[House Document 105-277]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-277


 
                            STATUS ON IRAQ

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              TRANSMITTING

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)





 June 25, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                         Washington, June 24, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
April 3 to the present.
Introduction
    During the 60-day period covered by this report, Iraq 
continued to provide access to U.N. weapons inspectors as 
required under the terms of the February 23 Annan-Aziz MOU and 
UNSC Resolution 1154. Travel restrictions on Iraq imposed under 
UNSC Resolution 1137 of November 12, 1997 expired by their 
terms after UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler reported that Iraq 
was complying with access requirements. In accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 1134, regular sanctions reviews have resumed. 
However, Iraq's continued failure to meet its obligations under 
UNSC Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions led the 
Security Council to conclude on April 27 that Iraq still had 
not met the conditions necessary to enable the Council to lift 
sanctions. Ongoing UNSCOM and IAEA inspections continue to test 
Iraq's long-term intentions with regard to providing full 
access and full disclosure to U.N. weapons inspectors.
    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program and other 
humanitarian efforts. Resolution 1153, which was adopted by the 
UNSC on February 20, expands the ``oil-for-food'' program 
considerably by raising the ceiling of permitted Iraqi oil 
exports to $5.2 billion every 180 days and by authorizing 
repairs to Iraq's degraded petroleum, health, education, and 
sanitation infrastructure under strict U.N. supervision in 
accordance with a prioritized distribution plan.
    During the period covered by this report, the humanitarian 
needs of the Iraqi people were addressed through Phase Three of 
the original ``oil-for-food'' plan in accordance with UNSCRs 
986 and 1143. The Iraqi government only recently produced an 
acceptable distribution plan to implement UNSCR 1153.
    On May 1, I signed into law the 1998 Supplemental 
Appropriations and Rescissions Act. This legislation provides 
funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to initiate a 
surrogate broadcast service for the Iraqi people. It also 
provides funding for efforts to support the democratic Iraqi 
opposition in presenting a credible alternative to the present 
Iraqi regime and compiling information to support the 
indictment of Iraqi officials for war crimes. These new 
programs will enable us to redouble our work with the Iraqi 
opposition to support their efforts to build a pluralistic, 
peaceful Iraq that observes the international rule of law and 
respects basic human rights. Such an Iraq would have little 
trouble regaining its rightful place in the region and in the 
international community.
    The United States will keep a significant military presence 
in the region to provide the full range of military options 
necessary to deter Iraqi aggression, to ensure that UNSC 
resolutions are enforced, and to deal with other contingencies 
that may arise.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
    In view of Saddam's record of brutality and unreliability, 
it is prudent to retain a significant force presence in the 
region to deter Iraq. United States and allied forces now in 
the region are prepared to deal with contingencies. This gives 
us the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi 
aggression or threats against its neighbors. As we make the 
force adjustments mentioned below, we are strengthening a rapid 
redeployment capability to supplement our forces in the Gulf. 
Our cruise missile force will be twice the pre-crisis level. In 
addition, we will be able to double again our cruise missile 
force in days. Once these moves are completed, this capability 
will allow for a swift, powerful strike.
    The aircraft carrier USS JOHN C. STENNIS and her 
accompanying battle group combatant ships and combat aircraft 
remain in the region as United States force levels are being 
reduced. The aircraft carriers USS INDEPENDENCE and USS GEORGE 
WASHINGTON and their accompanying battle group combatant ships 
left the region, as scheduled. Once force level adjustments are 
completed, U.S. forces will include land and carrier-based 
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, 
Patriot missile battalions, a mechanized battalion task force 
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of 
USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout 
the region, additional military security personnel are also 
deployed. During the crisis, U.S. forces were augmented by HMS 
ILLUSTRIOUS and accompanying ships from the United Kingdom.
    During our successful effort to compel Iraq's compliance 
with relevant UNSC resolutions earlier this year, the United 
Kingdom and number of other nations pledged forces. Although 
all of the members of this international effort sought a 
peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis, all showed their 
resolve to achieve our common objective by military force if 
that becomes necessary.
    Twenty nations deployed forces to the region or readied 
their forces for contingency deployment. Another 12 nations 
offered important access; basing, overflight, and other 
assistance essential for the multinational effort. Still others 
identified force contributions that were held in reserve for 
deployment should during the need arise. For those nations with 
forces deployed during the crisis, most of these governments 
redeployed their forces back home after the crisis in keeping 
with own force adjustments. These nations have made clear their 
willingness to repeat this deployment should Iraq again 
challenge the international community.

Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to 
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern 
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. In response to a series of 
Iraqi no-fly zone violations in October and November 1997, we 
increased the number of aircraft participating in these 
operations. Since them, there have been no observed no-fly zone 
violations. In early April, we restored the preexisting level 
of aircraft deployed to Northern Watch. We have made clear to 
the Government of Iraq and to all other relevant parties that 
the United States and coalition partners will continue to 
enforce both no-fly zones.

