[House Document 106-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 106-158


 
                     EXTENSION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

HIS NOTIFICATION OF HIS DECLARATION CONTINUING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY, 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938, WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
        BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1999, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1621(a)




  November 11, 1999.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    On November 14, 1944, in light of the dangers of the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
(``weapons of mass destruction''--WMD) and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and 
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the 
national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its 
declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each 
anniversary date, I publish in the Federal Register and 
transmit to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency 
is to continue in effect. The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery continues to pose an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I am 
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995, November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 
1998, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999. 
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in 
Executive Order 12938, as amended.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(a) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent 
pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information 
on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons 
(CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent 
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in Executive Order 13094, I amended 
section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that the United States 
Government could more effectively respond to the worldwide 
threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities. 
The amendment of section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in 
several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of 
proliferation activity that can subject entities to potential 
penalties under the Executive order. The original Executive 
order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts 
of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, 
design, produce, or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; 
the amended Executive order also covers contributions to 
foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable 
of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the 
amendment expands the original Executive order to include 
attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as 
well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of 
potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of 
U.S. Government assistance to foreign persons, and the 
prohibition of imports into the United States and U.S. 
Government procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United 
States Government greater flexibility and discretion in 
deciding how and to what extent to impose measures against 
foreign persons that assist proliferation programs.
Nuclear Weapons
    In May 1998, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of 
nuclear tests. World reaction included nearly universal 
condemnation across a broad range of international fora and 
multilateral support for a broad range of sanctions, including 
new restrictions on lending by international financial 
institutions unrelated to basic human needs and on aid from the 
G-8 and other countries.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, 
we have worked unilaterally with other P-5 and G-8 members, and 
through the United Nations, to dissuade India and Pakistan from 
taking further steps toward developing nuclear weapons. We have 
urged them to join multilateral arms control efforts and to 
conform to the standards of nonproliferation regimes, to 
prevent a regional arms race and build confidence by practicing 
restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve their differences 
through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security Council have 
called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete 
actions. The United States has focused most intensely on 
several objectives that can be met over the short and medium 
term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional 
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT); engagement in productive negotiations on a fissile 
material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, pending their conclusion, a 
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in 
development and deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and 
aircraft, and adoption of controls meeting international 
standards on export of sensitive materials and technology.
    Against this backdrop of international pressure on India 
and Pakistan, high-level U.S. dialogues with India and 
Pakistani officials have yielded little progress. In September 
1998, Indian and Pakistani leaders had expressed a willingness 
to sign the CTBT. Both governments, have already declared 
testing moratoria, had indicated they were prepared to sign the 
CTBT by September 1999 under certain conditions. These 
declarations were made prior to the collapse of Prime Minister 
Vajpayee's Indian government in April 1999, a development that 
has delayed consideration of CTBT signature in India. The 
Indian election, the Kargil conflict, and the October political 
coup in Pakistan have further complicated the issue, although 
neither country has renounced its commitment. Pakistan has said 
that it will not sign the Treaty until India does. Additionally 
Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated publicly on September 12, 
1999, that Pakistan would not consider signing the CTBT until 
sanctions are removed.
    India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to 
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 
Conference on Disarmament session. However, these negotiations 
were unable to resume in 1999 and we have no indications that 
India or Pakistan played helpful ``behind the scenes'' roles. 
They also pledged to institute strict controls that meet 
internationally accepted standards on sensitive exports, and 
have begun expert discussions with the United States and others 
on this subject. In addition, India and Pakistan resumed their 
bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, 
at the Foreign Secretary level. The Kargil conflict this summer 
complicated efforts to continue this bilateral dialogue, 
although both sides have expressed interest in resuming the 
