[House Document 106-231]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-231


 
             PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS IN BOSNIA

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON PROGRESS MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
                             PEACE PROCESS




   May 2, 2000.--Referred jointly to the Committee on International 
Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services and ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                        Washington, April 19, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: As required by section 7 of the 1998 
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 
105-174) (the Levin Amendment), and section 1203 of the Strom 
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 (Public 
Law 105-261), I transmit herewith a report on progress made 
toward achieving benchmarks for a sustainable peace process.
    In July 1999, I sent the second semiannual report to the 
Congress under Public Law 105-174, detailing progress towards 
achieving the 10 benchmarks adopted by the Peace Implementation 
Council (PIC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for 
evaluating implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. This 
report provides an updated assessment of progress on the 
benchmarks covering the period from July 1 through December 31, 
1999.
    In addition to the semiannual reporting requirement of 
Public Law 105-174, this report fulfills the requirements of 
section 1203 in connection with my Administration's request for 
funds for FY 2001.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.
  Report to Congress on Progress Toward Achieving Benchmarks in Bosnia

    This document is divided into two parts, corresponding to 
two separate Congressional reporting requirements concerning 
SFOR operations and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH). Part I responds to the requirements of section 7 of 
Public Law 105-174 and outlines the latest developments in our 
continuing efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Part II responds to the supplementary reporting 
requirements contained in section 1203(a) of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I am submitting 
these two reports in a single document in order to afford 
Congress a broad and comprehensive assessment of recent 
developments in BiH.

                                 part i

    The United States has strong national interests in 
fostering security and stability in Southeastern Europe. To 
that end, working with our Allies and Partners, we are making 
steady, but uneven, progress in helping BiH on its way to 
political and economic recovery. On July 30, I joined more than 
40 other world leaders in Sarajevo as the three members of the 
BiH Joint Presidency hosted the first Summit of the Stability 
Pact for Southeastern Europe. We have worked hard to maintain 
the cooperative momentum this important event generated. In 
November, Bosnia's three co-Presidents appeared together before 
the U.N. Security Council to issue the New York Declaration, in 
which they committed to joint efforts to resolve several 
persistently troublesome areas of peace implementation. Active 
engagement by the international community, led by the United 
States and our partners in the PIC, will be needed to remove 
other obstacles in the months ahead. Our goal is to foster 
circumstances that allow the people of BiH to assume 
stewardship of a self-sustaining peace process leading to full 
integration of BiH into the family of European democracies.
    The following evaluation provides a detailed account of 
progress achieved over the reporting period. Basic structures 
of government now in place are slowly extending their reach, 
and Dayton-mandated central institutions function with 
increased, but still very limited, effectiveness. The United 
Nations has begun training multi-ethnic State Border Service, 
and multi-ethnic police units are being formed for deployment 
in support of UN operations in East Timor. In addition, Bosnia 
will assume control of its upper airspace in 2000. Over the 
past six months, there has also been increased awareness and 
concern in the international community at deep-rooted 
corruption throughout BiH, which impedes Dayton implementation 
and economic growth. The international community has 
intensified support for increased independence of the still-
fragile BiH police force and judicial system and has carried 
out direct action against corrupt government and business 
officials. Nevertheless, there remains much room to improve 
these institutions and prepare them to contribute to 
establishing a truly multi-ethnic state.
    Many political figures remain committed to mono-ethnic, 
anti-Dayton visions of the future, and resist taking steps that 
would ensure a European future for a multi-ethic BiH. Key 
indicted war criminals remain at large, poisoning the 
environment in which peace is taking root. The rate of minority 
refugee returns, though improved, remains less than 
satisfactory, and many needed economic and judicial reforms are 
still pending. In November, the High Representative dismissed 
22 officials from all three ethnic groups found to be at fault 
for obstructing Dayton implementation. In October, the Serb 
Radical Party refused to meet the requirements for registration 
laid down by the OSCE Provisional Electoral Commission, thus 
decertifying themselves for the April 2000 municipal elections. 
Further forceful international community action will be needed 
to eliminate the influence of discredited opponents of the 
Dayton process.
    A benchmark-by-benchmark analysis of the current situation 
follows:
    1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire. 
