    [Senate Treaty Document 105-28]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    105th Congress                                              Treaty Doc.
                                     SENATE
    1st Session                                                   105-28
    _______________________________________________________________________

                     COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

                                   __________

                                    MESSAGE

                                      FROM

                       THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                  transmitting

    COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY, OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AND SIGNED
    BY THE UNITED STATES AT NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996. TREATY INCLUDES
            TWO ANNEXES, A PROTOCOL, AND TWO ANNEXES TO THE PROTOCOL

    September 23, 1997.--Treaty was read the first time, together with the
    accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
                  ordered to be printed for use of the Senate

                                  ----------

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                 WASHINGTON : 1997

                             LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                   The White House, September 22, 1997.
    To the Senate of the United States:
        I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the
    Senate to ratification, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
    Treaty (the ``Treaty'' or ``CTBT''), opened for signature and
    signed by the United States at New York on September 24, 1996.
    The Treaty includes two Annexes, a Protocol, and two Annexes to
    the Protocol, all of which form integral parts of the Treaty. I
    transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of
    the Department of State on the Treaty, including an Article-by-
    Article analysis of the Treaty.
        Also included in the Department of State's report is a
    document relevant to but not part of the Treaty: the Text on
    the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization, adopted by
    the Signatory States to the Treaty on November 19, 1996. The
    Text provides the basis for the work of the Preparatory
    Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
    Organization in preparing detailed procedures for implementing
    the Treaty and making arrangements for the first session of the
    Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty. In particular,
    by the terms of the Treaty, the Preparatory Commission will be
    responsible for ensuring that the verification regime
    established by the Treaty will be effectively in operation at
    such time as the Treaty enters into force. My Administration
    has completed and will submit separately to the Senate an
    analysis of the verifiability of the Treaty, consistent with
    section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended.
    Such legislation as may be necessary to implement the Treaty
    also will be submitted separately to the Senate for appropriate
    action.
        The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
    is a signal event in the history of arms control. The subject
    of the Treaty is one that has been under consideration by the
    international community for nearly 40 years, and
    thesignificance of the conclusion of negotiations and the signature to
    date of more than 140 states cannot be overestimated. The Treaty
    creates an absolute prohibition against the conduct of nuclear weapon
    test explosions or any other nuclear explosion anywhere. Specifically,
    each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
    explosion or any other nuclear explosion; to prohibit and prevent any
    nuclear explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
    to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in
    the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
    nuclear explosion.
        The Treaty establishes a far reaching verification regime,
    based on the provision of seismic, hydroaucoustic,
    radionuclide, and infrasound data by a global network (the
    ``International Monitoring System'') consisting of the
    facilities listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol. Data provided by
    the International Monitoring System will be stored, analyzed,
    and disseminated, in accordance with Treaty-mandated
    operational manuals, by an International Data Center that will
    be part of the Technical Secretariat of the Comprehensive
    Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The verification regime
    includes rules for the conduct of on-site inspections,
    provisions for consultation and clarification, and voluntary
    confidence-building measures designed to contribute to the
    timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising from
    possible misinterpretation of monitoring data related to
    chemical explosions that a State Party intends to or has
    carried out. Equally important to the U.S. ability to verify
    the Treaty, the text specifically provides for the right of
    States Parties to use information obtained by national
    technical means in a manner consistent with generally
    recognized principles of international law for purposes of
    verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an
    on-site inspection request. The verificationregime provides
    each State Party the right to protect sensitive installations,
    activities, or locations not related to the Treaty. Determinations of
    compliance with the Treaty rest with each individual State Party to the
    Treaty.
        Negotiations for a nuclear test-ban treaty date back to the
    Eisenhower Administration. During the period 1978-1980,
    negotiations among the United States, the United Kingdom, and
    the USSR (the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-
    Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)) made progress, but
    ended without agreement. Thereafter, as the nonnuclear weapon
    states called for test-ban negotiations, the United States
    urged the Conference on Disarmament (the ``CD'') to devote its
    attention to the difficult aspects of monitoring compliance
    with such a ban and developing elements of an international
    monitoring regime. After the United States, joined by other key
    states, declared its support for comprehensive test-ban
    negotiations with a view toward prompt conclusion of a treaty,
    negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban were initiated in the
    CD, in January 1994. Increased impetus for the conclusion of a
    comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty by the end of 1996
    resulted from the adoption, by the Parties to the NPT in
    conjunction with the indefinite and unconditional extension of
    that Treaty, of ``Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation and Disarmament'' that listed the conclusion of a
    CTBT as the highest measure of its program of action.
        On August 11, 1995, when I announced U.S. support for a
    ``zero yield'' CTBT, I stated that:

