[Senate Treaty Document 105-36]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress                                              Treaty Doc.
  2d Session                     SENATE                       105-36
_______________________________________________________________________



 
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND, 
                    HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

  PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE ACCESSION OF 
 POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. THESE PROTOCOLS WERE OPENED 
FOR SIGNATURE AT BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 16, 1997, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF 
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
                                 TREATY




 February 11, 1998.--Protocols were read the first time and, together 
  with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.



                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                The White House, February 11, 1998.
To the Senate of the United States:
    I transmit herewith Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty 
of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic. These Protocols were opened for signature at Brussels 
on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States 
of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the 
ratification of these documents, and transit for the Senate's 
information the report made to me by the Secretary of State 
regarding this matter.
    The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will improve the 
ability of the United States to protect and advance our 
interests in the transatlantic area. The end of the Cold War 
changed the nature of the threats to this region, but not the 
fact that Europe's peace, stability, and well-being are vital 
to our own national security. The addition of these well-
qualified democracies, which have demonstrated their commitment 
to the values of freedom and the security of the broader 
region, will help deter potential threats to Europe, deepen the 
continent's stability, bolster its democratic advances, erase 
its artificial division, and strengthen an Alliance that has 
proved its effectiveness during and since the Cold War.
    NATO is not the only instrument in our efforts to help 
build a new and undivided Europe, but it is our most important 
contributor to peace and security for the region. NATO's 
steadfastness during the long years of the Cold War, its 
performance in the mission it has led in Bosnia, the strong 
interest of a dozen new European democracies in becoming 
members, and the success of the Alliance's Partnership for 
Peace program all underscore the continuing vitality of the 
Alliance and the Treaty that brought it into existence.
    NATO's mission in Bosnia is of particular importance. No 
other multinational institution possessed the military 
capabilities and political cohesiveness necessary to bring an 
end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia--Europe's worst 
conflict since World War II--and to give the people of that 
region a chance to build a lasting peace. Our work in Bosnia is 
not yet complete, but we should be thankful that NATO existed 
to unite Allies and partners in this determined common effort. 
Similarly, we should welcome steps such as the Alliance's 
enlargement that can strengthen its ability to meet future 
challenges, beginning with NATO's core mission of collective 
defense and other missions that we and our Allies may choose to 
pursue.
    The three states that NATO now proposes to add as full 
members will make the Alliance stronger while helping to 
enlarge Europe's zone of democratic stability. Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic have been leaders in Central Europe's 
dramatic transformation over the past decade and already are a 
part of NATO's community of values. They each played pivotal 
roles in the overthrow of communist rule and repression, and 
they each proved equal to the challenge of comprehensive 
democratic and market reform. Together, they have helped to 
make Central Europe the continent's most rebust zone of 
economic growth.
    All three of these states will be security producers for 
the Alliance and not merely security consumers. They have 
demonstrated this through the accords they have reached with 
neighboring states, the contributions they have made to the 
mission of Bosnia, the forces they plan to commit to the 
Alliance, and the military modernization programs they have 
already begun and pledge to continue in the years to come at 
their own expense. These three states will strengthen NATO 
through the addition of military resources, strategic depth, 
and the prospect of greater stability in Europe's central 
region. American troops have worked alongside soldiers from 
each of these nations in earlier times, in the case of the 
Poles, dating back to our own Revolutionary War. Our 
cooperation with the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs has 
contributed to our security in the past, and our Alliance with 
them will contribute to our security in the years to come.
    The purpose of NATO's enlargement extends beyond the 
security of these three states, however, and entails a process 
encompassing more than their admission to the Alliance 
Accordingly, these first new members should not and will not be 
the last. No qualified European democracy is ruled out as a 
future member. The Alliance has agreed to review the process of 
enlargement at its 1999 summit in Washington. As we prepare for 
that summit, I look forward to discussing this matter with my 
fellow NATO leaders. The process of enlargement, combined with 
the Partnership for Peace program, the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and NATO's 
new charter with Ukraine, signify NATO's commitment to avoid 
any new division of Europe, and to contribute to its 
progressive integration.
