[House Document 106-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-18
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A REPORT ON PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT TO CONGRESS OF ONGOING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BiH)
February 8, 1999.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011 WASHINGTON : 1999
To the Congress of the United States:
Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing
this report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to
achieve sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). This
is the first semiannual report that evaluates progress in BiH
against the ten benchmarks (``aims'') outlined in my
certification to the Congress of March 3, 1998. NATO adopted
these benchmarks on May 28, 1998, as part of its approval of
the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military operations plan (OPLAN
10407). The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council
(PIC) subsequently adopted corresponding benchmarks in its
Luxembourg Declaration of June 9, 1998.
NATO, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and my
Administration have coordinated closely in evaluating progress
on Dayton implementation based on these benchmarks. There is
general agreement that there has been considerable progress in
the past year. The basic institutions of the state, both
political and economic, have been established. Key laws
regarding foreign investment, privatization, and property are
now in place. Freedom of movement across the country has
substantially improved. Fundamental reform of the media is
underway. Elections have demonstrated a continuing trend toward
growing pluralism. Nevertheless, there is still much to be
done, in particular on interethnic tolerance and
reconciliation, the development of effective common
institutions with powers clearly delineated from those of the
Entities, and an open and pluralistic political life. The
growth of organized crime also represents a serious threat.
With specific reference to SFOR, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, in meetings in December 1998 with their NATO
counterparts, agreed that SFOR continues to play an essential
role in the maintenance of peace and stability and the
provision of a secure environment in BiH, thus contributing
significantly to progress in rebuilding BiH as a single,
democratic, and multiethnic state. At the same time, NATO
agreed that we do not intend to maintain SFOR's presence at
current levels indefinitely, and in fact agreed on initial
reductions, which I will describe later in this report. Below
is a benchmark-by-benchmark evaluation of the state-of-play in
BiH based on analysis of input from multiple sources.
1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire.
Considerable progress has been made toward military
stabilization in BiH. Entity Armed Forces (EAFs) are in
compliance with Dayton, and there have been no incidents
affecting the ceasefire. EAFs remain substantially divided
along ethnic lines. Integration of the Federation Army does not
reach down to corps-level units and below. However, progress
has been made through the Train and Equip Program to integrate
the Ministry of Defense and to provide the Federation with a
credible deterrent capability. Although it is unlikely to meet
its target of full integration by August 1999, the Federation
Ministry of Defense has begun staff planning for integration.
The Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continues its relationship with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) Army. Similarly, the
Bosnian Croat element of the Federation Army maintains ties
with Croatia. In both cases, however, limited resources impinge
on what either Croatia or the FRY can provide financially or
materially; the overall trend in support is downward. In some
areas, the VRS continues to have certain qualitative and
quantitative advantages over the Federation Army, but the Train
and Equip Program has helped narrow the gap in some key areas.
The arms control regimes established under Articles II
(confidence and security-building measures) and IV (arms
reduction and limitations) of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Peace
Accords are functioning. In October 1997, BiH and the other
parties were recognized as being in compliancewith the
limitations on five major types of armaments (battle tanks, armored
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters)
set forth in the Article IV agreement, which were derived from the
Annex 1B 5:2:2 ratios for the FRY, Republic of Croatia, and BiH
respectively. The parties have since maintained armament levels
consistent with the limitations and are expected to do so in the
future. A draft mandate for an Article V agreement (regional stability)
has been approved; negotiations are due to begin in early 1999.
Military stability remains dependent on SFOR as a deterrent force.
2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured
and democratic police force in both entities. There has been
considerable progress to date on police reform due to sustained
joint efforts of the International Police Task Force (IPTF),
Office of the High Representative (OHR), and SFOR, which have
overcome a number of significant political obstacles. So far,
approximately 85 percent of the police in the Federation have
received IPTF-approved training, as have approximately 35
percent of the police in the Republika Srbska (RS). All sides
continue to lag in the hiring of minority officers and, as the
IPTF implements its plans to address this problem, tensions
will increase in the short-term. SFOR often must support the
IPTF in the face of crime, public disorder, and rogue police.
