[House Document 105-240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 2d Session  - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-240


 
                            STATUS ON IRAQ

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              TRANSMITTING

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)





 April 21, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                         Washington, April 3, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
February 3, 1998, to the present.
Introduction
    For much of the period covered by this report, Iraq was 
engaged in a serious challenge to the authority of the UNSC and 
the will of the international community. As documented in my 
last report, Iraq refused to allow U.N. Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) inspectors to carry out their work at a number of 
sites last December; Iraq's refusal to cooperate in spite of 
repeated warnings continued until the signing of the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) between U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on February 
23, and the endorsement of this agreement by the UNSC on March 
2 when it adopted UNSCR 1154. Both the MOU and UNSCR 1154 
reiterate Iraq's commitment to provide immediate, 
unconditional, and unrestricted access to UNSCOM and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). UNSCR 1154 also 
stresses that any further Iraqi violation of the relevant UNSC 
resolutions would result in the severest consequences for Iraq. 
Iraq's commitment is now in the process of being tested. A 
series of UNSCOM inspections of so-called ``sensitive'' sites 
in early March proceeded without Iraqi interference. On March 
26, UNSCOM inspections of the so-called ``presidential sites'' 
began under the arrangements agreed to by UNSCOM Chairman 
Richard Butler and Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. 
The team of 60 UNSCOM inspectors, accompanied by 20 diplomatic 
observers, is conducting inspections of the so-called 
``presidential sites'' through April 5. Chairman Butler 
traveled to Baghdad in mid-March for discussions with Iraqi 
officials concerning Iraq's missile and chemical weapons 
programs.
    Throughout the crisis created by Iraq's refusal to 
cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors, the objective of my 
Administration was to achieve effective inspections, preferably 
through a diplomatic solution. Our vigorous diplomatic efforts 
were backed by the credible threat to use force, if necessary. 
I consulted with our allies in the region as well as with the 
other members of the U.N. Security Council. Secretary of State 
Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen, U.N. Ambassador 
Richardson, and other Administration officials also pursued our 
objectives vigorously with foreign governments, including 
several trips to the region and to relevant capitals and at the 
United Nations. Our military forces responded quickly and 
effectively to support our diplomatic efforts by providing a 
credible military option, which we were prepared to use if Iraq 
had not ultimately agreed to meet its obligation to provide 
full access to USCOM and the IAEA.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
    As a demonstration of U.S. resolve during the recent crisis 
with Iraq, the aircraft U.S.S. Independence, U.S.S. George 
Washington, their accompanying battle group combatant ships, 
and additional combat aircraft have remained in the region. 
United States force levels in the region now include land- and 
carrier-based aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious 
task force, Patriot missile battalions, a mechanized battalion 
task force, and a mix of special operations forces deployed in 
support of USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection 
throughout the region, additional military security personnel 
are also deployed. These U.S. forces were augmented by the 
H.M.S. Illustrious and accompanying ships from the United 
Kingdom.
    In addition to the United Kingdom, a number of other 
nations have pledged forces to our efforts to compel Iraq's 
compliance with its commitments. Although all of the members of 
this international effort seek a peaceful diplomatic resolution 
of the crisis in Iraq, all have shown their resolve to achieve 
our common objective by military force if that becomes 
necessary. Without this demonstration of resolve to both use 
military force and impose the severest consequences on Iraq for 
any further Iraqi transgressions, it is unlikely that the MOU 
and UNSCR 1154 (see below) would have been achieved.
    Twenty nations have deployed forces to the region or have 
readied their forces for contingency deployment. Those 
countries currently represented in the Gulf include Australia, 
Argentina, Canada, the Czech Republic, Kuwait, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Romania, and the United Kingdom. Another 12 nations 
have offered important access, basing, overflight,and other 
assistance essential for the multi-national effort. Still others have 
identified force contributions that are being held in reserve for 
deployment should the need arise. United States and Allied forces in 
the region are prepared to deal with numerous contingencies, either 
conventional or weapons of mass destruction-related. UNSCR 949, adopted 
in October 1994, demands that Iraq not use its military forces to 
threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq and that it not 
redeploy troops nor enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq. In 
view of Saddam's record of brutality and unreliability, it is prudent 
to retain a significant force presence in the region to deter Iraq. 
This gives us the capability to respond rapidly to possible Iraqi 
aggression or threats against its neighbors.
    Until Iraqi intent to comply with the MOU is verified, it 
will be necessary to maintain our current augmented force 
posture in the region. The ongoing inspections of the so-called 
``presidential sites'' mark the next critical phase in the 
UNSCOM inspections process. Once Iraqi compliance is assured, 
we will consider whether we can reduce our present force 
posture.

Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch

    The United States and coalition partners continue to 
enforce the no-fly zones over Iraq under Operation Northern 
Watch and Operation Southern Watch. In response to a series of 
Iraqi no-fly zone violations in October and November 1997, we 
increased the number of aircraft participating in these 
operations. There have been no observed no-fly zone violations 
during the period covered by this report. We have repeatedly 
made clear to the Government of Iraq and to all other relevant 
parties that the United States and coalition partners will 
continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and that we reserve the 
right to respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi 
provocations.

The Maritime Interception Force

    The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating under the 
authority of UNSCR 665, vigorously enforces U.N. sanctions in 
the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of this 
international naval force, but it is augmented by ships and 
aircraft from Australia, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical 
support and shipriders, and accepting vessels caught violating 
sanctions.
    Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted 15 sanctions 
violators in the Gulf for a total of over 25,000 metric tons of 
illegal Iraqi petroleum products. Ships involved in smuggling 
have often utilized the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF 
inspections. We have given detailed reports of these illegal 
activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
    The level of petroleum smuggling from Iraq appears to be 
decreasing. There are indications, still preliminary, that the 
Government of Iran may be taking steps to curb the flow of 
illegal petroleum products through its territorial seas. While 
it is too early to tell if Iran will completely and permanently 
stop this illegal traffic, we are hopeful that Iran will help 
enforce the provisions of UNSCR 661 and other relevant UNSCRs. 
In this regard, we note that the Iranian government has 
recently played a helpful role in enforcing the sanctions on 
air travel to and from Iraq by requiring that planes wishing to 
enter Iraq obtain the appropriate approval from the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee before overflying Iranian territory.
    Recent actions by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will 
greatly enhance our efforts to halt illegal exports from Iraq. 
After diplomatic consultations with the United States and our 
MIF allies, the UAE has significantly increased its level of 
cooperation with the MIF. These efforts have resulted in a 
significant increase in the number of ships caught with illegal 
cargoes. In addition, the UAE has prohibited the use of 
tankers, barges, and other vessel types to transport petroleum 
products to UAE ports and through its waters or to store such 
products there. While it is still too early to determine the 
full effect of these measures, we are hopeful that these 
actions will deal a significant blow to sanctions-busting 
activity in the region.
    While Iran and the UAE are taking positive steps, Iraq 
continues to improve loading facilities in the Shatt Al Arab 
waterway, which gives it the potential to smuggle even larger 
quantities of gas oil and fuel oil. The U.S. Government will 
seek to address this problem in the context of the expansion of 
the ``oil-for-food'' program approved under UNSCR 1153.

Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: UNSCOM and the IAEA

    Iraq's refusal to cooperate fully and unconditionally with 
UNSCOM and the IAEA, which are tasked with tracking down and 
destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, 
was once again at the heart of the latest crisis between the 
U.N. and Iraq.
    On February 23, the United Nations Secretary General signed 
the MOU with the Government of Iraq reiterating Iraq's 
obligation to cooperate fully and unconditionally with 
inspections by UNSCOM and IAEA for weapons of mass destruction. 
The agreement stipulates that Iraq will provide UNSCOM and IAEA 
weapons inspectors with immediate, unconditional, and 
unrestricted access to any suspect site inside Iraq, including 
presidential palaces, and provides for specific procedures for 
inspections at eight clearly identified presidential sites.
    The recent crisis with Iraq was only the latest chapter in 
the long history of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its 
obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions. Iraq has 
persistently failed to disclose fully its programs for WMD. 
Iraq has admitted, when confronted with incontrovertible 
evidence, that it has repeatedly and consistently concealed 
information from UNSCOM and the IAEA and has moved significant 
pieces of dual-use equipment that are subject to monitoring in 
violation of its obligations. Without full disclosure and free 
access to all sites UNSCOM and IAEA wish to inspect, the 
ongoing monitoring and verification mandated by relevant UNSC 
resolutions, including Resolutions 687, 707, and 715, cannot 
effectively be conducted.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1154

    On March 2, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
resolution 1154, which welcomed the MOU and reiterated that 
Iraq must cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA. In the 
clearest possible terms, the Council warned Iraq in UNSCR 1154 
that it will face the ``severest consequences'' if it fails to 
adhere to the commitments it reaffirmed in the MOU. This 
resolution is one of the strongest and clearest statements the 
Council has made in 7 years with regard to what Iraq must do to 
comply with its obligations, and what the consequences of 
failing to meet those obligations will be. This strong language 
of UNSCR 1154 is critical to ensuring that UNSCOM and IAEA can 
do their job and that Iraq is held accountable to its 
agreement. We welcomed Resolution 1154 and agreed with 
Secretary General Annan that, if respected, honored, and 
sustained, the agreement ``could constitute one of the U.N.'s 
most important steps in addressing the consequences of Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait 7 years ago.''
    Iraq's compliance with the agreement is now being tested. 
Since the beginning of March, UNSCOM has pursued an intensive 
agenda of inspections, including inspections of so-called 
``sensitive'' sites and ``presidential sites'' to which the 
Iraqis had previously blocked access. Iraq has not 
significantly obstructed access to any sites UNSCOM and the 
IAEA wished to visit since the MOU was signed. This may mean 
Iraq will comply with the relevant UNSC resolutions, but the 
testing process must continue until UNSCOM and the IAEA are 
fully satisfied. We have consistently stressed that full, 
unconditional, repeated access by UNSCOM to all sites, 
personnel, equipment, documents, and means of transportation 
provides the only means by which the world can make certain 
Iraq does not maintain or develop WMD. We have full faith and 
confidence in UNSCOM and its Executive Chairman.

Biological and Chemical Weapons

    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons remain the most 
troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate dual-use 
nature of the technology; it can easily be hidden within 
civilian industries such as, for biological agents, the 
pharmaceutical industry and, for chemical agents, the pesticide 
industry. UNSCOM is still unable to verify that all of Iraq's 
SCUD missile warheads filled with biological agents--anthrax 
and botulinum toxin--have been destroyed.

Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems

    The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should 
``close the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But 
there are still many uncertainties and questions that need to 
be resolved. Iraq has never provided a full and accurate 
account of its indigenous efforts to develop nuclear weapons 
and prohibited long-range missiles. Among the many problems, 
Iraq has failed to answer critical questions on nuclear weapons 
design and fabrication, procurement, and centrifuge enrichment; 
failed to provide a written description of its post-war nuclear 
weapons procurement program; and failed to account for major 
engine components, special warheads, missing propellants, and 
guidance instruments that could be used to assemble fully 
operational missiles. Until Iraq complies with its obligation 
to provide a full accounting of these and other relevant 
aspects of its program, the questions must remain open.

