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REQUEST FOR FUNDS FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS
OF U.S. FORCES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR FUNDS
FOR CONTINUED OPERATIONS OF U.S. FORCES IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA



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To the Congress of the United States:

Section 1203 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261 (the Act), requires submission of a report to the Congress whenever the President submits a request for funds for continued operations of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In connection with my Administration's request for funds for FY 2000, the attached report fulfills the requirements of section 1203 of the Act.

I want to emphasize again my continued commitment to close consultation with the Congress on political and military matters concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in the months ahead as we work to establish a lasting peace in the Balkans.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 12, 1999.*

Report Pursuant to Section 1203
of Public Law 105-261

Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B-H)

U.S. military force structure in B-H has been and will continue to be reduced, as progress is made on implementation of, or the capability of other nonmilitary institutions increases. The 6-month review process that began with initial deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995 continues today. The reviews include assessments of the security situation, compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the progress towards achievement of benchmarks, as well as recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian implementation agencies, and/or any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force. The December 1998 assessment concluded that no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels were warranted but that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and nonmaneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short term. Based on this review, the Secretary of Defense announced the reduction of U.S. forces operating in Bosnia from 6,900 to approximately 6,200. This reduction, to be fully realized later this year, resulted from an analysis of the current SFOR mission, its key military and supporting tasks and 6 months of experience of operating under Operation Joint Forge. It is important to remember that the current U.S. force level of 6,900 already represents a 20 percent reduction from the 8,500 U.S. military personnel deployed in June 1998, and is 66 percent less than the peak U.S. deployment of 20,000 in 1996. This reduction does not signal a change in the SFOR mission, nor will it affect SFOR's ability to support implementation of the Dayton Accords. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has also recommended sourcing the second authorized Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units in order to achieve some additional force reductions. We expect a comprehensive, wide-ranging mission and force structure analysis, based on the Six Month Review (SMR), to be completed by the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) in the spring of this year.

Percentage of benchmarks completed

The report submitted in February 1999, pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, provides an update on the status of benchmarks identified in March 1998. That report provides a complete assessment on the progress of each benchmark. We would also emphasize that the benchmarks are not a checklist that must be completed before NATO can depart

but rather a road map to guide civil implementation aimed at reaching the point where it can proceed without the need for a major international military force. Overall, we are pleased with the progress made during the past year on successful implementation of those benchmarks; however, much remains to be accomplished before we can look to the complete withdrawal of our forces.

The status of the NATO force of gendarmes

In response to the North Atlantic Council's guidance to consider specialized support to the International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the possible establishment of specialized units, SHAPE recommended that a unit be formed in "order to assist in partially closing the public security gap and increasing civil implementation." In July 1998, the MSU was established in Bosnia as part of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) OPLAN 10407. The MSU was established as an integral element of SFOR and operates under the existing rules of engagement and within the SFOR command structure. The unit, led by the Italians, is authorized to include two battalions and a brigade headquarters. To date, only one of the battalions has been formed and staffed, along with the headquarters element. The United States contributes two individuals to the headquarters element. The MSU provides Commander SFOR with a centrally controlled reserve capability to assist in reducing the public security gap by supporting local authorities in responding to civil disorder. Since certification, the MSU has conducted a continuous series of exercises, orientation deployments, reconnaissance missions and information gathering operations throughout the country. Since August 1998, the MSU has conducted several intervention and preventive deployments to potential problem areas. In all cases, their actions served to defuse the situation and provide stability to allow local law enforcement to assume control.

The military and nonmilitary missions that the President has directed for U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The North Atlantic Council has tasked Commander SFOR through SACEUR with the mission of providing a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace in B-H, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for ongoing civil implementation plans.

Key military tasks

- Maintain a deterrent military presence.
- Act to prevent major breaches of the cessation of hostilities or removal of heavy weapons from cantonment.
- Continue to operate Joint Military Commissions.
- Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a secure environment in which the international civil organizations and parties to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia (GFAP) can carry out their responsibilities.
- Ensure force protection and freedom of movement for the force.
- Ensure continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of Separation and other military aspects of the GFAP.
- Monitor, and if required, enforce compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP.
- Enforce rules and procedures governing the use of airspace over B-H.

Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of SFOR:

- Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Representative.
- Support the Supervisor in implementation of Brcko arbitration decision.
- Support conduct of elections and installation of elected officials.
- Support phased and orderly returns of displaced persons and refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but not forcibly return them or undertake to guard individual locations.
- Support organizations tasked with media reform efforts.
- Support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and efforts against persons indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs).
- Support the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and International Police Task Force (IPTF) in assisting local police, providing back-up support and a secure operating environment, directed towards the creation of a reformed and restructured indigenous police force, but without undertaking civil police tasks.

- Provide, on a case-by-case basis, selective support to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) if requested in implementing Annex 1B of the GFAP in B-H.
- Contribute to the continued improvement of freedom of movement in B-H.
- Support the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs)

Progress is being made on bringing war criminals to justice. Less than half of the indictees charged by the Tribunal remain at large, and SFOR has conducted several operations to date to facilitate the transfer of 29 indictees to The Hague for trial. There are still fugitives at-large, though, that must be brought to justice and held accountable for their actions. Congressional action in October 1998 that allows the Department of State to offer rewards to persons for information leading to the apprehension and/or conviction of PIFWCs by the ICTY may accelerate this program. The reward incentive is not a substitute for the apprehension/detention of war criminals, but only meant to complement existing programs and to put more pressure on indictees to turn themselves in to authorities. The Government of the Republika Srpska (RS) has openly stated that they would not support or assist in arrests of Bosnian Serbs indicted for war crimes who live in the RS. The Bosnian Muslims and Croats have cooperated with the ICTY, but there are still areas in need of improvement. Under Dayton, the parties are primarily responsible for apprehension and surrender of PIFWCs. The SFOR is not a police force, but it will continue to detain PIFWCs in accordance with its mandate and rules of engagement and provide detainees safe passage to The Hague.

Support to civilian police functions

Public security is fundamental to the continued development of B-H. Bosnia and Herzegovina's current public safety situation is not viable without the support of SFOR; however, progress is being made. In December 1998, an agreement for restructuring of the police in the RS was signed between RS authorities and United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and the OHR has increased efforts to build professional and multi-ethnic police forces in B-H. The IPTF relies on SFOR's back-up in cases of civil unrest; while IPTF has accomplished a great deal in the development, organization, and training of indigenous police forces, however, the process is far from being complete.

Return of refugees

The SFOR contributes, within means and capabilities, to the secure environment needed by the international community to promote the return of refugees to their homes. For example, SFOR expelled some police from Croatia who were illegally present in Martin-Brod and had been harassing newly returned refugees to that area. We are disappointed with the low level of support by the Sarajevo authorities in allowing minority returns in their canton. Likewise, we are displeased with the continuing resistance by authorities in the RS to minority returns in key centers such as Banja Luka. Bosnian Croat authorities have also been lackluster in their support of returns and quelling outbursts in communities such as Stolac. The value of SFOR support is clearly evident in areas such as Brcko and Central Bosnia, where SFOR has been more closely involved in the planning and implementation process and returnee rates have risen.

Support to local and international authorities

Elections. One of the most significant benchmarks is the ability to hold and implement free and fair elections, the latest of which took place in September 1998 for all offices above the municipal level. Although the September elections show that the electorate has not yet totally repudiated the hard-line nationalist parties in B-H and members of these parties continue to hold many of the major elected offices, the elections confirmed an overall trend in favor of moderation, pluralism and pragmatism. They were conducted in a secure environment with only very minor security incidents noted. While SFOR provided an increased presence to foster wide-area security in potentially problematic areas, for the first time, SFOR was able to reduce its level of election support as compared to the three previous elections. The OSCE, the IPTF, and the Bosnians were able to step in and successfully execute many responsibilities previously shouldered by SFOR. This signaled an important step on the path to further reductions in U.S./NATO force responsibilities in Bosnia.