              . . . As part of our national security strategy, the
            United States must and will retain strategic nuclear
            forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign
            leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from
            acting against our vital interests and to convince it
            thatseeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In
    this regard, I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear
    stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States. ``I
    am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear
    weapons labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear
    deterrent under a CTBT through a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship
    program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such
    a program almost 2 years ago, and it is being developed with the
    support of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. This program will now be tied to a new certification
    procedure. In order for this program to succeed, both the
    Administration and the Congress must provide sustained bipartisan
    support for the stockpile stewardship program over the next decade and
    beyond. I am committed to working with the Congress to ensure this
    support.
              While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship
            program will be successful, as President I cannot
            dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the
            program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore,
            in addition to the new annual certification procedure
            for our nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also
            establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define
            the conditions under which the United States can enter
            into a CTBT . . .

        The safeguards that were established are as follows:

              The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship
            program to ensure a high level of confidence in the
            safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active
            stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of
            effective and continuing experimental programs.
              The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory
            facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory
            nuclear technology that will attract, retain, and
            ensure the continued application of our human
            scientific resources to those programs on which
            continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
              The maintenance of the basic capability to resume
            nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should
            the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this
            Treaty.
              The continuation of a comprehensive research and
            development program to improve our treaty monitoring
            capabilities and operations.
              The continuing development of a broad range of
            intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and
            operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
            information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear
            weapons development programs, and related nuclear
            programs.
              The understanding that if the President of the United
            States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the
            Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear
            Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons
            laboratories,and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
    Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability
    of a nuclear weapon type that the two Secretaries consider to be
    critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the
    President, in consultation with the Congress, would be prepared to
    withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national
    interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be
    required.

        With regard to the last safeguard:

              The U.S. regards continued high confidence in the
            safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons stockpile
            as a matter affecting the supreme interests of the
            country and will regard any events calling that
            confidence into question as ``extraordinary events
            related to the subject matter of the treaty.'' It will
            exercise its rights under the ``supreme national
            interests'' clause if it judges that the safety or
            realibility of its nuclear weapons stockpile cannot be
            assured with the necessary high degree of confidence
            without nuclear testing.
              To implement that commitment, the Secretaries of
            Defense ad Energy--advised by the Nuclear Weapons
            Council or ``NWC'' (comprising representatives of DOD,
            JCS, and DOE), the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons
            laboratories and the commander of the U.S. Strategic
            Command--will report to the President annually, whether
            they can certify that the Nation's nuclear weapons
            stockpile and all critical elements thereof are, to a
            high degree of confidence, safe andreliable, and, if
    they cannot do so, whether, in their opinion and that of the NWC,
    testing is necessary to assure, with a high degree of confidence, the
    adequacy of corrective measures to assure the safety and reliability of
    the stockpile, or elements thereof. The Secretaries will state the
    reasons for their conclusions, and the views of the NWC, reporting any
    minority views.
              After receiving the Secretaries' certification and
            accompanying report, including NWC and minority views,
            the President will provide them to the appropriate
            committees of the Congress, together with a report on
            the actions he has taken in light of them.
              If the President is advised, by the above procedure,
            that a high level of confidence in the safety or
            reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to the
            Nation's nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified
            without nuclear testing, or that nuclear testing is
            necessary to assure the adequacy of corrective
            measures, the President will be prepared to exercise
            our ``supreme national interests'' rights under the
            Treaty, in order to conduct such testing.
              The procedure for such annual certification by the
            Secretaries, and for advice to them by the NWC, U.S.
            Strategic Command, and the DOE nuclear weapons
            laboratories will be embodied in domestic law.

