[House Document 106-255]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-255
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938
________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
Transmitting
A REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.
12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, IN RESPONSE TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION'') AND OF THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS,
PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c)
June 14, 2000.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-011 WASHINGTON : 2000
To the Congress of the United States:
Enclosed is a report to the Congress on Executive Order
12938, as required by section 204 of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)).
William J. Clinton.
The White House, June 14, 2000.
Report to Congress on Executive Order 12938
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
(``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of the means of
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938,
declaring a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary
date of its declaration unless, within the ninety-day period
prior to each anniversary date, I publish in the Federal
Register and transmit to the Congress a notice stating that
such an emergency is to continue in effect. The proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery
continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States. I therefore advised the Congress that the national
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; and
November 12, 1998; must continue in effect beyond November 14,
1999. I accordingly extended the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, on November 10, 1999.
The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(a) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the
period November 1999 through April 2000. Additional information
on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons
(CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
(Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to Section 308 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, I amended section 4 of
E.O. 12938 so that the United States Government could more
effectively respond to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass
destruction proliferation activities. The amendment of section
4 strengthens E.O. 12938 in several significant ways. The
amendment broadens the type of proliferation activity that can
subject entities to potential penalties under the Executive
Order. The original Executive Order provided for penalties for
contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project or
entity to use, acquire, design, produce or stockpile chemical
or biological weapons; the amended Executive Order also covers
contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive Order to
include attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation
activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the
range of potential penalties to expressly include the
prohibition of U.S. Government assistance to foreign persons,
and the prohibition of imports into the United States and U.S.
Government procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United
States Government greater flexibility in deciding how and to
what extent to impose measures against foreign persons that
assist proliferation programs.
Nuclear Weapons
In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of
nuclear tests. World reaction included nearly universal
condemnation across a broad range of international fora and
multilateral support for a broad range of sanctions, including
new restrictions on lending by international financial
institutions unrelated to basic human needs and on aid from the
G-8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions,
we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members,
with the South Asia Task Force (SATF) and through the UN to
dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward
developing nuclear weapons. We have urged them to join
multilateral arms control efforts (in the near term, especially
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT); ultimately the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) and to conform to the standards
of nonproliferation export control regimes, to prevent a
regional arms race and build confidence by practicing
restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences
through dialogue.
The P-5, G-8, and UN Security Council have called on India
and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions designed
to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear and missile arms
race. The United States has focused most intensely on
severalobjectives that can be met over the short and medium term: an
end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional adherence to the CTBT;
constructive engagement in negotiations on an FMCT and, pending their
conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the
development of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and adoption of
controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive
materials and technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India
and Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and
Pakistani officials have yielded little progress. In September
1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders had expressed a willingness
to sign the CTBT. Both governments, having already declared
testing moratoria, indicated they were prepared to sign the
CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions. Those
declarations were made before the collapse of Prime Minister
Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, which delayed
consideration of CTBT signature in India. The Indian election,
the Kargil conflict, and the October coup in Pakistan further
complicated the issue, although neither country has renounced
its commitment. Both governments say they are taking steps to
build domestic consensus for CTBT signature but cannot proceed
without this.
India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998
Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got
underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were
unable to resume in 1999 and neither India nor Pakistan played
a helpful ``behind the scenes'' role. They did pledge to revise
and strengthen their export controls to bring them into closer
conformity with international standards on sensitive exports,
and have begun expert discussion with the U.S. and others on
this subject. In April 2000, India announced welcome revisions
to its export control procedures.
The summer 1999 Kargil conflict complicated efforts to
continue the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore;
currently there are few encouraging signs that they will re-
engage soon. We have agreed to continue regular discussions
with India at the senior and expert levels, and will also
remain engaged with Pakistan as appropriate. Our diplomatic
efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in international fora
will also continue.
I discussed these issues on my trip to India and Pakistan
in March. In India, we stressed that the United States and
India will not be able to reach the full potential of their new
relationship without progress in this area. In Pakistan, we
also emphasized the importance of progress on regional security
and nonproliferation, among other pressing issues.
In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an
Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately
result in the complete cessation of the DPRK's nuclear weapons-
related program and its full compliance with the NPT. As a
first step, North Korea froze construction and operations at
its Yongbyon and Taechon nuclear facilities. The freeze remains
in place and the IAEA has maintained a continuous presence at
these sites since 1994. U.S. experts also remain on-site in
North Korea working to complete clean up operations and have
completed the canning, under IAEA seals, of spent fuel from the
North's 5-megawatt nuclear reactor.
