senator Wellstone to make a
    motion to open that debate pursuant to his motion timely filed,
    and that the Senate proceed immediately to the vote, pursuant
    to the impeachment rules.
        I further ask that following that vote, if defeated, it be
    in order to move to close the session for deliberations on the
    motion to subpoena witnesses, as provided under the impeachment
    rules of the Senate, and proceed to an immediate vote.
        If we have any change in either one of these, certainly we
    would have to ask for consent on that and would notify Members
    to that effect.
        I further ask that if the Senate votes to proceed to a
    closed session, those deliberations be limited to 3 hours
    equally divided between the two leaders, notwithstanding the 5-
    minute allocation of time under the impeachment rule.
        I further ask unanimous consent that when the Senate
    concludes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 1
    p.m. on Wednesday, January 27.
        Finally, I ask unanimous consent that pursuant to S. Res.
    16, the votes occur immediately upon convening on Wednesday,
    first on the motion to dismiss and, if defeated, the motion to
    subpoena witnesses without intervening action or debate.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so
    ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe, Mr. Chief Justice, we are ready to
    proceed with White House counsel.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel
    Kendall.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, we reserve our time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        Mr. Kendall.
        You are going to use it now? You have 52 minutes remaining.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, Members of
    the Senate. When I was a trial judge back in California, there
    was something I had to do in every single case, whether it was
    a criminal or civil case, and that was to advise the triers of
    fact--in that particular case, the jury--that what the lawyers
    said was not evidence. This is a universal warning that is
    given in courtrooms throughout the country to the triers of
    fact because the law prefers that those people who have to make
    the determination as to what the facts are make that
    determination based not only on interpretation of the evidence
    but based upon what the evidence ac-

    tually is. And that has been the underpinning of our argument
    before this body from the very first day as to why witnesses
    are needed--not to accommodate us but for the Senate to be able
    to make the ultimate conclusion as to what is the truth.
        A perfect example of why the evidence should come from
    witnesses rather than lawyers can be seen from the fact that
    throughout these proceedings lawyers on both sides have tried
    to characterize what is the evidence and tried to characterize
    the interpretation that this body should adopt.
        I am reminded when we were before the Judiciary Committee,
    just before we voted articles of impeachment, White House
    counsel suggested to our committee, as they do before this
    body, that the President's state of mind during his various
    statements under oath was he intended to mislead people but to
    be truthful. They say the President didn't lie. Instead, they
    say he carefully crafted these hypertechnical definitions to
    protect himself from any perjury charge.
        We believe the evidence will show that by so doing, Paula
    Jones was denied the information a Federal judge said she was
    entitled to have and, thereby, perjury and obstruction of
    justice lie.
        Before the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Ruff reaffirmed this
    was the President's strategy. This is what Mr. Ruff told our
    committee:
        Question to Mr. Ruff:

        I do want to make sure I understand your position. From the
    beginning, the President has taken the position that he never
    lied to the American people or lied while giving testimony
    under oath. Essentially claims he simply misled [them] with a
    different definition, and he was sending the same message both
    to the American people and the court.

        Answer by Mr. Ruff:

        I think that is fair, Congressman. Yes.

        Question:

        And he did that intentionally, because in his own mind he
    drew a distinction between the technical definition of ``sexual
    relations'' and the definition of ``improper relationship,'' or
    something along those lines, which is how he now characterizes
    his relationship with Monica Lewinsky?

        Answer by Mr. Ruff:

        Yes, I think that's correct.

        Question:

        You suggested earlier in your testimony this distinction is
    one he has drawn since the Jones deposition. My notes indicate
    you said the definitions are one that he held in his mind in
    January and in August and he has so testified.

        Answer by Mr. Ruff:

        Yes.

        Question:

        In determining whether the President either perjured
    himself or lied under oath in this matter, you are asking the
    committee to look to his state of mind from the beginning of
    this whole episode and make that determination?
        Answer:

        Yes.

        Members of this body, we suggest the evidence has shown,
    and the evidence will further show by the calling of the
    witnesses that we propose, that the President denied under oath
    specific facts that were relevant to the case, relevant to the
    Jones case, relevant to the perjury and obstruction
    investigation by the grand jury, and in so doing, among the
    other lies that my colleagues have pointed out, we will show
    that he lied to his aides.
        This is important, because he, the President, admitted he
    knew that his aides were potential witnesses in a criminal
    investigation before the grand jury. This is the portion of the
    grand jury transcript where the President testified about his
    conversations with key aides once the Monica Lewinsky story
    became public.
        Question to the President:

        Did you deny it to them or not, Mr. President?
        A. . . . I did not want to mislead my friends, but I wanted
    to find language where I could say that. I also, frankly, did
    not want to turn any of them into witnesses, because I--and,
    sure enough, they all became witnesses.
        Q. Well, you knew they might be witnesses, didn't you?
        A. And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said,
    there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I
    have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And
    did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day
    giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do
    anything to complicate this matter further. So, I said things
    that were true. . . .

        The President's position is they were misleading, but they
    were true. No lies. That is precisely what Mr. Ruff told the
    Judiciary Committee, and that is the position that White House
    counsel takes before this body.
        Remember, the grand jury was conducting a criminal
    investigation. They were seeking evidence of possible perjury
    and obstruction of justice, and the White House contends before
    this body that the President did nothing to obstruct their
    investigation. The evidence shows that he did. One of those
    witnesses who will demonstrate that to this body is the
    President's own aide, Sidney Blumenthal. That is why we request
    this body to allow Mr. Blumenthal to be deposed. Further, we
    hope that you will allow him the opportunity to testify before
    you so that you can gauge his credibility and his demeanor as
    he presents the answers that we expect he will give.
        Mr. Blumenthal's testimony puts him in direct conflict with
    the claims of the President and shatters the myth of the
    President's truthful but misleading answers given under oath.
        Just for a quick way of background, Mr. Blumenthal, on
    January 21, 1998, was an assistant to the President. That was
    the day the Monica Lewinsky story broke in the national press
    through the Washington Post. That story broke in the morning.
        Later the same day, Mr. Blumenthal met both with the First
    Lady and then with the President to discuss these news
    revelations. One month later, Mr. Blumenthal was called to
    testify before the grand jury. His testimony was not
    particularly helpful during that time because, through most of
    the questioning that involved conversations that he had at the
    White House, Mr. Blumenthal claimed executive privilege.
        That issue was apparently litigated, and then he returned
    in June to testify before the grand jury twice, on June 4 and
    on June 25, 1998.
        When Mr. Blumenthal was free to share his recollections of
    the events, this is how Mr. Blumenthal characterized his
    meetings with President and Mrs. Clinton before the grand jury.
    It is interesting to note, by the way, that there was a dual
    lie going on here from the President. The President was lying
    to his wife, who could never be called as a witness against
    him, but he was also lying to his aides whom he admitted could
    be called.
        This is from Mr. Blumenthal's testimony on June 4.

        The First Lady said that she was distressed that the
    President was being attacked, in her view, for political
    motives, for his ministry of a troubled person. She said that
    the President ministers to troubled people all the time . . .
    and he does so out of religious conviction and personal
    temperament. . . .
        And the First Lady said he had done this dozens if not
    hundreds of times with people, the President came from a broken
    home and this was very hard to prevent him from trying to
    minister to these troubled people.
        So I related that conversation to the President. . . . And
    I said to him that I understand that you . . . want to minister
    to troubled people, that you feel compassionate, but that part
    of the problem with troubled people is that they're . . .
    troubled. . . .
        I said, ``However, you're President and these troubled
    people can just get you in incredible messes . . . you have to
    cut yourself off from them.''
        And he said, [meaning the President, he said,] ``It's very
    difficult for me to do that, given how I am. I want to help
    people.''

        Then Mr. Blumenthal testified that the President said Dick
    Morris suggested that the President go on television and admit
    in a national address whatever he may have done wrong.
        Once again Mr. Blumenthal testified:

        And I said to the President, ``What have you done wrong?''
    And he said, ``Nothing. I haven't done anything wrong.'' [And]
    I said, ``Well, then, that's one of the stupidest ideas I've
    ever heard. Why would you do that if you've done nothing
    wrong?''
        And it was at that point that he gave his account of what
    happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast.
    He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand
    on me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road
    before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going
    to do that again.''
        She threatened him. She said that she would tell people
    they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among
    her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or
    said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker
    anymore.
        And I repeated to the President that he really needed never
    to be near people who were troubled like this, that it was
    just--he needed not to be near troubled people like this. And I
    said, ``You need to find some sure footing here, some solid
    ground.''
        And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel
    like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is
    creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel
    like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.''
        And I said to him, I said, ``When this happened with Monica
    Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within
    eyesight or earshot of someone.''
        I said, ``You know, there are press reports that you made
    phone calls to her and that there's voice mail. Did you make
    phone calls to her?''
        He said that he remembered calling her when Betty Currie's
    brother died and that he left a message on her voice machine
    that Betty's brother had died and he said she was close to
    Betty and had been very kind to Betty. And that's what he
    recalled.

        And then in his June 24 deposition, Mr. Blumenthal expanded
    on this thinking. He was asked the question:

        In your conversation with the President when he stated that
    Monica Lewinsky threatened to disclose an affair, or fabricate
    an affair in a public disclosure, did you understand him to be
    saying that if the President didn't concede or didn't agree to
    have some [type] of sexual contact with her, that she would
    report an affair?
        A. My understanding was that she demanded to have sexual
    relations. He rejected her. And she said that--this is--I
    recall him saying--that, ``They called me the Stalker.'' That's
    what Lewinsky said. ``And if I can say we had an affair, then
    they won't call me that,'' something like that.
        Q. Now, you previously characterized Ms. Lewinsky's
    comments to the President as a threat, if you will?
        A. Right, yeah, I would interpret--that's my understanding.

        Then Mr. Blumenthal told the grand jury about the impact
    the President's emphatic denials had upon his state of mind--
    the mind of a potential grand jury witness.

        Q. In response to my question how you responded to the
    President's story about a threat or discussion about a threat
    from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you didn't recall
    specifically. Do you recall generally the nature of your
    response to the President?

        Answer by Mr. Blumenthal:

        I was generally sympathetic to the President. And I
    certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he
    was pouring out his heart, and I believed him. . . .
        Q. Did the President explain to you what Monica Lewinsky's
    trouble was that he was helping?
        A. No.
        Q. And you never asked him?
        A. No.
        Q. Did anyone else, including the First Lady, tell you what
    Monica Lewinsky's trouble was that the President was
    ministering about?
        A. No. . . .
        Q. What did you understand the President to mean by, he had
    done nothing wrong?
        A. My understanding was that the accusation against him,
    which appeared in the press that day, was false, that he had
    not done anything wrong.
        Q. That he had not had any sort of sexual relationship?
        A. He had not had a sexual relationship with her and had
    not sought to obstruct justice or suborn perjury.

        Mr. Blumenthal then went on to say he then asked the
    President about some of these reports that there were phone
    calls between him and Monica Lewinsky.

        Q. Did the President say anything to you about telephone
    calls with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. As I testified, I had said to him that there were
    reports that his voice was on her voice mail, her tape machine
    at home to take message--message machine. And he said to me
    that he could recall that after Betty's brother died he may
    have called Monica because Monica had been very close to Betty.
    And Betty didn't have a way of relating to her that her brother
    had died, so that he had called and left a message that Betty's
    brother died.
        Q. Did he suggest to you that that was the only call he had
    ever made to Monica Lewinsky?
        A. That's the only one he told me about.
        Q. Did you ask him if there were any more calls than that?
        A. He said that's the only one he could remember.

        Well, we now know certainly from White House logs that
    ``the only one the President remembered'' isn't quite true,
    that in fact I believe it was over 50 telephone conversations
    between the President and Monica Lewinsky. And it begs the
    question: Why was the President, on the day this story broke,
    pulling his aides in to relay information that the President
    knew was patently false when he knew that they were potential
    witnesses before the grand jury?
        Now, it is important to remember that this testimony from
    Mr. Blumenthal was given 1 month before Monica Lewinsky decided
    to opt to cooperate with the Office of Independent Counsel.
    Thus, these questions were asked of him in a vacuum without the
    benefit of Ms. Lewinsky's extensive testimony, as well as the
    President's own grand jury testimony. And the House managers
    agree that these and other areas need to be more fully explored
    with the gentleman under oath in light of the later revelations
    that occurred surrounding this case.
        Now, we know a couple of things. We know that the Monica
    Lewinsky story broke on January 21. We know that the President
    spoke to Sidney Blumenthal the very same day. We know that the
    President said he knew his aides could be potential witnesses
    before the grand jury. And we also know that Mr. Blumenthal was
    called three times before the grand jury--once in February,
    twice in June.
        There is an important question that was never asked Mr.
    Blumenthal during his testimony. It could not have been asked
    because at the time he testified, the revelation that the
    President shared with America in August and Monica Lewinsky's
    revelation had not yet been aired. If the President knew that
    Mr. Blumenthal was going to be a witness, a potential witness
    before the grand jury, if 6 months after this story broke the
    President presumably knew that his aide had gone down, not once
    but twice, to the grand jury, I would like to know from Mr.
    Blumenthal: Did the President ever come up to you and say
    something to you? Did he ever say to you: Do you remember that
    story I told you back in January? Well, now that you're
    actually going to be a witness, I know that you're going down
    to testify before the grand jury, I don't want you to give the
    grand jury a false impression. I don't want you to give false
    information to the grand jury. I don't want you to be a cog in
    the wheel of an obstruction of giving the grand jury the
    opportunity to hear the truth. I need to recant for you what I
    told you.
        There is no evidence of that. We would like to find that
    out. The only way we can do that is by deposing Mr. Blumenthal
    and hopefully bringing him in and sharing that information with
    this body.
        Another area we would like to inquire about is the area of
    a potential plan to destroy Monica Lewinsky if she ever decided
    to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. Mr. Blumenthal
    told the grand jury that, following the Monica Lewinsky news
    revelations, White House aides held twice-a-day staff
    briefings, at 8:30 in the morning and at 6:45 in the evening,
    every day to discuss, among other topics, the media impact of
    the Lewinsky scandal and how to deal with it in the press.
        Mr. Blumenthal testified that the primary purpose of these
    meetings was to discuss press strategy.
        In making his presentation to the Judiciary Committee last
    month, chief investigative counsel David Schippers related some
    of the quotes in the press following the Lewinsky story. I want
    to read a few paragraphs from Mr. Schippers' presentation:

        Worst of all, in order to win, it was necessary to convince
    the public, and hopefully, those grand jurors who read the
    newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the
    account given by Monica to Linda Tripp was believed, then there
    would be a tawdry affair in and near the oval office. Moreover,
    the President's own perjury and that of Monica Lewinsky would
    surface. How do you do this? Congressman Graham showed you. You
    employ the full power and credibility of the White House and
    the press corps of the White House to destroy the witness.

        Mr. Schippers then quoted from several news sources. Now,
    this is just a few days after the President told Mr. Blumenthal
    that Monica was known as ``the stalker.''

        Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best
    way to destroy ``that woman'' as President Clinton called
    Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly fanaticist
    or as a malicious stalker?

        Again, January 30:

        It's always very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this
    thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction
    and take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent
    relationship in which the President was a victim of someone,
    rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.

        From another source:

        One White House aide called reporters to offer information
    about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problem, and what the
    aide said was her nickname ``the stalker.''

        Just hours after the story broke, one White House source
    made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the troubled
    product of divorced parents.
        And the reference goes on and on. You can find the complete
    reference in the committee report.
        Now the question is, Was this a mere coincidence that the
    President's false statements to Mr. Blumenthal about Monica
    Lewinsky being a ``stalker'' quickly found their way into press
    accounts, even though those accounts are attributed by the
    press to sources inside the White House? The answer to the
    question is, yes, it is a coincidence, according to White House
    counsel. And we heard that from them just 3 days ago. Mr. Ruff
    said in his presentation, and I am quoting:

        The White House, the President, the President's agents, the
    President's spokespersons, no one has ever trashed, threatened,
    maligned, or done anything else to Monica Lewinsky. No one.

        Mr. Blumenthal needs to be questioned now under the light
    of the facts as we now know them. All we have from Mr.
    Blumenthal are the facts as he testified before the revelations
    saw the light of day, and he needs to be questioned for the
    benefit of those who must make a determination of credibility
    and the determination of guilt or innocence. This is the reason
    we have included Mr. Blumenthal on our proposed list. He is
    just one example of several aides whose testimony is already
    before you in the record. But we believe it would be beneficial
    not only for the body to hear him but certainly to question him
    in light of the revelations that occurred following his grand
    jury testimony.
        Mr. Chief Justice, with that, we reserve the balance of our
    time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Mr.
    Counsel Kendall for the White House.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentleman of the Senate, House managers, the purpose of the
    managers' motion, and what I am going to address, is whether
    you need to add any evidence to the record before you. And that
    is all I am going to address. Now, I am tempted--it is like
    waving a red flag at the bull--to take on the substantive
    arguments that have been presented here as to why the President
    is guilty. I am going to refrain from doing that, but my
    refraining from doing that is not because I agree with them but
    that we have already addressed them. I think here that the
    proper procedure is to just address the need for new evidence
    to add to the record before you.
        The managers' case is in no way--no way--harmed by being
    unable to call witnesses at this point. The independent counsel
    conducted a wide-ranging investigation. It was intense. It was
    comprehensive of every conceivable allegation against the
    President after the Lewinsky publicity erupted on January 21,
    1998. In the record of publicly available materials, which the
    Senate has asked the House managers to certify, the actual
    number of pages is somewhat understated because, as I mentioned
    before, frequently four or five pages of transcript are
    reproduced on a single page of the bound. But, in fact, there
    are over 10,000 pages of grand jury testimony, over 800 pages
    of other testimony such as depositions, 3,400 pages of
    documentary evidence, 1,800 pages of audio transcripts, and
    800-some pages of FBI interviews.
        The Office of Independent Counsel has an unlimited budget
    with unlimited investigative resources, ranging from the FBI to
    private investigators. Its agents interviewed people all over
    the country, used several different grand juries, conducted
    hundreds of interviews, even called people back from abroad. If
    the OIC could have turned up anything that was negative or
    prejudicial, it would be in those volumes. You can rest assured
    that they did their best to find that evidence.
        The Starr team has been fully supportive of the pro
    impeachment forces in the House of Representatives--indeed, so
    supportive that the independent counsel's ethics advisory
    professor, Sam Dash, resigned to protest Mr. Starr's zealous
    advocacy of the impeachment of the President.
        Just this week, Mr. Starr and his staff have aggressively
    continued to support the House managers during these Senate
    proceedings. Some commentators have commented that the
    independent counsel is, perhaps, the honorary 14th House
    manager.
        Now, I rehash this all not to cast aspersions at Mr. Starr
    but to remind the Senate that after 5 years and $50 million
    President Clinton may be the most investigated person in
    America. I would certainly say this for Mr. Starr: He is
    thorough. He is thorough. After all the work that has been done
    for them by the independent counsel, there is simply no way
    that the House managers are prejudiced by not being able to add
    to this record at this point.
        Now, Mr. Manager McCollum repeated this morning that we are
    afraid of witnesses. We are not. We have reviewed in detail in
    our presentations what the evidence shows about both the
    perjury and the obstruction of justice allegation. We are not
    at all afraid of what the witnesses would say. Indeed, we know
    what they are going to say because it is all right there in the
    volumes before you. We think that you have everything there for
    the basis on which you can make a fair judgment and achieve a
    fair resolution. The managers' hope to call more witnesses is
    simply a product of their desire, their hope, their prayer,
    that something will come to rescue their case.
        Let's be clear about one thing: Any delay in the process
    necessary for us to have fair discovery is on their heads. Our
    point here is that there is simply no need to go outside this
    record because what you have before you is voluminous, and it
    is a completely adequate basis for your decision.
        As I pointed out the other day in the questioning period,
    the only thing left out of this record is evidence that might
    be exculpatory or helpful to the President. And if we must, we
    will as conscientious lawyers seek out that helpful additional
    evidence through discovery.
        This body has been scrupulously fair in these proceedings,
    and I am confident it will be fair concerning our need for
    discovery; if the ``genie'' of discovery is let out of the
    bottle and live witnesses are deemed to be appropriate, then we
    are going to need a fair period of time for our own discovery.
        But, again, the point today on this motion is that the
    managers have simply identified no particular need for
    witnesses, no specific areas of testimony that might contribute
    to what is already in the record and, indeed, no material
    questions--you can always think of questions that were
    unasked--but no material questions, given the allegation in the
    two articles that are not in the record before you.
        Just recall, in the House the managers believed that this
    was an adequate record to come to you and urge removal of the
    President. They rested on that record in the House, and they
    impeached an elected President on the basis of that record.
    They cannot now complain that it is, for some reason, unfair to
    submit this same record to you for judgment at this point. We
    are not afraid of or reluctant to call witnesses, but we think
    that at the end of the day, the addition of more testimony from
    the three witnesses you have heard about won't affect any
    evidentiary judgment you have to make.
        Mr. Manager Barr declared during his presentation a week
    ago Friday, on January 15, that this was in fact a relatively
    simple case, although we, the White House lawyers, would try to
    nitpick the evidence. He told you that what we have before us,
    Senators and Mr. Chief Justice, is really not complex--
    critically important, yes, but not essentially complex. The
    able House managers have kept insisting on their need for
    witnesses, but they haven't indicated what substantial,
    material, and relevant questions the witnesses would be asked
    which haven't already been asked or why such questions are
    essential or even relevant to the resolution of this
    proceeding.
        Frankly, I think this is because there just aren't that
    many more questions to ask of these witnesses. Mr. Manager
    McCollum kind of let the cat out of the bag on this one when, a
    week ago Friday, he told you, ``I don't know what the witnesses
    will say, but I assume if they are consistent, they will say
    the same thing that's in here.''
        I was surprised at some of the statements the managers made
    during the questioning period on Friday and Saturday. Mr.
    Bryant said, ``We would very much like to talk to some of these
    witnesses.'' And he added, ``It is very critical that you talk
    to the witness before having that witness testify.'' Mr.
    Manager McCollum stated, ``As a matter of fact, we think we
    would have been incompetent and derelict as presenters of the
    evidence if we hadn't talked to them first.'' Just this Sunday
    Mr. Manager Hyde, on ``Meet the Press,'' observed that the
    purpose of the court-ordered Office of Independent Counsel's
    chaperoned interview of Ms. Lewinsky last Sunday was to get a
    sense of what kind of a witness she would make.
        I say this respectfully, but I am duty-bound to observe
    that it is, in fact, a dereliction of duty to have come this
    far in the process, to have made this serious set of charges as
    have been made against the President to seek his removal and
    not to have talked to the witnesses on whom they purport to
    rely. How can they have come this far and now tell you: Oh,
    yes, we now need to meet face to face with the witnesses? We
    don't know what they sound like, how credible they will be, but
    we have rested our judgment on this. We need to see them
    personally.
        This procedure, I submit to you, is just backward. First,
    they filed the charges, which have been spoon fed by Mr. Starr.
    They don't bother to check these out; they take them at face
    value, and now they finally want to talk to the witnesses, and
    they again use Mr. Starr to threaten Ms. Lewinsky with
    imprisonment unless she cooperates with them.
        Now, it is no answer to say that the witnesses didn't want
    to talk to us. There was a way to talk to them in the House of
    Representatives, and that was through the subpoena power that
    the House could have used if they had wanted to talk to their
    witnesses, if they had fulfilled the obligation they had before
    they proffered these charges to you.
        This has been a partisan process on the part of the House
    managers. In the House, they had the votes. They didn't think
    they needed to talk to witnesses. When you have the votes and
    the independent counsel on your side, you don't need to
    independently develop the evidence. Indeed, Sunday, on CNN, Mr.
    Manager Cannon provided some insight----
        Mr. HUTCHINSON addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Arkansas.
        Mr. HUTCHINSON. I object to White House counsel's continual
    reference to comments made on television programs which are
    outside the record before the Senate.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is on a motion to call additional
    witnesses, and the argument has been very free form and kind of
    far reaching. I think this is a permissible comment, so I
    overrule the objection.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I think
    Mr. Manager Cannon's comments did provide some insight into the
    need for witnesses or the justification for witnesses here. He
    noted that the Republicans had lost five seats in the November
    election, and he went on to say that, accordingly, the
    Republicans felt a need to speedily complete impeachment in the
    lame duck session before the 106th began its session. He said,
    ``Republicans on the Judiciary Committee were committed to
    being done by the time we got done,'' and that is where we got
    on that track with no witnesses.
        Now, they are trying to take a different track, and I think
    it comes from desperation. You have had the case analyzed
    before you; you have had the evidence in the case assessed. I
    think it has been demolished in an adversary proceeding.
        The House managers are like the character in ``David
    Copperfield,'' Mr. Micawber, who was always hoping that
    something would turn up. They continue to hope that something
    will turn up for them. They don't know what it is, but they
    believe they will know it when they see it and they hope if,
    for the first time in these proceedings, they actually talk to
    the witnesses on whom they have relied, they will find
    something to persuade you to overcome the evidence in the
    record.
        Now the managers have said, ``Well, we told the White House
    that they could have called witnesses in the House if they
    wanted to, and they chose not to do so, so it is really their
    fault.'' I respectfully submit to you that only in the world of
    Franz Kafka do you have to present evidence of your own
    innocence before you even hear the charges or the allegations
    against you.
        It was the burden of the House to establish, by an adequate
    evidentiary basis, a case for impeaching the President. They
    failed to do that, I respectfully submit. They are a little
    like a blackjack player who sees 20 on the table and has 19 and
    is going to try to draw that 2, hoping against the odds. Here
    they are simply gambling. And gambling may have its place as a
    recreation, but I don't think it has a place in this
    impeachment trial when the fate of the President is at stake.
        Now, I don't want to be uncharitable to the House
    managers--and they are able--but I think it is perhaps
    appropriate to remind you, as my partner Ms. Seligman did in
    her argument yesterday, that in their own Chamber the House
    managers sang a very different song about the need for
    witnesses. And to be fair, this was not just one manager; they
    sang as kind of a barbershop chorus. Most of them are on the
    record to this effect, and I think the very best witnesses you
    have about the need for witnesses are the House managers
    themselves.
        Let's listen to some of the comments of the managers on
    whether live witnesses needed to be heard to supplement the
    evidence in the many volumes already gathered by the
    independent counsel.
        For example, on November 5, Mr. Manager Hyde said:

        We believe the most relevant witnesses have already
    testified at length about the matters in issue, and in the
    interest of finishing our expeditious inquiry we will not
    require most of them to come before us to repeat their
    testimony.

        He added that, ``[Monica Lewinsky and Linda Tripp] have
    already testified under oath. We have their testimony. We don't
    need to reinvent the wheel.''
        The very next day, on November 6, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

        Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already
    concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no
    purpose at all.

        On December 1, during a hearing before the House Judiciary
    Committee at which the committee received testimony concerning
    the consequences of perjury and related crime, Mr. Manager
    Chabot stated:

        We could call more and more and more witnesses. We are
    trying to get this wrapped up as expeditiously as possible. I
    think both sides want to do that. If we call more witnesses and
    drag this on into next year, then they are going to scream
    because they say we are on a fishing expedition, we have
    already got enough evidence.

        At that same period, Mr. Manager Canady said, of the need
    for witnesses:

        Now, we do have a responsibility to make certain that we
    act on a solid basis. We should not move forward with articles
    of impeachment on the basis of insubstantial evidence. I think
    all of us agree on that. The fact of the matter is that we have
    a mountain of sworn testimony. . . .

        On December 9, Congressman Coble, who was a member of the
    House Judiciary Committee, told us during our presentation on
    behalf of the White House:

        Mr. Ruff, I want to address a couple of myths and one myth
    is that we have no evidence because there have been no fact
    witnesses called . . .

        Five volumes sit alongside me. These are the same five
    volumes that are at our table that contain sworn testimony
    before a criminal grand jury, FBI interviews, depositions and
    other materials.
        Mr. Manager Hyde made two statements on the floor of the
    House of Representatives during the debate over the articles of
    impeachment which I think bear quotation here.
        On December 18, Mr. Manager Hyde stated:

        We had the facts, and we had them under oath. We had Ms.
    Lewinsky's heavily corroborated testimony under a grant of
    immunity that would be revoked if she lied; we accepted that. .
    . .

        And then the next day, on Saturday, December 19, Mr.
    Manager Hyde stated:

        No fact witnesses, I have heard that repeated again and
    again. Look, we had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand
    jury, from depositions, from statements under oath. That is
    testimony that we can believe and accept. We chose to believe
    it and accept it. Why reinterview Betty Currie to take another
    statement when we already have her statement? Why interview
    Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement under oath, and with
    a grant of immunity that if she lied, she would forfeit?

        ``Why interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement
    under oath, and with a grant of immunity that if she lied, she
    would forfeit.''
        After the House voted its two articles of impeachment, the
    House managers still saw no need for live witnesses. On
    December 29, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

        We are going to make the case that there is already enough
    testimony under oath, in one grand jury testimony and
    affidavits.

        Then again, a week later, Mr. Manager Gekas stated:

        In my judgment, there might not be any real rationale for
    calling Linda Tripp or Betty Currie or Vernon Jordan if the
    testimony of Monica Lewinsky is accepted as being what she
    offered on grand jury terms.

        Roll Call reported on January 7 that Mr. Manager Cannon
    stated, regarding calling Ms. Currie as a witness in the Senate
    trial:

        I am reluctant to call [Ms. Currie] because it's a rotten,
    nasty thing to do to a public servant.

        When confronted with this inconsistency, the managers, who
    are talented attorneys and successful Congressmen, have all
    argued, ``Oh, well. The forum has changed,'' as if it is no big
    deal for the House to impeach a President without witnesses.
    But it would be unconscionable for the Senate to acquit the
    President without first doing the ``rotten, nasty thing''--Mr.
    Manager Cannon's phrase--to some witnesses. How can you have a
    trial, they protest, without witnesses? One might ask, How can
    you have a hearing without witnesses? But the House did. How
    can you impeach a President without witnesses? The House showed
    you.
        Finally, it is instructive to note that when the managers
    were presenting their case in the House in the Judiciary
    Committee, they did not declare that they would insist on
    witnesses when they got to the Senate. They did not tell their
    colleagues, We will not need witnesses in the House because we
    will have them in the Senate. No. They rushed this through the
    House because they had the votes and now they want to delay in
    the Senate because they are afraid they don't have the votes.
        There is no reason, we respectfully submit, to delay this
    Chamber, to drag out these proceedings and defer doing the
    business of the American people.
        I would like to discuss each of the five categories. I will
    call them categories. There are three witnesses. Then there are
    the two affidavits, and then there are the telephone records.
    There are really six. I would like to discuss these in terms of
    whether they add anything, or whether the managers have made a
    proffer that they add anything to the record which is now
    before you because I think that is the question you have to
    determine.
        On this motion, you are not voting whether substantively to
    convict the President. You are simply determining, Is the
    record adequate?
        Let's first take Ms. Lewinsky. On Sunday, the House
    managers, with the gentle assistance of the independent counsel
    prosecutors, were able to interview Ms. Lewinsky after
    schlepping her across the country from California. They did so
    despite the fact that the Senate had established by a 100-to-0
    vote a procedure for the orderly calling of witnesses after
    discussion and debate. They did so after declining to interview
    Ms. Lewinsky at any time during the House proceedings when they
    could have compelled her appearance by the House subpoena
    power. And they did so without providing us here with any
    reliable record for what that ``talk-fest'' on Sunday may have
    produced.
        Newspaper reports indicate that the managers did not take
    notes. You will recall, of course, that during the questioning
    period on Saturday they explicitly rejected a request they
    received during the question period that they provide either an
    unedited transcript or a videotape of that interview to be sure
    that the interview would be open to scrutiny for fairness, and
    ascertain whether Ms. Lewinsky in that interview really did add
    anything to the record. They declined to do that. But when they
    emerged from the Mayflower Hotel on Sunday, after meeting for
    their sidewalk press conference, we heard some general
    statements generally commending Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Manager
    Bryant called her ``an impressive person.'' Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson praised her ``intelligence and poise.''
        I thought to myself, where have we heard that before about
    Ms. Lewinsky? It was deja vu all over again. Of course, we
    heard from Mr. Jordan, from Ambassador Richardson, and from the
    people who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky for a job in New York. It
    is helpful that the House managers have now at least confirmed
    those observations in the record.
        At their press conference we heard the managers make some
    abstract pronouncements about what Ms. Lewinsky was going to
    add--she would be a valuable witness; she would be a helpful
    witness; and it was a productive meeting and a benefit to our
    case.
        That is what we heard. But Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Plato
    Cacheris, threw, if I might say, some cold water on those happy
    and optimistic pronouncements. It could not have been clearer
    in his comments that, not surprisingly, nothing new whatsoever
    had emerged from that session. You really didn't hear that. I
    think the House managers were quite honest about the session
    because you heard nothing about what had emerged from that
    today.
        Mr. Cacheris told the press conference--some of you may
    have seen it: Ms. Lewinsky answered all their questions; there
    was nothing new; she added nothing to the record that is
    already sitting before the Senate. She shouldn't be called to
    the Senate to testify.
        The New York Times reported yesterday that after the
    interview, Ms. Lewinsky told a friend: It went really well; I
    feel positive about it, but I didn't have anything new to say.
        Now, according to the Washington Post, the managers were
    focused on making sure Ms. Lewinsky had no intention of
    changing her testimony. The Washington Post went on to confirm
    that she did not indicate any desire to change her testimony in
    any way. And the Post article continues that, in fact, Lewinsky
    reaffirmed her grand jury statement that no one ever asked her
    to lie or offered her a job in exchange for a false affidavit
    in the Jones case.
        Now, as you are well aware, Ms. Lewinsky was interviewed
    extensively by the Office of Independent Counsel. She testified
    twice before the grand jury. She gave a lengthy deposition to
    the prosecutors. She was extensively interviewed by the agents.
    There are over 20 interview reports.
        I should also add that a great deal of this comes after the
    President was examined in the grand jury on August 17. Ms.
    Lewinsky has given detailed and explicit testimony,
    particularly in her August 26 deposition, as to her account of
    the physical relationship she had with the President. Nothing
    at all would be added by further interrogation of her. Nothing
    could be gained by repetition in a Senate deposition or in the
    well of this body by a repetition of that testimony.
        I confess I don't fully understand--I seem to hear Mr.
    Manager Bryant and Mr. Manager McCollum say slightly different
    things about what they intend to present in the way of Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony. The record on that is what it is. But
    whenever I hear somebody tell me, as the very able Mr. Manager
    Bryant did, they don't need to cross-examine, really, I am
    reminded of what Senator Bumpers said, and he got it from H.L.
    Mencken, who probably got it from somebody else: The more they
    say they don't have to cross-examine, the more need I feel to
    cross-examine.
        I don't know what they intended to do there, but in the
    grand jury the President plainly acknowledged an improper
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He declined to answer further
    key questions about that. The Office of Independent Counsel did
    not seek either to compel him or to issue a new grand jury
    subpoena which would cause the President to come back and go
    through those explicit details.
        The testimony is what it is, and I don't think anything
    further from Ms. Lewinsky is going to in any material way
    affect it or even add to it.
        With regard to some of the conflicts that are there, I
    think we have addressed those in the question period. I am not
    going to go over them again in full. Did the improper
    relationship begin in November? Did it begin 6 or 7 weeks
    later? That conflict is utterly immaterial, I respectfully
    submit, in view of what the parties have acknowledged. Mr.
    Manager Hyde, indeed, stated in a House Judiciary Committee
    hearing on December 1 that that particular point did not strike
    him as a terribly serious count, and I agree with that.
        The managers have claimed, Mr. Manager Hutchinson claimed
    this morning, that there is a contradiction in the testimony of
    the President and Ms. Lewinsky with regard to cover stories.
    This is not true. We have gone over that again and again. There
    is nothing that links this testimony to any deposition in the
    Jones case. These were discussed, the record shows, in a
    nonlegal context.
        I don't think there is anything further to be gained from
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that is not already there in the
    record.
        Let's take Mr. Vernon Jordan. Mr. Manager Hutchinson was
    kind enough to leave up here his copies of Mr. Vernon Jordan's
    five appearances before the grand jury. He held them up on a
    chart. I think it is proper to point out that Mr. Jordan's
    testimony runs over 900 pages. On March 3, the transcript is
    196 pages; 2 days later, on March 5, with the transcript
    running to 212 pages, Mr. Jordan emerged from the grand jury,
    and he made the following statement which I would like to play
    for you:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        First of all it is a fact that I helped Monica Lewinsky
    find private employment in New York. Secondly, it is a fact
    that I took Monica Lewinsky to a very competent lawyer, Frank
    Carter, here in Washington, D.C. And thirdly, it is a fact that
    I kept the President of the United States informed about my
    activities. I want to say two further things. One is I did not
    in any way tell her, encourage her, to lie. And secondly that
    my efforts to find her a job were not a quid pro quo for the
    affidavit that she signed.

        Mr. Jordan testified a third time before the grand jury on
    May 5, and that transcript runs to 285 pages. Finally, he
    testified two more times, on May 28, for 128 pages, and he
    observed as he exited the grand jury room, if we could have the
    videotape again:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        For the fourth time I have answered every question over and
    over and over again. I suspect, however that I will have to
    answer the same questions over and over and over again.

        And guess what. Mr. Jordan was clairvoyant because he was
    called back to the grand jury for a fifth time on June 9. He
    said as he exited:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        When I came here in March, early March, I said that I
    helped Ms. Lewinsky get a lawyer. I helped her get a job. I had
    assurances that there was no sexual relationship and I did not
    tell her to lie. That was the truth then. And that is the truth
    today. And I've testified five times, over and over again to
    those truths.

        One of the justifications Mr. Manager Hutchinson offered
    for calling Mr. Jordan was to explore an alleged conflict
    between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky over whether Mr. Jordan had
    told her to go home and make sure that notes she had been
    keeping were not there. Here, I think Mr. Manager Hutchinson is
    referencing a statement that Ms. Lewinsky made in her proffer
    to the Office of Independent Counsel describing her
    recollection of a breakfast she believed she had with Mr.
    Jordan. It is in the appendix volume at page 716.
        Now, the thing to note, ladies and gentlemen, about this
    statement is its date. Ms. Lewinsky said this on February 1,
    1998. She had written then that she expressed concern about Ms.
    Tripp to Mr. Jordan and that Ms. Tripp may have seen notes when
    she was in Ms. Lewinsky's house. According to the offer, ``Mr.
    Jordan asked if the notes were from the President. Ms. Lewinsky
    said that they were notes to the President. Mr. Jordan
    suggested to Ms. Lewinsky,'' the proffer says, ``that she check
    to make sure they were not there, or something to that
    effect,'' from Ms. Lewinsky.
        Now, contrary to this supposed conflict, Mr. Jordan was
    never asked in the grand jury on any of the five occasions he
    was there--all of which, I remind you, were after this February
    1 proffer about this matter. He wasn't asked about it. It
    doesn't concern the President, in any event. And I think, most
    importantly, it is nowhere alleged, if you look in the actual
    articles--if you look at article II, nowhere is this
    conversation alleged in any way as a basis for impeachment, a
    basis for charging the President with obstruction. I think in
    fact it is a gratuitous smear of Mr. Jordan. And it certainly
    does not provide a basis for extending this proceeding to ask
    him questions about it.
        Now, Mr. Manager Hutchinson also claims that there is a
    conflict between the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan
    on the issue of whether they discussed specific changes that
    were subsequently made in her affidavit. He said to you that he
    thought that was a basis for calling them as witnesses.
    However, the record is clear--it could not be clearer--that the
    idea of certain deletions in the affidavit came from Ms.
    Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Frank Carter.
        As I mentioned in my presentation on Thursday, Ms. Lewinsky
    discussed that she had talked to Mr. Jordan about some
    affidavit changes and he told her: Go talk to your lawyer.
        In any event, Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Frank Carter,
    testified unequivocally to the grand jury: I don't recall
    Vernon ever asking me the substance of what Monica told me or
    tried to talk about the substance of what Monica told me. He
    clearly never told me how I should proceed or what I should do.
        Mr. Carter further testified that paragraph 6 of the
    affidavit in its draft form, the last part of the sentence,
    ``has certain words about the private meeting.''
        That paragraph, Mr. Carter--Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer--
    testified, was modified when we sat down in my office on
    January 7. He further testified that it was his idea before
    that meeting to take it out because he didn't want to give Ms.
    Jones' lawyers any hint of a one-on-one meeting.
        There is simply no basis to call Mr. Vernon Jordan once
    again to have him go through the things he has testified about
    a great many times already.
        Now we come to Sidney Blumenthal. Mr. Manager Rogan very
    ably argued that there was a need to call Mr. Blumenthal
    because of Mr. Blumenthal's testimony as to what the President
    had told him, Sidney Blumenthal, in the aftermath of the
    explosion of publicity over the Lewinsky matter in January a
    year ago.
        First of all, there is no conflict here that is material
    because the President has never disputed Mr. Blumenthal or his
    aide's accounts of this conversation. Any dispute is wholly
    immaterial as to the two counts--the two articles of
    impeachment. The President was examined extensively about this
    subject in his own grand jury testimony and he testified as to
    what he tried to say. But he also added that in this period
    things were a ``blur'' is a term he used one time; ``a
    blizzard'' was a term he used another time--that he had
    discussions with a number of his aides, including Mr.
    Blumenthal, he tried to be careful in what he said, he thought
    he was technically accurate, but he would not dispute and did
    not dispute their characterizations of what they recalled of
    the conversations with him.
        Again, Mr. Blumenthal--Mr. Rogan pointed this out--
    testified three times before the grand jury. His recollection
    of his conversations with the President has been analyzed in
    detail and a further round of deposition would add nothing of
    substance to that testimony. Indeed, the President's speech to
    the Nation the day of his grand jury testimony, when he spoke
    to the Nation on the evening of August 17, also represented an
    acknowledgment by the President that he had misled his aides,
    such as Sidney Blumenthal.
        As I indicated last Thursday, however, any statements to
    the White House staff could have had no impact whatsoever on
    the Paula Jones case, as article II alleges each of the seven
    grounds has, because Mr. Blumenthal had no firsthand knowledge
    of the President's relation with Ms. Lewinsky. He could only
    report to the grand jury what the President had told him,
    however misleading those statements of the President may have
    been at the time. There is no dispute here, there is no
    material reason to call Mr. Blumenthal, except to try to
    embarrass the President by the presentation of testimony from a
    member of his senior staff.
        Now, the next two things that the managers would seek to
    add to the record are not, they tell you, live witness
    testimony. But don't let that fool you. They want to put in two
    sworn declarations--like an affidavit--from two people. One of
    them is a Mr. Wesley Holmes, a lawyer for Ms. Paula Jones, and
    the other is Mr. Barry Ward.
        Now, I don't have the pleasure of knowing Mr. Wesley
    Holmes, but I do know Mr. Barry Ward. He is a very intelligent,
    very hard-working and knowledgeable young lawyer in Little
    Rock, AR, who works as a law clerk for Chief Judge Wright. He
    has got an encyclopedic knowledge of Razorback athletic lore.
    He has a lot of fine characteristics. He is very helpful as a
    law clerk and gets information to you and back very
    efficiently. But there is one thing Mr. Ward is not, and I am
    sure he would agree, a mind reader. He is not a mind reader.
    There were a number of people in the room at the deposition.
    None of them were mind readers. They could all give their
    testimony about what they thought was going through the
    President's mind. The President has addressed that a number of
    times. You have seen the videotape.
        Now, the second witness is exceedingly interesting, and
    that is Mr. Holmes. And Mr. Holmes would give a sworn
    declaration to, among other things, say what he had in mind
    when he issued the witness subpoena to Betty Currie, which was
    days after the President's conversation with her on December
    18.
        Well, he would be a very interesting witness to depose, let
    me tell you. This is one of Paula Jones' lawyers talking about
    offering a declaration about his litigation strategy. And I
    think the opportunity to depose him would provide a great deal
    of information about what really motivated the events of
    January 1998. I think we could show that there were a number of
    connections between the independent counsel, Linda Tripp, and
    the Paula Jones lawyers. But I don't think you need to get into
    that briar patch because Mr. Holmes is not a mind reader any
    more than Mr. Ward is. You simply don't need that testimony to
    illuminate the record.
        Before I leave that, let me make the point that while the
    managers would like very much to throw in a couple of sworn
    declarations, you should be assured of our need to take
    discovery and, in Mr. Holmes' case, take comprehensive
    discovery. I don't think anything in S. Res. 16--I don't know
    if you have gotten to this, but I don't read the resolution as
    authorizing simple hearsay evidence.
        We would need to depose the Paula Jones lawyers in some
    detail, and I think they have now waived significant legal
    protections that would make that possible.
        Finally, there was a category of telephone records. It is a
    little hard to address that category. Those are just documents.
    I don't think the record need be expanded by their addition,
    and I will tell you why.
        Telephone records, as I said the other day, really tell you
    nothing, unless it is very important to time, to date a
    particular call. They really are inscrutable. You have to have
    the witness testify about what they mean. I don't see anything
    in there that would justify opening the record to add certain
    telephone records.
        Finally, I want to be candid with you. I don't want to be
    alarmist. I want to be honest, though, about what opening the
    door for discovery will mean for this process. I said before
    that the Senate had been fair in these proceedings, and it has
    been fair. I think the identification of a specific record
    which the parties could agree on, have in the sunlight, talk
    about, argue about, was the fair thing to do and the right
    thing to do. I think if discovery is inevitable, we will
    anticipate and believe that you will be fair in allowing us the
    discovery we are going to need.
        I ask you, if you would, to read our trial memorandum
    because at pages 124 to 130 we have set forth there our need
    for discovery. It is not a new invention. Should the Senate
    decide to authorize the House managers to call additional
    witnesses live in this proceeding or have the depositions
    taken, we will be faced with a critical need for the discovery
    of evidence useful to our defense.
        I made the point that the discovery of evidence in the
    Office of the Independent Counsel proceeding was--not to put
    too fine a point on it--not aimed at getting us exculpatory or
    helpful evidence. We need to be able to do that. We have never
    had the kind of compulsory process, the kind of ability to
    subpoena documents and witnesses that you will have in a garden
    variety civil case. We have not had access to a great deal,
    many thousands of pages of evidence which is, first of all, in
    the hands of the House managers that they got from the Office
    of Independent Counsel, but did not put into the public record,
    did not print up. We also need discovery of those other
    documents, witness testimony transcripts, interview notes,
    other materials, which may be helpful or exculpatory that are
    in the hands of the independent counsel.
        Our dilemma is this: We do not know what we do not know.
    That is what discovery means. You have to get discovery so you
    can find out what is available. It may not necessarily prolong
    a trial, but it makes you able to defend your client in the way
    you have to be able to do so as a lawyer. It doesn't turn on
    the number of witnesses.
        The calling of these witnesses produces a need in us to be
    ready to examine them, to cross-examine them. It initiates a
    process that leaves us unprepared and exposed unless we have
    adequate discovery. This is a proceeding, I need not remind
    you--I know everyone recognizes its gravity--to remove the
    President of the United States. You have to give us, and I
    believe you will, the discovery that will enable us to
    represent the President adequately, competently, and
    effectively.
        The sequence of discovery is also important. I want to be
    clear about that. It is all very well, and I recognize how it
    happens, for one side to say, ``Well, we are going to put on
    three witnesses and they can put on three witnesses.'' Ladies
    and gentlemen of the Senate, we don't know right now how to
    make a reasoned choice because we haven't had the discovery you
    would normally have to do that. We would first need to obtain
    and review the relevant documents. I have indicated where those
    are. We would then need to be able to depose relevant
    witnesses. We need to know whether the witness depositions that
    the House managers had taken would need to lead to other
    depositions there. Only at that point when we have had
    discovery of our witnesses will we be able to identify the
    witnesses we might want to call.
        This is a logical procedure, and I think those of you who
    have tried cases will recognize it as such. It is simply
    impossible from where we now are to see how a witness
    designated by the House managers can be fairly rebutted without
    ourselves having access to all of the available evidence.
        Given what is at stake, I think fundamental fairness
    requires fair discovery. We will be expeditious, but in the
    event the genie is out of the bottle, we need time, we need
    access to defend the President in the way any client ought to
    be defended.
        I think the Senate has wisely elected to proceed on a
    voluminous record, a record that is available for public
    scrutiny that was assembled by people not favorable to the
    President. I think you have enough evidence to make your
    decision on the basis of that record.
        But in the event you decide to expand it, affording us
    adequate discovery is essential if we are really going to
    practice the rule of law as I believe the Senate would intend
    for that rule of law to be practiced in its proceedings.
        But let me conclude by saying that I don't think, and I
    respectfully submit to you, that there is a need to prolong
    this process. We hope that you will render your decision in a
    manner that is speedy, and we are confident that you will
    decide to make that decision in a manner that is fair, and that
    this body will, as so often it has done in past times of
    crisis, be able to bring to the country both the closure and
    reconciliation that the country wants so very much. Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Does counsel for the President have any
    more presentation?
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I reserve
    the remainder of my time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. No, you can't reserve it. It is open,
    respond, and rebuttal.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. I will then quitclaim the rest of my
    time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, may I inquire how
    much rebuttal time we have remaining?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Thirty minutes.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I will be
    brief and ask other managers to come up and follow me. I have
    four quick points to make.
        Before I get into that, I want to thank my distinguished
    colleague from DC, Mr. Kendall. Over my practice of law for
    several years, I have received a number of jabs before in the
    courtroom but never so gentle and never so eloquently, and I
    thank you.
        I think his presentation was very good but probably makes
    the best illustration of why witnesses are needed in that he
    has chosen to use selective quotes. He likes to use those
    quotes and point to the managers over there where we were
    quoted without a real context and certainly that is what this
    hearing has been about so far, both sides picking and choosing
    among quotes that best illustrate the point we want to make at
    the time.
        Really, what we need is the big picture, the entire,
    complete picture that witnesses and only witnesses can provide
    in this case.
        Let me go back to a couple of the selective quotes, and
    those are the quotes that we made back in the House when we
    were involved in the proceedings which, I remind each one of
    you involved, are the very same stacks of books that they have
    shown you very often in the past as the record here and why do
    we need to go outside the record? That very same record was
    there in the House, and it was at that time Mr. Lowell, the
    minority counsel, was representing the President's interests,
    but also Mr. Kendall was there. In fact, both together examined
    Mr. Starr. That was when they were making the request for the
    witnesses, based on this very same record. Notwithstanding
    that, we need witnesses. I simply point that out to you to show
    you that Mr. Kendall and his very talented staff do not have a
    monopoly on consistency.
        Another example of selective quoting has to do with quotes
    made about our occasion to visit Ms. Lewinsky, to talk to her.
    This was the one witness we had not been able to talk to. He
    pulled those quotes out as if we needed to talk to all the
    witnesses. We don't need to talk to all the witnesses, but we
    just needed to sit down and talk with her. I might tell you she
    was ably represented by three attorneys. She had as many
    lawyers there as we did and perhaps more. So she was not
    imposed upon.
        In terms of my statement about discovery, I think I perhaps
    was misunderstood, but I certainly conceded the White House
    might want discovery to depose Ms. Lewinsky. But I still have a
    hard time determining why they would need to discover what Ms.
    Currie might want to say; she sat right outside the President's
    office every day, or what Mr. Jordan might say; he plays golf
    with Mr. Clinton every day, or Mr. Podesta, his former Chief of
    Staff.
        I am just trying to save this Senate some time on the
    question why we would need to go through discovery of those
    types of people.
        My last point I would like to make before I bring Mr.
    Hutchinson in is Mr. Kendall's point--and I am not sure where
    they were going but perhaps trying to worse case this
    situation--in terms of taking forever and a day to conclude all
    kinds of witnesses. He indicated we needed to take all the
    lawyers of Paula Jones and question her motivation. I suggest
    to you that a real clue for her motivation for this lawsuit, we
    could say, was the 850,000--reasons motivation she received the
    other day. But let me end with that note and bring up Mr.
    Hutchinson who will continue this process.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I
    will just take a moment.
        Mr. Kendall did an outstanding job, as he always does, of
    making his case for not calling witnesses. I thought the most
    compelling example as to why we need witnesses was the fact
    that he called a live witness, Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan
    testified here in this Chamber. Why did they not present a
    transcript? Why did he want to bring a live witness? Because it
    was real. It was alive. He was more meaningful than a
    transcript. He told the story in short, concise ways that I
    have not been able to do during my presentation during the last
    week. We would like to have the same opportunity, not through
    video but to present a live witness so that he could cross-
    examine, so that we could question. I think that is a fair
    proceeding.
        Mr. Kendall raised the point that the statements about the
    notes that Ms. Lewinsky testified she discussed with Mr. Jordan
    were referenced in her February 1998 proffer. When I was making
    my point, I was referencing her August grand jury testimony,
    not the February proffer, because my recollection is that the
    February proffer that was submitted by Mr. Ginsburg had
    subsequently become a subject of litigation because we were not
    able to reach an immunity agreement. So perhaps that was the
    reason that subject was not inquired into by the independent
    counsel. For whatever reason, my review of the transcripts is
    that that subject was never broached with Mr. Jordan. I do not
    profess perfect knowledge of it, but that is my understanding
    of it.
        And then finally I want to also look at the discovery that
    Mr. Bryant referenced. There was a gambling illustration that
    Mr. Kendall used about blackjack. But another part of poker is
    bluffs. And I don't know whether they are bluffing. I don't
    know whether they are serious about all the discovery that they
    need to have. But I know that lawyers do that sometimes to
    intimidate, to scare you away.
        But I think even more important is that the House managers
    have submitted to the rules of the Senate. We were not
    particularly happy about all of them, but we recognized it was
    important to have legitimacy in this process. We accept that.
    We move on.
        I hope that whatever rules of discovery, whatever
    limitations you wish to put, whatever timeframes you wish to
    put, the White House counsel will be as amenable to the desire
    of this Senate and this Nation to conclude this as we have been
    in adopting what our desires are to your schedule.
        I yield to Mr. McCollum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very
    much.
        I want to make a couple of observations, and one of them
    seems pretty apparent. Mr. Kendall says they are not afraid and
    I was wrong in characterizing them as being afraid--the White
    House counsel--of calling witnesses. But I am going to tell
    you, I cannot rationalize any other way why he would be out
    here to make the pitch as hard as he is against witnesses,
    especially the sort of threat that this is going to go on and
    on and on if we open the door and we call three witnesses. You
    know, we are down from thinking we ought to have 10, 12, maybe
    15 witnesses, to 3--Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney
    Blumenthal. And we have introduced three--or proposed to
    introduce three very simple pieces of new evidence. That can't
    take a lot of discovery, the need to go further than that. If
    he wants to produce witnesses, that is fine. But I just can't
    imagine why that opens that door.
        Mr. Holmes he talks about, the attorney. What is the
    significance of that declaration or affidavit, that sworn
    declaration that we would like you to take in that says,
    ``well, we have to depose Mr. Holmes.'' That was put in very
    simply because counsel on the other side--I don't accuse them
    of doing it intentionally, but the other day they misled us, I
    think unintentionally misled you, on the idea that the
    President, at the time he left the deposition in the Jones case
    and went over to talk to Betty Currie the next day, didn't and
    couldn't have had any idea that she was going to be called as a
    witness. In fact, I think they said she never was on the
    witness list and she never was subpoenaed.
        What Mr. Holmes' declaration does, as I said earlier, is
    bring into the record the subpoena that in fact was issued
    within a day or so of that time of when Betty Currie was talked
    to. Remember, she was talked to twice, the notice about it and
    her name being put on the witness list--that is what that is
    all about--and a general explanation of why they chose, as
    attorneys, to make that case, why they chose to put her name
    out there, and subpoena her, so it is clear on the record.
        Very simple. If you look at it--and I am sure you will have
    it before you--his declaration is very short. It is about three
    paragraphs. And it goes straight to the point. And it encloses
    these accompanying documents.
        I don't think you should, for one minute, think it opens
    the door to some great big, gigantic discovery period. That is
    simply an idle threat to intimidate, in my judgment--with a
    proper intimidation effort, proper tactic; I don't accuse him
    of anything improper--to try to discourage you from letting us
    have these three witnesses.
        Second, I want to point out that with respect to some of
    the things that I said, one thing I did say earlier is I don't
    know what all the witnesses would say if we called them. I
    don't know what they all would say, certainly. But I would
    expect them all to be consistent with what they have already
    said in their sworn testimony. And there is nothing
    inconsistent with my expecting them to be consistent on the
    facts.
        We already know with that sworn testimony in the case of
    Monica Lewinsky--she has immunity--if she deviates and goes off
    of it, she can get herself in trouble. But by no means does my
    expectation that the testimony you already have will remain
    true mean that I don't think there are new things to be brought
    out or that you shouldn't have live witnesses here.
        I thought it interesting that Mr. Kendall totally ignored
    the one thing that was most significant, in my mind, and that
    is the whole idea that there is a need for witnesses out here
    to determine their credibility, to check their demeanor, to see
    how they respond to questioning, to do all of those things that
    I described earlier, that any reasonable attorney in any
    courtroom setting in this country in a criminal case--and you
    do have to decide whether the crimes were committed or not--
    would expect to do. So you can, as my colleagues have said,
    look them in the eye and make that determination yourself. He
    didn't even address that. And I think that that alone is
    sufficiently good reason to have a live witness here, as I said
    before to you.
        So with that in mind, I will yield to Mr. Rogan.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, Mr. Kendall made a very able and strong presentation.
    It was particularly effective when he brought up a series of
    quotations from House Members and House managers talking about
    the need for witnesses or the lack thereof. It would be more
    effective if it were presented in context, but it could not be,
    because the context of every single one of those quotations was
    in reference to the distinction between the House's function as
    the accusatory body versus the Senate's constitutional function
    of being the body where an impeachment case is tried. There he
    blurs the distinction. That is why in the Constitution a
    President is impeached solely on the majority vote. But removal
    requires at the trial a two-thirds vote.
        Now, Mr. Kendall's presentation begs the question, did the
    founders get it wrong when they designed this process? Did the
    founders simply intend for us to waste our resources rather
    than conserve them and simply do the very same thing, first in
    one body and then in the other, with the sole distinction that
    the only difference would be the ultimate vote? That was not
    their intent. That was not the procedure established by the
    Constitution. And it is not the procedure recognized throughout
    the country in court proceedings.
        There is a reason why courts of inferior jurisdiction will
    be able to hold a defendant in a criminal case to answer for
    trial at a preliminary hearing based on hearsay testimony,
    based on transcripts, based solely on police reports.
        But that defendant at a trial has a constitutional right to
    come forward. The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
    is supremely guaranteed in the Constitution because the framers
    understood the difference, even if White House counsel refuses
    to acknowledge the difference.
        The argument they have really isn't with the House
    managers. Their argument is with the precedence of the House.
    Their argument, in fact, is with people like the venerable
    Barbara Jordan, our late distinguished former colleague. She
    understood the difference between the House's function in an
    impeachment role versus the Senate's function. She said during
    the Rodino hearings in establishing the division between the
    two branches of the legislature, the House and the Senate:

        Assigning to one the right to accuse and to the other the
    right to judge, the Framers of the Constitution were very
    astute. They did not make the accusers and the judges the same
    person.

        Now, in the words of Yogi Berra, I fear that we are going
    through ``deja vu all over again'' with Mr. Kendall's able
    argument, because what he has accentuated in this presentation
    has been accentuated by White House counsel ever since they
    first rose to address this body at the lectern, and that is the
    complaint that no witnesses were called before the House
    Judiciary Committee, and how wrong it is for the House managers
    now to assert the need and the right to have witnesses before
    this body when, in fact, no witnesses were called before the
    Judiciary Committee.
        Once again, he mistakes the function of the two Houses. But
    I would invite the Members of this body, if that is an issue
    concerning them, to go back and review the voluminous
    transcripts during the Judiciary Committee where Chairman Hyde
    did everything but get on his knees and beg the members of the
    President's defense team, beg our colleagues on the other side
    of the aisle, to identify for us which witnesses they wished to
    dispute, what facts they wanted to challenge, to let us know
    the witnesses where there was a contention in the evidence. And
    despite their complaining and despite their griping and despite
    their anger over a supposedly unfair process, they never once
    identified in the factual record whose testimony they wished to
    challenge.
        What we heard repeatedly, day after day in the hearing and
    outside before the cameras, was an attack upon the process
    rather than an identification of the issues where there are
    factual disputes. In fact, they refused to identify, despite
    the repeated pleas of Chairman Hyde, who those witnesses were
    that they felt were appropriate because the chairman said,
    ``Tell us who they are, we will call them.''
        They champion the cause of witnesses in word but they do
    not champion the cause of witnesses in deed, at least not in
    the House, because the same people who were complaining of the
    unfairness in the House for not having witnesses suddenly have
    an allergic reaction to the concept of witnesses being called
    before this body where it counts the most, where the ultimate
    decision is to be made, where the triers of fact have to make
    the constitutional decision whether the case is sufficient for
    removal of the President.
        Mr. Kendall's repeated hints and statements that somehow
    they were denied some form of due process in the House by not
    being able to call witnesses is patently unfair and does not
    withstand the test of the record. Chairman Hyde alluded to it a
    couple of days ago, and based upon Mr. Kendall's presentation,
    I feel it is worth a minute or two of this body's time. Mr.
    Kendall has stated in these proceedings, and I am quoting:

        We have never had the chance to call witnesses ourselves,
    to examine them, to cross-examine them, to subpoena documentary
    evidence--at no point in this process.

        The record is to the contrary:
        On October 5, the House passed a procedure by a voice vote
    which included the right to call witnesses. On October 21, the
    House Judiciary Committee staff met with Messrs. Ruff, Kendall,
    and Craig. At that time, Judiciary Committee staff asked the
    White House to provide any exculpatory information and provide
    a list of any witnesses the President wished to call. On
    November 9, the House Judiciary Committee staff wrote to
    Messrs. Ruff, Kendall, and Craig and again informed them of the
    President's right to call witnesses. On November 19,
    Independent Counsel Starr testified before the House Judiciary
    Committee. The President's counsel was given the opportunity to
    question the independent counsel. The President's counsel did
    not ask a question relating to the facts of the independent
    counsel's report and allegations against the President. On
    November 25, Chairman Hyde wrote a letter to the President
    asking the President, among other things, to provide any
    exculpatory information and inform the committee of any
    witnesses he wished to call. On December 4, 2 working days
    before the presentation of the President to the Judiciary
    Committee, counsel for the President requested to put on 15
    witnesses. The White House was allowed to present all 15
    witnesses, and not a single one of the 15 witnesses did they
    wish to call, that they asked to call, were factual witnesses.
        And so the complaints of unfairness are unfair.
        One other point I want to make because again I see a
    reversal in roles, is that Mr. Kendall can't seem to decide in
    what type of ``ogre'' role he wants to portray us, because he
    said in his presentation just a few minutes ago that we were
    somehow--at least he alluded to the fact we were somehow tools
    of Judge Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel. I was a
    little surprised to hear him suggest that Judge Starr spoon-fed
    us the charges, and that Judge Starr spoon-fed them to us to
    the point where he didn't know whether Judge Starr should be
    deemed an honorary member of the House management team.
        Well, that is an interesting proposition because it seemed
    to me just a day or two ago the same lawyers who are now making
    this allegation were claiming constitutional unfairness before
    this body and asking that this body dismiss the articles of
    impeachment. Why? Because the House Judiciary Committee and the
    managers didn't present the exact same charges that the
    independent counsel suggested. You can't have it both ways. You
    can't fashion the argument depending on what the result is
    being sought, and yet that is exactly what the managers with
    the White House counsel are attempting to do.
        Yesterday we were renegades who didn't follow the strict
    rules of Judge Starr and didn't give them proper notice. Now,
    of course, he is the marionette and we are the puppets doing
    his will.
        Members of this body, it is the job of the House of
    Representatives, it is the constitutional obligation of the
    House of Representatives, to act as the accusatory body in an
    impeachment proceeding. The Constitution gives the authority to
    this body to try that case. This is the place for trial. This
    is the place to determine guilt. This is the place to determine
    credibility. This is the place for witnesses.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I yield the remainder of our time to our
    distinguished chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
    Mr. Manager Hyde, you have 9 minutes remaining.
        Mr. Manager HYDE. I won't use the entire 9 minutes.
        Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel and Senators, I
    will be very brief. Mr. Rogan and my colleagues have handled
    this very well, but there are just a couple of things I want to
    talk about.
        It is disturbing, it is annoying, it is irritating when I
    hear that the counsel for the President had been cut off from
    information, that we have sequestered things. I pleaded with
    them to produce witnesses, made the subpoenas available to
    them. They have a positive allergy to fact witnesses.
        Oh, they will come up with academics. We saw a parade of
    professors. You know what an intellectual is? It is someone who
    is educated beyond their intelligence. I certainly don't mean
    that of some of those Harvard professors who they paraded out,
    even though we disagreed with them, but you would get eye
    strain looking for a fact witness.
        And it is remarkable, the flexibility they have, that they
    complain we called no witnesses in the House. Now they are
    complaining that we are calling witnesses in the Senate as
    though they don't understand the difference in the threshold.
    There we had to prove we had enough to submit to the Senate for
    a trial but not try it over there. And a majority vote prevails
    over there. Here, you have an extraordinary mountain to climb:
    a two-thirds vote and the trial is here, and that is the
    difference.
        Witnesses help you. They won't help me. I know the record.
    I am satisfied a compelling case is here for removal of the
    President. But they will help you. And we aren't dragging this
    out. We have been as swift as decency will let us be throughout
    this entire situation.
        Their defense has never been on the facts. If they can come
    up with a good fact witness that has something to say, we will
    see a reenactment of the Indian rope trick, it seems to me. We
    will see professors, though, if past is prologue. I don't know.
    But the threat of prolonged hearings, I suppose, is supposed to
    make you tremble. It doesn't to me, but then different things--
    different strokes, I guess, for different folks. Their defense
    has been to demonize Mr. Starr to a fare-thee-well and then
    yell about the process. That is their defense.
        I will be frank with you. I am not sure I could stand a lot
    more of that. But that is what they will do. As far as the
    information not available to them, maybe not. Maybe some of the
    stuff we got from the independent counsel was held in executive
    session, but it was available to Mr. Conyers, available to Abbe
    Lowell, available to every Democrat on the Judiciary Committee,
    and they went through it. I wrote with Mr. Conyers to Mr. Starr
    a letter saying, ``Show us what you didn't send us. Let's look
    at what you have over there. There might be some exculpatory
    material.'' Mr. Conyers sent his people over and they looked
    and they looked and they looked, and I would assume they were
    in touch with you folks. I would assume they were. If they
    weren't, they should have been. That is a breakdown in
    communication.
        We have a good case. We have an excellent case without the
    witnesses. But the witnesses help you. We have narrowed it down
    to three--a pitiful three. I should think you would want to
    proceed with that minimum testimony, and Mr. Kendall can try
    his cross-examination skills on them, and that I want to watch.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The time of both sides has now expired.
    The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in view of the time that we
    have been in without a break, the next pending business is that
    we would want to have a motion by Senator Harkin or Senator
    Wellstone. Before we do that, I suggest that, without
    objection, we take a 15-minute break.
        There being no objection, at 3:42 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 4:04 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                          unanimous-consent agreement

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    during each day the Senate sits as a Court of Impeachment, it
    be in order for Senators to submit to the desk statements and
    introduce legislation.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so
    ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Now, Mr. Chief Justice, I believe at this point
    it would be in order for a motion to be made that we go into
    open debate, if any, and then when that is dispensed with, we
    would go to the move to close and would deal with that issue,
    and then we would begin the closed session. So I believe we are
    ready for a motion to be offered, if any, at this time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Iowa, Mr. Harkin.

                          motion to suspend the rules

        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, in accordance with rule V of
    the Senate's Standing Rules, I filed a motion of intent to move
    to suspend the rules to open debate on this motion to subpoena
    witnesses. The motion is at the desk. It is No. 5, I believe.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from Iowa, Mr. Harkin, for himself and Mr.
    Wellstone, moves to suspend the following portions of the Rules
    of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
    Impeachment Trials in regard to debate by Senators on a motion
    to subpoena witnesses during the trial of President William
    Jefferson Clinton.
        (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in rule VII.
        (2) The following portion of rule XX: ``, unless the Senate
    shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
    decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon
    without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall
    be voted on without debate and by yeas and nays, which shall be
    entered on the record''; and
        (3) In rule XXIV, the phrases, ``without debate except when
    the doors shall be closed for deliberation in that case'' and
    ``, to be had without debate.''

        Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Iowa.
        Mr. HARKIN. I ask for the yeas and nays.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there a sufficient second? There is a
    sufficient second.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
        Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Ms.
    Mikulski) is absent due to illness.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 41, nays 58, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 3]

                 [Subject: Harkin motion to suspend the rules]

                                    YEAS--41

    Akaka
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kohl
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Specter
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--58

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Baucus
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kerry
    Kyl
    Landrieu
    Lincoln
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Rockefeller
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                 NOT VOTING--1

    Mikulski

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 41, the nays
    are 58. A quorum being present, two-thirds of those Senators
    voting not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not
    agreed to.
        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, that motion being defeated, I
    believe it is now in order to move to close the session so we
    can have debate on the question of the motion to subpoena
    witnesses.
        Mr. LOTT. I so move, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion.
        The motion was agreed to.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask that Senators remain at
    their place, but I will put in a request for a quorum call just
    momentarily so the appropriate arrangements can be made for the
    closed session.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

                                 closed session

        [At 4:29 p.m., the quorum was dispensed with and the doors
    of the Chamber were closed. The proceedings of the Senate were
    held in closed session until 8:01 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate
    resumed open session.]

                                  open session

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent
    that the Senate return to open session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of an objection, it is so
    ordered.
                                    ------

                       adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate stand in adjournment as under the previous order.
        There being no objection, at 8:02 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Wednesday, January
    27, 1999, at 1 p.m.
                                    ------

                          Wednesday, January 27, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:07 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Dear God, leadership has its defining days in which crucial
    decisions must be made. You know that this is an important one
    of those days. In a few moments, votes must be cast. Now in the
    quiet, the Senators wait to be counted. It is a lonely time.
    Beyond party loyalties, those on both sides of the aisle long
    to do what ultimately is best for our Nation. Debate has led to
    firm convictions. Give the Senators the courage of these
    convictions and the assurance that, if they are true to
    whatever they now believe is best, You will bless them with
    peace. We intercede for them and the heavy responsibility they
    must carry. Imbue them with Your calming Spirit and strengthen
    them with Your gift of faith to trust You to maintain unity
    once the votes are tallied. We commit the results to You. Our
    times are in Your hands. Through our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows.

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The majority leader is recognized.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a moment we will begin two
    consecutive votes. The first will be on the motion to dismiss.
    That will be followed by an immediate vote on the motion to
    subpoena. Following those votes, there will be an opportunity
    to describe how we would go forward from there with the
    depositions. I have discussed this with Senator Daschle. It is
    likely that we would take a break at that point so that we
    could have further discussions with our conferences to make
    sure we understand how that subpoena and deposition process
    would go forward. I have a resolution prepared. We have some
    simpler ones that we can consider. But we would want to discuss
    those with each other during the vote, and perhaps even after
    the two votes occur, depending on what the results are.
        The idea is that we have now before us Senate Resolution
    16, which has brought us to the point to these two votes. We
    need to give some consideration to making sure we understand
    how the process will go forward to a conclusion after that.
        I thank my colleagues for their attention. I believe we are
    ready for the votes, Mr. Chief Justice.

                           Vote on Motion to Dismiss

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question occurs on the motion to
    dismiss the impeachment proceedings offered by the Senator from
    West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. The yeas and nays are required.
        The clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
        The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 56, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 4]

         [Subject: Byrd motion to dismiss the impeachment proceedings]

                                    YEAS--44

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--56

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

        The motion was rejected.

      Vote on Motion for Appearance of Witnesses and Admission of Evidence

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Now the question occurs on the motion
    requesting the appearance of witnesses at depositions and to
    admit evidence offered by the managers on the part of the House
    of Representatives. On this question, the yeas and nays are
    required, and the clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The result was announced--yeas 56, nays 44, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 5]

        [Subject: House managers motion to subpoena witnesses and admit
                            evidence not in record]

                                    YEAS--56

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                    NAYS--44

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The motion was agreed to.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as I indicated earlier, we are
    attempting now to clarify exactly how this will proceed and to
    reach agreement with regard to the remaining procedure and the
    beginning of the deposition process.
        We are acting in good faith, but we want to make sure we
    are at least going to try to think about all contingencies, and
    we are exchanging resolutions and suggestions between Senator
    Daschle and myself at this time. We may be asked to vote later
    on today on a procedure. We will let you know if that is
    necessary today. It could happen tomorrow. But we don't want it
    to go much longer than that because we need to make sure this
    procedure is going forward.
        Of course, if we don't have a resolution, I presume we will
    begin to go forward anyway, but we would like to have some
    orderly procedure as we have had in the past. My thinking at
    this time is that we would just stand in recess subject to the
    call of the Chair while we talk this through. It may not be
    necessary to do anything further as far as a recorded vote but
    it may be. So we just wanted Senators to be on notice of that.

                    Recess Subject to the Call of the Chair

        Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chief Justice, that
    the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
        There being no objection, at 1:33 p.m., the Senate recessed
    subject to the call of the Chair.
        The Senate reassembled at 4:47 p.m. when called to order by
    the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        First, I thank all the Members, all concerned, for their
    patience throughout this process. We have had a productive day,
    and I believe this recess that we have been experiencing has
    been helpful in allowing further discussions to occur and to
    clarify what the procedures will be from here through the
    subpoena and deposition process and, hopefully, even to a
    conclusion.
        Senator Daschle and I have traded proposals which outline
    those procedures for the remainder of the trial, and although I
    won't go into detail at this time, I will say that both
    proposals bring us to a final vote on the pending articles of
    impeachment in an expeditious manner. We have been narrowing
    the questions that are involved, and we are now working on what
    I hope will be the final draft. But it is not going to be
    possible to complete that this afternoon. We hope to be able to
    do it when we reconvene at 1 p.m. on Thursday.
        There will be conferences of the two parties in the morning
    so that we can go over this with all the Senators. It is not
    enough just that the leaders understand or agree; we have to
    make sure every Senator understands it and agrees with the
    procedure that we would go forward with.
                                    ------

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that the Court of
    Impeachment stand in adjournment until the hour of 1 p.m. on
    Thursday.
        There being no objection, at 4:47 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, January
    28, 1999, at 1 p.m.

                           SENATOR BYRD'S FINEST HOUR

        Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of myself,
    Senator Stevens and Senator Dodd: George Santayana stated,
    ``Those who disregard the lessons of history are bound to
    repeat them.'' The United States Senate is too politically
    charged and it would be more so were it not for the
    distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Robert C. Byrd. A
    couple of weeks ago the Senate was about to go over the
    precipice of partisanship. Fortunately, we agreed to have an
    off-the-record session of all Senators. That alone would not
    have prevented our reckless course, but it did give all
    Senators an opportunity to hear Senator Byrd at his finest
    hour. He commenced by thanking Senator Daniel Akaka for leading
    us in prayer, harkening the time Benjamin Franklin took to the
    floor of the Continental Convention to call on divine guidance
    for cooperation and bipartisanship. Then Senator Byrd continued
    to calm partisan zeal and give us all a sense of historic
    perspective. We started talking sense instead of politics. It
    got us together. We could have gone the way of the House, but
    Senator Byrd is the one who put us on the right path. In
    appreciation for his leadership, we think the country could
    benefit by reading Senator Byrd's comments. I ask that the full
    text of Senator Byrd's remarks be printed in the Record.
        The remarks follow:

      Remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd--Bipartisan Conference in the Old
                           Senate Chamber, January 8

        My colleagues, I thank the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader
    for bringing us together in this joint caucus. Mr. Daschle asked me
    last evening to be prepared to speak this morning following the remarks
    of the two leaders. I am flattered and honored to do so. Having a
    proclivity to speak at length on subjects that are close to my heart
    and about which I feel deeply, I have taken the precaution this morning
    to prepare some remarks in order that I might present them in an
    organized fashion and thus avoid speaking as long as I might otherwise
    be wont to do. I shall, however, add some extemporaneous remarks as the
    spirit of the occasion leads me.
        Before proceeding with the thoughts that I have put in writing, I
    wish to remind ourselves that we do, indeed, have not only the standing
    rules of the Senate, but we also have the standing rules for our
    guidance in impeachment trials. This bound copy of rules governing
    impeachment trials that I hold in my hand was published in 1986 as a
    result of a resolution which former Senator Robert Dole and I offered
    for referral to the Rules Committee, at which time we called on that
    Committee to update and provide any proposed modifications or revisions
    to the rules that had been in existence from the year 1868 when the
    impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson took place.
        The rules which the Senate approved in 1986 were followed during
    the impeachment trials of the three Federal judges: Claiborne,
    Hastings, and Walter Nixon. In listening to some of the comments on
    television last evening, I noted that when news reporters interviewed
    tourists, those visitors to this city were under the impression that
    the Senate was proceeding into a trial without any rules for guidance.
    Some of the representatives of the news media were also under this
    mistaken impression. I am concerned about the public perception that we
    are proceeding to a trial without any rules to guide us. Therefore, I
    trust that we will all make it clear as we work with the press that the
    Senate, indeed, has a set of standing rules to guide us in this trial.
        Before I begin my prepared remarks, I wish to thank the Majority
    Leader and the Minority Leader for calling on Senator Akaka to deliver
    prayer. They chose the right Senator to lead us in prayer, and I thank
    Danny. His prayer set just the right tone and the right spirit for his
    occasion. In the midst of Danny's prayer, I recalled that day which
    came during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, when the
    Framers were encountering difficult problems, and their spirits were at
    a low ebb. There was dissension and divisiveness, and their hopes for
    success in achieving their goal were fading. Things seemed to be
    falling apart. Their dreams of fashioning a new Constitution--the
    Articles of Confederation being our first national Constitution--
    appeared to be growing dim. The new Ship of State which they hoped to
    launch was floundering in troubled waters with rocks and shoals upon
    every hand. Dark clouds of despair were closing in upon them, and the
    Framers were brought face-to-face with the stark possibility of
    failure.
        It was then, at that fateful moment, that the oldest man at the
    Convention, Benjamin Franklin, stood to his feet and addressed the
    chair in which sat General George Washington: ``Sir, I have lived a
    long time, and the longer I live the more convincing proofs I see that
    God still governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall
    to the ground without our Father's notice, is it probable that we can
    build an empire without our Father's aid? We have been assured, sir, in
    the sacred writings, that, `Except the Lord build the house, they labor
    in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman
    waketh but in vain.' I firmly believe this; and I also believe that
    without our Father's aid, we shall succeed in this political building
    no better than did the builders of Babel. I, therefore, beg leave, sir,
    to move that, henceforth, prayers imploring the assistance of heaven
    and its blessings on our deliberations be held in this assembly every
    morning before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the
    clergy of this city be requested to officiate in that service.''
        Franklin's motion was seconded by Mr. Sherman.
        My colleagues, let us proceed in these deliberations this morning
    in a spirit of prayerfulness and cooperation and bipartisanship, and
    see if we, too, in our generation may produce something worthy of being
    remembered.
        I speak from the viewpoint of having a long and varied experience
    in legislative bodies. I was born during the Woodrow Wilson
    Administration. I was sworn in as a new member of the House of
    Representatives during the final days of the Truman Administration. He
    is my favorite Democratic President in my lifetime. I having been sworn
    in as a new member of Congress in January 1953, I have served longer in
    Congress than has any man or woman in either House of Congress today.
    Dizzy Dean said that it is alright to brag if you've done it. Well I
    have done it! No member of Congress in either House today was here when
    I first became a member 46 years ago.
        I also try to take the long view of the history that is yet before
    us. This country has a long history ahead of it, and the things we do
    here, the service we perform, our words and our deeds will be long
    remembered and long recorded.
        As we proceed to the unpleasant task that awaits us in the days
    ahead, let us remember that this is not a trial in a court of law. It
    is not a criminal trial. It is a political trial. The Nation will be
    watching us, and I implore us all to conduct ourselves in a way that
    will bring honor to this body. I view the immediate future with
    considerable dread. There is a poison in the air, and it is not the flu
    virus, and there is no antibiotic that can be prescribed for it. It is
    a bitter political partisanship, and if we let it control us in the
    impeachment trial, we will find it to be lethal, and we will die
    together.
        From time to time there occur events which rise above the everyday,
    and sorely test the leaders of men and the institutions they create.
        This is such a time. For it is not only William Jefferson Clinton
    who is on trial. It is this August body and all of us who carry the
    title of Senator.
        The White House has sullied itself. The House of Representatives
    has fallen into the black pit of partisan self-indulgence. The Senate
    is teetering on the brink of that same black pit.
        Meanwhile, the American people look in vain for the order and
    leadership promised to them by the Constitution. Of one thing I am
    sure: the public trust in all of the institutions of government has
    severely suffered.
        Senators, this is the headline, I had so hoped we could avoid. I
    have in my hand this morning's Washington Times bearing the headline:
    ``Trial Opens Amid Pomp, Partisanship.'' It is the word
    ``partisanship'' that is troubling.
        Any of you who have read your mail or the phoned-in comments from
    your constituents knows that the anger and disappointment is only
    growing in intensity with each day that we prolong this painful ordeal.
        I have always believed that whatever the crisis and whatever the
    age, the Senate would always attract and produce men and women of the
    quality and character needed to step up and calm the angry and
    dangerous seas which might threaten the Ship of State, and dash it on
    the rocks and shoals.
        I still believe that. I still believe that the Senate can restore
    some order to the anger which has overtaken this country and the chaos
    which threatens this city. I believe in all of you. I believe that all
    of the courage and conviction needed to handle any crisis is present
    right in this room.
        But, at this moment, we look very bad. We appear to be dithering
    and posturing and slowly disintegrating into the political quicksand.
    And it is no fault of our leaders. Our two leaders have done their
    level best to get us started toward lancing this inflamed boil in an
    honorable and orderly way. Left alone, without all of us to contend
    with, they would have worked these arrangements out long ago.
        Of course, I am very fond and proud of my own Leader, Tom Daschle.
    But, may I say to my Republican friends that I am also very fond and
    proud of our Majority Leader, Mr. Lott. However, I have been a Majority
    Leader in this body, and I know too well who gets the blame when
    important matters flounder in the Senate. It is the Majority Leader
    and, to a lesser degree, the Minority Leader. And when that happens,
    neither party looks good.
        I feel it to be appropriate at this point to digress from my
    prepared statement and bring to your recollection Chaucer's
    ``Canterbury Tales,'' and I shall refer to the ``Pardoner's Tale,''
    which most, if not all, of you will remember having read in your school
    days. The setting took place in Flanders, where, once, there sat
    drinking in a tavern three young men who were given to folly. As they
    sat, they heard a small bell clink before a corpse being carried to the
    grave, whereupon, one of them called to his knave and ordered him to go
    and find out the name of the corpse that was passing by.
        The boy answered that he already knew, and that it was an old
    comrade of the roisterers who had been slain while drunk by an unseen
    thief called Death, who had slain others in recent days.
        Out into the road the three young ruffians went in search of this
    monster called death. They came upon an old man, and seized him and
    with rough language demanded that he tell them where they could find
    this cowardly adversary who was taking the lives of their good friends
    in the countryside.
        The old man pointed to a great oak tree on a nearby knoll, saying,
    ``There, under that tree, you will find Death.'' In a drunken rage, the
    three roisterers set off in a run 'til they came to the tree, and there
    they found a pile of gold--eight basketfuls, of florins, newly minted,
    round coins. Forgotten was the monster called Death, as they pondered
    their good fortune, and they decided that they should remain with the
    gold until nightfall when they would divide it among themselves and
    take it to their homes. It would be unsafe, they thought, to attempt to
    do so in broad daylight, as they might be fallen upon by thieves who
    would take their treasure from them.
        It was proposed that they draw straws, and the person who drew the
    shortest cut would go into the nearby village and purchase some bread
    and wine which they could enjoy as they whiled away the daylight hours.
    Off towards the village the young man went. When he was out of sight,
    the remaining two decided that there was no good reason why this
    fortune should be divided among three individuals, so one of them said
    to the other: ``When he returns, you throw your arm around him as if in
    jest, and I will rive him with my dagger. And, with your dagger, you
    can do the same. Then, all of this gold will be divided just between
    you and me.''
        Meanwhile, the youngest rouge, as he made its way into the town,
    thought what a shame it was that the gold would be divided among three,
    when it could so easily belong only to the ownership of one. Therefore,
    in town, the young man went directly to an apothecary and asked to be
    sold some poison for large rats and for a polecat that had been killing
    his chickens. The apothecary quickly provided some poison, saying that
    as much as equalled only a grain of wheat would result in sudden death
    for the creature that drank the mixture.
        Having purchased the poison, the young villain crossed the street
    to a winery where he purchased three bottles--two for his friends, one
    for himself. After he left the village, he sat down, opened two bottles
    and deposited an equal portion in each, and then returned to the oak
    tree, where the two older men did as they had planned. One threw his
    arm playfully around the shoulders of the third, they buried their
    daggers in him, and he fell dead on the pile of gold. The other two
    then sat down, cut the bread and opened the wine. Each took a good,
    deep swallow, and, suffering a most excruciating pain, both fell upon
    the body of the third, across the pile of gold. All three were dead.
        Their avarice, their greed for gain had destroyed them. There is a
    lesson here. The strong temptation for political partisanship can tear
    the Senate apart, and can tear the Nation apart, and confront all of us
    with destruction.
        I ask everyone here who might be tempted, to step back from the
    brink of political gamesmanship. I ask everyone here who might harbor
    such feelings to abandon any thought of mean-spirted, destructive,
    vengeful, partisan warfare. It is easy to get caught up in the poison
    of bitter, self-consuming partisanship when faced with such situations
    as the one which confronts us now.
        Witnesses are the main sticking point. I try to put myself in the
    shoes of our GOP friends. At least 13 House members are pushing you.
        They had the opportunity to call witnesses but didn't. I watched
    all House proceedings. It seems to me that with such a mass of
    evidence, nothing new will be added. We must avoid a repetition of what
    the House has just gone through.
        I urge all of us to step back and think about it. What can possibly
    be served in this unique court of impeachment by having a repeat of
    what we have already seen?
        I implore us all to endeavor to lift our eyes to higher things. We
    can perform some much needed healing on the body politic. We can start
    by disdaining any more of the salacious muck which has already soiled
    the gowns of too many. If we can come together in a dignified way to
    orderly and expeditiously dispose of this matter, then perhaps we can
    yet salvage a bit of respect and trust from the American people for all
    of us, for the Senate, and for their institutions of government.
        There have been only 1,851 Senators from the beginning of this
    Republic, and that includes all of us. We have a duty at this critical
    time to rise above politics-as-usual, in which we eat one another and,
    in so doing, eat ourselves. Let us put the nation first. The American
    people want us to do that. In the long run, that is how we will be
    judged, and, more importantly, it is how the Senate will be judged. The
    Constitution makes no reference to political party. The constitutional
    provision concerning impeachment makes no mention of political party.
    There were no political parties at the time the Constitution was
    written.
        When this is all over and this matter is behind us--and that time
    will surely come--then we can be politically partisan if we wish, as
    various legislative matters come before us. That is all in the natural
    course of things. Republicans and Democrats can go at each others
    throats politically if that is what they desire. But this is not a time
    for political partisanship. We will be sitting in judgment of a
    President. And we should be guided by our oath that, in all things
    appertaining to the trial of William Jefferson Clinton, we shall do
    impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws.
        Let us be guided by higher motives, by what is best for the
    Republic, and by how future history will judge us. We need a surer
    foundation than political partisanship, and that sure foundation is the
    Constitution.
        The Senate was the preeminent spark of genius by the Framers. It
    was here that passions would be cooled. The Senate would be the
    stabilizing element when confronted with the storms of political frenzy
    and the silent arts of corruption.
        Let us be true to the faith of our fathers and to the expectations
    of those who founded this Republic. The coming days will test us. Let
    us go forward together, hoping that in the end, the Senate will be
    perceived as having stood the test. And may we--both Republicans and
    Democrats--when our work is done, be judged by the American people and
    by the pages of future history as having done our duty and done it
    well. Our supreme duty is not to any particular person or party, but to
    the people of the Nation and to the future of this Republic.
        It is in this spirit that we may do well to remember the words of
    Benjamin Hill, a great United States Senator from the State of Georgia,
    inscribed, as they are, upon his monument:

    Who saves his country
    Saves all things,
    Saves himself
        and all things saved do bless him.

    Who lets his country die
    Let's all things die,
    Dies himself ignobly,
    And all things dying curse him.

        Thank you, my friends, thank you.
                                    ------

      MOTION TO DISMISS ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON
                                    CLINTON

        Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to oppose the motion
    offered in the Court of Impeachment to dismiss the articles of
    impeachment against President Clinton. To support the motion
    would undermine the precedents and history of the impeachment
    process laid out in the Constitution. To my knowledge, the only
    instances in our history that the Senate has dismissed a
    resolution of impeachment without voting up or down on at least
    one of the articles sent over by the House was when the
    impeached officer resigned before the Senate had the
    opportunity to act. I do not think we should deviate from our
    precedents on this occasion.
        In voting on the motion to dismiss, we are supposed to
    assume that even if the President did everything the House
    claims he did, we should still dismiss the articles. So for
    purposes of this motion, we have to assume that he committed
    every act of obstruction of justice and witness tampering the
    House has claimed and every instance of perjury before the
    grand jury that the House claims. This would include perjury
    before a grand jury sitting to help the Congress determine
    whether the President committed impeachable offenses.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I have by no means decided whether
    President Clinton has done everything the House alleges. But if
    I am to assume all these allegations are correct, I cannot see
    how in good conscience I can support the motion to dismiss and
    permit the President to stay in office.
                                    ------

     SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST
                               PRESIDENT CLINTON

        Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, each Member of the Senate
    is obligated today to render a judgment, a profound judgment,
    about the conduct of President William Jefferson Clinton and
    the call of the House of Representatives to remove him from
    office. A motion to dismiss the two articles of impeachment
    lodged against the President has been put before us, and so we
    must now determine whether there are sufficient grounds to
    continue with the impeachment trial, or whether we know enough
    to reach a conclusion and end these proceedings.
        I know enough from the record the House forwarded to us and
    the public record to reach certain conclusions about the
    President's conduct. President Clinton had an extramarital
    sexual relationship with a young White House employee, which,
    though consensual, was reckless and immoral, and thus raised a
    series of questions about his judgment and his respect for the
    office. He then made false and misleading statements about that
    relationship to the American people, to a Federal district
    court judge in a civil deposition, and to a Federal grand jury;
    in so doing, he betrayed not only his family but the public's
    trust, and undermined his public credibility.
        But the judgment we must now make is not about the
    rightness or wrongness of the President's relationship with
    Monica Lewinsky and his efforts to conceal it. Nor is that
    judgment about whether the President is guilty of committing a
    specific crime. That may be determined by a criminal court,
    which the Senate clearly is not, after he leaves office.
        The question before us now is whether the President's
    wrongdoing--as outlined in the two articles of impeachment--was
    more than reprehensible, more than harmful, and in this case,
    more than strictly criminal. We must now decide whether the
    President's wrongdoing makes his continuance in office a threat
    to our Government, our people, and the national interest. That
    to me is the extraordinarily high bar the framers set for
    removal of a duly-elected President, and it is that standard we
    must apply to the facts to determine whether the President is
    guilty of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
        This trial has now proceeded for 10 session days. Each side
    has had ample opportunity to present its case, illuminating the
    voluminous record from the House, and we Senators have been
    able to ask wide-ranging questions of both parties. I have
    listened intently throughout, and both the House managers and
    the counsel for the President have been very impressive. The
    House managers, for their part, have presented the facts and
    argued the Constitution so effectively that they impelled me
    more than once to seriously consider voting for removal.
        But after much reflection and review of the extensive
    evidence before us, of the meaning of high crimes and
    misdemeanors, and, most importantly, of what I believe to be in
    the best interests of the Nation, I have concluded that the
    facts do not meet the high standard the founders established
    and do not justify removing this President from office.
        It was for this reason that I decided today to vote in
    favor of dismissing the articles of impeachment against
    President Clinton, and against the motion to allow for the
    testimony of live witnesses. I plan to submit a more detailed
    statement explaining exactly how I arrived at these decisions
    when the final votes are taken on the articles of impeachment.
    But I do think it is important at this point to summarize my
    arguments for voting to end the trial now.
        I start from the indisputable premise that the founders
    intended impeachment to be a measure of extreme last resort,
    because it would disrupt the democratic process they so
    carefully calibrated and would supersede the right of the
    people to choose their leaders, which was at the heart of their
    vision of the new democracy they were creating. That is why I
    believe that the Constitutional standard in question here--
    ``high crimes and misdemeanors''--demands clear and convincing
    evidence that the President committed offenses that, to borrow
    from the words of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
    respectively, proceed from ``the abuse or violation of some
    public trust,'' and that demonstrate a ``loss of capacity or
    corruption.'' A review of the constitutional history convinces
    me that impeachment was not meant to supplant the criminal
    justice system but to provide a political remedy for offenses
    so egregious and damaging that the President can no longer be
    trusted to serve the national interest.
        The House managers therefore had the burden of proving in a
    clear and convincing way that the behavior on which the
    articles of impeachment are based has irreparably compromised
    the President's capacity to govern in the Nation's best
    interest. I conclude that, as unsettling as their arguments
    have been, they have not met that burden.
        I base that conclusion in part on the factual context of
    the President's actions. As the record makes abundantly clear,
    the President's false and misleading statements under oath and
    his broader deception and coverup stemmed directly from his
    private sexual misconduct, something that no other sitting
    American president to my knowledge has ever been questioned
    about in a legal setting. On each occasion when I came close to
    the brink of deciding to vote for one of the articles of
    impeachment, I invariably came back to this question of context
    and asked myself: Does this sordid story justify, for the first
    time in our Nation's history, taking out of office the person
    the American people chose to lead the country? Each time I
    answered, ``no.''
        The record shows that the President was not trying to
    conceal public malfeasance or some heinous crime, like murder.
    And I believe that distinction, while not determinative, does
    matter. The American people, according to most public surveys,
    also think that distinction matters--which helps us to
    understand why the overwhelming majority of them can
    simultaneously hold the views that the President has demeaned
    his office and yet should not be evicted from it.
        In noting this, I recognize that it would be a dereliction
    of our duty to substitute public opinion polls for our reasoned
    judgment in resolving this constitutional crisis. But it would
    also be a serious error to ignore the people's voice, because
    in exercising our authority as a Court of Impeachment we are
    standing in the place of the voters who re-elected the
    President 2 years ago.
        In this case, the prevailing public opposition to
    impeachment has particular relevance, for it provides
    substantial evidence that the President's misconduct, while
    harmful to his moral authority and his personal credibility,
    has not been so harmful as to shatter the public's faith in his
    ability to fulfill his Presidential duties and act in their
    interest. Nearly two-thirds of them say repeatedly that they
    approve of the job that President Clinton is doing and that
    they oppose his removal, which means that, though they are
    deeply disaffected by his personal behavior, they do not
    believe that he has lost his capacity to govern in the national
    interest.
        In reaching my conclusion, I first had to determine that
    the request of the House managers to bring witnesses to the
    floor would not add to the record and the arguments that have
    been made, or change my conclusion or the outcome of this
    trial, which most Senators and observers agree will not end in
    the President's removal. It is true that witnesses may add
    demeanor evidence, but they will subtract from the Senate's
    demeanor, and unnecessarily extend the trial for some time,
    preventing the Senate from returning to the other pressing
    business of the Nation.
        Am I content to have this trial end in the articles failing
    to receive the required two-thirds vote of the Senate for
    removal? The truth is that nothing about this terrible national
    experience leaves me comfortable. But an unequivocal,
    bipartisan statement of censure by Congress would, at least,
    fulfill our responsibility to our children and our posterity to
    speak to the common values the President has violated, and make
    clear what our expectations are for future Presidents. Such a
    censure would bring better closure to this demeaning and
    divisive episode, and help us begin to heal the injuries the
    President's misconduct and the impeachment process'
    partisanship have done to the American body politic, and to the
    soul of the Nation.
                                    ------

      MOTION TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES IN COURT OF IMPEACHMENT OF
                           WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

        Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, there is a lot about this
    impeachment process that is new and unfamiliar to all of us.
    That is all the more reason why we should allow ourselves to be
    guided by the Constitution and historical precedents in
    deciding how we proceed. The Constitution's requirement that
    the Senate ``shall have the sole Power to try all
    Impeachments'' certainly suggests that the Senate will
    ordinarily do more than simply look at the record made by the
    House in deciding whether to send us articles of impeachment,
    and that has generally been the Senate's practice.
        Moreover, the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment is
    charged with seeking the truth in this trial. If any Senators
    reasonably believe that hearing witnesses would assist in
    finding the truth, then I believe both the President and the
    House should have the opportunity to call witnesses. Based on
    the record before us and the arguments we have heard, it is
    clear that at least on some of the House's charges, there are
    factual issues in dispute that the witnesses whom this motion
    proposes to subpoena for depositions could help us resolve.
        It is for this reason, Mr. Chief Justice, that I support
    the motion to allow both sides to depose these three witnesses.
    I do not see why this limited discovery should in any way cause
    this matter to be drawn out for any extended period of time.
    Rather, I believe it can be conducted very expeditiously
    without in any way jeopardizing the Senate's ability to conduct
    other important legislative business.
                                    ------

                           Thursday, January 28, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:04 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Almighty God, thank You for the gift of vibrant confidence
    based on vital convictions. We are confident in Your unlimited
    power. Therefore, at no time are we helpless or hapless. Our
    confidence is rooted in Your Commandments. Therefore, we are
    strengthened by Your absolutes that give us enduring values.
    Our courage is based on the assurance of Your ever-present,
    guiding Spirit. Therefore, we will not fear. Our hope is rooted
    in trust in Your reliability. Therefore, we will not be
    anxious. Your interventions in trying times in the past have
    made us hopeful thinkers for the future. Therefore, we trust
    You.
        You have called us to glorify You in the work here in this
    Senate. Therefore, we give You our best for this day's
    responsibilities. You have guided our beloved Nation through
    difficult periods of discord and division in the past.
    Therefore, we ask for Your help in the present deliberations of
    the impeachment trial. Thank You for the courage that flows
    from our unshakable confidence in You. Through our Lord and
    Saviour. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Senators will be seated. The Sergeant at
    Arms will make the proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

                               order of procedure

        Mr. LOTT. For the information of all of our colleagues--
    obviously, they have already received the word by the fact that
    they are not all present--but we are still attempting to reach
    an agreement with respect to the remaining procedures for the
    trial, particularly with regard to how and when the depositions
    will be taken.
        We have been making progress, but it is something we need
    to be careful about. Hopefully, we will be able to reach an
    agreement yet today. If agreement is reached, I expect it very
    likely that a rollcall vote would be requested on that
    agreement and, therefore, all Members should be aware of that.
    We will notify them via the hotline system as the voting
    schedule becomes clear. Certainly we will keep the Chief
    Justice informed of our deliberations and when we anticipate
    the need to reconvene.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. But in view of the continuing negotiations and
    conferences that are meeting at this time, I ask unanimous
    consent the Senate stand in recess until the hour of 2 p.m.
    today.
        There being no objection, at 1:07 p.m., the Senate recessed
    until 2:02 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, again, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in an effort to get an
    agreement on how to proceed, it is very important that all
    parties are aware of the procedures that we are outlining and
    that those include Senators on both sides of the aisle, the
    House managers, the White House, the attorneys for the
    witnesses. So it does take time.
        Just as we were prepared to come in at 2 and move to a
    resolution, questions were raised about a couple specific
    points. We believe those questions need to be clarified for
    certainty. Rather than continue to recess hour to hour, which I
    know is not fair to the Chief Justice, I think it would be
    better at this point to make sure Senators are aware that we
    are working to get an agreement on this procedure. We need to
    get that done today so the depositions can get underway with
    the attorneys consulting with their clients Friday and
    Saturday. Hopefully, the depositions will begin on Sunday and
    Monday and be completed by Tuesday. But we are working on the
    details of that.
        This still could very well require a vote or two today or
    even tomorrow. But we will make that announcement once it is
    clear that it is going to take a recorded vote of one or more
    and exactly how that would work.
        We will keep the Chief Justice notified of the expected
    timeframe and, as information becomes available, as to exactly
    when we will come back into session, and whether or not or how
    many votes will be required. We will get that information to
    Senators.

                    Recess Subject to the Call of the Chair

        Mr. LOTT. In view of all that, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate stand in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
        There being no objection, at 2:03 p.m., the Senate recessed
    subject to the call of the Chair.
        The Senate reassembled at 5:31 p.m., when called to order
    by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        I thought we were ready to proceed. I see Senator Daschle
    is not on the floor. He should be back momentarily. Maybe I can
    explain a few details. He is returning now. We may still need a
    little more time.
        We thank you for your patience, and our colleagues on both
    sides for their patience, as we have tried to work through the
    details of these resolutions and how to proceed with the
    depositions. There are a lot of details to it and everybody
    needs to be relatively comfortable that they understand how it
    will work. That is why it has taken this additional time.
        I think we are to the point where we are ready to proceed.
    I believe the way it will proceed is that we will have a
    resolution which I will send to the desk, followed by a
    substitute from Senator Daschle. Then Senator Daschle has
    indicated that they may want to have a motion to go straight to
    the articles of impeachment. That would require three votes.
    Then we also, at that point, would make it clear the
    depositions would begin on Monday, the 1st. It is our intent to
    then go to those three votes. I also understand that the
    parties are willing to waive the debate time on these issues.
        With that explanation, I begin that process.

       Relating to the Procedures Concerning the Articles of Impeachment
                       Against William Jefferson Clinton

        Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk and ask unanimous
    consent that it be read in its entirety by the clerk, and time
    for the two parties be waived.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the resolution in
    its entirety.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe there was a request for unanimous
    consent.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the request is agreed
    to.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        A resolution (S. Res. 30) relative to the procedures concerning the
    Articles of Impeachment against William Jefferson Clinton.
        Resolved,

      TITLE I--PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST
                           WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

        Sec. 101. That the deposition time for all witnesses be determined
    by the Senate Majority Leader and Minority Leader, as outlined in
    Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, and
    title II of this resolution and that all Senators have an opportunity
    to review all deposition material, which shall be made available at the
    earliest possible time.
        Sec. 102. When the Senate reconvenes on the day after completion of
    the depositions, and the review period, it shall be in order for both
    the House Managers and the President's counsel to move to resolve any
    objections made during any deposition. After resolution of any such
    motions, it shall be in order for the House Managers and/or White House
    counsel to make a motion or motions to admit the depositions or
    portions thereof into evidence, whether transcribed or on video tape
    provided further for a presentation employing all or portions of such
    tape, and it shall then be in order for the two Leaders jointly, only
    to make motions for additional discovery because of new relevant
    evidence discovered during the depositions. Motions may also then be
    made for orders governing the presentation of evidence and/or the
    testifying of witnesses before the Senate.
        Sec. 103. If no such motions are made, or following the completion
    of any procedures authorized as a result of the votes on any motions,
    the White House shall have up to 24 hours to make any motions dealing
    with testimony or evidence that the White House counsel deems
    appropriate, as described previously.
        Sec. 104. If no such motions are made, or no witnesses are called
    to testify in the Senate, the Senate shall proceed to final arguments
    as provided in the impeachment rules waiving the two person rule
    contained in Rule XXII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the
    Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials for not to exceed six hours,
    to be equally divided. If motions are agreed to regarding new evidence
    or calling of new witnesses, this resolution is suspended.
        Sec. 105. At the conclusion of the final arguments the parties
    shall proceed in accordance with the rules of impeachment: Provided
    however, That no motion with respect to re-opening the record in the
    case shall be in order, and: Provided further, That it shall be in
    order for a Senator to offer a motion to suspend the rules to allow for
    open final deliberations with no amendments or motions to that motion
    in order; and the Senate shall proceed to vote on the motion to suspend
    the rules to provide for open Senate deliberations.
        Sec. 106. Following that vote, and if no motions have been agreed
    to as provided in sections 102 and 103, and no motions are agreed to
    following the arguments, then the vote will occur on any pending
    motions and amendments thereto and then on the articles of impeachment
    no later than 12:00 noon on Friday, February 12, 1999.

    TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE
    TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
                         PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of
    Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment
    Trials, and S. Res. 16, 106th Congress, 1st Session, the Chief Justice
    of the United States, through the Secretary of the Senate, shall issue
    subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral deposition to the
    following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S. Lewinsky, and Vernon
    E. Jordan, Jr.
        Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the
    services of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the
    United States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued
    by this resolution.
        Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken
    before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators
    appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting
    jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed
    by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When
    Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers
    shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question
    arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be
    noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition, but
    the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such
    question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary
    to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, and must identify such
    privilege cited if refusing to answer a question.
        Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be
    conducted by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel,
    and by counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no
    more than two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for
    the President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of
    the examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be
    limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The
    party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18
    hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the
    deposing party intends to enter into the record during the deposition.
    No exhibits outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for
    articles and materials in the press, including electronic media. Any
    party may interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared
    adverse.
        Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of
    the proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in
    private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the
    following: the witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the
    part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President,
    and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is
    required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped
    and transcript forms, and employees of the Senate whose presence is
    required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the
    depositions, or for other purposes, as determined after consultation by
    the Majority Leader with the Democratic Leader. All present must
    maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings.
        Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the
    videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the
    Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential
    proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make
    available for review any of the videotaped or transcribed deposition
    records to Members of the Senate, one designated staff member per
    Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct the Secretary of
    the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use whichever means of
    dissemination, including printing as Senate documents, printing in the
    Congressional Record, photo- and video-duplication, and electronic
    dissemination, he determines to be appropriate to accomplish any
    distribution of the videotaped or transcribed deposition records that
    he is directed to make pursuant to this section.
        Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be
    deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of
    the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, 100th
    Congress, 1st Session, 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d,
    288f, 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6002, 6005, and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1365. The
    Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including
    videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 5. Such
    expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation
    Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon
    vouchers approved by the Secretary.
        Sec. 208. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of
    the House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority
    leader.

                                Amendment No. 1

        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I have an amendment that I
    send to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the amendment.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] proposes an amendment
    numbered 1.
        In the resolution strike all after the word ``that'' in the first
    line and insert the following:

    ``the deposition time for all witnesses to be deposed be limited to no
    later than close of business Wednesday, February 3 and that all
    Senators have an opportunity to review all deposition material, which
    shall be made available at the earliest possible time.
        ``When the Senate reconvenes the trial at 10 a.m. on Saturday,
    February 6 it shall be in order to resolve any objections that may not
    be resolved regarding the depositions; after these deposition
    objections have been disposed of, it shall be in order for the House
    managers and/or the White House counsel to make a motion, or motions to
    admit the depositions or portions thereof into evidence, such motions
    shall be limited to transcribed deposition material only;
        ``On Monday, February 8 there shall be 4 hours equally divided for
    closing arguments; with the White House using the first 2 hours and the
    House Republican managers using the final 2 hours; that
        ``Upon the completion of the closing arguments the Senate shall
    begin final deliberation on the articles; a timely filed motion to
    suspend the rules and open these deliberations shall be in order; upon
    the completion of these deliberations the Senate shall, without any
    intervening action, amendment, motion or debate, vote on the articles
    of impeachment.
        ``Provided further, That the votes on the articles shall occur no
    later than 12 noon Friday, February 12.''

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Utah, Mr. Hatch.
        Mr. HATCH. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chief Justice: Does
    the majority leader's resolution, does that also keep open the
    right of Senators to file----
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian says it takes a
    unanimous consent for a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. HATCH. I ask unanimous consent I be permitted to ask
    one question.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. HATCH. Does the majority leader's resolution allow for
    the filing and consideration of motions that may not be
    mentioned in the resolution itself?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me it is never
    the function of the Chair to interpret a resolution.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe the regular order is that now we would
    go to a vote on the two resolutions. Just for the information
    of Senators, after that, Senator Daschle may have a motion,
    again, as I indicated earlier, just to go to a vote on the
    articles of impeachment.
        So there could be three votes now, in order, without
    intervening debate. After that, Senator Daschle and I will
    formally lock in the beginning time for the depositions.
        I yield the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The first vote will be on the amendment
    from the minority leader, the Senator from South Dakota.
        The yeas and nays are required.
        The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr.
    Allard] is necessarily absent.
        Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms.
    Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
        I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator
    from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``aye.''
        The result was announced--yeas 44, nays 54, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 6]

                     [Subject: Daschle amendment No. 1 to
                                  S. Res. 30]

                                    YEAS--44

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--54

    Abraham
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                 NOT VOTING--2

    Allard
    Mikulski

        The amendment (No. 1) was rejected.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on agreeing to S. Res.
    30, the resolution offered by Senator Lott. On this question,
    the yeas and nays are called for.
        Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority
    leader.
        Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, the Senate is not in order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                                Amendment No. 2

        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I send an amendment to the
    desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] proposes an
    amendment numbered 2.
        In the resolution strike all after the word ``that'' in the
    first line and insert the following:

    ``the Senate now proceed to closing arguments; that there be 2
    hours for the White House counsel followed by 2 hours for the
    House managers; and that at the conclusion of this time the
    Senate proceed to vote, on each of the articles, without
    intervening action, motion or debate, except for deliberations,
    if so decided by the Senate.''

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the amendment just
    read. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the
    roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr.
    Allard] is necessarily absent.
        Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms.
    Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
        I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator
    from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``aye.''
        The result was announced--yeas 43, nays 55, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 7]

                       [Subject: Daschle amendment No. 2]

                                    YEAS--43

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--55

    Abraham
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                 NOT VOTING--2

    Allard
    Mikulski

        The amendment (No. 2) was rejected.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, may we have order, please?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

                                Amendment No. 3

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I send an amendment to the
    desk modifying the last paragraph of page 3.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the amendment.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] proposes an
    amendment numbered 3.
        On page 3, strike the words ``any pending motions and
    amendments thereto and then on'' and insert the following at
    the end of page 3 ``strike the period and insert, if all
    motions are disposed of and final deliberations are
    completed.''

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the amendment be agreed to and that the motion to reconsider be
    laid upon the table.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        The amendment (No. 3) was agreed to.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the resolution, as
    amended. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call
    the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr.
    Allard] is necessarily absent.
        Mr. REID. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms.
    Mikulski] is absent because of illness.
        I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator
    from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] would vote ``no.''
        The result was announced--yeas 54, nays 44, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 8]

                        [Subject: S. Res. 30 as amended]

                                    YEAS--54

    Abraham
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                    NAYS--44

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                 NOT VOTING--2

    Allard
    Mikulski

        The resolution (S. Res. 30), as amended, was agreed to.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                            Modification To Title II

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, with regard to the beginning
    of the depositions, I ask unanimous consent that title II of S.
    Res. 30 be modified with the language I send to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        The modification follows:

    TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE
    TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
                         PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

      Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of Procedure
    and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, and
    Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, the
    Chief Justice of the United States, through the Secretary of the
    Senate, shall issue subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral
    deposition to the following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S.
    Lewinsky, and Vernon E. Jordon, Jr.
      Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the services
    of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the United
    States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued by this
    resolution.
      Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken
    before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators
    appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting
    jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed
    by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When
    Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers
    shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question
    arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be
    noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition but
    the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such
    question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary
    to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, or constitutional right,
    and must identify such privilege cited if refusing to answer a
    question.
      Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be conducted
    by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel, and by
    counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no more than
    two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for the
    President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of the
    examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be
    limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The
    party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18
    hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the
    deposing party intends to enter into the deposition. No exhibits
    outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for articles and
    materials in the press, including electronic media. Any party may
    interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared adverse.
      Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of the
    proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in
    private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the
    following: The witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the
    part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President,
    and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is
    required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped
    and transcript forms, and Senate staff members whose presence is
    required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the
    depositions, or for other purposes, as determined by the Majority
    Leader and the Democratic Leader. All present must maintain the
    confidentiality of the proceedings.
      Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the
    videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the
    Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential
    proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make
    available for review at secure locations, any of the videotaped or
    transcribed deposition records to Members of the Senate, one designated
    staff member per Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct
    the Secretary of the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use
    whichever means of dissemination, including printing as Senate
    documents, printing in the Congressional Record, photo- and video-
    duplication, and electronic dissemination, he determines to be
    appropriate to accomplish any distribution of the videotaped or
    transcribed deposition records that he is directed to make pursuant to
    this section.
      Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be
    deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of
    the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, One Hundredth
    Congress, First Session, sections 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d, 288f of
    title 2, United States Code, sections 6002, 6005 of title 18, United
    States Code, and section 1365 of title 28, United States Code. The
    Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including
    videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 205. Such
    expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation
    Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon
    vouchers approved by the Secretary.
      Sec. 208. The Majority and Minority Leaders, acting jointly, may make
    other provisions for the orderly and fair conduct of these depositions
    as they seem appropriate.
      Sec. 209. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of the
    House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

        The resolution (S. Res. 30), as amended, as modified, reads
    as follows:

                                   S. Res. 30

      Resolved,

      TITLE I--PROCEDURES CONCERNING THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST
                           WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

      Sec. 101. That the deposition time for all witnesses be determined by
    the Senate Majority Leader and Minority Leader, as outlined in Senate
    Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, and title II
    of this resolution and that all Senators have an opportunity to review
    all deposition material, which shall be made available at the earliest
    possible time.
      Sec. 102. When the Senate reconvenes on the day after completion of
    the depositions, and the review period, it shall be in order for both
    the House Managers and the President's counsel to move to resolve any
    objections made during any deposition. After resolution of any such
    motions, it shall be in order for the House Managers and/or White House
    counsel to make a motion or motions to admit the depositions or
    portions thereof into evidence, whether transcribed or on videotape
    provided further for a presentation employing all or portions of such
    tape, and it shall then be in order for the two Leaders jointly, only
    to make motions for additional discovery because of new relevant
    evidence discovered during the depositions. Motions may also then be
    made for orders governing the presentation of evidence and/or the
    testifying of witnesses before the Senate.
      Sec. 103. If no such motions are made, or following the completion of
    any procedures authorized as a result of the votes on any motions, the
    White House shall have up to 24 hours to make any motions dealing with
    testimony or evidence that the White House counsel deems appropriate,
    as described previously.
      Sec. 104. If no such motions are made, or no witnesses are called to
    testify in the Senate, the Senate shall proceed to final arguments as
    provided in the impeachment rules waiving the two person rule contained
    in Rule XXII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When
    Sitting on Impeachment Trials for not to exceed six hours, to be
    equally divided. If motions are agreed to regarding new evidence or
    calling of new witnesses, this resolution is suspended.
      Sec. 105. At the conclusion of the final arguments the parties shall
    proceed in accordance with the rules of impeachment: Provided however,
    That no motion with respect to reopening the record in the case shall
    be in order, and: Provided further, That it shall be in order for a
    Senator to offer a motion to suspend the rules to allow for open final
    deliberations with no amendments or motions to that motion in order;
    and the Senate shall proceed to vote on the motion to suspend the rules
    to provide for open Senate deliberations.
      Sec. 106. Following that vote, and if no motions have been agreed to
    as provided in sections 102 and 103, and no motions are agreed to
    following the arguments, then the vote will occur on the articles of
    impeachment no later than 12:00 noon on Friday, February 12, 1999, if
    all motions are disposed of and final deliberations are completed.

    TITLE II--TO AUTHORIZE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS IN THE
    TRIAL OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,
                         PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

      Sec. 201. That, pursuant to Rules V and VI of the Rules of Procedure
    and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, and
    Senate Resolution 16, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, the
    Chief Justice of the United States, through the Secretary of the
    Senate, shall issue subpoenas for the taking of testimony on oral
    deposition to the following witnesses: Sidney Blumenthal, Monica S.
    Lewinsky, and Vernon E. Jordon, Jr.
      Sec. 202. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to utilize the services
    of the Deputy Sergeant at Arms or any other employee of the United
    States Senate in serving the subpoenas authorized to be issued by this
    resolution.
      Sec. 203. Depositions authorized by this resolution shall be taken
    before, and presided over by, on behalf of the Senate, two Senators
    appointed by the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader, acting
    jointly, one of whom shall administer to witnesses the oath prescribed
    by Rule XXV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When
    Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Acting jointly, the presiding officers
    shall have authority to rule, as an initial matter, upon any question
    arising out of the deposition. All objections to a question shall be
    noted by the presiding officers upon the record of the deposition but
    the examination shall proceed, and the witness shall answer such
    question. A witness may refuse to answer a question only when necessary
    to preserve a legally-recognized privilege, or constitutional right,
    and must identify such privilege cited if refusing to answer a
    question.
      Sec. 204. Examination of witnesses at depositions shall be conducted
    by the Managers on the part of the House or their counsel, and by
    counsel for the President. Witnesses shall be examined by no more than
    two persons each on behalf of the Managers and counsel for the
    President. Witnesses may be accompanied by counsel. The scope of the
    examination by the Managers and counsel for both parties shall be
    limited to the subject matters reflected in the Senate record. The
    party taking a deposition shall present to the other party, at least 18
    hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all exhibits which the
    deposing party intends to enter into the deposition. No exhibits
    outside of the Senate record shall be employed, except for articles and
    materials in the press, including electronic media. Any party may
    interrogate any witness as if that witness were declared adverse.
      Sec. 205. The depositions shall be videotaped and a transcript of the
    proceedings shall be made. The depositions shall be conducted in
    private. No person shall be admitted to any deposition except for the
    following: The witness, counsel for the witness, the Managers on the
    part of the House, counsel for the Managers, counsel for the President,
    and the presiding officers; further, such persons whose presence is
    required to make and preserve a record of the proceedings in videotaped
    and transcript forms, and Senate staff members whose presence is
    required to assist the presiding officers in presiding over the
    depositions, or for other purposes, as determined by the Majority
    Leader and the Democratic Leader. All present must maintain the
    confidentiality of the proceedings.
      Sec. 206. The presiding officers at the depositions shall file the
    videotaped and transcribed records of the depositions with the
    Secretary of the Senate, who shall maintain them as confidential
    proceedings of the Senate. The Sergeant at Arms is authorized to make
    available for review at secure locations, any of the videotaped or
    transcribed deposition records to Members of the Senate, one designated
    staff member per Senator, and the Chief Justice. The Senate may direct
    the Secretary of the Senate to distribute such materials, and to use
    whichever means of dissemination, including printing as Senate
    documents, printing in the Congressional Record, photo- and video-
    duplication, and electronic dissemination, he determines to be
    appropriate to accomplish any distribution of the videotaped or
    transcribed deposition records that he is directed to make pursuant to
    this section.
      Sec. 207. The depositions authorized by this resolution shall be
    deemed to be proceedings before the Senate for purposes of Rule XXIX of
    the Standing Rules of the Senate, Senate Resolution 259, One Hundredth
    Congress, First Session, sections 191, 192, 194, 288b, 288d, 288f of
    title 2, United States Code, sections 6002, 6005 of title 18, United
    States Code, and section 1365 of title 28, United States Code. The
    Secretary shall arrange for stenographic assistance, including
    videotaping, to record the depositions as provided in section 205. Such
    expenses as may be necessary shall be paid from the Appropriation
    Account--Miscellaneous Items in the contingent fund of the Senate upon
    vouchers approved by the Secretary.
      Sec. 208. The Majority and Minority Leaders, acting jointly, may make
    other provisions for the orderly and fair conduct of these depositions
    as they seem appropriate.
      Sec. 209. The Secretary shall notify the Managers on the part of the
    House, and counsel for the President, of this resolution.

                          Unanimous Consent Agreement

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the unanimous consent agreement I send to the desk be agreed
    to. This all deals with the taking of depositions.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        The text of the unanimous consent agreement reads as
    follows:

        I ask unanimous consent that the time and place to take
    depositions in the trial of the articles of impeachment against
    William Jefferson Clinton be decided jointly by the majority
    leader, and the Democratic leader, and shall be set forth in
    each subpoena.
        I further ask unanimous consent that the opportunity for
    taking depositions of Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney
    Blumenthal expires when the Senate convenes on Thursday, Feb.
    4, 1999.
        Finally I ask unanimous consent that each deposition may
    last no more than 8 hours, unless the majority leader, and the
    Democratic leader determine on a deposition-by-deposition
    basis, to extend the time of the deposition, and all the time
    allotted for examination shall be divided equally between the
    parties, and time consumed by objections shall not be charged
    to either objecting party.

        Mr. LOTT. Now, I understand, Mr. Chief Justice, that the
    Democratic leader is prepared to agree that the depositions
    will begin on Monday, February 1, and with this having been
    decided, and the vote we just took, we have discussed the
    schedule for the remainder of the week. In view of the fact
    that at this point the parties will begin to prepare for
    depositions and the depositions will begin on Monday, Members
    will not be expected to be here for any business before
    Wednesday, but we could be required to have a session Wednesday
    afternoon.
        I want to emphasize that as the deposition material becomes
    available, we will have the Sergeant at Arms have it in a room
    for Members to begin to review. So beginning Tuesday, for
    Senators who would like to begin reviewing the depositions, the
    material in the depositions, it will be available in
    installments as it becomes available on Tuesday. So you would
    have that opportunity Tuesday and Wednesday. Not later than
    Thursday, then, we would go to the next phase of our agreement
    that we have voted on.
        At this time, we are notifying the Members that there will
    be no further recorded votes and no further business while we
    await returning of the depositions through Friday, Saturday,
    Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, but Members should expect to be
    here on Wednesday and they would need to be here on Wednesday,
    in order to begin to make sure they have had time to review the
    documents, the deposition material, so that we can proceed,
    then, on Thursday.
        Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator yield?
        Mr. LOTT. I yield.
        Mr. HARKIN. Are Senators allowed to attend these
    depositions or not?
        Mr. LOTT. Under the agreement we just passed, Mr. Chief
    Justice, if I may proceed and respond to that question.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mr. LOTT. There will be a Senator from each side at the
    depositions who will preside over the depositions. Senator
    Daschle and I also will have certain staff there, but a Senator
    other than the two presiding Senators would not be in order to
    what we agreed to. There will be one from each side who will be
    presiding and will actually make determinations when objections
    are made.
                                    ------

              ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that the Court of
    Impeachment stand in adjournment until the hour of 1 p.m. on
    Thursday, February 4.
        There being no objection, at 6:34 p.m. the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, February
    4, 1999, at 1 p.m.

             THE IMPEACHMENT OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

        Mr. CLELAND. Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by saying that
    the reason we are here today, the reason the United States
    Senate is being asked to exercise what Alexander Hamilton
    termed the ``awful discretion'' of impeachment, is because of
    the wrongful, reprehensible, indefensible conduct of one
    person, the President of the United States, William Jefferson
    Clinton. Indeed, I believe it is conduct deserving of the
    censure of the Senate, and I will support such a resolution
    when it comes before us.
        The question before the Senate, however, is not whether the
    President's conduct was wrong, or immoral, or even censurable.
    We must decide solely as to whether or not he should be
    convicted of the allegations contained in the articles of
    impeachment and thus removed from office. In my opinion, the
    case for removal, presented in great detail in the massive
    60,000-page report submitted by the House, in many hours of
    very capable but often repetitive presentations to the Senate
    by the House managers and the President's defense team, and in
    many additional hours of Senators' questioning of the two
    sides, fails to meet the very high standards which we must
    demand with respect to Presidential impeachments. Therefore, I
    will vote to dismiss the impeachment case against William
    Jefferson Clinton, and to vote for the Senate resuming other
    necessary work for the American people.
        To this very point, I have reserved my judgment on this
    question because of my constitutional responsibility and oath
    to ``render impartial justice'' in this case. Most of the same
    record presented in great detail to Senators in the course of
    the last several weeks has long been before the public, and
    indeed most of that public, including editorial boards, talk
    show hosts, and so forth, long ago reached their own
    conclusions as to the impeachment of President Clinton. But I
    have now heard enough to make my decision. With respect to the
    witnesses the House managers apparently now wish to depose and
    call before the Senate, the existing record represents multiple
    interrogations by the Office of the Independent Counsel and its
    grand jury, with not only no cross-examinations by the
    President's counsel but, with the exception of the President's
    testimony, without even the presence of the witnesses' own
    counsel. It is difficult for me to see how that record would
    possibly be improved from the prosecution's standpoint. Thus, I
    will not support motions to depose or call witnesses.
        In reaching my decision on impeachment, there are a number
    of factors which have been discussed or speculated about in the
    news media which were not a part of my calculations.
        First of all, while as political creatures neither the
    Senate nor the House can or should be immune from public
    opinion, we have a very precise constitutionally-prescribed
    responsibility in this matter, and popular opinion must not be
    a controlling consideration. I believe Republican Senator
    William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said it best during the only
    previous Presidential impeachment trial in 1868:

        To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the
    conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he
    is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate .
    . . The people have not heard the evidence as we have heard it.
    The responsibility is not on them, but upon us. They have not
    taken an oath to ``do impartial justice according to the
    Constitution and the laws.'' I have taken that oath. I cannot
    render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer
    to themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should
    consider myself undeserving of the confidence of that just and
    intelligent people who imposed upon me this great
    responsibility, and unworthy of a place among honorable men, if
    for any fear of public reprobation, and for the sake of
    securing popular favor, I should disregard the convictions of
    my judgment and my conscience.

        Nor was my decision premised on the notion, suggested by
    some, that the stability of our Government would be severely
    jeopardized by the impeachment of President Clinton. I have
    full faith in the strength of our Government and its leaders
    and, more importantly, faith in the American people to cope
    successfully with whatever the Senate decides. There can be no
    doubt that the impeachment of a President would not be easy for
    the country but just in this century, about to end, we have
    endured great depressions and world wars. Today, the U.S.
    economy is strong, the will of the people to move beyond this
    national nightmare is great, and we have an experienced and
    able Vice President who is more than capable of stepping up and
    assuming the role of the President.
        Third, although we have heard much argument that the
    precedents of judicial impeachments should be controlling in
    this case, I have not been convinced and did not rely on such
    testimony in making my decision. After a review of the record,
    historical precedents, and consideration of the different roles
    of Presidents and Federal judges, I have concluded that there
    is indeed a different legal standard for impeachment of
    Presidents and Federal judges. Article 11, Section 4 of the
    Constitution provides that ``the President, Vice President, and
    all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from
    Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
    or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article III, Section I
    of the Constitution indicates that judges ``shall hold their
    Offices during good Behavior.'' Presidents are elected by the
    people and serve for a fixed term of years, while Federal
    judges are appointed without public approval to serve a life
    tenure without any accountability to the public. Therefore,
    under our system, impeachment is the only way to remove a
    Federal judge from office while Presidents serve for a
    specified term and face accountability to the public through
    elections. With respect to the differing impeachment standards
    themselves, Chief Justice Rehnquist once wrote, ``the terms
    `treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors' are
    narrower than the malfeasance in office and failure to perform
    the duties of the office, which may be grounds for forfeiture
    of office held during good behavior.''
        And my conclusions with respect to impeachment were not
    based upon considerations of the proper punishment of President
    Clinton for his misdeeds. During the impeachment of President
    Nixon, the Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry
    concluded that ``impeachment is the first step in a remedial
    process--removal from office and possible disqualification from
    holding future office. The purpose of impeachment is not
    personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain
    constitutional government.'' Regardless of the outcome of the
    Senate impeachment trial, President Clinton remains subject to
    censure by the House and Senate, and criminal prosecution for
    any crimes he may have committed. Whatever punishment President
    Clinton deserves for his misdeeds will be provided elsewhere.
        Finally, I do not believe that perjury or obstruction of
    justice could never rise to the level of threatening grievous
    harm to the Republic, and thus represent adequate grounds for
    removal of a President. However, we must approach such a
    determination with the greatest of care. Impeachment of a
    President is, perhaps with the power to declare War, the
    gravest of constitutional responsibilities bestowed upon the
    Congress. During the history of the United States, the Senate
    has only held impeachment trials for two Presidents, the 1868
    trial of President Johnson, who had not been elected to that
    office, and now President Clinton. Although the Senate can look
    to impeachment trials of other public officials, primarily
    judicial, as I have already said, I do not believe that those
    precedents are or should be controlling in impeachment trials
    of Presidents, or indeed of other elected officials.
        My decision was based on one overriding concern: the impact
    of this precedent-setting case on the future of the Presidency,
    and indeed of the Congress itself. It is not Bill Clinton who
    should occupy our only attention. He already stands rebuked by
    the House impeachment votes, and by the words of virtually
    every Member of Congress of both political parties. And even if
    we do not remove him from office, he still stands liable to
    future criminal prosecution for his actions, as well as to the
    verdict of history. No, it is Mr. Clinton's successors,
    Republican, Democrat or any other party, who should be our
    concern.
        The Republican Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who
    ``looked down into my open grave'' of political oblivion when
    he cast one of the decisive votes in acquitting Andrew Johnson
    in spite of his personal dislike of the President explained his
    motivation this way:

        . . . In a large sense, the independence of the executive
    office as a coordinate branch of the government was on trial .
    . . If . . . the President must step down . . . upon
    insufficient proofs and from partisan considerations, the
    office of President would be degraded, cease to be a coordinate
    branch of government, and ever after subordinated to the
    legislative will. It would practically have revolutionized our
    splendid political fabric into a partisan Congressional
    autocracy.

        While our Government is certainly on a stronger foundation
    now than in the aftermath of the Civil War, the basic point
    remains valid. If anything, in today's world of rapidly
    emerging events and threats, we need an effective, independent
    Presidency even more than did mid-19th Century Americans.
        While in the history of the United States the U.S. Senate
    has never before considered impeachment articles against a
    sitting elected official, we do have numerous cases of each
    House exercising its constitutional right to, ``punish its
    Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
    two-thirds expel a Member.'' However, since the Civil War,
    while a variety of cases involving personal and private
    misconduct have been considered, the Senate has never voted to
    expel a Member, choosing to censure instead on seven occasions,
    and the House has rarely chosen the ultimate sanction. Should
    the removal of a President be subject to greater punishment
    with lesser standards of evidence than the Congress has applied
    to itself when the Constitution appears to call for the reverse
    in limiting impeachment to cases of ``treason, bribery and
    other high crimes or misdemeanors''? In my view, the answer
    must be no.
        Thus, for me, as one Senator, the bar for impeachment and
    removal from office of a President must be a high one. I want
    the record to reflect that my vote to dismiss is based upon a
    standard of evidence equivalent to that used in criminal
    proceedings--that is, that guilt must be proven ``beyond a
    reasonable doubt''--and a standard of impeachable offense
    which, in my view, conforms to the founders' intentions that
    such an offense must be one which represents official
    misconduct threatening grievous harm to our whole system of
    government. To quote Federalist No. 65, Hamilton defined as
    impeachable:

        Those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
    men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some
    public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar
    propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to
    injuries done immediately to the society itself.

