[House Document 106-309]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     

106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-309


 
                       VETO MESSAGE ON H.R. 4392

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 HIS VETO OF H.R. 4392, THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL 
                               YEAR 2001




  November 13, 2000.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
 Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) and ordered to be printed
To the House of Representatives:
    Today, I am disapproving H.R. 4392, the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,'' because of one badly 
flawed provision that would have made a felony of unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information. Although well 
intentioned, that provision is overbroad and may unnecessarily 
chill legitimate activities that are at the heart of a 
democracy.
    I agree that unauthorized disclosures can be 
extraordinarily harmful to United States national security 
interests and that far too many such disclosures occur. I have 
been particularly concerned about their potential effects on 
the sometimes irreplaceable intelligence sources and methods on 
which we rely to acquire accurate and timely information I need 
in order to make the most appropriate decisions on matters of 
national security. Unauthorized disclosures damage our 
intelligence relationships abroad, compromise intelligence 
gathering, jeopardize lives, and increase the threat of 
terrorism. As Justice Stewart stated in the Pentagon Papers 
case, ``it is elementary that the successful conduct of 
international diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective 
national defense require both confidentiality and secrecy. 
Other nations can hardly deal with this Nation in an atmosphere 
of mutual trust unless they can be assured that their 
confidences will be kept * * * and the development of 
considered and intelligent international policies would be 
impossible if those charged with their formulation could not 
communicate with each other freely.'' Those who disclose 
classified information inappropriately thus commit a gross 
breach of the public trust and may recklessly put our national 
security at risk. To the extent that existing sanctions have 
proven insufficient to address and deter unauthorized 
disclosures, they should be strengthened. What is in dispute is 
not the gravity of the problem, but the best way to respond to 
it.
    In addressing this issue, we must never forget that the 
free flow of information is essential to a democratic society. 
Justice Stewart also wrote in the Pentagon Papers case that 
``the only effective restraint upon executive policy in the 
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in 
an enlightened citizenry--in an informed and critical public 
opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic 
government.''
    Justice Brandeis reminded us that ``those who won our 
independence believed * * * that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle 
of the American government.'' His words caution that we must 
always tread carefully when considering measures that may limit 
public discussion--even when those measures are intended to 
achieve laudable, indeed necessary, goals.
    As President, therefore, it is my obligation to protect not 
only our Government's vital information from improper 
disclosure, but also to protect the rights of citizens to 
receive the information necessary for democracy to work. 
Furthering these two goals requires a careful balancing, which 
must be assessed in light of our system of classifying 
information over a range of categories. This legislation does 
not achieve the proper balance. For example, there is a serious 
risk that this legislation would tend to have a chilling effect 
on those who engage in legitimate activities. A desire to avoid 
the risk that their good faith choice of words--their exercise 
of judgment--could become the subject of a criminal referral 
for prosecution might discourage Government officials from 
engaging even in appropriate public discussion, press 
briefings, or other legitimate official activities. Similarly, 
the legislation may unduly restrain the ability of former 
Government officials to teach, write, or engage in any activity 
aimed at building public understanding of complex issues. 
Incurring such risks is unnecessary and inappropriate in a 
society built on freedom of expression and the consent of the 
governed and is particularly inadvisable in a context in 
whichthe range of classified materials is so extensive. In such 
circumstances, this criminal provision would, in my view, create an 
undue chilling effect.
    The problem is compounded because this provision was passed 
without benefit of public hearings--a particular concern given 
that it is the public that this law seeks ultimately to 
protect. The Administration shares the process burden since its 
deliberations lacked the thoroughness this provision warranted, 
which in turn led to a failure to apprise the Congress of the 
concerns I am expressing today.
    I deeply appreciate the sincere efforts of Members of 
Congress to address the problem of unauthorized disclosures and 
I fully share their commitment. When the Congress returns, I 
encourage it to send me this bill with this provision deleted 
and I encourage the Congress as soon as possible to pursue a 
more narrowly drawn provision tested in public hearings so that 
those they represent can also be heard on this important issue.
    Since the adjournment of the Congress has prevented my 
return of H.R. 4392 within the meaning of Article I, section 7, 
clause 2 of the Constitution, my withholding of approval from 
the bill precludes its becoming law. The Pocket Veto Case, 279 
U.S. 655 (1929). In addition to withholding my signature and 
thereby invoking my constitutional power to ``pocket veto'' 
bills during an adjournment of the Congress, to avoid 
litigation, I am also sending H.R. 4392 to the House of 
Representatives with my objections, to leave no possible doubt 
that I have vetoed the measure.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 4, 2000.
    
    
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