[House Document 106-41]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-41
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FORCE PROTECTION IN MACEDONIA
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
NOTIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SEND CERTAIN U.S. FORCES TO
MACEDONIA TO ENHANCE FORCE PROTECTION FOR U.S. AND OTHER NATO FORCES IN
THAT NATION, TO SUPPORT U.S. AND NATO MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE
REGION, TO DETER ATTACKS ON U.S. AND NATO FORCES ALREADY IN MACEDONIA,
AND TO ASSIST IN PREPARING FOR A POSSIBLE NATO PEACE IMPLEMENTATION
FORCE IN KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 105-262
April 12, 1999.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International
Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services and ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011 WASHINGTON : 1999
The White House,
Washington, DC, March 25, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: This is a report under section 8115 of
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (Public Law
105-262), to inform you of my decision to send certain U.S.
forces to Macedonia to enhance force protection for U.S. and
other NATO forces in that nation, to support U.S. and NATO
military activities in the region, to deter attacks on U.S. and
NATO forces already in Macedonia, and to assist in preparing
for a possible NATO peace implementation force in Kosovo. Over
the past several weeks, non-U.S. NATO countries began a
consensual deployment of national forces to Macedonia to
prepare to implement a peace agreement in Kosovo, should one be
signed. Approximately 10,000 non-U.S. NATO forces are now
deployed to Macedonia and have been placed under NATO's
operational control.
As you know, the mandate for the U.N. Preventive Deployment
(UNPREDEP) expired on February 28, 1999. Approximately 400 U.S.
personnel are currently stationed in Macedonia in Task Force
Able Sentry (TFAS). We expect that some elements of these
forces will redeploy out of the area and that others, together
with certain of the enabling forces described below, will
continue to maintain the current TFAS infrastructure and will
begin to prepare Camp Able Sentry as a potential staging area
in Macedonia for a U.S. contribution to a NATO-led
implementation force in Kosovo, if it is decided to provide
one. Operational control of these forces for force protection
purposes only has been transferred to NATO, as has been the
case for the forces of certain other nations whose forces are
participating in UNPREDEP.
NATO, during the past month, decided to deploy elements of
the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters (ARRC HQ) Rear
Command Post to provide a command element in Macedonia and to
ensure that there will be unity of command and a single NATO
commander on the ground who will be in a position to allocate
infrastructure, coordinate training facilities, and provide a
single point of contact for liaison with the Macedonian
authorities. In addition, the ARRC commander has been
designated as the NATO commander responsible for protection of
forces and reaction to possible threats in Macedonia. The ARRC
HQ's Rear Command Post element includes approximately 30 U.S.
personnel who occupy key positions on the staff, but who have
not yet deployed to Macedonia to assume their roles there.
Having those officers serving in their regular positions will
enhance the safety of U.S. and other friendly military
personnel and increase the effectiveness of the NATO presence.
Sound military planning may also call for sending a limited
number of additional U.S. military personnel to Macedonia in
support of ongoing operations including Combat Search and
Rescue (CSAR), intelligence support, surveillance and
reconnaissance, command and control, and logistical support,
and selected forces and equipment to deter Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) attacks on NATO personnel in Macedonia. In
addition, it may become advisable to send U.S. military
personnel to Macedonia as part of an enabling force in
anticipation of the possible signing of a peace agreement,
which remains our ultimate objective. These forces could
include (besides those U.S. forces attached to the ARRC HQ),
logistical support and survey elements and liaison officers,
CSAR, intelligence support, surveillance and reconnaissance,
command and control, as well as U.S. forces conducting
rotational training at facilities in Macedonia. Their presence
would not commit the United States to participating in a
possible NATO-led peace implementation force; but prudent and
limited preparatory activities in Macedonia would enhance the
effectiveness of such a force, should we decide to participate,
as well as enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign and
protection of the U.S. forces in TFAS that are already there.