Monoethnic police forces have often failed to facilitate
minority returns. In these types of scenarios, SFOR's use of
the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) has been a force
multiplier, requiring fewer, but specifically trained troops.
At this point, SFOR's essential contribution to maintaining a
secure environment, to include backing up IPTF in support of
nascent civilian police forces, remains critical to continued
progress.
3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform
program. Several key steps forward were taken in 1998, such as
the signing of an MOU on Inter-Entity Legal Assistance on May
20, 1998, and establishment of an Inter-Entity Legal Commission
on June 4, 1998. The Federation Parliament in July adopted a
new criminal code. Nevertheless, the judicial system still
requires significant reform. Judges are still influenced by
politics, and the system is financially strapped and remains
ethnically biased. Execution of judgments, in particular
eviction of persons who illegally occupy dwellings, is
especially problematic. The progress made in the area of
commercial law is encouraging for economic development
prospects.
4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption.
Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions.
Corruption remains a major challenge to building democratic
institutions of government. Structures for independent
monitoring of government financial transactions are still not
in place. Shadow institutions still need to be eliminated. The
burden of creating institutions to combat fraud and organized
crime falls mostly to the international community and in
particular to the IPTF. SFOR contributes to the secure
environment necessary for the success of other international
efforts to counter these illegal activities.
5. Media Reform. Aim: Regulated, democratic, and
independent media. Approximately 80 percent television coverage
has been achieved in BiH through the international community's
support for the Open Broadcasting Network (OBN), which is the
first (and so far only) neutral source of news in BiH. Several
television and radio networks have been restructured and are
led by new management boards. Most are in compliance with
Dayton except for some regional broadcasts. The Independent
Media Commission assumed responsibility for media monitoring
from the OSCE on October 31, 1998. Progress has been
significant, but BiH still has far to go to approach
international standards.SFOR's past actions in this area are a
key deterrent against illegal use of media asserts to undermine Dayton
implementation.
6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National
democratic institutions and practices. With the exception of
the election of a nationalist to the RS presidency, the
September 1998 national elections continued the long-term trend
away from reliance on ethnically based parties. The two major
Serb nationalist parties lost further ground and, once again,
will be unable to lead the RS government. Croat and Bosniak
nationalist parties retained control, but saw margins eroded
significantly. In this regard, SFOR's continued presence will
facilitate conduct of the municipal elections scheduled for
late 1999 but, as has been the case with every election since
Dayton,the trend of increasingly turning over responsibility
for elections to the Bosnians themselves will continue.
7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reforms. While
the process of economic recovery and transformation will take
many years, some essential groundwork has been laid.
Privatization legislation and enterprise laws have been passed,
and banking legislation has been partially passed. Fiscal
revenues from taxes and customs have increased significantly.
Nevertheless, the fiscal and revenue system is in its infancy.
Implementation of privatization legislation is slow and the
banking sector is under-funded, but there are signs of
development in GDP. There has been a marked increase in freedom
of movement, further enhanced by the uniform license plate law.
SFOR's continued contribution to a secure environment and
facilitating freedom of movement is vital as economic reforms
begin to take hold.
8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A
functioning phased and orderly minority return process. While
there have been some significant breakthroughs on DPRE returns
to minority areas, such as Jajce, Stolac, Kotor Varos,
Prijedor, Mostar, and Travnik, the overall numbers have been
low. In some areas where minority DPREs have returned,
interethnic tensions rose quickly. Some nationalist political
parties continue to obstruct the return of minority DPREs to
the areas they control. Poor living conditions in some areas
present little incentive for DPREs to return. The Entities are
using DPREs to resettle regions (opstinas) that are of
strategic interest to each ethnic faction. SFOR's contribution
to a secure environment remains vital to OHR efforts to
facilitate minority returns.
