[House Document 106-80]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-80


 
                  A REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO AND 
                          THE SURROUNDING AREA




 June 7, 1999.--Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services, 
 International Relations, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011                     WASHINGTON : 1999


                                           The White House,
                                          Washington, June 5, 1999.
Hon. Dennis J. Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Since my previous reports to the Congress 
under section 8115 of the Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), the continuing humanitarian 
crisis created by Belgrade's repression of its own citizens has 
resulted in thousands of additional refugees fleeing into 
neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are now 443,000 Kosovar 
refugees in Albania, 246,000 in Macedonia, and another 68,000 
in Montenegro. In addition, there could be as many as 700,000 
displaced persons still remaining within Kosovo. In both 
Albania and Macedonia, the number of refugees continues to 
over-tax the limited resources of the host countries. Efforts 
by military personnel, in support of civilian assistance 
efforts, have been critical to establishing the refugee camps 
and necessary infrastructure.
    In light of the continuing crisis, I have directed that 
additional U.S. forces be deployed to Albania to assist in 
refugee relief operations, including to improve airfield ramp 
and off-load capabilities, upgrade key roads and bridges to 
facilitate movement of refugees to safe areas and 
transportation of relief supplies, and to assist in the 
provision of additional shelter for refugees.
    In parallel with the military support for refugee relief, 
we are continuing to increase the pressure on Milosevic to 
accept NATO's conditions, while simultaneously preparing for 
success. Belgrade's recent acceptance of the document delivered 
by Finnish President Ahtissaari and Russian Special Envoy 
Chernomyrdin is an encouraging development, through we are 
taking a very cautious approach until the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia's (FRY's) intentions are clear.
    In line with this strategy, I have increased the number of 
U.S. military personnel assigned to support Task Force HAWK, 
our deep strike task force in Albania. I have authorized the 
deployment of a significant contingent of military personnel to 
Kosovo as part of an international security presence (KFOR), 
including some forces that may be pre-positioned in Macedonia 
prior to entry into Kosovo, as well as the deployment of other 
military personnel to the region, including Macedonia, as a 
national support element for U.S. forces in KFOR. However, 
forces will not enter Kosovo unless it is clear that Belgrade 
has adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces.
    In regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am 
providing the following information:
    1. & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that 
the deployment of additional forces to Albania, Macedonia, and 
Kosovo as described above is necessary in the national security 
interests of the United States. The deployments will provide 
additional relief for the refugees and help to return them to 
their homes with security and self-government. In doing so, the 
deployments serve out national security interests by promoting 
peace and stability in this volatile region, by strengthening 
NATO, and by demonstrating to other would-be aggressors in and 
around Europe that the United States and the Alliance will not 
stand by idly while they commit war crimes or seek to spread 
instability.
    3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel to be deployed 
cannot be definitively provided at this time since planning for 
the deployments is ongoing. For relief operations, it is 
anticipated that the number of additional personnel should be 
approximately 4,000, bringing the total number of U.S. 
personnel associated with relief operations in Albania to 
approximately 5,000. This is in addition to the total of 
approximately 5,500 personnel that will be associated with the 
deep strike task force now deployed to Albania. In addition, if 
it is clear that Belgrade has adopted NATO's conditions and is 
withdrawing its forces, I anticipate that approximately 7,000 
personnel will be deployed as part of KFOR and approximately 
1,500 personnel will be deployed as part of the national 
support element in the region, including Macedonia, to 
facilitate the flow of support to KFOR.
    I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a timely 
manner concerning any significant changes to the deployments 
described in this report when such information is available.
    4. Mission/Objectives. Our overall objective is to return 
the refugees to their homes with safety and security, to 
provide necessary refugee relief in the interim, and to promote 
peace and stability in the region. The specific missions of the 
forces involved are:
     Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE: To facilitate 
military operations by assisting the UNHCR in providing 
emergency relief to refugees in Albania.
     Task Force HAWK: To provide a deep strike force 
capability in support of NATO air operations and to be ready 
for use against FRY forces at a time and manner of our 
choosing.
     Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR): To deploy a 
military presence in a permissive environment to deter renewed 
hostilities, and, if necessary, enforce a cease-fire and the 
demilitarization of Kosovo, and to establish a secure 
environment for the stabilization of the humanitarian situation 
and the establishment and operation of an international 
provisional administration.
    5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine 
how long NATO operations in the region will need to continue, 
nor how long U.S. forces will be needed to assist in refugee 
relief operations, and therefore how long these deployments 
will need to be maintained.
    6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. 
military presence will depend on the course of events, and in 
particular, on Belgrade's actions.
     For Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, military 
support to refugee relief may need to continue for some time, 
even if a settlement allows for refugees to begin to return. 
Ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be 
transferred to the UNHCR, other humanitarian organizations, and 
host countries.
     Some elements of Task Force HAWK may deploy as 
initial elements of KFOR. In this case, the exit strategy for 
Task Force HAWK will become the same as that for KFOR. The 
remaining elements will continue deployment in support of NATO 
operations until no longer required.
     For Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, after the withdrawal 
of all Serb forces from Kosovo and an initial stabilization 
period, KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security 
situation permits and local police forces are established. At a 
time to be determined, KFOR will transfer responsibilities to 
the international provisional administration and local 
institutions and ultimately transition to a different set of 
security arrangements.
    7. Costs. The costs of operations in the Kosovo region will 
initially be paid from the FY 99 Defense appropriations in the 
supplemental appropriations bill recently enacted. As we 
further refine the detailed plans for KFOR, and as attendant 
costs become better known, I will consult with Congress as to 
how any additional costs should be covered.
    8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. These 
deployments affect morale, retention and readiness in a 
positive way because they demonstrate U.S. commitment of 
necessary resources to maximize operational effectiveness 
toward achievement of the important U.S. objectives in Kosovo. 
Given the importance of these deployments, we anticipate that 
U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and effectiveness 
while fulfilling the range of military objectives encompassed 
by these deployments, including refugee relief operations and 
the anticipated contribution to the international security 
force in Kosovo. Indeed, it has been our experience that 
personnel serving in these important and demanding positions 
experience higher retention rates than in other, less 
challenging assignments. The Department of Defense has underway 
extensive and effective programs to do what is necessary to 
manage personnel and other resources so as to reduce problems 
such as extended family separation and other burdens of 
military service. As with any operational deployment, the 
effects on readiness are mixed. In this case, however, it is 
expected that many of the U.S. forces will be conducting 
operations as they were trained to perform, which will provide 
an unparalleled opportunity to apply their skills in an active 
environment. The Administration is committed to ensuring that 
America's armed forces maintain the high levels of readiness 
necessary to safeguard America's national security.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                  
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