        As I have said before, I can conceive of instances in which
    both perjury and obstruction of justice would meet this test. I
    certainly believe that most, if not all, capital crimes,
    including murder, would qualify for impeachment and removal
    from office. However, in my judgment, the current case does not
    reach the necessary high standard.
        In the words of John F. Kennedy, ``with a good conscience
    our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our
    deeds,'' I believe that dismissal of the impeachment case
    against William Jefferson Clinton is the appropriate action for
    the U.S. Senate. It is the action which will best preserve the
    system of government which has served us so well for over 200
    years, a system of checks and balances, with a strong and
    independent Chief Executive.
        In closing, I wish to address those in the Senate and
    House, and among the American public, who have reached a
    different conclusion than have I in this case. I do not
    question the sincerity or legitimacy of your viewpoint. The
    process itself pushes us to make absolute judgments--yes or no
    to conviction and removal from office--and the nature of debate
    yields portraits of complex issues in stark black-and-white
    terms, but I believe it is possible for reasonable people to
    reach different conclusions on this matter. Indeed, I recognize
    that, while my decision seeks to avoid the dangers of setting
    the impeachment bar too low, setting that bar too high is not
    without risks. I believe the House managers spoke eloquently
    about the need to preserve respect for the rule of law,
    including the critical principle that no one, not even the
    President of the United States, is above that rule. However, I
    have concluded that the threat to our system of a weakened
    Presidency, made in some ways subordinate to the will of the
    legislative branch, outweighs the potential harm to the rule of
    law, because that latter risk is mitigated by:
        An intact, independent criminal justice system, which
    indeed will retain the ability to render final, legal judgment
    on the President's conduct;
        A vigorous, independent press corps which remains perfectly
    capable of exposing such conduct, and of extracting a personal,
    professional and political price; and
        An independent Congress which will presumably continue to
    have the will and means to oppose Presidents who threaten our
    system of government.
        By the very nature of this situation, where I sit in
    judgment of a Democratic President as a Democratic Senator, I
    realize that my decision cannot convey the nonpartisanship
    which is essential to achieve closure on this matter, one way
    or the other. Indeed, in words which could have been written
    today, the chief proponent among the Founding Fathers of a
    vigorous Chief Executive, Alexander Hamilton, wrote in 1788, in
    No. 65 of ``The Federalist Papers,'' that impeachments ``will
    seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and
    to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical,
    to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the
    pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
    partialities, influence and interest on one side, or on the
    other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest
    danger, that the decision will be regulated more by the
    comparative strength of the parties than by the real
    demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
        I have, however, in making my decision, laid out for you
    the standards which I believe to be appropriate whenever the
    Congress considers the removal from office of an elected
    official, whether executive branch, or legislative branch. I
    will do my best to stand by those standards in all such cases
    to come before me while I have the privilege of representing
    the people of Georgia in the U.S. Senate, regardless of the
    party affiliation of the accused. I only hope and pray that no
    future President, of either party, will ever again engage in
    conduct which provides any basis, including the basis of the
    current case, for the Congress to consider the grave question
    of impeachment.
                                    ------

                  MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES

        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, during yesterday's
    impeachment trial proceedings, I voted against the motion to
    dismiss offered by the senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr.
    Byrd. I also voted in favor of allowing the House managers to
    depose a limited number of witnesses in this case. I would like
    to explain the reasons for my votes.
        Let me state first that I understand that this trial is a
    unique proceeding; it is not precisely a ``trial'' as we
    understand that term to be used in the criminal context. The
    Senate, for example, as the Chief Justice made clear in
    upholding Senator Harkin's objection early in the trial, is
    both judge and jury, with the final authority to determine not
    only the ``guilt'' or ``innocence'' of the defendant, but also
    the legal standard to apply and what kind of evidence is
    relevant to the decision.
        Nonetheless, Senator Byrd's motion was a motion to dismiss,
    which I believe gives the motion a legal connotation we must
    not ignore. I believe that in order to dismiss the case at this
    point, a Senator should be of the opinion that it is not
    possible for the House managers to show that the President has
    committed high crimes and misdemeanors, even if they are
    permitted to call the witnesses that they want to call. Even
    apart from the possibility of witness testimony, in order to
    vote for the motion, a Senator should believe that regardless
    of what occurs in the closing arguments by the parties and in
    deliberations in the Senate, that a Senator would not vote to
    convict.
        So for me, this motion to dismiss was akin to asking the
    judge in this case not to send the case to the jury. In a
    criminal trial, there is a strong presumption against taking a
    case out of the hands of the jury, and a very high degree of
    certainty on the facts of the case is demanded before a judge
    will take that step. Indeed, a judge must decide that a
    reasonable juror viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the prosecution could not vote to convict the
    defendant, before he will direct a judgment of acquittal.
        My view, as of this moment, is that to dismiss this case
    would in appearance and in fact improperly ``short circuit''
    this trial. I simply cannot say that the House managers cannot
    prevail regardless of what witnesses might plausibly testify
    and regardless of what persuasive arguments might be offered
    either by the managers or by Senators who support conviction.
    When the history of this trial is written, I want it to be
    viewed as fair and comprehensive, not as having been shortened
    merely because the result seemed preordained.
        As Senator Collins and I indicated in a letter to Senator
    Byrd on Saturday and in a unanimous consent request we offered
    on Monday, my preference would have been to divide the motion
    to dismiss and allow separate votes on the two articles of
    impeachment to more closely approximate the separate final
    votes on the two articles contemplated by the impeachment
    rules. It would have allowed the Senate to consider the
    strength of the evidence presented on the two separate articles
    and the possibility that one of the articles comes closer to
    the core meaning of high crimes and misdemeanors than the
    other.
        I believe that many of my colleagues on the Republican side
    view the perjury article as less convincing than the
    obstruction article and might have voted to dismiss it had the
    opportunity to do that been made available. But we will never
    know. When a final vote is taken on the articles, and I now
    believe such votes will almost certainly occur, I hope that my
    colleagues who did not vote to dismiss the case today will
    carefully consider the two articles separately.
        I want to be clear that my vote not to dismiss this case
    does not mean that I would vote to convict the President and
    remove him from office or that I am leaning in that direction.
    I have not reached a decision on that question. It is my
    inclination, however, to demand a very high standard of proof
    on this question. Because the House managers have relied so
    heavily on the argument that the President has committed the
    Federal crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice as the
    reason that his conduct rises to the level of high crimes and
    misdemeanors, they probably should be required to prove each
    element of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the
    standard that juries in criminal proceedings must apply. In
    this case, where the ``impeachability'' question rests so much
    on a conclusion that the President's conduct was not only
    reprehensible but also criminal, I currently believe that
    standard is the most appropriate for a Senator to apply.
        It is my view at this point that the House managers' case
    has some serious problems, and I am not certain that it can be
    helped by further testimony from witnesses. But I believe it is
    possible that it can. The managers deserve the opportunity to
    take the depositions they have requested.
        In voting against the motion to dismiss and to allow
    witnesses to be subpoenaed, I have not reached the important
    question of whether, even if the House managers manage to prove
    their case beyond a reasonable doubt, the offenses charged
    would be ``impeachable'' and require the President to be
    removed from office. That is an important question that I
    decided should be addressed in the context of a final vote on
    the articles after the evidentiary record is complete.
    Therefore, I want to be clear that my vote against the motion
    does not mean I am leaning in favor of a final vote to convict
    the President. I am not.
        But I have determined, after much thought, that we must
    continue to move forward and not truncate the proceeding at
    this point. I believe that it is appropriate for the House
    managers, and if they so choose, the President's counsel, to be
    able to depose and possibly to present the live testimony of at
    least a small number of witnesses. And I want to hear final
    arguments and deliberate with my colleagues before rendering a
    final verdict on the articles.
        I reached my decision on witnesses for a number of reasons.
    First, although I recognize that this is not a typical,
    ordinary criminal trial, it is significant and in my mind
    persuasive that in almost all criminal trials witnesses are
    called by the prosecution in trying to prove its case. Because
    I have decided that the House managers probably must be held to
    the highest standard of proof--beyond a reasonable doubt--I
    believe that they should have every reasonable opportunity to
    meet that standard and prove their case.
        Furthermore, witnesses have been called every time in our
    history that the Senate has held an impeachment trial. In two
    cases, the impeachment of Senator Blount in 1797 and the
    impeachment of Judge English in 1926, articles of impeachment
    passed by the House were dismissed without a trial. I recognize
    that an unusually exhaustive factual record has been assembled
    by the Independent Counsel, including numerous interviews with,
    and grand jury testimony from, key witnesses. That
    distinguishes this case from a number of past impeachments. But
    in at least the three judicial impeachments in the 1980s, the
    record of a full criminal trial--two resulting in conviction
    and one in acquittal--was available to the Senate and still
    witnesses testified.
        In this case, the House managers strenuously argued that
    witnesses should be called. It would call the fairness of the
    process into question were we to deny the House managers the
    opportunity to depose at least those witnesses that might shed
    light on the facts in a few key areas of disagreement in this
    case. I regard this as a close case in some respects, and the
    best course to follow is to allow both sides a fair opportunity
    to make the case they wish to make.
        This does not mean that I support an unlimited number of
    witnesses or an unnecessarily extended trial. Furthermore, at
    this point, I am reserving judgment on the question of whether
    live testimony on the Senate floor should be permitted. I
    believe the Senate has the power, and should exercise the
    power, to assure that any witnesses called to deliver live
    testimony have evidence that is truly relevant to present.
        In this regard, I think we should allow somewhat greater
    latitude to the President's counsel since he is the defendant
    in this proceeding. I am inclined to give a great deal of
    deference to requests by the President's counsel to conduct
    discovery and even call additional witnesses if they believe
    that is necessary. But at least with respect to the House
    manager's case, while we must be fair in allowing them to
    depose the witnesses they say they need to prove their case, we
    need not allow them to broaden their case beyond the acts
    alleged in the articles or inordinately extend the trial with
    witnesses who cannot reasonably be expected to provide evidence
    relevant to our decision on those articles.
        Finally, let me reiterate. My vote against the motion to
    dismiss should not be interpreted as a signal that I intend to
    vote to convict the President. Nor does it mean that I would
    not support a motion to adjourn or a motion to dismiss offered
    at some later stage of this trial, although I strongly prefer
    that this trial conclude with a final vote on the articles. It
    only means that I do not believe that dismissing the case at
    this moment is the appropriate course for the Senate to follow.
                                    ------

        MOTION OF THE HOUSE MANAGERS FOR THE APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES AT
                       DEPOSITIONS AND TO ADMIT EVIDENCE

        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, the House managers want to
    conduct depositions of at least four people and their requests
    to admit affidavits could very well lead to the depositions of
    at least three others and, indeed, many more witnesses. The
    three people they expressly ask be subpoenaed are Monica
    Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney Blumenthal. All three have
    previously testified before the Starr grand jury and Ms.
    Lewinsky has been interviewed or testified at least 23 times on
    these matters over the last year.
        The fourth deponent requested by the House managers is none
    other than the President of the United States. Although they
    characterize their request as a ``petition'' that the President
    be requested to appear, in their memorandum, the House
    Republican managers are less coy about their request. They note
    that ``obtaining testimony from the witness named in the
    motion, and additionally from the President himself'' is what
    they seek.
        The House managers' request is unprecedented in
    impeachments. The Senate has never formally requested or
    demanded that a respondent testify in his own impeachment
    trial. Should the President decide that he wants to speak to
    the Senate, that would be his choice. But I cannot support an
    effort that would have the Senate reject over 200 years of our
    jurisprudence and begin requiring an accused to prove his
    innocence.
        The presumption of innocence is a core concept in our rule
    of law and should not be so cavalierly abandoned. The petition
    of the House managers is a clever but destructive effort to
    stand this trial on its head. As a former prosecutor and trial
    attorney, I appreciate the temptation to turn the tables on an
    accused person to make up for a weak case, but the Senate
    should not condone it. The burden of proof is on the House to
    establish why the Senate should convict and remove from office
    the person the American people elected to serve as their
    President.
        I commend President Clinton for focusing on his duties as
    President and on moving the country forward. That the Congress
    remains immersed in this impeachment trial is distraction
    enough from the functions of our Federal Government. We have
    heard hours of argument from the House Republican managers and
    the response of the President's lawyers. Senator Byrd has,
    pursuant to our unanimous consent resolution governing these
    proceedings, offered a motion to dismiss to bring this entire
    matter to conclusion. If, on the other hand, the majority in
    the Senate wishes to continue these proceedings, that is the
    majority's prerogative.
        The House managers apparently want to excuse the weaknesses
    in their case by blaming the Senate for not calling the
    President to the stand or the President for not volunteering to
    run the gauntlet of House managers. Having had the House reject
    their proposed article of impeachment based on the President's
    deposition in the Jones case, the House managers are left to
    pursue their shifting allegations of perjury before the grand
    jury. Their allegations of perjury have devolved to semantical
    differences and the choice of such words as ``occasional'' and
    ``on certain occasions.'' Their view of perjury allows them to
    take a part of a statement out of context and say that it is
    actionable for not explicating all relevant facts and
    circumstances. They view perjury by a standard that would
    condemn most presentations, even some of their own
    presentations before the Senate.
        In addition to their request that the President be deposed,
    the House Republican managers also propose to include in this
    record affidavits and other materials apparently not part of
    the record provided by Mr. Starr or considered by the House.
    Ironically, in so doing, they have chosen to proceed by
    affidavit. They must know that by proffering the declaration of
    an attorney for Paula Jones about that case and the link
    between that now settled matter and the Starr investigation,
    they are necessarily opening this area to possible extensive
    discovery that could result in the depositions of additional
    witnesses, as well.
        Does anyone think that the Senate record can fairly be
    limited to the proffered declaration of Mr. Holmes without
    giving the President an opportunity to depose him and other
    relevant witnesses after fair discovery? The links between the
    Jones case and the Starr investigation will be fair game for
    examination in the fullness of time if the Holmes declaration
    proffered by the House managers is accepted.
        The Holmes declaration is at variance with the House
    managers' proffer. The declaration suggests that the Jones
    lawyers made a collective decision, whereas the House managers
    suggest that the decision to subpoena Ms. Currie was Mr.
    Holmes' decision. Mr. Holmes declares that no Washington Post
    article played any part in his decisionmaking to subpoena Ms.
    Currie and that he ``does not recall'' any attorney in his firm
    saying anything about such an article ``in the discussions in
    which we decided to subpoena Ms. Currie.'' This could lead to
    discovery from a number of Jones lawyers.
        The Holmes declaration says that the Jones lawyers ``had
    received what [they] considered to be reliable information that
    Ms. Currie was instrumental in facilitating Monica Lewinsky's
    meetings with Mr. Clinton and that Ms. Currie was central to
    the `cover story' Mr. Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky had developed to
    use in the event their affair was discovered.'' That assertion
    was strongly omitted from the House Republican managers'
    proffer. That assertion raises questions about what the Jones
    lawyers knew, when they knew it and whether there was any link
    to the Starr investigation. If the purpose of the declaration
    is to rebut the notion that Ms. Currie was subpoenaed because
    the Jones lawyers were following the activities of the Starr
    investigation, this declaration falls far short of the mark. It
    raises more questions that it resolves.
        I am surprised to see a judicial clerk submit an affidavit
    in this case. The one thing that is clear from Mr. Ward's
    affidavit is that it does not support the conclusions drawn in
    the House managers' proffer. Mr. Ward says only that President
    Clinton was looking directly at Mr. Bennett at one moment
    during the argument by the lawyers during the deposition. He
    does not aver, as the House managers suggest he would
    competently testify, that ``he saw President Clinton listening
    attentively to Mr. Bennett's remarks.''
        While the affidavit of Barry Ward cannot convert the
    President's silence into statements, it does provide one
    perspective on the President's deposition in the Jones case.
    Accepting that proffered evidence may, however, prompt the
    President's lawyers to want to examine other perspectives to
    give the Senate a more complete picture and a fairer
    opportunity to consider what was happening during the
    discussions among Judge Wright and the lawyers. For that
    purpose, is the Senate next going to authorize the deposition
    of Judge Wright and the other lawyers who attended the
    deposition? The circumstances under which Mr. Ward came to take
    such an affidavit and what he knows about the variety of issues
    mentioned in the House managers' proffer on this item will
    undoubtedly be fair subjects of discovery by the President's
    lawyers if this is admitted.
        The House managers characterized documents as certain
    telephone records and the participants in various telephone
    calls whose identities are not revealed by the records. Indeed,
    those proffered documents are without authentification. The
    House Republican managers' brief goes even farther, suggesting
    that the telephone records will prove what happened at the
    White House gate on December 6, and asserting the identity of
    those who participated in telephone calls and the content of
    those telephone calls and concluding that they prove meetings
    and conversations that were not even by telephone. The
    documents appear to be a series of numbers. Giving them content
    and context will require more than mere authentification. Any
    such testimonial explanation can be expected to engender
    further discovery, as well.
        Now let me turn to the witnesses that the House managers
    have identified by name and for which they are expressly
    seeking subpoenas at the outset of this discovery period. I
    understand that under Senate Resolution 16 Senators must vote
    for or against the entire package of witnesses and discovery
    requested by the House.
        The House Republican managers have already interviewed
    Monica Lewinsky after Mr. Starr arranged for that interview and
    had her ordered to comply. In light of the circumstances under
    which she has already been forced to cooperate with the House
    Republican managers, any doubt as to the coercion being
    exercised through her immunity agreement could not be more
    starkly seen. I seriously question Ms. Lewinsky's freedom to
    express herself in the present circumstances and suggest that
    her immunity situation will inevitably affect the credibility
    of anything that she might ``add'' to the House's case. Mr.
    Starr has the equivalent of a loaded gun to her head, along
    with her mother's and her father's.
        Consider also the report in The Washington Post on Tuesday
    that Mr. Starr tore up her immunity agreement once before when
    she tried to clarify her February 1998 proffer to note that she
    and the President had talked about using a ``cover story''
    before she was ever subpoenaed as a witness in the Jones case,
    not after. That is now a key point of the House managers'
    proffer but it points now in the other direction by suggesting
    that she is now willing to testify that the President
    ``instructed'' her to invoke cover stories if questioned in
    connection with the Jones case. Would not such a shift in
    testimony necessarily lead to discovery into the impact of the
    immunity agreement on her testimony and the many twists and
    turns in the 7-month negotiation between Mr. Starr and Ms.
    Lewinsky's attorneys and the pressures exerted upon her over
    the last 6 months?
        Moreover, press accounts of the celebrated interview of Ms.
    Lewinsky by the House managers last weekend suggest that she
    may also have said things during that interview that were
    favorable to the President. The President's counsel are now in
    the untenable position of having to oppose the House managers'
    motion without specific knowledge of any exculpatory
    information that Ms. Lewinsky may have provided that would
    weigh against the need to call her as a witness. That is unfair
    and contrary to basic precepts of our law. The House managers
    created this circumstance and should not benefit from it.
        The House managers also insist that they must open
    discovery to take the deposition of Vernon Jordan. Mr. Jordan
    has been interviewed or testified under oath before Starr's
    grand jury at least five times already. The House managers'
    proffer is merely that they expect that his live testimony will
    lead to reasonable and logical inferences that might help their
    case and somehow link the job search to discouraging her
    testimony in the Jones case. That is not a proffer of anything
    new but an attempt to take another shot at eliciting testimony
    that Mr. Starr could not.
        The House managers also insist that the Senate must depose
    Sidney Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal also testified before the
    Starr grand jury. The House managers' proffer notes nothing new
    that he would be expected to provide.
        If the President has been willing to forego the opportunity
    to cross-examine the witnesses whose grand jury testimony has
    been relied upon by the House managers, that removes the most
    pressing need for further discovery in this matter. After all,
    Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan, and to a lesser extent, Mr.
    Blumenthal, were interviewed for days and weeks by the FBI,
    trained investigators, Mr. Starr's lawyers and then testified,
    some repeatedly, before the Starr grand jury. That is about as
    one-sided as discovery gets--no cross-examination, no
    opportunity to compare early statements with the way things are
    reconfigured and re-expressed after numerous preparation
    sessions with Mr. Starr's office.
        These witnesses testified under threat of prosecution by
    Mr. Starr. Ms. Lewinsky remains under a very clear threat of
    prosecution, even though she has a limited grant of immunity
    from Starr. This special prosecutor has shown every willingness
    to threaten and prosecute.
        If the President has not initiated efforts to obtain more
    discovery and witnesses and is willing to have the matter
    decided on the voluminous record submitted to the House, the
    House managers carry a heavy burden to justify extending these
    proceedings further and requiring the reexamination of people
    who have already testified.
        I heard over and over from the House managers that there is
    no doubt, that the record established before the House and
    introduced into this Senate proceeding convinced the House to
    vote for articles of impeachment to require the removal of the
    President from office last month. The House managers have told
    us that they have done a magnificent job and established their
    case.
        Based on the House managers' motion and their proffer in
    justification, I do not believe that they have justified
    extending these proceedings into the future through additional
    depositions and additional evidence. Can anyone confidently
    predict how many witnesses will be needed to sort through the
    evidentiary supplement that the House proffers and the issues
    that it raises? Can anyone confidently predict how long that
    discovery will take and how long this trial will be extended?
    And for what? What is the significant and ultimate materiality
    to the fundamental issues being contested at this trial of the
    materials the House is moving now to include in the record?
    Although the House managers can say that they only sought to
    depose three witnesses, does anyone think that in fairness the
    President's lawyers and the House managers together will not
    end up deposing at least 10 people if the Senate were to grant
    the House motion?
        The Senate should not extend these proceedings by a single
    day. The Senate runs a grave risk of being drawn down into the
    mire that stained the House impeachment proceedings.
    Republicans and Democrats have all told me that they do not
    believe that there is any possibility that this trial will end
    in the conviction of the President and his removal. In that
    light, the Senate should have proceeded to conclude this matter
    rather than extend it.
                                    ------

    MOTION TO DISMISS THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST WILLIAM JEFFERSON
                                    CLINTON

        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, this Senate is the last of
    the 20th century. We begin this first session of the 106th
    Congress facing a challenge that no other Senate in over 100
    years has been called upon to meet; namely, whether to remove
    from office the person the American people elected to serve as
    the President of the United States.
        What we do in this impeachment of the President, in terms
    of the standards we apply and the judgments we make, will
    either follow the Constitution or alter the intent of the
    framers for all time. I have heard more than one Senator
    acknowledge that in that sense it is not just the President but
    also the Senate that is on trial in this matter.
        The Senate now has an opportunity, as provided in S. Res.
    16, to vote on a motion to conclude these proceedings by
    adopting Senator Byrd's motion to dismiss. I commend Senator
    Byrd and agree with him that such action is both appropriate
    and in the best interests of the Nation. I do not believe that
    the House managers have proven a case for conviction and
    removal of the President on the articles of impeachment sent by
    the House last year. I further suggest that those articles are
    improperly vague and duplicitous.
        We can all agree that the President's conduct with a young
    woman in the White House was inexcusable. It was deeply
    disappointing, especially to those who know the President and
    who support the many good things he has done for this country.
    His conduct in trying to keep his illicit relationship secret
    from his wife and family, his friends and associates, and from
    the glare of a politically charged lawsuit and from the
    American public, though understandable on a human level, has
    had terrible consequences for him personally and for the legacy
    of his Presidency.
        Last week, Senator Bumpers reminded us of the human costs
    that have been paid by this President and his family. The
    underlying lawsuit has now been settled and a financial
    settlement of $850,000 has been paid on a case that the
    District Court judge had dismissed for failing to state a
    claim. The President has admitted terribly embarrassing
    personal conduct before a Federal grand jury, has seen a
    videotape of that grand jury testimony broadcast to the entire
    Nation which had excerpts replayed over and over, again.
    Articles of impeachment were reported by the House of
    Representatives against a President for only the second time in
    our history.
        The question before the Senate is not whether William
    Jefferson Clinton has suffered, for surely he has as a result
    of his conduct. The question is not even whether William
    Jefferson Clinton should be punished and sent to jail on a
    criminal charge, for the Constitution does not confer that
    authority on this Court of Impeachment. The question, as framed
    by the House, is whether his conduct violated Federal criminal
    laws and, if he did, whether those crimes constitute ``other
    high crimes and misdemeanors'' warranting his removal from the
    office of President to which he was reelected by the people of
    the United States in 1996.
        Justice Robert Jackson, when he was Attorney General in
    1940, observed that the most dangerous power of the prosecutor
    is the power to ``pick people that he thinks he should get,
    rather than cases that need to be prosecuted.'' When this
    happens, he said, ``it is not a question of discovering the
    commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has
    committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then . .
    . putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.''
    ``It is here,'' he concluded, ``that law enforcement becomes
    personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular
    with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the
    wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in
    the way of the prosecutor himself.''
        In the case of President William Jefferson Clinton, things
    became personal a long time ago. I am not alone in questioning
    Mr. Starr's conduct. His own ethics advisor felt compelled to
    resign his position after Mr. Starr appeared before the House
    Judiciary Committee as the head cheerleader for impeachment.
        It now appears that Mr. Starr has gone from head
    cheerleader to the chief prosecutor for impeachment. Over the
    last week he forced Ms. Lewinsky to cooperate with the House
    Republican managers as part of her immunity agreement. She must
    ``cooperate'' under the threat that Mr. Starr may decide to
    prosecute her, her mother or her father if he is not satisfied.
        It is now up to the Senate to restore sanity to this
    process, exercise judgment, do justice and act in the interests
    of the Nation. We will be judged both today and by history on
    whether we resolve this case in a way that serves the good of
    the country, not the political ends of any political party or
    particular person.
        I doubt that any Senator can impartially say that the case
    against the President has been established beyond a reasonable
    doubt. In this matter, my view is that is the appropriate
    standard of proof. Here the Senate is being asked to override
    the electoral judgment of the American people with respect to
    the person they elected to serve them as the President of the
    United States. In this matter the charges have not been
    established beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
        The inferences the House managers would draw from the facts
    are not compelled by the evidence. Indeed, the House managers
    fail to take into account Ms. Lewinsky's admitted interest in
    keeping her relationship with President Clinton from the public
    and out of the Jones case. They ignore the role of Linda Tripp
    in Ms. Lewinsky's job search and the fact that it was Ms. Tripp
    who suggested that Ms. Lewinsky involve Vernon Jordan. In light
    of these and other fundamental flaws in the House managers'
    case, I doubt whether many can vote that the articles have been
    established by clear and convincing evidence.
        I know that Republican Senators as well as Democratic
    Senators have told me that they do not believe there is any
    realistic possibility that the Senate will convict the
    President and remove him from office. I agree. Having heard the
    arguments from both sides and having considered the evidence, I
    do not believe that there is any possibility that the Senate
    will convict the President on the articles of impeachment and
    remove him from office. That being so, I believe that the
    interests of the Nation are best served by ending this matter
    now, at the earliest opportunity.
        As a consequence of the House's action, the impeachment
    process is continuing to preoccupy the Congress into this year.
    This unfinished business of constitutional dimension will
    necessarily displace the other important business facing the
    country until it is resolved. I believe this matter should be
    concluded and we should turn our attention to legislative
    matters.
        History has judged harshly the radical Republicans who
    pursued impeachment against President Andrew Johnson. I believe
    that history will likewise render a harsh judgment against
    those who have fomented this impeachment of William Jefferson
    Clinton on the charges brought forward by the House of
    Representatives. I do not believe those charges have been or
    can be proven. I do not believe that the House managers have
    justified the Senate overriding the 1996 presidential election
    and ordering the duly elected President of the United States
    removed from office.
        When the Chief Justice, as Presiding Officer, sustained
    objection to the House managers' mischaracterization of the
    Senate in this matter, it highlighted the House managers'
    misconceptions of the trial. Senators are not merely serving as
    petit jurors who will be instructed on the law by a judge and
    are asked to find facts. Senators have a greater role and a
    greater responsibility in this trial. As the Chief Justice
    properly observed: ``The Senate is not simply a jury; it is a
    court in this case.''
        Our job is to do justice in this matter and to protect the
    Constitution. In that process, I believe we must serve the
    interests of the Nation and fulfill our responsibilities to the
    American people. I believe that this impeachment trial should
    have been concluded now and that the articles of impeachment
    should be dismissed.

                          Wednesday, February 3, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

                        IMPEACHMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION

        Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to call the attention
    of my colleagues to a piece that was written by our
    distinguished Senator from West Virginia, our colleague,
    Senator Byrd, that appeared in today's Washington Post entitled
    ``Don't Tinker With Impeachment.''
        The reason I want to do that is there are discussions
    occurring now, according to some of my colleagues and accounts
    in the newspaper and on television, about trying to create a
    mechanism to require a vote in the Senate during the
    impeachment trial on the findings of fact prior to a vote on
    the articles of impeachment themselves.
        I was just looking at the Constitution in our Senate
    manual, and, of course, article I in the Constitution
    establishes the basis for impeachment, and it is simple, direct
    and provides nothing of the sort that would lead Senators to
    believe that they can bifurcate the vote in the Senate in an
    impeachment trial first to findings of fact and have a majority
    vote on findings of fact and then to move toward a vote on the
    two articles of impeachment that are currently in front of the
    Senate.
        But I think the article written by our colleague, Senator
    Byrd, provides the best description of the difficulty with
    these findings of fact. Let me read just a few comments, and I
    will ask unanimous consent to have the article printed in the
    Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
        The article, in part, by Senator Byrd says:

        The notion of trumping the articles of impeachment with
    even a ``broad'' findings of fact flies in the face of what the
    Framers of the Constitution intended. They deliberately set the
    bar high when it came to the vote on articles of impeachment,
    first by requiring a supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate
    to convict, and second, by fusing the penalty--[that is]
    removal from office [being the penalty]--into the question of
    guilt.
        In voting on articles of impeachment [he goes on to say]
    senators must answer not one but two questions: Is the
    president guilty or not guilty of committing high crimes and
    misdemeanors, and, if he is guilty, do his actions warrant
    removal from office?

        Continuing to quote from Senator Byrd's article:

        This was not a casual coupling on the part of the Framers.
    Their intent was to force senators to set aside their own
    passions and prejudices and focus instead on the best interests
    of the nation. To lift this burden from the shoulders of
    senators by offering them a way to convict the president
    without having to accept responsibility for removing him from
    office would, in effect, bastardize the impeachment process.
        Moreover [he says] the aftershocks would be felt long after
    this impeachment has faded into history. No longer would
    senators be confined to the articles of impeachment formulated
    by the House of Representatives. No longer would senators need
    a two-thirds majority vote to pronounce a president guilty.
    From this time forward, they could cite the precedent set by
    the Senate in the 106th Congress as giving them carte blanche
    to write, and approve by a simple majority, ersatz articles of
    impeachment cloaked as ``findings of fact.''

        Senator Byrd, as always, finds the bull's-eye in this
    debate. This is not some ordinary debate; this is a debate
    about constitutional requirements and responsibilities and what
    the provisions of the Constitution mean with respect to
    impeachment.
        The impeachment article provisions of the Constitution
    require, when impeachment articles are voted by the U.S. House
    of Representatives and sent to the Senate, that a trial must
    commence, and the vote on the articles of impeachment would be
    conducted by the Senate; and two-thirds of the Senate would
    have to vote guilty on those articles of impeachment in order
    to remove a President from office.
        But it doesn't bifurcate the vote, doesn't call for extra
    procedures, doesn't call for findings of fact, doesn't allow
    some Senators to say, ``Yes, that's what the Constitution says
    but we're going to create a new, or pretend there's a new,
    provision in the Constitution without having the difficulty of
    debating Madison and Mason and Hamilton and Franklin over our
    proposal. We'll just pretend it's in the Constitution. And
    we'll have separate votes on findings of fact. And in fact,
    doing that, we can have our own little vote and create our own
    little result with only 51 Members of the Senate voting in
    favor of our resolution.''
        That is a terrible idea and, in my judgment, stands this
    Constitution, and the article of impeachment provisions in this
    Constitution, on its head. But Senator Byrd says it much better
    than I do. I will, as I indicated, include his article at the
    conclusion of my remarks.
        This Constitution, written in a room in Philadelphia over
    200 years ago, is quite a remarkable document. It established
    the separation of powers. It established the framework for a
    new kind of Government that has worked remarkably well. If
    those who watch these proceedings and become interested in the
    Constitution would go to that room in Philadelphia, they would
    see that that room still exists. It is called the Assembly Room
    in Constitution Hall.
        That room, which is smaller than the Senate Chamber, has a
    chair in the front of the room where George Washington sat as
    he presided over that Chamber. The same chair sits there today.
    And you will see where Mason sat, Madison, Franklin, and others
    who wrote this Constitution. They wrote it on a hot
    Philadelphia summer with the curtains drawn to keep the heat
    out of that room, and they created this remarkable document
    that is printed in the Senate Manual. And that is the document
    by which we in the Senate are now conducting an impeachment
    trial.
        I come to the floor today only to say that I think there is
    great danger in believing there are things written in this
    Constitution that don't exist in the Constitution. There is
    danger, in my judgment, in suggesting ways or mechanisms by
    which some can vote and create majority votes on some
    extraordinary findings of fact that are not provided for in
    this Constitution.
        In this impeachment trial, there is one of two results, and
    that is a vote on the two articles of impeachment that have
    been sent to the U.S. Senate by the House of Representatives.
    That vote will be a vote cast by each and every Member of this
    Senate, and the vote will be either a vote to convict or a vote
    to acquit--guilty or not guilty on the two articles of
    impeachment. And my hope is that when the Senate reconvenes in
    the impeachment trial, all Senators will have read this rather
    remarkable article by the preeminent constitutional scholar in
    this Chamber and the historian of this U.S. Senate, the
    esteemed Senator Byrd.
        I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the
    Record.
        There being no objection, the article was ordered to be
    printed in the Record as follows:
                    [From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1999]

                         Don't Tinker With Impeachment

                              (By Robert C. Byrd)
        While the lawyers are busy deposing witnesses in the Senate
    impeachment trial of the president, a number of senators are continuing
    to work quietly behind the scenes to chart a course that will end the
    trial with a minimum of political carnage. One route currently being
    investigated is a so-called ``findings of fact,'' an extravagant
    novelty by which a simple majority of the Senate could condemn the
    president's behavior within the framework of the impeachment process
    without being forced to remove him from office.
        This convict-but-don't-evict strategy appeals to some senators who
    have no appetite for prolonging a trial whose outcome is all but
    certain. At the same time, they are squeamish about the likelihood of
    an all-but-inevitable acquittal without having some vehicle to first
    register their condemnation of the president's actions. No doubt their
    motives are sincere, and I applaud their ingenuity, but this findings-
    of-fact proposal is not the answer. While the Senate sits in the
    impeachment trial, it is not in legislative session. The insertion of
    such a legislative mutant into the impeachment proceedings would
    subject the process to some very experimental genetic engineering.
        The notion of trumping the articles of impeachment with even a
    ``broad'' findings of fact flies in the face of what the Framers of the
    Constitution intended. They deliberately set the bar high when it came
    to the vote on articles of impeachment, first by requiring a
    supermajority of two-thirds of the Senate to convict, and second, by
    fusing the penalty--removal from office--into the question of guilt.
        In voting on articles of impeachment, senators must answer not one
    but two questions: Is the president guilty or not guilty of committing
    high crimes and misdemeanors, and, if he is guilty, do his actions
    warrant removal from office?
        This was not a casual coupling on the part of the Framers. Their
    intent was to force senators to set aside their own passions and
    prejudices and focus instead on the best interests of the nation. To
    lift this burden from the shoulders of senators by offering them a way
    to convict the president without having to accept responsibility for
    removing him from office would, in effect, bastardize the impeachment
    process.
        Moreover, the aftershocks would be felt long after this impeachment
    has faded into history. No longer would senators be confined to the
    articles of impeachment formulated by the House of Representatives. No
    longer would senators need a two-thirds majority vote to pronounce a
    president guilty. From this time forward, they could cite the precedent
    set by the Senate in the 106th Congress as giving them carte blanche to
    write, and approve by a simple majority, ersatz articles of impeachment
    cloaked as ``findings of fact.''
        And why stop at findings of fact? If the Senate can ignore the
    intent of the Framers to combine a guilty verdict with removal from
    office in an impeachment trial, maybe senators can find a way around
    the constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder, or
    legislative punishments.
        The Senate impeachment trial takes place in a quasi-judicial
    setting, and findings of fact would move the Senate headlong into an
    area reserved for the judicial system, where the Senate, under the
    separation of powers principle, dares not go.
        Findings of fact would become part of a quasi-judicial record that
    could not subsequently be amended or overturned. Could such a record of
    findings of fact be later used by an independent counsel before a
    federal grand jury in an effort to secure an indictment? If this or any
    president were to be indicted, could such findings be introduced as
    evidence in a subsequent trial in an effort to sway a jury and bring
    about a conviction? Who knows what monsters this rogue gene might spawn
    in future days?
        The impeachment process, as messy and uncomfortable as it may be,
    is working as designed. This is neither the time nor the place for
    constitutional improvisation. No matter how sincere the motivation, our
    nation and our Constitution will not be well served by this sort of
    seat-of-the-pants tinkering.
        A post-trial censure resolution that does not cross the line into
    legislative punishment is something else. It can and should be
    considered by the Senate after the court of impeachment has adjourned
    sine die. Censure is not meaningless, it will not subvert the
    Constitution, and it will be indelibly seared into the ineffaceable
    record of history for all future generations to see and to ponder. For
    those who fear that it can be expunged from the record, be assured that
    it can never be erased from the history books. Like the mark that was
    set upon Cain, it will follow even beyond the grave.

        Mr. DORGAN. I yield the floor.
                                    ------

                           Thursday, February 4, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:03 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Gracious God, these days here in the Senate are filled with
    crucial issues, differences on solutions, and eventually a
    vital vote in the impeachment trial. We begin this day's
    session with the question You asked King Solomon, ``Ask! What
    shall I give You?'' We empathize with Solomon's response. He
    asked for an ``understanding heart.'' We are moved by the more
    precise translation of the Hebrew words for ``understanding
    heart,'' meaning ``a hearing heart.''
        Solomon wanted to hear a word from You, Lord, for the
    perplexities he faced. He longed for the gift of wisdom so he
    could have answers and direction for his people. We are moved
    by Your response, ``See, I have given you a wise and listening
    heart.''
        I pray for nothing less as Your answer for the women and
    men of this Senate. Help them to listen to Your guidance and
    grant them wisdom for their decisions. All through our history
    as a Nation, You have made good men and women great when they
    humbled themselves, confessed their need for Your wisdom, and
    listened intently to You. Speak Lord; we need to hear Your
    voice. We are listening. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senators will be seated. The
    Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               order of procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could take just a moment
    to outline how the proceedings will go this afternoon, I think
    that will answer any questions that Senators may have. We will,
    of course, continue with the consideration of articles of
    impeachment. I am not aware of any objections made during the
    depositions which require motions to resolve. Therefore, I
    believe the House managers are prepared to go forward with a
    motion that has three parts. The first would allow for the
    introduction of the depositions into evidence. The second would
    call Monica Lewinsky as a witness. And the third part would
    allow for a presentation period by the parties for not to
    extend beyond 6 hours. This motion would be debated by the
    House managers and the White House counsel for not to exceed 2
    hours.
        In addition, it is my understanding that Senator Daschle
    intends to offer a motion that provides for going directly to
    the articles of impeachment for a vote.
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, will the majority leader
    yield?
        Mr. LOTT. I am glad to yield to the minority leader,
    Senator Daschle.
        Mr. DASCHLE. The motion would allow for closing arguments,
    final deliberations, and then the motions on the two articles.
        Mr. LOTT. Having said that, Mr. Chief Justice, in order for
    the managers to prepare debate for the motions, I ask unanimous
    consent that the House managers and the White House counsel be
    allowed to make reference to oral depositions during this
    debate on pending motions.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection? In the absence
    of objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Consequently, four votes, then, will occur in the
    4 p.m. timeframe today with respect to these four motions.
        We will take at least one break--maybe two--between now and
    then, and that will determine exactly when that series of votes
    occur--once we begin the process of offering and debating the
    motions. We will make a determination as to exactly when those
    provisions would occur.
        In addition, if the motion for additional presentation time
    is agreed to by the Senate, it is my intention to adjourn the
    trial after today's deliberations over until Saturday for the
    parties to make their preparations, then to present their
    presentations of evidence on Saturday, and the trial would then
    resume on Monday at 12 noon for the closing arguments of the
    parties.
        Again, I remind all of my colleagues to please remain
    standing at their desks when the Chief Justice enters the
    Chamber and leaves the Chamber.
        I thank my colleagues for their attention. I believe we are
    ready to proceed, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    McCollum.

        motion for admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and
                            presentation of evidence

        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a motion to
    deliver to the Senate.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion:
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

    motion of the united states house of representatives for the admission
       of evidence, the appearance of witnesses, and the presentation of
                                    evidence

        Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by
    and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully
    submits to the United States Senate its motion for the
    admission of evidence, the appearance of witnesses, and the
    presentation of evidence in connection with the Impeachment
    Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
    States.
        The House moves that the transcriptions and videotapes of
    the oral depositions taken pursuant to S. Res. 30, from the
    point that each witness is sworn to testify under oath to the
    end of any direct response to the last question posed by a
    party, be admitted into evidence.
        The House further moves that the Senate authorize and issue
    a subpoena for the appearance of Monica S. Lewinsky before the
    Senate for a period of time not to exceed eight hours, and in
    connection with the examination of that witness, the House
    requests that either party be able to examine the witness as if
    that witness were declared adverse, that counsel for the
    President and counsel for the House Managers be able to
    participate in the examination of that witness, and that the
    House be entitled to reserve a portion of its examination time
    to reexamine the witness following any examination by the
    President.
        The House further moves that the parties be permitted to
    present before the Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a
    total of six hours, equally divided, all or portions of the
    parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions of Monica S.
    Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal admitted
    into evidence, and that the House be entitled to reserve a
    portion of its presentation time.

        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I understand that the pending motion is
    divisible, and as is my right, I ask that the motion be divided
    in the following manner: The first paragraph be considered
    division I; the second paragraph be considered division II; and
    the final paragraph be considered division III.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. It will be divided in the manner
    indicated by the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I thank the Chair.
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
    order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there any objection? In the absence
    of objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I identified this as the first
    paragraph to be considered division I. Actually, that should be
    the second paragraph would be division I, the third paragraph
    division II, and the fourth paragraph would be division III. I
    want that clarification.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. That will be the order.
        Mr. LOTT. Also, so that both sides will understand, the
    motion--there is one motion, but we have divided it into three
    parts so there will only be 2 hours equally divided, one on
    each side; not 2 hours equally divided on each one of the three
    divisions. We had one clarification. I believe we have cleared
    this up. I believe now we are ready to hear from the managers,
    Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes Mr.
    Manager McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        As the first one up here today, I have to fiddle with the
    microphone, I guess; it is testing. I apologize.
        Mr. Chief Justice and Members of the Senate, what we have
    presented to you today is a three-part motion, as Mr. Lott has
    described it, and as you have heard read to you. We would like
    very much, as we always have, to have all the witnesses we want
    presented here live, as we would normally have in a trial, as
    the House has always believed that it should have.
        We came before you a few days ago recognizing reality and
    went forward with your procedures to request not 5, not 6, not
    12, but 3 witnesses be deposed so that we might be able to, in
    the discovery process you have allowed us, gain the depositions
    of those three witnesses. Today we are before you with motions,
    first, to enter those depositions and the video recordings of
    those depositions into evidence formally for your consideration
    because they have now been accomplished; secondly, to request
    that you provide us with the opportunity to examine Monica
    Lewinsky live here as a witness on the floor of the Senate, and
    for you to allow us to present the other two depositions to you
    in some format; and, if you do not allow us the permission to
    have Ms. Lewinsky live here to examine as a witness, to allow
    us to present any or all portions of the depositions of all
    three of them.
        Now, I think that it is eminently fair that we be allowed
    to present at least one witness live to you, the central
    witness in the cast of this entire proceeding, and that is
    Monica Lewinsky. I am not here to argue all of that. My
    principal discussion with you is going to be on the part
    dealing with just admitting these into evidence, and then my
    colleagues, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Hutchinson, and Mr. Rogan are going
    to present some complementary discussion about the entire
    motion as we go through this.
        But in the context of all of this I think we have to
    recognize a couple of things. One is that live witnesses are
    preferable whether you have depositions or not. These were
    discovery depositions. We would have liked to have asked for
    all of them to be live. We were recognizing reality by coming
    down to one today, and the reasons are fairly straightforward.
    Some of you have had the privilege, and I am sure you have
    availed yourself of the opportunity, to look at the videotapes
    of these depositions, and you see that they are, indeed, what
    most depositions are. They are discovery. They have long pauses
    in them. They are not at all like it would be in a trial
    itself; you don't have the opportunity to fully see or explore
    with the witness the demeanor, the temperament, the
    spontaneity, all of those things that you normally get with an
    exchange. You have the camera simply focused on the witness.
    You don't get to have the interaction you get in a courtroom.
        Remember, again, that we are dealing here first with your
    determining whether or not the President committed the crimes
    of perjury and obstruction of justice and then the question of
    whether or not he should be removed from office. So I believe
    and we believe as House managers that you should at least let
    us have Monica Lewinsky here live for both of those reasons.
        I also want to make comments specifically about just
    admitting these into evidence. There are two obvious reasons
    why, beyond the question of whether a witness should appear
    live or whether we should use portions of them in whatever
    fashion to present to you, they certainly should be part of the
    record. It seems self-evident. It is part of what you gave us
    as the procedure to do, and it would seem to me that it should
    be a mere formality for me to ask, but I cannot assume
    anything--we certainly do not--that we let these depositions
    into evidence, and there are two reasons why.
        One is the historical basis for this. There has to be a
    record, not only for you but for the public and for history, of
    the entire proceeding. There is evidence in these depositions
    that needs to be a part of the official record, and that
    evidence is not just the cold transcript, but it is also the
    videotape with all of the limited, albeit not satisfactory,
    portion of it that you can see and observe. Especially if you
    were to conclude we weren't going to have any live witness here
    or were not going to allow us to present these depositions, you
    certainly should allow the depositions to be part of the record
    and the videotape part of it. It is evidence. It is to be
    examined. It seems self-evident.
        But the second point is, as you are going to hear more from
    my colleagues in just a moment, there is new evidence in these
    depositions. There is new factual record information that needs
    to be here for you to decide the guilt or innocence question of
    the perjury and obstruction of justice charge.
        One illustration I would give you--and I am sure my
    colleagues will give you plenty more--one of them deals with
    the gift question. We have talked about it a lot out here. If
    you recall with regard to the question of the gifts, the issue
    is did the President obstruct justice? Did he decide in the
    Jones case, in the Jones Court, as a part of his course of
    conduct of trying to keep from the Court the nature of his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky, to keep the gifts hidden?
        There is new information in the deposition relative to what
    happened on the day those gifts were supposedly exchanged
    between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie, about the telephone
    call. Again, I am not going into the details of that. I will
    leave that for my colleagues who took the depositions. They can
    tell you about it. The point is you could enumerate--and they
    will--new evidence. There is significant relevant new evidence
    from the Vernon Jordan deposition and from the Sidney
    Blumenthal deposition. So just on the record alone, just to put
    the depositions into the record, there can be nothing complete
    about this trial if we don't at least do that. At least do
    that.
        And so with that in mind, having said that and urging you
    to do that, I will yield to Mr. Manager Bryant at this point in
    time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    colleagues and Senators, I encourage each of you to consider
    calling Monica Lewinsky as the one live witness in this
    proceeding. Ms. Lewinsky continues to be, in her own way, an
    impressive witness. As I spoke to you earlier, she does have a
    story to tell. After all, no one knows more about the majority
    of the allegations against the President other than, of course,
    the President himself.
        At her deposition, she appeared to be a different Monica
    Lewinsky than the Monica Lewinsky whom I had met a week
    earlier. Unlike before, she was not open to discussion or fully
    responsive to fair inquiry. She didn't volunteer her story. She
    didn't tell her story. Rather, she was very guarded in each
    response and almost protective. Her words were carefully chosen
    and relatively few. At times, the concepts that she discussed
    had the familiar ring of another key witness to these
    proceedings, such as ``it wasn't a lie'' or ``wasn't false,''
    it was ``misleading or incomplete.'' ``Truth is what one
    believes it is and may be different for different people.''
    ``Truth depends on the circumstances.''
        As we progressed through her deposition Monday, I felt more
    and more like one of the characters in the classic movie
    ``Witness For The Prosecution.'' I was Charles Laughton. Ms.
    Lewinsky was Marlene Dietrich. And the President was Tyrone
    Power. If you are familiar with this movie, you will
    understand, and if you aren't, you should see the movie.
        However, there was and there still remains truth in her
    testimony. Sometimes, though, just like the President, and now
    Ms. Lewinsky, it is the literal truth only, the most restricted
    and stretched definition one could reach. And we all know that
    the law frowns upon manipulations such as this to avoid telling
    the complete truth. Her testimony is clearly tinted, some might
    even say tainted, by a mixture of her continued admiration for
    the President, her desire to protect him, and her own personal
    views of right and wrong.
        And she was well represented in the deposition by some of
    Washington's finest defense attorneys who had thoroughly
    prepared her for all questions, as they should have, as well as
    being present throughout the deposition to assist her. In fact,
    the Senator in charge of this particular deposition had to warn
    these counsel not to coach and not to whisper to her while she
    was attempting to answer the questions.
        If you have seen this deposition, you have witnessed an
    effective effort by a loyal supporter of the President to
    provide the very minimum of truth in order to be consistent
    with her own grand jury testimony, which is legally necessary
    for her to fulfill the terms of her immunity agreement.
        On the perjury article of impeachment, she reaffirmed the
    specific facts which happened between her and the President on
    more than one occasion, including November 15, 1995, their
    first encounter, when the President's conduct fit squarely
    within the four corners of the term ``sexual relationship'' as
    defined in the Jones lawsuit, and this is in opposition to the
    President's own sworn testimony of denial. But this is one of
    the clearest examples of the President's guilt of this charge
    of perjury. It is not about this twisted definition the
    President assigned to the term ``sexual relations.'' Rather, it
    is his word against her word as to whether this specific
    conduct occurred. Even under his own reading of this
    definition, he agrees that that specific conduct, if it
    occurred, would make him guilty of sexual relations within that
    definition. But he simply says I did not do that; she says you
    did do that--a ``he said/she said'' case.
        But this is why it is important for you to be able to see
    Ms. Lewinsky in person. In the deposition you will observe her
    as having to affirm her prior testimony. She had to affirm her
    prior testimony because that was what was in the grand jury,
    and because of this, she could not back away at all on her
    testimony. She couldn't bend it here or there, she couldn't
    shade it in the President's favor. So what you have is a
    person, who you may well conclude is still wanting to help the
    President, having to admit to testimony that would do damage to
    the President, a very difficult situation for her. But, yet,
    this same difficulty lends this portion of her testimony great
    credibility.
        With respect to the other article of impeachment on
    obstruction of justice, her credibility is again bolstered by
    her reluctance to do legal harm to this President. In the end,
    though, she does admit that he called her early one morning in
    December of 1997--actually it was 2 o'clock in the morning--and
    told her that she was on the witness list. And he told her that
    she might be able to file an affidavit to avoid testifying. And
    he told her that she could always use the story that she was
    bringing papers to him, or coming up to see Ms. Currie.
        Now, we know that she did not carry papers to him on these
    visits other than personal, private notes from her to him. And
    Ms. Lewinsky indicated in the deposition that she didn't carry
    him official papers, although she did pass along this cover
    story--of carrying papers--to her attorney, Mr. Carter. She
    testified also that she discussed the draft affidavit with Mr.
    Jordan, changes were made, she offered the President the
    opportunity to review it, he declined, and, according to Ms.
    Lewinsky, he never suggested any way that she could file a
    truthful affidavit, sufficient to skirt--avoid having to
    testify. This, in spite of his answer to this Senate where he
    told you that he might have had a way for her to file a
    truthful affidavit and still avoid testifying in the Jones
    case.
        Yes, you can parse the words and you can use legal
    gymnastics, but you cannot get around the filing of a false
    affidavit in an effort to avoid appearing in the Jones case and
    possibly providing damaging testimony against the President.
        Ms. Lewinsky confirmed positively that Ms. Currie initiated
    a telephone call to her on December 28, 1997, stating words--
    and this is about the gifts--``I understand you have something
    for me.'' Then Ms. Currie drove over to Ms. Lewinsky's home and
    picked up the box of gifts.
        Now, remember, this occurred on the heels of Ms. Lewinsky's
    conversation with the President that very morning about what
    she might do with the gifts. The only explanation is that the
    President is directly involved, himself, in the obstruction of
    justice by telling Ms. Currie, who otherwise knew nothing about
    this earlier conversation, to retrieve these items from Ms.
    Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky said there was no doubt that Ms. Currie
    initiated the call to retrieve the gifts.
        Also recall that the President's testimony from his side
    was that this conversation occurred earlier in the day with Ms.
    Lewinsky but that he had told her she would have to turn over
    whatever gifts that she had. Now, with that advice from the
    President, it would be totally illogical for Ms. Lewinsky to
    have then called Ms. Currie that same day and ask her to come
    pick up and hold these gifts. By calling Ms. Currie, Ms.
    Lewinsky would have been going against the direct instruction
    of the President to surrender any and all gifts. The facts, the
    logic, and common sense tell us all that the President's
    version is not true and that he obstructed justice here.
        Ms. Lewinsky also testified at the deposition about the job
    at Revlon and obtaining a job offer within 2 days of signing
    the affidavit. She also denied that she was a stalker, as the
    President had described her in a conversation with Mr.
    Blumenthal in January of 1998. She also denied that she
    threatened the President or attempted to threaten the President
    into having an affair. She denied that he rebuffed her on the
    occasion of their first encounter on November 15, 1995. Again,
    all false statements that the President made to Mr. Blumenthal
    about her, with knowledge that Mr. Blumenthal would be
    testifying in a grand jury, thereby obstructing justice.
        Now, the former lawyers and judges among us are familiar
    with what is called the best evidence rule. Stated simply, the
    court always prefers the best available evidence to be used.
    In-person testimony is better than a video deposition, which
    itself is better than the written transcript of a deposition.
    When all three forms of testimony are available, as they are in
    this situation, the court will most often require the witness
    to testify in person over the video deposition or over the
    written transcript of the deposition.
        In closing, I know we all want to work within the Senate
    rules and we all want to ensure that these proceedings are
    concluded in a constitutional fashion by the end of next week.
    It is with this in mind that we propose that Ms. Lewinsky be
    called as a live witness, the only person called to testify in
    person, and, further, that we use the two depositions, the
    video depositions of Mr. Jordan and Mr. Blumenthal, in lieu of
    their personal attendance. In the event the Senate does not
    call Ms. Lewinsky, we also ask that we be permitted to use all
    or portions of her deposition, just as we would the other two
    depositions.
        And finally, several Senators have sent out a letter to the
    President inviting him to come here and to provide his
    testimony, if he so chooses. In the event he should accept, Ms.
    Lewinsky, likewise, should be afforded the same opportunity.
    They continue to be the two most important and essential
    witnesses for you and the American people to hear in order to
    finally--finally--resolve this matter.
        Permit us all to return to our districts, and you to your
    States, and tell our constituents that we considered the full
    and complete case, including live witnesses and, in your case,
    made your vote accordingly.
        At this time, I yield to my colleague from Arkansas, Mr.
    Hutchinson.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, in an effort to be
    helpful, I have asked the pages to distribute to you some
    exhibits that I will be referring to as I consider the
    testimony that we are presenting to you.
        There are two aspects to an impeachment trial. There is the
    truth-seeking responsibility, which is the trial, in my
    judgment, and then there is the conclusion, the judgment, the
    verdict, the conviction or the acquittal. If you look at those
    two phases of a trial, the latter is totally your
    responsibility. We leave that completely in your judgment.
        But the first responsibility of the factfinding of the
    truth-seeking endeavor, I feel some responsibility in that
    regard. Hopefully, our presentation is helpful in seeking the
    truth. I know, as Mr. Bryant mentioned, that we all want to
    bring this matter to a conclusion. We want to see the end of
    this story. We want to have a final chapter in this national
    drama. I understand that and agree with that. But let's not,
    because we are in a hurry to get to the judgment phase, let's
    not let that detract, let's not let that shortchange, nor
    diminish the importance of the presentation and consideration
    of the facts, and that is what I think is very important as we
    consider this motion that is before us.
        It is my responsibility to talk about Mr. Vernon Jordan--
    and the need for your consideration of his testimony--whom we
    recently deposed. I deposed Mr. Vernon Jordan, Jr., and I
    recommend that that be received in evidence as part of the
    Senate record.
        I took this deposition under the able guidance of Senator
    Thompson and Senator Dodd. The questioning took place over
    almost 3 hours with numerous and extraneous objections on
    behalf of the President's lawyers, most of which were resolved.
        I believe that the testimony of Mr. Jordan goes to the key
    element in the obstruction of justice article, and even though
    it is just one element that we are dealing with, it is a very
    important element because it goes to the connection between the
    job search, the benefit provided to a witness, and the
    solicited false testimony from that witness.
        I believe the testimony of Mr. Jordan is dramatic in that
    it shows the control and direction of the President of the
    United States in the effort to obstruct justice. I believe the
    testimony of Mr. Jordan provides new evidence supporting the
    charges of obstruction and verifying the credibility of Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        The testimony, in addition, is the most clear discussion of
    the facts reflecting Mr. Jordan's actions in behalf of the
    President and the President's direction and control of the
    activities of Mr. Jordan, and therefore they support the
    allegations under the articles of impeachment. Let me make the
    case for you.
        If you have the President of the United States personally
    directing the effort to obtain a job for Ms. Lewinsky, which is
    a benefit to a witness, and simultaneously Ms. Lewinsky is
    under subpoena as a witness in the case, and thirdly, in
    addition, the President is suggesting means to that witness to
    avoid truthful testimony, as evidenced by the December 17
    conversation and the suggestion of the affidavit, the
    conclusion is that you have a corrupt attempt to impede the
    administration of justice and the seeking of truth and the
    facts in the civil rights case.
        Now, let me go to the testimony of Mr. Jordan. Has that
    been distributed now? Good. Let me give a caveat here,
    particularly to my colleagues, the counselors for the
    President, that this summary of the portions of the testimony
    of Mr. Jordan are based upon my handwritten notes. So, please
    don't blow it up in a chart if there is some discrepancy. I
    believe this is, in good faith, accurate, but I did not have a
    copy of the transcript. I was required to go to the Senate
    Chamber and actually take notes in order to prepare this.
        There are a number of areas that I think are relevant and
    new information and are very important for your consideration.
    Let me just touch upon five areas.
        The first one is the job search and Mr. Jordan being an
    agent of the President. In the deposition, Mr. Jordan testified
    that:

        There is no question but that through Betty Currie I was
    acting on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job.

        He goes on to say:

        I interpreted [the request, referring from Betty Currie] it
    as a request from the President.

        Then he testified:

        There was no question that he asked me to help [referring
    to the President] and that he asked others to help. I think
    that is clear from everybody's grand jury testimony.

        So the question is as to whether the information, the
    request, came from Betty Currie or whether it came directly
    from the President, there is no question but that Mr. Jordan
    was acting at the request of the President of the United States
    and no one else. In fact, he goes on to say:

        The fact is I was running the job search, not Ms. Lewinsky,
    and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were
    not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.

        This is very important. There has been a reference, ``Well,
    he was simply getting a job referral, making a referral for
    routine employment interview by this person, Ms. Lewinsky.''
    But, in fact, it is clear that Mr. Jordan knew whom he wanted
    to contact. He was running the job search as he testified.
        Then he testified:

        Question: You're acting in behalf of the President when you
    are trying to get Ms. Lewinsky a job and you were in control of
    the job search?

        The answer is:

        Yes.

        So that is one area, and it is important to establish that
    he was an agent for the President.
        Secondly, there was a witness list that came out December
    5. The President knew about it, at the latest, on December 6,
    and yet he had two meetings with Mr. Jordan, on December 7 and
    December 11. In neither one of those meetings was it disclosed
    to Mr. Jordan that Monica Lewinsky was a witness. I am
    referring to the second page of the exhibits I have handed you
    in which Mr. Jordan testified to that effect:

        Question: And on either of these conversations that I've
    referenced, that you had with the President after the witness
    list came out, your conversation on 12/7 and your conversation
    sometime after the 11th, did the President tell you that Ms.
    Monica Lewinsky was on the witness list in the Jones case?
        Answer: He did not.
        Question: Would you have expected the President to tell you
    if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be
    called as a witness in the Paula Jones case?
        Answer: That would have been helpful.
        Question: So it would have been helpful and it was
    something you would have expected?
        Answer: Yes.

        Even though it would have been helpful, he would have
    expected the President to tell him the information, it was not
    disclosed to him. The materiality, the relevance, of that is
    that you have the President controlling a job search, knowing
    this is a witness in which we are trying to provide a benefit
    for, and yet the person he is directing to get the job for Ms.
    Lewinsky, he fails to tell Mr. Jordan the key fact that she is,
    in fact, a witness, an adverse witness in that case. I think
    that is an important area of his testimony.
        The third area, keeping the President informed--very clear
    testimony about the development of the job search, the Lewinsky
    affidavit that was being prepared, and the fact that it was
    signed. On the third page I have provided to you, Mr. Jordan's
    testimony:

        I was keeping him [the President] informed about what was
    going on and so I told him.

        He goes on further to say:

        He [referring to the President] was obviously interested in
    it.

        Then the question, I believe, was:

        What did you tell the President when the affidavit was
    signed?

        And his answer:

        Mr. President, she signed the affidavit, she signed the
    affidavit.

        So was there any connection between the job benefit that
    was provided and the affidavit that was signed in reference to
    her testimony? Clearly, it was something the President not only
    directed the job search, but he was clearly interested,
    obviously concerned, receiving regular reports about the
    affidavit.
        Then the fourth area is the information at the Park Hyatt
    that was developed. To lay the stage for this--and I will do
    this very briefly--if you look at page 4, you see the previous
    testimony of Mr. Jordan before the grand jury in March. At that
    time, the question was asked of him:

        Did you ever have breakfast or any meal, for that matter,
    with Monica Lewinsky at the Park Hyatt?

        His answer was:

        No.

        It was not equivocally, it was indubitably no.
        And he was further asked, and he testified:

        I've never had breakfast with Monica Lewinsky.

        And then on page 5 he goes on, in the May 28 grand jury
    testimony:

        Did you at any time have any kind of a meal at the Park
    Hyatt with Monica Lewinsky?

        His answer was:

        No.

        So that sets the stage, because in Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony, as evidenced by page 6 of your exhibits, she
    testified in August, after the last time Mr. Jordan testified,
    very clearly about this meeting on December 31 at the Park
    Hyatt with Mr. Jordan where they had breakfast. The discussion
    was about Linda Tripp. Then the discussion went to the notes
    from the President, and she said, ``No, [it was] notes from me
    to the President.'' And Mr. Jordan told her, according to her
    testimony, ``Go home and make sure they're not there.'' That is
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony.
        It was important to ask Mr. Jordan about this. I assumed
    that we, of course, would get simply a denial, sticking with
    the previous grand jury testimony, that unequivocally, no, that
    meeting never happened: we never had breakfast at the Hyatt.
        On page 7, you will notice that Ms. Lewinsky, in her
    testimony, specifically identified even what they had for
    breakfast. And so the investigation required us to go out and
    get the receipt at the Park Hyatt, which is page 8. And the
    receipt showed that there was a charge on December 31 by Mr.
    Jordan that included every item for breakfast, that
    corroborated the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky as to her memory;
    that is, the omelette they had for breakfast.
        And so it is tightening here. The evidence is becoming more
    clear, unequivocally, that this meeting occurred. And so we had
    to ask this of Mr. Jordan. And this is page 9. And, of course,
    I presented the Park Hyatt receipt, I presented the testimony
    of Ms. Lewinsky, and his testimony, which is page 9:

        It is clear, based on the evidence here, that I was at the
    Park Hyatt on Dec 31st. So I do not deny, despite my testimony
    before the grand jury, that on [December] 31 that I was there
    with Ms. Lewinsky, but I did testify before the Grand Jury that
    I did not remember having a breakfast with her on that date and
    that was the truth.

        But what amazed me was, as you go through the questions
    with him, all of a sudden he remembered the breakfast but all
    of a sudden he remembered the conversation in which he before
    said it never happened at all. And his testimony was, when
    asked about the notes:

        I am certain that Ms. Lewinsky talked to me about [the]
    notes.

        And so I think there are a number of relevant points here.
    First of all, you reflect back on the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky
    in this same deposition in which she was asked the question,
    getting Mr. Jordan's approval was basically the same as getting
    the President's approval? Her answer: Yes.
        And so that is how Ms. Lewinsky viewed this. And this is
    what was told to her at this meeting at the Park Hyatt. It goes
    to credibility, it goes to what happened, it goes to the
    obstruction of justice. It is extraordinarily relevant. It is
    new information. It is what was developed because this Senate
    granted us the opportunity to take this further deposition of
    Mr. Jordan and the other witnesses.
        And there are other, you know--the fifth point is that the
    testimony goes to the interconnection between the job help and
    the testimony that was being solicited from Ms. Lewinsky.
        So why is the presentation necessary? Some of you might
    even think, ``Well, thank you very much for that explanation
    you have given to us. Now we have all the facts. Let's go on
    and vote.'' I do think there is some merit. First of all, this
    is not all. There is much more there. I just have a moment to
    develop a portion of Mr. Jordan's testimony that I believe is
    helpful, but, secondly, it tells a story that has never been
    told before.
        I went and saw the videotape and I was underwhelmed by my
    questioning, because it is just not the same. I thought we had
    a dynamic exchange. But then I saw it on videotape and I am
    nowhere to be found. You get to look at Mr. Jordan, a
    distinguished gentleman. But it is still helpful not
    withstanding the difficulty of a video presentation. I
    respectfully request this body to develop the facts fully, to
    hear the testimony of Mr. Jordan, to allow him to explain this
    that tells the story, start to finish, on this one aspect of
    obstruction of justice that is critical to your determination.
    And so I ask your concurrence in the approval of the motion
    that has been offered to you, and at this time I yield to
    Manager Rogan.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, yesterday, along with Mr. Manager Graham, I had the
    privilege of conducting the deposition of Sidney Blumenthal,
    assistant to the President. That deposition was presided over
    by the senior Senator from Pennsylvania and the junior Senator
    from North Carolina. On behalf of the House managers, and I am
    also sure the White House counsel, we thank them for the able
    job that they did.
        This deposition must be played for Members of the U.S.
    Senate, and if one Senator has failed to personally sit through
    this deposition--and every deposition--that Senator is not
    equipped to render a verdict on the impeachment trial of the
    President of the United States.
        I will address very briefly just a couple of the reasons
    why I believe Mr. Blumenthal's deposition warrants being played
    before this body. But to do it, it needs to be put in
    perspective. Remember what the President of the United States
    testified to on the day he was sworn in as a witness before the
    grand jury. He said that in dealing with his aides, he knew
    there was a potential that they could become witnesses before
    the grand jury, and that is why he told them the truth. That is
    the President's own word: the ``truth.'' Mr. Blumenthal's
    deposition paints a totally different picture and gives a
    terribly different interpretation of what the President was
    doing in passing along false stories to his aides.
        We have been treated to a number of euphemisms by the
    distinguished White House counsel during their presentation as
    to what the President was doing during his grand jury
    testimony. They described his testimony as ``maddening.'' They
    have described his testimony as ``misleading'' and
    ``unfortunate.'' But the one thing they have never described it
    as is a lie.
        Mr. Blumenthal gave a totally different take on that
    because he testified under oath that, upon reflection, he
    believes the President was not maddening to him, the President
    lied to him, and he testified so for a very good reason.
        Remember, Sidney Blumenthal testified three times before
    the grand jury in 1998. He testified in February and twice in
    June. But that testimony was in a vacuum because each time he
    testified before the grand jury we were still in a national
    state of, at least presumptively, believing that the President
    had told the truth. The President had made an emphatic denial
    as to the Monica Lewinsky story. There was no physical evidence
    presented to the FBI lab at the time Mr. Blumenthal testified.
    And Monica Lewinsky was not cooperating with the grand jury. So
    we know that certain questions were not asked of him during his
    grand jury testimony because of the status of the facts as we
    thought they were. But Mr. Blumenthal shed some incredible new
    light on the testimony that we received yesterday from him.
        He said, first of all: After I was subpoenaed, but before I
    testified before the grand jury, once in February and twice in
    June--with the President knowing he was about to become a
    witness before the grand jury, a criminal grand jury
    investigation--the President never came to him and said, ``Mr.
    Blumenthal, before you go and provide information in a criminal
    grand jury investigation, I need to recant the false stories I
    told you about my relationship with Monica Lewinsky.''
        And he testified about those false stories. He corroborated
    his own testimony from earlier proceedings. You will recall
    from the record that the day the Monica Lewinsky story broke in
    the national press Mr. Blumenthal was called to the Oval Office
    by the President. The door was closed. They were alone. And
    this is what the President told Sidney Blumenthal about the
    revelations that were breaking that day on the national press
    wire:

        He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual
    demand on me.''

        The President said he rebuffed her. He said:

        I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a lot
    of people and I'm not going to do that again.

        The President said Monica Lewinsky threatened him:

        She said that she would tell people they'd had an affair,
    that she was known as the stalker among her [colleagues], and
    that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an
    affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.

        And the testimony goes on. You are all familiar with it at
    this point.
        The President of the United States allowed his aide to
    appear three times before a Federal grand jury conducting a
    criminal investigation, and never once did the President of the
    United States inform that aide before providing that
    information to the investigatory body--never once--asked or
    told the aide that that was false information. Mr. Blumenthal's
    testimony demonstrates that the President of the United States
    used a White House aide as a conduit for false information
    before the grand jury in a criminal investigation.
        I just want to make one other brief point before I close
    this presentation because I think it needs to be said. I am in
    no position to lecture any of the distinguished Members of this
    body on what the founders intended in drafting the
    Constitution. I believe all of us in this room have an abiding
    respect for that. But there are a couple of points that need to
    be made. I believe there is a reason the founders drafted a
    document that allows us the opportunity in every trial
    proceeding in America to confront and cross-examine live
    witnesses. It is because that gives the trier of fact the
    opportunity to gauge the credibility and the demeanor of the
    witnesses. We have discussed that at length during these
    proceedings.
        But one thing we haven't discussed and one thing that I
    think is important--not from the House managers' perspective,
    but from the perspective of history and the history that will
    be written on the ultimate verdict in this case--and that is
    the idea of open trials. There is a reason why the founders
    looked askance on the concept of secret trials and closed
    trials. There is a reason why in every courtroom across the
    land trials are open. They are open. It is an open process. The
    light of truth is allowed to shine in the courtroom and from
    the courtroom because we don't trust the credibility of a
    verdict if it is done in secret. What would be the verdict on
    this proceeding if the judgment of this body is based upon
    testimony and witnesses, on videotapes, locked in a room
    somewhere, available only to the triers of fact without the
    public being privy to what was made available?
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I would urge you, not
    for the sake of the managers and not for the sake of the
    presentation of the case, but for the sake of this body and for
    the verdict of history that will be written, to please allow
    this to be a public trial in the real sense. If the witnesses
    will not be brought here live before the Senate, please allow
    the doors of the Senate to be open so that the testimony upon
    which each of you must base your verdict will be made available
    not only to all 100 Senators, but will be made available to
    those who will make the ultimate judgment as to the
    appropriateness of the verdict, the American people.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I yield to Mr. Manager Graham.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, how much time?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Your colleagues have consumed 37
    minutes.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I
    do not have a whole lot to add, but I would like to recognize
    this thought: That we have learned a great deal in these
    depositions. Thank you for letting us have them. We didn't get
    everything we wanted--and I think that is a fair statement--but
    who does in life? But we do appreciate you giving us the
    opportunity to explore the testimony of these witnesses because
    I think it would be helpful in setting the historical record
    straight.
        Mr. Blumenthal, to his credit, said the President of the
    United States lied to him. The President of the United States
    did lie to him. The President of the United States, in his
    grand jury testimony, denied ever lying to me. That should be
    historically significant and should be legally significant. Mr.
    Blumenthal, to his credit, said the President of the United
    States tried to paint himself as a victim to Ms. Lewinsky. That
    would be legally and historically relevant and it will mean a
    lot in our arguments and it will be something you should
    consider.
        This has been a good exercise. Thank you very much for
    letting us depose these witnesses.
        I was not at the other two depositions, but I was at Mr.
    Blumenthal's deposition, and I can assure you we know more now
    about what the truth is than before we started this process. I
    hope at the end of the day it is our desire to get to the truth
    that guides us all. We are asking for one live witness, Ms.
    Lewinsky.
        Let me tell you, I know how difficult it is to want this to
    go on given where everybody is at in the country. Trust me, I
    want this to end as much as you do. However, there is a signal
    we will send if we don't watch it. We will make the independent
    counsel report the impeachment trial, and I am not so sure that
    is what the statute was written for.
        The key difference between the House and the Senate is that
    the White House never disputed the facts over in the House.
    They never disputed the facts. They called 15 witnesses to talk
    about process and about the interpretations that you would want
    to put on those facts. In their motion to the Senate,
    everything is in dispute. It is a totally different ball game
    here. That is why we need witnesses, ladies and gentlemen, to
    clarify who said what, who is being honest, who is not, and
    what really did happen in this sordid tale.
        Ms. Lewinsky comes before us because the allegations arise
    that the President of the United States, with an intern, had an
    inappropriate workplace sexual relationship that was discovered
    in a lawsuit where he was a defendant. This was not us or
    anyone else trying to look into the President's private life
    for political reasons or any other reason. It was a defendant
    in a lawsuit asking to look at the behavior of that defendant
    in the workplace, something that goes on every day in
    courtrooms throughout the country.
        And is it uncomfortable? Yes, it is uncomfortable. If you
    have ever tried a sexual harassment case, an assault case, or a
    rape case, it is very much uncomfortable to have to listen to
    these things. But the reason that people are asked to do what
    you are asked to do by the House managers is that the folks
    that are involved represented themselves much better than
    lawyers talking about what happened. And if you find it
    uncomfortable listening to Ms. Lewinsky, think how juries feel,
    think how the victims feel, think how somebody like Ms. Jones
    must feel not to be able to tell the story of the person they
    are suing.
        That is a signal that is going to be sent here that will be
    a devastating and bad signal. If we can't stomach it, if we
    can't stomach listening to inappropriate sexual conduct, why do
    we put that burden on anyone else?
        Give us this witness. We will do it in a professional
    manner. We will focus on the obstruction. We will try to do it
    in a way not to demean the Senate. We will try to do it in a
    way not to demean Ms. Lewinsky. We will try to do it in a way
    to get to the truth. Please give us a chance to present our
    case in a persuasive fashion, because unlike the House,
    everything is in dispute here.
        Thank you very much. I reserve the remainder of my time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers reserve the remainder
    of their time.
        The Chair recognizes Counsel Craig.
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and gentlemen
    of the Senate, I have divided my presentation into three parts
    that fortunately correspond to the three parts of the motion
    that is before you today.
        I would like, first, to argue against admitting videotape
    evidence into the record of this trial. Second, I would like to
    argue against calling live witnesses to this trial. And third,
    I would like to argue against the proposed presentation of
    videotape and deposition testimony for Saturday.
        I sound rather negative. I don't mean to be negative. But
    we don't find much to recommend the three proposals that the
    House managers have brought before you today.
        Let me begin by saying that we support the idea of
    admitting written transcripts of deposition testimony of these
    three witnesses into the record of this trial. But we believe
    that it would be a terrible mistake and wholly redundant to put
    the videotape testimony into that record as well, particularly
    if that means releasing any of this videotaped material to the
    public.
        We can only call the Senate's attention to section 206 of
    Senate Resolution 30, which instructs the Secretary of the
    Senate ``to maintain the videotaped and transcribed records of
    the deposition as confidential proceedings of the Senate.''
    That was the intention of the Senate when you first passed
    Resolution 30. If this decision as proposed today will result
    in overruling that rule, if there is any risk or danger of a
    wholesale, unconditional, and unlimited release of these
    videotapes for the public through the national media, just as
    was done by the House of Representatives when it released all
    the Starr materials, we think it is a bad idea.
        In retrospect, most people believe that it was a mistake
    for the House to release those materials--and those materials
    included videotaped grand jury testimony--and we believe it
    would be a mistake for the Senate, at the request of the House
    managers, to do the same thing with these videotaped materials
    now. To release these videotapes generally to the public--which
    will happen if they are put into the record--inevitably will
    surely cause consternation among those members of the public,
    particularly parents who do not choose to spend one more
    moment, much less hours and even days, thinking about the
    President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky and explaining it
    again to the children. Placing these videotapes in the formal
    record of this trial will be one step closer to releasing the
    tapes to the public for immediate broadcast. If that release
    occurs, it will produce an avalanche of unwelcome deposition
    testimony into the public domain.
        The videotaped testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and
    Mr. Blumenthal will be forced, hour after hour, unbidden and
    uninvited, into the living rooms and family rooms of the
    Nation. Make no mistake about what would happen; we have seen
    it before. We can expect to see the networks play these tapes,
    wall-to-wall, nonstop, and without interruption, over the
    airwaves. This would be a repeat of what happened when the case
    first came to the House of Representatives. For the Senate to
    decide to include the videotapes of this deposition testimony,
    as opposed to the written transcripts in the formal record of
    this trial, would have the same effect and could result in this
    kind of release. The picture, voices, and words on these tapes
    would flow directly and irreversibly into the life of the
    Nation. In addition, these videotapes will, no doubt, be edited
    and excerpted and cut and spliced, and the materials will not
    only be overused, they will also be inevitably abused.
        To take advantage of these witnesses, I submit to you, in
    this way is wrong--whether in the context of the grand jury
    proceeding where confidentiality is promised, or whether
    testifying under subpoena in an impeachment trial in the
    Senate. It is unfair to the witnesses, unfair to the public,
    unfair to the Senate and, we submit, unfair to the President as
    well.
        We do not object to release of the written transcripts of
    this testimony; we support that release. And we believe that
    that satisfies any reasonable requirement of public access to
    the information. The public's right to know and understand what
    is happening in this impeachment trial would be respected. But
    we should learn a lesson from America's experience in the House
    of Representatives: More is not always better.
        It is not wise or right for the House or the Senate to
    perform the function of a mere conveyor belt simply and
    automatically transmitting unfiltered evidence into the public
    domain. It is not wise or right to suspend judgment and turn
    over for public viewing the videotaped testimony of private
    witnesses who are forced to appear and testify under
    compulsion. It is simply wrong to release videotapes of such
    testimony for cable news networks or for friends or foes to use
    as they want. This, I submit, is profoundly unfair to the
    witnesses.
        One can only ask, who really benefits from this kind of
    practice? Is it really in the public interest for the Senate to
    issue and serve a subpoena on private individuals like Monica
    Lewinsky, or Vernon Jordan, to summon these citizens before the
    Senate to compel their testimony before video cameras and then
    to take that videotaped testimony, without any consideration or
    thought about the legitimate personal concerns or interests of
    those witnesses, and release those videotapes of that testimony
    for the national media? Is it really in Ms. Lewinsky's interest
    to do this, or in the interest of her family or her future? Is
    it fair to Mr. Jordan or to his family to subject him to this
    kind of treatment? Is it really in the Senate's interest? Is it
    in the interest of the Constitution, or the Presidency, or of
    the American people to have a videotape of Monica Lewinsky
    readily available for all the world to see and to hear?
        What about those individuals who are, in fact, truly
    innocent but who will surely suffer if these videotapes are
    released to the public for permanent residence in the public
    domain? What about the members of the President's immediate
    family? How can the Senate contemplate releasing Ms. Lewinsky's
    videotaped testimony, discussing her relationship with the
    President, without giving at least some thought to the impact
    that this might have on the members of that family? You can be
    sure that the release of this testimony and of this videotape
    will only add to their agony, embarrassment, and humiliation.
        I only hope that those who purport to be concerned about
    the moral damage that can be attributed to the President's
    conduct and example are equally mindful of the hurt that will
    be inflicted on innocent people by the mere broadcasting of
    these videotapes and of their existence in perpetuity in the
    public record and the public domain.
        We think it is perfectly appropriate and, no doubt, helpful
    to many Senators and staffers to be able to watch the
    deposition testimony of these three witnesses on videotape as
    part of the Senate's trial proceeding, but that function has
    now been satisfied. There is no need for these tapes to be
    broadcast to the public, as the public knows better than
    anyone. It is for that precise reason, one suspects, that
    three-quarters of those polled, according to a survey reported
    in yesterday's New York Times, oppose releasing the videotaped
    testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan and Mr. Blumenthal to
    the public.
        I urge you to not vote to place these materials into the
    record of this trial without giving careful consideration to
    these interests and to these concerns. These are not just the
    interests and concerns of the President and the members of his
    family. They are not just the interests and concerns of these
    three witnesses and the members of their families. I think they
    are also the interests and concerns of the American people as
    well.
        The bottom line, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, is
    simple: You do not need these videotapes released to do your
    constitutional duty, and the people we all work for do not want
    these videotapes released to them. Please draw the line.
        As for the issue of witnesses, we believe that there is no
    useful purpose served by calling live witnesses to testify
    before the Senate in this trial. Live witnesses will not
    advance the factual record. We have known the facts for many
    months. Nor will live witnesses give us new insight into the
    witnesses themselves. Sidney Blumenthal's fourth appearance,
    Vernon Jordan's seventh appearance, and Monica Lewinsky's
    twenty-third appearance told us really very little that was
    new. I take issue with the presentation of the managers. Why
    should we expect Mr. Blumenthal's fifth appearance, Mr.
    Jordan's eighth appearance, and Ms. Lewinsky's twenty-fourth
    appearance to add anything more? Live witnesses will simply not
    serve the interests of fairness. They will not serve the
    interests of the American people, and they will not serve the
    interests of the Senate. In fact, live testimony from these
    three individuals--or from Ms. Lewinsky alone--will be worse
    than an exercise in redundancy and will be an exercise in
    excess. It will only postpone the end of the trial that nobody
    wants anymore and that no one wants to prolong any longer.
    There is every reason, finally and at long last, to bring the
    trial to a close. And calling live witnesses, I submit, will
    not be quick, and it will not be easy. It will prevent the
    Senate from keeping its pledge to bring this trial to a
    conclusion by February 12.
        Because live witnesses are unnecessary for the resolution
    of this matter, perhaps the most important question for the
    Senate to consider and resolve itself is whether calling live
    witnesses might, in fact, tarnish the Senate as an institution.
    This is a question that only you can resolve, the Members of
    the Senate. And you certainly need not take instructions from
    me or from any of us at this table on that subject. But the
    question is worth asking: Will the public's respect for the
    Senate and for the Members of this body be enhanced by calling
    live witnesses? Does the Senate really feel a need or an
    obligation or some requirement to bring Ms. Lewinsky to sit
    here and testify in the well of this historic Chamber?
        The managers first argued that live witnesses were
    necessary to resolve conflicts of testimony, that the only way
    to reconcile disparities and differences in testimony was to
    bring in live witnesses. Today we know that is not true. You
    gave the managers an opportunity to resolve those conflicts and
    find new facts. But most of the critical conflicts that existed
    a week ago still exist today.
        Calling Monica Lewinsky to testify a 24th time is not
    likely to resolve those conflicts. Then we were told that we
    must look into the eyes of the witnesses and observe their
    demeanor to make a judgment as to credibility. But you now have
    the opportunity to observe almost every major witness as he or
    she testifies. Precious little is left to the imagination or to
    guess or to question the credibility, and you certainly have a
    better chance of observing demeanor through the videotape than
    you do with a witness here on the floor of the Senate.
        We are now given a third reason why live witnesses are
    absolutely necessary to this trial to go forward; that is to
    ``validate'' the testimony of these witnesses.
        According to Mr. Manager Hyde, the depositions have been
    successful, but ``what we need now is to validate the record
    that already exists under oath about obstruction of justice and
    perjury.''
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, we on this side of the
    House have never challenged that record. We have always agreed
    that the witnesses said what the record says they said, and
    that record needs no further validation through the live
    testimony of individual witnesses.
        Those of us who have made a career of being lawyers and
    trying cases probably understand better than anyone else why
    the House managers are so adamant in their desire to call live
    witnesses. It keeps the door open if only for a few more days.
    As Mr. Kendall observed last week, like Mr. Micawber in ``David
    Copperfield,'' they hope against hope that something may turn
    up.
        As an abstract proposition, the importance of live
    witnesses cannot be disputed. They are important to prosecutors
    who are trying to make a case. They are important to defense
    lawyers who are trying to defend a case. Trial lawyers know
    better than anyone that live witnesses can make all the
    difference in a trial. There is just no disputing that point.
        But that abstract question is not the real live question
    that the Senate has before it today. The issue before the
    Senate today is different. It is more specifically whether
    these three witnesses, each one of whom has testified on
    multiple occasions under oath before the Federal grand jury, or
    have been interviewed on multiple occasions by lawyers and law
    enforcement officers, would have anything whatsoever to add to
    this trial if they were to appear before you in person. The
    answer to that question is clearly no.
        The answer is no--not because Ms. Lewinsky has already been
    interviewed so many times and has testified so many times, not
    because she was just interviewed a few weekends ago, and not
    because she appeared and answered the House managers' questions
    under oath for many hours just 4 days ago. The answer is no
    because if you watch the videotape of her testimony, and if you
    look at the videotape of the testimony of Mr. Jordan and Mr.
    Blumenthal, you realize and you know deep in your bones that
    calling these witnesses to testify personally before you in the
    Senate in detail would simply be a massive waste of this
    Senate's time.
        You already know the facts. You have already read what they
    have had to say on many different occasions. And you have
    already seen and read their most recent testimony under oath.
    It simply can no longer be credibly argued that you need
    testimony from these witnesses to ``flesh'' out the factual
    record or to resolve conflicts or to fill in the evidentiary
    gaps or to look the witnesses in the eye and assess their
    credibility. All that has been done many times before by many
    lawyers before and by many law enforcement officers many months
    ago. And then it was done just recently again by House managers
    as they took their deposition testimony last week.
        The Senate has given the managers every opportunity to
    persuade the Senate and the Nation to see this case the same
    way they see it. And the managers have run a vigorous and
    energetic campaign aimed at capturing the Senate and changing
    American public opinion. How many times do you know of where
    the prosecutors base their case on a multimillion-dollar
    criminal investigation involving multiple interrogations of
    witnesses, producing 60,000 pages of documents, generating 19
    boxes of evidence, when the prosecutors are allowed to go back
    to those witnesses again and again and again in an effort to
    maybe--somehow maybe--in some way to make their case, covering
    the same territory, presenting the same evidence, hour after
    hour? In fact, in our view, the Senate has indulged the
    managers. And despite the misgivings of many Senators, the
    Senate has leaned over backwards to accommodate the managers.
        We believe it is time for the Senate to say it is time to
    vote. Given the state of the record compiled by the Office of
    Independent Counsel, given the discovery that has already been
    given to the managers, the evidence is as it is, and it is not
    likely to change in any significant way. The moment of truth
    can no longer be avoided, and the Senate should move to make
    the decision.
        President Clinton is not guilty of having committed high
    crimes and misdemeanors. He should not be removed from office.
    The Senate must act now to end this impeachment trial finally
    and for all time.
        Finally, as to the proposed proceedings for Saturday,
    Senate Resolution 30 gives the House managers and White House
    counsel an opportunity to ``make a presentation'' to the Senate
    employing all or portions of the videotape of the deposition
    testimony. And the final portion of the motion involves a
    request that the parties be permitted to present before the
    Senate for a period of time not to exceed a total of 6 hours
    equally divided all or portions of the parts of the videotapes
    of the oral depositions of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Sidney
    Blumenthal that have been admitted into evidence.
        We are convinced that such a presentation would provide no
    new information to the Senate and would only serve to delay
    this trial and further burden the service of the Senate.
        We also believe that there is a potential for unfairness
    that lurks in the process of excerpting and presenting portions
    of individual videotape testimony out of context. We remain
    committed to the notion that to be fair to all sides, the
    videotapes, if they are used, must be shown in their entirety
    or shown not at all. And, above all, we do not believe these
    videotapes should be released to the public in any form which
    would of course occur if they were used as part of the
    presentation on Saturday.
        Senators have themselves been reviewing the videotaped
    deposition testimony of the witnesses at great length and in
    great detail over the past 4 days. It appears to us that the
    Senate has been very conscientious in carrying out this
    assignment. And within a matter of days, Senators will listen
    to final arguments from each side.
        Is there really a need for an intermediate stage involving
    the playing of videotape testimony of the very same evidence?
    After conscientiously reviewing the videotape testimony and
    reading the transcripts of that testimony, should Senators now
    be required to sit and watch and listen to more of the same?
    Such an exercise would only be cumulative and causes us to ask
    what the point would be. We just do not think that additional
    presentations of the same evidence that Senators have been
    reviewing over the past few days will be that helpful to the
    process.
        Presumably, the House managers seek to present a collection
    of snippets--the greatest hits from the deposition testimony of
    Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Blumenthal. This would be
    unfortunate because it would require a full response from the
    White House--presumably our own collection of snippets aimed at
    putting the managers' excerpts into some kind of context. This
    would be a dual of snippets and excerpts, and presumably each
    side in the course of the presentation would conduct a guided
    tour for the Senate through that evidence, although I must say
    that the language of the motion leaves that open to some doubt.
        The language of the motion provides no opportunity for
    argument, no opportunity for explanation, and simply talks
    about playing a total of 6 hours equally divided, all or
    portions of the parts of the videotapes.
        Is this the way your time is best used in this enterprise?
    We fully understand the House managers' desire--and even share
    it--to highlight and explain the importance of certain
    testimony that came out of the depositions over the past few
    days. But in truth, there are no bombshells in that testimony.
    There is no dynamite. There are no explosions. We believe that
    highlighting, explaining, and calling attention to those parts
    of that testimony that are important can be done with the
    transcripts, and the transcripts more than satisfy the
    requirement that we see, or the need to conduct that function,
    carry out that function. That is what ordinary lawyers do when
    they are trying cases or arguing in front of a jury.
        To the extent that the managers wish to call attention to
    various aspects of the testimony, we think they will have ample
    time to do so in the course of their final argument.
    Traditionally, that is the time to do that, during closing
    arguments, the time for advocates in a trial to marshal their
    evidence, to summarize and comment on that evidence; and to
    allow the managers to go through the deposition testimony first
    would be tantamount to giving the managers two closing
    arguments.
        In summary, Mr. Chief Justice, I have a point of
    parliamentary inquiry I would direct to the Chair having to do
    with the first paragraph, the first section of the proposed
    motion submitted by the House managers. Is there any way that
    the Senate can deal first with the question of the first
    question being bifurcated? Is there any way the Senate can
    bifurcate this first question and a separate vote be taken
    first on including the transcripts of the deposition testimony
    in the record of the trial and, second, whether the videotapes
    should also be included in the record?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. A preemptive motion to that effect could
    be made by any Senator.
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Thank you.

                                     recess

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we take a 15-minute recess. I think we can address that
    question during this recess.
        There being no objection, at 2:22 p.m. the Senate recessed
    until 2:44 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that there is time
    remaining for arguments by the White House counsel, and then at
    their conclusion, by the House managers. After that, I will
    make an attempt to explain to the Senate exactly what is in the
    motions, because there seems to be some degree of question
    about that. Then we will be prepared to have a series of votes
    at that time. I still believe we should be able to start that
    around 4 o'clock. I yield the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Craig.
        Mr. Counsel CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, we have completed our
    presentation. Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The House managers have 19 minutes
    remaining.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Mr. Chief Justice, I will respond
    briefly, to be followed by Mr. Manager McCollum, who will be
    followed by Mr. Manager Hutchinson.
        Let me first talk quickly about Mr. Craig's argument about
    disagreeing on the admission of the video depositions. He cited
    the House proceedings, and we want to be clear as to our belief
    of our position in the House in this process, as the accusatory
    branch of the Government in this process, and I think that is
    the case because we vote by a majority vote, we chose to bring
    forward the case that we felt established the allegations of
    impeachment.
        There was no conflict of evidence brought forward from
    those House proceedings. This evidence was not challenged until
    we came to this body, the appropriate body, for resolving the
    evidence and trying the case, as you will. That is evidenced by
    the constitutional requirement that you must vote conviction
    based on two-thirds of your body. But the actual conflict was
    not presented until we arrived here in the Senate. By allowing
    us to have this procedure of taking depositions, we have
    focused more clearly on resolving those particular conflicts.
        I might add also in response to Mr. Craig's statement that
    the Starr Report was released out to the public and, as a
    result of that, there may be danger here in releasing these
    video depositions. But let me tell you about the House vote on
    the Starr Report. Seventy percent of the Democrats supported
    the release of those documents; 100 percent of the Democratic
    leadership in the House supported the release of those
    documents. So it was not just one party over the other party
    that threw these out to the public. It was a decision that was
    a bipartisan decision on the part of the House.
        I might add, that is not our interest in doing this with
    video depositions. We are open to your process, but we must
    conclude by those who would argue that perhaps you should open
    your debate to the public, we don't see the consistency in
    trying to take a very important part of the evidence in this
    case and not opening that to the public. So we are at your
    wishes. It is our desire to make the presentation using all or
    portions of these video depositions and to use those as fully
    as we would any other evidence.
        With that said, I ask Mr. Manager McCollum to follow me.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chief
    Justice.
        If you listen to the White House counsel, the simple fact
    is, they don't want a public display in any form of any
    testimony here in front of the Senate. They don't want the
    public to have an opportunity to have a public trial.
        Now, maybe an impeachment trial is not exactly the same as
    any other trial, but in the history of the Senate, it has been
    a basically open process, except for the voting. It has been an
    opportunity for witnesses to come before you. It has been an
    opportunity for people to be heard. It has been an opportunity
    for the public to hear the people who want to speak.
        White House counsel didn't just say, ``We don't want live
    witnesses here.'' They said, ``We don't want you to be able to
    admit even into evidence the videotape that might become
    public, and we don't want you to be able to show any portion,
    or all even, of the videotapes of the depositions that have
    been taken.''
        If a Republican had gotten up and said that, we would have
    probably gotten hung on some political petard for that. The
    reality is, the public has business here. This is a trial. I
    suggest and submit to you, we need--you need--the opportunity
    to hear these witnesses one way or the other--preferably Monica
    Lewinsky live. We need to bring closure in this matter.
        How can the public come to closure? How can those who feel
    so emotionally, as we know they do, around the country, come to
    closure on this--which we need for them to do as much as you
    need to resolve and we need to have you resolve the questions
    before you--how can they come to closure? How can we all come
    to closure without an opportunity for the public to
    participate, in one way or another, in seeing the credibility,
    judging the witnesses, judging the truth of this?
        Let me remind you, there is nothing in these depositions
    that is salacious material, so it has been constrained very
    delicately--nothing at all that would be offensive to anybody.
        In addition, think about this for a minute. When it comes
    to calling Monica Lewinsky live, when it comes to letting the
    deposition be presented, if you believe that the President did
    not break the law--not talking about whether he should be
    removed from office--if you believe he did not break the law,
    that he did not commit the crimes of perjury and obstruction of
    justice, that means you must have concluded that Monica
    Lewinsky was not telling the truth when she said about the
    false affidavit, ``I knew what he meant,'' when she said about
    the concealment of the gifts, ``Betty called me,'' when she
    said about the nature of their relationship, ``It began the
    night we met,'' and many other things.
        You, I would submit, my colleagues in the Senate, have a
    moral obligation to allow Monica Lewinsky to come here and be
    judged on her credibility, not just by you but by the public,
    by all of us, as a live witness. Certainly, barring that, you
    have an obligation to have the credibility on the issues of
    guilt or innocence of these crimes be judged by everybody, at
    the very least, by the presentation of these videos in a
    public, open format here in the Senate before everybody. I
    think it is a powerful question you have to resolve.
        I submit one last point. For those of you who do believe
    the President is guilty of these crimes, you have an obligation
    to let the showing of these depositions, or the presentation
    preferably of Monica Lewinsky live, so those who maybe don't
    think the same way you do have an opportunity for that
    credibility to be judged. Only if the witnesses are present can
    they be judged that way.
        The most remarkable thing about the White House
    presentation may have been, just a moment ago, the admission
    that normally in trials this is exactly what happens. And I
    present to you the suggestion, this is exactly what should
    happen here today.
        I yield to Manager Hutchinson.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Manager Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Very briefly, I was asked to respond to the last argument
    by counsel for the President in regard to their objections on
    the evidentiary presentation of 6 hours under the motion, which
    would be, I believe, on Saturday. After 6 days of opening
    statements in this trial, and after 2 days of questions and
    answers, and then we had, I believe, 2 days of motion
    arguments, you have heard from all the lawyers more than you
    ever wanted to hear. I don't think that it is too much to ask,
    for 6 hours of discussion of the evidentiary record that was
    developed from the deposition testimony. I think that is
    reasonable.
        It has been argued that it is going to be snippets, it is
    going to be a battle of snippets.
        If this motion is passed, it will be introduced into
    evidence, and each side will have an opportunity to discuss
    that evidence, to contrast it with other individuals'
    testimony, and to present it in a fashion that is most
    understandable. It is equally divided; therefore, both sides
    can present their case. That is how it is traditionally done.
    There is nothing unusual about that, and certainly the White
    House defense lawyers will be very vigilant in making sure that
    it is fairly presented.
        There was objection that was made--and this is overlapping
    a little bit--as to the public release of the video. Our motion
    really goes to introducing into evidence. It is up to you as to
    how that evidence is handled. Customarily in a trial, when
    something is entered into evidence, that is released. But there
    was concern expressed about the witnesses, about Mr. Jordan and
    the fact that he has testified and now it would be made public.
    I recall the White House defense lawyers, on this screen over
    here, put Mr. Jordan's video up there for the world to see. I
    believe they also brought in other witnesses on video that was
    put out there for the whole world to see. So I think it is a
    little bit late to come in and say that that should not be
    subject to public discussion.
        I think that the motion that is presented is reasonable. It
    is fair. They say there is nothing of dynamite or there is
    nothing explosive. Then if that is the case, there should not
    be any objection to the discussion and the fair playing of that
    evidence. But in fact much of this is due because it was not
    developed after the President made his grand jury appearance.
    Many of these witnesses testified early. They were not able to
    testify again after the President's grand jury testimony. So I
    think there are new areas that have certainly been developed.
        With that, Mr. Chief Justice, I yield back.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Will the House managers yield back?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, then all time has been yielded
    back on both sides?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
        Mr. LOTT. We had expected this would take a little bit
    longer. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Chief Justice, I believe it would be of interest to the
    Senators that we give just a brief explanation of the motions.
    I believe Senator Daschle may have an additional motion that he
    would like to offer. So that we can make sure he has had the
    time to prepare that, and how we would go into the voting
    procedure, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
    order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, very briefly, I believe that
    Senator Daschle, or one of his Senators, will have a peremptory
    motion that they will offer, and it will be read by the clerk;
    then there will be a vote on that. Then there will be a vote on
    the 3 divisions that have been identified--the 3 votes on the
    one motion--and then I believe Senator Daschle will also have a
    motion; we will go straight to debate and closing arguments and
    the vote on the articles of impeachment. Is that a correct
    recitation?
        I yield to Senator Daschle.
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I appreciate the Senator
    yielding. As I understand it, Senator Murray's motion will
    relate to the third motion, which is, as I understand it, the
    motion that allows for video excerpts to be used. Her motion
    would restrict both managers to transcripts, written
    transcripts. I am not sure in which order her motion should be
    offered, but since it relates to the third one, perhaps it
    would be in concert with that motion.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. This is the motion to debate and divide
    the third motion.
        Mr. DASCHLE. That's correct.
        Mr. LOTT. We would vote on the first paragraph, the second
    paragraph, and then there would be a motion at that point by
    Senator Murray and a vote on that, and a vote then on the third
    division, and then a vote on the articles of impeachment
    itself.

                               vote on division i

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on Division I. The clerk
    will read Division I.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The House moves that the transcriptions and videotapes of
    the oral depositions taken pursuant to Senate resolution 30
    from the point that each witness is sworn to testify under oath
    to the end of any direct response to the last question posed by
    a party be admitted into evidence.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are required.
        The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 9]

     [Subject: Division I of House managers motion regarding admission of
                                   evidence]

                                   YEAS--100

    Abraham
    Akaka
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Bennett
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Bond
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Brownback
    Bryan
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Cochran
    Collins
    Conrad
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    Daschle
    DeWine
    Dodd
    Domenici
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Graham
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Harkin
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hollings
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Kyl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murkowski
    Murray
    Nickles
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Roberts
    Rockefeller
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Torricelli
    Voinovich
    Warner
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 100, the nays
    are 0. Division I of the motion is agreed to.

                              vote on division ii

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The next vote will be on Division II of
    the motion. The clerk will read Division II of the motion.
        The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

        Division II: The House further moves that the Senate
    authorize and issue a subpoena for the appearance of Monica S.
    Lewinsky before the Senate for a period of time not to exceed
    eight hours, and in connection with the examination of that
    witness, the House requests that either party be able to
    examine the witness as if the witness were declared adverse,
    that counsel for the President and counsel for the House
    Managers be able to participate in the examination of that
    witness, and that the House be entitled to reserve a portion of
    its examination time to reexamine the witness following any
    examination by the President.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The
    clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 30, nays 70, as follow:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 10]

    [Subject: Division II of House managers motion regarding appearance of
                                   witnesses]

                                    YEAS--30

    Abraham
    Ashcroft
    Bond
    Bunning
    Burns
    Cochran
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gramm
    Grams
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Santorum
    Smith (NH)
    Specter
    Thompson

                                    NAYS--70

    Akaka
    Allard
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Bennett
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Brownback
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Coverdell
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Domenici
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Gorton
    Graham
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Roberts
    Rockefeller
    Roth
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thurmond
    Torricelli
    Voinovich
    Warner
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.
        On this vote, the yeas are 30, the nays are 70. Division II
    of the motion is not agreed to.
        The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington, Mrs.
    Murray.

                       murray substitute for division iii

        Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, I send a substitute for
    Division III to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from Washington, Mrs. Murray, moves that the
    following shall be substituted for Division III:
        I move that the parties be permitted to present before the
    Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a total of six
    hours, equally divided, all or portions of the parts of the
    written transcriptions of the depositions of Monica S.
    Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        The Parliamentarian advises me that there are 2 hours of
    argument on this motion. Who is the proponent?
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent
    that the time be yielded back.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        I think the clerk should read Division III, having read the
    proposed substitute.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The House further moves that the parties be permitted to
    present before the Senate, for a period of time not to exceed a
    total of six hours, equally divided, all or portions of the
    parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions of Monica S.
    Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal admitted
    into evidence, and that the House be entitled to reserve a
    portion of its presentation time.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Now the clerk will read the substitute
    again.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        I move that the parties be permitted to present before the
    Senate for a period of time not to exceed a total of six hours,
    equally divided, all or portions of the parts of the written
    transcriptions of the depositions of Monica S. Lewinsky, Vernon
    E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The
    question is on the substitute. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 27, nays 73, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 11]

    [Subject: Murray motion to substitute Division III of the House motion]

                                    YEAS--27

    Akaka
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Campbell
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Harkin
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Levin
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Snowe
    Torricelli

                                    NAYS--73

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Bennett
    Bond
    Breaux
    Brownback
    Bryan
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Graham
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hollings
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Kyl
    Leahy
    Lieberman
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Moynihan
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Schumer
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 27, the nays
    are 73, and the motion is not agreed to.

                              vote on division iii

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The vote is now on the Division III of
    the motion. The clerk will read Division III.
        The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

        Division III. The House further moves that the parties be
    permitted to present before the Senate, for a period of time
    not to exceed a total of six hours, equally divided, all or
    portions of the parts of the videotapes of the oral depositions
    of Monica S. Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney
    Blumenthal admitted into evidence, and that the House be
    entitled to reserve a portion of its presentation time.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The
    clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 62, nays 38, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 12]

         [Subject: Division III of the House managers motion regarding
                           presentation of evidence]

                                    YEAS--62

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Breaux
    Brownback
    Bryan
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hollings
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lieberman
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Moynihan
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--38

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Snowe
    Torricelli

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 62, the nays
    are 38. Division III of the motion is agreed to.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the minority
    leader.

                     motion to proceed to closing arguments

        Mr. DASCHLE. I send a motion to the desk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Daschle] moves that the
    Senate now proceed to closing arguments; that there be 2 hours
    for the White House Counsel followed by 2 hours for the House
    Managers; and that at the conclusion of this time the Senate
    proceed to vote, on each of the articles, without intervening
    action, motion or debate, except for deliberations, if so
    decided by the Senate.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The minority leader.
        Mr. DASCHLE. I ask unanimous consent that all time be
    yielded back.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so
    ordered. The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call
    the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 44, nays 56, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 13]

           [Subject: Daschle motion to proceed to closing arguments]

                                    YEAS--44

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--56

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Feingold
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 44, the nays
    are 56, and the motion is not agreed to.
        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that was the last of
    the motions that had been offered.
        I am ready to go to the closing script unless there is some
    other motion pending or to be offered.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. May I ask, Mr. Chief Justice, for
    indulgence for just a couple minutes to consult with my
    colleagues?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that it is in order
    for White House counsel to offer a motion at this point. If
    they wish to do so, then I believe they could, then we would
    vote on that motion.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. White House
    Counsel Ruff.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                  motion to provide written notice to counsel

        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Majority Leader, I want to hand up to
    the desk a brief motion dealing with the presentation of
    videotape evidence on Saturday pursuant to the motion that has
    just been voted on by the Senate. If I may, I hand it up to the
    clerk.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday,
    February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to
    counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line
    designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of
    Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they
    plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday,
    or during their closing argument.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. There are 2 hours equally divided on the
    motion.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, we won't use but a
    small percentage of that. I will turn the matter over, if I
    may, to my colleague, Mr. Kendall.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Counsel
    Kendall.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, House managers, I will
    be brief. This is simply a procedural motion which I think will
    make for a fairer hearing and a more efficient use of the
    Senate's time on Saturday.
        Fascinating though these depositions are, I don't think
    there is any need to inflict them on you repeatedly. What we
    are asking in this motion is simply a procedure that would be
    normal in a civil trial, and that is by a fair time tomorrow
    for the House managers to designate the portions of the three
    depositions that they intend to use. That will allow us not to
    repeat those portions, and it will give us some fair chance to
    organize our responsive presentation.
        The burden is on the House managers. I think this is not an
    extensive set of transcripts. I think it can be easily done.
    You have all, many of you, watched the depositions this week,
    read the transcripts. So I think if we can simply have this
    designation by 2 o'clock tomorrow, it will enable Saturday,
    perhaps, to be a shorter proceeding.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Counsel for House managers? The Chair
    recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you.
        I will imitate my colleague at the bar Mr. Kendall's
    brevity, if not his eloquence.
        I simply suggest this is somewhat a unique opportunity that
    counsel is inviting the House managers to engage in, to give
    counsel notice of page and line of transcripts for the
    presentation of evidence that we are going to make. It is our
    prerogative to put on our evidence; it is White House counsel's
    opportunity to put on their evidence. Asking us to choreograph
    that for them and with them is something that I am unfamiliar
    with, except for one time.
        I remember during my days as a judge in California that a
    similar request was made for me, and a law clerk pointed out to
    me language from one of the late great justices of the
    California Supreme Court, Otto Kaus. Apparently, a similar
    request was made to Justice Kaus to do the same thing in a
    case, and Justice Kaus looked at the lawyer making the request
    and he said, ``I believe the appropriate legal response to your
    request is that it is none of your damn business what the other
    side is going to put on.''
        With that, Mr. Chief Justice, we will yield back the
    balance of our time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Kendall.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. That philosophy might want to be
    emulated at some point by the drafters of the Federal Civil
    Rules, but it is not. In every Federal civil trial, this
    procedure is followed, the designation, the identifying, and
    designating of deposition excerpts.
        Again, I think it will make for a fairer and more efficient
    proceeding. I don't think trial by surprise has a place here.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The vote is on the motion.
        The clerk will read the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday,
    February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to
    counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line
    designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of
    Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they
    plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday,
    or during their closing argument.

        Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chief Justice, may we have order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. I fully agree with the Senator.
        Mr. BYRD. Would the clerk read that again.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Let the Senate remain in order and let
    the clerk read the motion again.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        Mr. Ruff moves that no later than 2:00 P.M. on Friday,
    February 5, 1999, the Managers shall provide written notice to
    counsel for the President indicating the precise page and line
    designations of any video excerpts from the depositions of
    Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan or Sidney Blumenthal that they
    plan to use during their three-hour presentation on Saturday,
    or during their closing argument.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The yeas and nays are automatic. The
    clerk will call the roll.
        The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
        [Disturbance in the Visitors' Galleries.]
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will restore order
    to the gallery.
        The assistant legislative clerk continued with the call of
    the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 46, nays 54, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 14]

                    [Subject: White House Counsels' motion]

                                    YEAS--46

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--54

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote, the yeas are 46, the nays
    are 54. The motion is rejected.

          orders for saturday, february 6 and monday, february 8, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that completes all
    the motions. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that when the
    Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment
    until 10 a.m. on Saturday, February 6, and at 10 a.m. on
    Saturday, immediately following the prayer, the Senate will
    resume consideration of the articles of impeachment. I further
    ask consent that on Saturday there be 6 hours equally divided
    between the House managers and White House counsel for
    presentations. I further ask that following those presentations
    on Saturday, the Senate then adjourn until 1 p.m. on Monday,
    February 8. I finally ask consent that on Monday, immediately
    following the prayer, the Senate resume consideration of the
    articles of impeachment, and there then be 6 hours equally
    divided between the managers and White House counsel for final
    arguments.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to
    object, and I shall not, I ask the distinguished leader this.
    We have had exhibits handed out today to be printed in the
    Congressional Record, referring to depositions which, I
    understand under rule XXIX, are still confidential. Are those
    to be printed in the Record?
        Mr. LOTT. I will ask consent that the transcripts of the
    depositions be printed in the Record of today's date.
        Mr. LEAHY. The exhibits were handed out today in debate.
    Were they handed out under rule XXIX?
        Mr. LOTT. I believe we got approval that they be used in
    the oral presentations at the beginning of the session today.
        Mr. LEAHY. I withdraw any objection.
        Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection has been heard.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I withdrew any objection.
        Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr.
    Kerry, is recognized.
        Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to
    object. I ask the majority leader, is there an assumption that
    if White House counsel were to want sufficient time on Saturday
    in order to be able to present video testimony countering
    whatever surprise video--and there may or may not be a
    surprise--would they have time to be able to provide that on
    Saturday--not to carry over, but merely if they choose to, to
    do that on Saturday?
        Mr. LOTT. I am not sure I understand the question, except
    that we will come in at 10, and we will have 6 hours equally
    divided. I presume that the House would make a presentation
    first and then the White House and then close. There would be
    time during that 6-hour period for the White House to use it as
    they see fit. Are you asking that there would be some sort of
    break so they would be able to consider that?
        Mr. KERRY. Clearly, the purpose of the trial and the
    purpose of this effort is to have a fair presentation of
    evidence. The Senate now having denied notice to White House
    counsel of what areas may be the subject of video, it might be
    that the voice of the witnesses themselves is the best response
    to whatever it is that the House were to present. If they were
    to decide----
        Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chief Justice, I call for the regular
    order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The regular order has been called for.
    There is a unanimous consent request pending. Is there
    objection?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, briefly, if I could say on
    behalf of my unanimous consent, and in brief response to the
    question, we have all worked hard and bent over backward trying
    to be fair. I am sure if there is something that would be
    needed on Saturday, it would be carefully considered by both
    sides.
        Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        Mr. GRAMM. A quorum is present.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader has the floor.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe it would be
    appropriate to go ahead and get this unanimous consent
    agreement. We will continue to work with both sides to try to
    make sure there is a fair way to proceed on Saturday. We will
    have the remainder of today and tomorrow to work on that. So I
    would like to renew my unanimous consent request.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, reserving the right to object.
    May I inquire of the majority leader if that Saturday time
    schedule gives both parties adequate time to prepare for the
    presentation of the evidence? Have both sides agreed that they
    will be prepared?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, as best I can respond to that,
    I just say that hopefully both sides have had more than
    adequate time allocated on Saturday. One of the reasons we are
    doing it this way--Saturday instead of tomorrow--is so both
    sides will have an opportunity to review everything and
    hopefully communicate with each other. We will do that Friday
    during the day so that an orderly presentation can be made by
    both sides on Saturday. I believe we are seeing a problem here
    where there may not be one.
        But if one develops certainly we would take it into
    consideration.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I renew my request.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? In the absence of
    objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    those parts of the transcripts of the depositions admitted into
    evidence be printed in the Congressional Record of today's
    date.
        I further ask consent that the deposition transcripts of
    Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, and the
    videotapes thereof, be immediately released to the managers on
    the part of the House and the counsel to the President for the
    purpose of preparing their presentations, provided, however,
    that such copies shall remain at all times under the
    supervision of the Sergeant at Arms to ensure compliance with
    the confidentiality provisions of S. Res. 30.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so
    ordered.
        [The material follows:]

        In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the
       Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
                                     States

               excerpts of video deposition of monica s. lewinsky
                  (Monday, February 1, 1999, Washington, D.C.)

        SENATOR DeWINE: If not, I will now swear the witness.

        Ms. Lewinsky, will you raise your right hand, please?

        Whereupon, MONICA S. LEWINSKY was called as a witness and, after
    having been first duly sworn by Senator DeWine, was examined and
    testified as follows:

        SENATOR DeWINE: The House Managers may now begin your questioning.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

        Good morning to all present.
                         examination by house managers

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, welcome back to Washington, and wanted to just
    gather a few of our friends here to have this deposition now. We do
    have quite a number of people present, but we--in spite of the numbers,
    we do want you to feel as comfortable as possible because I think we--
    everyone present today has an interest in getting to the truth of this
    matter, and so as best as you can, we would appreciate your answers in
    a--in a truthful and a fashion that you can recall. I know it's been a
    long time since some of these events have occurred.

        But for the record, would you state your name once again, your full
    name?

        A. Yes. Monica Samille Lewinsky.

        Q. And you're a--are you a resident of California?

        A. I'm--I'm not sure exactly where I'm a resident now, but I--
    that's where I'm living right now.

        Q. Okay. You--did you grow up there in California?

        A. Yes.

        Q. I'm not going to go into all that, but I thought just a little
    bit of background here.

        You went to college where?

        A. Lewis and Clark, in Portland, Oregon.

        Q. And you majored in--majored in?

        A. Psychology.

        Q. Tell me about your work history, briefly, from the time you left
    college until, let's say, you started as an intern at the White House.

        A. Uh, I wasn't working from the time I--

        Q. Okay. Did you--

        A. I graduated college in May of '95.

        Q. Did you work part time there in--in Oregon with a--with a
    District Attorney--

        A. Uh--

        Q. --in his office somewhere?

        A. During--I had an internship or a practicum when I was in school.
    I had two practicums, and one was at the public defender's office and
    the other was at the Southeast Mental Health Network.

        Q. And those were in Portland?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. What--you received a bachelor of science in psychology?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Okay. As a part of your duties at the Southeast Health Network,
    what did you--what did you do in terms of working? Did you have direct
    contact with people there, patients?

        A. Yes, I did. Um, they referred to them as clients there and I
    worked in what was called the Phoenix Club, which was a socialization
    area for the clients to--really to just hang out and, um, sort of work
    on their social skills. So I--

        Q. Okay. After your work there, you obviously had occasion to come
    to work at the White House. How did--how did you come to decide you
    wanted to come to Washington, and in particular, work at the White
    House?

        A. There were a few different factors. My mom's side of the family
    had moved to Washington during my senior year of college and I wanted--
    I wasn't ready to go to graduate school yet. So I wanted to get out of
    Portland, and a friend of our family's had a grandson who had had an
    internship at the White House and had thought it might be something I'd
    enjoy doing.

        Q. Had you ever worked around--in politics and campaigns or been
    very active?

        A. No.

        Q. You had to go through the normal application process of
    submitting a written application, references, and so forth to--to the
    White House?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you do that while you were still in Oregon, or were you
    already in D.C.?

        A. No. The application process was while I was a senior in college
    in Oregon.

        Q. Had you ever been to Washington before?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Obviously, you were accepted, and you started work when?

        A. July 10th, 1995.

        Q. Where--where were you assigned?

        A. The Chief--

        Q. Physically, where were you located?

        A. Oh, physically?

        Q. Yes.

        A. Room 93 of the Old Executive Office Building.

        Q. Were you designated in any particular manner in terms of--were
    all interns the same, I guess, would be my question?

        A. Yes and no. We were all interns, but there were a select group
    of interns who had blue passes who worked in the White House proper,
    and most of us worked in the Old Executive Office Building with a pink
    intern pass.

        Q. Now, can you explain to me the significance of a pink pass
    versus a blue pass?

        A. Sure.

        Q. Okay. Is it--is it access?

        A. Yes.

        Q. To what?

        A. A blue pass gives you access to anywhere in the White House and
    a pink intern pass gives you access to the Old Executive Office
    Building.

        Q. Did interns have blue passes?

        A. Yes, some.

        Q. Some did, and some had pink passes?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And you had the pink?

        A. Correct.

        Q. How long was your internship?

        A. It was from July 'til the end of August, and then I stayed on
    for a little while until the 2nd.

        Q. Are most interns for the summertime--you do part of the summer
    or the entire summer?

        A. I believe there are interns all year-round at the White House.

        Q. Now, you as an intern, you are unpaid.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And tell--tell me how you came to, uh, through your
    decisionmaking process, to seek a paid position and stay in Washington.

        A. Uh, there were several factors. One is I came to enjoy being at
    the White House, and I found it to be interesting. I was studying to
    take the GREs, the entrance exam for graduate school, and needed to get
    a job. So I--since I had enjoyed my internship, my supervisor at the
    time, Tracy Beckett, helped me try and secure a position.

        Q. Now, you mentioned the pink pass that you had. So you were able
    to--I don't want to presume--you were able to get into the White House
    on occasion even with a pink pass?

        A. The--do you mean the White House proper, or--

        Q. Yes, the White House--

        A. --the complex?

        Q. Yes. Let me be clear. When I--I tend to say ``White House''--I
    mean the actual building itself. And I know perhaps you think of the
    whole complex in terms of the whole--

        A. I'm sorry. Just to be clear--

        Q. Yes.

        A. --do you mean the West Wing and the residence and--

        Q. Right.

        A. --the East Wing when you say the White House?

        Q. Right. The White House where the President lives, and works, I
    guess, right.

        A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?

        Yes, yes. I mean that White House. As an intern, you had a pink
    pass that did allow you to have access to that White House where the
    President was on occasion?

        A. No.

        Q. Did not. Did you have--did you ever get in there as an intern?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And under--under what circumstances?

        A. It--

        Q. Did you have to be accompanied by someone, or--

        A. Exactly; someone with a blue pass.

        Q. So how did you--once you decided you wanted to stay in
    Washington and find a paying job, you sought out some help from friends
    there, people you knew, contacts, and you were--you did--you were
    successful?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And you were hired where--where in the White House?

        A. In Legislative Affairs.

        Q. Now, again, to educate me on this, in that group, in that
    section, department, you would have worked where, physically?

        A. Physically, in the East Wing.

        Q. Okay, and as an intern before, you worked in the Old Executive
    Office Building?

        A. Correct.

        Q. But you moved about and occasionally would go into the White
    House, if escorted?

        A. Correct.

        Q. It takes a while, but I'll get there with you; I'll catch up.

        When did you actually--what was your first day on the job with the
    Legislative Affairs, uh, group?

        A. Um, first day on the job was sometime after the furlough. I was
    hired right before the furlough, but the paperwork hadn't gone through,
    so first day on the job was some point after the furlough. I don't
    remember the exact date.

        Q. So you remained, uh, on as an intern during the furlough--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --the Government shutdown period.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And that was in November of 1995, some date during that?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Um, tell me how you, um, began--I guess the--the--we're
    going to talk about a relationship with the President. Uh, when you
    first, uh, I guess, saw him, I think there was some indication that you
    didn't speak to him maybe the first few times you saw him, but you had
    some eye contact or sort of smiles or--

        A. I--I believe I've testified to that in the grand jury pretty
    extensively.

        Q. Uh-huh.

        A. Is--is there something more specific?

        Q. Well, again, I'm wanting to know times, you know, how soon that
    occurred and sort of what happened, you know, if you can--you know,
    there are going to be occasions where you--obviously, you testified
    extensively in the grand jury, so you're going to obviously repeat
    things today. We're doing the deposition for the Senators to view, we
    believe, so it's--

        MR. CACHERIS: May I note an objection? The Senators have the
    complete record, as you know, Mr. Bryant, and she is standing on her
    testimony that she has given on the occasions that Mr. Stein alluded to
    at the introduction of this deposition.

        MR. BRYANT: Well, I appreciate that, but, uh, if this is going to
    be the case, we don't even need the deposition, because we're limited
    to the record and everything is in the record. So I think, uh, to be
    fair, we're--we're obviously going to have to talk about, uh, some
    things for 8 hours here, or else we can go home.

        THE WITNESS: Sounds good to me.

        [Laughter.]

        MR. BRYANT: I think we probably all would like to do that.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, are you objecting to the question?

        MR. CACHERIS: Yes. I'm objecting to him asking specific questions
    that are already in the record that--he has said they are limited to
    the record, and so we accept his, his designation. We're limited to the
    record.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We're going to go off the record for just a moment.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 9:37 a.m.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 9:45 a.m.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

        The objection is noted, but it's overruled, and the witness is
    instructed to answer the question.

        Senator Leahy?

        SENATOR LEAHY: And I had noted during the break that obviously, the
    witness has 48 hours to correct her deposition, and would also note
    that when somebody has testified to some of these things 20 or more
    times that it is not unusual to have some nuances different, and that
    could also be reflected in time to correct her testimony.

        And I had also noted when we were off the record Mr. Manager
    Bryant's comment on January 26th, page S992 in the Congressional
    Record, in which he said: ``If our motion is granted, I want to make
    this very, very clear. At no point will we ask any questions of Monica
    Lewinsky about her explicit sexual relationship with the President,
    either in deposition or, if we are permitted on the floor of the
    Senate, they will not be asked.''

        And I should add also, to be fair to Mr. Bryant, another sentence
    in that: ``That, of course, assumes that White House Counsel does not
    enter into that discussion, and we doubt that they would.'' Period,
    close quote.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Let me just add something that I stated to counsel
    and to Ms. Lewinsky off the record, and I think I will briefly repeat
    it, and that is that counsel is entitled to an answer to the question,
    but Ms. Lewinsky certainly can reference previous testimony if she
    wishes to do that. But counsel is entitled to a new explanation of--of
    what occurred.

        Counsel, you may--why don't you re-ask the question, and we will
    proceed.

        MR. BRYANT: May I, before I do that, ask a procedural question in
    terms of timekeeping?

        SENATOR DeWINE: The time is not counted--any of the time that you
    have--once there is an objection, none of the time is counted until we
    rule on the objection and until you then have the opportunity to ask
    the question again. So the time will start now.

        MR. BRYANT: Very good.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, again, let me--I know this is difficult, but let
    me apologize that, uh, that it is going to be necessary that I ask you
    these questions because we're limited to the record and if we--we can't
    ask you any new questions outside that record, so I have to talk about
    what's in the record. And I realize you've answered all these questions
    several times before, but it's, uh--I'm sincere that we really wouldn't
    need to take your deposition if we couldn't ask you those kinds of
    questions. So it's not motivated to cause you discomfort or to make you
    sit here in Washington when you'd rather be in California. We'll try to
    get through this as quickly as we can.

        But we were talking about when you were first assigned there at the
    White House and those initial contacts, and I mean, again, when you
    were--you would see the President. I think you've mentioned you would--
    there was some mild flirting going on; you would smile or you would
    make eye contact. It was something of this nature?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And the first--was the first time you actually spoke to the
    President or he spoke to you, other than perhaps a hello in the
    hallway, was that on November the 15th, 1995?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And that was--that was the day, uh, of the first so-called
    salacious encounter, the same day?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Now, when the President gave a statement testifying before the
    grand jury, he--he described that relationship as what I considered
    sort of an evolving one. He says: ``I regret that what began as a
    friendship came to include this conduct.'' And he goes on to take full
    responsibility for his actions. But that almost sounds as if this was
    an evolving--something from a friendship evolving over time to a sexual
    relationship. That was not the case, was it?

        A. I--I can't really comment on how he perceived it. My perception
    was different.

        Q. Okay--

        A. But I--I--I mean, I don't feel comfortable saying that he
    didn't, that he didn't see it that way, or that's wrong; that's how he
    saw it. I--

        Q. But you saw it a different way?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Now, on November the 15th, had you already accepted this job
    with Legislative Affairs?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And, uh, was--that was during the shutdown, so you had no job to
    go to because the Government was shut down.

        A. No. I accepted it on the Friday before the furlough.

        Q. And that--

        A. But the paperwork hadn't gone through.

        Q. Okay. Did, uh--when you first met with the President on November
    the 15th, did he say anything to you that would indicate that he knew
    you were an intern?

        A. No.

        Q. Did he make a comment about your, your pink security badge?

        A. Can I ask my counsel a question real quickly, please?

        [Witness conferring with counsel.]

        MR. CACHERIS: Okay, Mr Bryant.

        THE WITNESS: Sorry. It was--that occurred in the second encounter
    of that evening.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. On November--

        A. So, not the first encounter.

        Q. On November the 15th, 1995?

        A. Correct.

        Q. What--do you recall what he said or what he did in regard to the
    intern pass?

        A. He tugged on my pass and said: ``This is going to be a
    problem.''

        Q. And what did, uh--did he say anything else about what he meant
    by ``problem''?

        A. No.

        Q. Tell me about your job at Legislative Affairs. Did that involve
    going into the White House itself?

        A. Yes. My job was in the White House.

        Q. You were in one wing, but did that involve going--did it give
    you access--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --pretty well throughout the White House?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What did you do primarily?

        A. I worked under Jocelyn Jolly, who supervised the letters that
    came from the Hill; so the opening of those letters and reading them
    and vetting them and preparing responses for the President's
    signature--responding.

        Q. Now, you've indicated through counsel at the beginning that you
    are willing to affirm, otherwise adopt, your sworn testimony of August
    the 6th and August the 20th, I think, which would be grand jury, and
    the deposition of August the 26th, 1998.

        A. Correct.

        Q. So you're saying that that information is accurate, and it is
    truthful?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Well, thank you. That--that will save us a little bit of time,
    but certainly we will ask you some of that information also.

        At some point, you were transferred to the Pentagon, to the
    Department of Defense. When did that occur?

        A. I found out I was being transferred on April 5th, 1996.

        Q. Did you want to go--

        A. No.

        Q. --to the Department of Defense? Did you have a discussion with
    the President about this?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What was your reaction to being transferred?

        A. I started to cry.

        Q. Did you talk to anyone else at the White House other than the
    President about the transfer at that time?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And who--who was that?

        A. I spoke with several people. I--I can't--I know I--I spoke with,
    uh, Jocelyn about it. I spoke with people with whom I was friendly at
    the White House. I spoke to Betty, Nancy Hernreich, several people.

        Q. Did you--did you find out why you were being transferred?

        A. Uh, I was told why I was being transferred by Mr. Keating on
    Friday, the 5th of April.

        Q. And that was why?

        A. Uh, he said that the--the Office of Administration, I think it
    was, was not pleased with the way the correspondence was being handled,
    and they were, quote-unquote, ``blowing up'' the Correspondence Office,
    and that I was being transferred and it had nothing to do with my work.

        Q. Did you have any understanding that it might have been other
    reasons that you were being moved?

        A. Not at that point.

        Q. Did the--what did the President say about your transfer at that
    point?

        A. He thought it had something to do with our relationship.

        Q. What else did he say about--about your transfer, if anything?
    Did he give you any assurances that you might be back, or--

        A. Yes.

        Q. Back after what time period?

        A. He promised me he'd bring me back after the election.

        Q. So this was, again, in early 19--April of 1996, and he was up
    for reelection--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --in November of 1996.

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you attach any significance to being transferred away before
    the election and then him assuring you he would bring you back after
    the election? Did you attach any significance to the election and your
    having to leave?

        A. Emotional significance, yes.

        Q. Your emotion? I'm--I'm not sure I follow you. You were--

        A. Well, yes, I attached significance to it.

        Q. And that was emotional--

        A. But that was emotional.

        Q. But the reason you both felt--again, I'm not trying to put words
    in your mouth, but you both felt you were leaving until after the
    election was because of your relationship and perhaps people finding
    out?

        A. No. I--I--first, I can only speak for myself. I mean, I, uh, my
    understanding initially was that it was, um, for work-related issues,
    but not my work, and I came to understand later that it was having to
    do with my relationship with the President.

        Q. Okay. Did, uh, you have a conversation--and it may be the same
    one with the President on April the 12th--which determined that Ms.
    Lieberman maybe spearheaded your transfer because you were paying too
    much attention--you were all--you were both paying too much attention
    to each other and she was worried that it was close to election time?
    And I think you've testified to that, haven't you?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay, good. You started, uh, with the Department of Defense at
    the Pentagon in mid-April, April the 17th, 1996?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What did you do there?

        A. I was the confidential assistant to Mr. Bacon, who is the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

        Q. Did, uh--after the 1996 election, did you still want to go back
    to the White House?

        A. Yes.

        Q. You had not fallen in love with the job at the Pentagon that
    much?

        A. No.

        Q. Was that, in fact, a frustrating period of time?

        A. Yes. No offense to Mr. Bacon, of course.

        Q. I understand; I'm sure he would take none.

        I would like--I don't think it's been mentioned, but you helped in
    preparing a chart which we have listed as one of our exhibits, ML
    Number 2, which I assume might have a different number for now, but
    it's a chart of contacts--

        A. Right.

        Q. --that you had with the President. And do you have a copy of
    that chart? It--

        [Witness conferring with counsel.]

        MR. BRYANT: In the--yes, in the record, it's at page 1251.

        MR. BURTON: May we have an extra copy for counsel, please?

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Have you had occasion to review this document?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And very--very simply, I would like for you to, uh, if you can,
    to affirm that document as an accurate representation and a truthful
    representation of all the contacts that you had with the President from
    approximately August 9th, 1995 until January of 1998. It includes in-
    person contacts, telephone calls, gifts and notes exchanged, I think
    are the categories.

        A. Yes. I believe there might have been one or two changes that
    were made and noted in the grand jury or my deposition, and I adopt
    those as well.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay, good.

        I am not going to at this point make her--the information she
    adopts and affirms exhibits to this deposition. I don't want to clutter
    it any more unless someone wants to make this an exhibit in terms of
    your deposition testimony, your grand jury testimony, and now the
    charts that you have affirmed, so I just want you to specifically
    affirm it but not make it an exhibit, because it's already a part of
    the record.

        MR. CACHERIS: We defer to the White House.

        MS. SELIGMAN: I just wanted to make clear on the record, then, what
    the app. or sub-cite is of anything we're adopting so that we all know
    what particular pages it is.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay. And that, again, was, I think, page 1251 of--
    right, of the record.

        SENATOR LEAHY: I don't--I don't understand.

        MS. MILLS: Can you cite the ending page?

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, is that where this appears?

        MR. BRYANT: It appears in the record, uh--

        SENATOR DeWINE: You need to designate also if you're talking about
    the Senate record or--I think at this point we'll go off the record.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10:01 a.m.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 10:11 a.m.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Let me--we're now back on the record.

        Let me advise counsel, the Managers, that they have used 25 minutes
    so far.

        You may resume questioning, and if you could begin by identifying
    the exhibit for the record, please.

        MR. BRYANT: Tom, let me also for clarification purposes--Tom, on
    the referral to the Senate record, you're saying that the appendices
    are numbered 3, but the numbers are the same. The page numbers are the
    same.

        MR. GRIFFITH: Yes.

        MR. BRYANT: And the supplemental materials are your Volume IV, but,
    again, the pages are the same.

        MR. GRIFFITH: That's our understanding.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay. For the record, then, using the Senate volumes,
    if this is an appendices, Volume III, and the chart that we just
    alluded to before the break is--appears at pages 116 through 126 of the
    Senate record, Volume III.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, did you tell a number of people in varying details
    about your relationship with the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. You tell us who did you tell?

        A. Catherine Allday Davis, Neysa Deman Erbland, Natalie Ungvari,
    Ashley Raines, Linda Tripp, Dr. Kathy Estep, Dr. Irene Kassorla, Andy
    Bleiler, my mom, my aunt. Who else has been subpoenaed?

        Q. Okay. Let me suggest Dale--did you mention Dale Young?

        A. Dale Young. I'm sorry.

        Q. Thank you.

        Now, in the floor presentation, Mr. Craig, who was one of--is one
    of the counsel for the President, adopted an argument that had been
    raised in some of the previous hearings, uh, and he adopted this
    argument in the Senate that--that you have--have or had, I think, both
    past and present, the incentive to not tell the truth about how the
    President--this relationship with him because you wanted to avoid--and
    again, I use the quote from Mr. Craig's argument--the demeaning nature
    of providing wholly un-reciprocated sex.

        Did, uh--did you lie before the grand jury and to your friends
    about the nature of that relationship with the President--

        A. No.

        Q. --so as to avoid what Mr. Craig says? Okay, and I'll break it
    down.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, do you want to just--just rephrase the
    question?

        MR. BRYANT: Okay. We'll break it down into two questions.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Did you not tell the truth before the grand jury as to how the
    President touched you because of what Mr. Craig alleges as the
    demeaning nature of the wholly un-reciprocated sex?

        MR. CACHERIS: Well, that--may I register an objection, gentlemen?
    This witness is not here to comment on what some lawyer said on the
    floor of the Senate. He can ask her direct questions. She will answer
    them, but what Mr. Craig said or didn't say would have happened after
    her grand jury testimony. So it's totally inappropriate that he's--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you--

        MR. CACHERIS: --marrying those two concepts. We object.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you just rephrase the
    question?

        MR. BRYANT: Well, we--we have had presented on behalf of the
    President a defense, an incentive, a reason why she would not tell the
    truth, and I think she should have the opportunity to respond to that--
    that allegation.

        MR. CACHERIS: We--we don't, uh--

        SENATOR LEAHY: Ask her a direct question.

        MR. CACHERIS: We welcome you asking her if her testimony was
    truthful, and she will tell you that it is truthful. We don't have any
    problem with that. We don't have any brief with what the White House
    did or didn't do through their counsel. That's their business. We don't
    represent the White House.

        MS. SELIGMAN: So, for the record, I'd like to object to the
    characterization of what Mr. Craig says, which obviously speaks for
    itself, but I certainly don't want my silence to be construed as
    accepting the Manager's characterization of it.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, why don't you--why don't you ask the
    question?

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Go ahead and ask your question.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. In regard to your testimony at the grand jury about your--your
    relationship and the physical contact that you have said occurred in
    some of these, uh, visits with the President, it has been characterized
    in a way that would give you an excuse not to tell the truth. Did you
    tell the truth in the grand jury about what actually happened and how
    the President touched--the President touched you?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did you likewise tell the truth to your friends in
    connection with the same matters?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did your relationship with the President involve giving gifts,
    exchanging gifts?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And you mentioned earlier that in reference to this chart that
    it was, uh, subject to certain corrections you've made in later
    testimony. It was an accurate representation or an accurate compilation
    of the gifts that, uh, you gave the President and the President gave
    you. Is that correct?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Approximately how many gifts did you give the President?

        A. I believe I've testified to that number. I don't recall right
    now.

        Q. About 30? Would that be--

        A. If that's what I testified to, then I accept that.

        Q. That's the number I have, and do you recall how many gifts
    approximately the President gave you?

        A. It would be the same situation.

        Q. Okay, and you've previously testified in your grand jury that he
    gave you about 18 gifts.

        A. I accept that.

        Q. Okay, good. What types of gifts did you give the President?

        A. They varied. I think they're listed on this chart, and I've
    testified to them.

        Q. Okay, and--

        MR. CACHERIS: Do you want her to read the list that's on this
    chart?

        MR. BRYANT: No. I was just, again, looking for just a--I think
    maybe a little broader category, but that's--that's okay. That's an
    acceptable answer there.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. After leaving the White House and going to the Pentagon, did you
    continue to visit the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. How would you--how would you be transported from the Pentagon
    over to the White House? How did you get there?

        A. I drove or took a taxi.

        Q. Do you have your own car?

        A. No.

        Q. Whose--whose car would you drive?

        A. Either my mom's or my brother's.

        Q. So you did have access to a vehicle?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Okay. How were these meetings arranged when you would want to go
    from the Pentagon to the White House? How did--how did these--how were
    they set up? Did you get an appointment?

        [The witness conferring with counsel.]

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel--if you have to ask counsel, you can stop
    and ask us--

        THE WITNESS: Okay.

        SENATOR DeWINE: --to do that.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. How were these meetings arranged?

        A. Through Ms. Currie.

        Q. Would--would you call her and set the meeting up, or would she
    call you on behalf of the President and set the meeting up?

        A. It varied.

        Q. Both--both situations occurred?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Now, Ms. Currie is the President's--that's Betty Currie, we're
    talking about, the President's secretary?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Why was this done? Why was that procedure used?

        A. It was my understanding that Ms. Currie took care of the
    President's guests who were coming to see him, making those
    arrangements.

        Q. Was, uh--was this--were these visits done sort of off the
    record, so to speak, so it wouldn't necessarily be a record?

        A. I believe so.

        Q. In other words, you wouldn't be shown on Betty Currie's calendar
    or schedule book for the President?

        A. I don't know.

        Q. Did--who suggested this type of arrangement for setting up
    meetings?

        A. I believe the President did.

        Q. During this time that you were at the Department of Defense at
    the Pentagon, uh, how--how was it working out about you being
    transferred back to the White House? How was the job situation coming?

        A. Well, I waited until after the election and then spoke with the
    President about it on several occasions.

        Q. And what would he say in response?

        A. Various things; ``I'm working on it,'' usually.

        Q. In July, uh, particularly around the--the 3rd and 4th of July,
    there--there--you wrote the President a letter, I think.

        A. Which year?

        Q. July of '90--it would have been '97 that you wrote the President
    a letter expressing some frustrations about the job situation in terms
    of--is that, uh--can you tell us about that?

        A. Yes. I had had a--well, I guess I was--I know I've testified
    about this, I mean, in the grand jury, but I was feeling at that point
    that I was getting the runaround on being brought back to the White
    House. So I sent a letter to the President that was probably the
    harshest I had sent.

