    [House Document 105-276]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-276

                               VETO OF H.R. 2709

                                    MESSAGE

                                      from

                       THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                  transmitting

     HIS VETO OF H.R. 2709, THE ``IRAN MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS ACT
                                   OF 1998''

        June 24, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
         Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed

    To the House of Representatives:

        I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2709, the
    ``Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1998.''

        H.R. 2709 would require sanctions to be imposed on foreign
    individuals and companies if there is ``credible information
    indicating that'' they transferred certain items or provided
    certain types of assistance that contributed to Iran's missile
    program, or attempted more than once to transfer such items or
    provide such assistance. These sanctions would last at least 2
    years and would prohibit sales of defense articles and
    services; exports of certain duel-use items; and United States
    Government assistance.

        My Administration unequivocally supports the critical
    objectives of fighting terrorism and taking steps to halt the
    transfer of missile technology to nations whose foreign policy
    practices and nonproliferation policies violate international
    norms. This legislation, however, is indiscriminate,
    inflexible, and prejudicial to these efforts, and would in fact
    undermine the national security objectives of the United
    States. Taken together, the flaws in H.R. 2709 risk a
    proliferation of indiscriminate sanctioning worldwide.

        Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the
    credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering
    U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Indeed, the sweeping
    application of sanctions likely would cause serious friction
    with many governments, diminishing vital international
    cooperation across the range of policy areas--military,
    political, and economic--on which U.S. security and global
    leadership depend.

        Specifically, H.R. 2709 would require the imposition of
    sanctions based on an unworkably low standard of evidence:
    ``credible information indicating that'' certain transfers
    orattempted transfers had occurred. Such a low standard of evidence
    could result in the erroneous imposition of sanctions on individuals
    and business entities worldwide--even in certain instances when they
    did not know the true end user of the items. The bill would also hinder
    U.S. efforts to enlist the support of other countries to halt the
    objectionable activities by imposing an unreasonable standard for
    waiving the bill's sanctions. In addition, the sanctions proposed by
    the legislation are disproportionate. A minor violation (e.g., the
    transfer of a few grams of aluminum powder) would carry the same
    penalty as a transfer of major proliferation significance. This, too,
    undermines U.S. credibility and increases foreign opposition to U.S.
    policy.

        H.R. 2709 does not specifically refer to Russia, but it
    will affect that country. The legislation does not allow
    flexibility sufficient to reflect the progress made by the
    Russian government in formulating policies and processes whose
    goal is to sever links between Russian entities and Iran's
    ballistic missile program. At the urging of the United States,
    President Yeltsin, the Prime Minister, Russian security
    services Chief Kovelev, and Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev
    have all made clear that proliferation of missiles and weapons
    of mass destruction is a serious threat to Russia's security.
    They have called for strict control of sensitive technologies
    and stressed the strict penalties that will be imposed for
    violations of Russian law. On January 22 of this year, the
    Russian government issued a ``catch all'' executive order
    providing authority to stop all transfers of dual-use goods and
    services for missiles and weapons of mass destruction programs,
    and on May 15 published detailed regulations to implement that
    order. They have recently developed and circulated a list of
    end users of concern in Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Pakistan.
    In the course ofregular and active discussion of this issue
    with the Russian government, the United States has raised problem cases
    involving cooperation between Russian entities and the Iranian missile
    program. We have seen progress in this area, and a number of these
    cases are no longer active concerns.

        Precisely because Russia needs to take effective
    enforcement steps to control the flow of technology, the United
    States needs to be able to work cooperatively with the Russian
    government to assure further progress. H.R. 2709 would undercut
    the cooperation we have worked to achieve with the Russian
    government without helping us solve the problem of technology
    transfer. The legislation's unilateral nature could also hurt
    our increasing cooperation with Russian government agencies in
    other vital areas such as law enforcement, counter-narcotics,
    and combating transnational crime. Furthermore, Russia would
    interpret this law as an infringement of its sovereignty,
    affecting our ability to work with Russia on broader U.S.
    policy goals and on regional and global issues.

        Finally, Title I of H.R. 2709 is not needed. Existing law,
    such as the missile technology control provisions of the Arms
    Export Control Act, provides a sufficient basis for imposing
    sanctions to prevent missile proliferation to Iran and
    elsewhere.

        I also note that it is disappointing that the Congress
    attach Title II, the ``Chemical Weapons Convention
    Implementation Act of 1997,'' to this problematic and
    counterproductive bill. Because Chemical Weapons Convention
    (CWC) implementation legislation has not been enacted, the
    United States has not yet fully carried out its obligations
    under the CWC. The CWC implementing legislation has strong
    bipartisan support, and should be passed by the Congress as a
    free-standing bill without further delay. I note, however, that
    sections 213(e)(2)(B)(iii), 213(e)(B)(v), and 213(f) of Title
    II could interfere with certain of my exclusive constitutional
    powers, and I urge the Congress to correct these constitutional
    deficiencies.
        For the reasons stated, I am compelled to return H.R. 2709
    without my approval.

                                                    William J. Clinton.
        The White House, June 23, 1998.

    H.R. 2709

       One Hundred Fifth Congress of the United States of America at the
    second session Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the
      twenty-seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-
                                     eight