[House Document 106-256]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-256
SIX MONTH PERIODIC REVIEW WITH REGARDS TO THE LAPSE OF THE EXPORT
ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979
__________
MESSAGE
From
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Transmitting
A CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
12924 OF AUGUST 19, 1994, TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY
THE LAPSE OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, PURSUANT TO 50
U.S.C. 1703(c)
June 14, 2000.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-011 WASHINGTON : 2000
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 204 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 401(c) of
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I transmit
herewith a 6-month periodic report on the national emergency
declared by Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994, to deal
with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States caused by the lapse of the Export
Administration Act of 1979.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, June 14, 2000.
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency Caused by the
Lapse of the Export Administration Act of 1979 for August 19, 1999, to
February 19, 2000
On August 19, 1994, in Executive Order No. 12924, I
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal
with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States caused by the lapse of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et
seq.) and the system of controls maintained under that Act. In
that order, I continued, in effect, to the extent permitted by
law, the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
as amended, the Export Administration Regulations (15 U.S.C.
730 et seq.), and the delegations of authority set forth in
Executive Order No. 12002 of July 7, 1977 (as amended by
Executive Order No. 12755 of March 12, 1991), Executive Order
No. 12214 of May 2, 1980, Executive Order No. 12735 of November
16, 1990 (subsequently revoked by Executive Order No. 12938 of
November 14, 1994), and Executive Order No. 12851 of June 11,
1993. As required by the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), I issued notices on August 15, 1995, August 14, 1996,
August 13, 1997, August 13, 1998, and August 10, 1999,
continuing the emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12924.
In 1996, I issued two Executive Orders concerning the
transfer of items from the United States Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List. On October 12, 1996, I issued Executive
Order No. 13020 (regarding hot-section technologies for
commercial aircraft engines) and on November 15, 1996, I issued
Executive Order No. 13026 (regarding encryption products).
I issued Executive Order No. 12924 pursuant to the
authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, including, but not limited to,
IEEPA. At that time, I also submitted a report to the Congress
pursuant to section 204(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)).
Section 204 of IEEPA requires follow-up reports, with respect
to actions or changes, to be submitted every six months.
Additionally, section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) requires that the President, within 90 days
after the end of each six-month period following a declaration
of a national emergency, report to the Congress on the total
expenditures directly attributable to that declaration. To
comply with these requirements, I have submitted combined
activities and expenditures reports for the six-month periods
ending February 19, 1995, August 19, 1995, February 19, 1996,
August 19, 1996, February 19, 1997, August 19, 1997, February
19, 1998, August 19, 1998, February 19, 1999, and August 19,
1999. The following report covers the six-months period from
August 19, 1999, to February 19, 2000. Detailed information on
export control activities is contained in the most recent
Export Administration Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1999 and
the January 2000 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls,
required by section 14 and section 6(f) of the Export
Administration Act, respectively, which the Department of
Commerce continues to submit to Congress under a policy of
conforming actions under the Executive Order to the provisions
of the Export Administration Act, as appropriate.
Since the issuance of Executive Order No. 12924, the
Department of Commerce has continued to administer and enforce
the system of export controls, including antiboycott
provisions, contained in the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR). In administering these controls, the Department has
acted under a policy of conforming actions under Executive
Order Nos. 12924, 13020, and 13026 to the provisions of the
Export Administration Act, insofar as appropriate.
The expenses incurred by the federal government in the six-
month period from August 19, 1999, to February 19, 2000, that
are directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with
respect to export controls were largely centered in the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration (BXA).
Expenditures by the Department of Commerce for the reporting
period are anticipated to be $24,264,000, most of which
represents program operating costs, wage and salary costs for
federal personnel, and overhead expenses.
Since my last report to the Congress, there have been
several significant developments in the area of export
controls:
Multilateral Developments
Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies is a multilateral regime currently consisting of
33 member countries. Its purpose is to contribute to
regionaland international security and stability by promoting
transparency and greater responsibility in international transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
The United States Government continues to
participate in submissions of export data made by member
countries in the regime since the November 1996 implementation
of the Wassenaar dual-use export control list. The Wassenaar
members make dual-use data submissions on a semiannual basis in
April and October.