In regard to the elements of section 8115(a) (1)-(8), I am
providing the following information:
1 & 2. National Security Interests. I hereby certify that
the deployment of additional personnel to Macedonia as
described above is necessary in the national security interests
of the United States. These actions will preserve and protect
critical infrastructure and Camp Able Sentry facilities, and
will enhance the effectiveness of NATO's air campaign by
ensuring U.S. forces are fully integrated into the ARRC HQ
command and control structure; improving CSAR, reconnaissance
and surveillance, and other capabilities to support the air
operations by enhancing force protection from U.S. and other
NATO personnel in Macedonia by helping deter attacks on
Macedonia and NATO forces there, and by strengthening U.S.
leadership in NATO.
3. Numbers. The number of U.S. personnel who will assume
their functions in the ARRC HQ is approximately 30. At this
point, no decisions have been made on numbers of personnel who
would be deployed for other functions. I will ensure that the
Congress is informed in a timely manner about such additional
deployments described in this report if these prove necessary.
If U.S. personnel were sent as part of an enabling force, the
number would likely not exceed 2,000.
4. Mission/Objectives. The overall objective of our efforts
with our allies is to maintain stability in the region and
prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from the ongoing FRY
offensive against the people of Kosovo. The specific military
mission of the forces to be deployed would be to enhance force
protection both for NATO (including U.S. formerUNPREDEP)
military personnel in Macedonia and for allied fliers participating in
the air operations, to contribute to the effectiveness of those
operations, and to help deter FRY attacks on Macedonia and on NATO
(including U.S.) forces in Macedonia. In addition, these forces will
likely assist in preparations necessary for a NATO-led implementation
force to be effective, if a decision were made to deploy one, after an
agreement was reached.
5. Schedule. At this point, it is not possible to determine
how long NATO air operations will need to continue, and
therefore how long the support and deterrence functions will
need to be maintained. However, it is important to be clear
that it is the U.S. position, shared by our allies, that NATO
will continue air operations as long as necessary to meet the
military objectives to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's
purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative
of reversing course; to deter an even bloodier offensive
against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, to
seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the
people of Kosovo.
6. Exit Strategy. The duration of the requirement for U.S.
military presence in Macedonia will depend on the course of
events, and in particular, on Belgrade's reaction to the air
operations. So long as air operations continue, force
protection, support for those operations, and deterrence from
possible FRY acts of violence will continue to be required.
7. Costs. The costs of the deployments covered by this
notice like other costs of the air operations will be paid
initially from FY99 Defense O&M appropriations. An estimate of
likely costs for these limited deployments is being prepared,
and I will ensure that it is provided to the Congress as soon
as it is available.
8. Effect on Morale, Retention and Readiness. In the first
instance, these deployments will have a positive effect on
morale, retention and readiness because they will demonstrate
the commitment of the necessary resources to maximize force
protection for our personnel engaged in the air operations.
United States forces participating in Task Force Able Sentry,
as well as U.S. forces deployed to other locations in the
region, are dedicated professionals serving with great pride
and enthusiasm. Given the importance of the mission in
Macedonia, we anticipate that U.S. forces would maintain the
highest morale and effectiveness, just as they have in respect
to other missions in the Balkans. Indeed, it has been our
experience that personnel serving in these important and
demanding positions experience higher retention rates than in
other, less challenging assignments. However, we recognize that
even deployments for the best of reasons increase the period of
separation from family and add other burdens to military
service. The Department of Defense has underway extensive and
effective programs to do what is necessary to manage personnel
and other resources so as to reduce these problems. As with any
operational deployment, the effects on readiness for other
operations are mixed. On the one hand, the personnel involved
gain invaluable real world experience. On the other hand,
normal training programs are interrupted. The numbers of
personnel covered by this report are sufficiently limited,
however, that any effect on the overall readiness of our U.S.
Armed Services to meet other requirements, including major
theater war contingencies, will be marginal.
Finally, in accordance with sections 8115(b)(2) and (c), I
have determined that it is necessary to order a Marine FAST
team to Skopje, Macedonia, to protect our Embassy and U.S.
persons at the Embassy. This team will remain deployed for as
long as is necessary to protect our Embassy and U.S. persons.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.