[House Document 106-34]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-34
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           IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)




 March 4, 1999.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed

                               --------

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE                    
69-011                     WASHINGTON : 1999




                                           The White House,
                                         Washington, March 3, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). My last report, consistent with Public 
Law 102-1, was transmitted on December 18, 1998.


                                overview


    As stated in my December 18 report, on December 16, United 
States and British forces launched military strikes on Iraq 
(Operation Desert Fox) to degrade Iraq's capacity to develop 
and deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to degrade 
its ability to threaten its neighbors. The decision to use 
force was made after U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) Executive 
Chairman Richard Butler reported to the U.N. Secretary General 
on December 14, that Iraq was not cooperating fully with the 
Commission and that it was ``not able to conduct the 
substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security 
Council.''
    The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when 
the Iraqi government suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except on a limited-
range of monitoring activities. On October 31, Iraq announced 
that it was ceasing all cooperation with UNSCOM. In response to 
this decision, the Security Council on November 5 unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1205, which condemned Iraq's decision as a 
``flagrant violation'' of the Gulf War cease-fire Resolution 
687 and other relevant resolutions. Resolution 1205 also 
demanded that Iraq immediately rescind both its October 31 
decision and its decision of August 5. This came after the 
passage on March 3, 1998, of Resolution 1154, warning Iraq that 
the ``severest consequences'' would result from Iraq's failure 
to cooperate with the implementation of Resolution 687.
    Iraq ignored the Security Council's demands until November 
14, when U.S. and British forces prepared to launch air strikes 
on Iraq. Baghdad initially tried to impose unacceptable 
conditions on its offer of resumption of cooperation; however, 
the United States and Great Britain insisted on strict 
compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions. 
Subsequently, Iraq agreed in writing in letters to the U.N. 
Secretary General to rescind its August 5 and October 31 
decisions and to resume full cooperation with UNSCOM and the 
IAEA in accordance with Security Council resolutions. Iraq 
informed the Security Council on November 14 that it was the 
``clear and unconditional decision of the Iraqi government to 
resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.''
    On November 15, the Security Council issued a statement in 
which it stressed that Iraq's commitment ``needs to be 
established by unconditional and sustained cooperation with the 
Special Commission and the IAEA in exercising the full range of 
their activities provided for in their mandates.''
    UNSCOM and the IAEA resumed their full range of activities 
on November 17, but Iraq repeatedly violated its commitment of 
cooperation. As Chairman Butler's report of December 14 
details, Iraq has, over the course of the last 8 years, refused 
to provide the key documents and critical explanations about 
its prohibited weapons programs in response to UNSCOM's 
outstanding requests. It refused to allow removal of missile 
engine components, denied access to missile test data, 
restricted photography of bombs, and endangered the safety of 
inspectors by aggressively maneuvering a helicopter near them. 
Iraq failed to provide requested access to archives and 
effectively blocked UNSCOM from visiting a site on November 25.
    On December 4 and again on December 11, Iraq further 
restricted UNSCOM's activities by asserting that certain teams 
could not inspect on Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, despite 7 
years of doing so and the fact that other inspection teams' 
activities were not restricted on Fridays. Iraq blocked access 
to offices of the ruling Ba'ath Party on December 9, which 
UNSCOM held ``solid evidence'' contained prohibited materials. 
Iraq routinely removed documents from facilities prior to 
inspection, and initiated new forms of restrictions on UNSCOM's 
work. We also have information that Iraq ordered the military 
to destroy WMD-related documents in anticipation of the UNSCOM 
inspections.
    Iraq's actions were a material breach of the Gulf War 
cease-fire resolution (UNSC Resolution 687), the February 23, 
1998, Annan-Aziz Memorandum of Understanding, and Iraq's 
November 14 commitment to the Security Council. The threat to 
the region posed by Iraq's refusal to cooperate unconditionally 
with UNSCOM, and the consequent inability of UNSCOM to carry 
out the responsibilities the Security Council entrusted to it, 
could not be tolerated. These circumstances led the United 
States and the United Kingdom to use military force to degrade 
Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors through the 
development of WMD and long-range delivery systems. During 
Desert Fox, key WMD sites and the facilities of the 
organizations that conceal them, as well as important missile 
repair facilities and surface-to-air missile sites, were 
attacked. Operation Desert Fox degraded Saddam's ability to 
threaten his neighbors militarily.
    UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq on December 
15 when Chairman Butler reported that inspectors were not able 
to conduct the substantive disarmament work required of UNSCOM 
by the Security Council. The United States continues to support 
UNSCOM and the IAEA as the agreed mechanisms for Iraq to 
demonstrate its compliance with UNSC resolutions concerning 
disarmament.
    Since December 18, the Security Council has discussed next 
steps on Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish three 
assessment panels to address disarmament issues, humanitarian 
issues, and Kuwait-related issues. The panels, under the 
chairmanship of the Brazilian Ambassador to the United Nations, 
are due to complete their reviews by April 15.
    The United States also continues to support the 
international community's efforts to provide for the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the ``oil-for-
food'' program. On November 24, 1998, the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1210 establishing a new 6-month 
phase (phase five) of the oil-for-food program (phase four 
ended November 25). In January, the United States announced its 
support for lifting the ceiling on oil sales under the oil-for-
food program so that Iraqi civilian humanitarian needs can 
better be met.
    As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he represents a 
threat to the well-being of his people, the peace of the 
region, and the security of the world. We will continue to 
contain the threat he poses, but over the long term the best 
way to address that threat is through a new government in 
Baghdad. To that end, we--working with the Congress--are 
deepening our engagement with the forces for change in Iraq to 
help make the opposition a more effective voice for the 
aspirations of the Iraqi people. Our efforts are discussed in 
more detail below.

