[House Document 106-34]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-34
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IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
__________
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L.
102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)
March 4, 1999.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011 WASHINGTON : 1999
The White House,
Washington, March 3, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). My last report, consistent with Public
Law 102-1, was transmitted on December 18, 1998.
overview
As stated in my December 18 report, on December 16, United
States and British forces launched military strikes on Iraq
(Operation Desert Fox) to degrade Iraq's capacity to develop
and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to degrade
its ability to threaten its neighbors. The decision to use
force was made after U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) Executive
Chairman Richard Butler reported to the U.N. Secretary General
on December 14, that Iraq was not cooperating fully with the
Commission and that it was ``not able to conduct the
substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security
Council.''
The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when
the Iraqi government suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except on a limited-
range of monitoring activities. On October 31, Iraq announced
that it was ceasing all cooperation with UNSCOM. In response to
this decision, the Security Council on November 5 unanimously
adopted Resolution 1205, which condemned Iraq's decision as a
``flagrant violation'' of the Gulf War cease-fire Resolution
687 and other relevant resolutions. Resolution 1205 also
demanded that Iraq immediately rescind both its October 31
decision and its decision of August 5. This came after the
passage on March 3, 1998, of Resolution 1154, warning Iraq that
the ``severest consequences'' would result from Iraq's failure
to cooperate with the implementation of Resolution 687.
Iraq ignored the Security Council's demands until November
14, when U.S. and British forces prepared to launch air strikes
on Iraq. Baghdad initially tried to impose unacceptable
conditions on its offer of resumption of cooperation; however,
the United States and Great Britain insisted on strict
compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.
Subsequently, Iraq agreed in writing in letters to the U.N.
Secretary General to rescind its August 5 and October 31
decisions and to resume full cooperation with UNSCOM and the
IAEA in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Iraq
informed the Security Council on November 14 that it was the
``clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi government to
resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.''
On November 15, the Security Council issued a statement in
which it stressed that Iraq's commitment ``needs to be
established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the
Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of
their activities provided for in their mandates.''
UNSCOM and the IAEA resumed their full range of activities
on November 17, but Iraq repeatedly violated its commitment of
cooperation. As Chairman Butler's report of December 14
details, Iraq has, over the course of the last 8 years, refused
to provide the key documents and critical explanations about
its prohibited weapons programs in response to UNSCOM's
outstanding requests. It refused to allow removal of missile
engine components, denied access to missile test data,
restricted photography of bombs, and endangered the safety of
inspectors by aggressively maneuvering a helicopter near them.
Iraq failed to provide requested access to archives and
effectively blocked UNSCOM from visiting a site on November 25.
On December 4 and again on December 11, Iraq further
restricted UNSCOM's activities by asserting that certain teams
could not inspect on Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, despite 7
years of doing so and the fact that other inspection teams'
activities were not restricted on Fridays. Iraq blocked access
to offices of the ruling Ba'ath Party on December 9, which
UNSCOM held ``solid evidence'' contained prohibited materials.
Iraq routinely removed documents from facilities prior to
inspection, and initiated new forms of restrictions on UNSCOM's
work. We also have information that Iraq ordered the military
to destroy WMD-related documents in anticipation of the UNSCOM
inspections.
Iraq's actions were a material breach of the Gulf War
cease-fire resolution (UNSC Resolution 687), the February 23,
1998, Annan-Aziz Memorandum of Understanding, and Iraq's
November 14 commitment to the Security Council. The threat to
the region posed by Iraq's refusal to cooperate unconditionally
with UNSCOM, and the consequent inability of UNSCOM to carry
out the responsibilities the Security Council entrusted to it,
could not be tolerated. These circumstances led the United
States and the United Kingdom to use military force to degrade
Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors through the
development of WMD and long-range delivery systems. During
Desert Fox, key WMD sites and the facilities of the
organizations that conceal them, as well as important missile
repair facilities and surface-to-air missile sites, were
attacked. Operation Desert Fox degraded Saddam's ability to
threaten his neighbors militarily.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq on December
15 when Chairman Butler reported that inspectors were not able
to conduct the substantive disarmament work required of UNSCOM
by the Security Council. The United States continues to support
UNSCOM and the IAEA as the agreed mechanisms for Iraq to
demonstrate its compliance with UNSC resolutions concerning
disarmament.
Since December 18, the Security Council has discussed next
steps on Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish three
assessment panels to address disarmament issues, humanitarian
issues, and Kuwait-related issues. The panels, under the
chairmanship of the Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations,
are due to complete their reviews by April 15.
