[House Document 106-41]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-41
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                     FORCE PROTECTION IN MACEDONIA

                               __________

                              COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

NOTIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND CERTAIN U.S. FORCES TO 
MACEDONIA TO ENHANCE FORCE PROTECTION FOR U.S. AND OTHER NATO FORCES IN 
   THAT NATION, TO SUPPORT U.S. AND NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE 
REGION, TO DETER ATTACKS ON U.S. AND NATO FORCES ALREADY IN MACEDONIA, 
  AND TO ASSIST IN PREPARING FOR A POSSIBLE NATO PEACE IMPLEMENTATION 
              FORCE IN KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 105-262




 April 12, 1999.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International 
Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services and ordered to be printed

                               --------

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE                    
69-011                     WASHINGTON : 1999




                                           The White House,
                                    Washington, DC, March 25, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: This is a report under section 8115 of 
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law 
105-262), to inform you of my decision to send certain U.S. 
forces to Macedonia to enhance force protection for U.S. and 
other NATO forces in that nation, to support U.S. and NATO 
military activities in the region, to deter attacks on U.S. and 
NATO forces already in Macedonia, and to assist in preparing 
for a possible NATO peace implementation force in Kosovo. Over 
the past several weeks, non-U.S. NATO countries began a 
consensual deployment of national forces to Macedonia to 
prepare to implement a peace agreement in Kosovo, should one be 
signed. Approximately 10,000 non-U.S. NATO forces are now 
deployed to Macedonia and have been placed under NATO's 
operational control.
    As you know, the mandate for the U.N. Preventive Deployment 
(UNPREDEP) expired on February 28, 1999. Approximately 400 U.S. 
personnel are currently stationed in Macedonia in Task Force 
Able Sentry (TFAS). We expect that some elements of these 
forces will redeploy out of the area and that others, together 
with certain of the enabling forces described below, will 
continue to maintain the current TFAS infrastructure and will 
begin to prepare Camp Able Sentry as a potential staging area 
in Macedonia for a U.S. contribution to a NATO-led 
implementation force in Kosovo, if it is decided to provide 
one. Operational control of these forces for force protection 
purposes only has been transferred to NATO, as has been the 
case for the forces of certain other nations whose forces are 
participating in UNPREDEP.
    NATO, during the past month, decided to deploy elements of 
the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters (ARRC HQ) Rear 
Command Post to provide a command element in Macedonia and to 
ensure that there will be unity of command and a single NATO 
commander on the ground who will be in a position to allocate 
infrastructure, coordinate training facilities, and provide a 
single point of contact for liaison with the Macedonian 
authorities. In addition, the ARRC commander has been 
designated as the NATO commander responsible for protection of 
forces and reaction to possible threats in Macedonia. The ARRC 
HQ's Rear Command Post element includes approximately 30 U.S. 
personnel who occupy key positions on the staff, but who have 
not yet deployed to Macedonia to assume their roles there. 
Having those officers serving in their regular positions will 
enhance the safety of U.S. and other friendly military 
personnel and increase the effectiveness of the NATO presence.
    Sound military planning may also call for sending a limited 
number of additional U.S. military personnel to Macedonia in 
support of ongoing operations including Combat Search and 
Rescue (CSAR), intelligence support, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, command and control, and logistical support, 
and selected forces and equipment to deter Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) attacks on NATO personnel in Macedonia. In 
addition, it may become advisable to send U.S. military 
personnel to Macedonia as part of an enabling force in 
anticipation of the possible signing of a peace agreement, 
which remains our ultimate objective. These forces could 
include (besides those U.S. forces attached to the ARRC HQ), 
logistical support and survey elements and liaison officers, 
CSAR, intelligence support, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
command and control, as well as U.S. forces conducting 
rotational training at facilities in Macedonia. Their presence 
would not commit the United States to participating in a 
possible NATO-led peace implementation force; but prudent and 
limited preparatory activities in Macedonia would enhance the 
effectiveness of such a force, should we decide to participate, 
as well as enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign and 
protection of the U.S. forces in TFAS that are already there. 
In regard to the elements of section 8115(a) (1)-(8), I am 
providing the following information:
    1 & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that 
the deployment of additional personnel to Macedonia as 