    A democratic Russia is and should be a part of that new 
Europe. With bipartisan congressional support, my 
Administration and my predecessor's have worked with our Allies 
to support political and economic reform in Russia and the 
other newly independent states and to increase the bonds 
between them and the rest of Europe. NATO's enlargement and 
other adaptions are consistent, not at odds, with that policy. 
NATO has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not threaten 
Russia and that it seeks closer and more cooperative relations. 
We and our Allies welcomed the participation of Russian forces 
in the mission in Bosnia.
    NATO most clearly signaled its interest in a constructive 
relationship through the signing in May 1997 of the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act. That Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it 
created, help to ensure that if Russia seeks to build a 
positive and peaceful future within Europe, NATO will be a full 
partner in that enterprise. I understand it will require time 
for the Russian people to gain a new understanding of NATO. The 
Russian people, in turn, must understand that an open door 
policy with regard to the addition of new members is an element 
of a new NATO. In this way, we will build a new and more stable 
Europe of which Russian is an integral part.
    I therefore propose the ratification of these Protocols 
with every expectation that we can continue to pursue 
productive cooperation with the Russian Federation. I am 
encouraged that President Yeltsin has pledged his government's 
commitment to additional progress on nuclear and conventional 
arms control measures. At our summit in Helsinki, for example, 
we agreed that once START II has entered into force we will 
begin negotiations on a START III accord that can achieve even 
deeper cuts in our strategic arsenals. Similarly, Russian's 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year 
demonstrated that cooperation on a range of security matters 
will continue.
    The Protocols of accession that I transmit to you 
constitute a decision of great consequence, and they involve 
solemn security commitments. The addition of new states also 
will entail financial costs. While those costs will be 
manageable and broadly shared with our current and new Allies, 
they nonetheless represent a sacrifice by the American people.
    Successful ratification of these Protocols demands not only 
the Senate's advice and consent required by our Constitution, 
but also the broader, bipartisan support of the American people 
and their representatives. For that reason, it is encouraging 
that congressional leaders in both parties and both chambers 
have long advocated NATO's enlargement. I have endeavored to 
make the Congress an active partner in this process. I was 
pleased that a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives 
accompanied the U.S. delegation at the NATO summit in Madrid 
last July. Officials at all levels of my Administration have 
consulted closely with the relevant committees and with the 
bipartisan Senate NATO Observer Group. It is my hope that this 
pattern of consultation and cooperation will ensure that NATO 
and our broader European policies continue to have the 
sustained bipartisan support that was so instrumental to their 
success throughout the decades of the Cold War.
    The American people today are the direct beneficiaries of 
the extraordinary sacrifices made by our fellow citizens in the 
many theaters of that ``long twilight struggle,'' and in the 
two world wars that preceded it. Those efforts aimed in large 
part to create across the breadth of Europe a lasting, 
democratic peace. The enlargement of NATO represents an 
indispensable part of today's program to finish building such a 
peace, and therefore to repay a portion of the debt we owe to 
those who went before us in the quest for freedom and security.
    The rise of new challenges in other regions does not in any 
way diminish the necessity of consolidating the increased level 
of security that Europe has attained at such high cost. To the 
contrary, our policy in Europe, including the Protocols I 
transmit herewith, can help preserve today's more favorable 
security environment in the transatlantic area, thus making is 
possible to focus attention and resources elsewhere while 
providing us with additional Allies and partners to help share 
our security burdens.
    The century we are now completing has been the bloodiest in 
all of human history. Its lessons should be clear to us: the 
wisdom of deterrence, the value of strong Alliances, the 
potential for overcoming past divisions, and the imperative of 
America engagement in Europe. The NATO Alliance is one of the 
most important embodiments of these truths, and it is in the 
interest of the United States to strengthen this proven 
institution and adapt it to a new era. The addition of this 
Alliance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is an 
essential part of that program. It will help build a Europe 
that can be integrated, democratic, free, and at peace for the 
first time in its history. It can help ensure that we and our 
Allies and our partner will enjoy greater security and freedom 
in the century that is about to begin.