The United States also continues to support the
international community's efforts to provide for the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the ``oil-for-
food'' program. On November 24, 1998, the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1210 establishing a new 6-month
phase (phase five) of the oil-for-food program (phase four
ended November 25). In January, the United States announced its
support for lifting the ceiling on oil sales under the oil-for-
food program so that Iraqi civilian humanitarian needs can
better be met.
As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he represents a
threat to the well-being of his people, the peace of the
region, and the security of the world. We will continue to
contain the threat he poses, but over the long term the best
way to address that threat is through a new government in
Baghdad. To that end, we--working with the Congress--are
deepening our engagement with the forces for change in Iraq to
help make the opposition a more effective voice for the
aspirations of the Iraqi people. Our efforts are discussed in
more detail below.
u.s. and coalition force levels in the gulf region
Saddam's record of aggressive behavior compels us to retain
a highly capable force in the region in order to deter Iraq and
deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the
reconstitution of its WMD program, or movement against the
Kurds in northern Iraq. We demonstrated our resolve in mid-
December when forces in the region carried out Operation Desert
Fox to degrade Iraq's ability to develop and deliver weapons of
mass destruction and its ability to threaten its neighbors. We
will continue to maintain a robust posture and have established
a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our forces in
the Gulf, if needed.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine Expeditionary unit, a
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force,
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of
U.S. Central Command. To enhance force protection throughout
the region, additional military security personnel are also
deployed. Because of the increased air-defense threat to
coalition aircraft, we have also added a robust personnel
recovery capability.
operation northern watch and operation southern watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. Since December 23,
following the conclusion of Desert Fox, we have seen a
significant increase in the frequency, intensity, and
coordination of the Iraqi air defense system to counter
enforcement of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U.S. and
coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject
to multiple anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firings, radar
illuminations, and over 20 surface-to-air missile attacks.
Subsequent to Desert Fox, Iraq significantly increased its air
defense presence in both the north and south, but it has since
returned to pre-Desert Fox levels. Despite the decrease,
however, Iraq has not ceased threatening coalition aircraft.
In response to Iraq's increased and repeated no-fly zone
violations, and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense's
advice, our aircrews have been authorized by me to respond to
the increased Iraqi threat. United States and coalition forces
can defend themselves against any Iraqi threat in carrying out
their no-fly zone enforcement mission. On over 50 occasions
since December, U.S. and coalition forces have engaged the
Iraqi integrated air defense system. As a consequence, the
Iraqi air defense system has been degraded substantially
further since December.
the maritime interception force
The Multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF),
operating in accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant
resolutions, enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy
is the single largest component of the MIF, but it is
frequently augmented by ships, aircraft, and other support from
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Kuwait, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide logistical support and
shipriders to the MIF and accept vessels diverted for violating
U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful
providing significant naval and coast guard assistance.
Additionally, they accepted over 15 diverted sanctions
violators.
Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise
most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a
growing number of ships smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in
violation of U.N. sanctions and outside the parameters of the
humanitarian oil-for-food program. In early December, the MIF
conducted the latest in a series of periodic surge operations
in the far northern Gulf near the major Iraqi waterways. These
operations disrupted smuggling in the region. Kuwait and the
UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts. Although
partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra
refinery inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact
on Iraq's gas and oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile
batteries to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The
missiles in question, with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles,
could reach far into the North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious
threat to the MIF. The deployment of these missiles to a
position from which they could engage coalition naval forces
was carried out in concert with the increased attempts to shoot
down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones and constituted an
enhancement of Iraq's military capability in southern Iraq.
Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the threat
posed by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so
as necessary.
chemical weapons
After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional
cooperation with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the
Iraqi promise. In a November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny
that it ever weaponized VX nerve agent or produced stabilized
VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated confidencein the Edgewood
Arsenal Laboratory finding of stabilized VX components in fragments of
Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Iraq alleges that the presence of VX was a
deliberate act of tampering with the samples examined in the United
States.
On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM
efforts to determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled
with mustard chemical agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with
such an effort when logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to
cooperate in verifying the tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and
in determining the precise locations of pits that had been used
for the field storage of special warheads at Fallujah Forest
and the Tigris Canal.
On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to
provide various documents Chairman Butler requested pertaining
to Iraq's chemical weapons program. Included in this request
was the Iraqi Air Force file of documents found previously by
UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical weapons expended during
the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the file
indicates that Iraq's official declarations to UNSCOM have
greatly overstated the quantities of chemical weapons expended,
which means that at least 6,000 chemical weapons are
unaccounted.
