[House Document 105-304]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-304


 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
                        COUNCIL REGARDING IRAQ

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)





    September 11, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International 
                  Relations and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, September 3, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
June 24 to the present.


                              introduction


    From June 24 until August 5, Iraq had provided site access 
to U.N. weapons inspectors, as required under UNSC resolutions 
and reaffirmed under the terms of the February 23 Secretary 
General/Tariq Aziz MOU and UNSC Resolution 1154. In June, 
UNSCOM inspectors presented a work plan to Iraq to delineate 
areas of concern and elements that Iraq needed to disclose. 
However, in June, UNSCOM revealed that it had found evidence of 
Iraqi weaponization of VX nerve agent and in July, Iraq refused 
to turn over a document accounting for use of CW during the 
Iran-Iraq war. On August 3-4 Chairman Butler was in Iraq to 
discuss phase two of the work plan, the Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister claimed that Iraq was fully ``disarmed'' and demanded 
that this be reported to the Council; Butler refused, and 
subsequently departed Baghdad.
    On August 5, Iraq declared that it was suspending all 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, except some limited 
monitoring activities. On August 6, the Security Council 
President issued a press statement which noted that Iraq's 
action contravenes the February 23 MOU and relevant Security 
Council resolutions. On August 11/12, the IAEA and UNSCOM sent 
letters to the Security Council that noted that Iraq's decision 
to suspend cooperation with them halted ``all of the 
disarmament activities'' of UNSCOM and placed limitations on 
the inspection and monitoring activities of both organizations. 
On August 18, the Council President replied in writing to 
UNSCOM and IAEA on the Council's behalf reiterating full 
support for the full implementation of their mandates and 
underscoring Iraq's obligation to cooperate in the conduct of 
their activities, including inspections. Chairman Butler wrote 
to the Iraqi regime August 19 expressing his willingness to 
resume activity, but that offer was rebuffed.
    On August 20, the Security Council met to conduct the 
periodic review of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security 
Council resolutions. It stated that ``the necessary conditions 
do not exist for the modification of the regime established'' 
in relevant resolutions. Moreover, the Security Council 
``reiterates that the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation 
with UNSCOM and the IAEA (on August 5) is totally 
unacceptable'' and that it ``views with extreme concern the 
continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to rescind its 
decision.'' The United States is working with other Security 
Council members to suspend subsequent periodic reviews until 
Iraq reverses course and resumes cooperation with UNSCOM and 
the IAEA.
    The cornerstone of U.S. policy is to contain Iraq and 
prevent it from threatening regional peace and security. To 
that end, the United States has supported UNSCOM since its 
inception and continues to do so, as an integral part of our 
policy to contain Iraq and disarm it of its WMD. We have 
consistently worked to uphold the principle that UNSCOM must be 
able to do its job, free of Iraqi restrictions and impediments. 
That includes inspections wherever, whenever, and however the 
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directs. There have been 
allegations recently that the United States impeded some kinds 
of inspections since last fall. In fact, the international 
effort to secure full access for UNSCOM and the IAEA last fall 
and winter was led by the United States. Since early August, 
the United States has again led the effort to reverse Iraq's 
decision blocking UNSCOM activities. Decisions on how UNSCOM 
does its job, including timing, locations and modalities for 
inspections, are the Chairman's to make. As Chairman Butler 
stated on August 14, ``Consultations on policy matters take 
place regularly between the Executive Chairman and Council 
members, but all operational decisions are taken by the 
Executive Chairman (of UNSCOM) who has not been given and would 
find it invidious were any attempt made to direct his 
operational decisions or to micro-manage the day-to-day work of 
the Special Commission.''
    Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA is 
totally unacceptable; Iraq must meet its international 
obligations. In the first instance, the Council and the 
Secretary General must respond effectively to Iraq's flagrant 
challenge to their authority. We are working with Council 
members to ensure that there is a clear, united and forceful 
U.N. response to Iraq's actions. If the Council fails to 
persuade the Iraqi regime to resume cooperation, all other 
options are on the table.
    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program and other 
humanitarian efforts. On May 27, 1998, Iraq presented a 
distribution plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153, 
which had been adopted on February 20. Under phase three of the 
``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997, 
through June 2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods 
were approved for export to Iraq. Under the current phase, 
phase four, which began in June the U.N. Sanctions Committee 
has approved the purchase of over $562 million worth of 
humanitarian goods. United States companies can participate in 
the ``oil-for-food'' program, and over $165 million worth of 
contracts from U.S. firms have been approved since the program 
began.
    On June 26, the Secretary of State reported to the Congress 
on plans to establish a program to support the democratic 
opposition in Iraq, as required by section 10008 of the 1998 
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law 
105-174). Opposition leaders and their representatives have 
been generally receptive of the focus on the central themes of 
building a consensus on the transition from dictatorship to 
pluralism, conveying to the U.N. opposition views on Iraqi 
noncompliance with U.N. resolutions and compiling information 
to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes. 
The new Radio Free Iraq service, also funded by that Act, is 
preparing to broadcast directly to the Iraqi people under the 
direction of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. These new 
programs will help us encourage the Iraqi people to build a 
pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule 
of law and respects basis human rights. Such an Iraq would have 
little trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and 
in the international community.
    The United States maintains a significant military presence 
in the region in order to provide the full range of military 
options necessary to deter Iraqi aggressive, to ensure that 
UNSC resolutions are enforced, and to deal with other 
contingencies that may arise.

