[House Document 106-263]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-263
THE REPORT ON THE EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ENTITLED, ``EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE,'' AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 1309 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2000 (PUBLIC LAW 106-65)
June 28, 2000.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-011 WASHINGTON : 2000
To the Congress of the United States:
Enclosed is a report to the Congress on the Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative, as required by section 1309 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public
Law 106-65).
William J. Clinton.
The White House, June 27, 2000.
Report on the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative
introduction
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, (P.L. 106-65), Section 1309, requires that:
Not later than March 31, 2000, the President shall
submit to Congress a report on the Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative. Such report shall include a
description of the plans for ensuring effective
coordination between executive agencies in carrying out
the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative to minimize
duplication of efforts.
The following responds to this requirement. Specifically,
the report outlines the status of the Expanded Threat Reduction
Initiative (ETRI) and the process and plans for carrying out
programs under his Initiative to ensure effective coordination
among executive agencies and to minimize possible areas of
duplication.
background
The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative was proposed in
January 1999 to intensify cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and
other New Independent States (NIS) and prevent threats of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After almost a
decade of close cooperation with the NIS, the August 1998
economic crisis in Russia and continuing regional economic
turmoil jeopardized efforts to implement key arms control
agreements, reduce weapons to desired levels, and reduce
proliferation threats. Proliferation risks increased as
deterioration threats. Proliferation risks increased as
deteriorating economies exacerbated problems for weapons
scientists, increased temptations for illicit trafficking, and
created new obstacles to military downsizing. The ETRI has
provided a solid framework over the past year for accelerating,
expanding and coordinating bilateral and international threat
reduction assistance efforts in Russia and the other NIS. While
we have made progress under ETRI, the risk of weapons
proliferation remains one of the most critical security
challenges we face today.
Thus, threat reduction is among out top assistance
priorities. Out of the $1 billion requested for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2000, there is an estimated $888 million available for
security programs under ETRI in four priority areas:
1. Nuclear Security Programs;
2. Non-Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs;
3. Science and Technology Nonproliferation Programs;
and
4. Military Relocation, Stabilization and Other
Security Cooperation.
Congress provided nearly full funding for the Departments
of Energy ($239 million of $265 million requested) and Defense
($467 million of $485 million) although critical Defense
Department chemical weapons (CW) destruction assistance was
prohibited. Congressional funding for State Department NIS
assistance was reduced overall, forcing difficult tradeoffs
between economic and technical assistance programs and the ETRI
nonproliferation and security programs. Consequently, the State
Department has allocated a total of $182 million in FY 2000
funding under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for
ETRI-related programs (vice a $250 million request). This
amount includes a total of $175 million from the NIS Account
and an estimated $7 million from the Nonproliferation, Anti-
terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account. The
specific allocation of funds for individual threat reduction
programs is based on preliminary program planning and is
subject to change in subsequent congressional notifications. It
has been difficult and time consuming to make the necessary
tradeoffs among worthy programs in light of the reduction in
State's funding request and the need to work closely with
Congress on allocation decisions. As a result, nine months into
FY 2000, State's ETRI related program funds remain obligated
and delivery of assistance has been delayed.
In FY 2001, we are seeking further increases for programs
under ETRI with a total request of $974 million for: Defense
($469 million), Energy ($364 million) and State ($141 million).
Programs proposed under ETRI for FY 2001 include a significant
increase--$100 million--for Department of Energy
nonproliferation programs in Russia to address the serious
proliferation threat of nuclear materials. Defense Department
and State Department programs continue to address
nonproliferation priorities, but with increases over FY 2000
levels.
The Administration proposes to seek nearly $4.9 billion
over the five years from FY 2000-FY 2004--a significant
increase over the planned assistance levels before the economic
crisis--to address the high priority risks of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation.
CURRENT ESTIMATE, EXPANDED THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE, FY 2001-2004, U.S. AGENCY PROGRAMS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Request Total Request Request Request Request Request
Financial summary project FY00 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY00-04
total enacted total total total total total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SOAE/Russia............................... 157.3 182.3 152.8 65.5 62.7 67.0 530.3
SNAE/Ukraine.............................. 33.0 35.0 29.1 11.5 0.0 0.0 75.6
Warhead dismantl pkg/process.............. 9.3 9.3 9.3 53.2 53.6 86.0 211.4
Weapons storage security.................. 40.0 84.0 89.7 56.0 75.0 102.7 407.4
Weapons transport security................ 15.2 15.2 14.0 9.5 9.5 9.5 57.7
Mayak fissile material storage............ 64.5 62.1 57.4 57.4 57.4 57.4 291.7
Core conversion/elimin wpns pu............ 20.0 32.2 32.1 39.7 15.2 0.0 119.2
CW destruction/CW site security........... 130.4 20.0 35.0 75.8 118.6 189.0 438.4
BW proliferation prevention............... 2.0 14.0 12.0 12.0 15.5 28.8 82.3
Defense & mil contacts.................... 2.0 2.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 58.0
Other assessment/rel prog's............... 1.8 2.0 13.0 13.0 11.8 13.0 52.8
DOD/FBI/USCS COUNTERPROLIF................ 4.0 3.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 22.7
Arctic mil environm'tl.................... 6.0 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 29.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Cooperation (AMEC)........................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
DOD total........................... 485.5 467.5 469.0 418.2 443.9 578.0 2,376.6
=====================================================================
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Enhanced MPC&A \1\........................ 145.4 144.6 149.9 149.9 149.9 149.9 744.2
Second line defense/export cont........... 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 14.5
Plutonium disposition..................... 25.0 30.0 40.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 205.0
Nuclear cities initiative................. 30.0 7.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 77.5
Science collaboration (DOE/IPP) \1\....... 30.0 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 112.5
HEU agreement transparency................ 15.8 15.8 15.2 15.2 15.2 15.2 76.6
DOE augment BN-350 PU DIS/KAZ............. 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 80.0
DOE Russian initiative.................... 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 400.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE total........................... 264.7 238.9 364.1 369.1 369.1 369.1 1,710.3
=====================================================================
STATE DEPARTMENT \2\
Science collabor/BW redirect.............. 28.0 18.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 94.0
Export control/border security............ 61.0 47.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 227.0
(NIS account and NADR) \1\................ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........