Since the July 1999 assessment, and despite events in Kosovo, 
BiH continues to be relatively calm. NATO deemed the security 
environment in Bosnia sufficiently improved to undertake 
substantial cuts in SFOR's total troop strength, which will 
reduce SFOR personnel by about one-third, to 19,000, by April 
2000. Current plans are to reduce the U.S. component by about 
25 percent by April 2000, which means the United States would 
contribute about 25 percent of SFOR strength in Bosnia. As of 
December 31, 1999, approximately half of the planned drawdown 
from 32,000 to 19,000 troops was accomplished. As a result of 
this drawdown, local commanders have to cover their assigned 
areas with fewer forces, which may in some cases be located 
farther from potential trouble areas. Nonetheless, SFOR's new 
operational concept compensates for the reduction in troop 
numbers through enhanced flexibility and permits 
therestructured force to accomplish its mission with the same overall 
effectiveness.
    Progress has resumed towards increasing mutual confidence 
between the entity armed forces (EAFs). There was a temporary 
setback in this cooperation in the Republika Srpska (RS) 
following the arrest on a war crimes indictment of RS Army 
(VRS) Chief of Staff Talic in August in Vienna. However, VRS 
cooperation with SFOR improved significantly in November. The 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), OSCE, and SFOR have 
cooperated closely to increase the professionalism and 
education of the EAFs. The EAFs have agreed to formulate a 
common Bosnian security policy as a first step towards creating 
a state dimension of defense. The permanent secretariat for the 
Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) was established 
in July, and has assumed an important role in coordinating 
actions of the EAFs at the policy level. In addition to working 
on the common security policy, the SCMM secretariat has 
assisted in planning for reduction of the EAFs' budgets and 
military personnel by 15 percent. This drawdown was underway at 
year's end. Final reporting on this drawdown has not yet been 
received. Steps are being taken to establish a small joint unit 
to participate in international peacekeeping missions.
    2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured 
and democratic police force in the Federation and RS. There are 
slow but consistent signs of reform in both entities. Closely 
monitored by the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), 
better-equipped, better-trained, and more professional law 
enforcement officers are increasingly able to work together 
across ethnic lines and under civilian control. Internal 
affairs units in the cantonal interior ministries and in the RS 
are exhibiting higher professional standards and ensuring 
greater personal accountability. Minority representation at the 
entities' police academies, the integration of the Brcko 
police, and in particular, the commitment to a single State 
Border Service have accelerated multi-ethnic policing. As 
demonstrated by the necessity of SFOR's operation against anti-
Dayton elements in Mostar in October (Operation Westar), 
Bosnian police forces remain subject to political influence and 
are dependent on international community assistance to combat 
organized crime, civil disorder, narcotics trafficking, ethnic 
violence, and public sector corruption. The U.N. Mission in BiH 
(UNMIBH) is undertaking intensive audits of local police 
administration and operations and vigorously enforcing non-
compliance and decertification policies.
    3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform 
program. Structural and political obstacles still obstruct 
effective law enforcement and impartial justice, but key steps 
forward were taken during the past six months. In July, OHR 
issued a Comprehensive Judicial Reform Strategy for BiH that 
complements the earlier-issued anti-corruption strategy. In 
June, Codes of Ethnics for Judges and Prosecutors were adopted 
by judicial associations in both entities. In August, OHR 
imposed laws strengthening the Federation Prosecutor's Office, 
establishing a Federation court to try inter-cantonal crime, 
terrorism, and organized crime and providing witness identity 
protection in sensitive Federation cases. In September, a 
single multi-ethnic court was established in Canton 7, where 
parallel mono-ethnic courts had previously existed. The U.N. 
Mission in BiH's Judicial System Assessment Program issued two 
new reports detailing judicial reform priorities. Criminal law 
training continued in the Federation. The OHR strategy 
identifies critical next steps, many of which continue to meet 
political resistance. Sustained international community support 
is crucial to carry these initiatives through.
    4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption. 
Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions. The 
international community acted against anti-Dayton individuals 
and institutions, but anti-Dayton elements remain influential. 
Organized crime, public sector corruption, and parallel 
institutions undermine economic reform, deter refugee returns, 
and preclude political reconciliation. Under pressure from the 
international community, Bosnian agencies have taken a more 
active role, particularly in the banking sector, and local 
authorities are pursuing a number of high-profile corruption 
cases, notably against officials in Tuzla canton. As 
demonstrated by SFOR action against anti-Dayton elements in 
Mostar, the international community will be the key player over 
the short term in providing a secure environment and a 
practical framework for steps by Bosnian authorities in the 
future. Significant progress was made towards establishing a 
consensual international community strategy to combat 
corruption with the creation of OHR's Anti-corruption and 
Transparency (ACT) Group. The interagency Frowick Anti-
corruption Task Force (FACT) provides a valuable U.S. 