Serious U.S. suspicions about an underground facility at
Kumchang-ni led the U.S. to raise its concerns directly with
Pyongyang and to negotiate access to the site. In May 1999, a
U.S. Department of State team visited the site and judged it to
be neither suitable for plutonium production reactors nor
designed for reprocessing activities in its current state.
Based on the data gathered by the United States delegation and
the subsequent technical review, the United States has
concluded that the activities there were not a violation of the
Agreed Framework. The United States will conduct another visit
to the site in the spring of 2000, and follow up visits will
continue as long as U.S. concerns about the site remain.
While the Kumchang-ni visit addressed some of our concerns,
future negotiations with the North will seek to discuss ways to
allay all of them--in the context of assuring full
implementation of the Agreed Framework and improving overall
relations. At the March round of US-DPRK discussions, agreement
was reached to schedule further talks in preparation for the
visit of a high-level North Korean to Washington, as well as
talks related to the DPRK's missile program and Agreed
Framework implementation.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the
cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In
May 1999, NPT Parties met in New York to complete preparations
for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United States isworking
with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review Conference is a success
that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and viable part of the global
security system.
The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty on September 24, 1996. So far, 155 countries have signed
and 57 have ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories
conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission
(PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the
International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the
Treaty. In October 1999, a Conference was held pursuant to
Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the
entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that
Conference as an observer.
On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I
deeply regret the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999 to
refuse its consent to ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve
several United States national security interests by
prohibiting all nuclear explosions. It will constrain the
development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons,
make the development of advanced new types of weapons much more
difficult, contribute to the prevention of nuclear
proliferation and the process of nuclear disarmament, and
strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT marks a
historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
and to build a safer world. For these reasons, we hope that at
an appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider this treaty in
a manner that will ensure a thorough hearing process and a
comprehensive debate.
The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize
implementation of NPT Article III.2 to ensure that IAEA
safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states
of (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material. The relative
informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the
lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more
difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
At the March 2000 meeting, the Committee approved the
Chairman's report of Committee activities to the 2000 NPT
Review Conference (REVCON). The Committee also agreed to
continue consideration of possible future adoption of a policy
of requiring full-scope safeguards (acceptance by a nation of
IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities) as a condition
of supply to non-nuclear weapon states. The Committee agreed to
an informal meeting with IAEA staff to discuss procedures for
keeping the Agency informed on Trigger List changes and the
rationale for such changes, since the Agency uses the Zangger
Trigger List as a reference document.
During the past year, two new members have joined the
Zangger Committee--Turkey in October 1999 and Slovenia in March
2000.
With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is
a widely accepted mature, and effective export-control
arrangement. The NSG Guidelines go beyond the charter of the
Zangger Committee and allow the NSG to control nuclear-related
dual-use equipment and materials as well as technology related
to both nuclear and dual-use equipment. The NSG has also
established a policy of requiring non-nuclear weapon states to
accept full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear
cooperation that also goes beyond the requirements of Article
III.2 of the NPT.
NSG membership includes all members of the Zangger
Committee, except China, Turkey and Slovenia, plus non-Zangger
Committee members Brazil, New Zealand and Latvia. China is the
only major nuclear supplier that is not a member of the NSG,
primarily because it has not accepted the NSG policy of
requiring full-scope safeguards as a condition for supply of
nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapon states.
However, China has taken a major step toward harmonization of
its export control system with the NSG Guidelines by the
implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use
equipment and technology.
Turkey and Belarus are expected to be accepted as new NSG
members prior to the 2000 Plenary in France. The NSG is
considering membership requests from Cyprus and Kazakhstan.
The 1999 NSG Plenary meeting in Florence, Italy, inter
alia: (a) established an Implementation Working Group chaired
by the United Kingdom to consider streamlining and
restructuring the NSG; (b) mandated the Transparency Working
Group to prepare a report on NSG activities for presentation at
the 2000 NPT Review Conference by the Italian chair, and (c)
accepted offers by France to host the 2000 Plenary and the
United States to host the 2001 Plenary.
In Vienna meetings during October 1999: (a) Italy chaired
an NSG plenary meeting to confirm agreement to add to the NSG
Trigger List the uranium and plutonium conversion equipment
recently added to the Zangger Trigger List; (b) the
Implementation Issues Working Group began discussion of
restructuring proposals; and (c) the Dual Use Consultations
considered a report from the Swedish-chaired Components Working
Group regarding addition of components to the Dual-Use Regime
Annex.