discussions at some future point. We will continue discussions 
with both governments at the senior and expert levels, and our 
diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5, G-8, and in 
international fora. Efforts may be further complicated by 
India's release in August 1999 of a draft of its nuclear 
doctrine, which, although its timing may have been politically 
motivated, suggest that India intends to make nuclear weapons 
an integral part of the national defense.
    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK of North 
Korea) continue to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities 
consistent with the 1994 U.S.-KPRK Agreed Framework, which 
calls for the immediate freezing and eventual dismantling of 
the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant 
at Yongbyon and Taechon. The United States has raised its 
concerns with the DPRK about suspect underground site under 
construction, possibly intended to support nuclear activities 
contrary to the Agreed Framework. In March 1999, the United 
States reached agreement with the DPRK for visits by a teamof 
U.S. experts to the facility. In May 1999, a Department of State team 
visited the underground facility at Kumchang-ni. The team was permitted 
to conduct all activities previously agreed to help remove suspicions 
about the site. Based on the data gathered by the U.S. delegation and 
the subsequent technical review, the United States has concluded that, 
at present, the underground site does not violate the 1994 U.S.-DPRK 
Agreed Framework.
    The Agreed Framework requires the DPRK to come into full 
compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations as a part of a 
process that also includes the supply of two light water 
reactors to North Korea. United States experts remain on-site 
in North Korea working to complete clean-up operations after 
largely finishing the canning of spent fuel from the North's 5-
megawatt nuclear reactor.
    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the 
cornerstone on the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 
May 1999, NPT Parties met in New York to complete preparations 
for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The United States is 
working with others to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference is a success that reaffirms the NPT as a strong and 
viable part of the global security system.
    The United States signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty on September 24, 1996. So far, 154 countries have signed 
and 51 have ratified the CTBT. During 1999, CTBT signatories 
conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory Commission 
(PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of the 
International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the 
Treaty. In October 1999, a conference was held pursuant to 
Article XIV of the CTBT, to discuss ways to accelerate the 
entry into force of the Treaty. The United States attended that 
conference as an observer.
    On September 22, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the 
Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. I 
deeply regret the Senate's decision on October 13, 1999, to 
refuse its consent to ratify the CTBT. The CTBT will serve 
several U.S. national security interests by prohibiting all 
nuclear explosions. It will constrain the development and 
qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; end the development 
of advanced new types of weapons; contribute to the prevention 
of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. 
The CTBT marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the 
nuclear threat and to build a safer world. For these reasons, 
we hope that at an appropriate time, the Senate will reconsider 
this treaty in a manner that will ensure a fair and thorough 
hearing process and will allow for more thoughtful debate.
    With 35 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is 
a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control 
arrangement. At its May 1999 Plenary and related meetings in 
Florence, Italy, the NSG considered new members (although none 
were accepted at that meeting), reviewed efforts to enhance 
transparency, and pursued efforts to streamline procedures and 
update control lists. The NSG created an Implementation Working 
Group, chaired by the UK, to consider changes to the 
guidelines, membership issues, the relationship with the NPT 
Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and controls on brokering. The 
Transparency Working Group was tasked with preparing a report 
on NSG activities for presentation at the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference by the Italian chair. The French will host the 
Plenary and assume the NSG Chair in 2000 and the United States 
will host and chair in 2001.
    The NSG is currently considering membership requests from 
Turkey and Belarus. Turkey's membership is pending only 
agreement by Russia to join the intercessional consensus of all 
other NSG members. The United States believes it would be 
appropriate to confirm intercessional consensus in support of 
Turkey's membership before considering other candidates. 
Belarus has been in consultation with the NSG Chair and 
othermembers including Russia and the United States regarding its 
interest in membership and the status of its implementation of export 
controls to meet NSG Guideline standards. The United States will not 
block intercessional consensus of NSG members in support of NSG 
membership for Belarus, provided that consensus for Turkey's membership 
precedes it. Cyprus and Kazakhstan have also expressed interest in 
membership and are in consultation with the NSG Chair and other members 
regarding the status of their export control systems. China is the only 
major nuclear supplier that is not a member of the NSG, primarily 
because it has not accepted the NSG policy of requiring full-scope 
safeguards as a condition for supply of nuclear trigger list items to 
nonnuclear weapon states. However, China has taken major steps toward 
harmonization of its export control system with the NSG Guidelines by 
the implementation of controls over nuclear-related dual-use equipment 
and technology.
    During the last 6-months, we reviewed intelligence and 
other reports of trade in nuclear-related material and 
technology that might be relevant to nuclear-related sanctions 
provisions in the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, 
as amended; the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended; and 
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994. No statutory 
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting 
period. The administrative measures imposed against ten Russian 
entities for their nuclear- and/or missile-related cooperation 
with Iran remain in effect.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