    I therefore recommend that the Senate give prompt advice 
and consent to ratification of these historic Protocols.

                                                William J. Clinton.


                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                      Washington, February 9, 1998.
The President,
The White House.
    The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a 
view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent 
to ratification, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 
on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 
These protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on 
December 16, 1997, and were signed on behalf of the United 
States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic 
Treaty.
    Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the NATO 
Alliance will contribute materially to the national security of 
the United States. It will advance the efforts we have 
undertaken with our allies and partners to build an undivided, 
democratic, and peaceful Europe, which in turn reduces threats 
to our own national interests. It will strengthen the stability 
of a region that helped spawn this century's world wars and the 
Cold War, which we prosecuted at a cost of trillions of dollars 
and hundreds of thousands of American lives. It will give us 
capable new allies willing and able to defend our common 
interests. It will demonstrate continuing American engagement 
and leadership in transatlantic affairs.
    The addition of these three states to NATO is a central 
element of our transatlantic strategy. This strategy aims to 
strengthen the favorable security environment in the region 
created by the seminal events of the past decade: the end of 
the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union itself, the rise in its place of a 
democratic Russia and other newly independent states, the 
establishment of market democracies throughout Central Europe, 
the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the conclusion of 
agreements to reduce and stabilize conventional and nuclear 
armaments throughout the region.
    These transforming events reduce the likelihood of large-
scale aggression in Europe, but also present a host of new 
challenges and dangers. Threats stemming from the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and conflicts fueled by ethnic 
or religious tensions, such as in Bosnia, loom immediately. 
Over the longer term, Europe could face the possibility of 
renewed aggression or threats to its interests. Europe's new 
democracies must be more fully integrated into the 
transatlantic region's security, economic, and political 
institutions in order to prevent the erosion of recent 
democratic gains and the possibility of conflict.
    All these require continuing American engagement in the 
region's security affairs and changes in European and 
transatlantic security institutions. To this end, we have 
strengthened the role of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, opened the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development to new members, pursued the 
adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, 
worked closely with the European Union and urged its 
enlargement, supported democratic and market reforms in Russia, 
Ukraine, and the other newly independent states, and pursued 
initiatives with states in the region, such as the Charter of 
Partnership signed with the three Baltic states on January 16.
     NATO's unique attributes--an unrivaled military 
capability, an integrated command structure, and a primary 
focus on the collective defense of its members--require that 
this Alliance remain the keystone of our involvement in the 
transatlantic region's security affairs. Those attributes made 
NATO a principal instrument of our successful effort to defend 
the territory and values of the North American and European 
democracies during the Cold War, and made NATO history's most 
successful Alliance.
    Since then, the Alliance has repeatedly demonstrated its 
continuing utility and competence. NATO's success in stopping 
the war in Bosnia underscores its military effectiveness. 
NATO's completion last December of a thorough reform of its 
command structure, reducing the number of commands from 65 to 
20, testifies to the premium it places on operational 
coherence. The addition of new members from Central Europe, 
along with other adaptations in the Alliance's operations and 
command structure, will further strengthen NATO's 
effectiveness, protect more of Europe from future threats, and 
bolster the development of a Europe whole and free.
    Specifically, the addition of these three democracies to 
the Alliance will increase the security of the United States in 
four ways.
    First, it will reduce the prospect of threats to Europe's 
security, such as those we have seen throughout this century, 
which could harm American interests and potentially involve 
American forces. Integrating Central European states into NATO 
will reduce the chances of conflict by ensuring that such 
states pursue cooperative rather than competitive security 
policies. It also will help deter potential threats to this 
region from materializing. These include the dangers posed by 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means 
for their delivery. NATO's enlargement can also help address 
the possibility, although we see it as unlikely, that Russia's 
democratic transition could fail and that Russia could resume 
the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. By engaging 
Russia and enlarging NATO, we will give Russia every incentive 
to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful integration 
with the rest of Europe, while foreclosing more destructive 
alternatives.