The Wassenaar Arrangement's Initial Elements call
for Participating States to assess the overall functioning of
the Arrangement. This assessment was done for the first time in
1999. The 1999 review process provided an opportunity to focus
discussions on how the Arrangement is meeting its objectives.
In 1999, four assessment meetings were held. Participating
States reaffirmed their commitment to maintain responsible
national security policies consistent with the purposes of the
Arrangement. They agreed to maximize restraint as a matter of
national policy when considering licensing for the export of
arms and sensitive dual-use items to all destinations where the
risks are judged to be the greatest, and in particular to
regions where conflict is occurring. In addition, Participating
States confirmed their commitment to maintaining strong law-
based enforcement of export controls.
The 1999 List review of the Arrangement's controls
on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies
resulted in major changes for computers and microprocessors.
These relaxations in controls for computers and microprocessors
resulted primarily in response to U.S. unilateral decisions to
apply certain liberalized licensing requirements to these
items, in order to reflect rapid technological advances and
controllability factors. Agreement for a Statement of
Understanding on the importance of controlling intangible
transfers of technology and software was also reached. All
agreed list changes are expected to be incorporated into our
national regulations soon.
In February 2000, BXA representatives attended a
special meeting of computer specialists to study the highly
complex issue of upgrading and clustering computers with the
intention to develop proposals that would provide effective
controls over clustered systems. The United States tabled a
non-paper on the future of domestic export control for high
performance computers and microprocessors. This non-paper
reaffirms our commitment to provide Participating States
advanced notice of any possible change in our domestic
licensing policies.
Australia Group. The Australia Group (AG) is an informal
multilateral export control regime that seeks to impede the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through
the harmonization of export controls, the exchange of
information on global proliferation activities, and outreach to
nonmembers. The 30 member countries meet annually and
communicate between sessions to review and refine the list of
controlled chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment
and technology.
BXA provides technical and policy analysis for the
review of items controlled by the AG. This review permits
continued updating of the controls to optimize their
nonproliferation impact while taking into account current
chemical and biological trade patterns. At the October 1999 AG
Plenary, BXA participated in the Technical Experts Group's
review of a number of controlled items. As a result of these
meetings, some item descriptions were more finely tuned to
capture items of proliferation concern while excluding benign
products.
BXA supports and complies with the AG's no
undercut policy which is intended to ensure that AG members are
following a common approach to export controls. If one AG
member denies an export of an AG-listed item for CBW
nonproliferation reasons, all other members agree not to
approve essential identical export license applications without
first consulting with the member that issued the original
denial. This policy has worked well to close the loophole for
potential diverters who shop around to acquire items for
proliferation purposes.
The AG works to impede the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons through outreach to non-AG
countries. BXA contributes to this effort by inviting foreign
export control officials to events to discuss national export
laws and regulations, including those relating to the AG. A
number of non-AG countries have been taken steps to adopt AG-
Type controls.
BXA will publish changes to Australia Group-
related controls based on the agreements reached at the 1999
Plenary.
Chemical Weapons Convention. The Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) is an international arms control and
nonproliferation treaty that bans chemical weapons (CW) and
monitors the legitimate production, processing, consumption,
export, and import of certain toxic chemicals and precursors
related to CW. BXA has implemented certain export control
provisions of the Convention in the Export Administration
Regulations. During this reporting period, BXA received eight
advanced notifications of exports of Schedule 1 chemicals, two
annual reports on exports for calendar year 1997, two annual
reports on exports for calendar year 1998, and 21 end-use
certificates for exports to the Dominican Republic, Israel,
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. BXA returned without
action three annual reports on Schedule 1 exports because they
were not required under the EAR.
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
composed of 35 member countries with the European Commission as
a permanent observer, is an informal group of nations concerned
with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NSG has
established Guidelines to assist member nations in
administering national nuclear export control programs.
Controls are focused on certain categories of goods: nuclear
material, equipment and technology unique to the nuclear
industry, and so-called nuclear dual-use items that have both
nuclear and non-nuclear applications. Formal annual plenaries
are held to provide the opportunity for multilateral
consultations by NSG members on nuclear proliferation concerns.
A NSG Components Working Group meeting was held on
September 13-14, 1999, in Vienna, Austria, to discuss proposals
offered by the United States and other countries on how and
when to control parts and components for items listed in the
NSG Dual Use Annex. No agreement could be reached on how to
approach the issue, but agreement was reached to hold further
discussions on the proposal.