           u.s. and coalition force levels in the gulf region

    Saddam's record of aggressive behavior compels us to retain 
a highly capable force in the region in order to deter Iraq and 
deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the 
reconstitution of its WMD program, or movement against the 
Kurds in northern Iraq. We demonstrated our resolve in mid-
December when forces in the region carried out Operation Desert 
Fox to degrade Iraq's ability to develop and deliver weapons of 
mass destruction and its ability to threaten its neighbors. We 
will continue to maintain a robust posture and have established 
a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our forces in 
the Gulf, if needed.
    Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based 
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine Expeditionary unit, a 
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, 
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of 
U.S. Central Command. To enhance force protection throughout 
the region, additional military security personnel are also 
deployed. Because of the increased air-defense threat to 
coalition aircraft, we have also added a robust personnel 
recovery capability.

         operation northern watch and operation southern watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to 
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern 
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. Since December 23, 
following the conclusion of Desert Fox, we have seen a 
significant increase in the frequency, intensity, and 
coordination of the Iraqi air defense system to counter 
enforcement of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U.S. and 
coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject 
to multiple anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firings, radar 
illuminations, and over 20 surface-to-air missile attacks. 
Subsequent to Desert Fox, Iraq significantly increased its air 
defense presence in both the north and south, but it has since 
returned to pre-Desert Fox levels. Despite the decrease, 
however, Iraq has not ceased threatening coalition aircraft.
    In response to Iraq's increased and repeated no-fly zone 
violations, and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense's 
advice, our aircrews have been authorized by me to respond to 
the increased Iraqi threat. United States and coalition forces 
can defend themselves against any Iraqi threat in carrying out 
their no-fly zone enforcement mission. On over 50 occasions 
since December, U.S. and coalition forces have engaged the 
Iraqi integrated air defense system. As a consequence, the 
Iraqi air defense system has been degraded substantially 
further since December.

