[House Document 106-311]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-311
CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS IS TO
CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 2000, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C.
1622(d).
November 14, 2000.--Referred to the Committee on International
Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-011 WASHINGTON : 2000
The White House,
Washington, November 9, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: On November 14, 1994, in light of the
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of
the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order
12938, declaring a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary
date of its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior
to each anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and
transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency
is to continue in effect. The proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery continues to pose an
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I am,
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14,
1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998;
and November 10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November
14, 2000. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency
declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the
period May 2000 through October 2000. Additional information on
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended
section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that the United States
Government could more effectively respond to the worldwide
threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities.
The amendment of section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in
several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of
proliferation activity that can subject entities to potential
penalties under the Executive Order. The original Executive
Order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts
of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire,
design, produce or stockpile chemical or biological weapons;
the amended Executive Order also covers contributions to
foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable
of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the
amendment expands the original Executive Order to include
attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as
well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of
potential penalties to include expressly the prohibition of
United States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the
prohibition of imports into the United States and United States
Government procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United
States Government greater flexibility in deciding how and to
what extent to impose measures against foreign persons that
assist proliferation programs.
nuclear weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of
nuclear tests that brought their nuclear weapon programs out in
the open, in defiance of decades of international efforts to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Since that time, they
have continued production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and have flight-tested ballistic nuclear-capable
missiles. World reaction to these developments included nearly
universal condemnation across a broad range of international
fora. The United States and a number of other countries
respectively imposed sanctions and other unilateral measures.
The G-8 agreed to new restrictions on lending by international
financial institutions.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions,
we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members,
with the South Asia Task Force, and through the United Nations
to urge India and Pakistan to move toward the international
nonproliferation mainstream.
We have supported calls by the P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security
Council on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete
actions designed to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear
arms and missile race, with possible implications beyond the
region. The United States has focused most intensely on several
objectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence by
India and Pakistan to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations on a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its conclusion, a
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the
development of nuclear-capable missiles, as well as their
nondeployment; and adoption of controls meeting international
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
Against a backdrop of international pressure on India and
Pakistan, intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and
Pakistan officials have yielded only modest progress,
principally on export controls. In September 1998, Indian and
Pakistani leaders, noting that their countries had already
declared testing moratoria, expressed to the U.N. General
Assembly a willingness to sign the CTBT by September 1999 under
certain conditions. Subsequent developments including the
Indian election, the Kargil conflict, the October coup in
Pakistan, and the U.S. Senate's vote against providing its
advice and consent to CTBT ratification further complicated the
issue during 1999, although neither country renounced its
commitment. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his
visit to Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain
its moratorium until CTBT entered into force. Both governments
have said they would work to build domestic consensus for CTBT
signature, without which they could not sign. Such consensus
has not been achieved and, consequently, neither country has
signed the CTBT thus far.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998
Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got
underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were
unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over the
negotiating mandate.
Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistani
export controls into closer conformity with international
standards. India recently instituted new, more specific
regulations on many categories of sensitive nonnuclear
equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-related
regulations will be forthcoming. Pakistan has publicly
announced regulations restricting nuclear exports and has
indicated that further measures are being prepared. However,
both countries' steps still fall well short of international
standards. We have begun with India a program of technical
cooperation designed to improve the effectiveness of its
already extensive export controls, and encourage further steps
to bring India's controls in line with international standards.
Similar assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related
sanctions.
The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999
military takeover in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the
Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions
remain high, particularly over insurgent attacks in Kashmir,
and there are no encouraging signs that talks will resume soon.
We have agreed to continue regular discussions with India
at the senior an expert levels, and will also remain engaged
with Pakistan, as appropriate. Our diplomatic efforts, in
concert with the P-5, G-8, and in international fora, will also
continue.
I discussed these issues with the Governments of India and
Pakistan during my trip there in March 2000 and with Prime
Minister Vajpayee when he came to Washington this September.
With India, we have stressed that our relationship will not be
able to reach its full potential without progress on our
nonproliferation and regional security concerns. With Pakistan,
we also emphasized the importance of progress on regional
security and nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.
In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an
Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately
result in the complete cessation of the DPRK's nuclear weapon-
related program and its full compliance with the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As a first step, North Korea froze
construction and operations at its Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear
facilities. The freeze remains in place, and to monitor the
freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
maintained a continuous presence at the Yongbyon site since
1994. The U.S. spent fuel team completed canning of the
accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments from the North's
5-megawatt nuclear reactor in April 2000. The IAEA has
confirmed that the remaining few rod fragments that are
currently inaccessible do not represent a proliferation
concern, and the Agency continues to monitor the canned fuel.