During early March 2000 meetings in Vienna: (a) the
Netherlands-chaired Transparency Working Group reached
agreement on the report by the NSG Chair to the NPT Review
Conference; (b) Italy chaired a meeting to review the status of
NSG controls over intangible technology; (c) the Implementation
Issues Working Group agreed that restructuring is needed to
strengthen the Plenary and to eliminate the current separate
Dual Use Regime; and (d) the Components Working Group made
progress on a definition of controllable components.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force
and continue to be administered by the Department of Commerce,
in consultation with other agencies, in order to control the
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29,
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC)
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States Signatories
as original States Parties. The United States was among their
number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia
ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party
on December 8, 1997. As of 1 May 2000, 132 countries (including
China, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States
Parties. Three others will become States Parties during May (30
days after they ratified or acceded): Colombia (ratified 4/5/
00); Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (acceded 4/20/00); and
Malaysia (ratified 4/20/00).
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established on
April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located in The Hague, has primary
responsibility (along with States Parties) for implementing the
CWC. It consists of the Conference of States Parties, the
Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The
TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and
presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200
inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and
industrial facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW
has conducted over 600 routine inspections in some 35
countries. Challenge inspections have not yet taken place. To
date, some 200 inspections have been conducted at military
facilities in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent
inspector presence at operational U.S. CW destruction
facilities in Utah, Johnston Island and elsewhere.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs
and risks for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in
chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration
requirements improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons
activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access to
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998
was enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-277). The Administration
published Executive Order 13128 on June 25, 1999, to facilitate
implementation of the Act and published regulations in December
1999 regarding industrial declarations and inspections of
industrial facilities. The Administration submitted Schedule 1
and Schedule 2 industry declarations on April 28, 2000, and
will submit all other declarations by the end of June 2000. The
first industry inspections took place in early May. Submission
of these declarations to the OPCW, and subsequent inspections,
will enable the United States to be fully compliant with the
CWC. This will strengthen United States leadership in the
organization as well as our ability to encourage other States
Parties to make accurate and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
isolated and prohibited by the CWC from trading with States
Parties in certain key chemicals. The relevant treatyprovisions
are specifically designed to penalize countries that refuse to join the
rest of the world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play an active role in
the international effort to reduce the treat from biological
weapons (BW). We actively participate in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG)
of States Parties. The AHG strives to complete a legally
binding protocol to strengthen the 1972 Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC), to
promote compliance and to enhance transparency. This Ad Hoc
Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference (November/December
1996) urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as
possible but no later than the next BWC Review Conference in
2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling text through
discussion of national views and clarification of existing
text. Although major differences in national views persist
concerning such substantive areas as on-site activities, export
controls, declarations and technical assistance provisions, the
United States remains committed to the objective agreed to in
the 1996 Review Conference.
I announced in my 1998 State of the Union Address that the
United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect
stronger international barriers against the proliferation and
use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new international
means to detect and deter cheating. The United States
Government is working closely with industry representatives to
obtain technical input relevant to the development of U.S.
negotiating positions and then to reach international agreement
on data declarations and on-site investigations.
The United States continues to be a leading participant in
the 30-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological
weapons (CBW) nonproliferation regime. The United States
attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October
4-8, 1999, during which the Group reaffirmed the members'
continued collective belief in the AG's viability, importance
and compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members continue to
agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments
will be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on
chemical and biological weapons, and that all states adhering
to these Conventions must take steps to ensure that their
national activities support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary,
the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG export
controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW
terrorism. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue
its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries,
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of
national policies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to be
more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC
contexts.
During the last six months, we continued to examine closely
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material
and technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were
reached during this reporting period. The United States also
continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues carefully to control exports
that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons
of mass destruction, and closely to monitor activities of
potential missile proliferation concern. We also continue to
implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In April 2000 we imposed
sanctions against a North Korean entity and four Iranian
entities for missile proliferation activities. These sanctions
followed March 1999 missile sanctions against three Middle
Eastern entities.
During this reporting period, Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Partners continued to share information about
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control
systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of
missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs
of concern.
In March the United States participated in the MTCR's
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR
Partners held in depth discussions on various proposals for
better addressing the global missile proliferation threat.
During this reporting period, the United States continued
to work unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR
Partnersto combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to
export responsibility and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my
last report, we continued our missile nonproliferation dialogues with
China, India, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and North Korea (DPRK).
Regular discussions with Pakistan at the senior and expert levels have
not proceeded since the coup. However, we have remained engaged at the
diplomatic level and I addressed our nonproliferation concerns during
my visit to Pakistan in March. In the course of normal diplomatic
relations we also have pursued such discussions with other countries in
Central Europe, South Asia and the Middle East.
In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth
round of missile talks. We stated our strong opposition to
North Korea's destabilizing missile development and export
activities and pressed for tight constraints on DPRK missile
development, testing and exports. We affirmed that the United
States viewed further launches of long-range missiles and
transfers of long-range missiles or technology for such
missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the
United States itself. We subsequently reiterated that message
at every available opportunity. In particular, we reminded the
DPRK of the consequences of another rocket launch and
encouraged it not to take such action. We also urged the DPRK
to take steps towards building a constructive bilateral
relationship with the United States.