    Second, adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to 
NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address 
Europe's security challenges. These states will add 
approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance, a commitment to 
common values and political goals, and a willingness to 
contribute to the security of the surrounding region, as they 
have demonstrated through their contribution of over 1,000 
troops to the mission in Bosnia. The military and strategic 
assets of these states will improve NATO's ability to carry out 
what is and will remain its core mission, collective defense, 
as well as its other missions.
    Third, the process of adding new states to NATO bolsters 
stability and democratic trends in Central Europe. Partly in 
order to improve their prospects for membership, states in the 
region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighboring 
states, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and 
broadened protections for ethnic and religious minorities. Such 
actions help to prevent conflicts in the region that could 
adversely affect American security and economic interests.
    Fourth, NATO's enlargement, with other elements of our 
transatlantic strategy, advances European integration and moves 
the continent beyond its forced division of the past half 
century. The perpetuation of Europe's Cold War dividing line 
would be both destabilizing the morally indefensible. To help 
erase that line, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace 
program with 27 non-NATO states, opened its doors to new 
members, inaugurated a constructive relationship with Russia 
through the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed a new charter 
with Ukraine, and created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council.
    These Protocols propose to add Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic to NATO as full members, with all privileges and 
responsibilities that apply to current allies. The core 
commitment to these three states will be embodied in the 
existing text of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, including 
the central collective defense provision in Article 5, which 
has proved its reliability across the decades of the Treaty's 
existence. Article 5 represents our country's solemn commitment 
to the security of the other allies, but the Treaty reserves to 
each NATO member, including the United States, decisions about 
what specific actions to take should a NATO member be attacked, 
and fully preserves Congress' Constitutional role in decisions 
regarding the use of force. During the Fall of 1997, NATO's 
military authorities concluded the Alliance would be able to 
meet the Article 5 and other security assurances to the new 
states from their first day of NATO membership.
    The decision to enlarge NATO's membership results from 
intensive analysis of the implications of this initiative and 
the qualifications of the three states now proposed for 
admission. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO 
declared that the Alliance remained open to membership for 
other European states, and created the Partnership for Peace 
program in part to help prepare interested states for possible 
membership. The Alliance's September 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement set out the rationale and process for adding new 
members. At its Madrid summit in July 1997, the Alliance 
invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the 
process of accession, and declared its determination to keep 
the door open for other states interested in joining NATO.
    Between September and November of 1997, NATO held four 
rounds of accession talks in Brussels with Poland, and five 
each with Hungary and the Czech Republic. These discussions 
examined in detail the three states' military capabilities, 
their willingness to contribute forces to NATO activities, and 
their readiness to accept the political and legal obligations 
of NATO membership. These discussions were based in part on 
Defense Planning Questionnaire response completed by each of 
the three states; these questionnaires are NATO's standard 
instrument for obtaining information on the military 
contributions of member states.
    During the accession talks, the three states accepted 
NATO's broad approach to security and defense, as outlined in 
its Strategic Concept and subsequent Alliance statements. They 
confirmed their intention to participate fully in NATO's 
military structure and collective defense planning and, for the 
purpose of taking part in the full range of Alliance missions, 
to commit the bulk of their armed forces to the Alliance. They 
accepted the need for standardization and interoperability as 
part of the foundation for multinationality and flexibility. 
They expressed their readiness to accept the nuclear element of 
NATO's strategy and policy and the Alliance's nuclear posture. 
They accepted NATO's restrictions and procedures for the 
handling of sensitive information. They also recognized and 
accepted that the Alliance rests upon a commonality of views, 
based on the principle of consensus in decision making, and 
expressed a readiness to contribute to attaining such 
consensus. Finally, they agreed to assume shares of NATO's 
common-funded budgets that cumulatively constitute slightly 
over four percent of the total.
    On November 10, 12, and 17, 1997, respectively, the Czech 
Prime Minister, Polish Foreign Minister, and Hungarian Foreign 
Minister wrote to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to 
confirm that, on the basis of the completed accession talks, 
their states desired to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and were willing to accept in full all the 
obligations and commitments pertaining to their membership. At 
NATO's Ministerial on December 16 in Brussels, I joined all 
fifteen other NATO ministers in agreeing to make these states 
full members, subject to the ratification of member 
governments.
    Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the 
Alliance may add ``any other European state in a position to 
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area.'' It was on that basis 
that the Alliance added Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. The unanimity 
of NATO leaders in welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic into the Alliance reflects the qualifications of each 
of these states and a confidence that each of them will, in 
fact, make meaningful contributions to transatlantic security.
    Poland's size, location, population, and resources have 
cast this state in a pivotal role in European security affairs 
throughout the past two centuries. Its addition to the Alliance 
will create an important anchor for regional security. Poland 
has the most significant military resources in Central Europe, 
and will bring to the Alliance 23 combat brigades, at least 
eight squadrons of combat aircraft, and modest naval resources. 
Poland now spends 2.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on 
defense, it has adopted a 15-year plan for military 
modernization, and the country's strong economic performance 
during this decade suggests that it will have adequate 
resources to fund that plan and contribute substantially to 
Alliance capabilities.
    Poland also has a heritage of strong political values 
consistent with those of the Alliance. Poland was home to 
Europe's first written constitution, and its officers played 
important roles in support of the United States during our 
Revolutionary War. In the 1980s, the resistance of the Polish 
people to authoritarian rule and their efforts through the 
Solidarity trade union helped topple Soviet domination of their 
own state and others in the region. Since 1989, Poland has held 
two presidential and three parliamentary rounds of elections, 
the results of which have shown a broad and stable political 
commitment to tolerant politics, market economics, and an 
outward looking foreign policy. Poland has resolved a broad 
range of issues with its neighbors, including accords with 
Germany, Lithuania, and Ukraine, and contributes a force of 
nearly 500 to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia, as well as 
contributing to peacekeeping operations in other regions of the 
world. Indeed, Poland currently has more soldiers deployed in 
multinational peacekeeping operations than any other state.
    Hungary, as well, already has proved its commitment to 
NATO's security objectives. Hungary's willingness to offer its 
base at Taszar to American forces enabled our troops to deploy 
to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia safely and effectively. This 
commitment to help bring stability to southeastern Europe has 
been valuable to the Alliance in this circumstance, and will be 
in others as well. Hungary has further demonstrated its 
commitment to NATO's objectives by contributing an engineering 
battalion to the Bosnia mission. Hungary will bring eight 
combat brigades and five squadrons of combat aircraft to the 
Alliance, and has committed to a five year program to increase 
its defense spending by one-tenth of one percent of Gross 
Domestic Product for each of the next five years.
    Hungary also brings values and a political outlook that fit 
well with those of the Alliance. The Hungarian people expressed 
early and courageous opposition to Soviet domination in their 
1956 uprising, and played a key role in the dramatic events of 
1989. They have held two rounds of presidential and 
parliamentary elections since then and have pursued 
constructive policies throughout the region. Hungary's recent 
treaties with Slovakia and Romania have helped to defuse 
tensions regarding ethnic Hungarian minorities in those states. 
In a national referendum in November, 85 percent of Hungarians 
voting favored their country's membership in the Alliance.
    The Czech Republic also will be a strong addition to NATO. 
A vibrant democracy during the inter-war years, it is today 
among the most western of the former Warsaw Pact states in both 
geography and outlook. The Czechs contributed forces to 
Operation Desert Storm and currently contribute over 600 troops 
to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Like Poland and Hungary, the 
Czech Republic has participated actively in the Partnership for 
Peace program. The Czechs will contribute 11 combat brigades 
and six squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance. The Czech 
government recently approved a budget that fully meets its 
commitment to increase defense spending by one-tenth of one 
percent of GDP in each of the next three years.
    The Czechs have proved their attachment to values shared by 
the Alliance's member states. Their Velvet Revolution of 1989, 
like events of the Prague Spring two decades earlier, 
demonstrated an abiding commitment to democracy, civil society, 
and the standards of human rights espoused by Vaclav Havel and 
other Czech leaders. Since then the Czechs have held three 
rounds of parliamentary elections, separated from Slovakia on 
peaceful terms, and concluded agreements with Germany settling 
a range of issues, including those related to treatment of 
Sudeten Germans during the post-World War II era.