The U.S. spent-fuel team returned to the DPRK in October 2000
to continue clean-up and canning at Yongbyon, and to begin
looking at long-term maintenance.
Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at
Kumchang-ni led the United States to raise its concerns
directly with Pyongyang and to negotiate access to the site as
long as U.S. concerns remain. In May 1999, a Department of
State-led team of experts visited the site and judged it, as
then configured, not suited to house plutonium production
reactors or reprocessing operations. Based on the data gathered
by the U.S. team and the subsequent technical review, the
United States concluded that the activities were not a
violation of the Agreed Framework. A second Department of
State-led team conducted a visit in May 2000 and found no
evidence to contradict the 1999 assessment. In light of a final
review of these results, the joint communique issued following
the visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington
stated that ``U.S. concerns'' about the underground site at
Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.''
While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our
nonproliferation concerns, future negotiations with the North
will seek to discuss ways to allay all of them--in the context
of assuring full implementation of the Agreed Framework and
improving overall relations. In May and July 2000, the United
States and DPRK held rounds of talks concerning Agreed
Framework implementation and the DPRK's missile program,
respectively. Another round of talks, which included discussion
on terrorism issues, was held in New York from September 27 to
October 2 of this year. During the talks, the DPRK informed us
that DPRK Special Envoy Marshal Jo Myong Rok would visit
Washington from October 9 to 12, 2000. The joint communique
released at the end of that historic visit noted that both
countries ``are prepared to undertake a new direction in their
relations.'' Toward that end, the two stated that ``neither
government would have hostile intent toward the other.'' Both
sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and their efforts
to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under
the Agreed Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic
missile flight test moratorium, and agreed that ``there are a
variety of available means, including the Four Party talks, to
reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and formally end the
Korean war by replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with
permanent peace arrangements.''
The NPT is the cornerstone of the global nuclear
nonproliferation regime. In May 2000, NPT Parties met in New
York for the 2000 NPT Review Conference (REVCON). Despite
predictions to the contrary, the 158 participating nations
adopted by consensus a Final Document that reviews NPT
implementation over the past 5 years and establishes a program
of action for the future. This is the first NPT Review
Conference to achieve such a Final Document since 1985. The
Conference met or exceeded all U.S. objectives. It provided an
important boost to the NPT and to nuclear nonproliferation
goals in general.
The IAEA verifies states' compliance with their NPT
obligations by means of its safeguards system. The discovery at
the time of the Gulf War of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear
activities led to an international consensus in favor of
strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect
undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United States
and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in the mid-
1990's substantial safeguardsstrengthening measures, including
the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the classes
of nuclear activities states are required to declare, and expansion of
IAEA access rights. Measures requiring additional legal authority are
embodied in a Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol
has now been signed by 54 states and has entered into force for 14.
Provided the IAEA is given the resources and political support it needs
to implement its new safeguards measures effectively, proliferators
will now find it much harder to evade the system.
The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban
Treaty on September 24, 1996. As of early October 2000, 160
countries have signed and 65 have ratified the CTBT, including
30 of the 44 countries required by the Treaty for its entry
into force. During 2000, CTBT signatories conducted numerous
meetings of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and its
subsidiary bodies in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
completion of the International Monitoring System (MS)
established by the Treaty.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I
deeply regret the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to
refuse to provide its advice and consent to ratify the CTBT.
The CTBT will serve several United States national security
interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will
constrain the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons; make the development of advanced new types of
weapons much more difficult; contribute to the prevention of
nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament;
and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks
a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
and to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at
an appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty.
The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize
implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to
apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to nuclear
exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure
that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to nonnuclear
weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material. The Committee maintains and updates a list (the
``Trigger List'') of equipment that may only be exported if
safeguards are applied to the recipient facility. The relative
informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the
lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more
difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
At its March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the
Chairman's report of Committee activities to the 2000 NPT
REVCON. The Committee also agreed to continue consideration of
possible future adoption of the full-scope safeguards (FSS)
policy. The Committee also agreed to an informal meeting with
IAEA staff to discuss procedures for keeping the Agency
informed on Trigger List changes and the rationale for such
changes, since the Agency uses the Zangger Trigger list as a
reference document. A separate working group, chaired by
Sweden, is considering the addition of plutonium enrichment
equipment to the Trigger List.
