[House Document 105-276]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-276


 
                           VETO OF H.R. 2709

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 HIS VETO OF H.R. 2709, THE ``IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT 
                               OF 1998''





    June 24, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed


To the House of Representatives:

    I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the 
``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''

    H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign 
individuals and companies if there is ``credible information 
indicating that'' they transferred certain items or provided 
certain types of assistance that contributed to Iran's missile 
program, or attempted more than once to transfer such items or 
provide such assistance. These sanctions would last at least 2 
years and would prohibit sales of defense articles and 
services; exports of certain duel-use items; and United States 
Government assistance.

    My Administration unequivocally supports the critical 
objectives of fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the 
transfer of missile technology to nations whose foreign policy 
practices and nonproliferation policies violate international 
norms. This legislation, however, is indiscriminate, 
inflexible, and prejudicial to these efforts, and would in fact 
undermine the national security objectives of the United 
States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 risk a 
proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.

    Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the 
credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering 
U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, the sweeping 
application of sanctions likely would cause serious friction 
with many governments, diminishing vital international 
cooperation across the range of policy areas--military, 
political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global 
leadership depend.

    Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of 
sanctions based on an unworkably low standard of evidence: 
``credible information indicating that'' certain transfers 
orattempted transfers had occurred. Such a low standard of evidence 
could result in the erroneous imposition of sanctions on individuals 
and business entities worldwide--even in certain instances when they 
did not know the true end user of the items. The bill would also hinder 
U.S. efforts to enlist the support of other countries to halt the 
objectionable activities by imposing an unreasonable standard for 
waiving the bill's sanctions. In addition, the sanctions proposed by 
the legislation are disproportionate. A minor violation (e.g., the 
transfer of a few grams of aluminum powder) would carry the same 
penalty as a transfer of major proliferation significance. This, too, 
undermines U.S. credibility and increases foreign opposition to U.S. 
policy.

    H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it 
will affect that country. The legislation does not allow 
flexibility sufficient to reflect the progress made by the 
Russian government in formulating policies and processes whose 
goal is to sever links between Russian entities and Iran's 
ballistic missile program. At the urging of the United States, 
President Yeltsin, the Prime Minister, Russian security 
services Chief Kovelev, and Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev 
have all made clear that proliferation of missiles and weapons 
of mass destruction is a serious threat to Russia's security. 
They have called for strict control of sensitive technologies 
and stressed the strict penalties that will be imposed for 
violations of Russian law. On January 22 of this year, the 
Russian government issued a ``catch all'' executive order 
providing authority to stop all transfers of dual-use goods and 
services for missiles and weapons of mass destruction programs, 
and on May 15 published detailed regulations to implement that 
order. They have recently developed and circulated a list of 
end users of concern in Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan. 
In the course ofregular and active discussion of this issue 
with the Russian government, the United States has raised problem cases 
involving cooperation between Russian entities and the Iranian missile 
program. We have seen progress in this area, and a number of these 
cases are no longer active concerns.

    Precisely because Russia needs to take effective 
enforcement steps to control the flow of technology, the United 
States needs to be able to work cooperatively with the Russian 
government to assure further progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut 
the cooperation we have worked to achieve with the Russian 
government without helping us solve the problem of technology 
transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature could also hurt 
our increasing cooperation with Russian government agencies in 
other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics, 
and combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would 
interpret this law as an infringement of its sovereignty, 
affecting our ability to work with Russia on broader U.S. 
policy goals and on regional and global issues.

    Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law, 
such as the missile technology control provisions of the Arms 
Export Control Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing 
sanctions to prevent missile proliferation to Iran and 
elsewhere.

    I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress 
attach Title II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention 
Implementation Act of 1997,'' to this problematic and 
counterproductive bill. Because Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) implementation legislation has not been enacted, the 
United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations 
under the CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong 
bipartisan support, and should be passed by the Congress as a 
free-standing bill without further delay. I note, however, that 
sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii), 213(e)(B)(v), and 213(f) of Title 
II could interfere with certain of my exclusive constitutional 
powers, and I urge the Congress to correct these constitutional 
deficiencies.
    For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709 
without my approval.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, June 23, 1998.


H.R. 2709

   One Hundred Fifth Congress of the United States of America at the 
second session Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the 
  twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-
                                 eight





                                