A number of NSG working groups met in Vienna,
Austria, at an NSG meeting held the week of October 17, 1999.
Issues discussed included the institutional arrangements of the
NSG, revising the Part I Guidelines, and the addition of
controls on parts and components listed in the Dual Use Annex.
With regard to the latter issue, the Components Working Group
decided to take a two-pronged approach to determining how to
control components. The first approach is to identify the
components themselves, and the second is to develop a
definition of controlled components and to determine the
circumstances under which they would be controlled. This issue
will continue to be explored in working group meetings to be
held over the course of the next year.
A NSG meeting was held in Vienna, Austria, on
November 3, 1999, on the establishment of an official NSG Web
site. The decision was made to accept the offer of the
University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and
Security to create and maintain a NSG Web site at no charge.
Discussions are underway to determine the content of the site;
it is anticipated it will be completed by the summer of 2000.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is an
informal group of countries founded in 1987 by the United
States and its G-7 trading partners to coordinate their
national export controls for the prevention of missile
proliferation. Each member, under its own laws and practices,
has committed to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines for export
licensing policy for items found on the MTCR Equipment and
Technology Annex. The United States continued to maintain its
multilateral MTCR controls as well as its unilateral Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative controls during the reporting
period.
BXA represented the Department at the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) intercessional Technical
Experts Meeting held in Paris on September 6-7, 1999. Proposals
offered at the intercessional meeting included one that would
combine several categories in the MTCR Annex to make it more
concise and similar to the European Dual-Use and Commerce
Control Lists. This proposal was accepted for consideration at
the MTCR Technical Experts Meeting in October.
BXA participated in the annual Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary and Technical Experts Meeting
held in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, on October 11-15, 1999. In
the information exchange portion of the Plenary, 16 MTCR
members actively participated in sharing information on non-
MTCR partner missile programs that constitute serious missile
proliferation threats. Later in the Plenary, the United States
proposed that the MTCR sponsor another workshop on the
implementation and enforcement of intangible technology
controls, which would serve to continue the MTCR's outreach and
transparency program.
At the Technical Experts Meeting during the week
of October 11, 1999, MTCR partners agreed to relax controls on
aluminum powder and other metal powders used as fuel in solid
rocket motors, which will reduce the number of Commerce license
applications for metal fuels. State Department licenses for
metal fuels will not be affected by this change. Special dual
use items for chemical/biological weapons delivery systems were
also identified that could be added to the MTCR Equipment and
Technology Annex in the future. The proposal first raised at
the TEM meeting in September, to reformat the MTCR Equipment
Annex into larger categories based on the newly reformatted
Annex structure, was reviewed, with action on the proposal
tabled for further discussion.
Encryption/High Performance Computer Policy
Encryption: During the period August 19, 1999, to February
19, 2000, BXA carried out a number of activities in relation to
the Administration's encryption policy. Most significantly, on
January 14, 2000, BXA published regulations implementing the
Administration's September 16, 1999, announcement to simplify
the export of cryptography. The core of this policy rests on
three tenets: a review of encryption products in advance of
sale; a streamlined post-export reporting system that takes
into account industry's distribution models; and review of
exports to foreign government end-users. These activities also
include reviewing licenses, participating in multilateral and
interagency discussions on encryption policy, and reaching out
to industry members and the public. Much of the policy update
resulted from invaluable consultations and comments provided by
industry and privacy groups, such as those provided by the
President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption
(PECSENC). BXA held three PECSENC meetings during this period.
This committee fulfills the Administration's commitment to
establish a formal mechanism to provide industry, users, state
and local law enforcement, and other privacy groups with the
opportunity to advise the U.S. Government on the impact of
commercial encryption policy. Following on its June 1999
recommendations paper on encryption export liberalization, the
PECSENC's ad-hoc Experts Working Group, comprising export
controls specialists from subcommittee members' companies,
offered guidance to the Administration throughout the
regulation-drafting process.
BXA participated in several Wassenaar working group
meetings and explained the current U.S. licensing policy for
cryptographic products and the rationale behind the policy
update. The United States proposed releasing encryption
products considered in the public domain for discussion at the
next Experts Meeting in April 2000. BXA also has discussed
encryption export control policy with numerous foreign
delegations on a bilateral basis.