                    the maritime interception force

    The Multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), 
operating in accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant 
resolutions, enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy 
is the single largest component of the MIF, but it is 
frequently augmented by ships, aircraft, and other support from 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Kuwait, The Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide logistical support and 
shipriders to the MIF and accept vessels diverted for violating 
U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful 
providing significant naval and coast guard assistance. 
Additionally, they accepted over 15 diverted sanctions 
violators.
    Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise 
most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a 
growing number of ships smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in 
violation of U.N. sanctions and outside the parameters of the 
humanitarian oil-for-food program. In early December, the MIF 
conducted the latest in a series of periodic surge operations 
in the far northern Gulf near the major Iraqi waterways. These 
operations disrupted smuggling in the region. Kuwait and the 
UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts. Although 
partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra 
refinery inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact 
on Iraq's gas and oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
    In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile 
batteries to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The 
missiles in question, with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles, 
could reach far into the North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious 
threat to the MIF. The deployment of these missiles to a 
position from which they could engage coalition naval forces 
was carried out in concert with the increased attempts to shoot 
down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones and constituted an 
enhancement of Iraq's military capability in southern Iraq. 
Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the threat 
posed by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so 
as necessary.

                            chemical weapons

    After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional 
cooperation with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the 
Iraqi promise. In a November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny 
that it ever weaponized VX nerve agent or produced stabilized 
VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated confidencein the Edgewood 
Arsenal Laboratory finding of stabilized VX components in fragments of 
Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Iraq alleges that the presence of VX was a 
deliberate act of tampering with the samples examined in the United 
States.
    On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM 
efforts to determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled 
with mustard chemical agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with 
such an effort when logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to 
cooperate in verifying the tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and 
in determining the precise locations of pits that had been used 
for the field storage of special warheads at Fallujah Forest 
and the Tigris Canal.
    On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to 
provide various documents Chairman Butler requested pertaining 
to Iraq's chemical weapons program. Included in this request 
was the Iraqi Air Force file of documents found previously by 
UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical weapons expended during 
the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the file 
indicates that Iraq's official declarations to UNSCOM have 
greatly overstated the quantities of chemical weapons expended, 
which means that at least 6,000 chemical weapons are 
unaccounted.
    In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons 
disarmament issues: VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air 
Force file of chemical weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled 
with CBW (field inspections needed); and chemical weapons 
production equipment (field verification is needed for 18 of 20 
shipping containers UNSCOM knows were moved together). On 
monitoring, the report identified as priorities the ability to 
verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to detect 
construction of new dual-use facilities.

                           biological weapons

    Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for 
UNSCOM tests that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD 
missile warheads. Iraq has been claiming since 1995 that it put 
anthrax in only five such warheads, and had previously denied 
weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's explanations to date are far 
from satisfactory, although it now acknowledges putting both 
anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number of warheads.
    Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program--including SCUD 
missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled 
with BW, spray devices for BW, production of BW agents 
(anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut), 
and BW agent growth media--remains the ``black hole'' described 
by Chairman Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to provide a 
credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its BW 
agents.
    During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an 
undeclared Class II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses 
were discovered; these items are subject to declarations by 
Iraq and biological monitoring.
    On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler again asked Iraq's 
Deputy Prime Minister for information concerning Iraq's 
biological weapons programs. Iraq has supplied none of the 
information requested.
    In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security 
Council President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological 
weapons disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on 
``the whole scope of the BW program.'' The declarations are 
important because ``Iraq possesses an industrial capability and 
knowledge base, through which biological warfare agents could 
be produced quickly and in volume.'' The report also identified 
the importance of monitoring dual-use biological items, 
equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at 250 listed 
sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is ``proportional to 
Iraq's cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored 
sites, and to the number of inspectors.''

                          long-range missiles

    Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further 
its system for concealment of longer range missiles and their 
components, (2) refusing to provide credible evidence of its 
disposition of large quantities of the unique fuel required for 
the long-range SCUD missile, and (3) continuing to test 
modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air missile components 
appear intended to enhance Iraq's capability to produce a 
surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted 
range of 150 km.
    While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 and 819 
imported Soviet-made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give 
UNSCOM a credible accounting of the indigenous program that 
produced complete SCUD missiles that were both successfully 
test-flown and delivered to the Iraqi Army.
    In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security 
Council President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority 
missile disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional 
warheads; 500 tons of SCUD propellants, the destruction of 
which has not been verified; 7 Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to 
the army, the destruction of which cannot be verified; 
truckloads of major components for SCUD production that are 
missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the lack of 
accounting for VX-filled warheads. The report identified as 
priorities the capability to monitor declared activities, leaps 
in missile technology, and changes to declared operational 
missiles. There are 80 listed missile sites.

