[House Document 106-231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-231
PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS IN BOSNIA
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON PROGRESS MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE
PEACE PROCESS
May 2, 2000.--Referred jointly to the Committee on International
Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, April 19, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: As required by section 7 of the 1998
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law
105-174) (the Levin Amendment), and section 1203 of the Strom
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 (Public
Law 105-261), I transmit herewith a report on progress made
toward achieving benchmarks for a sustainable peace process.
In July 1999, I sent the second semiannual report to the
Congress under Public Law 105-174, detailing progress towards
achieving the 10 benchmarks adopted by the Peace Implementation
Council (PIC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for
evaluating implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. This
report provides an updated assessment of progress on the
benchmarks covering the period from July 1 through December 31,
1999.
In addition to the semiannual reporting requirement of
Public Law 105-174, this report fulfills the requirements of
section 1203 in connection with my Administration's request for
funds for FY 2001.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.
Report to Congress on Progress Toward Achieving Benchmarks in Bosnia
This document is divided into two parts, corresponding to
two separate Congressional reporting requirements concerning
SFOR operations and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH). Part I responds to the requirements of section 7 of
Public Law 105-174 and outlines the latest developments in our
continuing efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Part II responds to the supplementary reporting
requirements contained in section 1203(a) of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I am submitting
these two reports in a single document in order to afford
Congress a broad and comprehensive assessment of recent
developments in BiH.
part i
The United States has strong national interests in
fostering security and stability in Southeastern Europe. To
that end, working with our Allies and Partners, we are making
steady, but uneven, progress in helping BiH on its way to
political and economic recovery. On July 30, I joined more than
40 other world leaders in Sarajevo as the three members of the
BiH Joint Presidency hosted the first Summit of the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe. We have worked hard to maintain
the cooperative momentum this important event generated. In
November, Bosnia's three co-Presidents appeared together before
the U.N. Security Council to issue the New York Declaration, in
which they committed to joint efforts to resolve several
persistently troublesome areas of peace implementation. Active
engagement by the international community, led by the United
States and our partners in the PIC, will be needed to remove
other obstacles in the months ahead. Our goal is to foster
circumstances that allow the people of BiH to assume
stewardship of a self-sustaining peace process leading to full
integration of BiH into the family of European democracies.
The following evaluation provides a detailed account of
progress achieved over the reporting period. Basic structures
of government now in place are slowly extending their reach,
and Dayton-mandated central institutions function with
increased, but still very limited, effectiveness. The United
Nations has begun training multi-ethnic State Border Service,
and multi-ethnic police units are being formed for deployment
in support of UN operations in East Timor. In addition, Bosnia
will assume control of its upper airspace in 2000. Over the
past six months, there has also been increased awareness and
concern in the international community at deep-rooted
corruption throughout BiH, which impedes Dayton implementation
and economic growth. The international community has
intensified support for increased independence of the still-
fragile BiH police force and judicial system and has carried
out direct action against corrupt government and business
officials. Nevertheless, there remains much room to improve
these institutions and prepare them to contribute to
establishing a truly multi-ethnic state.
Many political figures remain committed to mono-ethnic,
anti-Dayton visions of the future, and resist taking steps that
would ensure a European future for a multi-ethic BiH. Key
indicted war criminals remain at large, poisoning the
environment in which peace is taking root. The rate of minority
refugee returns, though improved, remains less than
satisfactory, and many needed economic and judicial reforms are
still pending. In November, the High Representative dismissed
22 officials from all three ethnic groups found to be at fault
for obstructing Dayton implementation. In October, the Serb
Radical Party refused to meet the requirements for registration
laid down by the OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission, thus
decertifying themselves for the April 2000 municipal elections.
Further forceful international community action will be needed
to eliminate the influence of discredited opponents of the
Dayton process.
A benchmark-by-benchmark analysis of the current situation
follows:
1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire.