In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons
disarmament issues: VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air
Force file of chemical weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled
with CBW (field inspections needed); and chemical weapons
production equipment (field verification is needed for 18 of 20
shipping containers UNSCOM knows were moved together). On
monitoring, the report identified as priorities the ability to
verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to detect
construction of new dual-use facilities.
biological weapons
Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for
UNSCOM tests that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD
missile warheads. Iraq has been claiming since 1995 that it put
anthrax in only five such warheads, and had previously denied
weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's explanations to date are far
from satisfactory, although it now acknowledges putting both
anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number of warheads.
Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program--including SCUD
missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled
with BW, spray devices for BW, production of BW agents
(anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut),
and BW agent growth media--remains the ``black hole'' described
by Chairman Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to provide a
credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its BW
agents.
During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an
undeclared Class II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses
were discovered; these items are subject to declarations by
Iraq and biological monitoring.
On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler again asked Iraq's
Deputy Prime Minister for information concerning Iraq's
biological weapons programs. Iraq has supplied none of the
information requested.
In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security
Council President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological
weapons disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on
``the whole scope of the BW program.'' The declarations are
important because ``Iraq possesses an industrial capability and
knowledge base, through which biological warfare agents could
be produced quickly and in volume.'' The report also identified
the importance of monitoring dual-use biological items,
equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at 250 listed
sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is ``proportional to
Iraq's cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored
sites, and to the number of inspectors.''
long-range missiles
Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further
its system for concealment of longer range missiles and their
components, (2) refusing to provide credible evidence of its
disposition of large quantities of the unique fuel required for
the long-range SCUD missile, and (3) continuing to test
modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air missile components
appear intended to enhance Iraq's capability to produce a
surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted
range of 150 km.
While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 and 819
imported Soviet-made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give
UNSCOM a credible accounting of the indigenous program that
produced complete SCUD missiles that were both successfully
test-flown and delivered to the Iraqi Army.
In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security
Council President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority
missile disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional
warheads; 500 tons of SCUD propellants, the destruction of
which has not been verified; 7 Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to
the army, the destruction of which cannot be verified;
truckloads of major components for SCUD production that are
missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the lack of
accounting for VX-filled warheads. The report identified as
priorities the capability to monitor declared activities, leaps
in missile technology, and changes to declared operational
missiles. There are 80 listed missile sites.
Nuclear Weapons
After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of
non-cooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the
Iraqi pledge of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General
Mohammed El-Baradei's December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation
stated: ``The Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary
level of cooperation to enable the above-enumerated activities
[ongoing monitoring] to be completed efficiently and
effectively.'' In its 6-month report to the Security Council on
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a ``technically
coherent'' view of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that time, the
IAEA also stated its remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear
program can be dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and
verification (OMV) effort. In the IAEA's February 8 report to
the U.N. Security Council it reiterated this position.
Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in
response to the Security Council's May 14 Presidential
Statement. This statement noted that the IAEA continues to have
questions and concerns regarding foreign assistance,
abandonment of the program, and the extent of Iraqi progress in
weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal legislation
prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to Resolution
687.
In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council
President, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized
previous IAEA assessments of Iraq's compliance with its nuclear
disarmament and monitoring obligations. The report restates
that ``Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures
and enact penal laws, to implement and enforce compliance with
Iraq's obligations under Resolutions 687 and 707, other
relevant Security Council resolutions and the IAEA OMV plan, as
required under paragraph 34 of that plan.'' The IAEA states
that the three areas where questions on Iraq's nuclear
disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation, lack of
information on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine
nuclear weapons program, and lack of information on Iraq's
abandonment of its nuclear weapons program) would not prevent
the full implementation of its OMV plan.
The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and
verification under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report,
the IAEA restated that monitoring must be ``intrusive'' and
estimated annual monitoring costs would total nearly $10
million.
Dual-Use Imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must
notify the unit before it imports specific items that can be
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is
no monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has
presented new challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and
is taken into consideration in the approval process.
The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program
We continue to support the international community's
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the oil-for-food program. Transition from phase
four to phase five (authorized by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four, Iraq is again
authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180
days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was
only able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of
oil during phase four. Since the first deliveries under oil-
for-food began in March 1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and
over $497 million worth of medicine and health supplies have
been delivered to Iraq.
As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food
program, contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth
of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people have been presented
to the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program for review by the
Sanctions Committee; of these, contracts worth over $1.6
billion have been approved; most of the remaining contracts are
being processed by the Office of the Iraq Program. As of
February 4, the United States had approved 584 contracts in
phase four and had placed 28 on hold pending clarification of
questions about the proposed contracts.
