[House Document 105-240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-240
STATUS ON IRAQ
__________
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L.
102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)
April 21, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, April 3, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1)
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
February 3, 1998, to the present.
Introduction
For much of the period covered by this report, Iraq was
engaged in a serious challenge to the authority of the UNSC and
the will of the international community. As documented in my
last report, Iraq refused to allow U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM) inspectors to carry out their work at a number of
sites last December; Iraq's refusal to cooperate in spite of
repeated warnings continued until the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) between U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on February
23, and the endorsement of this agreement by the UNSC on March
2 when it adopted UNSCR 1154. Both the MOU and UNSCR 1154
reiterate Iraq's commitment to provide immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access to UNSCOM and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). UNSCR 1154 also
stresses that any further Iraqi violation of the relevant UNSC
resolutions would result in the severest consequences for Iraq.
Iraq's commitment is now in the process of being tested. A
series of UNSCOM inspections of so-called ``sensitive'' sites
in early March proceeded without Iraqi interference. On March
26, UNSCOM inspections of the so-called ``presidential sites''
began under the arrangements agreed to by UNSCOM Chairman
Richard Butler and Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.
The team of 60 UNSCOM inspectors, accompanied by 20 diplomatic
observers, is conducting inspections of the so-called
``presidential sites'' through April 5. Chairman Butler
traveled to Baghdad in mid-March for discussions with Iraqi
officials concerning Iraq's missile and chemical weapons
programs.
Throughout the crisis created by Iraq's refusal to
cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors, the objective of my
Administration was to achieve effective inspections, preferably
through a diplomatic solution. Our vigorous diplomatic efforts
were backed by the credible threat to use force, if necessary.
I consulted with our allies in the region as well as with the
other members of the U.N. Security Council. Secretary of State
Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, U.N. Ambassador
Richardson, and other Administration officials also pursued our
objectives vigorously with foreign governments, including
several trips to the region and to relevant capitals and at the
United Nations. Our military forces responded quickly and
effectively to support our diplomatic efforts by providing a
credible military option, which we were prepared to use if Iraq
had not ultimately agreed to meet its obligation to provide
full access to USCOM and the IAEA.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
As a demonstration of U.S. resolve during the recent crisis
with Iraq, the aircraft U.S.S. Independence, U.S.S. George
Washington, their accompanying battle group combatant ships,
and additional combat aircraft have remained in the region.
United States force levels in the region now include land- and
carrier-based aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious
task force, Patriot missile battalions, a mechanized battalion
task force, and a mix of special operations forces deployed in
support of USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection
throughout the region, additional military security personnel
are also deployed. These U.S. forces were augmented by the
H.M.S. Illustrious and accompanying ships from the United
Kingdom.
In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other
nations have pledged forces to our efforts to compel Iraq's
compliance with its commitments. Although all of the members of
this international effort seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution
of the crisis in Iraq, all have shown their resolve to achieve
our common objective by military force if that becomes
necessary. Without this demonstration of resolve to both use
military force and impose the severest consequences on Iraq for
any further Iraqi transgressions, it is unlikely that the MOU
and UNSCR 1154 (see below) would have been achieved.
Twenty nations have deployed forces to the region or have
readied their forces for contingency deployment. Those
countries currently represented in the Gulf include Australia,
Argentina, Canada, the Czech Republic, Kuwait, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Romania, and the United Kingdom. Another 12 nations
have offered important access, basing, overflight,and other
assistance essential for the multi-national effort. Still others have
identified force contributions that are being held in reserve for
deployment should the need arise. United States and Allied forces in
the region are prepared to deal with numerous contingencies, either
conventional or weapons of mass destruction-related. UNSCR 949, adopted
in October 1994, demands that Iraq not use its military forces to
threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not
redeploy troops nor enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In
view of Saddam's record of brutality and unreliability, it is prudent
to retain a significant force presence in the region to deter Iraq.
This gives us the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi
aggression or threats against its neighbors.
Until Iraqi intent to comply with the MOU is verified, it
will be necessary to maintain our current augmented force
posture in the region. The ongoing inspections of the so-called
``presidential sites'' mark the next critical phase in the
UNSCOM inspections process. Once Iraqi compliance is assured,
we will consider whether we can reduce our present force
posture.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. In response to a series of
Iraqi no-fly zone violations in October and November 1997, we
increased the number of aircraft participating in these
operations. There have been no observed no-fly zone violations
during the period covered by this report. We have repeatedly
made clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other relevant
parties that the United States and coalition partners will
continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and that we reserve the
right to respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi
provocations.