           u.s. and coalition force levels in the gulf region

    In view of Saddam's record of aggressive behavior, it is 
prudent to retain a significant force presence in the region to 
deter Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its 
neighbors. The U.S. and allied forces now in the region are 
prepared to deal with all contingencies. We have the capability 
to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression. We have 
restructured our in-theater force levels since my last report. 
We willcontinue to maintain a robust force posture, and 
moreover, have established a rapid reinforcement capability to 
supplement our forces in the Gulf when needed. Our cruise missile force 
is twice the pre-October 1997 level, a number that can be augmented 
significantly within days. Our contingency plans allow us the 
capability for a swift, powerful strike.
    The aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN and accompanying 
combatant ships and aircraft are on station in the Gulf today. 
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based 
aircraft, surface warships, a marine expeditionary unit, a 
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force 
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of 
USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout 
the region, additional military security personnel are also 
deployed.

         operation northern watch and operation southern watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to 
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern 
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. There have been no observed 
no-fly zone violations. However, on June 30, U.S. forces 
responded to an Iraqi ``threat radar'' and subsequently 
defended the coalition forces by firing an anti-radiation 
(HARM) missile. We have made clear to Iraq and to all other 
relevant parties that the United States and coalition partners 
will continue to enforce both no-fly zones. The no-fly zones 
remain in effect.

                    the maritime interception force

    The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the 
authority of UNSC Resolution 665, vigorously enforces U.N. 
sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest 
component of this multinational force, but it is frequently 
augmented by ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
Today in the Gulf, ships and aircraft from Canada and the 
United Kingdom are operating with us in maritime patrols. 
Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council support the MIF 
by providing logistical support and shipriders and by accepting 
vessels diverted for violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
    The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal 
smuggling from Iraq. In late August, we conducted stepped-up 
operations in the far northern Gulf in the shallow waters near 
the major Iraqi waterways. These operations severely disrupted 
smuggling operations in the region. Since the beginning of the 
year, over thirty vessels have been detained for violations of 
the embargo and sent to ports in the Gulf for enforcement 
actions by the GCC. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries adjacent 
to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their enforcement 
efforts and have recently intercepted and detained vessels 
involved in sanctions violations. Although petroleum products 
comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has recently 
diverted vessels engaged in date smuggling as well. Smuggling 
into Iraq is also a target for MIF patrols. One additional 
difficulty remains in our effort to enforce U.N. sanctions. 
Ships involved in smuggling have often utilized the territorial 
seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have recently 
provided detailed reports of these illegal activities to the 
U.N. sanctions Committee in New York.

                            chemical weapons

    Despite major progress reported by UNSCOM in accounting for 
SCUD CBW warheads during this period, the Iraqis have taken a 
giant step backward by continuing to deny the weaponization of 
VX nerve agent. This denial is in direct contravention of the 
finding for UNSCOM by the U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal of 
stabilized VX nerve agent in SCUD missile warhead fragments 
recovered by UNSCOM in Iraq. France and Switzerland are now 
examining further samples taken in Iraq. They may not report 
results to UNSCOM until late September. However, we, UNSCOM 
Executive Chairman Butler, and a team of international experts 
gathered by Butler are unanimously confident of the scientific 
accuracy of the Edgewood results--which Butler has declared 
publicly. Iraq is lying today about VX.
    While the Iraqis provided new documents to help account for 
R-400 aerial bombs used for chemical weapons, they have failed 
to provide the needed accounting for missing 155mm mustard-
filled shells.
    On July 22, 1998, UNSCOM reported in a letter to the 
President of the Security Council that Iraq had refused to 
allow an UNSCOM chief inspector to take, or even copy, a 
document found in Iraqi air force headquarters that gave an 
accounting of chemical munitions used during the Iran-Iraq war. 
This document would be of great value in helping UNSCOM 
establish a true material balance for Iraqi chemical 
munitions--a mandatory task for UNSCOM. During Butler's aborted 
visit to Iraq August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister told 
Ambassador Butler that Iraq would never give it to the 
Commission. This evidence directly contradicts the Iraqi claim 
that it has given UNSCOM all the information it has.