Government contribution that specifically addresses corruption 
issues. The international community will continue its efforts 
to turn over responsibility for basic elements of governance to 
the Bosnian leadership.
    5. Media Reform. Aim: A regulated, independent, and 
democratic media. The international community took several 
important steps in the past six months to advance media reform. 
The Independent Media Commission (IMC) initiated a six-month 
provisional licensing program for all television and radio 
broadcasters. For the first time since before the war, all 
broadcasters operate in a regulated environment subject to 
financial and operational sanctions if they break IMC 
guidelines on fairness and objectivity. At the same time, the 
High Representatives imposed decisions to restructure 
Federation-based RTV-BiH into Federation TV and PBS-BiH, to 
reform SRT-TV in Banja Luka (now known as RTRS), and to force 
the pro-HDZ Erotel network to accept IMC authority and cease 
all Croatian Government HRT-TV rebroadcasts in Bosnia, except 
as permitted by the IMC. While there has been resistance to all 
these measures, they are moving forward. In 2000, a new long-
term licensing program is expected to reduce the number of 
Bosnian broadcasters dramatically. Internationally supported 
OBN TV and Radio Fern continue to broadcast objective news and 
information nationwide. The majority of media outlets are 
subject to political and economic influence from (or controlled 
outright by) political parties and elected officials, but 
compared to two years ago, there is less ethnic hatred voiced 
in the media. Overall professionalism has improved marginally, 
due in part to U.S. Government-funded training programs. 
However, Bosnian media still does not meet international 
standards of professional and objective journalism.
    6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National 
democratic institutions and practices. At the State level, all 
Dayton-mandated central institutions meet regularly, but their 
effectiveness could be enhanced. The Joint Presidency agreed in 
New York to create a joint secretariat to make its work more 
efficient and to increase funding for the three under-funded 
State ministries. Pursuant to the New York Declaration, the 
Joint Presidents submitted a law to Parliament November 24 to 
establish a State Border Service (a combination Border Patrol/
INS-type agency). This would be the first multi-ethnic armed 
force under central government control. The Joint Presidents 
also undertook some foreign visits together. There is 
resistance, particularly from the Serb side, to investing these 
State institutions with real power, as they view an increase in 
State power as an infringement on entity prerogatives. Within 
the Federation, potential use of the National Interest Clause 
continues to render the parliamentary process slow and often 
ineffective. The national Parliament has begun discussions on 
the OSCE-drafted election law, which must be passed early in 
the year in order for national elections to proceed on October 
7. The OSCE remains responsible for administering the April 
municipal elections and has already introduced aspects of the 
proposed law, which should make candidates and parties more 
accountable. Enforcement efforts by OSCE and OHR are supported 
by SFOR's continued contribution to a secure and stable 
environment, in which State and entity institutions can 
function and democratic elections can take place.
    7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-Market reform. Progress 
has been slow. However, Bosnia has been accepted for WTO 
observer status. There is now a common customs regime in place 
in both entities, and the new Bosnia Konvertible Marka currency 
is accepted throughout BiR. Moreover, first steps have been 
taken to replace the communist-era payments bureaus in the 
Federation and the RS. Both entities are making progress on 
harmonized investment laws, and banks are better regulated. 
These reforms, combined with donor assistance, enabled 
continued growth during 1999, despite fallout from the Kosovo 
conflict. Significant problems remain. Privatization has been 
hampered by entity governments and enterprise managers seeking 
political and financial gain. The Federation enacted a labor 
law, against the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, which 
will burden companies with so much debt that privatization will 
be difficult, if not impossible, in the short run. Bank reform 
is also proceeding at a much slower pace than hoped. The lack 
of commitment to structural reforms and to establishing a fair 
and independent judiciary has prevented Bosnia from enjoying 
any significant level of domestic or foreign investment.