        Q. Did you get a response?

        A. Sort of.

        Q. Would you explain?

        A. Um, Betty called me and told me to come to the White House the
    next morning, on July 4th, at 9:00 a.m.

        Q. And what happened when you--I assume you went to the White House
    on July the 4th. What happened?

        A. I know I--I--do you have a specific question? I know I
    testified, I mean, extensively about this whole day, that whole--

        Q. Well, in regards to--let's start with the job.

        A. Well, I started crying. We were in the back office and, um--and
    when the subject matter came up, the President was upset with me and
    then I began to cry. So--

        Q. Did he encourage you about you coming back? Did he make a
    promise or commitment to you that he would make sure you came back to
    work at the White House?

        A. I don't know that he reaffirmed his promise or commitment. I
    remember leaving that day thinking that, as usual, he was going to work
    on it and had a renewed sense of hope.

        Q. Did he comment on your letter, the tone of your letter?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What did he say?

        A. He was upset with me and told me it was illegal to threaten the
    President of the United States.

        Q. Did you intend the letter to be interpreted that way?

        A. No.

        Q. Did you explain why you wrote the letter to him about reminding
    him that you were a good girl and you left the White House? Did you
    have that type of conversation?

        A. Yes. That's what made me start to cry.

        Q. Did you, uh--did you ever explain to him that you didn't intend
    to threaten him?

        A. I believe so.

        Q. What was the intent of the letter?

        A. First, I felt the letter was going to him as a man and not as
    President of the United States. Um, second, I think I could see how he
    could interpret it as a threat, but my intention was to sort of remind
    him that I had been waiting patiently and what I considered was being a
    good girl, about having been transferred.

        Q. And the threat we're talking about here would not have been
    interpreted as a threat to do physical injury or bodily injury to him.
    It was to expose your relationship to the--to your parents--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --explain to them why you were not going back to the White
    House--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --after the election?

        And certainly the President did not encourage you to expose that
    relationship, did he?

        A. I don't believe he made any comment about it at that point.

        Q. His only comment about the so-called threat was that it's a---
    it's--you can't do that, it's against the law to threaten the
    President?

        A. Exactly.

        Q. That meeting turned into--I guess you've testified that that
    meeting did turn into a more positive meeting toward the end. It was
    not all emotional and accusations being made?

        A. Correct.

        Q. At some point, uh--well, let me--let me back up and ask this.
    There was a subsequent meeting on July the 14th, and I believe the
    President had been out of town and this was the follow-up meeting to
    the July 4th meeting where you had originally discussed the possibility
    of a newspaper reporter or a magazine writer, I believe, writing a
    story about Ms. Willey?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And you, uh--did you have any instructions from the President,
    from either of these meetings, about doing something for the President,
    specifically about having Ms. Tripp call White House counsel--

        A. I don't know--

        Q. --Mr. Lindsey?

        A. --that I'd call them instructions.

        Q. Okay. What did he tell you? I don't want to mischaracterize.

        A. He asked me if I would try to have Ms. Tripp contact Mr.
    Lindsey.

        Q. Okay, and if you were to be successful in doing that, what were
    you supposed to do? Were you supposed to contact Ms. Currie, his
    secretary?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what were you supposed to tell her?

        A. In an innocuous way that I had been able to convey that to Ms.
    Tripp or get her to do that.

        Q. Now, in--at some point in October of that year, 1997, did your
    job focus change?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And how was that? What were you doing?

        A. Uh, it really changed on October 6th, 1997, as a result of a
    conversation with Linda Tripp.

        Q. Uh, in that, as I understand, you sort of got secondhand
    information that you were probably never going back to work at the
    White House.

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did you understand what that meant? Did you accept that? And I
    guess why would you accept it at that point? Why would you give up on
    the White House?

        MR. CACHERIS: Those are three questions, Mr. Bryant. Will you--
    would you break it down, please?

        MR. BRYANT: Well, yeah, it's true.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Do you understand? I guess I'm trying to clarify.

        A. Not really. I'm sorry.

        Q. Why would you accept at that point in October that you were
    never going back to the White House?

        A. I don't really remember, I mean, what--what--what was going
    through my mind at that point as to--to answer that question. Is that--

        Q. Okay.

        A. I'm sorry.

        Q. Certainly, if you don't remember, that's a--that's a good
    answer.

        A. Okay.

        Q. So you don't recall anything had really changed other than you
    had heard secondhand that you weren't going to go back. You have no
    independent recollection of anything else other than what somebody told
    you that would have changed--

        A. My recollection is--

        Q. --changed your focus?

        A. --that it was this--it was this conversation, what Linda Tripp
    told me from whom this information was coming, the way it was relayed
    to me that--that shifted everything that day.

        Q. And you didn't feel it was necessary to go back to the President
    and perhaps confront the President and say, ``why am I not coming back,
    I want to come back?''

        A. I mean, I had a discussion with the President, but I had made a
    decision from that based on that information, and I guess my--my
    experience of it coming up on a year from the election, having not been
    brought back, that it probably wasn't going to happen.

        Q. But you--you did call the President about that time and then--
    but the focus had been changed toward perhaps a job in another
    location.

        A. Yes and no. I didn't call him, but I, um--

        Q. You called Betty--

        A. --but we did have a discussion about that.

        Q. You called Betty Currie, his secretary.

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay, and then through her, he contacted you and you had a
    discussion?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what did you tell him at that time about the job?

        A. I believe I testified to that, so that my testimony is probably
    more accurate. The gist of it was, um, that I wanted to move to New
    York and that I was accepting I wasn't going to be able to come back to
    the White House, and I asked for his help.

        Q. Did you bring up Vernon Jordan's name as perhaps somebody that
    could help you?

        A. It's possible it was in that conversation.

        Q. What was the President's comments back to you about your
    deciding to go to New York?

        A. I don't remember his exact comments. He was accepting of the
    concept.

        Q. In regards to your--your, uh, decision to search for a job in
    New York, in your comments to the President, did he ever tell you that
    that was good, that perhaps the Jones lawyers could not easily find you
    in New York?

        A. I'm sorry. I don't--I--I--

        MR. CACHERIS: Excuse me again, Mr. Bryant. That's a compound
    question. He could--she could answer it was good, and then she could
    answer maybe the Jones lawyer couldn't get her, but I think you'd want
    an answer to each question.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. Let me ask it this way. There has been some reference to
    that fact throughout the proceedings, and I recall seeing something
    somewhere in your--your testimony that you said it or he said it. Do
    you recall anything being said about you going to Washington--to New
    York and that the effect of that might be that you would be more
    difficult to find?

        A. I believe that might have been mentioned briefly on the 28th of
    December, but not as a reason to go to New York, but as a possible
    outcome of being there. Does that--does that make sense?

        Q. It does.

        A. Okay.

        Q. What, uh--what would have been the context of that? And we're
    jumping ahead to December the 28th, but what would have been the
    context of that particular conversation about the New York and being
    perhaps--the result being it might be difficult to find you, or more
    difficult? What was the context?

        A. Um, I--I--if I remember correctly, it came sort of at the tail-
    end of a very short discussion we had about the Jones case.

        Q. At this November the 11th meeting, did the President ask you to
    prepare a list, sort of a wish list for jobs?

        A. I'm sorry. Which--

        Q. I'm sorry. Did I say October? We're back to the October the 11th
    meeting. Did the President ask you to prepare a wish list?

        A. Okay. We haven't gone to the October 11th meeting yet. I--I
    haven't said anything about that meeting yet.

        Q. Okay.

        A. The phone call was on the 9th.

        Q. Okay, and you subsequently had a meeting, then, with the
    President on the 11th?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Face--face-to-face meeting?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And at that meeting, did he suggest you give him a wish list or
    Betty Currie a wish list?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Again, I asked a compound question there.

        Who did he suggest you give the wish list to?

        MR. CACHERIS: We're getting used to that.

        MR. BRYANT: I'm getting good. I'm making my own objections now.

        [Laughter.]

        THE WITNESS: Um, we sustain those. No, I'm sorry.

        [Laughter.]

        MR. BRYANT: I can do that, too. I'll be doing that in a minute.
    Overruled. Okay.

        THE WITNESS: Um, I--I believe he--he said I should get him a list,
    and the implication was through Betty.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. And obviously you prepared a list of--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --the people you'd like to work for in New York City.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And you sent that list--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --to Betty Currie or to the President?

        A. I sent it to Ms. Currie.

        Q. And also during this time--and I'm probably going to speed this
    up a little bit, but, uh, you did interview for the job at the United
    Nations?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And, uh--and through a process of several months there, or weeks
    at least, you did--made an offer to take a job at the United Nations
    and eventually declined it. Is that correct?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did you in early November have the occasion to meet with Vernon
    Jordan about the job situation?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And how did you learn about that meeting?

        A. I believe I asked Ms. Currie to check on the status of--I guess
    of finding out if I could have this meeting, and then she let me--she
    let me know to call Mr. Jordan's secretary?

        Q. And you set up an appointment with Mr. Jordan, or did she, Ms.
    Currie, do that?

        A. No. I set up an appointment. I think that was after a phone--
    well, I guess I don't--I don't know that, so sorry.

        Q. But that appointment was November the 5th?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Prior to going to the meeting with Vernon Jordan, did you tell
    the President that you had a meeting with Mr. Jordan?

        A. I don't think so. I don't remember.

        Q. Did you carry any documents or any papers with you to the
    meeting with Mr. Jordan?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What were those?

        A. My resume and a list of public relations firms in New York.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan ask you why you were there?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what did you say?

        A. I was hoping to move to New York and that he could assist me in
    securing a job there.

        Q. Did he ask you why you wanted to leave Washington?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what was your answer?

        A. I gave him the vanilla story of, um, that I--I think I--I don't
    remember exactly what I said. I--I believe I've testified to this. I
    think it was something about wanting to get out of Washington.

        Q. The vanilla story. You mean sort of an innocuous set of reasons,
    not really the true reasons you wanted to leave?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what were the true reasons you wanted to leave?

        A. Because I couldn't go back to the White House.

        Q. Did--did you think Mr. Jordan accepted--did you think he would
    accept that vanilla story, or did you feel like he understood the real
    story?

        A. No, I felt he accepted it.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you during this meeting that he had already
    spoken with the President?

        A. It was--I believe so.

        Q. And that you had come highly recommended, I think?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did he, Mr. Jordan, review your list of job preferences and
    suggest anything?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what did he suggest?

        A. He said the names of the--he looked at the list of public
    relations firms and I think sort of said, ``oh, I've heard of them, I
    haven't heard of these people, have you heard of so and so,'' that I
    hadn't heard of.

        Q. Your meeting lasted about 20 minutes?

        A. If that's what I've testified to, then I accept that.

        Q. It is, or close to it. I know this is an approximation, but
    thereabouts. You weren't there all day.

        A. I had--well, I don't--I don't remember how long it was right
    now. I know I've testified to that. So if I said 20 minutes, then--

        Q. Did you have a conversation with the President on--about a week
    later on November the 12th and by telephone?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did you indicate there you had spoken with Mr. Jordan about
    a job?

        A. Yes.

        Q. After you met with Mr. Jordan, did you--did you have an
    impression that you would get, uh--get a job, get favorable results in
    your job search?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did anything favorable happen to--in your job search from that
    November the 5th, 1997, meeting until Thanksgiving?

        A. No, but I believe Mr. Jordan was out of town for a week or two.

        Q. During the weeks after this November the 5th interview, did you
    try to contact Mr. Jordan?

        A. Yes.

        Q. How?

        A. First, I sent him a thank-you note for the initial meeting, and
    I believe I placed some phone calls right before Thanksgiving--maybe a
    phone call. I don't remember if it was more than one.

        Q. What--what happened with respect to the job search, uh, through
    there, through Thanksgiving? Was there anything? I mean, I know he--you
    said he was out of town, but did anything, to your knowledge, occur?
    Could you see any results up to Thanksgiving?

        A. From my meeting with Mr. Jordan?

        Q. Yes.

        A. No.

        Q. Did you contact Betty Currie after you received no response from
    Mr. Jordan?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did she page you? I think you were in Los Angeles at the
    time.

        A. Correct.

        Q. Okay. What--what did she tell you as a result of that telephone
    call?

        A. She asked me to place a call to Mr. Jordan, which I did.

        Q. And this would have been, again, around November the 26th,
    shortly--well, around Thanksgiving?

        A. It was before Thanksgiving.

        Q. And I assume you found Mr. Jordan.

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what did he tell you?

        A. That he was working on it.

        Q. Did he tell you to call him back?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you indeed call him back

        A. I didn't actually get ahold of him; he was out-of-town that day.
    I think it was December 5th.

        Q. Did you try to meet with the President during this time?

        A. Yes.

        Q. How did you do that?

        A. I was a pest. I sent a note to Ms. Currie and asked her to pass
    it along to the President, requesting that I meet with him.

        Q. Were you successful in having a meeting as a result of those
    efforts?

        A. I don't know if it was a result of those efforts, but yes, I
    ended up having a meeting with the President.

        Q. And when would that have been; what day?

        A. On the 6th of December 1997.

        Q. Again you are going through Betty Currie; is that, again, the
    standard procedure at that time?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you go--I think you spoke also perhaps to Betty Currie on
    December the 5th, the day before the meeting--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --and this was something about attending the President's speech.
    Was that when that occurred--or the radio address, or something? Does
    that ring any bells?

        A. No.

        Q. Did--you did attend the Christmas party that day--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --and the White House. And you saw the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Just socially, speak to him, and that's it?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Picture, handshaking, and that?

        A. [Nodding head.]

        Q. Okay. That's a yes?

        A. Yes. Sorry.

        Q. Prior to December 6th, 1997, had you purchased a Christmas gift
    for the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Which was?

        A. An antique standing cigar holder.

        Q. And had you purchased any other additional gifts for him?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what were those?

        A. Uh, a Starbucks mug that said ``Santa Monica''; a necktie that I
    got in London; a little box--I call it a ``chochki''--from, uh--and an
    antique book on Theodore Roosevelt.

        Q. Was it your intention to, to carry those Christmas presents to
    the President home that Saturday, December the 6th?

        A. If I were to have a meeting with him, yes.

        Q. Did you attempt to have a meeting?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you go through Betty Currie?

        A. Yes. I sent her the letter to, to give to the President.

        Q. And when you went to the White House that day, you also
    attempted to, to have the meeting through calling Betty Currie and
    telephoning her; I believe you had to go to--

        A. Which day? I'm sorry.

        Q. On the 6th.

        A. No.

        Q. The Saturday.

        A. [No response.]

        Q. No?

        A. I--I attempted to give the presents to Betty, but I didn't call
    and attempt to have a meeting there--well, I guess I called in the
    morning, so that's not true--I'm sorry. Yes, I called Ms. Currie in the
    morning trying to see if I could see the President and apologize.

        Q. And--were you--did you see the President, then, on the 6th?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Tell us about that meeting--that was a long--was that, uh--did
    you have a telephone conversation with him that day also?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And that was the long telephone conversation?

        A. It--it was.

        Q. Okay. I think there has been some indication it may have been 56
    minutes, something approximating an hour-long conversation; does that
    sound right?

        A. Right. That would--that might include some conversation time
    with Ms. Currie as well.

        Q. Okay. Was he interrupted by Ms. Currie--could you tell--did he
    have to take a break from the telephone call to talk to Ms. Currie, or
    do you recall any, any--

        A. I don't recall that.

        Q. --do you recall any breaks to talk to anybody else?

        A. I don't recall that. Doesn't mean it didn't happen; I just don't
    remember it.

        Q. What else did you--did you arrange in that telephone
    conversation, or did he invite you in that telephone conversation to
    come to the White House that day?

        A. Yes, he did.

        Q. What happened during, during that conversation in terms of--I
    understand that it was again an emotional day, some sort of a word
    fight; is that right?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Could you tell me--he was, uh--again, to perhaps save some
    time--he was angry about an earlier incident, and, uh, he felt like you
    were intruding on his lawyer time?

        A. Uh, he was upset that I hadn't accepted that he just couldn't
    see me that day.

        Q. And what was your response to that?

        A. Probably not positive. Uh, that's why it was a fight.

        Q. Again, I want to be careful that I don't put words in your
    mouth, but you were dealing with this relationship from an emotional
    standpoint of wanting to spend time with him--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --not as President, but as a man?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And this was at a point when you didn't feel like you were
    spending enough time with him?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And he obviously felt he had to do other things, too, talk to
    lawyers and do those kinds of things--be the President--is that right?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Now, was some of this discussion that we term ``the
    fight,'' was that over the telephone?

        A. Yes. It was all over the telephone.

        Q. So by the time you arrived and had the face-to-face meeting with
    him, that was over?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Was that during the time that you exchanged--exchanged some of
    the Christmas presents with him?

        A. In--in the meeting?

        Q. Yes.

        A. Yes. I gave him my Christmas presents.

        Q. Did you discuss the job search with him also at that time?

        A. I believe I mentioned it.

        Q. Did you tell him that, uh, your job search with Mr. Jordan was
    not going well?

        A. I don't know if I used those words. I don't, I don't remember
    exactly--

        Q. If your grand jury testimony said yes--I mean, words to that
    effect--that would--you could have used those words if they're in your
    grand jury--

        A. If my grand jury testimony says that--if that's what I said in
    my grand jury testimony, then I accept that.

        Q. I'm not trying to--I'm not trying to trick you.

        A. Okay.

        Q. Did he make any comment to you about what he might do to aid in
    your job search at that time, if you recall?

        A. I think he--I think he said, oh, let me see about it, let me see
    what I can do--his usual.

        Q. Did, uh, did the President say anything to you at that time
    about your name appearing on a witness list in the Paula Jones case?

        A. No.

        Q. Did you later learn that your name had appeared on such a list?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did you later learn that that witness list had been faxed to
    the White House--to the President's lawyers on December the 5th?

        A. Much later, as in last year.

        Q. Okay. Yes--that's what I mean--later.

        A. I, I mean--

        Q. Yes.

        A. --post this investigation.

        Q. Okay. All right. Let's go forward another week or so to December
    the 11th and a lunch that you had with Vernon Jordan, I believe, in his
    office.

        A. Yes.

        Q. How did--how was that meeting set up.

        A. Through his secretary.

        Q. Did you instigate that, or did he call through his secretary?

        A. I don't remember.

        Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?

        A. Uh, it was to discuss my job situation.

        Q. And what, what--how was that discussed?

        A. Uh, Mr. Jordan gave me a list of three names and suggested that
    I contact these people in a letter that I should cc him on, and that's
    what I did.

        Q. Did he ask you to copy him on the letters that you sent out?

        A. Yes.

        Q. During this meeting, did he make any comments about your status
    as a friend of the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What--what did he say?

        A. In one of his remarks, he said something about me being a friend
    of the President.

        Q. And did you respond?

        A. Yes.

        Q. How?

        A. I said that I didn't, uh--I think I--my grand jury testimony, I
    know I talked about this, so it's probably more accurate. My memory
    right now is I said something about, uh, seeing him more as, uh, a man
    than as a President, and I treated him accordingly.

        Q. Did you express your frustration to Mr. Jordan with, uh, with
    the President?

        A. I expressed that sometimes I had frustrations with him, yes.

        Q. And what was his response to you about, uh--after you talked
    about the President?

        A. Uh, he sort of jokingly said to me, You know what your problem
    is, and don't deny it--you're in love with him. But it was a sort of
    light-hearted nature.

        Q. Did you--did you have a response to that?

        A. I probably blushed or giggled or something.

        Q. Do you still have feelings for the President?

        A. I have mixed feelings.

        Q. What, uh--maybe you could tell us a little bit more about what
    those mixed feelings are.

        A. I think what you need to know is that my grand jury testimony is
    truthful irrespective of whatever those mixed feelings are in my
    testimony today.

        Q. I know in your grand jury you mentioned some of your feelings
    that you felt after he spoke publicly about the relationship, but let
    me ask you more about the positive--you said there were mixed feelings.
    What about--do you still, uh, respect the President, still admire the
    President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Do you still appreciate what he is doing for this country as the
    President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December
    the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?

        A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother
    had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was
    on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned
    the Christmas present he had for me.

        Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of
    2 o'clock to 2:30.

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?

        A. No.

        Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones
    witness list?

        A. Yes.

        Q. I realize he, he commented about some other things, but I do
    want to focus on the witness list.

        A. Okay.

        Q. Did he say anything to you about how he felt concerning this
    witness list?

        A. He said it broke his heart that, well, that my name was on the
    witness list.

        Can I take a break, please? I'm sorry.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Sure, sure. We'll take a 5-minute break at this
    point.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Videotape Number 1 in the
    deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. We are going off the record at 10:56
    a.m.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 2 in
    the deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. The time is 11:10 a.m.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

        I will advise the House Managers that they have used one hour and 8
    minutes.

        Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you.

        By MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Did--did we get your response? We were talking about the
    discussion you were having with the President over the telephone, early
    morning of the December 17th phone call, and he had, uh, mentioned that
    it broke his heart that you were on that list.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And I think you were about to comment on that further, and then
    you need a break.

        A. No.

        Q. No.

        A. I just wanted to be able to focus--I know this is an important
    date, so I felt I need a few moments to be able to focus on it.

        Q. And you're comfortable now with that, with your--you are ready
    to talk about that?

        A. Comfortable, I don't know, but I'm ready to talk about.

        Q. Well, I mean comfortable that you can focus on it.

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. Good. Now, with this discussion of the fact that your name
    appeared as a witness, had you--had you been asleep that night when the
    phone rang?

        A. Yes.

        Q. So were you wide awake by this point? It's the President calling
    you, so I guess you're--you wake up.

        A. I wouldn't say wide awake.

        Q. He expressed to you that your name--you know, again, you talked
    about some other things--but he told you your name was on the list.

        A. Correct.

        Q. What was your reaction to that?

        A. I was scared.

        Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact that
    your name was on the list? You were scared; he was disappointed, or it
    broke his heart. What other discussion did you have?

        A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not necessarily
    direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that he said something
    about that, uh, just because my name was on the list didn't necessarily
    mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some point, I asked him what I should do
    if I received a subpoena. He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie
    know. Uh--

        Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What did he say?

        A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
    if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to
    avoid being deposed.

        Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an
    affidavit?

        A. I don't think he did.

        Q. You just accepted that statement?

        A. [Nodding head.]

        Q. Yes?

        A. Yes, yes. Sorry.

        Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation to you
    about what you could say in that affidavit or--

        A. No.

        Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that affidavit to
    avoid testifying?

        A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. To the
    best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it was a range of
    things. I mean, it could either be, uh, something innocuous or could go
    as far as having to deny the relationship. Not being a lawyer nor
    having gone to law school, I thought it could be anything.

        Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other version?

        A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a further
    discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in an affidavit.

        Q. When you say, uh, it would be--it could have been something
    where the relationship was denied, what was your thinking at that
    point?

        A. I--I--I think I don't understand what you're asking me. I'm
    sorry.

        Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted
    stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there
    some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these
    stories--the cover stories?

        A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the
    affidavit.

        Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would accomplish
    preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?

        A. No.

        Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--why
    would you have wanted to avoid testifying?

        A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second of all,
    I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones or her case.
    And--I guess those two reasons.

        Q. You--you have already mentioned that you were not a lawyer and
    you had not been to law school, those kinds of things. Did, uh, did you
    understand when you--the potential legal problems that you could have
    caused yourself by allowing a false affidavit to be filed with the
    court, in a court proceeding?

        A. During what time--I mean--I--can you be--I'm sorry--

        Q. At this point, I may ask it again at later points, but the night
    of the telephone--

        A. Are you--are you still referring to December 17th?

        Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could file an
    affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of filing a false
    affidavit with the court?

        A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it would have
    to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't remember having any
    thoughts like that, so I imagine I would remember something like that,
    and I don't, but--

        Q. Did you know what an affidavit was?

        A. Sort of.

        Q. Of course, you're talking at that time by telephone to the
    President, and he's--and he is a lawyer, and he taught law school--I
    don't know--did you know that? Did you know he was a lawyer?

        A. I--I think I knew it, but it wasn't something that was present
    in my, in my thoughts, as in he's a lawyer, he's telling me, you know,
    something.

        Q. Did the, did the President ever tell you, caution you, that you
    had to tell the truth in an affidavit?

        A. Not that I recall.

        Q. It would have been against his interest in that lawsuit for you
    to have told the truth, would it not?

        A. I'm not really comfortable--I mean, I can tell you what would
    have been in my best interest, but I--

        Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did
    you?

        A. Uh, actually, I did.

        Q. To avoid testifying.

        A. Yes.

        Q. But had you testified truthfully, you would have had no--
    certainly, no legal implications--it may have been embarrassing, but
    you would have not had any legal problems, would you?

        A. That's true.

        Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would
    draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that
    earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. And what was said?

        A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can
    always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.

        Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that
    night. You are sure he said that that night?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?

        A. I don't believe so, no.

        Q. Why would he have told you you could always say that?

        A. I don't know.

        Mr. BURTON: Objection. You're asking her to speculate on someone
    else's testimony.

        MR. BRYANT: Let me make a point here. I've been very patient in
    trying to get along, but as I alluded to earlier, and I said I am not
    going to hold a hard line to this, but I don't think the President's--
    the witness' lawyers ought to be objecting to this testimony. If
    there's an objection here, it should come from the White House side,
    nor should they be--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, why don't you rephrase the question?

        MR. BRYANT: Do we have a clear ruling on whether they can object?

        SENATOR DeWINE: We'll go off the record for a moment.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 11:20 a.m.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 11:30 a.m.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

        It's our opinion that counsel for Ms. Lewinsky do have the right to
    make objections. We would ask them to be as short and concise as
    humanly possible. So we will now proceed.

        Mr. Bryant?

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Let's kind of bring this back together again, and I'll try to
    ask sharper questions and avoid these objections.

        We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation in the
    morning with you and the President, and he has among other things
    mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has
    also mentioned to you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid
    possible testifying in that case. Is that right?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were in our
    questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he had had, that
    perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver
    papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?

        A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that story.

        Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly
    familiar to you?

        A. Yes.

        Q. You knew what he was talking about?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And why was this familiar to you?

        A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.

        Q. Had you actually had to use elements of this cover story in the
    past?

        A. I think so, yes.

        Q. Did the President ever tell you what to say if anyone asked you
    about telephone conversations that you had had with him?

        A. Are we--are we still focused on December 17th?

        Q. No, no.

        A. Okay.

        Q. It did not have to be that night. Did he ever?

        A. If I could just--I--I'm pretty date-oriented, so if you could
    just be more specific with the date. If we're staying on a date or
    leaving that date, it would just help me. I'm sorry.

        Q. Well, my question was phrased did he ever do that, but--

        A. Okay.

        Q. Well, I--I'm sorry. I'm playing guessing games with you. Was
    there a conversation on March 29th of 1997 when the President told you
    he thought perhaps his telephone conversations were being tapped or
    taped--either way, or both--by a foreign embassy?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And was there some reference to some sort of cover story there
    in the event that his line was tapped?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And what was that?

        A. That--I think, if I remember it correctly, it was that we--that
    he knew that we were sort of engaging in those types of conversations,
    uh, knowing that someone was listening, so that it was not for the
    purposes that it might have seemed.

        Q. Did you find it a little strange that he would express concern
    about possible eavesdropping and still persist in these calls to you?

        A. I don't think phone calls of that nature occurred and happened
    right after, or soon after that discussion. I think it was quite a few
    months until that resumed.

        Q. I think my question was more did you not find it a little
    strange that he felt that perhaps his phone was being tapped and
    conversations taped by a foreign embassy, and he--

        A. I--I thought it was strange, but if--I mean, I wasn't going to
    question what he was saying to me.

        Q. But that he also continued to make the calls--you're saying he
    didn't make any calls after that?

        A. No. My understanding was it was referencing a certain type of
    phone call, certain nature of phone call, uh, and those--

        Q. Let me direct your attention back to a point I did not mention a
    couple--a few days before the December--early December telephone call,
    the lengthy telephone call from the President. We had talked about how
    that was a heated conversation.

        A. Correct.

        Q. At--did at some point during that telephone conversation--did
    the tone--did the President's tone change to a more receptive, friendly
    conversation?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Do you know why that happened?

        A. No, nor do I remember whose tone changed first. I mean, we made
    up, so--

        Q. Okay. Now let me go back again to the December 11th date--I'm
    sorry--the 17th. This is the conversation in the morning. What else--
    was there anything else you talked about in terms of--other than your
    name being on the list and the affidavit and the cover story?

        A. Yes. I had--I had had my own thoughts on why and how he should
    settle the case, and I expressed those thoughts to him. And at some
    point, he mentioned that he still had this Christmas present for me and
    that maybe he would ask Mrs. Currie to come in that weekend, and I said
    not to because she was obviously going to be in mourning because of her
    brother.

        Q. In--in that--in that relationship with the President, I think
    you have expressed in your testimony somewhere that you weren't
    necessarily jealous of those types of people like Kathleen Willey or
    Paula Jones, and perhaps you didn't even believe those stories occurred
    as--as they alleged.

        A. That's correct. I don't--I don't know, jealous or not jealous. I
    don't think I've testified to my feelings of jealousy, but the latter
    half of the question is true.

        Q. I--I saw it. I mean, it's not a major point. I thought I saw
    that in your testimony, that particular word.

        A. Okay. If I said that, then I--I don't.

        Q. Was it your belief that the Paula Jones case was not a valid
    lawsuit? Was that part of that discussion that night, or your strategy?

        A. Uh, can I separate that--that into two questions?

        Q. Any way, any way you want to.

        A. Okay. I don't believe it was a valid lawsuit, and I don't think
    whether I believed it was a valid lawsuit or not was the topic of the
    conversation.

        Q. Okay, that's a fair answer.

        You believe the President's version of the Paula Jones incident?

        A. Is that relevant to--

        Q. I--I just asked you the question.

        A. I don't believe Paula Jones' version of the story.

        Q. Okay, good. That's a fair answer.

        You have testified previously that you tried to maintain secrecy
    regarding this relationship--and we're talking about obviously with the
    President. Is that true?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And to preserve the secrecy and I guess advance this cover
    story, you would bring papers to the President and always use Betty
    Currie for the excuse for you to be WAVE'd in. Is that right?

        A. Papers when I was working at the White House and Mrs. Currie
    after I left the White House. So Mrs. Currie wasn't involved when I was
    working at the White House.

        Q. Were these papers you carried in to the President--were they--
    were they business documents, or were they more personal papers from
    you to him?

        A. They--they weren't business documents.

        Q. So, officially, you were not carrying in official papers?

        A. Correct.

        Q. You were carrying in personal papers that would not have
    entitled you ordinarily to go see the President?

        A. Correct.

        Q. When--in this procedure where Betty Currie was always the one
    that WAVE'd you in to the White House--and I--I don't know if the
    people who may be watching this deposition, the Senators, understand
    that the WAVES process is just the--to give the guards the okay for you
    to come in. Is that a short synopsis?

        A. I'm not really versed on--

        Q. I'm not either. You know more than I do, probably, since you
    worked there, but--

        A. Well, I know you had to go, you had to type in a thing in at
    WAVES, and now you have to give a Social Security, birth date, have to
    show ID.

        Q. Is there a record kept of that?

        A. I believe so.

        Q. Was it always Betty Currie that WAVE'd you in to the--access to
    the White House? I'm talking about now after you left and went to work
    at the Pentagon.

        A. No.

        Q. Other people did that?

        A. There were other reasons that I came to the White House at
    times.

        Q. Did you ever ask the President if he would WAVE you in?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did he ever do that?

        A. No, not to my--not to my knowledge.

        Q. Was there a reason? Did he express anything to you why he would
    or would not?

        A. Yes. He said that, uh--I believe he said something about that
    there's a specific list made of people that he requests to come in
    and--and there are people who have access to that list.

        Q. So, obviously, he didn't want your name being on that list?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Now, some of those people--

        A. I think--well, that's my understanding.

        Q. Would some of those people be the people that worked outside his
    office, Ms. Lieberman and those--those folks?

        A. I--I believe so, but I'm not really sure.

        Q. Did you not want those people to know that you were inside the
    White House?

        A. I didn't.

        Q. Why is that?

        A. Because they didn't like me.

        Q. Would they have objected, do you think--if you know.

        A. I don't know.

        Q. Did you work with Betty Currie on occasions to--to get in to see
    the President, perhaps bypass some of these people?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And that would be another way that you would conceal the meeting
    with the President, by using Betty Currie to get you in?

        A. I--I think, yes, be cautious of it.

        Q. Did--well, I think we've covered that, about some papers, and I
    think we've covered that after you left your job inside the White House
    with Legislative Affairs and went to the Pentagon, you developed a
    story, a cover story to the effect that you were going to see Betty,
    that's how you would come in officially?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And during that time that you were at the Pentagon, you would
    more likely visit him on weekends or during the week? Which would--
    which would--

        A. Weekends.

        Q. Weekends. And why--why the weekends?

        A. First, I think he had less work, and second of all, there were--
    I believe there were less people around.

        Q. Now, whose idea was it for you to come on weekends?

        A. I believe it was the President's.

        Q. When you--when the President was in his office, was your purpose
    to go there and see him? If he was in the office, you would go see him?

        A. What--I'm sorry.

        Q. No--that's not clear. I'll withdraw that question.

        Was Ms. Currie, the President's secretary--was she in the loop, so
    to speak, in keeping this relationship and how you got in and out of
    the White House, keeping that quiet?

        A. I think I actually remember reading part of my grand jury
    testimony about this and that it was more specific in that she was in
    the loop about my friendship with the President, but I just want to not
    necessarily--there was a clarification, I believe, in that about
    knowledge of the complete relationship or not. So--

        Q. She would help with the gifts and notes and things like that--
    the passing?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Would you agree that these cover stories that you've just
    testified to, if they were told to the attorneys for Paula Jones, that
    they would be misleading to them and not be the whole story, the whole
    truth?

        A. They would--yes, I guess misleading. They were literally true,
    but they would be misleading, so incomplete.

        Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were
    reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was
    on the witness list, I should say?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness
    list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to
    testify in the Paula Jones case?

        A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a
    possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was
    a subpoena to testify, but--

        Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And that was what--

        A. December 19th, 1997.

        Q. December 19th.

        Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing
    comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very
    conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you
    that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could
    sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?

        A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing
    affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--

        Q. Well, those two--

        A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked
    for me.

        Q. But they were in the same conversation, were they not?

        A. Yes, they were.

        Q. Did you understand in the context of the conversation that you
    would deny the--the President and your relationship to the Jones
    lawyers?

        A. Do you mean from what was said to me or--

        Q. In the context of that--in the context of that conversation,
    December the 17th--

        A. I--I don't--I didn't--

        Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the
    telephone conversation with the President that early morning of
    December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your
    relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of
    these cover stories?

        A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I
    don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to
    myself I knew I would deny the relationship.

        Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?

        A. Yes, correct.

        Q. Good.

        A. If--if that's what it came to.

        Q. And in fact you did deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers
    in the affidavit that you signed under penalty of perjury; is that
    right?

        A. I denied a sexual relationship.

        Q. The President did not in that conversation on December the 17th
    of 1997 or any other conversation, for that matter, instruct you to
    tell the truth; is that correct?

        A. That's correct.

        Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you--you both spoke--

        A. Well, I guess any conversation in relation to the Paula Jones
    case. I can't say that any conversation from the--the entire
    relationship that he didn't ever say, you know, ``Are you mad? Tell me
    the truth.'' So--

        Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you both spoke about
    denying this relationship if asked?

        A. Yes. That was discussed.

        Q. He would say something to the effect that--or you would say
    that--you--you would deny anything if it ever came up, and he would nod
    or say that's good, something to that effect; is that right?

        A. Yes, I believe I testified to that.

        Q. Let me shift gears just a minute and ask you about--and I'm
    going to be delicate about this because I'm conscious of people here in
    the room and my--my own personal concerns--but I want to refer you to
    the first so-called salacious occasion, and I'm not going to get into
    the details. I'm not--

        A. Can--can we--can you call it something else?

        Q. Okay.

        A. I mean, this is--this is my relationship--

        Q. What would you like to call it?

        A. --so, I mean, is--

        Q. This is the--or this was--

        A. It was my first encounter with the President, so I don't really
    see it as my first salacious--that's not what this was.

        Q. Well, that's kind of been the word that's been picked up all
    around. So--

        A. Right.

        Q. --let's stay on this first--

        A. Encounter, maybe?

        Q. Encounter, okay.

        A. Okay.

        Q. So we all know what we're talking about. You had several of
    these encounters, perhaps 10 or 11 of these encounters; is that right?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Now, with regard to the first one on November the 15th,
    1995, you have testified to a set of facts where the President actually
    touched you in certain areas--is that right--and that's--that's where I
    want to go. That's as far as I want to go with that question.

        MR. CACHERIS: If that's as far as it goes, we will not object--

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        MR. CACHERIS: --and if it goes any further, we will object.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. You have testified to that?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And I have the excerpts out, and I don't--but they've been
    adopted and affirmed as true. So I'm not going to get--get you looking
    at--have you read those excerpts.

        A. I appreciate that.

        Q. Now, in the--in later testimony before the grand jury, you were
    given a definition, and in fact it was the same definition that was
    used in the Paula Jones lawsuit, of ``sexual relations.'' Do you recall
    the--

        A. So I've read.

        Q. Yes.

        A. I was not shown that definition.

        Q. But you were asked a question that incorporated that definition.

        A. Not prior to this whole--not prior to the Independent Counsel
    getting involved.

        Q. But--no--it was the Independent Counsels themselves who asked
    you this question.

        A. Right. Oh, so you're--you're saying in the grand jury, I was
    shown a definition of--

        Q. Right.

        A. Yes, that's correct.

        Q. And you admitted in that answer to that question that the
    conduct that you were involved in, the encounter of November the 15th,
    1995, fit within that definition of ``sexual relations''?

        A. The second encounter of that evening did.

        Q. Right.

        And were there other similar encounters later on with the
    President, not that day, but other occasions that would have likewise
    fit into that definition of ``sexual relations'' in the Paula Jones
    case?

        A. Yes. And--yes.

        Q. There was more than one occasion where that occurred?

        A. Correct.

        Q. So, if the President testifies that he did not--he was not
    guilty of having a sexual relationship under the Paula Jones definition
    even, then that testimony is not truthful, is it?

        MR. CACHERIS: Objection. She should not be called upon to testify
    what was in the mind of another person. She's testifying to the facts,
    and she has given the facts.

        MR. BRYANT: I would ask that she answer the question.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Go ahead.

        SENATOR LEAHY: The objection is noted for the record.

        SENATOR DeWINE: The objection is noted. She may answer the
    question.

        THE WITNESS: I--I really--

        SENATOR LEAHY: If she can.

        THE WITNESS: --don't feel comfortable characterizing whether what
    he said was truthful or not truthful. I know I've testified to what I
    believe is true.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Well, truth is not a wandering standard.

        A. Well--

        Q. I would hope not. But you have testified, as I've told you, that
    what you and he did together on November the 15th, 1995 fit that
    definition of the Paula Jones, and you've indicated that there were
    other occasions that likewise--

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. --that that occurred.

        But now the President has indicated as a part of his specific
    defense--he has filed an answer with this Senate denying that this
    occurred, that he did these actions.

        A. I know. I'm not trying to be difficult, but there is a portion
    of that definition that says, you know, with intent, and I don't feel
    comfortable characterizing what someone else's intent was.

        I can tell you that I--my memory of this relationship and what I
    remember happened fell within that definition.

        If you want to--I don't know if there's another way to phrase that,
    but I'm just not comfortable commenting on someone else's intent or
    state of mind or what they thought.

        Q. Let's move forward to December the 19th, 1997, at that point you
    made reference to earlier.

        A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the date again? I'm sorry.

        Q. Yes. December the 19th, 1997.

        A. Okay, sorry.

        Q. At that point where you testified that you received a subpoena
    in the Paula Jones case, and that was, of course, on December the 19th,
    1997.

        Do you recall the specific time of day and where you were when you
    were served with the subpoena?

        A. I was actually handed the subpoena at the Metro entrance of the
    Pentagon--at the Pentagon, and the time--I think it was around 4:30--
    4--I--I--if I've testified to something different, then, I accept
    whatever I testified to, closer to the date. Sometime in the late
    afternoon.

        Q. Did they call you, and you had to come out of your office and go
    outside--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --and do that?

        Okay. And what did you do after you accepted service of the
    subpoena?

        A. I started crying.

        Q. Did he just give it to you and walk away, or did he give you any
    kind of explanation?

        A. I think I made a stink. I think I was trying to hope that he
    would convey to the Paula Jones attorneys that I didn't know why they
    were doing this, and this is ridiculous, and he said something or
    another, there is a check here for witness fee. And I said I don't want
    their stinking money, and so--

        Q. What did you do after, after you got through the emotional part?

        A. I went to a pay phone, and I called Mr. Jordan.

        Q. Any reason you went to a pay phone, and why did you call Mr.
    Jordan? Two questions, please.

        A. First is because my office in the Pentagon was probably a room
    this size and has--let's see, one, two, three, four--four other people
    in it, and there wasn't much privacy. So that I think that's obvious
    why I wouldn't want to discuss it there.

        And the second question was why Mr. Jordan--

        Q. Why did you call Mr. Jordan; yes.

        A. Because I couldn't call Mrs. Currie because it was--I hadn't
    expected to be subpoenaed that soon. So she was grieving with her
    brother's passing away, and I didn't know who else to turn to. So--

        Q. And what--what occurred with that conversation with Mr. Jordan?

        A. Well, I remember that--that he couldn't understand me because I
    was crying. So he kept saying: ``I don't understand what you're saying.
    I don't understand what you're saying.''

        And I just was crying and crying and crying. And so all I remember
    him saying was: ``Oh, just come here at 5 o'clock.''

        So I did.

        Q. You went to see Mr. Jordan, and you were inside his office after
    5 o'clock, and you did--is that correct?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Were--were you interrupted, in the office?

        A. Yes. He received a phone call.

        Q. And you testified that you didn't know who that was that called?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did you excuse yourself?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What--after you came back in, what--what occurred? Did he tell
    you who he had been talking to?

        A. No.

        Q. Okay. What happened next?

        A. I know I've testified about this--

        Q. Yes.

        A. --so I stand by that testimony, and my recollection right now is
    when I came back in the room, I think shortly after he had placed a
    phone call to--to Mr. Carter's office, and told me to come to his
    office at 10:30 Monday morning.

        Q. Did you know who Mr. Carter was?

        A. No.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you who he was?

        A. No--I don't remember.

        Q. Did you understand he was going to be your attorney?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you express any concerns about the--the subpoena?

        A. I think that happened before the phone call came.

        Q. Okay, but did you express concerns about the subpoena?

        A. Yes, yes.

        Q. And what were those concerns?

        A. In general, I think I was just concerned about being dragged
    into this, and I was concerned because the subpoena had called for a
    hatpin, that I turn over a hatpin, and that was an alarm to me.

        Q. How--in what sense was it--in what sense was it an alarm to you?

        A. The hatpin being on the subpoena was evidence to me that someone
    had given that information to the Paula Jones people.

        Q. What did Mr. Jordan say about the subpoena?

        A. That it was standard.

        Q. Did he have any--did he have any comment about the specificity
    of the hatpin?

        A. No.

        Q. And did you--

        A. He just kept telling me to calm down.

        Q. Did you raise that concern with Mr. Jordan?

        A. I don't remember if--if I've testified to it, then yes. If--I
    don't remember right now.

        Q. Did--would you have remembered then if he made any comment or
    answer about the hatpin?

        A. I mean, I think I would.

        Q. And you don't remember?

        A. I--I remember him saying something that it was--you know, calm
    down, it's a standard subpoena or vanilla subpoena, something like
    that.

        Q. Did you ask Mr. Jordan to call the President and advise him of
    the subpoena?

        A. I think so, yes. I asked him to inform the President. I don't
    know if it was through telephone or not.

        Q. And you did that because the President had asked you to make
    sure you let Betty know that?

        A. Well, sure. With Betty not being in the office, I couldn't--
    there wasn't anyone else that I could call to get through to him.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan say to you when he might see the President next?

        A. I believe he said he would see him that evening at a holiday
    reception.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan during that meeting make an inquiry about the
    nature of the relationship between you and the President?

        A. Yes, he did.

        Q. What was that inquiry?

        A. I don't remember the exact wording of the questions, but there
    were two questions, and I think they were something like did you have
    sex with the President or did he--and if--or did he ask for it or
    some--something like that.

        Q. Did you--what did you suspect at that point with these questions
    from Mr. Jordan in terms of did he know or not know about this?

        A. Well, I wasn't really sure. I mean, two things. I think there
    is--I know I've testified to this, that there was another component to
    all of this being Linda Tripp and her--what she might have led me to
    believe or led me to think and how that might have characterized how I
    was perceiving the situation.

        I--I sort of felt that I didn't know if he was asking me as what
    are you going to say because I--I don't know these answer to these
    questions, or he was asking me as I know the answer to these questions
    and what are you going to say. So, either way, for me, the answer was
    no and no.

        Q. And that's just what I wanted to ask you--you did answer no to
    both of those, but--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --as you explained--you didn't mention this directly, but you
    mentioned in some of your earlier testimony about it, that this was
    kind of a wink and--you thought this might be a wink-and-nod
    conversation, where he really knew what was going on, but--

        A. Well, I think that's what I just said.

        Q. --he was testing you to see what you would say?

        A. --that I wasn't--I--that was one of the--that was one of the
    things that went through my mind. I mean, it was not--I think that's
    what I just testified to, didn't I?

        Q. You didn't use the term ``wink-and-nod,'' though.

        A. Oh.

        Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. Jordan during that
    meeting about the specifics of an affidavit?

        A. No.

        Q. Do you know if the subject of an affidavit even came up?

        A. I don't think so.

        Q. What happened next? Is that when he made the call to Mr. Carter,
    after this conversation?

        A. No. He made the call to Mr.--I think--well, I think he made the
    call to Mr. Carter, uh, shortly after I came back into the room, but I
    could be wrong.

        Q. And then the meeting concluded after that--after the appointment
    was set up with Mr. Carter, the meeting concluded?

        A. Yes.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, we're going to need to break sometime
    in the next 5 minutes. Is this a good time, or do you want to
    complete--

        MR. BRYANT: This is a good time.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Okay. We'll take a 5-minute break.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 12:04 p.m.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 12:16 p.m.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are back on the record.

        Let me advise House Managers that they have consumed one hour and
    54 minutes.

        Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, sir.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, let me just cover a couple of quick points, and
    then I'll move on to another area, at least the next meeting with Mr.
    Jordan and eventual meeting with Mr. Carter.

        Back when issues of--we were discussing the issues of cover
    stories, uh, would you tell me about the, uh, code name with Betty
    Currie, the President's secretary and how that worked in terms of the
    use--I guess the word ``Kay,'' the name ``Kay,'' and were there other
    code names, and when did this start?

        A. Sure. First, let me say there's--from my experience with working
    with Independent Counsel on this subject area, there--my initial memory
    of things and then what I came to learn from, from other evidence, I
    think, are sort of two different things. So I initially hadn't
    remembered when that had happened or what had happened.

        The name ``Kay'' was used because Betty and I first came to know
    each other and know--or, I guess I came to know of Mrs. Currie through
    Walter Kaye, who was a family friend, and I think that that--I don't
    remember when we started using it, but I know that by January at some
    point--by let's just say January, I think, 12th or 13th, we were doing
    that. So I know I was beyond paranoid at this point.

        Q. Was ``Kay'' your code name, so to speak?

        A. I believe--yes, yes. So she was ``Kay'' and I was ``Kay.''

        Q. So any time, uh--not any time--so you used the ``Kay'' name
    interchangeably between the two--just between the two of you?

        A. Just for paging messages.

        Q. And, uh, when we're talking about that Ms. Currie would WAVE you
    into the White House, would that occur when the President was there? I
    mean, you went in--

        A. There--there were times that I went to see Mrs. Currie when the
    President wasn't there.

        Q. Right. And she would WAVE you in.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And there were times other people WAVE'd you in when the
    President wasn't there?

        A. Correct.

        Q. But when the President was there, and you were going to see the
    President, Ms. Currie was the one that always WAVE'd you in?

        A. Yes, and I think, unless--maybe on the occasions of the radio
    address or it was an official function.

        Q. Now, I think we talked a little bit about this. During your
    December the 19th meeting with Mr. Jordan, uh, he did schedule you a
    time to meet, uh, and introduce you to Mr. Carter?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And that--when was that meeting with Mr. Carter scheduled?

        A. Uh, I believe for--it was Monday morning. I think it was 11
    o'clock, around--sometime around that time.

        Q. And my notes say that would have been December the 22nd, 1997.

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did you, uh, call to meet him earlier, and if so, why?

        A. Yes. I had--I had had some concerns over the weekend that I
    didn't know if--if Mr. Jordan knew about the relationship or didn't
    know about the relationship. I was concerned about--I'm sure you can
    understand that I was dealing with a set of facts that were very
    different from what the President knew about being pulled into this
    case in that I had, in fact, disclosed information. So I was very
    paranoid, and, uh, I, uh, I--I was trying to--trying to see what Mr.
    Jordan knew was--was trying to inform him, was trying to just get a
    better grasp of what was going on.

        Is that--is that clear? No?

        Q. You were--you were worried that Mr. Jordan didn't have a--did
    not have a grasp of what was really going on?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And that would be in terms of actually knowing the real
    relationship between you and the President?

        A. Correct.

        Q. So how did you attempt to correct that?

        A. Well, I--I sort of--I think the way it came up was I said, uh--I
    think I said to Mr. Jordan--I know I've testified to this, uh, that--
    something about what about if someone overheard the phone calls that I
    had with him. And Mr. Jordan, I believe, said something like: So what?
    The President's allowed to call people.

        And then--well.

        Q. Now, was this at a meeting on December the 22nd, before you went
    to see Mr. Carter?

        A. Correct.

        Q. I assume you--you went to Mr. Jordan's office first, and then he
    was going to escort you over and turn you over to Mr. Carter?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And it was at that meeting that you brought up the possibility
    of someone overhearing a conversation with the President and you--
    between the two of you?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What else was said at that meeting with Mr. Jordan?

        A. I think it covered a topic that I thought we weren't discussing
    here.

        Q. Uh, okay. All right. I'm not sure.

        A. Okay. Well, I--I know I've testified to this in my--I think in
    all three, if not both of my grand jury appearances, and I'm very happy
    to stand by that testimony.

        Q. All right. I'm going to go around this a little bit without
    getting into details. You had a conversation with Mr. Jordan to
    detail--to give him more specific details of your relationship with the
    President.

        A. Uh, to give him more details of some of the types of phone calls
    that we had.

        Q. Okay. Uh, did you ask Mr. Jordan had he spoken with the
    President during that conversation?

        A. Yes, I believe so.

        Q. And why was this--why did you need to know that, or why was it
    important that you know that?

        A. I wanted the President to know I'd been subpoenaed.

        Q. Did, uh--in your, uh, proffer, you say that you made it clear to
    Mr. Jordan that you would deny the sexual relationship. Do you recall
    saying that in your proffer?

        A. Uh, I know--I know that was written in my proffer.

        Q. Okay. Well, I guess the better question is did you--did you in
    fact make that clear to Mr. Jordan that you would deny a sexual
    relationship with the President?

        A. I--I'm not really sure. I--this is sort of an area that, uh, has
    been difficult for me. I think, as I might have discussed in the grand
    jury, that when I originally wrote this proffer, it was to be a road
    map and, really, something to help me to get immunity and not
    necessarily--it's not perfect.

        Uh, so, I think that was my intention--I know that was my intention
    of--or at least what I thought I was doing--but I never really thought
    that this would become the be-all and end-all, my proffer.

        Q. Did, uh, did you bring with you to the meeting with Mr. Jordan,
    and for the purpose of carrying it, I guess, to Mr. Carter, items in
    response to this request for production?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you discuss those items with Mr. Jordan?

        A. I think I showed them to him, but I'm not 100 percent sure. If
    I've testified that I did, then I'd stand by that.

        Q. Okay. How did you select those items?

        A. Uh, actually, kind of in an obnoxious way, I guess. I--I felt
    that it was important to take the stand with Mr. Carter and then, I
    guess, to the Jones people that this was ridiculous, that they were--
    they were looking at the wrong person to be involved in this. And, in
    fact, that was true. I know and knew nothing of sexual harassment. So I
    think I brought the, uh, Christmas cards, that I'm sure everyone in
    this room has probably gotten from the President and First Lady, and
    considered that correspondence, and some innocuous pictures and--they
    were innocuous.

        Q. Were they the kind of items that typically, an intern would
    receive or, like you said, any one of us might receive?

        A. I think so.

        Q. In other words, it wouldn't give away any kind of special
    relationship?

        A. Exactly.

        Q. And was that your intent?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you discuss how you selected those items with anybody?

        A. I don't believe so.

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan make any comment about those items?

        A. No.

        Q. Were any of these items eventually turned over to Mr. Carter?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did you tell Mr. Jordan at that meeting that morning that
    these were not all of the gifts?

        A. I think I--I know I sort of alluded to that in my proffer, and I
    don't, uh--it's possible. I don't have a specific recollection of that.

        Q. And do you have a recollection of any response he may have made
    if you said that?

        A. No.

        Q. That--did you tell Mr. Jordan that day that the, uh, President
    gave you a hatpin and that the hatpin was mentioned in the subpoena?

        A. No.

        Q. Did you discuss the hatpin with Mr. Jordan?

        A. On the 22nd?

        Q. Yes.

        A. No.

        Q. Any other time?

        A. Yes.

        Q. When was that?

        A. On the 19th.

        Q. Okay, and what was--I think I may have missed that, going
    through that. Tell me about it.

        A. Actually, I think we--we went through it.

        Q. You just maybe mentioned it.

        A. I mentioned it when I first mentioned to him the subpoena that
    the hatpin had concerned me.

        Q. What was the significance of that hatpin to you? That seems to
    stand out. Was that--was that a--

        A. Right. I think, as I mentioned before, it was an alarm to me
    because it was a specific item--

        Q. Right.

        A. --in this list of generalities--I don't know generalities, but
    of general things--you sort of go--hatpin?

        Q. Right. I recall that, but I--I think my question was, was it of
    any special significance to you.

        A. Sure.

        Q. Was it, like, the first gift or something, that it really stood
    out above the others?

        A. Yes. It--it was--it was the first gift he gave me. It was a
    thoughtful gift. It was beautiful.

        Q. And was the hatpin in that list, that group of items that you
    carried to surrender to Mr. Carter?

        A. No.

        Q. And the hatpin was not in that list of items that you showed Mr.
    Jordan?

        A. I--I didn't show Mr. Jordan a list of items.

        Q. No--I thought you said you showed him the items.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And the hatpin was not in that group--I may have ``list''--

        A. Oh.

        Q. --but the hatpin was not in that group of items--

        A. No, it was not.

        Q. --that you showed Mr. Jordan. Okay.

        Tell us, if you would, how you arrived at Mr. Carter's. I know you
    rode in a car, but Mr. Jordan was with you--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --you went in--and tell us what happened.

        A. Uh, in the car, we spoke about job things. I know he mentioned
    something about, I think, getting in touch with Howard Pastor, and I
    mentioned to Mr. Jordan that Mr. Bacon knew Mr. Pastor and had already
    gotten in touch with him, and so he should--I just wanted Mr. Jordan to
    be aware of that.

        Uh, we talked about--it was really all about the job stuff because
    Mr. Jordan--the man driving the car--I didn't want to discuss anything
    with the case.

        Q. But once you arrived and Mr. Jordan made the introduction--

        A. Correct.

        Q. --between the two of you. And did he explain to Mr. Carter your
    situation, or did he go beyond just the perfunctory introduction?

        A. No.

        Q. Did he leave?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you, uh--I guess--generally, what did you discuss with Mr.
    Carter?

        A. The same vanilla story I had kind of--well, actually, not even
    that. I discussed with Mr. Carter the--uh, that this was ridiculous,
    that I was angry, I didn't want to be involved with this, I didn't want
    to be associated with Paula Jones, with this case.

        Q. Did you, uh--

        A. I asked if I could sue Paula Jones. [Laughing.]

        Q. Did you discuss an affidavit?

        A. Yes, I believe I mentioned an affidavit.

        Q. Did you mention, uh, the, uh--well, was there discussion about
    how you could sign an affidavit that might be--allow you to skirt being
    called as a witness?

        A. Mr. Carter said that was a possibility but that there were other
    things that we should try first; that he, uh, thought--well, actually,
    can I ask my attorneys a question for a moment?

        MR. BRYANT: Uh, sure.

        [Witness conferring with counsel.]

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, Ms. Lewinsky's mike is carrying; it's
    picking up, so we don't want to--

        THE WITNESS: Sorry. I was only saying nice things about you all.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Thank you.

        [Laughter.]

        MR. CACHERIS: So that you'll know what we're discussing here, as
    you know, Ms. Lewinsky is not required to give up her lawyer-client
    privileges, and the question we don't know the answer to and would like
    to address after lunch is whether in fact Mr. Carter has testified to
    this conversation.

        Therefore, perhaps--

        SENATOR DeWINE: All right. Maybe counsel at this point could--could
    you rephrase--rephrase the question or ask another question, and after
    lunch, we can come back--

        MR. CACHERIS: Or come back.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Well, I don't want--I don't think he has to move
    off the general area if he can--I'll leave that up to counsel.

        MR. BRYANT: There may be some misunderstanding or--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Why don't you rephrase the question and we'll see
    where we are.

        MR. BRYANT: --on this issue of--well, on this issue of the
    attorney-client privilege, it is our understanding that she is able to
    testify. But again, I don't know, uh, if we're going to resolve that
    right now.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Why don't we try to resolve that issue over lunch
    and--

        MR. BRYANT: Because I do have other questions that would relate to
    this area.

        SENATOR DeWINE: --you can stay in this general area.

        MR. BRYANT: Well, I'm not sure I can stay in this area too far
    without other questions that might arguably be involved in that
    privilege. I can ask them and you can object if you think they're
    within that range.

        MR. CACHERIS: Well, as I said, it's our understanding that under
    her agreement with the Independent Counsel, she has not been required
    to waive her lawyer-client privilege, and we don't want to do so here.
    That's that simple. And, Mr. Bryant, I want to check to see if Mr.
    Carter has testified about this. If he has, then we might be
    objecting--

        MR. BRYANT: Well, she has already, I think, waived that privilege
    through talking with the FBI and those folks. I mean, we have
    statements that concern those conversations--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Well, let's, instead of--

        MR. BRYANT: --and the 302's.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, let me just--if I could interrupt both of
    you, to keep moving here. Mr. Bryant, you have a choice. You can
    continue on this line of questioning, and we will have to deal with
    that, or you can move off of it, and in 20 minutes we'll be at a lunch
    break and then we can try to resolve that.

        MR. BRYANT: To be clear and fair, let's just--let me postpone the
    rest of this--

        SENATOR DeWINE: That will be fine.

        MR. BRYANT: --exam, and we'll move over to December 28th, and we'll
    come back if it's appropriate.

        SENATOR DeWINE: That will be fine.

        THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I'm not trying to be difficult. I'm sorry.

        MR. BRYANT: No. That's a valid concern; it really is.

        Let's talk a minute--I just don't want to forget to do this; unless
    I make notes, I forget.

        SENATOR LEAHY: You've got enough people here making notes; I don't
    think it'll be--I don't think it'll be forgotten.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. We're going to move in the direction of the December 28th, 1997
    meeting, and I'm going to ask you, at some point did you meet with the
    President later in December?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay, and what date was that?

        A. December 28th, 1997.

        Q. Thank you. How did the meeting come about?

        A. Uh, I contacted Mrs. Currie after Christmas and asked her to
    find out if the President still wanted to give me his Christmas
    present, or my Christmas present.

        Q. Did Ms. Currie get back to you?

        A. Yes, she did.

        Q. And what was her response?

        A. To come to the White House at 8:30 a.m. on the 28th.

        Q. And that would have been Sunday?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you in fact go to the White House on that date?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And how did you get in?

        A. I believe the Southwest Gate.

        Q. Did Ms. Currie WAVE you in?

        A. I think so.

        Q. You've testified to that previously.

        A. Okay, then I accept that.

        Q. This, uh, meeting on the 28th was a Sunday, and Ms. Currie--
    again, according to your prior testimony--WAVE'd you in. This was all
    consistent with what the President had told you to do about, number
    one, coming on weekends; is that correct?

        A. I--I--I don't think me coming in on that Sunday had--I mean, for
    me, my memory of it was that it was a holiday time, so it could have
    been any day. It's pretty quiet around the White House from Christmas
    to New Year's.

        Q. And it would have been consistent with her WAVEing you in when
    she was there at work on Sunday?

        A. Yes.

        Q. That was unusual, though, for her to be in on Sunday, wasn't it?

        A. I--I--I--I think so, but I mean, that's her--I think that's
    something you'd have to ask her.

        MR. BRYANT: I'm concerned about the time. I'm going to go ahead and
    continue with this, and we'll just stop wherever we have a--whenever
    you tell us to stop. This will take a little bit longer than another 15
    minutes or so; but it's appropriate, I think, for us to continue.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Well, frankly, it's up to you.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Do you have a problem in breaking it?

        MR. BRYANT: No; no, I don't think so.

        SENATOR DeWINE: I mean, if you do, we can take lunch now. I'll
    leave that up to you.

        MR. BRYANT: Uh, why don't we take the lunch now--

        SENATOR DeWINE: All right. No one has any objection to that, we
    will do that.

        THE WITNESS: I never object to food.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Let me just announce to counsel you have used 2
    hours and 14 minutes. It is now 20 minutes until 1. We'll come back
    here at 20 minutes until 2. And we need during this break also to see
    counsel and try to resolve the other issue prior to going back in. This
    is the privilege issue.

        SENATOR LEAHY: Did counsel for Ms. Lewinsky have to make a couple
    phone calls first, before we have that discussion? I think--

        SENATOR DeWINE: My suggestion would be we do that at the last 15
    minutes of the break.

        SENATOR LEAHY: I think he said he wanted to call Mr. Carter; that's
    why--

        MR. CACHERIS: Meet you back up here?

        SENATOR DeWINE: Yes. I would also--the sergeant-at-arms has asked
    me to announce that the food is on this floor, and since we have a very
    limited period of time, we suggest you try to stay on the floor.

        MS. HOFFMANN: We were planning to go back--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Except--I understand. I know that you're--

        MR. CACHERIS: We have our own arrangements.

        SENATOR DeWINE: I know that you have your room, and you've made
    your own arrangements, and that's fine.

        So we will start back in one hour.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 12:39 p.m.

        [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the deposition was recessed, to
    reconvene at 1:39 p.m. this same day.]
                               afternoon session

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 13:43 hours.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are now back on the record.

        As we broke for lunch, there was an objection that had been made by
    Ms. Lewinsky's counsel. Let me call on them at this point for
    statements.

        MR. CACHERIS: Yes. We have examined the record during the course of
    the break, and while we know that the immunity agreement does provide
    for Ms. Lewinsky to maintain her lawyer-client privilege, we think in
    this instance, the matter has been testified so fully that it has been
    waived. So the objection that we lodged is withdrawn.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Thank you very much.

        Mr. Bryant, you may proceed.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Mr. Senator.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. We've got you to the point where Mr. Jordan has escorted you to
    Mr. Carter's office and has departed, and you and Mr. Carter have
    conversations.

        Generally, what did you discuss with Mr. Carter?

        A. I guess the--the reasons why I didn't think I should be called
    in this matter.

        Q. Did he ask you questions?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What type of questions did he ask you?

        A. Um, they ranged from where I lived and where I was working to
    did I have a relationship with the President, did--everything in
    between.

        Q. When he--when he asked you about the relationship, did you
    understand he meant a sexual-type relationship?

        A. He asked me questions that--that indicated he was being
    specific.

        Q. And did--did you deny such a relationship?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Did he ask you questions about if you were ever alone with the
    President?

        A. Yes, he did.

        Q. And did you deny that?

        A. I think I mentioned that I might have brought the President
    papers on occasion, may have had an occasion to be alone with him, but
    not--not anything I considered significant.

        Q. But that was not true either, was it?

        A. No.

        Q. And in fact, that--the fact that you brought him papers, that
    was part of the cover-up story?

        A. Correct.

        Q. I'm unclear on a point I want to ask you. Also, did Mr. Carter
    ask you about how you perhaps were pulled into this case, and you gave
    some answer about knowing Betty Currie and--and Mr. Kaye? Does that
    ring bells? You gave that testimony in your deposition.

        A. That that's how I got pulled into the case?

        Q. Right. Did--

        A. May I see that, please?

        Q. It's about your denying the relationship with the President, and
    you think maybe you got pulled into the case. It's--certainly, it's--
    it's in your grand jury--okay. It's--it's in the August 1 interview,
    page 9. This was a 302 exam from the FBI.

        A. Um--

        MR. BRYANT: Let me give that to her. Let me just give it to her to
    refresh her memory. I'm not going to put it in evidence, although
    it's--it should be there.

        [Handing document.]

        [Witness perusing document.]

        THE WITNESS: I don't think that's an accurate representation of
    what I might have said in this interview.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. Would you--how would you have related Walter Kaye in that
    interview? How would his name have come up?

        A. In this interview or with Mr. Carter?

        Q. Well, in the interview with Mr. Carter that I assume was sort of
    summarized in that--

        A. Right.

        Q. --302, but, yes, with Mr. Carter.

        A. Uh, I think I mentioned that I was friendly with Betty Currie,
    the President's secretary.

        Q. And how would Mr. Kaye's name have come up in the conversation?

        A. Because of how I met Ms. Currie was through--that's how I came
    to know of Ms. Currie and--and first introduced myself to her. Excuse
    me.

        Q. Let's go back now and resume where we were before the lunch
    break. We were talking about the December visit to the White House and
    the conversation with the President. You had discussed--well, I think
    we're to the point where perhaps you--or I'll ask you to bring up your
    discussion with the President about the subpoena and the request for
    production.

        A. Um, part way into my meeting with the President, I brought up
    the concern I had as to how I would have been put--how I might have
    been alerted or--not alerted, but how I was put on the witness list and
    how I might have been alerted to the Paula Jones attorneys, and that
    that was--I was sort of concerned about that. So I discussed that a
    little, and then I said, um, that I was concerned about the hatpin. And
    to the best of my memory, he said that that had concerned him as well,
    and--

        Q. Could he have said that bothered him?

        A. He--he could have. I--I mean, I don't--I know that sometimes in
    the--in my grand jury testimony, they've put quotations around things
    when I'm attributing statements to other people, and I didn't
    necessarily mean that those were direct quotes. That was the gist of
    what I remembered him saying. So, concern, bothered, it doesn't--

        Q. Was--was there a discussion at that point as to how someone
    might have--may have discovered the--the hatpin and why?

        A. Well, he asked me if I had told anybody about it, and I said no.

        Q. But the two of you reached no conclusion as to how that hatpin
    came--

        A. No.

        Q. --to appear on the motion?

        A. No.

        Q. Did he appear at all, I think, probably surprised that--that you
    had received a request for production of documents or the--the hatpin
    was on that document?

        A. I didn't discuss--we didn't discuss documents, request for
    documents, but with regard to the hatpin, um, I don't remember him
    being surprised.

        Q. Mm-hmm. How long did the discussion last about the--this request
    for production of--of the items?

        A. The topic of the Paula Jones case, maybe 5 minutes. Not very
    much.

        Q. What else was said about that?

        A. About the case?

        Q. Yes.

        A. There was--then, at some point in this discussion--I think it
    was after the hatpin stuff--I had said to him that I was concerned
    about the gifts and maybe I should put them away or possibly give them
    to Betty, and as I've testified numerously, his response was either
    ranging from no response to ``I don't know'' or ``let me think about
    it.''

        Q. Did the conversation about the--the gifts that you just
    mentioned, did that immediately follow and tie into, if you will, the
    conversation about the request for production of items, the hatpin and
    so forth? Did one lead to the other?

        A. I don't remember. I know the gift conversation was subsequent to
    the hatpin comment, but I--I don't remember if one led to the other.

        Q. What else happened after that?

        A. Hmm, I think we went back to sort of--we left that topic, kind
    of went back to the visit.

        Q. Did--which included exchanging the Christmas gifts?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Okay.

        A. I had already--he had already given me my presents at this
    point.

        Q. Okay. Did--he gave you some gifts that day, and my question to
    you is what went through your mind when he did that, when you knew all
    along that you had just received a subpoena to produce gifts. Did that
    not concern you?

        A. No, it didn't. I was happy to get them.

        Q. All right. Why did it--beyond your happiness in receiving them,
    why did the subpoena aspect of it not concern you?

        A. I think at that moment--I mean, you asked me when he gave me
    those gifts. So, at that moment, when I was there, I was happy to be
    with him. I was happy to get these Christmas presents. So I was nervous
    about the case, but I had made a decision that I wasn't going to get
    into it too much--

        Q. Well--

        A. --with a discussion.

        Q. --have you in regards to that--you've testified in the past that
    from everything that the President had told you about things like this,
    there was never any question that you were going to keep everything
    quiet, and turning over all the gifts would prompt the Jones attorneys
    to question you. So you had no doubt in your mind, did you not, that
    you weren't going to turn these gifts over that he had just given you?

        A. Uh, I--I think the latter half of your statement is correct. I
    don't know if you're reading from my direct testimony, but--because you
    said--your first statement was from everything the President had told
    you. So I don't know if that was--if those were my words or not, but
    I--no, I was--I--it--I was concerned about the gifts. I was worried
    someone might break into my house or concerned that they actually
    existed, but I wasn't concerned about turning them over because I knew
    I wasn't going to, for the reason that you stated.

        Q. But the pattern that you had had with the President to conceal
    this relationship, it was never a question that, for instance, that
    given day that he gave you gifts that you were not going to surrender
    those to the Jones attorneys because that would--

        A. In my mind, there was never a question, no.

        Q. I'm just actually looking at your deposition on page--no, I'm
    sorry--your grand jury proceedings of August the 6th, just to be clear,
    since you raised that question.

        1004 in the book, appendices.

        You indicate that in response to a question, ``What do you think
    the President is thinking when he is giving you gifts when there is a
    subpoena covering gifts. I mean, does he think in any way, shape or
    form that you're going to be turning these gifts over?'' And your
    answer is, ``You know, I can't answer what he was thinking, but, to me,
    it was--there was never a question in my mind, and I--from everything
    he said to me, I never questioned him that we were ever going to do
    anything but keep this private. So that meant deny it, and that meant
    do whatever appropriate--take whatever appropriate steps needed to be
    taken, you know, for that to happen, meaning that if--if I had to turn
    over every gift--if I had turned over every gift he had given me--first
    of all, the point of the affidavit and the point of everything was to
    try to avoid a deposition. So where I'd have to sort of--you know, I
    wouldn't have to lie as much as I would necessarily in an affidavit how
    I saw it,'' and you continue on, just one short paragraph.

        A. Right.

        Q. ``So, by turning over all of these gifts, it would at best
    prompt him to want to question me about what kind of friendship I had
    with the President, and they would want to speculate and they'd leak
    it, and my name would be trashed and he would be in trouble.''

        So you recall giving that testimony?

        A. Yes. I accept--I accept what's said here.

        Q. Okay.

        A. It's a little different from what you said, but very close.

        Q. Thank you.

        Did the President ever tell you to turn over the gifts?

        A. Not that I remember.

        Q. Now, is that--does that bring us to the end of this conversation
    with the President, or did other things occur?

        A. I think that the aspect of where this case is related, yes.

        Q. Okay. And then you left, and where did you go when you left the
    White House?

        A. I think I went home.

        Q. This is at--at your apartment?

        A. My mother's apartment.

        Q. Mother's apartment.

        Did you later that day receive a call from Betty Currie?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Tell us about that.

        A. I received a call from--from Betty, and to the best of my
    memory, she said something like I understand you have something for me
    or I know--I know I've testified to saying that--that I remember her
    saying either I know you have something for me or the President said
    you have something for me. And to me, it's a--she said--I mean, this is
    not a direct quote, but the gist of the conversation was that she was
    going to go visit her mom in the hospital and she'd stop by and get
    whatever it was.

        Q. Did you question Ms. Currie or ask her, what are you talking
    about or what do you mean?

        A. No.

        Q. Why didn't you?

        A. Because I assumed that it meant the gifts.

        Q. Did--did you have other telephone calls with her that day?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. What was the purpose of those conversations?

        A. I believe I spoke with her a little later to find out when she
    was coming, and I think that I might have spoken with her again when
    she was either leaving her house or outside or right there, to let me
    know to come out.

        Q. Do--at that time, did you have the caller identification--

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. --on your telephone?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And did you at least on one occasion see her cell phone number
    on your caller-ID that day?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Now, Ms. Currie has given different versions of what happened
    there, but I recall one that she mentioned about Michael Isikoff, that
    you had called her and said Michael Isikoff is calling around or called
    me--

        A. Mm-hmm.

        Q. --about some gifts.

        Did Mr. Isikoff ever call you about the gifts?

        A. No.

        Q. Okay. Would there have been--would there have been any reason
    for you not to have carried the gifts to Ms. Currie had you wanted
    her--had you called her, would you have had her come over to get them
    from you, or does that--

        A. Probably not.

        Q. I mean, is there--is there any doubt in your mind that she
    called you to come pick up the gifts?

        A. I don't think there is any doubt in my mind.

        Q. Okay. Let me ask was--I think you did something special for her,
    as I recall, too, or her mother. Did you prepare a plant or something
    for her to pick up?

        A. Um, no. I just--

        Q. To take to her mother?

        A. I bought a small plant and a balloon.

        Q. Okay. What was your understanding about her mother, and was--

        A. Oh, I--I knew her mom was in--was in the hospital and was sick,
    and I think this was her second trip to the hospital in several months,
    and it had been a tough year.

        Q. And was she--was Mrs. Currie coming by your place on her way to
    visit her mother in the hospital? Do you know that?

        A. That's what I remember her saying.

        Q. So you prepared--and you bought a gift for her mother?

        A. Correct.

        Q. Okay. Do you know what kind of time frame this covered? First of
    all, it was the same day, December the 28th, 1997?

        A. Seven, yes.

        Q. Do you know what kind of time frame it covered?

        A. I think it was afternoon. I know I've testified to around 2
    o'clock.

        Q. Could it have been later?

        A. Sure.

        Q. So, when Betty Currie came, what--what did you have prepared for
    her?

        A. I had a box from the Gap with some of the presents the President
    had given me, taped up in it.

        Q. What happened when she arrived?

        A. Uh, I think I walked out to the car and asked her to hold onto
    this, and I think we talked about her mom for a few minutes. Um--

        Q. Did she call you right before she arrived, or did you just go
    wait for her in the building?

        A. I think she called me right before she--at some point, I think,
    before she--either when she was leaving or she was outside.

        Q. Do you know--did you have any indication from Ms. Currie what
    she was going to do with that box of gifts?

        A. Um, I know I've testified to this. I don't--I don't remember. I
    think maybe she said something about putting it in a closet, but
    whatever I--I stand by whatever I've said in my testimony about it.

        Q. But she was supposed to keep these for you?

        A. Well, I had asked her to.

        Q. Okay. Did Ms. Currie ask you at any time about what was in the
    box?

        A. No, or not that I recall, I guess I should say.

        Q. What was the--in your mind, what was the purpose of having Ms.
    Currie retain these gifts as opposed to another friend of yours?

        A. Hmm, I know I've testified to this, and I can't--can I look at
    my grand jury--I mean, I don't really remember sitting here right now,
    but if I could look at my grand jury testimony, I--or I'd just stand by
    it.

        Q. We will pass that to you.

        A. Okay. Thank you.

        [Witness handed documents.]

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. The answer I'm looking for is--if this refreshes your
    recollection is that turning these over was a reassurance to the
    President that everything was okay. Is that--

        A. Can I read it in context, please?

        Q. Sure, sure.

        A. Thank you.

        [Witness perusing document.]

        THE WITNESS: I--I--I stand by this testimony. I mean, I'd just note
    that it--what I'm saying here about giving it to the President or the
    assurance to the President is how I saw it at that point, not
    necessarily how I felt then. So I think you asked me what--why I didn't
    at that point, and I'm just--that's what's a little more clear there,
    just to be precise. I'm sorry.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. Did you have any later conversations with either Ms.
    Currie or the President about these gifts in the box?

        A. No.

        Q. Let me direct your attention to your meeting with Vernon Jordan
    on December the 31st of 1997. Was that to go back and talk about the
    job again?

        A. Little bit, but the--the--for me, the point of that meeting was
    I had gotten to a point where Linda Tripp wasn't returning my phone
    calls, and so I felt that I needed to devise some way, that somehow--to
    kind of cushion the shock of what would happen if Linda Tripp testified
    all the facts about my relationship, since I had never disclosed that
    to the President. So that was sort of my intention in meeting with Mr.
    Jordan, was hoping that I could give a little information and that
    would get passed on.

        Q. This was at a meeting for breakfast at the Park Hyatt Hotel?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Were just the two of you present?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you discuss other things, other than Linda Tripp and your
    job search?

        A. I think we talked about what each of us were doing New Year's
    Eve.

        Q. Specifically about some notes that you had at your apartment?

        A. Oh, yes. I'm sorry.

        Um, well, I mean, that really was in relation to discussing Linda
    Tripp. So--

        Q. And the Jones lawyers, too. Was that right?

        A. Um, I--I don't know that I discussed the Jones lawyers. If I've
    testified that I discussed the Jones lawyers, then I did, but--

        Q. Okay. Well, tell us about the notes.

        A. Well, the--sort of the--I don't know what to call it, but the
    story that I gave to Mr. Jordan was that I was trying to sort of alert
    to him that, gee, maybe Linda Tripp might be saying these things about
    me having a relationship with the President, and right now, I'm
    explaining this to you. These aren't the words that I used or how I
    said it to him, and that, you know, maybe she had seen drafts of notes,
    trying to obviously give an excuse as to how Linda Tripp could possibly
    know about my relationship with the President without me having been
    the one to have told her. So that's what I said to him.

        Q. And what was his response?

        A. I think it was something like go home and make sure--oh,
    something about a--I think he asked me if they were notes from the
    President to me, and I said no. I know I've testified to this. I stand
    by that testimony, and I'm just recalling it, that I said no, they were
    draft notes or notes that I sent to the President, and then I believe
    he said something like, well, go home and make sure they're not there.

        Q. And what did you do when you went home?

        A. I went home and I searched through some of my papers, and--and
    the drafts of notes I found, I sort of--I got rid of some of the notes
    that day.

        Q. So you threw them away?

        A. Mm-hmm.

        THE REPORTER: Is that a ``yes''?

        THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. On your way home, you were with Mr. Jordan? I mean, he carried--
    did he carry you someplace or take you home, drop you off?

        A. Yes, he dropped me off.

        Q. Okay. On the way home--

        A. It wasn't on the way to my home, but--

        Q. Okay. Did he--did you tell him that you had had an affair with
    the President?

        A. Yes.

        Q. What was his response?

        A. No response.

        Q. When was the next time--well, let me direct your attention to
    Monday, January the 5th, 1998. You had an occasion to meet with your
    lawyer, Mr. Carter, about your case, possible depositions, and so
    forth.

        Did you have some concern at that point about those depositions and
    how you might answer questions in the Paula Jones case?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Did you reach any sort of determination or resolution of those
    concerns by talking to Mr. Carter?

        A. No.

        Q. What's the status of the affidavit at this point? Is there one?

        A. No.

        Q. Do you recall any other concerns or questions that either you or
    Mr. Carter may have presented to each other during that meeting?

        A. I think I--I think it was in that meeting I brought up the
    notion of having my family present, if I had to do a deposition, and he
    went through what--I believe we discussed--at this point, I think I
    probably knew at this point I was going to sign an affidavit, but it
    wasn't created yet, and I believe we discussed what--if the affidavit
    wasn't, I guess, successful--I don't know how you'd say legally--say
    that legally--but what a deposition would be like, sitting at a table.

        Q. I'll bet he never told you it would be like this, did he?

        A. No.

        Q. Did you try to contact the President after you left the meeting
    with Mr. Carter?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And you reached Betty Currie?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And you told her to pass along to the President that you
    wanted--it was important to talk with him?

        A. Yes.

        Q. You may have mentioned to her something about signing something?

        A. Right; I might have.

        Q. What response did you get from that telephone call?

        A. Uh, Betty called me back, maybe an hour or two later, and put
    the President through.

        Q. And what was that conversation?

        A. I know I've testified to this, and it was sort of two-fold. On
    the one hand, I was, uh, upset, so I was sort of in a pissy mood and a
    little bit contentious. Uh, but more related to the case, uh, I had
    concerns that from questions Mr. Carter had asked me about how I got my
    job at the Pentagon and transferred and, and, uh, I was concerned as to
    how to answer those questions because those questions involved naming
    other people who I thought didn't like me at the White House, and I was
    worried that those people might try and--just to get me in trouble
    because they didn't like me--so that if they were then--I mean, I had
    no concept of what exactly happens in these legal proceedings, and I
    thought, well, maybe if I say Joe Schmo helped me get my job, then
    they'd go interview Joe Schmo, and so, if Joe Schmo said, ``No, that's
    not true,'' because he didn't like me, then I didn't want to get in
    trouble. So--

        Q. Did there appear to be a question possibly about how you--how
    you got the job at the Pentagon? Did you fear for some questions there?

        A. Yes. I think I tend to be sort of a detail-oriented person, and
    so I think it was, uh, my focusing on the details and thinking
    everything had to be a very detailed answer and not being able to kind
    of step back and look at how I could say it more generally. So that's
    what concerned me.

        Q. Mm-hmm. This--

        A. Because clearly, I mean, I would have had to say, ``Gee, I was
    transferred from the Pentagon because I had this relationship that I'm
    not telling you about with the President.'' So there was--there was
    that concern for me there.

        Q. And what did the President tell you that you could say instead
    of saying something like that?

        A. That the people in Legislative Affairs helped me get the job--
    and that was true.

        Q. Okay, but it was also true, to be complete, that they moved you
    out into the Pentagon because of the relationship with the President?

        A. Right.

        Q. Did--did the subject of the affidavit come up with the
    President?

        A. Yes, towards the end of the conversation.

        Q. And how did--tell us how that occurred.

        A. I believe I asked him if he wanted to see a copy of it, and he
    said no.

        Q. Well, I mean, how did you introduce that into the subject--into
    the conversation?

        A. I don't really remember.

        Q. Did he ask you, well, how's the affidavit coming or--

        A. No, I don't think so.

        Q. But you told him that you had one being prepared, or something?

        A. I think I said--I think I said, you know, I'm going to sign an
    affidavit, or something like that.

        Q. Did he ask you what are you going to say?

        A. No.

        Q. And this is the time when he said something about 15 other
    affidavits?

        A. Correct.

        Q. And tell us as best as you can recall what--how that--how that
    part of the conversation went.

        A. I think that was the--sort of the other half of his sentence as,
    No, you know, I don't want to see it. I don't need to--or, I've seen 15
    others.

        It was a little flippant.

        Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated
    that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
    get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt
    these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.

        Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?

        A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all,
    ever.

        Q. But, I mean, he didn't make an offer that, you know, here's what
    you can do, or let me send you over something that can maybe keep you
    from committing perjury?

        A. No. We never discussed perjury.

        Q. On--well, how did that conversation end? Did you talk about
    anything else?

        A. I said goodbye very abruptly.

        Q. The next day--well, on January the 6th--I'm not sure exactly
    what day we are--1998, did you pick up a draft of the affidavit from
    Mr. Carter?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. What did you do with that draft?

        A. I read it and went through it.

        Q. How did it look?

        A. I don't really remember my reaction to it. I know I had some
    changes. I know there's a copy of this draft affidavit that's part of
    the record, but--

        Q. Were portions of it false?

        A. Incomplete and misleading.

        Q. Did you take that affidavit to Mr. Jordan?

        A. I dropped off a copy in his office.

        Q. Did you have any conversation with him at that point or some
    later point about that affidavit?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. And tell us about that.

        A. I had gone through and had, I think, as it's marked--can I maybe
    see? Isn't there a copy of the draft?

        [Witness handed document.]

        [Witness perusing document.]

        The WITNESS: Thank you.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Mr. Bryant, can you reference for the record at
    this point?

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        SENATOR DeWINE: If you can.

        MR. BRYANT: It would be--

        MR. SCHIPPERS: 1229.

        SENATOR DeWINE: 1229?

        MR. SCHIPPERS: Yes.

        SENATOR DeWINE: All right. Thank you.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. Have you had an opportunity to review the draft of your
    affidavit?

        A. I--yes.

        Q. Okay. What--do you have any comment or response?

        A. I received it. I made the suggested changes, and I believe I
    spoke with Mr. Jordan about the changes I wanted to make.

        Q. Did he have any comment on your proposed changes?

        A. I think he said the part about Lewis & Clark College was
    irrelevant. I'd have to see the--I don't believe it's in the final copy
    in the affidavit, so--but I could be mistaken.

        Q. At this point, of course, you had a lawyer, Mr. Carter, who was
    representing your interest. Mr. Jordan was--I'm not sure if he--how you
    would characterize him, but would it--would it be that you view Mr.
    Jordan as, in many ways, Mr.--the President--if Mr. Jordan knew it, the
    President knew it, or something of that nature?

        A. I think I testified to something similar to that. I felt that, I
    guess, that Mr. Jordan might have had the President's best interest at
    heart and my best interest at heart, so that that was sort of maybe a--
    some sort of a blessing.

        Q. I think, to some extent, what you--what you had said was getting
    Mr. Jordan's approval was basically the same thing as getting the
    President's approval. Would you agree with that?

        A. Yeah. I believe that--yes, I believe that's how I testified to
    it.

        Q. The fact that you assume that Mr. Jordan was in contact with the
    President--and I believe the evidence would support that through his
    own testimony that he had talked to the President about the signed
    affidavit and that he had kept the President updated on the subpoena
    issue and the job search--

        A. Sir, I'm not sure that I knew he was having contact with the
    President about this. I--I think what I said was that I felt that it
    was getting his approval. It didn't necessarily mean that I felt he was
    going to get a direct approval from the President.

        I'm sorry to interrupt you.

        Q. Oh, that's fine. At any time you need to clarify a point,
    please--please feel free to do so.

        Did--did--did you have any indication from Mr. Jordan that he--when
    he discussed the signed affidavit with the President, they were
    discussing some of the contents of the affidavit? Did you have--

        A. Before I signed it or--

        Q. No; during the drafting stage.

        A. No, absolutely not--either/or. I didn't. No, I did not.

        Q. Now, the changes that you had proposed, did Mr. Jordan agree to
    those changes?

        A. I believe so.

        Q. And then you somehow reported those changes back to Mr. Carter
    or to someone else?

        A. No. I believe I spoke with Mr. Carter the next morning, before I
    went in to see him, and that's when I--I believe that's--I dictated the
    changes.

        Q. Okay. Mr. Jordan did not relay the changes to Mr. Carter--you
    did?

        A. I know I relayed the changes, these changes to Mr. Carter.

        Q. Specifically, the concerns that you had about--about the draft,
    what did they include, the changes?

        A. I think one of the--I think what concerned me--and I believe
    I've testified to this--was--was in Number 6. Even just mentioning that
    I might have been alone with the President, I was concerned that that
    would give the Jones people enough ammunition to want to talk to me, to
    think, oh, well, maybe if she was alone with him that--that he
    propositioned me or something like that, because I hadn't--of course, I
    mean, you remember that at this point, I had no idea the amount of
    knowledge they had about the relationship. So--

        Q. Did--Mr. Carter, I assume, made those changes, and then you
    subsequently signed the affidavit?

        A. We worked on it in his office, and then, yes, I signed the
    affidavit.

        Q. Is this the same day--

        A. Yes.

        Q. --at this point?

        A. This was the 7th?

        Q. Yes.

        A. Correct.

        Q. Did--did you take the signed--or a copy of the signed affidavit,
    I should say--did you take a copy--did you keep a copy?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Did you give it to anyone or give anyone else a copy?

        A. No.

        Q. Now, did you, the next day on the 8th, go to New York for some
    interviews for jobs?

        A. It was--it--I either went later on the 7th or on the 8th, but
    around that time, yes.

        Q. Was this a place that you had already interviewed?

        A. Yes.

        Q. And I assume this was at McAndrews and Forbes?

        A. Yes.

        Q. How did you feel that the interview went?

        A. I--I know I characterized it in my grand jury testimony as
    having not gone very well.

        Q. Okay. I think you also mentioned it went very poorly, too. Does
    that sound--does that ring a bell?

        A. Sure.

        Q. Why? Why would you so characterize it?

        A. Well, as I've had a lot of people tell me, I'm a pessimist, but
    also I--I wasn't prepared. I was in a waiting room downstairs at
    McAndrews and Forbes, and--or at least, I thought it was a waiting
    room--and Mr. Durnan walked into the room unannounced, and the
    interview began. So I felt that I started on the wrong foot, and I just
    didn't feel that I was as articulate as I could have been.

        Q. Did you call Mr. Jordan after that?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. Did you express those same concerns?

        A. Yes, I did.

        Q. What did he say?

        A. And this is a little fuzzy for me. I know that I had a few phone
    calls with him in that day. I think in this call, he said, you know,
    ``Don't worry about it.'' I--my testimony is probably more complete on
    this. I'm sorry.

        Q. What--what other phone calls did you have with him that day?

        A. I remember talking to--I know that at some point, he said
    something about that he'd call the chairman, and then I think he said
    just at some point not to worry. He was always telling me not to worry
    because I always--I overreact a little bit.

        Q. All total, how many calls did you have with him that day--your
    best guess?

        A. I have no idea.

        Q. More than two?

        A. I--I don't know.

        Q. Can you think of any other subjects the two of you would have
    talked about?

        A. I don't think so.

        Q. Did he, Mr. Jordan, tell you that he had talked to the chairman,
    or Mr. Perelman, whatever his title is?

        A. I'm sorry. I know I've testified to this. I don't--I think so.

        Q. And you had--did you have additional interviews at this company
    or a subsidiary?

        A. Yes, I--well, I had with the sort of, I guess, daughter--
    daughter company, Revlon. I had an interview with Revlon the next day.

        Q. And you were offered a job?

        A. Yes, I was.

        Q. About the 9th or so? That would have been 2 days after the
    affidavit?

        A. Oh. Actually, no. I think I was offered a position, whatever
    that Friday was. Oh, yes, the 9th. I'm sorry. You're right.

        Oh, wait. It was either the 9th or the 13th--or the 12th--the 9th
    or the 12th.

        Q. Okay. Now, I'm--I was looking away. I'm confused.

        A. That's okay. I--my interview was on the 9th, and I don't
    remember right now--I know I've testified to this--whether I found out
    that afternoon or it was on Monday that I got the informal offer.

        Q. Mm-hmm.

        A. So, if you want to tell me what I said in my grand jury
    testimony, I'll be happy to affirm that.

        Q. I think we may be talking about perhaps an informal offer. Does
    that--on the 9th?

        A. Yes. I know it was--okay. Was it on the--I don't--

        Q. Yes.

        A. --remember if it was the 9th or the 13th--

        A. Okay.

        Q. --but I know Ms. Sideman called me to extend an informal offer,
    and I accepted.

        Q. Okay. Now, in regard to the affidavit--do you still have your
    draft in front of you?

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. In paragraph number 3, you say: ``I can not fathom any reason--
    fathom any reason why--that the plaintiff would seek information from
    me for her case.''

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. Did Mr. Carter at all go into the gist of the Paula Jones
    lawsuit, the sexual harassment part of it, and tell you what it was
    about?

        A. I think I knew what it was about.

        Q. All right. And then you indicated that you didn't like the part
    about the doors, being behind closed doors, but on the sexual
    relationship, paragraph 8, the first sentence, ``I've never had a
    sexual relationship with the President''--

        A. Mm-hmm.

        Q. --that's not true, is it?

        A. No. I haven't had intercourse with the President, but--

        Q. Was that the distinction you made when you signed that
    affidavit, in your own mind?

        A. That was the justification I made to myself, yes.

        Q. Let me send you the final affidavit. It might be a little easier
    to work from--

        A. Okay.

        Q. --than the--than the original.

        MR. BRYANT: Do we have all the--1235.

        [Witness handed document.]

        SENATOR DeWINE: Congressman?

        MR. BRYANT: Yes.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We're down to 3 minutes on the tape. Would now be a
    good time to have him switch tapes and then we'll go right back in?

        MR. BRYANT: Okay, that would be fine.

        SENATOR DeWINE: I think we'll hold right at the table, and we'll
    get the tapes switched.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Okay, we will do that now.

        This marks the end of Videotape Number 2 in the deposition of
    Monica S. Lewinsky.

        We are going off the record at 14:31 hours.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 3 in
    the deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky. The time is 14:44 hours.

        SENATOR DeWINE: We are back on the record.

        Let me advise counsel that you have used 3 hours and 2 minutes.

        Congressman Bryant, you may continue.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, sir.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, let me just follow up on some points here, and
    then I'll move toward the conclusion of my direct examination very,
    very quickly, I hope.

        In regard to the affidavit--I think you still have it in front of
    you--the final copy of the affidavit--I wanted to revisit your answer
    about paragraph 8--

        A. Yes, sir.

        Q. --and also refer you to your grand jury testimony of August the
    6th. This begins on--actually, it is on page 1013 of the--it should be
    the Senate record, in the appendices, but it's your August 6th, 1998,
    grand jury testimony.

        And it's similar to the--my question about paragraph 8 about the
    sexual relationship-- and I notice you--you now carve out an exception
    to that by saying you didn't have intercourse, but I would direct your
    attention to a previous answer and ask if you can recall being asked
    this question in your grand jury testimony and ask--giving the answer--
    the question is: ``All right. Let me ask you a straightforward
    question. Paragraph 8, at the start, says, quote, 'I have never had a
    sexual relationship with the President,' unquote. Is that true?,'' and
    your answer is, ``No.''

        Now, do you have any comment about why your answer still would not
    be no, that that is not a true statement in paragraph 8?

        A. I think I was asked a different question.

        Q. Okay.

        A. My recollection, sir, was that you asked me if that was a lie,
    if paragraph 8 was--I--I'm not trying to--

        Q. Okay. Well, if--if I ask you today the same question that was
    asked in your grand jury, is your statement, quote, ``I have never had
    a sexual relationship with the President,'' unquote, is that a true
    statement?

        A. No.

        Q. Okay, that's good.

        Now, also in paragraph 8, you mention that there were occasions
    after you left--I think it looks like the--the last sentence in
    paragraph 8, ``The occasions that I saw the President after I left my
    employment at the White House in April 1996 were official receptions,
    formal functions, or events related to the United States Department of
    Defense, where I was working at the time,'' period--actually the last
    sentence, ``There were other people present on those occasions.'' Now,
    that also is not a truthful statement; is that correct?

        A. It--I think I testified that this was misleading. It's
    incomplete--

        Q. Okay. It's not a truthful statement?

        A. --and therefore, misleading.

        Well, it--it is true; it's not complete.

        Q. Okay. All right. Now, I will accept that.

        A. Okay. Thank you.

        Q. Thank you.

        Going back to the gift retrieval of December the 28th, I want to be
    clear that we're on the same sheet of music on this one. As I
    understand, there's no doubt in your mind that Betty Currie called you,
    initiated the call to you to pick up the gifts? She--

        A. That's how I remember this event.

        Q. And you went through that process, and at the very end, you were
    sitting out in the car with her, with a box of gifts, and it was only
    at that time that you asked her to keep these gifts for you?

        A. I don't think I said ``gifts.'' I don't--

        Q. Or keep this package?

        A. I think I said--gosh, was it in the car that I said that or on
    the phone? I think it was in the car. I--I'm--I don't know if that
    makes a difference.

        Q. But this was at the end of a process that Betty Currie had
    initiated by telephone earlier that day to come pick up something that
    you have for her?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Now, were you ever under the impression from anything that
    the President said that you should turn over all the gifts to the Jones
    lawyers?

        A. No, but where this is a little tricky--and I think I might have
    even mentioned this last weekend--was that I had an occasion in an
    interview with one of the--with the OIC--where I was asked a series of
    statements, if the President had made those, and there was one
    statement that Agent Phalen said to me--I--there were--other people,
    they asked me these statements--this is after the President testified
    and they asked me some statements, did you say this, did you say this,
    and I said, no, no, no. And Agent Phalen said something, and I think it
    was, ``Well, you have to turn over whatever you have.'' And I said to
    you, ``You know, that sounds a little bit familiar to me.''

        So that's what I can tell you on that.

        Q. That's in the 302 exam?

        A. I don't know if it's in the 302 or not, but that's what
    happened.

        Q. Uh-huh.

        A. Or, that's how I remember what happened.

        Q. Okay. And your response to the question in the deposition that I
    just asked you--were you ever under the impression from anything the
    President said that you should have--that you should turn over all the
    gifts to the Jones lawyers--your answer in that deposition was no.

        A. And which date was that, please?

        Q. The deposition was August the 26th.

        A. Oh, the 26th.

        Q. Yes.

        A. It might have been after that, or maybe it was--I don't--

        Q. Okay. I wanted to ask you, too, about a couple of other things
    in terms of your testimony. Regarding the affidavit--and this appears
    to be, again, grand jury testimony--

        A. Sir, do you have a copy that I could look at if you're going
    to--

        Q. Sure. August, the August 6th--233--it's the--it's this page
    here.

        While we're looking at that, let me ask you a couple other things
    here. I wanted to ask you--I talked to you a little bit about the
    President today and your feelings today that persist that you think
    he's a good President, and I assume you think he's a very intelligent
    man?

        A. I think he's an intelligent President.

        [Laughter.]

        MR. BRYANT: Okay. Thank goodness, this is confidential; otherwise,
    that might be the quote of the day. I know we won't see that in the
    paper, will we?

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Referring to January the 18th, 1998, the President had a
    conversation with Betty Currie, and he made five statements to her. One
    was that ``I was never really alone with Monica; right?'' That's one.
    That's not true, is it, that ``I was never alone with''--

        A. Sir, I was not present for that conversation. I don't feel
    comfortable--

        Q. Let me ask you, though--I realize none of us were there--but
    that statement, ``I was never really alone with Monica; right?''--that
    was not--he was alone with you on many occasions, was he not?

        A. I--I'm not trying to be difficult, but I feel very uncomfortable
    making judgments on what someone else's statement when they're defining
    things however they want to define it. So if you--if you ask me,
    Monica, were you alone with the President, I will say yes, but I'm not
    comfortable characterizing what someone else says--

        Q. Okay.

        A. --passing judgment on it. I'm sorry.

        Q. Were you--was Betty Currie always with you when the President
    was with you?

        A. Betty Currie was always at the White House when I went to see
    the President at the White House after I left working at the White
    House.

        Q. But was--at all times when you were alone with the President,
    was Betty Currie always there with you?

        A. Not there in the room.

        Q. Okay. Did--did--did you come on to the President, and did he
    never touch you physically?

        A. I guess those are two separate questions, right?

        Q. Yes, they are.

        A. Did I come on to him? Maybe on some occasions.

        Q. Okay.

        A. Not initially.

        Q. Okay. Not initially.

        A. I--

        Q. Did he ever--did he ever touch you?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Could Betty Currie see and hear everything that went on
    between the two of you all the time?

        A. I can't answer that. I'm sorry.

        Q. As far as you know, could she see and hear everything that went
    on between the two of you?

        A. Well, if I was in the room, I couldn't--I--I couldn't be in the
    room and being able to see if Betty Currie could see and hear what
    was--

        Q. I think I--

        MR. STEIN: Wouldn't it be a little speedier--if I may make this
    observation, you have her testimony; you have the evidence of--

        SENATOR DeWINE: Counsel, is this an objection?

        MR. STEIN: I just would ask him to draw whatever inferences there
    were to speed this up.

        SENATOR DeWINE: I'll ask him to rephrase the question.

        MR. BRYANT: I would just stop at that point. I think, uh, that's
    enough of that.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. The President also had conversations with Mr. Blumenthal on
    January the 21st, 1998, and indicated that you came on to the President
    and made a sexual demand. At the initial part of this, did you come on
    to the President and make a sexual demand on the President?

        A. No.

        Q. At the initial meeting on November the 15th, 1995, did he ever
    rebuff you from these advances, or from any kind of--

        A. On November 15th?

        Q. November 15th. Did he rebuff you?

        A. No.

        Q. Did you threaten him on November 15th, 1995?

        A. No.

        Q. On January 23rd, 1998, the President told John Podesta that--
    many things. I'll--I'll withdraw that. Let me go--kind of wind this
    down. I'd like to save some time for redirect.

        You've indicated that with regard to the affidavit and telling the
    truth, there is some testimony I'd like to read you from your
    deposition that we started out--August the 6th--I'm sorry--the grand
    jury, August 6th, 1998--

        MS. MILLS: What internal page number?

        MR. SCHIPPERS: 1021 internal, 233.

        MR. BRYANT: Okay, we need to get her a copy.

        MR. SCHIPPERS: Do you have the August 6th still over there?

        THE WITNESS: I can share with Sydney--if you don't mind.

        [Witness perusing document.]

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Beginning--do you have page 233--

        A. Uh-huh.

        Q. --okay--beginning at line 6--

        A. Okay.

        Q. --it reads--would you prefer to read that? Why don't you read--

        A. Out loud?

        Q. Would you read it out loud?

        A. Okay.

        Q. Through line 16--6 through 16. This is your answer.

        A. ``Sure. Gosh. I think to me that if--if the President had not
    said the Betty and letters cover, let's just say, if we refer to that,
    which I'm talking about in paragraph 4, page 4, I would have known to
    use that. So to me, encouraging or asking me to lie would have--you
    know, if the President had said, Now, listen, you'd better not say
    anything about this relationship, you'd better not tell them the truth,
    you'd better not--for me, the best way to explain how I feel what
    happened was, you know, no one asked or encouraged me to lie, but no
    one discouraged me, either.''

        Q. Okay. That--that statement, is that consistent in your view with
    what you've testified to today?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. Look at page 234, which is right below there.

        A. Okay. [Perusing document.]

        Q. Beginning with the--your answer on line 4, and read down, if you
    could, to line 14--4 through 14.

        A. ``Yes and no. I mean, I think I also said that Monday that it
    wasn't as if the President called me and said, You know, Monica, you're
    on the witness list. This is going to be really hard for us. We're
    going to have to tell the truth and be humiliated in front of the
    entire world about what we've done, which I would have fought him on,
    probably. That was different. And by him not calling me and saying
    that, you know, I knew what that meant. So I, I don't see any
    disconnect between paragraph 10 and paragraph 4 on the page. Does that
    answer your question?''

        Q. Okay. Now, has that--has your testimony today been consistent
    with that provision?

        A. I--I think so.

        Q. Okay.

        A. I've intended for my testimony to be consistent with my grand
    jury testimony.

        Q. Okay. And one final read just below that, line 16 through 24.

        A. ``Did you understand all along that he would deny the
    relationship also?''

        ``Mm-hmm, yes.''

        Q. And 19 through 24--the rest of that.

        A. Oh, sorry.

        ``And when you say you understood what it meant when he didn't say,
    Oh, you know you must tell the truth, what did you understand that to
    mean?''

        ``That, that, as we had on every other occasion and in every other
    instance of this relationship, we would deny it.''

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        Could we have just--go off the record here a minute?

        SENATOR DeWINE: Sure. Let's go off the record at this point.

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 1459 hours.

        [Recess.]

        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 1504 hours.

        SENATOR DeWINE: Manager Bryant, you may proceed.

        MR. BRYANT: Thank you, Senator.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Ms. Lewinsky, I have just a few more questions here.

        With regard to the false affidavit, you do admit that you filed an
    untruthful affidavit with the court in the Jones case; is that correct?

        A. I think I--I--yes--I mean, it was incomplete and misleading,
    and--

        Q. Okay. With regard to the cover stories, on December the 6th, you
    and the President went over cover stories, and in the same conversation
    he encouraged you to file an affidavit in the Jones case; is that
    correct?

        A. No.

        MS. SELIGMAN: I think that misstates the record.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. All right. On December the 17th. Let's try December 17; all
    right?

        A. Okay.

        Q. You and the President went over cover stories--that's the
    telephone conversation--

        A. Okay--I'm sorry--can you repeat the question?

        Q. Okay. On December 17th, you and the President went over cover
    stories in a telephone conversation.

        A. Correct.

        Q. And in that same telephone conversation, he encouraged you to
    file an affidavit in the Jones case?

        A. He suggested I could file an affidavit.

        Q. Okay. With regard to the job, between your meeting with Mr.
    Jordan in early November and December the 5th when you met with Mr.
    Jordan again, you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help
    you get a job; is that correct?

        MS. SELIGMAN: Objection. Misstates the record.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Okay. You can answer that.

        A. It--

        Q. Let me repeat it. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early
    November and December the 5th when you met with Mr. Jordan again, you
    did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help you get a job; is
    that correct?

        MS. SELIGMAN: Same objection.

        THE WITNESS: Do you mean when I met with him again on December
    11th? I don't--

        MR. BRYANT: The--

        THE WITNESS: --I didn't meet with Mr. Jordan on December 5th. I'm
    sorry--

        MR. BRYANT: Okay.

        THE WITNESS: --am I misunderstanding something?

        MR. BRYANT: We're getting our numbers wrong here.

        THE WITNESS: Okay.

        BY MR. BRYANT:

        Q. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early November and
    December the 11th when you met with Mr. Jordan again, you did not feel
    that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help you get a job; is that correct?

        A. I hadn't seen any progress.

        Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December, you began
    to interview in New York and were much more active in your job search;
    correct?

        A. Yes.

        Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon with the
    help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?

        A. Yes.

        Q. Okay. With regard to gifts, regarding the gifts that were
    subpoenaed in the Jones case, you are certain that Ms. Currie called
    you and that she understood you had something to give her; is that
    correct?

        A. That's my recollection.

        Q. You never told Ms. Currie to come pick up the gifts or that
    Michael Isikoff had called about them; is that correct?

        A. I don't recall that.

        Q. Regarding stalking, you never stalked the President; is that
    correct?

        A. I--I don't believe so.

        Q. Okay. You and the President had an emotional relationship as
    well as a physical one; is that right?

        A. That's how I'd characterize it.

        Q. Okay. He never rebuffed you?

        A. I--I think that gets into some of the intimate details of--no,
    then, that's not true. There were occasions when he did.

        Q. Uh-huh. Okay. But he never rebuffed you initially on that first
    day, November the 15th, 1995?

        A. No, sir.

                                         Law Offices of
                                                Plato Cacheris,
                                      Washington, DC, February 2, 1999.
    Re February 1, 1999, Monica S. Lewinsky deposition transcript.

        Dear Ms. Jardim and Mr. Bitsko: Upon our review of the videotape
    and transcript of Monica S. Lewinsky's deposition transcript, we have
    noted the following errors or omissions:

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Page     Line                         Corrections
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
         19    14      The oath and affirmation are not transcribed.
         24     9      ``second . . .'' should replace ``2d''
         44     6      Comments by counsel are not transcribed.
         61  11-13     Delete quotation marks. These are not direct quotes
                        in this instance.
         62    23      ``town'' should replace ``down''
         63    17      ``called'' should replace ``found''
         63    23      ``after Thanksgiving'' should follow ``back.''
         63    24      Insert following line 23:
                         A: Yes I did.
                         Q: What did he tell you then?
         65    21      ``tchotchke'' should replace ``chochki''
         65    24      ``on'' should replace ``home''
         66    20      The line should read:
                         ``see if I could see the President. I apologize,''
                        not
                         ``see if I could see the President and apologize.''
         75     1      ``needed'' should replace ``need''
         90     5      ``the'' should replace ``some''
        116    16      ``said'' should precede ``list''
        128     9      ``that's'' should replace ``of''
        154     5      Delete quotation marks.
        156     6      ``Seidman'' should replace ``Sideman''
        161    15      ``Fallon'' should replace ``Phalen''
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Provided these changes are made, we will waive signature on behalf
    of Ms. Lewinsky.
        We understand from Senate Legal Counsel that copies of this letter
    will be made available to the parties and Senate.
        Thank you for your assistance.
                Sincerely,
                                       Plato Cacheris.
                                       Preston Burton.
                                       Sydney Hoffmann.
                                     ______

        In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the
       Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
                                     States

