[House Document 105-304]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-304
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL REGARDING IRAQ
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L.
102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)
September 11, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International
Relations and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, September 3, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
June 24 to the present.
introduction
From June 24 until August 5, Iraq had provided site access
to U.N. weapons inspectors, as required under UNSC resolutions
and reaffirmed under the terms of the February 23 Secretary
General/Tariq Aziz MOU and UNSC Resolution 1154. In June,
UNSCOM inspectors presented a work plan to Iraq to delineate
areas of concern and elements that Iraq needed to disclose.
However, in June, UNSCOM revealed that it had found evidence of
Iraqi weaponization of VX nerve agent and in July, Iraq refused
to turn over a document accounting for use of CW during the
Iran-Iraq war. On August 3-4 Chairman Butler was in Iraq to
discuss phase two of the work plan, the Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister claimed that Iraq was fully ``disarmed'' and demanded
that this be reported to the Council; Butler refused, and
subsequently departed Baghdad.
On August 5, Iraq declared that it was suspending all
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, except some limited
monitoring activities. On August 6, the Security Council
President issued a press statement which noted that Iraq's
action contravenes the February 23 MOU and relevant Security
Council resolutions. On August 11/12, the IAEA and UNSCOM sent
letters to the Security Council that noted that Iraq's decision
to suspend cooperation with them halted ``all of the
disarmament activities'' of UNSCOM and placed limitations on
the inspection and monitoring activities of both organizations.
On August 18, the Council President replied in writing to
UNSCOM and IAEA on the Council's behalf reiterating full
support for the full implementation of their mandates and
underscoring Iraq's obligation to cooperate in the conduct of
their activities, including inspections. Chairman Butler wrote
to the Iraqi regime August 19 expressing his willingness to
resume activity, but that offer was rebuffed.
On August 20, the Security Council met to conduct the
periodic review of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security
Council resolutions. It stated that ``the necessary conditions
do not exist for the modification of the regime established''
in relevant resolutions. Moreover, the Security Council
``reiterates that the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation
with UNSCOM and the IAEA (on August 5) is totally
unacceptable'' and that it ``views with extreme concern the
continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to rescind its
decision.'' The United States is working with other Security
Council members to suspend subsequent periodic reviews until
Iraq reverses course and resumes cooperation with UNSCOM and
the IAEA.
The cornerstone of U.S. policy is to contain Iraq and
prevent it from threatening regional peace and security. To
that end, the United States has supported UNSCOM since its
inception and continues to do so, as an integral part of our
policy to contain Iraq and disarm it of its WMD. We have
consistently worked to uphold the principle that UNSCOM must be
able to do its job, free of Iraqi restrictions and impediments.
That includes inspections wherever, whenever, and however the
Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directs. There have been
allegations recently that the United States impeded some kinds
of inspections since last fall. In fact, the international
effort to secure full access for UNSCOM and the IAEA last fall
and winter was led by the United States. Since early August,
the United States has again led the effort to reverse Iraq's
decision blocking UNSCOM activities. Decisions on how UNSCOM
does its job, including timing, locations and modalities for
inspections, are the Chairman's to make. As Chairman Butler
stated on August 14, ``Consultations on policy matters take
place regularly between the Executive Chairman and Council
members, but all operational decisions are taken by the
Executive Chairman (of UNSCOM) who has not been given and would
find it invidious were any attempt made to direct his
operational decisions or to micro-manage the day-to-day work of
the Special Commission.''
Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and the IAEA is
totally unacceptable; Iraq must meet its international
obligations. In the first instance, the Council and the
Secretary General must respond effectively to Iraq's flagrant
challenge to their authority. We are working with Council
members to ensure that there is a clear, united and forceful
U.N. response to Iraq's actions. If the Council fails to
persuade the Iraqi regime to resume cooperation, all other
options are on the table.
We continue to support the international community's
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program and other
humanitarian efforts. On May 27, 1998, Iraq presented a
distribution plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153,
which had been adopted on February 20. Under phase three of the
``oil-for-food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997,
through June 2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods
were approved for export to Iraq. Under the current phase,
phase four, which began in June the U.N. Sanctions Committee
has approved the purchase of over $562 million worth of
humanitarian goods. United States companies can participate in
the ``oil-for-food'' program, and over $165 million worth of
contracts from U.S. firms have been approved since the program
began.