                           biological weapons

    In July 1998, UNSCOM assembled yet another group of 
international experts to meet with Iraqi counterparts for 
review of Iraqi declarations on the biological weapons program. 
And again, the Iraqis presented no new material. The experts 
thus found, again, that Iraq's declarations are not adequate 
for credible verification. This conclusion covered weapons 
(SCUD missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be 
filled with BW, and spray devices for BW), production of BW 
agents (botulinum toxin, anthrax, aflatoxin, and wheat cover 
smut), and BW agent growth media.
    The report of this UNSCOM-250 mission of international 
experts recommended to the UNSCOM Executive Chairman that no 
further verification of Iraq's declarations be conducted until 
Iraq commits itself to provide new and substantive information, 
stating that any other approach would be counter-productive.

                          long-range missiles

    UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler reported to the 
Security Council on August 5 that UNSCOM and Iraq had made 
significant progress in the accounting of both CBW and 
conventional SCUD warheads, as well as the material balance of 
major components for SCUD engine production. However, no 
progress was reported in accounting for the unique SCUD 
propellant possessed by Iraq, and the Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister refuses to allow further discussion of Iraq's 
concealment program, including the hiding of SCUD warheads.

                            nuclear weapons

    In an interim report to the UNSC July 29, the IAEA said 
that Iraq had provided no new information regarding outstanding 
issues and concerns. The IAEA said while it has a ``technically 
coherent picture'' of Iraq's nuclear program, Iraq has never 
been fully transparent and its lack of transparency compounds 
remaining uncertainties. The IAEA noted Iraq claims to have no 
further documentation on such issues as weapons design 
engineering drawings, experimental data, and drawings received 
from foreign sources in connection with Iraq's centrifuge 
enrichment program. The IAEA also reported that Iraq said it 
was ``unsuccessful'' in its efforts to locate verifiable 
documentation of the abandonment of the nuclear program. Iraq 
has failed to pass the measures required under UNSC Resolution 
715 to implement UNSC Resolutions 687, 707 and other relevant 
resolutions, including the penal laws required to enforce them.

                            dual-use imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to 
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must 
notify the unit before it imports specific items which can be 
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian 
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely 
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
    We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are 
extremely porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its 
neighbors. There is significant potential for evasion of 
sanctions by land routes, giving additional weight to our 
position that UNSCOM must have full and unconditional access to 
all locations, and be allowed to inspect and monitor Iraqi 
compliance over time.