During the past year, two new members have joined the
Zangger Committee--Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March
2000.
All of the nuclear weapon states, including China, are
members of the Zangger Committee. However, unlike all of the
other nuclear weapon states members of the Zangger Committee,
China is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
which requires its members to adhere to a FSS policy of
requiring nonnuclear weapon states to accept IAEA safeguards on
all of its nuclear facilities as a condition of supply to those
states. China has been reluctant to agree to this policy.
With 38 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted and
effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of
guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
Members pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the
Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through
exchanges of information on developments of nuclear
proliferation concern.
Turkey, Belarus, and Cyprus became the newest members of
the NSG in May 19, 2000. Slovenia was invited to participate as
an observer at the 2000 Paris Plenary and has applied for NSG
membership this year. NSG members often agree to allow
nonmember nations deemed eligible for NSG membership to
participate in Plenary meetings as observers. While not an NSG
member, China has taken a major step toward harmonization of
its export control system with the NSG part 2 Guidelines by the
implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use
equipment, material, and related technology.
In May 2000, the NSG Troika (composed of the past, present,
and future NSG Chairs--in this case Britain, Italy and France)
met with representatives of the Iranian Government to discuss
Iranian criticism of the NSG. The meeting of the Troika
followed upearlier meetings by the Italian Chair in Tehran and
on the margins of the 1999 NSG Transparency Seminar in New York. The
Troika urged Iran to sign the additional protocol with the IAEA that
strengthens safeguards. Iranian officials offered to provide additional
confidence building measures to facilitate nuclear exports from NSG
members. The United States, as the future plenary chair, intends to be
an active participant in all NSG Troika activities in the coming years,
though any involvement in Troika contracts with Iran will need to be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis prior to the meetings. The United
States does not believe that the ongoing discussions with Iran can or
should soften supplier attitudes.
During the Plenary meetings in Paris in June 2000, the
Czech Republic presented information on its new legislation
intended to halt all tangible and intangible supply to the
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in Iran. The Czech delegation
stated that the new legislation covers direct transfers to
Bushehr, as well as indirect support through a third party. The
Italian NSG Chair presented a report of NSG activities at the
2000 NPT Review Conference.
chemical and biological weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Expanded
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force
and continue to be administrated by the Department of Commerce,
in consultation with other agencies, in order to control the
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29,
1997, the convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States Signatories
as original States Parties, including the United States, which
ratified on April 25, 1997. Russia ratified the CWC on November
5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 8, 1997. As of
October 30, 2000, 140 countries will have become States
Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established on
April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague is comprised of
States parties and international civil servants that are
responsible for implementing the CWC. It consists of the
Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and
the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff
of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities
throughout the world. As of October 30, 2000, the OPCW has
conducted over 790 routine inspections in some 37 countries. No
challenge inspections have yet taken place. The OPCW maintains
a permanent inspector presence at operational U.S. CW
destruction facilities in Utah, on Johnston Island, and
elsewhere. Accordingly, approximately 70 percent of the
inspection days currently have been at U.S. declared
facilities.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs
and risks for states or other entities attempting to engage in
chemical weapons-related activities. Receiving accurate and
complete declarations from all States Parties will improve our
knowledge of possible chemical weapons-related activities. Its
inspection provisions provide for access by international
inspectors to declared and potentially undeclared facilities
and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons
production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more
expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
was enacted into U.S. law on October 21, 1998, as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). I issued
Executive Order 13128 on June 25, 1999, to facilitate
implementation of the Act and the Convention, and published
regulations on December 30, 1999, regarding declarations and
inspections of industrial facilities. The United States
commenced its submission of industry declarations at the end of
April 2000, and hosted its first industry inspection on May 8,
2000. Industry inspections are proceeding well. Our submission
of the industry declarations to the OPCW and commencement of
inspections, has strengthened U.S. leadership in the
organization as well as our ability to encourage other States
Parties to make complete, accurate, and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC have been isolated
politically and denied access by the CWC to certain key
chemicals from States Parties. The relevant treaty provisions
are specifically designed to penalize countries that refuse to
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of
chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play an active role in
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological
weapons (BW). We participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of
States Parties of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) andToxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The AHG is striving to complete
a legally binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention to promote
compliance and enhance transparency. This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by
the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review
Conference (November/December 1996) urged the AHG to complete the
protocol as soon as possible before the next BWC Review Conference in
2001. Work is progressing on a draft text through discussion of
national views and clarification of existing text. Differences in
national views persist concerning such substantive areas as on-site
activities, export controls, declarations, and technical assistance
provisions. The United States remains strongly committed to the
objective agreed to in the 1996 Review Conference, but will only accept
a protocol that enhances U.S. security and strengthens national and
international efforts to address the BW threat.