On June 26, the Secretary of State reported to the Congress
on plans to establish a program to support the democratic
opposition in Iraq, as required by section 10008 of the 1998
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (Public Law
105-174). Opposition leaders and their representatives have
been generally receptive of the focus on the central themes of
building a consensus on the transition from dictatorship to
pluralism, conveying to the U.N. opposition views on Iraqi
noncompliance with U.N. resolutions and compiling information
to support the indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes.
The new Radio Free Iraq service, also funded by that Act, is
preparing to broadcast directly to the Iraqi people under the
direction of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. These new
programs will help us encourage the Iraqi people to build a
pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule
of law and respects basis human rights. Such an Iraq would have
little trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and
in the international community.
The United States maintains a significant military presence
in the region in order to provide the full range of military
options necessary to deter Iraqi aggressive, to ensure that
UNSC resolutions are enforced, and to deal with other
contingencies that may arise.
u.s. and coalition force levels in the gulf region
In view of Saddam's record of aggressive behavior, it is
prudent to retain a significant force presence in the region to
deter Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its
neighbors. The U.S. and allied forces now in the region are
prepared to deal with all contingencies. We have the capability
to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression. We have
restructured our in-theater force levels since my last report.
We willcontinue to maintain a robust force posture, and
moreover, have established a rapid reinforcement capability to
supplement our forces in the Gulf when needed. Our cruise missile force
is twice the pre-October 1997 level, a number that can be augmented
significantly within days. Our contingency plans allow us the
capability for a swift, powerful strike.
The aircraft carrier USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN and accompanying
combatant ships and aircraft are on station in the Gulf today.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based
aircraft, surface warships, a marine expeditionary unit, a
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of
USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout
the region, additional military security personnel are also
deployed.
operation northern watch and operation southern watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. There have been no observed
no-fly zone violations. However, on June 30, U.S. forces
responded to an Iraqi ``threat radar'' and subsequently
defended the coalition forces by firing an anti-radiation
(HARM) missile. We have made clear to Iraq and to all other
relevant parties that the United States and coalition partners
will continue to enforce both no-fly zones. The no-fly zones
remain in effect.
the maritime interception force
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the
authority of UNSC Resolution 665, vigorously enforces U.N.
sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest
component of this multinational force, but it is frequently
augmented by ships and aircraft from Australia, Canada,
Belgium, The Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Today in the Gulf, ships and aircraft from Canada and the
United Kingdom are operating with us in maritime patrols.
Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council support the MIF
by providing logistical support and shipriders and by accepting
vessels diverted for violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal
smuggling from Iraq. In late August, we conducted stepped-up
operations in the far northern Gulf in the shallow waters near
the major Iraqi waterways. These operations severely disrupted
smuggling operations in the region. Since the beginning of the
year, over thirty vessels have been detained for violations of
the embargo and sent to ports in the Gulf for enforcement
actions by the GCC. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries adjacent
to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their enforcement
efforts and have recently intercepted and detained vessels
involved in sanctions violations. Although petroleum products
comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has recently
diverted vessels engaged in date smuggling as well. Smuggling
into Iraq is also a target for MIF patrols. One additional
difficulty remains in our effort to enforce U.N. sanctions.
Ships involved in smuggling have often utilized the territorial
seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have recently
provided detailed reports of these illegal activities to the
U.N. sanctions Committee in New York.
chemical weapons
Despite major progress reported by UNSCOM in accounting for
SCUD CBW warheads during this period, the Iraqis have taken a
giant step backward by continuing to deny the weaponization of
VX nerve agent. This denial is in direct contravention of the
finding for UNSCOM by the U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal of
stabilized VX nerve agent in SCUD missile warhead fragments
recovered by UNSCOM in Iraq. France and Switzerland are now
examining further samples taken in Iraq. They may not report
results to UNSCOM until late September. However, we, UNSCOM
Executive Chairman Butler, and a team of international experts
gathered by Butler are unanimously confident of the scientific
accuracy of the Edgewood results--which Butler has declared
publicly. Iraq is lying today about VX.
While the Iraqis provided new documents to help account for
R-400 aerial bombs used for chemical weapons, they have failed
to provide the needed accounting for missing 155mm mustard-
filled shells.