        As negotiations on a text drew to a close it became
    apparent that one member of the CD, India, would not join in a
    consensus decision to forward the text to the United Nations
    for its adoption. After consultations among countries
    supporting the text. Australia requested the President of the
    U.N. GeneralAssembly to convene a resumed session of the 50th
    General Assembly to consider and take action on the text. The General
    Assembly was so convened, and by a vote of 158 to 3 the Treaty was
    adopted. On September 24, 1996, the Treaty was opened for signature and
    I had the privilege, on behalf of the United States, of being the first
    to sign the Treaty.
        The Treaty assigns responsibility for overseeing its
    implementation to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
    Organization (the ``Organization''), to be established in
    Vienna. The Organization, of which each State Party will be a
    member, will have three organs: the Conference of the State
    Parties, a 51-member Executive Council, and the Technical
    Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat will supervise the
    operation of and provide technical support for the
    International Monitoring System, operate the International Data
    Center, and prepare for and support the conduct of on-site
    inspections. The Treaty also requires each State Party to
    establish a National Authority that will serve as the focal
    point within the State Party for liaison with the Organization
    and with other States Parties.
        The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the deposit
    of instruments of ratification by all of the 44 states listed
    in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but in no case earlier than 2 years
    after its being opened for signature. If, 3 years from the
    opening of the Treaty for signature, the Treaty has not entered
    into force, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his
    capacity as Depositary of the Treaty, will convene a conference
    of the states that have deposited their instruments of
    ratification if a majority of those states so requests. At this
    conference the participants will consider what measures
    consistent with international law might be undertaken to
    accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the
    early entry into force of the Treaty. Their decision on such
    measures must be taken by consensus.
        Reservations to the Treaty Articles and the Annexes to the
    Treaty are not permitted. Reservations may be taken to the
    Protocol and its Annexes so long as they are not incompatible
    with the object and purpose of the Treaty. Amendment of the
    Treaty requires the positive vote of a majority of the States
    Parties to the Treaty, voting in a duly convened Amendment
    Conference at which no State Party casts a negative vote. Such
    amendments would enter into force 30 days after ratification by
    all States Parties that cast a positive vote at the Amendment
    Conference.
        The Treaty is of unlimited duration, but contains a
    ``supreme interests'' clause entitling any State Party that
    determines that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by
    extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the
    Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon 6-month's notice.
        Unless a majority of the Parties decides otherwise, a
    Review Conference will be held 10 years following the Treaty's
    entry into force and may be held at 10-year intervals
    thereafter if the Conference of the States Parties so decides
    by a majority vote (or more frequently if the Conference of the
    States Parties so decides by a two-thirds vote).
        The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular
    significance to the continuing efforts to stem nuclear
    proliferation and strengthen regional and global stability. Its
    conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority item
    on the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda.
    Its effective implementation will provide a foundation on which
    further efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons can be
    soundly based. By responding to the call for a CTBT by the end
    of 1996, the Signatory States, and most importantly the nuclear
    weapon states, have demonstrated the bona fides of their
    commitment to meaningful arms control measures.
        The monitoring challenges presented by the wide scope of
    the CTBT exceed those imposed by any previous nuclear test-
    related treaty. Our current capability to monitor nuclear
    explosions will undergo significant improvement over the next
    several years to meet these challenges. Even with these
    enhancements, though, several conceivable CTBT evasion
    scenarios have been identified. Nonetheless, our National
    Intelligence Means (NIM), together with the Treaty's
    verification regime and our diplomatic efforts, provide the
    United States with the means to make the CTBT effectively
    verifiable. By this, I mean that the United States:

              will have a wide range of resources (NIM, the
            totality of information available in public and private
            channels, and the mechanisms established by the Treaty)
            for addressing compliance concerns and imposing
            sanctions in cases of noncompliance; and
              will thereby have the means to: (a) assess whether
            the Treaty is deterring the conduct of nuclear
            explosions (in terms of yields and number of tests)
            that could damage U.S. security interests and
            constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
            (b) take prompt and effective counteraction.