    The addition of these three states to the Alliance is part 
of a strategy to improve not only their security and that of 
current NATO members, but also all other states of Europe, 
including the Russian Federation. It is the intent of the 
United States, and of NATO, to avoid any destabilizing 
redivision of the European continent, and instead to promote 
its progressive integration. The Alliance declared at its 
Madrid summit that it will leave the door open for the addition 
of other new members in the future, and that it will review 
this process at its next summit, which will be held in 
Washington in April 1999. It is encouraging that states that 
aspire to NATO membership, but have not yet been invited to 
join the Alliance, nonetheless welcomed the series of 
enlargement decisions at Madrid, the creation of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, and similar steps as beneficial 
to their own security.
    The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May of 1997, has 
special importance in this regard. The Founding Act opened the 
way to a new and constructive relationship between the Alliance 
and Russia. It therefore complements the efforts of individual 
allies to see a democratic, peaceful Russia integrated into the 
community of European nations and security structures. To that 
end, the Founding Act created a new forum, the Permanent Joint 
Council, which allows NATO and Russia to pursue security issues 
of mutual interest. The Council first convened at the 
Ministerial level on September 26 in New York, met among 
Defense Ministers in Brussels on December 2, and again among 
Foreign Ministers on December 17. The Founding Act, the 
Permanent Joint Council, the integration of Russian forces in 
the mission in Bosnia, and other actions by NATO stand as 
evidence to the Russian people that the Alliance's enlargement 
in no way will threaten Russia's security, but rather will 
enhance it by deepening democratic stability in Europe.
    The Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council advance 
Russia's cooperation with NATO and integration in European 
affairs, but they also safeguard NATO's freedom of action and 
the integrity of its decisionmaking. The Founding Act places no 
restrictions on NATO's ability to respond to the security 
environment as its own members see fit. Similarly, the 
Permanent Joint Council has no power to direct or veto actions 
by the North Atlantic Council, which remains NATO's supreme 
decisionmaking body. Moreover, all actions within the Permanent 
Joint Council must proceed by consensus, which provides the 
United States and each other NATO member with an effective veto 
over proposed points of discussion or action. The Ministerial 
meetings of the Permanent Joint Council to date demonstrates 
that it can be a useful forum for advancing relations with 
Russia, and that it will not adversely affect NATO's progress 
on internal issues such as the Alliance's enlargement.
    NATO's enlargement and related adaptations, which will 
enhance the security of its members and partners, also will 
entail financial costs to the United States and our allies over 
the coming years. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO's 
leaders commissioned a study of the military requirements of 
the Alliance's enlargement, and of the resource implications of 
meeting those requirements. The declaration from that summit 
expressed the confidence of NATO's leaders that ``Alliance 
costs associated with the integration of new members will be 
manageable and . . . the resources necessary to meet those 
costs will be provided.''
    The studies completed by the Alliance this past Fall 
confirm this view. They estimate that the addition of these 
three members will require approximately $1.5 billion in 
expenditures from NATO's common-funded military budgets over 
the next 10 years. The United States currently provides about 
one quarter of these common-funded budgets and will continue to 
do so after the addition of the new states. Thus the additional 
costs to the United States of adding these three states to the 
Alliance is estimated to be about $400 million over the next 
ten years. Adding other states to NATO in the future likely 
will entail costs as well, although it is not possible to 
estimate these without knowing which states might be invited 
and when.
    There are other costs to the United States less directly 
related to NATO's enlargement. Under the Warsaw Initiative, the 
United States has provided bilateral foreign military financing 
assistance to Central European states totaling approximately 
$185 million between fiscal years 1996 and 1998, of which $37.3 
million in the current fiscal year is allocated to Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In addition, we provide 
funding to assist partner participation in the Partnership for 
Peace program and ``in the Spirit of Partnership for Peace'' 
exercises and events, which totaled about $80 million from 
fiscal years 1996 to 1997. The three invited states took full 
advantage of this assistance to play a major role in the 
Partnership for Peace program. While all these programs are 
consistent with the aims of NATO enlargement, they constitute 
neither direct nor automatic costs of enlargement, and their 
continuation will relay on future decisions by Congress to 
provide funds.
