[House Document 105-341]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-341


 
                            STATUS ON IRAQ

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)




    December 17, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International 
                  Relations and ordered to be printed

                               --------

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE                    
69-011                     WASHINGTON : 1998




                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, November 5, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
September 3 to the present.


                              INTRODUCTION


    On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all 
cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) 
including monitoring activity. This announcement represents a 
serious escalation of Iraq's August 5 decision to suspend 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). On October 31, the UNSC issued a statement 
condemning Iraq's decision as a ``flagrant violation of 
relevant Council resolutions and of the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between the Secretary General and the 
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq'' last February. Iraq's action 
followed its receipt of a letter from the UK (as President of 
the Security Council) indicating a willingness to conduct a 
comprehensive review, but only after Iraq returned to full 
compliance. Since the October 31 statement, UNSCOM has been 
able to conduct only very limited monitoring activity.
    Earlier, on September 9, the UNSC unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1194, which condemns Iraq's August 5 decision as a 
``totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations,'' 
demands that Iraq rescind its decision and resume cooperation, 
and suspends bimonthly sanctions reviews until UNSCOM and IAEA 
report that they are satisfied that Iraq has done so.
    The resolution also notes the Council's willingness to hold 
a comprehensive review of ``Iraq's compliance with its 
obligations under all relevant resolutions once Iraq has 
rescinded its * * * decision [to suspend cooperation] and 
demonstrated that it is prepared to fulfill all its 
obligations, including, in particular on disarmament issues, by 
resuming full cooperation with the Special Commission and the 
IAEA. * * * ''
    On September 23, the P-5 Foreign Ministers issued a 
statement reiterating that Iraq's actions are ``totally 
unacceptable,'' and confirmed that ``Iraq must respond 
immediately to Security Council Resolution 1194 and resume full 
cooperation.'' The statement also noted that the prerequisite 
for a comprehensive review was Iraq's ``unconditional 
resumption'' of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
    Tariq Aziz spend several days at the United Nations in New 
York at the end of September discussing the comprehensive 
review with Security Council members and the Secretary General. 
The Secretary General's Special Representative Prakash Shah is 
engaged in discussions in Baghdad on the subject. Despite 
Iraq's lobbying efforts, the Secretary General and all Council 
members remain united in judging Iraq's actions unacceptable; 
all 15 Council members supported the Council President's letter 
to the Secretary General that said Iraq must rescind its August 
5 decision and resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We 
continue to work with the Council to convince Iraq to reverse 
course, but we have not ruled out any option should the Council 
fail to reverse Iraq's decision.
    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. On May 27, 1998, 
Iraq presented a distribution plan for the implementation of 
Resolution 1153, which had been adopted on February 20. Under 
phase three of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from 
December 3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2 billion worth of 
humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq. Under the 
current phase, phase four, which began in June, the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee has approved the purchase of over $1.2 
billion worth of humanitarian goods. United States companies 
can participate in the ``oil-for-food'' program, and over $185 
million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms have been 
approved since the program began.
    Recent developments in northern Iraq demonstrate once again 
the power of persistent diplomacy. On September 17, leaders of 
the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, Massoud Barzani and Jalal 
Talabani, met together for the first time in over 4 years to 
sign a forward-looking joint statement committing their parties 
to reconciliation. Their talks, held at the Department of State 
under U.S. auspices, followed 6 months of intensive discussions 
and close consultation with the Kurdish parties and with our 
Turkish and British allies. The statesmanlike achievement of 
the Iraq Kurdish leaders signals a hopeful new chapter for all 
the people of northern Iraq.
    On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 
1998. Work also continues on the existing opposition program to 
help opposition groups unify politically, and the new Radio 
Free Iraq service began broadcasting in late October. These new 
programs will help us encourage the Iraqi people to build a 
pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule 
of law and respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq would have 
little trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and 
in the international community.

           U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region

    Saddam's record of aggressive behavior forces us to retain 
a highly capable force presence in the region in order to deter 
Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors. 
The United States and allied forces now in the theater are 
prepared to deal with all contingencies. We have the capability 
to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression. We will 
continue to maintain a robust force posture and have 
established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our 
forces in the Gulf when needed. Our cruise missile force is 
twice the pre-October 1997 level and can be augmented 
significantly within days. Our contingency plans allow us the 
capability for swift, powerful strikes if that becomes 
necessary.
    Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based 
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine expeditionary unit, a 
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, 
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of 
U.S. Central Command operations. To enhance force protection 
throughout the region, additional military security personnel 
are also deployed.

         OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH AND OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH

    The United States and coalition partners continue to 
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern 
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. There were no observed no-
fly zone violations during the period covered by this report. 
We have made clear to Iraq and to all other relevant parties 
that the United States and coalition partners will continue to 
enforce both no-fly zones.

                    THE MARITIME INTERCEPTION FORCE

    The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in 
accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions, 
vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy 
is thesingle largest component of this multinational force, but 
it is frequently augmented by ships, aircraft, and other support from 
Australia, Canada, Belgium, Kuwait, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the 
UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council also support the MIF by providing logistical support and 
shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for violating U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq.
    The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal 
smuggling into and out of Iraq. In late August, the MIF 
conducted stepped-up operations in the far northern Gulf in the 
shallow waters near the major Iraqi waterways. These operations 
severely disrupted smuggling operations in the region. A new 
round of stepped up activity took place in mid-October. Since 
the beginning of the year, over 40 vessels have been detained 
for violations of the embargo and sent to ports in the Gulf for 
enforcement actions. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries adjacent 
to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their own 
enforcement efforts and have intercepted and detained vessels 
involved in sanctions violations. Although refined petroleum 
products leaving Iraq comprise most of the prohibited traffic, 
the MIF has also intercepted a growing number of ships in 
smuggling prohibited goods into Iraq in violation of U.N. 
sanctions resolutions and the ``oil-for-food'' program. Ships 
involved in smuggling frequently utilize the territorial seas 
of Iran to avoid MIF patrols. In September, Iran closed the 
Shatt Al Arab waterway to smugglers and we observed the lowest 
level of illegal gasoil smuggling in 2 years. Iran apparently 
reopened the waterway in October. Detailed reports of these 
smuggling activities have been provided to the U.N. Sanctions 
Committee in New York.

                            CHEMICAL WEAPONS

    Iraq continues to deny that it ever weaponized VX nerve 
agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly 
stated confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal laboratory finding of 
stabilized VX components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile 
warheads. Tests by France and Switzerland on other warhead 
fragments have been conducted to help UNSCOM estimate the total 
number of warheads loaded with VX. On October 22 and 23, 
international experts from seven countries met to discuss all 
analytical results obtained in the course of UNSCOM's 
verification of Iraq's declarations related to VX activities. 
Ambassador Butler reported to the U.N. Security Council on 
October 26 that the international experts ``unanimously 
concluded'' that ``all analytical data'' provided by the United 
States, Swiss, and French laboratories involved were considered 
``conclusive and valid.'' Ambassador Butler continued, ``the 
existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraqi 
declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads 
had never been filled with CW agents.'' The experts recommended 
the UNSCOM ask Iraq to explain the origin and history of the 
fragments analyzed by all three laboratories and the presence 
of degradation products of nerve agents, and to explain the 
presence of a compound known as VX stabilizer and its 
degradation product.
    Iraq still refuses to turn over to UNSCOM the Iraqi Air 
Force document found by UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical 
weapons expended during the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that 
UNSCOM believes the document indicates that Iraq's official 
declaration to UNSCOM have greatly overstated the quantities of 
chemical weapons expended, which means a greater number of 
chemical weapons are unaccounted for than previously estimated.

                           BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

    Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for 
UNSCOM tests that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD 
missile warheads. Iraq has been claiming since 1995 that it put 
anthrax in only five such warheads, and had previously denied 
weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's explanations to date are far 
from satisfactory, although it now acknowledges putting both 
anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number of warheads.
    Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program, including SCUD 
missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled 
with BW, spray devices for BW, production of BW agents 
(anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut), 
and BW agent growth media, remains the ``black hole'' described 
by Ambassador Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to provide a 
credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its BW 
agents.
    In response to a U.S. proposal, the Security Council agreed 
on October 13 to seek clarification from Iraq of statements 
made by Iraqi officials on October 7 concerning the existence 
of additional information on biological weapons still in Iraq's 
hands, and about Iraq's refusal to turn over the Iraqi Air 
Force document on chemical weapons expended in the Iran-Iraq 
War.

                          LONG-RANGE MISSILES

    While Iraq continued to allow UNSCOM to witness flight 
tests of nonprohibited Iraqi missiles with range under 150 km 
(this cooperation has not been tested since the October 31 
decision), there has been no change in (1) Iraq's refusal to 
further discuss its system for concealment of longer-range 
missilesand their components, (2) Iraq's refusal to provide 
credible evidence of its disposition of large quantities of the unique 
fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile, or (3) Iraq's continued 
test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air missile components, 
despite written objections by UNSCOM (reported to the Security 
Council). These areas contribute to an Iraqi capability to produce a 
surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted range of 
150 km.
    While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 
imported Soviet-made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give 
UNSCOM a credible accounting of the indigenous program that 
produced complete SCUD missiles that were both successfully 
test-flown and delivered to the Iraqi army.