                     Iraq's concealment mechanisms

    In June, UNSCOM Chairman Butler presented Iraq with a 
proposed work plan which, had Iraq cooperated, could have moved 
the process of verifying the disarmament forward. However, when 
Butler made a return visit August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister denounced UNSCOM and demanded that UNSCOM report to 
the Council that Iraq was ``disarmed in all areas.'' On August 
5, Iraq announced it was suspending cooperation with UNSCOM and 
the IAEA. The following day, the Security Council President 
issued a press statement declaring the Iraqi decision ``totally 
unacceptable,'' noting that it ``contravened'' relevant 
Security Council resolutions.
    On August 11, 1998, IAEA Director-General El Baradei wrote 
to the President of the Security Council that Iraq's August 5 
decision to suspend its cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA 
``makes it impossible for the IAEA * * * to investigate * * * 
remaining questions and concerns * * *,'' and that Iraq's 
decision will allow only ``limited implementation'' of 
monitoring that will ``fall short of full implementation of the 
OMV plan and result in a significantly reduced level of 
assurance'' that Iraq is not renewing its programs for weapons 
of mass destruction.
    On August 12, 1998, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler sent 
the President of the Security Council a letter similar to the 
August 11 letter of the IAEA noted above, saying that ``Iraq's 
actions bring to a halt all of the disarmament activities of 
the Commission and place limitations on the rights of the 
Commission to conduct its monitoring operations.''
    On August 18, the Council President replied to UNSCOM and 
the IAEA on behalf of the Council, reiterating the full support 
of the Council for IAEA and UNSCOM to fully implement their 
mandates and noting that Iraq is obliged to cooperate with them 
in their activities, including inspections. On August 19, 
Chairman Butler wrote to the Iraqi government seeking a 
resumption of the dialogue between UNSCOM and the regime and of 
all substantive UNSCOM work. That request was immediately 
rebuffed.
    On August 20, the Security Council conducted its periodic 
review of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council 
resolutions. The Council stated that ``the Sanctions Review 
showed that the necessary conditions do not exist for the 
modification of the regime'' and reiterated that ``the decision 
by Iraq to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA is 
totally unacceptable.'' Further, ``they view with extreme 
concern the continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to 
rescind its decision.''
    We continue to work with the Council in its effort to bring 
about full Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We are 
now seeking a Council resolution that would suspend further 
periodic reviews until Iraq reverses course and resumes 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Iraq's refusal to 
cooperate is a challenge to the authority of the Security 
Council and to the credibility of all international weapons 
nonproliferation efforts, since UNSCOM and the IAEA are 
responsible to the Security Council for the most thorough arms 
control regime on earth.

                  the u.n.'s ``oil-for-food'' program

    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program and other 
humanitarian efforts. Under the last phase of the ``oil-for-
food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997, through June 
2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods were approved 
for export to Iraqi. United States companies can participate in 
``oil-for-food'' and over $165 million worth of contracts for 
U.S. firms have been approved.
    Under the current phase of ``oil-for-food'' Iraq is 
authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180 
days, up from $2.0 billion in previous phases. Although the 
UNSC resolution outlining this program, Resolution 1153, was 
adopted on February 20, Iraq did not present an acceptable 
distribution plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153 
until May 27, 1998; it was accepted by the U.N. Secretary 
General on May 29.
    Under the current phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, 
235 contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods for the 
Iraqi people have been presented for approval; of these, 162 
contracts worth over $562 million have been approved and 13 are 
on hold pending clarification of questions about the proposed 
contracts. With regard to oil sales, 50 contracts with a total 
value of $955 million have been approved so far during this 
phase.
    The United States has supported the repair of the Iraqi oil 
infrastructure in order to allow sufficient oil to be exported 
to fund the level of humanitarian purchases the Security 
Council approved in UNSC Resolution 1153. Treasury is in the 
process of amending its regulations to allow U.S. companies to 
bid on oil infrastructure repair contracts just as they are 
permitted both to purchase Iraqi oil and sell humanitarian 
goods under the U.N. ``oil-for-food'' program.
    Resolution 1153 maintains the separate program for northern 
Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with 
the local population. This program, which the United States 
strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds 
generated under the ``oil-for-food'' program. The separate 
northern program was established because of the Baghdad 
regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian condition of the 
Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern Iraq and 
its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression 
against them. The well-documented series of chemical weapons 
attacks a decade ago by the government against civilians in the 
north is only one example of this brutality. In northern Iraq, 
where Baghdad does not exercise control, the ``oil-for-food'' 
program has been able to operate relatively effectively. The 
Kurdish factions are seeking to set aside their differences to 
work together so that UNSC Resolution 1153 is implemented as 
efficiently as possible.
    The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of 
Resolution 1153. As the current phase anticipates a doubling of 
goods flowing into Iraq, including equipment for infrastructure 
repairs in areas such as oil export capacity, generation of 
electricity, and water purification, the U.N. faces increasing 
challenges in monitoring. The Iraqi government continues to 
insist on the need for repaid lifting of the sanctions regime, 
despite its clear record of non-compliance with its obligations 
under relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was unanimously 
acknowledged during the Security Council's 39th sanctions 
review on June 24. We will continue to work with the U.N. 
Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the 
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs 
of the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or 
economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