    There are also costs related to enlargement that will be 
borne by our new and current allies. With regard to NATO's 
direct expenditures through its common-funded budgets, our 
Canadian and European allies will continue to bear about 75 
percent of the cost In addition, as noted, the three new states 
plan on making substantial investments in military 
modernization and reorganization over the coming years, and 
have committed to achieve defense spending levels on a par with 
other NATO members. Several leaders from the region have noted 
that their countries likely would need to spend more on 
military modernization if they were left outside the Alliance.
    Current allies will also continue to make investments 
through their national military budgets to help ensure that an 
enlarged NATO can carry out its missions. In particular, NATO's 
military authorities have stressed the need for improved lift, 
logistics, and other power projection capabilities, and many 
current allies are undertaking modernization efforts in these 
areas. For example, France is restructuring its armed forces to 
be more mobile and easily deployable, and is establishing a 
Rapid Action Force designed for rapid response in both European 
and overseas contingencies. Already, Britain provides NATO's 
only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO, 
and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command 
Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. Germany is standing up a Rapid 
Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from its 
Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, NATO's recent decisions 
to develop Combined Joint Task Force capabilities and a 
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance will 
enable European allies to play a larger role and to bear 
additional burdens.
    The decision to pursue the enlargement of NATO has 
reflected, in our country, a unique process of bipartisan 
cooperation across the two political branches of government. 
Both the Senate and House have considered the question of 
adding new members to the Alliance in some depth over the past 
three years. In July 1996, the House approved the NATO 
Enlargement Facilitation Act by a bipartisan majority of 353 to 
65, and the Senate adopted a similar resolution by a margin of 
81 to 16. During the course of 1997, four Senate committees 
held ten hearings on the strategic, military, diplomatic, and 
budgetary implications of this initiative.
    In addition, on April 22, 1997, the Majority Leader and 
Minority Leader of the Senate created the Senate NATO Observer 
Group, comprised of 28 Senators from both political parties, to 
work with the Administration of the process of NATO 
enlargement. During the past year, senior administration 
officials met with the members and staff of this Group in 
classified sessions over a dozen times, briefed them on 
military and political issues related to NATO's enlargement, 
provided a range of classified documents and periodic issue 
summaries, and consulted them in advance on key questions, such 
as which states to support for admission to the Alliance. Four 
members of this Group, along with four members of the House of 
Representatives, attended the NATO summit in Madrid last July 
as members of the United States delegation, and participated 
directly in its proceedings.
    This unprecedented process of consultation has helped 
ensure a thorough and bipartisan examination of the full range 
of issues at stake in NATO's enlargement. It has helped to 
inform decisionmaking within the executive branch. It also has 
helped to ensure that the voice of the American public plays a 
role in this set of decisions that will so vitally affect their 
own lives and those of their children.
    The Protocols to the Treaty of 1949 for each of the three 
states are identical in structure and composed of three 
Articles. Article I provides that once the Protocol has entered 
into force, the Secretary General of NATO shall extend an 
invitation to the named state to accede to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, and that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, 
the state shall become a party to the Treaty on the date it 
deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the 
United States of America. Article II provides that the Protocol 
shall enter into force when each of the parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United 
States of America of its acceptance of the Protocol. Article 
III provides for the equal authenticity of the English and 
French texts, and for deposit of the Protocol in the archives 
of the Government of the United States of America, the 
depository state for North Atlantic Treaty purposes.
    The addition of these three states to the Alliance, along 
with the other elements of our transatlantic strategy, will 
enable NATO to help accomplish for Europe's east what it has 
accomplished for Europe's west over the past half century. It 
will safeguard our own country's vital interests in Europe's 
well-being, and help ensure that aggression, conflict, and 
repression do not once again visit that continent as they have 
too often, and at terrible cost, throughout our lifetimes. I 
therefore convey these protocols to you with high expectations 
that their ratification will further strengthen the peace and 
security of the transatlantic region well into the approaching 
century.
    Respectfully submitted,
                                                Madeleine Albright.




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