    The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced 
Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force 
and continue to be applied by the Department of Commerce, in 
consultation with other agencies, in order to control the 
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological 
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.
    Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious 
threat to our security and that of our allies. On April 29. 
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) 
entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 States Signatories 
as original States Parties. The United States was among their 
number, having ratified the CWC on April 25, 1997. Russia 
ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State Party 
on December 8, 1997. To date, 126 countries (including China, 
Iran, India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
    The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--was established at 
entry-into-force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The 
OPCW, located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along 
with States Parties) for implementing the CWC. It consists of 
the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council 
(EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS). The TS carries out 
the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a 
staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors 
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial 
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has 
conducted over 500 routine inspections in some 29 countries. No 
challenge inspections have yet taken place. To date, nearly 170 
inspections have been conducted at military facilities in the 
United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector 
presence at operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah 
and Johnston Island.
    The United States is determined to seek full implementation 
of the concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs 
and risks for any state or terrorist attempting to engage in 
chemical weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration 
requirements improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons 
activities. Its inspection provisions provide for access 
todeclared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making 
clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, 
more risky, and more expensive.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 
was enacted into U.S. law in October 1998, as part of the 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriation 
Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-277). My 
Administration published an Executive order on June 25, 1999, 
to facilitate implementation of the Act and is working to 
publish regulations regarding industrial declarations and 
inspections of industrial facilities. Submission of these 
declarations to the OPCW, and subsequent inspections, will 
enable the United States to be fully compliant with the CWC. 
United States noncompliance to date has, among other things, 
undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as our 
ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete, 
accurate, and timely declarations.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically 
isolated and prohibited by the CWC from trading with States 
Parties in certain key chemicals. The relevant treaty 
provisions are specifically designed to penalize countries that 
refuse to join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat 
of chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in 
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological 
weapons (BW). We participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) 
of States Parties striving to complete a legally binding 
protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance with the 1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production 
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons 
Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the 
September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review 
Conference, held in November/December 1996, urged the AHG to 
complete the protocol as soon as possible but not later than 
the next Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is 
progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of 
national views and clarification of existing text. Five AHG 
negotiating sessions were scheduled for 1999. The United States 
is working toward completion of the substance of a strong 
Protocol next year.
    On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union address, 
I announced that the United States would take a leading role in 
the effort to erect stronger international barriers against the 
proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new 
international system to detect and deter cheating. The United 
States is working closely with U.S. industry representatives to 
obtain technical input relevant to the development of U.S. 
negotiating positions and then to reach international agreement 
on data declarations and on-site investigations.
    The United States continues to be a leading participant in 
the 30-member Australia Group (AG) chemical and biological 
weapons nonproliferation regime. The United States attended the 
most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 4-8, 1999, 
during which the Group reaffirmed the members' continued 
collective belief in the Group's viability, importance, and 
compatibility with the CWC and BWC. Members continue to agree 
that full adherence to the CWC and BWC by all governments will 
be the only way to achieve a permanent global ban on chemical 
and biological weapons, and that all states adhering to these 
Conventions must take steps to ensure that their national 
activities support these goals. At the 1999 Plenary, the Group 
continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and 
sharing information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. The 
AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active 
outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to 
promote regional consultations on export controls and non-
proliferation to further awareness and understanding of 
nationalpolicies in these areas. The AG discussed ways to be 
more proactive in stemming attacks on the AG in the CWC and BWC 
contexts.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in CBW-related material 
and technology that might be relevant to sanctions provisions 