                            Nuclear Weapons

    After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of 
non-cooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the 
Iraqi pledge of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General 
Mohammed El-Baradei's December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation 
stated: ``The Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary 
level of cooperation to enable the above-enumerated activities 
[ongoing monitoring] to be completed efficiently and 
effectively.'' In its 6-month report to the Security Council on 
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a ``technically 
coherent'' view of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that time, the 
IAEA also stated its remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear 
program can be dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and 
verification (OMV) effort. In the IAEA's February 8 report to 
the U.N. Security Council it reiterated this position.
    Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in 
response to the Security Council's May 14 Presidential 
Statement. This statement noted that the IAEA continues to have 
questions and concerns regarding foreign assistance, 
abandonment of the program, and the extent of Iraqi progress in 
weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal legislation 
prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to Resolution 
687.
    In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council 
President, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized 
previous IAEA assessments of Iraq's compliance with its nuclear 
disarmament and monitoring obligations. The report restates 
that ``Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures 
and enact penal laws, to implement and enforce compliance with 
Iraq's obligations under Resolutions 687 and 707, other 
relevant Security Council resolutions and the IAEA OMV plan, as 
required under paragraph 34 of that plan.'' The IAEA states 
that the three areas where questions on Iraq's nuclear 
disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation, lack of 
information on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine 
nuclear weapons program, and lack of information on Iraq's 
abandonment of its nuclear weapons program) would not prevent 
the full implementation of its OMV plan.
    The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and 
verification under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report, 
the IAEA restated that monitoring must be ``intrusive'' and 
estimated annual monitoring costs would total nearly $10 
million.

                            Dual-Use Imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to 
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must 
notify the unit before it imports specific items that can be 
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian 
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely 
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items. 
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is 
no monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has 
presented new challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and 
is taken into consideration in the approval process.

                  The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the oil-for-food program. Transition from phase 
four to phase five (authorized by U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four, Iraq is again 
authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180 
days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was 
only able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of 
oil during phase four. Since the first deliveries under oil-
for-food began in March 1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and 
over $497 million worth of medicine and health supplies have 
been delivered to Iraq.
    As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food 
program, contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth 
of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people have been presented 
to the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program for review by the 
Sanctions Committee; of these, contracts worth over $1.6 
billion have been approved; most of the remaining contracts are 
being processed by the Office of the Iraq Program. As of 
February 4, the United States had approved 584 contracts in 
phase four and had placed 28 on hold pending clarification of 
questions about the proposed contracts.
    With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and 
equipment to increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333 
contracts with a total value of nearly $178 million have been 
approved; 94 contracts are on hold. In January, the United 
States released a number of holds on oil spare parts contracts. 
Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase four of the oil-
for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment to 
increase Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available 
humanitarian funding. The United States had requested holds on 
contracts that did not directly boost oil exports. As the 
current phase of oil-for-food again sets aside $300 million for 
this purpose, the United States decided to remove holds on 
lower priority contracts.
    The Security Council met in January to discuss the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq. The United States supported an 
examination of the current situation and exploration of ways to 
improve the humanitarian situation, particularly with regard to 
vulnerable groups such as children under age five, and pregnant 
and nursing women. The United States has expressed its support 
for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil exports under the oil-for-food 
program, and has suggested some streamlining of approval of 
food and medicine contracts in the U.N. Sanctions Committee.
    Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi 
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's 
obligations regarding Kuwait. The panels are expected to 
complete their work by the middle of April.
    Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program 
for northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations 
in consultation with the local population. This program, which 
the United States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent 
of the funds generated under the oil-for-food program. The 
separate northern program was established because of the 
Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian needs of 
the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern 
Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of 
repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does 
not exercise control, the oil-for-food program has been able to 
operate relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are 
setting aside their differences to work together so that 
Resolution 1210 is implemented as efficiently as possible.
    The United Nations is required to monitor carefully 
implementation of all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The 
current phase marked by Resolution 1210 anticipates 
infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil export capacity, 
generation of electricity, and water purification. The U.N. 
monitoring regime is presented with increasing challenges, as 
UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
    Humanitarin programs such as oil-for-food have steadily 
improved the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions 
(who for example, now receives a ration basket providing over 
2,000 calories per day, a significant improvement in nutrition 
since the program began) while denying Saddam Hussein control 
over oil revenues. We will continue to work with the U.N. 
Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the 
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs 
of the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or 
economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