The Maritime Interception Force
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the
authority of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in
the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of this
international naval force, but it is augmented by ships and
aircraft from Australia, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical
support and shipriders, and accepting vessels caught violating
sanctions.
Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted 15 sanctions
violators in the Gulf for a total of over 25,000 metric tons of
illegal Iraqi petroleum products. Ships involved in smuggling
have often utilized the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF
inspections. We have given detailed reports of these illegal
activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be
decreasing. There are indications, still preliminary, that the
Government of Iran may be taking steps to curb the flow of
illegal petroleum products through its territorial seas. While
it is too early to tell if Iran will completely and permanently
stop this illegal traffic, we are hopeful that Iran will help
enforce the provisions of UNSCR 661 and other relevant UNSCRs.
In this regard, we note that the Iranian government has
recently played a helpful role in enforcing the sanctions on
air travel to and from Iraq by requiring that planes wishing to
enter Iraq obtain the appropriate approval from the U.N.
Sanctions Committee before overflying Iranian territory.
Recent actions by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will
greatly enhance our efforts to halt illegal exports from Iraq.
After diplomatic consultations with the United States and our
MIF allies, the UAE has significantly increased its level of
cooperation with the MIF. These efforts have resulted in a
significant increase in the number of ships caught with illegal
cargoes. In addition, the UAE has prohibited the use of
tankers, barges, and other vessel types to transport petroleum
products to UAE ports and through its waters or to store such
products there. While it is still too early to determine the
full effect of these measures, we are hopeful that these
actions will deal a significant blow to sanctions-busting
activity in the region.
While Iran and the UAE are taking positive steps, Iraq
continues to improve loading facilities in the Shatt Al Arab
waterway, which gives it the potential to smuggle even larger
quantities of gas oil and fuel oil. The U.S. Government will
seek to address this problem in the context of the expansion of
the ``oil-for-food'' program approved under UNSCR 1153.
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: UNSCOM and the IAEA
Iraq's refusal to cooperate fully and unconditionally with
UNSCOM and the IAEA, which are tasked with tracking down and
destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs,
was once again at the heart of the latest crisis between the
U.N. and Iraq.
On February 23, the United Nations Secretary General signed
the MOU with the Government of Iraq reiterating Iraq's
obligation to cooperate fully and unconditionally with
inspections by UNSCOM and IAEA for weapons of mass destruction.
The agreement stipulates that Iraq will provide UNSCOM and IAEA
weapons inspectors with immediate, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to any suspect site inside Iraq, including
presidential palaces, and provides for specific procedures for
inspections at eight clearly identified presidential sites.
The recent crisis with Iraq was only the latest chapter in
the long history of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its
obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions. Iraq has
persistently failed to disclose fully its programs for WMD.
Iraq has admitted, when confronted with incontrovertible
evidence, that it has repeatedly and consistently concealed
information from UNSCOM and the IAEA and has moved significant
pieces of dual-use equipment that are subject to monitoring in
violation of its obligations. Without full disclosure and free
access to all sites UNSCOM and IAEA wish to inspect, the
ongoing monitoring and verification mandated by relevant UNSC
resolutions, including Resolutions 687, 707, and 715, cannot
effectively be conducted.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1154
On March 2, the Security Council unanimously adopted
resolution 1154, which welcomed the MOU and reiterated that
Iraq must cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. In the
clearest possible terms, the Council warned Iraq in UNSCR 1154
that it will face the ``severest consequences'' if it fails to
adhere to the commitments it reaffirmed in the MOU. This
resolution is one of the strongest and clearest statements the
Council has made in 7 years with regard to what Iraq must do to
comply with its obligations, and what the consequences of
failing to meet those obligations will be. This strong language
of UNSCR 1154 is critical to ensuring that UNSCOM and IAEA can
do their job and that Iraq is held accountable to its
agreement. We welcomed Resolution 1154 and agreed with
Secretary General Annan that, if respected, honored, and
sustained, the agreement ``could constitute one of the U.N.'s
most important steps in addressing the consequences of Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait 7 years ago.''
Iraq's compliance with the agreement is now being tested.