I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the
United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect
stronger international barriers against the proliferation and
use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international
means to detect and deter cheating. We are working closely with
industry representatives to obtain technical input relevant to
the development of U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach
international agreement on protocol provisions.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in
the 32-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological
weapons nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the
most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 2-5, 2000,
during which the Group reaffirmed the members' continued
collective belief in the AG's viability, importance, and
compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members continue to agree
that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments will
be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on chemical
and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national
activities support these goals. At the 2000 Plenary, the Group
welcomed its newest members, Cyprus and Turkey. At this year's
plenary, the regime continued to focus on strengthening and
refining AG export controls and sharing information to address
the CBW threat, especially from terrorism. The AG also
reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach
program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote
regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation
to further awareness and understanding of national policies in
these areas. The AG discussed ways to be more proactive in
stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC contexts.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine
intelligence and other information of trade in CBW-related
material and technology that might be relevant to sanctions
provisions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions
determinations were reached during this reporting period. The
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners
and other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation
concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues carefully to control exports
that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction, and closely to monitor activities of
potential missile proliferation concern. We also continue to
implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In April 2000, we
imposed sanctions against a North Korean entity and four
Iranian entities for missile proliferation activities. These
sanctions followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three
Middle Eastern entities.
During this reporting period, the 32 Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Partners (members) continued to share
information about proliferation problems with each other and
with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
use in missile programs of concern.
In March and September 2000, the United States participated
in two MTCR Reinforced Point of Contact Meetings (RPOC). At the
RPOCs, MTCR Partners continued their discussions on new ways to
better address the global missile proliferation threat. They
also undertook to develop a new multilateral mechanism on
missile nonproliferation. This mechanism is intended to
complement the important work of the MTCR and eventually to
include the participation of both MTCR and non-MTCR countries.
The MTCR Partners held their annual plenary meeting in
Helsinki, on October 9-13, 2000. The Partners took decisions
concerning the substance of a new multilateral mechanism on
missile nonproliferation and ways to take it forward. They also
discussed cooperation on halting shipments of missile
proliferation concern and exchanged information about
activities of missile proliferation concern worldwide,
including in South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East.
During this reporting period, the United States continued
to work unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners
to combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to
export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since
my last report, we continued our missile nonproliferation
dialogues with China, India, the Republic of Korea, and North
Korea, and have raised this issue with Pakistan at senior
levels. Although regular discussions with Pakistan at the
expert level have not proceeded since the fall 1999 coup, we
remain engaged at the diplomatic level, and I addressed our
nonproliferation concerns during my visit to Pakistan in March
of this year. In the course of normal diplomatic relations we
also have pursued such discussions with other countries in
Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
In July 2000, the United States and the DPRK held a fifth
round of missile talks in Kuala Lumpur. This was the first
round of talks after a 16-month hiatus. It provided a useful
opportunity to assess developments since the March 1999 talks
in Pyongyang, including the DPRK's June 2000 reaffirmation of
its moratorium on flight tests of long-range missiles of any
kind. The United States discussed its continuing concerns about
North Korea's missile activities and again pressed for tight
constraints on DPRK missile development, testing, and exports.
Both sides agreed to hold another round of talks as soon as
possible, and a sixth round occurred September 28-29 in New
York. The United States continued to urge the DPRK to take
steps to address U.S. and international concerns about the
DPRK's indigenous missile programs and its missile-related
activities. The United States also discussed Chairman Kim Jong-
Il's idea, suggested to Russian President Putin in mid-July, of
trading missile restraints for launches of DPRK satellites on
foreign launchers. During the October visit to Washington of
DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok, the United States and DPRK
agreed that ``resolution of the missile issue would make an
essential contribution to a fundamentally improved relationship
between them and to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific
region.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight
test moratorium ``while talks on the missile issue continue.''