                   The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
a cause for grave concern. Particularly troubling are the 
assassinations of two distinguished Shia clerics--Ayatollah 
Borujerdi on April 22 and Grand Ayatollah Mirza Ali Gharavi on 
June 18. These killings have been widely attributed to the 
Baghdad regime and were followed by an increased security 
presence in the predominantly Shia cities of south and central 
Iraq, such as Najaf and Karbala. These events expose a callous 
disregard for human life and the free exercise of religion. 
Summary, arbitrary, and extra-judicial executions also remain a 
primary concern. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent 
inspections of Iraqi prisons despite the conclusion of U.N. 
Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, that ``there is 
strong evidence that hundreds of prisoners (were) executed in 
Abu Graraib and Radwaniyah prisons'' late last year. As noted 
in my last report, based on these reports of summary executions 
and other ongoing human rights violations, the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission in April issued a strong condemnation of the 
``all-pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi 
government. Nevertheless, sources inside Iraq report another 
wave of executions in June, with about sixty people summarily 
killed.
    In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the 
Shia population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and 
the unique ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, 
outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government continues 
the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Kurds and 
Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. The government continues 
to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for more than 600 
Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at the 
hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of 
Kuwait. The Government of Iraq shows no sign of complying with 
UNSC Resolution 688, which demands that Iraq cease the 
repression of its own people.

                  Northern Iraq: Deepening Engagement

    In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish 
parties, established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. 
efforts, continues to hold. It is strengthened by growing and 
effective cooperation between the parties on humanitarian 
matters, particularly those related to the U.N.'s ``oil-for-
food'' program. Working with the U.N., the Kurds have been able 
to resolve nutrition and medical problems and look forward to 
rebuilding their infrastructure as U.N. programs expand.
    David Welch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for Near Eastern Affairs, led a U.S. delegation to the north, 
July 17-20. He encouraged the Kurds' efforts towards peace; 
underscored U.S. support for their human rights, physical 
welfare and safety; and renewed our decades-long engagement 
with them. During the visit, Massoud Barzani, leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (DKP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), made positive, forward-
looking statements on political reconciliation, and they 
accepted separate invitations to visit the United States later 
this year.
    The United States firmly supports the territorial integrity 
of Iraq. Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi Kurds 
within Iraq in no way contradicts that support. The United 
States is committed to ensuring that international aid 
continues to get through to the north, that the human rights of 
the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as the 
Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis and others are respected, and that 
the no-fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is 
observed.
    We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent 
reconciliation through mediation in order to help the people of 
northern Iraq find the permanent, stable settlement they 
deserve, and to minimize the influence of either Baghdad or 
Tehran. Baghdad continues to pressure the two groups to enter 
into negotiations.

                          The Iraqi Opposition

    It is the policy of the U.S. Government to support the 
Iraqi opposition by establishing unifying programs on which all 
of the opposition can agree. Section 10008 of the 1998 
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (P.L. 105-174), 
earmarks $5 million in FY 98 Economic Support Funds for these 
programs. These programs are designed to encourage and assist 
political opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition groups, and 
unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about their nation's future in 
peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism, human rights, and 
the rule of law for their country. Based on extensive 
consultations with opposition leaders and representatives, we 
have found a deep resonance on several central themes. These 
are: building a consensus on the transition from dictatorship 
to pluralism, conveying to the U.N. opposition views on Iraqi 
noncompliance with U.N. resolutions and compiling information 
to support indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes.
    Iraq is a diverse country--ethnically, religiously, and 
culturally. The Iraqi opposition reflects this diversity. We 
emphasize themes and programs, rather than individuals and 
groups, in order to encourage unity and discourage the 
rivalries which have divided the opposition in the past. Many 
opposition political groups that formerly coordinated their 
efforts decided several years ago to work independently. We are 
interested in working with them towards greater unity on their 
own terms, not in forming the issue by declaring that any one 
group must take the lead. We firmly believe they can succeed in 
this effort.
    We anticipate that there will be a need for additional 
funding for these programs as the opposition becomes more 
active and as it grows. The funds will be administered by the 
Department of State working through established NGOs, Federal 
institutions, and comparable private organizations. To ensure 
transparency and accountability and to avoid creating potential 
rivalries among opposition groups, none of these funds will go 
directly to any opposition group.

               the united nations compensation commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 687 and 692, continues 
to resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful 
invasions and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 
1.3 million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty 
percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSC 
Resolutions 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to 
the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations 
of the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in the 
Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are 
authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has 
approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 809 U.S. 
claimants have received an initial installment payment, and 
payment is still in process for another 25 U.S. claimants.

                               conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all 
of its obligations under UNSC resolutions. The United States 
looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of 
nations as a responsibility and law-abiding member.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts 
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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