9. Brcko. Aim: A multiethnic administration, DPRE returns,
and secure environment. Freedom of movement in Brcko has
improved dramatically. Citizens of BiH are increasingly
confident in using their right to travel freely throughout the
municipality and the region. Police and judicial elements have
been installed, but the goal of multiethnicity in these
elements still has not been realized. About 1,000 Federation
families have returned to the parts of Brcko on the RS side of
the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, but few Serb displaced persons
have left Brcko to return to their pre-war homes. SFOR support
will be a critical deterrent to the outbreak of violence during
the period surrounding the Arbitrator's decision on Brcko's
status anticipated for early in 1999.
10. Persons Indicated for War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim:
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to
The Hague for trial. Thanks to action by the Congress, the
Secretary of State now has the ability to offer rewards of up
to $5 million for information leading to the arrest or
conviction of PIFWCs. Of the 81 people indicated publicly by
the Tribunal, only 29-36 percent--are still at large. The two
highest-profile indictees, Karadzic and Mladic, areamong them.
Bosniaks are cooperating with the ICTY, but the failure of the RS to
support the ICTY is a major obstacle to progress. Bosnian Croats have
cooperated with respect to the surrender of all but two public
indictees, but have not cooperated fully with respect to the Tribunal's
orders that they turn over documents needed for the fair trial of a
number of indictees. SFOR continues to provide crucial support in the
apprehension of PIFWCs and for ICTY exhumations.
In my report to the Congress dated July 28, 1998, I
emphasized the important role that realistic target dates,
combined with concerted use of incentives, leverage, and
pressure on all parties, should play in maintaining the sense
of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an enduring peace.
The December 1998 Peace Implementation Council Declaration
and its annex (attached) offer target dates for accomplishment
of specific tasks by authorities in BiH. The PIC decisions
formed the background against which NATO Defense Ministers
reviewed the future of SFOR in their December 17 meeting.
Failure by Bosinian authorities to act within the prescribed
timeframes would be the point of departure for more forceful
action by the OHR and other elements of the international
community. Priorities for 1999 will include: accelerating the
transition to a sustainable market economy; increasing the
momentum on the return of refugees and displaced persons,
particularly to minority areas; providing a secure environment
through the rule of law, including significant progress on
judicial reformed and further establishment of multiethnic
police; developing and reinforcing the central institutions,
including adoption of a permanent election law, and the
development of greater confidence and cooperation among the
Entity defense establishments with the goal of their eventual
unification; and pressing ahead with media reform and education
issues.
In accordance with the NATO Defense Minister's guidance in
June 1998, NATO is conducting a series of comprehensive reviews
at no more than 6-month intervals. The first of these reviews
was completed on November 16, 1998, and recently endorsed by
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Foreign and Defense Ministers.
In reviewing the size and shape of SFOR against the benchmarks
described above, the United States and its Allies concluded
that at present, there be no changes in SFOR's mission. NATO
Recommended, however, that steps begin immediately to
streamline SFOR. The NAC Foreign and Defense Ministers endorsed
this recommendation on December 8, 1998, and December 17, 1998,
respectively. The Defense Ministers also endorsed a report from
the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) authorizing further
adjustments in SFOR force levels--in response to the evolving
security situation and support requirements--to be completed by
the end of March 1999. While the specifics of these adjustments
are still being worked, they could amount to reductions of as
much as 10 percent from the 6,900 U.S. troops currently in
SFOR. The 6,900 troop level already represents a 20 percent
reduction from the 8,500 U.S. troops deployed in June 1998 and
is 66 percent less than peak U.S. deployment of 20,000 troops
in 1996.
The NATO Defense Ministers on December 17, 1998, further
instructed NMAs to examine options for possible longer-term and
more substantial adjustments to the future size and structure
of SFOR. Their report is due in early 1999 and will give the
United States and its Allies the necessary information on which
to base decisions on SFOR's future. We will address this issue
in the NAC again at that time. Decisions on future reductions
will be taken in the light of progress on implementation of the
Peace Agreement. Any and all reductions of U.S. forces in the
short or long term will be made in accordance with my
Administration's policy that such reductions will not
jeopardize the safety of U.S. armed forces serving in BiH.
My Administration values the Congress' substantial support
for Dayton implementation. I look forward to continuing to work
with the Congress in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, February 4, 1999.