The Maritime Interception Force

    The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the 
authority of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in 
the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of this 
multinational force, but its is frequently augmented by ships 
and aircraft from Australia, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Today in the Gulf, ships 
from Canada, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have 
joined with use in maritime patrols. Member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical 
support and shipriders and by accepting vessels diverted for 
violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
    Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted several 
vessels involved in illegal smuggling from Iraq. Although 
petroleum products comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the 
MIF has recently diverted vessels engaged in date smuggling as 
well. Ships involved in smuggling have often utilized the 
territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF inspections. We have 
provided detailed reports of these illegal activities to the 
U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
    The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be in 
a state of flux. For several weeks, Iran ceased allowing gasoil 
smugglers to use its territorial seas to avoid the MIF 
inspections, causing a dramatic decrease in the level of gasoil 
smuggling. In recent weeks, however, we have noted ships once 
again using Iranian waters with the apparent aid of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard forces that operate in small boats near the 
mouth of the Shatt Arab waterway. It is too early to tell what 
the long-term police of Iran will be in this matter, although 
we are hopeful that it will take the necessary steps to curb 
U.N. sanctions violations occurring within its territorial 
seas.
    Our forces continue to benefit from recent actions by the 
United Arab Emirates that make it difficult for sanctions 
violators to operate in UAE territory. We will continue to work 
with the Emirate to find ways to thwart the significant 
sanctions-busting trade which has historically been bound for 
UAE ports. As noted in my last report, the UAE has 
significantly increased its level of cooperative with the MIF. 
These efforts have resulted in an increase in the number of 
ships caught with illegal cargoes. In addition, the UAE has 
prohibited the use of tankers, barges, and other vessel types 
to transport petroleum products to UAE ports and through its 
waters or to store such products there. While it is still too 
early to determine the full effect of these measures, we are 
hopeful that these actions will deal a significant blow to 
sanctions-busting activity in the region.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most 
troubling issues for UNSCO. This is due to the innate dual-use 
nature of the technology, it can easily be hidden within 
civilian industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry for 
biological agents and the pesticide industry for chemical 
agents. Iraq continue to resist making a full and complete 
declaration of its biological weapons programs, as required by 
UNSCR 707.
    Following its March technical evaluation meetings, UNSCOM 
concluded that Iraq has not provided a clear statement of the 
current status of the programs. Iraq's declaration 
stillcontains major mistakes, inconsistencies, and gaps. It may 
substantially understate Iraq's production of bulk biological weapons 
agents. UNSCOM is till unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile 
warheads filled with biological agents--anthrax, botulinum toxin, and 
aflatoxin--have been destroyed. UNSCOM also suspects Iraq may be 
concealing additional, as-yet undisclosed, biological weapons research 
or development programs.

Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

    On May 14, the UNSC adopted a Presidential Statement on the 
most recent UNSCOM and IAEA reports about Iraq's nuclear 
program. The Statement notes that the IAEA's investigations 
over the past several years have yielded a technically coherent 
picture of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program, but that all 
outstanding unanswered technical and substantive questions must 
be answered before the UNSC will authorize the IAEA to move 
from inspections to ongoing monitoring and verification in the 
nuclear field. While the bulk of its resources are now devoted 
to monitoring, the IAEA will continue to exercise its right to 
investigate any aspect of Iraq's nuclear program. The IAEA, in 
a recent report, points out that Iraq still has not provided 
information requested about certain sites, that concerns remain 
as to the completeness, accuracy, and internal consistency of 
Iraq's nuclear declaration and that Iraq has failed to enact 
laws prohibiting certain activities.

Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms

    From March 26 to April 2 UNSCOM conducted inspections of 
the so-called ``Presidential Sites.'' The inspectors reported 
that the sites appeared to have been ``sanitized'' prior to 
their visits, and, as anticipated, they discovered no materials 
related to Iraq's WMD programs during these inspections.
    In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, UNSCOM and 
the IAEA must be allowed to continue to investigate all aspects 
of Iraq's prohibited programs until they can verify that all 
relevant components have been destroyed under international 
supervision, and that all remaining capabilities have been 
eliminated. Without such verification, Iraq could develop the 
ability to strike at any city in the region--and beyond the 
region--with devastating biological, chemical, and possibly 
even nuclear weapons.

Dual-Use Imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to 
monitor Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must 
notify the unit before it imports specific items which can be 
used in both weapons of mass destruction and civilian 
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely 
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
    We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are 
extremely porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its 
neighbors. There is significant potential for evasion of 
sanctions by land routes, giving additional weight to our 
position that UNSCOM must have full and unconditional access to 
all locations, and be allowed to inspect and monitor Iraqi 
compliance over time.