Iraq's Concealment Mechanisms

    The U.N. Special Commission's work must include vigorous 
efforts to expose Iraq's ``Concealment Mechanism.'' During the 
last 60 days, but before signature of the MOU, UNSCOM launched 
two special inspection teams that once again targeted this 
mechanism in order to ferret out WMD programs and documents 
that UNSCOM--and we--believe Iraq stubbornly retains. 
Unfortunately, it became clear that the Iraqi government had no 
intentionof cooperating with these inspections as specifically 
called for in the most recent UNSCRs on the topic--resolutions 1134 of 
October 23, 1997, and 1137 of November 12, 1997. The teams were stopped 
en route, denied access, and prevented from videotaping equipment 
movement or document-destruction activity at suspect sites.
    In accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions, UNSCOM and 
the IAEA must be allowed to continue to investigate all aspects 
of Iraq's prohibited programs until they can verify that all 
relevant components have been destroyed under international 
supervision, and that all remaining capabilities have been 
eliminated. Without such verification, Iraq could quickly 
develop the ability to strike at any city in the region--and 
perhaps even as far as Europe--with weapons of mass 
destruction.

Dual-Use Imports

    United Nations Security Council Resolution 1051 established 
a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire 
proscribed weapons. Iraq must notify the unit before it imports 
any items that can be used in both military and civilian 
applications. Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely 
notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
    We continue to be concerned that Iraq's land borders are 
extremely porous. Iraq continues substantial trade with its 
neighbors. There is significant potential for evasion of 
sanctions by land routes, giving additional weight to our 
position that UNSCOM must have full and unconditional access to 
all locations and be allowed to inspect and monitor Iraqi 
compliance over time.

The U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Program

    On February 20, the Security Council adopted resolution 
1153, which expands to $5.2 billion the amount of oil Iraq is 
authorized to sell every 6 months. The previous amount was $2.0 
billion every 6 months. Resolution 1153 states that the 
nutritional and health requirements of the Iraqi people are the 
top priority and allocates $1 billion to rebuild hospitals, 
schools, water, and sanitation facilities. My Administration's 
support for resolution 1153 is fully consistent with long-
standing U.S. policy. Since 1990, at the height of the Gulf 
War, the United States has held that the international 
community's dispute is with Iraq's leadership, not its people. 
We proposed an ``oil-for-food'' program in 1991 (UNSCR 706/
712), which Iraq rejected. A similar program (UNSCR 986) was 
eventually accepted by Iraq in 1996. We supported the expansion 
of the oil-for-food program under UNSCR 1153 because it will 
provide additional humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, 
under strict U.N. supervision, without benefiting the regime.
    Since the beginning of the oil-for-food program, we have 
consistently worked with the U.N. and other U.N. member states 
to find ways to improve the program's effectiveness to better 
meet the humanitarian needs of Iraq's civilian population. 
Iraq, however, has frequently failed to provide the full 
cooperation necessary to ensure that the program functions 
smoothly. For example, during calendar year 1997, the 
Government of Iraq refused to pump oil under UNSCR 986 for more 
than 3 months, all the while blaming the U.N. and the United 
States for disruptions in the flow of food and medicine that it 
had caused. We will be watching closely to determine how the 
Government of Iraq performs under UNSCR 1153. The Iraqi 
government refused to provide appropriate input to the 
Secretary General's report of January 30 on Iraq's humanitarian 
needs, which provide the basis for determining allocations 
under UNSCR 1153. On February 5, Iraq sent its official 
``observations'' on that report to the Secretary General, 
rejecting many of its proposals and recommendations to 
alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people without stating 
whether or not the Government of Iraq would ``accept'' the 
resolution. The U.N. Secretariat continues to work to reach 
agreement with Iraq on implementing UNSCR 1153.
    Among its other provisions, UNSCR 1153 calls for an 
independent assessment of Iraq's oil infrastructure to 
ascertain whether it can export enough oil to cover the $5.2 
billion oil export ceiling. Based on this report, the Secretary 
General will recommend to the UNSC whether repairs to Iraq's 
oil infrastructure will be needed to meet the new export 
target. The United States is prepared to support only those oil 
infrastructure repairs needed to fund the expanded humanitarian 
program.
    The U.N. must carefully monitor how Iraq implements 
resolution 1153. The Iraqi government continues to insist on 
the need for rapid lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its 
record of noncompliance with its obligations under relevant 
U.N. resolutions. Saddam Hussein has exploited the suffering he 
himself has imposed on his people to build sympathy for Iraq 
and its government and to create pressure to life the 
sanctions. In the meantime, he has continued to build lavish 
palaces that benefit only the elite within his regimes.