During October 1999, BXA participated in the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) E-Commerce Working Group. This
subcommittee is studying e-commerce-related issues, such as
authentication, security, privacy, market readiness indicators,
and taxation to assess the current e-commerce environment in
the Western Hemisphere. The United States delegation reported
that approximately 80 percent of the U.S. recommendations on e-
commerce language were adopted by the Ministerial Declaration.
Furthermore, BXA agreed to undertake an initiative to brief
interested Latin American countries both in the private sector
and public sector on the United States encryption policy.
Corresponding with that effort, BXA representatives addressed
e-commerce and U.S. encryption issues with Brazilian
congressional representatives as a part of the Worldnet program
on e-commerce.
During this reporting period, BXA participated in a number
of events to educate exporters and the general public on the
goals of the Administration's new encryption policy and the
details of the Bureau's licensing procedures. The
Administration consulted with numerous industry, privacy,
technical, and academic groups as part of its review of
encryption export controls. Further, BXA continued to conduct
individual meetings with U.S. companies to explain and discuss
the revised policy on a weekly basis, and regularly updated its
Web site to provide exporters guidance concerning encryption
export control policy.
High Performance Computers: During the past six months, BXA
has been actively engaged in various activities in order to
update the Administration's High Performance Computer (HPC)
export control policy. These activities include updating export
controls on HPCs, studying alternative methods for controlling
HPCs, meeting with industry counterparts to assess their needs,
and reforming the HPC licensing process.
On February 16, 2000, the President submitted a report to
Congress outlining his intent to raise the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) notification requirement for Tier 3
countries from 6,500 MTOPS to 12,500 MTOPS. This change will go
into effect August 14, 2000. The report also outlined the
President's intent to move Romania from Tier 3 to Tier 2. This
change will go into effect June 15, 2000.
At the request of BXA, the Information Security Technical
Advisory Committee (ISTAC) has studied alternative control
parameters for HPCs. The significant adjustments required to
keep up with the rapid technological advances in the computer
industry call into question the viability of the current
approach for determining HPC control levels and create the need
to explore alternative control parameters that will provide the
flexibility necessary to accommodate future advances in HPC and
microprocessor technology. Although no single solution has been
chosen yet, it appears that the best idea thus far is a new
export control parameter based on the number of controlled
processors used in a computer. The number of processors used in
a system is a better predictor of performance; however, several
technical issues must be resolved before this could be adopted
as a new control metric.
During the past six months, BXA undertook an
intensive study of the HPC licensing process in order to
pinpoint unnecessary choke points, redundant paperwork
requirements, and other areas in need of improvement. As a
result of this study, the average license processing time for
HPCs has dropped by one-third, and the Security Safeguard Plan
provisions have been modified to reflect the current technology
environment. Additionally, BXA published a Web site dedicated
to HPC controls to provide the public with guidance related to
HPC export policy and the license application process. In
October 1999, BXA held three seminars (in Washington, D.C.,
Texas, and California) to advise the U.S. computer industry on
HPC policy and to further educate industry officials of their
duties related to export compliance. Furthermore, BXA
maintained an ongoing dialogue with U.S. computer manufacturers
and industry groups on HPC policy and licensing issues.
Bilateral Cooperation/Technical Assistance
As part of the Administration's continuing effort to
encourage other countries to strengthen their export control
systems, the Department of Commerce and other agencies
conducted a wide range of discussions with a number of foreign
countries.
Hong Kong. BXA continues to work with the Hong Kong
authorities on export licensing and enforcement issues, and
maintains a close working relationship with the Ministry of
Trade and Industry regarding export controls.
On September 1, 1999, BXA representatives met with
representatives of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office to
discuss licensing and export policy issues. The two sides
discussed the licensing of items controlled unilaterally by the
United States, information technology policy, developments in
the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the draft Export Administration
Act and other pending legislation that could affect U.S. export
controls relating to Hong Kong.
On October 6, 1999, officials from the Hong Kong Trade
Department met with BXA officials to discuss licensing and
policy issues. The Hong Kong officials sought more extensive
information sharing, including access to U.S. export license
data to verify reexport privileges of U.S.-licensed goods, and
data on end-users in Hong Kong to whom BXA had denied proposed
exports. The Hong Kong officials offered to supply import
certificates for items, such as high performance computers,
that enter Hong Kong without an export license.