under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991. No new sanctions determinations were 
reached during this reporting period. The United States also 
continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries 
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    The United States continues carefully to control exports 
that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons 
of mass destruction, and closely to monitor activities of 
potential missile proliferation concern. We also continued to 
implement U.S. missile sanctions laws. In March 1999, we 
imposed missile sanctions against three Middle Eastern entities 
for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) Annex items. Category I missile sanctions imposed 
in April 1998 against North Korean and Pakistani entities for 
the transfer from North Korea to Pakistan of equipment and 
technology related to the Ghauri missile remain in effect.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to 
share information about proliferation problems with each other 
and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment 
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing 
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted 
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    In June the United States participated in the MTCR's 
Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the RPOC, MTCR 
Partners held in-depth discussions of regional missile 
proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on Iran, North 
Korea, and South Asia. They also discussed steps Partners can 
take to further increase outreach to nonmembers. The Partners 
agreed to continue their discussion of this important topic at 
the October 1999 Noordwijk MTCR Plenary.
    Also in June, the United Sates participated in a German-
hosted MTCR workshop at which Partners and non-Partners 
discussed ways to address the proliferation potential inherent 
in intangible technology transfers. The seminar helped 
participants to develop a greater understanding of the 
intangible technology issue (i.e., how proliferators misuse the 
internet, scientific conferences, plant visits, student 
exchange programs, and higher education to acquire sensitive 
technology), and to begin to identify steps governments can 
take to address this problem.
    In July 1999, the Partners completed a reformatting of the 
MTCR Annex. The newly reformatted Annex is intended to improve 
clarity and uniformity of implementation of MTCR controls while 
maintaining the coverage of the previous version of the MTCR 
Annex.
    The MTCR held its Fourteenth Plenary Meeting in Noordwijk, 
The Netherlands, on October 11-15. At the Plenary, the Partners 
shared information about activities of missile proliferation 
concern worldwide. They focussed in particular on the threat to 
international security and stability posed by missile 
proliferation in key regions and considered what practical 
steps they could take, individually and collectively, to 
address ongoing missile-related activities of concern. During 
their discussions, Partners gave special attention to DPRK 
missile activities and also discussed the threat posed by 
missile-related activities in South and North East Asia and the 
Middle East.
    During this reporting period, the United States continued 
to work unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners 
to combat missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers 
toexport responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. To encourage 
international focus on missile proliferation issues, the USG also 
placed the issue on the agenda for the G8 Cologne Summit, resulting in 
an undertaking to examine further individual and collective means of 
addressing this problem and reaffirming commitment to the objectives of 
the MTCR. Since my last report, we continued our missile 
nonproliferation dialogues with China (interrupted after the accidental 
bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy), India, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan. In the course of normal 
diplomatic relations we also have pursued such discussions with other 
countries in Central Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.
    In March 1999, the United States and the DPRK held a fourth 
round of missile talks to underscore our strong opposition to 
North Korea's destabilizing missile development and export 
activities and press for tight constraints on DPRK missile 
development, testing, and exports. We also affirmed that the 
United States viewed further launches of long-range missiles 
and transfers of long-range missiles or technology for such 
missiles as direct threats to U.S. allies and ultimately to the 
United States itself. We subsequently have reiterated that 
message at every available opportunity. In particular, we have 
reminded the DPRK of the consequences of another rocket launch 
and encouraged it not to take such action. We also have urged 
the DPRK to take steps towards building a constructive 
bilateral relationship with the United States.
    These efforts have resulted in an important first step. 
Since September 1999, it has been our understanding that the 
DPRK will refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind 
during our discussions to improve relations. In recognition of 
this DPRK step, the United States has announced the easing of 
certain sanctions related to the import and export of many 
consumer goods.
    In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to 
acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's 
missile and nuclear development programs, the United States 
continued its high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at finding 
ways the United States and Russia can work together to cut off 
the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic missile 
development program. During this reporting period, Russia's 
government created institutional foundations to implement a 
newly enacted nonproliferation policy and passed laws to punish 
wrongdoers. It also passed new export control legislation to 
tighten government control over sensitive technologies and 
began working with the United States to strengthen export 
control practices at Russian aerospace firms. However, despite 
the Russian government's nonproliferation and export control 
efforts, some Russian entities continued to cooperate with 
Iran's ballistic missile program and to engage in nuclear 
cooperation with Iran beyond the Bushehr reactor project. The 
administrative measures imposed on ten Russian entities for 
their missile- and nuclear-related cooperation with Iran remain 
in effect.