                 northern iraq: Kurdish reconciliation

    Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary Albright 
in September, Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman of the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have met three times to 
continue their work towards full reconciliation. Both parties 
have condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain from 
violence in settling their differences, and resolved to 
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for 
Iraq's borders. Our deep concern for the safety, security, and 
economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others 
who have been subject to brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime 
remains a primary focus of our Iraq policy.
    On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United 
Kingdom joined us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative 
achievement of Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states 
reiterated the importance of preserving the unity and 
territorial integrity of Iraq and noted, with pleasure, the 
prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this principle. We 
also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny 
sanctuary to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to eliminate all 
PKK bases from the region, and to safeguard the Turkish border. 
The parties believe that key decisions on Iraq's future should 
be made by all the Iraqi people together at the appropriate 
time and in a regular political process. Their work to achieve 
the principles embodied in the Ankara Statements are thus meant 
to implement a framework of regional administration until a 
united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq is achieved.
    On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S., 
U.K., or Turkish interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq. 
They reiterated their determination to implement the September 
agreement, made concrete progress on key issues of revenue 
sharing and closing down PKK bases, and agreed to stay in close 
contact.
    The United States is committed to ensuring that 
international aid continues to reach the north, that the human 
rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as 
the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and 
that the no-fly-zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is 
observed. The United States will decide how and when to respond 
should Baghad's actions pose an increased threat to Iraq's 
neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S. interests, and 
to the Iraqi people, including those in the north.

                   the human rights situation in iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
a cause for grave concern. As I reported November 5, the Iraqi 
army has stepped up repressive operations against the Shia in 
the south. In mid-November, we received unconfirmed reports 
from the Iraqi opposition that 150 persons had been executed at 
Amara, with three bodies left hanging on the city's main bridge 
over the Tigris River as a warning to those who oppose the 
regime. An additional 172 persons, some detained since 1991, 
were reported to have been summarily executed in Abu Gharaib 
and Radwaniya prisons; as in prior waves of summary prison 
killings, bodies showing clear signs of torture were reportedly 
returned to their families. Reports reached us in December that 
a mass grave containing at least 25 bodies was found near the 
Khoraisan River in Diyala province, east of Baghdad.
    The Iraqi government continues to work toward the 
destruction of the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique 
ecology of the southern marshes. In the past 2 months, 7 more 
villages were reportedly destroyed on the margins of the 
marshes, with irrigation water cut off and the vegetation cut 
down and burned. Those who could not flee to the interior of 
the marshes--particularly the old, infirm, women, and 
children--were said to have been taken hostage by regime 
forces.
    On February 19, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr 
was murdered in Iraq along with several of his relatives. 
Opposition sources indicate this murder was the work of the 
Saddam regime. The regime also violently suppressed 
demonstrations that followed in Baghdad and other cities 
opposing the murder.
    In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the 
government continues the forced expulsion of ethnic Kurds and 
Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. In recent months, 
hundreds of families have reportedly been expelled from Kirkuk 
with seven new Arab settlements created on land seized from the 
Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-controlled areas where the 
displaced persons are received indicate that they are forced to 
leave behind almost all of their personal property. Due to a 
shortage of housing, they are still living in temporary 
shelters.
    A conference of the research and treatment of victims of 
chemical and biological weapons attacks in northern Iraq, 
organized by the Washington Kurdish Institute and sponsored by 
the Department of State was held on November 18-19, 1998. The 
conference focused on the long-range effects of the Iraqi 
chemical attack on the village of Halabja, where nearly 5,000 
persons were killed in 1988. According to panelists, the 
hideous combination of mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, tear gas, 
and possibly aflatoxin that the Iraqi military used in the 
attack has resulted in dramatically increased rates of cancer, 
respiratory problems, heart failures, infertility, 
miscarriages, and possibly genetic damage in the surviving 
population.
    On December 1, the London-based INDICT organization 
announced that 12 senior Iraqi officials--including Saddam 
Hussein, his sons Uday and Qusay, his half-brother Barzan al-
Tikriti, Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan, and Deputy Prime 
Minister Tariq Aziz--would be the focus if its campaign for 
prosecution by an international tribunal.
    The Iraqi government continues to stall and obfuscate 
attempts to account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi 
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait, despite a 
Security Council resolution requiring it to do so. Baghdad 
still refuses to allow independent human rights monitors to 
enter Iraq, despite repeated requests by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel. The U.N. Human Rights 
Commission has issued a strong condemnation of the ``all-
pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government.