             excerpts of video deposition of vernon e. jordan, jr.
                 (Tuesday, February 2, 1999, Washington, D.C.)
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. If there are no further questions from
    the parties or counsel for the witness, I'll now swear in the witness.
    Mr. Jordan, will you please raise your right hand?
        Do you, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., swear that the evidence you shall
    give in this case now pending between the United States and William
    Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, shall be the truth,
    the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
        THE WITNESS: I do.
        Whereupon, VERNON E. JORDAN, JR., was called as a witness and,
    after having been first duly sworn by Senator Fred Thompson, was
    examined and testified as follows:
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. The House Managers may begin their
    questioning of the witness.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson and Senator Dodd.
                         examination by house managers
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Good morning, Mr. Jordan. For the record, would you state your
    name, please?
        A. Good morning, Congressman. My name is Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
        Q. And, Mr. Jordan, we have not had the opportunity to meet
    previously, is that correct?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And I do appreciate--I have met your counsel, Mr. Hundley, in
    his office, and so I've looked forward to this opportunity to meet you.
    Now, you have--
        A. I can't say that the feeling is mutual.
        [Laughter.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. I certainly understand.
        You have testified, I believe, five times previously before the
    Federal grand jury?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And so I know that probably about every question that could be
    asked has been asked, but there are a number of reasons I want to go
    over additional questions with you, and some of them will be
    repetitious of what's been asked before.
        Prior to coming in today, though, have you had the opportunity to
    review your prior testimony in those five appearances before the grand
    jury?
        A. I have done some preparation, Congressman.
        Q. And let me start with the fact that the oath that you took today
    is the same as the oath that you took before the Federal grand jury?
        A. I believe that's correct.
        Q. And, Mr. Jordan, what is your profession?
        A. I am a lawyer.
        Q. And where do you practice your profession?
        A. I am a senior partner at the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss,
    Hauer & Feld, here in Washington, D.C., with offices in Texas,
    California, Pennsylvania and New York, three offices in Europe, London,
    Brussels and Moscow.
        Q. And how long have you been a senior partner?
        A. I have been a senior partner--well, I didn't start out as a
    senior partner. I started out as a partner, and at some point--I don't
    know when, but not long thereafter I was elevated to this position of
    senior partner.
        Q. And what type of law do you practice?
        A. I am a corporate international generalist at Akin, Gump.
        Q. And does Akin, Gump have about 800 lawyers?
        A. We have about 800 lawyers, yes.
        Q. Which is an incredible number for lawyers from someone who
    practiced law in Arkansas.
        How do all of those lawyers--
        A. We have some members of our law firm who are from Arkansas, so
    it's not unusual for them.
        Q. And how is it that you are able to obtain enough business for
    800 lawyers?
        A. I don't think that's my entire responsibility. I'm just one of
    800 lawyers, and that is what I do in part, but I'm not alone in that
    process of making rain.
        Q. When you say ``making rain,'' that's the terminology of being a
    rainmaker?
        A. I think even in Arkansas, you understand what rainmaking is.
        Q. We've read Grisham books.
        And so, when you say making rain or being a rainmaker, that is to
    bring in business so that you can keep the lawyers busy practicing law?
        A. Well, that is--that is part and parcel of the practice of law.
        Q. And do you bill by the hour?
        A. I do not.
        Q. And I understand you used to, but you do not anymore?
        A. I graduated.
        Q. A fortunate graduation.
        And when the--when you did bill by the hour, what was your billable
    rate the last time you had to do that?
        A. I believe my billable rate at the last time was somewhere
    between 450 and 500 an hour.
        Q. Now, would you describe--
        A. Not bad for a Georgia boy. I'm from Georgia. You've heard of
    that State, I'm sure.
        Q. It's probably not bad from Washington standards.
        Would you describe the nature of your relationship with President
    Clinton?
        A. President Clinton has been a friend of mine since approximately
    1973, when I came to your State, Arkansas, to make a speech as
    president of the National Urban League about race and equal opportunity
    in our Nation, and we met then and there, and our friendship has grown
    and developed and matured and he is my friend and will continue to be
    my friend.
        Q. And just to further elaborate on that friendship, it's my
    understanding that he and his--and the First Lady has had Christmas Eve
    dinner with you and your family for a number of years?
        A. Every year since his Presidency, the Jordan family has been
    privileged to entertain the Clinton family on Christmas Eve.
        Q. And has there been any exceptions in recent years to that?
        A. Every year that he has been President, he has had, he and his
    family, Christmas Eve with my family.
        Q. And have you vacationed together with the Clinton family?
        A. Yes. I think you have seen reels of us playing golf and having
    fun at Martha's Vineyard.
        Q. And so you vacation together, you play golf together on a semi-
    regular basis?
        A. Whenever we can. We've not been doing it recently, for reasons
    that I think are probably very obvious to you, Counsel.
        Q. Well, explain that to me.
        A. Just what I said, for a time, I was going before the grand jury,
    and under the advice of counsel and I'm sure under advice of the
    President's counsel, it was thought best that we not play golf
    together.
        So, from the time that I first went to the grand jury, I don't
    think--we have not played golf this year, unfortunately, together.
        Q. Since you--I think your first appearance at the grand jury was
    March 3 of '98. Then you went March 5, and then in May, I believe you
    were two times before the grand jury and then one in June of '98.
        Since your last testimony before the grand jury in June of '98,
    have you been in contact with the President of the United States?
        A. Yes, I have.
        Q. And are these social occasions or for business purposes?
        A. Social occasions. I was invited to the Korean State Dinner. I
    forget when that was. I think that was the first time I was in the
    White House since Martin Luther King Day of last year.
        I saw the President at Martha's Vineyard. I was there when he got
    off Air Force One to greet him and welcome him to--to the Vineyard, and
    I was at the White House for one of the performances about music. The
    Morgan State Choir sang, and so I've been to the White House only for
    social occasions in the last year since Martin Luther King's birthday,
    I believe.
        Q. Have you had any private conversations with the President?
        A. Yes, I have, as a matter of fact.
        Q. And has this been on the telephone or in person?
        A. I've talked to him on the telephone, and I talked to him at the
    Vineyard. He was at my house on Christmas Eve. There were a lot of
    people around, but, yes, I've talked to the President.
        Q. And did you discuss your testimony before the grand jury or his
    testimony before the grand jury?
        A. I did not.
        Q. There was one reference that he made in his Federal grand jury
    testimony, and I'll refer counsel, if they would like. It was on page
    77 of the President's testimony in his appearance before the grand jury
    on August 17th.
        And he referenced discussions with you, and he said, ``I think I
    may have been confused in my memory because I've also talked to him on
    the phone about what he said, about whether he had talked to her or met
    with her. That's all I can tell you,'' and I believe the ``her'' is a
    reference to Ms. Lewinsky.
        And it appeared to me from reading that, that there might have been
    some conversations with you by the President, perhaps in reference to
    your grand jury testimony or your knowledge of when and how you talked
    to Ms. Lewinsky.
        A. If I understand your question about whether or not the President
    of the United States and I talked about my testimony before the grand
    jury or his testimony before the grand jury, I can say to you
    unequivocally that the President of the United States and I have not
    discussed our testimony. I was advised by my counsel, Mr. Hundley, not
    to discuss that testimony, and I have learned in this process, Mr.
    Hutchinson, to--to take the advice of counsel.
        Q. I would certainly agree that that is good counsel to take, but
    going back to the question--and I will try to rephrase it because it
    was a very wordy question that I asked you--and it's clear from your
    testimony that you have not discussed your grand jury testimony--
        A. That is correct.
        Q. --but did you, subsequent to your last testimony before the
    grand jury, talk to the President in which you discussed conversation
    that you have had with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I have not discussed a conversation that I have had with Monica
    Lewinsky with the President of the United States.
        Q. And have you had any discussions about Monica Lewinsky with the
    President of the United States since your last testimony before the
    grand jury?
        A. I have not.
        Q. Now, going back to your relationship with the President, you
    have been described as a friend and advisor to the President. Is that a
    fair terminology?
        A. I think that's fair.
        Q. And in the advisor capacity, had you served as co-chairman of
    the Clinton-Gore transition team in 1992?
        A. I believe I was chairman.
        Q. That is an important distinction.
        And have you served in any other official or semi-official
    capacities for this administration?
        A. I have not, except that I was asked by the President to lead the
    American delegation to the inauguration of President Li in Taiwan, and
    that was about as official as you can get, but beyond that, I have
    not--not had any official capacity.
        For a very brief moment, very early in the administration, I was
    appointed to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee, and I went to
    one meeting and stayed half that meeting, went across the street and
    told Bruce Lindsey that that was not for me.
        Q. Now, let's move on. After we've established to a certain degree
    your relationship with the President, let's move on to January 20th of
    1998, and just to put that in clearer terms, this is a Tuesday after
    the January 17 deposition of President Clinton in the Paula Jones civil
    rights case. Do you recall that time frame?
        A. [Nodding head up and down.]
        Q. This is in the afternoon of January 20th, again, after the
    President's deposition. You contacted Mr. Howard Gittis, who I believe
    is General Counsel of McAndrews & Forbes Holdings?
        A. Howard Gittis is Vice Chairman of McAndrews, Forbes, and he is
    not the General Counsel. He is a lawyer, but he is not the General
    Counsel.
        Q. And what was the purpose of you contacting Mr. Howard Gittis on
    January 20th?
        A. If I talked to Howard Gittis on the 20th, I don't recall exactly
    what my conversation with Howard Gittis was about. I think it was a
    telephone call, maybe.
        Q. And that's difficult. Let me see if I can't help you in that
    regard.
        A. Right.
        Q. Was the purpose of that call with Mr. Gittis to arrange
    breakfast the next morning on January 21st?
        A. Yeah. I was in New York, and I did call Mr. Gittis and say--and
    as I remember, I had breakfast with him on the 21st, I believe. Yes, I
    did.
        Q. And this is a breakfast that you had set up?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And what was the reason you made the decision to request a
    breakfast meeting with Mr. Gittis?
        A. Yes. As I remember, I had gotten a telephone call from David
    Bloom at 1 o'clock in the morning at the St. Regis Hotel about the
    matter that was about to break having to do with the entire Lewinsky
    matter, and I had not at any time discussed the Lewinsky matter with--
    with Howard Gittis. And so I had breakfast with him to tell him that
    reporters were calling, that this would obviously involve Revlon, which
    had responded to my--my efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky employment, and so
    Howard Gittis is a friend of mine. Howard Gittis is a fellow board
    member with me at Revlon. He is the Vice Chairman of McAndrews &
    Forbes, and I thought it--I thought I had--it was incumbent upon me to
    stop and say, ``Listen, there's trouble a-brewing.''
        Q. And just--you've mentioned McAndrews & Forbes and Revlon.
    McAndrews & Forbes, am I correct, is the parent company of--
        A. It's the holding company.
        Q. The holding company of Revlon and presumably other companies.
        And you sit on the board of McAndrews & Forbes?
        A. I do not. I sit on the board of Revlon.
        Q. All right. And that is a position that brings you an annual
    salary--
        A. There is a director's fee.
        Q. You receive a director's fee, and in addition, your law firm
    receives--from business from--
        A. We do--
        Q. --Revlon?
        A. We do. We do business. We've represented Revlon, and we
    represented Revlon before I was elected a director.
        Q. And you mention that things were breaking that you felt like you
    needed to advise Mr. Gittis concerning. At the time that you made the
    arrangements for the breakfast on January 21st, had you become aware of
    the Drudge Report?
        A. Yes, I had.
        Q. And you had had lunch with Bruce Lindsey on January 20th?
        A. No. I don't think it was on January--it was on Sunday. No, that
    was not the 20th.
        Q. And during that luncheon, did you become aware of the Drudge
    Report--
        A. That is correct.
        Q. --and receive a copy of it?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And that was from Bruce Lindsey?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And that Drudge Report, did it mention your name?
        A. I don't think so, but I don't remember.
        Q. Was there some news stories that had mentioned your name in
    reference to Ms. Lewinsky and the President?
        A. I believe that my name has been an integral part of this process
    from the beginning.
        Q. And did you in fact have the breakfast meeting with Mr. Gittis?
        A. Yes, I did.
        Q. And what information did you convey to Mr. Gittis concerning Ms.
    Lewinsky at that breakfast meeting?
        A. I just simply said that the press was calling about Ms.
    Lewinsky; that while I had not dealt with him, I had dealt with Richard
    Halperin, I had dealt with Ronald Perelman. I had not dealt with him,
    but that he ought to know and that I was sorry about this.
        And I also said that it would probably be even more complicated
    because early on I had referred Webb Hubbell to them to be hired as
    counsel.
        Q. And I want to get to that in just a moment, but you indicated
    that you said you were sorry. Were you referring to the problems that
    this might create for the company?
        A. Well, I was obviously concerned. I am a director. I am their
    counsel. They're my friends. And publicity was breaking. I thought I
    had some responsibility to them to give them a heads-up as to what was
    going on.
        Q. Now, is it true that your efforts to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky
    that you referenced in that meeting with Mr. Gittis--were your efforts
    carried out at the request of the President of the United States?
        A. There is no question but that through Betty Currie, I was acting
    on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. I think that's
    clear from my grand jury testimony.
        Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure that that's firmly
    established. And in reference to your previous grand jury testimony,
    you indicated, I believe, on May 28th, 1998, at page 61, that ``She''--
    referring to Betty Currie--''was the one that called me at the behest
    of the President.''
        A. That is correct, and I think, Congressman, if in fact the
    President of the United States' secretary calls and asks for a request
    that you try to do the best you can to make it happen.
        Q. And you received that request as a request coming from the
    President?
        A. I--I interpreted it as a request from the President.
        Q. And then, later on in June of '98 in the grand jury testimony at
    page 45, did you not reference or testify that ``The President asked me
    to get Monica Lewinsky a job''?
        A. There was no--there was no question but that he asked me to help
    and that he asked others to help. I think that is clear from
    everybody's grand jury testimony.
        Q. And just one more point in that regard. In the same grand jury
    testimony, is it correct that you testified that ``He''--referring to
    the President--''was the source of it coming to my attention in the
    first place''?
        A. I may--if that is--if you--if it's in the--
        Q. It's at page 58 of the grand jury--
        A. I stand on my grand jury testimony.
        Q. All right. Now, during your efforts to secure a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky, I think you mentioned that you talked to Mr. Richard
    Halperin.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And he is with McAndrews & Forbes?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you also at one point talked to Mr. Ron Perelman; is that
    correct?
        A. I made a call to Mr. Perelman, I believe, on the 8th of January.
        Q. And he is the--
        A. He is the chairman/CEO of McAndrews Forbes. He is a majority
    shareholder in McAndrews Forbes. This is his business.
        Q. Now, at the time that you requested assistance in obtaining Ms.
    Lewinsky a job, did you advise Mr. Perelman or Mr. Halperin of the fact
    that the request was being carried out at the request of the President
    of the United States?
        A. I don't think so. I may have.
        Q. Well, the first answer you gave was ``I don't think so.'' Now,
    in fact, you did not advise either Mr. Perelman or Mr. Halperin of that
    fact because am I correct that Mr. Perelman--or, excuse me, Mr.
    Gittis--expressed some concern that Revlon was never advised of that
    fact?
        A. Then, uh, I cannot say, I guess, precisely that I told that ``I
    am doing this for the President of the United States.''
        I do believe, on the other hand, that given the fact that she was
    in the White House, given the fact that she had been a White House
    intern, I would not be surprised if that was their understanding.
        Q. Well, in your conversation with Mr. Halperin.
        A. Yes--I'm certain I did not say that to Richard Halperin.
        Q. Okay. So there's no question that you did not tell Mr. Halperin
    that you were acting at the request of the President?
        A. I'm fairly certain I did not.
        Q. And in your conversation with Mr. Perelman, did you indicate to
    him that you were calling--or you were seeking--employment for Ms.
    Lewinsky at the request of the President?
        A. Yes--I don't think that I, that I made that explicit in my
    conversation with Mr. Perelman, and I'm not sure I thought it necessary
    to say ``This is for the President of the United States.''
        By the same token, I would have had no hesitance in doing that.
        Q. Now, at the time that you had called Mr. Perelman, which I
    believe you testified was in January of '98--
        A. That's right.
        Q. --I think you said January 8th--
        A. Right.
        Q. --you were aware at that time, were you not, that Ms. Lewinsky
    had received a subpoena to give a deposition in the Jones versus
    Clinton case?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. At the time that you talked to Mr. Perelman requesting his
    assistance for Monica Lewinsky, did you advise Mr. Perelman of the fact
    that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the Jones case?
        A. I did not.
        Q. And when you--did Mr. Perelman, Mr. Gittis or Mr. Halperin ever
    express to you disappointment that they were not told of two facts--
    either of these two facts--one, that Ms. Lewinsky was being helped at
    the request of the President; and secondly, that she was known by you
    and the President to be under subpoena in that case?
        A. No.
        Q. Now, you are on the board of directors of Revlon.
        A. I am.
        Q. And how long have you been on the board of Revlon?
        A. I forget. Ten years, maybe.
        Q. And as a member of the board of directors, do you not have a
    fiduciary responsibility to the company?
        A. I do.
        Q. And how would you define a fiduciary responsibility?
        A. I define my fiduciary responsibility to the company about
    company matters.
        Q. And how would you define fiduciary responsibility in reference
    to company matters?
        A. Anything that has to do with the company, that I believe in the
    interest of the company, I have some fiduciary responsibility to
    protect the company, to help the company in any way that I--that is
    possible.
        Q. And is fiduciary responsibility sometimes considered a trust
    relationship in which you owe a degree of trust and responsibility to
    someone else?
        A. I think--I think that ``trust'' and ``fiduciary'' are probably
    synonymous.
        Q. Okay. Do you believe that you were acting in the company's
    interest or the President's interest when you were trying to secure a
    job for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Well, what I knew was that the company would take care of its
    own interest. This is not the first time that I referred somebody, and
    what I know is, is that if a person being referred does not meet the
    standards required for that company, I have no question but that that
    person will not be hired. And so the referral is an easy thing to do;
    the judgment about employment is not a judgment as a person referring
    that I make. But I do have confidence in all of the companies on whose
    boards that I sit that, regardless of my reference, that as to their
    needs and as to their expectations for their employees that they will
    make the right decisions, as happened in the American Express
    situation.
        American Express called and said: We will not hire Ms. Lewinsky. I
    did not question it, I did not challenge it, because they understood
    their needs and their needs in comparison to her qualifications. They
    made a judgment. Revlon, on the other hand, made another judgment.
        I am not the employer, I am the referrer, and there is a major
    difference.
        Q. Now, going back to what you knew as far as information and what
    you conveyed to Revlon, you indicated that you did not tell Mr.
    Halperin that you were making this request or referral at the request
    of the President of the United States.
        A. Yes, and I didn't see any need to do that.
        Q. And then, when you talked to Mr.--
        A. Nor do I believe not saying that, Counselor, was a breach of
    some fiduciary relationship.
        Q. And when you had your conversation with Mr. Perelman--
        A. Right.
        Q. --at a later time--
        A. Right.
        Q. --you do not remember whether you told him--you do not believe
    you told him you were calling for the President--
        A. I believe that I did not tell him.
        Q. --but you assumed that he knew?
        A. No. I did not make any assumptions, let me say. I said: Ronald,
    here is a young lady who has been interviewed. She thinks the interview
    has not gone well. See what you can do to make sure that she is
    properly interviewed and evaluated--in essence.
        Q. And did you reference her as a former White House intern?
        A. Probably. I do not have a recollection of whether I described
    her as a White House intern, whether I described her as a person who
    had worked for the Pentagon. I said this is a person that I have
    referred.
        I think, Mr. Hutchinson, that I have sufficient, uh, influence,
    shall we say, sufficient character, shall we say, that people have been
    throughout my career able to take my word at face value.
        Q. And so you didn't need to reference the President. The fact that
    you were calling Mr. Perelman--
        A. That was sufficient.
        Q. --and asking for a second interview for Ms. Lewinsky, that that
    should be sufficient?
        A. I thought it was sufficient, and obviously, Mr. Perelman thought
    it was sufficient.
        Q. And so there is no reason, based on what you told him, for him
    to think that you were calling at the request of the President of the
    United States?
        A. I think that's about right.
        Q. And so, at least with the conversation with Mr. Halperin and Mr.
    Perelman, you did not reference that you were acting in behalf of the
    President of the United States. Was there anyone else that you talked
    to at Revlon in which they might have acquired that information?
        A. The only persons that I talked to in this process, as I
    explained to you, was Mr. Halperin and Mr. Perelman about this process.
    And it was Mr. Halperin who put the--who got the process started.
        Q. So those are the only two you talked about, and you made no
    reference that you were acting in behalf of the President?
        A. Right.
        Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that you knew
    and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the
    Jones case, and that information was not provided to either Mr.
    Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Now, I wanted to read you a question and answer of Mr. Howard
    Gittis in his grand jury testimony of April 23, 1998.
        The question was: ``Now, you had mentioned before that one of the
    responsibilities of director is to have a fiduciary duty to the
    company. If it was the case that Ms. Lewinsky had been noticed as a
    witness in the Paula Jones case, and Vernon Jordan had known that, is
    that something that you believe as a person who works for McAndrews &
    Forbes, is that something that you believe that Mr. Jordan should have
    told you, or someone in the company, not necessarily you, but someone
    in the company, when you referred her for employment?''
        His answer was ``Yes.''
        Do you disagree with Mr. Gittis'' conclusion that that was
    important information for McAndrews & Forbes?
        A. I obviously didn't think it was important at the time, and I
    didn't do it.
        Q. Now, in your previous answers, you reference the fact that you--
    --
        A. I think, on the other hand, that had she been a defendant in a
    murder case and I knew that, then I probably wouldn't have referenced
    her. But her being a witness in a civil case I did not think important.
        Q. Despite the fact that you were acting at the request of the
    President, and this witness was potentially adverse to the President's
    interest in that case?
        A. I didn't know that. I mean, I don't--I don't know what her
    position was or whether it was adverse or not.
        Q. All right. Mr. Jordan, prior to you answering that, did you get
    an answer from your attorney?
        A. My attorney mumbled something in my ear, but I didn't hear him.
        MR. HUNDLEY: It was a spontaneous remark. I'll try to refrain.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I know that--
        THE WITNESS: He does have a right to mumble in my ear, I think.
        MR. HUNDLEY: I mumble too loud because I don't hear too well
    myself.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Now, going back to a complicating factor in your conversation
    with Mr. Gittis and this embarrassing situation of the Lewinsky job,
    the complicating fact was that you had also helped Webb Hubbell get a
    job or consulting contracts with the same company; is that--
        A. Yes. You use the word ``complicated.'' I did not view it as a
    complication. I viewed it as a, as another something that happened, and
    that that caused some embarrassment to the company, and here again, we
    were back for another embarrassment for the company, and I thought I
    had a responsibility to say that.
        Q. Would you explain how you helped Webb Hubbell secure a job or a
    contract with Revlon?
        A. Yes. Webb Hubbell came to me after his resignation from the
    Justice Department. Webb and I got to be friends during the transition,
    and Webb came to me and he said, ``I'm leaving the Justice
    Department,'' or ``I've left the Justice Department''--I'm not sure
    which--and he said, ``I really need work.''
        And I said, ``Webb, I will do what I can to help you.''
        I called New York, made arrangements. I took Webb Hubbell to New
    York. We had lunch. I took him the headquarters of McAndrews & Forbes
    at 62nd Street. I introduced him to Howard Gittis, Ronald Perelman, and
    I left.
        Q. And did, subsequently, Mr. Hubbell obtain consulting contracts
    with Revlon?
        A. Subsequently, Mr. Hubbell was hired, as I understand it, as
    outside counsel to McAndrews & Forbes, or Revlon, or some entity within
    the Perelman empire.
        Q. And was that consulting contracts of about $100,000 a year?
        A. I--I think so, I think so.
        Q. And did you make other contacts with other companies in which
    you had friends for assistance for Webb Hubbell?
        A. I did not.
        Q. And was the effort to assist Mr. Webb Hubbell during this time--
    was it after he left the Department of Justice and prior to the time
    that he pled guilty to criminal charges?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And at the time you assisted Webb Hubbell by securing a job with
    Revlon for him, was he a potential adverse witness to the President in
    the ongoing investigation by the Independent Counsel?
        A. I don't know whether he was an adverse witness or not. What he
    was was my friend who had just resigned from the Justice Department,
    and he was out of work, and he asked for help, and I happily helped
    him.
        Q. And did you know at the time that he was a potential witness in
    the investigation by the OIC?
        A. I don't know whether I knew whether he was a potential witness
    or not. I simply responded to Webb Hubbell who was a friend in trouble
    and needing work.
        Q. Now, let's backtrack to the time when you first had any contact
    with Ms. Lewinsky. We've talked about this January 20-21st meeting with
    Mr. Gittis and covered a little bit of the tail end of this entire
    episode. Now I would like to go back in time to your first meetings
    with Ms. Lewinsky.
        Now, when was the first time that you recall that you met with
    Monica Lewinsky?
        A. If you've read my grand jury testimony--
        Q. I have.
        A. --and I'm sure that you have--there is testimony in the grant
    jury that she came to see me on or about the 5th of November. I have no
    recollection of that. It was not on my calendar, and I just have no
    recollection of her visit. There is a letter here that you have in
    evidence, and I have to assume that in fact that happened. But as I
    said in my grand jury testimony, I'm not aware of it, I don't remember
    it--but I do not deny that it happened.
        Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has made reference to a meeting that occurred
    in your office on November 5, and that's the meeting that you have no
    recollection of?
        A. That is correct. We have no record of it in my office, and I
    just have no recollection of it.
        Q. And in your first grand jury appearance, you were firm, shall I
    say, that the first time you met with Ms. Lewinsky, that it was on
    December 11th?
        A. Yes. It was firm based on what my calendar told me, and
    subsequently to that, there has been a refreshing of my recollection,
    and I do not deny that it happened. By the same token, I will tell you,
    as I said in my grand jury testimony, that I did not remember that I
    had met with her.
        Q. And in fact today, the fact that you do not dispute that that
    meeting occurred is not based upon your recollection but is simply
    based upon you've seen the records, and it appears that that meeting
    occurred?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. Okay. And you've made reference to my first exhibit there, which
    is front of you, and I would refer you to this at this time, which is
    Exhibit 86.
        Now, this is captioned as a ``Letter from Ms. Lewinsky to Mr.
    Vernon Jordan dated November 6, 1997,'' and it appears that this letter
    thanks you for meeting with her in reference to her job search. And do
    you recall this--
        MR. KENDALL: Mr. Hutchinson, excuse me. May I ask--this is an
    unsigned copy. Do you have a signed copy of this letter?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Let me go through my questions if I might.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Do you recall receiving this letter?
        A. I do not.
        Q. Do you ever recall seeing this letter before?
        A. The first time I saw this letter was when I was before the grand
    jury.
        Q. And am I correct that it's your testimony that the first time
    you ever recall hearing the name ``Monica Lewinsky'' was in early
    December of '97?
        A. That's correct. I--I may have heard the name before, but the
    first time I remember seeing her and having her in my presence was
    then.
        Q. Well, regardless of whether you met with her in November or not,
    the fact is you did not do anything in November to secure a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky until your activities on December 11 of '97?
        A. I think that's correct.
        Q. And on December 11, I think you made some calls for Ms. Lewinsky
    on that particular day?
        A. I believe I did. I have some--it's all right for me to refresh
    my recollection?
        Q. Certainly.
        A. Thank you. [Perusing documents.] I did make calls for her on the
    11th, yes.
        Q. And may I just ask what you're referring to?
        A. I'm referring here to telephone logs prepared by counsel here
    for me to refresh my recollection about calls.
        MR. HUNDLEY: You are welcome to have a copy of that.
        THE WITNESS: You are welcome to see it.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Do you have an extra copy?
        THE WITNESS: Yes--in anticipation.
        MR. HUNDLEY: There are a few calls.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Might this be a good time to take a 5-minute
    break?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Certainly.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's adjourn for 5 minutes.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 10:03 a.m.
        [Recess.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:16 a.m.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Counsel has consumed 38 minutes.
        Counsel, would you proceed?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
        At this time, I would offer as Jordan Deposition Exhibit 86, if you
    don't mind me going by that numerology--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Would it be better to do that or make it Jordan
    Exhibit Number 1? Does counsel have any preference on that--is that--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: One is fine.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Let's do it that way. It will be made a part of
    the record, Jordan Deposition Number 1.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 1 marked for identification.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, let me go back to that meeting on December 11th. I
    believe we were discussing that. My question would be: How did the
    meeting on December 11 of 1997 with Ms. Lewinsky come about?
        A. Ms. Lewinsky called my office and asked if she could come to see
    me.
        Q. And was that preceded by a call from Betty Currie?
        A. At some point in time, Betty Currie had called me, and Ms.
    Lewinsky followed up on that call, and she came to my office, and we
    had a visit.
        Q. Ms. Lewinsky called, set up a meeting, and at some point sent
    you a resume, I believe.
        A. I believe so.
        Q. And did you receive that prior to the meeting on December 11th?
        A. I--I have to assume that I did, but I--I do not know whether she
    brought it with her or whether--it was at some point that she brought
    with her or sent to me--somehow it came into my possession--a list of
    various companies in New York with which she had--which were here
    preferences, by the way--most of which I did not know well enough to
    make any calls for.
        Q. All right. And I want to come back to that, but I believe--would
    you dispute if the record shows that you received the resume of Ms.
    Lewinsky on December 8th?
        A. I would not.
        Q. And presumably, the meeting on December 11th was set up
    somewhere around December 8th by the call from Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I--I would not dispute that, sir.
        Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess
    some people refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
        A. Not jobs--companies.
        Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment
    with.
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go
    with your own list of friends and companies that you had better
    contacts with.
        A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business,
    and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel
    comfortable in calling.
        Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and
    ask you response to this, but many times I will be listed as a
    reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed
    as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference
    anywhere, would it not?
        A. I would hope so.
        Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the
    best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
        A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms.
    Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were
    not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
        Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms.
    Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you
    were going to be a reference for.
        A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting
    jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an
    assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
        Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to
    get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, going back--going to your meeting that we're talking about
    on December 11th, prior to the meeting did you make any calls to
    prospective employers in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I don't think so. I think not. I think I wanted to see her
    before I made any calls.
        Q. And so if they were not before, after you met with her, you made
    some calls on December 11th?
        A. I--I believe that's correct.
        Q. And you called Mr. Richard Halperin of McAndrews & Forbes?
        A. That's right.
        Q. You called Mr. Peter--
        A. Georgescu.
        Q. --Georgescu. And he is with what company?
        A. He is chairman and chief executive officer of Young & Rubicam, a
    leading advertising agency on Madison Avenue.
        Q. And did you make one other call?
        A. Yes. I called Ursie Fairbairn, who runs Human Resources at
    American Express, at the American Express Company, where I am the
    senior director.
        Q. All right. And so you made three calls on December 11th. You
    believe that they were after you met with Ms. Lewinsky--
        A. I doubt very seriously if I would have made the calls in advance
    of meeting her.
        Q. And why is that?
        A. You sort of have to know what you're talking about, who you're
    talking about.
        Q. And what did you basically communicate to each of these
    officials in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I essentially said that you're going to hear from Ms. Lewinsky,
    and I hope that you will afford her an opportunity to come in and be
    interviewed and look favorably upon her if she meets your
    qualifications and your needs for work.
        Q. Okay. And at what level did you try to communicate this
    information?
        A. By--what do you mean by ``what level''?
        Q. In the company that you were calling, did you call the chairman
    of human resources, did you call the CEO--who did you call, or what
    level were you seeking to talk to?
        A. Richard Halperin is sort of the utility man; he does everything
    at McAndrews & Forbes. He is very close to the chairman, he is very
    close to Mr. Gittis. And so at McAndrews & Forbes, I called Halperin.
        As I said to you, and as my grand jury testimony shows, I called
    Young & Rubicam, Peter Georgescu as its chairman and CEO. I have had a
    long-term relationship with Young & Rubicam going back to three of its
    CEOs, the first being Edward Ney, who was chairman of Young & Rubicam
    when I was head of the United Negro College Fund, and it was during
    that time that we developed the great theme, ``A mind is a terrible
    thing to waste.'' So I have had a long-term relationship with Young &
    Rubicam and with Peter Georgescu, so I called the chairman in that
    instance.
        At American Express, I called Ms. Ursie Fairbairn who is, as I said
    before, in charge of Human Resources.
        So that is the level--in one instance, the chairman; in one
    instance a utilitarian person; and in another instance, the head of the
    Human Resources Department.
        Q. And the utilitarian connection, Mr. Richard Halperin, was sort
    of an assistant to Mr. Ron Perelman?
        A. That's correct. He's a lawyer.
        Q. Now, going to your meeting on December 11th with Ms. Lewinsky,
    about how long of a meeting was that?
        A. I don't--I don't remember. You have a record of it, Congressman.
        Q. And actually, I think you've testified it was about 15 to 20
    minutes, but don't hold me to that, either.
        During the course of the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, what did you
    learn about her?
        A. Uh, enthusiastic, quite taken with herself and her experience,
    uh, bubbly, effervescent, bouncy, confident, uh--actually, I sort of
    had the same impression that you House Managers had of her when you met
    with her. You came out and said she was impressive, and so we come out
    about the same place.
        Q. And did she relate to you the fact that she liked being an
    intern because it put her close to the President?
        A. I have never seen a White House intern who did not like being a
    White House intern, and so her enthusiasm for being a White House
    intern was about like the enthusiasm of White House interns--they liked
    it.
        She was not happy about not being there anymore--she did not like
    being at the Defense Department--and I think she actually had some
    desire to go back. But when she actually talked to me, she wanted to go
    to New York for a job in the private sector, and she thought that I
    could be helpful in that process.
        Q. Did she make reference to someone in the White House being
    uncomfortable when she was an intern, and she thought that people did
    not want her there?
        A. She felt unwanted--there is no question about that. As to who
    did not want her there and why they did not want her there, that was
    not my business.
        Q. And she related that--
        A. She talked about it.
        Q. --experience or feeling to you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky was on December 11th, and I
    believe that Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met with the President
    on December 5--excuse me, on December 6--at the White House and
    complained that her job search was not going anywhere, and the
    President then talked to Mr. Jordan.
        Do you recall the President talking to you about that after that
    meeting?
        A. I do not have a specific recollection of the President saying to
    me anything about having met with Ms. Lewinsky. The President has never
    told me that he met with Ms. Lewinsky, as best as I can recollect. I--I
    am aware that she was in a state of anxiety about going to work. She
    was in a state of anxiety in addition because her lease at Watergate,
    at the Watergate, was to expire December 31st. And there was a part of
    Ms. Lewinsky, I think, that thought that because she was coming to me,
    that she could come today and that she would have a job tomorrow. That
    is not an unusual misapprehension, and it's not limited to White House
    interns.
        Q. I mentioned her meeting with the President on the same day,
    December 6th. I believe the record shows the President met with his
    lawyers and learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list.
    Now, did you subsequently meet with the President on the next day,
    December 7th?
        A. I may have met with the President. I'd have to--I mean, I'd have
    to look. I'd have to look. I don't know whether I did or not.
        Q. If you would like to confer--I believe the record shows that,
    but I'd like to establish that through your testimony.
        MS. WALDEN: Yes.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. All right. So you met with the President on December 7th. And
    was it the next day after that, December 8th, that Ms. Lewinsky called
    to set up the job meeting with you on December 11th?
        A. I believe that is correct.
        Q. And sometime after your meeting on December 11th with Ms.
    Lewinsky, did you have another conversation with the President?
        A. Uh, you do understand that conversations between me and the
    President, uh, was not an unusual circumstance.
        Q. And I understand that--
        A. All right.
        Q. --and so let me be more specific. I believe your previous
    testimony has been that sometime after the 11th, you spoke with the
    President about Ms. Lewinsky.
        A. I stand on that testimony.
        Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness
    list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and
    then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky
    on the 11th.
        Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you
    discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if
    so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
        A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit
    to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it
    was about the job search.
        Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about
    the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted
    to get a job in New York?
        A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her
    job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was
    also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector,
    and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me.
    There is no doubt about that.
        Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
        A. There's no question about that, either.
        Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that
    you had with the President after the witness list came out, your
    conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the
    11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the
    witness list in the Jones case?
        A. He did not.
        Q. And did you consider this information to be important in your
    efforts to be helpful to Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I never thought about it.
        Q. Was there a time that you became aware that Ms. Lewinsky had
    been subpoenaed to give a deposition in the Jones versus Clinton case?
        A. On December 19th when she came to my office with the subpoena--I
    think it's the 19th.
        Q. That's right. Now, you indicated you never thought about it,
    because of course, at that point, you didn't know that she was on the
    witness list, according to your testimony.
        A. [Nodding head up and down.]
        Q. Now, you said that she came to see you on December 19th--I'm
    sorry. I've been informed you didn't respond out loud, so--
        A. Well, if you'd ask the question, I'd be happy to respond.
        Q. I was afraid you would ask me to ask the question again.
        Well, let's go to the December 19th meeting.
        A. Fine.
        Q. How did it come about that you met with Ms. Lewinsky on December
    19th?
        A. Ms. Lewinsky called me in a rather high emotional state and said
    that she needed to see me, and she came to see me.
        Q. And she called you on the telephone on December 19th, in which
    she indicated she had received a subpoena?
        A. That's right, and was emotional about it and asked, and so I
    said come over.
        Q. And what was your reaction to her having received a subpoena in
    the Jones case?
        A. Surprise, number one; number two, quite taken with her emotional
    state.
        Q. And did you see that she had a problem?
        A. She obviously had a problem--she thought--
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We have to go off the record.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Off the record.
        [Recess due to power failure.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:49 a.m.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, let the record reflect that we've been
    down for 20 to 25 minutes due to a power failure, but we are ready to
    proceed now, counsel.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
        And Mr. Jordan, before we go back to my line of questioning, I have
    been informed that we have that question in which we did not get an
    audible response, and so I'm going to ask the court reporter to read
    that question back.
        [The court reporter read back the requested portion of the record.]
        THE WITNESS: I did not know that she was on the witness list,
    Congressman. And let me say parenthetically here that our side had
    nothing to do with the power outage.
        [Laughter.]
        THE WITNESS: As desirable as that may have been.
        [Laughter.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Thank you, Mr. Jordan. And again, we're talking about the fact
    you never thought about the President not telling you that Ms. Lewinsky
    was on the witness list because you didn't know it at the time.
        A. I--I did not know it.
        Q. All right. Now, before we go back to December 19th, I've also
    been informed that I've been neglectful, and sometimes you will give a
    nod of the head, and I've not asked you to give an audible response. So
    I'm going to try to be mindful of that, but at the same time, Mr.
    Jordan, if you can try to give an audible response to a question rather
    than what we sometimes do in private conversation, which is a nod of
    the head. Fair enough?
        A. I'm happy to comply.
        Q. Now, we're talking about December 19th, that you had received a
    call from Monica Lewinsky; she had been subpoenaed in the Jones case.
    She was upset. You said, Come to my office.
        Now, when she got to the office, I asked you, actually, before
    that, what was your reaction to her having this subpoena, and she had a
    problem because of the subpoena.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And I believe you previously indicated that any time a witness
    gets a subpoena, they've got a problem that they would likely need
    legal assistance.
        A. That's been my experience.
        Q. And in fact she did subsequently come to see you at the office
    on that December 19th, is that correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And what happened at that meeting in your office with Ms.
    Lewinsky on the 19th?
        A. She, uh, as I said, was quite emotional. She was--she was
    disturbed about the subpoena. She was disturbed about not having, in
    her words, heard from the President or talked to the President.
        It was also in that meeting that it became clear to me that the--
    that her eyes were wide and that she, uh, that--let me--for lack of a
    better way to put it, that she had a ``thing'' for the President.
        Q. And how long was that meeting?
        A. I don't know, uh, but it's in the record.
        MR. HUNDLEY: You testified 45 minutes.
        THE WITNESS: Forty-five minutes. Thank you.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Is that okay if I--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: That's all right, and that's helpful, Mr. Hundley.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Thank you. I'm trying to be helpful.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And during this meeting, did she in fact show you the subpoena
    that she had received in the Jones litigation?
        A. I'm sure she showed me the subpoena.
        Q. And the subpoena that was presented to you asked her to give a
    deposition, is that correct?
        A. As I recollect.
        Q. But did it also ask Ms. Lewinsky or direct her to produce
    certain documents and tangible objects?
        A. I think, if I'm correct in my recollection, it asked that she
    produce gifts.
        Q. Gifts, and some of those gifts were specifically enumerated.
        A. I don't remember that. I do remember gifts.
        Q. And did you discuss any of the items requested under the
    subpoena?
        A. I did not. What I said to her was that she needed counsel.
        Q. Now, just to help you in reference to your previous grand jury
    testimony of March 3, '98--and if you would like to refer to that, page
    121, but I believe it was your testimony that you asked her if there
    had been any gifts after you looked at the subpoena.
        A. I may have done that, and if I--if that's in my testimony, I
    stand by it.
        Q. And did she--from your conversation with her, did you determine
    that in your opinion, there was a fascination on her part with the
    President?
        A. No question about that.
        Q. And I think you previously described it that she had a ``thing''
    for the President?
        A. ``Thing,'' yes.
        Q. And did you make any specific inquiry as to the nature of the
    relationship that she had with the President?
        A. Yes. At some point during that conversation, I asked her
    directly if she had had sexual relationships with the President.
        Q. And is this not an extraordinary question to ask a 24-year-old
    intern, whether she had sexual relations with the President of the
    United States?
        A. Not if you see--not if you had witnessed her emotional state and
    this ``thing,'' as I say. It was not.
        Q. And her emotional state and what she expressed to you about her
    feelings for the President is what prompted you to ask that question?
        A. That, plus the question of whether or not the President at the
    end of his term would leave the First Lady; and that was alarming and
    stunning to me.
        Q. And she related that question to you in that meeting on December
    19th?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Now, going back to the question in which you asked her if she
    had had a sexual relationship with the President, what was her
    response?
        A. No.
        Q. And I'm sure that that was not an idle question on your part,
    and I presume that you needed to know the answer for some purpose.
        A. I wanted to know the answer based on what I had seen in her
    expression; obviously, based on the fact that this was a subpoena about
    her relationship with the President.
        Q. And so you felt like you needed to know the answer to that
    question to determine how you were going to handle the situation?
        A. No. I thought it was a factual data that I needed to know, and I
    asked the question.
        Q. And why did you need to know the answer to that question?
        A. I am referring this lady, Ms. Lewinsky, to various companies for
    jobs, and it seemed to me that it was important for me to know in that
    process whether or not there had been something going on with the
    President based on what I saw and based on what I heard.
        Q. And also based upon your years of experience--I mean your--
        A. I don't understand that question.
        Q. Well, you have children?
        A. I have four children; six grandchildren.
        Q. And you've raised kids, you've had a lot of experiences in life,
    and do you not apply that knowledge and experience and wisdom to
    circumstances such as this?
        A. Yes. I've been around, and I've seen young people, both men and
    women, overly excited about older, mature, successful individuals, yes.
        Q. Now, let me just go back as to what signals that you might have
    had at this particular point that there was a sexual relationship
    between Ms. Lewinsky and the President. Was one of those the fact that
    she indicated that she had a fascination with the President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And did she relate that ``He doesn't call me enough''?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And was the fact that there was an exchange of gifts a factor in
    your consideration?
        A. Well, I was not aware that there had been an exchange of gifts.
    I thought it a tad unusual that there would be an exchange of gifts,
    uh, but it was just clear that there was a fixation by this young woman
    on the President of the United States.
        Q. And was it also a factor that she had been issued a subpoena in
    a case that was rooted in sexual harassment?
        A. Well, it certainly helped.
        Q. And that was an ingredient that you factored in and decided this
    is a question that needed to be asked?
        A. There's no question about that.
        Q. Now, heretofore, the questions or the discussions with Ms.
    Lewinsky had simply been about a job?
        A. Had been about a job.
        Q. And I think you indicated that you didn't have to be an Einstein
    to know that this was a question that needed to be asked after what you
    learned on this meeting?
        A. Yes, based on my own judgment, that is correct.
        Q. Now, at this point, you're assisting the President in obtaining
    a job for a former intern, Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Right.
        Q. It comes to your attention from Ms. Lewinsky that she has a
    subpoena in a civil rights case against the President. And did this
    make you consider whether it was appropriate for you to continue
    seeking a job for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Never gave it a thought.
        Q. Despite the fact that you were seeking the job for Ms. Lewinsky
    at the request of the President when she is under subpoena in a case
    adverse to the President?
        A. I--I did not give it a thought. I had committed that I was going
    to help her, and I was going to--and I kept my commitment.
        Q. And so, however she would have answered that question, you would
    have still prevailed upon your friends in industry to get a job for
    her?
        A. Congressman, that is a hypothetical question, and I'm not going
    to answer a hypothetical question.
        Q. Well, I thought you had answered it before, but if--so you don't
    know whether it would have made a difference or not, then?
        A. I asked her whether or not she had had sexual relationships with
    the President. Ms. Lewinsky told me no.
        MR. HUNDLEY: I'd just like to interject. My recollection,
    Congressman, is that in the grand jury, he gave basically the same
    answer, that it was a hypothetical question, and that he really didn't
    know what he would have done had the answer been different. You could
    double-check it if you want, but I'm sure I'm right.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Okay, I'm not asking you a hypothetical question. I want to ask
    it in this phrase, in this way. Did her answer make you consider
    whether it was appropriate for you to continue seeking a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky at the request of the President?
        A. I did not see any reason why I should not continue to help her
    in her job search.
        Q. Now, was the fact that she was under subpoena important
    information to you?
        A. It was additional information, certainly.
        Q. If you were trying to get Ms. Lewinsky a job, did you expect her
    to tell you if she had any reason to believe she might be a witness in
    the Jones case?
        A. She did in fact tell me by showing me the subpoena. I had no
    expectations one way or the other.
        Q. Well, I refer you to your grand jury testimony of March 3, '98
    at page 96. Do you recall the answer: ``I just think that as a matter
    of openness and full disclosure that she would have done that.''
        A. And she did.
        Q. Precisely. She disclosed to you, of course, when she received
    the subpoena, and that's information that you expected to know and to
    be disclosed to you?
        A. Fine.
        Q. Is--
        A. Yes. Fine.
        Q. And in fact, if Ms. Currie--I'm talking about Betty Currie--if
    she had known that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have
    expected her to tell you that information as well since you were
    seeking employment for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Well, it would have been fine had she told me. I do make a
    distinction between being a witness on the one hand and being a
    defendant in some sort of criminal action on the other. She was a
    witness in the civil case, and I don't believe witnesses in civil cases
    don't have a right for--to employment.
        Q. Okay. I refer you to page 95 of your grand jury testimony, in
    which you said: ``I believe that had Ms. Currie known, that she would
    have told me.''
        And the next question: ``Let me ask the question again, though.
    Would you have expected her to tell you if she knew?''
        And do you recall your answer?
        A. I don't.
        Q. ``Yes, sure.''
        A. I stand by that answer.
        Q. And so it's your testimony that if Ms. Currie had known that Ms.
    Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have expected her to tell you
    that information?
        A. It would have been helpful.
        Q. And likewise, would you have expected the President to tell you
    if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be called as a
    witness in the Paula Jones case?
        A. That would have been helpful, too.
        Q. And that was your expectation, that he would have done that in
    your conversations?
        A. It--it would certainly have been helpful, but it would not have
    changed my mind.
        Q. Well, being helpful and that being your expectation is a little
    bit different, and so I want to go back again to your testimony on
    March 3, page 95, when the question is asked to you--question: ``If the
    President had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky could be called a
    witness in the Paula Jones case, would you have expected him to tell
    you that when you spoke with him between the 11th and the 19th about
    her?''
        And your answer: ``And I think he would have.''
        A. My answer was yes in the grand jury testimony, and my answer is
    yes today.
        Q. All right. So it would have been helpful, and it was something
    you would have expected?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so
    advise you of that fact in the conversations that he had with you on
    December 7th and December 11th after he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was
    on the witness list?
        A. As I testified--
        MR. KENDALL: Objection. Misstates the record with regard to
    December 11th.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I--I will restate the question. I believe it
    accurately reflects the record, and I'll ask the question.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so
    advise you of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list
    despite the fact that he had conversations with you on two occasions,
    on December 7th and December 11th?
        A. I have no recollection of the President telling me about the
    witness list.
        Q. And during this meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on the 11th, did you
    take some action as a result of what she told you?
        A. On the 11th or the 18th?
        Q. Excuse me. I'm sorry. Let me go to the 19th.
        A. Nineteenth.
        Q. Thank you for that correction.
        Did you refer her to an attorney?
        A. Yes, I did.
        Q. Okay, and who was the attorney that you referred her to?
        A. Frank Carter, a very able local attorney here.
        Q. And did you give her two or three attorneys to select from, or
    did you just give her one recommendation?
        A. I made a recommendation of Frank Carter. That was the only
    recommendation.
        Q. Now, let me go to I believe it's the next three exhibits that
    are in front of you, if you'd just turn that first page, and I believe
    they are marked 29, 31, 32 and 33. And these are, I believe, exhibits
    that you have seen before and are summaries and documents relating to
    telephone conversations on this particular day of December 19th.
        [Witness perusing documents.]
        SENATOR DODD: How are these going to be marked--as Jordan
    Deposition Exhibits--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: These should be marked as Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
        SENATOR DODD: Okay.
        MR. KENDALL: Excuse me, Mr. Manager. Are you offering these in
    evidence?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Not at this time.
        I guess it's 2, 3, 4 and 5.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Are we referring to the next four exhibits in the
    package here?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes, sir.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Well, we'll just--identify them one at a time,
    and we'll--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: All right.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Let's go to Exhibit 29 as it's marked, but for our purpose,
    we're going to refer to it as Deposition Exhibit 2.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. For identification for right now,
    we'll call that Jordan Exhibit Number 2 for identification, which is
    marked as, I assume, Grand Jury Exhibit Number 29.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 2 marked for identification.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And from this record, would you agree that you received a call
    from Ms. Lewinsky at 1:47 p.m.?
        A. For 11 seconds.
        Q. All right. And subsequent to that, you placed a call to talk to
    the President at 3:51 p.m. and talked to Deborah Schiff?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And what was the purpose of that call to Deborah Schiff?
        A. I--I'm certain that I did not call Deborah Schiff. I had no
    reason to call Deborah Schiff. My suspicion was that if I in fact
    called 1414, that somehow Deborah Schiff was answering the telephone.
        Q. Were you trying to get hold of the President?
        A. I think maybe I was.
        Q. All right. And then, subsequent to that, Ms. Lewinsky arrived in
    your office at 4:47 p.m.--and I believe that would be reflected on
    Exhibit 3--excuse me--Exhibit 4.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Four.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And does it also reflect, going back to the call records, that
    you talked to the President during the course of your meeting with Ms.
    Lewinsky at approximately 5:01 p.m.?
        A. I beg your pardon?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: This would be Exhibit 5.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's mark these for identification
    purposes.
        We have already identified Deposition Exhibit Number 29 as Exhibit
    Number 2 for identification in Mr. Jordan's deposition.
        The next one would be Grand Jury Exhibit Number 31, and we will
    mark that as Exhibit Number 3 for identification purposes. Following
    that will be Grand Jury Exhibit Number 32, that we will identify as
    Exhibit Number 4 to Mr. Jordan's deposition for identification
    purposes; and Grand Jury Exhibit Number 33 will be Exhibit Number 5 to
    Mr. Jordan's deposition for identification purposes.
        Now, do we need to go any further at this time?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: No. Thank you.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 and 5 marked for
    identification.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan--
        A. Yes.
        Q. --under Exhibit--
        A. Yes.
        Q. --according to these records, specifically Exhibit 5, does it
    reflect that you talked to the President during the course of your
    meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at approximately 5:01 p.m.?
        MR. KENDALL: Object to the form of the question.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: You may answer.
        THE WITNESS: I'm confused.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: There's an objection as to the form of the
    question.
        THE WITNESS: Oh.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: We can resolve it.
        MR. KENDALL: The question was do these records indicate this. If he
    offers Number 2, I'm going to object to it. It's not the best evidence.
    It's a chart. I don't know who prepared it--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: He's referring to 5 now, I believe, isn't he?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: I believe this had to do with 5.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: All right.
        THE WITNESS: Would you ask your question?
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, I'm simply trying to establish, and using Exhibit 5
    to refresh your recollection--
        MR. KENDALL: I withdraw the objection, I withdraw the objection.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir; very fine.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. --that this record, Exhibit 5, reflects that you talked to the
    President during the course of your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at
    approximately 5:01 p.m.
        A. Yes. I--I have never had a conversation with the President while
    Ms. Lewinsky was present. The wave-in sheet from my office said that
    she came in at 5:47--
        Q. Four forty-seven.
        A. --4:47. She may have been in the reception area, or she may have
    been outside my office, but Ms. Lewinsky was not in my office during
    the time that I had a conversation with the President.
        Q. And the other alternative would be that she came into your
    office, and then you excused her while you received a call from the
    President?
        A. That's a possibility, too--
        Q. All right.
        A. --but she was not present in my office proper during the time
    that I was having a conversation with the President.
        Q. Absolutely, and that is clear.
        Now, because we got a little bogged down in the records, let me
    just go back for a moment. Is it your understanding, based upon the
    records and recollection, that you received a call from Ms. Lewinsky
    about 1:47; you talked to Deborah Schiff trying to get hold of the
    President about 3:51 that afternoon; Ms. Lewinsky arrived at about 4:47
    p.m.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Am I correct so far?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And then you received a call from the President at about 5:01
    p.m.?
        A. That's correct.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I want to say ``Your Honor''--I've wanted to do
    this all day, Senator--I would offer these Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5 at
    this time.
        MR. KENDALL: I would object to the admission of Exhibit Number 2.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Hutchinson, could you identify what this
    exhibit is from?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, this exhibit is a summary exhibited based
    upon the original records that establish this. Now, we've established
    it clearly through the testimony, so it's not of earth-shattering
    significance whether this is in the record or not, because the witness
    has established it.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. But this is a compilation of what you
    contend--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: --is otherwise in the record?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel, do we really have a problem with that?
        MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, I don't know who prepared this or
    what records it's based on. I have not objected to any of the original
    records, and I'll continue my objection.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: I think in light of that we will sustain it, if
    Mr. Hutchinson thinks it's otherwise in the record anyway, and not make
    an issue out of that.
        So we will, then, make as a part of the record Exhibits Numbers 3,
    4 and 5 that have previously been introduced for identification
    purposes; they will now be made a part of the record.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 3, 4 and 5 received in evidence.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, you indicated you had this conversation with
    the President at about 5:01 p.m. out of the presence of Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now, during this conversation with the President, what did you tell the
    President in that conversation?
        A. That Lewinsky--I'm sure I told him that Ms. Lewinsky was in my
    office, in the reception area, that she had a subpoena and that I was
    going to visit with her.
        Q. And did you advise the President as well that you were going to
    recommend Frank Carter as an attorney?
        A. I may have.
        Q. And why was it necessary to tell the President these facts?
        A. I don't know why it was not unnecessary to tell him these facts.
    I was keeping him informed about what was going on, and so I told him.
        Q. Why did you make the judgment that you should call the President
    and advise him of these facts?
        A. I just thought he ought to know. He was interested it--he was
    obviously interested in it--and I felt some responsibility to tell him,
    and I did.
        Q. All right. And what was the President's response?
        A. He said thank you.
        Q. Subsequent to your conversation with the President about Monica
    Lewinsky, did you advise Ms. Lewinsky of this conversation with the
    President?
        A. I doubt it.
        Q. And if she indicates that she was not aware of that
    conversation, would you dispute her testimony in that regard?
        A. I would not.
        Q. And you say that you doubt it. Was there a reason that you would
    not disclose to her the fact that you talked to the President when she
    was the subject of that conversation?
        A. No. I--I didn't feel any particular obligation to tell her or
    not to tell her, but I did not tell her.
        Q. Now, we have discussed to a limited extent the gifts that were
    mentioned in the subpoena in this discussion that you had with Ms.
    Lewinsky. Did she in fact tell you about the gifts she had received
    from the President?
        A. I think she told me that she had received gifts from the
    President.
        Q. Did she also indicate that there had been an exchange of gifts?
        A. She did.
        Q. And did you think that it was somewhat unusual that there had
    been an exchange of gifts?
        A. Uh, a tad unusual, I thought.
        Q. These--
        A. Which again occasioned the question.
        Q. Pardon?
        A. Which again occasioned the ultimate question.
        Q. On--on whether there was a sexual relationship?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And so that was a significant fact in determining whether that
    question should be asked?
        A. It was an additional fact.
        Q. Now, the subpoena also references ``documents constituting or
    containing communications between you''--which would have been Ms.
    Lewinsky under the subpoena--``and the Defendant Clinton, including
    letters, cards, notes, et cetera.''
        Did you ask Ms. Lewinsky at all whether there were any kinds of
    cards or communications between them?
        A. Uh, I did not, but she may have volunteered that.
        Q. And did she tell you about telephone conversations with the
    President?
        A. She did tell me that she and the President talked on the
    telephone.
        Q. And did she express it in a way that it was frustrating because
    the President didn't call her sufficiently?
        A. Well, that--that is correct, and she was disappointed, uh, and
    disapproving of the fact that she was not hearing from the President of
    the United States on a regular basis.
        Q. During this conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, she also made
    reference to the First Lady?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was another question of concern when she asked if you
    thought that the President would leave the First Lady at the end of his
    term?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And what was your reaction to this statement?
        A. My reaction to the statement after I got over it was that--no
    way.
        Q. Did it send off alarm bells in your mind as to her relationship
    with the President?
        A. I think it's safe to say that she was not happy.
        Q. You're speaking of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. That's the only person we're talking about, Congressman.
        Q. Now, based upon all of this, was it your conclusion the subpoena
    meant trouble?
        A. Beg your pardon?
        Q. Based upon all of these facts and your conversation with Ms.
    Lewinsky, was it your conclusion that the subpoena meant trouble?
        A. Well, I always, based on my experience with the grand jury,
    believe that subpoenas are trouble.
        Q. I think you've used the language, ``ipso facto'' meant trouble?
        A. Yes, yes, right.
        Q. Now, subsequent to your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on this
    occasion, did you in fact set up an appointment with Mr. Frank Carter?
        A. Yes--for the 22nd, I believe.
        Q. Which I believe would have been the first part of the next week?
        A. That's right.
        Q. And still on December 19th, after your meeting with Ms.
    Lewinsky, did you subsequently see the President of the United States
    later that evening?
        A. I did.
        Q. And is this when you went to the White House and saw the
    President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. At the time that Ms. Lewinsky came to see you on December 19th,
    did you have any plans to attend any social function at the White House
    that evening?
        A. I did not.
        Q. And in fact there was a social invitation that you had at the
    White House that you declined?
        A. I had--I had declined it; that's right.
        Q. And subsequent to Ms. Lewinsky visiting you, did you change your
    mind and go see the President that evening?
        A. After the--a social engagement that Mrs. Jordan and I had, we
    went to the White House for two reasons. We went to the White House to
    see some friends who were there, two of whom were staying in the White
    House; and secondly, I wanted to have a conversation with the
    President.
        Q. And this conversation that you wanted to have with the President
    was one that you wanted to have with him alone?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And did you let him know in advance that you were coming and
    wanted to talk to him?
        A. I told him I would see him sometime that night after dinner.
        Q. Did you tell him why you wanted to see him?
        A. No.
        Q. Now, was this--once you told him that you wanted to see him, did
    it occur the same time that you talked to him while Ms. Lewinsky was
    waiting outside?
        A. It could be. I made it clear that I would come by after dinner,
    and he said fine.
        Q. Now, let me backtrack for just a moment, because whenever you
    talked to the President, Ms. Lewinsky was not inside the room--
        A. That's correct.
        Q. --and therefore, you did not know the details about her
    questions on the President might leave the First Lady and those
    questions that set off all of these alarm bells.
        A. [Nodding head up and down.]
        Q. And so you were having--is the answer yes?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And so you were having this discussion with the President not
    knowing the extent of Ms. Lewinsky's fixation?
        A. Uh--
        Q. Is that correct?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And, regardless, you wanted to see the President that night, and
    so you went to see him. And was he expecting you?
        A. I believe he was.
        Q. And did you have a conversation with him alone?
        A. I did.
        Q. No one else around?
        A. No one else around.
        Q. And I know that's a redundant question.
        A. It's okay.
        Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
        A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came
    in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left
    the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan
    went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
    I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with
    him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he
    had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said,
    ``No, never.''
        Q. All right. Now, during that conversation, did you tell the
    President again that Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
        A. Well, we had established that.
        Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about
    her fascination?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that
    day?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked
    about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the
    term?
        A. I did.
        Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to
    whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of
    conversation.
        Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to
    Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question
    to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this
    question to the President?
        A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who
    happens to be the President of the United States.
        Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United
    States, to give you a truthful answer?
        A. I did.
        Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to
    continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
        A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to
    do.
        Q. Well, my question was more did you rely upon the President's
    answer in your decision to continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a
    job.
        A. I did not rely on his answer. I was going to pursue the job in
    any event. But I got the answer to the question that I had asked Ms.
    Lewinsky earlier from her, and I got the answer from him that night as
    to the sexual relationships, and he said no.
        Q. It would appear to me that there's two options. One, you asked
    the question in terms of idle conversation, and that does not seem
    logical in view of the fact that you made a point to go and visit the
    President about this alone.
        A. Yes. I never said that--I never talked about options. I told you
    I went to ask him that question.
        Q. Well, was it idle conversation, or was there a purpose in you
    asking him that question?
        A. It obviously, Congressman, was not idle conversation.
        Q. All right.
        A. For him nor for me.
        Q. There was a purpose in it--and would you describe it as being
    important, the question that you asked to him?
        A. I wanted to satisfy myself, based on my visit with her, that
    there had been no sexual relationships, and he said no, as she had said
    no.
        Q. And why was it important to you to satisfy yourself on that
    particular point?
        A. I had seen this young lady, and I had seen her reaction, uh, and
    it raised a presumption, uh, and I wanted to satisfy myself, as I had
    done with her, that there had been no sexual relationship between them.
        Q. If you had--
        A. And I did satisfy myself.
        Q. And if you had--well, let me rephrase it. If you believed the
    presumption, or if you had evidence that Ms. Lewinsky did have sexual
    relations with the President, would this have affected your decision to
    act in the President's interest in locating her a job when she had been
    subpoenaed in a case adverse to the President?
        A. I do not think it would have affected my decision.
        Q. Now, you mentioned that you set up an appointment for Ms.
    Lewinsky at the office of Frank Carter for December 22nd.
        A. Right.
        Q. Prior to that appointment with Mr. Carter, did Ms. Lewinsky come
    to see you in your office?
        A. I took Ms. Lewinsky from my office, in my Akin Gump, chauffeur-
    driven car, to Frank Carter's office.
        Q. And when she arrived at your office, did you have a discussion
    with her?
        A. I think I got my coat, she got her--she had on her coat--and we
    left.
        Q. While in your office before going to see Mr. Carter, did Ms.
    Lewinsky ask about her job?
        A. Every conversation that I had with Ms. Lewinsky had at some
    point to do with pending employment.
        Q. And I take that as a ``yes'' answer, but I would also refer you
    to page 184 of your previous testimony in which that answer was
    ``yes.''
        A. Yes.
        Q. And so prior to going to see Mr. Carter, you met with Ms.
    Lewinsky and--where she asked about her job?
        A. Well, as I'm putting on my coat, I mean, we did not sit down and
    have a conference. We had an appointment.
        Q. Now, you last testified before the grand jury in June of 1998,
    and you have not had the opportunity to address some issues that Ms.
    Lewinsky raised when she testified before the grand jury in August of
    1998, and I would like to--there will be a number of questions as we go
    through this today relating to some things that she testified to,
    because it's important that we hear your responses to it, and so I'd
    like to ask you about a couple of these particular areas.
        During this meeting--and you say it was a short meeting, that you
    really didn't sit down--but during this time, did Ms. Lewinsky ask if
    you had told the President that she had been subpoenaed in the Jones
    case?
        A. She may have, and--and if she did, I answered yes.
        Q. Even though you did not tell her about the conversation on
    December 19th that you had with the President in which you told the
    President she had been subpoenaed?
        A. If she had asked, I would have told her. If she asked me on the
    22nd, I answered yes.
        Q. And did Ms. Lewinsky show you any gifts that she was bringing to
    Mr. Frank Carter?
        A. Yeah--I'm not aware that Ms. Lewinsky showed me any gifts. I
    have no--I have no recollection of her having shown me gifts given her
    by the President. And my best recollection is that she came to my
    office, I got myself together, and that we left. I have no recollection
    of her showing me gifts given her by the President.
        Q. Would you dispute if she in fact had gifts with her on that
    occasion?
        A. I don't know whether she had gifts with her or not. I do have--I
    have no recollection of her showing me, saying, ``This is a gift given
    me by the President of the United States.''
        Q. And if she testifies that she showed you the gifts she was
    bringing Mr. Carter, you would dispute that testimony?
        A. I have not any recollection of her showing me any gifts.
        Q. And I take that as not denying it--
        MR. KENDALL: Objection to form.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. --but that you have no recollection.
        A. Uh, I don't know how else to say it to you, Mr. Congressman.
        Q. Well--
        A. I have no recollection of Ms. Lewinsky coming to my office and
    showing me gifts given her by the President of the United States.
        Q. Let me go on. Did Ms. Lewinsky tell you that she and the
    President had had phone sex?
        A. I think Ms.--I know Ms. Lewinsky told me about, uh, telephone
    conversations with the President. If Ms. Lewinsky had told me something
    about phone sex, I think I would have remembered that.
        Q. And therefore, if she testifies that she told you that Ms.
    Lewinsky and the President had phone sex, then you'd simply deny her
    testimony in that regard?
        A. I--
        MR. KENDALL: Object to the form.
        THE WITNESS: I have no recollection, Congressman, of Ms. Lewinsky
    telling me about phone sex--but given my age, I would probably have
    been interested in what that was all about.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: We'll overrule the objection. It's a leading
    question, but I think that it will be permissible for these purposes.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: It's my understanding, Senator, that under the
    Senate rule, that the witness would be considered an adverse witness.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: That's correct.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Well, I don't mean to engage in disputes over fine points, but I
    guess--
        A. Well, you obviously, Congressman, have Ms. Lewinsky saying one
    thing and me saying another. I stand by what I said.
        Q. Which is that you have no recollection of that discussion taking
    place.
        A. But I do think that I would have remembered it had it happened.
        Q. All right. Now, after your brief encounter or meeting with Ms.
    Lewinsky in your office, did you take Ms. Lewinsky in your vehicle to
    Mr. Carter's office?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And when you arrived at Mr. Carter's office, did you meet with
    Mr. Carter in advance, while Ms. Lewinsky waited outside?
        A. I said a brief hello to him. We talked about lunch. I never took
    off my coat. I did take off my hat, because it was inside. And I left
    them, and I got a piece of his candy.
        Q. Now, I was looking at the testimony of Mr. Carter. Now, do you
    recall a meeting with Mr. Carter in his office while Ms. Lewinsky
    waited outside, even if it might have been a brief meeting?
        A. Yes, I think maybe I went in. I just don't know--I was there for
    a very short time.
        Q. Did you explain to Mr. Carter that you were seeking Ms. Lewinsky
    a job at the request of the President?
        A. No, I did not, but I think he knew that.
        Q. And why do you think he knew that?
        A. I must have told him.
        Q. So at some point, you believe that you told Mr. Carter that you
    were seeking Ms. Lewinsky a job at the request of the President?
        A. I think I may have done that.
        Q. Now, you have referred other clients to Mr. Carter during your
    course of practice here in Washington, D.C.?
        A. Yes, I have.
        Q. About how many have you referred to him?
        A. Oh, I don't know. Maggie Williams is one client that I--I
    remember very definitely.
        I like Frank Carter a lot. He's a very able young lawyer. He's a
    first-class person, a first-class lawyer, and he's one of my new
    acquaintances amongst lawyers in town, and I like being around him. We
    have lunch, and he's a friend.
        Q. And is it true, though, that when you've referred other clients
    to Mr. Carter that you never personally delivered and presented that
    client to him in his office?
        A. But I delivered Maggie Williams to him in my office. I had
    Maggie Williams to come to my office, and it was in my office that I
    introduced, uh, Maggie Williams to Mr. Carter, and she chose other
    counsel. I would have happily taken Maggie Williams to his office.
        Q. But this is the only occasion that you took your Akin, Gump-
    chauffeured vehicle and delivered the client to Mr. Carter in his
    office?
        A. It was.
        Q. Now, we're not going to go through, probably to your relief,
    each day's phone calls, but is it safe to say that Ms. Lewinsky called
    you regularly, both keeping you posted on her interviews and contacts,
    but also asking you what you knew about her job desires?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And it is also true that during this process, you kept the
    President informed?
        A. That, too, is correct.
        Q. And did the President ever give you any other instruction other
    than to find Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York?
        A. I do not view the President as giving me instructions. The
    President is a friend of mine, and I don't believe friends instruct
    friends. Our friendship is one of parity and equality.
        Q. Let me rephrase it, and that's--
        A. Thank you.
        Q. That's a fair comment that you certainly made.
        Did you ever receive any other request from the President in
    reference to your dealing with Monica Lewinsky other than the request
    to find her a job in New York?
        A. That is correct.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I've been informed that there's a few minutes left
    on the tape. Do you want to break?
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Let's take a 5-minute break at this
    point.
        Also, if it's not objectionable to anyone, let's move a little
    closer to 1 o'clock, after all, for lunch, if that's okay. We have a
    conference that that will coincide with a little better, but for right
    now, let's take a 5-minute break.
        SENATOR DODD: Just before we do, just to make it--and the
    admonition about these--these--this matter being in--confidential.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Right.
        SENATOR DODD: And I'm going to restate that over and over again
    today, so that people understand the rules under which we're operating
    here, and this is confidential and no one is to reveal anything they
    hear, except to the people that was listed in Senator Thompson's
    opening remarks.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Absolutely.
        We'll be in recess.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Videotape Number 1 in the
    deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. We are going off the record at
    11:35 a.m.
        [Recess.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the beginning of Videotape Number 2 in
    the deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. We are going back on the record
    at 11:49 a.m.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, Mr. Hutchinson, and you have consumed
    an hour and 40 minutes.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senator Thompson.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, I was reminded that the last question I asked you
    received an answer that I didn't, at least, understand, so I'm going to
    reask that question, and the question that I had asked, I believe, was:
    Did you ever receive any other request from the President in reference
    to your dealings with Ms. Lewinsky other than the request to find her a
    job in New York? And I think your answer was: That's correct. And that
    confuses me a little bit, so let me rephrase the question.
        Did you ever receive--not rephrase it, but restate the question.
    Did you ever receive any other request from the President in reference
    to your dealings with Monica Lewinsky other than the request to find
    her a job in New York?
        A. I did not.
        Q. Now, let me go to December 31, 1997, in reference to another
    issue that Ms. Lewinsky has testified about in her August grand jury
    appearance and in which you have not had the opportunity to discuss in
    detail.
        Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met you for breakfast at the
    Park Hyatt--
        MR. HUNDLEY: Excuse me. I think you misspoke yourself. You said
    '97.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: This is '97, right?
        MR. HUNDLEY: It is? I apologize.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Hundley. The years are
    confusing, but I believe this is December 31, 1997.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met you for breakfast at
    the Park Hyatt, and even specifically as to what she had for breakfast
    on that particular occasion when she met with you and as to the
    conversation that she had.
        And I want to show you, in order to hopefully refresh your
    recollection, an exhibit which I'm going to mark as the next exhibit
    number, which will be 6, I believe?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes. What--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: And it's in the binder as Exhibit 42. It is not
    there, but it is in the binder as Exhibit 42.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Let's take a moment so everyone can refer to
    that.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Have you located that, Mr. Jordan?
        A. [Nodding head up and down.]
        Q. And this receipt, is this a receipt for a charge that you had at
    the Park Hyatt on December 31st?
        A. That's an American Express receipt for breakfast.
        Q. And is the date December 31st?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And does it reflect the items that were consumed at that
    breakfast?
        A. It reflects the items that were paid for at that breakfast.
        [Laughter.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Does it appear to you that this is a breakfast for two people?
        A. The price suggests that it was a breakfast for two people.
        Q. All right. And the fact that there's two coffees, there is one
    omelet, one English muffin, one hot cereal, and can you identify from
    that what you ordinarily eat at breakfast?
        A. What I ordinarily eat at breakfast varies. This morning, it was
    fish and grits.
        Q. All right. Now, Ms. Lewinsky in her testimony, I think,
    referenced as to what she ate, which I believe would be confirmed in
    this record.
        Do you recall a meeting with Ms. Lewinsky at the Park Hyatt on
    December 31st of--
        A. If you--
        Q. --1997?
        A. If you would refer to my testimony before the grand jury when
    asked about a breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on December 31st, I testified
    that I did not have breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on December 31st
    because I did not remember having had breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky on
    December 31st. It was not on my calendar. It was New Year's Eve. I have
    breakfast at the Park Hyatt Hotel three or four times a week if I am in
    town, and so I really did not remember having breakfast with Ms.
    Lewinsky. And that's an honest statement, I did not remember, and I
    told that to the grand jury.
        It is clear, based on the evidence here, that I was at the Park
    Hyatt on December 31st. So I do not deny, despite my testimony before
    the grand jury, that on December 31st that I was there with Ms.
    Lewinsky, but I did testify before the grand jury that I did not
    remember having a breakfast with her on that date, and that was the
    truth.
        My recollection has subsequently been refreshed, and--and so it
    is--it is undeniable that there was a breakfast in my usual breakfast
    place, in the corner at the Park Hyatt. I'm there all the time.
        Q. All right. And so--and that would be with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And so the--so your memory has been refreshed, and I appreciate
    the statement that you just made.
        Let me go to that meeting with her and ask whether during this
    occasion that you met her for breakfast that there was a discussion
    about Ms. Linda Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with her and
    conversations with her.
        A. I also testified in my grand jury testimony that I never heard
    the name ``Linda Tripp'' until such time that I saw the Drudge Report.
    I did not have a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky at the breakfast at the
    Park Hyatt Hotel on December 31st about Linda Tripp. I never heard the
    name ``Linda Tripp,'' knew nothing about Linda Tripp until I read the
    Drudge Report.
        Q. All right. And do you recall a discussion with Ms. Lewinsky at
    the Park Hyatt on this occasion in which there were notes discussed
    that she had written to the President?
        A. I am certain that Ms. Lewinsky talked to me about notes.
        Q. On this occasion?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And would these have been notes that she would have sent to the
    President?
        A. I think that there was--these notes had to do with
    correspondence between Ms. Lewinsky and the President.
        Q. And would have she mentioned the retention or copies of some of
    that correspondence on her computer in her apartment?
        A. She may have done that.
        Q. And did you ask her a question, were these notes from the
    President to you?
        A. I understood from our conversation that she and the President
    had correspondence that went back and forth.
        Q. And did you make a statement to her, ``Go home and make sure
    they're not there''?
        A. Mr. Hutchinson, I'm a lawyer and I'm a loyal friend, but I'm not
    a fool, and the notion that I would suggest to anybody that they
    destroy anything just defies anything that I know about myself. So the
    notion that I said to her go home and destroy notes is ridiculous.
        Q. Well, I appreciate that reminder of ethical responsibilities. It
    was--
        A. No, it had nothing to do with ethics, as much as it's just good
    common sense, mother wit. You remember that in the South.
        Q. And so--and let me read a statement that she made to the grand
    jury on August 6th, 1998. This is the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky,
    referring to a conversation with you at the Park Hyatt that, ``She,''
    referring to Linda Tripp, ``was my friend. I didn't really trust her. I
    used to trust her, but I didn't trust her anymore, and I was a little
    bit concerned because she had spent the night at my home a few times,
    and I thought--I told Mr. Jordan. I said, `Well, maybe she's heard
    some'--you know, I mean, maybe she saw some notes lying around, and Mr.
    Jordan said, `Notes from the President to you?,' and I said, `No. Notes
    from me to the President,' and he said, `Go home and make sure they're
    not there.' ''
        A. And, Mr. Hutchinson, I'm saying to you that I never heard the
    name ``Linda Tripp'' until I read the Judge--Drudge Report.
        Secondly, let me say to you that I, too, have read Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony about that breakfast, and I can say to you, without fear of
    contradiction on my part, maybe on her part, that the notion that I
    told her to go home and destroy notes is just out of the question.
        Q. And so this is not a matter of you not recalling whether that
    occurred or not--
        A. I am telling you--
        Q. Well, let me--
        A. --emphatically--
        Q. Mr. Jordan, let me finish the question.
        A. Okay, all right.
        Q. Please, sir.
        A. Okay.
        Q. It's sort of important for the record.
        This is a statement by Ms. Lewinsky that you flatly and
    categorically deny?
        A. Absolutely.
        Q. Now, you talked about ``mother wit,'' I think it was; that you
    knew at the time that you had this discussion with Ms. Lewinsky that
    these notes would have been covered by the subpoena based upon your
    discussion of that on December 19th?
        A. Ask that question again.
        Q. All right. This is a meeting on December 31st at the Park Hyatt.
        A. Right.
        Q. A discussion about the notes, correspondence between Ms.
    Lewinsky and the President.
        A. Right.
        Q. You are aware, based upon your discussion of the subpoena on
    December 19th, that these were covered under the subpoena?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And did you tell Ms. Lewinsky that you need to make sure you
    tell your attorney, Mr. Carter, and that these are turned over under
    the subpoena?
        A. What I did not tell her was to destroy the notes. Whether I told
    her to give them to Mr. Carter or not, I have no recollection of that.
        Q. But you knew at the time that these notes were a matter of
    evidence?
        A. I think that's a valid assumption.
        Q. But you knew that?
        A. It's a valid assumption.
        Q. Now, during this meeting at the Park Hyatt, did Ms. Lewinsky
    also make it clear to you that she was in love with the President?
        A. That, I had already concluded.
        Q. And if Ms.--now, was there anything else at the Park Hyatt at
    this meeting on December 31st that you recall discussing with Ms.
    Lewinsky?
        A. Job, work, in New York, in the private sector.
        Q. And that was the--was this a meeting that was set up at her
    request or your request?
        A. I'm certain it was at her request. I am fairly certain that I
    did not call Ms. Lewinsky and say will you join me at the Park Hyatt
    for breakfast on December 31st, on New Year's Eve.
        Q. All right. And did you also talk about her situation under the
    subpoena and the fact that she was going to have to give testimony, it
    looked like?
        A. I am not Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, and I did not view it as my
    responsibility to give Ms. Lewinsky advice and counsel.
        I had found her very able, competent counsel.
        Q. Respectfully, I am simply asking whether that was discussed.
        A. And I am simply saying to you, I did not provide her legal
    counsel.
        Q. Okay. Was it discussed in--not in terms of legal representation,
    but in terms of Mr. Jordan to Monica Lewinsky about any emotional
    concerns she might have about pending testimony?
        A. I have no recollection of talking to her about pending
    testimony.
        Q. Fair enough. Now, let's go back to Mr. Carter's representation
    of Ms. Lewinsky that you referred to. Were you aware that Mr. Carter
    was preparing an affidavit for Ms. Lewinsky to sign in the Jones case?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And on or about the 6th or 7th of January, did you become aware
    that she in fact had signed the affidavit and that Mr. Carter had filed
    a motion to quash her subpoena in the case?
        A. She told me that she had signed the affidavit.
        Q. And did in fact Mr. Carter also relate to you that that had
    occurred?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And I think you made a statement in your March grand jury
    testimony that there was no reason for accountability, that he
    reassured me that he had things under control?
        A. That is correct. I stand by that testimony.
        Q. And now, if you would, look at the next exhibit, which is in
    that stapled bunch of exhibits that have been provided to you.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: This will be Exhibit No. 7, we'll mark for your
    deposition.
        And, Senator, did we put Exhibit No. 6 in?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: No, we didn't.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I would like to offer that as an exhibit to this
    deposition.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: It will be made a part of the record.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit Nos. 6 and 7 marked for identification.]
        [Witness perusing document.]
        SENATOR DODD: That is Number 6?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Six. That's the Park Hyatt.
        SENATOR DODD: Oh, that is going to be Number 6, the Park Hyatt, not
    the--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Now, what is 7?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Now, 7 is the affidavit of Jane Doe Number 6, which
    in the--I think everybody has found that in the book.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: What is the grand jury number?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: It's 85, the grand jury number.
        This will be Deposition Exhibit Number 7.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, I think you're reviewing that.
        This affidavit bears the signature on the last page of Monica S.
    Lewinsky, is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And have you ever seen this signed affidavit before?
        A. I don't think so.
        Q. Do you not recall that Ms. Lewinsky brought this in and showed
    it to you?
        A. She may have.
        Q. And I'd be glad to refresh you. I know that some of this--
        A. Yeah, if it's in the testimony, Congressman.
        Q. Page 192 of your previous grand jury testimony. Is it your
    recollection that she showed this to you in a meeting in your office
    after she had signed it?
        A. I stand by that testimony.
        Q. And so the date of that signature of Ms. Lewinsky, is that
    January 7?
        A. January 7th, 1998.
        Q. All right. Now, whenever she presented this signed affidavit to
    you, did you read it sufficiently to know that it stated that Ms.
    Lewinsky did not have a sexual relationship with the President?
        A. I was aware that that was in the affidavit.
        Q. And I believe you previously testified that you're a quick
    reader and you skimmed it and familiarized yourself with it?
        A. Skimmed it.
        Q. And prior to seeing the signed affidavit that she brought to
    you, the day after it was signed, was there a time that Ms. Lewinsky
    called you concerning the affidavit and said that she had some
    questions about the draft of the affidavit?
        A. Yes. I do recollect her calling me and asking me about the
    affidavit, and I said to her that she should talk to the--talk to Frank
    Carter, her counsel, about the affidavit and not to me.
        Q. And if I could go into, again, some areas that had not been
    previously asked to you, and since Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand
    jury on August 6th.
        Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she dropped a copy of the affidavit
    to you, and that you--and that you and she had a telephone conversation
    in which you discussed changes to the affidavit. Does this refresh your
    recollection, and do you agree with Ms. Lewinsky's recollection of a
    discussion on changes in the affidavit?
        A. I do agree with the assumption--I mean, I do agree with the
    statement that Ms. Lewinsky dropped the affidavit off and called me up
    about the affidavit and was quite verbose about it, and I sort of
    listened and said to her, ``You need to talk to Frank Carter.''
        She was not satisfied with that, and so she kept talking and I kept
    doodling and listening as she went on in sort of a, for lack of a
    better word, babble about this--about this thing, but it was not my job
    to advise her about an affidavit. I don't do affidavits.
        Q. Now, if I may show you, which would be Exhibit--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: First, let me go ahead and offer 7.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: It's made a part of the record.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 7 received in evidence.]
        MR. HUTCHINSON: It's part of the record.
        And then go to Exhibit 8, which was marked as Exhibit 39 as your
    previous grand jury testimony.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 8 marked for identification.]
        [Witness perusing document.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Now, Exhibit 8 is a summary of telephone calls on January 6th,
    which would be the day before the affidavit was signed by Ms. Lewinsky
    on the 7th.
        Now, you can reflect on that for a moment, but in reviewing these
    calls, it appears that Mr. Carter was paging Ms. Lewinsky early on in
    the day, 11:32 a.m., and then at 3:26, you had a telephone call with
    Mr. Carter for 6 minutes and 42 seconds.
        And then there was--call number 6 was to Ms. Lewinsky, which was
    obviously a 24-second short call, and then a subsequent call for almost
    6 minutes at 3:49 p.m. to Ms. Lewinsky.
        Was this last call for 5 minutes to Ms. Lewinsky the call that you
    just referenced in which the draft affidavit was discussed?
        A. I think that is correct. The 24-second call, I think, was voice
    mail.
        Q. Was--was--pardon?
        A. Voice mail.
        Q. Certainly.
        And subsequent to your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky for 5 minutes
    and 54 seconds, did you have two calls to Mr. Carter, which would be
    No. 9 and 10?
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter on three
    occasions, the day before the affidavit was signed?
        A. Yeah. I--my recollection is--is that I was exchanging or sharing
    with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she had asked me to do, what I
    refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the lawyer and I was not
    the lawyer. I mean, it would be so presumptuous of me to try to advise
    Frank Carter as to how to practice law.
        Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your conversations
    with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I may have.
        Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about the
    affidavit, would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned about
    the economics of law practice, he would have likely billed Ms. Lewinsky
    for some of those telephone calls?
        A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.
        Q. It wouldn't surprise you if his billing did reflect a--a charge
    for a telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan?
        A. Keep in mind that Mr. Carter spent most of his time in being a
    legal services lawyer. I think his concentration is primarily on
    service, rather than billing.
        Q. But, again, based upon the conversations you had with him, which
    sounds like conversations of substance in reference to the affidavit,
    that it would be consistent with the practice of law if he charged for
    those conversations?
        A. That's a question you'd have to ask Mr. Carter.
        Q. They were conversations of substance with Mr. Carter concerning
    the affidavit?
        A. And they were likely conversations about more than Ms. Lewinsky.
        Q. But the answer was yes, that they were conversations of
    substance in reference to the affidavit?
        A. Or at least a portion of them.
        Q. In other words, other things might have been discussed?
        A. Yes.
        Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the affidavit
    being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both the job and her
    concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky talked to her
    about the job, on one hand, or job being interrelated with the
    conversation about the affidavit. The affidavit was over here. The job
    was over here.
        Q. But the--in the same conversations, both her interest in a job
    and her discussions about the affidavit were contained in the same
    conversation?
        A. As I said to you before, Counselor, she was always interested in
    the job.
        Q. Okay. And she was always interested in the job, and so, if she
    brought up the affidavit, very likely it was in the same conversation?
        A. No doubt.
        Q. And that would be consistent with your previous grand jury
    testimony when you expressed that you talked to her both about the job
    and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. Now, on January 7th, the affidavit was signed. Subsequent to
    this, did you notify anyone in the White House that the affidavit in
    the Jones case had been signed by Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Yeah. I'm certain I told Betty Currie, and I'm fairly certain
    that I told the President.
        Q. And why did you tell Betty Currie?
        A. I'm--I kept them informed about everybody else that was--
    everything else. There was no reason not to tell them about that she
    had signed the affidavit.
        Q. And why did you tell the President?
        A. The President was obviously interested in her job search. We had
    talked about the affidavit. He knew that she had a lawyer. It was in
    the due course of a conversation. I would say, ``Mr. President, she
    signed the affidavit. She signed the affidavit.''
        Q. And what was his response when you informed him that she had
    signed the affidavit?
        A. ``Thank you very much.''
        Q. All right. And would you also have been giving him a report on
    the status of the job search at the same time?
        A. He may have asked about that, and--and part of her problem was
    that, you know, she was--there was a great deal of anxiety about the
    job. She wanted the job. She was unemployed, and she wanted to work.
        Q. Now, I think you indicated that he was obviously concerned
    about--was it her representation and the affidavit?
        A. I told him that I had found counsel for her, and I told him that
    she had signed the affidavit.
        Q. Okay. You indicated that he was concerned, obviously, about
    something. What was he obviously concerned about in your conversations
    with him?
        A. Throughout, he had been concerned about her getting employment
    in New York, period.
        Q. And he was also concerned about the affidavit?
        A. I don't know that that was concern. I did tell him that the
    affidavit was signed. He knew that she had counsel, and he knew that I
    had arranged the counsel.
        Q. Do you know whether or not the President of the United States
    ever talked to her counsel, Mr. Carter?
        A. I have--I have no knowledge of that.
        Q. Did you ever relate to Mr. Carter that you were having
    discussions with the President concerning his representation of Ms.
    Lewinsky and whether she had signed the affidavit?
        A. I don't know whether I told him that she had--he had--I don't
    know whether I told Mr. Carter that I told the President he had signed
    the affidavit. It is--it is not beyond reasonableness.
        Q. Now let's go on. After the affidavit was signed, were you
    ultimately successful in obtaining Ms. Lewinsky a job?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And in fact, the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed the affidavit,
    you placed a personal call to Mr. Ron Perelman of Revlon, encouraging
    him to take a second look at Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. That is correct, based on the fact that Ms. Lewinsky thought
    that her interview had not gone well, when in fact it had gone well.
        Q. Okay. And in fact, Ms. Lewinsky had called you on a couple of
    occasions after the interview and finally got a hold of you and told
    you she thought the interview went poorly?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And as a response to that information, you did not call Mr.
    Halperin back, who you had previously talked to about the issue, but
    you called Mr. Perelman?
        A. That's right.
        Q. Was there a reason that you called Mr. Perelman in contrast to
    Mr. Halperin?
        A. Well, the same reason I would have called you about a committee
    if you were chairman of it, as opposed to calling to a member of the
    committee.
        Q. All right. You wanted to go to the top?
        A. When it's necessary.
        Q. And I remember a phrase you used. I might not have it exactly
    right, but you don't get any richer or more powerful than Mr. Perelman?
        A. Certainly not much richer.
        Q. Okay. And--and so you had a conversation with Mr. Perelman, and
    did you tell him something like, make it happen if it can happen?
        A. I said, ``This young lady''--I mean, I think I said, ``This
    young lady has been interviewed. She thinks it did not go well. Would
    you look into it?''
        Q. And what was his response?
        A. That he would look into it.
        Q. Now I'd like to show you the next exhibit, and before I do that,
    I would go back and offer Number 7.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Seven is the last.
        This would be Number 8 that you--that you have been discussing. The
    compilation of the telephone call record?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        MR. KENDALL: I object. Same ground as before. It's not best
    evidence. We don't know who compiled these. These are not primary
    records.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Jordan has verified several of these items,
    but I do notice there are some items here that do not have to do with
    Mr. Jordan, that we could not expect him to be able to verify.
        So I would ask counsel, if he needs to identify any more of these
    conversations and use this to reflect Mr. Jordan's memory, he's free to
    do so, but as an exhibit, I think the objection is probably well taken.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Let me just state, Senator, that this is a
    compilation of calls based upon the records that have been in the
    Senate record, and this has been--this compilation has been in there
    some time.
        Now, I, quite frankly, understand the objection, and it might have
    meritorious if this was being introduced into evidence in the actual
    trial, and so I would suggest perhaps, since he's identified most of
    the calls already, that this could be referenced as a deposition
    exhibit because he's referred to it and that's helpful, without--
    obviously, there might in a more--it might not be entered into evidence
    as such.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Could I ask you if it's been in the record as a
    compilation?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes, it has.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: In this form? I notice that it has a grand jury--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: It's--Senator, it's Volume III of the Senate
    record, page 161, and so it's all in there, anyway.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: I notice in the record here, counsel is informing
    me that it is in the record, but there are several redactions. Is that
    correct?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: That is correct, and for that reason--in fact, a
    number of these summaries are not redacted in our form and they're
    redacted in the record, and we'd like to have the opportunity to redact
    it in the form of taking out the personal telephone numbers.
        MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, if I may be heard, my objection is--
    to this is a summary. We don't know who did it. We don't know what it's
    based on.
        The witness has testified, and his testimony is in the record, so
    far as his recollection is refreshed.
        I have no objection to original phone records, but I do object to
    the summary.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel, could I suggest that maybe you just make
    a reference specifically to where it is in the existing record? I think
    it would serve your same purpose and to keep you from having--
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Sure.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: --to go through and redact everything. Would that
    be satisfactory?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I think that would be satisfactory, and what I can
    do is that I can withdraw this exhibit and reference in the transcript
    of this deposition that the exhibit is found in Table 35 of Senate
    record, Volume III, at page 161.
        SENATOR DODD: Let me just ask the House Manager, if I can as well.
    Are these from the Senate record? I'm told that some of these are not
    from the Senate record, and we're kind of confined to the Senate
    record, as I understand it.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, other than the redactions, this summary
    itself is in the Senate record.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes.
        Counsel informs me, it's already in. It refers to evidentiary
    record Volume IV.
        MS. BOGART: Is it IV or III?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: It says IV here, Part 2 of--Part 2 of 3.
        So, for the record, this would be pages 1884 and 1885 of the
    evidentiary record, Volume IV, Part 2 of 3, all right?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. So the record will be--the objection
    will be sustained, and reference has been made.
        SENATOR DODD: And can we just--because I presume you may have more
    of these coming along, and it seems to me you might want to have staff
    or others begin to work so we don't go through this every time,
    particularly with the unredacted material that may be included in here,
    which is not part of the Senate record.
        The unredacted information comes out of the House record, as I
    understand, and that is a distinction.
        MR. HUNDLEY: I would just add that Mr. Jordan--the last 3 days of
    his grand jury testimony, they asked him about every phone call, and if
    you want to use those, you know, go to his grand jury testimony, you
    know, I think it would move things along.
        There isn't a phone call. We produced like a telephone book of
    phone calls that Mr. Jordan made, and they called them all out, after
    they got through asking about who's that, who's that and who's the--
    you've got a pretty good record of calls that might have some relevance
    in this.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir. All right.
        SENATOR DODD: Let me also just suggest on the earlier--Senator
    Thompson, in the earlier objection raised by Counsel Kendall, sustained
    the objection, but had made reference to the fact that since this
    material had been brought into the record that those--if any
    documentation is included there, that we--we do use the Senate
    documents with the redacted information, rather than the House records
    for the purposes of this deposition.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Proceed.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And I will handle it this way, Mr. Jordan, and let me say that I
    was sort of constructing my questioning, so as not to get bogged down
    in an extraordinary number of telephone calls, but let me go to the
    chart in front of you which is Grand Jury Exhibit 44, which is marked
    for our purposes as Exhibit 9 for identification purposes.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 9 marked for identification.]
        [Witness perusing document.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And I'm going to--I'd like for you to refer that--refer you to
    that for purposes of putting this particular day, January 8th, in
    context and asking you some questions about some of those telephone
    calls.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: I'm sorry. What was the question? Are you making
    reference for identification purposes?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes. This is Exhibit 9, which is Grand Jury Exhibit
    44.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, for identification purposes.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Now, this is the day, January 8th, which is the day that Ms.
    Lewinsky felt like she had a poor job interview. Does this reflect
    calls from the Peter Strauss residence to your office?
        A. I see a call number 3, 11:50 a.m., Peter Strauss residence. The
    number is here to my office.
        Q. All right.
        A. And it says length of call, one minute.
        Q. All right. And, in fact, calls 3, 4 and 5 and 9 are calls from
    the Peter Strauss residence to your office?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And Peter Strauss is the residence in which Ms. Lewinsky was
    staying while in New York?
        A. I just know that Peter Strauss, my old friend, is Monica
    Lewinsky's stepfather.
        MR. HUNDLEY: But he wasn't there.
        THE WITNESS: You know, where she was and all of that, I don't know.
    I'm just--
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. You received calls from Ms. Lewinsky on this particular day?
        A. From this number, according to this piece of paper.
        Q. And does this time reference coincide with your recollection as
    to when you received calls from Ms. Lewinsky on this particular day?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And during these calls is when she related the difficulty of the
    job interview; is that correct?
        A. I believe so--that it had not gone well.
        Q. All right. And then, subsequently, you put in a call to Mr.
    Perelman at Revlon?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was to encourage him to take a second look. Is that
    call number 6 on this summary?
        A. Call number 6; it lasted one minute and 42 seconds.
        Q. And is that the call that you placed to Mr. Perelman?
        A. I believe that is correct.
        Q. And this was subsequent to the calls that you received from Ms.
    Lewinsky?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And then you let Ms. Lewinsky know that you had called Mr.
    Perelman; and do you recall what you would have told her at that time?
        A. I think I told her that I had spoken with, uh--with, uh, Mr.
    Perelman, the chairman, and that I was hopeful that things would work
    out.
        Q. All right. And, in fact, they did work out because the next day
    you were informed that a temporary job--or a preliminary job offer had
    been made to Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. That's right.
        Q. So she was able to secure the job based upon your call to Mr.
    Perelman?
        A. Based upon my call, from the time that I called Halperin through
    to Mr. Perelman.
        Q. All right.
        A. I take credit for that.
        Q. All right. Now, in fact, you've used terms like ``the Jordan
    magic worked''?
        A. It--it has from time to time.
        Q. And it did on this occasion?
        A. I believe so.
        Q. And then, you also informed Ms. Betty Currie that the mission
    was accomplished?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And after securing the job for Ms. Lewinsky, you did inform
    Betty Currie of that fact?
        A. And the President.
        Q. All right. And was the purpose of letting Betty Currie know so
    that she could tell the President?
        A. She saw the President much more often that I did.
        Q. And--but you wanted to inform the President personally that you
    were successful in getting Ms. Lewinsky a job?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you did that, uh--was it on the--what, the day after she
    secured the job or the day--the day that she secured the job?
        A. I don't know the answer to that.
        Q. Well, shortly thereafter is it fair to say that you informed the
    President personally?
        A. I certainly told him.
        Q. All right. Now, at this point, you had successfully obtained a
    job for Ms. Lewinsky at the request of the President, and you had been
    successful in obtaining an attorney for Ms. Lewinsky. Did you see your
    responsibilities in regard to Ms. Lewinsky as continuing or completed?
        A. I don't know, uh, that I saw them as, uh, necessary completed.
    There is--as you know from your own experience in helping young people
    with work, there tends to be some sense of responsibility to follow
    through, that they get to work on time, that they work hard, and that
    they succeed. So I don't think that I felt that my responsibility had
    terminated. I felt like I had a continuing responsibility to just make
    sure that it happened and that she--that it worked out all right. But I
    don't think I acted on that responsibility.
        Q. Well, this is--the job was completed--I believe it was January
    8th when she secured the job?
        A. That was the day that I called Ronald Perelman.
        Q. Okay, so it would have been the 9th that she would have been
    informed that she had the job.
        A. That's right.
        Q. So this is the 9th of January, and that mission had been
    accomplished. Now, I want you to recall your testimony of May 28th
    before the grand jury in which the question was asked to you--and this
    is at page 81; the question begins at the bottom of page 80.
        Question: ``When you introduced Monica Lewinsky to Frank Carter on
    December 22, 1997, what further involvement did you expect to have with
    Monica Lewinsky and Frank Carter?''
        Answer: ``Beyond getting her the job, I thought it was finished,
    done''--and what's that last word you used?
        A. ``Fini.''
        Q. ``Fini.'' And so that was the basis on the question, was your
    previous testimony that after you got Ms. Lewinsky a job and after you
    secured her attorney, there was really no other need for involvement or
    continued meetings with her?
        A. That is correct. That does not mean, on the other hand, that,
    uh, if you go to a meeting at the board, that you don't stop in and see
    how--how people are doing. In this circumstance, that process was
    short-circuited very quickly.
        Q. I'm sorry?
        A. She never ended up working there. You--you--you do remember
    that.
        Q. Now, but you had described your frequent telephone calls from
    Ms. Lewinsky as being bordering on annoyance, I think. Is that a fair
    characterization?
        A. That's a fair characterization.
        Q. And you're a busy man. You stopped billing at $450 an hour.
    You're having calls from Ms. Lewinsky. Were you glad at this point to
    have this ``bordering on annoyance'' situation completed?
        A. ``Glad'' is probably the wrong word. ``Relieved'' is maybe a
    better word.
        Q. All right. Now, during the time that you were helping Ms.
    Lewinsky secure a job, this was widely known at the White House, is
    that correct?
        A. I--I don't know the extent to which it was widely known. I dealt
    with Ms. Currie and with the President.
        Q. In fact, Ms. Cheryl Mills, sitting here at counsel table, knew
    that you were helping Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I believe that's true.
        Q. And Betty Currie knew that you were helping Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Yes.
        Q. The President knew it?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you presumed that Bruce Lindsey knew it?
        A. I presumed that. That's a very small number, given the number of
    people who work at the White House.
        Q. Now, after that December 19 meeting--and I'm backtracking a
    little bit--the meeting that you had with Ms. Lewinsky in which she
    covered with you the fact that she had been subpoenaed, after that, you
    had numerous conversations with Ms. Betty Currie; is that correct?
        A. I'm not sure I had numerous conversations with Ms. Betty Currie,
    but I have always during this administration been in touch with Ms.
    Currie.
        Q. And during those conversations with Ms. Betty Currie, did you
    let her know that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
        A. I think I've testified to that.
        Q. All right, and so would that have been fairly shortly after the
    meeting on December 19th with Ms. Lewinsky that you notified Betty
    Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had in fact been subpoenaed?
        A. I--I think that's safe to say, Counselor.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Senator, I--this would be a good time for a break,
    if that would meet with your approval, for lunch.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: And I'm--it's hard to estimate, and you probably
    don't trust lawyers when they tell you how long it's going to take
    after lunch, but--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Try your best. Do you want to make an estimate,
    or you'd rather not?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Oh, I think it would be less than an hour that I
    would have remaining, and most likely much shorter than that.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
        THE WITNESS: May I make a suggestion? It's 25 minutes to 1. Do you
    want to go to 1 o'clock?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I think a break would be helpful.
        THE WITNESS: To you or to me?
        [Laughter.]
        SENATOR THOMPSON: I think some of us have some scheduling issues,
    and I do understand that, so I'm open to any suggestions, Senator Dodd
    or anyone else, as to how long we want to take. Yesterday, they took an
    hour. I'm not--we have a conference and I could use a little extra
    time, I suppose, in addition to the hour, but it's not of major concern
    to me.
        I assume you want to get back as soon as possible.
        THE WITNESS: I'm prepared to forgo lunch and stay here as long as
    need be so we can finish. And we don't have to have lunch; we can just
    keep going, if it's all right with counsel.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Well, we've got some scheduling issues that we
    are going to have to take care of. So let's just make it--let's just
    make it--
        SENATOR DODD: That clock is a little fast, I think.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Is it?
        SENATOR DODD: Is that right? It's about 12:30?
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: It's 12:35.
        SENATOR DODD: So an hour and 15 minutes. Is that--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: What about--what about--let's come back at 1:45.
    That will be about, what--that's an hour and 10 minutes, isn't it, or 8
    minutes, something like that?
        All right. Without objection, then--
        SERGEANT-AT-ARMS: Senator, we have lunch outside here. It's
    sandwiches--
        SENATOR DODD: Can we go off the record?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Are we off the record? Let's go off the record.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record now at 12:33 p.m.
        [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken.]
                               afternoon session
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 1349 hours.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right. Mr. Hutchinson?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Senators.
                 direct examination by house managers--resumed
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, good afternoon.
        A. Good afternoon.
        Q. You testified very clearly earlier today that you were a close
    friend of the President. Would you also describe yourself as a friend
    of Mr. Kendall, sitting to my left, one of the attorneys for the
    President?
        A. Not only is Mr. Kendall my friend, Mr. Kendall has,
    unfortunately, the distinction of graduating from Wabash College, a
    little, small town in Indiana, and I'm a graduate of DePauw University,
    and we have a 100-year rivalry. And Mr. Kendall and I bet.
        Mr. Hutchinson, I am pleased to tell you that Mr. Kendall is in
    debt to me for 2 years because DePauw--
        MR. KENDALL: May I object?
        [Laughter.]
        THE WITNESS: --because DePauw University has defeated Wabash
    College two times in succession. And so, yes, we are very good friends.
    I have great respect for him as a person, as a lawyer, and despite his
    undergraduate degree from Wabash, I respect his intellect.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. May I assume from that answer that the answer to my question is
    yes?
        A. The answer--the answer to your question is, indubitably, yes.
        Q. Now I am going to ask another question in similar vein. You can
    answer yes or no. Do you consider yourself a friend of Cheryl Mills?
        A. That requires more than just a ``yes'' answer.
        Q. I do not want to shortchange her, but I know that--in fact, I
    think you might have, to a certain extent, mentored her. Is that a fair
    description?
        A. And vice versa.
        Q. All right. And Bruce Lindsey, is he also a friend of yours?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now--so when was the last time that you met with any member of
    the President's defense team?
        A. I have not had a meeting with a member of the President's
    defense team. They were right nextdoor to me just a few minutes ago,
    and we said hello, but we have not had a meeting. And maybe if you'd
    tell me about what, I can be more specific.
        Q. Well--and that's a good point. Certainly, we're lawyers, and we
    have casual conversations, and we visit and we exchange pleasantries,
    and that's the way life should be.
        I guess I was more specifically going to the question as to whether
    you have discussed with the President's defense team any matter of
    substance relating to the present proceedings in the United States
    Senate.
        A. Any matter of substance relating to these proceedings here in
    the United States Senate have been handled very ably by my lawyer, Mr.
    William Hundley.
        Q. And I understand that, but my question is--despite your able
    representation by Mr. Hundley--my question is--is whether you had any
    meetings or discussions with the President's defense team in regard to
    these proceedings.
        A. The answer is no.
        Q. Thank you.
        And has anyone briefed you other than your attorney, Mr. Hundley,
    on yesterday's deposition of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. The answer is no.
        Q. Now, you know Greg Craig?
        A. I do know Greg Craig.
        Q. And he's a member of the President's defense team as well?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And you have not had any meetings of substance with him in
    regard to the present proceedings?
        A. I have not.
        Q. And have you had any meetings with any of the President's
    defense team in regard to not just the present proceedings, but prior
    proceedings related to your testimony before the grand jury or the
    investigation by the OIC?
        A. I have had conversations with the President's lawyer, Mr.
    Bennett, and a conversation or two with Mr. Kendall on the issue of
    settlement of the Paula Jones case, and I believe I testified to that
    before the grand jury.
        Q. All right. Thank you, Mr. Jordan, and now let me move to another
    area.
        Do you recall an occasion in which Ms. Betty Currie came to see you
    in your office a few days before the President's deposition in the
    Jones case on January 17th?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. And I believe you have previously indicated that it was on a
    Thursday or Friday, which would have been around the 15th or 16th?
        A. Yeah. I've testified to that specifically as to the date in my
    grand jury testimony, and I stand on that testimony.
        Q. Certainly. But in general fashion, it would have been a couple
    of days before the President's testimony on January 17th?
        A. I believe that is correct, sir.
        Q. And did--was this meeting with Betty Currie originated by a
    telephone call with Ms. Betty Currie?
        A. Ms. Currie called me.
        Q. And did she explain to you why she needed to see you?
        A. Yes, she did.
        Q. And was that that she had a call from Michael Isikoff of
    Newsweek magazine?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And what did she say about that that caused her to call you?
        A. She had said that Mr. Isikoff had called her and wanted to
    interview her, having something to do with Monica Lewinsky, and I said
    to her, why don't you come to see me.
        Q. And why did you ask her to come see you, rather than just
    talking to her about it over the telephone?
        A. I felt more comfortable doing that, and I think she felt
    comfortable or more comfortable doing that, rather than doing it on the
    telephone. And so I asked her to come to my office, and she did.
        Q. Did you consider--or did she seem upset at the time that she
    called?
        A. I think she was concerned.
        Q. And as--you did in fact meet with her in your office?
        A. I did.
        Q. And what did she relate to you in your office?
        A. That Michael Isikoff was a friend of hers, and that Michael
    Isikoff had called to--pursuant to a story that he was about to write
    having to do with Ms. Lewinsky, and she--she was concerned about what
    to do. And I suggested to her that she talk to Bruce Lindsey and to
    Mike McCurry as to what she should do, Bruce Lindsey on the legal side
    and Mike McCurry on the communications side.
        Q. Did she explain to you what it was specifically that Mr. Isikoff
    was inquiring about in reference to Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. No. I don't remember the exact nature of Isikoff's inquiry. What
    I do remember is that Isikoff, a Newsweek magazine reporter, had called
    and was making these inquiries, and she was at a loss as to where to
    turn or to what to do, and I think that stemmed from the fact of some
    White House policy saying that before you talk to anybody in the media,
    you check it out.
        Q. And did she explain to you that she had already seen Bruce
    Lindsey about it before she came to see you?
        A. She did not.
        Q. And so you were basically telling her to see Bruce Lindsey, and
    if she had already seen that, then that might have not been that
    helpful?
        A. I don't know whether I was being helpful or not. I responded to
    her, and I gave her the advice to call Bruce Lindsey and to call Mike
    McCurry.
        Q. Let me refer you to the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, and
    perhaps that will help refresh you, and if not, perhaps you can respond
    to it.
        A. Sure.
        Q. And for reference purposes, I'm referring to the grand jury
    testimony of Ms. Betty Currie on May 6th, 1998, at page 122.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Is there a way I--
        MR. HUNDLEY: We don't have that. If you want to--if you want us to
    read along or just--
        THE WITNESS: Wait a minute. I might have it right here. What page?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: What's the exhibit number?
        MR. HUNDLEY: How long is it, Mr. Hutchinson?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: This would just be some short question-and-answers.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Why don't you just read it? We don't--go ahead.
        THE WITNESS: Oh, fine.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. I'm going to read it, and if there's--it's at page 122, but this
    just puts it in context.
        The question: ``Ms. Currie, if I'm not mistaken, if I could ask you
    a couple of questions. When you found out Mr. Isikoff was curious about
    the courier receipts, you were concerned enough to go visit Vernon
    Jordan?''
        The answer is: ``Correct.''
        And I'm skipping on down. I'm trying to point to a couple of things
    that are of interest.
        And question: ``And you went to Bruce Lindsey because you said you
    knew that he was working on the matter?''
        And question: ``What did Bruce tell you after you told him this?''
        And answer: ``He told me not to call him back, referring to Mr.
    Isikoff, make him work for the story. I remember that.''
        And then she refers to going to see Mr. Jordan.
        Why did you tell him, or, ``Why did you call Mr. Jordan?''
        Answer: ``Because I had a comfort level with Vernon, and I wanted
    to see what he had to say about it.''
        MR. KENDALL: Counsel, excuse me. I object to your reading of that,
    but my understanding that the conversation with Bruce Lindsey occurred
    later. Are you representing that it occurred before the visit to Mr.
    Jordan? I don't have the transcript in front of me.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Well, I'm--I'm not making a representation one way
    or the other. I'm just representing what Ms. Currie testified to, and
    that is the context of it, that the visit to Mr. Lindsey was prior to
    going to see Mr. Jordan. And that is at page 122 through 130 of Betty
    Currie's transcript of May 6th, 1998.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. But the first question, Mr. Jordan, is that she refers to
    courier receipts. I believe that was referring to courier records of
    gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the President.
        Did Ms. Currie come to you and say specifically that Mr. Isikoff
    was inquiring about courier records on gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to the
    President?
        A. I have no recollection of her telling me about the specific
    inquiry that Isikoff was making. The issue for her was whether or not
    she should see him, and I said to her, before she made any decision
    about that, that she should talk to these two particular people on the
    White House staff.
        Q. Well, again, if Ms. Currie refers to the courier receipts on
    gifts, would that be in conflict in any way with your recollection as
    to what Mr. Isikoff was inquiring about, what Ms. Currie told you?
        A. I stand on what I've just said to you.
        Q. Now, you followed this case, and, of course--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: While we're on that subject, does counsel need
    any additional time to look over that? I don't want to leave an
    objection on the record. If you feel like you need to press it--
        SENATOR DODD: Do you have a copy of the document?
        MR. KENDALL: Senator Thompson, we don't have the full copy of the
    Currie transcript. This was not--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Why don't we reserve this, then, and you can be
    looking at it, and then we'll--we'll take it up a little later.
        MR. KENDALL: We're still actually missing some pages of the
    transcript. I don't know if somebody has that.
        SENATOR DODD: Why don't you see if you can't get them for them?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Okay.
        SENATOR DODD: All right?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: We'll let them be doing that, if that's okay with
    everyone and--
        SENATOR DODD: And you'll withdraw your objection as of right now,
    or--
        MR. KENDALL: Yes. I'll withdraw it until I can scrutinize the
    pages, but I may then renew it.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right, sir.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. On--there's been some testimony in this case by Ms. Lewinsky
    that on December 28th, there was a gift exchange with the President;
    that subsequent to that, Ms. Currie went out and picked up gifts from
    Ms. Lewinsky, and she put those gifts under Ms. Currie's bed. Are you
    familiar with that basic scenario?
        A. I read about it and heard about it. I do not know that because
    that was told to me by Ms. Lewinsky or by Ms. Currie.
        Q. Certainly, and I'm just setting that forth as a backdrop for my
    questioning.
        Now, you know, I guess it's--it might be difficult to understand a
    great deal of concern about a news media call, but if that news media
    call was about gifts or evidence that was in fact under Ms. Currie's
    bed or involved in that exchange, then that would be a little
    heightened concern.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Would that seem fair?
        A. I do not, as I've said to you, know specifically the nature of
    Mr. Isikoff's inquiry to Ms. Currie, and I know nothing at that
    particular time about Mr. Isikoff making an inquiry about gifts under
    the bed.
        Q. All right. I refer you to your grand jury testimony of March 5,
    1998, at page 73, when the question was asked of you about Ms. Currie's
    visit to you, ``What exactly did she tell you?'' and your answer: ``She
    told me that she had a call from Isikoff from Newsweek magazine, who
    was calling to make inquiries about Monica Lewinsky and some taped
    conversations, and I said you have to talk to Mike McCurry and you have
    to talk to Bruce Lindsey.''
        And so, despite your statement today that you have no recollection
    as to what she told you, going back to your March testimony, you
    referred to her relating Isikoff inquiring about taped conversations.
        A. And that's what it says, ``taped conversations,'' and I stand by
    that.
        What was taped, I don't know.
        Q. Well, I don't think you previously today mentioned taped
    conversations.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Well, I don't really think your question would have
    called for that response, but I'm not going to object.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Hundley.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. I'm trying to get to the heart of the matter. Ms. Currie is
    concerned enough that she leaves the White House and goes to see Mr.
    Vernon Jordan, and she raises an issue with you and, according to your
    testimony, you told her simply, you need to go see Mike McCurry or
    Bruce Lindsey.
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And it's your testimony that she never raised with you any issue
    concerning the--Mr. Isikoff inquiring about gifts and records of gifts
    by Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I stand by what I--what you just read to me about--from my
    testimony about tapes conversations. I have no recollection about gifts
    or gifts under the bed.
        Q. Okay. Are you saying it did not happen, or you have no
    recollection?
        A. I certainly have no recollection of it.
        Q. Well, do you have a specific recollection that it did not
    happen, that she never raised the issue of gifts with you?
        A. It is my judgment that it did not happen.
        Q. Did she seem satisfied with your advice to go see Mr. Bruce
    Lindsey, who she presumably had already seen?
        A. I assumed that she took my advice.
        Q. Did she discuss in any way with you the incident on December
    28th when she retrieved the gifts--
        A. She did not.
        Q. --from Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. She did not.
        Q. Now, a few days later, the President of the United States
    testified before the grand jury in the--excuse me--testified in his
    deposition in the Jones case.
        After the President's deposition, did he have a conversation with
    you on that day?
        A. Yes. I'm sure we talked.
        Q. And then, on the next day, and without getting into the entire
    record of telephone calls, there was, is it fair to say, a flurry of
    telephone calls in which everyone was trying to locate Ms. Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. The next day being which day?
        Q. The next day would have been--well, January 18th.
        A. That's Sunday.
        Q. Correct.
        MR. HUNDLEY: I think it's the 19th.
        THE WITNESS: I think it's the 19th when there was a flurry of
    calls.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I think you're absolutely correct.
        THE WITNESS: We'll be glad to be helpful to you in any way we can.
        MR. HUNDLEY: We're even now. I was wrong on one. You were wrong.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: That's fair enough, fair enough.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And on the 19th--of course, the 18th is in the record where the
    President visited with Ms. Betty Currie at the White House--on the
    19th, which would have been Monday, was there on that day a flurry of
    activity in which there were numerous telephone calls, trying to locate
    Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Yes. And you have a record of those telephone calls, and those
    telephone calls, Congressman, were driven by two events--first, the
    Drudge Report; and later in the afternoon, driven by the fact that, uh,
    I had been informed by Frank Carter, counsel to Ms. Lewinsky, that he
    had been relieved of his responsibilities as her counsel. And that is
    the basis for these numerous telephone calls.
        Q. And you yourself were engaged in some of those telephone calls
    trying to locate Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Oh, yes, to ask her--I mean, I had just found out that she had
    been involved in these conversations with this person called Linda
    Tripp, and that was of some curiosity and concern to me.
        Q. And you had heard Ms. Tripp's name previously on December 31st
    at the Park Hyatt?
        A. I've testified already that I never heard the name ``Linda
    Tripp'' until I saw the Drudge Report. I did not testify that I heard
    the name ``Linda Tripp'' on December 31st.
        Q. So the first time you heard Ms. Tripp's name was on January 19th
    when the Drudge Report came out?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And you had already secured a--
        A. The 18th, I believe it was.
        MR. HUNDLEY: Eighteenth.
        THE WITNESS: Not the 19th.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Thank you.
        You had already secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And you--
        A. Found a lawyer.
        Q. And a lawyer. And, as you had said at one point, job finished--
    fini. Why is it that you felt like you needed to join in the search for
    Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. If you had been sitting where I was, and all of a sudden you
    found out, after getting her a job and after getting her a lawyer, that
    there's a report that says that she's been--she's been taped by some
    person named Linda Tripp, I think just, mother wit, common sense,
    judgment, would have suggested that you would be interested in what
    that was about.
        Q. And were you trying to provide assistance to the President of
    the United States in trying to locate Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I was not trying to help the President of the United States. At
    that point, I was trying to satisfy myself as to what had gone on with
    this person for whom I had gotten both a job and a lawyer.
        Q. Now, subsequent to this, you felt it necessary to make a public
    statement on January 22 in front of the Park Hyatt Hotel?
        A. I did make a public statement on January 22nd at the Park Hyatt
    Hotel.
        Q. And what was the reason that you gave this public statement?
        A. I gave the public statement because I was being rebuked and
    scorned and talked about, sure as you're born, and I felt some need to
    explain to the public what had happened.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: All right. And I have a copy of that public
    statement that is marked as Grand Jury Exhibit 87, but we will mark it
    as Exhibit--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Seven, I believe.
        SENATOR DODD: We've gone through 9, haven't we? You're marking it.
    If you're only marking it, I think we--
        SENATOR THOMPSON: We have six exhibits, didn't we?
        SENATOR DODD: We've done more than that, haven't we?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I have nine.
        SENATOR DODD: Nine. Did you enter 9, or did you just note it?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Six were entered, two were sustained, I think.
        MS. MILLS: I have seven.
        SENATOR DODD: Nine, you have here, but we didn't--I don't know if
    you--you don't have 9 as an exhibit, or just noted?
        MR. GRIFFITH: Nine was Grand Jury 44.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: We just noted it, I believe.
        SENATOR DODD: You didn't ask that it be entered in the record?
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I believe that's correct.
        SENATOR DODD: Yes.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: How about those we sustained objections to? That
    doesn't count.
        SENATOR DODD: Well, they're still marked.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: They were marked?
        SENATOR DODD: So which one should this be? Ten?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: This will be 10?
        SENATOR DODD: This is 10, then.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: All right, Number 10.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 10 marked for identification.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Do you have a copy of that, Mr. Jordan?
        A. I have a copy of it. Thank you.
        Q. Thank you. Now, prior to making this public statement, did you
    consult with the President's attorney, Mr. Bob Bennett?
        A. I did not, not about this statement.
        Q. Did you consult with the President's attorney, Mr. Bob Bennett?
        A. I did not consult with him. Mr. Bennett came to my office and
    met with me and my attorney, Mr. Hundley, in my office.
        Q. All right. And that was sometime prior to making this statement?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And it would be--and it would have been between the 19th and the
    22nd?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. It would have been after all of the public issues--
        A. It was after--
        Q. --came up?
        A. --I returned from Washington, and it may have been--from New
    York--and it may have been, I think, Wednesday afternoon.
        Q. Now, in this statement, you indicated that you referred Ms.
    Lewinsky for interviews at American Express and at Revlon.
        A. That is correct, and Young & Rubicam.
        Q. And in fact, as your testimony today indicates, you did more
    than refer her for interviews, did you not?
        A. Explain what you mean, and I'll be happy to answer.
        Q. Well, in fact, when the interview went poorly, according to Ms.
    Lewinsky, you made calls to get her a second interview and to make it
    happen.
        A. That is safe to say.
        Q. All right. And I think you've also described your involvement in
    the job search as running the job search?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And so it was a little bit more than simply referring her for
    interviews. Is that a fair statement?
         That's a fair statement.
        Q. And then, in this statement, you also indicate that ``Ms.
    Lewinsky was referred to me by Ms. Betty Currie''----
        A. Yes.
        Q. --is that correct?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And in fact, you were acting, as you stated, at the behest of
    the President?
        A. Through Ms. Currie. I'm satisfied with this statement as
    correct.
        Q. So--but you were acting in the job search at the behest of the
    President, as you have previously testified?
        A. I've testified to that.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Now, we would offer this as Exhibit No. 10.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Without objection, it will be made a part of the
    record.
        [Jordan Deposition Exhibit No. 10 received in evidence.]
        MR. HUNDLEY: The only problem with this line of questioning is I
    think I wrote that thing.
        [Laughter.]
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. After you--after you last testified before the grand jury in
    June of '98, since then, the President testified before the grand jury
    in August, and prior to his testimony before the grand jury in August,
    he made his statement to the Nation in which he--I believe the language
    was admitted to ``an inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.''
        Now, at the time that you testified in June of '98, you did not
    have this information, did you?
        A. He had not made that statement on the 17th of August, that's for
    sure.
        Q. And was he in fact, to your knowledge, still denying the
    existence of that relationship?
        A. I think, as I remember the statement, he said he misled the
    American people.
        Q. And subsequent to this admission, did you talk to your friend,
    the President of the United States, about his false statements to you?
        A. I have not spoken to him about any false statements, one way or
    the other.
        Q. Now, you have testified that you in the job search were acting
    at the behest of the President of the United States; is that correct?
        A. I stand on that.
        Q. And there is no question but that Ms. Monica Lewinsky understood
    that?
        A. I have to assume that she understood that.
        Q. Okay. And in the law, there is the rule of agency and apparent
    authority. Is it safe to assume that Ms. Lewinsky believed that you had
    apparent authority on behalf of the President of the United States?
        A. I think I know enough about the law to say that the law of
    agency is not applicable in this situation where there was a potential
    romance and not a work situation. I think the law of agency has to do
    with a work situation and an employment situation and not having to do
    with some sort of romance. I think that's right.
        Q. Well, let me take it out of the legal realm.
        A. You raised it--I didn't.
        Q. And let's put it in the realm of mother wit. Ms. Lewinsky is
    looking to you as a friend of the President of the United States,
    knowing that you're acting at the behest of the President of the United
    States. Is it not reasonable to assume that when she communicates
    something to you or she hears something from you, that it's as if she
    is talking to someone who is acting for the President?
        A. No. When she's talking to me, she's talking to me, and I can
    only speak for me and act for me.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Could I have just a moment?
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Yes.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: At this time, Your Honors, the House Managers would
    reserve the balance of its time.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Counsel?
        MR. HUNDLEY: Fine.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: All right.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
        THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. Hutchinson.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Kendall?
            examination by counsel for the president by mr. kendall
        Q. Mr. Jordan, is there anything you think it appropriate to add to
    the record?
        A. Mr. Hutchinson, I'd just like to----
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I'm going to object to the form of that question. I
    think that even though--and that's not even a leading question; that's
    an open-ended question that calls for a narrative response. And I think
    in fairness to the record that that is just simply too broad for this
    deposition purpose.
        SENATOR THOMPSON: Mr. Kendall, is there any chance of perhaps your
    rephrasing the question somewhat?
        MR. KENDALL: Certainly.
        BY MR. KENDALL:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, you were asked questions about job assistance. Would
    you describe the job assistance you have over your career given to
    people who have come to you requesting help finding a job or finding
    employment?
        A. Well, I've known about job assistance and have for a very long
    time. I learned about it dramatically when I finished at Howard
    University Law School, 1960, to return home to Atlanta, Georgia to look
    for work. In the process of my--during my senior year, it was very
    clear to me that no law firm in Atlanta would hire me. It was very
    clear to me that, uh, I could not get a job as a black lawyer in the
    city government, the county government, the State government or the
    Federal Government.
        And thanks to my high school bandmaster, Mr. Kenneth Days, who
    called his fraternity brother, Donald L. Hollowell, a civil rights
    lawyer, and said, ``That Jordan boy is a fine boy, and you ought to
    consider him for a job at your law firm,'' that's when I learned about
    job referral, and that job referral by Kenneth Days, now going to Don
    Hollowell, got me a job as a civil rights lawyer working for Don
    Hollowell for $35 a week.
        I have never forgotten Kenneth Days' generosity. And given the fact
    that all of the other doors for employment as a black lawyer graduating
    from Howard University were open to me, that's always--that's always
    been etched in my heart and my mind, and as a result, because I stand
    on Mr. Days' shoulders and Don Hollowell's shoulders, I felt some
    responsibility to the extent that I could be helpful or got in a
    position to be helpful, that I would do that.
        And there is I think ample evidence, both in the media and by
    individuals across this country, that at such times that I have been
    presented with that opportunity that I have taken advantage of that
    opportunity, and I think that I have been successful at it.
        Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in
    any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones
    case?
        A. No.
                                     ______

        In the Senate of the United States Sitting for the Trial of the
       Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
                                     States

               excerpts of video deposition of sidney blumenthal
                (Wednesday, February 3, 1999, Washington, D.C.)
        SENATOR SPECTER: If none, I will swear the witness.
        Mr. Blumenthal, will you please stand up and raise your right hand?
        You, Sidney Blumenthal, do swear that the evidence you shall give
    in this case now pending between the United States and William
    Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, shall be the truth,
    the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
        MR. BLUMENTHAL: I do.
        Whereupon, SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL was called as a witness and, after
    having been first duly sworn by Senator Specter, was examined and
    testified as follows:
        SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you.
        THE WITNESS: Thank you.
        SENATOR SPECTER: The House Managers may begin their questioning.
        MR. ROGAN: Thank you, Senator.
                         examination by house managers
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, first, good morning.
        A. Good morning to you.
        Q. My name is Jim Rogan. As you know, I am one of the House
    Managers and will be conducting this deposition pursuant to authority
    from the United States Senate.
        First, as a preliminary matter, we have never had the pleasure of
    meeting or speaking until this morning, correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. If any question I ask is unclear or is in any way ambiguous, if
    you would please call that to my attention, I will be happy to try to
    restate it or rephrase the question.
        A. Thank you.
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, where are you currently employed?
        A. At the White House.
        Q. Is that in the Executive Office of the President?
        A. It is.
        Q. What is your current title?
        A. My title is Assistant to the President.
        Q. Was that your title on January 21st, 1998?
        A. It was.
        Q. For the record, that is the date that The Washington Post story
    appeared that essentially broke the Monica Lewinsky story?
        A. Yes.
        Q. On that date, were you the Assistant to the President as to any
    specific subject matter?
        A. I dealt with a variety of areas.
        Q. Did your duties entail any specific matter, or were you
    essentially a jack-of-all-trades at the White House for the President?
        A. Well, I was hired to help the President develop his ideas and
    themes about the new consensus for the country, and I was hired to deal
    with problems like the impact of globalization, democracy
    internationally and domestically, the future of civil society, and the
    Anglo-American Project; and I also was hired to work on major speeches.
        Q. You testified previously that your duties are such as the
    President and Chief of Staff shall decide. Would that be a fair
    characterization?
        A. Oh, yes.
        Q. How long have you been employed in this capacity?
        A. Since August 11th, 1997.
        Q. And in the course of your duties, do you personally advise the
    President as to the matters that you just shared with us?
        A. Yes.
        Q. How often do you meet with the President personally to advise
    him?
        A. It varies. Sometimes several times a week; sometimes I go
    without seeing him for a number of weeks at a time.
        Q. Is dealing with the media part of your--your job?
        A. Yes. It's part of my job and part of the job of most people in
    the White House.
        Q. Was that also one of your responsibilities on January 21st,
    1998, when the Monica Lewinsky story broke?
        A. Yes.
        Q. You previously testified that you had a role in the Monica
    Lewinsky matter after the story broke in The Washington Post on that
    date, at least in reference to your White House duties; is that
    correct?
        A. I'm unclear on what you mean by ``a role.''
        Q. Specifically, you testified that you attended meetings in the
    White House in the Office of Legal Counsel in the morning and in the
    evening almost every day once the story broke?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And what times did those meetings occur after the story broke,
    these regular meetings?
        A. The morning meetings occurred around 8:30, after the morning
    message meeting, and the evening meetings occurred around 6:45.
        Q. Are those meetings still ongoing?
        A. No.
        Q. Can you tell me when those meetings ended?
        A. Oh, I'd say about the time that the impeachment trial started.
        Q. That would be about a month or--about a month ago?
        A. Yeah, something like that.
        Q. Thank you.
        A. I don't recall exactly.
        Q. Sure. But up until that point, were these essentially regularly
    scheduled meetings, twice a day, 8:30 in the morning and 6:45 in the
    evening?
        A. Right.
        Q. Did you generally attend those meetings?
        A. Generally.
        Q. Now, initially, when you testified before the grand jury on
    February 26th, 1998, your first grand jury appearance, you stated that
    these twice-daily meetings dealt exclusively with the Monica Lewinsky
    matter, correct?
        A. They dealt with our press reaction, how we would respond to
    press reports dealing with it. This was a huge story, and we were being
    inundated with hundreds of calls.
        Q. Right.
        A. So--
        Q. What I'm--what I'm trying to decipher is that at least
    initially, at the time of your first grand jury appearance, which was
    about a month after the story broke--
        A. Right.
        Q. --the meetings were exclusively related to Monica Lewinsky. Is
    that correct?
        A. Pretty much.
        Q. And then, 4 months later, when you testified before the grand
    jury in June, you said these meetings were still ongoing, and you
    referenced them at that time as discussing the policy, political, legal
    and media impact of scandals and how to deal with them. Do you remember
    that testimony?
        A. If I could see it.
        Q. Certainly. I'm happy to invite your attention to your grand jury
    testimony of June 4th, 1998, page 25, lines 1 through 5.
        MR. ROGAN: And that would be, for the Senators' and counsel's
    benefit--I believe that's in Tab 4 of the materials provided.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: Right. I see it.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. You've had a chance to review that, Mr. Blumenthal?
        A. I have.
        Q. And that--that's correct testimony?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Thank you.
        At the time you spoke of--you used the word ``scandals'' in the
    plural, and you were asked on June 4th what other scandals were
    discussed and you said they range from the Paula Jones trial to our
    China policy. Is that a fair statement?
        A. Oh, yes, yes. I do.
        Q. Who typically attended those meetings?
        A. As I recall, there were about a dozen or so people, sometimes
    more, sometimes less.
        Q. Do you remember the names of the people?
        A. I'll try to.
        Q. Would it be helpful if I directed your attention to a couple of
    passages in the grand jury testimony?
        A. Sure, if you'd like.
        MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senate and counsel's attention to the
    February 26th grand jury testimony, page 11, lines 2 through 16.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: Sure. Yeah.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. That would be Tab Number 1.
        A. Right, I see that.
        What it says here is that the names listed are Charles Ruff, Lanny
    Breuer, who is right over here, Cheryl Mills, Bruce Lindsey, John
    Podesta, Rahm Emanuel, Paul Begala, Jim Kennedy, Mike McCurry, Joe
    Lockhart, Ann Lewis, Adam Goldberg, Don Goldberg, and that's--those are
    the names that I--that I recall.
        Q. Thank you.
        And just for my benefit, Mr. Ruff, Mr. Breuer, Ms. Mills, and Mr.
    Lindsey, those are all White House counsel?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Could you just briefly identify for the record the other
    individuals that are--that are listed in your testimony?
        A. Sure. John Podesta was Deputy Chief of Staff. Rahm Emanuel was a
    Senior Advisor. Paul Begala had the title of Counselor. Jim Kennedy was
    in the Legal Counsel Office. Mike McCurry was Press Secretary. Joe
    Lockhart at that time was Deputy Press Secretary. Ann Lewis was
    Director of Communications, still is. Adam Goldberg worked as a--as an
    Assistant in the Legal Counsel Office, and Don Goldberg worked in
    Legislative Affairs.
        Q. Thank you.
        Mr. Blumenthal, specifically inviting your attention to January
    21st, 1998, you testified before the grand jury that on that date, you
    personally spoke to the President regarding the Monica Lewinsky matter,
    correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. When you spoke to the President, did you discuss The Washington
    Post story about Ms. Lewinsky that appeared that morning?
        A. I don't recall if we talked about that article specifically.
        Q. Do you recall on June 25th testifying before the grand jury, and
    I'm quoting, ``We were speaking about the story that appeared that
    morning''?
        A. Right. We were--we were speaking about that story, but I don't
    know if we referred to The Post.
        Q. Thank you.
        You are familiar with The Washington Post story that broke that
    day?
        A. I am.
        Q. That story essentially stated that the Office of Independent
    Counsel was investigating whether the President made false statements
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case, correct, to
    the best of your recollection?
        A. If you could repeat that?
        Q. Sure. The story stated that the Office of Independent Counsel
    was investigating whether the President made false statements about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case.
        A. Right.
        Q. And also that the Office of Independent Counsel was
    investigating whether the President obstructed justice in the Jones
    case. Is that your best recollection of what that story was about?
        A. Yes.
        Q. How did you end up speaking to the President on that specific
    date?
        A. I don't remember exactly whether he had summoned me or whether I
    had asked to speak him--to him.
        Q. And I realize, by the way, I--just so you know, I'm not trying
    to trick you or anything. I realize this is a year later--
        A. Right.
        Q. --and your testimony was many months ago, and so if I invite
    your attention to previous grand jury testimony to refresh your
    recollection, I don't want you to feel that in any way I'm trying to
    imply that you're not being candid in your testimony.
        With that, if I may invite your--your attention to the June 4th
    grand jury testimony on page 47, lines 5 through 6.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Let me see if this helps to refresh your recollection. You said,
    ``It was about a week before the State of the Union speech.''
        A. I see.
        Q. ``I was in my office, and the President asked me to come to his
    office.''
        Does that help to refresh your recollection?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And so you now remember that the President asked to speak with
    you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you go to the Oval Office?
        A. Yes.
        Q. During that conversation, were you alone with the President?
        A. I was.
        Q. Do you remember if the door was closed?
        A. It was.
        Q. When you met with the President, did you relate to him a
    conversation you had with the First Lady earlier that day?
        A. I did.
        Q. What did you tell the President the First Lady told you earlier
    that day?
        A. I believe that I told him that the First Lady had called me
    earlier in the day, and in the light of the story in The Post had told
    me that the President had helped troubled people in the past and that
    he had done it many times and that he was a compassionate person and
    that he helped people also out of his religious conviction and that
    this was part of--part of his nature.
        Q. And did she also tell you that one of the other reasons he
    helped people was out of his personal temperament?
        A. Yes. That's what I mean by that.
        Q. And the First Lady also at least shared with you her opinion
    that he was being attacked for political motives?
        MR. McDANIEL: Can I get a clarification, Senator--Senator Specter?
    The earlier question, I thought, had been what Mr. Blumenthal had
    relayed to the President had been said by the First Lady.
        MR. ROGAN: That's correct.
        MR. McDANIEL: And now the questions are back--it seems to me have
    moved to another topic--
        MR. ROGAN: No. That's--
        MR. McDANIEL: --which is what--
        MR. ROGAN: I'm--
        MR. McDANIEL: --did the First Lady say.
        MR. ROGAN: And I thank--I thank the gentleman for that
    clarification. I'm specifically asking what the witness relayed to the
    President respecting his conversation with--his earlier conversation
    with the First Lady.
        MR. McDANIEL: Thank you.
        Do you understand that, what he said?
        THE WITNESS: I understand the distinction, and I don't--
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. I'll restate the question, if that would help.
        A. Please.
        Q. Do you remember telling the President that the First Lady said
    to you that she felt that with--in reference to this story that he was
    being attacked for political motives?
        A. I remember her saying that to me, yes.
        Q. And you relayed that to the President?
        A. I'm not sure I relayed that to the President. I may have just
    relayed the gist of the conversation to him. I don't--I'm not sure
    whether I relayed the entire conversation.
        MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators' and counsel's attention to the
    June 4th, 1998, testimony of Mr. Blumenthal, page 47, beginning at line
    5.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, let me just read a passage to you and tell me if
    this helps to refresh your memory.
        A. Mm-hmm.
        MR. ROGAN: Do you have that, Lanny?
        MR. BREUER: Yes, I do. Thank you.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Reading at line--at line 5, ``I was in my office, and the
    President asked me to come to the Oval Office. I was seeing him
    frequently in this period about the State of the Union and Blair's
    visit''--and I--that was Prime Minister Tony Blair, as an aside,
    correct?
        A. That's right.
        Q. Thank you.
        And then again, reading at line 7, ``So I went up to the Oval
    Office and I began the discussion, and I said that I had received--that
    I had spoken to the First Lady that day in the afternoon about the
    story that had broke in the morning, and I related to the President my
    conversation with the First Lady and the conversation went as follows.
    The First Lady said that she was distressed that the President was
    being attacked, in her view, for political motives for his ministry of
    a troubled person. She said that the President ministers to troubled
    people all the time,'' and then it goes on to--
        A. Right.
        Q. --relate the substance of the answer you just gave.
        Does that help to refresh your recollection with respect to what
    you told the President, the First Lady had said earlier?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Thank you.
        And do you now remember that the First Lady had indicated to you
    that she felt the President was being attacked for political motives?
        A. Well, I remember she said that to me.
        Q. And just getting us back on track, a few moments ago, I think
    you--you shared with us that the First Lady said that the President
    helped troubled people and he had done it many times in the past.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you remember testifying before the grand jury on that
    subject, saying that the First Lady said he has done this dozens, if
    not hundreds, of times with people--
        A. Yes.
        Q. --with troubled people?
        A. I recall that.
        Q. After you related the conversation that you had with the First
    Lady to the President, what do you remember saying to the President
    next about the subject of Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Well, I recall telling him that I understood he felt that way,
    and that he did help people, but that he should stop trying to help
    troubled people personally; that troubled people are troubled and that
    they can get you in a lot of messes and that you had to cut yourself
    off from it and you just had to do it. That's what I recall saying to
    him.
        Q. Do you also remember in that conversation saying to him, ``You
    really need to not do that at this point, that you can't get near
    anybody who is even remotely crazy. You're President''?
        A. Yes. I think that was a little later in the conversation, but I
    do recall saying that.
        Q. When you told the President that he should avoid contact with
    troubled people, what did the President say to you in response?
        A. I'm trying to remember the sequence of it. He--he said that was
    very difficult for him. He said he--he felt a need to help troubled
    people, and it was hard for him to--to cut himself off from doing that.
        Q. Do you remember him saying specifically, ``It's very difficult
    for me to do that, given how I am. I want to help people''?
        A. I recall--I recall that.
        Q. And when the President referred to trying to help people, did
    you understand him in that conversation to be referring to Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. I think it included Monica Lewinsky, but also many others.
        Q. Right, but it was your understanding that he was all--he was
    specifically referring to Monica Lewinsky in that list of people that
    he tried to help?
        A. I believe that--that was implied.
        Q. Do you remember being asked that question before the grand jury
    and giving the answer, ``I understood that''?
        A. If you could point it out to me, I'd be happy to see it.
        Q. Certainly.
        MR. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators' and counsel's attention to the
    June 25th, 1998, grand jury, page 5, I believe it's at lines 6 through
    8.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: Yes, I see that. Thank you.
        By MR. ROGAN:
        Q. You recall that now?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Thank you.
        Mr. Blumenthal, did the President then relate a conversation he had
    with Dick Morris to you?
        A. He did.
        Q. What was the substance of that conversation, as the President
    related it to you?
        A. He said that he had spoken to Dick Morris earlier that day, and
    that Dick Morris had told him that if Nixon, Richard Nixon, had given a
    nationally televised speech at the beginning of the Watergate affair,
    acknowledging everything he had done wrong, he may well have survived
    it, and that was the conversation that Dick Morris--that's what Dick
    Morris said to the President.
        Q. Did it sound to you like the President was suggesting perhaps he
    would go on television and give a national speech?
        A. Well, I don't know. I didn't know.
        Q. And when the President related the substance of his conversation
    with Dick Morris to you, how did you respond to that?
        A. I said to the President, ``Well, what have you done wrong?''
        Q. Did he reply?
        A. He did.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said, ``I haven't done anything wrong.''
        Q. And what did you say to that response?
        A. Well, I said, as I recall, ``That's one of the stupidest ideas I
    ever heard. If you haven't done anything wrong, why would you do
    that?''
        Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened
    between him and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. As I recall, he did.
        Q. What did the President tell you?
        A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point
    and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he
    had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him.
    And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the
    stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would
    claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and
    that she would tell people.
        Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky
    would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her
    peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
        A. Yes, that's right.
        Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm
    quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot
    of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
        A. Yes. He told me that.
        Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the
    President?
        A. Right, in--in that sequence.
        Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared
    this information with you?
        A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.
        Q. And at that point, did you repeat your earlier admonition to him
    as far as not trying to help troubled people?
        A. I did. I--I think that's when I told him that you can't get near
    crazy people, uh, or troubled people. Uh, you're President; you just
    have to separate yourself from this.
        Q. And I'm not sure, based on your testimony, if you gave that
    admonition to him once or twice. Let me--let me clarify for you why my
    questioning suggested it was twice. In your grand jury testimony on
    June the 4th, at page 49, beginning at line 25, you began the sentence
    by saying, and I quote, ``And I repeated to the President''--
        A. Right.
        Q. --``that he really needed never to be near people who were''--
        A. Right.
        Q. --``troubled like this,'' and so forth. Do you remember now if
    you--if that was correct? Did you find yourself in that conversation
    having to repeat the admonition to him that you'd given earlier?
        A. I'm sure I did. Uh, I felt--I felt that pretty strongly. He
    shouldn't be involved with troubled people.
        Q. Do you remember the President also saying something about being
    like a character in a novel?
        A. I do.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. Uh, he said to me, uh, that, uh, he felt like a character in a
    novel. Uh, he felt like somebody, uh, surrounded by, uh, an oppressive
    environment that was creating a lie about him. He said he felt like,
    uh, the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.
        Q. Did he also say he felt like he can't get the truth out?
        A. Yes, I--I believe he said that.
        Q. Politicians are always loathe to confess their ignorance,
    particularly on videotape. I will do so. I'm unfamiliar with the novel
    Darkness at Noon. Did you--do you have any familiarity with that, or
    did you understand what the President meant by that?
        A. I--I understood what he meant. I--I was familiar with the book.
        Q. What--what did he mean by that, per your understanding?
        A. Uh, the book is by Arthur Koestler, who was somebody who had
    been a communist and had become disillusioned with communism. And it's
    an anti-communist novel. It's about, uh, uh, the Stalinist purge trials
    and somebody who was a loyal communist who then is put in one of
    Stalin's prisons and held on trial and executed, uh, and it's about his
    trial.
        Q. Did you understand what the President was trying to communicate
    when he related his situation to the character in that novel?
        A. I think he felt that the world was against him.
        Q. I thought only Members of Congress felt that way.
        Mr. Blumenthal, did you ever ask the President if he was ever alone
    with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I did.
        Q. What was his response?
        A. I asked him a number of questions that appeared in the press
    that day. I asked him, uh, if he were alone, and he said that, uh, he
    was within eyesight or earshot of someone when he was with her.
        Q. What other questions do you remember asking him?
        A. Uh, there was a story in the paper that, uh, there were recorded
    messages, uh, left by him on her voice-mail and I asked him if that
    were true.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said, uh, that it was, that, uh, he had called her.
        Q. You had asked him about a press account that said there were
    potentially a number of telephone messages left by the President for
    Monica Lewinsky. And he relayed to you that he called her. Did he tell
    you how many times he called her?
        A. He--he did. He said he called once. He said he called when, uh,
    Betty Currie's brother had died, to tell her that.
        Q. And other than that one time that he shared that information
    with you, he shared no other information respecting additional calls?
        A. No.
        Q. He never indicated to you that there were over 50 telephone
    conversations between himself and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Based on your conversation with the President at that time,
    would it have surprised you to know that there were over 50--there were
    records of over 50 telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky and the
    President?
        A. Would I have been surprised at that time?
        Q. Yes.
        A. Uh, I--to see those records and if he--I don't fully grasp the
    question here. Could you--would I have been surprised?
        Q. Based on the President's response to your question at that time,
    would it have surprised you to have been told or to have later learned
    that there were over 50 recorded--50 conversations between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I did later learn that, uh, as the whole country did, uh, and I
    was surprised.
        Q. When the President told you that Monica Lewinsky threatened him,
    did you ever feel compelled to report that information to the Secret
    Service?
        A. No.
        Q. The FBI or any other law enforcement organization?
        A. No.
        Q. I'm assuming that a threat to the President from somebody in the
    White House would normally send off alarm bells among staff.
        A. It wouldn't--
        MR. McDANIEL: Well, I'd like to object to the question, Senator.
    There's no testimony that Mr. Blumenthal learned of a threat
    contemporaneously with it being made by someone in the White House.
    This is a threat that was relayed to him sometime afterwards by someone
    who was no longer employed in the White House. So I think the question
    doesn't relate to the testimony of this witness.
        MR. ROGAN: Respectfully, I'm not sure what the legal basis of the
    objection is. The evidence before us is that the President told the
    witness that Monica Lewinsky threatened him.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: We've conferred and overrule the objection on the
    ground that it calls for an answer; that, however the witness chooses
    to answer it, was not a contemporaneous threat, or he thought it was
    stale, or whatever he thinks. But the objection is overruled.
        MR. ROGAN: Thank you.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Let me--let me restate the question, if I may. Mr. Blumenthal,
    would a threat--
        SENATOR SPECTER: We withdraw the ruling.
        [Laughter.]
        MR. McDANIEL: I withdraw my objection, then.
        [Laughter.]
        MR. ROGAN: Senator Specter, the ruling is just fine by my light.
    I'm just going to try to simplify the question for the witness'
    benefit.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We'll hold in abeyance a decision on whether to
    reinstate the ruling.
        MR. ROGAN: Thank you. Maybe I should just quit while I'm ahead and
    have the question read back.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Basically, Mr. Blumenthal, what I'm asking is, I mean, normally,
    would a threat from somebody against the President in the White House
    typically require some sort of report being made to a law enforcement
    agency?
        A. Uh, in the abstract, yes.
        Q. This conversation that you had with the President on January the
    21st, 1998, how did that conversation conclude?
        A. Uh, I believe we, uh--well, I believe after that, I said to the
    President that, uh--who was--seemed to me to be upset, that you needed
    to find some sure footing and to be confident. And, uh, we went on, I
    believe, to discuss the State of the Union.
        Q. You went on to other business?
        A. Yes, we went on to talk about public policy.
        Q. When this conversation with the President concluded as it
    related to Monica Lewinsky, what were your feelings toward the
    President's statement?
        A. Uh, well, they were complex. Uh, I believed him, uh, but I was
    also, uh--I thought he was very upset. That troubled me. And I also was
    troubled by his association with troubled people and thought this was
    not a good story and thought he shouldn't be doing this.
        Q. Do you remember also testifying before the grand jury that you
    felt that the President's story was a very heartfelt story and that
    ``he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him''?
        A. Yes, that's what I told the grand jury, I believe; right.
        Q. That was--that was how you interpreted the President's story?
        A. Yes, I did. He was, uh--he seemed--he seemed emotional.
        Q. When the President told you he was helping Monica Lewinsky, did
    he ever describe to you how he might be helping or ministering to her?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he ever describe how many times he may have tried to help or
    minister to her?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times he visited with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times Monica Lewinsky visited him in
    the Oval Office complex?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times he was alone with Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. He never described to you any intimate physical activity he may
    have had with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Oh, no.
        Q. Did the President ever tell you that he gave any gifts to Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you that Monica Lewinsky gave him any gifts?
        A. No.
        Q. Based on the President's story as he related on January 21st,
    would it have surprised you to know at that time that there was a
    repeated gift exchange between Monica Lewinsky and the President?
        A. Well, I learned later about that, and I was surprised.
        Q. The President never told you that he engaged in occasional
    sexual banter with her on the telephone?
        A. No.
        Q. He never told you about any cover stories that he and Monica
    Lewinsky may have developed to disguise a relationship?
        A. No.
        Q. He never suggested to you that there might be some physical
    evidence pointing to a physical relationship between he--between
    himself and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did the President ever discuss his grand jury--or strike that.
        Did the President ever discuss his deposition testimony with you in
    the Paula Jones case on that date?
        A. Oh, no.
        Q. Did he ever tell you that he denied under oath in his Paula
    Jones deposition that he had an affair with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did the President ever tell you that he ministered to anyone
    else who then made a sexual advance toward him?
        A. No.
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, after you testified before the grand jury, did
    you ever communicate to the President the questions that you were
    asked?
        A. No.
        Q. After you testified before the grand jury, did you ever
    communicate to the President the answers which you gave to those
    questions?
        A. No.
        Q. After you were subpoenaed to testify but before you testified
    before the Federal grand jury, did the President ever recant his
    earlier statements to you about Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. After you were subpoenaed but before you testified before the
    federal grand jury, did the President ever say that he did not want you
    to mislead the grand jury with a false statement?
        A. No. We didn't have any subsequent conversation about this
    matter.
        Q. So it would be fair also to say that after you were subpoenaed
    but before you testified before the Federal grand jury, the President
    never told you that he was not being truthful with you in that January
    21st conversation about Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Uh, he never spoke to me about that at all.
        Q. The President never instructed you before your testimony before
    the grand jury not to relay his false account of his relationship with
    Monica Lewinsky?
        A. We--we didn't speak about anything.
        Q. And as to your testimony on all three appearances before the
    grand jury on February 26th, June 4th and June 25th, 1998--as an aside,
    by the way, let me just say I think this question has been asked of all
    the witnesses, so this is not peculiar to you--but as to those three
    grand jury appearances, do you adopt as truth your testimony on all
    three of those occasions?
        A. Oh, yes.
        MR. ROGAN: If I may have a moment?
        SENATOR SPECTER: Of course. Would you like a short break?
        MR. ROGAN: That might be convenient, Senator.
        SENATOR SPECTER: All right. It's a little past 10. We'll take a 5-
    minute recess.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10 o'clock a.m.
        [Recess.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:12 a.m.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We shall proceed; Mr. Graham questioning for the
    House Managers.
        MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, Senator.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Again, Mr. Blumenthal, if I ask you something that's confusing,
    just slow me down and straighten me out here.
        A. Thank you.
        Q. Okay. I'm going to ask as direct, to-the-point questions as I
    can so we all can go home.
        June 4th, 1998, when you testified to the grand jury, on page 49--I
    guess it's page 185 on tab 4.
        MR. McDANIEL: Page 49?
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        MR. McDANIEL: Thank you.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the
    President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe the
    President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I do.
        Q. I appreciate your honesty. You had raised executive privilege at
    some time in the past, I believe.
        MR. McDANIEL: I object, Senator. Mr. Blumenthal was a passive
    vessel for the raising of executive privilege by the President. It's
    not his privilege to assert, so the question, I think, is misleading.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. At any time--I'm sorry.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I have conferred and believe
    that he can answer the question if he did not raise the privilege, so
    we will overrule the objection.
        SENATOR EDWARDS: Either he asserted it or it was asserted on his
    behalf.
        THE WITNESS: If you could repeat it, please.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. I believe early on in your testimony and throughout your
    testimony to the grand jury, the idea of executive privilege covering
    your testimony or conversations with the President was raised. Is that
    correct?
        A. It was.
        Q. Do you believe the White House knew that this privilege would be
    asserted in your testimony? That was no surprise to them?
        A. Uh--
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. It's the White House's privilege
    to assert it could not have been surprised. It's a mischaracterization
    of the facts.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I believe the objection is
    well-founded on the ground that he cannot testify as to what someone
    else knew. So would you rephrase the question? The objection will be
    sustained.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. When executive privilege was asserted, do you know how it came
    about? Do you have any knowledge of how it came about?
        A. What I recall is that I--in my first appearance before the grand
    jury, I was asked questions about my conversations with the President.
    And I went out into the hall, asked if I could go out in the hall, and
    I spoke with the White House legal counsel who was there, Cheryl Mills,
    and said, ``What do I say?''
        Q. And she said?
        A. And I was advised to assert privilege.
        Q. So the executive privilege assertion came about from advice to
    you by White House counsel?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, you've stated, I think, very honestly, and I appreciate,
    that you were lied to by the President. Is it a fair statement, given
    your previous testimony concerning your 30-minute conversation, that
    the President was trying to portray himself as a victim of a
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I think that's the import of his whole story.
        Q. During this period of time, the Paula Jones lawsuit, other
    allegations about relationships with the President and other women were
    being made and found their way in the press. Is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, when you have these morning meetings and evening meetings
    about press strategy, I believe your previous testimony goes along the
    lines that any time a press report came out about a story between the
    President and a woman, that you would sit down and strategize about
    what to do. Is that correct?
        A. Well, we would, uh, talk about what the White House spokesman
    would say about it.
        Q. Does the name ``Kathleen Willey'' mean anything to you in that
    regard?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. It's beyond the scope of this
    deposition. In the proffer from the Managers, they explicitly state the
    areas that they want to go into, and they explicitly state that they
    want to speak to Mr. Blumenthal about his January 21, 1998,
    conversation with the President about Monica Lewinsky. And any aspects
    as to Kathleen Willey are--have nothing to do with the Articles of
    Impeachment, nor do they have anything to do with the proffer made by
    the Managers, and it's beyond the scope of this deposition.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Just wait one second.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Graham, as you know, the scope of the
    examination of Mr. Blumenthal is limited by the subject matters
    reflected in the Senate record. Are you able to substantiate the Senate
    record as a basis for asking the question?
        MR. GRAHAM: I'm assuming, yes, Senator, that the grand jury
    testimony of Mr. Blumenthal is part of the Senate record. And on June
    25th, 1998, on page 21, there's a discussion between Mr. Blumenthal and
    the Independent Counsel's Office about strategy meetings and other
    women, and in that testimony, he mentions that ``we discussed Paula
    Jones, Kathleen Willey, in our strategy meeting.''
        And I think the question will not be as ominous as some may think
    it sounds. I think I can get right to the point pretty quickly about
    what I'm trying to do with--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Well, would you make an offer of proof so that we
    can see what the scope is that you have in mind?
        MR. GRAHAM: Basically, his testimony is that when a press report
    came about concerning Ms. Jones or Kathleen Willey or a relationship
    between the President and another woman, they sat down and strategized
    about how to respond to those press accounts, what to do and what to
    say--at least that's what his testimony indicates. And I just want to
    ask him, once the January 21st story about Ms. Lewinsky came out, how
    they discussed her in relationship to other strategy meetings.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Mr. Breuer, how would you respond to Congressman
    Graham's statement that as he refers to a reference to Ms. Willey in
    the record?
        MR. BREUER: Senator, I haven't seen the one reference, but I may--I
    would acknowledge that there may be one passing reference to Ms. Willey
    in the voluminous materials that are before us here in the grand jury,
    Senator. But it's clearly not germane to this deposition. It's clearly
    not germane to the proffer made by the Managers about why Mr. Sidney
    Blumenthal was a witness. It is clearly not germane to the Articles of
    Impeachment.
        And, indeed, in Mr. Lindsey Graham's proffer just now, he said that
    he wants to go back and ask about the January 21 conversation. It's my
    view that Kathleen Willey is tangential, at best, and is not germane to
    this deposition and ought not to be inquired into.
        SENATOR EDWARDS: And, Senator Specter, I would ask that we go off
    the record for this discussion, given the question of whether this is
    within the scope of the Senate record.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We shall go off the record.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 10:20 a.m.
        [Discussion off the record.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going back on the record at 10:48 a.m.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Congressman Lindsey, you may proceed.
        MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, sir.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Thank you for your patience, Mr. Blumenthal. I appreciate it.
        A. Thank you.
        Q. Let's get back to the--we'll approach this topic another way and
    we'll try to tie it up at the end here.
        The January 21st article breaks, and I think it's in The Washington
    Post, is that correct, the January 21st article about Ms. Lewinsky
    being on tape, talking about her relationship with the President? Are
    you familiar with that article?
        A. I'm familiar with an article on January 21st in The Washington
    Post.
        Q. And what--what was the essence of that article, as you remember
    it?
        A. If you have it there, I'd be happy to look at it.
        Q. Yeah. Let's see if we can find it, what tab that is. Tab 7.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: Well--
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. If you'd like a chance to read it over, just take your time.
        A. Yes. Thank you.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: It's a long article.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Yes, sir, it is, and just--
        A. Yeah.
        Q. --just take your time. I'm not going to give you a test on the
    article. I just wanted--
        A. No. I just wanted to read it.
        Q. --to refresh your memory. Absolutely, you take your time.
        A. I hope you don't mind if I took the time here.
        Q. No, sir. Are you--you're okay now?
        A. I am.
        Q. Okay. In essence, what this article is--is alleging is what we
    now know, the allegations that Ms. Lewinsky had a relationship with the
    President, that Mr. Jordan was trying to help her secure counsel, to
    file an affidavit saying they had no relationship, and the relationship
    on January 21st was being exposed through some tape recordings,
    supposedly, the Independent Counsel had access to between Ms. Lewinsky
    and Ms. Tripp. Is that correct?
        A. Well, there are a lot of questions in there.
        Q. Okay, yeah, and I'm sorry.
        This article seems to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky is telling a
    friend--
        A. Mm-hmm.
        Q. --that she has a relationship with the President, a sexual
    relationship with the President.
        A. Mm-hmm.
        Q. You understand that from the article?
        A. Yes.
        Q. This article also alleges that an affidavit was filed by Ms.
    Lewinsky denying that relationship, and Mr. Jordan sought an attorney
    for her, a friend of the President. Is that correct?
        A. It says she filed an affidavit, and I'm just looking for where
    it says that Jordan had secured the attorney.
        Q. The very first paragraph, let me read it. ``The Independent
    Counsel Kenneth Starr has expanded his investigation of President
    Clinton to examine whether Clinton and his close friend, Vernon Jordan,
    encouraged a 24-year-old''--
        A. Right.
        Q. --``former White House intern to lie to lawyers for Paula Jones
    about whether the intern had an affair with the President, sources
    close to the investigation said yesterday.''
        A. Right.
        Q. So I guess that first paragraph kind of sums up the accusation.
        A. I think--
        Q. What type reaction did the White House have when this--as you
    recall--when this article came to light?
        A. I--I think the White House was overwhelmed with press inquiries.
        Q. Was there a sense of alarm that this was a bad story?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And wasn't there a sense of reassurance by the President himself
    that this was an untrue story?
        A. The President did make a public statement that afternoon.
        Q. And I believe White House officials on his behalf denied the
    essence of this story; is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And basically, you were passing along what somebody you trust
    and admire told you to be the case, and from the White House point of
    view, that was the response to this story, that we deny these
    allegations.
        MR. McDANIEL: Senator, I really object to the question where we mix
    ``you'' and ``we'' and the ``White House.'' I'd like, if possible, for
    the question--if they want to know what Mr. Blumenthal did, to ask him
    what he did, and questions about what the White House did and what we
    and you did.
        MR. GRAHAM: That's fair enough.
        MR. McDANIEL: Okay, we thank you.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We think that's well-founded.
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, and I agree. I agree that is well-founded.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Did you have any discussions with White House press people about
    the nature of this relationship after this article broke?
        A. No.
        Q. Did you have any discussions with White House lawyers after this
    article broke about the nature of the relationship?
        A. No.
        Q. After you had the conversation with the President, sometime the
    week of the 21st--I believe that's your testimony--shortly after the
    news story broke, this 30-minute conversation where he tells you
    about--
        A. There's not a question.
        Q. Okay. Is that correct? When did you have this conversation with
    the President? Do you recall?
        A. Yes. It was in the early evening of January 21st.
        Q. Early evening of January 21st?
        A. Yes.
        Q. The same day the story was reported?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. So, from your point of view, this was something that
    needed to be addressed?
        MR. McDANIEL: Your Honor, I--Senator, I object to the question
    about ``this'' is something that needs to be addressed. I don't
    understand what the ``this'' is, exactly, that the question refers to.
    Does it refer to the story? Does it refer to the President's statement
    to Mr. Blumenthal?
        SENATOR SPECTER: Well, we think--Senator Edwards and I concur that
    the witness can answer the question. If he does not understand it, he
    can say so and then can have the question rephrased.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. You have a conversation with the President on the same day the
    article comes out, and the conversation includes a discussion about the
    relationship between him and Ms. Lewinsky. Is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. So it was certainly on people's minds, including the
    President, is that correct, the essence of this story?
        MR. McDANIEL: I object to the question about whether it's on
    people's minds. I think he can answer about what he knew or about what
    he learned from people who spoke to him, but the question goes far
    beyond that.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Well, let me ask you this. We know it was on the President's
    mind.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that, technically,
    that's correct, and perhaps you can avoid it by just pinpointing it
    just a little more.
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes. We'll try to be laser-like in these questions.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. You had a conversation with the President of the United States
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky on the same day The Washington
    Post article came out. That's correct? Yes or no?
        A. That--I--I--that's right.
        Q. Okay. During that period of time, that day or any day
    thereafter, were you involved in any meeting with White House lawyers
    or press people where the conversation--or where the topic of Ms.
    Lewinsky's allegations or the--Ken Starr's allegations about Ms.
    Lewinsky came up?
        A. I'm confused about which allegations you're talking about.
        Q. That she had a relationship with the President, and they were
    trying to get her to file a false affidavit. Did that topic ever come
    up in your presence with the Press Secretary, White House press people
    or lawyers for the White House?
        A. I think the whole story was discussed by senior staff in the
    White House.
        Q. When did that begin to occur?
        A. I'm sure we were discussing it on January 21st.
        Q. Do you recall that every--
        A. Every--everyone in the country was talking about it.
        Q. Well, do you recall the tenor of that conversation? Do you
    recall the flavor of it? Can you describe it the best you can, about--
    was there a sense of alarm, shock? How would you describe it?
        A. I think we felt overwhelmed by the crisis atmosphere.
        Q. Did anybody ever suggest who is Monica Lewinsky, go find out
    about who she is and what she does?
        A. No.
        Q. So is it your testimony that this accusation comes out on
    January 21st, and the accusation being that a White House intern has an
    inappropriate relationship with the President, filed a false affidavit
    on his behalf, and nobody at this meeting suggested let's find out who
    Monica Lewinsky is and what's going on here?
        A. Well, I wasn't referring to any meeting, but in any of my
    discussions with members of the White House staff, nobody discussed
    Monica Lewinsky's personal life or decided that we had to find out who
    she was.
        Q. Could I turn you now to Tab 15, please? Okay.
        MR. McDANIEL: Would you like him to read this?
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes. Yes, please. Just take your time. And I am now
    referring to an AP story by Karen G-u-l-l-o. I don't want to
    mispronounce her name.
        [Witness perusing document.]
        THE WITNESS: I'm ready, Congressman.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Thank you.
        And this article--do you know this reporter, by any chance?
        A. I do know this reporter, but I did not know this reporter on
    January 30th.
        Q. All right. Do you subsequently know--
        A. Some months later, I met this reporter.
        Q. And the basic essence of my question, Mr. Blumenthal, will be
    this report indicates some derogatory information about Ms. Lewinsky,
    and it also has some statements by White House Press Secretary and Ms.
    Lewis. And I want to ask how those two statements go together.
        This report indicates that a White House aide called this reporter
    to suggest that Ms. Lewinsky's past included weight problems, and she
    was called ``The Stalker.'' And it says that ``Junior staff members,
    speaking on condition that they not be identified, said she was known
    as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, was `` `a little bit weird'.''
    And the next paragraph says: ``Little by little, ever since the
    allegations of an affair between President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky
    surfaced 10 days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-
    scenes campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed
    with the President.''
        Do you have any direct knowledge or indirect knowledge that such a
    campaign by White House aides or junior staff members ever existed?
        A. No.
        Q. Okay. Do you ever remember hearing Ms. Lewis or Mr. McCurry
    admonishing anyone in the White House about ``watch what you say about
    Ms. Lewinsky''?
        A. No. I don't recall those incidents described in this article,
    but I do note that among senior advisors at one of the meetings that we
    held--it could have been in the morning or late afternoon--we felt very
    firmly that nobody should ever be a source to a reporter about a story
    about Monica Lewinsky's personal life, and I strongly agreed with that
    and that's what we decided.
        Q. When did that meeting occur?
        A. I'd say within a week of the story breaking.
        Q. Who was at that meeting?
        A. I don't recall exactly, but I would say that the list of names
    that I mentioned before.
        Q. And that would be?
        A. I may not get them all, but I would say Chuck Ruff, Cheryl
    Mills, Bruce Lindsey, Lanny Breuer, Jim Kennedy, Mike McCurry, Joe
    Lockhart, Adam Goldberg, Don Goldberg, Ann Lewis, Paul Begala, Rahm
    Emanuel, myself.
        Q. And this occurred about a week after the January 21st article?
        A. I don't recall the exact date.
        Q. At least 7 days?
        A. Within a week--
        Q. Okay.
        A. --I believe.
        Q. Would it be fair to say that you were sitting there during this
    conversation and that you had previously been told by the President
    that he was in essence a victim of Ms. Lewinsky's sexual demands, and
    you said nothing to anyone?
        MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said''--
        THE WITNESS: I don't--
        MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said nothing to anyone about
    what the President told you?''?
        MR. GRAHAM: Right.
        THE WITNESS: I never told any of my colleagues about what the
    President told me.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. And this is after the President recants his story--recounts his
    story--to you, where he's visibly upset, feels like he's a victim, that
    he associates himself with a character who's being lied about, and you
    at no time suggested to your colleagues that there is something going
    on here with the President and Ms. Lewinsky you need to know about. Is
    that your testimony?
        A. I never mentioned my conversation. I regarded that conversation
    as a private conversation in confidence, and I didn't mention it to my
    colleagues, I didn't mention it to my friends, I didn't mention it to
    my family, besides my wife.
        Q. Did you mention it to any White House lawyers?
        A. I mentioned it many months later to Lanny Breuer in preparation
    for one of my grand jury appearances, when I knew I would be questioned
    about it. And I certainly never mentioned it to any reporter.
        Q. Do you know how, over a period of weeks, stories about Ms.
    Lewinsky being called a stalker, a fantasizer, obsessed with the
    President, called the name ``Elvira''--do you know how that got into
    the press?
        A. Which--which--which question are you asking me? Which part of
    that?
        Q. Okay. Do you have any idea how White House sources are
    associated with statements such as ``She's known as `Elvira','' ``She's
    obsessed with the President,'' ``She's known as a flirt,'' ``She's the
    product of a troubled home, divorced parents,'' ``She's known as `The
    Stalker' ''? Do you have any idea how that got in the press?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. The document speaks for itself,
    but it's not clear that the terms that Mr. Lindsey has used are
    necessarily--any or all of them--are from a White House source. I
    object to the form and the characterization of the question.
        MR. GRAHAM: The ones that I have indicated are associated with the
    White House as being the source of those statements and--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that question is
    appropriate, and the objection is overruled.
        THE WITNESS: I have no idea how anything came to be attributed to a
    White House source.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Do you know a Mr. Terry Lenzner?
        A. I--I met him once.
        Q. When did you meet him?
        A. I met him outside the grand jury room.
        Q. And who is he?
        A. He's a private investigator.
        Q. And who does he work for?
        A. He works for many clients, including the President.
        Q. Okay. Mr. Blumenthal, I appreciate your candor here.
        Do you know Mr. Harry Evans?
        A. Harold Evans?
        Q. Yes, sir.
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. Who is Mr. Harold Evans?
        A. Harold Evans is--I don't know his exact title right now. He
    works for Mort Zuckerman, involving his publications, and he's the
    husband of my former editor, Tina Brown.
        Q. Has he ever worked for the New York Daily News?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to this line of questioning. It
    seems well beyond the scope of this deposition. I have never heard of
    Mr. Harold Evans, and it's not clear to me that's anywhere in this
    voluminous record or any of these issues.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think it would be
    appropriate to have an offer of proof on this, Congressman Graham.
        MR. GRAHAM: I'm going to ask Mr. Blumenthal if he has ever at any
    time passed on to Mr. Evans or anyone else raw notes, notes, work
    products from a Mr. Terry Lenzner about subjects of White House
    investigations to members of the press, to include Ms. Lewinsky.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Relating to Monica Lewinsky?
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, and anyone else.
        MR. McDANIEL: That's a good question. I think we don't have any
    objection to that question.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Well, we still have to rule on it. Overruled. The
    objection is overruled.
        MR. GRAHAM: All right. Now I think I know the answer.
        [Laughter.]
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. So let's phrase it very clearly for the record here. You know
    Mr. Evans; correct?
        A. I do.
        Q. Have you at any time received any notes, work product from a Mr.
    Terry Lenzner about anybody?
        A. No.
        Q. Okay. So, therefore, you had nothing to pass on?
        A. Right.
        Q. Fair enough. Do you know a Mr. Gene Lyons?
        A. Yes, I do.
        Q. Who is Mr. Gene Lyons?
        A. He is a columnist for the Arkansas Democrat Gazette.
        Q. Are you familiar with his appearance on ``Meet the Press'' where
    he suggests in an article he wrote later that maybe the President is a
    victim similar to David Letterman in terms of somebody following him
    around, obsessed with him?
        A. Is this one of the exhibits?
        Q. Yes, sir.
        A. I wonder if you could refer me to it.
        Q. Sure. I can't read my writing.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Well, while we are looking for the exhibit, let me ask you this.
    Do you have any independent knowledge of him making such a statement?
        A. Well, I'd like to see the exhibit so--
        Q. Okay.
        A. --so I could know exactly what he said.
        Q. Okay.
        MR. McDANIEL: If I might--Congressman, I don't know whether the one
    you're thinking of is--I note in Exhibit 20, there are--well, it's not
    a story by Mr. Lyons--
        MR. GRAHAM: And that's it.
        MR. McDANIEL: There are references to him in--in that story.
        MR. GRAHAM: That's it. Thank you very much.
        MR. McDANIEL: You're welcome.
        MR. GRAHAM: I appreciate it.
        THE WITNESS: This is 20?
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Yes, sir.
        A. Thank you.
        Do you mind if I just read through it?
        Q. Yes, sir. Take your time.
        A. Thank you. [Witness perusing document.] I've read this.
        Q. My question is that this article is a Boston Globe article,
    Saturday, February the 21st, and it references an appearance on ``Meet
    the Press'' by Mr. Gene Lyons. And I believe you know who Mr. Gene
    Lyons is; is that correct?
        A. I do.
        Q. Did you know who he was in January of 1998?
        A. I did.
        Q. And in this press appearance, it refers to it being the Sunday
    before the Saturday, February 21st, sometime in the middle of February.
        He indicates on the show, at least this article recounts that he
    indicates, that the President could be in fact in ``a totally innocent
    relationship in which the President was, in a sense, the victim of
    someone, rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.''
        Do you know how Mr. Lyons would come to that conclusion? I know
    word travels fast, but how would he know that? Do you have any
    independent knowledge of how he would know that?
        A. What exactly is the question?
        Q. Well, the question is Mr. Lyons is indicating in the middle of
    February that the truth of the matter may very well be that the
    President is in an ``innocent relationship in which the President was,
    in a sense, the victim of someone, rather like the woman who followed
    David Letterman around,'' and the question is that scenario of the
    President being a victim of someone obsessed seems rather like the
    conversation you had with the President on January the 21st. Do you
    know how Mr. Lyons would have had that take on things?
        MR. McDANIEL: Well, I object to a question that sort of loads up
    premises, Senators. That question sort of, you know, says, well, this
    conversation is a lot like the one you had with the President, and then
    asks the question. And the danger to the witness is that he'll--by
    answering the question accepts the premise.
        And I ask that if you want to ask him whether it's like the
    conversation with the President, that's a fair question, he'll answer
    it, but it ought to be broken out of there.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I disagree on the ruling, so
    we're going to take Senator Edwards and ask you to rephrase the
    question since it--
        [Laughter.]
        MR. GRAHAM: Fair enough.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. The characterization embodied here indicates this could be a
    totally innocent relationship in which the President was in a sense the
    victim of someone. Is it fair to say, Mr. Blumenthal, that is very much
    like the scenario the President painted to you when you talked with him
    on January the 21st?
        A. It could be like that.
        Q. Okay. And it goes on further: ``rather like the woman who
    followed David Letterman around.'' Is that very much like the
    characterization the President indicated to you between him and Ms.
    Lewinsky?
        A. Could be.
        Q. Did you ever at any time talk with Mr. Gene Lyons about Ms.
    Lewinsky or any other person that was the subject of a relationship
    with the President?
        A. I did talk to Gene Lyons about Monica Lewinsky.
        Q. Could you tell us what you told him?
        A. He asked me my views, and I told him, in no uncertain terms,
    that I wouldn't talk about her personally. I talked about Monica
    Lewinsky with all sorts of people, my mother, my friends, about what
    was in the news stories every day, just like everyone else, but when it
    came to talking about her personally, I drew a line.
        Q. So, when you talk to your mother and your friends and Mr. Lyons
    about Ms. Lewinsky, are you telling us that you have these
    conversations, and you know what the President has told you and you're
    not tempted to tell somebody the President is a victim of this lady,
    out of his own mouth?
        A. Not only am I not tempted, I did not.
        Q. You don't know how all this information came out? You have no
    knowledge of it at all?
        MR. McDANIEL: I don't understand the question about--
        MR. GRAHAM: About her being a stalker, her being obsessed with the
    President, the President being like David Letterman in relationship to
    her.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. You had no knowledge of how that all happened in the press?
        A. I have an idea how it started in the press.
        Q. Well, please share that with us.
        A. I believe it started on January 21st with the publication of an
    article in Newsweek by Michael Isikoff that was posted on the World
    Wide Web and faxed around to everyone in the news media, in Washington,
    New York, everywhere, and in the White House. And in that article,
    Michael Isikoff reported the contents of what became known as the
    talking points.
        And there was a mystery at the time about who wrote the talking
    points. We know subsequently that Monica Lewinsky wrote the talking
    points. And in that document, the author of the talking points advises
    Linda Tripp that she might refer to someone who was stalking the ``P'',
    meaning the President, and after that story appeared, I believe there
    were a flood of stories and discussions about this, starting on
    ``Nightline'' that very night and ``Nightline'' the next night and so
    on. And that's my understanding from observing the media of how this
    started.
        Q. How long have you been involved in the media yourself?
        A. Before I joined the White House staff, I was a journalist for 27
    years.
        Q. Is it your testimony that the Isikoff article on the 21st
    explains how White House sources contact reporters in late January and
    mid-February trying to explain that the President is a victim of a
    stalker, an obsessed young lady, who is the product of a broken home?
    Is that your testimony?
        A. No.
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question. There
    is no evidence that White House officials, both in January and in
    February, if at any time, contacted sources, press sources.
        MR. GRAHAM: I will introduce these articles. The articles are dated
    with White House sources, unsolicited, calling about this event, saying
    these things in January and February.
        MR. BREUER: Well--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I agree that the question may
    be asked and answered. Overruled.
        THE WITNESS: If you could restate it, please?
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Is it your testimony that the White House sources that are being
    referred to by the press are a result of the 21st of January Isikoff
    article? That's not what you're saying, is it?
        A. No.
        MR. McDANIEL: Well--
        MR. GRAHAM: Thank you.
        MR. McDANIEL: --I don't think that there ought to be argument with
    Mr. Blumenthal. I think he ought to be asked a question and given an
    opportunity to answer it, and that's an argumentative question and
    followed up by, ``That's not what you're saying, is it?''
        I also think the questions are remarkably imprecise, in that they
    do not specify what information it is this questioner is seeking to get
    Mr. Blumenthal to talk about, and in that regard, I think the questions
    are both irrelevant and unfair.
        SENATOR EDWARDS: Are you objecting to a question that's already
    been asked and answered?
        MR. McDANIEL: I might be, Senator, and I had that feeling when I
    heard Mr. Blumenthal say something, that I might be doing that.
        MR. GRAHAM: That would be my reply. He understood what I asked, and
    he answered, and I'll accept his answer and we'll move on.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I think the objection is mooted at this
    point.
        MR. GRAHAM: Okay.
        SENATOR SPECTER: I do--I do think that to the extent you can be
    more precise, because these articles do contain--
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --a lot of information. We're still looking for
    that laser.
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. And these--and the reason this comes up, Mr. Isikoff--excuse
    me--Mr. Blumenthal, is you've referenced the Isikoff article on the
    21st, and my question goes to White House sources indicating that Ms.
    Lewinsky is a stalker, the January 30th article, that she's obsessed
    with the President, that she wears tight skirts.
        What I'm trying to say is that you--you are not saying--it is not
    your testimony--that those White House sources are picking up on the
    21st article, are you?
        A. I don't know about any White House sources on these stories.
        Q. When you talked to Mr. Lyons, you never mentioned what time at
    all that Ms. Lewinsky was making demands on the President and he had to
    rebuff her?
        A. Absolutely not.
        Q. You never at one time told Mr. Lyons or anyone else that the
    President felt like that he was a victim much like the person in the
    novel, Darkness at Noon?
        MR. McDANIEL: Well, I object to that question. This witness has
    testified that he told his wife and that he told White House counsel at
    a later date, and the question included anyone else. So I think it--
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes. Strike that.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Excluding those two people?
        A. Well, I believe I've asked--I've been asked, and answered that,
    and I haven't told anyone else.
        Q. Was there--
        A. I didn't tell anyone else.
        Q. Was there ever an investigation at the White House about how
    these stories came out, supposedly?
        A. No.
        Q. Was anybody ever fired?
        A. No.
        MR. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Blumenthal.
        THE WITNESS: I thank you.
        MR. ROGAN: No further questions.
        MR. BREUER: Could we take a 5-minute break, Senator?
        SENATOR SPECTER: We can. We will recess for 5 minutes.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going off the record at 11:24 a.m.
        [Recess.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going on the record at 11:40 a.m.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Turn to White House counsel, Mr. Lanny Breuer.
        MR. BREUER: Senators, the White House has no questions for Mr.
    Blumenthal.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We had deferred one line of questions which had
    been subject objection and considerable conference, and we put it at
    the end of the transcript so it could be excised. Do you wish to--
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --proceed further?
        MR. BREUER: May we approach off the record, Senators?
        SENATOR SPECTER: Off the record.
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We're going off the record at 11:41 a.m.
        [Discussion off the record.]
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are going back on the record at 12:10 p.m.
        SENATOR SPECTER: The Senators have considered the matter, and in
    light of the references, albeit abbreviated, in the record and the
    generalization that answers--questions and answers would be permitted,
    reserving the final judgment to the full Senate, we will permit
    Congressman Graham to question on pattern and practice with respect to
    Ms. Willey.
        MR. GRAHAM: Okay. Thank you.
                     further examination by house managers
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, we're really close to the end here. If you could
    turn to Tab 5, page 193.
        A. We have it.
        Q. Okay, thank you.
        And page 20, the last question, it's in the right-hand corner. I'll
    read the question, and we'll kind of follow the testimony. ``Have you
    ever had a discussion with people in the White House or been present
    during any meeting where the allegation has come up that other women
    are fabricating an affair with the President?''
        Now, could you read the answer for me, please?
        A. Sure. My--my answer in the grand jury is this: ``We've discussed
    news stories that arose out of the Jones case, which was dismissed by
    the judge as having no basis, in which there were allegations made
    against the President, and these were stories that were in the press.''
        Q. ``And you''--''And did you discuss those with the President?''
        You said, ``No.''
        And the next question is: ``So what form did you discuss those news
    stories in?''
        And your answer was?
        A. ``In strategy meetings.''
        Q. Okay. ``And that would include the daily meetings, the morning
    and the evening meetings?''
        A. Yes.
        Q. And your answer was ``Yes.''
        Now, within that context, I want to walk through a bit how those
    strategy meetings came about and the purpose of the strategy meetings.
        The next question goes as follows: ``And there were names of the
    women that you discussed in that context that there had been news
    stories about and public allegations of an affair with the President?''
        And your answer was?
        A. ``As I recall, we discussed Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, we've
    discussed''--and the rest is redacted.
        Q. Redacted--and that's fine, that's fine.
        And the question later on, on line 24: ``When you say that that was
    a complete and utter fraudulent allegation--'', the answer is: ``In my
    view, yes.'' Right?
        A. Well--
        Q. About a woman?
        MR. McDANIEL: Senator, I must object to this, because I believe
    that question, clearly from the context, refers to redacted material--
        MR. GRAHAM: Right.
        MR. McDANIEL: --which has been preserved as secret by the grand
    jury, and I think it's somewhat misleading to talk about a fraudulent
    allegation that the grand jury heard that Mr. Blumenthal testified
    about, which is clearly not in the record before the Senate.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Well, it is unclear on the face of the record. So,
    Congressman Graham, if you could--
        MR. GRAHAM: The point I'm trying--
        SENATOR SPECTER: --excuse me, let me just finish--
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --if you could specify on what is on the record
    that you've put in up to now.
        MR. GRAHAM: Okay. What I'm reading from, Senator, is--is a question
    and answer and a redacted name, and the point I'm trying to make is
    ever who that person was, the allegation was considered to be
    fraudulent based on your prior testimony.
        THE WITNESS: That was--that was my testimony, that it was my view.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. And that leads to this question. Was there ever a discussion in
    these strategy meetings where there was an admission that the
    allegation was believed to be true against the President in terms of
    relationship with other women?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question in that
    it's referring to other women. Even based on the discussion that went
    off the record, I think that what Mr. Graham is doing now is certainly
    beyond any record in this case.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards would like to hear the question
    repeated.
        MR. GRAHAM: The strategy meetings--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Good idea?
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. The strategy meetings involved press accounts of allegations
    between the President and other women. The question is very simple. At
    any of those meetings, was it ever conceded that the President did have
    in fact a relationship?
        MR. BREUER: Object. I object to the question for the reasons I just
    previously stated.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards raises the concern that I think
    he's correct on, that we have limited it to Willey, Ms. Willey. So, if
    you would--if you would focus--
        MR. GRAHAM: Absolutely.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --there--
        MR. GRAHAM: Absolutely.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --it would be within your proffer and what we have
    permitted.
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir. Very well.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. In regards to Ms. Willey, is it fair to say that the consensus
    of the group was that these allegations were not true?
        A. I don't know.
        Q. Do you recall Ms. Willey giving a ``60 Minutes'' interview?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you recall any discussions after the interview at a strategy
    meeting about Ms. Willey?
        MR. BREUER: I want the record to be clear that the White House has
    a continuing objection as to this line of inquiry.
        SENATOR SPECTER: The record will so note.
        THE WITNESS: If you could repeat the question, please.
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes.
        THE WITNESS: Sorry.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. After the ``60 Minutes'' interview, was there ever a strategy
    meeting about what she said?
        A. At one of the morning or evening meetings, we discussed the ``60
    Minutes'' interview.
        Q. And can you--I--I know it's hard because these meetings go on a
    lot. How--do you know who was there on that occasion, who would be the
    players that would be there?
        A. They would be the same as before. I'd be happy to enumerate them
    for you, if you want me to.
        Q. But the same as you previously testified to?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay, that's fine.
        Do you recall what the discussions were about in terms of how to
    respond to the ``60 Minutes'' story?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Could you tell us?
        A. They were what our official spokespeople would say.
        Q. Did they include anything else?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Could you please tell us?
        A. There was a considerable complaining about how, in the ``60
    Minutes'' broadcast, Bob Bennett was not given adequate time to speak
    and present his case, and how he was, as I recall, poorly lighted.
        Q. Was there any discussion about what Ms. Willey said herself and
    how that should be responded to?
        A. I don't recall exactly. We just spoke about what our official
    spokespeople should respond to.
        Q. Did anybody ever discuss the fact that Ms. Willey may have had a
    checkered past?
        A. No, absolutely not. We never discussed the personal lives of any
    woman in those meetings.
        Q. Did it ever come up as to, well, here's what we know about
    Kathleen Willey and the President, or let's go see what we can find out
    about Kathleen Willey and the President?
        A. No.
        Q. Who had the letters that Kathleen Willey wrote to the President?
        A. I don't know exactly. The White House had them.
        Q. Isn't it fair to say that somebody found those letters, kept
    those letters, and was ready to respond with those letters, if needed
    to be?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object to the form of the question that
    it's outside the proffer of the Manager.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        MR. McDANIEL: Yes. I object to the compound nature of the question,
    and--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Could you rephrase the question, Congressman
    Lindsey--
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        SENATOR SPECTER: --or, Graham?
        MR. GRAHAM: Yes, sir.
        SENATOR SPECTER: I think that would solve your problem.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. There were letters written to Ms. Willey to the President that
    were released to the media. Is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you know who gathered those letters up and how they were
    gathered up?
        MR. BREUER: Objection.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I agree that the Congressman
    may ask the question. Overruled.
        THE WITNESS: No.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Would it be fair to say, using common sense, that somebody was
    planning to answer Ms. Willey by having those letters to offer to the
    press?
        MR. BREUER: Objection.
        MR. McDANIEL: It's argumentative.
        MR. BREUER: It certainly is.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Would you repeat that question?
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. The question is: Mr. Blumenthal, do you believe it's a fair
    assumption to make that somebody in the White House made a conscious
    effort to go seek out the letters between the President and Ms. Willey
    and use in response to her allegations?
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        THE WITNESS: Well, that's an opin--
        MS. MARSH: Wait, wait, wait.
        MR. McDANIEL: Please, Mr. Blumenthal.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards says, and I agree with him, that
    you ought to direct it to somebody with specific knowledge so you
    don't--
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Do you have any knowledge--
        SENATOR SPECTER: --deal totally with speculation.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. Do you have any specific knowledge of that event occurring,
    somebody gathering the letters up, having them ready to be able to
    respond to Ms. Willey if she ever said anything?
        A. No.
        Q. You have no knowledge whatsoever of how those letters came into
    the possession of the White House to be released to the press?
        A. No, I don't. I don't know--
        MR. GRAHAM: Thank you. I--
        THE WITNESS: --who had them--
        MR. GRAHAM: --don't have any--
        THE WITNESS: --in the White House.
        MR. GRAHAM: --further questions.
                                    ------