With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and
equipment to increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333
contracts with a total value of nearly $178 million have been
approved; 94 contracts are on hold. In January, the United
States released a number of holds on oil spare parts contracts.
Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase four of the oil-
for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment to
increase Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available
humanitarian funding. The United States had requested holds on
contracts that did not directly boost oil exports. As the
current phase of oil-for-food again sets aside $300 million for
this purpose, the United States decided to remove holds on
lower priority contracts.
The Security Council met in January to discuss the
humanitarian situation in Iraq. The United States supported an
examination of the current situation and exploration of ways to
improve the humanitarian situation, particularly with regard to
vulnerable groups such as children under age five, and pregnant
and nursing women. The United States has expressed its support
for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil exports under the oil-for-food
program, and has suggested some streamlining of approval of
food and medicine contracts in the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's
obligations regarding Kuwait. The panels are expected to
complete their work by the middle of April.
Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program
for northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations
in consultation with the local population. This program, which
the United States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent
of the funds generated under the oil-for-food program. The
separate northern program was established because of the
Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian needs of
the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern
Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of
repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does
not exercise control, the oil-for-food program has been able to
operate relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are
setting aside their differences to work together so that
Resolution 1210 is implemented as efficiently as possible.
The United Nations is required to monitor carefully
implementation of all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The
current phase marked by Resolution 1210 anticipates
infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil export capacity,
generation of electricity, and water purification. The U.N.
monitoring regime is presented with increasing challenges, as
UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
Humanitarin programs such as oil-for-food have steadily
improved the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions
(who for example, now receives a ration basket providing over
2,000 calories per day, a significant improvement in nutrition
since the program began) while denying Saddam Hussein control
over oil revenues. We will continue to work with the U.N.
Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs
of the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or
economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.
northern iraq: Kurdish reconciliation
Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary Albright
in September, Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman of the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have met three times to
continue their work towards full reconciliation. Both parties
have condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain from
violence in settling their differences, and resolved to
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for
Iraq's borders. Our deep concern for the safety, security, and
economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others
who have been subject to brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime
remains a primary focus of our Iraq policy.
On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United
Kingdom joined us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative
achievement of Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states
reiterated the importance of preserving the unity and
territorial integrity of Iraq and noted, with pleasure, the
prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this principle. We
also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny
sanctuary to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to eliminate all
PKK bases from the region, and to safeguard the Turkish border.
The parties believe that key decisions on Iraq's future should
be made by all the Iraqi people together at the appropriate
time and in a regular political process. Their work to achieve
the principles embodied in the Ankara Statements are thus meant
to implement a framework of regional administration until a
united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq is achieved.
On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S.,
U.K., or Turkish interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq.
They reiterated their determination to implement the September
agreement, made concrete progress on key issues of revenue
sharing and closing down PKK bases, and agreed to stay in close
contact.
The United States is committed to ensuring that
international aid continues to reach the north, that the human
rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as
the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and
that the no-fly-zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is
observed. The United States will decide how and when to respond
should Baghad's actions pose an increased threat to Iraq's
neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S. interests, and
to the Iraqi people, including those in the north.
the human rights situation in iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be
a cause for grave concern. As I reported November 5, the Iraqi
army has stepped up repressive operations against the Shia in
the south. In mid-November, we received unconfirmed reports
from the Iraqi opposition that 150 persons had been executed at
Amara, with three bodies left hanging on the city's main bridge
over the Tigris River as a warning to those who oppose the
regime. An additional 172 persons, some detained since 1991,
were reported to have been summarily executed in Abu Gharaib
and Radwaniya prisons; as in prior waves of summary prison
killings, bodies showing clear signs of torture were reportedly
returned to their families. Reports reached us in December that
a mass grave containing at least 25 bodies was found near the
Khoraisan River in Diyala province, east of Baghdad.
The Iraqi government continues to work toward the
destruction of the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
ecology of the southern marshes. In the past 2 months, 7 more
villages were reportedly destroyed on the margins of the
marshes, with irrigation water cut off and the vegetation cut
down and burned. Those who could not flee to the interior of
the marshes--particularly the old, infirm, women, and
children--were said to have been taken hostage by regime
forces.
On February 19, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr
was murdered in Iraq along with several of his relatives.
Opposition sources indicate this murder was the work of the
Saddam regime. The regime also violently suppressed
demonstrations that followed in Baghdad and other cities
opposing the murder.