Science collabor (ISTC/STCU) \1\.......... 95.0 59.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 45.0 239.0
Science collabor (CRDF) \1\............... 23.5 15.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 71.0
Military reloc/ammun disposal............. 43.0 43.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 115.0
---------------------------------------------------------------------
State total......................... 250.5 182.0 141.0 141.0 141.0 141.0 746.0
=====================================================================
Total U.S........................... 1,000.7 888.4 974.1 928.3 954.0 1,088.1 4,832.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Funding in prior years from CTR.
\2\ State Department allocation of funds is based on preliminary program planning and is subject to change in
subsequent congressional notifications.
coordination process and plans
The level of cooperation and coordination among executive
agencies was extraordinary during development of the ETRI. The
same interagency coordination process has largely continued and
is planned to continue through the FY 2000 program
implementation process and Congressional review of the FY 2001
President's Budget Request.
The ETRI was developed under Presidential and Vice
Presidential leadership. Coordination among executive agencies
was led by NSC staff in conjunction with the Special Advisor to
the Secretary of State, Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the
New Independent States of the former Soviet Union. NSC staff
and the U.S. Assistance Coordinator worked closely with an ETRI
Interagency Working Group (IWG) with representatives of a wide
range of agencies involved in security and nonproliferation
issues. Included were representatives from the Departments of
State, Defense, Energy, Treasury, Health and Human Services,
Agriculture, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Management and Budget, and others as needed.
The need for interagency coordination to prevent or
minimize duplication of efforts varies by program. Where
different agencies' programs are complementary and even
supplementary, the impact of carefully coordinated U.S.
assistance resources is maximized. Thus, every effort is made
to ensure agencies exchange information on their programs and
activities on a regular basis. This information exchange is
accomplished through interagency working groups that meet
regularly or special interagency teams for specific project
activities.
An interagency team from the NSC staff, State, Defense,
Energy, and the Intelligence Community provided joint,
coordinated briefings to congressional staff to outline the
elements of the ETRI. Senior-level officials from the NSC staff
or agencies involved in elements of ETRI coordinate their
efforts in specific IWGs for projects as necessary. These
working groups coordinate and oversee programs where there is
potential for overlap or duplication such as: the IWG on
Plutonium Disposition; the biweekly IWG on Export Control and
Border Security; and the IWG on Biotechnology Engagement
Programs. IWG's generally are chaired by NSC staff or by the
agency primarily responsible for funding and carrying out the
project. IWG members then meet with, or provide input as needed
to, the NSC and the U.S. Assistance Coordinator.
This close executive agency coordination process ensured
consistency with presidential direction and for the development
and overall coordination of the ETRI. Moreover, this
coordination process continues and is planned to continue to
ensure coherent, integrated programs and prevent overlap or
duplication in implementation of programs and agency
responsibilities under ETRI.
international coordination
We are strongly urging other nations to increase security
and nonproliferation assistance and to improve coordination of
assistance efforts. The G8 committed to seek increased threat
reduction assistance for Russia and other NIS at the G8 June
1999 Summit in Cologne. Japan also announced that it has
committed an additional $200 million for ETRI-related efforts.
A June 1999 U.S.-hosted ETRI Experts Meeting in Brussels
and a Dutch-hosted ETRI Conference in The Hague in November
1999, helped focus over 30 participating nations on the
increasing threats, urgent needs for assistance and existing
program coordination and implementation issues. Common
assistance implementation problems were discussed and areas of
potential assistance collaboration were identified. We were
encouraged at these meetings as several participating nations
indicated that they are seeking new resources to advance
nonproliferation goals.
We were particularly encouraged by the European Union (EU)
approval on December 17, 1999, of the ``Cooperation Program for
Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation''
under the Common Strategy on Russia. Initial assistance
projects include funding for a chemical weapons destruction
facility at Gorny, Russia and plutonium disposition studies.
Initial funding is modest (about $9 million), but the EU has
indicated its intention to increase funding for this effort in
future budgets. The EU has also offered to host a follow-on
multilateral meeting on threat reduction assistance this year
to help maintain international momentum for these efforts.
Other nations have also made new funding commitments, or
are seeking additional resources, including:
Germany: considering additional Russia
chemical weapons (CW) destruction assistance; and added
Ukraine missile destruction assistance (estimated at
$3.7 million);
United Kingdom: considering $5 million to
support CW destruction at Shchuch'ye, Russia (if U.S.
DOD/Cooperative Threat Reduction funding for CW
destruction is restored);
Italy: approved about $8 million in new CW
destruction aid;
Netherlands: providing new nuclear security
assistance and considering use of $10 million for CW
destruction aid;
Sweden: considering aid for security at
former biological weapons (BW) facilities; and
Canada: approved $70,000 for CW destruction
assistance and is considering additional funds.
International support for ETRI related activities has
increased and looks promising over the next year.