The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    On February 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1153, which raises from $2.0 billion to $5.2 billion the amount 
of oil Iraq is authorized to sell every 180 days. Resolution 
1153 provides that the nutritional and health requirements of 
the Iraqi people are the top priority. My Administration's 
support for Resolution 1153 is fully consistent with long-
standing U.S. policy. Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf 
War, the United States has held that the international 
community's dispute is with Iraq's leadership, not its people. 
The Security Council proposed an ``oil-for-food'' program in 
1991 (UNSCR 706/712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program 
(UNSCR 986) was eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We 
supported the expansion of the ``oil-for-food'' program under 
UNSCR 1153 because it will provide additional humanitarian 
assistance to the Iraqi people, under strict U.N. supervision, 
without benefiting the regime.
    Since the beginning of the ``oil-for-food'' program, we 
have consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member 
states to find ways to improve the program's effectiveness to 
better meet the humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian 
population. Iraq, however, has frequently failed to provide the 
full cooperation necessary to ensure that the program functions 
smoothly. For example, during calendar year 1997, the 
Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for more 
than three months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the 
United States for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine 
which it had caused. The Iraqi government, after much prodding 
by the U.N. Secretary General's office, finally submitted a 
satisfactory distribution plan to the U.N. as called for by 
UNSCR 1153.
    Resolution 1153 calls for an independent assessment of 
Iraq's oil infrastructure to determine whether it can export 
$5.2 billion in oil in a 180-day period, as provided for in the 
resolution. This report, which was submitted to the UNSC on 
April 15, recommended that the Sanctions Committee approveup to 
$300 million worth of repairs to Iraq's oil infrastructure during the 
period covered by UNSCR 1153. The United States has expressed its 
intention to support those oil infrastructure repairs needed to fund 
the expanded humanitarian program, provided these repairs can be 
carried out in a manner fully consistent with the humanitarian 
objectives of UNSCR 1153, and that the U.N. is able to properly monitor 
all aspects of the repair process. We are continuing to work with 
members of the Security Council to resolve these concerns.
    Resolution 1153 also maintains the separate program for 
northern Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in 
consultation with the local population. This program receives 
13 to 15 percent of the funds generated under the ``oil-for-
food'' program. The United States strongly supports this 
provision. The separate northern program was established 
because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the 
humanitarian condition of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen 
minorities of northern Iraq and its readiness to apply the most 
brutal forms of repression against them. The well-documented 
series of chemical weapons attacks a decade ago by the 
government against civilians in the north is only one example 
of this brutality. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not 
exercise control, the ``oil-for-food'' program has been able to 
operate unhindered. The Kurdish factions are seeking to set 
aside their differences to work together so that UNSCR 1153 is 
implemented as efficiently as possible. As a result, the 
contrast between the north and the rest of the country is 
striking.
    The U.N. must carefully monitor implementation of 
Resolution 1153. The Iraqi government continues to insist on 
the need for rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its 
clear record of noncompliance with its obligations under 
relevant U.N. resolutions--a record which was unanimously 
acknowledged during the Security Council's 38th sanctions 
review on April 27. We will continue to work with the U.N. 
Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the 
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs 
of the Iraqi people are met while denying any political or 
economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.

The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
a cause for grave concern. Summary, arbitrary, and extra-
judicial executions remain a primary concern. On March 10, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, reported that 
his ongoing investigation had revealed that ``there is strong 
evidence that hundreds of prisoners have been executed in Abu 
Gharaib and Radwaniyah prisons since August 1997.''
    According to credible reports, any of those killed were 
serving sentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as insulting 
the regime or being members of an opposition political party. 
Families in Iraq reportedly received the bodies of the executed 
which bore, in some cases, clear signs of torture. In April, 
the U.N. Human Rights Commission issued a strong condemnatory 
resolution describing these and other ongoing Iraqi human 
rights violations. The resolution extended the Special 
Rapporteur's mandate and condemned the ``all-pervasive 
repression and oppression'' perpetrated by the Government of 
Iraq.
    In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the 
Shi'a population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and 
the unique ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, 
outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government continues 
the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Kurds and 
Turkomans from Kirkuk and other cities. The government 
continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to account for more 
than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who disappeared 
at the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the 
occupation of Kuwait. In the course of recent prisoner 
exchanges brokered by the ICRC, Iraq has released more than 300 
Iranian prisoners of war taken during the Iran-Iraq war in 
exchange for 5,600 Iraqi POWs. Yet the Government of Iraq shows 
no sign of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq 
cease the repression of its own people.

Northern Iraq: PUK-KDP Relations

    In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish 
parties, established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. 
efforts, continues to hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have made positive, 
forward-looking statements on political reconciliation, and 
talks between the two groups are now entering their sixth 
round. We will continue our efforts to reach a permanent 
reconciliation through mediation in order to help the people of 
northern Iraq find the permanent, stable settlement which they 
deserve, and to minimize the opportunities for Baghdad and 
Tehran to insert themselves into the conflict and threaten 
Iraqi citizens in this region. Baghdad continues to pressure 
the two groups to enter into negotiations.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to UNSCRS 687 and 692, continues to 
resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued also 1.3 
million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of the proceeds 
from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, 1143 have 
been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards and to 
finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money is 
available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each 
claimant are authorized for awards in the order in which the 
UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 757 
U.S. claimants have received an initial installment payment, 
and payment is still in process for approximately another 58 
U.S. claimants.

Conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all 
of its obligations under UNSC resolutions. The United States 
looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of 
nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts 
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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