Since the July 1999 assessment, and despite events in Kosovo,
BiH continues to be relatively calm. NATO deemed the security
environment in Bosnia sufficiently improved to undertake
substantial cuts in SFOR's total troop strength, which will
reduce SFOR personnel by about one-third, to 19,000, by April
2000. Current plans are to reduce the U.S. component by about
25 percent by April 2000, which means the United States would
contribute about 25 percent of SFOR strength in Bosnia. As of
December 31, 1999, approximately half of the planned drawdown
from 32,000 to 19,000 troops was accomplished. As a result of
this drawdown, local commanders have to cover their assigned
areas with fewer forces, which may in some cases be located
farther from potential trouble areas. Nonetheless, SFOR's new
operational concept compensates for the reduction in troop
numbers through enhanced flexibility and permits
therestructured force to accomplish its mission with the same overall
effectiveness.
Progress has resumed towards increasing mutual confidence
between the entity armed forces (EAFs). There was a temporary
setback in this cooperation in the Republika Srpska (RS)
following the arrest on a war crimes indictment of RS Army
(VRS) Chief of Staff Talic in August in Vienna. However, VRS
cooperation with SFOR improved significantly in November. The
Office of the High Representative (OHR), OSCE, and SFOR have
cooperated closely to increase the professionalism and
education of the EAFs. The EAFs have agreed to formulate a
common Bosnian security policy as a first step towards creating
a state dimension of defense. The permanent secretariat for the
Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) was established
in July, and has assumed an important role in coordinating
actions of the EAFs at the policy level. In addition to working
on the common security policy, the SCMM secretariat has
assisted in planning for reduction of the EAFs' budgets and
military personnel by 15 percent. This drawdown was underway at
year's end. Final reporting on this drawdown has not yet been
received. Steps are being taken to establish a small joint unit
to participate in international peacekeeping missions.
2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured
and democratic police force in the Federation and RS. There are
slow but consistent signs of reform in both entities. Closely
monitored by the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF),
better-equipped, better-trained, and more professional law
enforcement officers are increasingly able to work together
across ethnic lines and under civilian control. Internal
affairs units in the cantonal interior ministries and in the RS
are exhibiting higher professional standards and ensuring
greater personal accountability. Minority representation at the
entities' police academies, the integration of the Brcko
police, and in particular, the commitment to a single State
Border Service have accelerated multi-ethnic policing. As
demonstrated by the necessity of SFOR's operation against anti-
Dayton elements in Mostar in October (Operation Westar),
Bosnian police forces remain subject to political influence and
are dependent on international community assistance to combat
organized crime, civil disorder, narcotics trafficking, ethnic
violence, and public sector corruption. The U.N. Mission in BiH
(UNMIBH) is undertaking intensive audits of local police
administration and operations and vigorously enforcing non-
compliance and decertification policies.
3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform
program. Structural and political obstacles still obstruct
effective law enforcement and impartial justice, but key steps
forward were taken during the past six months. In July, OHR
issued a Comprehensive Judicial Reform Strategy for BiH that
complements the earlier-issued anti-corruption strategy. In
June, Codes of Ethnics for Judges and Prosecutors were adopted
by judicial associations in both entities. In August, OHR
imposed laws strengthening the Federation Prosecutor's Office,
establishing a Federation court to try inter-cantonal crime,
terrorism, and organized crime and providing witness identity
protection in sensitive Federation cases. In September, a
single multi-ethnic court was established in Canton 7, where
parallel mono-ethnic courts had previously existed. The U.N.
Mission in BiH's Judicial System Assessment Program issued two
new reports detailing judicial reform priorities. Criminal law
training continued in the Federation. The OHR strategy
identifies critical next steps, many of which continue to meet
political resistance. Sustained international community support
is crucial to carry these initiatives through.
4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption.
Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. The
international community acted against anti-Dayton individuals
and institutions, but anti-Dayton elements remain influential.
Organized crime, public sector corruption, and parallel
institutions undermine economic reform, deter refugee returns,
and preclude political reconciliation. Under pressure from the
international community, Bosnian agencies have taken a more
active role, particularly in the banking sector, and local
authorities are pursuing a number of high-profile corruption
cases, notably against officials in Tuzla canton. As
demonstrated by SFOR action against anti-Dayton elements in
Mostar, the international community will be the key player over
the short term in providing a secure environment and a
practical framework for steps by Bosnian authorities in the
future. Significant progress was made towards establishing a
consensual international community strategy to combat
corruption with the creation of OHR's Anti-corruption and
Transparency (ACT) Group. The interagency Frowick Anti-
corruption Task Force (FACT) provides a valuable U.S.