        My judgment that the CTBT is effectively verifiable also
    reflects the belief that U.S. nuclear deterrence would not be
    undermined by possible nuclear testing that the United States
    might fail to detect under the Treaty, bearing in mind that the
    United States will derive substantial confidence from other
    factors--the CTBT's ``supreme national interests'' clause, the
    annual certification procedure for the U.S. nuclear stockpile,
    and the U.S. Safeguards program.
        I believe that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is
    in the best interests of the United States. Its provisions will
    significantly further our nuclear nonproliferation and arms
    control objectives and strengthen international security.
    Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable
    consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to
    ratification as soon as possible.

                                                    William J. Clinton.
                              LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                                  ----------

                                           Department of State,
                                        Washington, September 20, 1997.
        The President: I have the honor to submit to you the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Treaty, or CTBT),
    opened for signature at New York on September 24, 1996, and
    signed by the United States of America and 145 other countries
    to date.
        The Treaty includes as integral parts, two Annexes and a
    Protocol (on verification) with two Annexes. Accompanying this
    Report for the information of the Senate, is an Article-by-
    Article analysis of the Treaty.

                                  introduction

        The Treaty represents the culmination of nearly four
    decades of efforts, beginning during the Eisenhower
    Administration, to ban completely all nuclear weapon test
    explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, wherever they
    might be carried out. Since 1963, the carrying out of a nuclear
    weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in the
    atmosphere, in outer space or underwater has been prohibited by
    the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
    Outer Space and Under Water (the Partial or Limited Test-Ban
    Treaty, or LTBT), done at Moscow August 5, 1963. More than 120
    states are party to the LTBT, but importantly two of the
    formally acknowledged nuclear weapon states, China and France,
    are not. During the 1977-1980 time frame, trilateral
    negotiations on a comprehensive test ban were carried out by
    the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
    These negotiations reached an impasse over a number of issues,
    including seismic monitoring. They continued following the
    Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in early December 1979 and were
    adjourned in November 1980.
        In the decade that followed, efforts to explore the
    verification needs for a comprehensive test ban were undertaken
    by the Group of Scientific Experts, a group of the Conference
    on Disarmament (the CD), while strong calls were made for
    negotiations on a test ban by many non-nuclear weapon states.
    In making their case for negotiation of a test ban, these non-
    nuclear weapon states repeatedly referred to the preambular
    expressions of support for continued negotiations on a test ban
    contained in the LTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
    of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), done at Washington, London, and
    Moscow July 1, 1968.
        Since December 11, 1990, the United States and the Russian
    Federation (as successor to the Soviet Union) have been legally
    precluded from conducting nuclear explosions with yields
    greater than 150 kilotons in the one environment to which the
    1963 LTBT was not applicable, beneath the surface of the earth,
    by the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon
    Tests (TTBT) and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions
    for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on July 3, 1974 and May
    28, 1976 respectively. Following signature of these Treaties
    and pending their entry into force, the United States and the
    Soviet Union in 1976 each publicly stated its intention to
    observe the 150 kiloton limit, provided that the other did
    likewise. Following agreement on new verification Protocols,
    the two Treaties were ratified and entered into force on
    December 11, 1990.
        The CTBT will prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions
    and any other nuclear explosion, however small, and it does so
    in each and every environment, without exception.
        The text of the Treaty was negotiated in Geneva, between
    January 1994 and August 1996, in the CD. Nearly all of the
    member states of the CD, initially numbering 38, but
    subsequently expanded to 61 in June 1996, participated actively
    in the negotiations. On behalf of the United States,
    representatives of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the
    Department of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    the Intelligence Community, the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, and the Department of Energy all played important
    roles in the development of the Treaty through participation in
    the negotiations in Geneva and the development of policy in
    Washington. Throughout the negotiating process, the United
    States consulted and worked closely with its Western Allies in
    the CD, as well as with Israel and withthe non-Western nuclear
    weapon state members of the CD, Russia and China.

                             background information

        When the United States made the decision in mid-1993
    actively to pursue conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban
    treaty it did so in an environment, both international and
    domestic, significantly different from that in which
    negotiations of a test ban had taken place from 1977 to 1980.
    The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the appreciation of the
    magnitude of the security threat posed by the possible
    proliferation of states having nuclear weapon capabilities
    fostered a new look at the impact a comprehensive test-ban
    could have on constraining such threats. Additional factors
    included the redress of the major imbalance in conventional
    forces in Europe brought about by the Treaty on Conventional
    Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), done at Paris December
    19, 1990, which greatly reduced the levels of tanks, armored
    combat vehicles, artillery, attack aircraft, and helicopters,
    and the major reduction in the strategic forces of the United
    States and the former Soviet Union resulting from the START
    negotiations. Finally, it was determined that the United States
    had no current military requirement for new-design nuclear
    warhead production. Accordingly, the constraints of a test ban
    could be accepted. In contrast to earlier comprehensive test
    ban negotiations, all the negotiating parties were willing to
    accept relatively intrusive verification measures, including
    extensive in-country sensors and on-site inspections.
        In addition, legislation was signed into law by President
    Bush in 1992 that directed the United States to stop all
    testing by September 30, 1996, provided no other state tested
    after that date, and to engage in negotiations to achieve a
    comprehensive test-ban by that date. In the meantime, the
    legislation (sponsored by Senators Hatfield, Exon, and
    Mitchell) precluded the expenditure of funds for more than 15
    nuclear weapon tests (including three for the United Kingdom)
    and permitted the expenditure of appropriated funds for such
    tests only if they were found by the Executive Branch to be
    necessary for the sole purpose of maintaining the reliability
    and safety of the existing nuclear weapon stockpile.
        As regards the international climate that contributed to
    the U.S. decision actively to support negotiation and
    conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban, the then forthcoming
    1995 Review and Extension Conferenceof the NPT focused new
    light on the importance of a comprehensive test-ban to the member
    states of the NPT and to the continued viability of the
    nonproliferation regime. The United States was deeply committed to the
    indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and it became clear
    that a comprehensive test-ban could make a major contribution to
    achievement of the NPT's permanent extension. The decision to support a
    concerted effort to conclude a comprehensive test-ban was thus based on
    the careful assessment that any possible risks were outweighed by the
    benefits to United States nonproliferation and other security
    objectives in constraining the spread and improvement of nuclear weapon
    capabilities. However, the U.S. decision to pursue actively a
    comprehensive test-ban was conditioned on having the capability to
    ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of the
    U.S. stockpile and to achieve an effective verification regime for the
    Treaty. At the same time, the United States sought to ensure protection
    of U.S. interests with respect to the scope, membership, and
    termination provisions of the Treaty.
        The negotiations in the CD continued throughout 1994, 1995,
    and most of 1996. The CD was working to meet a target date for
    signature of the Treaty in the fall of 1996 set by the United
    Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution unanimously adopted
    in December 1995. The objective was for the CD to forward the
    agreed-upon text to a resumed 50th session of the UNGA, which
    could then request the Secretary-General to open the Treaty for
    signature. As the 1996 CD session drew close to an end it
    became clear that one state, India, would block consensus
    action by the CD to forward the text to the UNGA. The member
    states of the CD that supported the text thereupon began to
    consider other means by which the text that had resulted from
    the deliberations within the CD's AD Hoc Committee on a Nuclear
    Test-Ban might be forwarded to the UN. Australia took the lead
    in its individual capacity, not as a member of the CD, and
    formally requested that the UNGA President convene a resumed
    session of the 50th General Assembly for the purpose of
    considering and acting upon the text of a comprehensive test-
    ban treaty. At its resumed session the General Assembly adopted
    the text of the Treaty by a vote of 158 to 3 with 5
    abstentions. Thereafter the Secretary-General opened the Treaty
    for signature on September 24, 1996. At the same time, the
    Signatory States held a series of consultations regarding the
    Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization that had
    been developed at the CD. At a meeting of SignatoryStates of
    the CTBT on November 19, 1996, the Signatory States, at that time
    numbering 130, adopted by acclamation the Text, thereby establishing
    the Preparatory Commission for the Organization. This document provides
    the basis for the work of the Preparatory Commission, which is the
    entity responsible for preparing detailed procedures for implementing
    the Treaty and for laying the foundation for the operation of the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (the Organization)
    that is established by the Treaty and will come into being once the
    Treaty enters into force. The Text, which is relevant to but not part
    of the Treaty, is enclosed for the information of the Senate. On
    November 20, 1996, the Preparatory Commission convened its first
    meeting (which was reconvened and concluded in March 1997), and began
    the process of developing Rules of Procedure, Financial Regulations,
    and other necessary measures for the future operation of the
    Organization in implementing the Treaty.