War Crimes and The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
a cause for grave concern. U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 
Max Van der Stoel, is investigating credible reports from 
numerous, independent sources that the Government of Iraq may 
have summarily executed hundreds--perhaps thousands--of 
political detainees in November and December 1997. According to 
these reports, many of those killed were serving sentences of 
15-20 years for such crimes as insulting the regime or being 
members of an opposition political party. Families in Iraq 
reportedly received the bodies of the executed that bore, in 
some cases, clear signs of torture. In addition, the 
possibility that the government used humans as experimental 
subjects in its chemical and biological weapons programs 
remains a grave concern.
    In southern Iraq, the government continues to repress the 
Shi'a population, destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life and 
the unique ecology of the southern marshes. In the north, the 
government continues the forced expulsion of tens of thousands 
of ethnic Kurds from Kirkuk and other cities. The government 
continues to stall and obfuscate, rather than work in good 
faith toward accounting for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-
country nationals who disappeared at the hands of Iraqi 
authorities during or after the occupation of Kuwait, and the 
nearly 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war taken prisoner by Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq shows no sign 
of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq cease the 
repression of its own people. The U.N. Special Rapporteur 
reported to the General Assembly his particular concern that 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, and the 
practice of torture continue to occur in Iraq.

The INDICT Campaign

    The INDICT campaign continues to gain momentum. Led by 
various independent Iraqi opposition groups and nongovernmental 
organizations, this effort seeks to document crimes against 
humanity and other violations of international humanitarian law 
committed by the Iraqi regime. We applaud the tenacity of the 
Iraqi opposition in the face of one of the most repressive 
regimes in history. We take note of, and welcome, Senate 
Resolution 179 of March 13 expressing the sense of the Senate 
concerning the need for an international criminal tribunal to 
try members of the Iraqi regime for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.
    March 16, 1998, marked the tenth anniversary of the Iraqi 
military's devastating chemical attack on the Iraqi Kurdish 
town of Halabja. As many as 5,000 civilians were killed. More 
than 10,000 were injured. The Iraqi regime never expressed 
remorse for Halabja. In fact, the regime defended its use of 
chemical weapons in its war with Iran by claiming, ``every 
nation has the right to protect itself against invasion,'' even 
though a 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which Iraq is subject, 
outlaws the use of chemical weapons. Ten years after the 
massacre, the people of Halabja still suffer from the effects 
of the attack, including much higher rates of serious diseases 
(such as cancer) birth defects, and miscarriages. The 
sympathies of the United States are with the people of Halabja 
and other victims of Iraqi chemical attacks as we remind 
ourselves and the international community that the U.N. must 
remain vigilant to stop Iraq from reacquiring weapons of mass 
destruction.

Northern Iraq

    In northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish 
parties, established in November 1997 as the result of U.S. 
efforts, continues to hold. Both Massoud Barzani, leader of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani, leader of 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have made positive, 
forward-looking statements on political reconciliation, and 
talks between the two groups have commenced. We will continue 
our efforts to reach a permanent reconciliation through 
mediation in order to help the people of northern Iraq find the 
permanent, stable settlement that they deserve, and to minimize 
the opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves 
into the conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to UNSCRs 687 and 692, continues to 
resolve claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued almost 
1.3 million awards worth $6 billion. Thirty percent of the 
proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCRs 986, 1111, and 
1143 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards 
and to finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money 
is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each 
claimant are authorized for awards in the order in which the 
UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 457 
U.S. claimants have received an initial installment payment, 
and payment is in process for an additional 323 U.S. claimants.

Conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. I remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all 
of its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The 
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the 
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts 
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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