                          the iraqi opposition

    We are deepening our engagement with the forces of change 
in Iraq, helping Iraqis inside and outside Iraq become a more 
effective voice for the aspirations of the people. We will work 
toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its 
people--a government prepared to live in peace with its 
neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its 
citizens, rather than represses them. On October 31, I signed 
into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It provides 
significant new discretionary authorities to assist the 
opposition in its struggle against the regime. On January 19, I 
submitted tothe Congress a notification of my intent to 
designate certain groups under the Act; I designated those groups on 
February 4. The assessment of additional groups that may qualify for 
assistance under the Act is progressing. Also on October 31, Radio Free 
Iraq began operations. It broadcasters are being heard in Iraq and its 
message profoundly displeases the regime.
    On November 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, Martin Indyk, met with 17 London-based 
representatives of the Iraqi opposition. He heard the full 
range of views of the parties present, and outlined the new 
U.S. policy toward the opposition. Indyk urged them to work 
together toward the common purpose of a new government in 
Baghdad; the United States will help, but the opposition itself 
must take the lead. He urged them to do all they could to get a 
message to the people of Iraq that there is an alternative to 
Saddam Hussein, adding that the United States will support the 
campaign to indict Saddam as a war criminal.
    Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi outlined a 
number of agreed points to Indyk. The group: (1) welcomed the 
new U.S. policy toward the opposition; (2) will work to create 
a democratic government in Iraq; (3) will redouble efforts to 
get all groups to work together; (4) wants the opposition to 
serve as an interlocutor for the Iraqi people with the 
international community; and (5) expressed thanks for the U.S. 
role in the recent Kurdish reconciliation.
    On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the 
appointment of Frank Ricciardone as Special Representative for 
Transition in Iraq (SRTI). We will abbreviate his current tour 
as Deputy Chief of Mission on Ankara, and take up his new 
responsibilities in early March. He traveled with the Secretary 
of State to London, Riyadh, and Cairo in later January to 
discuss U.S. policy on this issue. He outlined U.S. intentions 
to help Iraq resume its rightful place in the region--a goal 
the United States believes can only be achieved under new Iraqi 
leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis--who 
alone can make this happen--inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as 
well as with Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives.
    There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. 
policy. These include the maintenance of Security Council 
support for efforts to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and 
missile programs, and economic sanctions that continue to deny 
the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to 
international peace and security. United States support for the 
Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those 
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be 
attuned to what Iraqis can effectively make use of as it 
develops over time.

               the united nations compensation commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to Resolutions 687, 692, and 1210, 
continues to resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's 
unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued 
over 1.3 million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty 
percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by 
Security Council resolutions have been allocated to the 
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operation of the 
UNCC. Pursuant to decisions of the UNCC Governing Council, 
certain small claims are to receive initial payments of $2,500 
toward the amounts approved on those claims before large claims 
of individuals and claims of corporations and governments may 
share in the funds available for claims payments. As money from 
Iraqi oil sales is deposited in the Compensation Fund the UNCC 
makes these initial $2,500 payments on eligible claims in the 
order in which those claims were approved by the UNCC. To date, 
the United States Government has received funds from the UNCC 
for initial installment payments on approximately 1,435 claims 
of U.S. claimants.

                               Conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all 
of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The 
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the 
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member. I 
appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and 
shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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