President Milosevic of the FRY and Serbian hard-line followers continue to meddle in RS politics. Their maneuverings have resulted in failure to confirm a new Prime Minister following the elections. In early March, the High Representative removed RS President Poplasen for his deference to Belgrade (a foreign power) and for trying to remove Prime Minister Dodik, who continues in office. The SFOR continues to provide a stabilizing presence during this political uncertainty.

Media. Significant progress has been realized in media reform throughout B-H. Over 80 percent of the population are covered by the footprint of the internationally funded Open Broadcast Network (OBN) TV network. A new broadcast management control board has been installed that has restructured radio and television networks in both the RS and the Federation. Compliance with GFAP requirements is now monitored by the Independent Media Commission, and with the continual presence of SFOR to enforce standards, media reform has improved throughout the region. The SFOR will continue to support this initiative and the newly founded Media Commission.

Brcko. On March 5, the Brcko Arbitration Panel announced its decision that Brcko would be a neutral district within the territory of both the Federation and the RS. The award sparked some public demonstrations in the RS but these caused relatively little damage and subsided fairly quickly. Brcko has made some progress in self-government as well as in freedom of movement and resettlement. The SFOR's proactive involvement supporting the IPTF and providing area security has been key to these initiatives. Now, and for the foreseeable future, Brcko, coupled with Bosnian Serb animosity toward NATO air strikes as a result of the conflict in Kosovo, present the highest potential for civil unrest and renewed ethnic tension in the region. The SFOR will continue to support international and civil organizations involved in the implementation of the Brcko decision.

Assessment of the expected threats to the United States forces

From the initial IFOR deployment, the former warring factions (FWFs) generally complied with military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord and with NATO's military mission. The FWFs have not challenged NATO's power and authority. Moreover, the FWFs have remained in compliance as the overall force size declined. There have been no combat-related casualties. The established rules of engagement and IFOR/SFOR's willingness to use force, if necessary, have generally deterred the police, security forces, and criminals from threatening activities. NATO forces have encountered isolated incidents largely as a result of volatile crowd situations beyond the ability or willingness of local police and IPTF to control. NATO commanders have made it clear that any challenge to SFOR will generate a prompt and decisive response.

Reactions to SFOR detentions of war criminals in July 1997 were directed primarily at United Nations and OSCE targets, and dissipated when SFOR threatened to respond. Subsequent detentions did not spark reactions on as large a scale; reactions remained more localized. Apprehension of Bosnian Serb Army General Krstic in December 1998 provoked a reaction that was limited largely to demonstrations in several cities in the RS.

Other confrontations involving SFOR personnel resulted from providing support to IPTF-backed returns of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The SFOR is fully capable of handling these situations. The addition of the MSU, which is trained in public security tasks, has further enhanced SFOR's capability to handle situations and reduced the overall risk to the force. The parties are in favor of a continued NATO security presence, although for differing reasons.

Commencement of the air strikes against the FRY has had an impact on the threat to U.S. forces in the RS, and they have gone to a heightened alert posture. Bosnian Serbs have mounted public demonstrations, and there have been some isolated incidents of violence. The SFOR took action to cut a FRY rail line that transited a portion of Bosnian territory. Some members of the RS army have entered the FRY to fight alongside fellow Serbs. Although it is unlikely, the FRY could attack SFOR; to date, with the exception of some in-and-out cross-border incursions into northern Albania, the FRY has avoided widening the conflict. The SFOR, however, is prepared for such an eventuality.

Assessment of Bosnia costs

Since FY 1996, the cost to the Department of Defense of carrying out the military missions directed in B-H is about \$8.6 billion. These costs are summarized below:

	FY 1999	FY 1998	FY 1997	FY 1996
<u>DOD Costs in Millions</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Actual</u>
Deliberate Forge	161.3	159.4	183.3	225.9
Joint Forge	1,589.1	1,792.8	-	-
IFOR/IFOR Prep	-	-	2,087.5	2,231.7
Provide Promise	-	-	-	21.7
Sharp Guard	-	-	-	9.3
Totals	1,750.4	1,952.2	2,280.8	2,488.6

Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight, Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate Forge, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil authority in B-H.