                                    program

        Mr. LOTT. Under the order just granted, the Senate will
    meet again as the Court of Impeachment on Saturday. On
    Saturday, the Senate will hear presentations from the House
    managers and the White House counsel for not to exceed 6 hours.
    After those presentations, the Senate will resume its business
    on Monday for 6 hours, beginning at 1 p.m.
                                    ------

              ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent
    the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order, and
    ask that all Senators remain at their desks until the Chief
    Justice departs the Chamber.
        There being no objection, at 4:31 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Saturday, February
    6, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                    ------

                           Saturday, February 6, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 10:05 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the
    following:
        Mr. Chief Justice, it is with profound sadness that we
    express our grief over the loss of our legislative clerk, R.
    Scott Bates, who, along with his wife, Ricki Ellison Bates,
    last evening was struck by a car while walking across Lee
    Highway in Arlington. Mrs. Bates remains in serious condition
    and needs our prayers throughout this day.
        Let us pray.
        O eternal God, our heavenly Father, who loves us with an
    everlasting love and transforms the darkness of the Valley of
    the Shadow of Death into bright hope, the Senate family of
    Members and staff call on You for strength, comfort, and
    courage. Tragic death has taken from us a beloved friend, an
    admired fellow worker, a faithful Senate employee for over 30
    years.
        In the quietness we can hear his voice call the roll, read
    proposed legislation and, most of all, express his caring
    friendship to us all.
        Thank You for Scott's commitment to excellence and his
    dedication to the work of the Senate regardless of long
    sessions or arduous debate. We intercede now for his wife, for
    her complete healing and recovery. Hold his wonderful children
    in Your loving arms: Lisa, Lori, and Paul. We remember with
    gratitude Lisa and Lori's outstanding service as pages in the
    Senate. Help them and their brother, Paul, to know that their
    dad, whom they loved so deeply, is with You. He trusted You in
    this life and now lives with You forever. Traumatic as was his
    physical death, it was but a transition in his eternal life.
        Now, Lord, bless the Senate as it turns to the work of this
    day, cognizant of the shortness of time and the length of
    eternity for all of us. In the sure hope of the resurrection
    and eternal life. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
                                    ------

                       R. SCOTT BATES, LEGISLATIVE CLERK

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, our Senate family grieves
    today and our hearts are heavy as a result of the tragic loss
    of Scott Bates. Senators come and Senators go, but Scott has
    been a fixture in this great Chamber for 30 years and the last
    8 years as our legislative clerk. His familiar voice was a
    pillar of our continuity and tradition. He was not just a
    coworker; he was a friend, really a great guy. Even as we
    conduct our business today, we will be grieving, but those who
    knew him well know that that is exactly what he would want us
    to do, to continue with the work of the Senate to which he
    devoted his life. He was an example of public service at its
    finest, never claiming the spotlight, never seeking a headline,
    but always working for the good of this institution and for the
    country we are here to serve.
        We pray for the recovery of his wife, Ricki. We ask that
    the Lord keep her and their three children always in His care.
    Before I ask for a moment of silence by the Senate, I yield to
    Senator Daschle for his comments.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The minority leader is recognized.
        Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the majority leader. I thank our
    Chaplain for his gracious prayer.
        The presence of Scott Bates in that chair and in our lives
    is something most of us have counted on each and every day. As
    the majority leader so eloquently said, he, Scott, served the
    Senate, our country, and each of us so admirably for the last
    30 years. Who can forget that resonant voice? Who can forget
    the call of the roll? Who can forget the authority with which
    he articulated each of our names? The answer is--no one.
        When Scott began his service, Senator Mansfield was the
    majority leader and Senator Hugh Scott the minority leader.
    Ever since that time, Scott was an integral part of the history
    created in this Chamber and certainly an integral part of our
    Senate family. He grew up with small town values, active in his
    church and Boy Scouts. He loved politics and school and served
    as a page in both the House and the Senate in the Arkansas
    Legislature. Scott's love of politics came naturally for him.
    His father actually served as a member of the Arkansas State
    Legislature. In 1970 he came here as a summer intern for
    Senator John McClellan, in the bill clerk's office, and began
    his work for us in 1973.
        Today, we send our thoughts and our prayers to his wife,
    Ricki, who remains in the hospital, and to their three
    children, Lisa, Lori, and Paul, and his family in Arkansas, who
    are now dealing with this tragic loss.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask that all Senators
    rise and let's observe a moment of silence for our friend,
    Scott Bates.
        [Moment of silence, Senators rising.]
        Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, under the order for today
    there will be a 6-hour presentation equally divided between the
    House managers and the White House counsel. It is our intention
    to have a break around noon so we will have an opportunity for
    lunch, and also it may be necessary to have one break, a brief
    break, before that time.
        Following today's presentation, the Senate will adjourn
    over until 1 p.m. on Monday.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    the proceedings of the trial is approved to date.

                               Order of Procedure

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Pursuant to the order of February 1,
    1999, the managers on the part of the House of Representatives
    and the counsel for the President each have 3 hours to make
    their presentation. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan to
    begin the presentation on the part of the House of
    Representatives.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel
    for the President, Members of the United States Senate, this is
    the first and only chance you will have in this historic
    impeachment trial to consider the evidence from a few of the
    actual witnesses. After weeks of proceedings, the day has
    finally arrived when the U.S. Senate will listen, not just to
    lawyers talk about the evidence, but to witnesses with direct
    knowledge of the unlawful conduct of the President of the
    United States.
        Today in particular, you will have your only opportunity to
    hear from the one person whose testimony invariably leads to
    the conclusion that the President of the United States
    committed perjury and obstructed justice in a Federal civil
    rights action. That person is Monica Lewinsky, a bright lady
    whose life has forever been marked by the most powerful man on
    the Earth.
        If her testimony is truthful, then the President committed
    the offenses alleged in the articles of impeachment. Many
    different opinions have been formed about her over the last
    year. Nearly all of this has been fueled by spin and by
    propaganda rather than by truth. Today, the analysis and the
    speculation ends. There is only one judgment the Senate must
    make for history about Monica Lewinsky: Do you believe her?
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        SENATOR DeWINE. Do you, Monica S. Lewinsky, swear or affirm
    that the evidence you shall give in the case now pending
    between the United States and William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States, shall be the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
        THE WITNESS. I do.
        SENATOR DeWINE. The House managers may now begin your
    questioning.

        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Who is this former intern who swore
    under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth? Monica Lewinsky is an intelligent, articulate young
    woman who, until recently, held untarnished hope for tomorrow,
    like any other recent college graduate. That hope was
    drastically altered when she was subpoenaed in a lawsuit
    against the President of the United States.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        But for the record, would you state your name once again, your full
    name?
        A. Yes. Monica Samille Lewinsky.
        Q. And you're a--are you a resident of California?
        A. I'm--I'm not sure exactly where I'm a resident now, but I--
    that's where I'm living right now.
        Q. Okay. You--did you grow up there in California?
        A. Yes.
        Q. I'm not going to go into all that, but I thought just a little
    bit of background here.
        You went to college where?
        A. Lewis and Clark, in Portland, Oregon.
        Q. And you majored in--majored in?
        A. Psychology.
        Q. Tell me about your work history, briefly, from the time you left
    college until, let's say, you started as an intern at the White House.
        A. Uh, I wasn't working from the time I--
        Q. Okay. Did you--
        A. I graduated college in May of '95.
        Q. Did you work part time there in--in Oregon with a--with a
    District Attorney--
        A. Uh--
        Q. --in his office somewhere?
        A. During--I had an internship or a practicum when I was in school.
    I had two practicums, and one was at the public defender's office and
    the other was at the Southeast Mental Health Network.
        Q. And those were in Portland?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. What--you received a bachelor of science in psychology?
        A. Correct.
        Q. Okay. As a part of your duties at the Southeast Health Network,
    what did you--what did you do in terms of working? Did you have direct
    contact with people there, patients?
        A. Yes, I did. Um, they referred to them as clients there and I
    worked in what was called the Phoenix Club, which was a socialization
    area for the clients to--really to just hang out and, um, sort of work
    on their social skills. So I--
        Q. Okay. After your work there, you obviously had occasion to come
    to work at the White House. How did--how did you come to decide you
    wanted to come to Washington, and in particular work at the White
    House?
        A. There were a few different factors. My mom's side of the family
    had moved to Washington during my senior year of college and I wanted--
    I wasn't ready to go to graduate school yet. So I wanted to get out of
    Portland, and a friend of our family's had a grandson who had had an
    internship at the White House and had thought it might be something I'd
    enjoy doing.
        Q. Had you ever worked around--in politics and campaigns or been
    very active?
        A. No.
        Q. You had to go through the normal application process of
    submitting a written application, references, and so forth to--to the
    White House?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you do that while you were still in Oregon, or were you
    already in D.C.?
        A. No. The application process was while I was a senior in college
    in Oregon.
        Q. Had you ever been to Washington before?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Obviously, you were accepted, and you started work when?
        A. July 10th, 1995.

        That image, the image of a young woman, very much like a
    family member or a friend that we might know, is an image that
    the President did not want America to see when his
    indiscretions with her became public. When that happened, the
    President painted Monica Lewinsky in a very different and
    callous light.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON: But I want to say one thing to
    the American people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to
    say this again. I did not have sexual relations with that
    woman, Ms. Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not a single
    time, never. These allegations are false, and I need to go back
    to work for the American people. Thank you.

        ``That woman'' with that subtle description, the President
    invited a waiting America to adopt a totally false impression
    of Monica Lewinsky. That was not fair. Yet, with his close
    aides, aides that he later testified he knew would be witnesses
    before the grand jury, he went much further than a subtle
    sneer. Hear the words of Sidney Blumenthal, assistant to the
    President, recount how the President painted this vulnerable
    young intern who made the tragic mistake of becoming involved
    with him.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened
    between him and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. As I recall, he did.
        Q. What did the President tell you?
        A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point
    and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he
    had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him.
    And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the
    stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would
    claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and
    that she would tell people.
        Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky
    would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her
    peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
        A. Yes, that's right.
        Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm
    quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot
    of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
        A. Yes. He told me that.
        Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the
    President?
        A. Right, in--in that sequence.
        Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared
    this information with you?
        A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.

        He was a man in anguish. This was more than rakish
    behavior. When the President used his aides as a conduit to
    impart false information to a Federal grand jury in a criminal
    investigation, his behavior graduated from the unconscionable
    to the illegal.
        Members of the Senate, your task is to determine who is
    telling the truth and who is lying. As you weigh that option,
    consider Mr. Blumenthal's conclusion drawn on the very subject.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the
    President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe
    the President lied to you about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky?
        A. I do.

        To justify a vote of not guilty for the President, you
    certainly have the right to reject Monica Lewinsky's testimony
    as untruthful. However, I trust your sense of fairness will
    dictate that you will listen to all of her testimony before you
    dismiss it outright. If you believe her, you will see this
    morning how the President wove the web of perjury and
    obstruction of justice. You will see why he was impeached by
    the House of Representatives, and you will see why a just and
    proper verdict in this body would be to replace him as
    President with Vice President Al Gore.
        Consider, for example, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding
    witness tampering, one element of the obstruction of justice
    charge against the President. The President stands charged with
    illegally encouraging a witness in a Federal civil rights suit
    brought against him to give perjured testimony in that
    proceeding. Did he do this? Listen to Monica Lewinsky.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation
    in the morning with you and the President, and he has among
    other things mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones
    witness list. He has also mentioned to you that perhaps you
    could file an affidavit to avoid possible testifying in that
    case. Is that right?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were
    in our questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he
    had had, that perhaps you could say that you were coming to my
    office to deliver papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?
        A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that
    story.
        Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that
    instantly familiar to you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. You knew what he was talking about?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And why was this familiar to you?
        A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.

        It was part of the pattern of the relationship. During Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony earlier this week under oath pursuant to a
    Senate deposition order, she further elaborated on this
    critical piece of evidence.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I
    would draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded
    to that earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that
    night?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And what was said?
        A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--
    you can always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me
    papers.
        Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that
    that night. You are sure he said that that night?
        A. Yes.

        Consider also Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding concealing
    subpoenaed evidence; namely, the gifts he gave her. This is yet
    another element in the obstruction of justice allegation
    against the President. The President stands charged with
    corruptly engaging in a scheme to conceal evidence that had
    been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought
    against him. Did he do this? Remember, on the morning of
    December 28, 1997, a few days after Ms. Lewinsky received a
    subpoena directing her to turn over any gifts she had received
    from the President, the President met with Ms. Lewinsky. She
    suggested to him that she could give the gifts he gave her to
    Betty Currie, the President's personal secretary. The President
    said that he would think about it. Listen to what Monica
    Lewinsky said happened next.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Did you later that day receive a call from Betty Currie?
        A. Yes, I did.
        Q. Tell us about that.
        A. I received a call from--Betty, and to the best of my
    memory, she said something like I understand you have something
    for me or I know--I know I've testified to saying that--that I
    remember her saying either I know you have something for me or
    the President said you have something for me. And to me, it's
    a--she said--I mean, this is not a direct quote, but the gist
    of the conversation was that she was going to go visit her mom
    in the hospital and she'd stop by and get whatever it was.
        Q. Did you question Ms. Currie or ask her, what are you
    talking about or what do you mean?
        A. No.
        Q. Why didn't you?
        A. Because I assumed that it meant the gifts.

        As you can see, the only way Betty Currie would have known
    to come and get the gifts would have been for the President to
    tell her to do so.
        Finally, consider Ms. Lewinsky's testimony regarding the
    President's help in securing a New York job for her to
    encourage her silence, which is another element of the
    obstruction of justice charge against him. The President is
    charged with chasing a job for her in order to prevent her
    truthful testimony. Did he do this? Remember that the President
    learned on December 6, 1997, that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Paula
    Jones witness list.
        Listen to Monica Lewinsky.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Okay. Between your meeting with Mr. Jordan in early
    November, and December the 11th when you met with Mr. Jordan
    again, you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help
    you get a job; is that correct?
        A. I hadn't seen any progress.
        Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December,
    you began to interview in New York and were much more active in
    your job search; correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon
    with the help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?
        A. Yes.

        Members of the Senate, these are but a few highlights of a
    broad tapestry of corruption that Mr. Manager Hutchinson and I
    will develop for you this morning through videotape testimony
    and through other evidence.
        Before we proceed to that, it is worth briefly recounting
    the circumstances that elevated the President's initial
    indiscretions to the level of impeachable offenses. The lesson
    is not complex. It is quite elementary.
        In all the things we do in life, life is about making
    choices. Parents teach children that bad choices bring sorrow
    and consequences. We do that because the failure to impose
    meaningful consequences for bad choices brings about more bad
    choices. That simple primer on life encapsulates the political
    and personal legacy of Bill Clinton, his continuing pattern of
    indulging all choices and accepting no consequences. This is
    demonstrated by the actions he took leading to his impeachment
    and trial before the Senate.
        In May 1991, an incident allegedly occurred that led the
    President to make a bad choice. According to Paula Jones, a
    subordinate government employee, then-Governor Clinton made a
    crude and unwelcome sexual advance on her. She later filed a
    legal claim for sexual harassment against him.
        In November 1995, the President made another bad choice. He
    began a physical relationship with a 22-year-old White House
    intern. He chose to begin a physical relationship with her.
    This was not, as he told the grand jury, a relationship that
    began as a friendship only to later blossom into intimacy. The
    President impulsively began using her for his gratification the
    very day he first spoke with her. Later, he made the bad choice
    of continuing the relationship after Monica became a paid
    Government employee.
        An important note. As regrettable as his choice was here,
    any accountability for the private aspect of this should not be
    determined by the Congress of the United States. It should be
    determined by his family. Had the President's bad choice simply
    ended with this indiscretion, we would not be here today.
    Adultery may be a lot of things, but it is not an impeachable
    offense.
        Unfortunately, the President's bad choices only grew worse.
    In December 1997, the President made a bad choice. In order to
    avoid any possible legal accountability to Paula Jones, he
    chose to destroy her lawful right to proceed with her case. And
    this is how he did it: During the so-called discovery portion
    of the Paula Jones case, Federal Judge Susan Wright ordered the
    President to answer questions under oath about any intimate
    relationship he may have had with subordinate female government
    employees while he was Governor or President.
        Why did Judge Susan Wright order him to answer these
    questions? She did it because sexual harassers in the workplace
    usually do not commit their offenses in the open. Typically
    they get their victims alone and isolated. Predators know if
    they can do this, one of two things generally will happen. Out
    of fear and intimidation the victim will submit, or out of fear
    and intimidation the victim will not submit but the victim will
    not tell anybody about it.
        There usually is no other way for a sexual harassment
    victim to learn if there is evidence of a pattern of similar
    conduct by a predator without being able to ask these kinds of
    questions in a sexual harassment case. Without this
    information, a harassment victim in the workplace generally
    would not be able to prove her case. This is why courts
    routinely order defendants to answer these kinds of questions
    in almost every sexual harassment case in the country.
        Now, President Clinton vigorously pursued legal arguments
    and motions to avoid answering these questions about his sexual
    relations with subordinate government employees. Yet, after
    hearing his arguments, Judge Susan Wright ordered the President
    to answer under oath these routine questions. And by the way,
    Paula Jones also was required to provide truthful answers under
    oath as part of the trial in the discovery process. Had Paula
    Jones lied in providing such answers, she would have been
    liable for criminal prosecution.
        It was while the Paula Jones case was proceeding in the
    summer of 1995, that a 22-year-old named Monica Lewinsky went
    to work as an intern at the White House. Shortly thereafter, in
    November 1995, the President began his physical relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky. And this continued from 1995 until the
    early part of 1997.
        In order to shield him, Monica Lewinsky promised the
    President that she would always deny the sexual nature of their
    relationship. She said she would always protect him. The
    President spoke words of approval and encouragement to this
    pledge of secrecy. Monica and the President even agreed to
    cover stories to disguise the true nature of their
    relationship.
        In April 1996, Monica was transferred, against her will,
    from the White House job to a job at the Pentagon. After she
    left employment at the White House, she frequently returned
    there to continue her secret relationship with the President
    under the guise of visiting Betty Currie, the President's
    personal secretary.
        After working at the Pentagon for over a year, Monica
    became disheartened. Despite the President's promises to the
    contrary, Monica was not returned to work at the White House.
    In July 1997, she began looking for a job in New York. She
    wasn't having any luck, despite the President's promise to help
    her with this, too. By early November 1997, Monica became
    frustrated with the lack of assistance.
        Finally, Betty Currie arranged a meeting for Monica with
    Vernon Jordan, one of the President's closest friends. They
    sought to enlist his help in her New York job search. On
    November 5, 1997, Monica met for 20 minutes with Mr. Jordan in
    his office. No job referrals followed, no job interviews were
    arranged, and there were no contacts from Mr. Jordan. In short,
    Mr. Jordan made no effort to find Monica a job. Indeed, getting
    her a job was so unimportant to him that Mr. Jordan later
    testified that he didn't even remember meeting her on November
    5.
        Nothing happened on her job search through the month of
    November, because Mr. Jordan was either gone or he simply
    wasn't returning Monica's phone calls. All that changed on
    December 5, 1997. That was the day Monica Lewinsky's name
    appeared on the Paula Jones witness list.
        Members of the Senate, this is how the whole thing started.
    A lone woman in Arkansas felt that she had been wronged by the
    President of the United States. The law said that she had a
    right to have her claim heard in a court of law. At each stage
    the President could have chosen to uphold the law. Instead, he
    chose to obstruct justice and to commit perjury.
        In his presentation, Mr. Manager Hutchinson will show you,
    through videotape words of the key witnesses, how the President
    used his position to obstruct justice as set forth in the
    articles of impeachment. I will then return to make the same
    showing respecting the allegations of perjury in the articles.
    Throughout all of this, throughout this presentation, it is
    important to keep in mind that we seek no congressional
    punishment for a man who chose to cheat on his wife. However,
    we have a legal obligation to expect constitutional
    accountability for a President who chooses to cheat the law.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I want to continue the
    presentation that was commenced this morning by Mr. Rogan. Let
    me continue with the path of obstruction. The obstruction, for
    our purposes, began on December 5, 1997, when the witness list
    came out in the civil rights case. It was faxed to the
    President's lawyers. It was later given to the President.
        At that point, the administration of justice became a
    threat to the President of the United States. He determined
    that the truth would be harmful to the case that he was trying
    to defend, and the President made a decision to take whatever
    steps were necessary to suppress the truth rather than to
    uphold the law. The acts of obstruction included attempts to
    improperly influence the testimony of witnesses in the case
    against him, the procurement of a false affidavit in the case,
    the willful concealment of evidence that was under subpoena,
    and efforts to illegally influence the testimony of witnesses
    before the Federal grand jury.
        You have heard these areas of obstruction presented to you
    before by managers on behalf of the House. Today it is
    important that you hear this case from those who have testified
    by deposition at your direction. And as you hear their
    testimony, you will see that the President may have been the
    only individual who had the complete picture. He had all the
    facts, and he did not always share those facts with others. He
    did not share those facts with Mr. Vernon Jordan, nor did he
    share all the facts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky, until he
    determined the time was right to do so.
        For example, he knows that Ms. Lewinsky is a witness but
    does not tell Ms. Lewinsky that fact until the time is right
    and whenever the job search is proceeding. He asks Mr. Jordan
    to help Ms. Lewinsky to get a job, but he does not tell Mr.
    Jordan the essential facts, first of all, that Ms. Lewinsky is
    a witness and, secondly, that there is a dangerous relationship
    between them in which, if she testified, her testimony would be
    harmful.
        The President was obviously concerned about the truth of
    the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky. It would have been harmful to
    his interests in the case. As a result, the President
    personally obstructed and directed the efforts of Mr. Jordan to
    secure Ms. Lewinsky a job and urge the filing of the affidavit.
    Now, what is the President's defense to this charge? Let's
    listen.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in
    any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones
    case?
        A. No.

        Now, you have heard that before. As you can see, Mr. Jordan
    defends his actions and, by implication, defends the actions of
    the President. You can weigh his intentions, but his intentions
    are not the issue, because regardless of your view of Mr.
    Jordan and his motivations, they are irrelevant. His view as to
    whether there is a connection between the job and the testimony
    is not an issue. It is not an issue as to whether Ms. Lewinsky
    thought there was a connection between the job and the
    testimony. It is not an issue as to whether Revlon thought
    there was a connection between the job and the testimony.
        There is only one issue, and that is whether the President
    viewed that there was a connection between those two. And it is
    the President who, under the law, had to have the corrupt
    intent, and that is the question that you have to answer. And I
    believe that the evidence will show that regardless of what
    anyone else believed, he knew the direct connection.
        Now, after each of you hears the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky
    and Mr. Jordan, some of you will conclude that surely he had to
    know that there was an inappropriate relationship between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky. And why do I say that? Well, Ms.
    Lewinsky will testify that he made it clear--that she made it
    clear to Mr. Jordan that there was that type of relationship.
    At first, she sort of is careful about it, but then she just
    ultimately tells him, as you will see from her testimony. But
    Mr. Jordan also, for those who have listened to his testimony,
    refers to mother wit, and his oft relied upon mother wit would
    have told him as well, under the circumstances, that there is
    something more going on.
        If he knew about the relationship, he had to know that all
    was not as it should be in what the President was asking him to
    do. The President requested a job for Ms. Lewinsky at the same
    time he was monitoring the filing of a false affidavit and
    knowing she was a witness in a case against him: All indicated
    that the job was not a favor for a young friend but it was a
    favor for someone in high office that had to be accomplished in
    order to assure the cooperation of a dangerous witness. That
    evidence will show that it is the President who suggested the
    assistance from Ms. Lewinsky and it is the President who
    suggested the false affidavit.
        Now, let's listen to the testimony, step by step, through
    the job search, through the signing of the false affidavit, to
    the encouragement to file the false affidavit on December 17,
    to the discussion of the gifts on December 28, through the
    tampering with the testimony of Betty Currie on two occasions,
    and then with the President's aide when they were called before
    the Federal grand jury, or prior to that.
        First, let's go to the job benefit to Ms. Lewinsky. How
    involved was the President in this activity? Let's first listen
    to the President as to what he said when he testified under
    oath in his deposition.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Do you know a man named Vernon Jordan?
        A. I know him well.
        Q. You have known him for a long time?
        A. A long time.
        Q. Has it ever been reported to you that he met with Monica
    Lewinsky and talked about this case?
        A. I knew that he met with her. I think Betty suggested he
    met with her and she may have met with her. I thought that he
    talked with her about something else. I thought he had given
    her some advice about her move to New York. It seems like that
    is what Betty said.

        Rather vague. Attributes all of his knowledge about Vernon
    Jordan, in reference to Ms. Lewinsky, to Betty, to Betty.
        Let's go on and hear more of what the President has to say
    in this connection.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Have you ever had a conversation with Vernon Jordan in
    which Monica Lewinsky was mentioned?
        A. I have. He told me that he thought he mentioned in
    passing to me that he had talked to her and she had come to him
    for advice about moving to New York.
        Q. She had come to him for advice.
        A. She had come to him for advice about moving to New York.
    She had called him and asked if she could come see him, and
    Betty, I think, maybe had said something to him about talking
    to him and he had given her some advice about moving to New
    York.
        That's all I know about that.

        That is all I know about that--diminished knowledge,
    diminished responsibility.
        But let's see what his good friend and confidant, Mr.
    Jordan, says about what the President knew, when he knew it,
    and to what extent he controlled this effort.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, is it true that your efforts to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky
    that you referenced in that meeting with Mr. Gittis--were your efforts
    carried out at the request of the President of the United States?
        A. There is no question but that through Betty Currie, I was acting
    on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. I think that's
    clear from my grand jury testimony.
        Q. Okay. And I just want to make sure that that's firmly
    established. And in reference to your previous grand jury testimony,
    you indicated, I believe, on May 28th, 1998, at page 61, that ``She''--
    referring to Betty Currie--``was the one that called me at the behest
    of the President.''
        A. That is correct, and I think, Congressman, if in fact the
    President of the United States' secretary calls and asks for a request
    that you try to do the best you can to make it happen.
        Q. And you received that request as a request coming from the
    President?
        A. I--I interpreted it as a request from the President.
        Q. And then, later on in June of '98 in the grand jury testimony at
    page 45, did you not reference or testify that ``The President asked me
    to get Monica Lewinsky a job''?
        A. There was no--there was no question but that he asked me to help
    and that he asked others to help. I think that is clear from
    everybody's grand jury testimony.
        Q. And just one more point in that regard. In the same grand jury
    testimony, is it correct that you testified that ``He''--referring to
    the President--``was the source of it coming to my attention in the
    first place''?
        A. I may--if that is--if you--if it's in the--
        Q. It's at page 58 of the grand jury--
        A. I stand on my grand jury testimony.

        As Mr. Jordan testified, the President was a source of it
    coming to his attention in the first place. Mr. Jordan, the
    President's friend, testified that this was not a casual matter
    for the President. He was interested, he was directing the show
    and, as will be clear, he was consumed with preventing the
    truth from coming out in the civil rights case.
        But let's start back, for a moment, at the beginning. In
    the packet provided to you, there is a time line, and you can
    see again that there was the witness list that came out on
    December 5. That triggered the action in this case. But as we
    know, there was a meeting on November 5 between Ms. Lewinsky
    and Mr. Jordan in Mr. Jordan's office. Ms. Lewinsky wanted a
    job before the witness list came out, but not a whole lot was
    happening in that regard.
        Let's look at the testimony of Mr. Jordan in regard to this
    November 5 meeting that he was first asked about, which he had
    no recollection about. When the records were reproduced for
    him, he had a recollection.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Well, regardless of whether you met with her in November or not,
    the fact is you did not do anything in November to secure a job for Ms.
    Lewinsky until your activities on December 11 of '97?
        A. I think that's correct.
        Q. And on December 11, I think you made some calls for Ms. Lewinsky
    on that particular day?
        A. I believe I did.

        There will be a pattern developing, as you can see. Mr.
    Jordan had no recollection of the November 5 meeting when he
    originally testified before the grand jury. He had no
    recollection whatsoever of that meeting. Basically, he said it
    didn't happen.
        The second time he testified before the grand jury, the
    record was produced and it was substantiated. He recalls that.
    The second thing you can see from this was the meeting was of
    absolutely no consequence to him because this was not a
    priority issue to him. He was not going to do anything. It
    started happening, of course, when the witness list came out.
    The President met with the attorneys with the witness list, and
    on December 7 the President and Mr. Jordan meet. On December 8,
    a meeting is set up by Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. Jordan for the
    11th, and it was on the 11th when they met that things started
    moving and calls were being made. Of course, that was done at
    the direction of the President.
        Look at Ms. Lewinsky's recollection of that same November 5
    meeting.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. . . . you did not feel that Mr. Jordan was doing much to help
    you get a job; is that correct?
        A. I hadn't seen any progress.
        Q. Okay. After you met with Mr. Jordan in early December, you began
    to interview in New York and were much more active in your job search;
    correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. In early January, you received a job offer from Revlon with the
    help of Vernon Jordan; is that correct?
        A. Yes.

        Ms. Lewinsky, at this point, is at their mercy. She doesn't
    know what the communication is, she doesn't know what the
    President knows. The witness list has come in, and she hoped
    things were moving, but she doesn't know it. Finally, they
    start moving after the witness list comes in. On December 11,
    she has the meeting at which things start moving.
        Was this a typical referral? Each of you in this body have
    had occasions where friends and acquaintances, at different
    levels, or previous employees come to you and say: I am going
    to be applying for a job with such and such a company. Will you
    be a reference for me?
        Sometimes they ask you to make a call to that company to
    which they are applying for a job. This is not a typical
    referral, as you will see from the testimony. A few days prior
    to the December 11 meeting, Ms. Lewinsky sends up a wish list
    of the companies she wanted to apply. Mr. Jordan quickly said,
    ``I'm not concerned about your wish list. I have the people I
    want to deal with.'' He took control of the job search.
        Let's listen to the testimony of Mr. Jordan as he
    emphasizes that point.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess some people
    refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
        A. Not jobs--companies.
        Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment
    with.
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go
    with your own list of friends and companies that you had better
    contacts with.
        A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business,
    and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel
    comfortable in calling.
        Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and
    ask your response to this, but many times I will be listed as a
    reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed
    as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference
    anywhere, would it not?
        A. I would hope so.
        Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the
    best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
        A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms.
    Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were
    not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
        Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms.
    Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you
    were going to be a reference for.
        A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting
    jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an
    assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
        Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to
    get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
        A. Yes.

        The testimony is very clear as to Mr. Jordan running the
    job search--in essence, a job placement on behalf of the
    President.
        Let's go again to that meeting of December 11 at which Ms.
    Lewinsky goes, for the first time Mr. Jordan remembers, for
    that meeting about the jobs. Ms. Lewinsky's view of this
    meeting--again, Jordan's list--he was the one controlling the
    job search. Also, you will see that Mr. Jordan acquires some
    knowledge from Ms. Lewinsky as to the relationship.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Let's go forward another week or so to December the 11th and a
    lunch that you had with Vernon Jordan, I believe, in his office.
        A. Yes.
        Q. How did--how was that meeting set up.
        A. Through his secretary.
        Q. Did you instigate that, or did he call through his secretary?
        A. I don't remember.
        Q. What was the purpose of that meeting?
        A. Uh, it was to discuss my job situation.
        Q. And what, what--how was that discussed?
        A. Uh, Mr. Jordan gave me a list of three names and suggested that
    I contact these people in a letter that I should cc him on, and that's
    what I did.
        Q. Did he ask you to copy him on the letters that you sent out?
        A. Yes.
        Q. During this meeting, did he make any comments about your status
    as a friend of the President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What--what did he say?
        A. In one of his remarks, he said something about me being a friend
    of the President.
        Q. And did you respond?
        A. Yes.
        Q. How?
        A. I said that I didn't, uh--I think I--my grand jury testimony, I
    know I talked about this, so it's probably more accurate. My memory
    right now is I said something about, uh, seeing him more as, uh, a man
    than as a President, and I treated him accordingly.
        Q. Did you express your frustration to Mr. Jordan with, uh, with
    the President?
        A. I expressed that sometimes I had frustrations with him, yes.
        Q. And what was his response to you about, uh--after you talked
    about the President?
        A. Uh, he sort of jokingly said to me, You know what your problem
    is, and don't deny it--you're in love with him. But it was a sort of
    light-hearted nature.
        Q. Did you--did you have a response to that?
        A. I probably blushed or giggled or something.

        That was on December 11. And I am sure Mr. Jordan and
    others were starting to kick in, at this point, understanding
    that there was something a little bit more involved in the
    relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President.
        But let's go to another aspect of the relationship on the
    job search. Let's look how information is controlled. Mr.
    Jordan learns ultimately on December 19 clearly that Ms.
    Lewinsky is on the witness list because she presents a subpoena
    to him. But whenever he pursues the jobs later on and maybe the
    call to Mr. Perelman, he does not pass that information along
    to the company. Does that make a difference to Revlon? You will
    hear some reference to Mr. Halperin, who is one of the
    executives at MacAndrews & Forbes, the parent company of
    Revlon, and Mr. Perelman, who is the CEO of MacAndrews and
    Forbes as well.
        Let's listen to the testimony of Mr. Jordan on how
    information is controlled.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that
    you knew and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under
    subpoena in the Jones case, and that information was not
    provided to either Mr. Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that
    correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Now, I wanted to read you a question and answer of Mr.
    Howard Gittis in his grand jury testimony of April 23, 1998.
        The question was: ``Now, you had mentioned before that one
    of the responsibilities of director is to have a fiduciary duty
    to the company. If it was the case that Ms. Lewinsky had been
    noticed as a witness in the Paula Jones case, and Vernon Jordan
    had known that, is that something that you believe as a person
    who works for MacAndrews & Forbes, is that something that you
    believe that Mr. Jordan should have told you, or someone in the
    company, not necessarily you, but someone in the company, when
    you referred her for employment?''
        His answer was ``Yes.''
        Do you disagree with Mr. Gittis' conclusion that that was
    important information for MacAndrews & Forbes?
        A. I obviously didn't think it was important at the time,
    and I didn't do it.

        Why would Revlon want to know that Ms. Lewinsky was on a
    witness list and under subpoena in a case that was adverse to
    the President and the fact the President was really the one
    that was wanting the job placement for Ms. Lewinsky? I think
    everyone understands the extraordinary conflict, extraordinary
    impropriety of that circumstance. As Mr. Jordan himself
    testified previously, that whenever the subpoena was issued, it
    changed the circumstances, and, yet, that information was not
    provided to Revlon, and Mr. Gittis certainly would have thought
    that it should have been.
        So Revlon wanted to know for the same reason, really, that
    Mr. Jordan would have liked to have had that information. But
    when the President learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness
    list, he did not share that information with Mr. Jordan
    himself.
        So it is explosive information that the President did not
    make available to him until the right time.
        Let's listen to Mr. Jordan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness
    list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and
    then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky
    on the 11th.
        Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you
    discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if
    so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
        A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit
    to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it
    was about the job search.
        Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about
    the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted
    to get a job in New York?
        A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her
    job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was
    also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector,
    and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me.
    There is no doubt about that.
        Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
        A. There's no question about that, either.
        Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that
    you had with the President after the witness list came out, your
    conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the
    11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the
    witness list in the Jones case?
        A. He did not.

        The President knew it was not disclosed to Mr. Jordan,
    according to his testimony. Mr. Jordan has to be reminded as to
    how important this information was because he previously
    testified that he expected to be told. It was significant
    enough information that if Ms. Betty Currie knew that Ms.
    Lewinsky was under subpoena that Betty Currie should tell him.
    He expected the President to tell him. That was his
    expectation, for natural reasons--that this is an extraordinary
    conflict whenever the President knows there is a relationship.
    She is an adverse witness. She is under subpoena, and provided
    a job benefit. But he kept some of those details to himself
    without disclosing.
        Let's listen again to Mr. Jordan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Precisely. She disclosed to you, of course, when she received
    the subpoena, and that's information that you expected to know and to
    be disclosed to you?
        A. Fine.
        Q. Is--
        A. Yes. Fine.
        Q. And in fact, if Ms. Currie--I'm talking about Betty Currie--if
    she had known that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have
    expected her to tell you that information as well since you were
    seeking employment for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Well, it would have been fine had she told me. I do make a
    distinction between being a witness on the one hand and being a
    defendant in some sort of criminal action on the other. She was a
    witness in the civil case, and I don't believe witnesses in civil cases
    don't have a right for--to employment.
        Q. Okay. I refer you to page 95 of your grand jury testimony, in
    which you said: ``I believe that had Ms. Currie known, that she would
    have told me.''
        And the next question: ``Let me ask the question again, though.
    Would you have expected her to tell you if she knew?''
        And do you recall your answer?
        A. I don't.
        Q. ``Yes, sure.''
        A. I stand by that answer.
        Q. And so it's your testimony that if Ms. Currie had known that Ms.
    Lewinsky was under subpoena, you would have expected her to tell you
    that information?
        A. It would have been helpful.
        Q. And likewise, would you have expected the President to tell you
    if he had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky would be called as a
    witness in the Paula Jones case?
        A. That would have been helpful, too.
        Q. And that was your expectation, that he would have done that in
    your conversations?
        A. It--it would certainly have been helpful, but it would not have
    changed my mind.
        Q. Well, being helpful and that being your expectation is a little
    bit different, and so I want to go back again to your testimony on
    March 3, page 95, when the question is asked to you--question: ``If the
    President had any reason to believe that Ms. Lewinsky could be called a
    witness in the Paula Jones case, would you have expected him to tell
    you that when you spoke with him between the 11th and the 19th about
    her?''
        And your answer: ``And I think he would have.''
        A. My answer was yes in the grand jury testimony, and my answer is
    yes today.
        Q. All right. So it would have been helpful, and it was something
    you would have expected?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so
    advise you of that fact in the conversations that he had with you on
    December 7th and December 11th after he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was
    on the witness list?
        A. As I testified--
        MR. KENDALL: Objection. Misstates the record with regard to
    December 11th.
        MR. HUTCHINSON: I--I will restate the question. I believe it
    accurately reflects the record, and I'll ask the question.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. And yet, according to your testimony, the President did not so
    advise you of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list
    despite the fact that he had conversations with you on two occasions,
    on December 7th and December 11th?
        A. I have no recollection of the President telling me about the
    witness list.

        Now, I am providing some long snippets because I want you
    to see the testimony of the witnesses. I think it is very
    important as you piece it together. You might say, well, there
    is nothing explosive here. Whenever you are talking about
    obstruction of justice, it ties together, it fits together.
    Information is controlled and that is what we see in this
    particular case.
        Clearly, Mr. Jordan expected information because he knew
    that something that the President should have shared, it was
    not shared, according to Mr. Jordan's testimony. And for
    natural reasons.
        If you look at the exhibit that I passed out, on the time
    line we have talked about when the witness list came out, on
    the 7th, and on the 11th, or sometime thereafter, the President
    and Mr. Jordan meet, and that information is not disclosed,
    despite the fact that the President knows she is on the witness
    list.
        And now, let's go to the 17th, because now the President is
    ready to share some additional information with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now that he has got the job search moving, perhaps she is in a
    more receptive mood so that she can handle the news that she is
    on the witness list. So let's listen to Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony as to this December 17, 2 a.m., telephone
    conversation from the President of the United States.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December
    the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?
        A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother
    had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was
    on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned
    the Christmas present he had for me.
        Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of
    2 o'clock to 2:30.
        A. Correct.
        Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?
        A. No.
        Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones
    witness list?
        A. Yes.
        Q. I will try to ask sharper questions to avoid these objections.
    At that point we got a telephone conversation in the morning with you
    and the President. And he has, among other things, mentioned to you
    that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has also mentioned to
    you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid possible
    testifying in that case. Is that right.
        A. Correct.
        Q. And he's also, I think, now at the point that we were in our
    questioning in reference to the cover story that you and he had, that
    perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver
    papers or to see Betty Currie. Is that right.
        A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship. That's correct.
        Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly
    familiar to you.
        A. Yes.
        Q. You knew what he was talking about.
        A. Yes.
        Q. And why was this familiar to you.
        A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.
              * * * * *
        Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were
    reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--
        A. Correct.
        Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was
    on the witness list, I should say?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness
    list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to
    testify in the Paula Jones case?
        A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a
    possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was
    a subpoena to testify, but--
        Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was what--
              * * * * *
        Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the
    telephone conversation with the President that early morning of
    December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your
    relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of
    these cover stories?
        A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I
    don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to
    myself I knew I would deny the relationship.
        Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?
        A. Yes, correct.
        Q. Good.

        Do you believe Monica Lewinsky? I believe her testimony is
    credible. She is not trying to hammer the President. She is
    trying to tell the truth as to her recollection of this 2 a.m.
    call to her by the President of the United States on December
    17.
        The news is broken to her that she is on the witness list.
    It puts it in a legal context. This is a 24-year-old ex-intern.
    She might not have the legal sophistication of the President,
    but the President certainly knows the legal consequences as to
    his actions. What he is telling a witness in a case that is
    adverse to him is that: You do not have to tell the truth. You
    can use the cover stories that we used before. And that might
    have been in a nonlegal context, but now we are in a different
    arena and he says: Continue the same lies, even though you are
    in a court of law. Continue the same pattern.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, in my book that is
    illegal, and I hate to say it, but that is obstruction of
    justice by the President of the United States. And, if you
    believe Ms. Lewinsky, then you have to accept that fact.
    Otherwise, we are saying that it is all right for someone to
    take a witness who is against them and say: Don't tell the
    truth, don't worry about that, use the cover stories. You can
    file an affidavit. You can avoid telling the truth.
        Ladies and gentlemen, this is significant. It is important.
    Do not diminish this, the impact of what happened on December
    17, with the obstruction of justice on that occasion.
        And, now, let's move on. That is December 17. We can move
    on to December 19, and this is when the subpoena is actually
    delivered to Ms. Lewinsky. She calls Vernon Jordan. She is in
    tears. She is upset. Vernon Jordan says, ``Come over to my
    office,'' and they have the discussion. And you are going to
    hear Mr. Jordan's version of what happens on December 19. You
    are going to hear Ms. Lewinsky's testimony as to what happens
    in that office on December 19 as well.
        Let's hear from Mr. Jordan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. And during this meeting, did she in fact show you the subpoena
    that she had received in the Jones litigation?
        A. I'm sure she showed me the subpoena.
        Q. And the subpoena that was presented to you asked her to give a
    deposition, is that correct?
        A. As I recollect.
        Q. But did it also ask Ms. Lewinsky or direct her to produce
    certain documents and tangible objects?
        A. I think, if I'm correct in my recollection, it asked that she
    produce gifts.
        Q. Gifts, and some of those gifts were specifically enumerated.
        A. I don't remember that. I do remember gifts.
        Q. And did you discuss any of the items requested under the
    subpoena?
        A. I did not. What I said to her was that she needed counsel.
        Q. Now, just to help you in reference to your previous grand jury
    testimony of March 3, '98--and if you would like to refer to that, page
    121, but I believe it was your testimony that you asked her if there
    had been any gifts after you looked at the subpoena.
        A. I may have done that, and if I--if that's in my testimony, I
    stand by it.
        Q. And did she--from your conversation with her, did you determine
    that in your opinion, there was a fascination on her part with the
    President?
        A. No question about that.
        Q. And I think you previously described it that she had a ``thing''
    for the President?
        A. ``Thing,'' yes.
        Q. And did you make any specific inquiry as to the nature of the
    relationship that she had with the President?
        A. Yes. At some point during that conversation, I asked her
    directly if she had had sexual relationships with the President.
        Q. And is this not an extraordinary question to ask a 24-year-old
    intern, whether she had sexual relations with the President of the
    United States?
        A. Not if you see--not if you had witnessed her emotional state and
    this ``thing,'' as I say. It was not.
        Q. And her emotional state and what she expressed to you about her
    feelings for the President is what prompted you to ask that question?
        A. That, plus the question of whether or not the President at the
    end of his term would leave the First Lady; and that was alarming and
    stunning to me.
        Q. And she related that question to you in that meeting on December
    19th?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. Now, going back to the question in which you asked her if she
    had had a sexual relationship with the President, what was her
    response?
        A. No.
        Q. And I'm sure that that was not an idle question on your part,
    and I presume that you needed to know the answer for some purpose.
        A. I wanted to know the answer based on what I had seen in her
    expression; obviously, based on the fact that this was a subpoena about
    her relationship with the President.
        Q. And so you felt like you needed to know the answer to that
    question to determine how you were going to handle the situation?
        A. No. I thought it was a factual data that I needed to know, and I
    asked the question.
        Q. And why did you need to know the answer to that question?
        A. I am referring this lady, Ms. Lewinsky, to various companies for
    jobs, and it seemed to me that it was important for me to know in that
    process whether or not there had been something going on with the
    President based on what I saw and based on what I heard.

        Why was it important? Why was it important for Mr. Jordan
    to know whether she was under subpoena? Why was it important
    for Mr. Jordan to know whether there was a sexual relationship?
    Why was it important? Because those would be incredible,
    explosive ingredients in a circumstance that is fraught with
    danger and impropriety, and he knows that and he asked the
    right questions. But he doesn't listen to the right answer, nor
    does he take the right steps, because he is acting at the
    direction of the President.
        As you will see, during his meeting on December 19, he was
    keeping the President very closely informed. You will see in
    your packet of materials that the call--as soon as he was
    notified, Mr. Jordan was notified Ms. Lewinsky was under
    subpoena, he tried to get ahold of the President, exhibit H-25,
    a 3:51 call to the President. He didn't make contact at that
    point. Ms. Lewinsky came into his office about 4:47. It was at
    5:01 that he received a call from the President. So the
    President actually called him at the same time Ms. Lewinsky was
    in the office.
        Let's look at Ms. Lewinsky's testimony as to her
    recollection of that December 19 meeting with Mr. Jordan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. You went to see Mr. Jordan, and you were inside his office after
    5 o'clock, and you did--is that correct?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Were--were you interrupted, in the office?
        A. Yes. He received a phone call.
        Q. And you testified that you didn't know who that was that called?
        A. Correct.
        Q. Did you excuse yourself?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What--after you came back in, what--what occurred? Did he tell
    you who he had been talking to?
        A. No.
        Q. Okay. What happened next?
        A. I know I've testified about this--
        Q. Yes.
        A. --so I stand by that testimony, and my recollection right now is
    when I came back in the room, I think shortly after he had placed a
    phone call to--to Mr. Carter's office, and told me to come to his
    office at 10:30 Monday morning.
        Q. Did you know who Mr. Carter was?
        A. No.
        Q. Did Mr. Jordan tell you who he was?
        A. No--I don't remember.
        Q. Did you understand he was going to be your attorney?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you express any concerns about the--the subpoena?
        A. I think that happened before the phone call came.
        Q. Okay, but did you express concerns about the subpoena?
        A. Yes, yes.
        Q. And what were those concerns?
        A. In general, I think I was just concerned about being dragged
    into this, and I was concerned because the subpoena had called for a
    hatpin, that I turn over a hatpin, and that was an alarm to me.
        Q. How--in what sense was it--in what sense was it an alarm to you?
        A. The hatpin being on the subpoena was evidence to me that someone
    had given that information to the Paula Jones people.
        Q. What did Mr. Jordan say about the subpoena?
        A. That it was standard.
        Q. Did he have any--did he have any comment about the specificity
    of the hatpin?
        A. No.
        Q. And did you--
        A. He just kept telling me to calm down.
        Q. Did you raise that concern with Mr. Jordan?
        A. I don't remember if--if I've testified to it, then yes. If--I
    don't remember right now.
        Q. Did--would you have remembered then if he made any comment or
    answer about the hatpin?
        A. I mean, I think I would.
        Q. And you don't remember?
        A. I--I remember him saying something that it was--you know, calm
    down, it's a standard subpoena or vanilla subpoena, something like
    that.

        What we see here is another example of compartmentalization
    of information. During this meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, Mr.
    Jordan receives a call from the President, presumably in
    response to a call he had placed to the President, to tell him
    Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. When the President calls, Mr.
    Jordan takes that call in private. It is about Ms. Lewinsky, it
    is about the subpoena, and that information is not shared with
    Ms. Lewinsky. It is of interest to her.
        Let's go on and hear some more about Ms. Lewinsky's version
    of that conversation on December 19.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did Mr. Jordan during that meeting make an inquiry about the
    nature of the relationship between you and the President?
        A. Yes, he did.
        Q. What was that inquiry?
        A. I don't remember the exact wording of the questions, but there
    were two questions, and I think they were something like did you have
    sex with the President or did he--and if--or did he ask for it or
    some--something like that.

        At this point, Ms. Lewinsky denies the relationship. She
    thinks this is some type of a test. She is not sure the reason
    for the question. She thinks he knows there is a little
    confusion on that. Clearly, Mr. Jordan is not satisfied with
    the answer. Mother wit is still around, as he indicated. But he
    feels so concerned about it that that night he goes to see the
    President, that we will later see, and asks that same question
    of the President.
        Now, let's talk to President Clinton and see what he
    testifies about when this information was reported to him on
    the subpoena. Let's listen to the testimony of President
    Clinton.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that
    Monica Lewinsky had been served with subpoena in this case?
        A. I don't think so.
        Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the
    possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case?
        A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she
    was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I
    want to be as accurate as I can.

        Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Nebraska.
        Mr. KERREY. Can I ask the manager to identify which
    deposition this is?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. This is the January deposition.
        Mr. KERREY. Mr. Chief Justice, will the manager answer the
    question and then show that again? This is the second time he
    has shown a tape of the President without indicating which
    deposition it was.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes, I think it would be a good idea for
    the manager if he will indicate what deposition it was, if you
    are showing a deposition video of the President.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and I
    thank the Senator for the question. It is a very fair question,
    and I will try to be more clear in the identification of that.
    This is the testimony of William Jefferson Clinton before the
    deposition in the Jones case in January, January 17. I
    believe--can we replay that? We are not going to replay that.
    Let me go on.
        The testimony that he gave at that time was, ``Did anyone
    other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky
    had been served with a subpoena in that case,'' and the answer
    was, ``I don't think so.'' Clearly, Mr. Jordan was keeping
    close contact with the President, telling him every step of the
    way, when the subpoena, the call, he is placing a call back--
    the information is there, but, of course, the President tries
    to diminish that.
        Let's go on with some more testimony of Ms. Lewinsky.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did you ask Mr. Jordan to call the President and advise
    him of the subpoena?
        A. I think so, yes. I asked him to inform the President. I
    don't know if it was through telephone or not.
        Q. And you did that because the President had asked you to
    make sure you let Betty know that?
        A. Well, sure. With Betty not being in the office, I
    couldn't--there wasn't anyone else that I could call to get
    through to him.
        Q. Did Mr. Jordan say to you when he might see the
    President next?
        A. I believe he said he would see him that evening at a
    holiday reception.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, could I inquire, was the
    manager thinking in terms of concluding this portion in 15
    minutes, or do you want to take a break now?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. This would be a good time for a
    break.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    we take a 15-minute break at this time.
        There being no objection, at 11:30 a.m., the Senate
    recessed until 11:53 a.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I was
    going to take the opportunity to replay the videotape--in fact,
    I will now--that I did not properly explain before. This is the
    videotape of President Clinton and his testimony before the
    civil deposition in the Jones case in January of 1997.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. When you say ``before,'' you actually
    mean ``during,'' don't you? It is not before the deposition;
    his testimony was during the deposition.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, you are
    absolutely correct. Excuse me. Thank you.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that
    Monica Lewinsky had been served with subpoena in this case?
        A. I don't think so.
        Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the
    possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case?
        A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she
    was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I
    want to be as accurate as I can.

        And now let's go to what Mr. Jordan has to say in reference
    to his contacts with the President when he learned of the
    subpoena on December 19. Let's play that tape.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, Mr. Jordan, you indicated you had this conversation with
    the President at about 5:01 p.m. out of the presence of Ms. Lewinsky.
    Now, during this conversation with the President, what did you tell the
    President in that conversation?
        A. That Lewinsky--I'm sure I told him that Ms. Lewinsky was in my
    office, in the reception area, that she had a subpoena and that I was
    going to visit with her.
        Q. And did you advise the President as well that you were going to
    recommend Frank Carter as an attorney?
        A. I may have.
        Q. And why was it necessary to tell the President these facts?
        A. I don't know why it was not unnecessary to tell him these facts.
    I was keeping him informed about what was going on, and so I told him.
        Q. Why did you make the judgment that you should call the President
    and advise him of these facts?
        A. I just thought he ought to know. He was interested it--he was
    obviously interested in it--and I felt some responsibility to tell him,
    and I did.
        Q. All right. And what was the President's response?
        A. He said thank you.
        Q. Subsequent to your conversation with the President about Monica
    Lewinsky, did you advise Ms. Lewinsky of this conversation with the
    President?
        A. I doubt it.

        Once again, Mr. Jordan testifies that the President was
    obviously interested in it. This was not a matter of casual
    interest to him. It was a matter of deep concern that
    jeopardized what he saw as his position in that lawsuit.
        Now, let's go back again to the testimony of President
    Clinton, this time before the grand jury in August of 1998.
        [Playing of videotape.]
        Mr. STEVENS. We cannot hear that monitor.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I will read the answer again:

        . . . and Mr. Jordan informed you of that, is that right?
        Answer: No, sir.

        Now, in fairness to the President, he gives a longer answer
    than that. I welcome anybody to read it, but it appears rather
    convoluted. I think that you can see the contrast. There is no
    question in Mr. Jordan's mind as to the details that he is
    providing to the President on a regular basis. We are on
    December 19. The subpoena is issued. He notifies the President.
    He notifies the President how the job search is going. He
    notifies the President that they got representation through Mr.
    Carter. So the details are provided to the President and to
    contrast that with the President's recollection as to did he
    have any contact with Mr. Jordan, once again diminishing that.
        Let's go back to December 19, back to the chart--to
    December 19 when the subpoena is issued. Mr. Jordan meets with
    Monica Lewinsky. He confronts her about the relationship. Now,
    he goes that evening to see the President at the White House to
    confront him personally about it to discuss this with him.
    Let's hear from Mr. Jordan, and this is at the White House.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
        A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came
    in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left
    the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan
    went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
    I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with
    him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he
    had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said,
    ``No, never.''

        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. Well, we had established that.
        Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about
    her fascination?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that
    day?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked
    about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the
    term?
        A. I did.
        Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to
    whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of
    conversation.
        Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to
    Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question
    to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this
    question to the President?
        A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who
    happens to be the President of the United States.
        Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United
    States, to give you a truthful answer?
        A. I did.
        Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to
    continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
        A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to
    do.
        Q. Well, my question was more did you rely upon the President's
    answer in your decision to continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a
    job.
        A. I did not rely on his answer. I was going to pursue the job in
    any event. But I got the answer to the question that I had asked Ms.
    Lewinsky earlier from her, and I got the answer from him that night as
    to the sexual relationships, and he said no.

        You will have to judge for yourselves as to why Mr. Jordan
    felt compelled to ask the question. He is asking the right
    questions. It was important information. If the President had
    said, ``Yes; there is,'' then it would certainly have been
    inappropriate to continue providing a job benefit for a witness
    that you are seeking an affidavit from denying a relationship
    when you know the relationship exists, when that witness would
    be adverse to the President's interest who is seeking the job.
        To some that might be convoluted, and perhaps I didn't
    explain it as best it can be. But it looks to me like that is
    why Mr. Jordan is asking the question because he knows it would
    be inappropriate if that, in fact, did exist. He got an answer
    ``no.'' I don't know what was in his mind. But clearly you see
    the conversations develop when Ms. Lewinsky made it totally
    clear to him without any question that there was that
    relationship. But still the job benefit was provided.
        We are not going to have time to go through it all. But
    sequentially, the next thing that happens is December 2 when
    Ms. Lewinsky goes to Mr. Jordan's office where Mr. Jordan
    drives her in the chauffeur-driven government vehicle to Mr.
    Frank Carter's office where the attorney is that is provided
    for Ms. Lewinsky. That is the only time that it happened in the
    referral that Mr. Jordan took it upon himself to personally
    deliver a client to Mr. Carter. During that conversation, Ms.
    Lewinsky tells Mr. Jordan more of the details of their
    relationship.
        But let's go to another element of obstruction--on December
    28, a few days after Christmas. You are very familiar with this
    episode in which Ms. Lewinsky and the President meet. They
    exchange gifts. The testimony in the Jones case is discussed.
    There is concern expressed about the gifts. She asks the
    President in essence, Should I get them out of my house? And
    you will hear her answer. Her testimony is very clear on this.
    That is what I would like you to listen to. There is no
    ambiguity. There are no ``what-ifs.'' It is very clear. And
    let's move now to the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky.
        [Inaudible.]
        Mr. LAUTENBERG. I can't hear.
        Mr. GRAMM. Can we turn this up?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. I don't think the question is
    audible.
        Well, that is a different--it's not as sophisticated a
    sound collection system as the U.S. Senate used in the
    depositions here, so I apologize for the fact that that was
    inaudible but the question was asked of the President:

        Q. After you gave her the gifts on December 28, did you
    speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her to pick up a
    box of gifts that was some compilation of gifts that Ms.
    Lewinsky would have?

        His answer:

        No, sir, I did not do that.

        His denial and then the facts presented by Ms. Lewinsky and
    the circumstantial evidence, the question was asked of Ms.
    Lewinsky:

        Q. Did the President ever tell you to turn over the gifts?
        A. Not that I remember.

        But when I say that she that testified unequivocally,
    whenever Ms. Lewinsky was asked ``Did you later that day
    receive a call from Ms. Currie,'' the answer was, ``Yes, I
    did,'' and she goes ahead and explains it. There is no
    hesitation. There is no question. But their memory is clear
    that the call came from Betty Currie.
        Now, how could Betty Currie know to go pick up the gifts? I
    think you understand there is only one way that could have come
    about, and that would be through a communication from the
    President to her.
        Now, let's go on down the path. After we see the meeting on
    December 28, there was a meeting at the Hyatt on December 31.
    We could play this video--I would like to--with Vernon Jordan
    and with Ms. Lewinsky. This is a meeting at the Hyatt that Mr.
    Jordan totally denied ever happened in his first few
    testimonies before the grand jury. But in his most recent
    testimony before the Senate, in the deposition, he was
    confronted with receipts from the Hyatt, and the testimony of
    Ms. Lewinsky which was clear, and the corroborating facts, and
    he said yes, in fact, it did happen. Not only did he recall the
    meeting, but then he recalled what was discussed, that yes, in
    fact, notes were discussed there.
        Ms. Lewinsky testifies that she raised the issue of other
    evidence that would be possibly in her apartment, notes to the
    President. According to her testimony, she was told that: You
    need to get rid of those.
        Now, Mr. Jordan totally denies that. But the point is,
    there is more evidence at risk for the President. Mr. Jordan,
    who is doing the work for the President, has this conversation
    with Ms. Lewinsky that he earlier denied ever happened.
        So, I think you look at credibility there. You believe Ms.
    Lewinsky? If you accept the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, then you
    have more evidence that is at issue, and that is being urged to
    be destroyed and not available for the truth-seeking endeavor
    in the civil rights case. I think that is significant.
        Now, you say that is not the President, that is Mr. Jordan.
    You have to put this in context. It is Ms. Lewinsky who says
    that she is talking to the President when she is talking to Mr.
    Jordan--and I am paraphrasing that, but that is what she was
    seeing--seeing Mr. Jordan as a conduit to the President.
        Then we go on after the meeting in the Hyatt, we go into
    January, where the job search continues. But it is tied
    directly to the signing of the affidavit, which is false by its
    nature.
        If we look at the testimony of Mr. Jordan, in the January 5
    timeframe where the affidavit is prepared and discussed with
    Mr. Jordan:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter
    on 3 occasions the day before the affidavit was signed?
        A. Yeah, my recollection is, is that I was exchanging or
    sharing with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she asked me to
    do, what I refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the
    lawyer and I was not the lawyer. I mean, it would be so
    presumptuous of me to try to advise Frank Carter as to how to
    practice law.
        Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your
    conversation with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I may have.
        Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about
    the affidavit would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned
    about the economics of law practice he would have likely billed
    Ms. Lewinsky for some of those telephone calls?
        A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.

        So you have Mr. Jordan discussing the affidavit with both
    Ms. Lewinsky and her attorney, Mr. Carter. And if you look at
    the testimony of Mr. Carter, he talks about the fact that he
    did bill some time for his conversations with Mr. Jordan.
    Certainly they are matters of substance in relation to the
    affidavit that was being discussed between the three: Ms.
    Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Carter.
        Now, let's hear what Ms. Lewinsky has to say on the changes
    that were made in the affidavit:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. OK, have you had an opportunity to review the draft of
    your affidavit?
        A. I--yes.
        Q. Do you have any comment or response?
        A. I received it. I made the suggested changes. And I
    believe I spoke with Mr. Jordan about the changes I wanted to
    make.

        Now, because of time, I am not going to be able to go
    completely through all of their testimony but let me tell you
    time sequentially what is happening here. This is the second
    page of the time chart that you have.
        January 5 and 6, the affidavit is prepared and discussed
    with Mr. Jordan and with the President.
        On the 7th, the affidavit is signed. You recall Mr. Jordan
    lets the President know that the affidavit was signed. And he
    says he was interested, he was obviously interested in this.
        On January 8 the job came through, the day after the
    affidavit was signed. And of course it had to come through, the
    personal call of Mr. Jordan to Mr. Perelman to ``make it
    happen--if it can happen.'' Once that job is secured, the
    President is informed: Mission accomplished.
        January 15, there are some inquiries from the news media
    about the gifts that had been delivered to the White House.
    This makes Betty Currie nervous enough that she has to go see
    Mr. Jordan about it.
        You go to the 17th; the President gives his deposition in
    which that false affidavit is presented on behalf of Ms.
    Lewinsky and the President's attorney.
        And then the next day, after that deposition is given, you
    go to January 18, where he is very concerned because he
    mentions Betty Currie's name so many times.
        We were not able--we did not ask for the deposition of
    Betty Currie. We wish that we had had that opportunity. We
    would like to call her here. But that is one of the most
    critical and important elements of the structure in which the
    truth is so critically clear, because it happened not just on
    one day, because it happened on a couple of days.
        We see on the 17th, the President is deposed. This is the
    third chart that you have. The 18th, the President coaches
    Betty Currie, going through the series of questions. On the
    19th, there is this dramatic search for Ms. Lewinsky. On the
    20th, the Washington Post story becomes known, because the
    President's counselors get calls and the OIC investigation
    becomes known.
        On the 21st, at 12:30 a.m., the Post story appears on the
    Internet. At 12:41, the President calls Bruce Lindsey. At 1:16
    a.m, the Post story appears. The President calls Betty Currie
    for 20 minutes, discusses the Post story. And then, according
    to Betty Currie, on the 20th or the 21st, it was the second
    incident of coaching that took place, where the President calls
    her in and goes through that series of questions: I did nothing
    wrong; she came on to me; we were never alone. So that was the
    second time that it happened. And that, ladies and gentlemen of
    the Senate, is another example of witness tampering: A known
    witness clearly going to be testifying, a subordinate employee
    who is called in and coached.
        Now, the President says, ``I was trying to gain facts.''
    You determine that. You are the ones who have to defend that
    question as to whether, under common sense, the President was
    gaining information on two separate occasions or whether he was
    actually trying to tamper with the testimony of a witness.
        The 21st, she is subpoenaed by the OIC. The 23rd, she is
    added to the Jones witness list.
        Now I want to play the last video clip that I am going to
    move to on Ms. Lewinsky, some things that she said that are
    different with regard to the President:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. The President did not in that conversation on December 17 of
    1997, or any other conversation for that matter, instruct you to tell
    the truth; is that correct?
        A. That's correct.
              * * * * *
        Q. But the--the pattern that you had with the President to conceal
    this relationship, it was never questioned that, for instance, that
    given day that he gave you gifts you were not going to surrender those
    to the Jones attorneys because that would--
        A. In my mind there is no reflection; no.

        We have one more here we would like you to listen to.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. Sure, gosh, I think to me that if the President had not
    said to Betty in letters us--cover--let us just say if we refer
    to that which I am talking about in paragraph 4 of page 4, I
    would have known to use that. So, to me, encouraging or asking
    me to lie would have, you know if the President had said now
    listen you better not say anything about this relationship, you
    better not tell them the truth, you better not--for me the best
    way to explain how I feel what happened was, you know, no one
    asked or encouraged me to lie, but no one discouraged me
    either.

        It is very important to understand that we want you to know
    very clearly that Ms. Lewinsky says that the President never
    told her to lie. There is no question about that. There is no
    dispute about that, either. I think you have to look at all the
    context of this. What the President did suggest to her was to
    use an affidavit to avoid truthful testimony, to stick with the
    cover stories under legal context.
        Is the issue here whether Ms. Lewinsky believed the
    President was encouraging her to lie, that's what the President
    was trying to do here? Or is the issue what the President was
    trying to do? It is your determination. You have to make the
    decision whether the President, in talking to a 24-year-old ex-
    employee, whether he is encouraging her to come forward and to
    tell the truth or, in a legal context, to use the old cover
    stories, to lie, to use false affidavits, to avoid the truth
    from coming out.
        It is not Ms. Lewinsky's viewpoint that is important. It is
    what the President intended. What did the President intend by
    this conversation when he told her on December 17, ``Guess
    what, bad news; you're a witness''. Then he proceeded to
    suggest to her ways to avoid truthful testimony.
        I really don't care what is in Ms. Lewinsky's mind at that
    point. The critical issue is what is in the President's mind at
    that point as to what he was intending. Was it an innocent
    conversation, or was it a conversation with corrupt intent?
        I believe that if you put all of this in context--from the
    affidavit to the job search, to the coaching of Ms. Betty
    Currie, to all of the other conversations with the aides--that
    it was the President's intent to avoid the workings of the
    administration of justice, to impede the flow of the truth in
    the administration of justice for his own benefit, and that is
    what obstruction of justice is about. That is what people go to
    jail about, and that is what we are presenting to you as a
    factual basis for this case.
        I now yield to my fellow manager, Mr. Rogan.

                                     recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I think it would be
    appropriate if we take a break at this time for lunch and
    return at 1:15, and I so ask unanimous consent.
        There being no objection, at 12:22 p.m., the Senate
    recessed until 1:24 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled
    when called to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        I believe we are ready to resume the presentation by the
    House managers, and Mr. Manager Rogan is prepared to speak.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the
    Senate, before the break, you had the opportunity to hear the
    very able presentation from Mr. Manager Hutchinson relating to
    the article of impeachment alleging obstruction of justice
    against the President of the United States. I would like to use
    my portion to discuss very briefly article I of the impeachment
    resolution that alleges on August 17, 1998, the President
    committed perjury before a Federal grand jury conducting a
    criminal investigation. He did this in a number of ways,
    embarking on a calculated effort to cover up illegal
    obstruction of justice.
        First, the President lied about statements he made to his
    top aides regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. This
    is significant because the President admitted, under oath, that
    he knew these aides were potential witnesses before a criminal
    grand jury.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said there was
    nothing going on between us. That was true. I said I have not had sex
    with her as I define it. That was true. And did I hope that I never had
    to be here on this day giving this testimony, of course. But I also
    didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter further.
        So I said things that were true that may have been misleading, and
    if they were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I am sorry.
        Q. It may have been misleading, but you knew, though, after January
    21 when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was looking
    into this, you knew they might be witnesses, you knew they might be
    called into the grand jury?
        A. That's right.
        Q. And you do recall denying any sexual relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky to the following people: Harry Thomasson, Erskine Bowles,
    Harold Ickes, Mr. Podesta, Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Jordan, Miss Betty
    Currie. Do you recall denying any sexual relation--

        The question to the President: ``You knew they might be
    called into a grand jury, didn't you?'' Answer by the
    President: ``That's right.''
        The President's testimony that he said things that were
    misleading but true to his aides was perjury.
        Just as the President predicted, several of his top aides
    later were called to testify before the grand jury as to what
    the President told them. When they testified before the grand
    jury, they passed along the President's false account, just as
    the President intended. The President's former chief of staff,
    Erskine Bowles, and his current chief of staff, John Podesta,
    went before the grand jury and testified that the President
    told them he did not have sexual relations with Monica and he
    did not ask anybody to lie.
        Mr. Podesta had an additional meeting with the President 2
    days after the story broke. Mr. Podesta testified that at that
    meeting with the President, the President was extremely
    explicit in saying he never had sex with her in any way
    whatsoever and that he was not alone with her in the Oval
    Office.
        The most glaring example of the President using an aide as
    a messenger of lies to the grand jury was his manipulation of
    his Presidential assistant, Mr. Blumenthal. Mr. Blumenthal has
    been assistant to the President since August of 1997. Mr.
    Blumenthal testified that dealing with the media was one of his
    responsibilities on January 21, 1998, the day the Monica
    Lewinsky story broke. Mr. Blumenthal testified under oath that
    once the story became public, he attended twice-a-day White
    House strategy sessions called to deal with the political,
    legal, and media impact of the Clinton scandals on the White
    House.
        In his deposition testimony taken just this week by
    authority of the U.S. Senate, Mr. Blumenthal shared in chilling
    detail the story of how the President responded to the public
    discovery of his longstanding relationship with a young woman
    who had shared tearful and emotional descriptions of her love
    for him. Mr. Clinton responded not in love, not in friendship,
    not even with a grain of concern for her well-being or
    emotional stability. Instead, the President took the deep and
    apparently unrequited emotional attachment Monica Lewinsky had
    formed for him, and prepared to summarily take her life and
    throw it on the ash heap.
        The date is January 21, 1998. The Lewinsky scandal had just
    broken in the newspapers that morning. Mr. Blumenthal met
    initially with the First Lady, Mrs. Clinton, to get her take on
    the growing political fire storm. Later that day, Mr.
    Blumenthal is summoned to the Oval Office. Listen as Sidney
    Blumenthal describes, step by step, the destructive mechanism
    of the man who twice was elected President under the banner of
    feeling other people's pain.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, specifically inviting your attention to January
    21, 1998, you testified before the grand jury that on that date you
    personally spoke to the President regarding the Monica Lewinsky matter,
    correct?
        A. Yes.
              * * * * *
        Q. You are familiar with the Washington Post story that broke that
    day?
        A. I am.
              * * * * *
        Q. The story stated that the Office of Independent Counsel was
    investigating whether the President made false statements about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case?
        A. Right.
        Q. And also that the Office of Independent Counsel was
    investigating whether the President obstructed justice in the Jones
    case, is that your best recollection of what that story was about?
        A. Yes.
              * * * * *
        Q. And you now remember that the President asked to speak with you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you go to the Oval Office?
        A. Yes.
        Q. During that conversation were you alone with the President?
        A. I was.
        Q. Do you remember if the door was closed?
        A. It was.
        Q. When you met with the President, did you relate to him a
    conversation you had with the First Lady earlier that day?
        A. I did.
        Q. What did you tell the President the First Lady told you earlier
    that day?
        A. I believe that I told him that the First Lady had called me
    earlier in the day, and in the light of the story in the Post had told
    me that the President had helped troubled people in the past and that
    he had done it many times and that he was a compassionate person and
    that he helped people also out of his religious conviction and that
    part it was part of--his nature.
        Q. And did she also tell you that one of the other reasons he
    helped people was out of his personal temperament?
        A. Yes. That is what I mean by that.
              * * * * *
        Q. Do you remember telling the President that the First Lady said
    to you that she felt that with--in reference to the story that he was
    being attacked for political motives?
        A. I remember her saying that to me, yes.
        Q. And you relayed that to the President?
        A. I'm not sure I relayed that to the President. I may have just
    relayed the gist of the conversation to him. I don't --I'm not sure
    whether I relayed the entire conversation.

        Mr. ROGAN: Inviting the Senators and counsel's attention to the
    June 4th, 1998 testimony of Mr. Blumenthal, page 47, beginning at line
    5.

        By Mr. ROGAN:
        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, let me just read a passage to you and tell me if
    this helps to refresh your memory?
        A. Mm-hmm.
        Q. Reading at line 5, ``I was in my office, and the President asked
    me to come to the Oval Office. I was seeing him frequently in this
    period about the State of the Union and Blair's visit''--that was Prime
    Minister Tony Blair, as an aide--correct?
        A. That's right.
              * * * * *
        Q. Reading at line 7, ``So I went up to the Oval Office and I began
    a discussion, and I said that I HAD received--that I had spoken to the
    First Lady that day in the afternoon about the story that had broke in
    the morning, and I related to the President my conversation with the
    First Lady and the conversation went as follows. The First Lady said
    that she was distressed that the President was being attacked, in her
    view, for political motives for his ministry of a troubled person. She
    said that the President ministers to troubled people all the time,''
    and then it goes on to--
        Does that help refresh your recollection with respect to what you
    told the President the First Lady had said earlier?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And do you now remember that the First Lady had indicated to you
    that she felt the President was being attacked for political motives?
        A. Well, I remember she said that to me.
        Q. And just getting us back on track, a few moments ago, I think
    you--you shared with us that the First Lady said that the President
    helped troubled people and he had done it many times in the past.
        A. Yes.
        Q. Do you remember testifying before the grand jury on that
    subject, saying that the First Lady said that he has done this dozens,
    if not hundreds, of times with people--
        A. Yes.
        Q. --with troubled people?
        A. I recall that.
        Q. After you related the conversation that you had with the First
    Lady to the President, what do you remember saying to the President
    next about the subject of Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Well, I recall telling him that I understood he felt that way,
    and that he did help people, but that he should stop trying to help
    troubled people personally, that troubled people are troubled and that
    they can get you in a lot of messes and that you had to cut yourself
    off from it and you just had to do it. That's what I recall saying to
    him.
        Q. Do you also remember in that conversation saying to him, ``You
    really need to not do that at this point, that you can't get near
    anybody who is even remotely crazy. You're President''?
        A. Yes. I think that was a little later in the conversation, but I
    do recall saying that.
        Q. When you told the President that he should avoid contact with
    troubled people, what did the President say to you in response?
        A. I'm trying to remember the sequence of it. He--he said that was
    very difficult for him. He said he--he felt a need to help troubled
    people, and it was hard for him to--to cut himself off from doing that.
        Q. Do you remember him saying specifically, ``It's very difficult
    for me to do that given how I am. I want to help people''?
        A. I recall--I recall that.
        Q. And when the President referred to helping people, did you
    understand him in that conversation to be referring to Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I think it included Monica Lewinsky, but also many others.
        Q. Right, but it was your understanding that he was all--he was
    specifically referring to Monica Lewinsky in that list of people that
    he tried to help?
        A. I believe that--that was implied.
        Q. Do you remember being asked that question before the grand jury
    and giving the answer, ``I understood that''?
        A. If you could point it out to me, I'd be happy to see it.
              * * * * *
        By Mr. ROGAN: Inviting Senators' and counsels' attention to June
    25th, 1998 grand jury, page 5, I believe it's at lines 6 through 8.
        The WITNESS: Yes, I see that. Thank you.
        By Mr. ROGAN:
        Q. You recall that now?
        A. Yes.

        Following this conversation where Mr. Blumenthal told the
    President about his conversation with the First Lady that day,
    the President told Mr. Blumenthal about the President's own
    conversation he had earlier that day with his pollster, Dick
    Morris.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. Blumenthal, did the President then relate a conversation he
    had with Dick Morris to you?
        A. He did.
        Q. What was the substance of that conversation, as the President
    related it to you?
        A. He said that he had spoken to Dick Morris earlier that day, and
    that Dick Morris had told him that if Nixon, Richard Nixon, had given a
    nationally televised speech at the beginning of the Watergate affair,
    acknowledging everything he had done wrong, he may well have survived
    it, and that was the conversation that Dick Morris--that's what Dick
    Morris said to the President.
        Q. Did it sound to you like the President was suggesting perhaps he
    would go on television and give a national speech?
        A. Well, I don't know. I didn't know.
        Q. When the President related the substance of his conversation
    with Dick Morris to you, how did you respond to that?
        A. I said to the President, ``Well, what have you done wrong?''
        Q. Did he reply?
        A. He did.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said, ``I haven't done anything wrong.''
        Q. And what did you say to that response?
        A. Well, I said, as I recall, ``That's one of the stupidest ideas I
    ever heard. If you haven't done anything wrong, why would you do
    that?''

        After denying to Mr. Blumenthal any wrongdoing with Monica
    Lewinsky, the President then struck the harshest of blows
    against her. He launched a preemptive strike against her name
    and her character to an aide who he expected would be, and very
    shortly became, a witness before a Federal grand jury
    investigation.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did the President then give you his account of what happened
    between him and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. As I recall, he did.
        Q. What did the President tell you?
        A. He, uh--he spoke, uh, fairly rapidly, as I recall, at that point
    and said that she had come on to him and made a demand for sex, that he
    had rebuffed her, turned her down, and that she, uh, threatened him.
    And, uh, he said that she said to him, uh, that she was called ``the
    stalker'' by her peers and that she hated the term, and that she would
    claim that they had had an affair whether they had or they hadn't, and
    that she would tell people.
        Q. Do you remember him also saying that the reason Monica Lewinsky
    would tell people that is because then she wouldn't be known by her
    peers as ``the stalker'' anymore?
        A. Yes, that's right.
        Q. Do you remember the President also saying that--and I'm
    quoting--``I've gone down that road before. I've caused pain for a lot
    of people. I'm not going to do that again''?
        A. Yes. He told me that.
        Q. And that was in the same conversation that you had with the
    President?
        A. Right, in--in that sequence.
        Q. Can you describe for us the President's demeanor when he shared
    this information with you?
        A. Yes. He was, uh, very upset. I thought he was, a man in anguish.
        Q. And at that point, did you repeat your earlier admonition to him
    as far as not trying to help troubled people?
        A. I did. I--I think that's when I told him that you can't get near
    crazy people, uh, or troubled people. Uh, you're President; you just
    have to separate yourself from this.
        Q. And I'm not sure, based on your testimony, if you gave that
    admonition to him once or twice. Let me--let me clarify for you why my
    questioning suggested it was twice. In your grand jury testimony on
    June the 4th, at page 49, beginning at line 25, you began the sentence
    by saying, and I quote, ``And I repeated to the President''--
        A. Right.
        Q. --``that he really needed never to be near people who were''--
        A. Right.
        Q. --``troubled like this,'' and so forth. Do you remember now if
    you--if that was correct? Did you find yourself in that conversation
    having to repeat the admonition to him that you'd given earlier?
        A. I'm sure I did. Uh, I felt--I felt that pretty strongly. He
    shouldn't be involved with troubled people.
        Q. Do you remember the President also saying something about being
    like a character in a novel?
        A. I do.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. Uh, he said to me, uh, that, uh, he felt like a character in a
    novel. Uh, he felt like somebody, uh, surrounded by, uh, an oppressive
    environment that was creating a lie about him. He said he felt like,
    uh, the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.
        Q. Did he also say he felt like he can't get the truth out?
        A. Yes, I--I believe he said that.
        Q. Politicians are always loathe to confess their ignorance,
    particularly on videotape. I will do so. I'm unfamiliar with the novel
    Darkness at Noon. Did you--do you have any familiarity with that, or
    did you understand what the President meant by that?
        A. I--I understood what he meant. I--I was familiar with the book.
        Q. What--what did he mean by that, per your understanding?
        A. Uh, the book is by Arthur Koestler, who was somebody who had
    been a communist and had become disillusioned with communism. And it's
    an anti-communist novel. It's about, uh, uh, the Stalinist purge trials
    and somebody who was a loyal communist who then is put in one of
    Stalin's prisons and held on trial and executed, uh, and it's about his
    trial.
        Q. Did you understand what the President was trying to communicate
    when he related his situation to the character in that novel?
        A. I think he felt that the world was against him.
        Q. I thought only Members of Congress felt that way.

        The President continued to pass along false information to
    Mr. Blumenthal with regard to the substance of his relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Mr. Blumenthal, did you ever ask the President if he was ever alone
    with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I did.
        Q. What was his response?
        A. I asked him a number of questions that appeared in the press
    that day. I asked him, uh, if he were alone, and he said that, uh, he
    was within eyesight or earshot of someone when he was with her.
        Q. What other questions do you remember asking him?
        A. Uh, there was a story in the paper that, uh, there were recorded
    messages, uh, left by him on her voice-mail and I asked him if that
    were true.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said, uh, that it was, that, uh, he had called her.
        Q. You had asked him about a press account that said there were
    potentially a number of telephone messages left by the President for
    Monica Lewinsky. And he relayed to you that he called her. Did he tell
    you how many times he called her?
        A. He--he did. He said he called once. He said he called when, uh,
    Betty Currie's brother had died, to tell her that.
        Q. And other than that one time that he shared that information
    with you, he shared no other information respecting additional calls?
        A. No.
        Q. He never indicated to you that there were over 50 telephone
    conversations between himself and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Based on your conversation with the President at that time,
    would it have surprised you to know that there were over 50--there were
    records of over 50 telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky and the
    President?
        A. Would I have been surprised at that time?
        Q. Yes.
        A. Uh, I--to see those records and if he--I don't fully grasp the
    question here. Could you--would I have been surprised?
        Q. Based on the President's response to your question at that time,
    would it have surprised you to have been told or to have later learned
    that there were over 50 recorded--50 conversations between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I did later learn that, uh, as the whole country did, uh, and I
    was surprised.
        Q. When the President told you that Monica Lewinsky threatened him,
    did you ever feel compelled to report that information to the Secret
    Service?
        A. No.
        Q. The FBI or any other law enforcement organization?
        A. No.
        Q. I'm assuming that a threat to the President from somebody in the
    White House would normally send off alarm bells among staff.
        A. It wouldn't--
        MR. McDANIEL: Well, I'd like to object to the question, Senator.
    There's no testimony that Mr. Blumenthal learned of a threat
    contemporaneously with it being made by someone in the White House.
    This is a threat that was relayed to him sometime afterwards by someone
    who was no longer employed in the White House. So I think the question
    doesn't relate to the testimony of this witness.
        MR. ROGAN: Respectfully, I'm not sure what the legal basis of the
    objection is. The evidence before us is that the President told the
    witness that Monica Lewinsky threatened him.
        [Senators Specter and Edwards conferring.]
        SENATOR SPECTER: We've conferred and overrule the objection on the
    ground that it calls for an answer; that, however the witness chooses
    to answer it, was not a contemporaneous threat, or he thought it was
    stale, or whatever he thinks. But the objection is overruled.
        MR. ROGAN: Thank you.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Let me--let me restate the question, if I may. Mr. Blumenthal,
    would a threat--
        SENATOR SPECTER: We withdraw the ruling.
        [Laughter.]
        MR. McDANIEL: I withdraw my objection, then.
        [Laughter.]
        MR. ROGAN: Senator Specter, the ruling is just fine by my light.
    I'm just going to try to simplify the question for the witness'
    benefit.
        SENATOR SPECTER: We'll hold in abeyance a decision on whether to
    reinstate the ruling.
        MR. ROGAN: Thank you. Maybe I should just quit while I'm ahead and
    have the question read back.
        BY MR. ROGAN:
        Q. Basically, Mr. Blumenthal, what I'm asking is, I mean, normally,
    would a threat from somebody against the President in the White House
    typically require some sort of report being made to a law enforcement
    agency?
        A. Uh, in the abstract, yes.
        Q. This conversation that you had with the President on January the
    21st, 1998, how did that conversation conclude?
        A. Uh, I believe we, uh--well, I believe after that, I said to the
    President that, uh--who was--seemed to me to be upset, that you needed
    to find some sure footing and to be confident. And, uh, we went on, I
    believe, to discuss the State of the Union.
        Q. You went on to other business?
        A. Yes, we went on to talk about public policy.
        Q. When this conversation with the President concluded as it
    related to Monica Lewinsky, what were your feelings toward the
    President's statement?
        A. Uh, well, they were complex. Uh, I believed him, uh, but I was
    also, uh--I thought he was very upset. That troubled me. And I also was
    troubled by his association with troubled people and thought this was
    not a good story and thought he shouldn't be doing this.
        Q. Do you remember also testifying before the grand jury that you
    felt that the President's story was a very heartfelt story and that
    ``he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him''?
        A. Yes, that's what I told the grand jury, I believe; right.
        Q. That was--that was how you interpreted the President's story?
        A. Yes, I did. He was, uh--he seemed--he seemed emotional.
        Q. When the President told you he was helping Monica Lewinsky, did
    he ever describe to you how he might be helping or ministering to her?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he ever describe how many times he may have tried to help or
    minister to her?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times he visited with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times Monica Lewinsky visited him in
    the Oval Office complex?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you how many times he was alone with Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. He never described to you any intimate physical activity he may
    have had with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Oh, no.
        Q. Did the President ever tell you that he gave any gifts to Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did he tell you that Monica Lewinsky gave him any gifts?
        A. No.
        Q. Based on the President's story as he related on January 21st,
    would it have surprised you to know at that time that there was a
    repeated gift exchange between Monica Lewinsky and the President?
        A. Well, I learned later about that, and I was surprised.
        Q. The President never told you that he engaged in occasional
    sexual banter with her on the telephone?
        A. No.
        Q. He never told you about any cover stories that he and Monica
    Lewinsky may have developed to disguise a relationship?
        A. No.
        Q. He never suggested to you that there might be some physical
    evidence pointing to a physical relationship between he--between
    himself and Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did the President ever discuss his grand jury--or strike that.
        Did the President ever discuss his deposition testimony with you in
    the Paula Jones case on that date?
        A. Oh, no.
        Q. Did he ever tell you that he denied under oath in his Paula
    Jones deposition that he had an affair with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. Did the President ever tell you that he ministered to anyone
    else who then made a sexual advance toward him?
        A. No.

        One of the things that the President's counsel has
    continuously urged upon this body, as they did over in the
    House of Representatives, is to look at the President's state
    of mind in determining whether, in fact, he committed the crime
    of perjury. We hope that you will do that. Because nowhere is
    the President's state of mind more evident than it is in the
    manner in which he dealt with Sidney Blumenthal at this point.
        Remember, the date of this conversation that Sidney
    Blumenthal just related to you was January 21, the day the
    Monica Lewinsky story broke. About a month later, Sidney
    Blumenthal was called to testify as a witness before the grand
    jury. That was the first time.
        Five months later or 4 months later Sidney Blumenthal was
    called back to testify to the grand jury--not once, but two
    more times. From January 21 until the end of June 1998, the
    President had almost 6 months in which to tell Sidney
    Blumenthal, after he was subpoenaed, but before he testified,
    not to tell the grand jury information that was false. The
    President had the opportunity to not use his aide as a conduit
    of false information. Listen to what Sidney Blumenthal said the
    President failed to tell him.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. After you were subpoenaed to testify but before you testified
    before the Federal grand jury, did the President ever recant his
    earlier statements to you about Monica Lewinsky?
        A. No.
        Q. After you were subpoenaed but before you testified before the
    federal grand jury, did the President ever say that he did not want you
    to mislead the grand jury with a false statement?
        A. No. We didn't have any subsequent conversation about this
    matter.
        Q. So it would be fair also to say that after you were subpoenaed
    but before you testified before the Federal grand jury, the President
    never told you that he was not being truthful with you in that January
    21st conversation about Monica Lewinsky?
        A. Uh, he never spoke to me about that at all.
        Q. The President never instructed you before your testimony before
    the grand jury not to relay his false account of his relationship with
    Monica Lewinsky?
        A. We--we didn't speak about anything.

        The President of the United States used a special
    assistant, one of his aides, as a conduit to go before a
    Federal grand jury and present false and misleading information
    and precluded the grand jury from being able to make an honest
    determination in their investigation. He obstructed justice
    when he did it, and when he denied that testimony he committed
    the offense of perjury.
        In response to a question from Mr. Manager Graham, Mr.
    Blumenthal candidly addressed the President's claim under oath
    that he was truthful with his aides that he knew would be
    future grand jury witnesses:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. . . . Knowing what you know now, do you believe the
    President lied to you about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I do.
        Q. I appreciate your honesty . . . .

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. . . . Is it a fair statement, given your previous
    testimony concerning your 30-minute conversation, that the
    President was trying to portray himself as a victim of a
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

        In an earlier presentation, the President's attorney, Mr.
    Ruff, said that the very same denial the President made to his
    family and his friends was the same one he made to the American
    people.
        Mr. Ruff said:

        Having made the announcement to the whole country, it is
    simply absurd, I suggest to you, to believe that he was somehow
    attempting corruptly to influence his senior staff when he told
    them virtually the same thing at the same time.

        Members of the Senate, Mr. Ruff's conclusion is wrong
    because his premise is wrong. The President didn't tell the
    American public and his aides the same thing, nor did he make
    the very same denial. On the contrary, the President went out
    of his way with his aides to make explicit denials, coupled
    with character assassination against Monica Lewinsky. Why the
    distinction? Because the American public was not destined to be
    subpoenaed as a witness before the grand jury and the
    President's aides were.
        Members of the Senate, our time draws short. The record is
    replete with other examples which I have addressed and Mr.
    Manager Hutchinson has addressed dealing with the President's
    perjuries in other areas, for instance, in the Paula Jones
    deposition where he emphatically denied having a relationship
    with Monica Lewinsky that we now know to be true, a
    relationship that a Federal judge ordered him to discuss with
    Paula Jones' attorneys because it was relevant information in
    the sexual civil harassment lawsuit.
        The President's perjury is with respect to Betty Currie and
    using Betty Currie as somebody to be brought into the Oval
    Office so that he could coach her as a witness and doing
    everything he could in his own testimony to ensure that the
    Jones attorney would subpoena her as a witness, to once again
    use a White House aide as a conduit of false information before
    the grand jury.
        I don't feel the need to have to go over this ground with
    you any further. In my final couple of minutes, before I
    reserve time, I do want to raise one last point, because I
    think it is a valid one and it, perhaps, in the long run, is
    the most important point that this body should consider in
    coming to their verdict.
        We have heard an awful lot throughout this entire episode
    about the idea of proportionality of punishment. We have also
    heard that lying about sex somehow minimizes the perjury
    because everybody does it. Many people in everyday life under
    the stress of ordinary relations may well lie about personal
    matters when confronted with embarrassing situations. But, no,
    everybody doesn't commit perjury under oath in a court
    proceeding, having been ordered by a Federal judge to answer
    questions. And if they did so, they generally don't expect to
    keep their job or their liberty if they get caught.
        The dispensation this President wants for himself is not
    the same dispensation he grants as head of the executive branch
    to ordinary Americans when they lie about sex under oath. Bill
    Clinton wants it both ways. The question before this body is
    whether you are going to give it to him.
        During our committee hearings, we learned the Clinton
    administration had no shyness in prosecuting other people for
    lying under oath about consensual sex in civil cases, even when
    the underlying civil case was dismissed. For instance, Dr.
    Barbara Battalino was an attorney and a VA doctor when she
    began a relationship with one of her counseling patients at a
    VA hospital. On a single occasion, she performed an
    inappropriate sexual act with him in her office. The patient
    later sued the Veterans Administration for, among other things,
    sexual harassment.
        During a deposition in this civil lawsuit, Dr. Battalino
    was asked if anything of a sexual nature took place in her
    office with the patient. Fearing embarrassment, disgrace and
    the loss of her job, Dr. Battalino answered, ``No.'' Later, she
    learned the patient had tape recorded conversations which
    proved she lied about sex under oath.
        Even though the patient's harassment case was eventually
    dismissed, the Clinton Justice Department prosecuted Dr.
    Battalino. She lost her medical license. She lost her right to
    practice law. She was fired from her job. She later agreed to a
    plea bargain. She was fined $3,500 and sentenced to 6 months of
    imprisonment under electronic monitoring.
        Listen to the words of Dr. Battalino as she testified
    before the House Judiciary Committee, and then explain to her
    the theory of proportionality, if you can.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Dr. Battalino, your case intrigues me.
        I want to make sure I understand the factual circumstances. You
    lied about a one-time act of consensual sex with someone on Federal
    property; is that correct?
        Ms. Battalino. Yes, absolutely, correct.
        Mr. Rogan. This act of perjury was in a civil lawsuit, not in a
    criminal case?
        Ms. Battalino. That's also correct.
        Mr. Rogan. And, in fact, the civil case eventually was dismissed?
        Ms. Battalino. Correct.
        Mr. Rogan. Yet despite the dismissal, you were prosecuted by the
    Clinton Justice Department for this act of perjury; is that correct?
        Ms. Battalino. That is correct.
        Mr. Rogan. I want to know, Dr. Battalino: During your ordeal,
    during your prosecution, did anybody from the White House, from the
    Clinton Justice Department, any Members of Congress, or academics from
    respected universities every show up at your trial and suggest that you
    should be treated with leniency because ``everybody lies about sex''?
        Ms. Battalino. No, sir.
        Mr. Rogan. Did anybody ever come forward from the White House or
    from the Clinton Justice Department and urge leniency for you because
    your perjury was only in a civil case?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Mr. Rogan. Did they argue for leniency because the civil case in
    which you committed perjury was ultimately dismissed?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from the White House ever say that leniency
    should be granted to you because you otherwise did your job very well?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Mr. Rogan. Did anybody ever come forward from Congress to suggest
    that you were the victim of an overzealous or sex-obsessed prosecutor?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Mr. Rogan. Now, according to the New York Times, they report that
    you lied when your lawyer asked you at a deposition whether ``anything
    of a sexual nature'' occurred; is that correct?
        Ms. Battalino. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from Congress or from the White House come
    forward to defend you, saying that that phrase was ambiguous or it all
    depended on what the word ``anything'' meant?
        Ms. Battalino. No, sir. May I just--I am not sure it was my lawyer
    that asked the question, but that is the exact question that I was
    asked.
        Mr. Rogan. The question that was asked that caused your prosecution
    for perjury.
        Ms. Battalino. That's correct.
        Mr. Rogan. No one ever argued that that phrase itself was
    ambiguous, did they?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Ms. Waters. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Rogan. Regrettably, my time is limited and I will not yield for
    that reason.
        Now, Doctor, you lost two licenses. You lost a law license.
        Ms. Battalino. Well, I have a law degree. I was not a member of any
    bar.
        Mr. Rogan. Your conviction precludes you from practicing law?
        Ms. Battalino. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Rogan. You also had a medical degree and license.
        Ms. Battalino. That is correct.
        Mr. Rogan. You lost your medical license?
        Ms. Battalino. Yes. I am no longer permitted to practice medicine
    either.
        Mr. Rogan. Did anybody from either the White House or from Congress
    come forward during your prosecution, or during your sentencing, and
    suggest that rather than you suffer the severe punishment of no longer
    being able to practice your profession, perhaps you should simply just
    receive some sort of rebuke or censure?
        Ms. Battalino. No one came to my aid or defense, no.
        Mr. Rogan. Nobody from the Clinton Justice Department suggested
    that during your sentencing hearing?
        Ms. Battalino. No.
        Mr. Rogan. Has anybody come forward from the White House to suggest
    to you that in light of circumstances, as we now see them unfolding,
    you should be pardoned for your offense?
        Ms. Battalino. Nobody has come no. . . .

        That is how the Clinton administration defines
    proportionality in punishment.
        Mr. Chief Justice, we reserve the remainder of our time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The Chair recognizes the
    majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe now we are prepared
    to hear from White House counsel for up to 3 hours. How much
    time is remaining for the House managers?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Thirty-one minutes.
        Mr. LOTT. Does the Chief Justice suggest we take a brief
    break here?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. No, let's keep going.
        Mr. LOTT. All right, sir.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. LOTT. I guess that settles that.
        [Laughter.]
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Counsel Seligman.
        Ms. Counsel SELIGMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, the House managers have suggested to
    you that the deposition of Ms. Lewinsky helped their case. The
    opposite is true. Ms. Lewinsky undermined critical aspects of
    the House managers' obstruction case.
        As those of you who watched the entire video are well
    aware, the managers have cleverly snipped here and there in an
    effort to present their story even if, as a result, the story
    they are telling you is not Ms. Lewinsky's story. They have
    distorted, they have omitted, and they have created a
    profoundly erroneous impression.
        So let's look at the facts.
        In her deposition this week, Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed her
    previous testimony and provided extremely useful supplements to
    that testimony. We asked her no questions. Why? Because there
    was no need. Her testimony exonerated the President. In four
    areas in particular, what she said demonstrates that the
    allegations in the articles cannot stand.
        First, she refuted the allegations in article II, subpart
    (1), with respect to alleged efforts to obstruct and influence
    Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
        Second, she contradicted the allegations in article II,
    subpart (2), with respect to alleged efforts to influence Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony as distinct from her affidavit.
        Third, she undermined the allegations in article II,
    subpart (3), with respect to alleged efforts to conceal gifts.
        And fourth, she rebutted the allegations in article II,
    subpart (4), with respect to Ms. Lewinsky's job search.
        I will discuss each briefly.
        Let's begin with the December 17 phone call between the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky, which is at the heart of article
    II's first two subparts. The managers have consistently
    exaggerated the facts, the impact, and the import of this
    conversation. They have relentlessly argued that you should
    draw inferences and conclusions that are not supported by the
    evidence. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony this week should put an end
    to these inflated claims about that call.
        Article II charges, in subpart (1), that the President:
    ``On or about December 17, 1997 . . . corruptly encouraged a
    witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to
    execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be
    perjurious, false and misleading.''
        ``On or about December 17.'' In other words, the allegation
    is firmly grounded in the December 17 phone call. That is where
    the House of Representatives charged the deed was done. That is
    the single event on which the managers base the first
    obstruction of justice charge.
        Indeed, Mr. Manager McCollum made this point emphatically
    before the Senate. He claimed:

        In this context, the evidence is compelling that the
    President committed both the crimes of obstruction of justice
    and witness tampering right then and there on December 17th.

        He went on:

        Now, Monica Lewinsky's testimony is so clear about this
    that the President's lawyers probably won't spend a lot of time
    with you on this; they didn't in the Judiciary Committee. I
    could be wrong, and they probably will just to show me I am
    wrong.

        Well, Mr. McCollum was wrong in one respect. We do plan to
    spend time on that call. But he was absolutely right in another
    respect. He was correct that Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is so
    clear on this issue. It is so clear it exonerates the
    President.
        The managers asked this body to permit the deposition and
    later the live testimony of Ms. Lewinsky to complete their
    proof. As Mr. Manager Bryant stated:

        An appropriate examination--and an appropriate cross-
    examination, I might add; let's don't limit the White House
    attorneys here--of Ms. Lewinsky on the factual disputes of the
    affidavit and their cover story, wouldn't that be nice to hear?

        Well, the managers got their examination of Ms. Lewinsky
    about the December 17 phone call, and it defeated the charge.
    It showed that she and the President did not discuss the
    content of an affidavit--never ever. Again, the managers ask
    you to convict the President and remove him from office for
    what turns out to be his silence. No discussion of content.
        Let's listen to the testimony of Monica Lewinsky about that
    December 17 phone call. It is critically important. And we are
    showing it to you unvarnished, not in snippets, because the
    snippets you have seen are terribly misleading. The tape you
    will hear establishes beyond doubt that she and the President
    did not discuss the content of the affidavit in that call, or
    ever. It establishes beyond doubt that what happened is not
    obstruction of justice.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Sometime back in December of 1997, in the morning of December
    the 17th, did you receive a call from the President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What was the purpose of that call? What did you talk about?
        A. It was threefold--first, to tell me that Ms. Currie's brother
    had been killed in a car accident; second, to tell me that my name was
    on a witness list for the Paula Jones case; and thirdly, he mentioned
    the Christmas present he had for me.
        Q. This telephone call was somewhere in the early morning hours of
    2 o'clock to 2:30.
        A. Correct.
        Q. Did it surprise you that he called you so late?
        A. No.
        Q. Was this your first notice of your name being on the Paula Jones
    witness list?
        A. Yes.
        Q. I realize he, he commented about some other things, but I do
    want to focus on the witness list.
        A. Okay.
        Q. Did he say anything to you about how he felt concerning this
    witness list?
        A. He said it broke his heart that, well, that my name was on the
    witness list.
        Can I take a break, please? I'm sorry.
        SENATOR DeWINE: Sure, sure.
              * * * * *
        BY MR. BRYANT:
        Q. Did--did we get your response? We were talking about the
    discussion you were having with the President over the telephone, early
    morning of the December 17th phone call, and he had, uh, mentioned that
    it broke his heart that you were on that list.
        A. Correct.
        Q. And I think you were about to comment on that further, and then
    you need a break.
        A. No.
        Q. No.
        A. I just wanted to be able to focus--I know this is an important
    date, so I felt I need a few moments to be able to focus on it.
        Q. And you're comfortable now with that, with your--you are ready
    to talk about that?
        A. Comfortable, I don't know, but I'm ready to talk about.
        Q. Well, I mean comfortable that you can focus on it.
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. Good. Now, with this discussion of the fact that your name
    appeared as a witness, had you--had you been asleep that night when the
    phone rang?
        A. Yes.
        Q. So were you wide awake by this point? It's the President calling
    you, so I guess you're--you wake up.
        A. I wouldn't say wide awake.
        Q. He expressed to you that your name--you know, again, you talked
    about some other things--but he told you your name was on the list.
        A. Correct.
        Q. What was your reaction to that?
        A. I was scared.
        Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact that
    your name was on the list? You were scared; he was disappointed, or it
    broke his heart. What other discussion did you have?
        A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not necessarily
    direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that he said something
    about that, uh, just because my name was on the list didn't necessarily
    mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some point, I asked him what I should do
    if I received a subpoena. He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie
    know. Uh--
        Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
    if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to
    avoid being deposed.
        Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an
    affidavit?
        A. I don't think he did.
        Q. You just accepted that statement?
        A. [Nodding head.]
        Q. Yes?
        A. Yes, yes. Sorry.
        Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation to you
    about what you could say in that affidavit or--
        A. No.
        Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that affidavit to
    avoid testifying?
        A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury. To the
    best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it was a range of
    things. I mean, it could either be, uh, something innocuous or could go
    as far as having to deny the relationship. Not being a lawyer nor
    having gone to law school, I thought it could be anything.
        Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other version?
        A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a further
    discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in an affidavit.
        Q. When you say, uh, it would be--it could have been something
    where the relationship was denied, what was your thinking at that
    point?
        A. I--I--I think I don't understand what you're asking me. I'm
    sorry.
        Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted
    stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there
    some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these
    stories--the cover stories?
        A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the
    affidavit.
        Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would accomplish
    preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?
        A. No.
        Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--why
    would you have wanted to avoid testifying?
        A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second of all,
    I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones or her case.
    And--I guess those two reasons.
        Q. You--you have already mentioned that you were not a lawyer and
    you had not been to law school, those kinds of things. Did, uh, did you
    understand when you--the potential legal problems that you could have
    caused yourself by allowing a false affidavit to be filed with the
    court, in a court proceeding?
        A. During what time--I mean--I--can you be--I'm sorry--
        Q. At this point, I may ask it again at later points, but the night
    of the telephone--
        A. Are you--are you still referring to December 17th?
        Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could file an
    affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of filing a false
    affidavit with the court?
        A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it would have
    to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't remember having any
    thoughts like that, so I imagine I would remember something like that,
    and I don't, but--
        Q. Did you know what an affidavit was?
        A. Sort of.
        Q. Of course, you're talking at that time by telephone to the
    President, and he's--and he is a lawyer, and he taught law school--I
    don't know--did you know that? Did you know he was a lawyer?
        A. I--I think I knew it, but it wasn't something that was present
    in my, in my thoughts, as in he's a lawyer, he's telling me, you know,
    something.
        Q. Did the, did the President ever tell you, caution you, that you
    had to tell the truth in an affidavit?
        A. Not that I recall.
        Q. It would have been against his interest in that lawsuit for you
    to have told the truth, would it not?
        A. I'm not really comfortable--I mean, I can tell you what would
    have been in my best interest, but I--
        Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did
    you?
        A. Uh, actually, I did.
        Q. To avoid testifying.
        A. Yes.
        Q. But had you testified truthfully, you would have had no--
    certainly, no legal implications--it may have been embarrassing, but
    you would have not had any legal problems, would you?
        A. That's true.
        Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would
    draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that
    earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And what was said?
        A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can
    always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.
        Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that
    night. You are sure he said that that night?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
        A. I don't believe so, no.
        Q. Why would he have told you you could always say that?
        A. I don't know.
              * * * * *
        We're at that point that we've got a telephone conversation in the
    morning with you and the President, and he has among other things
    mentioned to you that your name is on the Jones witness list. He has
    also mentioned to you that perhaps you could file an affidavit to avoid
    possible testifying in that case. Is that right?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And he has also, I think, now at the point that we were in our
    questioning, referenced the cover story that you and he had had, that
    perhaps you could say that you were coming to my office to deliver
    papers or to see Betty Currie; is that right?
        A. Correct. It was from the entire relationship, that story.
        Q. Now, when he alluded to that cover story, was that instantly
    familiar to you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. You knew what he was talking about?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And why was this familiar to you?
        A. Because it was part of the pattern of the relationship.
        Q. Had you actually had to use elements of this cover story in the
    past?
        A. I think so, yes.
              * * * * *
        Q. Okay. Now let me go back again to the December 11th date--I'm
    sorry--the 17th. This is the conversation in the morning. What else--
    was there anything else you talked about in terms of--other than your
    name being on the list and the affidavit and the cover story?
        A. Yes. I had--I had had my own thoughts on why and how he should
    settle the case, and I expressed those thoughts to him. And at some
    point, he mentioned that he still had this Christmas present for me and
    that maybe he would ask Mrs. Currie to come in that weekend, and I said
    not to because she was obviously going to be in mourning because of her
    brother.
              * * * * *
        Q. As I understand your testimony, too, the cover stories were
    reiterated to you by the President that night on the telephone--
        A. Correct.
        Q. --and after he told you you would be a witness--or your name was
    on the witness list, I should say?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And did you understand that since your name was on the witness
    list that there would be a possibility that you could be subpoenaed to
    testify in the Paula Jones case?
        A. I think I understood that I could be subpoenaed, and there was a
    possibility of testifying. I don't know if I necessarily thought it was
    a subpoena to testify, but--
        Q. Were you in fact subpoenaed to testify?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And that was what--
        A. December 19th, 1997.
        Q. December 19th.
        Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing
    comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very
    conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you
    that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could
    sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?
        A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing
    affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--
        Q. Well, those two--
        A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked
    for me.
        Q. But they were in the same conversation, were they not?
        A. Yes, they were.
        Q. Did you understand in the context of the conversation that you
    would deny the--the President and your relationship to the Jones
    lawyers?
        A. Do you mean from what was said to me or--
        Q. In the context of that--in the context of that conversation,
    December the 17th--
        A. I--I don't--I didn't--
        Q. Okay. Let me ask it. Did you understand in the context of the
    telephone conversation with the President that early morning of
    December the 17th--did you understand that you would deny your
    relationship with the President to the Jones lawyers through use of
    these cover stories?
        A. From what I learned in that--oh, through those cover stories, I
    don't know, but from what I learned in that conversation, I thought to
    myself I knew I would deny the relationship.
        Q. And you would deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers?
        A. Yes, correct.
        Q. Good.
        A. If--if that's what it came to.
        Q. And in fact you did deny the relationship to the Jones lawyers
    in the affidavit that you signed under penalty of perjury; is that
    right?
        A. I denied a sexual relationship.
        Q. The President did not in that conversation on December the 17th
    of 1997 or any other conversation, for that matter, instruct you to
    tell the truth; is that correct?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you--you both spoke--
        A. Well, I guess any conversation in relation to the Paula Jones
    case. I can't say that any conversation from the--the entire
    relationship that he didn't ever say, you know, ``Are you mad? Tell me
    the truth.'' So--
        Q. And prior to being on the witness list, you both spoke about
    denying this relationship if asked?
        A. Yes. That was discussed.
        Q. He would say something to the effect that--or you would say
    that--you--you would deny anything if it ever came up, and he would nod
    or say that's good, something to that effect; is that right?
        A. Yes, I believe I testified to that.
        Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated
    that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
    get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt
    these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.
        Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
        A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all,
    ever.

        Now, there is a lot there, but that's the testimony. I
    would like to go quickly through some parts of it. First, let's
    be very clear, as you saw, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly told Mr.
    Manager Bryant that she and the President did not discuss the
    content of the affidavit in that phone call.
        Let's listen quickly again:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation
    to you about what you could say in that affidavit or--
        A. No.
        Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that
    affidavit to avoid testifying?
        A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury.
    To the best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it
    was a range of things. I mean, it could either be, uh,
    something innocuous or could go as far as having to deny the
    relationship. Not being a lawyer nor having gone to law school,
    I thought it could be anything.
        Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other
    version?
        A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a
    further discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in
    an affidavit.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has
    indicated that he thought he had--might have had a way that he
    could have you--get you to file a--basically a true affidavit,
    but yet still skirt these issues enough that you wouldn't be
    called as a witness.
        Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
        A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at
    all, ever.

        Now, ladies and gentlemen, the managers skipped these
    excerpts. They hid from you this key fact about the call. To
    borrow a phrase, they ``want to win too badly.''
        In that excerpt, Ms. Lewinsky also made clear that the
    President only suggested she might be able to file an affidavit
    that might enable her to avoid testifying.
        Let's listen:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did he say anything about an affidavit?
        A. Yes.
        Q. What did he say?
        A. He said that, uh, that I could possibly file an affidavit if I--
    if I were subpoenaed, that I could possibly file an affidavit maybe to
    avoid being deposed.
        Q. How did he tell you you would avoid being deposed by filing an
    affidavit?
        A. I don't think he did.
        Q. You just accepted that statement?
        A. [Nodding head.]
        Q. Yes?
        A. Yes, yes. Sorry.
              * * * * *
        Q. And in that same telephone conversation, he encouraged you to
    file an affidavit in the Jones case?
        A. He suggested I could file an affidavit.
        She also made clear that the President was not certain she
    even would be subpoenaed and have to confront the issue.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. What other discussion did you have in regard to the fact
    that your name was on the list? You were scared; he was
    disappointed, or it broke his heart. What other discussion did
    you have?
        A. Uh, I believe he said that, uh--and these are not
    necessarily direct quotes, but to the best of my memory, that
    he said something about that, uh, just because my name was on
    the list didn't necessarily mean I'd be subpoenaed; and at some
    point, I asked him what I should do if I received a subpoena.
    He said I should, uh, I should let Ms. Currie know. Uh----

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. How would--was there any discussion of how you would
    accomplish preparing or filing an affidavit at that point?
        A. No.