    8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A 
functioning and orderly minority return process. This period 
saw a sharp increase in minority refugees returning to a pre-
war homes, especially in hard-line areas in the RS, a cause for 
cautious optimism. Surprisingly few acts of violence 
accompanied these returns. SFOR's support in contributing to a 
secure environment was critical. Over 23,000 minority DPREs 
were registered by UNHCR as returnees in 1999, double the 
number for 1998. Some organizations estimate an additional 20-
30,000 minority DPREs returned but did not register. These 
figures are all the more remarkable because they include a 
slowdown in the first six months of 1999 due to the Kosovo 
conflict. Many of these increased refugee return movements were 
to isolated, destroyed rural villages, where individuals have 
taken advantage of improved security conditions provided by 
SFOR to begin rebuilding while awaiting international 
assistance. Lack ofassistance funds for shelter repair is the 
greatest obstacle to sustaining these returns. The U.S. Department of 
State made available an additional $2.3 million and the Department of 
Agriculture $1.7 million to help these so-called ``spontaneous'' 
returnees. The High Representative used U.S. assistance as a catalyst 
to call for aid from other donors, with the impressive result of an 
additional $7 million. However, returns to contested property remain 
slow, particularly in large cities. The High Representative imposed new 
property legislation in both the RS and Federation in October, 
providing a legal framework for return to occupied housing. On average, 
only 10 percent of occupied property claims have been decided, and 
fewer of these decisions have been implemented. The lack of progress 
can be blamed on hard-line politicians and shortages of resources for 
housing and return offices. This problem is particularly acute in West 
Mostar and Banja Luka, The late-November firing of 22 municipal 
officials, most of whom resisted minority refugee returns, should ease 
this obstructionism. Although security is no longer the primary concern 
of most returnees, the issues of employment and education have become 
increasingly important to sustaining returns.
    9. Brcko. Aim: Implementation of the Brcko Final Award. The 
Award, which addresses a key unresolved issue from Dayton, 
establishes a neutral, multi-ethnic district. Annexes released 
August 18 provide details of government structure and overall 
implementation. The December 7 release of the Brcko district 
statue (constitution) breaks significant new ground, as it 
contains minimal ethnic criteria and no vital interest clauses. 
Progress has been made in Brcko with virtually no violent 
opposition. Freedom of movement has been established, a multi-
ethnic police force has been created, and an inter-ethnic 
municipal assembly functions. Brcko has had significant 
minority refugee/DPRE returns to outlying villages. In December 
the Supervisor began programmed evictions of certain Bosnian 
Serbs from occupied homes in Brcko town. Bosnian Serbs, who 
initially opposed the Award, are now grudgingly accepting the 
concept of Brcko as a special district. They may, however 
challenge aspects of the statute in the Bosnian constitutional 
court. Final demilitarization of entity armed forces in the 
area is scheduled to be accomplished by the end of February 
2000. SFOR support remains crucial to deterring violent 
attempts by hard liners to disrupt Brcko implementation.
    10. Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim: 
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to 
The Hague for trial. Thus far 43 PIFWCs have been transferred 
to The Hague for trial under open and sealed indictments. 
Acting within its mandate, SFOR has assisted in the transfer of 
32 indictees to the Hague and continues to support ICTY field 
investigations in Bosnia. The most recently captured indictees, 
Radomir Kovac, Damir Dosen, Radoslav Brdjanin, RS Army Chief of 
Staff Momir Talic, Stanislav Galic, and Zoran Vukovic now await 
trial. Brdjanin (July 6), Kovac (August 2), Dosen (October 25), 
Galic (December 20), and Vukovic (December 24) were detained by 
SFOR in Bosnia. Cooperation from the parties, who are 
responsible for apprehending and turning over PIFWCs to ICTY, 
continues to vary widely; RS Prime Minister Dodik has expressed 
full support for the arrest of indictees, but Bosnian Serb 
extremists continue to oppose action against PIFWCs in the RS. 
The RS Interior Minister has reportedly denied his Ministry's 
responsibility to execute ICTY warrants, while HDZ government 
and party officials in BiH have openly supported Croat 
indictees. (This may change, as democratic reforms in Croatia 
under a new government will likely have a positive impact in 
the Croatian community in Bosnia.)
    The United States considers apprehension and detention of 
Serb PIFWCs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to be of the 
highest priority in serving the interest of justice and 
facilitating Dayton implementation. Their efforts to avoid 
apprehension. Their efforts to avoid apprehension sustains 
Bosnian Serb extremism, frustrates the Bosniak and Croat 
communities, undermines the credibility of the international 
community, and erodes the Rule of Law.