On July 22, 1998, UNSCOM reported in a letter to the
President of the Security Council that Iraq had refused to
allow an UNSCOM chief inspector to take, or even copy, a
document found in Iraqi air force headquarters that gave an
accounting of chemical munitions used during the Iran-Iraq war.
This document would be of great value in helping UNSCOM
establish a true material balance for Iraqi chemical
munitions--a mandatory task for UNSCOM. During Butler's aborted
visit to Iraq August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister told
Ambassador Butler that Iraq would never give it to the
Commission. This evidence directly contradicts the Iraqi claim
that it has given UNSCOM all the information it has.
biological weapons
In July 1998, UNSCOM assembled yet another group of
international experts to meet with Iraqi counterparts for
review of Iraqi declarations on the biological weapons program.
And again, the Iraqis presented no new material. The experts
thus found, again, that Iraq's declarations are not adequate
for credible verification. This conclusion covered weapons
(SCUD missile BW warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be
filled with BW, and spray devices for BW), production of BW
agents (botulinum toxin, anthrax, aflatoxin, and wheat cover
smut), and BW agent growth media.
The report of this UNSCOM-250 mission of international
experts recommended to the UNSCOM Executive Chairman that no
further verification of Iraq's declarations be conducted until
Iraq commits itself to provide new and substantive information,
stating that any other approach would be counter-productive.
long-range missiles
UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler reported to the
Security Council on August 5 that UNSCOM and Iraq had made
significant progress in the accounting of both CBW and
conventional SCUD warheads, as well as the material balance of
major components for SCUD engine production. However, no
progress was reported in accounting for the unique SCUD
propellant possessed by Iraq, and the Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister refuses to allow further discussion of Iraq's
concealment program, including the hiding of SCUD warheads.
nuclear weapons
In an interim report to the UNSC July 29, the IAEA said
that Iraq had provided no new information regarding outstanding
issues and concerns. The IAEA said while it has a ``technically
coherent picture'' of Iraq's nuclear program, Iraq has never
been fully transparent and its lack of transparency compounds
remaining uncertainties. The IAEA noted Iraq claims to have no
further documentation on such issues as weapons design
engineering drawings, experimental data, and drawings received
from foreign sources in connection with Iraq's centrifuge
enrichment program. The IAEA also reported that Iraq said it
was ``unsuccessful'' in its efforts to locate verifiable
documentation of the abandonment of the nuclear program. Iraq
has failed to pass the measures required under UNSC Resolution
715 to implement UNSC Resolutions 687, 707 and other relevant
resolutions, including the penal laws required to enforce them.
dual-use imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must
notify the unit before it imports specific items which can be
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are
extremely porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its
neighbors. There is significant potential for evasion of
sanctions by land routes, giving additional weight to our
position that UNSCOM must have full and unconditional access to
all locations, and be allowed to inspect and monitor Iraqi
compliance over time.
Iraq's concealment mechanisms
In June, UNSCOM Chairman Butler presented Iraq with a
proposed work plan which, had Iraq cooperated, could have moved
the process of verifying the disarmament forward. However, when
Butler made a return visit August 3-4, the Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister denounced UNSCOM and demanded that UNSCOM report to
the Council that Iraq was ``disarmed in all areas.'' On August
5, Iraq announced it was suspending cooperation with UNSCOM and
the IAEA. The following day, the Security Council President
issued a press statement declaring the Iraqi decision ``totally
unacceptable,'' noting that it ``contravened'' relevant
Security Council resolutions.
On August 11, 1998, IAEA Director-General El Baradei wrote
to the President of the Security Council that Iraq's August 5
decision to suspend its cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA
``makes it impossible for the IAEA * * * to investigate * * *
remaining questions and concerns * * *,'' and that Iraq's
decision will allow only ``limited implementation'' of
monitoring that will ``fall short of full implementation of the
OMV plan and result in a significantly reduced level of
assurance'' that Iraq is not renewing its programs for weapons
of mass destruction.
On August 12, 1998, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler sent
the President of the Security Council a letter similar to the
August 11 letter of the IAEA noted above, saying that ``Iraq's
actions bring to a halt all of the disarmament activities of
the Commission and place limitations on the rights of the
Commission to conduct its monitoring operations.''