        Now, where does this leave us? Ms. Lewinsky described a
    brief conversation in which the President mentioned the
    possibility that an affidavit might enable her to avoid
    testifying if the need for it arose, and they left the subject.
    No discussion of content. No discussion of logistics. No
    discussion of timing. Virtually no discussion at all. And that
    very brief exchange is the heart of the case.
        Now, the managers contend that because Ms. Lewinsky also
    recalls a reference to cover stories in that call, it is clear
    beyond doubt that the President instructed her to file a false
    affidavit.
        But for at least two reasons, this claim fails also. First,
    Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly told Mr. Manager Bryant that the
    mention of cover stories in that call was not connected to the
    mention of a possible affidavit--a position, I must note, that
    she had taken with the independent counsel for a very long
    time.
        Second, Ms. Lewinsky has insisted for more than a year that
    the cover stories were not, in any event, false--a position she
    reasserted this week in explaining why an affidavit didn't
    necessarily have to be false.
        Let's look quickly at Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, first, with
    respect to the alleged connection between cover stories and the
    affidavit.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the concocted
    stories and those things like that, did this come to mind? Was there
    some discussion about that, or did it come to your mind about these
    stories--the cover stories?
        A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the
    affidavit.
              * * * * *
        Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I would
    draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded to that
    earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that night?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And what was said?
        A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can
    always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me papers.
        Q. I think you've testified that you're sure he said that that
    night. You are sure he said that that night?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
        A. I don't believe so, no.
        Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your closing
    comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that very
    conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the President told you
    that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could
    sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?
        A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily signing
    affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does--
        Q. Well, those two--
        A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't linked
    for me.

        Again, the managers did not play these excerpts for you
    either. They don't want you to know Ms. Lewinsky's
    recollection, which is that the cover stories and the affidavit
    were not connected in that telephone call. And that is the call
    that is at the heart of that first obstruction charge.
        The managers have suggested to you that Ms. Lewinsky for
    the first time this week offered responses, responses
    concerning the literal truth, for example, of the cover story
    designed to help the President. That was a suggestion a few
    days ago. Concerned then that the testimony might now undermine
    their case, they suddenly did an about-face and attacked her on
    Thursday.
        Through these proceedings, the managers have consistently
    told you how credible a witness Ms. Lewinsky is and they have
    invoked her immunity agreement as the reason that she must be
    honest, and today they again credit her testimony, but
    carefully, only in snippets, only when it suits their purposes.
    The responses Ms. Lewinsky provided about the cover story that
    were mentioned on Thursday by Mr. Manager Bryant are not new;
    they are the same responses Ms. Lewinsky gave to the
    independent counsel. For example, when asked about the so-
    called cover story, Ms. Lewinsky testified as follows this
    week.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Would you agree that these cover stories that you've
    just testified to, if they were told to the attorneys for Paula
    Jones, that they would be misleading to them and not be the
    whole story, the whole truth?
        A. They would--yes, I guess misleading. They were literally
    true, but they would be misleading, so incomplete.

        The managers suggest that this testimony may be new,
    different, tinted, and tainted, I think they said on Thursday,
    but they don't tell you that Ms. Lewinsky said the very same
    things to the independent counsel. She did so repeatedly, and
    she did so--and this is key--before the President testified.
    She didn't know what he would say. He didn't know what she had
    said.
        For example, Ms. Lewinsky referred to the two cover stories
    in her February 1998 proffer, more than a year ago. Remember,
    one such cover story concerned the reasons for visiting the
    President before she left the White House. That was to bring
    papers to him. And the other concerned her reasons for visiting
    the President after she left the White House, and that was to
    visit Betty Currie. Ms. Lewinsky was asked and said that
    neither of these statements was untrue and also that there was
    truth to both of these statements in her proffer a year ago.
        She repeated this testimony in July to the independent
    counsel, telling an FBI agent that ``these statements were not
    untrue but were misleading'' and that ``some facts were omitted
    from this statement.'' That is what she said this week.
        The cover story testimony is consistent and is consistently
    exculpatory. Of course, it was easy for Mr. Manager Bryant to
    stand before you on Thursday reminiscing about the open and
    forthcoming Ms. Lewinsky he had met during the informal
    interview. It was easy for Mr. Manager Bryant to complain that
    the Ms. Lewinsky of the deposition was, I believe he said, not
    open to discussion or fully responsive to their inquiry. Let
    the questions and answers let you be the judge of that. It was
    easy for him to say that, because the House managers had
    refused Senator Daschle's request that they be allowed to make
    a transcript of the interview. That absence of a transcript
    allowed them this unverifiable fallback if their examination
    was disappointing: Oh, she changed on us. The truth is that she
    didn't tell the story that the managers wanted to hear.
    Remember those stubborn facts.
        So we know that the managers are disappointed and want to
    blame their disappointment on Ms. Lewinsky. But when you get to
    the substance of today's presentation by the House managers, it
    shows that they have not in fact identified any significant
    area where Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on Monday differs from her
    earlier testimony in the grand jury. Her view of the cover
    story has been consistent from day 1.
        Mr. Manager McCollum has also insisted that in the December
    17 call it was clear both to the President and Ms. Lewinsky
    that the affidavit had to be false. As he put it--and I quote--
    ``Can there be any doubt that the President was suggesting that
    they file an affidavit that contained lies and falsehoods that
    might keep her from ever having to testify in the Jones case,
    and give the President the kind of protection he needed when he
    testified?'' Yes, there surely is doubt.
        Ms. Lewinsky herself explains this week that she did not
    discuss the content of the affidavit with the President--we
    played those portions already and I will not again--but also
    that in her mind an affidavit presented a whole range of
    possibilities that were not necessarily false.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could
    file an affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of
    filing a false affidavit with the court?
        A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it
    would have to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't
    remember having any thoughts like that, so I imagine I would
    remember something like that, and I don't, but--

        Thus, as we have seen and heard, Ms. Lewinsky testified
    that there was no discussion of what would be in the affidavit
    and also that, to her thinking, the affidavit would not
    necessarily have been false.
        Now that the December 17 call has fallen short, the
    managers have tried to transform the articles, as drafted, by
    asserting that the alleged obstruction occurred also on another
    date, January 5, in a call that took place then, even though
    the articles pin everything on December 17.
        With respect to a January 5 call, Mr. Manager Hutchinson
    made the following claim to you. He asserted, and I quote:

        Well, the record demonstrates that Monica Lewinsky's
    testimony is that she had a conversation with the President on
    the telephone in which she asked questions about the affidavit.
    She was concerned about signing that affidavit and according to
    Ms. Lewinsky, the President said, ``Well, you could always say
    the people in legislative affairs got it for you or helped you
    get it.''

        This is still a quote:

        And that is in reference to a paragraph in a particular
    affidavit.

        Those were Mr. Manager Hutchinson's words. But the record
    unequivocally demonstrates that Ms. Lewinsky and the President
    did not ever discuss the content of that affidavit in this
    January 5 call or otherwise. And I challenge you to find any
    paragraph in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, either her draft or the
    final, reflecting this conversation. There isn't one. The call
    wasn't about the affidavit. He didn't tell her what to say in
    the affidavit. It is just not there.
        In fact, Mr. Manager Hutchinson repeatedly represented to
    you that Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the content of her affidavit
    with the President. He had to say that because he is asking you
    to remove the President from office for getting her to file a
    false affidavit. That is a tough sell if they never talked
    about the content of the affidavit. That is why he told you,
    and I quote, ``On January 6th''--5th or 6th--``she discussed
    that with the President, signing that affidavit, and the
    content of the affidavit.''
        That is why Mr. Manager Hutchinson also told you, ``She
    went over the contents of that, even though she might not have
    had it in hand, with the President.''
        That is just not true. It is not true. To borrow a phrase,
    again: It is wanting to win too much. What is clear from Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony is that she never went over the contents
    of the affidavit with the President, on January 5 or at any
    other time. Let's watch a brief excerpt about this matter.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did--did the subject of the affidavit come up with the
    President?
        A. Yes, towards the end of the conversation.
        Q. And how did--tell us how that occurred.
        A. I believe I asked him if he wanted to see a copy of it, and he
    said no.
        Q. Well, I mean, how did you introduce that into the subject--into
    the conversation?
        A. I don't really remember.
        Q. Did he ask you, well, how's the affidavit coming or--
        A. No, I don't think so.
        Q. But you told him that you had one being prepared, or something?
        A. I think I said--I think I said, you know, I'm going to sign an
    affidavit, or something like that.
        Q. Did he ask you what are you going to say?
        A. No.
        Q. And this is the time when he said something about 15 other
    affidavits?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And tell us as best as you can recall what--how that--how that
    part of the conversation went.
        A. I think that was the--sort of the other half of his sentence as,
    No, you know, I don't want to see it. I don't need to--or, I've seen 15
    others.
        It was a little flippant.
        Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has indicated
    that he thought he had--might have had a way that he could have you--
    get you to file a--basically a true affidavit, but yet still skirt
    these issues enough that you wouldn't be called as a witness.
        Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
        A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at all,
    ever.

        In fact, Ms. Lewinsky made clear she did not have any
    indication whatsoever that the President learned of the content
    of the affidavit from Mr. Jordan, either.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. The fact that you assume that Mr. Jordan was in contact
    with the President--and I believe the evidence would support
    that through his own testimony that he had talked to the
    President about the signed affidavit and that he had kept the
    President updated on the subpoena issue and the job search--
        A. Sir, I'm not sure that I knew he was having contact with
    the President about this. I--I think what I said was that I
    felt that it was getting his approval. It didn't necessarily
    mean that I felt he was going to get a direct approval from the
    President.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. Did you have any indication from Mr. Jordan that he--
    when he discussed the signed affidavit with the President, they
    were discussing some of the contents of the affidavit? Did you
    have--
        A. Before I signed it or--
        Q. No; during the drafting stage.
        A. No, absolutely not--either/or. I didn't. No, I did not.

        Finally, lacking any direct evidence of any kind that there
    was a discussion about the content of the affidavit, the
    managers have argued again and again that the President must
    have told Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit because it was
    in his interest, not hers, to avoid her testifying in the Jones
    case. Mr. Manager Bryant argued to you at the start of these
    proceedings, ``When everything is said and done, Ms. Lewinsky
    had no motivation, no reason whatsoever, to want to commit a
    crime by willfully submitting a false affidavit with a court of
    law. She really did not need to do this at that point in her
    life.''
        Mr. Manager Bryant also argued that only the President
    would benefit from a false affidavit, so he must have
    instructed her to do it. As he put it, ``Ms. Lewinsky files a
    false affidavit in the Jones case. What is the result of filing
    that false affidavit and who benefited from that?''
        But he was wrong. He was wrong, as Ms. Lewinsky made very
    clear when Mr. Manager Bryant asked her about this very subject
    this week. Let's listen to what she said:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best
    interest, did you?
        A. Uh, actually, I did.
        Q. To avoid testifying.
        A. Yes.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--
    why would you have wanted to avoid testifying?
        A. First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second
    of all, I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones
    or her case. And--I guess those two reasons.

        Ms. Lewinsky concedes that she had a reason to act on her
    own.
        Now, we have been discussing subpart (1) of article II, the
    affidavit allegation. But this testimony also undermined
    subpart (2) of article II, which alleges that the President
    obstructed justice in that very same phone call by encouraging
    Ms. Lewinsky to lie in any testimony that she might give. Ms.
    Lewinsky previously denied that she and the President ever
    discussed the content of any deposition testimony in that
    conversation. That happened before this week. Indeed, she had
    told the FBI that she and the President never discussed what to
    say about her visits to the White House in the context of the
    Paula Jones case. And the managers themselves said, in a press
    release on January 19 of this year, that the President and Ms.
    Lewinsky ``did not discuss the deposition that evening because
    Monica had not yet been subpoenaed.''
        So it is not entirely surprising that the managers did not
    ask Ms. Lewinsky to confirm that she and the President talked
    about the testimony in this call, even though that is where the
    obstruction allegedly occurred. They didn't ask her about that
    this week because they knew the answer. They knew the answer
    was ``No.'' They knew there was no discussion about the content
    of her testimony during that call. And the testimony you have
    seen today confirms that answer resoundingly. There is no
    evidence to support the charge in subpart (2) either. The
    managers did not even try to elicit it.
        The President did not obstruct justice. Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony explodes these two claims arising out of the December
    17 telephone call.
        Now let's turn to the allegation in article II concerning
    gifts. Subpart (3) charges that:

        On or about December 28, 1997, [the President] corruptly
    engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal
    evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights
    action brought against him.

        Now, the managers have indicated to you that Ms. Lewinsky
    provided testimony useful to their case with respect to the
    President's involvement in the transfer of gifts to Ms. Currie.
    We must have attended a different deposition. In fact, Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony provides powerful support for the position
    that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to keep from the Jones
    lawyers the gifts she had received from the President. It
    provides powerful support for the position that she had her own
    reasons and concerns for keeping the gifts from them. And it
    provides powerful support for the position that she never
    discussed either the topic of gifts or her own reasons for
    concern with the President before making her own independent
    decision on how to handle the gifts.
        Perhaps most notably, her testimony also provides
    corroboration for the President's testimony that he told her
    she had to turn over to the Jones lawyers what gifts she had.
    That is new evidence. But it undermines the managers' case, it
    doesn't help it.
        In one of the most extraordinary points in the deposition--
    and we will get to this in a moment--we learned that the Office
    of Independent Counsel failed to disclose to the House, to the
    Senate, to the President, Ms. Lewinsky's exculpatory statement
    on this point.
        Since the OIC evidently had chosen not to share the
    information with us, with the House or with this body, we owe
    the managers a small debt of gratitude for allowing us to learn
    of it here.
        Now let's look at the record with respect to the phone
    calls giving rise to the gift pickup. The managers repeatedly
    asserted at the outset that they could prove Ms. Currie called
    Ms. Lewinsky and not the other way around. They claimed they
    had found a cell phone record documenting that initial call to
    arrange to pick up the gifts. As Mr. Manager Hutchinson said
    tantalizingly at the start of these proceedings:

        Well, it was not known at the time of the questioning of
    Monica Lewinsky, but since then, the cell phone record was
    retrieved. And you don't have it in front of you, but it will
    be available. The cell phone record was retrieved that showed
    on Betty Currie's cell phone calls that a call was made at 3:32
    p.m. from Betty Currie to Monica Lewinsky and--

        Still under quotes--

    this confirms the testimony of Monica Lewinsky that the
    followup to get the gifts came from Betty Currie.

        That is what Mr. Manager Hutchinson promised the record
    would show. But that is not, in the end, what the record now
    shows. There is no evidence that the cell phone call initiated
    the process, as the managers claimed, and since there is no
    evidence that that call from Ms. Currie was the call initiating
    the process, there is no documentary evidence that Ms. Currie
    initiated the process. It is that simple. The proof has failed.
        What the record does show is that there was a cell phone
    call that day, a proposition that no one has ever disputed. Ms.
    Lewinsky testified to the managers that she recalls a cell
    phone call that day. Let's look at the testimony. This passage
    that you are about to see addresses the calls between Ms.
    Lewinsky and Ms. Currie on December 28. Ms. Lewinsky has just
    described Ms. Currie's call to her about picking something up,
    and this is what follows.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did--did you have other telephone calls with her that day?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Okay. What was the purpose of those conversations?
        A. I believe I spoke with her a little later to find out when she
    was coming, and I think that I might have spoken with her again when
    she was either leaving her house or outside or right there, to let me
    know to come out.
        Q. Do--at that time, did you have the caller identification--
        A. Yes, I did.
        Q. --on your telephone?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And did you at least on one occasion see her cell phone number
    on your caller-ID that day?
        A. Yes, I did.

        Nowhere does Ms. Lewinsky say which call was the cell phone
    call. In fact, if anything, it is logical to assume that it is
    the call from Ms. Currie announcing her imminent arrival which,
    of course, says nothing about how the visit was initially
    planned, and no one ever has disputed that Ms. Currie picked up
    the box. The fact that she might have called to say, ``I'm
    downstairs now,'' is of no additional evidentiary value
    whatsoever.
        Left without a documentary record, the managers assert that
    there is new testimonial evidence of other calls on December 28
    that somehow corroborate their theory of the case. But the new
    testimony doesn't even establish who made the other calls that
    day, and the record already had evidence of other calls on that
    day. Ms. Lewinsky mentioned such calls to the grand jury. Ms.
    Lewinsky and Ms. Currie spoke often, especially in that time
    period. There were phone calls.
        There is nothing new here. Ms. Currie has one recollection;
    Ms. Lewinsky has a different recollection. Indeed, when asked
    by Mr. Manager Bryant whether there was any doubt in her mind
    that it was Betty Currie who called her, Ms. Lewinsky stated
    simply, ``That's how I remember this event.''
        Straining for something beyond this absolutely unresolvable
    conflict, the managers promised evidence to tip the balance,
    and they produced none. The much-touted cell phone call utterly
    fails to establish who initiated the gift pickup by Ms. Currie.
        It is, therefore, clear that the deposition testimony does
    not advance the managers' case with respect to the gifts, but
    it sure advances the defense case. Remember, Ms. Lewinsky
    received a subpoena on December 19 requesting gifts she had
    received from the President. She met with her lawyer, Frank
    Carter, on December 22, and she did not speak to the President
    in the interim.
        In her deposition this week, Ms. Lewinsky testified at some
    length about how she decided what to bring her attorney, Frank
    Carter, in response to that request for gifts. As we will see,
    she decided on her own that she would bring only innocuous
    things to produce, things that any intern might have in his or
    her possession.
        Again, this was on December 22, well before the December 28
    meeting with the President at which the managers and the
    articles say the plan to hide the gifts was hatched. Ms.
    Lewinsky explained to the managers what she did and why she did
    it. Let's listen.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Did, uh, did you bring with you to the meeting with Mr. Jordan,
    and for the purpose of carrying it, I guess, to Mr. Carter, items in
    response to this request for production?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you discuss those items with Mr. Jordan?
        A. I think I showed them to him, but I'm not 100 percent sure. If
    I've testified that I did, then I'd stand by that.
        Q. Okay. How did you select those items?
        A. Uh, actually, kind of in an obnoxious way, I guess. I--I felt
    that it was important to take the stand with Mr. Carter and then, I
    guess, to the Jones people that this was ridiculous, that they were--
    they were looking at the wrong person to be involved in this. And, in
    fact, that was true. I know and knew nothing of sexual harassment. So I
    think I brought the, uh, Christmas cards, that I'm sure everyone in
    this room has probably gotten from the President and First Lady, and
    considered that correspondence, and some innocuous pictures and--they
    were innocuous.
        Q. Were they the kind of items that typically, an intern would
    receive or, like you said, any one of us might receive?
        A. I think so.
        Q. In other words, it wouldn't give away any kind of special
    relationship?
        A. Exactly.
        Q. And was that your intent?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Did you discuss how you selected those items with anybody?
        A. I don't believe so.
        Q. Did Mr. Jordan make any comment about those items?
        A. No.
        Q. Were any of these items eventually turned over to Mr. Carter?
        A. Yes.

        As an aside, contrary to the assertion of Mr. Manager
    Rogan, it is also clear from that excerpt that Ms. Lewinsky
    knew nothing of sexual harassment. That is what she said.
        So it is clear from this tape that well before December 28
    Ms. Lewinsky had made her own decision for her own reasons not
    to produce the gifts. She remained firm in this decision for
    her own reasons on December 28 when the President gave her more
    gifts. Let's watch again.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Okay. Did--he gave you some gifts that day, and my question to
    you is what went through your mind when he did that, when you knew all
    along that you had just received a subpoena to produce gifts. Did that
    not concern you?
        A. No, it didn't. I was happy to get them.
        Q. All right. Why did it--beyond your happiness in receiving them,
    why did the subpoena aspect of it not concern you?
        A. I think at that moment--I mean, you asked me when he gave me
    those gifts. So, at that moment, when I was there, I was happy to be
    with him. I was happy to get these Christmas presents. So I was nervous
    about the case, but I had made a decision that I wasn't going to get
    into it too much--
        Q. Well--
        A. --with a discussion.
        Q. --have you in regards to that--you've testified in the past that
    from everything that the President had told you about things like this,
    there was never any question that you were going to keep everything
    quiet, and turning over all the gifts would prompt the Jones attorneys
    to question you. So you had no doubt in your mind, did you not, that
    you weren't going to turn these gifts over that he had just given you?
        A. Uh, I--I think the latter half of your statement is correct. I
    don't know if you're reading from my direct testimony, but--because you
    said--your first statement was from everything the President had told
    you. So I don't know if that was--if those were my words or not, but
    I--no, I was--I--it--I was concerned about the gifts. I was worried
    someone might break into my house or concerned that they actually
    existed, but I wasn't concerned about turning them over because I knew
    I wasn't going to, for the reason that you stated.

        Now, when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of gifts with the
    President on December 28, she did not state he even answered.
    Her recollection of whether he said anything has been murky, as
    we have heard discussed here. And in her recent deposition she
    declined to resolve the inconsistencies in favor of the version
    the managers have advanced.
        And then what happened after she left on December 28? As
    Ms. Lewinsky recounted the subsequent events, Ms. Currie later
    called and arranged to pick up something. But what? According
    to Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie never said ``gifts'' when she
    called. Ms. Lewinsky assumed that was what she was calling
    about--that is her testimony--no doubt because they had been on
    her mind for the reasons we have just heard explained.
        Now, the managers attempt to respond to all this by saying
    over and over, yes, but the President never told Ms. Lewinsky
    she had to produce the gifts he had given her. They attempt to
    convert his silence into a failure to perform a legal duty and
    then to convert that failure to perform a legal duty into a
    high crime.
        But are we really sure that he didn't tell her to produce
    the gifts? Remember, the President volunteered on his own in
    the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky had raised the subject of
    gifts with him. That was long before he knew she had said it.
    And remember, he said what his response was: ``You have to give
    them whatever you have.''
        Now, the managers would have you believe Ms. Lewinsky
    rejected that recollection wholesale, that she said he never
    said any such thing. They need that to be the case. But it is
    not so, we now learn, no thanks to Mr. Starr's agents.
        Let's watch.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Okay. Now, were you ever under the impression from anything that
    the President said that you should turn over all the gifts to the Jones
    lawyers?
        A. No, but where this is a little tricky--and I think I might have
    even mentioned this last weekend--was that I had an occasion in an
    interview with one of the--with the OIC--where I was asked a series of
    statements, if the President had made those, and there was one
    statement that Agent Phalen said to me--I--there were--other people,
    they asked me these statements--this is after the President testified
    and they asked me some statements, did you say this, did you say this,
    and I said, no, no, no. And Agent Phalen said something, and I think it
    was, ``Well, you have to turn over whatever you have.'' And I said to
    you, ``You know, that sounds a little bit familiar to me.''
        So that's what I can tell you on that.
        Q. That's in the 302 exam?
        A. I don't know if it's in the 302 or not, but that's what
    happened.
        Q. Uh-huh.

        This is extraordinary testimony. Why? Because Ms. Lewinsky
    apparently corroborated the President. She recognized those
    words when she heard them. She didn't refute the President. And
    the OIC never told us that that was what she said. Never told
    the House. Never told this body. We had no idea about Ms.
    Lewinsky's recollection until we heard her testimony. We can
    only wonder--in troubled disbelief--how much more we still
    don't know. The President did not obstruct justice. Ms.
    Lewinsky's testimony seriously undermines the gift claim that
    is before you.
        We have reviewed the first three subparts of article II.
    Now, let's look quickly at the fourth.
        Ms. Lewinsky's testimony also confirms what has been clear
    throughout these proceedings: That her New York job search
    efforts began in October 1997, well before Ms. Lewinsky was
    ever named a potential witness in the Jones case; and that Mr.
    Jordan first became involved in the job search effort in
    November, early November, also before she became a witness;
    that Ms. Lewinsky had received a job offer in New York from the
    United Nations in November also, and also well before there was
    any indication she would be a witness; and that Mr. Jordan and
    Ms. Lewinsky had several contacts related to her job search in
    November, despite the fact that both of them were traveling
    extensively, including out of the country in that period.
        In fact, Ms. Lewinsky makes it clear in this testimony that
    she and Mr. Jordan began arranging the meeting that took place
    on December 11 before Thanksgiving, before anyone knew Ms.
    Lewinsky's name would be on a witness list--all of this, of
    course, before anyone knew Ms. Lewinsky's name would be on a
    witness list. If the fact that the assistance to Ms. Lewinsky
    preceded her appearance on the witness list needed
    confirmation, it has been confirmed again.
        But there is more. What has also been confirmed is Ms.
    Lewinsky's grand jury testimony that, ``No one ever asked me to
    lie. And I was never promised a job for my silence.'' We have
    repeatedly reminded this body of these plain and simple words
    with their plain, simple and exculpatory meaning.
        The House managers repeatedly have tried to suggest that
    these words must mean something else. But at no time in their
    hours of questioning Ms. Lewinsky did they question her about
    this pivotal assertion regarding the job search allegation.
    They did not ask her to explain it, to amend it, to qualify it.
    They did not challenge it. They did not confront it. They
    didn't dare. They knew the answer. They knew there was no quid
    pro quo. And their failure to elicit a response speaks volumes.
        The President did not obstruct justice. Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony undermines this job search claim, as well. Plain and
    simple, the evidence is to the contrary.
        Now, Mr. Manager Bryant remarked on Thursday that after
    deposing Ms. Lewinsky he felt like the actor Charles Laughton
    in the film ``Witness for the Prosecution.'' As counsel for the
    President, I would respectfully submit that another famous role
    of Charles Laughton might be the more fitting reference. It is
    that of the dogged, tireless, obsessed Inspector Javert once
    played by Mr. Laughton in the 1935 movie version of ``Les
    Miserables.''
        The most recent testimony of Ms. Lewinsky has seriously
    damaged the managers' case and has confirmed that it is time
    for this tireless pursuit of the President to come to an end.
        I turn now to my partner, Mr. Kendall, who will discuss Mr.
    Jordan's recent testimony.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. I think I see in the Chief Justice's eyes the
    desire for----
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. LOTT. --a 15-minute break. Let's return as shortly
    after 3:30 as is possible.
        Thereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the Senate recessed until 3:42
    p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by
    the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I believe the White
    House counsel has an additional presenter at this time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes White House Counsel
    Kendall.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. Mr. Chief Justice, ladies and
    gentlemen of the Senate, distinguished House Managers, I am
    going to deal with Vernon Jordan's videotape deposition. That
    deposition was taken on February 2, this last Tuesday, and it
    produced nothing at all which was significant and new. Time and
    again, Mr. Manager Hutchinson cited Mr. Jordan's previous grand
    jury testimony, and time and again Mr. Jordan confirmed and
    recited his previous grand jury testimony.
        The managers had a full and fair opportunity to take Mr.
    Jordan's testimony, and they, indeed, had time to spare. They
    used just about 3 hours of their allotted 4-hour time. And they
    discovered nothing that was not contained in the previous 900
    pages of Mr. Jordan's grand jury testimony which has been taken
    in his March 3, March 5, May 5, May 28, and June 9 appearances
    before the OIC grand jury. Assertions by counsel is not the
    same thing as proof. And I think that it is clear when you
    watch the actual video as we have done today of the three
    witnesses whose testimony the managers took earlier this week.
        For example, with respect to Mr. Jordan, Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson, who did a first-rate job of interrogation as you
    can see from the video, told you last Thursday that he needed
    to have in evidence the videotape, and you admitted it into
    evidence, because--and I quote--``Mr. Jordan's testimony goes
    to the connection between the job search, the benefit provided
    to a witness, and the solicited false testimony from that
    witness.''
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson also asserted more than once last
    Thursday that Mr. Jordan's testimony will prove that the
    President was controlling the job search. There is only one
    problem with these assertions. When you actually look at the
    videotape and listen to what Mr. Jordan testified to, there is
    no support for these propositions. There is no direct evidence
    and there is no circumstantial evidence. It is plain that to
    help somebody find a job is an acceptable activity. It is only
    when this is tied, as the second article of impeachment alleges
    it is tied, to some obstruction in the Paula Jones case that it
    becomes illegal. And, when fairly considered, Mr. Jordan's
    testimony provides no evidence whatsoever of that.
        Mr. Jordan was a long-time and close personal friend of the
    President.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. It's probably not bad from Washington standards.
        Would you describe the nature of your relationship with President
    Clinton?
        A. President Clinton has been a friend of mine since approximately
    1973, when I came to your State, Arkansas, to make a speech as
    president of the National Urban League about race and equal opportunity
    in our Nation, and we met then and there, and our friendship has grown
    and developed and matured and he is my friend and will continue to be
    my friend.
        Q. And just to further elaborate on that friendship, it's my
    understanding that he and his--and the First Lady has had Christmas Eve
    dinner with you and your family for a number of years?
        A. Every year since his Presidency, the Jordan family has been
    privileged to entertain the Clinton family on Christmas Eve.
        Q. And has there been any exceptions in recent years to that?
        A. Every year that he has been President, he has had, he and his
    family, Christmas Eve with my family.
        Q. And have you vacationed together with the Clinton family?
        A. Yes. I think you have seen reels of playing golf and having fun
    at Martha's Vineyard.
        Q. And so you vacation together, you play golf together on a semi-
    regular basis?
        A. Whenever we can.

        It has been, since the start of this investigation, well
    known that Mr. Jordan was active in helping Ms. Lewinsky secure
    employment in New York, and also that he construed this request
    which came to him through Betty Currie as having come from the
    President himself. In his May 28 grand jury testimony, for
    example, Mr. Jordan testified that Betty Currie is the
    President's secretary. ``She was the person who called me at
    the behest of the President, I believe, to ask me to look into
    getting Monica Lewinsky the job.''
        And, again, on June 9, Mr. Jordan testified to the grand
    jury that, ``The President asked me to help get Monica Lewinsky
    a job.''
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson played an excerpt, which I will not
    play again, which once more repeats that testimony.
        Mr. Jordan, however, made clear that while he recommended
    Ms. Lewinsky for a job at three New York firms which he had
    some connection with, the decision to hire her was the
    company's, and he put no pressure of any kind on these
    companies to hire Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, she received an offer
    at one company, Revlon, and failed to obtain one from American
    Express or Burson-Marsteller.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Okay. Do you believe that you are acting in the company's
    interest or the President's interest when you were trying to secure a
    job for Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Well, what I knew was that the company would take care of its
    own interest. This is not the first time that I referred somebody, and
    what I know is, is that if a person being referred does not meet the
    standards required for that company, I have no question but that that
    person will not be hired. And so the referral is an easy thing to do;
    the judgment about employment is not a judgment as a person referring
    that I make. But I do have confidence in all of the companies on whose
    boards I sit that, regardless of my reference, that as to their needs
    and as to their expectations for their employees that they will make
    the right decisions, as happened in the American Express situation.
        American Express called and said: We will not hire Ms. Lewinsky. I
    did not question it, I did not challenge it, because they understood
    their needs and their needs in comparison to her qualifications. They
    made a judgment. Revlon, on the other hand, made another judgment.
        I am not the employer. I am the referrer, and there is a major
    difference.
        Q. Now, going back to what you knew as far as information and what
    you conveyed to Revlon, you indicated that you did not tell Mr.
    Halperin that you were making this request or referral at the request
    of the President of the United States.
        A. Yes, and I didn't see any need to do that.
        Q. And then, when you talked to Mr.--
        A. Nor do I believe not saying that, Counselor, was a breach of
    some fiduciary relationship.
        Q. And when you had your conversation with Mr. Perelman--
        A. Right.
        Q. --at a later time--
        A. Right.
        Q. --you do not remember whether you told him--you do not believe
    you told him you were calling for the President--
        A. I believe that I did not tell him.
        Q. --but you assumed that he knew?
        A. No. I did not make any assumptions, let me say. I said: Ronald,
    here is a young lady who has been interviewed. She thinks the interview
    has not gone well. See what you can do to make sure that she is
    properly interviewed and evaluated--in essence.
        Q. And did you reference her as a former White House intern?
        A. Probably. I do not have a recollection of whether I described
    her as a White House intern, whether I described her as a person who
    had worked for the Pentagon. I said this is a person that I have
    referred.
        I think, Mr. Hutchinson, that I have sufficient, uh, influence,
    shall we say, sufficient character, shall we say, that people have been
    throughout my career able to take my word at face value.
        Q. And so you didn't need to reference the President. The fact that
    you were calling Mr. Perelman--
        A. That was sufficient.
        Q. --and asking for a second interview for Ms. Lewinsky, that that
    should be sufficient?
        A. I thought it was sufficient, and obviously, Mr. Perelman thought
    it was sufficient.
        Q. And so there is no reason, based on what you told him, for him
    to think that you were calling at the request of the President of the
    United States?
        A. I think that's about right.
        Q. And so, at least with the conversation with Mr. Halperin and Mr.
    Perelman, you did not reference that you were acting in behalf of the
    President of the United States. Was there anyone else that you talked
    to at Revlon in which they might have acquired that information?
        A. The only persons that I talked to in this process, as I
    explained to you, was Mr. Halperin and Mr. Perelman about this process.
    And it was Mr. Halperin who put the--who got the process started.
        Q. So those are the only two you talked about, and you made no
    reference that you were acting in behalf of the President?
        A. Right.
        Q. Now, the second piece of information was the fact that you knew
    and the President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was under subpoena in the
    Jones case, and that information was not provided to either Mr.
    Halperin or to Mr. Perelman; is that correct?
        A. That's correct.

        The most critical thing about this deposition is it
    contained no evidence of any kind which supports the central
    allegation of article II, the obstruction of justice article,
    that Mr. Jordan's job search assistance was tied to Ms.
    Lewinsky testifying in a certain way or that the President
    intended Mr. Jordan's assistance to corruptly influence her
    testimony. Mr. Jordan was unequivocal about the fact that he
    had frequently helped other people and that here there was no
    quid pro quo, no tie-in of any kind. Indeed, he provided direct
    evidence of this fact.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Mr. Jordan, you were asked questions about job assistance. Would
    you describe the job assistance you have over your career given to
    people who have come to you requesting help finding a job or finding
    employment?
        A. Well, I've known about job assistance and have for a very long
    time. I learned about it dramatically when I finished at Howard
    University Law School, 1960, to return home to Atlanta, Georgia to look
    for work. In the process of my--during my senior year, it was very
    clear to me that no law firm in Atlanta would hire me. It was very
    clear to me that, uh, I could not get a job as a black lawyer in the
    city government, the county government, the State government or the
    Federal Government.
        And thanks to my high school bandmaster, Mr. Kenneth Days, who
    called his fraternity brother, Donald L. Hollowell, a civil rights
    lawyer, and said, ``That Jordan boy is a fine boy, and you ought to
    consider him for a job at your law firm,'' that's when I learned about
    job referral, and that job referral by Kenneth Days, now going to Don
    Hollowell, got me a job as a civil rights lawyer working for Don
    Hollowell for $35 a week.
        I have never forgotten Kenneth Days' generosity. And given the fact
    that all of the other doors for employment as a black lawyer graduating
    from Howard University were open to me, that's always--that's always
    been etched in my heart and my mind, and as a result, because I stand
    on Mr. Days' shoulders and Don Hollowell's shoulders, I felt some
    responsibility to the extent that I could be helpful or got in a
    position to be helpful, that I would do that.
        And there is I think ample evidence, both in the media and by
    individuals across this country, that at such times that I have been
    presented with that opportunity that I have taken advantage of that
    opportunity, and I think that I have been successful at it.
        Q. Was your assistance to Ms. Lewinsky which you have described in
    any way dependent upon her doing anything whatsoever in the Paula Jones
    case?
        A. No.

        That is direct evidence. That is not circumstantial
    evidence. That is unimpugned direct evidence.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson emphasized that Mr. Jordan now
    admits that he met with Ms. Lewinsky for breakfast on December
    31. But Mr. Jordan also conceded in his deposition that, while
    he has no direct recollection of it, he also met with Ms.
    Lewinsky on November 5, a date well before any of the many
    managerial-selected dates for the beginning of the corrupt
    conspiracy here.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. . . . Now, when was the first time that you recall that you met
    with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. If you've read my grand jury testimony--
        Q. I have.
        A. --and I'm sure that you have--there is testimony in the grand
    jury that she came to see me on or about the 5th of November. I have no
    recollection of that. It was not on my calendar, and I just have no
    recollection of her visit. There is a letter here that you have in
    evidence, and I have to assume that in fact that happened. But as I
    said in my grand jury testimony, I'm not aware of it, I don't remember
    it--but I do not deny that it happened.
        Q. And Ms. Lewinsky has made reference to a meeting that occurred
    in your office on November 5, and that's the meeting that you have no
    recollection of?
        A. That is correct. We have no record of it in my office, and I
    just have no recollection of it.
        Q. And in your first grand jury appearance, you were firm, shall I
    say, that the first time you met with Ms. Lewinsky, that it was on
    December 11th?
        A. Yes. It was firm based on what my calendar told me, and
    subsequently to that, there has been a refreshing of my recollection,
    and I do not deny that it happened. By the same token, I will tell you,
    as I said in my grand jury testimony, that I did not remember that I
    had met with her.
        Q. And in fact today, the fact that you do not dispute that that
    meeting occurred is not based upon your recollection but is simply
    based upon you've seen the records, and it appears that that meeting
    occurred?
        A. That is correct.

        The managers' theory is that it wasn't the original job
    assistance which constitutes obstruction of justice, it was,
    rather, the intensification of it which began at a certain
    point--and that point has varied.
        When you boil it all down, when you look at Mr. Jordan's
    deposition or read his grand jury testimony, you see that he
    acted for Ms. Lewinsky on two different occasions. On December
    11 he made three phone calls for her to New York firms, and
    then on January 8, when she thought an interview had gone
    badly, he made another phone call, this time to Mr. Perelman.
    That is all he did.
        Now, you also will recall, I think, that the managers'
    original theory was that what catalyzed this job search
    intensification, what really kick-started it, was the entry of
    an order in the Paula Jones case by Judge Wright on December
    11.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson told you on January 14 what that
    triggered:

        Let's look at the chain of events. The judge--the witness
    list came in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the
    President into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan
    into action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job
    search along. . . . Remember what else happened on that day,
    December 11. Again, that was the same day that Judge Wright
    ruled that the questions about other relationships could be
    asked by the Jones attorneys.

        That was the theory then. This is now. We demonstrated, in
    our own presentation, of course, that that order was entered
    late in the day at a time when Mr. Jordan was high over the
    Atlantic in an airplane on his way to Amsterdam.
        Mr. Manager Hutchinson's very able examination did not try
    to resuscitate that theory. He didn't even make the attempt. He
    didn't ask Mr. Jordan about the December 11 order.
        So today we have a different time line. We have a new chart
    and a new time line. Let's look at this.
        This is Mr. Manager Hutchinson's chart this morning. What
    is critical here? Well, we learned today that it is the
    December 5 date that is critical. That is when the witness list
    was faxed to the President's counsel, and that is what
    triggered the succeeding chain of events. Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson remarked, if I heard him correctly, that whenever
    you are talking about obstruction of justice, it ties together,
    it all fits together.
        Let's look at his chart. We see that December 11 is on
    here, but Judge Wright's order has dropped off entirely, unless
    it is there where I don't see it. Judge Wright's order is now
    not part of the chain of causation.
        We look at December 7. We ask ourselves what happened then;
    this is 2 days after the witness list came in. It must have
    been something nefarious, because the President and Jordan
    meet. But Mr. Manager Hutchinson did not represent to you that
    they even talked about the Jones litigation or Ms. Lewinsky
    because they didn't. The managers told you that in their trial
    brief, and it has been Mr. Jordan's consistent testimony.
        On December 11, Mr. Jordan did have a meeting with Ms.
    Lewinsky. That was originally set up not on December 8, you
    will recall, but back in November when Ms. Lewinsky had agreed
    to call Mr. Jordan when he returned from his travel.
        So the chronology here produces no even circumstantial
    evidence of some linkage between the Paula Jones case and Mr.
    Jordan's job search.
        It is also significant, I think, while the witness list
    came in on December 5, the President met with his lawyers on
    December 6, the President doesn't call Ms. Lewinsky until
    December 17 and Mr. Jordan doesn't learn about the fact that
    Ms. Lewinsky is on the witness list until December 19. There
    does not seem to be a lot of urgency here.
        Let's review the nefarious conspiracy that we have heard
    about today to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. We are told today that
    Vernon Jordan had no corrupt intent, that Ms. Lewinsky had no
    corrupt intent, and that Revlon had no corrupt intent. Rather,
    it was the President who somehow spun out this conspiracy. But
    I ask you, where, in all of the voluminous record, is there any
    evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the President
    somehow tied these things together through Mr. Jordan? It is a
    shell game, but the game doesn't have any shell in it, and I
    think this is the loneliest conspiracy in human history, if it
    was a conspiracy. But it wasn't.
        On the subject of quid pro quo, I want to play two
    excerpts, and part of these I ask your indulgence. They were
    played in part by Mr. Manager Hutchinson, but I think they
    deserve to be seen in their full context. In one of them you
    are going to hear Mr. Jordan say that he was running the job
    search, he was in control of the job search. I think that is
    true about the Vernon Jordan job search. Ms. Lewinsky's job
    search had also been proceeding with Mr. Richardson--Mr. Jordan
    was not involved in any way with that--and through her superior
    at the Pentagon, Mr. Ken Bacon. Let's listen to the full
    context and listen for any evidence of a quid pro quo.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. Mr. Jordan, let me go back to that meeting on December 11th. I
    believe we were discussing that. My question would be: How did the
    meeting on December 11 of 1997 with Ms. Lewinsky come about?
        A. Ms. Lewinsky called my office and asked if she could come to see
    me.
        Q. And was that preceded by a call from Betty Currie?
        A. At some point in time, Betty Currie had called me, and Ms.
    Lewinsky followed up on that call, and she came to my office, and we
    had a visit.
        Q. Ms. Lewinsky called, set up a meeting, and at some point sent
    you a resume, I believe.
        A. I believe so.
        Q. And did you receive that prior to the meeting on December 11th?
        A. I--I have to assume that I did, but I--I do not know whether she
    brought it with her or whether--it was at some point that she brought
    with her or sent to me--somehow it came into my possession--a list of
    various companies in New York with which she had--which were her
    preferences, by the way--most of which I did not know well enough to
    make any calls for.
        Q. All right. And I want to come back to that, but I believe--would
    you dispute if the record shows that you received the resume of Ms.
    Lewinsky on December 8th?
        A. I would not.
        Q. And presumably, the meeting on December 11th was set up
    somewhere around December 8th by the call from Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I--I would not dispute that, sir.
        Q. All right. Now, you mentioned that she had sent you a--I guess
    some people refer to it--a wish list, or a list of jobs that she--
        A. Not jobs--companies.
        Q. --companies that she would be interested in seeking employment
    with.
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And you looked at that, and you determined that you wanted to go
    with your own list of friends and companies that you had better
    contacts with.
        A. I'm sure, Congressman, that you too have been in this business,
    and you do know that you can only call people that you know or feel
    comfortable in calling.
        Q. Absolutely. No question about it. And let me just comment and
    ask your response to this, but many times I will be listed as a
    reference, and they can take that to any company. You might be listed
    as a reference and the name ``Vernon Jordan'' would be a good reference
    anywhere, would it not?
        A. I would hope so.
        Q. And so, even though it was a company that you might not have the
    best contact with, you could have been helpful in that regard?
        A. Well, the fact is I was running the job search, not Ms.
    Lewinsky, and therefore, the companies that she brought or listed were
    not of interest to me. I knew where I would need to call.
        Q. And that is exactly the point, that you looked at getting Ms.
    Lewinsky a job as an assignment rather than just something that you
    were going to be a reference for.
        A. I don't know whether I looked upon it as an assignment. Getting
    jobs for people is not unusual for me, so I don't view it as an
    assignment. I just view it as something that is part of what I do.
        Q. You're acting in behalf of the President when you are trying to
    get Ms. Lewinsky a job, and you were in control of the job search?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, going back--going to your meeting that we're talking about
    on December 11th, prior to the meeting did you make any calls to
    prospective employers in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I don't think so. I think not. I think I wanted to see her
    before I made any calls.
        Q. And so if they were not before, after you met with her, you made
    some calls on December 11th?
        A. I--I believe that's correct.
        Q. And you called Mr. Richard Halperin of McAndrews & Forbes?
        A. That's right.
        Q. You called Mr. Peter--
        A. Georgescu.
        Q. --Georgescu. And he is with what company?
        A. He is chairman and chief executive officer of Young & Rubicam, a
    leading advertising agency on Madison Avenue.
        Q. And did you make one other call?
        A. Yes. I called Ursie Fairbairn, who runs Human Resources at
    American Express, at the American Express Company, where I am the
    senior director.
              * * * * *
        Q. And what did you basically communicate to each of these
    officials in behalf of Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I essentially said that you're going to hear from Ms. Lewinsky,
    and I hope that you will afford her an opportunity to come in and be
    interviewed and look favorably upon her if she meets your
    qualifications and your needs for work.
        Q. Okay. And at what level did you try to communicate this
    information?
        A. By--what do you mean by ``what level''?
        Q. In the company that you were calling, did you call the chairman
    of human resources, did you call the CEO--who did you call, or what
    level were you seeking to talk to?
        A. Richard Halperin is sort of the utility man; he does everything
    at McAndrews & Forbes. He is very close to the chairman, he is very
    close to Mr. Gittis. And so at McAndrews & Forbes, I called Halperin.
        As I said to you, and as my grand jury testimony shows, I called
    Young & Rubicam, Peter Georgescu as its chairman and CEO. I have had a
    long-term relationship with Young & Rubicam going back to three of its
    CEOs, the first being Edward Ney, who was chairman of Young & Rubicam
    when I was head of the United Negro College Fund, and it was during
    that time that we developed the great theme, ``A mind is a terrible
    thing to waste.'' So I have had a long-term relationship with Young &
    Rubicam and with Peter Georgescu, so I called the chairman in that
    instance.
        At American Express, I called Ms. Ursie Fairbairn who is, as I said
    before, in charge of Human Resources.
        So that is the level--in one instance, the chairman; in one
    instance a utilitarian person; and in another instance, the head of the
    Human Resources Department.
        Q. And the utilitarian connection, Mr. Richard Halperin, was sort
    of an assistant to Mr. Ron Perelman?
        A. That's correct. He's a lawyer.
        Q. Now, going to your meeting on December 11th with Ms. Lewinsky,
    about how long of a meeting was that?
        A. I don't--I don't remember. You have a record of it, Congressman.
        Q. And actually, I think you've testified it was about 15 to 20
    minutes, but don't hold me to that, either.
        During the course of the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, what did you
    learn about her?
        A. Uh, enthusiastic, quite taken with herself and her experience,
    uh, bubbly, effervescent, bouncy, confident, uh--actually, I sort of
    had the same impression that you House Managers had of her when you met
    with her. You came out and said she was impressive, and so we come out
    about the same place.
        Q. And did she relate to you the fact that she liked being an
    intern because it put her close to the President?
        A. I have never seen a White House intern who did not like being a
    White House intern, and so her enthusiasm for being a White House
    intern was about like the enthusiasm of White House interns--they liked
    it.
        She was not happy about not being there anymore--she did not like
    being at the Defense Department--and I think she actually had some
    desire to go back. But when she actually talked to me, she wanted to go
    to New York for a job in the private sector, and she thought that I
    could be helpful in that process.
        Q. Did she make reference to someone in the White House being
    uncomfortable when she was an intern, and she thought that people did
    not want her there?
        A. She felt unwanted--there is no question about that. As to who
    did not want her there and why they did not want her there, that was
    not my business.
        Q. And she related that--
        A. She talked about it.
        Q. --experience or feeling to you?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky was on December 11th, and I
    believe that Ms. Lewinsky has testified that she met with the President
    on December 5--excuse me, on December 6--at the White House and
    complained that her job search was not going anywhere, and the
    President then talked to Mr. Jordan.
        Do you recall the President talking to you about that after that
    meeting?
        A. I do not have a specific recollection of the President saying to
    me anything about having met with Ms. Lewinsky. The President has never
    told me that he met with Ms. Lewinsky, as best as I can recollect. I--I
    am aware that she was in a state of anxiety about going to work. She
    was in a state of anxiety in addition because her lease at Watergate,
    at the Watergate, was to expire December 31st. And there was a part of
    Ms. Lewinsky, I think, that thought that because she was coming to me,
    that she could come today and that she would have a job tomorrow. That
    is not an unusual misapprehension, and it's not limited to White House
    interns.
        Q. I mentioned her meeting with the President on the same day,
    December 6th. I believe the record shows the President met with his
    lawyers and learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list.
    Now, did you subsequently meet with the President on the next day,
    December 7th?
        A. I may have met with the President. I'd have to--I mean, I'd have
    to look. I'd have to look. I don't know whether I did or not.
        Q. If you would like to confer--I believe the record shows that,
    but I'd like to establish that through your testimony.
        MS. WALDEN: Yes.
        THE WITNESS: Yes.
        BY MR. HUTCHINSON:
        Q. All right. So you met with the President on December 7th. And
    was it the next day after that, December 8th, that Ms. Lewinsky called
    to set up the job meeting with you on December 11th?
        A. I believe that is correct.
        Q. And sometime after your meeting on December 11th with Ms.
    Lewinsky, did you have another conversation with the President?
        A. Uh, you do understand that conversations between me and the
    President, uh, was not an unusual circumstance.
        Q. And I understand that--
        A. All right.
        Q. --and so let me be more specific. I believe your previous
    testimony has been that sometime after the 11th, you spoke with the
    President about Ms. Lewinsky.
        A. I stand on that testimony.
        Q. All right. And so there's two conversations after the witness
    list came out--one that you had with the President on December 7th, and
    then a subsequent conversation with him after you met with Ms. Lewinsky
    on the 11th.
        Now, in your subsequent conversation after the 11th, did you
    discuss with the President of the United States Monica Lewinsky, and if
    so, can you tell us what that discussion was?
        A. If there was a discussion subsequent to Monica Lewinsky's visit
    to me on December the 11th with the President of the United States, it
    was about the job search.
        Q. All right. And during that, did he indicate that he knew about
    the fact that she had lost her job in the White House, and she wanted
    to get a job in New York?
        A. He was aware that--he was obviously aware that she had lost her
    job in the White House, because she was working at the Pentagon. He was
    also aware that she wanted to work in New York, in the private sector,
    and understood that that is why she was having conversations with me.
    There is no doubt about that.
        Q. And he thanked you for helping her?
        A. There's no question about that, either.
        Q. And on either of these conversations that I've referenced that
    you had with the President after the witness list came out, your
    conversation on December 7th, and your conversation sometime after the
    11th, did the President tell you that Ms. Monica Lewinsky was on the
    witness list in the Jones case?
        A. He did not.
        Q. And did you consider this information to be important in your
    efforts to be helpful to Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I never thought about it.

        Mr. Jordan found out about Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena on
    December 19 when a weeping Ms. Lewinsky telephoned him and came
    to his office. Mr. Manager Hutchinson played that excerpt from
    the testimony this morning. I won't replay it. Mr. Jordan then
    did what I think is best called due diligence. He talked to Ms.
    Lewinsky, got her a lawyer, asked her whether there was any
    sexual relationship with the President, and was assured that
    there was not. That same evening, he went to the White House
    and made a similar inquiry of the President and he received a
    similar response.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. And still on December 19th, after your meeting with Ms.
    Lewinsky, did you subsequently see the President of the United States
    later that evening?
        A. I did.
        Q. And is this when you went to the White House and saw the
    President?
        A. Yes.
        Q. At the time that Ms. Lewinsky came to see you on December 19th,
    did you have any plans to attend any social function at the White House
    that evening?
        A. I did not.
        Q. And in fact there was a social invitation that you had at the
    White House that you declined?
        A. I had--I had declined it; that's right.
        Q. And subsequent to Ms. Lewinsky visiting you, did you change your
    mind and go see the President that evening?
        A. After the--a social engagement that Mrs. Jordan and I had, we
    went to the White House for two reasons. We went to the White House to
    see some friends who were there, two of whom were staying in the White
    House; and secondly, I wanted to have a conversation with the
    President.
        Q. And this conversation that you wanted to have with the President
    was one that you wanted to have with him alone?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. And did you let him know in advance that you were coming and
    wanted to talk to him?
        A. I told him I would see him sometime that night after dinner.
        Q. Did you tell him why you wanted to see him?
        A. No.
        Q. Now, was this--once you told him that you wanted to see him, did
    it occur the same time that you talked to him while Ms. Lewinsky was
    waiting outside?
        A. It could be. I made it clear that I would come by after dinner,
    and he said fine.
        Q. Now, let me backtrack for just a moment, because whenever you
    talked to the President, Ms. Lewinsky was not inside the room--
        A. That's correct.
        Q. --and therefore, you did not know the details about her
    questions on the President might leave the First Lady and those
    questions that set off all of these alarm bells.
        A. [Nodding head up and down.]
        Q. And so you were having--is the answer yes?
        A. That's correct.
        Q. And so you were having this discussion with the President not
    knowing the extent of Ms. Lewinsky's fixation?
        A. Uh--
        Q. Is that correct?
        A. Correct.
        Q. And, regardless, you wanted to see the President that night, and
    so you went to see him. And was he expecting you?
        A. I believe he was.
        Q. And did you have a conversation with him alone?
        A. I did.
        Q. No one else around?
        A. No one else around.
        Q. And I know that's a redundant question.
        A. It's okay.
        Q. Now, would you describe your conversation with the President?
        A. We were upstairs, uh, in the White House. Mrs. Jordan--we came
    in by way of the Southwest Gate into the Diplomatic Entrance--we left
    the car there. I took the elevator up to the residence, and Mrs. Jordan
    went and visited at the party. And the President was already upstairs--
    I had ascertained that from the usher--and I went up, and I raised with
    him the whole question of Monica Lewinsky and asked him directly if he
    had had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, and the President said,
    ``No, never.''
        Q. All right. Now, during that conversation, did you tell the
    President again that Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed?
        A. Well, we had established that.
        Q. All right. And did you tell him that you were concerned about
    her fascination?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you describe her as being emotional in your meeting that
    day?
        A. I did.
        Q. And did you relate to the President that Ms. Lewinsky asked
    about whether he was going to leave the First Lady at the end of the
    term?
        A. I did.
        Q. And as--and then, you concluded that with the question as to
    whether he had had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. And he said he had not, and I was satisfied--end of
    conversation.
        Q. Now, once again, just as I asked the question in reference to
    Ms. Lewinsky, it appears to me that this is an extraordinary question
    to ask the President of the United States. What led you to ask this
    question to the President?
        A. Well, first of all, I'm asking the question of my friend who
    happens to be the President of the United States.
        Q. And did you expect your friend, the President of the United
    States, to give you a truthful answer?
        A. I did.
        Q. Did you rely upon the President's answer in your decision to
    continue your efforts to seek Ms. Lewinsky a job?
        A. I believed him, and I continued to do what I had been asked to
    do.

        This morning, a very short portion of the President's grand
    jury testimony was played. The sound was not very good. It was
    a very short snippet, but it relates to what happened between
    Mr. Jordan and the President in that December 19, late-night
    meeting at the White House. The snippet that was played for you
    was:

        Q. And Mr. Jordan informed you of that, is that correct?

        ``That'' being the subpoena.

        A. No, sir.

        That leaves the misleading impression in his grand jury
    testimony the President did not acknowledge this visit with Mr.
    Jordan. The question right above the one that was quoted,
    however, was the following:

        Q. You were familiar, weren't you, Mr. President, that she
    had received the subpoena? You have already acknowledged that.

        The answer was, ``Yes, sir, I was.''
        And then two pages later, the President was asked by the
    OIC:

        Q. Did you, in fact, have a conversation with Mr. Jordan on
    the evening of December 19, 1997, in which he talked to you
    about Monica being in Mr. Jordan's office, having a copy of the
    subpoena and being upset about being subpoenaed?

        And the President's answer was:

        I remember that Mr. Jordan was in the White House on
    December 19 for an event of some kind, that he came up to the
    residence floor and told me that he had--that Monica had gotten
    subpoenaed or Monica was going to have to testify and I think
    he told me he recommended a lawyer for her. I believe that's
    what happened, but it was a very brief conversation.

        So I think it is absolutely clear that there is no conflict
    between the President's testimony and Mr. Jordan's testimony
    about this. Mr. Jordan had recommended Ms. Lewinsky and took
    her to the lawyer's office, to a lawyer, a Mr. Frank Carter, a
    respected Washington, DC, lawyer, to whom Mr. Jordan had
    recommended other clients.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, you have referred other clients to Mr. Carter during your
    course of practice here in Washington, D.C.?
        A. Yes, I have.
        Q. About how many have you referred to him?
        A. Oh, I don't know. Maggie Williams is one client that I--I
    remember very definitely.
        I like Frank Carter a lot. He's a very able young lawyer. He's a
    first-class person, a first-class lawyer, and he's one of my new
    acquaintances amongst lawyers in town, and I like being around him. We
    have lunch, and he's a friend.

        Q. And is it true, though, that when you've referred other clients
    to Mr. Carter that you never personally delivered and presented that
    client to him in his office?
        A. But I delivered Maggie Williams to him in my office. I had
    Maggie Williams to come to my office, and it was in my office that I
    introduced, uh, Maggie Williams to Mr. Carter, and she chose other
    counsel. I would have happily taken Maggie Williams to his office.

        I will skip the next two videotapes, 21 and 22. I hear a
    sigh of relief.
        I want to use the next videotape--and I am almost through--
    to correct the record as to one point that was made by the
    managers on Thursday. And again, this representation was
    important because it asserted an interconnection between the
    job search assistance and testimony in the Jones case.
        We were shown a chart on Thursday and it was a chart that
    was entitled ``Interconnection Between Job Help and
    Testimony.''
        Managers' version:

        Q. [so you] Talk to her both about the job and her concerns
    about parts of the affidavit.

        Answer, according to the managers' version, ``That is
    correct.''
        When we actually looked at the testimony which we will see
    in just a second, the question is:

        Q. Did you, in fact, talk to her about the job and her
    concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky
    talked to her about the job, on the one hand, or job being
    interrelated with the conversation about the affidavit. The
    affidavit was over here. The job was over here.

        I don't suggest any intentional misrepresentation, but I
    think the record deserves to be corrected.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Do you know why you would have been calling Mr. Carter on three
    occasions, the day before the affidavit was signed?
        A. Yeah. I--my recollection is--is that I was exchanging or sharing
    with Mr. Carter what had gone on, what she had asked me to do, what I
    refused to do, reaffirming to him that he was the lawyer and I was not
    the lawyer. I mean, it would be so presumptuous of me to try to advise
    Frank Carter as to how to practice law.
        Q. Would you have been relating to Mr. Carter your conversations
    with Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. I may have.
        Q. And if Ms. Lewinsky expressed to you any concerns about the
    affidavit, would you have relayed those to Mr. Carter?
        A. Yes.
        Q. And if Mr. Carter was a good attorney that was concerned about
    the economics of law practice, he would have likely billed Ms. Lewinsky
    for some of those telephone calls?
        A. You have to talk to Mr. Carter about his billing.
        Q. It wouldn't surprise you if his billing did reflect a--a charge
    for a telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan?
        A. Keep in mind that Mr. Carter spent most of his time in being a
    legal services lawyer. I think his concentration is primarily on
    service, rather than billing.
        Q. But, again, based upon the conversations you had with him, which
    sounds like conversations of substance in reference to the affidavit,
    that it would be consistent with the practice of law if he charged for
    those conversations?
        A. That's a question you'd have to ask Mr. Carter.
        Q. They were conversations of substance with Mr. Carter concerning
    the affidavit?
        A. And they were likely conversations about more than Ms. Lewinsky.
        Q. But the answer was yes, that they were conversations of
    substance in reference to the affidavit?
        A. Or at least a portion of them.
        Q. In other words, other things might have been discussed?
        A. Yes.
        Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the affidavit
    being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both the job and her
    concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky talked to her
    about the job, on one hand, or job being interrelated with the
    conversation about the affidavit. The affidavit was over here. The job
    was over here.
        Q. But the--in the same conversations, both her interest in a job
    and her discussions about the affidavit were contained in the same
    conversation?
        A. As I said to you before, Counselor, she was always interested in
    the job.
        Q. Okay. And she was always interested in the job, and so, if she
    brought up the affidavit, very likely it was in the same conversation?
        A. No doubt.
        Q. And that would be consistent with your previous grand jury
    testimony when you expressed that you talked to her both about the job
    and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. That is correct.
        Q. Now, on January 7th, the affidavit was signed. Subsequent to
    this, did you notify anyone in the White House that the affidavit in
    the Jones case had been signed by Ms. Lewinsky?
        A. Yeah. I'm certain I told Betty Currie, and I'm fairly certain
    that I told the President.
        Q. And why did you tell Betty Currie?
        A. I'm--I kept them informed about everybody else that was--
    everything else. There was no reason not to tell them about that she
    had signed the affidavit.
        Q. And why did you tell the President?
        A. The President was obviously interested in her job search. We had
    talked about the affidavit. He knew that she had a lawyer. It was in
    the due course of a conversation. I would say, ``Mr. President, she
    signed the affidavit. She signed the affidavit.''
        Q. And what was his response when you informed him that she had
    signed the affidavit?
        A. ``Thank you very much.''
        Q. All right. And would you also have been giving him a report on
    the status of the job search at the same time?
        A. He may have asked about that, and--and part of her problem was
    that, you know, she was--there was a great deal of anxiety about the
    job. She wanted the job. She was unemployed, and she wanted to work.
        Q. Now, I think you indicated that he was obviously concerned
    about--was it her representation and the affidavit?
        A. I told him that I had found counsel for her, and I told him that
    she had signed the affidavit.
        Q. Okay. You indicated that he was concerned, obviously, about
    something. What was he obviously concerned about in your conversations
    with him?
        A. Throughout, he had been concerned about her getting employment
    in New York, period.
        Q. And he was also concerned about the affidavit?
        A. I don't know that that was concern. I did tell him that the
    affidavit was signed. He knew that she had counsel, and he knew that I
    had arranged the counsel.

        In his presentation, Mr. Manager Hutchinson discussed the
    breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan now concedes he
    had, on December 31. He showed you the restaurant bill. I am
    not going to dwell long on that because it really is not
    relevant to article II.
        First of all, it is nowhere alleged as a ground of
    obstruction of justice. Mr. Manager Hutchinson referred to the
    seven pillars of obstruction in article II. Those are seven
    different factual grounds. This alleged obstruction is nowhere
    in the grounds.
        There is plainly a conflict in the testimony between Ms.
    Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan; although Mr. Jordan, as you will
    recall, vehemently denies ever giving that instruction, saying
    in the videotape played this morning: ``I'm a lawyer and I'm a
    loyal friend, but I'm not a fool. That's ridiculous. I never
    did that.''
        The second reason why I think this is irrelevant is, it was
    not presented as a separate ground for impeachment by the
    independent counsel. It was identified--the fact of the
    conflicted testimony was identified, but it was not urged as a
    separate ground, despite the very, very energetic investigation
    of Mr. Starr. We have heard a lot in this case about ``dogs
    that won't hunt.'' In my mind, this is like a Sherlock Holmes
    story about the dog that didn't bark. If the independent
    counsel didn't raise it, that is significant. Finally, it has
    nothing whatsoever to do with the President, by anybody's
    contention.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to raise a question now,
    which arose in the final stage of the Vernon Jordan deposition.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson had taken the deposition. I had asked a
    couple of questions in response. After I had concluded, Mr.
    Jordan made a statement defending his own integrity to which
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson objected. I propose--since the issue has
    arisen of his integrity and since Mr. Jordan is an honorable
    man and has had a distinguished career--that I be allowed to
    play the approximately 2-minute segment of his own statement
    about his integrity.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Do the managers object?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, it is my
    understanding that that is not a part of the Senate record, and
    therefore it would not be appropriate to be played under the
    rules of the Senate.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. But is it a part of the deposition of
    him that was taken?
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. It is not a part of the deposition
    that was entered into the Senate record under the Senate rules.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Well, the Parliamentarian advises me
    that Division I of the motion on Thursday, which was approved,
    would prevent the playing of that. So the Chair will rule that
    that is not acceptable.
        Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont, Mr. Leahy, is
    recognized.
        Mr. LEAHY. I was one of the Senators at that deposition. I
    think it would be extremely interesting to hear it. It was
    taken at the deposition. I ask unanimous consent that it----
        Mr. NICKLES. Regular order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Vermont may appeal the
    decision of the Chair, which is that it not be played, ask
    consent for----
        Mr. LEAHY. I'm asking unanimous consent, under the
    circumstances and because it is so short, that the deposition--
    and it would clarify that part of the deposition Mr. Jordan
    gave, which has been videotaped--be allowed to be shown here on
    the floor.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. NICKLES. Objection.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Counsel may proceed.
        Mr. Counsel KENDALL. I would like to recognize my
    colleague. Well, I think that concludes our presentation.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. We yield back the remainder of our time,
    Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well. The managers have 31 minutes
    remaining.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. We will
    conclude our roughly half hour by responding to as many of the
    contentions and statements raised by counsel for the White
    House as we can. I first want to talk, I suppose, about the
    statement that we heard back a couple of weeks ago, which was
    repeated today by one of the White House counsels, that ``the
    managers want to win too much.''
        This is not a game. This is not a game to anyone here.
    There are extraordinary consequences to what we are doing and
    what we have been doing and what your decision will be. The
    stakes are very high. We don't need to take a poll to do what
    we did. I am reminded of the testimony of the President and
    Dick Morris taking the poll to determine whether to tell the
    truth or not, and then after deciding the public would not
    forgive his perjury, he said, ``We will just have to win.'' But
    that's not the attitude the House managers have in bringing
    this case here. The managers fully appreciate the seriousness
    and the consequences of this. We want to do the right thing. We
    are not here just to win. We want to help the Senate in this
    constitutional process do the constitutional thing--not only
    for the precedent of this Senate but for the precedent of
    future generations in terms of how the courts now and later
    will view obstruction of justice and perjury. We believe this
    is a constitutional effort and not a game.
        The question about snippets, that we just put some snippets
    on the air today--we wanted to call live witnesses. We wanted
    Ms. Lewinsky to be here and let everybody examine her fully and
    completely. But we are working with a timeframe, and we brought
    up those points in her testimony and in Mr. Jordan's testimony
    and Mr. Blumenthal's testimony that we felt proved our case.
        With regard to the issue that Ms. Seligman raised about
    filing a false affidavit, she ran that testimony many times. I
    thought we ran the President's earlier in these hearings
    several times, but I think she beat our record with that
    testimony. I appreciate that.
        But what that is important for is not what Ms. Lewinsky
    felt was going on that night; but I think it perfectly
    illustrates what I told you the other day about her testimony.
    While she was truthful and while she gave us the testimony she
    had to give us to keep her immunity agreement, where there were
    some blanks to fill in, or where there was something that could
    be bent, she did so.
        As they pointed out on the question of the linkage between
    filing an affidavit and this cover story, it was so obvious
    that they were connected that the OIC did not ask that
    question, ``Did you think about this when you''--and that. It
    was obvious. But he did not ask that question. She was right;
    the question was not asked. So when she, Ms. Lewinsky, had an
    opportunity in these hearings, when I asked her, she said,
    ``Well, you know, I really didn't link the two together.''
    Let's not throw away all of our common sense here.
        She gets a phone call in the middle of the night with a
    message that you are on the witness list, and she says three
    things occurred: You are on the witness list, you can file an
    affidavit, and you can use a cover story. Why else would the
    President raise the issue of a cover story at 2:30 in the
    morning if he didn't intend for her to use that?
        But keep in mind, too, it really doesn't matter how she
    appreciated this. It really matters what the President
    intended. And he intended to let her know that she was on the
    list, she could be subpoenaed, she could file an affidavit, and
    she could use the cover story.
        And in fact she did use that cover story. She went to her
    lawyer, Mr. Carter, and told him that. And it was incorporated
    into the draft affidavit that she went to take papers to the
    President to sign, and in those cases she may have been alone.
    But they didn't like the specter of her being alone. So they
    struck that provision out of the final affidavit. But they did
    attempt to use it.
        But keep in mind also that it is the President's intent.
    And his intent was to interfere with justice in the Paula Jones
    case and to have her give a false affidavit. And that is why he
    so suggested that.
        On the gifts to people, is it really an issue? Is there
    really an issue here? There is some fabulous lawyering over
    here. But there is no issue here. Ms. Lewinsky testified that
    there was no doubt in her mind that Ms. Currie initiated the
    call. That is all there is to this issue. The fact that there
    were other calls in the day, the fact that one of the other
    calls may have been at 3:30, really are moot points. The issue
    is, if Betty Currie initiated that phone call, the only impetus
    for her to initiate that call had to come from the President.
    She was not in that conversation that morning. The President
    had to tell her, and apparently did so, because she made the
    call.
        At the end of the examination of her testimony, or toward
    the end--it was shown several times--we asked her, ``Did the
    President ever tell you anything about the gifts?'' And she
    said, ``Not that I remember.'' And then later on in the
    segment, you also saw she was asked the question again by me:
    ``OK. Were you ever under any impression or the impression from
    the President that you should turn over all the gifts to the
    Jones lawyers?'' And she said, ``No.'' Then she goes on to say,
    ``This gets a little tricky here, and it could be I heard the
    statements from agents, or somewhere along the line, or perhaps
    that it did sound familiar.''
        I would suggest to you what happened there is that Mr.
    Carter--it is clearly in the testimony and before all of us in
    the record--her own lawyer told her she had to turn over all
    the records. That is where she heard that.
        But logic demands that you reject that view, because why
    would the President, whose intent was to conceal this whole
    affair, ever think of telling her that: You have to turn over
    all those gifts? If he did tell her that she had to turn over
    all of those gifts, why would she immediately go out that
    afternoon and reject that instruction, and just completely say:
    Well, I am going to forget what he told me to do. I am going to
    call his secretary and have her come pick up these gifts and
    store them for me?
        That is just not logical. Common sense tells us that didn't
    happen that way. Ms. Lewinsky was absolutely positive that
    there was no doubt that Betty Currie initiated the call. And
    that is that.
        Job search: Very quickly, this is not a bribery case. This
    is not giving her a job, bribing her with a job to get her
    false testimony. It is not a bribery case. If it was, we
    wouldn't be arguing about the impeachability of obstruction of
    justice. It would be clear that bribery is mentioned in the
    Constitution. It is about attempting to corruptly persuade or
    influence the behavior of a witness. That is exactly what that
    is about.
        I would also close very quickly by telling you in the
    beginning I urged you to look at particularly obstruction of
    justice charges, the result-benefit analysis. And I do not ever
    hear anybody talking about that but me. So maybe I am off base
    here. But I ask you to consider each of these seven pillars of
    obstruction that Mr. Hutchinson raised, and look at the end
    results of those acts, and look at who benefited from those
    results. And what I believe you would have found and can still
    find is that each case resulted in impeding justice in the
    Paula Jones case in some way that favored the President. And
    the benefit naturally inured to the President.
        I guess if you reject that result-benefit test, and if you
    accept each and every argument of these extremely fine defense
    counsel that the President wasn't behind any of this, then I
    guess you just have to reach the conclusion that the President
    was the luckiest man in the world, that people would commit
    crimes by filing false affidavits, by hiding evidence, by going
    out and possibly trashing the witnesses and giving false
    testimony in grand jury proceedings. If that is the way you
    feel about it, so be it; we will abide by your judgment. But I
    suggest to you that the facts of this case are really not in
    contest. They have been argued very well by defense counsel for
    the White House.
        I am about to exhaust my time. So I yield to Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson to make some remarks.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. This
    will be very brief, and then I will yield to Mr. Graham.
        Let's recall Ms. Monica Lewinsky to the stand for a brief
    moment. Let's go to the Park Hyatt Hotel, December 31, 1997,
    breakfast between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        A. Well, the--sort of the--I don't know what to call it,
    but the story that I gave to Mr. Jordan was that I was trying
    to sort of alert to him that, gee, maybe Linda Tripp might be
    saying these things about me having a relationship with the
    President, and right now, I'm explaining this to you. These
    aren't the words that I used or how I said it to him, and that,
    you know, maybe she had seen drafts of notes, trying to
    obviously give an excuse as to how Linda Tripp could possibly
    know about my relationship with the President without me having
    been the one to have told her. So that's what I said to him.
        Q. And what was his response?
        A. I think it was something like go home and make sure--oh,
    something about a--I think he asked me if they were notes from
    the President to me, and I said no. I know I've testified to
    this. I stand by that testimony, and I'm just recalling it,
    that I said no, they were draft notes or notes that I sent to
    the President, and then I believe he said something like, well,
    go home and make sure they're not there.
        Q. And what did you do when you went home?
        A. I went home and I searched through some of my papers,
    and--and the drafts of notes I found, I sort of--I got rid of
    some of the notes that day.
        Q. So you threw them away?
        A. Mm-hmm.
        THE REPORTER: Is that a ``yes''?
        THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

        Thank you. This goes to the overall pattern of obstruction.
    It goes to credibility. I believe it is relevant in this case.
    I yield to Mr. Graham.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. How much
    time do I have?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. You have 18 minutes and some seconds.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I may yield back some of the seconds, I
    hope.
        [Laughter.]
        Point of agreement, rebuttal is to refocus, and the law
    allows that for the person or the party with the burden. And we
    do have the burden.
        Point of agreement, White House counsel says there is much
    more that we need to know. There is much more we need to know.
        White House counsel said strongly, when these proceedings
    opened up, the President is not guilty of obstruction of
    justice, the President is not guilty of perjury. Refocus: No
    fair-minded person, in my opinion, could come to any other
    rational conclusion than that our President obstructed justice,
    that our President committed perjury in front of a grand jury.
        You vote your conscience. I have told you to do so. If we
    disagree at the end of the day, that is America at its best. I
    have never suggested there was any reasonable doubt that this
    President committed crimes. I will ask you at the conclusion of
    this case to remove him with a clear conscience. You vote your
    conscience, and I know it will be clear.
        Refocus: The gifts. Simply put, if you believe the
    President of the United States, in his grand jury testimony,
    said: I told her, look, the way these things work is when a
    person gets a subpoena, you have to give them whatever you
    have. That's what the law is, if you believe that, we need to
    congratulate our President because he did, in fact, state the
    law correctly, he fulfilled his obligation as Chief Executive
    Officer of the land. He fulfilled his obligation as an
    honorable person by telling someone, who happened to be Ms.
    Lewinsky: You are doing a bad thing here even by suggesting we
    do something with these gifts. You need to turn them over
    because that is what the law says.
        If you believe that, that is the only time he really
    embraced the law in this case, as I can see. Everything about
    him, in the way he behaved, was 180 degrees out from that
    statement. That is the most self-serving statement that flies
    in the face of every action he took for months. The truth is
    that a reasonable person should conclude that when Ms. Lewinsky
    approached him about what to do with the gifts, he said: I'll
    have to think about that. And you know what, ladies and
    gentlemen, he thought about it. And do you know what he did
    after he thought about it.--Betty, go get those gifts. And they
    wound up under the bed of the President's secretary. And the
    people are wondering what the heck happened here? What the heck
    happened here is you have a man trying to hide his crimes.
        Affidavit--where I come from, if you call somebody at 2:30
    in the morning, you are up to no good.
        [Laughter.]
        That will be borne out, if you listen to the testimony and
    use your common sense. He was up to no good. He told her: My
    heart is breaking because you are on this witness list and
    maybe here's a way to get out of it. That is the God's truth.
    That is what he did. That is wrong. That is a crime.
        The rule of law, what does it mean? It means that process
    and procedure wins out over politics and personality. That
    means that subpoenas have to be honored by the great and the
    small. That means when subpoenas come, you can't, as the
    President, try to defeat them because you are nobody special in
    the eyes of the law--except that you are the guardian of the
    law. If you are special, you are special in a more ominous way,
    not a lesser way.
        When you file an affidavit in a court of law, nobody,
    because of their position in society, has the right to cheat
    and to get somebody to lie for them, even as the President.
    That means we are not a nation of men or kings, we are a nation
    of laws. And that is what this case has always been about to
    me.
        This affidavit was false for a reason--because the
    President and Ms. Lewinsky wanted it to be false.
        The job search? ``Mission accomplished,'' says it all.
    ``Mission accomplished.'' It went from being no big deal to the
    biggest deal in the world with a telephone bill. I don't know
    what the telephone bill was to get this job, but it was huge.
    ``Mission accomplished.''
        All these are crimes. All these are things that average
    Americans should not be allowed to do. But I am going to tell
    you something. At this point in time what is going on is that
    he is trying to conceal a relationship about the workplace that
    would be embarrassing and that would be illegal and that would
    help Ms. Jones and would hurt him. And it is not just about his
    private life. But you can say this about the President, he was
    trying to get her a job and he was trying to just get her to
    file a false affidavit so this would go away. And he was trying
    to hide the gifts. That is bad but that is not nearly as bad as
    what was to come.
        Let me tell you what was to come, ladies and gentlemen.
    After the deposition, when it was clear that Ms. Lewinsky may
    have been talking, or somebody knew something they weren't
    supposed to know, the alarm bells went off and concealing the
    relationship changed to redefining the relationship. That is
    why he should not be our President. The redefining of the
    relationship began very quickly after that deposition. It
    started with the President's secretary, and it goes like this:
    The President, on two occasions, under the guise of refreshing
    his memory, makes the following statements to his secretary:
    You were always there when she was there, right? We were never
    really alone? You could see and hear everything? Monica came on
    to me, and I never touched her, right? She wanted to have sex
    with me, and I couldn't do that.
        If you believe that is about refreshing your memory, you
    are not being reasonable. That is about coaching a witness. But
    here is where it gets to be nasty. Here is where it gets to be
    mean: ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I couldn't do that.'' He
    didn't say it once, he said it twice, just to make sure Ms.
    Currie would get the point.
        Now that Ms. Lewinsky may be a problem, let me tell you how
    the discussion goes. It is not from concealing; now it is
    redefining.
        Conversation with Mr. Morris, after they did the poll about
    what to do here, and ``We just have to win.'' The President had
    a followup conversation with Mr. Morris during the evening of
    January 22, 1998, the day after the story broke, when Mr.
    Morris was considering holding a press conference to blast Ms.
    Lewinsky out of the water. The President told Mr. Morris to be
    careful, to be careful. According to Mr. Morris, the President
    warned him not to be too hard on Ms. Lewinsky because ``there
    is some slight chance that she may not be cooperating with Mr.
    Starr and we don't want to alienate her by anything we are
    going to put out.'' In other words, don't blast her now, she
    may not be a problem to us.
        During this period of time, it went from concealing to
    redefining. When he knew he had to win, what did he do? He went
    to his secretary and he made her a sexual predator and him an
    innocent victim, and he did it twice. But did he do it to
    anybody else? Did he redefine his relationship to anybody else?
        I now would like to have a clip from Mr. Blumenthal,
    please.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. You have a conversation with the President on the same
    day the article comes out, and the conversation includes a
    discussion about the relationship between him and Ms. Lewinsky,
    is that correct?
        A. Yes.

        Next tape:

        Q. Now, you stated, I think very honestly, and I appreciate
    that, you were lied to by the President. Is it a fair
    statement, given your previous testimony concerning your 30-
    minute conversation, that the President was trying to portray
    himself as a victim of a relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
        A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

        Ladies and gentlemen, that is the import of his whole
    story. That story was told on the day this broke in the press,
    and it goes on. That story is very detailed. It makes him the
    victim of a sexual predator called Ms. Lewinsky. He had to
    rebuff her. She threatened him. And it goes on and on and on. I
    have always wondered, how did that story make it to the grand
    jury and how did it make it into the press? We know how it made
    it to the grand jury, because Mr. Blumenthal told it, and the
    President told him, and they claimed executive privilege, and
    the President never straightened it out. Your President
    redefined this relationship, and your President let that lie be
    passed to a grand jury. Your President obstructed justice in a
    mean way.
        Next statement.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. That's where you start talking about the story that the
    President told you. Knowing what you know now, do you believe
    the President lied to you about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky?
        A. I do.
        Q. Okay. Do you have any idea how White House sources are
    associated with statements such as ``She's known as `Elvira',''
    ``She's obsessed with the President,'' ``She's known as a
    flirt,'' ``She's the product of a troubled home, divorced
    parents,'' ``She's known as `The Stalker'''? Do you have any
    idea how that got in the press?
        MR. BREUER: I'm going to object. The document speaks for
    itself, but it's not clear that the terms that Mr. Lindsey has
    used are necessarily--any or all of them--are from a White
    House source. I object to the form and the characterization of
    the question.
        MR. GRAHAM: The ones that I have indicated are associated
    with the White House as being the source of those statements
    and--
        SENATOR SPECTER: Senator Edwards and I think that question
    is appropriate and the objection is overruled.
        THE WITNESS: I have no idea how anything came to be
    attributed to a White House source.

        Everybody wants this over so bad you can taste it,
    including me, but don't let's leave a taste behind that history
    cannot stand. It was shouted in this Chamber, ``For God's sake,
    vote.''
        Let me quietly, if I can, for God's sake, get to the truth;
    for God's sake, figure out what kind of person we have here in
    the White House; for God's sake, spend some time to fulfill
    your constitutional duty so that we can get it right, not just
    for our political moment but for the future of this Nation.
        When the President redefined this relationship, he did so
    by telling a lie. He told a lie to a key White House aide, who
    repeated that lie to a Federal grand jury. In our system,
    ladies and gentlemen, that is a crime. That lie made it into
    the public domain. That lie was mean. That lie would have the
    effect of running this young lady over. You think what you want
    to think, too, about Ms. Tripp. I agree she is not going to be
    in the hall of fame of friends, but let me tell you, the best
    advice she gave that young lady was to keep that blue dress.
        The final thing is that our President, in my opinion, and
    for you to judge, in August of last year, after being begged
    not to by many Members of this body and prominent Americans,
    appeared before a Federal grand jury to answer for his conduct
    in this case. We have alleged that with forewarning and
    knowledge on his part, that instead of clearing it up and
    making America a better place, instead of fulfilling his role
    as the chief law enforcement officer of the land to do honor to
    the law, instead of taking this burden off all Americans'
    backs, he told a story that defies common sense, that he played
    a butchery game with the English language that ``is'' maybe is
    not is, and ``alone'' is not alone, and he told John Podesta,
    ``My relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was not sexual, including
    oral sex.''
        He went on and told an elaborate farce to a Federal grand
    jury that they just didn't ask the right question and really
    the sexual relationship did include one thing but not another.
    And he says he never lied to his aides, and he says he never
    lied to the grand jury. Well, God knows he lied to somebody,
    and he lied to that grand jury, and this whole story is a fraud
    and a farce. The last people in the United States to straighten
    it out is the U.S. Senate. God bless you in your endeavors.
        Mrs. BOXER addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    California.
        Mrs. BOXER. In light of the negative comments made against
    Mr. Jordan by Manager Hutchinson and Manager Graham, I ask once
    again unanimous consent that in fairness--
        Mr. GREGG. Regular order.
        Mr. LOTT. Regular order.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Regular order of business has been
    called for.
        Mrs. BOXER. I ask unanimous consent that, in fairness, Mr.
    Jordan's 2-minute testimony regarding his own integrity be
    shown to the Senate at this time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. GREGG. I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, has all time been used or
    yielded back?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. All time has been used or yielded back.

      notice of intent to suspend the rules of the senate by senator lott

        In accordance with Rule V of the Standing Rules of the
    Senate, I (for myself, Mr. Daschle, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Harkin,
    Mr. Wellstone, Ms. Collins, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Leahy) hereby
    give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to
    suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and
    Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials in
    regard to any deliberations by Senators on the articles of
    impeachment during the trial of President William Jefferson
    Clinton.
        (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
        (2) the following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate
    shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
    decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon
    without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall
    be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be
    entered on the record''; and
        (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except
    when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that
    case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.

                                    program

        Mr. LOTT. That concludes the presentations for today. The
    Senate will reconvene as a Court of Impeachment on Monday at 1
    p.m. At that time, the managers and White House counsel will
    proceed to closing arguments for not to exceed 3 hours each and
    further business will resume after that.
                                    ------

               ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 1 P.M. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of
    Impeachment stand adjourned under the previous order.
        There being no objection, at 5:06 p.m. the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Monday, February 8,
    1999, at 1 p.m.
                                    ------

              SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

        Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, last week the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, voted on Senator Byrd's motion to
    dismiss the articles of impeachment brought by the managers
    from the House of Representatives. I voted in support of this
    motion, and would like to briefly state my position on this
    important question.
        While the motion failed, it received the support of 44
    Senators--11 more votes than needed to acquit the President of
    the charges made by the articles. Therefore, this vote
    demonstrates to a near certainty that there are insufficient
    votes to support the managers' position that the President
    should be convicted.
        This result comes as a surprise to no one--including most,
    if not all, of those who support the President's removal. These
    articles should never have been presented to the Senate. The
    President's actions were undoubtedly reprehensible. They
    deserve condemnation and may warrant prosecution after he
    leaves office. But they do not warrant removal--a sanction
    unprecedented in our Nation's history, and one that the framers
    of our Constitution envisioned would be used in only the rarest
    of circumstances to protect the country.
        The case presented by the managers is fatally deficient in
    three respects:
        First, the facts presented, even if viewed in the light
    most favorable to the managers' case, do not allege conduct
    that meets the high standard laid out by the framers for the
    impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of a
    President.
        Second, the articles as drafted are vague and contain
    multiple allegations--denying the President the fairness and
    due process that is the right of every American citizen, and
    depriving Senators of the clarity that is essential to
    discharging their responsibility as triers of fact.
        Third, the managers have failed to present facts that meet
    their heavy burden of proving the allegations contained in the
    articles.
        Let me address these points in turn.
        The conduct alleged by the managers to be worthy of
    conviction arises out of a private, civil lawsuit and a
    private, consensual, yet improper relationship between the
    President and Ms. Monica Lewinsky. It is the President's
    conduct in that lawsuit and in that relationship that are the
    basis of the charges at issue here. No charges arise from his
    official conduct as President.
        It is worth noting that, with regard to the Jones matter,
    the Supreme Court itself considered the conduct alleged therein
    to be private. The Court ruled that, while the President may
    delay or avoid until leaving office lawsuits based on his
    official conduct, he may claim no such immunity in an action
    based on private conduct unrelated to official duties.
        The managers claim that what is at issue is not the
    President's private actions but his actions in connection with
    efforts to prevent his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from
    becoming known to his family and others. These actions, the
    managers argue--including his testimony in the grand jury and
    his statements to staff and others--are official in nature.
    However, these actions clearly arise out of the President's
    efforts to keep secret a personal relationship which he
    admitted to be wrong. Under no reasonable analysis can they be
    understood to relate to the President's official duties.
        It follows, then, that the President's actions certainly do
    not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery or other high
    crimes and misdemeanors'' set forth by the framers as the
    standard for removing a President from office. As Alexander
    Hamilton explained, impeachment is to be reserved as ``a remedy
    for great injuries done to the society itself''. The
    impeachment process is intended to protect the Nation from
    official wrongdoing, not punish a President for personal
    misconduct.
        It is not in my view reasonable to conclude that the
    President's actions--while by his own admission wrong and
    offensive--pose a danger to the institutions of our society.
    The President's past behavior did not--and his continuation in
    office does not--pose a threat to the stability of those
    institutions.
        Indeed, I submit that convicting and removing the President
    based on these actions, not the actions themselves, would have
    a destabilizing effect on our institutions of government. Were
    this scenario to come to pass, then henceforth any President
    would have to worry that he or she could be removed on a
    partisan basis for essentially personal conduct. That standard
    would weaken the Presidency. In the words of Madison, it would
    in effect make the President's term equivalent to ``a tenure
    during pleasure of the Senate'', and upset the careful system
    of checks and balances established by the framers to govern
    relations between the legislative and executive branches.
        The articles also deserve to be dismissed because of the
    fatally flawed manner in which they are drafted. Those flaws
    are of two separate kinds.
        First, the articles fail to allege wrongdoing with the kind
    of specificity required to allow the President--or indeed, any
    person--to defend himself, and to allow the Senate to fully
    understand and judge the charges made against him. White House
    counsel described the articles as an ``empty vessel'', a
    ``moving target'' where neither the President nor the Senate
    knows with precision what has been alleged. Senators were
    presented with videotaped testimony of former Federal
    prosecutors who stated that standard prosecutorial practice
    requires that allegations of perjury and obstruction must be
    stated with particularity and specificity. The allegations here
    have not been so stated. That lack of specificity is manifestly
    unfair to the President. And it is detrimental to the Senate's
    ability to discharge its responsibility as the trier of fact in
    this case.
        The second fatal structural flaw in the articles is that
    the managers have aggregated multiple allegations of wrongdoing
    into single articles. Article I allows the President to be
    impeached for ``one or more'' of four enumerated, unspecified
    categories of alleged misconduct. Similarly, in article II he
    is alleged to have obstructed justice in ``one or more'' of
    seven ways. This smorgasbord approach to the allegations
    creates the deeply troubling prospect that the President could
    be convicted and removed without two-thirds of the Senate
    agreeing on what precisely he did wrong. For this reason, too,
    dismissal is appropriate.
        Dismissal is, finally, appropriate because the facts
    undergirding the managers' case do not prove the criminal
    wrongdoing the managers allege. Manager McCollum told the
    Senate that it must first find criminal wrongdoing and then
    determine whether to remove the President from office. While it
    is left to each Senator to determine the standard of proof he
    or she will use to judge the evidence, Manager McCollum's own
    analysis suggests that that standard should be beyond a
    reasonable doubt. After all, that is the standard used in all
    other criminal cases. Why should the President be subjected to
    any lower standard than that to which all citizens are
    entitled? Indeed, he should not--not only because he deserves
    no less fairness than other citizens, but also because this
    high standard of proof is appropriate to the gravity of the
    sanction the Senate is being asked to impose.
        In my view, the managers have failed to prove criminal
    culpability on the part of the President beyond a reasonable
    doubt. The record is replete with exculpatory, contradictory,
    and ambiguous facts.
        Consider, for example, these:
        (1) Ms. Lewinsky--who was questioned some 22 times by
    investigators, prosecutors, and grand jurors (not to mention
    twice by the managers themselves)--said under oath that neither
    the President nor anyone else ever asked her to lie.
        (2) She also said--again, under oath--that no one ever
    promised her a job for her silence.
        (3) Further, she stated without contradiction that the
    President did not suggest that she return the gifts given her
    by the President to him or anyone else on his behalf.
        (4) Betty Currie, the President's secretary--who was
    questioned some nine times--likewise testified that the
    President did not suggest that the gifts to Ms. Lewinsky be
    returned.
        (5) She also said that she never felt pressure to agree
    with the President when he spoke with her following the Jones
    deposition, and, indeed, felt free to disagree with his
    recollection.
        (6) Lastly, the managers argued that a December 11, 1997
    ruling by the judge in the Jones case, permitting the calling
    of witnesses regarding the President's conduct, triggered
    intensive efforts that very day by the President and Vernon
    Jordan to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job. We now know that the
    facts contradict that account of the managers. A meeting on
    that date between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky was scheduled 3
    days earlier. It was held several hours before the judge's
    ruling. At the time of that ruling, Mr. Jordan was on an
    airplane bound for Holland.
        In addition, factual discrepancies between the President
    and Ms. Lewinsky--about when their relationship began, about
    the nature of the inappropriate contacts between them, about
    the number of those contacts, and about the number of
    inappropriate telephone calls between them--amount to
    differences in recollection that in no way can be considered
    criminal on the part of the President. More fundamentally, they
    cannot be considered material to this proceeding. Not even the
    Office of Independent Counsel considered these discrepancies
    relevant or material to the matter at hand. It cannot
    reasonably be argued, in any event, that the President should
    be removed from his office because of them.
        For all of these reasons--the failure of the managers to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the President committed
    criminal wrongdoing, the structural flaws in the articles
    themselves, and the failure of the allegations, even if proven,
    to warrant the unprecedented action of conviction and removal--
    these articles should be dismissed. We have reviewed enough
    evidence, heard enough arguments, and asked enough questions to
    know with reasonable certainty that the flaws in the managers'
    case cannot be remedied. We know enough to decide this matter
    now. The national interest is best served not by extending this
    proceeding needlessly, but by ending it.
        I regret that the Senate has failed to do that. But I
    continue to believe that we must dispose of this matter as soon
    as possible so we can return to the other important business of
    the Nation.
                                    ------

         OPPOSITION TO MANAGERS' MOTION FOR THE APPEARANCE OF WITNESSES

        Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, last week the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, voted on a motion by the managers
    for the appearance of witnesses and to admit evidence not in
    the trial record. I opposed this motion, and would like to
    briefly state my reasons for doing so.
        While the motion carried, the fact that it was opposed by
    44 Senators demonstrates that a large number of our colleagues
    believe that the record of this case is sufficient to allow
    Senators to decide on the articles of impeachment. Indeed, it
    is not merely sufficient, it is voluminous. As I will discuss
    more fully below, neither the managers nor counsel for the
    President would in any way be harmed by a requirement that they
    rely on the record as presently constituted.
        Let me concede at the outset that this motion is not an
    easy one to decide. There is an argument to be made for calling
    witnesses. Our colleagues who believe there ought to be
    witnesses are motivated by earnest reasons.
        However, the issue for us is not whether there is a case
    for witnesses. It is this: Do we need to hear from witnesses in
    order to fulfil our responsibility as triers of fact? The
    answer to that question, in my opinion, is no. We know enough
    to decide this case, and decide it now.
        There may be legitimate reasons for calling witnesses. But
    the reasons for not calling them are compelling.
        There are five reasons, in particular, that strongly argue
    against the motion.
        First, the record is more than sufficient to allow the
    Senate to decide this case. We are all painfully familiar with
    the essential details of this matter. Like most Americans, we
    have been subjected to the blizzard of media attention paid to
    it from its very start just over a year ago.
        This is not 1868, when only a handful of people could
    witness the last Presidential impeachment. One hundred and
    thirty years later, we can receive an independent counsel's
    voluminous and graphic report over the Internet literally at
    the moment it is made available to the public. We can witness
    the proceedings of the House Judiciary Committee live on
    television. We can observe the televised impeachment
    proceedings in the House Chamber as if we are there.
        This trial is now in its fourth week. We have been provided
    with massive portions of a record that exceeds 67,000 pages in
    length. We have heard days of arguments. Ninety of us have
    asked some 105 questions to the House Republican managers and
    to counsel for the President.
        So I daresay that the facts of this case have been drilled
    into our consciousness--relentlessly, overwhelmingly, and, it
    seems endlessly.
        I should add one more adverb: repeatedly. That leads to the
    second reason for not calling witnesses: they have testified
    repeatedly and without contradiction on the key facts.
        Again and again, the record shows the same questions asked
    of the same witnesses. Ms. Lewinsky has been questioned a total
    of 23 times; Ms. Currie 9 times; Mr. Jordan 6 times; and Mr.
    Blumenthal 5 times. They were asked hundreds upon hundreds of
    questions--by some of the toughest, shrewdest legal minds in
    the country. Their testimony fills in excess of two 2,500 pages
    of the trial record.
        What is the likelihood that prolonging this trial to hear
    from these and possibly other witnesses will bring new details
    to light that could change the outcome of this trial? Regarding
    at least one witness--Ms. Lewinsky--we know from her interview
    by the managers two weekends ago: virtually nil.
        A third reason to oppose this motion is that witness
    testimony will invite the introduction of salacious details
    onto the floor of the U.S. Senate--details with which we are
    already painfully familiar, and details about which any
    differences between the President and Ms. Lewinsky are
    immaterial and irrelevant to the charges contained in the
    articles presented by the House Republican managers.
        The managers tell us that they have no interest in raising
    any such details. But sexual misconduct is at the core of this
    case. Manager Bryant admitted as much when he said on the floor
    that the issue in article I is ``perjury about sex''. The same
    could be said about article II--the issue is obstruction about
    sex.
        Every question about perjury or obstruction, then,
    necessarily invites testimony about the sexual details of this
    scandal. Given the massive size of the record, I do not think
    we need to risk allowing the Senate to become a forum for that
    kind of speech. It will not bring dignity to this proceeding or
    credit to this institution.
        If we somehow think that we can summon witnesses to appear
    in this trial and at the same time guarantee that the Senate
    will not become a kind of burlesque stage for the airing of
    this case's tawdry factual essence, let me remind my colleagues
    of the frenzied circus that formed immediately upon the news
    that Ms. Lewinsky had arrived in Washington, D.C. for
    questioning by the managers. Once the door to witnesses is
    opened, the Senate will be hard-pressed to keep that atmosphere
    from spilling into this trial and this body.
        The fourth reason why we should not call witnesses is that
    they will prolong this process needlessly and extensively.
    Senator Warner made the point well several days ago: It is
    questionable whether the list of witnesses, and the time
    required to hear from them, could be strictly limited because
    to do so might deny the President his right to defend himself.
        The point was echoed by one of the attorneys for the
    President. He stated that he and his associates would be
    committing ``malpractice'' if they failed to seek the most
    aggressive possible discovery process should that course be
    opened to them.
        That discovery process may reasonably be expected to
    include subpoenas for documents, interviews with corroborating
    witnesses, depositions, examinations and cross-examinations. As
    any person familiar with litigation knows, such a process is
    not easily restricted in time and scope. It could take weeks,
    or longer, to conclude. During that time, Senators would not
    necessarily be free from the burdens of serving as triers of
    fact in the Court of Impeachment. They could well be called
    upon to make any number of evidentiary rulings. They could be
    called upon to comment publicly on matters raised during
    depositions--including on salacious matters that deserve no
    comment. In short, this process could drag on and on.
        Fifth, and finally, let me say that I remain unconvinced by
    the argument of the managers that witnesses are so critical
    here. They have failed convincingly to explain why witnesses
    are so indispensable in this trial if they were so dispensable
    during the impeachment proceedings in the other body.
        During those proceedings, Mr. Manager Hyde said that ``the
    most relevant witnesses have already testified at length about
    the matters in issue. And in the interest of finishing our
    expeditious inquiry, we will not require most of them to come
    before us to repeat their testimony.'' Regarding Monica
    Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he added that they ``have already
    testified under oath. We have their testimony. We don't need to
    reinvent the wheel.''
        Likewise, Mr. Manager Gekas stated during the House
    hearings that ``bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony
    that's already concretely in the record would be a waste of
    time and serve no purpose at all.''
        The fervor with which the managers call for witnesses now
    is not only inconsistent with their refusal to call them
    earlier, it is also inconsistent with their underlying
    assertion that the facts in evidence already prove the
    President's criminal culpability. If the managers have any
    doubt about whether their evidence was sufficient to prove
    guilt and justify removal, then they had a responsibility to
    resolve those doubts in the House of Representatives--before
    they came to this body and had us take an oath to do impartial
    justice. They should never have put us through this trial.
        In conclusion, and at the risk of stating the obvious, we
    should remember that we, the Members of the Senate, are the
    triers of fact here. We are the ones who control how this trial
    is to be conducted. Each side deserves to be treated fairly.
    But neither side deserves an unlimited and open-ended right to
    put forth their arguments.
        I have never known a lawyer arguing a losing case to say he
    or she couldn't benefit from one more day in court. The proper
    response to a lengthy trial and a weak case is not more length
    and more case--it is an end to the case.
        Does anyone seriously believe that the outcome of this
    proceeding will be changed by allowing a parade of witnesses?
        Does anyone seriously believe that they will shed new and
    meaningful light on the key areas of this dispute?
        After our historic, bipartisan agreement to begin this
    trial, after weeks of the trial itself, after the opportunity
    to read a massive factual record, after the opportunity to ask
    over 100 questions--after all this, I do not believe that
    witnesses are now needed to demonstrate the Senate's commitment
    to conduct this trial in a fair and thorough manner. The
    dignity of this proceeding and the decorum of this institution
    are not likely to be enhanced--and could well be damaged--by
    taking such a step.
        In my view, the managers' motion to call witnesses is the
    expression of an increasingly desperate desire to breathe life
    into a case that--as the vote on the motion to dismiss
    demonstrated--has failed to convince anywhere close to two-
    thirds of the Senate as to its merit. They are eager for
    something, anything, to rescue the sinking ship that their
    impeachment has become.
        Their motion, furthermore, is an expression of the partisan
    process that they began in the House and now seek to perpetuate
    in the Senate. Having lost five seats in the November
    elections, Republican leaders in the other body, including the
    managers, knew that their best chance to impeach the President
    was during the lame duck session of the 105th Congress. So they
    eschewed a bipartisan inquiry, decided not to call witnesses,
    and forbade Members from considering a censure resolution in
    that Chamber--all so they could force a vote on articles of
    impeachment before the start of the 106th Congress. Two of the
    articles considered failed. Two others passed, but only by
    exceedingly slim margins: the article alleging obstruction of
    justice would have failed if just five Representatives had
    voted differently; the article alleging perjury would have
    failed if just 11 Representatives had cast their vote against
    impeachment.
        Having rushed to judgment in the House, the managers now
    rush to delay judgment in the Senate. Why? I think the reason
    is obvious: because they know that their case is weak. From the
    moment the articles were drafted in the House, they have
    attempted to obscure that inescapable fact.
        Each side of this dispute has now had ample opportunity to
    present its case. The time has come to bring this matter to a
    close, and return to the other compelling issues that we were
    elected to address. While I regret that the majority party in
    the Senate has decided to move forward with the calling of
    witnesses and gathering of additional information, I remain
    hopeful that we can conclude this trial at the earliest
    possible opportunity.
                                    ------

                            Monday, February 8, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:06 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Almighty God, guide the Senators today as they move closer
    to the completion of this impeachment trial and confront some
    of the most difficult decisions of their lives. Give them
    physical strength and mental fortitude for this day. In
    anticipation of Your burden-lifting blessing, we place our
    trust in You.
        We renew our prayers for peace in the Middle East. Thank
    You for the life and leadership of King Hussein of Jordan, that
    persistent peacemaker and emissary of light in the often dim
    negotiations for just peace. Now at this time of his untimely
    death, we pray for the people of Jordan and for his son, King
    Abdullah, as he assumes the immense challenges of leadership.
    In Your holy Name. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. This afternoon the Senate will resume
    consideration of the articles of impeachment. Pursuant to S.
    Res. 30, the Senate will proceed to final arguments for not to
    exceed 6 hours, equally divided between the House managers and
    the White House counsel.
        At the conclusion of those arguments today, I expect the
    Senate to adjourn the impeachment trial until tomorrow. We
    expect tonight, when we go out of the impeachment trial, to
    have a period for legislative business so we can pass a
    resolution or consider a resolution with regard to King
    Hussein.

                      Order for Tuesday, February 9, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. I now ask unanimous consent that when the Senate
    completes its business today, it stand in adjournment, to
    reconvene as a Court of Impeachment at 1 p.m. on Tuesday,
    February 9, 1999.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                           Unanimous Consent Request

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the February 5, 1999, affidavit of Mr. Christopher Hitchens and
    the February 7, 1999, affidavit of Ms. Carol Blue be admitted
    into evidence in this proceeding.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. DASCHLE. At this juncture in the trial, I am compelled
    to object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. LOTT. I believe we are ready to proceed, Mr. Chief
    Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Sensenbrenner.
        Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished
    counsel for the President, and Senators, I am Congressman Jim
    Sensenbrenner. I represent 580,000 people in southeastern
    Wisconsin in the U.S. House of Representatives. During my
    entire service in Congress, I have served as a member of the
    Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
        We are nearing the end of a long and difficult process. The
    Senate has considered for the past several weeks the grave
    constitutional responsibility to determine whether the actions
    of President Clinton merit his conviction and removal from
    office. The Senate has been patient, attentive and engaged
    throughout this unwelcome task, and for this the House managers
    are grateful. The managers also thank the distinguished Chief
    Justice for his patience and impartial demeanor throughout this
    trial.
        At the outset of the managers' closing arguments, it is
    important to distinguish what has caused only the second
    Presidential impeachment in history from extraneous matters
    that bear no relation to the verdict the Senate will shortly
    reach. When this trial began 4 long weeks ago, we said that
    what was on trial was the truth and the rule of law. That has
    not changed, despite the lengthy legal arguments you have
    heard. The truth is still the truth and a lie is still a lie.
    And the rule of law should apply to everyone no matter what
    excuses are made by the President's defenders.
        The news media characterizes the managers as 13 angry men.
    They are right in that we are angry, but they are dead wrong
    about what we are angry about. We have not spent long hours
    poring through the evidence, sacrificed time with our families
    and subjected ourselves to intense political criticism to
    further a political vendetta. We have done so because of our
    love for this country and respect for the Office of the
    Presidency, regardless of who may hold it. We have done so
    because of our devotion to the rule of law and our fear that if
    the President does not suffer the legal and constitutional
    consequences of his actions, the impact of allowing the
    President to stand above the law will be felt for generations
    to come.
        ``The Almanac of American Politics'' has called me ``a
    stickler for ethics.'' To that, I plead guilty as charged
    because laws not enforced are open invitations for more serious
    and criminal behavior. This trial was not caused by Kenneth
    Starr, who only did his duty under a law which President
    Clinton himself signed. It was not caused by the House
    Judiciary Committee's review of the independent counsel's
    mountain of evidence. Nor was it caused by the House of
    Representatives approving two articles of impeachment, nor by
    the Senate conducting a trial mandated by the Constitution.
        Regardless of what some may say, this constitutional crisis
    was caused by William Jefferson Clinton and by no one else.
    President Clinton's actions, and his actions alone, have caused
    the national agenda for the past year to be almost exclusively
    concentrated on those actions and what consequences the
    President, and the President alone, must suffer for them.
        This trial is not about the President's affair with Monica
    Lewinsky. It is about the perjury and obstruction of justice he
    committed during the course of the civil rights lawsuit filed
    against him, and the subsequent independent counsel
    investigation authorized by Attorney General Janet Reno.
        The President has repeatedly apologized for his affair, but
    he has never, never apologized for the consequences of the
    perjury and obstruction of justice he has committed. Perhaps
    those decisions were based upon a Dick Morris public opinion
    poll which told the President that the American people would
    forgive his adultery but not his perjury. Perhaps it was for
    another reason. Whatever the White House's motivations were,
    the fact remains that the President's apologies and the
    statements of his surrogate contritionists have been carefully
    crafted for the President to continue to evade and, yes, avoid
    responsibility for his deceiving the courts to prevent them
    from administering justice.
        Because the President's actions to obstruct justice are so
    egregious and repeated, many have ignored his grand jury
    perjury, charges before you in article I. I wish to point out
    four glaring examples of William Jefferson Clinton's
    perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury
    and not at the civil deposition in the Paula Jones case.
        First, the President lied under oath to the grand jury when
    he falsely testified about his attorneys' use of a false
    affidavit at his deposition. Second, he lied under oath to the
    grand jury about his conversations with Betty Currie. Third, he
    lied under oath to the grand jury about what he told his aides
    about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, knowing that those
    aides would be called to testify to the grand jury. Fourth, he
    lied under oath to the grand jury when he testified about the
    nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
        An ordinary citizen who lies under oath four times to a
    grand jury is subject to substantial time in a Federal prison.
    The decision each Senator must make with respect to article I
    is whether the President is to pay a price for his perjury,
    just like any citizen must. The President's defenders and spin
    doctors would have you believe that the President told all of
    these lies under oath to protect himself and his family from
    personal embarrassment, and even if he did tell a lie, it was
    not that bad a lie.
        Senators, please remember that the President's grand jury
    appearance was over 6 months after the news media broke the
    story about the President's affair with Ms. Lewinsky. By August
    17, few people doubted that he had an affair with her. There
    was little left to hide. And he lied after practically everyone
    who was asked--including many of you--advised the President to
    tell the truth to the grand jury. And still he lied.
        We have heard a litany of excuses, including the President
    saying he was not paying a great deal of attention and that he
    was trying to figure out what the facts were, and that he
    needed to know whether his recollection was right, and that he
    had not done anything wrong. And on and on. The President knew
    what had happened. If Monica Lewinsky came on to him and made a
    sexual demand upon him and he rebuffed her, as he told Sidney
    Blumenthal, he would have nothing to apologize for.
        Senators, don't be fooled by the President's excuses and
    spin control. The facts and the evidence clearly show that he
    knew what he was doing was to deceive everyone, including the
    grand jury. He and his defenders are still in denial. They will
    not accept the consequences of his repeated and criminal
    attempts to defeat the judicial process. His lies to the grand
    jury were not to protect his family or the dignity of his
    office but to protect himself from criminal liability for his
    perjury and obstruction of justice in the Jones case.
        Over 9 years ago, the Senate removed Judge Walter Nixon
    from office for about the same offense--lying under oath to the
    grand jury. The vote in the Senate was 89-8 in favor of Judge
    Nixon's removal, with 48 current Senators and Vice President
    Gore voting guilty. To boot a Federal judge from office while
    keeping a President in power after the President committed the
    same offense sets a double standard and lowers the standard of
    what the American people should expect from the leader of their
    country. To conclude that the standard of Presidential
    truthfulness is lower than that of a Federal judge is absurd.
    To conclude that perjury and obstruction of justice are
    acceptable if committed by a popular President during times of
    peace and prosperity sets a dangerous precedent which sets
    America on the road back to an imperial Presidency above the
    law.
        To justify the President's criminal behavior by demonizing
    those who seek to hold him accountable ignores the fact that
    President Clinton's actions, and those actions alone,
    precipitated the investigations which have brought us here
    today. To keep a President in office whose gross misconduct and
    criminal actions are a well-established fact will weaken the
    authority of the Presidency, undermine the rule of law, and
    cheapen those words which have made America different from most
    other nations on the Earth: equal justice under law.
        For the sake of our country and for future generations,
    please find the President guilty of perjury and obstruction of
    justice when you cast your votes.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Cannon.
    If you will wait a moment, Mr. Manager Cannon. If there is no
    objection, the Journal of the proceedings of the trial is
    approved to date. Please go ahead.
        Mr. Manager CANNON. Mr. Chief Justice, counsel to the
    President, Members of the Senate, my name is Christopher B.
    Cannon, and I represent over 600,000 people in the Third
    District of Utah.
        I want to begin with a couple of thank-yous. First, I thank
    you Senators for your attention during this series of
    presentations. I know that you all have deep conflicts over the
    matter before you. Some of you have made strong and public
    statements about it. But you have all paid extraordinary
    attention, and for that I thank you.
        I also thank the other members of the management team. It
    has been a remarkable experience to have been associated with
    them during the last 5 months--almost as good, I might say, as
    it would have been to have been home with my wife, children,
    and our new baby.
        I want to share with you a recent family experience. I have
    been home just about a little over a day out of the last 3
    weeks. It took my 10-month-old baby a little while to warm up
    to me when I was home last. Later, as I started packing, she
    realized I was leaving again and she insisted that I hold her.
    I think she felt that if she held on, I wouldn't disappear.
    Unfortunately, she fell asleep during the trip to the airport.
    I know that the other managers have had similar disruptions in
    their families. For instance, Charles Canady's wife had a baby
    during the trial.
        I, therefore, thank my wife and children, and the wives and
    children of all of the managers for their forbearance and
    support during this process. Like us, they believe in the
    obligation we have to assure good government. I might say that,
    like us, they are grateful that the managers' role is ending.
        For the managers, this process is almost done. I hope that
    history will judge that we have done our duty well. We have
    been congratulated and condemned. But we are done.
        While our difficult role is ending, yours is just
    beginning. While I am certain that sitting here silently has
    been difficult, the truly daunting task before you now is to
    conclude this trial with some sense of legitimacy. For America
    is deeply divided, and the end result of an impeachment trial
    was designed by the Founding Fathers to salve those wounds.
    Traditionally, after an airing of the facts and a vote by the
    Senate, either a President is removed or he is vindicated. In
    this case, it seems, neither of those results may be realized.
    While the facts are clear that the President committed perjury
    and obstruction of justice, it is equally clear that this body
    may not remove him from office. From this perception, you face
    the challenge of legitimizing the end result. Your vote will
    end this matter. It is nonjusticiable. Whatever your decision
    is, it cannot be undone. The outcome will be right by
    definition. But how well you do the work of divining that
    outcome will affect the way we as a nation deal with the
    divisions among us.
        To proceed in a manner that will be trusted, and viewed as
    legitimate by the American people, you must deal with the
    differences between this proceeding and prior impeachment
    trials. You must do this with an obvious commitment to your
    oath to do justice impartially according to the Constitution
    and the law. The law includes the rules and precedents of the
    Senate.
        Senate Resolution 16 made this process different from all
    of the preceding 13 Senate trials on impeachment, principally
    by removing from the managers the right to present our case as
    we see fit. I suspect that the lewd subject matter and the
    partisan fight in the House may have influenced your decision.
        But there is an integrity to the historic rules and reasons
    for them. For instance, the Senate by nature will be divided in
    the impeachment proceedings while the managers are united. It
    is therefore easier for the managers to decide on how to
    present their case than for the Senate.
        There are other differences in this proceeding from
    historic impeachment practice before the Senate. May I list the
    changes for you with the intent to help you focus on the goal
    of a conclusion that we, the people, will feel is legitimate.
        Senate Resolution 16 called for a 24-hour presentation or
    ``trial,'' that mainly consisted of what the public saw as the
    yammering of lawyers. Time was equally divided rather than
    sequenced as it is in a trial where opening statements are made
    and then evidence is put on through witnesses. In a trial, each
    side typically takes the time necessary to establish its case
    or undermine the witness through cross-examination. After the
    moving party has made its case, the responding party makes it
    case. Time is dictated only by what each side feels it needs.
    Each witness is subject to whatever cross-examination is
    appropriate. The case develops tested piece by tested piece,
    and ultimately one side prevails.
        Here, the managers had to cut very important portions of
    our limited case. We had a limited number of witnesses, limited
    to videotaped appearances, limited to fit an arbitrary three
    hour rule. That time was lessened because we had to reserve
    time for rebuttal.
        According to judicial traditions, defendants have to
    challenge each witness as they appear, not wrap the credibility
    of all in one wide ranging response. In these proceedings, the
    Senate has not had the opportunity to assess the credibility of
    witnesses as the case developed. The White House then used its
    time with long video portions and small cutting accusations.
    Who knows what the White House might have done if it had been
    able, or found it necessary, to challenge witnesses as they
    testified?
        Another diversion from judicial and Senate trial precedent
    was that the only rebuttal for the managers was what we
    reserved after our video presentation and, awkwardly, in the
    questioning period where important, complicated issues were cut
    off by artificial time limits, while peripheral issues got more
    time than they deserved. This questioning period had the
    unfortunate side effect of focusing the public on the
    partisanship of the Senate.
        The problem of the newness of the presentation format was
    exacerbated by our new media environment. The Internet with its
    immediate and often unvetted content, and cable television with
    its perpetual talking heads, gave equal time and equivalency of
    weight to the managers and the White House, with no witness
    testimony to constrain them. The process gave rise to the
    perception that the ``fix was in,'' leaving some to gloat at
    having scammed the situation, and others angry at being
    unheard.
        And that is the context within which the Senate must now
    find a legitimate outcome. Given the wide-ranging discussions
    of options, it is clear this is no easy task. Will it be:
        Adjournment with condemnation?
        Findings of fact about the President's behavior?
        A bifurcated vote to show agreement with the articles of
    impeachment but not removing the President?
        A simple up or down on the articles of impeachment?
        Or a vote for acquittal followed by censure?
        I don't know which, if any, of these options really makes
    sense. And I don't know of any other options. I do know that
    the issue is grave, and that your responsibility is great.
        So I am here today to ask you to set aside some natural
    inclinations for the good of the country.
        I implore you, Senators, both Republican and Democrat, to
    set aside partisanship, politics, polls, and personalities and
    exchange them for loftier inclinations--those of ``procedure,''
    ``policy,'' and ``precedents.'' These are the only guidelines
    this body should have.
        As the Senate deliberates this case, I ask that a few key
    facts never be forgotten:
        One. That the President committed perjury when he lied
    under oath.
        Two. The Senate has historically impeached judges for
    perjury--even recently by some of you assembled here.
        Three. Any American watching these proceedings who commits
    perjury would also be punished by the law.
        Four. If the Senate follows our Nation's precedents of
    punishing perjurers, and if the Senate follows its own
    precedents of convicting perjurers, then there is only one
    clear conclusion in this matter: conviction.
        Senators, we as Americans and legislators have never
    supported a legal system which has one set of laws for the
    ruler and another for the ruled. After all, our very own Pledge
    of Allegiance binds us together with the language of ``liberty
    and justice for all.'' If that is the case, if we intend to
    live up to the oaths and pledges we take, then our very own
    President must be subject to the precedents our Nation's
    judicial system and this Senate body have heretofore set.
        Because I love this country and its institutions, I pray
    for inspiration for each of you as you seek the proper,
    legitimate outcome. May God bless you in the process.
        Thank you.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Gekas.
        Mr. Manager GEKAS. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues on each
    side of the podium, Members of the Senate, if I were to take
    some time to thank the Chief Justice for his patience in all
    this, would that be counted against my time?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Yes.
        Mr. Manager GEKAS. Then I will send you a note.
        [Laughter.]
        We do offer our thanks to the Chief Justice.
        I come from Pennsylvania, and the people in my district and
    the entire State, and the people in their 49 brethren States
    across the Nation recognize that there is really only one
    issue, with all the fury and the tumult and the shouting and
    the invective, the language, and just the plain shouting that
    has occurred across the Halls of Congress and every place else
    in the country.
        It all swoops down the telescope to one issue: Did the
    President utter falsehoods under oath? Everyone understands
    that. Everyone comes to the conclusion that that is a serious
    allegation that has been made through the impeachment, and one
    which you must judge in the final vote that you will be
    casting.
        But why is it important about whether or not the President
    uttered the falsehoods under oath? It is important not just to
    constitute the basis of perjury, as is alleged, and/or
    obstruction of justice, which is alleged, but even if those two
    were not proved in all their elements as crimes, you would
    still have to consider a falsehood under oath as constituting
    an impeachable offense. I say that advisedly.
        It starts--my contention does--with the assertions of our
    esteemed colleagues who represent the President. Time after
    time, and in their briefs and in their statements on and off
    the floor, they have stated you need not have a criminal
    offense for it to constitute an impeachable offense. They
    provided examples of that. They said that all you have to
    demonstrate is that an impeachable offense is one that rocks
    against the integrity of the system of government. I am
    paraphrasing, of course.
        I submit--and I feel this so strongly that it bothers me
    that I can't make it clear--that to violate the oath as a
    witness in a civil case, or a criminal case, in the Jones
    matter, or in the grand jury, smashes against the integrity of
    our system of government. There are sundry reasons for that.
        In this case, if you follow the logic and the extreme
    intellectual presentation made by White House counsel that
    refutes every item that--or attempts to refute, not refutes--
    attempts to refute every item asserted by the managers, if you
    believe all of that and are confused or in doubt about the
    Jones case and whether lies under oath were committed, or at
    the grand jury, you must think about this. This is, to me,
    proof positive that the President uttered falsehoods under oath
    in all of his public stances.
        On December 23, the President, under oath, answered
    interrogatories that were sent to him by the court in the Jones
    case in which he said, in answer to the question, Have you ever
    had sexual relations with anyone in a subordinate role while
    you were Governor of Arkansas, or President of the United
    States?--this is important. At that time--and the record will
    disclose all of this--at that time, there was no definition in
    front of him, no gaggle of attorneys trying to dispute what
    word meant what, no judge there to interpose the legal standard
    that should be employed, but rather the boldfaced, naked phrase
    of ``sexual relations'' that everyone in the whole world
    understands to be what it is--and the President answered under
    oath ``None.''
        I submit to the Members of the Senate, if the answer then,
    December 23, before ever stepping foot in the deposition of the
    Paula Jones case, if he never appeared there, or whatever he
    said there was so clouded you can't draw a conclusion,
    certainly you can refer back to December 23 and see a starting
    point of a pattern of conduct on the part of the President that
    proves beyond all doubt that he committed a pattern and actual
    falsehoods under oath time and time again.
        If that is not enough, on January 15, as the record will
    disclose, he answered under oath requests for documents in
    which the question is asked under oath, to which the President
    responded, Have you ever received any gifts or documents from--
    and it mentioned among others Monica Lewinsky--and the
    President under oath said ``No'' or ``None.'' The record will
    show for sure exactly what he said. But he denied that any
    gifts were transferred from, or any documents, or any items of
    personalty, from Lewinsky to the President.
        I submit to you that if you are confused about that,
    because of the great presentation made by the counsel for the
    President about the murkiness and cloudiness of the Jones
    deposition, the maddening consequences of the President's
    testimony--``maddening,'' they said--then you can refer back to
    January 15 before the deposition, and December 23, and find
    proof positive in the documents already a part of the case that
    you have to decide that, indeed, a pattern of falsehoods under
    oath was initiated and conducted by the President of the United
    States.
        That is very important. Those allegations, by the way, have
    gone completely uncontradicted by the President of the United
    States.
        I think they took great delight--these colleagues of mine
    on behalf of the President--great delight in saying--at one
    point they put the marquee in the sky, that in so many
    different ways when Monica Lewinsky said, ``Nobody told me to
    lie,'' that was the case for them. What a case they made.
    ``Nobody told me to lie.'' They won the case right then and
    there in their minds, because that was exculpatory and that was
    brandishing in this case once and for all, Monica said,
    ``Nobody told me to lie.''
        I am going to take some liberties with the Latin that I
    learned in school, and we all learned in college and law
    school, ``falsum in unum is falsum in toto,'' meaning if you
    say something false in one phase of your testimony, more than
    likely the triers of fact can find that you were false in all
    of them.
        I am going to change that. I think I am right when I say
    that ``veritas in unum is veritas in toto.'' So when Monica
    Lewinsky says, ``Nobody told me to lie,'' and that is the
    indomitable, indestructible truth that the White House counsel
    say, that is the case, then it also must be ``veritas in
    toto,'' because when she said that she gave gifts to the
    President, then you must accept that ``veritas in unum is
    veritas in toto.''
        That goes on and on and on.
        Somebody is waving, ``Cut this short.''
        [Laughter.]
        It is very tough for me to do that, but I will comply.
        I have a witness. I call a witness to bolster my part of
    this summation. The witness is the American people.
        Mr. Craig, in his last appearance on this podium, was
    delighted to be able to quote a poll that showed that 75
    percent of the people of our country felt that there was no
    need to present videotapes to the Senate in the trial--75
    percent, he said with great gusto, of the American people.
        Of course the polls of all types were quoted time and time
    again by the supporters of the President as showing why you
    should vote to acquit. The polls, the polls, the polls.
        I now call the American people's poll on whether or not
    they believe that the President committed falsehoods under
    oath--80 percent of the American people--I call them to my side
    here at the podium to verify to you that the President
    committed falsehoods under oath.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Chabot.
        Mr. Manager CHABOT. Thank you. I am Steve Chabot. I
    represent the First District of Ohio, which is Cincinnati.
        This week we will likely finally conclude this trial. Has
    it been difficult? Yes. Would we all have preferred that none
    of this ever happened? Of course. But the President has put our
    Nation through a terrible ordeal, and it has been our duty to
    pursue this case to its conclusion.
        Despite the dire warnings, scare tactics and heavy-handed
    threats by those who would circumvent the solemn constitutional
    process that we are all engaged in, our great country has
    survived. We have finished this trial in just a few weeks. The
    economy continues to be strong, and the Nation's business is
    getting done.
        But, Senators, before you turn out the lights and head
    home, you must make one final decision. It is a decision that
    should not be influenced by party affiliation or by politics or
    by personal ties. It is a decision that should be guided by our
    Constitution, by our laws, and by your own moral compass.
        A few months ago I stood here in your shoes, as did all the
    colleagues here, and the colleagues in the House, preparing to
    make what would likely be the most important vote of our
    careers. Throughout the process, I did my best to be fair, to
    keep an open mind. I listened carefully to the views of my
    constituents, the people who sent me to Congress. I reviewed
    the evidence in excruciating detail. Ultimately, for me, the
    choice was clear. I came to the conclusion that it was my duty
    to support impeachment. Now it is your turn to cast what could
    be the most important vote of your political careers. The
    question is, Will moral fortitude or political expediency rule
    the day?
        This past weekend, I had the opportunity to spend a couple
    hours at my college alma mater, William and Mary, not too far
    from here, down in Williamsburg, VA. As I walked around the
    campus, I could not help but think back to my college days and
    what motivated me to seek public office in the first place.
        Back in 1972, I was a 19-year-old college student casting
    my first ballot in a Presidential election. Like a majority of
    Americans that year, I voted for a Republican, Richard Nixon,
    for President. Four years later, however, I voted for a
    Democrat, Jimmy Carter. This decision stemmed from my profound
    disappointment over Watergate and a strong conviction that
    President Nixon should not have received immunity for his
    actions.
        Now, just as in college, I find myself extremely troubled
    by the actions of a President. In fact, as I started to think
    about what I would say to you today, I wasn't sure how to
    begin. How exactly do you wrap up in 10 minutes or less
    everything we have witnessed in the last year? We have seen
    Bill Clinton's finger-waving denial to the American people. We
    have seen the President lie before a Federal grand jury. We
    have seen the President obstruct justice. We have seen the
    President hold a public celebration immediately following the
    House impeachment vote. We all know the President's behavior
    has been reprehensible.
        President Clinton, however, refuses to admit what all of us
    know is true. To this day, he continues to deny and distort; he
    continues to dispute the undeniable facts that are before the
    Senate and before the American people. The President's
    attorneys have done their best to disguise the truth as well.
        At the beginning of this trial, I predicted in my
    presentation that they would use legal smokescreens to mask the
    law and the facts. To their credit, they produced smoke so
    thick that it continues to cloud this debate. But if you look
    through the smoke and the mirrors employed by these very able
    lawyers, you will see the truth. The truth is that President
    Clinton lied to a Federal grand jury. He lied about whether or
    not he had committed perjury in a civil deposition, about the
    extent of his relationship with a subordinate Federal employee,
    about his coaching of his secretary, Betty Currie, and about
    the countless other matters.
        In my opening statement before this body, I outlined the
    four elements of perjury: an oath, intent, falsity,
    materiality. In this case, all those elements have been met.
        President Clinton also obstructed justice and encouraged
    others to lie in judicial proceedings. He sought to influence
    the testimony of a potentially adverse witness with job
    assistance, and he attempted to conceal evidence that was under
    subpoena.
        These truths cannot be ignored, distorted, or swept under
    the rug. Some of the President's partisan defenders want you to
    do just that. But it would be wrong. It would be wrong for you
    to send the message to every American that it is acceptable to
    lie under oath and obstruct justice. It would be wrong for you
    to tell America's children that some lies are all right. It
    would be wrong to show the rest of the world that some of our
    laws don't really matter.
        I must agree with Phyllis and Jack Stanley, constituents of
    mine who live in my district, who wrote me a letter saying:

        We believe that President Bill Clinton should definitely be
    impeached for the sake of the country. If he is not impeached,
    will not the rule of law in this country be weakened? We do not
    feel glee over the prospect of President Clinton's impeachment,
    however. For the sake of coming generations, acknowledging that
    integrity, honor and decency matter greatly is very important,
    especially in the highest office of the land.

        Like most of you, I have spent countless hours at grocery
    stores, shopping malls, in schools, in my church talking to my
    constituents. I have also read thousands of letters that have
    been sent to my office, just as we all have. What I have heard
    and read doesn't surprise me. People in Cincinnati, OH, have a
    variety of views on what the ultimate verdict should be by this
    body. Many want the President removed from office. Others want
    a censure. Still others would just like to see the process end.
    But regardless of their views, they are honorable people who
    care about our country and our future.
        I know that throughout the process some of the President's
    more partisan defenders have harshly criticized the managers,
    the House of Representatives, and anyone who would dare believe
    the President committed any crimes. These partisan attacks have
    been unfortunate because I think we all know that these issues
    are serious and that they deserve serious consideration. I know
    it, the American people know it, and I think you all know it,
    too. But despite the partisan rhetoric of the attacks, I
    believe that once this trial ends, we must work together.
        So I ask everyone here today to make a commitment, a
    commitment to every American, that regardless of the trial's
    outcome, we will join together to turn the page on this
    unfortunate chapter that President Clinton has written into our
    Nation's history.
        The question before you now is: How will this chapter end?
    Will the final chapter say that the U.S. Senate turned its back
    on perjury and obstruction of justice by a President of the
    United States, or will it say that the Senate took a principled
    stand and told the world that no person, not even the
    President, stands above the law; that all Americans, no matter
    how rich, how powerful, or how well connected, are accountable
    for their actions, even the President.
        As the father of two children and a former schoolteacher
    myself at an inner-city school in Cincinnati, I believe it is
    very important that we teach our children that honesty,
    integrity, and the rule of law do matter.
        While I am in Cincinnati, I spend a lot of time visiting
    schools throughout my community. I taught the seventh and
    eighth grades back in Cincinnati. When I go there, I go to
    elementary schools, I go to junior highs, I go to high schools;
    and I have been doing this for a number of years. Do you know
    what is inevitably one of the questions that the kids will ask
    me almost every time? It is, ``Have you ever met the President
    of the United States?''
        Why do kids ask that question? Because our kids understand
    how important the Office of the Presidency is. The person who
    occupies that office owes it to the children of this Nation to
    treat the office with respect. In the past, when those kids
    asked me that question, they asked me that question out of
    pride and respect. They looked up to the office. They looked up
    to everything the office represents. Bill Clinton has let our
    children down, and that is one of the greatest things that
    bothers me. It is the effect this will have on the children of
    this Nation.
        Let me conclude with a statement that I received recently
    from a student, Juliette Asuncion, at Mother Mercy High School:

        I am writing to express my feelings on the scandalous
    situation that has taken over the White House for the past
    couple of months. First, I would like to state the qualities
    that should be found in the President of the United States.
    Since the President is the official representative of the
    United States, he should uphold the values and ideals held by
    the people of this country. The President should be honest and
    a trustworthy person. He should be a good decision maker, have
    good morals and have his priorities straight. He should devote
    his time to the country and set a good example for the people
    of this Nation. I feel that President Clinton does not measure
    up to these standards. He's lied to the American people; he's
    committed perjury. For someone in his position, this is an
    unforgivable act, and he should not be allowed to just walk
    away without a punishment. He has shown that he feels he can go
    above the law, and I strongly believe the President should be
    impeached.

        I conclude by telling you, when you cast your vote, you
    remember that by your vote you are determining the lesson that
    Julia, your children and grandchildren will learn. So how will
    this chapter end? The decision is yours.
        I now yield to the gentleman from Georgia, Robert Barr.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Barr.
        Mr. Manager BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Distinguished and worthy adversarial counsel for the
    President, including my good friend and former Georgetown law
    professor, Charles Ruff, gentlemen and ladies of the Senate, my
    name is Bob Barr. I represent the Seventh District of Georgia,
    but in a broader sense I represent the country because I have
    been directed, as every one of the other 12 managers of the
    House has been directed by the American people, by a majority
    vote of the House of Representatives, to urge you to review the
    evidence and issue a verdict of conviction on the two articles
    of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives.
        Two days ago, all of us celebrated the birthday of former
    President Ronald Reagan. During his first year in office, on
    May 17, 1981, this President, known for giving voice to
    America's best and most decent instincts, spoke to the American
    people from Notre Dame University. Though spoken nearly 18
    years ago, and clearly not in contemplation of an impeachment,
    the former President's words provide guidance for you today.
        It was that date that President Reagan spoke of a certain
    principle; and in so doing, he quoted another giant of the 20th
    century, Winston Churchill. Specifically, President Reagan
    spoke of those who derided simple, straightforward answers to
    the problems confronting our country; those who decried clarity
    and certainty of principle, in favor of vagueness and
    relativism. He said:

        They say the world has become too complex for simple
    answers. They are wrong. There are no easy answers, but there
    are simple answers. We must have the courage to do what is
    morally right. Winston Churchill said that, ``the destiny of
    man is not measured by material computation. When great forces
    are on the move in the world, we learn we are spirits--not
    animals.'' And he said, ``there is something going on in time
    and space, and beyond time and space, which, whether we like it
    or not, spells duty.''