    Conclusion. In my July report, I emphasized the critical 
role SFOR plays in supporting the secure environment needed for 
democratic principles and free-market reforms to take root and 
grow. That role is no less essential today and has been noted 
in several places in this report. Progress on security and 
military stabilization has reduced our force requirements. 
However, the need to firmly establish such key democratic 
values as transparency, tolerance, and public accountability 
requires the continued commitment of the international 
community, which SFOR supports, until the nascent institutions 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina are fully capable of confronting such 
transnational threats as terrorism and the drug trade. The 
prospect of democratic change in two neighboring states--
Croatia and the FRY--increases the likelihood of medium and 
long-term improvement, but associated instability and cross-
border political manipulation pose significant threats in the 
short term. Over the past six months significant steps were 
taken by the international community that in the past might 
have been metwith strenuous or even violent opposition. The 
absence of such a response suggests a qualitative improvement in the 
overall situation. At the same time, however, nationalist politicians, 
organized crime, and secret police, paramilitary, and ethnic-based 
intelligence organizations remain entrenched opponents of the Dayton 
peace agreement and major obstacles to more rapid progress.

                                part ii

    Section 1203(a) of the Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense 
Authorization Act requires submission of a semiannual report to 
Congress as long as United States ground combat forces continue 
to participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This report 
supplements the ``Bosnia Benchmarks'' report required by Public 
Law 105-174 and is therefore submitted here in conjunction with 
that report. Where possible, when the requirements overlap, I 
have sought to avoid duplication in the two reports. The 
numbered responses that follow correspond to specific numbered 
reporting requirements contained in section 1203(b).
    1. Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Although no specific timetable has been 
established for complete withdrawal of U.S. force structure 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the size of the U.S. 
military footprint has been continually evaluated and reduced 
as appropriate. The six-month reviews include compliance by the 
parties with the provisions of the Dayton Accords, the security 
situation, progress towards achievement of identified 
benchmarks, and any recommendations on changes in the level of 
support to civilian implementation agencies or changes to the 
overall mission.
    The North Atlantic Council approved SFOR restructuring on 
October 25, 1999. National Military Authorities have been 
tasked to begin implementation of OPLAN 10407 (Revised), 
``JOINT FORGE--For the Continued Stabilization of the Peace in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.'' restructuring is to be completed by April 
2000. U.S. force strength will drop from 6,200 to roughly 
4,600; a significant reduction from the peak U.S. deployment of 
20,000 in 1996. SFOR's revised concept is based on enhanced 
operational agility and centers on the ability of forces to 
respond quickly throughout the SFOR Area of Responsibility. It 
requires that assigned forces be able to conduct operations 
across command boundaries. The continuing role of SFOR is to 
deter the renewed outbreak of hostilities and civil unrest and 
to reinforce the tenets of the Dayton Agreement, thereby 
enabling SFOR and the international community to work toward 
the desired ``end state''--a self-sustaining peace not 
requiring the presence of a NATO-led multinational military 
force. SFOR will continue to accomplish all key military tasks 
but in reduced depth and frequency. It will provide focused 
support to civil implementation, within means and capabilities.
    2. Percentage of benchmarks completed: No benchmark has 
been entirely fulfilled to date, nor would I expect any of them 
to be completed in the next reporting period. However, there 
has been substantial progress over the last six months towards 
completing all of the benchmarks, as described in Part I of 
this report.
    3. Status of the NATO ``force of gendarmes:'' The 
Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) continues to be an SFOR 
success story. It has proven to be a highly effective tool for 
fulfilling SFOR's million of contributing to a stable and 
peaceful environment for Dayton implementation. The MSU is 
praised by civilian agencies, and COMSFOR and his zone 
commanders rely heavily on it for gathering information and as 
the force of choice to address civil disturbances. SACEUR has 
described the MSU as a major force multiplier. The MSU operates 
under an Italian Carabinieri Commander. Italy provides roughly 
360 personnel and oversees certification of specialized units 
from other contributing countries, currently including 
Slovenia, Romania, and Argentina. SACEUR is soliciting 
contributions to form a second MSU battalion (approximately 380 
personnel).
    4. Military and nonmilitary missions directed by the 
President for U.S. forces in BiH: The U.S. Government supported 
the decision of the North Atlantic Council to task COMSFOR, 
through SACEUR, with the mission of providing a continued 
military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, 
contribute to a secure environment, and help to stabilize the 
peace.