Government contribution that specifically addresses corruption
issues. The international community will continue its efforts
to turn over responsibility for basic elements of governance to
the Bosnian leadership.
5. Media Reform. Aim: A regulated, independent, and
democratic media. The international community took several
important steps in the past six months to advance media reform.
The Independent Media Commission (IMC) initiated a six-month
provisional licensing program for all television and radio
broadcasters. For the first time since before the war, all
broadcasters operate in a regulated environment subject to
financial and operational sanctions if they break IMC
guidelines on fairness and objectivity. At the same time, the
High Representatives imposed decisions to restructure
Federation-based RTV-BiH into Federation TV and PBS-BiH, to
reform SRT-TV in Banja Luka (now known as RTRS), and to force
the pro-HDZ Erotel network to accept IMC authority and cease
all Croatian Government HRT-TV rebroadcasts in Bosnia, except
as permitted by the IMC. While there has been resistance to all
these measures, they are moving forward. In 2000, a new long-
term licensing program is expected to reduce the number of
Bosnian broadcasters dramatically. Internationally supported
OBN TV and Radio Fern continue to broadcast objective news and
information nationwide. The majority of media outlets are
subject to political and economic influence from (or controlled
outright by) political parties and elected officials, but
compared to two years ago, there is less ethnic hatred voiced
in the media. Overall professionalism has improved marginally,
due in part to U.S. Government-funded training programs.
However, Bosnian media still does not meet international
standards of professional and objective journalism.
6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National
democratic institutions and practices. At the State level, all
Dayton-mandated central institutions meet regularly, but their
effectiveness could be enhanced. The Joint Presidency agreed in
New York to create a joint secretariat to make its work more
efficient and to increase funding for the three under-funded
State ministries. Pursuant to the New York Declaration, the
Joint Presidents submitted a law to Parliament November 24 to
establish a State Border Service (a combination Border Patrol/
INS-type agency). This would be the first multi-ethnic armed
force under central government control. The Joint Presidents
also undertook some foreign visits together. There is
resistance, particularly from the Serb side, to investing these
State institutions with real power, as they view an increase in
State power as an infringement on entity prerogatives. Within
the Federation, potential use of the National Interest Clause
continues to render the parliamentary process slow and often
ineffective. The national Parliament has begun discussions on
the OSCE-drafted election law, which must be passed early in
the year in order for national elections to proceed on October
7. The OSCE remains responsible for administering the April
municipal elections and has already introduced aspects of the
proposed law, which should make candidates and parties more
accountable. Enforcement efforts by OSCE and OHR are supported
by SFOR's continued contribution to a secure and stable
environment, in which State and entity institutions can
function and democratic elections can take place.
7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-Market reform. Progress
has been slow. However, Bosnia has been accepted for WTO
observer status. There is now a common customs regime in place
in both entities, and the new Bosnia Konvertible Marka currency
is accepted throughout BiR. Moreover, first steps have been
taken to replace the communist-era payments bureaus in the
Federation and the RS. Both entities are making progress on
harmonized investment laws, and banks are better regulated.
These reforms, combined with donor assistance, enabled
continued growth during 1999, despite fallout from the Kosovo
conflict. Significant problems remain. Privatization has been
hampered by entity governments and enterprise managers seeking
political and financial gain. The Federation enacted a labor
law, against the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, which
will burden companies with so much debt that privatization will
be difficult, if not impossible, in the short run. Bank reform
is also proceeding at a much slower pace than hoped. The lack
of commitment to structural reforms and to establishing a fair
and independent judiciary has prevented Bosnia from enjoying
any significant level of domestic or foreign investment.