                     the treaty: its structure and content

        The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty consists of a
    Preamble, 17 Articles, and two Annexes, as well as the Protocol
    to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (the Verification
    Protocol) having three Parts and two Annexes. The basic
    obligations of the States Parties are set forth in Article I.
    Specifically, each State Party undertakes: (a) not to carry out
    any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear
    explosion; (b) to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear
    explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and
    (c) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
    participating in the carrying out of any such nuclear explosion
    by anyone else. The prohibitions and undertakings thus apply to
    geographic areas (i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or
    control of a State Party), as well as to the activities of a
    State Party (e.g., the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
    explosion or any other nuclear explosion) wherever such
    activity might take place.

                             organizational bodies

        The Treaty establishes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
    Treaty Organization (the Organization, or CTBTO) located in
    Vienna, Austria, as the body that is charged with achieving the
    object and purpose of the Treaty and overseeing implementation
    of the provisions of the Treaty and the international
    verification system described in the Protocol to the CTBT. Each
    State Party to the Treaty is a member of the Organization,
    which itself has threeorgans: the Conference of the States
    Parties, the Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
        The Conference of the States Parties (the Conference) is
    the body responsible for overseeing implementation of the
    Treaty, the activities of the Executive Council and the
    Technical Secretariat, and the States Parties' compliance with
    the Treaty's provisions. It is charged with considering and
    reviewing scientific and technological developments that could
    affect the operation of the Treaty, and with taking the
    necessary measures to ensure compliance with the Treaty and to
    redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the
    provisions of the Treaty.
        The Executive Council is composed of 51 member states,
    elected by the Conference of the States Parties. Annex 1 to the
    Treaty assigns each potential State Party to one of six
    geographical regions. Each region will present to the
    Conference designations of States Parties for seats on the
    Executive Council. Designations will be based, inter alia, on a
    State Party's nuclear capabilities relevant to the Treaty as
    well as the number of monitoring facilities and financial
    contributions to the Organization. The United States expects to
    serve continuously on the Executive Council. The Executive
    Council is the executive body of the Organization, responsible
    for the supervision of the Technical Secretariat. The Executive
    Council serves as the liaison with the National Authority of
    each State Party, and carries out the preparatory and follow-up
    work for sessions of the Conference. The Executive Council has
    important functions with respect to verification and
    compliance: it is directed to facilitate cooperation among the
    States Parties through the exchange of information; to
    facilitate consultations among States Parties; to receive,
    consider, and act on requests for on-site inspections; and to
    take action on the reports of such inspections. It may make
    recommendations to the Conference based on the results of on-
    site inspections, or, if a case is urgent, take a matter
    directly to the United Nations.
        The Technical Secretariat is responsible, inter alia and
    most importantly, for supervising the operation of the
    International Monitoring System (the IMS), operating the
    International Data Center (the IDC), and the conduct of on-site
    inspections. It is headed by a Director-General, appointed by
    the Conference, who will serve a four-year term and not more
    than two terms. Data from the monitoring stations in the IMS is
    provided by States directly or through their own national data
    centers, tothe IDC, where it is processed, analyzed and stored,
    and made available to all States Parties. The IDC products that will be
    made available to all States Parties at no cost include: standard
    screened event bulletins, executive summaries of data acquired, and
    integrated lists of all signals detected by the IMS.