China. On September 8-10, 1999, BXA hosted a seven-person
delegation from the People's Republic of China (PRC) for a
seminar on export licensing and enforcement procedures and
practices. The seminar was a result of an agreement that U.S.
and Chinese officials made at the December 1998 Joint
Commission on Commerce and Trade meeting to enhance the
bilateral dialogue on export controls. The deputy director of
the Science and Technology Division of the PRC Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation led the four-person
delegation from Beijing; three delegation members were from the
PRC Embassy in Washington.
On November 3-5, 1999, four officials from China's Ministry
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation visited Washington
for a seminar similar to the one held in September. The program
was designed to facilitate a technical exchange on implementing
andenforcing export controls, and included demonstrations of
the Bureau of Export Administration's (BXA) license review system and
the dispute resolution process, meetings with enforcement officials,
and a session with representatives from the Departments of State and
Defense.
India. The Defense Appropriations Act of 2000, enacted on
October 25, 1999, mandated that the Administration report to
Congress within 60 days on the list of sanctioned Indian and
Pakistani entities. The legislation urged the refinement of the
list and suggested that the criteria for the list be ``entities
that make a direct and material contribution to weapons of mass
destruction and missile programs.'' The law also urged that the
sanctions be limited to only those items that can contribute to
WMD and missile programs. Based on this guidance and an
interagency consensus, the United States decided to delete 51
entities from the list and to revise the licensing policy for
low-level technology from a policy of denial to approval. The
Bureau will publish the regulations implementing these changes
in March.
Cuba. The Treasury Department authorized a U.S. company to
stage a major exhibit in Cuba of U.S.-made medical products.
The five-day exhibit was held in late January 2000 in Havana,
will close to 300 Americans, representing almost 100 U.S.
firms, displaying their products. BXA issued almost 70 licenses
for the temporary export of goods displayed at the exhibition.
Since then, about 30 licenses have been approved for the
permanent export, either by sale or donation, of medical goods
to Cuba.
Nonproliferation and Export Control Cooperation. During the
period August 19, 1999, to February 19, 2000, BXA's
Nonproliferation and Export Control (NEC) International
Cooperation Program hosted, participated in, and/or coordinated
26 technical exchanges on export controls in conjunction with
representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy,
Justice, and the Treasury (U.S. Customs Service). These
programs sought not only to familiarize the governments of
Russia, Central Europe, the Balkans, the Baltics, the Caucasus,
and Central Asia with the major elements comprising an export
control system that meets international standards for
effectiveness, but also to assist the governments in developing
and strengthening their own national export control systems.
These elements involve five functional areas: the legal and
regulatory framework necessary for an effective export control
system, licensing procedures and control lists, enforcement
mechanisms, industry-government relations, and system
administration and automation support. Programs conducted
during this period also included special activities and
multilateral conferences that related to NEC objectives. These
programs have contributed to a reduction of the proliferation
threat from and through the participating countries by
strengthening these countries' national export control systems.
Regulatory Actions: Published and Pending
Encryption. On January 14, 2000, BXA published a rule
implementing the White House's streamlined encryption policy
announced on September 16, 1999, as well as changes based on a
Wassenaar Arrangement agreement. This rule simplified exports
of encryption while continuing to protect important national
interests. See Section B above for additional detail.
High Performance Computers. On February 1, 2000, the
President announced an update to the HPC export control policy.
See Section B above for additional detail on the pending
regulatory changes.
Kosovo. On November 5, 1999, BXA published a rule exempting
exports to Kosovo from the sanctions imposed on Serbia in May
1999.
Export Clearance. On October 4, 1999, BXA and the Census
Bureau jointly published proposed rules and request public
comment on clarifying export clearance, including the
definition of exporter and the requirements for filing a
Shipper's Export Declaration. After review of public comments,
both agencies will jointly publish final rules.
Syria. On September 16, 1999, BXA published a change to the
Export Administration Regulations that revised the license
review policy for the export and reexport to Syria of certain
aircraft parts and components. As a result of this change,
license applications for aircraft parts and components intended
to ensure the safety-of-flight of Syria's civil passenger
aircraft are reviewed on a case-by-case basis with a
presumption of approval.