    Key military tasks:
     Maintain a deterrent military presence.
     Ensure continued compliance with the military 
aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).
     Operate Joint Military Commissions (JMC) at 
appropriate levels.
     Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a 
secure environment in which the international 
civilorganizations and the parties to the GFAP can carry out their 
responsibilities under the agreement.
     Ensure force protection and freedom of movement 
for SFOR.
     Monitor Entity Armed Forces activities and inspect 
Weapons Storage Sites within capabilities and in close 
coordination with relevant international organizations.
     Be prepared to coordinate turnover of 
responsibility for Airspace Management/Control to the BiH 
Department of Civil Aviation when directed.
    Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of 
SFOR:
     Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the 
Office of the High Representative in implementing the civil 
aspects of the GFAP.
     Support the implementation of the Brcko 
Arbitration decision.
     Support the conduct of elections and installation 
of elected officials.
     Support the return of displaced persons and 
refugees by contributing to a safe and secure environment, but 
not forcibly returning them or undertaking to guard individual 
locations.
     Support the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and efforts against persons 
indicated for war crimes.
     Support the OHR and International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) on a case-by-case basis in assisting local police, 
providing back-up and contributing to a secure operating 
environment, without undertaking civil police tasks.
     Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the 
OSCE in implementing Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional 
Stabilization) of the GFAP in BiH.
     Support the continued development of the Standing 
Committee on Military Matters (SCMM).
    With regard to specific issues raised under reporting 
requirement 4:
    (A) Persons Indicted for War Crimes: SFOR remains the only 
actor in Bosnia that continues to detain PIFWCs. However, SFOR 
is not a police force and does not actively pursue, locate, or 
arrest PIFWCs. It will continue to detain PIFWCs in accordance 
with its mandate and rules of engagement and provide detainees 
safe passage to the Hague. (See also Part I, Benchmark 10.)
    (B) Support to civilian police functions: So long as 
organized opposition to Dayton continues, the OHR, United 
Nations, and other international organizations involved in 
civil implementation will rely on SFOR to contribute to a 
secure environment and to provide back-up in case of civil 
unrest fostered by Dayton opponents. (See also Part I, 
Benchmarks 2, 3, 4.)
    (C) Resettlement return of refugees: Support for the return 
of displaced persons and refugees by contributing to a secure 
and stable environment remains a key supporting task for SFOR. 
(See also Part I, Benchmark 8.)
    (D) Support to local and international authorities:
    Elections. Open and transparent elections, the foundation 
for democratic governance, are being supported by SFOR's 
contribution to a secure and stable environment in which the 
Parliamentary Assemblies at the State and Entity levels can 
function and in which democratic elections may take place. (See 
Part I, Benchmark 6.)
    Media. SFOR continues to enforce the standards of media 
reform and the efforts and initiatives of the Independent Media 
Commission. (See Part I, Benchmark 5.)
    Brcko. The effective date for the new district to come into 
being will be decided by the Supervisor, when he is satisfied 
that both entities have delegated their governance powers to 
the district government. The RS military will retain the right 
to transit through Brcko with SFOR's approval. SFOR has 
prepared for any eventuality by increasing force protection 
awareness and establishing several new checkpoints along roads 
leading to Brcko, Bijeljina and other areas of the RS. RS 
military forces in Brcko were granted an extension for 
departure until February 25, 2000, when security for the 
district's citizens will be jointly guaranteed by SFOR and the 
new Multi-Ethnic Police. (See Part I, Benchmark 9.)
    5. Assessment of threats to the United States forces: The 
risk of a return to open hostilities is currently assessed as 
minimal, as long as a credible SFOR remains deployed. The 
latest Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) study 
concludes that the most likely, though remote, scenario 
formilitary action would arise from a local problem escalating rapidly 
beyond the capacity of containment by local police. This could, in 
turn, draw in Entity Armed Forces, which would require an immediate and 
firm response by SFOR to prevent further escalation. The EAFs remain in 
overall compliance with the provisions of the GFAP. As part of its 
ongoing mission, SFOR continues to conduct no-notice weapons storage 
site inspections and observes EAF training and movement activities. No 
major instances of non-compliance have been reported by SFOR.