8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A
functioning and orderly minority return process. This period
saw a sharp increase in minority refugees returning to a pre-
war homes, especially in hard-line areas in the RS, a cause for
cautious optimism. Surprisingly few acts of violence
accompanied these returns. SFOR's support in contributing to a
secure environment was critical. Over 23,000 minority DPREs
were registered by UNHCR as returnees in 1999, double the
number for 1998. Some organizations estimate an additional 20-
30,000 minority DPREs returned but did not register. These
figures are all the more remarkable because they include a
slowdown in the first six months of 1999 due to the Kosovo
conflict. Many of these increased refugee return movements were
to isolated, destroyed rural villages, where individuals have
taken advantage of improved security conditions provided by
SFOR to begin rebuilding while awaiting international
assistance. Lack ofassistance funds for shelter repair is the
greatest obstacle to sustaining these returns. The U.S. Department of
State made available an additional $2.3 million and the Department of
Agriculture $1.7 million to help these so-called ``spontaneous''
returnees. The High Representative used U.S. assistance as a catalyst
to call for aid from other donors, with the impressive result of an
additional $7 million. However, returns to contested property remain
slow, particularly in large cities. The High Representative imposed new
property legislation in both the RS and Federation in October,
providing a legal framework for return to occupied housing. On average,
only 10 percent of occupied property claims have been decided, and
fewer of these decisions have been implemented. The lack of progress
can be blamed on hard-line politicians and shortages of resources for
housing and return offices. This problem is particularly acute in West
Mostar and Banja Luka, The late-November firing of 22 municipal
officials, most of whom resisted minority refugee returns, should ease
this obstructionism. Although security is no longer the primary concern
of most returnees, the issues of employment and education have become
increasingly important to sustaining returns.
9. Brcko. Aim: Implementation of the Brcko Final Award. The
Award, which addresses a key unresolved issue from Dayton,
establishes a neutral, multi-ethnic district. Annexes released
August 18 provide details of government structure and overall
implementation. The December 7 release of the Brcko district
statue (constitution) breaks significant new ground, as it
contains minimal ethnic criteria and no vital interest clauses.
Progress has been made in Brcko with virtually no violent
opposition. Freedom of movement has been established, a multi-
ethnic police force has been created, and an inter-ethnic
municipal assembly functions. Brcko has had significant
minority refugee/DPRE returns to outlying villages. In December
the Supervisor began programmed evictions of certain Bosnian
Serbs from occupied homes in Brcko town. Bosnian Serbs, who
initially opposed the Award, are now grudgingly accepting the
concept of Brcko as a special district. They may, however
challenge aspects of the statute in the Bosnian constitutional
court. Final demilitarization of entity armed forces in the
area is scheduled to be accomplished by the end of February
2000. SFOR support remains crucial to deterring violent
attempts by hard liners to disrupt Brcko implementation.
10. Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim:
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to
The Hague for trial. Thus far 43 PIFWCs have been transferred
to The Hague for trial under open and sealed indictments.
Acting within its mandate, SFOR has assisted in the transfer of
32 indictees to the Hague and continues to support ICTY field
investigations in Bosnia. The most recently captured indictees,
Radomir Kovac, Damir Dosen, Radoslav Brdjanin, RS Army Chief of
Staff Momir Talic, Stanislav Galic, and Zoran Vukovic now await
trial. Brdjanin (July 6), Kovac (August 2), Dosen (October 25),
Galic (December 20), and Vukovic (December 24) were detained by
SFOR in Bosnia. Cooperation from the parties, who are
responsible for apprehending and turning over PIFWCs to ICTY,
continues to vary widely; RS Prime Minister Dodik has expressed
full support for the arrest of indictees, but Bosnian Serb
extremists continue to oppose action against PIFWCs in the RS.
The RS Interior Minister has reportedly denied his Ministry's
responsibility to execute ICTY warrants, while HDZ government
and party officials in BiH have openly supported Croat
indictees. (This may change, as democratic reforms in Croatia
under a new government will likely have a positive impact in
the Croatian community in Bosnia.)
The United States considers apprehension and detention of
Serb PIFWCs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to be of the
highest priority in serving the interest of justice and
facilitating Dayton implementation. Their efforts to avoid
apprehension. Their efforts to avoid apprehension sustains
Bosnian Serb extremism, frustrates the Bosniak and Croat
communities, undermines the credibility of the international
community, and erodes the Rule of Law.
