[House Document 105-341]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-341
STATUS ON IRAQ
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L.
102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)
December 17, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International
Relations and ordered to be printed
--------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-011 WASHINGTON : 1998
The White House,
Washington, November 5, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
September 3 to the present.
INTRODUCTION
On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all
cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
including monitoring activity. This announcement represents a
serious escalation of Iraq's August 5 decision to suspend
cooperation with UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). On October 31, the UNSC issued a statement
condemning Iraq's decision as a ``flagrant violation of
relevant Council resolutions and of the Memorandum of
Understanding signed between the Secretary General and the
Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq'' last February. Iraq's action
followed its receipt of a letter from the UK (as President of
the Security Council) indicating a willingness to conduct a
comprehensive review, but only after Iraq returned to full
compliance. Since the October 31 statement, UNSCOM has been
able to conduct only very limited monitoring activity.
Earlier, on September 9, the UNSC unanimously adopted
Resolution 1194, which condemns Iraq's August 5 decision as a
``totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations,''
demands that Iraq rescind its decision and resume cooperation,
and suspends bimonthly sanctions reviews until UNSCOM and IAEA
report that they are satisfied that Iraq has done so.
The resolution also notes the Council's willingness to hold
a comprehensive review of ``Iraq's compliance with its
obligations under all relevant resolutions once Iraq has
rescinded its * * * decision [to suspend cooperation] and
demonstrated that it is prepared to fulfill all its
obligations, including, in particular on disarmament issues, by
resuming full cooperation with the Special Commission and the
IAEA. * * * ''
On September 23, the P-5 Foreign Ministers issued a
statement reiterating that Iraq's actions are ``totally
unacceptable,'' and confirmed that ``Iraq must respond
immediately to Security Council Resolution 1194 and resume full
cooperation.'' The statement also noted that the prerequisite
for a comprehensive review was Iraq's ``unconditional
resumption'' of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Tariq Aziz spend several days at the United Nations in New
York at the end of September discussing the comprehensive
review with Security Council members and the Secretary General.
The Secretary General's Special Representative Prakash Shah is
engaged in discussions in Baghdad on the subject. Despite
Iraq's lobbying efforts, the Secretary General and all Council
members remain united in judging Iraq's actions unacceptable;
all 15 Council members supported the Council President's letter
to the Secretary General that said Iraq must rescind its August
5 decision and resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We
continue to work with the Council to convince Iraq to reverse
course, but we have not ruled out any option should the Council
fail to reverse Iraq's decision.
We continue to support the international community's
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. On May 27, 1998,
Iraq presented a distribution plan for the implementation of
Resolution 1153, which had been adopted on February 20. Under
phase three of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from
December 3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2 billion worth of
humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq. Under the
current phase, phase four, which began in June, the U.N.
Sanctions Committee has approved the purchase of over $1.2
billion worth of humanitarian goods. United States companies
can participate in the ``oil-for-food'' program, and over $185
million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms have been
approved since the program began.
Recent developments in northern Iraq demonstrate once again
the power of persistent diplomacy. On September 17, leaders of
the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, Massoud Barzani and Jalal
Talabani, met together for the first time in over 4 years to
sign a forward-looking joint statement committing their parties
to reconciliation. Their talks, held at the Department of State
under U.S. auspices, followed 6 months of intensive discussions
and close consultation with the Kurdish parties and with our
Turkish and British allies. The statesmanlike achievement of
the Iraq Kurdish leaders signals a hopeful new chapter for all
the people of northern Iraq.
On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of
1998. Work also continues on the existing opposition program to
help opposition groups unify politically, and the new Radio
Free Iraq service began broadcasting in late October. These new
programs will help us encourage the Iraqi people to build a
pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule
of law and respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq would have
little trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and
in the international community.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
Saddam's record of aggressive behavior forces us to retain
a highly capable force presence in the region in order to deter
Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors.
The United States and allied forces now in the theater are
prepared to deal with all contingencies. We have the capability
to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression. We will
continue to maintain a robust force posture and have
established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our
forces in the Gulf when needed. Our cruise missile force is
twice the pre-October 1997 level and can be augmented
significantly within days. Our contingency plans allow us the
capability for swift, powerful strikes if that becomes
necessary.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine expeditionary unit, a
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force,
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of
U.S. Central Command operations. To enhance force protection
throughout the region, additional military security personnel
are also deployed.
OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH AND OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH
The United States and coalition partners continue to
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. There were no observed no-
fly zone violations during the period covered by this report.