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    The nuclear weapons situation remains as it was on August 
11, 1998, when IAEA Director General El Baradei wrote to the 
President of the Security Council that Iraq's August 5 
suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA allows only 
``limited implementation of its ongoing monitoring'' and 
``makes it impossible * * * to investigate * * * remaining 
questions and concerns * * * '' In its 6-month report to the 
U.N. Security Council on October 7, the IAEA stated that it had 
a ``technically coherent'' view of the Iraqi nuclear program. 
There are remaining questions, but IAEA believes they can be 
dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification 
effort.
    But the report also stated that Iraq's current suspension 
of cooperation with the IAEA limits the IAEA's right to full 
and free access. The IAEA is currently unable to investigate 
further aspects of Iraq's clandestine program or to ensure that 
prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq, free 
from the risk of detection through direct measures.

                            DUAL-USE IMPORTS

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to 
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must 
notify the unit before it imports specific items that can be 
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian 
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely 
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
    Given Iraq's current decision to suspend cooperation with 
UNSCOM/IAEA, we remain constantly vigilant for evidence of 
smuggling of items usable in weapons of mass destruction.

                  THE U.N.'S ``OIL-FOR-FOOD'' PROGRAM

    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. Under the last 
phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December 
3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2 billion worth of 
humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq. Untied 
States companies can participate in ``oil-for-food,'' and $185 
million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms have been 
approved; millions of dollars more have been earned through 
subcontracts. Since the first deliveries under the ``oil-for-
food'' program began in March 1997, 7 million tons of food 
worth over $2.25 billion and $336 million worth of medicine and 
health supplies have been delivered to Iraq.
    Iraq is authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil 
every 180 days, up from $2 billion in previous phases. Although 
Resolution 1153 was adopted on February 20, Iraq did not 
present as acceptable distribution plan for the implementation 
of Resolution 1153 until May 27, 1998; the plan was accepted by 
the U.N. Secretary General on May 29. The U.N. Office of the 
Iraq Programme (OIP) has recently released new estimates of the 
amount of oil revenues that will be available during this phase 
of the program. Citing declining world oil prices and the state 
of Iraq's oil industry, OIP now estimates that income for the 
6-month period ending in December will be around $3.3 billion. 
Discussions are under way within the Sanctions Committee and 
OIP as to how best to meet the most immediate needs of the 
Iraqi people in light of this projected shortfall in income.
    Under the current phase (four) of the ``oil-for-food'' 
program, 622 contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods 
for the Iraqi people have been presented for approval; of 
these, 485 contracts worth over $1.2 billion have been approved 
and 80 are on hold pending clarification of questions about the 
proposed contracts. With regard to oil sales, 58 contracts with 
a total value of over $2 billion have been approved so far 
during this phase.
    UNSC Resolution 1153 maintains a separate ``oil-for-food'' 
program for northern Iraq, administered directly by the United 
Nations in consultation with the local population. This 
program, which the United States strongly supports, receives 13 
to 15 percent of the funds generated under the ``oil-for-food'' 
program. The separate northern program was established because 
of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian 
needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of 
northern Iraq and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms 
of repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad 
does not exercise control,the ``oil-for-food'' program has been 
able to operate relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are 
setting aside their differences to work together so that Resolution 
1153 is implemented as efficiently as possible.
    The United Nations must carefully monitor implementation of 
Resolution 1153. As the current phase anticipates, 
infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil export capacity, 
generation of electricity, and water purification present 
increasing challenges to the U.N. monitoring regime.
    The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for 
rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record 
of noncompliance with its obligations under relevant UNSC 
resolutions. Although the Iraqi government maintains that 
sanctions cause widespread suffering among the Iraqi populace, 
the Iraqi government is still not prepared to comply with UNSC 
resolutions and thus create the conditions that would allow 
sanctions to be lifted. Even if sanctions were lifted and the 
Government of Iraq had complete control over oil revenues, it 
is doubtful that conditions would improve for the Iraqi people. 
The Iraqi government has for a number of years shown that 
meeting civilian needs is not among its priorities. 
Humanitarian programs such as ``oil-for-food'' have steadily 
improved the life of the average Iraqi (who, for example, now 
receives a ration basket providing 2,000 kilocalories per day; 
a significant improvement in nutrition since the program began) 
while denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues. We will 
continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security 
Council, and others in the international community to ensure 
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while 
denying any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad 
regime.