        Duty. A clear, simple concept. A foundational principle.
        Your duty is clearly set forth in your oath; your oath to
    do impartial justice according to the Constitution and the law.
        In the past month, you have heard much about the
    Constitution; and about the law. Probably more than you prefer;
    in a dizzying recitation of the U.S. Criminal Code: 18 U.S.C.
    1503. 18 U.S.C. 1505. 18 U.S.C. 1512. 18 U.S.C. 1621. 18 U.S.C.
    1623. Tampering. Perjury. Obstruction. That is a lot to digest,
    but these are real laws and they are applicable to these
    proceedings and to this President. Evidence and law, you have
    seen it and you have heard it.
        You have also seen and heard about straw men raised up by
    the White House lawyers, and then stricken down mightily. You
    have heard them essentially describe the President alternately
    as victim or saint. You have heard even his staunchest allies
    describe his conduct as ``reprehensible.'' Even some of you, on
    the President's side of the aisle, have concluded, ``there's no
    question about his having given false testimony under oath and
    he did that more than once.''
        There has also been much smoke churned up by the defense.
        Men and women of the Senate, Monica Lewinsky is not on
    trial. Her conduct and her intentions are not at issue here.
    Vernon Jordan is not on trial and his conduct and his
    intentions are not at issue here. William Jefferson Clinton is
    on trial here. His behavior, his intentions, his actions--these
    and only these are the issues here. When the White House
    lawyers raise up as a straw man that Vernon Jordan may have had
    no improper motive in seeking a job for Ms. Lewinsky; or that
    there was no formal ``conspiracy'' proved between the President
    and Vernon Jordan; or that Ms. Lewinsky says she did not draw a
    direct link between the President's raising the issue of a
    false affidavit and the cover stories, keep in mind, these are
    irrelevant issues. When the White House lawyers strike these
    theories down, even if you were to conclude they did, they are
    striking down nothing more than irrelevant straw men.
        What stands today, as it has throughout these proceedings,
    are facts--a false affidavit that benefits the President, the
    coaching of witnesses by the President, the secreting of
    subpoenaed evidence that would have harmed the President, lies
    under oath by the President. These reflect President Clinton's
    behavior; President Clinton's intentions; President Clinton's
    actions; and President Clinton's benefit. Not through the eyes
    of false theories; but by the evidence through the lens of
    common sense.
        You have heard tapes and read volumes of evidence. Not
    pursuant to the process we as House Managers would have
    preferred, but much evidence, nonetheless, has been presented.
        Many are saying, with a degree of certainty that usually
    comes only from ignorance, that there is nothing I or any of us
    can say to you today, on the eve of your deliberations, to sway
    your minds. I beg to differ with them. Moreover, we have been
    directed by the people of this country, by a majority vote of
    the House of Representatives, to fulfill and reaffirm a
    constitutional process and to present evidence to you and argue
    to you.
        There is much, in urging a vote for conviction, that can be
    gained by turning to, and keeping in mind, President Reagan's
    words to America, to do duty: duty unclouded by relativism,
    unmarred by artificiality. Duty that lives on after your vote--
    just as America will live on and prosper after a vote to
    convict. Duty untainted by polls. The country's fascination
    with polls has wormed its way even into these proceedings when,
    just a few days ago, we heard one of the White House lawyers
    cite polls as a reason not to release the videotapes.
        Polls played no role in the great decisions, decisive
    decisions that make America a nation and kept it a free and
    strong nation. Polls likewise played no role in the great
    trials of our Nation's history that opened schools equally to
    all of America's children, or that provided due process and
    equal protection of the laws for all Americans, regardless of
    economic might or political power.
        Yet, it is in many respects polls that threaten to become
    the currency of political discourse and even of judicial
    process as we near to enter the 21st century.
        Your duty, which I know you recognize today, is and must be
    based not on polls or politics, but on law and the
    Constitution. In other words, principle.
        What you decide in this case, the case now before you, will
    tell America and the world what it is we have, as a foundation
    for our Nation, not just today, but for ages to come. It will
    tell us and this Nation whether these seats here today will
    continue to be filled by true statesmen. Whether these seats
    will continue to echo with the booming principles, eloquence
    and sense of duty of Daniel Webster, John Calhoun, Everett
    Dirksen, Robert Byrd. I would add to that list of statesmen my
    fellow Georgian and your former colleague, Sam Nunn, whose
    concern for duty and our Nation's security caused him recently
    on CNN to raise grave concerns over our Nation's security
    because of the reckless conduct of this President. Will the
    principles embodied in our Constitution and our laws be
    reaffirmed; wrested from the pallid hands of pollsters and
    pundits, and from the swarm of theorists surrounding these
    proceedings? Will they be taken up by you, and placed squarely
    and firmly back in the hands of Thomas Jefferson, Alexander
    Hamilton, James Madison, George Washington, Abraham Lincoln,
    Martin Luther King, Jr., and so many other true statesmen of
    America's heritage? Principles that have stricken down bigotry,
    tyrants, and demagogs; principles that, through open and fair
    trials, have saved the innocent from the hangman's noose; and
    likewise have sent the guilty, clothed in due process, to then
    ether regions.
        It is principle, found and nurtured in our Constitution and
    our laws, that you are now called on to both use and reaffirm.
        Not only America is watching, the world is, too. And, for
    those who say people from foreign lands look down on this
    process and deride this process, I say, ``not so.''
        Let me speak briefly of a man not born in this country, but
    a man who has made this his country. A man born not in Atlanta,
    GA, though Atlanta is now his home. A man born many thousands
    of miles away, in Eritrea. A man to whom President Reagan
    surely was in a sense speaking, both in 1981 when he spoke of
    America's eternal sense of duty, and in January 1985, when he
    spoke of the ``American sound'' that echoes still through the
    ages and the continents.
        The man whose words I quote is a man who watches this
    process through the eyes of an immigrant, Mr. Seyoum Tesfaye. I
    have never met Mr. Tesfaye, but I have read his works. He
    wrote, in the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, just 3 days
    ago, on February 5, that this impeachment process ``is an
    example of America at its best . . . a core constitutional
    principle that profoundly distinguishes America from almost all
    other nations.'' He noted without hyperbole, that this process,
    far from being the sorry spectacle that many of the President's
    defenders have tried to make it, truly ``is a hallmark of
    representative democracy,'' reaffirming the principle that ``no
    man is above the law--not even the President.''
        These are not the words of the House Managers; though they
    echo ours.
        These are not the words of a partisan.
        These are the words of an immigrant. A man who came to
    America to study, and has stayed to work and pay taxes just as
    millions of us do every day.
        Men and women of the United States Senate, you must, by
    affirming your duty to render impartial justice based on the
    Constitution and the law, reaffirm those same laws and that
    very same Constitution, which drew Mr. Tesfaye and countless
    millions of other immigrants to our shores over the ages. This
    is not a comfortable task for any of us. But, as Martin Luther
    King, Jr., correctly noted, in words that hang on my office
    wall, and perhaps on some of yours, it is not in ``times of
    comfort and convenience'' that we find the measure of a man's
    character, but in times of ``conflict and controversy.'' This
    is such a defining time.
        Obstruction of justice and perjury must not be allowed to
    stand. Perjury and obstruction cannot stand alongside the law
    and the Constitution.
        By your oath, you must, like it or not, choose one over the
    other, up or down, guilt or acquittal. I respectfully submit on
    behalf of the House of Representatives and on behalf of my
    constituents in the Seventh District of Georgia that the
    evidence clearly establishes guilt and that the Constitution
    and laws of this land demand it.
        I thank the Members of the Senate and yield to Mr. Manager
    Buyer.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Buyer.
        Mr. Manager BUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel and Senators, my
    name is Steve Buyer, House manager, from Monticello, IN. I
    represent 20 counties between South Bend and Indianapolis. I
    will not try to claim the cornerstone of Hoosier common sense.
    Mr. Kendall would wrestle me for that cornerstone. But as a
    former criminal defense attorney, I want to take a moment and
    compliment the White House counsel and Mr. Kendall for doing
    your best to defend your client in the face of overwhelming
    facts and compelling evidence.
        [Laughter.]
        Your role here--a side comment here--your role here is much
    easier, though, in a Court of Impeachment as opposed to a
    criminal court of law.
        As a former Federal prosecutor, I compliment Chairman Henry
    Hyde and my colleagues, the House managers, who have embraced
    and given life meaning of the rule of law and presented this
    case to the Senate in a professional, thorough, and dignified
    manner.
        I assure you, the House managers would not have prosecuted
    the articles of impeachment before the bar of the Senate had we
    not had the highest degree of faith, belief, and confidence
    that, based on the evidence, the President committed high
    crimes and misdemeanors which warrant his removal from office.
        As you come to judgment, I recommend you square yourself
    with your duty first.
        On January 7, I witnessed as the Chief Justice administered
    your oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution
    and the laws. You should follow this prescription: Find the
    truth, define the facts, apply the law, give reverence to the
    Senate precedents while defending the Constitution. But I
    submit, it is the integrity of your oath in which you must
    regulate to uphold the principle of equal justice under the
    law.
        During the question-and-answer phase with the Chief Justice
    on Saturday, January 23, I stood in the well of the Senate and
    recommended that you vote on findings of fact. I want to clear
    the record of my intent of the recommendation. It has been
    grossly distorted.
        It is not to establish the guilt, as some have alleged. A
    finding of fact is not a finding of fiction. On the contrary,
    it is to prevent decisions by triers of fact from basing their
    judgment on fiction or chance or politics. The Chief Justice
    ruled that you are triers of fact, and since this
    constitutional proceeding of impeachment is more like a civil
    proceeding than a criminal trial, I bring to your attention
    rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that provides,
    in pertinent part, that when a judge sits alone as a trier of
    fact, he or she is required to set down in precise words the
    facts as he or she finds them. This requirement is mandatory
    and cannot be waived by the parties of Federal practice.
        A memorandum of findings of fact is not a radical concept
    to American jurisprudence. It is customary and habitually used
    in State and Federal courts all across this land. Since you sit
    collectively as a Court of Impeachment, as the triers of fact,
    I recommended the findings of fact to guarantee that you have
    carefully reviewed the evidence and have a rational basis for
    your final judgment.
        To claim that findings of fact is unconstitutional is
    false. The Supreme Court has consistently permitted the Senate
    to shape the contours and the due process of an impeachment
    trial.
        The Senate owes the American people and history an
    accounting of the stubborn facts.
        I would like to comment on some statements.
        I have heard some Senators state publicly that they are
    using the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Senate
    has held consistently that the criminal standard of proof is
    inappropriate for impeachment trials. The result of conviction
    in an impeachment trial is removal from office; it is not meant
    to punish. You are to be guided by your own conscience, not by
    the criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.
        I have also heard some Senators from both sides of the
    aisle state publicly, ``I think these offenses rise to the
    level of high crimes and misdemeanors.'' To state publicly that
    you believe that high crimes and misdemeanors have occurred,
    but for some reason you have this desire not to remove the
    President, that desire, though, does not square with the law,
    the Constitution, and the Senate's precedents for removing
    Federal judges for similar offenses.
        So long as William Jefferson Clinton is President, the only
    mechanism to hold him accountable for his high crimes and
    misdemeanors is the power of impeachment and removal. The
    Constitution is very clear. You cannot vindicate the rule of
    law by stating high crimes and misdemeanors have occurred, but
    leave the President in office subject to future prosecution
    after his term is expired.
        Without respect for the law, the foundation of our
    Constitution is not secure. Without respect for the law, our
    freedom is at risk.
        The President is answerable for his alleged crimes to the
    Senate here and now.
        Moreover, if criminal prosecution and not impeachment is
    the way to vindicate the rule of law, then the Senate would
    never have removed other civil officers such as Federal judges,
    who are not insulated from criminal prosecution while holding
    office.
        Thus, in providing for criminal punishment after conviction
    and removal from office, it was the framers who insured that
    the rule of law would be vindicated both in cleansing the
    office and in punishing the individual for the criminal act.
        I have asked myself many times how allowing a President to
    remain in office while having committed perjury and obstruction
    of justice is fair to those across the country who are sitting
    in jail for having committed the same crimes. I have had the
    fairness argument thrown into my face consistently.
        Fairness is important. Fairness is something that is simple
    in its nature and is powerful in the statement that it makes. A
    statement which you send carries us into tomorrow and becomes
    our future legacy.
        If you vote to acquit, think for a moment about what you
    would say to those who have been convicted of the same crimes
    as the President.
        What would you say to the 182 Americans who were sentenced
    in Federal court in 1997 for committing perjury?
        What would you say to the 144 Americans who were sentenced
    in Federal court in 1997 for obstruction of justice and witness
    tampering?
        Would you attempt to trivialize the evidence and say,
    ``This case was only about lying about sex''?
        I want to cite the testimony before the House Judiciary
    Committee of one woman who experienced the judicial system in
    the most personal sense, and that is the testimony of Dr.
    Barbara Battalino. I think it is compelling.
        She held degrees in medicine and law, and Manager Rogan
    showed some of the testimony just the other day. You see, she
    was prosecuted by the Clinton Justice Department and convicted
    for obstruction of justice because of her lie under oath about
    one act of consensual oral sex with a patient on VA premises.
    Her untruthful response was made in a civil suit which was
    later dismissed. In a legal proceeding, Dr. Battalino was asked
    under oath: ``Did anything of a sexual nature take place in
    your office on June 27, 1991?''
        Her one word reply, ``No,'' convicted her and forever
    changed her life.
        Her punishment? She was convicted of a felony, forced to
    wear an electronic monitoring device, and is presently on
    probation. She lost her license to practice medicine and her
    ability to practice law.
        Our prisons hold many who are truly contrite, they are
    sorry, they feel pain for their criminal offenses, and some
    whose victims have even forgiven them, others who were very
    popular citizens and had many friends and apologized profusely,
    but they were still held accountable under the law.
        Just like the President is acclaimed to be doing a good
    job, many in prison today were doing a good job in their chosen
    professions. None of our laws provides for good job
    performance, contrition, forgiveness, or popularity polls as a
    remedy for criminal conduct.
        These were the closing lines of Dr. Battalino's opening
    statement before the House Judiciary Committee:

        We all make mistakes in life. But, common frailty does not
    relieve us from our responsibility to uphold the Rule of Law.
    Regardless, this nation must never let any person or people
    undermine the Rule of Law. . . . If liberty and justice for all
    does not reign, we--like great civilizations before us--will
    surely perish from the face of the earth.

        What you would say to Dr. Battalino and others similarly
    situated is very important because fairness is important.
        Alexander Hamilton, writing not long after the Constitution
    was adopted, well expressed the harm that would come to our
    Republic from those who, by example, undermine respect for the
    law. In a statement that bears repeating, Hamilton wrote:

        If it were to be asked, What is the most sacred duty and
    the greatest source of security in a Republic? The answer would
    be, an inviolable respect for the Constitution and Laws--the
    first growing out of the last. . . . Those, therefore, who . .
    . set examples, which undermine or subvert the authority of the
    laws, lead us from freedom to slavery; they incapacitate us
    from a government of laws. . . .

        President Clinton, by his persistent and calculated
    misconduct and illegal acts, has set a pernicious example of
    lawlessness, an example which, by its very nature, subverts
    respect for the law. His perverse example inevitably undermines
    the integrity of both the Office of the President and the
    judicial process.
        You see, ladies and gentlemen, without choice we were all
    born free, and we inherited a legacy of liberty at great
    sacrifice by many who have come before us. We cannot
    collectively as a free people enjoy the liberties without
    measured personal restraint. And that is the purpose of the
    rule of law. It is the function of the courts to uphold the
    dignity of that prescription and the God-given liberties of all
    of us. That is how we are able to carry this Nation forward in
    the future generations.
        So in light of the historic principles regarding
    impeachment, the overwhelming evidence to the offenses alleged,
    and the application of the Senate precedents, I believe it
    makes it very clear that our President--who has shown such
    contempt for the law, the dignity and the integrity of the
    office of the Presidency that was entrusted to him--must be
    held to account; and it can only be by his removal from office.
        The House managers reserve the remainder of our time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        The Chair recognizes the White House counsel.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you.
        I wonder, Mr. Majority Leader, whether we can take a brief
    break because there is a need to arrange furniture.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.
        Mr. LOTT. I was hesitant to suggest it, too, early today,
    Mr. Chief Justice.
        [Laughter.]

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. On the request of counsel, I ask unanimous
    consent that we take a 10-minute recess. And please return
    quickly to the Chamber so we can get back to business.
        There being no objection, at 2:12 p.m. the Senate recessed
    until 2:35 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. White House
    Counsel Ruff.
        Mr. Counsel RUFF. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Mr. Chief
    Justice, managers of the House, ladies and gentlemen of the
    Senate, I can't resist beginning, following the lead of my
    colleagues across the well here, by telling you that my name is
    Charles Ruff and I am from the District of Columbia, and we
    don't have a vote in the Congress of the United States.
        [Laughter.]
        I truly did not intend to begin quite this way, but I must.
    I do not think there is a court in the land where a prosecutor
    would be able to stand up for one-third of his allotted time,
    speak in general terms about what the people are entitled to
    and what the rule of law stands for--as important as all of
    that may be--and sit down and turn to the defense counsel and
    ask that defense counsel go forward, reserving 2 hours for
    rebuttal. I recognize that procedural niceties have not
    necessarily characterized the way this trial has gone forward.
    But I do believe--and this is the only time today I will say
    this, I promise--that kind of prosecutorial gambit is
    symptomatic of what we have seen before in these last weeks--
    wanting to win too much.
        That said, let me begin where I intended to begin. We are
    taking the last steps along a path that, for most of us, has
    seemed to be unending. Indeed, some of us may have a sense that
    we have gone well beyond ``Yogi Berra land'' to deja vu all
    over again and all over again and all over again. I thought
    long and hard as I thought about what I was going to say today,
    and how I could be of most help to you as you make this
    momentous decision that will soon be entrusted to you. I
    momentarily considered whether the answer to that question was
    simply to yield back my time, but I weighed that against the
    special pleasure of stretching out our last hours with you.
        [Laughter.]
        Or as Ernie Banks would have said, ``It's such a nice day,
    let's play two.''
        [Laughter.]
        But cursed as I am with lawyerly instincts, I decided to
    compromise. I promise you as much brevity as I can manage, even
    if not much wit, while making a few final points that I think
    you need to carry with you as you go into your deliberations.
        You have heard the managers' vision--or at least some part
    of it--of the process we have been engaged in and the lessons
    we have learned and what it will look like at the end of our
    journey. I respect them as elected Representatives of their
    people and as worthy adversaries. But I believe their vision
    could be too dark, a vision too little attuned to the needs of
    the people, too little sensitive to the needs of our democracy.
    I believe it to be a vision more focused on retribution, more
    designed to achieve partisan ends, more uncaring about the
    future we face together.
        Our vision, I think, is quite different, but it is not
    naive. We know the pain the President has caused our society
    and his family and his friends. But we know, too, how much the
    President has done for this country. And more importantly, we
    know that our primary obligation, the duty we all have, is to
    preserve that which the founders gave us, and we can best
    fulfill that duty by carefully traveling the path that they
    laid out for us.
        You have heard many speeches over the past few weeks about
    high crimes and misdemeanors. As I look back on the arguments
    and the counterarguments, it seems to me that really very
    little can be gained by repeating them; for when all is said
    and done, what they mean is this: The framers chose stability.
    They made impeachment and removal constitutional recourses of
    last resort. The question that the managers appear to have
    asked--and I am unable to tell you what they will ask today--is
    whether perjury or obstruction of justice in the abstract are
    impeachable offenses. That is not the question you must answer.
        Nor must you assume, as the managers appear to, that
    because judges are removed for having committed perjury, a
    President must be removed as well. That is not what the rule of
    law requires. The rule of law and evenhanded justice is
    something more than a simple syllogism. You must decide whether
    on these facts arising out of these circumstances this
    President has so endangered the state that we can no longer
    countenance his remaining in office.
        I think in their hearts the managers do not truly disagree.
    Whatever they have been able to glean from the historical
    record or more modern scholarship, they cannot in the end avoid
    the conclusion that removal of the President is not something
    that the framers took lightly. Indeed, two of their own
    witnesses in the Judiciary Committee, Professor Van Alstyne and
    Judge Wiggins, tried to make it clear to them that even if they
    were to find that the offenses described in the independent
    counsel's referral as being committed, another decision had to
    be made. That decision was whether in the interest of society
    the President should be impeached. As Professor Van Alstyne put
    it, in words that I admit are unflattering to my client but
    nonetheless makes the point: ``In my own opinion,'' he said,
    ``I regard what the President did, that which the Special
    Counsel report declared, are crimes of such a low order that it
    would unduly flatter the President by submitting him to trial
    in the Senate, I would not bother to do it.''
        I read that statement to you, not obviously because the
    professor and I are on the same side of the political divide or
    have the same view of the President's conduct, but because it
    is important, I think, to understand, as I fear the managers do
    not, that the framers full well understood what they were doing
    when they drafted the impeachment provision of the
    Constitution. They consciously chose not to make all misconduct
    by the President a basis for removal; they chose instead only
    that conduct that they viewed as most serious, as most
    dangerous, to our system of government.
        As I said, I think in their hearts the managers recognize
    the force of it. But they have argued to you that perjury and
    obstruction really should be treated as the equivalent of
    treason and bribery and the danger that they pose to our
    society. They have offered on this much rhetoric and a few
    substantive arguments. I want to look at just a few of these
    arguments as they were advanced in the managers' opening and
    not really addressed instead.
        First, a historical item, that Blackstone in his commentary
    listed bribery and perjury and obstruction of justice under the
    same heading of ``offenses against public justice''; second, a
    modern statutory equivalent of that argument that under the
    sentencing guidelines we actually treat perjury more severely
    than we do bribery; and, third--this is a theme you have heard
    throughout these proceedings, what I will call the ``system of
    justice argument''--that the President's conduct, if he is not
    removed, will somehow subvert enforcement of our civil rights
    laws.
        But all of these arguments are mere subterfuge, offered
    because the managers knew that to make any plausible case for
    removal they must bring these articles within the very small
    circle of offenses that the framers believed were truly
    dangerous to the state.
        First, Blackstone: It is true that the commentaries rate
    perjury as among 21 offenses against public justice. Notably,
    however, Blackstone ranks the 21 in order of seriousness, or,
    as he puts it, ``malignity.'' No. 1 on the list, a most
    malignant offense, is a felony that I have to admit is unknown
    to me--that of vacating records. No. 6 is returning from
    transportation, also an offense rarely seen in our modern
    society. Nos. 10 and 12 are barratry, maintenance and
    champerty, especially dear to me because they involve my
    profession, but rarely viewed these days, I think you will
    agree. And, at No. 15 is perjury.
        If, as Madison told us, Blackstone was in the hands of
    every man, what does that tell us about why the framers chose
    treason and bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors as
    the grounds of impeachment? It tells us that they fully
    understood that comparative gravity of offenses against public
    justice, and, nonetheless, chose only those that truly pose
    that danger to the state--treason, for obvious reasons, and
    bribery because to them the risk that the executive would sell
    himself to a foreign country, for example, was much more than
    mere speculation. And then other high crimes of similar
    severity.
        As to the lesson to be learned from the more modern day,
    the sentencing guidelines, Manager McCollum argued to you a few
    weeks ago that those to whom you have given the responsibility
    to assess the comparative severity of crimes have concluded
    that perjury is at least as serious a crime as bribery. That
    decision, he told you, is evidenced by the commission's
    decision to assign perjury an offense level of 12, or
    approximately 1 year in prison, and to bribery an offense level
    slightly below that. But even to the extent that such an
    argument were to be weighed in the constitutional balance,
    Manager McCollum was simply not being candid with you, for he
    failed to explain that under these same guidelines a bribe of,
    let's say, $75,000 taken by an elected official, or a judge for
    that matter, automatically carries an offense level of 24, or
    twice that of perjury, and a prison sentence four to five times
    longer.
        The drafters of our guidelines, to the extent that Mr.
    McCollum asked you to look at them, full well understand the
    special gravity of bribes taken by the country's leaders, and
    to distinguish that offense from the offenses, even at best,
    that are before you now.
        Lastly is this system of justice argument--the notion that
    somehow President Clinton has undermined our civil rights laws.
    Whatever I might say could not match the eloquence of my
    colleague, Ms. Mills, and, therefore, I will not attempt fate
    by venturing further into that territory.
        I really do not want to become further immersed in the
    minutia here. On this, I do agree with the managers. We cannot
    lose sight of the constitutional forest for some of the
    analytical trees.
        There is only one question before you, albeit a difficult
    one, one that is a question of fact, and of law and
    constitutional theory. Would it put at risk the liberty of the
    people to retain the President in office? Putting aside
    partisan animus, if you can honestly say that it would not,
    that those liberties are safely in his hands, then you must
    vote to acquit.
        Each of you has a sense of this in your mind and your heart
    better than anything I can convey, or I suspect anything better
    than my colleagues could convey to you. And I will not
    undertake to instruct you further on this issue.
        Just as we ultimately leave that question in your hands, we
    leave to the conscience of each Member the question of what
    standard of proof you apply. Despite Congressman Buyer's
    exhortation to the contrary, this body has never decided for
    any of you what standard is appropriate or what standard is
    inappropriate. Each Senator is left to his or her own best
    judgment.
        I suggested to you when I last spoke to you that I believe
    you must apply a standard sufficiently stringent to enable you
    to make this most important decision with certainty and in a
    manner that will ensure that the American people understand
    that it has been made with that certainty.
        This is not an issue as to which we as a people and we as a
    Republic can be in doubt.
        Let me move to the articles. Just as you have listened
    patiently to our debate about the meaning of ``high crimes and
    misdemeanors,'' you have, as well, heard seemingly endless
    discourse about the specific details of the various matters
    that the managers allege constitute grounds for removal. I will
    strive, therefore, not to be unduly repetitive more than is at
    least absolutely necessary.
        My colleagues, last Saturday and in their earlier
    presentations, have done my work for me, but I want to focus
    for just a little while on those aspects of the managers'
    presentation that merit your special attention or those that
    have been particularly elucidated or, for that matter,
    beclouded by the testimony you heard and watched on Saturday.
        As we start this discussion, let me offer you a phrase that
    I hope you will remember as I move through the articles with
    you. That phrase is ``moving targets and empty pots.'' ``Moving
    targets,'' ever-shifting theories, each one advanced to replace
    the last as it has fallen, fallen victim to the facts. ``Empty
    pots,'' attractive containers, but when you take the lid off
    you find nothing to sustain them.
        I used the term, ``empty vessels,'' in my opening
    presentation, but it has since struck me that that was much too
    flattering and might even suggest that they had the capacity to
    float, which they don't.
        Article I, the first moving target. As we have said
    repeatedly, we have been more than a little puzzled as to the
    exact nature of the charges advanced by the managers under the
    rubric of article I, and our puzzlement has only increased, I
    must tell you, since this trial began.
        We have argued, I think with indisputable force, that both
    articles are so deficient that they would not survive a motion
    to dismiss in any court in the land. We are not insensitive to
    the claim that we are advancing some lawyer's argument, and we
    are seeking some technical escape, but I urge you not to treat
    this issue so lightly. As you look to article I, for example,
    ask yourselves whether you can at this late moment in the trial
    identify for yourselves with any remote sense of certainty the
    statements that the managers claim were perjurious.
        I suspect you will hear a lot about that in the 2 hours
    following my presentation, but I will try to look ahead just a
    bit.
        Ask yourselves whether you are comfortable in this gravest
    of proceedings that when you retire to your deliberations you
    could ever know that the constitutionally required two-thirds
    vote is present on any one charge.
        We have been making this argument for some time and with
    some frequency, and so you would think that at least once the
    trial began the managers would have fixed on some definable set
    of charges. But, no. Indeed, it struck me even earlier this
    afternoon that when Manager Sensenbrenner rose to speak to you,
    he was prepared to give you four examples of perjury. We have
    heard a lot of examples. We haven't heard much certainty.
        Just to give you an example of how rapidly the target can
    move, you will recall that in describing the incidents of
    perjury allegedly committed by the President, the managers made
    much of the preliminary statement he read to the grand jury,
    including the use of the words ``occasionally,'' and ``on
    certain occasions'' to describe the frequency of certain
    conduct and made the general allegation that the statement was
    itself part of a scheme to deceive the grand jury.
        Yet, strangely, when Mr. Manager Rogan was asked about
    these very charges as late as January 20, he quite clearly
    abandoned them.
        I direct your attention to the exhibits before you and to
    the charts. Appearing on television on January 20, with Chris
    Matthews, this is what transpired:

        MATTHEWS. . . . now defend these--these elements--one, that
    the president lied when he said he had had these relationships
    with her on certain occasions. Is that the language?
        Rep. ROGAN. That is the . . .
        MATTHEWS. And--and why is that perjurious--perjurious?
        Rep. ROGAN. In fact, I'm not--I don't think it's
    necessarily perjurious. That is--that's one little piece of
    this answer that he gave at the grand jury. . . .

               *         *         *         *         *

        MATTHEWS. Well, another time he used a phrase with regard
    to this ridiculous thing called phone sex, he referred to it as
    occasionally or on occasion. Why do you add them in as part of
    the perjury indictment?
        Rep. ROGAN. That's not added in as part of the perjury
    indictment in Article I. I simply raised that issue when I was
    addressing the Senate.

               *         *         *         *         *

        MATTHEWS. You better get to those senators because I think
    they made the mistake I did of thinking that was one of the
    elements in the perjury charge.

        And similarly over here, although I have reversed the order
    a bit:

        MATTHEWS. . . . Go through what you think are the main
    elements in your perjury indictment of the president,
    impeachment. . . .
        Rep. ROGAN. One of the things they were focusing on is a
    point, I think, I made last week when I was presenting the case
    for perjury dealing with that preliminary statement that the
    president read that just really gave the grand jury a
    misperception of what the president's relationship was with
    Monica Lewinsky. Now I never said that was the basis for the
    perjury charge. In fact, that's not even one of the four areas
    that's alleged, but they're trying to pick these little dots
    out of the matrix and try to hang their hat on that. . . .

        I have to tell you, as did Mr. Matthews, I made the same
    mistake. I heard Manager Rogan say:

        This prepared statement he read to the grand jury on August
    17th, 1998, was the linchpin in his plan to ``win.''

        I heard him say:

        It is obvious that the reference in the President's
    prepared statement to the grand jury that this relationship
    began in 1996 was intentionally false.

        I heard him say:

        The President's statement was intentionally misleading when
    he described being alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on certain
    occasions.

        And I heard him say:

        The President's statement was intentionally misleading when
    he described his telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky
    as occasional.

        That is what I heard when Manager Rogan spoke to you a few
    weeks ago.
        I know it is unusual to be given a bill of particulars on
    television, but maybe that is part of the modern litigation
    age.
        So as to article I's charge, now that this is off the
    books, that the President perjured himself concerning his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, we are once again left with the
    claim that he lied about touching, about his denial that he
    engaged in conduct that fell within his subjective
    understanding of the definition used in the Jones deposition--
    this in the course of testimony, Members of the Senate, in
    which the President had already made the single most
    devastating admission that any of us can conceive of. It defies
    common sense. And as any experienced prosecutor--and five
    experienced prosecutors said this to the Judiciary Committee--
    will tell you, it defies real world experience to charge
    anyone, President or not, with perjury on the grounds that you
    disbelieve his testimony about his own subjective belief in the
    definition of a term used in a civil deposition.
        Nothing in the evidentiary record has changed since the OIC
    referred this matter to the House 6 months ago. Indeed, it is
    impossible to conceive what could change in the evidentiary
    record. And the managers have offered this charge and persist
    in it for reasons not entirely clear to me, but some blind
    faith that they must go forward, facts or no.
        There are three other elements of article I. First, the
    allegation that the President lied when he claimed he did not
    perjure himself in the Jones deposition. The President, of
    course, made no such representation in the grand jury.
        The managers cannot, no matter how they try, resurrect the
    charges of the article, then, article II, that was so clearly
    rejected by the House of Representatives. Yet, if you listen to
    their presentations over the past weeks, it becomes evident
    that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, they themselves
    have come to the point where the President's testimony on
    January 17 in the Jones deposition and August 17 in the grand
    jury are treated as though they were one and the same.
        Just a few minutes ago you heard Manager Gekas talk to you
    about perjury, and probably 90 percent of what he talked to you
    about was perjury in the Jones case--in the Jones case. It
    doesn't exist anymore. The House of Representatives determined
    that that was not an impeachable offense. It appears to make no
    difference, though, that the House rejected this charge, for
    the managers do continue to dwell on it as though somehow they
    could show the House from which they came that they made a
    mistake.
        Only last Saturday, Manager Graham could be heard decrying
    the President's claim that he had never been alone with Monica
    Lewinsky, something that comes not out of the grand jury but
    out of the Jones deposition, at the same time he was taking him
    to task for his disquisition on the word ``is,'' something that
    is in the grand jury but is entirely irrelevant to these
    perjury charges. You could even see it in their videotape
    presentation last Saturday when snippets from January 17, then
    August 17, were played without any definition and without any
    sense that there was any distinction between the two events.
        There is literally nothing in the President's grand jury
    testimony that purports to adopt wholesale his testimony in the
    Jones deposition. If anything, it is evident that he is
    explaining at length and clarifying and adding to his
    deposition testimony. Indeed, even if the original article II
    had survived, the President's belief that he had ``worked
    through the minefield of the Jones deposition without violating
    the law''--which is a quote from his grand jury testimony--
    could not allow the managers, somehow, to establish that that
    statement was independently perjurious, and they surely cannot
    do so now that the original article II has disappeared.
        As to the second and third remaining elements of article I,
    that the President lied about Mr. Bennett's statement to Judge
    Wright at the time of the Jones deposition, and that he lied
    about his own statements to his staff, I will deal with them in
    my discussion of the obstruction charges in article II. Suffice
    it to say that nothing in the record as it came to you in
    January could support conviction on article I, and nothing
    added to the record since then has changed that result.
        Let me move to article II. Manager Hutchinson told you in
    his original presentation that article II rested on--his
    words--``seven pillars of obstruction.'' I had suggested in my
    opening statement of a few weeks ago that it would be more
    accurate to call them seven shifting sand castles of
    speculation, but Manager Hutchinson has not proved willing to
    accept my description and so I will accept his. Let's remove
    one pillar right at the start.
        Article II charges that the President engaged in a scheme
    to obstruct the Jones case--the Jones case--and alleges as one
    element of this scheme that in the days following January 21
    the President lied to his staff about his relationship with Ms.
    Lewinsky, conduct that could not possibly have had anything to
    do with the Jones litigation.
        I will get to the merits of that charge standing alone in a
    little while, but I bring up the more--forgive me--technical
    argument here, to highlight once more the extent to which the
    House simply ignored the most basic legal principles in
    bringing these charges to you. I have yet to hear from the
    managers a single plausible explanation for the inclusion of
    this charge as part of a scheme to obstruct the Jones
    litigation, and I can think of none. I am sure that in the 120
    minutes remaining to them, some portion of that time will be
    spent explaining just this point. And, so, one pillar gone; a
    slight list observed.
        Next: Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and the first of the empty
    pots. The managers charge that the President corruptly
    encouraged a witness to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew
    to be perjurious, false, and misleading, and similarly
    encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie if she were ever called as a
    witness. In my opening statement, and in Mr. Kendall's more
    detailed discussion, we made two points: First, that Ms.
    Lewinsky had repeatedly denied that she had ever been asked or
    encouraged to lie; and, second, that there was simply no direct
    or circumstantial evidence that the President had ever done
    such a thing.
        It is not in dispute that the President called Ms. Lewinsky
    in the early morning of December 17 to tell her about the death
    of Betty Currie's brother, and in the same call that he told
    her that she was now listed on the Jones witness list. The
    managers have from the beginning relied on one fact and on one
    baseless hypothesis stemming from this call which, in the
    managers' minds, was the beginning and the middle and the end
    of the scheme to encourage the filing of a false affidavit.
    There is literally no other event or statement on which they
    can rely.
        The one fact to which the managers point is Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony that the President said that if she were actually
    subpoenaed, she possibly could file an affidavit to avoid
    having to testify, and at some point in the call mentioned one
    of the so-called cover stories that they had used when she was
    still working at the White House--that is, bringing papers to
    him. And it is on this shaky foundation, a very slim pillar
    indeed, that the managers build the hypothesis.
        In the face of the seemingly insurmountable hurdle of Ms.
    Lewinsky's repeated denials that anyone ever asked or
    encouraged her to lie, the managers have persisted in arguing,
    and continue to do so, that the President did somehow encourage
    her to lie, even if she didn't know it. Now you have heard that
    theme sounded really for the first time on Saturday, and then a
    little bit today--even if she didn't know it, because both
    really understood that any affidavit Ms. Lewinsky would file
    would have to be false if it were to result in her avoiding her
    deposition. But neither the fact on which they rely nor their
    hypothesis was of much help to the managers before Ms.
    Lewinsky's deposition and neither, surely, has any force after
    her deposition.
        After you saw Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, there can be
    nothing left of what was, at best, only conjecture. Even before
    her deposition, Ms. Lewinsky had testified, as had the
    President in the grand jury, that given the claims being made
    in the Jones case, a truthful albeit limited affidavit might--
    might--establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to
    offer in the way of testimony in the Jones case.
        Faced with this record, the managers asked you to authorize
    Ms. Lewinsky's deposition, representing that she would--and I
    quote, and this is from the managers' proffer--``rebut the
    following inferences drawn by White House counsel on key
    issues, among others that President Clinton did not encourage
    Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and that President
    Clinton did not have an understanding with Ms. Lewinsky that
    the two would lie under oath.''
        Unhappily for the managers--and perhaps their unhappiness
    was best reflected in the tone of Manager Bryant's discussion
    on this subject--Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, as you saw yourself
    on Saturday, did just the opposite.
        In an extended colloquy with Mr. Manager Bryant on the
    subject of the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky made clear, beyond any
    doubt, first, that the President had never discussed the
    contents of the affidavit with her; second, that there was no
    connection between the suggestion that she might file an
    affidavit and the reference to any cover story; third, that she
    believed it possible to file a truthful affidavit.
        You saw much of this portion of Ms. Lewinsky's deposition
    on Saturday, and I am not going to impose too much on your
    patience, but I do want to play just a very few segments of
    that videotape.
        First, two segments dealing with the content of the
    affidavit.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Are you, uh--strike that. Did he make any representation
    to you about what you could say in that affidavit or--
        A. No.
        Q. What did you understand you would be saying in that
    affidavit to avoid testifying?
        A. Uh, I believe I've testified to this in the grand jury.
    To the best of my recollection, it was, uh--to my mind came--it
    was a range of things. I mean, it could either be, uh,
    something innocuous or could go as far as having to deny the
    relationship. Not being a lawyer nor having gone to law school,
    I thought it could be anything.
        Q. Did he at that point suggest one version or the other
    version?
        A. No. I didn't even mention that, so there, there wasn't a
    further discussion--there was no discussion of what would be in
    an affidavit.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. In his answer to this proceeding in the Senate, he has
    indicated that he thought he had--might have had a way that he
    could have you--get you to file a--basically a true affidavit,
    but yet still skirt these issues enough that you wouldn't be
    called as a witness.
        Did he offer you any of these suggestions at this time?
        A. He didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me at
    all, ever.

        Next, a couple of brief segments on the issue of the cover
    stories.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Well, based on prior relations with the President, the
    concocted stories and those things like that, did this come to
    mind? Was there some discussion about that, or did it come to
    your mind about these stories--the cover stories?
        A. Not in connection with the--not in connection with the
    affidavit.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Q. Did you discuss anything else that night in terms of--I
    would draw your attention to the cover stories. I have alluded
    to that earlier, but, uh, did you talk about cover story that
    night?
        A. Yes, sir.
        Q. And what was said?
        A. Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--
    you can always say you were coming to see Betty or bringing me
    papers.
        Q. I think You have testified that you're sure he said that
    that night. You are sure he said that that night?
        A. Yes.
        Q. Now, was that in connection with the affidavit?
        A. I don't believe so, no.

               *         *         *         *         *

        Now, you have testified in the grand jury. I think your
    closing comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet
    in that very conversation of December the 17th, 1997 when the
    President told you that you were on the witness list, he also
    suggested that you could sign an affidavit and use misleading
    cover stories. Isn't that correct?
        A. Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separate necessarily
    signing affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So,
    does--
        Q. Well, those two--
        A. Those three events occurred, but they don't--they
    weren't linked for me.

        And third, a brief segment on the supposed falsity of any
    affidavit that might be filed.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. The night of the phone call, he's suggesting you could
    file an affidavit. Did you appreciate the implications of
    filing a false affidavit with the court?
        A. I don't think I necessarily thought at that point it
    would have to be false, so, no, probably not. I don't--I don't
    remember having any thoughts like that, so I imagine I would
    remember something like that, and I don't, but--

        And last, if we might, a brief segment on the question of
    whose best interests were being served.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. But you didn't file the affidavit for your best
    interest, did you?
        A. Uh, actually, I did.
        Q. To avoid testifying.
        A. Yes.

        Brief, put pointed, I think, and I am sure you remember
    them from Saturday, and I am sure you will take those excerpts
    with you as you move into your deliberations.
        There was another issue that surfaced early on, although
    perhaps it has dissipated, and that is whether the President
    ever saw a draft of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, something that
    the managers alleged early on but, indeed, as we now know from
    that testimony, not only did nobody ever see a draft of the
    affidavit, the President and Ms. Lewinsky never even discussed
    the content of her affidavit. ``Not ever,'' as she put it,
    either on December 17 or on January 5 or on any other date.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President told her he didn't
    need to see a draft because he had seen other affidavits.
        Early on, Manager McCollum speculated for you--speculated
    for you--that when the President told Ms. Lewinsky that he
    didn't need to see her affidavit because he had seen other
    affidavits, he really must have meant that he had seen previous
    drafts of hers, and this is what he said:

        I doubt seriously the President was talking about 15 other
    affidavits of somebody else and didn't like looking at
    affidavits anymore. I suspect, and I would suggest to you, that
    he was talking about 15 other drafts of this proposed
    affidavit, since it had been around the horn a lot of rounds.

        That is what Manager McCollum told you. Now we know that
    those drafts didn't exist. They never existed. How do we know?
    Somewhat belatedly, the managers got around to telling us that.
    In describing the testimony they would expect to receive from
    Ms. Lewinsky when they moved for the right to take her
    deposition, they wrote in their motion:

        That same day, January 5, she called President Clinton to
    ask if the President would like to review her affidavit before
    it was signed. He declined, saying he had already seen about 15
    others. She understood that to mean that he had seen 15 other
    affidavits rather than 15 prior drafts of her affidavit (which
    did not exist).

        In sum, one, the only reference to an affidavit in the
    December 17 call was the suggestion of the President that
    filing one might possibly enable Ms. Lewinsky to avoid being
    deposed, itself an entirely legitimate and proper suggestion.
        Two, the President and Ms. Lewinsky never discussed the
    content of her affidavit on or after December 17.
        Three, the President never saw or read any draft of the
    affidavit before it was signed.
        Four, the President believed that she could file a true
    affidavit.
        Five, Ms. Lewinsky believed that she could file a true
    affidavit.
        Six, there is not one single document or piece of testimony
    that suggests that the President encouraged her to file a false
    affidavit.
        If there is no proof the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky
    to file a false affidavit, surely there must be some proof on
    the other charge that encouraged her to give perjurious
    testimony if she were ever called to testify. Well, there
    isn't.
        Let's begin by noting something that should help you assess
    the President's actions during this period--both the charge
    that he encouraged the filing of a false affidavit and the
    charge that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to testify falsely.
        The conversation that the managers allege gave rise to both
    offenses is that call of the early morning of December 17. The
    managers suggest that the President, in essence, used the
    subterfuge of a call to inform Ms. Lewinsky about the death of
    Ms. Currie's brother to discuss her status as a witness in the
    Jones case. Subterfuge? Come on. A tragedy had befallen a woman
    who was Ms. Lewinsky's friend and the President's secretary.
        But let's put this in the managers' own context. On
    December 6, the President learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the
    Jones witness list. According to the managers, that was a
    source of grave concern and spurred intensified efforts to find
    her a job--efforts that were still further intensified when, on
    December 11, Judge Wright issued her order allowing lawyers to
    inquire into the President's relationships with other women.
    Yet, I have not heard any explanation as to why the President,
    now theoretically so distraught that he was urging Mr. Jordan
    to keep Ms. Lewinsky happy by finding her a job, as Manager
    Hutchinson would have it, waited until December 17--11 days
    after he learned Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list and 6
    days after the supposedly critical events of December 11--to
    call and launch his scheme to suborn perjury.
        As to the charge of subornation, the managers do concede,
    as they must, that the President and Ms. Lewinsky did not even
    discuss her deposition on the 17th, logically, I suppose, since
    she wasn't actually subpoenaed until 2 days later.
        One might think that this would dispose of the matter,
    since they do not identify a single other moment in time when
    there was any discussion of Ms. Lewinsky's potential testimony.
    But once again, having lifted the lid and seen that their pot
    was empty, they ask you to find that the same signal that we
    now know did not encourage the filing of an affidavit was a
    signal to Ms. Lewinsky to lie if she was ever called to
    testify. But of course we have long known that there was no
    such signal. And the grand jury--as was so often the case, one
    of the jurors took it upon him or herself to ask that which the
    independent counsel chose not to. You have this before you, and
    you have seen it before:

        A JUROR: It is possible that you also had these discussions
    [about denying the relationship] after you learned that you
    were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
        [MS. LEWINSKY]: I don't believe so. No.
        A JUROR: Can you exclude that possibility?
        [MS. LEWINSKY]: I pretty much can. I really don't remember
    it. I mean, it would be very surprising for me to be confronted
    with something that would show me different, but I--it was 2:30
    in the--I mean, the conversation I'm thinking of mainly would
    have been December 17th, which was--
        A JUROR: The telephone call.
        [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in
    the morning. I remember the gist of it and I--I really don't
    think so.
        A JUROR: Thank you.

        But all of this is not enough to dissuade the managers.
        Now that they know that the only two participants in the
    relevant conversation denied that there was any discussion of
    either the affidavit or the testimony, they have created still
    another theory. As Manager Bryant told you last week--and in
    essence it was repeated today--``I don't care what was in Ms.
    Lewinsky's mind.''
        That is quite extraordinary. The only witness, the supposed
    victim of the obstruction, the person whose testimony is being
    influenced, says that it didn't happen. And the managers
    nonetheless want you to conclude, I assume, that some
    subliminal message was being conveyed that resulted in the
    filing of a false affidavit without the affiant knowing that
    she was being controlled by some unseen and unheard force. I
    won't comment further. Two more pillars lie in the dust.
        Next, the gifts. On this charge, the record is largely, but
    in critical respects not entirely, as the record has been from
    the beginning. Here is what it shows.
        On the morning of December 28, the President gave Ms.
    Lewinsky Christmas presents in token of her impending departure
    for New York. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she raised the
    subject of her subpoena and said something about getting the
    gifts out of her apartment, to which she herself has now told
    you the President either made no response or said something
    like, ``Let me think about it.''
        Betty Currie testified consistently that Ms. Lewinsky
    called her to ask her to pick up a box and hold them for her.
    Ms. Lewinsky has testified equally consistently, and testified
    again in her deposition, that it was her recollection that Ms.
    Currie called her and said that she understood she ``had
    something for her'' or perhaps even the President said, ``You
    have something for me.'' The President denies that he ever
    spoke to Betty Currie about picking up gifts from Monica
    Lewinsky. Betty Currie denies that the President ever asked her
    to pick up gifts from Monica Lewinsky.
        Ms. Lewinsky has stated on three occasions before her most
    recent deposition that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts at 2
    o'clock in the afternoon on the 28th. Having been shown the
    infamous 3:32 cell phone call, which had previously been
    trumpeted by the managers as absolute proof that it was Ms.
    Currie who called Ms. Lewinsky, who initiated the process, Ms.
    Lewinsky testified on Monday that Ms. Currie came to pick up
    the gifts sometime during the afternoon and that there had been
    other calls earlier in the day.
        But we learned at least a couple of interesting new things
    from Ms. Lewinsky on this subject.
        First, when she received her subpoena on December 19, 9
    days--9 days--before she spoke to the President about them, Ms.
    Lewinsky was frightened at the prospect that the Jones lawyers
    would search her apartment, and she began to think about
    concealing the gifts that she cared most about that would
    suggest some special relationship with the President. And as
    she told you, she herself decided then that she would turn over
    only what she described as the most innocuous gifts, and it was
    those gifts that she took with her to see her lawyer, Mr.
    Carter, on December 22.
        Thus, when she arrived to pick up her Christmas gifts from
    the President on December 28, she had already decided that she
    would not turn over all the gifts called for by the subpoena
    and had already segregated out the ones she intended to
    withhold. But she didn't tell the President about that.
    Instead, as she testified, she broached the question of what to
    do with the gifts and the possibility of giving them to Betty
    Currie, again without describing what had already occurred, to
    which the President either made no reply or said something
    like, ``I'll think about it.''
        This testimony sheds light on one of the issues that has
    troubled everyone who has tried to make sense out of what
    happened on that day. Why would the President, if he were
    really worried about Ms. Lewinsky's turning over gifts pursuant
    to the subpoena, give her more gifts? From our perspective, the
    answer has always been an easy one. He wouldn't have been
    concerned. He has testified that he was not concerned about
    gifts, that he gives them all the time to all sorts of people,
    and he wasn't worried about it.
        We know that from Ms. Lewinsky's perspective, as she
    explained in her deposition, it also made no difference that
    the President was giving her additional gifts, because she had
    already decided, having had the subpoena in hand for 9 days,
    that she would not turn them over.
        A second ray of light also shines on two aspects of the
    managers' case from Ms. Lewinsky's deposition.
        You may remember that as part of article I in their trial
    brief, the managers allege that the President lied to the grand
    jury--this is one of the never-ending list of possible
    perjuries--that he recalled saying to Ms. Lewinsky on December
    28 that she would have to ``turn over whatever she had'' when
    she raised the gift issue with him.
        The managers sought to obtain from Ms. Lewinsky testimony
    that would support that charge of perjury as well as the
    concealment charge under article II, but she turned that world
    upside down on both the perjury charge and the obstruction
    charge.
        When asked whether the President had ever said to her,
    ``You will have to give them whatever you have,'' or something
    like that, Ms. Lewinsky testified that FBI Agent Fallon of the
    OIC had interviewed her after the President's grand jury
    testimony, after they already knew what the President had said
    under oath, and asked her whether she recalled the President
    saying anything like that to her. I am sure somewhat to the
    surprise of Manager Bryant, she testified that she told Agent
    Fallon, ``That sounds familiar.''
        Now aside from the not-so-minor point that Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony corroborates the President's recollection of his
    response and undermines the charge in both article I and
    article II, a couple of other things are worth noting. As my
    colleague, Ms. Seligman, pointed out to you on Saturday, this
    was the first time after all Ms. Lewinsky's recorded versions
    of the events of December 28, that we had ever heard that the
    President's version sounded familiar to her. And second, there
    is not a single piece of paper--at least that we are aware of--
    in the entire universe turned over by the independent counsel,
    by the House, and thence to us that reflects the FBI's
    interview of Ms. Lewinsky. If she hadn't been honest enough to
    tell Manager Bryant about it, we and you would never have
    known.
        Senators, what else is there in the vaults of the
    independent counsel or in the memory of his agents that we
    don't know about?
        Another pillar down.
        The job search. It may have become tiresome to hear it, but
    any discussion of the job search must begin with Ms. Lewinsky's
    testimony oft repeated that no one promised her a job to
    influence her testimony. Remember my two themes: Moving
    targets, empty pots. They come together here. What the managers
    have presented to you in a series of different speculative
    theories, as each one is shown to be what it is, they move on
    to the next in the hope they will find one, someday, that
    actually has a connection to reality. But they cannot find that
    elusive theory; for the stubborn facts will not budge, nor will
    the stubborn denials by every participant in their mythical
    plot.
        Now we know that Monica Lewinsky's job search began in the
    summer of 1997, well in advance of her being involved in the
    Jones case. In October, she interviewed with U.N. Ambassador
    Richardson, was offered a job. She had her first meeting with
    Mr. Jordan early in November, well before she appeared in the
    Jones case. The next contact was actually before Thanksgiving
    when she made an effort to set up another meeting with Mr.
    Jordan and was told to call back after the holiday. She did, on
    December 8, and set up a meeting on December 11--again, before
    either she or Mr. Jordan knew that she was involved in the
    Jones case.
        On that date of December 11 which we have heard so much
    about, Mr. Jordan did open doors for Ms. Lewinsky in New York,
    but there was no inappropriate pressure. At American Express
    and Young & Rubicam she failed on her own, and at Revlon she
    succeeded on her own. As Mr. Jordan told the grand jury when
    asked whether there was any connection between his assistance
    to her and the Jones case, his answer was ``unequivocally,
    indubitably no.''
        In search of some evidence that Mr. Jordan's efforts were,
    indeed, triggering Ms. Lewinsky's status as a witness and
    therefore inappropriate, the managers focused on his January 8
    call to Mr. Perelman, the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes,
    admittedly a date known to Ms. Lewinsky, to Mr. Jordan, and to
    the President. Ms. Lewinsky had reported that her original
    interview had not gone well, although we know it actually had,
    and that her resume had already been sent over from MacAndrews
    & Forbes to Revlon where she ultimately was offered a job.
        Mr. Jordan was candid stating he went to the top because he
    wanted to get action if action could be had, but the record is
    clear that the woman involved at Revlon who interviewed Ms.
    Lewinsky had already made a decision to hire her. No one put
    any pressure on her. There was no special urgency. There was no
    fix. In fact, if you want it known what happens when Mr. Jordan
    calls the CEO of a company to get action, look at his call to
    the CEO of Young & Rubicam: No job; no job. They made an
    independent decision whether or not to hire Ms. Lewinsky.
        Other than the managers, there are only two people, as far
    as I can tell, who ever tried to create a link between the job
    search and the affidavit: Linda Tripp and Kenneth Starr. No
    one--not Ms. Lewinsky, not Mr. Jordan, not the President, no
    one--ever said anything to so much as suggest the existence of
    such a linkage, and the managers can find no proof; which is
    not to say they didn't try.
        Manager Hutchinson, you will recall, originally asked you
    to look at the events of January 5 when he said Ms. Lewinsky
    had met with her attorney, Mr. Carter, and then, according to
    the managers' account, Mr. Carter began drafting the affidavit
    and Ms. Lewinsky was so concerned that she called the President
    and he returned her call. The problem with that version, as my
    colleague, Mr. Kendall, showed you, was the affidavit wasn't
    drafted until January 6. Mr. Carter has so testified.
        The managers would also have you believe that Mr. Jordan
    was involved in drafting the affidavit and that he was involved
    in the deletion of language from the draft that suggested that
    she had been alone with the President. Ms. Lewinsky's and Mr.
    Jordan's testimony is essentially the same. They talked, Mr.
    Jordan listened--you recall him saying, ``Yes, she was talking,
    I was doodling,''--he called Mr. Carter, he transmitted to Mr.
    Carter some of her concerns, but he made it very clear to Ms.
    Lewinsky he wasn't her lawyer. And in words that will resonate
    forever, at least among the legal community, Mr. Jordan said,
    ``I don't do affidavits.'' And, of course, Mr. Carter himself
    testified it was his idea to delete the language about being
    alone.
        The very best the managers can do on this issue is to
    establish that Ms. Lewinsky talked to Mr. Jordan in the same
    conversation about the job search and about her affidavit. But
    as Mr. Jordan told you, Ms. Lewinsky was always talking about
    the job search, and he made it very clear to you that there was
    no linkage between the two.
        If we can play just a very brief section of Mr. Jordan's
    deposition.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. In your conversation with Ms. Lewinsky prior to the
    affidavit being signed, did you in fact talk to her about both
    the job and her concerns about parts of the affidavit?
        A. I have never in any conversation with Ms. Lewinsky
    talked to her about the job, on one hand, or job being
    interrelated with the conversation about the affidavit. The
    affidavit was over here. The job was over here.

        And of course we have already dispensed with the notion to
    the extent that the managers continue to assert that the
    President never discussed the contents of the affidavit with
    Ms. Lewinsky or even ever saw a draft.
        Recognizing that they would never be able to show that the
    inception of the job search was linked in any way to the
    affidavit, the managers developed a theory which they have
    advanced to you that the President committed obstruction of
    justice when the job search assistance became, in their words,
    ``totally interconnected, intertwined, interrelated,'' with the
    filing of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.
        The problem the managers have had, however, is that they
    have not been able to figure out when this occurred, why it
    occurred, or how it occurred. Think back on how many versions
    of their theory you have heard just in the last few weeks.
    First, it all started on December 11 when Judge Wright issued
    her order permitting Jones' lawyers to take depositions to
    prove that the President had relations with other women. That
    was what galvanized the President and Mr. Jordan to make real
    efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky a job.
        Woops, didn't quite fit the facts.
        Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and made calls to
    prospective employers before the order was issued. Let's try
    this. Second, well, it wasn't really the 11th, it was the 5th
    when the witness list came out. But they had already told you
    in a trial brief quite explicitly, and in the majority report
    of the committee to the Congress, that there was ``no
    urgency.'' Those were their words; there was ``no urgency''
    after December 5. I am a city boy, but that dog went back to
    sleep.
        Third, as Manager Hutchinson told you on Saturday, what
    really happened was that by December 17 the President had ``got
    the job search moving'' and thought ``maybe she is now more
    receptive,'' and that is why he called Ms. Lewinsky on the 17th
    and told her she was on the witness list.
        Nice try. No facts.
        I don't know whether this chart, which Manager Hutchinson
    used, was intended to speak for itself or to be elucidated by
    his own comments, but let's look at it. ``December 5th, witness
    list--Lewinsky,'' exclamation point. Her name is on it.
    ``December 6: President meets with attorneys on witness list.''
        True.
        ``December 7th: President and Jordan meet.''
        That is also true, but we know they didn't talk about
    Monica Lewinsky. I am not quite sure why it is there.
        ``December 8th: Lewinsky sets up a meeting with Jordan for
    the 11th.''
        True. At that point, she doesn't know she is on the list
    and Mr. Jordan doesn't know she is on the list.
        ``December 11th: Lewinsky job meeting with Jordan.''
        Yes, true. But as we know, well before Judge Wright's order
    came out, the two of them still don't know that her name is on
    the witness list.
        December 17th was the calls.
        True. They are on the list.
        On December 19, the subpoena was served.
        True.
        ``December 28: President and Lewinsky meet; evidence
    (gifts) concealed.''
        True, but I am not sure what that means in this context.
        Last, interestingly, was breakfast at the Park Hyatt.
    ``More evidence at risk.''
        It is clear that if you string all of these events together
    and you have a theory that will link them all together, you
    have made some progress. There is only one problem: Other than
    what we know to be true on this list, there is nothing other
    than surmise that links them together in any fashion that one
    could consider improper or certainly illegal. But that is, in
    essence, where the managers have brought us in their
    theorizing, for their fourth theory is that the pressure did
    not really begin to build until Ms. Lewinsky was actually
    subpoenaed and began to prepare an affidavit.
        On this theory, a call to Mr. Perelman was the final step--
    going right to the top of MacAndrews & Forbes to make
    absolutely sure that Ms. Lewinsky stayed on the team. But here
    there are other facts with which to deal. For example, look
    what happened--or more importantly, didn't happen--on December
    19. On that day, Monica Lewinsky came, weeping, to Mr. Jordan's
    office carrying with her the dreaded subpoena. Mr. Jordan
    called the President and visited with him that evening. And you
    will recall that they talked in very candid terms to the
    President about their relationship. Wouldn't one think that if
    the President was, in fact, engaged in some scheme to use a job
    in New York to influence Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, this would
    be the critical moment, that some immediate steps would be
    taken to be absolutely sure that there was a job for her? But
    what do we find? Mr. Jordan takes no further action on the job
    front until January 8.
        There was never so much as a passing reference concerning
    any connection between the job search and the affidavit among
    any of the three participants--any of them--because there was
    not one conversation that anyone could conclude was designed to
    implement this nefarious scheme that the managers would have
    you find. So now we have an entirely new theory--the ``one-man
    conspiracy,'' a beast unknown, I think, to Anglo-American
    jurisprudence.
        The fact that Ms. Lewinsky--this is on the managers'
    theory--didn't know she was on the witness list until December
    17, and Mr. Jordan didn't know about it until she was
    subpoenaed on the 19th, and Mr. Perelman never knew it, all are
    ``proof positive'' that the President himself was the
    ``mastermind'' pulling on unseen strings and influencing the
    participants in this drama, without their even knowing that
    they were being influenced. Under this theory--the latest in a
    long line--Ms. Lewinsky's denial that she ever discussed the
    contents of her affidavit with the President, her denial that
    there was any connection between the job and her testimony, Mr.
    Jordan's denial that there was ever a connection between his
    efforts to find her a job and the affidavit, and the fact that
    Mr. Jordan never discussed any such connection with the
    President, are simply evidence of the fact that there must have
    been such a connection; that unbeknownst to Ms. Lewinsky, she
    was being corruptly encouraged to file a false affidavit. With
    all due respect, somebody has been watching too many reruns of
    ``The X-Files.''
        Confronted with this problem, the managers now offer you
    one last theory. With ever-increasing directness, they now
    accuse Mr. Jordan himself of obstructing justice by urging Ms.
    Lewinsky to destroy her notes. Seemingly, they ask you to
    find--even in the face of Mr. Jordan's forceful denials--that
    one who would forget a breakfast at the Park Hyatt until
    reminded of it by being shown the receipt, and who then
    admitted his recollection was refreshed and would admit that he
    remembered a discussion of the notes, must have obstructed
    justice himself. And, of course, he must have been engaged all
    along with an effort to influence Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on
    behalf of the President.
        Nonsense. Nonsense. And so this pillar returns to the dust
    from which it came.
        Next, the events surrounding Mr. Bennett's statement to
    Judge Wright during the Jones deposition formed the basis for
    two charges: First, that the President obstructed justice in
    the Jones case; second, that he committed perjury by telling
    the grand jury that he really wasn't paying attention at the
    critical moment.
        Both charges depend on the managers' ability to prove that,
    indeed, the President had been paying attention. To do that,
    they always rely on the videotape of the deposition in which it
    can be seen that the President was looking in the direction of
    his lawyer while Mr. Bennett was talking.
        But 2 weeks ago, they came to you and they produced, with a
    modest flourish, a new bit of evidence--an affidavit from Mr.
    Barry Ward, clerk to Judge Wright, trumpeted, in their words,
    as ``lending even greater credence to their crime.'' In their
    memorandum in support of their request to expand the record by
    including Mr. Ward's affidavit, the managers told you the
    following, and this is the managers' own language:

        From his seat at the conference table next to the judge, he
    saw President Clinton listening attentively to Mr. Bennett's
    remarks, while the exchange between Mr. Bennett and the judge
    occurred.

        Then they said:

        Mr. Ward's declaration would lend even greater credence to
    the argument that President Clinton lied on this point during
    his grand jury testimony and obstructed justice by allowing his
    attorney to utilize a false affidavit in order to cut off a
    legitimate line of questioning. Mr. Ward's declaration proves
    that Mr. Ward saw President Clinton listening attentively while
    the exchange between Mr. Bennett and the presiding judge
    concurred.

        But this is what Mr. Ward's affidavit actually says. The
    affidavit was attached to the very motion the language of which
    I just read to you. I direct your attention only to the last
    sentence, because this is the only one of any moment: ``From my
    position at the conference table, I observed President Clinton
    looking directly at Mr. Bennett while this statement was being
    made.''
        Search if you will for any evidence relating to whether the
    President was looking attentively or not. There is not one iota
    of evidence added by the videotape. You were misled. Indeed,
    Mr. Ward said to the Legal Times on February 1, 1999, ``I have
    no idea if he was paying attention. He could have been thinking
    about policy initiatives, for all I know.'' You were misled.
        The record before the affidavit is the record after the
    affidavit. The managers ask that you remove the President of
    the United States on the basis of the videotape showing that he
    was looking in the direction of his lawyer.
        It was not much of a pillar to start with.
        There is no dispute of the conversation of January 18
    between the President and Ms. Currie. There is no dispute that
    President Clinton called Ms. Currie into the White House on
    Sunday, January 18, the day after his deposition, and asked her
    certain questions and made certain statements about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The only dispute is whether, in
    doing so, the President intended to tamper with a witness. The
    managers contend that he was corruptly attempting to influence
    Ms. Currie's testimony. The President denies it.
        Since we know that Ms. Currie was not on the Jones witness
    list at the time of the President's deposition, or at the time
    of either of the conversations with Ms. Currie, and we know
    that discovery was about to end, the managers have argued that
    the President's own references to her in the Jones deposition
    constituted an invitation to the Jones lawyers to subpoena her.
    They argue that proof of that invitation can be found in the
    witness list signed by the Jones lawyers on January 22, which
    listed Ms. Currie and other potential witnesses.
        When I spoke to you on January 19, I told you that Ms.
    Currie had never been placed on the witness list. I was wrong.
    Manager Hutchinson has quite properly taken me to task for it.
    But I fear that he became so caught up in this information that
    he has lost sight of its true significance, or rather a lack
    thereof.
        In order to convince you that Betty Currie was going to be
    called by the Jones lawyer when the President spoke to her on
    January 18, the managers, somewhat like Diogenes, lit their
    lantern and sought out the most reliable witness they could
    find, a witness whose credibility was beyond question, who had
    no ulterior motive, no bias--Paula Jones' lawyer. They brought
    it to you in a form that they hoped would allow his motive and
    bias to go untested.
        Remember how the managers told you that it is important to
    look a witness in the eye to test his demeanor. I doubt that
    you need to do that to understand what might color Mr. Holmes'
    view of the world. Let's look at what he had to say. You have
    in the exhibits before you an unredacted witness list attached
    to Mr. Holmes' affidavit. I have put up on the easels the
    redacted list as it was originally used by the managers a few
    weeks ago because I really see no purpose in unduly exposing
    the names of the people who are on that witness list. But let
    me direct you to these words just to highlight it: ``Under
    Seal.''
        You will remember that the President has been criticized
    for violating a gag order when he spoke to his own secretary
    about his deposition. What then do we say when the managers
    produce a document from a lawyer for one of the parties that is
    still under seal, not yet released by the court, and reveals
    the names of individuals who are no part of these proceedings?
    Surely the managers could have made their point just as well
    without such a revelation.
        Mr. Holmes states that the Jones lawyers had two reasons
    for putting Ms. Currie's name on the witness list: One, because
    of President Clinton's deposition testimony; and, two, because
    they had ``received what they considered to be reliable
    information that Ms. Currie was instrumental in facilitating
    Monica Lewinsky's meetings with Mr. Clinton and that Ms. Currie
    was central to the cover story Mr. Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky had
    developed to use in the event their affair was discovered.''
    They don't tell us where he got this reliable information. But
    of course we know.
        Let's figure out whether in fact Betty Currie really made
    it on the list because of the President's testimony. If you
    look at the number of times she is mentioned in the deposition,
    it becomes conventional wisdom that the President inserted her
    name into his testimony so frequently and so gratuitously that
    he did in fact invite the Jones lawyers to call her and, thus,
    must have known that she was going to be a witness when he
    spoke to her on January 18. But if you look at the deposition,
    you will find that the first time her name is mentioned, the
    President is simply responding to a question about his earlier
    meetings with Ms. Lewinsky and stated that Betty was present.
        The lawyers for the plaintiff then asked 13 questions, give
    or take a few, about Ms. Currie. We know there is no secret
    here. They got their information from Linda Tripp. And Linda
    Tripp surely told them about Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with
    Ms. Currie. It was only in response to a couple of their
    questions about whether letters had ever been delivered to Ms.
    Currie and whether she stated at some extraordinarily late hour
    that the President said, ``You'll have to ask her.'' He did not
    invite, he did not suggest to them that they call Ms. Currie.
    They knew, whatever they needed to know about Ms. Currie, to
    put her on their witness list.
        To judge further whether Ms. Currie made it on the list
    because of the President's invitation, or because they already
    knew about witnesses from Ms. Tripp, let me direct your
    attention--if you look at the exhibit in front of you rather
    than the redacted version here, the first listed on the witness
    list is No. 165. Her name does not come up at all in the
    deposition. But we know that she was in fact the subject of
    conversation surreptitiously recorded between Ms. Tripp and Ms.
    Lewinsky. And note that the name of Vernon Jordan is not on the
    list. They are the ones, the Jones lawyers are the ones, who
    first bring them up. And we know, of course, that they knew
    from Ms. Tripp that he was already involved in this scenario.
        Thus, neither the January 22 witness list nor Mr. Holmes'
    affidavit supported the managers' theory. The President did not
    know that Ms. Currie would be a witness when he spoke to her
    after her deposition, and he could not, therefore, have
    tampered with the witness.
        Well beyond their statement about how they got this
    information, Mr. Holmes volunteers that they didn't get it from
    the Washington Post, or perhaps not. But it is clear that in
    the days after the Post article, we know that some of the names
    on the list came from the press reports, we know that Jones
    lawyers began tracking the newly public activities of the
    independent counsel, which was issuing its own subpoenas in the
    hours and days following the lawyers' release. And for some
    insight into what they believe the independent counsel thought
    was going on, look at the pleading they filed with Judge Wright
    on Wednesday, January 28, to prevent the Jones lawyers from
    continuing to use their investigation as an aid--that is, the
    independent counsel's investigation--as an aid to civil
    discovery.
        The pleading said, ``As recently as this afternoon,
    plaintiff's counsel caused process to be served on Betty Currie
    who appeared before the grand jury in Washington yesterday.
    Such deliberate and calculated shadowing of the grand jury's
    investigation will necessarily pierce the veil of grand jury
    secrecy.''
        The managers have criticized us for ignoring the second
    conversation between the President and Ms. Currie, suggesting
    that I suppose it takes on an even more sinister cast than the
    first. But there is simply nothing of any substance to take
    from this second conversation that adds to the events of
    January 18. It is clear that the conversation occurred on
    Tuesday, January 20, before the Starr investigation became
    public. The managers disingenuously have suggested in their
    exhibit, the one they distributed on Saturday, that this
    conversation occurred after the Post story appeared. If you
    look at the exhibit that was used on Saturday, you will see:
    January 20, Post story is known. Of course, that's late at
    night. January 21, Post story was on the Internet. The
    President calls Betty for 20 minutes. And then sort of sneaking
    it in down here, January 20 or 21, President coaches Currie for
    the second time.
        But the record shows this: Ms. Currie has said that the
    conversation occurred ``whenever the President was next in the
    White House.'' That is after the Sunday conversation. And that
    was Tuesday, the 20th, the day after the Martin Luther King
    holiday. Thus, the second conversation is of no greater legal
    significance than the first since the President knew no more
    about Ms. Currie's status as a witness on Tuesday than he did
    on Sunday.
        In sum, the managers have tried to convince you that the
    President knew or must have known that Betty Currie would be a
    witness in the Jones case. If anything, we now know that the
    reason she was put on the January 22 list, along with many
    others, had more to do with Linda Tripp than anything else.
        But putting this aside for the moment; that is, putting
    aside the question whether the President could have had any
    reason to believe that Ms. Currie would be a witness, look at
    whether Ms. Currie herself believed that she was being
    corruptly influenced on January 18. In response to continuing
    efforts by the prosecutors to get her to admit that she felt
    some untoward pressure from the President, she testified--and
    you have seen this before as well:

        . . . did you feel pressured when he told you those statements?
        A. None whatsoever.
        Q. What did you think, or what was going through your mind about
    what he was doing?
        A. At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked
    or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.
              * * * * *
        Q. That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because he
    would end each of the statements with ``Rights?,'' with a question.
        A. I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would
    say, ``Right?'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
        Q. But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and
    you could either say whether it was true or not true.
        A. Correct.
        Q. Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
        A. None.

        So on a human level, we have the President, who has just
    seen his worst nightmare come true, and who knows that he is
    about to face a press tidal wave that will wash over him and
    his family and the country, and we have his secretary who knows
    of, indeed has been a part of, his relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky but knows nothing about the long-since ended improper
    aspects of that relationship--we have a conversation that was
    the product of the emotions that were churning through the
    President's very soul on that day. What we do not have is an
    attempt to corruptly influence the testimony of the witness.
        Only one pillar left. The managers ask the Senate to find
    that the President's conversations with Mr. Blumenthal and
    other aides was an effort to influence their testimony before
    the grand jury. Their theory, much as was true of some of their
    other theories, flounders on shoals that they don't account
    for. As they would have it, in the days immediately following
    the Lewinsky story, the President spoke with a few members of
    his senior staff, as they would allege, knowing that they would
    probably be grand jury witnesses and misled them about his
    relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that they would convey that
    misinformation to the grand jury when they were called.
        Now, just so that you can see for yourself what the
    President testified to in the grand jury on the subject, I want
    to play about 3 or 4 minutes of that testimony for you.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. If they testified that you denied sexual relations or
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky, or if they told us that you denied
    that, do you have any reason to doubt them, in the days after the story
    broke; do you have any reason to doubt them?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. No. The--let me say this. It's no secret to
    anybody that I hoped that this relationship would never become public.
    It's a matter of fact that it had been many, many months since there
    had been anything improper about it, in terms of improper contact. I--
        Q. Did you deny it to them or not, Mr. President?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. Let me finish. So, what--I did not want to
    mislead my friends, but I wanted find language where I could say that.
    I also, frankly, did not want to turn any of them into witnesses,
    because I--and, sure enough, they all became witnesses.
        Q. Well, you knew they might be----
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. And so----
        Q.--witnesses, didn't you?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. And so I said to them things that were true
    about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said,
    there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not
    had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I
    would never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of
    course. But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter
    further. So, I said things that were true. They may have been
    misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it and
    I'm sorry.
        Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after
    January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was
    looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that
    they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I
    said after that. I may have said something to all these people to that
    effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said,
    look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or
    give you information that could get you in trouble. I just wouldn't
    talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about this.
        Q. If all of these people--let's leave out Mrs. Currie for a
    minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes,
    Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge
    Starr's involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you
    denied a sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. No.
        Q. And You have told us that you----
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told
    you what I meant by it when they started this deposition.
        Q. You have told us now that you were being careful, but that it
    might have been misleading. Is that correct?
        PRESIDENT CLINTON. It might have been. Since we have seen this
    four-year, $40-million-investigation come down to parsing the
    definition of sex, I think it might have been. I don't think at the
    time that I thought that's what this was going to be about. In fact, if
    you remember the headlines at the time, even you mentioned the Post
    story. All the headlines were--and all the talking, people who talked
    about this, including a lot who have been quite sympathetic to your
    operation, said, well, this is not really a story about sex, or this is
    a story about subornation of perjury and these talking points, and all
    this other stuff. So, what I was trying to do was to give them
    something they could--that would be true, even if misleading in the
    context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's
    deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion
    that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other
    words.

        It is clear from that excerpt, I think, that in the hours
    and days immediately following the release of the Post story,
    the President was struggling with two competing concerns: How
    to give some explanation to the men and women he worked with
    every day, and worked with most closely, without putting them
    in a position of being grand jury witnesses. But he was not in
    any sense seeking to tamper with them or to obstruct the grand
    jury's investigation.
        Putting aside for the moment our strenuous disagreement
    both with the factual underpinning of and the legal conclusions
    that flow from the managers' analysis of these events, I find
    it difficult to figure out how it is that they believe the
    President intended that his statement to Mr. Blumenthal or his
    statement to Mr. Podesta would involve their conveying false
    information to the grand jury, or that he sought in some
    fashion to send that message to the grand jury when, at the
    very moment that those aides were first subpoenaed, he asserted
    executive privilege to prevent them from testifying before the
    grand jury. For someone who wanted Mr. Blumenthal to serve, as
    the managers would have it, as his messenger of lies, that is
    strange behavior indeed.
        There is an issue here that I don't really want to get into
    at length, and I, not having heard the last 2 hours of the
    managers' presentation, don't know whether they are going to
    get into, and that is Manager Graham's favorite issue, the
    question of whether there was some scheme to smear Monica
    Lewinsky--early, middle, or late. Other than to say that no
    such plan ever existed, I just want to ask the managers this.
    Although I must admit that for the first time in my life I have
    heard Marlene Dietrich's name used as a pejorative--what was
    Manager Bryant saying about Ms. Lewinsky? That she was lying?
    That she misled the managers? That because her testimony helped
    the President, they were now going to attack her character and
    her integrity? I don't know how many of you have seen ``Witness
    For The Prosecution,'' either before or after Mr. Bryant used
    that example, but ask yourselves: What was he saying? What was
    he doing?
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I don't know whether
    there is a market for used pillars, but they are all lying in
    the dust.
        It is difficult for me as a lawyer, as an advocate for my
    client, to speak to this body about lofty constitutional
    principles without seeming merely to engage in empty rhetoric.
    But I would like to think, I guess, that if there were ever a
    forum in which I could venture into that realm, be excused for
    doing so, could be heard without the intervening filter of
    skepticism that I fear too often lies between lawyer and
    listener, this is the time and this is the moment. Only once
    before in our Nation's history has any lawyer had the
    opportunity to make a closing argument on behalf of the
    President of the United States and only once before has the
    Senate ever had to sit in judgment on the head of the executive
    branch.
        We all must cast an eye to the past, looking over our
    shoulders to be sure that we have learned the right lessons
    from those who have sat in this Chamber before us. But we also
    must look to the future, to be sure that we leave the right
    lessons to those who come after us. We hope that no one will
    ever have need of them, but if they should, we owe them not
    only the proper judgment for today but the proper judgment for
    all time.
        You have heard the managers tell you very early on in these
    meetings that we have advanced a ``so what'' defense; that we
    are saying the President's conduct is really nothing to be
    concerned about; that we should all simply go home and ignore
    what he has done. And that, of course, to choose a word that
    would have been familiar to the framers themselves, is
    balderdash.
        If you want to see ``so what'' in action, look elsewhere.
    ``So what'' if the framers reserved impeachment and removal for
    only those offenses that threaten the state? ``So what'' if the
    House Judiciary Committee didn't quite do their constitutional
    job, if they took the independent counsel's referral and added
    a few frills and then washed their hands of it? ``So what'' if
    the House approved articles that wouldn't pass muster in any
    court in the land? ``So what'' if the managers have been
    creating their own theories of impeachment as they go long? And
    ``so what,'' and ``so what,'' and ``so what?''
        By contrast, what we offer is not ``so what,'' but this:
    Ask what the framers handed down to us as the standard for
    removing a President. Ask what impeachment and removal would
    mean to our system of government in years to come. Ask what you
    always ask in this Chamber: What is best for the country? No,
    the President wouldn't allow any of us to say ``so what,'' to
    so much as suggest that what he has done can simply be
    forgotten. He has asked for forgiveness from his family and
    from the American people, and he has asked for the opportunity
    to earn back their trust.
        In his opening remarks, Manager Hyde questioned whether
    this President can represent the interests of our country in
    the world. Go to Ireland and ask that question. Go to Israel
    and Gaza and ask that question. If you doubt whether he should,
    here at home, continue in office, ask the parent whose child
    walks safer streets or the men and women who go off to work in
    the morning to good jobs.
        We are together, I think, weavers of a constitutional
    fabric in which all of us now are clothed and generations will
    be clothed for millennia to come. We cannot leave even the
    smallest flaw in that fabric, for if we do, one day someone
    will come along and pull a thread and the flaw will grow and it
    will eat away at the fabric around it and soon the entire cloth
    will begin to unravel. We must be as close to perfect in what
    we do here today as women and men are capable of being. If
    there is doubt about our course, surely we must take special
    care, as we hold the fabric of democracy in our hands, to leave
    it as we found it, tightly woven and strong.
        Before today I wrote down the following: ``The rules say
    that the managers will have the last word.'' The rules today
    say the managers will have the last paragraphs. But that truly
    isn't so, because even when they are finished, theirs will not
    be the last voices you hear. Yes, one or more of them will now
    rise and come to the podium and tell you that they have the
    right of it and we the wrong, that our sense of what the
    Constitution demands is not theirs and should not be yours.
    That is their privilege.
        But as each of them does come before you for the final
    time, and as you listen to them, I know that you will hear not
    their eloquence, as grand as it may be; not the pointed jibes
    of Manager Hutchinson nor the stentorian tones of Manager Rogan
    nor the homespun homilies of Manager Graham nor the grave
    exhortations of Manager Hyde, but voices of greater eloquence
    than any of us can muster, the voices of Madison and Hamilton
    and the others who met in Philadelphia 212 years ago, and the
    voices of the generations since, and the voices of the American
    people now, and the voices of generations to come. These, not
    the voices of mere advocates, must be your guide.
        It has been an honor for all of us to appear before you in
    these last weeks on behalf of the President. And now our last
    words to you, which are the words I began with: William
    Jefferson Clinton is not guilty of the charges that have been
    brought against him. He did not commit perjury. He did not
    commit obstruction of justice. He must not be removed from
    office.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                                     Recess

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we take a
    15-minute recess.
        There being no objection, at 4:19 p.m. the Senate recessed
    until 4:41 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called
    to order by the Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order. The Chair
    recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe now we are ready to
    proceed with the managers from the House. I understand that
    they do have a 2-hour presentation. I will look for guidance
    from the Chief Justice about whether we should take a break for
    the last 45 minutes--that would be after Mr. Manager Rogan--if
    at all.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Very well.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager McCollum.
        Mr. Manager McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice and
    Members of the Senate.
        At the outset of my closing remarks, I would like to lay
    the record straight on a couple of matters. With all due
    deference to White House counsel, the suggestion that Mr. Ruff
    made at the beginning of his closing, that we were somehow
    being unfair to him on the timing today of the rebuttal, seems
    to me to be a little strained. ``Methinks thou doth protest too
    much,'' was a remark I used earlier, a quote from Shakespeare,
    and I think it is appropriate here, too, because if you recall,
    we had no rebuttal at all as you normally would have in the end
    of our case, to begin with. Secondly, we thought we ought to
    have live witnesses here. We haven't had those. The list could
    go on. I really don't think we are being unfair.
        Secondly, I would like to make one correction and make a
    clear point. I am sure it was not intended, but in your
    remarks, I believe, Mr. Ruff, you indicated there was no
    history with regard to ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard.
    Maybe I misunderstood that, but I want the record to be clear
    that in the Claiborne case there was, in fact, a vote that took
    place here in the case of Judge Claiborne, 75-17, saying that
    that standard did not apply to impeachment cases.
        Having said that, I would like to move on to my own
    thoughts. Notwithstanding the clever and resourceful arguments
    that White House counsel have made to you today, and in the
    past few weeks, I suspect that most of you--probably more than
    two-thirds--believe that the President did, indeed, commit
    most, if not all, of the crimes he is charged with under these
    articles of impeachment. I suspect that a great many of you
    share my view that these are high crimes and misdemeanors.
        But nonetheless, it is my understanding that some of you
    who share these views are not prepared to vote to convict the
    President and remove him from office. That instead, you are of
    the mind at the moment--subject to our persuading you
    otherwise--in your own debate, to acquit him.
        Ultimately, the choice is yours, not ours. But I would like
    to spend a few moments with you reviewing just a few of the
    facts--not many--and suggesting to you what I believe we
    managers believe would be some very significant negative
    consequences of failing to remove this President.
        Having heard all of the evidence over the past few days and
    weeks, there should be little doubt that beginning in December
    1997 William Jefferson Clinton set out on a course of conduct
    designed to keep from the Jones court the true nature of his
    relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Once he knew he would have
    to testify, he knew he was going to lie in his deposition. And
    he knew he was going to have to lie, not only himself but get
    Monica Lewinsky to lie--if he was going to be successful--and
    he was going to have to get his personal secretary to lie about
    his relationship, and have his aides and others help cover them
    up if he would be successful in lying in the Jones court
    deposition.
        He did all of these things. And then he chose to lie to the
    grand jury again, because if he did not, he would have not been
    able to protect himself from the crimes he had already
    committed.
        No amount of arguments by White House counsel can erase one
    simple fact: If you believe Monica Lewinsky, you cannot believe
    the President. If you believe Monica Lewinsky, the President
    committed most of the crimes with which he is charged in these
    arguments today.
        For example, while the President did not directly tell her
    to lie, he never advised her what to put in her affidavit, she
    knew from the December 17 telephone conversation with the
    President that he meant for her to lie about the relationship
    and file a false affidavit, and he would lie as well.
        I want to refresh your recollection. These charts we put up
    some time before--you have them in front of you. This is a
    direct quote from her. We showed this on television Saturday,
    where she was reading from her grand jury deposition and
    confirming, this is, indeed, what she said and what she--her
    interpretation of that affidavit, phone conversation, despite
    everything else you heard.
        She said:

        For me, the best way to explain how I feel what happened
    was, you know, no one asked me or encouraged me to lie, but no
    one discouraged me either. . . .
    . . . It wasn't as if the President called me and said, ``You
    know, Monica you're on the witness list, this is going to be
    really hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth and
    be humiliated in front of the entire world about what we've
    done,'' which I would have fought him on probably. That was
    different. And by him not calling me and saying that, you know,
    I knew what that meant. . . .

        ``I knew what that meant.''
        She lied in that affidavit. The President, clearly,
    intended to influence her by suggesting the affidavit and all
    the other things that went on in that conversation, and all of
    the circumstances that were there.
        Monica Lewinsky was equally clear in her testimony to you
    Saturday that Betty Currie called her about the gifts, not the
    other way around. And surely nobody believes that Betty Currie
    would have called Monica Lewinsky about the gifts on December
    28 unless the President had asked her to do so.
        Then the day after the President's deposition in the Jones
    case, the President clearly committed the crimes of witness
    tampering and obstruction of justice when, in logical
    anticipation of Betty Currie being called as a witness, he said
    to Betty Currie: ``You were always there when she was there,
    right? We were never really alone. You could see and hear
    everything. Monica came on to me and I never touched her,
    right? She wanted to have sex with me and I can't do that.''
        I am not going to rehash all of the evidence in this case
    again, but it is my understanding that some of you may be
    prepared to vote to convict the President on obstruction of
    justice and not on perjury. I don't know how you can do that. I
    honestly don't know how anybody can do that. If you believe
    Sidney Blumenthal's testimony that the President told him that
    Monica Lewinsky came at him and made a sexual demand and that
    he rebuffed her and that she threatened him and said she would
    tell people they had an affair, and that she was known as a
    stalker among her peers, surely you must conclude that the
    President committed perjury when he told the grand jury that he
    told his aides, including Blumenthal, nothing but the truth,
    even if misleading.
        The exact quotes, people are worried about the exact
    quotes. What are the words?

        And so I said to them things that were true about this
    relationship . . . so, I said things that were true. They may
    have been misleading . . . so, what I was trying to do was to
    give them something that could--that would be true, even if
    misleading. . . .

        That was played on television in the White House
    presentation a few minutes ago. That was perjury. What he told
    Sidney Blumenthal was not true. It wasn't just misleading, it
    was not true. He knew it was not true and it was perjury in
    front of the grand jury.
        If you believe the President committed the crimes of
    witness tampering and obstruction of justice when he called
    Betty Currie to his office the day after his deposition and
    told her, ``You were always there when she was, right''--the
    ones I just read to you, and the other statements to coach
    her--surely you must also conclude that the President committed
    perjury before the grand jury when he told the grand jurors his
    purpose in making these statements.
        These are his exact words to the grand jurors:

        I was trying to figure out what the facts were. I was
    trying to remember. I was trying to remember every time I had
    seen Ms. Lewinsky.

        That is not true. He knew that was not true. That is not
    what he was doing. No one can rationally reason that that is
    what he was trying to do when he made the coaching statements
    to Ms. Currie. That was perjury in front of the grand jury.
        We have heard a lot of talk about the civil deposition.
    Nobody is trying to prove up that deposition or is lying in
    here today. Nobody is trying to use that as a duplication or
    anything else of the sort. But the President said before the
    grand jurors:

        My goal--

        Talking about the Jones case deposition--

    in this deposition was to be truthful . . . .

        That is the lie. That is the perjury. That is as simple as
    the second count of the perjury article is. Does anybody
    believe, after hearing all of this, that the goal of the
    President in the Jones deposition was to be truthful? He lied
    to the grand jury and committed perjury.
        Last but not least, if you believe Monica Lewinsky about
    the acts of a sexual nature that they engaged in, how can you
    not conclude the President committed perjury when he
    specifically denied those acts? Those were very explicit. Mr.
    Ruff suggested that maybe this is a subjective question. Maybe
    about the interpretation of the definition you might call it
    subjective. We are not going to go over it again today, but he
    used specific words that he confirmed were in that definition
    and said, ``I did not do those things. I did not touch those
    parts.'' Monica Lewinsky, if you believe her, testified that he
    did do those things--many times.
        He committed perjury when he said he didn't do those
    things, if you believe Monica Lewinsky. If you are going to
    vote to convict the President on the articles of impeachment
    regarding obstruction of justice, I urge you in the strongest
    way to also vote to convict him on the perjury article as well.
    I think you would be doing a disservice not to do that, and it
    would be sending a terrible message about perjury and the
    seriousness of it for history and to the American people.
        As you have seen in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
    which Mr. Ruff talked about a while ago, perjury and
    obstruction of justice do have, under the baseline guidelines,
    a higher amount of sentencing than simple, plain ``vanilla''
    bribery does. That is where they start. He is right, you can
    get enhancements for aggravating circumstances for bribery in
    certain cases, and you can get a greater sentence. But so can
    you get a greater sentence for perjury if there was a
    significant effort to wrongfully influence the administration
    of justice, for example; and you can get a significantly
    enhanced sentence for perjury if you committed perjury, and so
    on.
        We didn't choose to bring up a litany and show all the
    enhancements. Of course, you can do that. But for the pure
    base, there is no question about it.
        The other significant thing that you will recall I brought
    up--some of us did--a couple of weeks ago is witness bribery.
    Bribing a witness is treated more severely under sentencing
    guidelines for base sentencing than ordinary bribery is.
    Clearly, all three are high crimes and misdemeanors.
        What are the consequences of failing to remove this
    President from office if you believe he committed the crimes of
    perjury and obstruction of justice? What are the consequences
    of failing to do that? What is the downside?
        First, at the very least, you will leave a precedent of
    doubt as to whether perjury and obstruction of justice are high
    crimes and misdemeanors in impeaching the President. In fact,
    your vote to acquit under these circumstances may well mean
    that no President in the future will ever be impeached or
    removed for perjury or obstruction of justice. Is that the
    record you want?
        Second, you will be establishing the precedent that the
    standard for impeachment and removal of a President is
    different from that of impeaching or removing a judge or any
    other official while, arguably--although it never happened--a
    Federal judge could be removed for the lesser standard under
    the good behavior clause of the Constitution. Such a removal
    would have to be by a separate tribunal, by a procedure set by
    statute, because under the impeachment provisions of the
    Constitution which all judges have been removed under
    previously, the same single standard exists for removing the
    President as for removing a judge. That standard is that you
    have to have treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
    misdemeanors.
        So while the Constitution on its face does not make a
    distinction for removing a President or removing a judge, if
    you vote to acquit, believing that the President committed
    perjury and obstruction of justice, for all times you are going
    to set a precedent that there is such a distinction.
        Third, if you believe the President committed the crimes of
    perjury and obstruction of justice and that they are high
    crimes and misdemeanors, but you do not believe a President
    should be removed when economic times are good and it is
    strongly against the popular will to do so, by voting to acquit
    you will be setting a precedent for future impeachment trials.
        Can you imagine how damaging that could be to our
    constitutional form of government, to set the precedent that no
    President will be removed from office for high crimes and
    misdemeanors unless the polls show that the public wants that
    to happen? Would our Founding Fathers have ever envisioned
    that? Of course not. Our Constitution was structured to avoid
    this very situation.
        Fourth, what happens to the rule of law if you vote to
    acquit? What damage is done for future generations by a vote to
    acquit? Will more witnesses be inclined to commit perjury in
    trials? Will more jurors decide that perjury and obstruction of
    justice should not be crimes for which they convict? No
    military officer, no Cabinet official, no judge, no CEO of a
    major corporation, no president of a university, no principal
    of a public school in this Nation would remain in office, no
    matter how popular they were, if they committed perjury and
    obstruction of justice as charged here.
        To vote to acquit puts the President on a pedestal which
    says that, as long as he is popular, we are going to treat him
    differently with regard to keeping his job than any other
    person in any other position of public trust in the United
    States of America. The President is the Commander in Chief; he
    is the chief law enforcement officer; he is the man who
    appoints the Cabinet; he appoints the judges.
        Are you going to put on the record books the precedent that
    all who serve under the President and whom he has appointed
    will be held to a higher standard than the President? What
    legacy to history is this? What mischief have you wrought to
    our Constitution, to our system of government, to the values
    and principles cherished by future generations of Americans?
    All this because--I guess this is the argument--Clinton was
    elected and is popular with the people? All this, when it is
    clear that a vote to convict would amount to nothing more than
    the peaceful, orderly, and immediate transition of government
    of the Presidency to the Vice President?
        William Jefferson Clinton is not a king; he is our
    President. You have the power and the duty to remove him from
    office for high crimes and misdemeanors. I implore you to
    muster the courage of your convictions, to muster the courage
    the Founding Fathers believed that the Senate would always have
    in times like these. William Jefferson Clinton has committed
    high crimes and misdemeanors. Convict him and remove him.
        I yield to Mr. Canady.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Canady.
        Mr. Manager CANADY. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Members of the Senate, during the next few minutes I will
    address the constitutional issue you are called on to decide in
    this case: Are the crimes charged against the President
    offenses for which he may be removed from office? Are these
    crimes high crimes and misdemeanors? Are these crimes that
    proceed, as Alexander Hamilton said, ``from the abuse or
    violation of some public trust?''
        The President's lawyers have argued vigorously that even if
    all the charges against the President are true, the
    Constitution forbids the removal of this President. They
    contend that this isn't even a close case, that the crimes
    charged against the President are far removed from the
    constitutional category of high crimes and misdemeanors--a
    category of offenses they have sought to restrict narrowly to
    misconduct causing ruinous harm to the system of government.
        While the President's lawyers have been consistent in
    urging a narrow and restricted understanding of the impeachment
    and removal power, they have not been--and I repeat--they have
    not been consistent in describing the standard used to
    determine if high crimes and misdemeanors have been committed.
        In their submission to the House of Representatives they
    stated unequivocally that ``the Constitution requires proof of
    official misconduct for impeachment.'' Those are their words. I
    quote them again. ``The Constitution requires proof of official
    misconduct for impeachment.'' Indeed, that statement was the
    primary heading for their whole argument on constitutional
    standards. And likewise, in their trial memorandum submitted to
    the Senate, they argue that impeachment should not be used to
    punish private misconduct.
        Subsequently, they have apparently abandoned this position,
    recognizing that it would lead to the absurd result of
    maintaining in office Presidents who were undoubtedly unfit to
    serve. They now begrudgingly concede that a President is not
    necessarily impeached and removed simply because these crimes
    did not involve the abuse of powers of his office. They have
    been driven to concede there are at least some circumstances in
    which a President may be removed for crimes not involving what
    they call ``official misconduct.'' But, of course, they contend
    that the circumstances in this case don't even justify
    consideration of removal.
        In the proceedings in the House and in their trial
    memorandum submitted to the Senate, the President's lawyers
    made much of the argument that tax fraud by a President of the
    United States would not be sufficiently serious to justify
    impeachment and removal. I had mentioned this before in these
    proceedings, and I mention it again now because it vividly
    demonstrates the low standard of integrity, the pathetically
    low standard of integrity that would be established for the
    Presidency if the arguments of the President's lawyers are
    accepted by the Senate.
        Perhaps I missed something, but I do not recall any mention
    of the tax fraud issue by the President's lawyers in the course
    of their various presentations to the Senate. Could it be that
    the President's lawyers have come to understand that the
    argument that tax fraud is not an impeachable offense does not
    strengthen their case, but on the contrary highlights the
    weakness of their case? Tax fraud by a President, like lying
    under oath and obstruction of justice by a President in this
    case, would of course be wrong. It would be shameful,
    indefensible, unforgivable, but--this is the big ``but''--it
    would not be impeachable, they say; not even a close case. Bad?
    Yes. But clearly not impeachable. And why that? Why would it
    not be impeachable? Why is it clearly, unquestionably
    unimpeachable? This is the answer. This is the heart and soul
    of the President's defense. Tax fraud and a host of undefined
    other crimes, like lying under oath and obstruction of justice
    in this case, are just not serious enough for impeachment and
    removal. That is the answer. That is the defense. It is just
    not serious enough. All the grand legal argument, all the fine
    legal distinctions come down to this marvelously simple
    proposition: It is just not serious enough.
        Let me refer you once again to a statement from the 1974
    Report on Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment
    prepared by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. I want
    to cite a portion of that report that I have previously cited
    to you. The President's lawyers have also cited this very same
    statement in both their trial memorandum and their argument
    during these proceedings.
        This is what the report says:

        Because impeachment of a President is a grave step for the
    Nation it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously
    incompatible with either constitutional form and principles of
    our government or the proper performance of constitutional
    duties of the Presidential office. For our purposes now,
    impeachment is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously
    incompatible, or the proper performance of constitutional
    duties of the Presidential office.

        That is a standard the managers accept. That is a standard
    the President's lawyers apparently also accept, and that is a
    standard I hope all 100 Members of the U.S. Senate can accept.
    I believe we can reach agreement on this standard. The problem
    comes, of course, in applying the standard. There is the rub. A
    wide gulf separates us on how this standard should be applied.
    The President's lawyers say that under this standard the case
    against the President isn't even worth considering. The
    managers argue on the contrary, that a conscientious
    application of the standard leads to the firm conclusion that
    the President should be convicted and removed.
        Our fundamental difference goes to the issue of
    seriousness. It all goes back to the claim of the President's
    lawyers that his offenses just are not serious enough to
    justify removal.
        I think we have agreement that obstruction of justice and
    lying under oath are incompatible with the proper performance
    of the constitutional duties of the Presidential office. A
    President who has lied under oath and obstructed justice has by
    definition breached his constitutional duty to take care that
    the laws be faithfully executed.
        Such conduct is directly and unambiguously at odds with the
    duties of this office. So far so good. But here is the real
    question. Is that conduct seriously incompatible with the
    President's constitutional duties?
        That is the question you all must answer. If you say yes,
    it is seriously incompatible, you must vote to convict and
    remove the President. If you say no, you must vote to acquit.
        The President's defenders have not offered a clear guide to
    determining what is serious enough to justify removal. Instead,
    they have simply sought to minimize the significance of the
    particular offenses charged against the President.
        Today we heard and attempt to minimize the significance of
    perjury. I was somewhat amazed to hear that. There was no
    mention made of what the first Chief Justice of the United
    States, Justice Jay, had to say about perjury, being of all
    crimes the most pernicious to society. That was omitted from
    the President's analysis.
        But let me say this: I believe that we should focus on any
    mitigating circumstances. We should also focus on the
    aggravating circumstances that relate to the particular facts
    of a given case. I would like to briefly review the factors
    advanced at mitigating the seriousness of the President's
    crimes.
        We all know what the leading mitigating factor is. We have
    all heard this 1,000 times. It goes like this: The offenses are
    not sufficiently serious because it is all about sex. This is
    directly linked to the claim that the President was simply
    trying to avoid personal embarrassment in committing these
    crimes. The problem with this argument is that it proves too
    much.
        It is very common for people to lie under oath and obstruct
    justice to do so at least in part to avoid personal
    embarrassment. People engage in such conduct in their efforts
    to extricate themselves from difficulty and embarrassing
    situations. To a large extent, the offenses of President Nixon
    could be attributed to his desire to avoid embarrassing
    revelations. Did that reduce his culpability? Did that lessen
    the seriousness of his misconduct? The answer is obvious. It
    did not.
        The desire to avoid embarrassment is not a mitigating
    factor. Likewise, the nature of the precipitating misconduct of
    a sexual affair does not mitigate the seriousness of the
    President's crimes. If you accept the argument that it is just
    about sex, you will render the law of sexual harassment
    virtually meaningless. Any defendant guilty of sexual
    harassment would obviously have an incentive to lie about any
    sexual misconduct that may have occurred. But no one--no one--
    has the license to lie under oath about sex in a sexual
    harassment case or a divorce case or any other case.
        I suggest to you that an objective review of all the
    circumstances of this case--and you need to look at all of the
    circumstances, all of the facts in context--will point not to
    mitigating factors, but to aggravating factors.
        The conduct of the President was calculated and sustained.
    His subtle and determined purpose was corrupt. It was corrupt
    from start to finish. He knew exactly what he was doing. He
    knew that it was in violation of the criminal law. He knew that
    people could go to prison for doing such things. He knew that
    it was contrary to his oath of office. He knew that it was
    incompatible with his constitutional duty as President, and he
    most certainly knew that it was a very serious matter. I am
    sure he believed he could get away with it, but I am equally
    sure that he knew just how serious it would be if the truth
    were known and understood.
        He knew all these things. In the midst of it all, he showed
    not the slightest concern for the honor, the dignity, and the
    integrity of his high office. When he called Ms. Lewinsky at
    2:30 in the morning, he was up to no good, just as my
    colleague, Mr. Graham, noted. He knew exactly what he was
    doing. When he called Ms. Currie into his office twice and told
    her lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he knew
    exactly what he was doing.
        When he sent Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms.
    Lewinsky--and that is the only way it happened--he knew exactly
    what he was doing. He was tampering with witnesses and
    obstructing justice. He was doing everything he could to make
    sure that Paula Jones did not get the evidence that a Federal
    district judge had determined and ordered that she was entitled
    to receive. He was doing everything he could to avoid adverse
    legal consequences in the Jones case. That is what he planned
    to do, and that is what he did. And to cap it all off, he went
    before the Federal grand jury and lied.
        Whatever you may think about the President's testimony to
    the grand jury, one thing is clear. He didn't lie to the grand
    jury to avoid personal embarrassment. The DNA on the dress had
    ensured his personal embarrassment. There was no avoiding that.
    There was no way to explain away the DNA. The stakes were
    higher before the Federal grand jury. This wasn't about
    avoiding personal embarrassment. This wasn't about avoiding
    liability in a sexual harassment case. This was a Federal
    criminal investigation concerning crimes against the system of
    justice. This was about lying under oath and obstructing
    justice in the Jones case.
        What did he do when he testified to the grand jury? He said
    anything he thought he needed to say to avoid responsibility
    for his prior crimes. The prosecutors went down to the White
    House, and William Jefferson Clinton sat there as President of
    the United States in the White House and lied to a Federal
    grand jury. He sat there in the White House, and he put on his
    most sincere face. He swore to God to tell the truth, and then
    he lied. He planned to lie, and he executed his plan because he
    believed it was in his personal and political interests to lie.
    Never mind the oath of office. Never mind the constitutional
    duty. Never mind that he solemnly swore to God to tell the
    truth.
        Ask yourself this simple question: Was this course of
    conduct seriously incompatible with the President's duty as
    President? If this doesn't fall within the meaning of the
    offenses Alexander Hamilton described as ``proceeding from the
    abuse or violation of some public trust,'' tell me what would.
    I respectfully suggest to you this is exactly the sort of
    conduct the framers had in mind when they provided a remedy for
    the removal of the Chief Executive who is guilty of misconduct.
    I believe they would have rejected the argument that this
    deliberate, willful, stubborn, corrupt course of criminal
    conduct just isn't serious enough for the constitutional remedy
    the framers established, a remedy that they designed to protect
    the health and integrity of our institutions.
        Those who established our Constitution would have
    understood the seriousness of the misconduct of William
    Jefferson Clinton. They would have understood that it was the
    President who has shown contempt for the Constitution, not the
    managers from the House of Representatives. They would have
    understood the seriousness of the example of lawlessness he has
    set. They would have understood the seriousness of the contempt
    for the law the President's conduct has caused. They would have
    understood the seriousness of the damage the President has done
    to the integrity of his high office. Those wise statesmen who
    established our form of government would have understood the
    seriousness of the harm President Clinton has done to the cause
    of justice and constitutional government. They would have
    understood that a President who does such things should not
    remain in office with his crimes.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, for the sake of justice
    and for the sake of the Constitution, this President should be
    convicted and removed.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Bryant.
        Mr. Manager BRYANT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Members of the Senate, the distinguished colleagues of the
    bar representing the President, I commend them for an
    outstanding effort they have made throughout these proceedings
    and tell them that I just read a poll from a couple days ago,
    that something over 80 percent of the American people believe
    the President is guilty of something here. But I think that
    moots our entire debate. I don't think there is any need to
    even talk about the facts any longer because of the poll.
        I use that tongue in cheek because that seems to beg the
    question that we are also going to talk about today, and that
    is whether the President ought to be removed for his conduct.
    One of the arguments I have heard put forward since we have
    been here is the fact that the polls support this President and
    that the stability issue would be in play. That is simply not
    the case because we all clearly understand that it is this
    body's function to determine not only the facts of this case,
    but also apply to it the law, as well as the constitutional
    law, as to the removal and conviction process.
        I still remain concerned with opposing counsels' continued
    reference that the House managers want to win too much. I know
    I am not that eloquent, but I did try to make that point the
    other day, and I will make it again. If I have to take an oath
    to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
    I will do that and tell you we are not trying to win at all
    costs. This has been a process that I think has been healthy
    for this country, and regardless of the outcome--it is going to
    be in your hands very shortly--regardless of the outcome, this
    country will benefit not only in the short term but in the long
    term from this debate.
        There are many, many other issues at stake here, and I
    tried to tell you a few the other day, without this concept
    that all we want to do is win, as if it is a simple game. We
    have been over the last 4 weeks, as men and women, as ordinary
    men and women I might say, involved in an extraordinary
    process. It is uniquely thorough. We have tried to blend the
    facts of this case with the law of the charges, together with
    the politics and the polls and the media, and we have had to
    make some tough decisions. We have had to make some difficult
    decisions--I know we have on our side--as to what witnesses to
    call, how to treat these witnesses in depositions. I know on
    this side they have had to make difficult calls, I am sure.
    There has been some talk about having the President come down
    or not come down. What has in large part made this process
    distinct from past impeachments--and I am talking about the one
    last century of the President--and the subsequent judicial
    impeachments has been just, it seems, the media and the daily
    grind on all of us, the critiques. It is almost as if we are
    performing, we are in a play, and every day we get a review. We
    have been good, bad or indifferent.
        What concerns me most about that is as you move to the very
    serious issue of deciding whether or not this President should
    be convicted based on the facts, and whether this President
    should be removed, I am concerned that people are stressing the
    trees. If that is what you see on TV and that is what you read
    in the paper, you are going to see the trees and not the forest
    here and miss the big picture.
        That is so important. It is not about the personalities of
    these people or the personalities here or the politics involved
    or the polls, but it is about the facts. Ladies and gentlemen
    of the Senate, there are conclusive facts here that support a
    conviction. The President and his attorneys, as I said the
    other day, have made a good defense and have tried to paint a
    picture of the facts I think that simply does not match with
    logic or common sense.
        Take, for instance, the affidavit. We continue to see Ms.
    Lewinsky testifying on video that she never talked with the
    President that night about linking the false story, the
    concocted story with the affidavit. Mr. Ruff, I think,
    challenged people to say: What do you think the President meant
    to do that night when he called her at 2:30 in the morning?
        What do you think he intended to do in that call at 2:30 in
    the morning? Do you think he called her to tell her he had a
    Christmas present for her, or do you think his intent was to
    tell her, which he did, that you have been listed on the
    witness list and you could be subpoenaed and you might give an
    affidavit to avoid testifying. He suggested the affidavit, and
    then he said in that same conversation: well, you know, you can
    always use that cover story.
        Why would he suggest using a cover story that night? Were
    they even seeing each other then? It belittles all reasonable
    judgment to accept this type of defense of this conduct, that
    it was an innocent phone conversation, the President really
    meant nothing by it, and the fact that Ms. Lewinsky said: I
    didn't connect the two. But look at what she did. She went to
    her lawyer and used that concocted story in an affidavit that
    she filed in the case.
        It was in the draft affidavit. They took that out later for
    other reasons. But she did tell her lawyer that, and they
    attempted to use it. Again, it is the President's state of mind
    that matters and what his intent was on the false affidavit.
        Then that same false affidavit was later used in the court,
    and the President knew it was false. He knew it was false. It
    was used in the deposition. We have seen the deposition
    testimony, with the President sitting, listening to his lawyer
    talk about that affidavit when he submitted it. He obstructed
    justice by not objecting at that point, not instructing his own
    lawyer: Don't put that false evidence into this testimony.
        People stand up and laugh and say, he was not paying any
    attention, and they got this silly affidavit from this guy who
    was there and said he was looking at his lawyer but he couldn't
    tell what he was thinking. Of course he couldn't tell what he
    was thinking. Nobody is a mind reader. But this was a critical
    affidavit at that time which was going to cut off critical
    testimony in that case, and you can just about guarantee, I
    would say 100 percent, that the President was indeed listening
    very carefully, knew that his lawyer was submitting a false
    affidavit, and did nothing to stop it. That is another count of
    obstruction of justice.
        Tampering with Betty Currie--two occasions--and they say
    nothing happened between the first time and the second time. I
    am not so sure legally that matters. It was 2 or 3 days after
    it happened the day following his deposition and 2 or 3 days
    after that. Initially, remember his defense was: I was simply
    trying to recall what happened. And then we brought up the
    fact: Why did you go the second time? Did you have a short
    memory? Didn't you get it right the first time? And now we hear
    the defense today that nothing really changed and it is really
    one issue there, one big tampering rather than two attempts to
    tamper. It is still obstruction of justice.
        Mr. Hutchinson will talk about the job situation later. Mr.
    Blumenthal, the same thing; I am sure Mr. Rogan will talk about
    him in a minute.
        If you will look carefully, you will see that the President
    is the only thread that goes from each one of these, from the
    very beginning, from the point when he met Monica Lewinsky and
    from that point when he looked at that pink pass and said:
    That's going to be a problem. You know why that was going to be
    a problem. Because that limited her access to this President
    and what he was going to do. From that point until they
    terminated the relationship, this President is involved in each
    one of these issues of obstruction of justice.
        It is always him, by himself, testifying falsely, sitting
    there letting his lawyers submit a false affidavit, or it is
    him and one other person--he and Monica Lewinsky talking about
    filing a false affidavit; he and Monica Lewinsky talking about
    a concocted story to testify; he and Betty Currie on two
    occasions. You remember the testimony was like this. He and
    John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, the many aides--talking to
    them individually, giving them a false story.
        As Mr. Hutchinson pointed out so well in his argument the
    other day, it is always a private issue in terms of no one else
    knows what is going on. Vernon Jordan didn't know what was
    happening with the affidavit necessarily. Betty Currie didn't
    understand what was happening with the affidavit, or the job
    search, to the point that they knew what was going on. Look at
    and analyze each one of these and you will see there is a
    compartmentalization going on with this President, and he is at
    the center of it each time.
        What do we do with it? What do you do with it? It is going
    to be in your hands very shortly, and I want to address just a
    couple of points on the constitutional issue of the conviction
    and the removal because White House counsel argued very well
    the issue of proportionality. Again, proportionality simply
    means that the legacy of this Senate and this Congress will be
    that we have destroyed sexual harassment laws. When you argue
    that proportionality, think about what it is.
        We have heard this issue about, ``Back in my hometown, 80
    percent of the people who get divorced lie about this issue.''
    Certainly we don't want that to be the legacy of this Congress,
    that we legitimize lying in divorce cases; nor would we want to
    have the legitimacy of this Congress being that we did not
    support the sexual harassment laws, because you know and I know
    that this is an important part. Going back and getting
    accurate, truthful testimony is absolutely essential in these
    types of cases, and if we send a message out on the
    proportionality theory that it is just about sex and you can
    lie about it, it will be the wrong thing to do.
        The laws, like the facts, are a very stubborn thing. If the
    law has been broken, if perjury has been committed, if
    obstruction of justice has been committed by this President, it
    is my belief that the fact that the economy is good should not
    prevent this Senate from acting and removing the President. If
    the economy was bad, you wouldn't want to be able to impeach
    the President because it is bad; and you don't want to not
    impeach him simply because the economy is good.
        It is a difficult task. We have had a difficult task
    bringing this case over to you, and I thank you. You have been
    in attendance the 4 weeks. You paid attention. When it was your
    turn to ask questions, you asked very good questions. You have
    been ready to listen, and I thank you for that.
        You have a difficult task ahead of you. I know when I voted
    on this I thought, ``If this were a Republican President, what
    would I do?'' It is a tough choice. I said, ``But I really
    think I would have voted the same way I voted even if it were a
    Republican President.'' I know. Like Mr. Chabot, I voted for
    Mr. Carter in 1976. I voted for Mr. Reagan in 1980, I might
    add, but I voted for Mr. Carter in 1976 after the 1974
    incident.
        It is tough. What has made it awfully hard is that you all
    have also taken an oath to do impartial justice. I simply ask
    you, as you consider these facts and do impartial justice, that
    you set a standard that, if you believe the President indeed
    did commit either perjury or obstruction of justice or both of
    those, that you set that standard high for the President, for
    the next President, for the next generations; you set that
    standard high for our courts that have to deal with perjury and
    obstruction every day, with people who are less than the
    President but yet who are watching very closely what we do
    here. But set that standard high for the President. Don't lower
    our expectation in what we expect of the President. If you do
    that, if you look high, if you set the standard high, the right
    thing will be done.
        I have confidence and trust, and I have just been so
    pleased with the way we have been received here. I know you
    will do the right thing.
        I apologize to you, as I will be talking to you probably
    for my last time, if I have come across as preaching to you. It
    is not my intent to lecture you. You do not need any lectures
    from me or for anyone else to preach to you. I hope I have
    rebutted some of the proof in the area for which I am in
    charge. There is conclusive proof here, particularly in terms
    of the obstruction of justice charges, of the hiding of the
    evidence, of the filing of a false affidavit.
        I did skip over the hiding of the evidence. I am not sure
    anything new can be added to what was said in the past. But if
    Monica is telling the truth, as her lawyers or as the
    President's lawyers seem to tell you, that is a no-brainer,
    because she says, ``I know for a fact that Ms. Currie called
    me, that she initiated the call.'' As I told you the other day,
    from that point forward it seems to me a moot issue because the
    initiation of the phone call by Betty Currie began a process to
    hide that evidence. The only way Betty Currie would have known
    to make that call to begin that process of hiding evidence
    would have been a conversation with the President, to have been
    instructed that way.
        For the President, whose intent was to conceal the
    relationship, it would have been totally inconsistent for him
    to suggest that she turn the evidence over. It would have been
    totally consistent for him to ask Betty Currie to get the
    evidence from Ms. Lewinsky and hide the evidence.
        As I close, let me just tell you, too--on the heels of Mr.
    Canady--that there are law professors who testified in our
    hearing who have a contrary view to the view that was expressed
    by other law professors that Mr. Ruff referred to, that it is
    constitutional to impeach a President for conduct that is not
    clearly official, that might be described as personal,
    particularly conduct of perjury or obstruction of justice.
        Professor Turley says:

        In my view, serious crimes in office, such as lying under
    oath before a federal grand jury, have always been ``malum in
    se'' conduct for a president and sufficient for impeachment.

        Professor John McGinnis of Benjamin Cardozo Law School says
    that obstruction of justice is clearly within the ambit of high
    crimes and misdemeanors.
        If there is any question of this private conduct versus
    personal conduct, that view is out there. Given the right type
    of personal misconduct, it is clearly an impeachable offense.
    With that, I call Mr. Manager Hutchinson to follow me.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager
    Hutchinson.
        Mr. Manager HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, when I was appointed as
    a manager, I hoped to present the case before the Senate with
    my colleagues in a manner that was consistent with the dignity
    of this great body and also respectful of the constitutional
    independence of the Senate. I hope that you agree and believe
    that we have done that as we have come over here.
        During the months of this trial process, I have grown to
    appreciate the institution of the Senate to a greater degree
    than ever before, but I think of even more importance to me, I
    have grown to respect the individuals that comprise this body
    more than ever. Let me say, it has been a privilege to appear
    before you.
        As we come to the close of this case, let's go to the key
    questions that should be on your mind. First of all, has the
    obstruction of justice and perjury cases been proven? Have the
    allegations been proven? My colleagues have touched upon the
    perjury. Let me talk about article II on the obstruction of
    justice.
        The White House defense team, composed of extraordinarily
    distinguished and talented attorneys, has tried to diminish the
    significance of the overwhelming facts on obstruction by using
    certain phrases such as, ``It's all circumstantial,'' or ``The
    managers ignore those stubborn facts,'' or ``They want to win
    too badly,'' or ``It's a shell with no shell.'' And today the
    latest catch phrase, ``moving targets, empty pots.''
        Those are certainly quotable phrases designed to diminish
    the factual presentation with dripping sarcasm, but I believe
    that they ignore the underlying facts, testimony, and evidence
    that has been presented.
        Let me just address a couple of arguments that Mr. Ruff has
    presented during his presentation.
        The first argument that he presented as he described it was
    a technical argument, that the article II obstruction of
    justice charge in the articles of impeachment on the lying to
    the aides was not really in reference to the Federal civil
    rights case, and that is a true statement. But if you read
    article II, paragraph 7, it refers to this and says:

        . . . The false and misleading statements made by William
    Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand
    jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading
    information.

        The article is appropriately drafted, is well stated, and
    gives them total notice as to what that charge is about.
        Some of the other arguments have been handled by my
    colleagues, but Mr. Ruff also said, Why have the managers
    never, never explained, if this is such an urgent matter for
    the President, why did he wait until December 17 to tell Ms.
    Lewinsky that she was on the list?
        I am afraid Mr. Ruff failed to listen to my opening
    presentation when I went through that timeframe. In that
    timeframe, the witness list came out on December 5, it
    continued to accelerate, December 11 was Judge Wright's order.
    Then it was December 17 that the call was made at 2 a.m. in the
    morning to let Ms. Lewinsky know she was on the list. Why was
    it December 17? This is in the President's mind. No one knows
    why he picked that particular date, but perhaps it was that the
    job search was well underway then. He felt like she could
    handle this distressing information and, in fact, on the day
    after that call, she already had two interviews lined up on
    that same day, December 18, set up by Mr. Jordan. So perhaps it
    was an appropriate time to let her know she was on the witness
    list.
        They raised the question about the Christmas gifts. You
    have the testimony of Betty Currie, you have the testimony of
    Ms. Lewinsky, and the issue is simply: Do you believe Monica
    Lewinsky? If you accept her reluctant testimony, yet forceful
    and clear testimony, that the call came from Betty Currie, then
    you have no choice but to conclude that the retention of the
    gifts, the retrieval of the gifts was initiated by the
    President of the United States.
        When you go to the job search, and they point to the
    testimony, they played the video of Mr. Jordan who said that
    there was never a conversation in which both the job and the
    false affidavit were discussed together, they cut it off at
    that point. You remember I had a ``but'' in there. If you had
    heard further beyond that, you would have heard me cross-
    examining Mr. Jordan, as I did, and reminding him of his
    previous testimony in which he acknowledged that in every
    conversation with Ms. Lewinsky, they talked about the job. So
    he acknowledged that they talked about the job and the
    affidavit all in the same conversation together.
        Mr. Ruff makes the point that the managers got close enough
    to accuse Mr. Jordan of telling Ms. Lewinsky to destroy the
    notes, implying that we are making this up. But is this
    evidence that is coming from the managers? It is my
    recollection that it is testimony coming from Ms. Monica
    Lewinsky. We are not concocting this. It is testimony from
    witnesses who have been brought before this body, whose sworn
    testimony you have received, whose sworn testimony they
    defended and relied upon, but when it comes to this, they say,
    ``No, it's the managers.''
        Then they come to another pillar of obstruction, the one
    they avoid at every opportunity, but finally addressed today,
    and that is the coaching of Betty Currie. I was interested in
    the fact that they finally talked about this, the first
    coaching incident and then the second one. Mr. Ruff tried to go
    into that it is clear it occurred on January 20 rather than 21.
    In fact, it is her testimony that it occurred on one of those
    days. But they miss the point.
        The legal significance of the second coaching episode is
    that it totally goes against the defense of the President--that
    it was there, he was doing this to acquire information, to get
    facts, to help in media inquiries.
        If that is the case, there is absolutely no reason for it
    to be done on the second occasion and, clearly, she was known
    to be a witness at that time, and that is the legal
    significance.
        It goes to his intent, his motive, what he was trying to do
    to a subordinate employee. The fact of this matter is that this
    is not a case that is based upon circumstantial evidence. On
    each element of obstruction, there is direct testimony linking
    the President to a consistent pattern of conduct designed to
    withhold information, conceal evidence and tamper with
    witnesses to avoid obedience and directives of a Federal court.
        Let's look at the direct proof, not circumstantial
    evidence, but direct testimony.
        What did Vernon Jordan testify as to the President's
    involvement in the job search?
        Question to Mr. Jordan:

        You're acting in behalf of the President when you're trying
    to get Ms. Lewinsky a job and you were in control of the job
    search?

        His answer:

        Yes.

        He was acting at the direction of the President and he was
    in control.
        What did Vernon Jordan testify he told the President when a
    job was secured for a key witness and the false affidavit was
    signed?

        Mr. President, she signed the affidavit, she signed the
    affidavit.

        Then the next day, the job is secured and the report to
    Betty Currie, the report to the President, ``Mission
    accomplished.''
        Is this circumstantial evidence? This is direct testimony
    by a friend and confidante of the President, Vernon Jordan.
        Who is the one person who clearly knew all of the
    ingredients to make the job search an obstruction of justice?
    It was the President who knew he had a dangerous relationship
    with Ms. Lewinsky. He knew his friend was securing a job at his
    direction, and he knew that a false affidavit was being
    procured at his suggestion. He was the one person who knew all
    the facts.
        Is this circumstantial evidence or direct testimony when
    Ms. Lewinsky talked about what the President told her on
    December 17? She was a witness, and immediately following the
    fact she was a witness, the suggestion that she could use the
    cover stories, the suggestion that she could use an affidavit.
        Direct testimony--was it direct proof about the President's
    tampering with the testimony of Betty Currie? It was Betty
    Currie herself who acknowledged this and testified to it. No,
    this is not circumstantial evidence, it is direct testimony.
        The same with Sidney Blumenthal. Direct testimony after
    direct testimony painting a picture, setting up the pillars of
    obstruction.
        They want you to believe Monica Lewinsky sometimes, but
    they don't want you to believe her other times, and you have to
    weigh her testimony.
        I could go on with the facts, but the truth is that our
    case on obstruction of justice has been established. Some of
    you might conclude, ``I accept five or six of those pillars of
    obstruction, but there is one I have a reservation about.'' If
    you look at the article, if there is one element of obstruction
    that you accept and believe and you agree upon, then that is
    sufficient for conviction and, surely, it is sufficient to
    convict the President, if there was even one element of
    obstruction.
        I remind you that a typical jury instruction on conspiracy
    for obstruction would be that it takes only one overt act to
    satisfy the requirements for conviction. The Government doesn't
    have to prove all the overt acts, just one that was carried
    out.
        Another question some of you might be thinking about is, Is
    this serious enough to warrant conviction and removal? One of
    the foundations of our judicial system is that any citizen,
    regardless of position or power, has access to the court. Can
    you imagine the shock and outrage of this body if a
    corporation, in an effort to protect itself from liability,
    concealed evidence and provided benefits to those witnesses who
    are cooperative? Outrage; injustice. Those are the allegations
    against the tobacco companies. Those are the allegations last
    night on CBS, ``60 Minutes,'' about a major corporation. There
    should be outrage by this body. We would rightfully be outraged
    about that. And we should also be outraged if it happened by
    the President. It should be no less when it is conducted by the
    President.
        The next argument is: Yes, the President should be held
    accountable, but he can always be prosecuted later. In fact, I
    understand a censure resolution is being circulated emphasizing
    that the President can be held criminally responsible for his
    actions when he leaves office. This is not too subtle a
    suggestion that the independent counsel go ahead and file
    criminal charges against the President.
        I appreciate Judge Starr, but I do not believe that is what
    the country has in mind when they say they want to get this
    matter over. I do not believe your vote on the articles of
    impeachment should be a signal to the independent counsel to
    initiate criminal proceedings. It appears to me that is the
    implication of this censure resolution being discussed.
        I emphasize that it is this body that the Founding Fathers
    entrusted with the responsibility to determine whether a
    President's conduct has breached the public trust, and your
    decision in this body should conclude this matter. It should
    not be the initiation of another national drama that will be
    carried over the next 3 years.
        Finally, there are some who consider the politics of this
    matter. We have proven our case. I entered this body thinking
    that this was a legal, judicial proceeding and not political. I
    have been reminded there are political aspects under the
    Constitution to a Senate trial. So I concede the point.
        We are all familiar with ``Profiles in Courage'' written by
    John F. Kennedy. He reminds us of the courageous act of Senator
    Edmund G. Ross in voting for the acquittal of President Andrew
    Johnson in his impeachment trial. Senator Ross was a profile in
    courage because he knew the case against President Johnson was
    not legally sufficient, even though the politically expedient
    vote was to vote for conviction. Senator Ross followed the
    facts and he followed the law, and he voted his conscience. It
    was to his political detriment, but it reflected his political
    courage.
        Today we have a different circumstance. The question is,
    Will the Senators of this body have the political courage to
    follow the facts and the law as did Senator Ross, despite
    enormous political pressure to ignore the facts and the law and
    the Constitution? You will make that decision.
        I appear before this body as an advocate. I am not paid for
    this special responsibility. I am here because I believe the
    Constitution requires me to make this case. The facts prove
    overwhelmingly that the President committed obstruction of
    justice and perjury. Despite this belief, whatever conclusion
    you reach will not be criticized by me. I will respect this
    institution regardless of the outcome.
        As the late Federal Judge Orin Harris of Arkansas always
    said from the bench to the jury when I was trying cases--and I
    hated his instruction because I was the prosecutor--but he
    would tell the jury, ``Remember, the government never wins or
    loses a case. The government always wins when justice is
    done.'' This is the Congress and this is the Senate. It is your
    responsibility to determine the facts and to let justice roll
    down like mighty waters.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Rogan.
        Mr. Manager ROGAN. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel
    for the President, Members of the U.S. Senate, for me the most
    poignant part of this entire proceeding was the day, a few
    weeks ago, when we were addressed by the distinguished former
    Senator from Arkansas, Dale Bumpers. Probably the thing that
    touched me most about his presentation is when he talked about
    the human element of what this impeachment proceeding has meant
    and how difficult that has been.
        It touched me because it made me remember that that
    difficulty is not limited solely for Democrats in this Chamber.
    I am one of the House managers. I am a Republican today. But
    that was not always the case. I used to be a Democrat, and
    being a House manager in the impeachment of President Clinton
    has been especially difficult for me. I would like to tell you
    why.
        Twenty years ago, in December 1978, I was finishing my last
    semester of college and had just applied to law school. I was
    waiting for my application to be accepted someplace. And in
    December of 1978, I was a delegate in Memphis, TN, to the
    Democratic Midterm Convention.
        At that time, President Carter was halfway through his term
    of office. He was not particularly popular among the party
    faithful. There was a great deal of sentiment that a Member of
    this body today should challenge him for the nomination. That
    decision had not yet been made, but among the delegates to that
    convention there was an overwhelming desire to see Senator Ted
    Kennedy appear.
        The Carter White House froze Senator Kennedy out of the
    proceedings. He was not invited to address the convention. His
    name appeared nowhere in the program. So the delegates did
    something on their own. There were workshops being held during
    the day, and a workshop on health care was called. Senator
    Kennedy was invited to fly out that day and address that
    workshop. He did that in the afternoon, and he left after he
    addressed it. I had gone to a workshop that morning where
    President Carter personally appeared, and my recollection is
    about 200 or 300 people came to that. Senator Kennedy's
    workshop had to be transferred to a large auditorium because
    about 2,000 people appeared to hear him.
        The Senator came, he spoke, and he left. I stayed even
    though most people left with him, because I was fascinated by
    the young fellow who was moderating the program that day. He
    was bright, he was in control, he was articulate. He didn't
    look that much older than me. I was stunned that this young man
    was not only the attorney general of his State, but he was the
    Governor-elect of the State.
        Sometime after that workshop I walked up to him and
    introduced myself. I told him who I was, and he spent about 15
    minutes encouraging me to go to law school, to stay active in
    politics. His name was Bill Clinton. I have never forgotten
    that day 20 years ago when then-Attorney General Clinton took
    the time for a young fellow who had an interest in the law and
    politics. I have never forgotten in recent days the
    graciousness he has shown to me, to my wife, and to my children
    when we have encountered him.
        This has been a very difficult proceeding for me and for my
    colleagues, the House managers. But our presence here isn't out
    of personal animosity toward our President. It is because we
    believe that, after reviewing all the evidence, the President
    of the United States had committed obstruction of justice and
    perjury, he had violated his oath of office; and in so doing he
    had sacrificed the principle that no person is above the law,
    and friendship and personal affection could not control under
    those circumstances.
        Up until now, the idea that no person is above the law has
    been unquestioned. Yet this standard is not our inheritance
    automatically. Each generation of Americans ultimately has to
    make that choice for themselves. Once again, it is a time for
    choosing. How will we respond? By impeaching the President? The
    U.S. House of Representatives made that choice. It went on
    record as saying that our body would not tolerate the most
    powerful man in the world trampling the constitutional rights
    of a lone woman, no matter how obscure or humble she might be.
        We refused to ignore Presidential misconduct despite its
    minimization by spin doctors, pundits, and, yes, even the
    polls. The personal popularity of any President pales when
    weighed against the fundamental concept that forever
    distinguishes us from every nation on the planet: No person is
    above the law.
        The House of Representatives jettisoned the spin and the
    propaganda. We sought, and we have now presented, the
    unvarnished truth. Now it is your unhappy task to make the
    final determination, face the truth, and polish the
    Constitution, or allow this Presidency, in the words of
    Chairman Henry Hyde, to take one more chip out of the marble.
        The Constitution solemnly required President Clinton, as a
    condition of his becoming President, to swear an oath to
    preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, and to take care
    that the laws be faithfully executed.
        That oath of obligation required the President to defend
    our laws that protect women in the workplace, just as it also
    required him to protect the legal system from perjury, abuse of
    power, and obstruction of justice. Fidelity to the Presidential
    oath is not dependent upon any President's personal threshold
    of comfort or embarrassment. Neither must it be a slave to the
    latest poll.
        How important was this oath to our founders? Did they
    intend the oath to have primacy over the shifting winds of
    political opinion? Or did they bequeath to us an ambiguous
    Constitution that was meant to roll with the punches of the
    latest polling data and focus groups? The Constitution gives us
    that answer in article II, section 1. It says:

        Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall
    take . . . [an] oath.

        And the oath is then prescribed.
        The mere fact that a person is elected President does not
    give him the right to become President, no matter how
    overwhelming his vote margin. Votes alone do not make a person
    President of the United States. There is a requirement that
    precedes obtaining the power and authority of obtaining the
    Presidency. It is the oath of office. It is swearing to
    preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. It is accepting
    the obligation that the laws are to be faithfully executed.
        No oath, no Presidency. It is the oath of office, and not
    public opinion polls, that gives life and legitimacy to a
    Presidency. This is true no matter how popular an elected
    President may be, or how broad his margin of victory.
        The founders did not intend the oath to be an afterthought
    or a technicality. They viewed it as an absolute requirement
    before the highest office in the land was entrusted to any
    person. The evidence shows the President repeatedly violated
    his oath of office. Now the focus shifts to your oath of
    office. The President hopes that in this Chamber the polls will
    govern. On behalf of the House of Representatives, we entreat
    you to require the Constitution reign supreme. For if polls
    matter more than the oath to uphold the law, then yet another
    chip out of the marble has been struck.
        The cry has also been raised that to remove the President
    is to create a constitutional crisis by undoing an election.
    There is no constitutional crisis when the simple process of
    the Constitution comes into play. Listen to the words of Dr.
    Larry Arnn of the Claremont Institute:

        [E]lections have no higher standing under our Constitution
    than the impeachment process. Both stem from provisions of the
    Constitution. The people elect a president to do a
    constitutional job. They act under the Constitution when they
    do it. At the same time they elect a Congress to do a different
    constitutional job. The president swears an oath to uphold the
    Constitution, both in elections and in the impeachment process.
        If the president is guilty of acts justifying impeachment,
    then he, not the Congress, will have ``overturned the
    election.'' He will have acted in ways that betray the purpose
    of his election. He will have acted not as a constitutional
    representative, but as a monarch, subversive of, or above, the
    law.
        If the great powers given the president are abused, then to
    impeach him defends not only the results of elections, but that
    higher thing which elections are in service, namely, the
    preeminence of the Constitution[.]

        The evidence clearly shows that the President engaged in a
    repeated and lengthy pattern of felonious conduct--conduct for
    which ordinary citizens can be and have been jailed and lost
    their liberty. This simply cannot be wished or censured away.
        With his conduct aggravated by a motivation of personal and
    monetary leverage in the Paula Jones lawsuit, the solemnity of
    our sacred oath obliges us to do what the President regretfully
    has failed to do: defend the rule of law, defend the concept
    that no person is above the law.
        On the day the House impeached President Clinton, I said
    that when they are old enough to appreciate the solemnity of
    that action, I wanted my little girls to know that when the
    roll was called, their father served with colleagues who
    counted it a privilege to risk political fortunes in defense of
    the Constitution.
        Today, I am more resolute in that opinion. From the time I
    was a little boy, it was my dream to one day serve in the
    Congress of the United States. My dream was fulfilled 2 years
    ago. Today, I am a Republican in a district that is heavily
    Democratic. The pundits keep telling me that my stand on this
    issue puts my political fortunes in jeopardy. So be it. That
    revelation produces from me no flinching. There is a simple
    reason why: I know that in life dreams come and dreams go. But
    conscience is forever. I can live with the concept of not
    serving in Congress. I cannot live with the idea of remaining
    in Congress at the expense of doing what I believe to be right.
        I was about 12 years old when a distinguished Member of
    this body, the late Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas, gave me
    this sage advice about elective office:

        Always put principle above politics; put honor above
    incumbency.

        I now return that sentiment to the body from which it came.
    Hold fast to it, Senators, and in doing so, you will be
    faithful both to our founders and to our heirs.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Graham.
    The managers have 45 minutes remaining.
        Mr. Manager GRAHAM. I promise not to take the whole 45
    minutes. I have been told that my voice fades, and I will try
    not to let that happen here.
        As we bring the trial to a conclusion, I think it needs to
    be said from our side of the aisle that our staff has been
    terrific. You don't know how many hours of sleep have been lost
    by the young men and women working to put this case together
    under the procedures that the Senate developed. They have done
    an absolutely magnificent job. If there is anybody to blame on
    our side, blame us, because our staff has done a terrific job.
    That just needs to be said.
        Now, let's talk about Mr. Rogan's district. True, if there
    is anybody on our side of the aisle who has been at risk it has
    been Jim. I have made some lifelong friends in this situation,
    really on both sides of the aisle. This has been tough, tough,
    tough for our country, but sometimes some good comes from tough
    situations, and I think some good will come from this before it
    is all said and done, ladies and gentlemen of the Senate. I
    know it doesn't look to be so, but it will be so later on.
        I come from a district where I am the first Republican in
    120 years. They told me they hanged the other guy, so I know I
    am doing better. I am 4 years into this thing. This is my third
    term.
        You can take the national polls and turn them upside down
    in my district, but I have on occasion said that if the
    President would reconcile himself to the law, I would be
    willing to consider something less than impeachment. I can
    assure you that did not go over well with some people in my
    district. But I thought that would be good for the country.
        The elections come and go and we can get through just about
    anything and everything in this country, but it does take
    leadership, and character does still count. Having said that, I
    am a sinner like the rest of us, and part of the problem with
    this case is we have to confront our own sins, because who are
    we to judge others when the things get to be private and
    personal? I am not asking you to use that standard. I am
    standing before you as a sinner, and I would never want my
    President or your President removed because of private sins,
    but only when it gets to be constitutionally out of bounds,
    only when it gets to be so egregious that you can't look your
    children in the eye and explain what happened here in terms of
    the law. We can all explain human failings, but we have a real
    mixed message going on, and it needs to be straightened out for
    them.
        If you could bring the Founding Fathers back, as everybody
    has suggested, the first debate would be, could we call them as
    a witness? There would be some people objecting to that. Live
    or dead, it has been hard to get a witness.
        [Laughter.]
        I think they would say to us: ``What's a poll?'' They would
    be instructive, but we can't summon them back. Do you know what
    I really think they would tell us? They would tell us that we
    started this thing, and it is up to you all to carry it on. And
    it is. They would be right. It is not their job to tell us what
    to do. It is our job to take the spirit of what they did and
    build on it.
        If you have kept an open mind, you have fulfilled your job.
    If you have listened to the facts and you vote your conscience,
    you will have fulfilled your job. I will not trample on your
    conscience; I have said that before. I started this process
    with great concern and I leave with a lot of contentment
    because I believe the facts have withstood the test of every
    type of scrutiny and demagoguery that have been thrown at them.
    They stand firm. Do you know what they are going to stand?
    They're going to stand the test of history. Some people suggest
    that history may judge you badly if you vote to convict this
    President. I suggest that that will be the least of your
    problems.
        Our past and this present moment become our Nation's
    future. What are we going to leave to the future generations?
    What do we do when the next Federal judge is brought before
    this body having been impeached by the House for cheating on
    his or her taxes? Are we going to self-righteously throw that
    Federal judge out after having listened to this massive case of
    obstruction of justice and perjury before a grand jury? We may
    throw that Federal judge out, but we will have to walk out the
    door backward; we will not walk out boldly. What happens when
    the next Federal judge is acquitted by a jury of his peers, and
    you know the result would be just to remove that judge? You did
    the right thing by not being bound by the acquittal in the case
    of Judge Hastings. You did the right thing to get to the truth
    and act accordingly, because for people who sit in judgment of
    others there needs to be no reasonable doubt about who they are
    and what they are able to do in that role. The President of the
    United States is at the top of the legal pyramid. If there is
    reasonable doubt about his ability to faithfully execute the
    laws of the land, our future will be better off if that
    individual is removed.
        Let me tell you what it all comes down to for me. If you
    can go back and explain to your children and your constituents
    how you can be truthful and misleading at the same time, good
    luck. That is the legacy that Bill Clinton has left all of us
    if we keep him in office--the idea that ``I was truthful but
    misleading.'' That scenario focuses around whether or not one
    type of sex occurred versus the other type of sex. He is
    wanting you to buy into this definition that was allowed to
    exist because the wording wasn't quite right. That is the
    essence of it--``I was truthful, but I was misleading.''
        Mr. Podesta asked a few more questions than the other
    people did and the President denied any type of sexual
    relationship to him. Was he truthful there? Was he truthful in
    his grand jury testimony? How can you be both? It is just
    absolutely impossible.
        I want to play two clips for you now.
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Now, You have stated, I think, very honestly, and I
    appreciate, that you were lied to by the President. Is it a
    fair statement, given your previous testimony concerning your
    30-minute conversation, that the President was trying to
    portray himself as a victim of a relationship with Monica
    Lewinsky?
        A. I think that's the import of his whole story.