Conclusion. In my July report, I emphasized the critical
role SFOR plays in supporting the secure environment needed for
democratic principles and free-market reforms to take root and
grow. That role is no less essential today and has been noted
in several places in this report. Progress on security and
military stabilization has reduced our force requirements.
However, the need to firmly establish such key democratic
values as transparency, tolerance, and public accountability
requires the continued commitment of the international
community, which SFOR supports, until the nascent institutions
of Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully capable of confronting such
transnational threats as terrorism and the drug trade. The
prospect of democratic change in two neighboring states--
Croatia and the FRY--increases the likelihood of medium and
long-term improvement, but associated instability and cross-
border political manipulation pose significant threats in the
short term. Over the past six months significant steps were
taken by the international community that in the past might
have been metwith strenuous or even violent opposition. The
absence of such a response suggests a qualitative improvement in the
overall situation. At the same time, however, nationalist politicians,
organized crime, and secret police, paramilitary, and ethnic-based
intelligence organizations remain entrenched opponents of the Dayton
peace agreement and major obstacles to more rapid progress.
part ii
Section 1203(a) of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense
Authorization Act requires submission of a semiannual report to
Congress as long as United States ground combat forces continue
to participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This report
supplements the ``Bosnia Benchmarks'' report required by Public
Law 105-174 and is therefore submitted here in conjunction with
that report. Where possible, when the requirements overlap, I
have sought to avoid duplication in the two reports. The
numbered responses that follow correspond to specific numbered
reporting requirements contained in section 1203(b).
1. Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Although no specific timetable has been
established for complete withdrawal of U.S. force structure
from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the size of the U.S.
military footprint has been continually evaluated and reduced
as appropriate. The six-month reviews include compliance by the
parties with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the security
situation, progress towards achievement of identified
benchmarks, and any recommendations on changes in the level of
support to civilian implementation agencies or changes to the
overall mission.
The North Atlantic Council approved SFOR restructuring on
October 25, 1999. National Military Authorities have been
tasked to begin implementation of OPLAN 10407 (Revised),
``JOINT FORGE--For the Continued Stabilization of the Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.'' restructuring is to be completed by April
2000. U.S. force strength will drop from 6,200 to roughly
4,600; a significant reduction from the peak U.S. deployment of
20,000 in 1996. SFOR's revised concept is based on enhanced
operational agility and centers on the ability of forces to
respond quickly throughout the SFOR Area of Responsibility. It
requires that assigned forces be able to conduct operations
across command boundaries. The continuing role of SFOR is to
deter the renewed outbreak of hostilities and civil unrest and
to reinforce the tenets of the Dayton Agreement, thereby
enabling SFOR and the international community to work toward
the desired ``end state''--a self-sustaining peace not
requiring the presence of a NATO-led multinational military
force. SFOR will continue to accomplish all key military tasks
but in reduced depth and frequency. It will provide focused
support to civil implementation, within means and capabilities.
2. Percentage of benchmarks completed: No benchmark has
been entirely fulfilled to date, nor would I expect any of them
to be completed in the next reporting period. However, there
has been substantial progress over the last six months towards
completing all of the benchmarks, as described in Part I of
this report.
3. Status of the NATO ``force of gendarmes:'' The
Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) continues to be an SFOR
success story. It has proven to be a highly effective tool for
fulfilling SFOR's million of contributing to a stable and
peaceful environment for Dayton implementation. The MSU is
praised by civilian agencies, and COMSFOR and his zone
commanders rely heavily on it for gathering information and as
the force of choice to address civil disturbances. SACEUR has
described the MSU as a major force multiplier. The MSU operates
under an Italian Carabinieri Commander. Italy provides roughly
360 personnel and oversees certification of specialized units
from other contributing countries, currently including
Slovenia, Romania, and Argentina. SACEUR is soliciting
contributions to form a second MSU battalion (approximately 380
personnel).
4. Military and nonmilitary missions directed by the
President for U.S. forces in BiH: The U.S. Government supported
the decision of the North Atlantic Council to task COMSFOR,
through SACEUR, with the mission of providing a continued
military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities,
contribute to a secure environment, and help to stabilize the
peace.