In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the
government continues the forced expulsion of ethnic Kurds and
Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. In recent months,
hundreds of families have reportedly been expelled from Kirkuk
with seven new Arab settlements created on land seized from the
Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-controlled areas where the
displaced persons are received indicate that they are forced to
leave behind almost all of their personal property. Due to a
shortage of housing, they are still living in temporary
shelters.
A conference of the research and treatment of victims of
chemical and biological weapons attacks in northern Iraq,
organized by the Washington Kurdish Institute and sponsored by
the Department of State was held on November 18-19, 1998. The
conference focused on the long-range effects of the Iraqi
chemical attack on the village of Halabja, where nearly 5,000
persons were killed in 1988. According to panelists, the
hideous combination of mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, tear gas,
and possibly aflatoxin that the Iraqi military used in the
attack has resulted in dramatically increased rates of cancer,
respiratory problems, heart failures, infertility,
miscarriages, and possibly genetic damage in the surviving
population.
On December 1, the London-based INDICT organization
announced that 12 senior Iraqi officials--including Saddam
Hussein, his sons Uday and Qusay, his half-brother Barzan al-
Tikriti, Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz--would be the focus if its campaign for
prosecution by an international tribunal.
The Iraqi government continues to stall and obfuscate
attempts to account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait, despite a
Security Council resolution requiring it to do so. Baghdad
still refuses to allow independent human rights monitors to
enter Iraq, despite repeated requests by the U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission has issued a strong condemnation of the ``all-
pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government.
the iraqi opposition
We are deepening our engagement with the forces of change
in Iraq, helping Iraqis inside and outside Iraq become a more
effective voice for the aspirations of the people. We will work
toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its
people--a government prepared to live in peace with its
neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its
citizens, rather than represses them. On October 31, I signed
into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It provides
significant new discretionary authorities to assist the
opposition in its struggle against the regime. On January 19, I
submitted tothe Congress a notification of my intent to
designate certain groups under the Act; I designated those groups on
February 4. The assessment of additional groups that may qualify for
assistance under the Act is progressing. Also on October 31, Radio Free
Iraq began operations. It broadcasters are being heard in Iraq and its
message profoundly displeases the regime.
On November 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, met with 17 London-based
representatives of the Iraqi opposition. He heard the full
range of views of the parties present, and outlined the new
U.S. policy toward the opposition. Indyk urged them to work
together toward the common purpose of a new government in
Baghdad; the United States will help, but the opposition itself
must take the lead. He urged them to do all they could to get a
message to the people of Iraq that there is an alternative to
Saddam Hussein, adding that the United States will support the
campaign to indict Saddam as a war criminal.
Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi outlined a
number of agreed points to Indyk. The group: (1) welcomed the
new U.S. policy toward the opposition; (2) will work to create
a democratic government in Iraq; (3) will redouble efforts to
get all groups to work together; (4) wants the opposition to
serve as an interlocutor for the Iraqi people with the
international community; and (5) expressed thanks for the U.S.
role in the recent Kurdish reconciliation.
On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the
appointment of Frank Ricciardone as Special Representative for
Transition in Iraq (SRTI). We will abbreviate his current tour
as Deputy Chief of Mission on Ankara, and take up his new
responsibilities in early March. He traveled with the Secretary
of State to London, Riyadh, and Cairo in later January to
discuss U.S. policy on this issue. He outlined U.S. intentions
to help Iraq resume its rightful place in the region--a goal
the United States believes can only be achieved under new Iraqi
leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis--who
alone can make this happen--inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as
well as with Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives.
There are, of course, other important elements of U.S.
policy. These include the maintenance of Security Council
support for efforts to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and
missile programs, and economic sanctions that continue to deny
the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to
international peace and security. United States support for the
Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be
attuned to what Iraqis can effectively make use of as it
develops over time.
the united nations compensation commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC),
established pursuant to Resolutions 687, 692, and 1210,
continues to resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued
over 1.3 million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty
percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by
Security Council resolutions have been allocated to the
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operation of the
UNCC. Pursuant to decisions of the UNCC Governing Council,
certain small claims are to receive initial payments of $2,500
toward the amounts approved on those claims before large claims
of individuals and claims of corporations and governments may
share in the funds available for claims payments. As money from
Iraqi oil sales is deposited in the Compensation Fund the UNCC
makes these initial $2,500 payments on eligible claims in the
order in which those claims were approved by the UNCC. To date,
the United States Government has received funds from the UNCC
for initial installment payments on approximately 1,435 claims
of U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all
of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member. I
appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and
shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.