Value of Nonproliferation Export Controls

    United States national export controls--both those 
implemented pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes 
and those implemented unilaterally--play an important part in 
impeding the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (As used here, 
``export controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case 
review of certain exports, or limitations on exports of 
particular items of proliferation concern to certain 
destinations, rather than broad embargoes or economic sanctions 
that also affect trade.) As noted in this report, however, 
export controls are only one of a number of tools the United 
States uses to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Global 
nonproliferation norms, informal multilateral nonproliferation 
regimes, interdictingshipments of proliferation concern, 
sanctions, export control assistance, redirection and elimination 
efforts, and robust U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic 
capabilities all work in conjunction with export controls as part of 
our overall nonproliferation strategy.
    Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation 
because every proliferant WMD/missile program seeks equipment 
and technology from other countries. Proliferators look over-
seas because needed items are unavailable elsewhere, because 
indigenously produced items are of insufficient quality or 
quantity, and/or because imported items can be obtained more 
quickly and cheaply than producing them at home. It is 
important to note that proliferators seek for their programs 
both items on multilateral lists (like gyroscopes controlled on 
the MTCR Annex and nerve gas ingridents on the Australia Group 
list) and unlisted items (like lower-level machine tools and 
very basic chemicals). In addition, many of the items of 
interest of proliferators are inherently dual-use. For example, 
key ingredients and technologies used in the production of 
fertilizers and pesticides also can be used to make chemical 
weapons; vaccine production technology (albeit not the vaccines 
themselves) can assist in the production of biological weapons.
    The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or 
even denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or 
technology for use in their WMD/missile programs. In large 
part, U.S. national export controls--and similar controls of 
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control 
Regime, and Nuclear Suppliers Group--have denied proliferators 
access to the largest sources of the best equipment and 
technology. Proliferators have mostly been forced to seek less 
capable items from nonregime suppliers. Moreover, in many 
instances, U.S. and regime controls and associated efforts have 
forced proliferators to engage in complex clandestine 
procurements even from nonmember suppliers, taking time and 
money away from proliferant programs.
    United States national export controls and those of our 
regime partners also have played an important leadership role, 
increasing over time the critical mass of countries applying 
nonproliferation export controls. For example, none of the 
following progress would have been possible without the 
leadership shown by U.S. willingness to be the first to apply 
controls: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has grown to 32 member 
countries; several nonmember countries have been persuaded to 
apply export controls consistent with one or more of the 
regimes unilaterally; and most of the members of the 
nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all'' 
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation 
Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a 
specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' 
controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items not 
on a list, when those items are destined for WMD/missile 
programs.)
    United States export controls, especially ``catch-all'' 
controls, also make important political and moral contributions 
to the nonproliferation effort. They uphold the broad legal 
obligations the United States has undertaken in the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (Article I), Biological Weapons 
Convention (Article III), and Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Article I) not to assist anyone in proscribed WMD activities. 
They endeavor to assure there are no U.S. ``fingerprints'' on 
WMD and missiles that threaten U.S. citizens and territory and 
our friends and interests overseas. They place the United 
States squarely and unambiguously against WMD/missile 
proliferation, even against the prospect of inadvertent 
proliferation from the United States itself.
    Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling 
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit 
dual-use export to proceed under circumstances where, without 
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to 
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries 
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased 
trade. Each of the WMD nonproliferation regimes, for example, 
has ``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make 
an export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons 
and notified to the rest--unless it first consults with the 
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it 
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime 
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for 
exporters.

Threat Reduction

    The potential for proliferation of WMD and delivery system 
expertise has increased in part as a consequence of the 
economic crisis in Russia and other Newly Independent States, 
causing concern. My Administration gives high priority to 
controlling the human dimension of proliferation through 
programs that support the transition of former Soviet weapons 
scientists to civilian research and technology development 
activities. I have proposed an additional $4.5 billion for 
programs embodied in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative 
that would support activities in four areas: nuclear security; 
nonnuclear WMD; science and technology nonproliferation; and 
military relocation, stabilization and other security 
cooperation programs. Congressional support for this initiative 
would enable the engagement of a broad range of programs under 
the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense.

Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific 
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities 
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in 
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from May 
15, 1999, through November 10, 1999.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 10, 1999.
                                 Notice

                              ----------                              


    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared 
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. 
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, the national emergency first 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995, November 12, 1996, November 13, 1997, and November 12, 
1998, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1999. 
Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National 
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622d)), I am continuing the 
national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 10, 1999.

                                
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