These efforts resulted in an important first step. Since
September 1999, it has been our understanding that the DPRK
will refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind
during our discussions to improve relations. In recognition of
this DPRK step, the U.S. has announced the intention to ease
certain sanctions related to the import and export of many
consumer goods.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's
missile and nuclear development programs, the United States
pursued high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways
to work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to
Iran's ballistic missile development program. During this
reporting period, Russia's government created institutional
foundations to implement a newly enacted nonproliferation
policy and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also passed new
export control legislation to tighten government control over
sensitive technologies and began working with the United States
to strengthen export control practices at Russian aerospace
firms. However, despite the Russian government's
nonproliferation and export control efforts, some Russian
entities continued to cooperate with Iran's ballistic missile
program and to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran beyond
the Bushehr Unit 1 nuclear power reactor project.
Consistent with the Russian Government's April 1999
announcement of administrative action against the Rector of
Baltic State Technical University (BSTU) for his involvement in
training Iranian specialists at BSTU, and following our own
assessment, the United States announced on April 24, 2000, that
it intends to impose trade and administrative penalties on the
rector for his involvement with the Iranian missile program. At
the same time, the United States also announced its intention
to remove restrictions imposed in July 1998 on two Russian
entities--INOR and Polyus--which have ceased the proliferant
behavior that led to the imposition of penalties. However,
trade penalties imposed in July 1998 against five other Russian
entities and in January 1999 against three additional entities
remain in effect.
Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls
U.S. national export controls--both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those
implemented unilaterally--play an important part in impeding
the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (As used here ``export
controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case review of
certain exports, or limitations on exports of particular items
of proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather than
broad embargoes or economic sanctions that also affect trade.)
As noted in this report, however, export controls are only one
of a number of tools the U.S. uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation norms,
informal multilateral regimes, interdictions of shipments of
proliferation concern, sanctions, export control assistance,
redirection and elimination efforts, and robust U.S. military,
intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities all work in
conjunction with export controls as part of our overall
nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment
and technology from other countries. Proliferators look to
other sources because needed items are unavailable within
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported items
can be operated more quickly and cheaply than domestically
produced ones. It is important to note that proliferators
seekfor their programs both items on multilateral lists (like
gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas ingredients on
the Australia Group list) and unlisted items (like lower-level machine
tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of the items of
interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, key
ingredients and technologies used in the production of fertilizers and
pesticides also can be used to make chemical weapons; bio-production
technology can be used to produce biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
even denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or
technology for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large
part, U.S. national export controls--and similar controls of
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control
Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have denied proliferators
access to the largest sources of the best equipment and
technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have
forced proliferators to engage in complex clandestine
procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking time and
money away from WMD/missile programs.
U.S. national export controls and those of our regime
partners also have played an important leadership role,
increasing over time the critical mass of countries applying
nonproliferation export controls. For example, progress on the
following would have been impossible without the leadership
shown by U.S. willingness to be the first to apply controls:
the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member countries;
several nonmember countries have committed unilaterally to
apply export controls consistent with one or more of the
regimes; and most of the members of the nonproliferation
regimes have applied national ``catch all'' controls similar to
those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative.
(Export controls normally are tied to a specific list of items,
such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch all'' controls provide a legal
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when those
items are destined for WMD/missile programs.)
U.S. export controls, especially ``catch all'' controls,
also make important political and moral contributions to the
nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal
obligations the United States has undertaken in the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological Weapons
Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention
(Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities.
They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' on
WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and
our friends and interests overseas. They place the United
States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent
proliferation from the United States itself.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
dual-use export to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation regimes, for example,
has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make
an export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons
and notified to the rest--unless it first consults with the
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for
exporters.
Threat Reduction
The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system
expertise has increased in part as a consequence of the
economic crisis in Russia and other NIS. The Administration
gives high priority to controlling the human dimension of
proliferation through programs that support the transition of
former Soviet weapons scientists to civilian research and
technology development activities. I have proposed an
additional $4.5 billion for programs embodied in the Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) that would support
activities in four areas over FYs 2000-2004; nuclear security;
non-nuclear WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and
military relocation, stabilization and other security
cooperation programs. Of the $1 billion Congressional ETRI
request for FY 2000, an estimated $888 million is available:
State ($182 million), Energy ($293 million) and Defense ($467
million). We are seeking $974 million in FY2001.
Expenses
Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from
November 14, 1999 through May 15, 2000.