        Before you put the other tape in, every Member of this body
    should need to answer this question: Is that a truthful
    statement? If you believe that the President of the United
    States is a victim of Ms. Lewinsky, we all owe him an apology.
    He is not. He is not.
        You ask me why I want this President removed? Not only are
    they high crimes, not only do they rise to the level of
    constitutional out-of-bounds behavior, not only are they worse
    than what you remove judges for, they show a tremendous
    willingness of a national leader to put himself above anything
    decent and good. I hope that still matters in America.
        The next clip:
        [Text of videotape presentation:]

        Q. Would it be fair to say that you were sitting there during this
    conversation and that you had previously been told by the President
    that he was in essence a victim of Ms. Lewinsky's sexual demands, and
    you said nothing to anyone?

        MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said''----
        THE WITNESS: I don't----
        MR. McDANIEL: Is the question, ``You said nothing to anyone about
    what the President told you?''----
        MR. GRAHAM: Right.
        THE WITNESS: I never told any of my colleagues about what the
    President told me.
        BY MR. GRAHAM:
        Q. And this is after the President recants his story--recounts his
    story--to you, where he's visibly upset, feels like he's a victim, that
    he associates himself with a character who's being lied about, and you
    at no time suggested to your colleagues that there is something going
    on here with the President and Ms. Lewinsky you need to know about. Is
    that your testimony?
        A. I never mentioned my conversation. I regarded that conversation
    as a private conversation in confidence, and I didn't mention it to my
    colleagues, I didn't mention it to my friends, I didn't mention it to
    my family, bedsides my wife.
        Q. Did you mention it to any White House lawyers?
        A. I mentioned it many months later to Lanny Breuer in preparation
    for one of my grand jury appearances, when I knew I would be questioned
    about it. And I certainly never mentioned it to any reporter.

        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I have asked you
    several times to vote your conscience, and I will not step on
    it if you disagree with me; but I have always said let us tell
    the story about what happened here. I am saying it again.
    Ladies and gentlemen, we need to get to the truth, nothing but
    the truth, the whole truth, and let the chips fall where they
    may.
        Let me say this about being truthful but misleading. Can
    you sit back as the President, after you told a lie to a key
    aide, where you portrayed yourself as a victim, and watch the
    press stories role out along the lines that ``she wears her
    dresses too tight''; ``she comes from a broken home''; ``she's
    a stalker''; ``she's sex obsessed''; can you sit back and watch
    all that happen and still be truthful but misleading?
        We have laws against that in this country. We have laws in
    this country that even high Government officials cannot tell a
    lie to somebody knowing that lie will be repeated to a grand
    jury. That is exactly what happened here. He portrayed himself
    as a victim, which is not a misleading statement; it is a lie
    because if you knew the truth, you wouldn't consider him a
    victim. And that lie went to the Federal grand jury. And those
    citizens were trying very hard to get it right, and he was
    trying very hard to mislead them. At every turn when they tried
    to get to the truth, he ran the other way, and he took the aura
    of the White House with him.
        If you believe he is a victim, then you ought to acquit
    him. If you believe he has lied, then he ought not to be our
    President.
        There are two things in this case that are crimes, two
    aspects of it--before the Paula Jones deposition and after the
    Paula Jones deposition. I am going to leave this with you for
    the very last time. The affidavit was an attempt to have a
    cover story where both of them could lie and go on about their
    lives. The job search was to take somebody who had been
    friendly and get them a job so they could go on about their
    lives someplace else, and get this matter behind them and
    conceal from a court the truth. Those things are crimes.
        These gifts being under the bed of Betty Currie, the
    President's secretary, is no accident. They didn't walk over
    there by themselves. They got conveyed by a secretary after she
    picked them up from his consensual lover. People have figured
    that part out. It is no accident that happened. That is a
    crime--when you are subpoenaed to give those gifts.
        But it is still about getting her a job and having a cover
    story so she could go on with her life. But when the article
    came out on January 21, the whole flavor of this case changed.
    I don't know how you are going to explain it to yourself or
    others, but I want to lay out to you what I think happened
    based on the evidence.
        That January 21 when the story broke that she may have been
    telling what went on, and the President was faced with the idea
    that the knowledge of their relationship was out in the public
    forum, what did he do then? There were no more nice jobs using
    a good friend. There was no more ``Let's see if we can hide the
    gifts and play hide the ball.'' Do you know what happened then?
    He turned on her. Not my favorite part of the case--it is the
    most disgusting part of the case. It is part of the case that
    history will judge. The crimes change. They become more
    ominous, because the character traits became more ominous. The
    young lady who was the stalker, who was sex-obsessed, who wore
    her skirts too tight, that young lady was being talked about
    openly in the public. That young lady was being lied about to
    the Federal grand jury. And the truth is that young lady fell
    in love with him. And probably to this day a 24- or 25-year-old
    young girl doesn't want to believe what was going to come her
    way. But you all are adults. You all are leaders of this
    Nation. For you to look at these facts and conclude anything
    else would be an injustice, because without that threat, ladies
    and gentlemen, the stories were going to grow in number, and we
    would have no admissions of ``misleading'' and ``truthful.''
        The White House is the bully pulpit. But it should never be
    occupied by a bully. The White House will always be occupied by
    sinners, including our Founding Fathers, and future occupants.
        What we do today will put a burden on the White House and
    the burden on our future, one way or the other. Is it too much
    of a burden to say to future Presidents, Don't fabricate
    stories in front of a grand jury, don't parse words, don't
    mislead, don't lie when you are begged not to? Is it too much
    to say to a President, If you are ever sued, play it straight;
    don't hide the gifts under the bed, don't give people false
    testimony, don't try to trash people who are witnesses against
    you? If that is too much of a burden to put on the White House,
    this Nation is in hopeless decline. It is not too much of a
    burden, ladies and gentlemen. It is only common decency being
    applied to the occupant of the White House.
        To acquit under these facts will place the burden on the
    constitutional process of impeachment and how we deal with
    others, Federal judges and other high public officials. That, I
    suggest to you, will be almost irreconcilable.
        I want my country to go boldly into the next century. I
    don't want us to limp into the next century. I don't want us to
    crawl into the next century regardless of rule of law. No
    matter what you do, we will make it. But the difference between
    how you vote here, I think, determines whether we go boldly
    with the rule of law intact, or whether we have to explain it
    for generations to come.
        I leave with you an example that I think says much. General
    MacArthur was removed by President Truman, a very popular
    fellow at the time. The reaction to the MacArthur dismissal was
    even more violent than Truman had expected. And for an entire
    year the majority of public opinion ranked itself ferociously
    against him. He said characteristically, as he felt that
    hostile poll, ``I wonder where Moses would have gone if they
    had taken a poll in Egypt. And what would Jesus Christ have
    preached if they had taken a poll in the land of Israel? It
    isn't polls that count. It is right and wrong and leadership of
    men with fortitude, honesty, and the belief in the right that
    make epics in the history of the world.''
        Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, thank you for
    listening. If you have any doubts about whether this President
    has committed high crimes, we need to make sure the Senate
    itself has told the truth. Don't leave any doubts lingering,
    because the evidence is overwhelming that these offenses
    occurred. The crime of perjury and obstruction of justice have
    traditionally been high crimes under our Constitution. For
    God's sake, let it remain so. And let it be said that no
    President can take the Presidency and the bully pulpit of the
    Presidency and hurt average citizens from it.
        Thank you very much. I yield now to our chairman.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde.
        Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, learned counsel, and
    the Senate, we are blessedly coming to the end of this
    melancholy procedure. But before we gather up our papers and
    return to the obscurity from whence we came--
        [Laughter.]
    --permit, please, a few final remarks.
        First of all, I thank the Chief Justice not only for his
    patience and his perseverance but for the aura of dignity that
    he has lent to these proceedings. It has been a great thrill
    for me to be here in his company, as well as in the company of
    you, distinguished Senators.
        Second, I compliment the President's counsel. They have
    conducted themselves in the most professional way. They have
    made the most of a poor case, in my opinion. There is an old
    Italian saying--and it has nothing to do with the lawyers, but
    to your case--that ``you may dress the shepherd in the silk, he
    will still smell of the goat.''
        [Laughter.]
        But all of you are great lawyers. It has been an adventure
    being with you.
        You know, the legal profession, like politics, is ridiculed
    pretty much. Every lawyer feels that and understands the
    importance of the rule of law, to establish justice, to
    maintain the rights of mankind, to defend the helpless and the
    oppressed, to protect innocents, to punish the guilty. These
    are duties which challenge the best powers of man's intellect
    and the noblest qualities of the human heart. We are here to
    defend the bulwark of our liberty, the rule of law.
        As to the House managers, I want to tell you and our
    extraordinary staff how proud I am of your service. For myself,
    I cannot find the words to adequately express how I feel. I
    must use the inaudible language of the heart. I have gone
    through it all by your side--the media condemnation, the
    patronizing editorials, the hate mail, the insults hurled in
    public, the attempts at intimidation, the death threats, and
    even the disapproval of our colleagues, which cuts the worst.
        You know, all a Congressman ever gets to take with him when
    he leaves this building is the esteem of his colleagues and his
    constituents--and we have risked even that for a principle, for
    our duty, as we have seen it.
        In speaking to my managers, of whom I am interminably
    proud, I can borrow the words of Shakespeare, ``Henry V,'' as
    he addressed his little army of longbowmen before the Battle of
    Agincourt. And he said:

        We few, we happy few, we band of brothers
        For he that sheds his blood with me
        Shall be my brother
        And gentlemen in England, now abed
        shall think themselves accursed they
        were not here
        And hold their manhood cheap
        while any speaks
        That fought with us upon St. Chrispen's day

        As for the juror judges, you distinguished Senators, it is
    always a victory for democracy when its elected representatives
    do their duty, no matter how difficult and unpleasant, and we
    thank you for it. Please don't misconstrue our fervor for our
    cause to any lack of respect or appreciation for your high
    office. But our most formidable opponent has not been opposing
    counsel nor any political party; it has been the cynicism, the
    widespread conviction that all politics and all politicians
    are, by definition, corrupt and venal.
        That cynicism is an acid eating away at the vital organs of
    American public life. It is a clear and present danger, because
    it blinds us to the nobility and the fragility of being a self-
    governing people.
        One of the several questions that needs answering is
    whether your vote on conviction lessens or enlarges that
    cynicism. Nothing begets cynicism like the double standard--one
    rule for the popular and the powerful and another for the rest
    of us.
        One of the most interesting things in this trial was the
    testimony of the President's good friend, the former Senator
    from Arkansas. He did his persuasive best to maintain the
    confusion that this is all about sex. Of course, it is useful
    for the defense to misdirect our focus to what everyone
    concedes are private acts and none of our business. But if you
    care to read the articles of impeachment, you won't find any
    complaints about private sexual misconduct. You will find
    charges of perjury and obstruction of justice which are public
    acts and Federal crimes, especially when committed by the one
    person duty bound to faithfully execute the laws. Infidelity is
    private and noncriminal. Perjury and obstruction are public and
    criminal. The deliberate focus on what is not at issue here is
    a defense lawyer's tactic and nothing more. This entire saga
    has been a theater of distraction and misdirection, time-
    honored defense tactics when the law and the facts get in the
    way.
        One phrase you have not heard the defense pronounce is the
    ``sanctity of the oath.'' But this case deeply involves the
    efficacy, the meaning, and the enforceability of the oath. The
    President's defenders stay away from the word ``lie,''
    preferring ``mislead'' or ``deceive.'' But they shrink from the
    phrase ``sanctity of the oath,'' fearing it as one might a
    rattlesnake.
        There is a visibility factor in the President's public
    acts, and those which betray a trust or reveal contempt for the
    law are hard to sweep under the rug, or under the bed, for that
    matter. They reverberate, they ricochet all over the land, and
    provide the worst possible example for our young people. As
    that third-grader from Chicago wrote to me, ``If you can't
    believe the President, who can you believe?''
        Speaking of young people, in 1946 a British playwright,
    Terrance Rattigan, wrote a play based on a true experience that
    happened in England in 1910. The play was called ``The Winslow
    Boy.'' The story--as I say, a true story--involved a young 13-
    year-old lad who was kicked out of the Royal Naval College for
    having forged somebody else's signature on a postal money
    order. Of course, he claimed he was innocent, but he was
    summarily dismissed and his family, of very modest means, could
    not afford legal counsel, and it was a very desperate
    situation. Sir Edward Carson, the best lawyer of his time--
    barrister, I suppose--got interested in the case and took it on
    pro bono and lost all the way through the courts.
        Finally, he had no other place to go, but he dug up an
    ancient remedy in England called ``petition of right.'' You ask
    the King for relief. And so Carson wrote out five pages of
    reasons why a petition of right should be granted and, lo and
    behold, it got past the Attorney General, it got to the King.
    The King read it, agreed with it, and wrote across the front of
    the petition, ``Let right be done. Edward VII.''
        I have always been moved by that phrase. I saw the movie; I
    saw the play; and I have the book. And I am still moved by that
    phrase, ``Let right be done.'' I hope when you finally vote
    that will move you, too.
        There are some interesting parallels to our cause here
    today. This Senate Chamber is our version of the House of
    Lords, and while we managers cannot claim to represent that 13-
    year-old Winslow boy, we speak for a lot of young people who
    look to us to set an example.
        Ms. Seligman last Saturday said we want to win too badly.
    This surprised me because none of the managers has committed
    perjury nor obstructed justice and claimed false privileges,
    none has hidden evidence under anyone's bed nor encouraged
    false testimony before the grand jury. That is what you do if
    you want to win too badly.
        I believe it was Saul Bellow who once said, ``A great deal
    of intelligence can be invested in ignorance when the need for
    illusion is great.'' And those words characterize the defense
    in this case. ``The need for illusion'' is very great.
        I doubt there are many people on the planet who doubt the
    President has repeatedly lied under oath and has obstructed
    justice. The defense spent a lot of time picking lint. There is
    a saying in the courts, I believe, that equity will not stoop
    to pick up pins. But that was their case. So the real issue
    doesn't concern the facts, the stubborn facts, as the defense
    is fond of saying, but what to do about them.
        I am still dumbfounded about the drafts of the censures
    that are circulating. We aren't half as tough on the President
    in our impeachment articles as this draft is that was printed
    in the New York Times:

        An inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee
    in the White House which was shameless, reckless and
    indefensible.

        I have a problem with that. It seems they are talking about
    private acts of consensual sexual misconduct which are really
    none of our business. But that is the leadoff.
        Then they say:

        The President deliberately misled and deceived the American
    people and officials in all branches of the U.S. Government.

        This is not a Republican document. This is coming from
    here.

        The President gave false or misleading testimony and
    impeded discovery of evidence in judicial proceedings.

        Isn't that another way of saying obstruction of justice and
    perjury?

        The President's conduct demeans the Office of the President
    as well as the President himself and creates disrespect for the
    laws of the land. Future generations of Americans must know
    that such behavior is not only unacceptable but bears grave
    consequences including loss of integrity, trust and respect.

        But not loss of job.

        Whereas, William Jefferson Clinton's conduct has brought
    shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the
    President; whereas, he has violated the trust of the American
    people--

        See Hamilton's Federalist No. 65--

    he should be condemned in the strongest terms.

        Well, the next to the strongest terms. The strongest terms
    would remove him from office.
        Well, do you really cleanse the office as provided in the
    Constitution or do you use the Airwick of a censure resolution?
    Because any censure resolution, to be meaningful, has to punish
    the President, if only his reputation. And how do you deal with
    the laws of bill of attainder? How do you deal with the
    separation of powers? What kind of a precedent are you setting?
        We all claim to revere the Constitution, but a censure is
    something that is a device, a way of avoiding the harsh
    constitutional option, and it is the only one we have up or
    down on impeachment. That, of course, is your judgment, and I
    am offering my views, for what they are worth.
        Once in a while I do worry about the future. I wonder if,
    after this culture war is over, this one we are engaged in, an
    America will survive that is worth fighting for to defend.
        People won't risk their lives for the U.N., or over the Dow
    Jones averages. But I wonder, in future generations, whether
    there will be enough vitality left in duty, honor and country
    to excite our children and grandchildren to defend America.
        There is no denying the fact that what you decide will have
    a profound effect on our culture, as well as on our politics. A
    failure to convict will make a statement that lying under oath,
    while unpleasant and to be avoided, is not all that serious.
    Perhaps we can explain this to those currently in prison for
    perjury. We have reduced lying under oath to a breach of
    etiquette, but only if you are the President.
        Wherever and whenever you avert your eyes from a wrong,
    from an injustice, you become a part of the problem.
        On the subject of civil rights, it is my belief this issue
    doesn't belong to anyone; it belongs to everyone. It certainly
    belongs to those who have suffered invidious discrimination,
    and one would have to be catatonic not to know that the
    struggle to keep alive equal protection of the law never ends.
    The mortal enemy of equal justice is the double standard, and
    if we permit a double standard, even for the President, we do
    no favor to the cause of human rights. It has been said that
    America has nothing to fear from this President on the subject
    of civil rights. I doubt Paula Jones would subscribe to that
    endorsement.
        If you agree that perjury and obstruction of justice have
    been committed, and yet you vote down the conviction, you are
    extending and expanding the boundaries of permissible
    Presidential conduct. You are saying a perjurer and obstructer
    of justice can be President, in the face of no less than three
    precedents for conviction of Federal judges for perjury. You
    shred those precedents and you raise the most serious questions
    of whether the President is in fact subject to the law or
    whether we are beginning a restoration of the divine right of
    kings. The issues we are concerned with have consequences far
    into the future because the real damage is not to the
    individuals involved, but to the American system of justice and
    especially the principle that no one is above the law.
        Edward Gibbon wrote his magisterial ``Decline and Fall of
    the Roman Empire'' in the late 18th century--in fact the first
    volume was issued in 1776. In his work, he discusses an emperor
    named Septimius Severus, who died in 211 A.D. after ruling 18
    years. And here is what Gibbon wrote about the emperor:

        Severus promised, only to betray; he flattered only to
    ruin; and however he might occasionally bind himself by oaths
    and treaties, his conscience, obsequious to his interest,
    always released him from the inconvenient obligation.

        I guess those who believe history repeats itself are really
    onto something. Horace Mann said:

        You should be ashamed to die unless you have achieved some
    victory for humanity.

        To the House managers, I say your devotion to duty and the
    Constitution has set an example that is a victory for humanity.
    Charles de Gaulle once said that France would not be true to
    herself unless she was engaged in some great enterprise. That
    is true of us all. Do we spend our short lives as consumers,
    space occupiers, clock watchers, as spectators, or in the
    service of some great enterprise?
        I believe, being a Senator, being a Congressman, and
    struggling with all our might for equal justice for all, is a
    great enterprise. It is our great enterprise. And to my House
    managers, your great enterprise was not to speak truth to
    power, but to shout it. Now let us all take our place in
    history on the side of honor and, oh, yes: Let right be done.
        I yield back my time.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                               Order Of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe that concludes the
    closing arguments. Therefore, the Senate will reconvene as the
    Court of Impeachment at 1 p.m. on Tuesday to resume
    consideration of the articles of impeachment.

     notice of intent to suspend the rules of the Senate by Senator daschle

        In accordance to Rule V of the Standing Rules of the
    Senate, I (for myself, Mr. Lott, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Harkin,
    Mr. Wellstone, Ms. Collins, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Leahy) hereby
    give notice in writing that it is my intention to move to
    suspend the following portions of the Rules of Procedure and
    Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials in
    regard to any deliberations by Senators on the articles of
    impeachment during the trial of President William Jefferson
    Clinton:
        (1) The phrase ``without debate'' in Rule VII;
        (2) the following portion of Rule XX: ``, unless the Senate
    shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
    decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon
    without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall
    be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be
    entered on the record''; and
        (3) In Rule XXIV, the phrases ``without debate'', ``except
    when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that
    case'' and ``, to be had without debate''.
                                    ------

                       adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of
    Impeachment stand in adjournment until 1 p.m. tomorrow, and I
    further ask consent that the Senate now resume legislative
    session. I remind all Senators to stand as the Chief Justice
    departs the Chamber.
        There being no objection, at 6:34 p.m. the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Tuesday, February 9,
    1999, at 1 p.m.
                                    ------

                     NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE RULES

        Mr. DASCHLE. In accordance with rule V, on behalf of myself
    and Senator Feinstein, I hereby give notice in writing that it
    is my intention to move to suspend the following:
        Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar''; and
        Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two
    hours of a new legislative day.''
        This is in order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure
    resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to
    proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the
    calendar of business.

                     NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND THE RULES

     Mrs. FEINSTEIN. In accordance with rule V, on behalf of myself
    and Senator Daschle, I hereby give notice in writing that it is
    my intention to move to suspend the following:
        Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar''; and
        Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two
    hours of a new legislative day.''
        That is in order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure
    resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to
    proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the
    calendar of business.

                           Tuesday, February 9, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 1:05 p.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Almighty God, we renew our trust in You when we realize how
    much You have entrusted to us. We are stunned by the psalmist's
    reminder that You have crowned us with glory and honor and
    given us responsibility over the work of Your hands. We renew
    our dependence on You as we assume this breathtaking call to
    courageous leadership.
        Help the Senators to claim Your promised glory and honor.
    Imbue them with Your own attributes and strengthen their desire
    to do what is right and just. As they humbly cast before You
    any crowns of position or pride, crown them with Your presence
    and power. In Your holy Name. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  the journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. This afternoon, the Senate will begin final
    deliberations on the articles of impeachment. However, pursuant
    to S. Res. 30, a Senator may at this time offer a motion to
    suspend the rules to allow the final deliberations to remain
    open. That motion is not amendable and no motions to that
    motion may be offered. Therefore, I expect at least one vote to
    occur shortly. Following that vote, if the motion is defeated,
    I will move to close deliberations. If that motion should be
    adopted, the Senate will begin full deliberations, with each
    Senator allocated 15 minutes to speak. And I note that that
    will be true whether it is in open or closed session, although
    Senator Daschle and I may have some further comments to make
    about that later on.
        I note that if each Senator uses his or her entire debate
    time, the proceedings will take 25 hours, not including breaks
    and recesses. Therefore, I remind all Senators that Lincoln
    gave his Gettysburg Address in less than 3 minutes and
    Kennedy's inaugural address was slightly over 7 minutes. But
    certainly every Senator will have his or her opportunity to
    speak for up to 15 minutes, if that is their desire, and, of
    course, we would also need to communicate with the Chief
    Justice about the time of the proceedings.
        I expect that we will try to go until about 6 or 6:30 this
    afternoon. I want to confer with Senator Daschle, but I think
    maybe we will try to begin earlier tomorrow and go throughout
    the day into the early evening. Again, we do have to take into
    consideration the fact that about 7 or 8 hours will be the
    absolute maximum we will probably be able to do in a single
    day. We will talk further about that and make an announcement
    before we conclude today.
        I now yield the floor to the Senator from Pennsylvania,
    Senator Specter, for the purpose of propounding a unanimous
    consent request.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes Senator Specter.

                           Unanimous Consent Request

        Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of the leader,
    and in my capacity as a copresider for the Senate at the
    deposition of Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, I ask unanimous consent
    that the parties be allowed to take additional discovery,
    including testimony on oral deposition of Mr. Christopher
    Hitchens, Ms. Carol Blue, Mr. R. Scott Armstrong and Mr. Sidney
    Blumenthal with regard to possible fraud on the Senate by
    alleged perjury in the deposition testimony of Mr. Sidney
    Blumenthal with respect to allegations that he, Mr. Sidney
    Blumenthal, was involved with the dissemination beyond the
    White House of information detrimental to the credibility of
    Ms. Monica Lewinsky, and that pursuant to the authority of
    title II of Senate Resolution 30, the Chief Justice of the
    United States, through the Secretary of the Senate, shall issue
    subpoenas for the taking of such testimony at a time and place
    to be determined by the majority leader after consultation with
    the Democratic leader, and, further, that these depositions be
    conducted pursuant to the procedures set forth in title II of
    Senate Resolution 30, except that the last four sentences of
    section 204 shall not apply to these depositions, provided,
    further, however, that the final sentence of section 204 shall
    apply to the deposition of Mr. Sidney Blumenthal.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the majority
    leader.

                          Motion To Suspend The Rules

        Mr. LOTT. On behalf of myself and Senator Daschle, I move
    to suspend the rules on behalf of Senators Hutchison, Harkin,
    and others in order to conduct open deliberations.
        Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask unanimous consent that there be a 40-
    minute debate, equally divided, between the leaders or their
    designees in open session on the motion to suspend the rules.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. GREGG. I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        The question is on the motion to suspend the rules. The
    yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the roll.
        The legislative clerk called the roll.
        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 59, nays 41, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 15]

                  [Subject: Lott motion to suspend the rules]

                                    YEAS--59

    Abraham
    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    DeWine
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Gorton
    Graham
    Hagel
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Kyl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Lugar
    McCain
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                    NAYS--41

    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Lott
    Mack
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this vote the yeas are 59, the nays
    are 41. Two-thirds of those Senators voting--a quorum being
    present--not having voted in the affirmative, the motion is not
    agreed to.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.
        The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to make this reminder:
    Only those people who are properly authorized to be on the
    floor of the Senate should be here. The Sergeant at Arms will
    act accordingly.
        Now, Mr. Chief Justice, there is a desire by a number of
    Senators that it be possible for their statements, even in
    closed session, to be made a part of the Record. Senator
    Daschle and I have talked a great deal about this. We think
    this is an appropriate way to proceed.

        Motion Relating to Record of Proceedings Held in Closed Session

        Mr. LOTT. Therefore, I send this motion to the desk: That
    the record of the proceedings held in closed session for any
    Senator to insert their final deliberations on the articles of
    impeachment shall be published in the Congressional Record at
    the conclusion of the trial.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the motion.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Lott] for himself and Mr.
    Daschle, moves as follows:
        That the record of the proceedings held in closed session
    for any Senator to insert their final deliberations on the
    Articles of Impeachment shall be published in the Congressional
    Record at the conclusion of the trial.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, so everybody can understand
    this, may I be recognized?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. It is the desire of one and all to have the
    opportunity for this record to be made. After the trial is
    concluded, Senators can have their statements in the closed
    session put into the Congressional Record--in the record of the
    trial. There may be Senators that choose, for whatever reason,
    not to do it in that way at that time. Senator Daschle and I
    have talked a great deal about this. We think this is the fair
    way to make that record. We urge that it be adopted.
        Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Chief Justice, point of clarification.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from California, Mrs.
    Feinstein, is recognized.
        Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Leader, can I ask a point of
    clarification? Does this mean that repartee between Members
    will not be recorded, but just the statement as the Member
    submits it?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could respond to that, I
    think that would be up to the Senators. That has been one of my
    points. I hope we won't just have speeches and that, in fact,
    we will have deliberations. As we have found ourselves in
    previous closed sessions, almost uncontrollably we wound up
    discussing and talking with each other. I hope that if we come
    to that, the Senators involved in the exchange would make that
    a part of the record and part of history. I believe they would
    have that right under this proposal.
        Mr. DASCHLE. If the leader will yield for the purpose of
    clarification, I may have misunderstood what the majority
    leader described here. But our intent would be to allow
    statements to be inserted into the Congressional Record, not
    into the hearing record.
        Mr. LOTT. That is correct. I misstated that.
        Mr. DASCHLE. So that people understand, this would actually
    allow you the opportunity to insert your statement into the
    Congressional Record, succeeding the votes on the two articles.
        Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota, Mr.
    Wellstone, is recognized.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, I have a question for the
    majority leader. I might not have heard this the right way.
    This would allow any Senator, who so wishes, to have his or her
    statements made in all of our--not just the final
    deliberations, but this would cover all of our sessions that
    have been in closed session; is that correct or not?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I believe this would be
    applicable only to the final deliberations.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could ask the
    majority leader whether he might be willing--it seems to me
    that if this is the principle, I wonder if he would amend his
    request to any Senator who wants to--and it is up to the
    Senator--this is far different than having our final
    deliberations a matter of public record, which is what I think
    we should do, but what you are saying is any Senator who so
    wishes can do so. Might that not apply to all of the closed
    sessions we had? It seems to me that the same principle
    applies.
        Mr. LOTT. That is not what is in this proposal. I would
    like to think about that and discuss it with the Senator from
    Minnesota and others. I remember making a passionate speech,
    but I had no prepared notes; and so I could not put it into the
    Record if I wanted to when we were in one of those closed
    sessions.
        I honestly had not considered that. This was aimed at the
    closing deliberations. I think we need to give some thought to
    reaching back now to the other closed sessions before we move
    in that direction.
        Mr. CRAIG addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Idaho, Mr. Craig, is
    recognized.
        Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, will the majority leader
    yield for a question?
        Mr. LOTT. I would be glad to yield, Mr. Chief Justice.
        Mr. CRAIG. Is my understanding correct that your motion
    would keep this session of deliberations closed, except for
    those Senators who would choose to have their statements become
    a part of the Congressional Record, and that it would be the
    choice of the individual Senators, and that the deliberations
    of the closed session would remain closed unless otherwise
    specified by each individual Senator, specific to their
    statements; is that a fair understanding?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, that is an accurate
    understanding, and that is with the presumption that we will go
    into closed session. And such a motion will be made in short
    order.
        I want to also clarify that this is made on behalf of
    Senator Daschle and myself. We have consulted a great deal on
    this and we have both been thinking about doing something like
    this, but we never put it on paper until a moment ago.
        Mr. CRAIG. I thank the leader.
        Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Georgia, Mr. Coverdell,
    is recognized.
        Mr. COVERDELL. I want to make an inquiry to the leader in
    response to the question by the Senator from California, who
    alluded to actual deliberations and statements among Senators.
    I assume that in order to go into the Congressional Record, it
    would require all of the participants of the colloquy----
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Parliamentarian tells me that this
    is all out of order.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I may, in a moment I will
    make a motion to close the doors for deliberations. However, we
    have to dispose of this.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the motion----
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent to
    ask the majority leader one follow-up question on his motion.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to make sure I fully
    understand the distinguished majority leader. Our vote on what
    we do on the record does not include a vote on closing the
    session itself, it simply assumes that vote carries?
        Mr. LOTT. That is correct. That is my understanding.
        Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Iowa, Mr. Harkin.
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, again, I ask unanimous
    consent that I be able to ask the majority leader a question
    regarding the ethics.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mr. HARKIN. I have a question regarding the ethics rules.
    Under this proposed motion, could a Senator give his or her
    statement in public and then give the same statement in closed
    session and still not violate the ethics rules? I am concerned
    about how we might want to follow that.
        I yield to the head of the Ethics Committee for
    clarification.
        Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. If the motion carries, as has
    been outlined by the majority leader, you have every right to
    release your statement. That would not violate rule 29.5.
        Mr. HARKIN. I could do whatever----
        Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Your statement, yours, not
    anybody else's.
        Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Washington, Mrs.
    Murray, is recognized.
        Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent to
    ask the majority leader a point of clarification.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mrs. MURRAY. If we reference another Senator's remarks in
    our statements, would we have to get that other Senator's
    consent in order to submit our statement, then, for the Record?
        Mr. LOTT. I am not chairman of the Ethics Committee, but I
    am assured by those on the committee that you would have to do
    so. Are we ready to move forward?
        Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr.
    Kerry, is recognized,
        Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    I be permitted to ask a point of clarification.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mr. KERRY. I ask the majority leader this: He mentioned
    that he hoped during the deliberations that there would be more
    than just speeches, that there would be a process of colloquy.
    I was wondering if he was contemplating how that would work
    because I think under the rules we are limited to one
    intervention of a specific time period. Does the majority
    leader contemplate approaching that difficulty?
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I have discussed this with the
    Democratic leader, and there is no ironclad rule. You know, in
    our other closed session when we sort of got on a roll, we
    yielded additional time to each other, and then at some point
    we started to have a round robin. The Chief Justice probably
    thought it was all completely out of order, but he allowed us
    to go forward. I think we will have to deal with that when we
    get there. I think, as has been the case all the way along, we
    will be understanding of each other and try to make these
    deliberations genuine deliberations. I think it would benefit
    us all in the final result.
        Before I make a motion to close the doors, I yield to the
    Senator from Texas, Mrs. Hutchison, for a parliamentary
    inquiry.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. We have a motion, do we not?
        Mr. LOTT. I beg your pardon.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. However amorphous it may be.
        [Laughter.]
        The question is on agreeing to the motion.
        The motion was agreed to.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, for that amorphous
    ruling.
        [Laughter.]
        I yield to the Senator from Texas for a parliamentary
    inquiry.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
    Texas, Mrs. Hutchison.
        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Chief Justice, rule XX says that while
    the Senate is in session the doors shall remain open unless the
    Senate directs that the doors be closed.
        My inquiry is this: If the Senate, by a majority, voted not
    to direct the doors to be closed, would it be in order to
    proceed to deliberations with the doors open?
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair is of the view that it would
    not be in order for this reason: On the initial reading of
    rules XX and XXIV of the Senate impeachment rules, it would not
    appear to mandate that the deliberations and debate occur in
    closed session, but only to permit it. But it is clear from a
    review of the history of the rules that the committee that was
    established in 1868 to create the rules specifically intended
    to require closed sessions for debate and deliberation. Senator
    Howard reported the rules for the committee and clearly stated
    this intention, and Chief Justice Chase, in the Andrew Johnson
    trial, stated in response to an inquiry, ``There can be no
    deliberation unless the doors are closed. There can be no
    debate under the rules unless the doors be closed.''
        I understand from the Parliamentarian that it has been the
    consistent practice of the Senate for the last 130 years in
    impeachment trials to require deliberations and debate by the
    Senate to be held in closed session. Therefore--though there
    may be some ambiguity between the two rules--my ruling is based
    partly on deference to the Senate's longstanding practice.
        In the opinion of the Chair, there can be no deliberation
    on any question before the Senate in open session unless the
    Senate suspends its rules, or consent is granted.
        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you.

                Motion to Close the Doors for Final Deliberation

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, with that record now having
    been made, I now move that the doors for final deliberations be
    closed, and I ask unanimous consent that the yeas and nays be
    vitiated.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senator from Minnesota is
    recognized.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, the majority leader is
    trying to get the floor, but I wonder whether I could not move
    that any Senator be allowed, if he or she makes it their
    choice, to have our statements that have been made and passed
    in closed session left entirely up to us to also be a part of
    the Congressional Record.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, if I could respond, give us an
    opportunity to discuss this with you. We will have another
    opportunity to do that. I think maybe we can work something
    out. I would like to make sure we have thought it through, if
    that is appropriate, Mr. Chief Justice.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection?
        Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I object.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Objection is heard.
        The yeas and nays are automatic. The clerk will call the
    roll.
        The bill clerk called the roll.
        The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 47, as follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 16]

                      [Subject: Motion to close the doors]

                                    YEAS--53

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Chafee
    Cochran
    Collins
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Jeffords
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Snowe
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                    NAYS--47

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Cleland
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Specter
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The motion was agreed to.

                                 Closed Session

        [At 1:52 p.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The
    proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until
    6:27 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                                  Open Session

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate resume open session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                                    ------

                       adjournment until 10 a.m. tomorrow

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate stand adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow. I further
    ask unanimous consent that immediately following the prayer on
    Wednesday, the Senate resume closed session for further
    deliberations of the pending articles of impeachment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Is there objection? There being no
    objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. LOTT. All Senators please remain standing at your desk.
        Thereupon, at 6:27 p.m., the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, adjourned until Wednesday, February 10, 1999, at
    10 a.m.
                                    ------

     MOTIONS TO OPEN TO THE PUBLIC THE FINAL DELIBERATIONS ON THE ARTICLES
                                 OF IMPEACHMENT

        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, in relation to the earlier
    vote, I have these thoughts. Accustomed as we and the American
    people are to having our proceedings in the Senate open to the
    public and subject to press coverage, the most striking
    prescription in the ``Rules of Procedure and Practice in the
    Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials'' has been the closed
    deliberations required on any question, motion and now on the
    final vote on the articles of impeachment.
        The requirement of closed deliberation more than any other
    rule reflects the age in which the rules were originally
    adopted in 1868. Even in 1868, however, not everyone favored
    secrecy. During the trial of President Johnson, the senior
    Senator from Vermont, George F. Edmunds, moved to have the
    closed deliberations on the articles transcribed and officially
    reported ``in order that the world might know, without
    diminution or exaggeration, the reasons and views upon which we
    proceed to our judgment.'' (Cong. Globe Supp'l, Impeachment
    Trial of President Andrew Johnson, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., vol.
    4, p. 424.) The motion was tabled.
        In the 130 years that have passed since that time, the
    Senate has seen the advent of television in the Senate Chamber,
    instant communication and rapid news cycles, distribution of
    Senate documents over the Internet, the addition of 46 Senators
    representing 23 additional States, and the direct election of
    Senators by the people in our States.
        Opening deliberations would help further the dual purposes
    of our rules to promote fairness and political accountability
    in the impeachment process. I supported the motion by Senators
    Harkin, Wellstone, and others to suspend this rule requiring
    closed deliberations and to open our deliberations on Senator
    Byrd's motion to dismiss and at other points earlier in this
    trial. We were unsuccessful. Now that we are approaching our
    final deliberations on the articles of impeachment, themselves,
    I hope that this secrecy rule will be suspended so that the
    Senate's deliberations are open and the American people can see
    them. In a matter of this historic importance, the American
    people should be able to witness their Senators' deliberations.
        Some have indicated objection to opening our final
    deliberations because petit juries in courts of law conduct
    their deliberations in secret. Analogies to juries in courts of
    law are misplaced. I was privileged to serve as a prosecutor
    for 8 years before I was elected to the Senate. As a
    prosecutor, I represented the people of Vermont in court and
    before juries on numerous occasions. I fully appreciate the
    traditions and importance of allowing jurors to deliberate and
    make their decisions privately, without intrusion or pressure
    from the parties, the judge or the public. The sanctity of the
    jury deliberation room ensures the integrity and fairness of
    our judicial system.
        The Senate sitting as an impeachment court is unlike any
    jury in any civil or criminal case. A jury in a court of law is
    chosen specifically because the jurors have no connection or
    relation to the parties or their lawyers and no familiarity
    with the allegations. Keeping the deliberations of regular
    juries secret ensures that as they reach their final decision,
    they are free from outside influences or pressure.
        As the Chief Justice made clear on the third day of the
    impeachment trial, the Senate is more than a jury; it is a
    court. Courts are called upon to explain the reasons for
    decisions.
        Furthermore, to the extent the Senate is called upon to
    evaluate the evidence as a jury, we stand in different shoes
    than any juror in a court of law. We all know many of the
    people who have been witnesses in this matter; we all know the
    Republican managers--indeed, one Senator is a brother of one of
    the managers; and we were familiar with the underlying
    allegations in this case before the Republican managers ever
    began their presentation.
        Because we are a different sort of jury, we shoulder a
    heavier burden in explaining the reasons for the decisions we
    make here. I appreciate why Senators would want to have certain
    of our deliberations in closed session: to avoid embarrassment
    to and protect the privacy of persons who may be discussed.
    Yet, on the critical decisions we are now being called upon to
    make our votes on the articles themselves, allowing our
    deliberations to be open to the public helps assure the
    American people that the decisions we make are for the right
    reasons.
        In 1974, when the Senate was preparing itself for the
    anticipated impeachment trial of former President Richard
    Nixon, the Committee on Rules and Administration discussed the
    issue of allowing television coverage of the Senate trial. Such
    coverage did not become routine in the Senate until later in
    1986. In urging such coverage of the possible impeachment trial
    of President Nixon, Senator Metcalf (D-MT), explained:

        Given the fact that the party not in control of the White
    House is the majority party in the Senate, the need for
    broadcast media access is even more compelling. Charges of a
    `kangaroo court,' or a `lynch mob proceeding' must not be given
    an opportunity to gain any credence whatsoever. Americans must
    be able to see for themselves what is occurring. An impeachment
    trial must not be perceived by the public as a mysterious
    process, filtered through the perceptions of third parties. The
    procedure whereby the individual elected to the most powerful
    office in the world can be lawfully removed must command the
    highest possible level of acceptance from the electorate.''
    (Hrg. August 5 and 6, 1974, p. 37).

        Opening deliberation will ensure complete and accurate
    public understanding of the proceedings and the reasons for the
    decisions we make here. Opening our deliberations on our votes
    on the articles would tell the American people why each of us
    voted the way we did.
        The last time this issue was actually taken up and voted on
    by the Senate was more than a century ago in 1876, during the
    impeachment trial of Secretary of War William Belknap. Without
    debate or deliberation, the Senate refused then to open the
    deliberations of the Senate to the public. That was before
    Senators were elected directly by the people of their State,
    that was before the Freedom of Information Act confirmed the
    right of the people to see how government decisions are made.
    Keeping closed our deliberations is wholly inconsistent with
    the progress we have made over the last century to make our
    Government more accountable to the people.
        Constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt noted in his
    important book, ``The Federal Impeachment Process,'' that ``the
    Senate is ideally suited for balancing the tasks of making
    policy and finding facts (as required in impeachment trials)
    with political accountability.'' Public access to the reasons
    each Senator gives for his vote on the articles is vital for
    the political accountability that is the hallmark of our role.
        I likewise urge the Senate to adjust these 130-year-old
    rules to allow the Senate's votes on the articles of
    impeachment to be recorded for history by news photographers.
    This is a momentous official and public event in the annals of
    the Senate and in the history of the Nation. This is a moment
    of history that should be documented for both its contemporary
    and its lasting significance.
        Open deliberation ensures complete accountability to the
    American people. Charles Black wrote that Presidential
    impeachment ``unseats the person the people have deliberately
    chosen for the office.'' (``Impeachment: A Handbook,'' p. 17.)
    The American people must be able to judge if their elected
    representatives have chosen for or against conviction for
    reasons they understand, even if they disagree. To bar the
    American people from observing the deliberations that result in
    these important decisions is unfair and undemocratic.
        The Senate should have suspended the rules so that our
    deliberations on the final question of whether to convict the
    President of these articles of impeachment were held in open
    session.
        I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the Application of
    Cable News Network, submitted by Floyd Abrams and others, be
    printed in the Record.
        There being no objection, the material was ordered to be
    printed in the Record, as follows:

              IN THE U.S. SENATE SITTING AS A COURT OF IMPEACHMENT

                                     ______

                                     In re

       Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
                                     States

                                     ______

    application of cable news network for a determination that the closure
    of these proceedings violates the first amendment to the united states
                                  constitution
                                     ______

    To: The Honorable William H. Rehnquist and The Honorable Members of the
            U.S. Senate
        Cable News Network (``CNN'') respectfully submits this application
    for a determination that the First Amendment to the United States
    Constitution requires that the public be permitted to attend and view
    the debates, deliberations and proceedings of the United States Senate
    as to the issue of whether President William Jefferson Clinton shall be
    convicted and as to other related matters.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Footnotes at end of document.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  introduction
        Under Rules VII, XX and XXIV of the ``Rules of Procedure and
    Practice in the Senate When Sitting On Impeachment Trials,'' the Senate
    has determined to sit in closed session during its consideration of
    various issues that have arisen during these impeachment proceedings.
    Motions to suspend the rules have failed and the debates among members
    of the Senate as to a number of significant matters have been closed.
    As the final debates and deliberations approach at which each member of
    the Senate will voice his or her views on the issue of whether
    President Clinton should be convicted or acquitted of the charges made,
    the need for the closest, most intense public scrutiny of the
    proceedings in this body increases. By this application, CNN seeks
    access for the public to observe those debates, as well as other
    proceedings that bear upon the resolution of the impeachment trial. The
    basis of this application is the First Amendment to the Constitution of
    the United States.
        We make this application mindful that deliberations upon
    impeachment were conducted behind ``closed doors'' at the last
    impeachment trial of a President, in 1868. We are, as well, mindful of
    the power of the Senate--consistent with the power conferred upon it in
    Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution--to exercise full control over
    the conduct of impeachment proceedings held before it. In so doing,
    however, the Senate must itself be mindful of its unavoidable
    responsibility to adopt rules and procedures consistent with the
    entirety of the Constitution as it is now understood and as the Supreme
    Court has interpreted it.
        The commands of the First Amendment, we urge, are at war with
    closed-door impeachment deliberations. If there is one principle at the
    core of the First Amendment it is that, as Madison wrote, ``the
    censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the
    Government over the people.'' 4 Annals of Congress, p. 934 (1794). That
    proposition in turn is rooted in the expectation that citizens--the
    people--will have the information that enables them to judge government
    and those in government. The right and ability of citizens to obtain
    the information necessary for self-government is indeed at the heart of
    the Republic itself: ``a people who mean to be their own Governors,''
    Madison also wrote, ``must arm themselves with the power which
    knowledge gives.'' James Madison, Letter to W.T. Barry, in 9 Writings
    of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed., 1910). As Chief Justice Warren
    Burger observed, writing for the Supreme Court in 1980 in one of its
    many recent rulings vindicating the principle of open government:
    ``People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
    institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are
    prohibited from observing.'' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
    U.S. 555, 572 (1980). Those very words could well have been written
    about the proceedings before the Senate today.
        All agree that the impeachment of a President presents the most
    solemn question of self-government that a free society can ever
    confront. All should also agree that the public ought to have the most
    complete information about each decision made by the body responsible
    for ruling upon that impeachment. Should the Senate vote to convict, a
    President duly elected twice by the public will be removed from office.
    Does not a self-governing public have the most powerful interest in
    being informed about every aspect of that decision and why it was
    taken? Should the Senate vote to acquit, the President will not be
    removed in the face of impeachment proceedings in which the majority in
    the House branded him a criminal. Can it seriously be doubted that the
    public possesses just as profound a right to know why?
        Only recently--and only during this century (and well after the
    trial of Andrew Johnson)--has our commitment to the principle that
    debate on public issues should be open become not merely a nationally
    shared philosophy but an element embedded in constitutional law as
    well. But deeply-rooted in the law it has become. It is thus no answer
    to observe that impeachment deliberations in the Senate were closed in
    the nineteenth century. The Senate has a duty to consider the
    transformation of First Amendment principles since that time in
    determining whether it is now constitutionally permissible to close
    impeachment deliberations on the eve of the twenty-first century. If,
    as is also true, the Senate, rather than the Supreme Court, was chosen
    to try impeachments precisely because its members are ``the
    representatives of the nation,'' Federalist No. 65, and as such possess
    a greater ``degree of credit and authority'' than the Supreme Court to
    carry out the task of determining the fate of a President,\1\ that
    ``credit and authority'' can only be brought to bear if the process by
    which judgment is reached is open to the public.
       the obligation of congress to account for and abide by the first
                                   amendment
        As we have said, we are mindful of the language of Article I,
    Section 3, according the Senate the ``sole Power to try all
    Impeachments.'' See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
    (according the Senate broad discretion to choose impeachment
    procedures). But this very delegation of authority to the Senate, a
    delegation that makes most issues concerning impeachment rules ``non-
    justiciable'', see Nixon, supra, also imposes on this body a very
    special responsibility to ensure that those rules comply with
    constitutional mandates.\2\ Congress itself--the very entity against
    which the First Amendment affords the most explicit protection \3\--is
    bound to abide by the First Amendment. The Constitution is ``the
    supreme Law of the Land,'' U.S. Const., art. VI, para. 2, and all
    ``Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound by Oath or
    Affirmation, to support'' it. Id. para. 3. The Supreme Court has
    repeatedly recognized that Congress is itself obligated to interpret
    the Constitution in exercising its authority. See, e.g., Rostker v.
    Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (``Congress is a coequal branch of
    government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the
    Constitution of the United States.''). And in promulgating its rules
    the Congress must, of course, abide by the Constitution: ``The
    constitution empowers each house to determine its rules and
    proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
    or violate fundamental rights. . . .'' United States v. Ballin, 144
    U.S. 1, 5 (1892), quoted in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
    Periodical Correspondents' Assoc., 515 F.2d 1341, 1347 (D.C. Cir.
    1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976); see Watkins v. United
    States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957).
                       the command of the first amendment
        The architecture of free speech law--and, in particular, that law
    placed in the context of access to information as to how and why
    government power is being exercised--could not more strongly favor the
    broadest dissemination of information about, and comment on,
    government. The foundation of the First Amendment is, in fact, our
    republican form of government itself. As the Supreme Court recognized
    in the landmark free speech decision, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
    376 U.S. 254 (1964): ``. . . the Constitution created a form of
    government under which `[t]he people, not the government possess the
    absolute sovereignty.' The structure of the government dispersed power
    in reflection of the people's distrust of concentrated power, and of
    power itself at all levels. This form of government was `altogether
    different' from the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign
    and the people were subjects.'' Id. at 274 (quoting Reporting of the
    General Assembly of Virginia, 4 Elliot's Debates). In Sullivan, a
    unanimous Court determined that the ``altogether different'' form of
    government ratified by the Founders necessitated an altogether
    ``different degree of freedom'' as to political debate than had existed
    in England. Id. at 275 (citation omitted). It was in the First
    Amendment that this unique freedom was enshrined and protected.
        For the Court, the ``central meaning of the First Amendment,'' 376
    U.S. at 273, was the ``right of free public discussion of the
    stewardship of public officials. . . .'' Id. at 275. Thus, the First
    Amendment ``was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
    the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
    people.'' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484. ``The maintenance
    of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
    government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes
    may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
    security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our
    constitutional system.'' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369.
    Id. at 269.\4\
        The decision in Sullivan related specifically to libel law. But
    what made Sullivan so transformative--what made it, as the eminent
    First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn remarked, cause for
    ``dancing in the streets'' \5\--was this: it recognized (in Madison's
    words) that ``[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute
    sovereignty.'' Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 274. It emphasized that the First
    Amendment protected the ``citizen-critic'' of government. Id. at 282.
    It barred government itself from seeking damages from insults directed
    at it by its citizens. And it declared that ``public discussion is a
    political duty.'' Id. at 270.
        In the decades following Sullivan, these notions became embedded in
    the First Amendment--and thus the rule of law--through dozens of
    rulings of the Supreme Court. In particular, and following from, the
    First Amendment protection of public discussion is the right of the
    public to receive information about government. The First Amendment is
    not merely a bar on the affirmative suppression of speech; as Chief
    Justice Rehnquist has observed, ``censorship . . . as often as not is
    exercised not merely by forbidding the printing of information in the
    possession of a correspondent, but in denying him access to places
    where he might obtain such information.'' William H. Rehnquist, ``The
    First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law,'' 12 Gonz. L. Rev.
    1, 17 (1976).
        And, indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed Chief
    Justice Rehnquist's insight. ``[T]he First Amendment goes beyond
    protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
    prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which
    members of the public may draw.'' First National Bank of Boston v.
    Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Accord Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
    U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (``In a variety of contexts this Court has
    referred to a First Amendment right to `receive information and ideas.'
    '').
        The Supreme Court has thus ruled on four occasions that the First
    Amendment creates a right for the public to attend and observe criminal
    trials and related judicial proceedings, absent the most extraordinary
    of circumstances. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
    (1980); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982);
    Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-
    Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). The cases are
    particularly relevant to this application because they--perhaps more
    clearly than any others--illustrate the core constitutional principle
    that government may not arbitrarily foreclose the opportunity for
    citizens to obtain information central to the decisions they make--and
    the judgments they render--about government itself.
        The teaching of this quartet of cases was aptly articulated by
    another Chief Justice, Warren Burger, writing for the Court in Richmond
    Newspapers, the first of the four decisions. The First Amendment, he
    wrote, ``assur[es] freedom of communication on matters relating to the
    functioning of government.'' 448 U.S. at 575. Noting the centrality of
    the openness in which trials were conducted to that end, id. at 575,
    the Court stated that openness was an ``indispensable attribute of an
    Anglo-American trial.'' Id. at 569. It had assured that proceedings
    were conducted fairly, and it had ``discouraged perjury, the misconduct
    of participants, and decisions based on secret bias''. Id. Most
    significantly, open trials had provided public acceptance of and
    support for the entire judicial process. It was with respect to this
    benefit of openness--the legitimacy it provides to the actions of
    government itself--that Chief Justice Burger (in the passage quoted
    above), observed that ``[p]eople in an open society do not demand
    infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to
    accept what they are prohibited from observing.'' Id. at 562.\6\
        To be sure, the Chief Justice in Richmond Newspapers rested heavily
    on the tradition of openness of criminal trials themselves--a
    difference of potential relevance because impeachment debates and
    deliberation have historically been conducted in secret. But, taken
    together, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny stand for propositions
    far broader than the constitutional value of any specific historical
    practice. The sheer range of proceedings endorsed as open by the
    Supreme Court suggests the importance under the First Amendment of
    public observation of the act of doing justice. Moreover, Supreme Court
    precedent itself suggests that the crucial right to see justice done
    prevails even where the specific kind of proceeding at issue had a
    history of being closed to the public. In Globe Newspaper Co.,  the
    Court ruled that the First Amendment barred government from closing of
    trials of sexual offenses involving minor victims. It did so despite
    the ``long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving
    sexual assaults, particularly those against minors.'' 457 U.S. at 614
    (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
        New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Richmond Newspapers have
    significance which sweep far beyond their holdings that debate about
    public figures must be open and robust and that trials must be
    accessible to the public. Both cases--and all the later cases they have
    spawned--are about the centrality of openness to the process of self-
    governance. ``[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a
    particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial
    process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal
    trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the fact-
    finding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as
    a whole. . . . And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal
    trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
    the judicial process--an essential component in our structure of self
    government.'' Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.
        The First Amendment principles set forth above lead inexorably to a
    straightforward conclusion: the Senate should determine as a matter of
    First Amendment law that the public may attend and observe its debates
    and deliberations about the impeachment of President Clinton. No issue
    relates more to self-government. No determinations will have more
    impact on the public. No judgment of the Senate should be subject to
    more--and more informed--public scrutiny.
        We are well aware that it is sometimes easier to be subjected to
    less public scrutiny and that some have the perception (which has
    sometimes proved accurate) that more can be accomplished more quickly
    in secret than in public. But this is, at its core, an argument against
    democracy itself, against the notion that it is the public itself which
    should sit in judgment on the performance of this body. It is nothing
    less than a rejection of the First Amendment itself. What Justice
    Brennan said two decades ago in the context of judicial proceedings is
    just as applicable here: ``Secrecy of judicial action can only breed
    ignorance and distrust of courts and suspicion concerning the
    competence and impartiality of judges; free and robust reporting,
    criticism, and debate can contribute to public understanding of the
    rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire
    criminal justice system, as well as improve the quality of that system
    by subjecting it to the cleansing effects of exposure and public
    accountability.'' Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587
    (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
        That it is the tradition of this body to conduct impeachment
    deliberations in closed session is not irrelevant. But neither should
    it be governing. The Senate has, after all, conducted only one
    presidential impeachment trial before this one. Our society in 1868--
    and, more significantly still, our law in 1868--was far different than
    it is today. As we have demonstrated, First Amendment jurisprudence as
    we know it--as it governs us and binds the Senate--is essentially a
    creature of the twentieth century. That jurisprudence assures public
    scrutiny, not public ignorance.
        There are, to be sure, certain limited instances when closure of
    Senate deliberations may serve useful purposes, such as when they
    involve disclosure of matters of national security. But no such
    concerns are present here. And however proper it may be to analogize
    the Senate in some ways to a jury, none of the considerations that
    permits juries to deliberate out of the public eye are present here.
    The identities of the ``jurors'' here are well known, as, under the
    Senate rules, will be how each one voted. The Constitution does not
    offer protection to the ``jurors'' here from the force of public
    opinion for their votes for or against the conviction of President
    Clinton. They will face the full weight of public approval or rejection
    the next time they seek re-election. The Constitution does require that
    the reasons they give for their votes and other statements made in the
    course of debate be made in public so that both the debate and the
    votes themselves can be assessed by the people--the ultimate
    ``Governors'' in this republic.
                                   conclusion
        From the time these proceedings commenced in the House of
    Representatives through the submission of this application, members of
    the Congress have repeatedly--and undoubtedly correctly--referred to
    the weighty constitutional obligations imposed upon them by this
    process. This application focuses on yet another constitutional
    obligation of the members of the Senate, an obligation reflected in the
    oath of office itself. It is that of adhering to the First Amendment.
    We urge the Senate to do so by permitting the public to observe its
    deliberations.

    Dated: New York, NY, January 29, 1999.

                Respectfully submitted,
                                       David Hokler,
                                               Senior Vice President and
                                                   General Counsel, Cable
                                                   News Network;
                                       Floyd Abrams,
                                       Dean Ringel,
                                       Susan Buckley,
                                       Jonathan Sherman,
                                               Cahill Gordon & Reindel;
                                                   Counsel for Applicant
                                                   Cable News Network.
                                   footnotes
        \1\ Federalist No. 65; see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
    233-34 (1993).
        \2\ It is precisely because the Senate possesses this power over
    its own rules that this application is made to the Senate rather than
    to any court.
        \3\ ``Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
    speech, or of the press . . . .''
        \4\ See Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7
    (1970); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 93-94 (1980); Robert
    Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
    L.J. 1, 23 (1971); see generally Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and
    Its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
        \5\ Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on ``The Central
    Meaning of the First Amendment,'' 1964 Supp. Ct. Rev. 191, 211 n. 125.
        \6\ The right of the public and the press to have access ``to news
    or information concerning the operations and activities of
    government,'' a right predicated in part on the principles set forth in
    cases such as Richmond Newspapers and its progeny, has been recognized
    in a variety of contexts outside the courtroom. Cable News Network,
    Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1243
    (N.D. Ga. 1981) (court enjoins Executive's expulsion of television
    networks from press travel pool covering the President); see also
    Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court requires White
    House to publish standards for denying press accreditation on security
    grounds).
                                     ______

                 IMPEACHMENT TRIAL--FINDINGS OF FACT PROPOSALS

        Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, on January 28, I was the
    only Democratic Senator to cross party lines and oppose the
    motion to dismiss. I felt it would be unwise to end this trial
    prior to a more complete presentation of evidence and a final
    vote on the articles of impeachment themselves. Nonetheless, I
    had no doubt that a motion to dismiss was a constitutional way
    to end the trial, if a majority of Senators had supported the
    motion.
        The Senate must keep in mind at every step in this process
    that our actions will be scrutinized not just by our
    constituents today and for the rest of the trial, but also by
    history. If another impeachment trial should occur 130 years
    from now, the record of this trial will serve as an important
    precedent for the Senate as it determines how to proceed. It is
    our responsibility to abide by the Constitution as closely as
    possible throughout the remainder of this trial. My votes on
    House managers' motions on February 4 were based on the same
    concerns about prudence and precedent that motivated my earlier
    votes on the motion to dismiss and calling witnesses.
        With the judgment of history awaiting us, I did have
    serious concerns about the constitutionality of proposals that
    the Senate should adopt so-called findings of fact before the
    Senate votes on the articles of impeachment themselves. It now
    appears that support for such proposals has waned, and the
    Senate will not be called upon to vote on them. Nonetheless, I
    want to explain my opposition to such proposals for the record.
        Findings of fact would allow a simple 51-vote majority of
    the Senate to state the judgment of the Senate on the facts of
    this case and, in effect, to determine the President's
    ``guilt'' of the crimes alleged in the articles. But the
    Constitution specifically requires that two-thirds of the
    Senate must convict the President on the articles in order to
    impose any sanction on him. The specific punishment set out by
    the Constitution if the Senate convicts is removal from office,
    and possibly disqualification from holding future office.
        The supermajority requirement makes the impeachment process
    difficult, and the framers intended that it be difficult. They
    were very careful to avoid making conviction and removal of the
    President something that could be accomplished for purely
    partisan purposes. In only 23 out of 105 Congresses and in only
    six Congresses in this century has one party held more than a
    two-thirds majority in the Senate. Never in our history has a
    President faced a Senate controlled by the other party by more
    than a two-thirds majority. The Republican party had nearly 80
    percent of the seats in the Senate that in 1868 tried Andrew
    Johnson. Johnson was at that time also a Republican, although
    he had been a Democrat before being chosen by Abraham Lincoln
    to be his Vice President in 1864. The great difficulty of
    obtaining a conviction in the Senate on charges that are seen
    as motivated by partisan politics has discouraged impeachment
    efforts in the past. Adding findings of fact to the process
    would undercut this salutary effect of the supermajority
    requirement for conviction.
        The Senate must fulfill its constitutional obligation and
    determine whether the President's acts require conviction and
    removal. The critical constitutional tool of impeachment should
    not be available simply to attack or criticize the President.
    Impeachment is unique. It is the sole constitutionally
    sanctioned encroachment on the principle of separation of
    powers, and it must be used sparingly. If findings of fact had
    been adopted in this trial, it would have set a dangerous
    precedent that might have led to more frequent efforts to
    impeach.
        The ability of a simple majority of the Senate to determine
    the President's guilt of the crimes alleged would distort the
    impeachment process and increase the specter of partisanship.
    When the Senate is sitting as a Court of Impeachment, its job
    is simply to acquit or convict. And that is the only judgment
    that the Senate should make during an impeachment trial.
                                    ------

            MOTIONS PERTAINING TO WITNESS DEPOSITIONS AND TESTIMONY

        Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, on Thursday, February 4, the
    Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, considered several
    motions pertaining to the depositions and live testimony of
    witnesses Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney
    Blumenthal. I wish to speak briefly on the important issues
    raised by several of these motions.
        First, let me say that I am pleased that the Senate, by a
    bipartisan vote of 30-70, voted not to compel the live
    testimony of Ms. Lewinsky. In my view, this was a sound
    decision to support the expeditious conduct of this trial,
    preserve the decorum of the Senate, and respect the privacy of
    this particular witness.
        Unfortunately, the Senate retreated from these same worthy
    aims in deciding to permit the videotaped depositions of Ms.
    Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and Mr. Blumenthal to be entered into
    evidence and broadcast to the public. I believe that this
    decision was erroneous for three basic reasons:
        First, it needlessly prolonged the trial. Prior to February
    4, Senators had an opportunity to view the depositions of each
    of these witnesses--not once, but repeatedly. Numerous times we
    could have viewed the content of their testimony, the tone of
    their answers, and their demeanor while under oath. By
    requiring that Senators view portions of these depositions
    again on the floor, in whole or in part, the managers' motion
    unnecessarily required the Senate to convene for an entire day.
    We learned nothing by viewing excerpts of the depositions on
    the floor that we had not already had an opportunity to learn
    by viewing those depositions previously, either on videotape
    or, in the case of myself and five other Senators, in person.
        Second, allowing the depositions to be publicly aired on
    the Senate floor exaggerated their importance. Even Manager
    Hyde has acknowledged that these depositions broke no material
    new ground in this case. Allowing their broadcast thus was not
    only an injudicious use of the Senate's time, it also elevated
    the significance of this particular testimony over all other
    sworn testimony taken in this matter--solely by virtue of the
    fact that it was recently videotaped. Broadcasting these
    minuscule and marginal portions of the record--while not
    broadcasting other depositions--does not illuminate the record
    so much as distort it. The distortion is only compounded by
    broadcasting selected portions of those depositions rather than
    the depositions in their entirety. The President's counsel
    obviously had an opportunity to rebut the managers'
    presentation and characterization of those portions. However,
    that rebuttal only underscores the fact that the managers'
    motion to use these videotapes gave the videotapes a prominence
    and gravity that they do not merit.
        Third, under the circumstances, publicly airing portions of
    these depositions constituted a needless invasion of the
    privacy of the witnesses whose testimony was videotaped. Let us
    remember that these individuals are not public figures who have
    willingly surrendered a portion of their privacy as a
    consequence of their freely chosen status. They are private
    citizens, reluctantly drawn into legal proceedings. They have
    attempted to discharge their obligations in those proceedings.
    But that obligation does not extend to the public broadcast of
    their videotaped depositions--particularly given that they have
    testified repeatedly before, and that their videotaped
    testimony contains no new material information. The privacy
    rights of these individuals deserved greater consideration by
    the managers and by the Senate. The managers did not need to
    force the images of these witnesses into the living rooms and
    family rooms of America in order to present their case. The
    Senate did not need to allow that to happen in order to meet
    its constitutional responsibility in this matter.
        For these reasons, I opposed the managers' motion to
    broadcast the deposition videotapes. In my view, the time has
    come to bring this matter to an end. The record is voluminous,
    the arguments have been made. We know enough to decide the
    questions before us. That is why I supported Senator Daschle's
    motion to proceed to final arguments and a vote on each of the
    articles of impeachment. I regret that his motion was not
    adopted, and that instead the Senate decided to needlessly
    prolong this matter without sufficient regard for the privacy
    of the witnesses deposed last week. However, that said, I am
    pleased that, barring any unforseen developments, this trial
    will at last conclude later this week. It is time for the
    Senate to move on to the other important business of the
    country that we were elected to address.
                                    ------

                          Wednesday, February 10, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 10:06 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Sovereign God, thank You for the good men and women of this
    Senate. Today we ask what should be done when really good
    people disagree. You have shown us so clearly what should and
    should not be done. When the fabric of our human relationships
    is being frayed, it is time to deepen our relationship with
    You. Draw each Senator into healing communion with You that
    will give physical strength and spiritual assurance of Your
    unqualified love for him or her. Then in the inner heart give
    Your peace and direction. Give each Senator the courage to
    speak truth as she or he hears it and knows it. When this trial
    is finished, may none feel the pangs of unspoken convictions.
        Dear God, we also know there is something we dare not do
    when good people disagree. You do not condone the impugning of
    other people's characters because they hold different
    convictions. You do not want us to break our unity or the bond
    of sacred friendship. Bless these good Senators as they press
    forward together with love for You, America, and each other. In
    the unity of Your Spirit and the bond of peace. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The majority leader is recognized.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, in a few moments, the Senate
    will resume the closed session in order to allow Members to
    continue to deliberate the two articles of impeachment. Members
    are reminded that the motion adopted yesterday allows for a
    Record to be printed on the day of the vote on the articles
    which could contain Senators' final statements if they choose
    to have them printed.
        Also, Senator Daschle was just noting that while Senators
    have been careful not to comment on the discussion in closed
    session, we still should use a lot of discretion in going out
    and talking to the media about the details of what is happening
    here. I don't think there have been any violations, but use a
    lot of discretion. I would prefer we not even talk about which
    Senator spoke or how many spoke. I think we need to be careful
    in doing that.
        I expect the Senate will be in session until approximately
    6. We will confer with the Senators, the leadership, and the
    Chief Justice, and see how the discussions are going, and the
    speeches, how many are being made. Perhaps we would wrap it up
    before that. It would just depend on how much endurance we have
    today.
        We will have a break from 12 until about 1:15, one hour and
    15 minutes for lunch, to allow the Chief Justice some time to
    return to the Supreme Court and then come back.
        I expect the Senate to convene again tomorrow at 10 a.m. in
    order to try to conclude the debate and vote on the articles if
    at all possible by 5 o'clock on Thursday. If we are still
    having speeches, if we can't do it, we would certainly just go
    over until Friday, but I think we need to talk about that goal
    of 5 o'clock on Thursday.
        Mr. REID. Thursday.
        Mr. LOTT. Also, I know some Senators are still on the way
    here from committee meetings. There are only two or three going
    on today, but we didn't give them much notice that we were
    going to begin at 10, but we are notifying everybody now that
    we will come in at 10 tomorrow, so that they will go ahead and
    be able to take action this morning to cancel those hearings
    and be here sharply at 10 o'clock.
        Again, we will alternate today, across the aisle, with the
    speakers going for up to 15 minutes.
        Senator Inhofe is scheduled to be our first speaker today.
        Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
        Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield to Senator Coverdell.
        Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent
    to pose a point of clarification to the majority leader.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection.
        Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Leader, I am still a little confused
    about this posting of a statement in the Record. Is it possible
    for a Member of the Senate to submit to the closed session
    their statement rather than speaking? I think that might be
    desirable on the part of some.
        Mr. LOTT. I think the answer to that is yes. You can do
    that.
        Mr. COVERDELL. In other words, if I chose, I could submit
    the statement in my sequence to the Record, and subsequently,
    at my choice, decide whether it will be made part of the
    Congressional Record subsequent to the close?
        Mr. LOTT. I believe that is correct.
        Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Leader.
        Mr. REID. Mr. Leader, and I would also say they would all
    appear the same as if they were spoken or not spoken.
        Mr. LOTT. Correct.
        Mr. LEAHY. Will the distinguished majority leader yield?
        Mr. LOTT. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.
        Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice--and I appreciate the courtesy
    of my good friend from Mississippi--I notice, as he has, that
    there are a lot of empty seats here in the Chamber. I realize
    at one time we thought we were coming in at noon, to have
    committee meetings.
        If these statements are not made in the Record, the only
    time we are going to have a chance to discuss with each other
    what our thoughts are is in this closed session, by being here.
    I also think, in respect to the Chief Justice, we should be
    doing that.
        I am inclined, I say to my friend from Mississippi, to
    suggest the absence of a quorum. I am withholding, just for a
    moment, doing that. But if we are going to be off in committee
    meetings, I don't think that does service to the intent of this
    closed door hearing.
        I hope that both leaders--and I have discussed this with
    the distinguished Democratic leader, too--would urge Members to
    be here. Nothing could be more important than this on our
    agenda today and tomorrow.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I certainly agree with that.
    We are going to have to have a momentary quorum call, just to
    get the doors closed and then officially go forward. We will
    call and make sure all the committee hearings are being shut
    down. Actually, I think Members are coming in steadily, and
    within a moment we are probably going to have almost all the
    Senators here. But we will take just a couple of minutes to
    notify committees to complete their actions and for Senators to
    come on the floor.
        Mr. LEAHY. If I might complete then, Mr. Chief Justice, out
    of respect to my friend from Mississippi, and in courtesy to
    what he said, I will not make that suggestion, knowing that he
    is going to make a similar suggestion anyway.
        Mr. GRAMM. Will the distinguished majority leader yield?
        Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield.
        Mr. GRAMM. Mr. Chief Justice, we are eager to get on with
    the debate. We have a quorum present. The Senator can make a
    point of order that a quorum is not present, but it is obvious
    to the naked eye that a quorum is present.
        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Leader, would you yield?
        Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to yield.
        Mrs. HUTCHISON. I think it is important, for the record,
    that it be known there are at least 60 to 70 Members in the
    Chamber, ready to proceed.
        Mr. LOTT. My count is we have about 70 Members here. I am
    sure we will have a full complement here momentarily, so we can
    lock the doors and give a few more Senators a little more time
    to get here. Would the Senator from Alaska like to speak?
        Mr. MURKOWSKI. May I ask for clarification relative to
    submitting statements in the Record and having them printed?
    What day would they be printed in the Record, assuming that we
    finish Thursday? The Friday Record?
        Mr. LOTT. The day of the vote, which means it would come
    out, I guess, the next day. So if we vote on Thursday--if we
    vote on Friday, then it would be available, I guess, Saturday
    morning. If we vote Thursday night, it would be available in
    the Record Friday morning.
        Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the leader.
        Mr. LOTT. If the Senators choose.
        Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Would the leader wish we go into closed
    session before the quorum call?
        Mr. LOTT. Yes, Mr. Chief Justice, and then suggest the
    absence of a quorum.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will now resume closed
    session for final deliberations on the articles of impeachment.

                                 Closed Session

        [At 10:16 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The
    proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until
    6:21 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                                  Open Session

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent
    that the Senate return to open session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                     Orders for Thursday, February 11, 1999

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in
    adjournment until 10 a.m. on Thursday, February 11. I further
    ask that upon reconvening on Thursday and immediately following
    the prayer, the majority leader be recognized to make a brief
    statement with respect to the Senate schedule. I further ask
    unanimous consent that following the majority leader's
    comments, the Senate resume final deliberations in closed
    session on the articles of impeachment.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. In the absence of objection, it is so
    ordered.

                                    Program

        Mr. LOTT. We will reconvene tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.
    We hope to be able to finish tomorrow afternoon, Mr. Chief
    Justice, but we have to make a ot better progress than we did
    today.
                                    ------

                       ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. If there is no further business, I ask unanimous
    consent that the Senate adjourn under the previous order.
        There being no objection, at 6:21 p.m., the Senate, sitting
    as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned until Thursday, February
    11, 1999, at 10 a.m.
                                    ------

                          Thursday, February 11, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 10:07 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:
        Holy God, Who allows beginnings and brings an end, a time
    for healing, a time to mend, we ask You to pour out Your
    palpable, unifying power on this Senate. Today, may the
    Senators count on You more than they count votes. This is a
    time neither for gloating over victory nor for grimness over
    losing, but rather a period for grief over all that has brought
    us to this day. We are one Nation under You; we repent as a
    Nation; we turn from conditional ethics and seek to return to
    the absolutes of Your Commandments.
        Thank You, Lord, for the clarion convictions expressed
    during this trial by so many Senators of both parties that
    morals do matter and character does count. May this shared,
    common commitment unite them as they lead this Nation. Now, as
    their chaplain, I hold them all before Your grace and mercy; as
    their friend, I intercede for their spiritual strength and
    courage. When the final votes are taken, hold them together in
    the oneness America so desperately needs them to exemplify.
    Help them to model rectitude and reconciliation. By Your power,
    the winner will be neither the Republicans nor the Democrats,
    but the American people. In Your holy Name. Amen.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.
        The majority leader is recognized.
        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order Of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. This morning the Senate will resume final
    deliberations in closed session. Our best guess, at this time,
    leaves approximately 37 Senators still intending to speak. It
    is possible that we could conclude and have the final votes
    this afternoon or late this evening, but I don't think that is
    going to be possible at this time. When we do approach that
    point, I would like to do it in an orderly fashion, that
    Members and those who are interested will be given notice. We
    have some business we would have to conclude, also, after all
    the deliberations have been complete. I will confer throughout
    the day with Senator Daschle to see how it is going, and as
    soon as we can see clearly when we would want to actually move
    to the final vote, we will notify all the Senators.
        We will also take a lunch break sometime today between 12
    and 12:30, and we will have, of course, some breaks throughout
    the day to take some refreshments.
        I yield the floor to allow the Chief Justice to close the
    session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will now go into closed
    session for final deliberations on the articles of impeachment.
    The Sergeant at Arms is directed to clear the galleries and
    close the doors of the Senate Chamber.

                                 Closed Session

        [At 10:11 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The
    proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until
    7:00 p.m., at which time the following occurred.]

                                  Open Session

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the Senate resume open session.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                      ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW

        Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Court of
    Impeachment stand in adjournment until 9:30 tomorrow morning,
    and the Senate then immediately proceed to closed session. I
    ask unanimous consent the Senate now resume legislative session
    in order to conduct some housekeeping business.
        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Thereupon, at 7 p.m. the Senate, sitting as a Court of
    Impeachment, adjourned until Friday, February 12, 1999, at 9:30
    a.m.
                                    ------

    AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE CHAMBER OF THE U.S. SENATE

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I send a resolution to the desk
    regarding the taking of pictures in the Senate Chamber during
    the impeachment vote and ask unanimous consent the resolution
    be considered agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid
    upon the table.
        Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I object. I would like to
    have a voice vote.
        Mrs. BOXER. Just a voice vote.
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move that this resolution be
    adopted by the Senate.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The clerk will report.
        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        A resolution (S. Res. 36) authorizing the taking of
    photographs in the Chamber of the United States Senate.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the
    motion.
        The resolution (S. Res. 36) was agreed to, as follows:

                                   S. Res. 36

        Resolved, That paragraph 1 of rule IV of the Rules for the
    Regulation of the Senate Wing of the United States Capitol (prohibiting
    the taking of pictures in the Senate Chamber) be temporarily suspended
    for the sole and specific purpose of permitting photographs to be taken
    on February 11 or 12, 1999, during the roll call vote on the Articles
    of Impeachment in the impeachment trial of the President of the United
    States.
        Sec. 2. The Sergeant at Arms of the Senate is authorized and
    directed to make the necessary arrangements therefor, which
    arrangements shall provide for a minimum of disruption to Senate
    proceedings.
                                     ______

               appointing a committee to escort the chief justice
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the
    Presiding Officer be authorized to appoint a committee of
    Senators, three upon the recommendation of the majority leader
    and three upon the recommendation of the minority leader, to
    escort the Chief Justice out of the Senate Chamber at the
    conclusion of the Court of Impeachment.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Chair, on
    behalf of the majority leader, appoints Mr. Thurmond of South
    Carolina, Mr. Roth of Delaware, and Mr. Domenici of New Mexico,
    and, on behalf of the Democratic leader, Mr. Sarbanes of
    Maryland, Mr. Moynihan of New York, and Mrs. Lincoln from
    Arkansas.
                                    ------

                unanimous consent agreement--censure resolution
        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that if
    Senator Feinstein offers her motion to suspend the rules in
    order to attempt to consider a censure resolution, and
    immediately following the reading of the motion by the clerk,
    Senator Gramm of Texas be recognized to offer a motion to
    postpone the Feinstein motion indefinitely.
        I further ask that immediately following the reporting of
    the Gramm motion by the clerk, the Senate proceed to a vote on
    the Gramm motion, immediately, all without any intervening
    debate or action.
        I further ask that following the vote, if two-thirds of the
    Senate fail to defeat the motion to postpone, then the motion
    to suspend is withdrawn and that no further motions relative to
    censure be in order prior to this week's adjournment of the
    Senate.
        I finally ask that following that vote there be up to 2
    hours of morning business to be equally divided between the two
    leaders or their designees.
        And before the Chair puts the question on the unanimous
    consent request, I just want to advise my colleagues on both
    sides, this has been cleared on both sides of the aisle, by the
    sponsor, Senator Feinstein, and by Senator Gramm on the other
    side. I believe this is a fair way, all things considered, to
    deal with this matter.
        The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                           Friday, February 12, 1999

                        [From the Congressional Record]

        The Senate met at 9:36 a.m. and was called to order by the
    Chief Justice of the United States.
                                    ------

       TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of
    Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer.
                                    ------

                                     prayer

        The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following
    prayer:

        Gracious God, whose love for this Nation has been displayed
    so magnificently through our history, we praise You that Your
    presence fills this historic Chamber and enters into the minds
    of the Senators gathered here. Each of them is here by Your
    divine appointment. Together they claim Your promise, ``Call
    upon Me in the day of trouble: I will deliver you.''--Ps.50:15.
    We call upon You on this day of trouble in America as this
    impeachment trial comes to a close. You have enabled an honest,
    open debate of alternative solutions. Soon a vote will be
    taken. You have established a spirit of unity in the midst of
    differences. Most important of all, we know that we can trust
    You with the results. You can use what is decided and continue
    to accomplish Your plans for America. We entrust to Your care
    the President and his family. Use whatever is decided today to
    enable a deeper experience of Your grace in his life and
    healing in his family. We commit this day to You and thank You
    for the hope that fills our hearts as we place our complete
    trust in You. You are our Lord and Saviour. Amen.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the
    proclamation.

        The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as
    follows:

        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to
    keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the
    United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of
    impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

                                  The Journal

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. If there is no objection, the Journal of
    proceedings of the trial is approved to date.

        The majority leader is recognized.

        Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

                               Order of Procedure

        Mr. LOTT. For the information of all Senators, later on
    today, the Secretary of the Senate will be putting at each
    Senator's desk something I think you will enjoy reading later.
    It is the prayers of the Chaplain during the impeachment trial.
    Subsequently, we plan to put it in a small pamphlet because
    they truly have been magnificent. We thought you each would
    like to have copies.

        The Senate will resume final deliberations now in the
    closed session. Thank goodness. At this point in the
    proceedings, there are approximately eight Members who still
    wish to speak or submit part of their speech into the Record.

        Following those final speeches, the Senate will resume open
    session and proceed to the votes on the two articles of
    impeachment. I estimate that those votes will begin at
    approximately 11, 11:30. However, the exact time will depend on
    the length of the remaining speeches, and also we will have to
    have a few minutes to open the Chamber and the galleries so
    that our constituents and our families can enter the galleries
    if they would like to.

        Following those votes, all Senators should remain at their
    desks as the Senate proceeds to several housekeeping items
    relating to the adjournment of the Court of Impeachment. So
    again, I emphasize, please, after the votes, don't rush out of
    the Chamber because we have some very important proceedings to
    attend to, and I think you will enjoy them if you will stay and
    participate.

        Under the consent agreement reached last night, following
    those votes, a motion relating to censure may be offered by the
    Senator from California, Mrs. Feinstein. If offered, Senator
    Gramm will be recognized to offer a motion relative to the
    Feinstein motion, with a vote to occur on the Gramm motion.
    Therefore, Senators may anticipate an additional vote or votes
    following the votes on the articles.

        I thank the Senators. And I believe we are ready to proceed
    to the closed session.

        Mrs. BOXER. Will the majority leader yield for a question?

        Mr. LOTT. Yes.

        Mrs. BOXER. Will there be intervening debate or no debate
    on any of those votes?

        Mr. LOTT. In the UC that was reached last night, I believe
    we have 2 hours, which will be equally divided, for Senators to
    submit statements at that point or to make speeches if they
    would like. So after the votes, yes.

        Mrs. BOXER. That is the question. Yes.

        Mr. LOTT. I presume we will go on for a couple hours--2 or
    3 o'clock in the afternoon, yes.

     Unanimous Consent Agreement--Printing of Statements in the Record and
             Printing of Senate Document of Impeachment Proceedings

        Mr. LOTT. I would like to clarify one other matter.
    Senators will recall the motion approved February 9, 1999,
    which permitted each Senator to place in the Congressional
    Record his or her own statements made during final
    deliberations in closed session.

        I ask unanimous consent that public statements made by
    Senators subsequent to the approval of that motion, with
    respect to his or her own statements made during the closed
    session, be deemed to be in compliance with the Senate rules.
    This would permit a Senator to release to the public his or her
    statement made during final deliberations in closed session,
    except that, in doing so, a Senator may not disclose any
    remarks of the other Senators made during deliberations,
    without the prior consent, of course, of that Senator.

        I further ask unanimous consent that Senators have until
    Tuesday, February 23, 1999--that would be the Tuesday after we
    come back--to have printed statements and opinions in the
    Congressional Record, if they choose, explaining their votes.

        Finally, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be
    authorized to include these statements, along with the full
    record of the Senate's proceedings, the filings by the parties,
    and the supplemental materials admitted into evidence by the
    Senate, in a Senate document printed under the supervision of
    the Secretary of the Senate. That will complete the
    documentation of the Senate's handling of these impeachment
    proceedings.

        Mr. REID. Mr. Leader, point of clarification. I had a
    couple of Members ask, does it take an affirmative act of a
    Senator to get their speech placed in the Record or does it
    happen automatically?

        Mr. LOTT. I believe it does take an affirmative act. It is
    not automatic.

        Mr. REID. To whom should that be given?

        Mr. LOTT. It should be given to the clerks at the desk, or
    to Marty on your side, or your secretary of the minority, or
    the secretary of the majority. They will get it into the Record
    at the right place.

        So I believe, once again, we are ready to go to our closed
    session.

        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the majority leader yield for a
    question?

        Mr. LOTT. Yes.

        Mrs. HUTCHISON. It does not require each person to ask
    unanimous consent to insert their remarks, just giving it?

        Mr. LOTT. Yes. That has already been cleared.

        I believe we have a unanimous consent request propounded.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

        The Senate will now go into closed session to complete its
    deliberations on the articles of impeachment. The Sergeant at
    Arms is directed to clear the galleries and close the doors of
    the Senate Chamber.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I suggest the absence of a
    quorum.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will call the roll.

        The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

                                 Closed Session

        [At 9:44 a.m., the doors of the Chamber were closed. The
    proceedings of the Senate were held in closed session until
    12:04 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate resumed open session.]

                                  Open Session

        Mr. LOTT. Will Senators return to their desks? Managers,
    thank you for joining us. Would Senators stand, and the
    gallery, as the Chief Justice enters the Chamber, please.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will be in order.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, the
    Senate has met almost exclusively as a Court of Impeachment
    since January 7, 1999, to consider the articles of impeachment
    against the President of the United States. The Senate meets
    today to conclude this trial by voting on the articles of
    impeachment, thereby, fulfilling its obligation under the
    Constitution. I believe we are ready to proceed to the votes on
    the articles. I yield the floor.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair would inform those in
    attendance in the Senate galleries that under rule XIX of the
    Standing Rules of the Senate, demonstrations of approval or
    disapproval are prohibited, and it is the duty of the Chair to
    enforce order on its own initiative.

                                   Article I

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will now read the first
    Article of impeachment.

        The legislative clerk read as follows:

                                   Article I

      In his conduct while President of the United States, William
    Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
    to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the
    best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
    the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and
    manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal
    gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:

      On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the
    truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal
    grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William
    Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following:
    (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate
    Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading
    testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him;
    (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to
    make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his
    corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede
    the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.

      In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity
    of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed
    his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the
    rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the
    United States.

      Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants
    impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to
    hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair reminds the Senate that each
    Senator, when his or her name is called, will stand in his or
    her place and vote ``guilty'' or ``not guilty'' as required by
    rule XXIII of the Senate rules on impeachment.

        The Chair also refers to article I, section 3, clause 6, of
    the Constitution regarding the vote required for conviction on
    impeachment: ``[N]o Person shall be convicted without the
    Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.''

                               Vote On Article I

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the first article of
    impeachment. Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, William
    Jefferson Clinton, guilty or not guilty? A rollcall vote is
    required.

        The clerk will call the roll.

        The legislative clerk called the roll.

        Mr. SPECTER (When his name was called). Not proven,
    therefore, not guilty.

        The result was announced--guilty 45, not guilty 55, as
    follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 17]

    [Subject: Article I--Articles of Impeachment Against President William
                               Jefferson Clinton]

                                   GUILTY--45

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Thomas
    Thurmond
    Voinovich

                                 NOT GUILTY--55

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Gorton
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Shelby
    Snowe
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thompson
    Torricelli
    Warner
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. On this article of impeachment, 45
    Senators having pronounced William Jefferson Clinton, President
    of the United States, guilty as charged, 55 Senators having
    pronounced him not guilty, two-thirds of the Senators present
    not having pronounced him guilty, the Senate adjudges that the
    respondent, William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
    States, is not guilty as charged in the first article of
    impeachment.

                                   Article II

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the second article
    of impeachment.

        The legislative clerk read as follows:

                                   Article II

      In his conduct while President of the United States, William
    Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully
    to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the
    best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of
    the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take
    care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed,
    and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged
    personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of
    conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the
    existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights
    action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.

      The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme included
    one or more of the following acts:

              (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
            corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action
            brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that
            proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.

              (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
            corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action
            brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading
            testimony if and when called to testify personally in that
            proceeding.

              (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton
            corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to
            conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil
            rights action brought against him.

              (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing
            through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson
            Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job
            assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action
            brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful
            testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the
            truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to
            him.

              (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil
            rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton
            corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading
            statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in
            order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such
            false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged
            by his attorney in a communication to that judge.

              (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William
            Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of
            events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought
            against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order
            to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.

              (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William
            Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to
            potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order
            to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The
            false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson
            Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury,
            causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading
            information.

      In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the
    integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has
    betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive
    of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of
    the United States.

      Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants
    impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to
    hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United
    States.

                               Vote on Article II

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The question is on the second article of
    impeachment. Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, William
    Jefferson Clinton, guilty or not guilty?

        The clerk will call the roll.

        The bill clerk called the roll.

        Mr. SPECTER (When his name was called). Not proven,
    therefore, not guilty.

        The result was announced--guilty 50, not guilty 50, as
    follows:

                             [Rollcall Vote No. 18]

    [Subject: Article II--Articles of Impeachment against President William
                               Jefferson Clinton]

                                   GUILTY--50

    Abraham
    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bennett
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Campbell
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Domenici
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gorton
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Hutchison
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lott
    Lugar
    Mack
    McCain
    McConnell
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Roth
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith (NH)
    Smith (OR)
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                 NOT GUILTY--50

    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Byrd
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Snowe
    Specter
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The galleries will be in order.

        On this article of impeachment, 50 Senators having
    pronounced William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
    States, guilty as charged, 50 Senators having pronounced him
    not guilty, two-thirds of the Senators present not having
    pronounced him guilty, the Senate adjudges that the respondent,
    William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, is
    not guilty as charged in the second article of impeachment.

        The Chair directs judgment to be entered in accordance with
    the judgment of the Senate as follows:

        The Senate, having tried William Jefferson Clinton,
    President of the United States, upon two articles of
    impeachment exhibited against him by the House of
    Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present not
    having found him guilty of the charges contained therein: it
    is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the said William
    Jefferson Clinton be, and he is hereby, acquitted of the
    charges in the said articles.

        The Chair recognizes the majority leader.

          COMMUNICATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND TO THE HOUSE OF
                                REPRESENTATIVES

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, there is an order at the desk.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the order.

        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        Ordered, that the Secretary be directed to communicate to
    the Secretary of State, as provided by Rule XXIII of the Rules
    of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when sitting on
    impeachment trials, and also to the House of Representatives,
    the judgment of the Senate in the case of William Jefferson
    Clinton, and transmit a certified copy of the judgment to each.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the order will be
    entered.

    STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE SENATE TRIAL

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Chair wishes to make a brief
    statement, without objection, I trust.

        [Laughter.]

        More than a month ago, I first came to preside over the
    Senate sitting as the Court of Impeachment. I was a stranger to
    the great majority of you. I underwent the sort of culture
    shock that naturally occurs when one moves from the very
    structured environment of the Supreme Court to what I shall
    call, for want of a better phrase, the more free-form
    environment of the Senate. [Laughter.]

        I leave you now a wiser but not a sadder man. I have been
    impressed by the manner in which the majority leader and the
    minority leader have agreed on procedural rules in spite of the
    differences that separate their two parties on matters of
    substance.

        I have been impressed by the quality of the debate in
    closed session on the entire question of impeachment as
    provided for under the Constitution. Agreed-upon procedures for
    airing substantive divisions must be the hallmark of any great
    deliberative body.

        Our work as a Court of Impeachment is now done. I leave you
    with the hope that our several paths may cross again under
    happier circumstances.

        The majority leader.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, we thank you for your
    comments.

       EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

        Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will read the resolution.

        The legislative clerk read as follows:

        A resolution (S. Res. 37) to express gratitude for the
    service of the Chief Justice of the United States as Presiding
    Officer during the impeachment trial.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent the
    Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. Res. 37
    introduced earlier today by Senator Lott and Senator Daschle.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the resolution be agreed to, the motion to reconsider be laid
    upon the table, and any statements that Senators wish to make
    on this resolution be printed at this point in the Record.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

        The resolution (S. Res. 37) was agreed to.

        The preamble was agreed to.

        The resolution, with its preamble, reads as follows:

                                   S. Res. 37

        Whereas Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the Constitution of the
    United States provides that, when the President of the United States is
    tried on articles of impeachment, the Chief Justice of the United
    States shall preside over the Senate;

        Whereas, pursuant to Rule IV of the Rules of Procedure and Practice
    in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, on January 6, 1999,
    the Senate notified William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United
    States, of the time and place fixed for consideration of the articles
    of impeachment against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the
    United States, and requested him to attend;

        Whereas, in the intervening days since January 7, 1999, Chief
    Justice Rehnquist has presided over the Senate, when sitting on the
    trial of the articles of impeachment, for long hours over many days;

        Whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist, in presiding over the Senate, has
    exhibited extraordinary qualities of fairness, patience, equanimity,
    and wisdom;

        Whereas, by his manner of presiding over the Senate, Chief Justice
    Rehnquist has contributed greatly to the Senate's conduct of fair,
    impartial, and dignified proceedings in the trial of the articles of
    impeachment;

        Whereas the Senate and the Nation are indebted to Chief Justice
    Rehnquist for his distinguished and valued service in fulfilling his
    constitutional duty to preside over the Senate in the trial of the
    articles of impeachment: Now, therefore, be it

        Resolved, That the Senate expresses its profound gratitude to
    William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, for his
    distinguished service in presiding over the Senate, while sitting on
    the trial of the articles of impeachment against William Jefferson
    Clinton, President of the United States.

        Sec. 2. The Secretary shall notify the Chief Justice of the United
    States of this resolution.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, on behalf of myself and the
    entire U.S. Senate, we offer you our thanks and the gratitude
    of the American people for your service to the Nation and to
    this institution throughout this Impeachment Court.

        As our Presiding Officer during most of the last 5 weeks,
    you have brought to our proceedings a gentle dignity and an
    unfailing sense of purpose and sometimes a sense of humor.

        The majority leader realized when it was time to take a
    break and not to take a break when the Chief Justice said let's
    go forward.

        By placing duty above personal convenience and many other
    considerations, you have taught a lesson in leadership. Your
    presence in the chair of the President of the Senate, following
    the directives of our Constitution, gave comity to this Chamber
    and assurance to the Nation. I would like to close with our
    traditional Mississippi parting: Y'all come back soon--I hope
    that is not taken the wrong way--but not for an occasion such
    as this one.

        So instead, as you return to your work on the Court in the
    great marble temple of the law right across the lawn from this
    Capitol, we salute you, sir, with renewed appreciation and
    esteem for a good friend and good neighbor.

                     Presentation of the Golden Gavel Award

        Now, Mr. Chief Justice, if the Democratic leader will join
    me, we have a small token of our appreciation. We have a
    tradition in the Senate that after you have presided over the
    Senate for 100 hours, we present you with the Golden Gavel
    Award. I am not sure it quite reached 100 hours, but it is
    close enough.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. It seemed like it.

        [Applause, Senators rising.]

        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I wish to add my thanks to
    the Chief Justice for his untiring efforts throughout the
    impeachment trial and to commend him for his dignity, fairness,
    and humor.

        Mr. KYL. I add my expression of appreciation to the Chief
    Justice and the officers of the court who had a role in this
    proceeding--the House managers, the counsel for the White
    House, and Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr--for their
    honorable service.

                          Unanimous Consent Agreement

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that
    the February 5, 1999, affidavit of Mr. Christopher Hitchens;
    the February 7, 1999, affidavit of Ms. Carol Blue; and the
    affidavit of Mr. R. Scott Armstrong be admitted into evidence
    in this proceeding and the full written transcripts of the
    depositions taken pursuant to S. Res. 30 be included in the
    public record of the trial. This matter has been cleared on
    both sides of the aisle.

        The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                ADJOURNMENT SINE DIE OF THE COURT OF IMPEACHMENT

        Mr. LOTT. Now, Mr. Chief Justice, I move that the Senate,
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment on the articles exhibited
    against William Jefferson Clinton, adjourn sine die.

        The motion was agreed to and, at 12:43 p.m., the Senate,
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourned sine die.

                                    ------

                         Escorting of the Chief Justice

        Mr. LOTT. The committee will go to the podium to escort the
    Chief Justice from the Chamber.

        Whereupon, the Committee of Escort: Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Roth,
    Mr. Domenici, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Moynihan, and Mrs. Lincoln,
    escorted the Chief Justice from the Chamber.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Sergeant at Arms will
    escort the House managers out of the Senate Chamber.

        Whereupon, the Sergeant at Arms escorted the House managers
    from the Chamber.

        Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will please come to
    order. The majority leader.

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President--I almost called you Mr. Chief
    Justice; I have to get used to going back to ``Mr.
    President''--before Senator Feinstein is recognized, I must
    take just a moment further to recognize a few individuals, and
    I know Senator Daschle would like to do that. In addition to
    the Chief Justice and his assistants who were here throughout--
    --

        Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I believe the White House
    attorneys should have the same privilege of being escorted out.

        Mr. LOTT. I think we will ask Senator Nickles to handle
    that. [Laughter.]

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The White House counsel will be
    escorted from the Chamber.

        Whereupon, White House counsel were escorted from the
    Chamber.

                             THANKING SENATE STAFF

        Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, if I could resume, I thank the
    assistants who came with the Chief Justice from the Supreme
    Court. I thank the Secretary of the Senate, Gary Sisco; the
    Sergeant at Arms, Jim Ziglar; and the Deputy Sergeant at Arms,
    Loretta Symms, who also gave us our instructions--the first
    time in history, I am sure, that a woman called the Senate to
    order.

        I would like to thank the secretary of the majority,
    Elizabeth Letchworth; counsel of the Senate, Tom Griffith, and
    deputy Morgan Frankel, our special impeachment counsel, Mike
    Wallace; my chief of staff, Dave Hoppe--who has just been
    tremendous and worked untold hours--and also all of our
    assistants at the desk--and especially our friend Scott Bates--
    for their wonderful work. I want the Record to reflect how much
    we appreciate the dedication and the long hours, the patience,
    and the competence of all these staff members.

        I would like to yield to Senator Daschle for his comments
    in this area.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Democratic leader.

        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I know I speak for all of my
    colleagues on this side of the aisle, sharing the expressions
    of gratitude that Senator Lott has just articulated for all of
    our staff. They have done a remarkable job. He mentioned all
    those who work for all of us. Let me mention a couple of people
    who work for those of us on this side: Bob Bauer, Bill Corr,
    Pete Rouse, Marty Paone, and so many people who were
    particularly responsible for the fact that we were able to
    conduct our work so effectively throughout this very difficult
    challenge.

        So on behalf of the Democratic Caucus, we join with Senator
    Lott in expressing our deep sense of gratitude for the great,
    great job that they have done in these difficult weeks that we
    have now concluded.

        I yield the floor.

        Mr. CHAFEE addressed the Chair.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator
    from Rhode Island.

                         APPRECIATION TO THE LEADERSHIP

        Mr. CHAFEE. I wonder if this isn't an appropriate time to
    express our appreciation to our two leaders for guiding us
    through these very difficult times.

        [Applause, Senators rising.]

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator
    from California.

                             RESOLUTION OF CENSURE

        Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I move to proceed to my
    censure resolution which is at the desk.

        The text of the motion reads as follows:

        I move to suspend the following:

        Rule VII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``upon the calendar'',
    and;

        Rule VIII, paragraph 2 the phrase ``during the first two
    hours of a new legislative day''.

        In order to permit a motion to proceed to a censure
    resolution, to be introduced on the day of the motion to
    proceed, notwithstanding the fact that it is not on the
    calendar of business.

        Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

        Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I have to object. This resolution
    is not on the Calendar. Therefore, it is not in order to
    present it to the Senate.

        Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.

        Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, in light of that objection,
    I move to suspend the rules, the notice of which I printed in
    the Record on Monday, February 8, in order to permit my motion
    to proceed.

        Mr. GRAMM addressed the Chair.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.

        Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I send a motion to the desk, a
    motion to indefinitely postpone the consideration of the
    Feinstein motion.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the motion.

        Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask that reading of the motion
    be dispensed with, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

        Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.

        The yeas and nays were ordered.

        The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the
    motion of the Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm. The yeas and nays
    have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

        The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 43, nays 56, as follows:

                          [Rollcall Vote No. 19 Leg.]

                                    YEAS--43

    Allard
    Ashcroft
    Bond
    Brownback
    Bunning
    Burns
    Byrd
    Campbell
    Cochran
    Coverdell
    Craig
    Crapo
    DeWine
    Enzi
    Fitzgerald
    Frist
    Gramm
    Grams
    Grassley
    Gregg
    Hagel
    Hatch
    Helms
    Hutchinson
    Inhofe
    Kyl
    Lott
    Mack
    McCain
    Murkowski
    Nickles
    Roberts
    Santorum
    Sessions
    Shelby
    Smith Bob
    Specter
    Stevens
    Thomas
    Thompson
    Thurmond
    Voinovich
    Warner

                                    NAYS--56

    Abraham
    Akaka
    Baucus
    Bayh
    Bennett
    Biden
    Bingaman
    Boxer
    Breaux
    Bryan
    Chafee
    Cleland
    Collins
    Conrad
    Daschle
    Dodd
    Dorgan
    Durbin
    Edwards
    Feingold
    Feinstein
    Gorton
    Graham
    Harkin
    Hollings
    Hutchison
    Inouye
    Jeffords
    Johnson
    Kennedy
    Kerrey
    Kerry
    Kohl
    Landrieu
    Lautenberg
    Leahy
    Levin
    Lieberman
    Lincoln
    Lugar
    McConnell
    Mikulski
    Moynihan
    Murray
    Reed
    Reid
    Robb
    Rockefeller
    Roth
    Sarbanes
    Schumer
    Smith Gordon H
    Snowe
    Torricelli
    Wellstone
    Wyden

                                 NOT VOTING--1

    Domenici

        The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Inhofe). On this vote, the yeas
    are 43, the nays are 56. Two-thirds of the Senators not having
    voted in the negative, the motion to suspend is withdrawn and
    the Gramm point of order is sustained. The Feinstein motion to
    proceed falls.

           CENSURE RESOLUTION OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

        Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I just want to point out to
    everyone who is interested that a censure resolution has been
    entered at the desk. It has 38 cosponsors.

        During these trying days, the question has been asked of
    many of us: ``What will we tell our children about this sordid
    period in our Nation's history?''

        Members of the Senate, I had hoped to be able to tell my
    granddaughter and, indeed, the rest of our Nation, that the
    U.S. Senate had come together in bipartisan fellowship to
    approve a censure resolution that would deliver a clear message
    that the behavior of President William Jefferson Clinton has
    been inappropriate, intolerable, and unacceptable.

        Unfortunately, some in this body have forestalled our
    ability to bring such a resolution to the floor of the Senate
    for a vote. This I regret deeply.

        There are moments in history when we are able to rise up
    against the forces driving us apart and come together with a
    united purpose. I believe that the censure resolution provided
    us with just such an opportunity.

        While not a cure-all, the resolution is a way to share with
    our children and the rest of our nation our findings, our
    sentiments, our belief that the actions of the President are a
    violation of the trust of the American people and have brought
    shame and dishonor upon the Presidency and the man.

        But as has been made clear, those of us who truly believe a
    strong censure is the appropriate resolution in this case are
    being prevented from bringing it to the floor of this Senate
    for a vote.

        The main co-sponsor is the Senator from Utah, Mr. Robert
    Bennett. In all, it is co-sponsored by 36 Senators--over one-
    third of this Senate.

        The words of the resolution were strong, but they are
    fitting words and I believe a bipartisan majority of the Senate
    would be prepared to vote for this censure resolution if it
    were permitted to come to a vote today.

        Over the past few weeks, I have worked very closely with a
    large number of Senators to develop a bipartisan resolution,
    largely because I felt it so important that anyone who looks at
    this shabby episode of American history understands that while
    one may not vote to convict and remove a President, one can
    have profound dismay and concern about the misconduct that was
    inherent in the articles of impeachment.

        That is why I regret deeply that some have seen fit to
    prevent us from voting on a censure resolution.

        Because that cannot happen today, I have joined with the
    cosponsors of this resolution to formally present it to the
    Senate and record it in the Congressional Record, making clear
    for all time the strong censure of this President and
    condemnation of his actions by at least one-third of the U.S.
    Senate.

        Earlier today, I voted against conviction and removal of
    the President on both articles of impeachment. I did not
    believe the House managers established beyond a reasonable
    doubt that this President is guilty of perjury and obstruction
    of justice.

        Although I deplore the circumstances that have brought us
    to this point, I do not believe they present a clear and
    present danger to the functioning of our government, and
    therefore this President, who has been a good President for the
    people of the United States, should not be convicted and
    removed from office.

        However, I feel very strongly and sincerely that the
    acquittal of the President on the articles of impeachment
    should not be the Senate's last word on the President's
    conduct, and that without further action such as a resolution
    of censure, the wrong message about the President's actions and
    the Senate's views thereon will be sent to the country.

        One of the most worthwhile experiences of my Senate career
    has been listening to the remarks of the Senators over the past
    three days on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Each one gave
    substantial deliberation, serious thought and research, and
    tried his or her level best to maintain their oath of
    impartiality.

        It should be clear that this was not an easy time. It
    should be clear that everyone in the Senate at every minute of
    every day wished this were not happening. But we found
    ourselves caught up in a constitutional requirement that gave
    us little choice.

        I hope we come out of this with a deeper understanding of
    the divisions and polarization which all of this has caused,
    and that every effort can be made, not only by our leadership
    but by every Member of the Senate in every issue that comes
    before us to seek out a bipartisanship and to work together to
    solve the problems facing our Nation.

        A good start in this process would have been to have
    allowed a vote on the censure resolution. I hope that when we
    return from the President's Day recess, we will do better.

        I want to clear up once and for all the intent behind our
    censure resolution.

        The resolution does not express legal conclusions in the
    court of impeachment. Rather, it is a legislative measure,
    expressing our conclusions regarding the President's conduct.

        The legal conclusions to be made in this case, if any, will
    be left to a court of law. Our intent is not to bind or
    influence the court one way or another, for good or ill, in
    making any determinations which it may about the President's
    conduct.

        Instead, our purpose is to speak to the moral ramifications
    of the President's conduct and to the message that those
    actions send to the people of our nation, especially its youth.

        While the President's actions do not constitute a
    fundamental threat to the nation, neither were they at all
    acceptable. The President's conduct was both willful and wrong;
    clearly, by any standard, his behavior is indefensible.

        These actions demeaned the Office of the President,
    violated the trust of the American people, and brought shame
    and dishonor upon President Clinton.

        Let me speak for a moment about the process which we have
    gone through in developing the language. I began the process
    when I started to doubt whether the President's conduct rose to
    the level of a high crime or misdemeanor for which he should be
    removed from office.

        Senator Herb Kohl was an early partner in this effort, and
    he and his staff provided valuable input.

        As we developed the language further, I sounded out more of
    my colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, on the issue. I was
    fortunate enough to have Senator Bennett join me as the lead
    Republican co-sponsor. Senator Bennett has been a stalwart
    partner in this effort, and it has been a real pleasure working
    with him.

        Many senators offered input regarding the specific language
    of the resolution, and we have incorporated virtually every
    suggestion made.

        Senators Lincoln, Snowe, Levin, Jeffords, and Schumer, for
    instance, all have left their imprint upon this text, as has
    Senator Moynihan, who was appointed by Senator Daschle to join
    Senator Kohl and myself as a Democratic task force on censure.

        In the process of developing this language and striving for
    a bipartisanship, we have gone through some 25 drafts of the
    resolution. We believe that the text before you today is that
    which can obtain the most support from the most senators, of
    both parties.

        As a result of these efforts, I am very pleased that we
    have been joined by a very significant number of co-sponsors
    from both sides of the aisle. These co-sponsors run the
    ideological gamut from liberal to moderate to conservative. The
    breadth of these co-sponsors, I believe, represents the
    widespread consensus that the President's actions merit serious
    condemnation.

        Let me now discuss the ample historical precedents for this
    censure resolution.

        Censure is an extraordinary measure that Congress has used
    sparingly over the past 200 years.

        Censure is rare because it is such a powerful expression of
    Congressional criticism. In a censure resolution, a House of
    Congress publicly states its collective view that an individual
    has acted beyond the bounds of acceptable professional conduct.
    A censure records for history the major misdoings of public men
    and women.

        Over the past 200 years, the House and Senate have
    initiated censure proceedings against Executive Branch
    officials on at least 13 different occasions.

        Three times a House of Congress has adopted measures that
    could be described as a censure of a President. In 1834, the
    Senate censured President Andrew Jackson. Twice the House has
    adopted statements criticizing presidents--in the cases of John
    Tyler and James Buchanan.

        Censuring President Clinton would be consistent with
    historical use of this rare, but powerful, Congressional power.

        By far the most famous censure case of a sitting President
    involved Andrew Jackson.

        President Jackson feuded with Congress over the
    establishment of a Bank of the United States.

        First, in 1832, he vetoed the rechartering of the Bank of
    the United States on the grounds that it was unconstitutional,
    elitist, and had failed in establishing a sound currency.

        Second, Jackson directed the government to withdraw its
    funds from the Bank. When his Treasury Secretary protested the
    withdrawal, Jackson removed him from his position.

        On March 28, 1834, the Senate voted to censure President
    Jackson by a partisan vote of 26-20.

        The resolution stated:

        Resolved, That the President, in the last executive
    proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has assumed upon
    himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution
    and laws, but in derogation of both.

        The censure resolution expressed more than idle words. It
    dealt Jackson a painful blow in the arena of public opinion and
    in history.

        Soon after the vote, Jackson wrote to the Senate
    challenging its action. He noted that the Senate resolution was
    ``an imputation upon my private as well as public character.''

        This censure was such a powerful condemnation of President
    Jackson's actions that his supporters led the Senate to revisit
    the issue several years later. On January 14, 1837, the Senate
    voted to expunge the censure resolution from the record by a
    vote of 24-19.

        The House of Representatives has adopted two other
    statements that can be construed as censure motions against a
    President.

        In 1841, John Tyler assumed the Presidency upon the death
    of President William Henry Harrison. In contrast to President
    Harrison, whose Whig views coincided with views of the majority
    of Congress, Tyler espoused States rights.

        Tyler aroused the anger of Congress by vetoing Whig-
    sponsored bills related to tariffs and the creation of a
    national bank. Exasperated members of the House of
    Representatives finally decided to publicly rebuke the
    President.

        A select committee drafted a report criticizing the
    President for:

        ``Gross abuse of constitutional power and bold assumptions
    of powers never vested in him by any law''; for having
    ``assumed the whole Legislative power to himself, and levying
    millions of money upon the people, without any authority of
    law''; and for the ``abusive exercise of the constitutional
    power of the President to arrest the action of Congress upon
    measures vital to the welfare of the people.''

        On August 17, 1842, the House passed this select Committee
    report.

        Along with his Secretary of the Navy, President Buchanan
    was implicated in a financial scandal. There were accusations
    of ``kickbacks'' and the granting of government contracts to
    political supporters.

        On June 13, 1860 the House of Representatives voted 106-61
    in favor of ``censuring'' the Secretary of the Navy and stating
    that President Buchanan's conduct deserved its ``reproof.''

        The resolution stated:

        Resolved, That the President and the Secretary of the Navy,
    by receiving and considering the party relations of bidders for
    contracts and the effect of awarding contracts upon pending
    elections, have set an example dangerous to the public safety,
    and deserving the reproof of this House.

        Other executive officials: At least three secretaries of
    cabinet departments and one ambassador have also been censured.

        These cases include:

        (1) Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey, 1860--On June 13,
    1860, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
    censuring Secretary Toucey in the same ``kickback'' and bribery
    scandal that led to the ``reproof'' of President Buchanan.

        (2) Secretary of War Simon Cameron, 1862--In another
    corruption scandal, the House passed a censure resolution
    against Secretary of War Cameron for embezzlement and for
    entrusting public money to his lieutenant, Alexander Cummings.
    Mr. Cummings allegedly spent $21,000 of government funds on
    personal items like straw hats, linen pantaloons, scotch ale,
    and herring.

        (3) Attorney General, A.H. Garland, 1886--On March 24,
    1886, the Senate passed a resolution of ``condemnation'' of the
    Attorney General for refusing to turn over government papers
    regarding the removal of a District Attorney from Office.

        (4) Ambassador Thomas Bayard, 1896--On March 20, 1896 the
    House of Representatives considered a resolution condemning and
    censuring Ambassador Bayard for diplomatic improprieties. He
    was charged with making partisan remarks to British audiences.

        Congress has also used censure to condemn the conduct of
    its own Members. Nine Senators and 22 Members of the House have
    been censured.

        Indeed, many Members of this body personally know former
    Senators who have been censured. To those who argue that
    censure is ``a wet noodle across the wrist,'' I would
    respectfully request that they ask their colleagues how these
    former Senators felt about being censured. I am confident,
    because I have had some of these conversations myself, that
    they would find that censure was felt deeply and was a very
    significant stain upon their reputations and legacy.

        In sum, censure is a powerful tool used very sparingly by
    Congress to condemn unacceptable conduct. Congress has
    initiated censure proceedings in policy disputes, but it has
    also criticized executive branch officials in the case of
    President Buchanan, Navy Secretary Welles, and President Nixon
    for personal misconduct.

        So to those who argue that passing this censure would
    establish a precedent for the future where Presidents and
    cabinet officials could be censured, I hope this discussion has
    made it clear: that precedent has already been set.

        In this bipartisan censure, we provided the Senate with a
    real opportunity to achieve a strong, unifying, bipartisan
    conclusion to this whole tawdry, exhausting, and divisive
    controversy.

        The House's actions were marred with partisanship. Indeed,
    one example of this was the action of the House leadership to
    prevent a censure resolution from even being considered on the
    House floor.

        The Senate started its proceedings on a high note, when we
    came together to agree unanimously, across party lines, upon
    procedures for the trial. Passing our censure resolution by a
    strong, bipartisan vote would represent an appropriate
    ``bookend'' to this bipartisan beginning and would stand this
    Senate well in the annals of history.

        Moreover, it would put the proper historical perspective
    upon the Senate's actions and determinations, which should not
    be read as a vindication of the President.

        I believe that passing this censure on a bipartisan basis
    would bring a real closure to the process, and would help to
    heal the divisions between the parties which were created
    during these proceedings, so that we can move on to work
    together to address the real problems confronting the American
    people, such as saving social security, improving education,
    and continuing the fight to reduce crime.

        It is time that we move on to these other matters of
    significance to our people, to reconcile differences between
    and within the branches of government, and to work together--
    across party lines--for the benefit of the American people.

        I ask unanimous consent that a list of cosponsors and the
    text of the resolution be printed in the Record.

        There being no objection, the material was ordered to be
    printed in the Record, as follows:

                                   Cosponsors

        Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Kohl,
    Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Smith of Oregon, Mr. Daschle, Ms.
    Snowe, Mr. Reid, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Bryan, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Cleland, Mr.
    Domenici, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Wyden, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr.
    Kerry, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Wellstone,
    Mr. Breaux, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Reed, Ms.
    Landrieu, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Levin, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Robb, Mr.
    Inouye, and Mr. Akaka.

                                     ______

                             Resolution of Censure

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
    engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee in
    the White House, which was shameful, reckless and indefensible;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
    deliberately misled and deceived the American people, and people in all
    branches of the United States government;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
    gave false or misleading testimony and his actions have had the effect
    of impeding discovery of evidence in judicial proceedings;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is
    unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the
    Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates
    disrespect for the laws of the land;

        Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in
    such behavior;

        Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such
    behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences,
    including loss of integrity, trust and respect;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal
    actions in a court of law like any other citizen;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has
    brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the
    President; and

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton through his conduct in this
    matter has violated the trust of the American people: Now therefore, be
    it

        Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William
    Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and does condemn his
    wrongful conduct in the strongest terms; and now be it

        Further resolved, That the United States Senate recognizes the
    historic gravity of this bipartisan resolution, and trusts and urges
    that future congresses will recognize the importance of allowing this
    bipartisan statement of censure and condemnation to remain intact for
    all time; and be it

        Further resolved, That the Senate now move on to other matters of
    significance to our people, to reconcile differences between and within
    the branches of government, and to work together--across party lines--
    for the benefit of the American people.

                                    censure

        Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, now that we have come to the end
    of the process required by the Constitution, I believe we have
    arrived at an appropriate time to consider a measure required
    by the President's conduct.

        I rise in support of censure because while I do not find
    that the President's behavior constitutes high crimes and
    misdemeanors requiring removal, I do believe that it compels us
    to record for history our recognition of the damage we all
    acknowledge he has inflicted upon the Office of the Presidency
    and the Nation.

        Acquittal must not be the last word. And while I have felt
    that it would have been more appropriate for the Senate to
    issue findings of fact in the impeachment case against the
    President, I am now prepared to support censure so that there
    is no mixed message for posterity about what the Senate thinks
    of the President's actions.

        As I said yesterday, the President's behavior is
    indefensible, and I for one have no interest in seeing another
    shameless ``Rose Garden Jubilee'' after today's vote by the
    Court of Impeachment. Acquittal is not exoneration. Nothing we
    do here today in any way absolves the President's
    responsibility for the harm he has inflicted--and the President
    must know this.

        Indeed, this has been a sordid chapter in the history of
    the Presidency, and it deserves to be closed with a stern
    warning and a strongly worded rebuke that will leave no doubt
    to future generations that this process was not simply much ado
    about nothing; it was, in fact, about something very
    important--the sanctity of public service.

        That's why I worked with Senators Feinstein and Bennett to
    include language expressing the will of this Senate that this
    resolution not be revoked by a future Congress. I also want to
    thank them for their willingness to include language that makes
    clear the Senate believes the President should be treated as
    any other citizen facing criminal allegations once he leaves
    office in 23 months.

        The fact is, even while this body has acquitted the
    President on articles of impeachment, the framers provided for
    an additional remedy for his conduct in standard criminal
    court. Why? Because they had known a country where some men
    were above the law and some below. They were determined to
    create a Nation where the level of justice served was not
    proportional to a person's pocketbook, social rank, or
    political power.

        I believe acquittal, though the proper outcome, by itself
    could present a skewed picture of the Senate's findings, and
    runs the risk that the President will claim exoneration for his
    actions. Such a claim, evidence of which is already apparent,
    is quite simply and obviously wrong.

        The President may not have committed high crimes and
    misdemeanors, but what he has done--in my mind including
    unlawfully influencing a potential witness--deserves a formal
    rebuke by the Senate. Censure would be an appropriate and
    constitutionally permissible way to do this.

        For a President who from the very beginning promised the
    most ethical administration any of us would ever see, censure
    would be a well-deserved legacy of a promise broken and a
    Presidency sullied. I will vote for this censure motion and I
    urge my colleagues to do likewise.

                               CENSURE RESOLUTION

        Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, the debate we will be having
    in the Senate is on whether to suspend the rules of the Senate
    to consider a resolution censuring the President's conduct.

        A motion will be made to indefinitely postpone the motion
    to suspend the rules. These votes will occur before Senators
    have the opportunity to amend the resolution censuring the
    President's conduct.

        I take the floor of the Senate to make clear that I am
    opposed to a censure resolution of President Clinton.

        The Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson
    Clinton is over. The Senate has faithfully discharged its
    constitutional obligation by serving as impartial jurors of the
    articles of impeachment approved by a bipartisan majority of
    the U.S. House of Representatives.

        The Senate has rendered its verdict and has found the
    President not guilty as charged. The consequence of this action
    by the Senate is to keep the President in office where he is to
    fully and faithfully discharge the constitutional duties of his
    office.

        The trial is over. It is time for the Senate to focus on
    the national legislative agenda.

        On this last point, I chose my words carefully. I did not
    say it is time for the Senate to turn to the people's business.

        Some have said we should not have had the trial or should
    have adjourned the trial much earlier so that we could turn to
    the people's business.

        I reject that notion. I firmly believe that conducting the
    trial was doing the people's business.

        But the truth is the trial is over. I do not see any place
    for the pending resolution censuring the President. It is not
    the business of the Senate to punish President Clinton.

        As Senator Byrd has concluded, censure, unlike impeachment,
    is ``extra-constitutional.'' The Constitution empowers the
    Senate to try a President impeached by the House and remove him
    if 67 Senators agree. The Constitution does not empower the
    Senate to punish a President in the absence of 67 votes to
    remove.

        The impeachment trial is over. The Senate should move on
    and leave President Clinton alone.

        The Constitution recognizes that if a President cannot be
    removed through impeachment, he should not be weakened by
    censure. Although the Senate passes sense of the Senate
    resolutions on many subjects, censure is different because the
    Constitution requires a two-thirds vote before the Senate can
    discipline the President and requires removal upon conviction
    for impeachable offenses. Censure is an effort to end-run these
    constitutional requirements.

        One final problem is that any censure resolution will have
    to be weak. Even proponents of censure concede that a censure
    resolution that actually punished the President would be an
    unconstitutional bill of attainder. Any censure that is
    consistent with the bill of attainder clause is too weak to be
    worth doing.

        The highest form of censure the Constitution allows is
    impeachment by the House. The failure to convict the President
    will not erase that action by the House. It is time for the
    Senate to move on.

        If the effort to suspend the rules passes, and the text of
    the censure resolution is before the Senate and is amendable, I
    will seek recognition to offer the following substitute:

        After the word ``Resolved'' strike everything and insert
    the following:

        ``That the United States Senate at the earliest opportunity will
    consider and have final votes on legislation favorably reported by its
    committees that--

        (1) reduces taxes so that Americans no longer pay record high
    levels of federal income taxes;

        (2) prohibits the financial surplus in the Social Security Trust
    Funds from financing additional deficit spending in the operating
    budget of the United States Government;

        (3) increases funds and flexibility for programs that local school
    districts and their parents, teachers and principals believe will
    enhance teaching and learning;

        (4) offers comprehensive responses to juvenile justice needs and
    criminal drug abuse, including increased penalties for adults who use
    minors in the commission of crimes, increased penalties for drug
    trafficking, and greater resources for local law enforcement agencies
    to stop methamphetamine trafficking.

        (5) improves military pay to reduce sharp declines in attracting
    new and keeping well-qualified solders in the all-volunteer Armed
    Forces.''

        This substitute resolution speaks for itself. This
    resolution sets the Senate on the right course for the Senate
    to accomplish the legislative priorities of this nation.

        These priorities include:

        Congress this year should direct the budget surplus to
    where it belongs, and that is to the people whose hard work
    produced the surplus.

        That means Congress should cut taxes. Americans should no
    longer pay record high levels of federal income taxes.

        The average household paid 25 percent of its income in
    taxes--Federal, State, and local--30 percent of every
    additional dollar earned by a four-person median income
    household of $55,000 will go to pay taxes.

        The typical American family spends more money on taxes than
    on food, clothing, and shelter combined. Each year, Americans
    work 4 months and 10 days just to pay their taxes. The tax
    burden is getting worse, not better. For the past 5 years, tax
    payments have grown faster than salaries. Total federal taxes
    in 1997 were the highest since World War II.

        Second, Congress should protect Social Security.

        The best action we can take now to protect the economic
    security of tomorrow's retirees is to protect current surpluses
    from government raiding.

        Using these surpluses to pay down our debt will put our
    country in the best possible financial position to meet our
    future obligations.

        Third, we should improve education by increasing funds and
    flexibility for programs that local school districts and their
    parents, teachers, and principals believe will enhance teaching
    and learning.

        The Department of Education requires over 48.6 million
    hours worth of paperwork to receive federal dollars. This
    bureaucratic maze takes up to 35% of every federal education
    dollar.

        Local school districts could find far better uses of the
    $10-$12 billion Washington spends. With direct funding, local
    schools could deploy resources to areas they deem most crucial
    for their students, such as hiring new teachers, raising
    teacher salaries, buying new textbooks or new computers

        Fourth, Congress must fight crime and drug abuse.

        While in the last few years the violent crime rate has
    declined, it remains at levels that are far too high. In 1960,
    159 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants were reported; in
    1997, 611 were reported. In short, violent crime has quadrupled
    since 1960.

        Drug abuse, especially use of methamphetamines, is also at
    dangerous levels. Public health and law enforcement officials
    believe that meth is more dangerous and addictive than cocaine
    and heroin. Communities are being devastated and the problem is
    growing exponentially. In 1994, DEA agents in Missouri seized
    14 clandestine meth labs. Last year, they seized 421 labs.

        Meth use is dangerous, threatens our children, and causes
    users to commit other crimes. Among 12th graders, the use of
    ice, a smokeable form of meth, has risen 60 percent since 1992.
    Meth-related emergency room incidents are up 63 percent over
    this same period.

        Fifth, Congress should improve military pay to reduce sharp
    declines in attracting new and keeping well-qualified soldiers
    in the all-volunteer Armed Forces.

        1999 marks the 14th straight year of decline in real
    dollars spent on our national defense. The number of active
    duty personnel is down 30% since 1991. Despite these
    reductions, the military is being asked to do more than it did
    during the Cold War.

        In writing these principles, I strived for bipartisan
    agreement. I believe many, if not all, of these principles have
    been articulated as priorities on both sides of the aisle.

        I did not include my own proposals for accomplishing these
    objectives. The details of these principles can and should be
    worked out by the committees of the Senate and then by the full
    Senate.

            PRESIDENT CLINTON SHOULD FEEL THE DISDAIN OF THE SENATE

        Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, the Senate has been held in the
    grip of the impeachment trial for the past 6 weeks, the House
    has been involved in the impeachment process for the past 6
    months, and the Nation has been divided over the actions and
    fate of the President for more than a year. We were not
    compelled to undertake this nearly unprecedented Constitutional
    remedy by partisanship, as some at the White House have
    suggested. We were driven to this point by Bill Clinton and
    Bill Clinton alone.

        Although I voted to acquit the President on the charges, I
    have no doubt that if I served in the House, I would have voted
    to impeach him.

        Chairman Hyde offered the White House every opportunity to
    defend the President, but the White House chose a different
    course. They chose to belittle the charges against the
    President by suggesting that everyone lies about sex. They
    chose to accuse their accusers by attacking the motives and
    integrity of the Judiciary Committee Republicans and by
    insinuating that Judge Starr is a sex-obsessed prosecutor run
    amok. They did not question the evidence on which the
    impeachment vote was based.

        With that evidence, the House Managers presented a powerful
    case against the President. As a result of their presentations,
    I am convinced that the President acted to circumvent the law.
    The notion that the President of the United States, the number
    one citizen of our nation, the man in whom the trust and
    respect of the country is meant to rest, would deliberately
    maneuver around the laws of the land is reprehensible and
    should be condemned.

        Alexander Hamilton, in ``The Federalist Papers'' No. 65,
    said:

        The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply
    concerns the political reputation and resistance of every man
    engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for
    themselves.

        President Clinton betrayed that delicate trust. The House
    Managers tried to restore it. In the end, the witnesses, all of
    whom were sympathetic to or allies of the President, provided
    direct evidence that failed to corroborate the House Managers'
    case. Removing the President from office in the face of a
    conflict between direct and circumstantial evidence, in my
    view, would be mistaken. On that basis, I voted to acquit the
    President. Nevertheless, the House Managers and all of the
    evidence left me convinced that the President acted in a way
    that is abominable. By voting for the censure resolution
    proposed by Senator Feinstein, the Senate makes clear that it
    does not exonerate the President.

                                    CENSURE

        Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, during the impeachment trial, it
    was the duty of the Senate to look at the facts, look at the
    law, look at the Constitution, and make a judgment. We did our
    duty.

        But now we need to go one step further because neither
    acquittal nor conviction is an entirely adequate conclusion to
    this sordid matter. We must speak our contempt and
    disappointment for the low behavior of our highest elected
    official.

        We need to speak for the spirit behind our laws, behind
    this institution, behind the country. We need to say that the
    President's actions and lies were wrong--``shameful, reckless
    and indefensible.'' We need to acknowledge that his conduct,
    unacceptable for any American, is especially so for the
    President of the United States because it ``creates disrespect
    for the laws of the land.''

        I am proud that all 100 Senators worked together through
    this ordeal to do our duty. I am proud that so many of us from
    both sides of the aisle worked together to craft this tough
    censure resolution.

        But I am sorry that a small minority will keep us from also
    doing what is honorable and what is right. We need to
    officially express our collective disdain for the President's
    conduct. It's the only truly appropriate, bipartisan way to
    bring closure to this melancholy moment in American history.

        When Senator Feinstein and I started talking about a
    censure resolution, as early as last December, I had no
    certainty that we would come so far and bring so many along.
    Her perseverance, hard work and legislative craftsmanship
    deserve our praise but our efforts deserve a clean ``up or
    down'' vote.

                             RESOLUTION OF CENSURE

        Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I ask that a draft of a
    proposed resolution of censure be printed in the Record.

        The material follows:

                             Resolution of Censure

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
    engaged in an in appropriate relationship with a subordinate employee
    in the White House, which was shameful, reckless and indefensible;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
    deliberately misled and deceived the American people, and people in all
    branches of the United States Government.

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is
    unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the
    Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates
    disrespect for the laws of the land;

        Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in
    such behavior;

        Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such
    behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences,
    including loss of integrity, trust and respect;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal
    actions in a court of law like any other citizen;

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has
    brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the
    President; and

        Whereas William Jefferson Clinton through his conduct in this
    matter has violated the trust of the American people: Now therefore, be
    it

        Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William
    Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and does condemn his
    wrongful conduct in the strongest terms; and now be it further

        Resolved, That the United States Senate recognizes the historic
    gravity of this resolution, and trusts and urges that future congresses
    will recognize the importance of allowing this statement of censure and
    condemnation to remain intact for all time; and be it further

        Resolved, That the Senate now move on to other matters of
    significance to our people, to reconcile differences between and within
    the branches of government, and to work together--across party lines--
    for the benefit of the American people.

                    A CALL FOR AN END TO THE POLITICAL WARS

        Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, today's votes on the articles
    of impeachment mark the end of a long and difficult journey.
    The story of this impeachment process suggests a number of
    lessons on which I expect we will all reflect individually and
    collectively for some time.

        From the beginning of this process, I objected in the
    clearest terms to the President's legal hairsplitting and
    attempts to find a legal excuse, or any excuse, for his
    deplorable personal conduct. In my view, the President violated
    the public trust and brought dishonor to the office he holds.
    For that, he will have to answer to the people of this country
    and to history.

        But it was every Senator's duty to put personal views aside
    and render impartial justice, based on constitutional standards
    and the evidence before the Senate. In my view, the President's
    conduct did not, under our Constitution, warrant his removal
    from office. Others, acting on equally sincere motives, reached
    a different conclusion.

        It is regrettable that something about this process led to
    a situation, particularly in Washington, where sincere voices
    on both sides were too often drowned out by partisan voices--
    again, on both sides. But, if we listen to voices outside the
    Nation's capital, the voices of citizens rather than of
    partisans, those voices tell us that something has gone
    terribly wrong in our public discourse.

        Those citizens see the impeachment process not as a solemn
    constitutional event, which it assuredly was, but, rather, as
    another sad episode in the sorry saga of a bitter, partisan,
    and negative political process that runs on the fuel of
    scandal. In this sense, to many Americans, the Starr
    investigation, and the impeachment process it spawned, were all
    too familiar.

        To much of the American public, this whole process was a
    long-running, 50-million-dollar negative ad built on personal
    attacks, the likes of which Americans regret and reject.

        I know this belief is shared by thousands of South Dakotans
    and millions of Americans who hold widely varying views of what
    the outcome of the impeachment proceeding should have been--
    conviction or acquittal, removal or continued service by the
    President to the conclusion of his term.

        What are the elements, the component parts, of this
    political process that so many Americans judge to be merely an
    ugly spectacle increasingly unworthy of their participation?
    What is making Americans so cynical that they are voting in
    record-low numbers and tuning out the government meant to serve
    them?

        Surely they must be concerned about the increased use, and
    misuse, of the legal process in our political process. They are
    no longer certain they can distinguish the proper application
    of the law to address real wrongdoing properly before the
    courts from the hijacking of the law to bludgeon political
    opponents and extend the battlefield of political attack.

        In just 10 years, we have seen the public careers of three
    House Speakers, representing both political parties, destroyed
    by scandal. As the process has escalated, independent counsel
    have pursued members of Presidents' cabinets--of both parties
    and then the President of the United States himself.

        We have watched what we all acknowledge as ``the politics
    of personal destruction'' threaten to devour our democratic
    ideals.

        We can, and we will, argue the merits of the independent
    counsel statute when it comes up for reauthorization this
    session. We can, and we will, continue to pursue those who are
    corrupt, who use their offices for personal gain, or who
    otherwise deserve punishment.

        But the law must be preserved as an instrument for the
    rendering of justice, not manipulated to serve as another
    readily accessible weapon to be used against political
    adversaries.

        The law should not become a substitute for elections.
    Political choices in this country must remain in the hands of
    the people of this country, not conveyed to prosecutors and
    lawyers.

        It is not the law's fault that there has been a hardening
    of position and a commitment to win at any cost. To paraphrase
    our former colleague Dale Bumpers' now famous declaration in
    his presentation to the Senate, ``Sometimes we want to win too
    badly.''

        It is time for elected officials to ask themselves, ``Does
    anyone in this country really feel as though they have been
    winners in this seemingly interminable process of
    investigation, media spectacle and impeachment controversy?''

        I hope we can keep Senator Bumpers' words in mind and honor
    each other, with the same degree of commitment that we bring to
    our disagreements. I hope we can persuade without spinning;
    that we can argue without shouting; that we can dissent without
    dividing.

        We can be passionate in our beliefs without prosecuting
    those who believe differently.

        There were no winners in this impeachment process, but
    there were plenty of losers. There are good people who have
    accumulated thousands of dollars in legal bills as a result of
    the years of investigating the President. There are good
    people--on both sides of the aisle--whose private lives will be
    never be private again. There are people whose reputations have
    been battered and beaten.

        I hope we can keep those people in mind and call for--
    indeed, insist upon--a truce in the political wars. We need now
    to think about what we owe ourselves, each other, and the
    public as we move--and I hope without further delay--to address
    the true agenda of the American people.

                             HEALING OF THE NATION

        Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the Senate to indulge me
    just a few words.

        It is a privilege for me to stand in for our distinguished
    leader, Mr. Lott. And my remarks also reflect on the
    outstanding performance not only by Leader Lott but Leader
    Daschle on this historic day of the Senate. Mr. President, I
    have just returned, as have most Senators, from responding to
    many requests by the media on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol.
    I have said that the verdict is in. It has been given by the
    Senate. It is now before the Nation and they will be the final
    jury, the final arbiter. The sovereignty of this country rests
    not in the high office holders, but it is in the hands of the
    people. It is for them to decide.

        As they approach the decision, I humbly submit to them: Let
    us put this chapter in our history, tragic though it may be,
    behind us, and that we heal ourselves and unite and go forward.

        This is a great and strong Nation. It is a leader of the
    world, not only in matters of security for ourselves but
    security for others, not only in matters of military security
    but in matters of economic security. Our President, by his own
    actions, is a weakened President. That strength which for a
    while he can no longer give to the Nation must be filled in by
    the people--individually and collectively. I think we should
    not spend time dwelling on the past. Leave it to the
    historians. Let us move forward to the future, heal ourselves,
    and strengthen our Nation so we can resume as a leader in the
    world. And may God rest his hand on this Senate and its verdict
    as being the best for the Nation and for our people.