The category IFOR/IFOR Preparation includes the costs of preparing U.S. Armed Forces for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace implementation force in the former Yugoslavia.

Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.

Operation Sharp Guard was the enforcement of the United Nations sanctioned embargo against the former Yugoslavia (excluding the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction with Western Europe Union forces.

For FY 1999, the Department of Defense projects costs of \$1.8 billion for Bosnia. A detailed breakout of these costs follows:

<u>Estimated FY 1999 DOD Bosnia Costs (\$ in Millions)</u>			
		Deliberate	
	<u>Joint Forge</u>	<u>Forge</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Military Personnel:			
Army	292.1	-	292.1
Navy	8.5	1.2	9.7
Marines	2.7	-	2.7
Air Force	31.5	1.5	33.0
Navy Reserve	<u>2.2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2.2</u>
Total	337.0	2.7	339.7
Operations & Maintenance:			
Army	1,041.5	-	1,041.5
Navy	19.2	52.4	71.6
Marine Corps	1.9	0.3	2.2
Air Force	86.0	105.1	191.1
Defense-Wide	90.7	0.8	91.5
Defense Health Program	12.7	-	12.7
Navy Reserve	<u>0.1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>0.1</u>
Total	1,252.1	158.6	1,410.7
GRAND TOTAL	1,589.1	161.3	1,750.4

Future plans for operations in Bosnia

Based on Commander SFOR's Six Month Review (SMR), SHAPE has recommended to NATO's Military Committee that there be no immediate major reductions in SFOR force levels but indicated that "routine" administrative adjustments in areas such as logistics and nonmaneuver unit headquarters were possible in the short term. SHAPE also suggested that adding a second Multinational Specialized Unit battalion and consideration of a shift from heavy to light units would result in additional force

reductions. The Military Committee and, subsequently, the NATO Policy Coordination Group (PCG) generally agreed with, but expanded upon, SHAPE's conclusions. Both emphasized the need for SFOR flexibility and recognized a requirement for further analysis. In December, the NAC tasked the PCG to prepare comprehensive political-military guidance for a NATO Military Authorities study of options for long-term SFOR restructuring/reductions. The resulting paper fostered a two-phase approach. Phase One involves short-term administrative reductions while Phase Two consists of a wide-ranging study including analysis of more radical approaches to SFOR's restructuring/reductions. Potential topics for further study include adjustments in Multinational Divisions (MNDs) and other administrative boundaries, reorganization of the basic command structure, and review of the lead nation principle in the MNDs. On December 17, 1998, SACEUR General Clark briefed NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels on the nature and timing of future SFOR force reductions. He reported that efficiency reductions, totaling 11.3 percent, would come from consolidation, commercialization, and streamlining headquarters and support. As a result of this process, the United States decided to reduce its contribution to SFOR by approximately 10 percent, from 6,900 to 6,200 military personnel. These reductions will be completed later this year.

Commenting on the NAC's proposed SFOR structural review, SACEUR anticipated that restructuring reductions could come from enhanced intelligence, availability of multinational specialized units, more flexible reserves and adjustments of tactics and techniques. SHAPE would aim for a NAC decision on any restructuring or reductions by June 1999, with implementation to begin later in the year.

The NATO Defense Ministers subsequently endorsed the SFOR Six Month Review, including SACEUR's recommendations for short term force reductions, and tasked the NATO Military Authorities to produce a study of options for the future size and structure of SFOR. All the Ministers agreed that, although no major reductions in SFOR size should be undertaken in the short term, SFOR should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely and it was important to prevent a dependency syndrome on the part of the Bosnian parties.

The NATO Military Authorities are developing options, taking into account the crisis in Kosovo that could affect the size of SFOR. A NAC decision on Military Committee recommendations will follow the completion of the review.