    6. Assessment of costs: Since FY 1996, the cost of the 
Department of Defense of the military missions that I directed 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been about $8.3 billion. These 
costs are summarized below (in millions):

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Fiscal year
                          Operation                          ---------------------------------------------------
                                                              1999 actual  1998 actual  1997 actual  1996 actual
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberate Forge............................................        141.4        159.4        183.3        225.9
Joint Forge.................................................      1,382.5      1,792.8  ...........  ...........
IFOR/IFOR Prep..............................................  ...........  ...........      2,087.5      2,231.7
Provide Promise.............................................  ...........  ...........  ...........         21.7
Sharp Guard.................................................  ...........  ...........  ...........          9.3
Able Sentry.................................................         14.0         10.5         11.7         30.9
UNCRO.......................................................  ...........  ...........  ...........          0.5
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Totals................................................      1,537.9      1,962.7      2,282.5      2,520.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight, 
Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations 
for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.
    Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate 
Force, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation 
to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a 
secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil 
authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    IFOR Preparation and IFOR included the costs of preparing 
U.S. forces for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace 
implementation force in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.
    Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that 
airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.
    Operation Sharp Guard enforced the United Nations-
sanctioned embargo against the FRY (excluding the enforcement 
of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction 
with Western Europe Union forces.
    Operation Abel Sentry was U.S. participation in the United 
Nations preventive deployment along the Serbian/Macedonian 
border (UNPREDEP).
    UNCRO was support provided to the Zagreb hospital in 
support of the United Nations in Croatia.
    For FY 1999, the actual costs for U.S. operations in Bosnia 
were $1.5 billion. A detailed breakout of these costs follows:

                                         ACTUAL FY 1999 DoD BOSNIA COSTS
                                            [In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Deliberate
                                                              Able sentry  Joint forge     forge        Totals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military Personnel:
    Army....................................................          2.8        127.0  ...........        129.8
    Navy....................................................  ...........          8.3          1.3          9.6
    Marine Corps............................................  ...........          2.6  ...........          2.2
    Air Force...............................................  ...........         28.4  ...........         28.4
    Navy Reserve............................................  ...........           .2  ...........           .2
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total.................................................          2.8        166.5          1.3        170.6
                                                             ===================================================
Operations & Maintenance:
    Army....................................................         11.2      1,052.8  ...........      1,064.0
    Navy....................................................  ...........         13.5         35.5         49.0
    Marine Corps............................................  ...........          2.1           .1          2.2
    Air Force...............................................  ...........         87.8        104.3        192.1
    Defense-Wide............................................  ...........         47.6          0.2         47.8
    Defense Health Program..................................  ...........         12.2  ...........         12.2
    Navy Reserve............................................  ...........  ...........  ...........            0
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
      Total.................................................         11.2      1,216.0        140.1      1,367.3
                                                             ===================================================
      Grand Total...........................................         14.0      1,382.5        141.4      1,537.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (7) Status of future operations plans: As these two reports 
indicate, there has been a continued, gradual improvement in 
all aspects of civil implementation and the security situation 
in Bosnia during the reporting period. The RS did not openly 
support Serbia during the Kosovo air campaign, and we saw last 
March that violent reactions to the final Brcko arbitration 
decision and to the removal by the High Representative of the 
anti-Dayton RS President were relatively minimal. With 
assistance from SFOR and full international engagement with 
local authorities, Sarajevo and the BiH government successfully 
hosted the Leaders Summit of the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe on July 30. Increasing flows of returning 
refugees and internally displaced persons continue to occur, 
and nation-wide municipal elections are scheduled for the 
spring of 2000. As Bosnia slowly moves toward normalcy and as 
its leaders and citizens take on greater responsibility for 
implementing all aspects of the agreement, the requirement for 
an overwhelming NATO presence should diminish. The SFOR 
Transition Strategy, reaffirmed in a revision of OPLAN 10407, 
provides for a deliberate, responsible reduction of forces 
based on civil implementation progress. The current reduction 
and restructuring of SFOR forces, including U.S. forces, 
reflects an ongoing assessment at NATO and in Washington that 
the threat of a resumption of hostilities by the Entity Armed 
Forces remains low. NATO will continue to evaluate its presence 
and the forces required based on these elements. Continued U.S. 
presence and leadership in this force will remain a critical 
element of its success.
    In conclusion, the Administration is grateful for the 
support of Congress for Dayton implementation. I look forward 
to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuit of U.S. 
foreign policy goals in the Balkans.

                                  
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