On August 18, the Council President replied to UNSCOM and
the IAEA on behalf of the Council, reiterating the full support
of the Council for IAEA and UNSCOM to fully implement their
mandates and noting that Iraq is obliged to cooperate with them
in their activities, including inspections. On August 19,
Chairman Butler wrote to the Iraqi government seeking a
resumption of the dialogue between UNSCOM and the regime and of
all substantive UNSCOM work. That request was immediately
rebuffed.
On August 20, the Security Council conducted its periodic
review of Iraq's compliance with relevant Security Council
resolutions. The Council stated that ``the Sanctions Review
showed that the necessary conditions do not exist for the
modification of the regime'' and reiterated that ``the decision
by Iraq to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA is
totally unacceptable.'' Further, ``they view with extreme
concern the continuing refusal by the Government of Iraq to
rescind its decision.''
We continue to work with the Council in its effort to bring
about full Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We are
now seeking a Council resolution that would suspend further
periodic reviews until Iraq reverses course and resumes
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. Iraq's refusal to
cooperate is a challenge to the authority of the Security
Council and to the credibility of all international weapons
nonproliferation efforts, since UNSCOM and the IAEA are
responsible to the Security Council for the most thorough arms
control regime on earth.
the u.n.'s ``oil-for-food'' program
We continue to support the international community's
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program and other
humanitarian efforts. Under the last phase of the ``oil-for-
food'' program, which ran from December 3, 1997, through June
2, 1998, $1.1 billion worth of humanitarian goods were approved
for export to Iraqi. United States companies can participate in
``oil-for-food'' and over $165 million worth of contracts for
U.S. firms have been approved.
Under the current phase of ``oil-for-food'' Iraq is
authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180
days, up from $2.0 billion in previous phases. Although the
UNSC resolution outlining this program, Resolution 1153, was
adopted on February 20, Iraq did not present an acceptable
distribution plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153
until May 27, 1998; it was accepted by the U.N. Secretary
General on May 29.
Under the current phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program,
235 contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods for the
Iraqi people have been presented for approval; of these, 162
contracts worth over $562 million have been approved and 13 are
on hold pending clarification of questions about the proposed
contracts. With regard to oil sales, 50 contracts with a total
value of $955 million have been approved so far during this
phase.
The United States has supported the repair of the Iraqi oil
infrastructure in order to allow sufficient oil to be exported
to fund the level of humanitarian purchases the Security
Council approved in UNSC Resolution 1153. Treasury is in the
process of amending its regulations to allow U.S. companies to
bid on oil infrastructure repair contracts just as they are
permitted both to purchase Iraqi oil and sell humanitarian
goods under the U.N. ``oil-for-food'' program.
Resolution 1153 maintains the separate program for northern
Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with
the local population. This program, which the United States
strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds
generated under the ``oil-for-food'' program. The separate
northern program was established because of the Baghdad
regime's proven disregard for the humanitarian condition of the
Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of northern Iraq and
its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of repression
against them. The well-documented series of chemical weapons
attacks a decade ago by the government against civilians in the
north is only one example of this brutality. In northern Iraq,
where Baghdad does not exercise control, the ``oil-for-food''
program has been able to operate relatively effectively. The
Kurdish factions are seeking to set aside their differences to
work together so that UNSC Resolution 1153 is implemented as
efficiently as possible.
The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of
Resolution 1153. As the current phase anticipates a doubling of
goods flowing into Iraq, including equipment for infrastructure
repairs in areas such as oil export capacity, generation of
electricity, and water purification, the U.N. faces increasing
challenges in monitoring. The Iraqi government continues to
insist on the need for repaid lifting of the sanctions regime,
despite its clear record of non-compliance with its obligations
under relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was unanimously
acknowledged during the Security Council's 39th sanctions
review on June 24. We will continue to work with the U.N.
Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs
of the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or
economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.
The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be
a cause for grave concern. Particularly troubling are the
assassinations of two distinguished Shia clerics--Ayatollah
Borujerdi on April 22 and Grand Ayatollah Mirza Ali Gharavi on
June 18. These killings have been widely attributed to the
Baghdad regime and were followed by an increased security
presence in the predominantly Shia cities of south and central
Iraq, such as Najaf and Karbala. These events expose a callous
disregard for human life and the free exercise of religion.