We have made clear to Iraq and to all other relevant parties
that the United States and coalition partners will continue to
enforce both no-fly zones.
THE MARITIME INTERCEPTION FORCE
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in
accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions,
vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy
is thesingle largest component of this multinational force, but
it is frequently augmented by ships, aircraft, and other support from
Australia, Canada, Belgium, Kuwait, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the
UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation
Council also support the MIF by providing logistical support and
shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for violating U.N.
sanctions against Iraq.
The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal
smuggling into and out of Iraq. In late August, the MIF
conducted stepped-up operations in the far northern Gulf in the
shallow waters near the major Iraqi waterways. These operations
severely disrupted smuggling operations in the region. A new
round of stepped up activity took place in mid-October. Since
the beginning of the year, over 40 vessels have been detained
for violations of the embargo and sent to ports in the Gulf for
enforcement actions. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries adjacent
to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their own
enforcement efforts and have intercepted and detained vessels
involved in sanctions violations. Although refined petroleum
products leaving Iraq comprise most of the prohibited traffic,
the MIF has also intercepted a growing number of ships in
smuggling prohibited goods into Iraq in violation of U.N.
sanctions resolutions and the ``oil-for-food'' program. Ships
involved in smuggling frequently utilize the territorial seas
of Iran to avoid MIF patrols. In September, Iran closed the
Shatt Al Arab waterway to smugglers and we observed the lowest
level of illegal gasoil smuggling in 2 years. Iran apparently
reopened the waterway in October. Detailed reports of these
smuggling activities have been provided to the U.N. Sanctions
Committee in New York.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Iraq continues to deny that it ever weaponized VX nerve
agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly
stated confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal laboratory finding of
stabilized VX components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile
warheads. Tests by France and Switzerland on other warhead
fragments have been conducted to help UNSCOM estimate the total
number of warheads loaded with VX. On October 22 and 23,
international experts from seven countries met to discuss all
analytical results obtained in the course of UNSCOM's
verification of Iraq's declarations related to VX activities.
Ambassador Butler reported to the U.N. Security Council on
October 26 that the international experts ``unanimously
concluded'' that ``all analytical data'' provided by the United
States, Swiss, and French laboratories involved were considered
``conclusive and valid.'' Ambassador Butler continued, ``the
existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraqi
declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads
had never been filled with CW agents.'' The experts recommended
the UNSCOM ask Iraq to explain the origin and history of the
fragments analyzed by all three laboratories and the presence
of degradation products of nerve agents, and to explain the
presence of a compound known as VX stabilizer and its
degradation product.
Iraq still refuses to turn over to UNSCOM the Iraqi Air
Force document found by UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical
weapons expended during the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that
UNSCOM believes the document indicates that Iraq's official
declaration to UNSCOM have greatly overstated the quantities of
chemical weapons expended, which means a greater number of
chemical weapons are unaccounted for than previously estimated.
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for
UNSCOM tests that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD
missile warheads. Iraq has been claiming since 1995 that it put
anthrax in only five such warheads, and had previously denied
weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's explanations to date are far
from satisfactory, although it now acknowledges putting both
anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number of warheads.
Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program, including SCUD
missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled
with BW, spray devices for BW, production of BW agents
(anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut),
and BW agent growth media, remains the ``black hole'' described
by Ambassador Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to provide a
credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its BW
agents.
In response to a U.S. proposal, the Security Council agreed
on October 13 to seek clarification from Iraq of statements
made by Iraqi officials on October 7 concerning the existence
of additional information on biological weapons still in Iraq's
hands, and about Iraq's refusal to turn over the Iraqi Air
Force document on chemical weapons expended in the Iran-Iraq
War.
LONG-RANGE MISSILES
While Iraq continued to allow UNSCOM to witness flight
tests of nonprohibited Iraqi missiles with range under 150 km
(this cooperation has not been tested since the October 31
decision), there has been no change in (1) Iraq's refusal to
further discuss its system for concealment of longer-range
missilesand their components, (2) Iraq's refusal to provide
credible evidence of its disposition of large quantities of the unique
fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile, or (3) Iraq's continued
test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air missile components,
despite written objections by UNSCOM (reported to the Security
Council). These areas contribute to an Iraqi capability to produce a
surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted range of
150 km.