Secretary Albright met with Chairman Kim Jong-Il in
Pyongyang October 23-24. They had serious, constructive, and
in-depth discussions on the full range of U.S. concerns on
missiles, including both the DPRK's indigenous missile programs
and exports. They also explored Chairman Kim's idea of
restraining DPRK missile capabilities in exchange for launches
of DPRK satellites on foreign boosters. U.S. and DPRK missile
experts are scheduled to continue discussions in early
November.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's
missile and nuclear development programs, the United States is
pursuing a high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding
ways to work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to
Iran's ballistic missile development program and its nuclear
weapon program. Russia's government has created institutional
foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation
policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed
new export control legislation to tighten government control
over sensitive technologies and continued working with the
United States to strengthen export control practices at Russian
aerospace firms. However, despite the Russian government's
nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian
entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile
program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond
the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear power reactor project, which could
further Iran's nuclear weapon aspirations.
Consistent with the Russian government's April 2000
announcement of administrative action against the Rector of the
Baltic State Technical University (BSTU) for his involvement in
training Iranian specialist at BSTU, and following our own
assessment, the United States announced on April 24, 2000,
plans to impose trade and administrative penalties on the
Rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program. At
the same time, the United States also announced its intention
to remove restrictions imposed in July 1998 on two Russian
entities--INOR and Polyus--which have ceased the proliferation
behavior that led to the imposition of penalties. However,
penalties imposed in July 1998 against five other Russian
entities and in January 1999 against three additional entities
remain in effect.
value of nonproliferation export controls
The U.S. national export controls--both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those
implemented unilaterally--play an important part in impending
the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (as used here, ``export
controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case review of
certain exports, or limitations on exports of particular items
of proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather than
broad embargoes or economic sanctions that also affect trade.)
As noted in this report, however, export controls are only one
of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties
and norms, Multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdictions
of shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and
robust U.S.military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities
all work in conjunction with export controls as part of our overall
nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every emerging WMD/missile program seeks equipment and
technology from other countries. Proliferators look to other
sources because needed items are unavailable within their
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported items
can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically
produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators seek
for their WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral
lists (like gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve
gas precursors on the Australia Group list) and unlisted items
(like lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In
addition, many of the items of interest to proliferators are
inherently dual-use. For example, key precursors and
technologies used in the production of fertilizers or
pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons; bio-
production technology can be used to produce biological
weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or
technology for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large
part, U.S. national export controls--and similar controls of
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control
Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have denied proliferators
access to the largest sources of the best equipment and
technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have
forced proliferators to engage in complex clandestine
procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking time and
money away from WMD/missile programs.
The U.S. national export controls and those of our regime
partners also have played an important role, increasing over
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation
export controls. For example: the 7-member MTCR of 1987 has
grown to 32 member countries; the NSG adopted full-scope
safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new controls
to nuclear-related dual-use items; several nonmember countries
have committed unilaterally to apply export controls consistent
with one or more of the regimes; and most of the members of the
nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all''
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a
specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all''
controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items not
on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile
programs.) The United States maintains a global program, funded
by the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related
Activities account, to assist other countries' efforts to
strengthen their export control systems. A principal focus of
this important effort is Russia and the Newly Independent
States (NIS), where we also employ funds provided under the
Freedom Support Act.
The U.S. export controls, especially ``catch-all''
controls, also make important political and moral contributions
to the nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal
obligations the United States has undertaken in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological Weapons
Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention
(Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities.
They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' on
WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and
our friends and interests overseas. They place the United
States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent
proliferation from the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
dual-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation regime, for example,
has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make
an export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons
and notified to the rest--unless it first consults with the
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for
exporters.
threat reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system
expertise has increased in part as a consequence of the
economic crisis in Russia and other Newly Independent States
(NIS). My Administration gives high priority to controlling the
human dimension of proliferation through programs that support
the transition of former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian
research and technology development activities. I have proposed
an additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the
Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support
activities in four areas over FYs 2000-2004: nuclear security;
nonnuclearWMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and
military relocation, stabilization and other security cooperation
programs. Of the $1 billion Congressional ETRI request for FY 2000, an
estimated $888 million is available: State ($182 million), Energy ($293
million), and Defense ($467 million). We are seeking $974 million in FY
2001.
expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from May
16, 2000, through November 12, 2000.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.
Notice
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Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass
destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. Because
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means
of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, the national emergency first
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14,
1995, November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, November 12, 1998,
and November 10, 1999, must continue in effect beyond November
14, 2000. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, November 9, 2000.