described above is necessary in the national security interests 
of the United States. These actions will preserve and protect 
critical infrastructure and Camp Able Sentry facilities, and 
will enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign by 
ensuring U.S. forces are fully integrated into the ARRC HQ 
command and control structure; improving CSAR, reconnaissance 
and surveillance, and other capabilities to support the air 
operations by enhancing force protection from U.S. and other 
NATO personnel in Macedonia by helping deter attacks on 
Macedonia and NATO forces there, and by strengthening U.S. 
leadership in NATO.
    3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel who will assume 
their functions in the ARRC HQ is approximately 30. At this 
point, no decisions have been made on numbers of personnel who 
would be deployed for other functions. I will ensure that the 
Congress is informed in a timely manner about such additional 
deployments described in this report if these prove necessary. 
If U.S. personnel were sent as part of an enabling force, the 
number would likely not exceed 2,000.
    4. Mission/Objectives. The overall objective of our efforts 
with our allies is to maintain stability in the region and 
prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from the ongoing FRY 
offensive against the people of Kosovo. The specific military 
mission of the forces to be deployed would be to enhance force 
protection both for NATO (including U.S. formerUNPREDEP) 
military personnel in Macedonia and for allied fliers participating in 
the air operations, to contribute to the effectiveness of those 
operations, and to help deter FRY attacks on Macedonia and on NATO 
(including U.S.) forces in Macedonia. In addition, these forces will 
likely assist in preparations necessary for a NATO-led implementation 
force to be effective, if a decision were made to deploy one, after an 
agreement was reached.
    5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine 
how long NATO air operations will need to continue, and 
therefore how long the support and deterrence functions will 
need to be maintained. However, it is important to be clear 
that it is the U.S. position, shared by our allies, that NATO 
will continue air operations as long as necessary to meet the 
military objectives to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's 
purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative 
of reversing course; to deter an even bloodier offensive 
against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, to 
seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the 
people of Kosovo.
    6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S. 
military presence in Macedonia will depend on the course of 
events, and in particular, on Belgrade's reaction to the air 
operations. So long as air operations continue, force 
protection, support for those operations, and deterrence from 
possible FRY acts of violence will continue to be required.
    7. Costs. The costs of the deployments covered by this 
notice like other costs of the air operations will be paid 
initially from FY99 Defense O&M appropriations. An estimate of 
likely costs for these limited deployments is being prepared, 
and I will ensure that it is provided to the Congress as soon 
as it is available.
    8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. In the first 
instance, these deployments will have a positive effect on 
morale, retention and readiness because they will demonstrate 
the commitment of the necessary resources to maximize force 
protection for our personnel engaged in the air operations. 
United States forces participating in Task Force Able Sentry, 
as well as U.S. forces deployed to other locations in the 
region, are dedicated professionals serving with great pride 
and enthusiasm. Given the importance of the mission in 
Macedonia, we anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the 
highest morale and effectiveness, just as they have in respect 
to other missions in the Balkans. Indeed, it has been our 
experience that personnel serving in these important and 
demanding positions experience higher retention rates than in 
other, less challenging assignments. However, we recognize that 
even deployments for the best of reasons increase the period of 
separation from family and add other burdens to military 
service. The Department of Defense has underway extensive and 
effective programs to do what is necessary to manage personnel 
and other resources so as to reduce these problems. As with any 
operational deployment, the effects on readiness for other 
operations are mixed. On the one hand, the personnel involved 
gain invaluable real world experience. On the other hand, 
normal training programs are interrupted. The numbers of 
personnel covered by this report are sufficiently limited, 
however, that any effect on the overall readiness of our U.S. 
Armed Services to meet other requirements, including major 
theater war contingencies, will be marginal.
    Finally, in accordance with sections 8115(b)(2) and (c), I 
have determined that it is necessary to order a Marine FAST 
team to Skopje, Macedonia, to protect our Embassy and U.S. 
persons at the Embassy. This team will remain deployed for as 
long as is necessary to protect our Embassy and U.S. persons.
            Sincerely,
                                                      Bill Clinton.

                                
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