                        national implementation measures

        In addition to the implementing organs established by the
    Treaty itself, the Treaty requires each State Party to
    establish a National Authority to serve as a focal point for
    liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
    States Parties are also expressly required to take the steps
    necessary to prohibit natural and legal persons on their
    territory and natural and legal persons in any other place
    under their jurisdiction or control, from undertaking any
    activity that the State Party itself is prohibited from
    undertaking. In addition, they are required to prohibit their
    nationals from undertaking such activities anywhere. These
    prohibitions complement the basic obligation of each State
    Party under Article I to ``prohibit and prevent'' nuclear
    explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

                           verification of compliance

        The verification regime established by the Treaty has four
    separate but interdependent components: an international
    monitoring system, consultation and clarification procedures,
    on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The
    Protocol to the Treaty contains the specific objectives,
    authorities, functions, and requirements for the international
    monitoring system, on-site inspections, and confidence-building
    measures. The Treaty also provides for the States Parties to
    take measures necessary to ensure compliance and to redress a
    situation that contravenes the Treaty, including the
    possibility of the imposition of sanctions. In conjunction with
    States Parties' obligations to provide data and accept on-site
    inspections, provision is made for the protection of sensitive
    facilities and confidential information and data provided by
    States Parties. The Treaty also specifically recognizes States
    Parties' rights to use information obtained by national
    technical means in a manner consistent with generally
    recognized principles of international law, including the
    respect for the sovereignty of states, for purposes of
    verification generally, and in particular, as the basis for an
    on-site inspection request.
        Each State Party is required to maintain and operate, in
    accordance with agreements or arrangements between it and the
    Organization, those facilities for seismological, radionuclide,
    hydro- acoustical, and infrasound monitoring comprising the
    IMS, as well as laboratories and related communication
    facilities, listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol, located on its
    territory or for which it is otherwise responsible. The
    Organization is also authorized to enter into similar
    agreements or arrangements with states not party to the Treaty
    as necessary.
        For the purpose of clarifying whether a nuclear explosion
    has been carried out in violation of the Treaty, each State
    Party has the right to request an on-site inspection. Within
    specific time frames an inspection request must be processed
    and referred to the Executive Council, which must take action
    within 96 hours from the time the request is first received.
    Approval of the request requires at least 30 affirmative votes
    of the 51 members of the Executive Council. If the request is
    approved, the inspection team must arrive at the point of entry
    no more than six days following the Executive Council's receipt
    of the request. Following the inspection, an inspection report
    is provided to all States Parties, and the Executive Council
    reviews the report and must address any concerns expressed by a
    State Party as to whether any non-compliance with the Treaty
    has occurred and whether the right to request an on-site
    inspection has been abused. If the Executive Council determines
    that further actions may be necessary, it may make
    recommendations to the Conference on measures to redress the
    situation.
        Recognizing that signals from non-nuclear explosions might
    create ambiguities, the Treaty calls upon each State Party, on
    a voluntary basis, to participate in a number of confidence-
    building measures, including the provision of information
    relating to any chemical explosions using over 300 metric tons
    of TNT-equivalent blasting material that it intends to carry
    out.

           entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the treaty

        Annex 2 to the Treaty names the 44 states that are members
    of the Conference on Disarmament and that are also listed in
    Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996
    edition of ``Nuclear Power Reactors in the World'' or listed in
    Table I of the IAEA's December 1995 edition of ``Nuclear
    Research Reactors in the World.'' Pursuant to paragraph 1 of
    Article XIV of theTreaty, these 44 states are those whose
    ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Once those
    states have ratified, the Treaty will enter into force 180 days
    following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification by the 44,
    or two years after September 24, 1996 (the date on which the Treaty was
    opened for signature), whichever is later.
        By virtue of this Article XIV provision, each of the 44
    named states could effectively block the entry into force of
    the Treaty. The Treaty therefore provides that three years
    after the opening of the Treaty for signature, if it has not
    yet entered into force, a majority of the states that have
    deposited their instruments of ratification can request the
    Secretary-General of the United Nations (the designated
    Depositary for the Treaty) to convene a conference to consider
    what measures, consistent with international law, might be
    undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to
    facilitate the Treaty's entry into force. This conference would
    not, however, have the authority to waive the requirement for
    ratification by the 44 designated states.
        The Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty contains a
    ``supreme interests'' clause, in accordance with which a State
    Party may withdraw from the Treaty upon six month's notice to
    all the other States Parties, the Executive Council, the
    Depositary, and the United Nations Security Council, if it
    determines that extraordinary events related to the subject
    matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A
    State Party exercising this right is required to provide, along
    with its notice of withdrawal, a statement of the extraordinary
    event or events that it regards as having jeopardized its
    supreme interests.

                          reservations and amendments

        Reservations may not be taken to the Articles of the Treaty
    or the Annexes to the Treaty. Reservations may be taken to the
    Protocol and the Annexes thereto so long as they are not
    incompatible with the object and purpose of the Treaty.
        The procedures for amendment of the Treaty, the Protocol or
    the Annexes to the Protocol provide that any State party may
    propose an amendment, which, if considered and adopted at an
    Amendment Conference by a majority of States Parties and
    without a negative vote by any State Party, shall enter into
    force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of an
    instrument ofratification or acceptance by all those States
    Parties that voted for the amendment at the Amendment Conference.
        In addition, the Treaty provides that, for the purpose of
    ensuring the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, the
    Parties may make changes of an administrative or technical
    nature to Part I (dealing with the International Monitoring
    System and the International Data Center) and Part III
    (Confidence-Building Measures) of the Protocol, as well as the
    Annexes to the Protocol, in accordance with a separate
    procedure and without going through the formal amendment
    process.

                                     costs

        The expenses of the Organization are to be borne by the
    States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of
    assessments, adjusted to take into account differences in
    membership between the United Nations and the Organization. It
    is anticipated that the United States share will be
    approximately 25 percent. The Treaty provides that each State
    Party establishing or upgrading International Monitoring
    Facilities (IMS) may reduce its annual assessed contribution by
    up to 50 percent pursuant to agreement with the Organization
    and, if applicable, the state(s) on whose territory the
    facility is based. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission
    are to be divided in the same manner as the expenses of the
    Organization, and provision is made for giving credit to States
    Parties for their contribution to the Preparatory Commission as
    offsets against their assessed contributions for the regular
    budget of the Organization.

                            national implementation

        As noted above, the Treaty requires that each State Party
    establish a National Authority that will function as its
    liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. Each
    State Party is required to inform the Organization of its
    National Authority upon entry into force of the treaty for it.
        In order for the United States to ensure full compliance
    with its obligations under the Treaty, implementing legislation
    will be required. Such legislation will be submitted separately
    to the Congress. In addition, any environmental documentation
    that may be deemed appropriate will be forwarded separately to
    the Senate for its information.

                                   conclusion

        I believe that this Treaty, by banning all nuclear weapon
    test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as described
    above, and by establishing a comprehensive verification system
    to monitor compliance and assist States Parties in making
    compliance decisions, will significantly strengthen the
    national security of the United States and its Allies and will
    contribute to global and regional security as well. I therefore
    recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its
    advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible
    time.
        Respectfully submitted,
                                                    Madeleine Albright.
        Enclosures: As stated.