Summary, arbitrary, and extra-judicial executions also remain a
primary concern. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent
inspections of Iraqi prisons despite the conclusion of U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, that ``there is
strong evidence that hundreds of prisoners (were) executed in
Abu Graraib and Radwaniyah prisons'' late last year. As noted
in my last report, based on these reports of summary executions
and other ongoing human rights violations, the U.N. Human
Rights Commission in April issued a strong condemnation of the
``all-pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi
government. Nevertheless, sources inside Iraq report another
wave of executions in June, with about sixty people summarily
killed.
In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the
Shia population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and
the unique ecology of the southern marshes. In the north,
outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government continues
the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Kurds and
Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. The government continues
to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for more than 600
Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared at the
hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the occupation of
Kuwait. The Government of Iraq shows no sign of complying with
UNSC Resolution 688, which demands that Iraq cease the
repression of its own people.
Northern Iraq: Deepening Engagement
In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish
parties, established in November 1997 as the result of U.S.
efforts, continues to hold. It is strengthened by growing and
effective cooperation between the parties on humanitarian
matters, particularly those related to the U.N.'s ``oil-for-
food'' program. Working with the U.N., the Kurds have been able
to resolve nutrition and medical problems and look forward to
rebuilding their infrastructure as U.N. programs expand.
David Welch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs, led a U.S. delegation to the north,
July 17-20. He encouraged the Kurds' efforts towards peace;
underscored U.S. support for their human rights, physical
welfare and safety; and renewed our decades-long engagement
with them. During the visit, Massoud Barzani, leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (DKP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), made positive, forward-
looking statements on political reconciliation, and they
accepted separate invitations to visit the United States later
this year.
The United States firmly supports the territorial integrity
of Iraq. Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi Kurds
within Iraq in no way contradicts that support. The United
States is committed to ensuring that international aid
continues to get through to the north, that the human rights of
the Kurds and northern Iraq minority groups, such as the
Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis and others are respected, and that
the no-fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is
observed.
We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent
reconciliation through mediation in order to help the people of
northern Iraq find the permanent, stable settlement they
deserve, and to minimize the influence of either Baghdad or
Tehran. Baghdad continues to pressure the two groups to enter
into negotiations.
The Iraqi Opposition
It is the policy of the U.S. Government to support the
Iraqi opposition by establishing unifying programs on which all
of the opposition can agree. Section 10008 of the 1998
Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act (P.L. 105-174),
earmarks $5 million in FY 98 Economic Support Funds for these
programs. These programs are designed to encourage and assist
political opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition groups, and
unaffiliated Iraqis concerned about their nation's future in
peacefully espousing democracy, pluralism, human rights, and
the rule of law for their country. Based on extensive
consultations with opposition leaders and representatives, we
have found a deep resonance on several central themes. These
are: building a consensus on the transition from dictatorship
to pluralism, conveying to the U.N. opposition views on Iraqi
noncompliance with U.N. resolutions and compiling information
to support indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes.
Iraq is a diverse country--ethnically, religiously, and
culturally. The Iraqi opposition reflects this diversity. We
emphasize themes and programs, rather than individuals and
groups, in order to encourage unity and discourage the
rivalries which have divided the opposition in the past. Many
opposition political groups that formerly coordinated their
efforts decided several years ago to work independently. We are
interested in working with them towards greater unity on their
own terms, not in forming the issue by declaring that any one
group must take the lead. We firmly believe they can succeed in
this effort.
We anticipate that there will be a need for additional
funding for these programs as the opposition becomes more
active and as it grows. The funds will be administered by the
Department of State working through established NGOs, Federal
institutions, and comparable private organizations. To ensure
transparency and accountability and to avoid creating potential
rivalries among opposition groups, none of these funds will go
directly to any opposition group.
the united nations compensation commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC),
established pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 687 and 692, continues
to resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful
invasions and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over
1.3 million awards worth approximately $7 billion. Thirty
percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSC
Resolutions 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to
the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations
of the UNCC. To the extent that money is available in the
Compensation Fund, initial payments to each claimant are
authorized for awards in the order in which the UNCC has
approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 809 U.S.
claimants have received an initial installment payment, and
payment is still in process for another 25 U.S. claimants.
conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all
of its obligations under UNSC resolutions. The United States
looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of
nations as a responsibility and law-abiding member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.