Since the beginning of March, UNSCOM has pursued an intensive
agenda of inspections, including inspections of so-called
``sensitive'' sites and ``presidential sites'' to which the
Iraqis had previously blocked access. Iraq has not
significantly obstructed access to any sites UNSCOM and the
IAEA wished to visit since the MOU was signed. This may mean
Iraq will comply with the relevant UNSC resolutions, but the
testing process must continue until UNSCOM and the IAEA are
fully satisfied. We have consistently stressed that full,
unconditional, repeated access by UNSCOM to all sites,
personnel, equipment, documents, and means of transportation
provides the only means by which the world can make certain
Iraq does not maintain or develop WMD. We have full faith and
confidence in UNSCOM and its Executive Chairman.
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most
troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use
nature of the technology; it can easily be hidden within
civilian industries such as, for biological agents, the
pharmaceutical industry and, for chemical agents, the pesticide
industry. UNSCOM is still unable to verify that all of Iraq's
SCUD missile warheads filled with biological agents--anthrax
and botulinum toxin--have been destroyed.
Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems
The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should
``close the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But
there are still many uncertainties and questions that need to
be resolved. Iraq has never provided a full and accurate
account of its indigenous efforts to develop nuclear weapons
and prohibited long-range missiles. Among the many problems,
Iraq has failed to answer critical questions on nuclear weapons
design and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge enrichment;
failed to provide a written description of its post-war nuclear
weapons procurement program; and failed to account for major
engine components, special warheads, missing propellants, and
guidance instruments that could be used to assemble fully
operational missiles. Until Iraq complies with its obligation
to provide a full accounting of these and other relevant
aspects of its program, the questions must remain open.
Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms
The U.N. Special Commission's work must include vigorous
efforts to expose Iraq's ``Concealment Mechanism.'' During the
last 60 days, but before signature of the MOU, UNSCOM launched
two special inspection teams that once again targeted this
mechanism in order to ferret out WMD programs and documents
that UNSCOM--and we--believe Iraq stubbornly retains.
Unfortunately, it became clear that the Iraqi government had no
intentionof cooperating with these inspections as specifically
called for in the most recent UNSCRs on the topic--resolutions 1134 of
October 23, 1997, and 1137 of November 12, 1997. The teams were stopped
en route, denied access, and prevented from videotaping equipment
movement or document-destruction activity at suspect sites.
In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, UNSCOM and
the IAEA must be allowed to continue to investigate all aspects
of Iraq's prohibited programs until they can verify that all
relevant components have been destroyed under international
supervision, and that all remaining capabilities have been
eliminated. Without such verification, Iraq could quickly
develop the ability to strike at any city in the region--and
perhaps even as far as Europe--with weapons of mass
destruction.
Dual-Use Imports
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 established
a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire
proscribed weapons. Iraq must notify the unit before it imports
any items that can be used in both military and civilian
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are
extremely porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its
neighbors. There is significant potential for evasion of
sanctions by land routes, giving additional weight to our
position that UNSCOM must have full and unconditional access to
all locations and be allowed to inspect and monitor Iraqi
compliance over time.
The U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program
On February 20, the Security Council adopted resolution
1153, which expands to $5.2 billion the amount of oil Iraq is
authorized to sell every 6 months. The previous amount was $2.0
billion every 6 months. Resolution 1153 states that the
nutritional and health requirements of the Iraqi people are the
top priority and allocates $1 billion to rebuild hospitals,
schools, water, and sanitation facilities. My Administration's
support for resolution 1153 is fully consistent with long-
standing U.S. policy. Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf
War, the United States has held that the international
community's dispute is with Iraq's leadership, not its people.
We proposed an ``oil-for-food'' program in 1991 (UNSCR 706/
712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program (UNSCR 986) was
eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We supported the expansion
of the oil-for-food program under UNSCR 1153 because it will
provide additional humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people,
under strict U.N. supervision, without benefiting the regime.
Since the beginning of the oil-for-food program, we have
consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member states
to find ways to improve the program's effectiveness to better
meet the humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian population.