While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819
imported Soviet-made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give
UNSCOM a credible accounting of the indigenous program that
produced complete SCUD missiles that were both successfully
test-flown and delivered to the Iraqi army.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The nuclear weapons situation remains as it was on August
11, 1998, when IAEA Director General El Baradei wrote to the
President of the Security Council that Iraq's August 5
suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA allows only
``limited implementation of its ongoing monitoring'' and
``makes it impossible * * * to investigate * * * remaining
questions and concerns * * * '' In its 6-month report to the
U.N. Security Council on October 7, the IAEA stated that it had
a ``technically coherent'' view of the Iraqi nuclear program.
There are remaining questions, but IAEA believes they can be
dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification
effort.
But the report also stated that Iraq's current suspension
of cooperation with the IAEA limits the IAEA's right to full
and free access. The IAEA is currently unable to investigate
further aspects of Iraq's clandestine program or to ensure that
prohibited activities are not being carried out in Iraq, free
from the risk of detection through direct measures.
DUAL-USE IMPORTS
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must
notify the unit before it imports specific items that can be
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
Given Iraq's current decision to suspend cooperation with
UNSCOM/IAEA, we remain constantly vigilant for evidence of
smuggling of items usable in weapons of mass destruction.
THE U.N.'S ``OIL-FOR-FOOD'' PROGRAM
We continue to support the international community's
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. Under the last
phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December
3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2 billion worth of
humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq. Untied
States companies can participate in ``oil-for-food,'' and $185
million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms have been
approved; millions of dollars more have been earned through
subcontracts. Since the first deliveries under the ``oil-for-
food'' program began in March 1997, 7 million tons of food
worth over $2.25 billion and $336 million worth of medicine and
health supplies have been delivered to Iraq.
Iraq is authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil
every 180 days, up from $2 billion in previous phases. Although
Resolution 1153 was adopted on February 20, Iraq did not
present as acceptable distribution plan for the implementation
of Resolution 1153 until May 27, 1998; the plan was accepted by
the U.N. Secretary General on May 29. The U.N. Office of the
Iraq Programme (OIP) has recently released new estimates of the
amount of oil revenues that will be available during this phase
of the program. Citing declining world oil prices and the state
of Iraq's oil industry, OIP now estimates that income for the
6-month period ending in December will be around $3.3 billion.
Discussions are under way within the Sanctions Committee and
OIP as to how best to meet the most immediate needs of the
Iraqi people in light of this projected shortfall in income.
Under the current phase (four) of the ``oil-for-food''
program, 622 contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods
for the Iraqi people have been presented for approval; of
these, 485 contracts worth over $1.2 billion have been approved
and 80 are on hold pending clarification of questions about the
proposed contracts. With regard to oil sales, 58 contracts with
a total value of over $2 billion have been approved so far
during this phase.
UNSC Resolution 1153 maintains a separate ``oil-for-food''
program for northern Iraq, administered directly by the United
Nations in consultation with the local population. This
program, which the United States strongly supports, receives 13
to 15 percent of the funds generated under the ``oil-for-food''
program. The separate northern program was established because
of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian
needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of
northern Iraq and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms
of repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad
does not exercise control,the ``oil-for-food'' program has been
able to operate relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are
setting aside their differences to work together so that Resolution
1153 is implemented as efficiently as possible.
The United Nations must carefully monitor implementation of
Resolution 1153. As the current phase anticipates,
infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil export capacity,
generation of electricity, and water purification present
increasing challenges to the U.N. monitoring regime.
The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for
rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record
of noncompliance with its obligations under relevant UNSC
resolutions. Although the Iraqi government maintains that
sanctions cause widespread suffering among the Iraqi populace,
the Iraqi government is still not prepared to comply with UNSC
resolutions and thus create the conditions that would allow
sanctions to be lifted. Even if sanctions were lifted and the
Government of Iraq had complete control over oil revenues, it
is doubtful that conditions would improve for the Iraqi people.
The Iraqi government has for a number of years shown that
meeting civilian needs is not among its priorities.
Humanitarian programs such as ``oil-for-food'' have steadily
improved the life of the average Iraqi (who, for example, now
receives a ration basket providing 2,000 kilocalories per day;
a significant improvement in nutrition since the program began)
while denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues. We will
continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security
Council, and others in the international community to ensure
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while
denying any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad
regime.