Key military tasks:
Maintain a deterrent military presence.
Ensure continued compliance with the military
aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).
Operate Joint Military Commissions (JMC) at
appropriate levels.
Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a
secure environment in which the international
civilorganizations and the parties to the GFAP can carry out their
responsibilities under the agreement.
Ensure force protection and freedom of movement
for SFOR.
Monitor Entity Armed Forces activities and inspect
Weapons Storage Sites within capabilities and in close
coordination with relevant international organizations.
Be prepared to coordinate turnover of
responsibility for Airspace Management/Control to the BiH
Department of Civil Aviation when directed.
Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of
SFOR:
Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the
Office of the High Representative in implementing the civil
aspects of the GFAP.
Support the implementation of the Brcko
Arbitration decision.
Support the conduct of elections and installation
of elected officials.
Support the return of displaced persons and
refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but
not forcibly returning them or undertaking to guard individual
locations.
Support the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and efforts against persons
indicated for war crimes.
Support the OHR and International Police Task
Force (IPTF) on a case-by-case basis in assisting local police,
providing back-up and contributing to a secure operating
environment, without undertaking civil police tasks.
Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the
OSCE in implementing Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional
Stabilization) of the GFAP in BiH.
Support the continued development of the Standing
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM).
With regard to specific issues raised under reporting
requirement 4:
(A) Persons Indicted for War Crimes: SFOR remains the only
actor in Bosnia that continues to detain PIFWCs. However, SFOR
is not a police force and does not actively pursue, locate, or
arrest PIFWCs. It will continue to detain PIFWCs in accordance
with its mandate and rules of engagement and provide detainees
safe passage to the Hague. (See also Part I, Benchmark 10.)
(B) Support to civilian police functions: So long as
organized opposition to Dayton continues, the OHR, United
Nations, and other international organizations involved in
civil implementation will rely on SFOR to contribute to a
secure environment and to provide back-up in case of civil
unrest fostered by Dayton opponents. (See also Part I,
Benchmarks 2, 3, 4.)
(C) Resettlement return of refugees: Support for the return
of displaced persons and refugees by contributing to a secure
and stable environment remains a key supporting task for SFOR.
(See also Part I, Benchmark 8.)
(D) Support to local and international authorities:
Elections. Open and transparent elections, the foundation
for democratic governance, are being supported by SFOR's
contribution to a secure and stable environment in which the
Parliamentary Assemblies at the State and Entity levels can
function and in which democratic elections may take place. (See
Part I, Benchmark 6.)
Media. SFOR continues to enforce the standards of media
reform and the efforts and initiatives of the Independent Media
Commission. (See Part I, Benchmark 5.)
Brcko. The effective date for the new district to come into
being will be decided by the Supervisor, when he is satisfied
that both entities have delegated their governance powers to
the district government. The RS military will retain the right
to transit through Brcko with SFOR's approval. SFOR has
prepared for any eventuality by increasing force protection
awareness and establishing several new checkpoints along roads
leading to Brcko, Bijeljina and other areas of the RS. RS
military forces in Brcko were granted an extension for
departure until February 25, 2000, when security for the
district's citizens will be jointly guaranteed by SFOR and the
new Multi-Ethnic Police. (See Part I, Benchmark 9.)
5. Assessment of threats to the United States forces: The
risk of a return to open hostilities is currently assessed as
minimal, as long as a credible SFOR remains deployed. The
latest Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) study
concludes that the most likely, though remote, scenario
formilitary action would arise from a local problem escalating rapidly
beyond the capacity of containment by local police. This could, in
turn, draw in Entity Armed Forces, which would require an immediate and
firm response by SFOR to prevent further escalation. The EAFs remain in
overall compliance with the provisions of the GFAP. As part of its
ongoing mission, SFOR continues to conduct no-notice weapons storage
site inspections and observes EAF training and movement activities. No
major instances of non-compliance have been reported by SFOR.