Libya. On September 13, 1999, BXA revised the Export
Administration Regulations to reinstate provisions of license
exception AVS (aircraft and vessels) for temporary reexports to
Libya of foreign-registered aircraft subject to the EAR,
allowing these aircraft to fly to and from Libya without
areexport license. This change was made in response to the suspension
of United Nations sanctions against Libya.
Export License Information
During the reporting period, BXA continued to receive many
requests for export licensing information through the Freedom
of Information Act and through discovery requests during
enforcement proceedings. Under section 12(c) of the Export
Administration Act, BXA continues to withhold from public
disclosure information obtained for the purpose of
consideration of, or concerning, export license applications,
unless the release of such information is determined by the
Under Secretary to be in the national interest, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 12924 directive to carry out the provisions
of the Export Administration Act, to the extent permitted by
law.
Export Enforcement
Export Enforcement continued, through its three constituent
offices, its programs of prevention of diversions,
investigation/enforcement of the export control provisions of
the Export Administration Regulations, and enforcement of the
antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration
Regulations.
Office of Enforcement Analysis
Preventive/Compliance Activities. Office of Enforcement
Analysis (OEA) prevention activities included designing a
systematic plan to target and prioritize pre-license checks
(PLCs) and post-shipment verifications (PSVs) conducted by
representatives of U.S. diplomatic posts. The purpose of the
plan is to ensure that the PLC and PSV programs, which are
coordinated by BXA's Export Enforcement, reflect the full range
of U.S. export control concerns and use available resources as
effectively as possible.
PLCs validate information on export license applications,
including the reliability of end-users. In contrast, PSVs
strengthen assurances that exporters, shippers, consignees, and
end-users comply with the terms of export licenses and
licensing conditions that are intended to deter diversions from
approved end-users and end-uses of dual-use exports. The
overall objective for conducting PLCs and PSVs is to detect and
prevent the illegal transfer of controlled U.S.-origin goods
and technology.
Another major preventive enforcement activity of OEA is the
compiling of information regarding parties or export control
concern and maintaining these names on Export Enforcement's
watch list. All of the parties included on this watch list are
screened against names listed on export license applications
received by BXA. OEA analysts review all applications in detail
that include a match against a party on the watch list to
assess diversion risks, identify potential violations, and
determine the reliability of proposed end-users of controlled
U.S.-origin commodities or technical data.
NDAA Activities. As required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY1998 (NDAA), BXA delivered to the
Congress its second annual report on high-performance computer
(HPC) exports. The report, delivered December 13, 1999,
identified HPC exports with processing speeds over 2,000
Million Theoretical Operations Per Second (MTOPS) to ``Tier 3''
countries. OEA has responsibility for implementing the NDAA/HPC
Program.
Visa Review Program. During the reporting period, OEA
continued restructuring its Visa Application Review Program to
prevent unauthorized access to controlled technology or
technical data by foreign nationals visiting the United States.
The Office has developed new criteria and thresholds for
evaluating visa applications for targeting purposes. OEA has
narrowed its focus and concentrated on specific products most
often used in weapons of mass destruction projects. OEA's
evaluation and analysis of visa application cable traffic
involves preventive enforcement efforts such as recommending
denial of certain visas and the referral of enforcement leads
to Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) field offices for
possible case development. In some insurances, OEA analysis
uncovered possible visa fraud on the part of the foreign
applicant. These findings were forwarded to the State
Department's Fraud Unit for further investigation and action.
Shipper's Export Declaration Review Program. OEA
systematically reviews Shipper's Export Declarations (SEDs)
field by exporters. Using a computerized index of data fields,
OEA produces a list of SEDs targeted for closer review. These
reviews focus particularly on licensed shipments, shipments
bound for destinations of concern, and shipments of strategic
commodities of proliferation concern. Through these reviews,
OEA identifies SEDs that may indicate violations of the Export
Administration Regulations and refers to OEE special agents for
further enforcement actions.
Office of Export Enforcement
The Office of Export Enforcement opened 531 and closed 440
investigations during the reporting period.
Office of Antiboycott Compliance Activities
The Office of Antiboycott Compliance continued to supply
the State Department with information on boycott requests
received by U.S. persons. The State Department uses this
information in its discussions with boycotting countries
concerning ending the Arab boycott of Israel. The Office of
Antiboycott Compliance opened 6 and closed 15 investigations
during the reporting period.