NORTHERN IRAQ: KURDISH RECONCILIATION
On September 16 and 17, Massoud Barzani, President of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman
of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), met for the first
time in more than 4 years in talks held at the Department of
State. Secretary Albright, welcoming the two leaders,
congratulated them on the courageous step they were taking on
behalf of their people. She expressed the United States deep
concern for the safety, security, and economic well-being of
Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others who have been subject to
brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime. She also made it clear
that the United States will decide how and when to respond to
Baghdad's actions based on the threat they pose to Iraq's
neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S. interests, and
to the Iraqi people, including those in the North.
While in Washington, Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani signed a
joint statement committing themselves to a timeline to improve
the regional administration of the three northern provinces in
the context of the 1996 Ankara Accords. Over the next 9 months,
they will seek to unify their administrations, share revenues,
define the status of their major cities, and hold elections. A
key component for the success of this program will be continued
meetings between the two leaders. To make this possible, both
parties have condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain
from violence in settling their differences, and resolved to
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for
Iraq's borders.
The Washington talks followed 6 months of intensive
diplomatic efforts including a visit to northern Iraq by
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Welch and
consultations in Ankara and London by both Kurdish parties.
Since the Washington talks, we have continued to work closely
on these issues with the Iraqi Kurds and with Turkey and Great
Britain. Both leaders met with U.N. officials in New York and
they were together hosted by members of the House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations.
The United States fairly supports the unity and territorial
integrity of Iraq. Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi
Kurds within Iraq in no way contradicts this position. In their
joint statement, the Kurdish leaders clearly enunciated this
principle. The United States is committed to ensuring that
international aid continues to reach the north, that the human
rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as
the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and
that the no-fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is
observed.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN IRAQ
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be
a cause for grave concern. As I reported September 3, the
regime increased its security presence in predominantly Shia
southern Iraq after the assassinations of two distinguished
Shia clerics--deaths widely attributed to regime agents. Since
that time, the Iraqi army has conducted a series of repressive
operations against the Shia in Nasiriya and Amara Provinces. In
particular, the government continues to work toward the
destruction of the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
ecology of the southern marshes. These events expose a callous
disregard for human life and the free exercise of religion.
Summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions also
remain a primary concern. Baghdad still refuses to allow
independentinspections of Iraqi prisons despite the conclusion
of U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, that ``there is
strong evidence that hundreds of prisoners (were) executed in Abu
Gharaib and Radwaniyah prisons'' late last year. The U.N. Human Rights
Commission in April issued a strong condemnation of the ``all-pervasive
repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government. Nevertheless,
sources inside Iraq report another wave of executions in June, with
about 60 people summarily killed. Preliminary reports indicate that the
killings continued into July and August.
In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the
government continues the forced expulsion of tens of thousands
of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. In
recent months, 545 more families were reportedly expelled from
Kirkuk (al-Tamim province) with 7 new Arab settlements created
on land seized from the Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-
controlled areas where the displaced persons are received
indicate that they are forced to leave behind almost all of
their personal property. Due to a shortage of housing, they are
still living in temporary shelters as winter approaches.
The government also continues to stall and obfuscate
attempts to account for more than 600 kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait. It shows
no sign of complying with Resolution 688, which demands that
Iraq cease the repression of its own people.
THE IRAQI OPPOSITION
It is the policy of the United States to support the Iraqi
opposition by establishing unifying programs in which all of
the opposition can participate. We are working to encourage and
assist political opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition
groups, and unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about their nation's
future in peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism, human
rights, and the rule of law for their country. These committed
Iraqis hope to build a consensus on the transition from
dictatorship to pluralism, convey to the United States their
views of Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, and compile
information to support holding Iraqi officials criminally
responsible for violations of international humanitarian law.
On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of
1998. It provides new discretionary authorities to assist the
opposition in their struggle against the regime. This Act makes
clear the sense of the Congress that the United States should
support efforts to achieve a very different future for Iraq
than the bitter, current reality of internal repression and
external aggression.
There are, of course, other important elements of U.S.
policy. These include the maintenance of U.N. Security Council
support efforts to eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and
missile programs and economic sanctions that continue to deny
the regime the means to reconstitute those threats to
international peace and security. United States support for the
Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be
attuned to what the opposition can effectively make use of as
it develops over time.
THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC),
established pursuant to Resolutions 687 and 692, continues to
resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3
million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty percent
of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by Resolutions
986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to the
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of
the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in the
Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are
authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has
approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, the United
States Government has received funds from the UNCC for initial
installment payments on approximately 1435 claims of U.S.
claimants.
CONCLUSION
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all
of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.