6. Assessment of costs: Since FY 1996, the cost of the
Department of Defense of the military missions that I directed
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been about $8.3 billion. These
costs are summarized below (in millions):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal year
Operation ---------------------------------------------------
1999 actual 1998 actual 1997 actual 1996 actual
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberate Forge............................................ 141.4 159.4 183.3 225.9
Joint Forge................................................. 1,382.5 1,792.8 ........... ...........
IFOR/IFOR Prep.............................................. ........... ........... 2,087.5 2,231.7
Provide Promise............................................. ........... ........... ........... 21.7
Sharp Guard................................................. ........... ........... ........... 9.3
Able Sentry................................................. 14.0 10.5 11.7 30.9
UNCRO....................................................... ........... ........... ........... 0.5
---------------------------------------------------
Totals................................................ 1,537.9 1,962.7 2,282.5 2,520.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight,
Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations
for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.
Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate
Force, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation
to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a
secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil
authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
IFOR Preparation and IFOR included the costs of preparing
U.S. forces for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace
implementation force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that
airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.
Operation Sharp Guard enforced the United Nations-
sanctioned embargo against the FRY (excluding the enforcement
of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction
with Western Europe Union forces.
Operation Abel Sentry was U.S. participation in the United
Nations preventive deployment along the Serbian/Macedonian
border (UNPREDEP).
UNCRO was support provided to the Zagreb hospital in
support of the United Nations in Croatia.
For FY 1999, the actual costs for U.S. operations in Bosnia
were $1.5 billion. A detailed breakout of these costs follows:
ACTUAL FY 1999 DoD BOSNIA COSTS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberate
Able sentry Joint forge forge Totals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Personnel:
Army.................................................... 2.8 127.0 ........... 129.8
Navy.................................................... ........... 8.3 1.3 9.6
Marine Corps............................................ ........... 2.6 ........... 2.2
Air Force............................................... ........... 28.4 ........... 28.4
Navy Reserve............................................ ........... .2 ........... .2
---------------------------------------------------
Total................................................. 2.8 166.5 1.3 170.6
===================================================
Operations & Maintenance:
Army.................................................... 11.2 1,052.8 ........... 1,064.0
Navy.................................................... ........... 13.5 35.5 49.0
Marine Corps............................................ ........... 2.1 .1 2.2
Air Force............................................... ........... 87.8 104.3 192.1
Defense-Wide............................................ ........... 47.6 0.2 47.8
Defense Health Program.................................. ........... 12.2 ........... 12.2
Navy Reserve............................................ ........... ........... ........... 0
---------------------------------------------------
Total................................................. 11.2 1,216.0 140.1 1,367.3
===================================================
Grand Total........................................... 14.0 1,382.5 141.4 1,537.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) Status of future operations plans: As these two reports
indicate, there has been a continued, gradual improvement in
all aspects of civil implementation and the security situation
in Bosnia during the reporting period. The RS did not openly
support Serbia during the Kosovo air campaign, and we saw last
March that violent reactions to the final Brcko arbitration
decision and to the removal by the High Representative of the
anti-Dayton RS President were relatively minimal. With
assistance from SFOR and full international engagement with
local authorities, Sarajevo and the BiH government successfully
hosted the Leaders Summit of the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe on July 30. Increasing flows of returning
refugees and internally displaced persons continue to occur,
and nation-wide municipal elections are scheduled for the
spring of 2000. As Bosnia slowly moves toward normalcy and as
its leaders and citizens take on greater responsibility for
implementing all aspects of the agreement, the requirement for
an overwhelming NATO presence should diminish. The SFOR
Transition Strategy, reaffirmed in a revision of OPLAN 10407,
provides for a deliberate, responsible reduction of forces
based on civil implementation progress. The current reduction
and restructuring of SFOR forces, including U.S. forces,
reflects an ongoing assessment at NATO and in Washington that
the threat of a resumption of hostilities by the Entity Armed
Forces remains low. NATO will continue to evaluate its presence
and the forces required based on these elements. Continued U.S.
presence and leadership in this force will remain a critical
element of its success.
In conclusion, the Administration is grateful for the
support of Congress for Dayton implementation. I look forward
to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuit of U.S.
foreign policy goals in the Balkans.