                 NORTHERN IRAQ: KURDISH RECONCILIATION

    On September 16 and 17, Massoud Barzani, President of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman 
of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), met for the first 
time in more than 4 years in talks held at the Department of 
State. Secretary Albright, welcoming the two leaders, 
congratulated them on the courageous step they were taking on 
behalf of their people. She expressed the United States deep 
concern for the safety, security, and economic well-being of 
Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others who have been subject to 
brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime. She also made it clear 
that the United States will decide how and when to respond to 
Baghdad's actions based on the threat they pose to Iraq's 
neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S. interests, and 
to the Iraqi people, including those in the North.
    While in Washington, Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani signed a 
joint statement committing themselves to a timeline to improve 
the regional administration of the three northern provinces in 
the context of the 1996 Ankara Accords. Over the next 9 months, 
they will seek to unify their administrations, share revenues, 
define the status of their major cities, and hold elections. A 
key component for the success of this program will be continued 
meetings between the two leaders. To make this possible, both 
parties have condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain 
from violence in settling their differences, and resolved to 
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for 
Iraq's borders.
    The Washington talks followed 6 months of intensive 
diplomatic efforts including a visit to northern Iraq by 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Welch and 
consultations in Ankara and London by both Kurdish parties. 
Since the Washington talks, we have continued to work closely 
on these issues with the Iraqi Kurds and with Turkey and Great 
Britain. Both leaders met with U.N. officials in New York and 
they were together hosted by members of the House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations.
    The United States fairly supports the unity and territorial 
integrity of Iraq. Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi 
Kurds within Iraq in no way contradicts this position. In their 
joint statement, the Kurdish leaders clearly enunciated this 
principle. The United States is committed to ensuring that 
international aid continues to reach the north, that the human 
rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as 
the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and 
that the no-fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is 
observed.

                   THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAQ

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
a cause for grave concern. As I reported September 3, the 
regime increased its security presence in predominantly Shia 
southern Iraq after the assassinations of two distinguished 
Shia clerics--deaths widely attributed to regime agents. Since 
that time, the Iraqi army has conducted a series of repressive 
operations against the Shia in Nasiriya and Amara Provinces. In 
particular, the government continues to work toward the 
destruction of the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique 
ecology of the southern marshes. These events expose a callous 
disregard for human life and the free exercise of religion.
    Summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions also 
remain a primary concern. Baghdad still refuses to allow 
independentinspections of Iraqi prisons despite the conclusion 
of U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, that ``there is 
strong evidence that hundreds of prisoners (were) executed in Abu 
Gharaib and Radwaniyah prisons'' late last year. The U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in April issued a strong condemnation of the ``all-pervasive 
repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, 
sources inside Iraq report another wave of executions in June, with 
about 60 people summarily killed. Preliminary reports indicate that the 
killings continued into July and August.
    In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the 
government continues the forced expulsion of tens of thousands 
of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. In 
recent months, 545 more families were reportedly expelled from 
Kirkuk (al-Tamim province) with 7 new Arab settlements created 
on land seized from the Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-
controlled areas where the displaced persons are received 
indicate that they are forced to leave behind almost all of 
their personal property. Due to a shortage of housing, they are 
still living in temporary shelters as winter approaches.
    The government also continues to stall and obfuscate 
attempts to account for more than 600 kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi 
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait. It shows 
no sign of complying with Resolution 688, which demands that 
Iraq cease the repression of its own people.

                          THE IRAQI OPPOSITION

    It is the policy of the United States to support the Iraqi 
opposition by establishing unifying programs in which all of 
the opposition can participate. We are working to encourage and 
assist political opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition 
groups, and unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about their nation's 
future in peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism, human 
rights, and the rule of law for their country. These committed 
Iraqis hope to build a consensus on the transition from 
dictatorship to pluralism, convey to the United States their 
views of Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, and compile 
information to support holding Iraqi officials criminally 
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law.
    On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 
1998. It provides new discretionary authorities to assist the 
opposition in their struggle against the regime. This Act makes 
clear the sense of the Congress that the United States should 
support efforts to achieve a very different future for Iraq 
than the bitter, current reality of internal repression and 
external aggression.
    There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. 
policy. These include the maintenance of U.N. Security Council 
support efforts to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and 
missile programs and economic sanctions that continue to deny 
the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to 
international peace and security. United States support for the 
Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those 
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be 
attuned to what the opposition can effectively make use of as 
it develops over time.

               THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to Resolutions 687 and 692, continues to 
resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3 
million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty percent 
of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by Resolutions 
986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to the 
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of 
the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in the 
Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are 
authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has 
approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, the United 
States Government has received funds from the UNCC for initial 
installment payments on approximately 1435 claims of U.S. 
claimants.

                               CONCLUSION

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all 
of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The 
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the 
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts 
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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