Iraq, however, has frequently failed to provide the full
cooperation necessary to ensure that the program functions
smoothly. For example, during calendar year 1997, the
Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for more
than 3 months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the United
States for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine that it
had caused. We will be watching closely to determine how the
Government of Iraq performs under UNSCR 1153. The Iraqi
government refused to provide appropriate input to the
Secretary General's report of January 30 on Iraq's humanitarian
needs, which provide the basis for determining allocations
under UNSCR 1153. On February 5, Iraq sent its official
``observations'' on that report to the Secretary General,
rejecting many of its proposals and recommendations to
alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people without stating
whether or not the Government of Iraq would ``accept'' the
resolution. The U.N. Secretariat continues to work to reach
agreement with Iraq on implementing UNSCR 1153.
Among its other provisions, UNSCR 1153 calls for an
independent assessment of Iraq's oil infrastructure to
ascertain whether it can export enough oil to cover the $5.2
billion oil export ceiling. Based on this report, the Secretary
General will recommend to the UNSC whether repairs to Iraq's
oil infrastructure will be needed to meet the new export
target. The United States is prepared to support only those oil
infrastructure repairs needed to fund the expanded humanitarian
program.
The U.N. must carefully monitor how Iraq implements
resolution 1153. The Iraqi government continues to insist on
the need for rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its
record of noncompliance with its obligations under relevant
U.N. resolutions. Saddam Hussein has exploited the suffering he
himself has imposed on his people to build sympathy for Iraq
and its government and to create pressure to life the
sanctions. In the meantime, he has continued to build lavish
palaces that benefit only the elite within his regimes.
War Crimes and The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be
a cause for grave concern. U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq,
Max Van der Stoel, is investigating credible reports from
numerous, independent sources that the Government of Iraq may
have summarily executed hundreds--perhaps thousands--of
political detainees in November and December 1997. According to
these reports, many of those killed were serving sentences of
15-20 years for such crimes as insulting the regime or being
members of an opposition political party. Families in Iraq
reportedly received the bodies of the executed that bore, in
some cases, clear signs of torture. In addition, the
possibility that the government used humans as experimental
subjects in its chemical and biological weapons programs
remains a grave concern.
In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the
Shi'a population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and
the unique ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, the
government continues the forced expulsion of tens of thousands
of ethnic Kurds from Kirkuk and other cities. The government
continues to stall and obfuscate, rather than work in good
faith toward accounting for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait, and the
nearly 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war taken prisoner by Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq shows no sign
of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq cease the
repression of its own people. The U.N. Special Rapporteur
reported to the General Assembly his particular concern that
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the
practice of torture continue to occur in Iraq.
The INDICT Campaign
The INDICT campaign continues to gain momentum. Led by
various independent Iraqi opposition groups and nongovernmental
organizations, this effort seeks to document crimes against
humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law
committed by the Iraqi regime. We applaud the tenacity of the
Iraqi opposition in the face of one of the most repressive
regimes in history. We take note of, and welcome, Senate
Resolution 179 of March 13 expressing the sense of the Senate
concerning the need for an international criminal tribunal to
try members of the Iraqi regime for war crimes and crimes
against humanity.
March 16, 1998, marked the tenth anniversary of the Iraqi
military's devastating chemical attack on the Iraqi Kurdish
town of Halabja. As many as 5,000 civilians were killed. More
than 10,000 were injured. The Iraqi regime never expressed
remorse for Halabja. In fact, the regime defended its use of
chemical weapons in its war with Iran by claiming, ``every
nation has the right to protect itself against invasion,'' even
though a 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which Iraq is subject,
outlaws the use of chemical weapons. Ten years after the
massacre, the people of Halabja still suffer from the effects
of the attack, including much higher rates of serious diseases
(such as cancer) birth defects, and miscarriages. The
sympathies of the United States are with the people of Halabja
and other victims of Iraqi chemical attacks as we remind
ourselves and the international community that the U.N. must
remain vigilant to stop Iraq from reacquiring weapons of mass
destruction.
Northern Iraq
In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish
parties, established in November 1997 as the result of U.S.
efforts, continues to hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have made positive,
forward-looking statements on political reconciliation, and
talks between the two groups have commenced. We will continue
our efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation through
mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq find the
permanent, stable settlement that they deserve, and to minimize
the opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves
into the conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC),
established pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 692, continues to
resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued almost
1.3 million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of the
proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, and
1143 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards
and to finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money
is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each
claimant are authorized for awards in the order in which the
UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 457
U.S. claimants have received an initial installment payment,
and payment is in process for an additional 323 U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all
of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton.