[House Document 106-80]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-80
A REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN KOSOVO AND
THE SURROUNDING AREA
June 7, 1999.--Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services,
International Relations, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011 WASHINGTON : 1999
The White House,
Washington, June 5, 1999.
Hon. Dennis J. Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Since my previous reports to the Congress
under section 8115 of the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-262), the continuing humanitarian
crisis created by Belgrade's repression of its own citizens has
resulted in thousands of additional refugees fleeing into
neighboring countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are now 443,000 Kosovar
refugees in Albania, 246,000 in Macedonia, and another 68,000
in Montenegro. In addition, there could be as many as 700,000
displaced persons still remaining within Kosovo. In both
Albania and Macedonia, the number of refugees continues to
over-tax the limited resources of the host countries. Efforts
by military personnel, in support of civilian assistance
efforts, have been critical to establishing the refugee camps
and necessary infrastructure.
In light of the continuing crisis, I have directed that
additional U.S. forces be deployed to Albania to assist in
refugee relief operations, including to improve airfield ramp
and off-load capabilities, upgrade key roads and bridges to
facilitate movement of refugees to safe areas and
transportation of relief supplies, and to assist in the
provision of additional shelter for refugees.
In parallel with the military support for refugee relief,
we are continuing to increase the pressure on Milosevic to
accept NATO's conditions, while simultaneously preparing for
success. Belgrade's recent acceptance of the document delivered
by Finnish President Ahtissaari and Russian Special Envoy
Chernomyrdin is an encouraging development, through we are
taking a very cautious approach until the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia's (FRY's) intentions are clear.
In line with this strategy, I have increased the number of
U.S. military personnel assigned to support Task Force HAWK,
our deep strike task force in Albania. I have authorized the
deployment of a significant contingent of military personnel to
Kosovo as part of an international security presence (KFOR),
including some forces that may be pre-positioned in Macedonia
prior to entry into Kosovo, as well as the deployment of other
military personnel to the region, including Macedonia, as a
national support element for U.S. forces in KFOR. However,
forces will not enter Kosovo unless it is clear that Belgrade
has adopted NATO's conditions and is withdrawing its forces.
In regard to the elements of section 8115(a)(1)-(8), I am
providing the following information:
1. & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that
the deployment of additional forces to Albania, Macedonia, and
Kosovo as described above is necessary in the national security
interests of the United States. The deployments will provide
additional relief for the refugees and help to return them to
their homes with security and self-government. In doing so, the
deployments serve out national security interests by promoting
peace and stability in this volatile region, by strengthening
NATO, and by demonstrating to other would-be aggressors in and
around Europe that the United States and the Alliance will not
stand by idly while they commit war crimes or seek to spread
instability.
3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel to be deployed
cannot be definitively provided at this time since planning for
the deployments is ongoing. For relief operations, it is
anticipated that the number of additional personnel should be
approximately 4,000, bringing the total number of U.S.
personnel associated with relief operations in Albania to
approximately 5,000. This is in addition to the total of
approximately 5,500 personnel that will be associated with the
deep strike task force now deployed to Albania. In addition, if
it is clear that Belgrade has adopted NATO's conditions and is
withdrawing its forces, I anticipate that approximately 7,000
personnel will be deployed as part of KFOR and approximately
1,500 personnel will be deployed as part of the national
support element in the region, including Macedonia, to
facilitate the flow of support to KFOR.
I will ensure that the Congress is informed in a timely
manner concerning any significant changes to the deployments
described in this report when such information is available.
4. Mission/Objectives. Our overall objective is to return
the refugees to their homes with safety and security, to
provide necessary refugee relief in the interim, and to promote
peace and stability in the region. The specific missions of the
forces involved are:
Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE: To facilitate
military operations by assisting the UNHCR in providing
emergency relief to refugees in Albania.
Task Force HAWK: To provide a deep strike force
capability in support of NATO air operations and to be ready
for use against FRY forces at a time and manner of our
choosing.
Operation JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR): To deploy a
military presence in a permissive environment to deter renewed
hostilities, and, if necessary, enforce a cease-fire and the
demilitarization of Kosovo, and to establish a secure
environment for the stabilization of the humanitarian situation
and the establishment and operation of an international
provisional administration.
5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine
how long NATO operations in the region will need to continue,
nor how long U.S. forces will be needed to assist in refugee
relief operations, and therefore how long these deployments
will need to be maintained.
6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S.
military presence will depend on the course of events, and in
particular, on Belgrade's actions.
For Joint Task Force SHINING HOPE, military
support to refugee relief may need to continue for some time,
even if a settlement allows for refugees to begin to return.
Ultimately, responsibilities for refugee relief will be
transferred to the UNHCR, other humanitarian organizations, and
host countries.
Some elements of Task Force HAWK may deploy as
initial elements of KFOR. In this case, the exit strategy for
Task Force HAWK will become the same as that for KFOR. The
remaining elements will continue deployment in support of NATO
operations until no longer required.
For Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, after the withdrawal
of all Serb forces from Kosovo and an initial stabilization
period, KFOR will be progressively reduced as the security
situation permits and local police forces are established. At a
time to be determined, KFOR will transfer responsibilities to
the international provisional administration and local
institutions and ultimately transition to a different set of
security arrangements.
7. Costs. The costs of operations in the Kosovo region will
initially be paid from the FY 99 Defense appropriations in the
supplemental appropriations bill recently enacted. As we
further refine the detailed plans for KFOR, and as attendant
costs become better known, I will consult with Congress as to
how any additional costs should be covered.
8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. These
deployments affect morale, retention and readiness in a
positive way because they demonstrate U.S. commitment of
necessary resources to maximize operational effectiveness
toward achievement of the important U.S. objectives in Kosovo.
Given the importance of these deployments, we anticipate that
U.S. forces would maintain the highest morale and effectiveness
while fulfilling the range of military objectives encompassed
by these deployments, including refugee relief operations and
the anticipated contribution to the international security
force in Kosovo. Indeed, it has been our experience that
personnel serving in these important and demanding positions
experience higher retention rates than in other, less
challenging assignments. The Department of Defense has underway
extensive and effective programs to do what is necessary to
manage personnel and other resources so as to reduce problems
such as extended family separation and other burdens of
military service. As with any operational deployment, the
effects on readiness are mixed. In this case, however, it is
expected that many of the U.S. forces will be conducting
operations as they were trained to perform, which will provide
an unparalleled opportunity to apply their skills in an active
environment. The Administration is committed to ensuring that
America's armed forces maintain the high levels of readiness
necessary to safeguard America's national security.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.