[House Document 105-223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-
223


 
                  CERTIFICATION OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
                         CONTINUED PRESENCE IN
                        BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              TRANSMITTING

 HIS CERTIFICATION THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES, 
  AFTER JUNE 30, 1998 IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO 
  MEET THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES




 March 4, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
   Committees on International Relations and Appropriations, and ordered 
   to be printed

                                --------                                

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

59-011                     WASHINGTON : 1998



To the Congress of the United States:
    I hereby certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed 
forces, after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
required in order to meet the national security interests of 
the United States, and that it is the policy of the United 
States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as, 
civil police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    This certification is presented pursuant to section 1203 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 
Public Law 105-85, and section 8132 of the National Defense 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-56. The 
information required under these sections is in the report that 
accompanies this certification. The supplemental appropriations 
request required under these sections is being forwarded under 
separate cover.
    America has major national interests in peace in Bosnia. We 
have learned from hard experience in this turbulent century 
that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately 
linked. The Bosnian war saw the worst fighting--and the most 
profound humanitarian disaster--on that continent since the end 
of the Second World War. The conflict could easily have spread 
through the region, endangering old Allies and new democracies 
alike. A larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability 
of the NATO alliance itself and crippled prospects for our 
larger goal of a democratic, undivided, and peaceful Europe.
    The Dayton framework is the key to changing the conditions 
that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional power keg. It is 
decisively in American interests to see Dayton implemented as 
rapidly as feasible, so that peace becomes self-sustaining. 
U.S. leadership is as essential to sustaining progress as it 
has been to ending the war and laying the foundation for peace.
    I expect the size of the overall NATO force in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will remain similar to that of the current SFOR. 
However, the U.S. contribution would decline by about 20 
percent, as our Allies and partners continue to shoulder an 
increasing share of the burden.
    Although I do not propose a fixed end-date for this 
presence, it is by no means open-ended. Instead, the goal of 
the military presence is to establish the conditions under 
which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of 
a major NATO-led military force. To achieve this goal, we have 
established concrete and achievable benchmarks, such as the 
reform of police and media, the elimination of illegal pre-
Dayton institutions, the conduct of elections according to 
democratic norms, elimination of cross-entity barriers to 
commerce, and a framework for the phased and orderly return of 
refugees. NATO and U.S. forces will be reduced progressively as 
achievement of these benchmarks improves conditions, enabling 
the international community to rely largely on traditional 
diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives 
and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and 
negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over 
the longer term.
    In fact, great strides already have been made towards 
fulfilling these aims, especically in the last ten months since 
the United States re-energized the Dayton process. Since 
Dayton, a stable military environment has been created; over 
300,000 troops returned to civilian life and 6,600 heavy 
weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving 
through the restrucuturing, retraining and reintegration of 
local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels 
of government and hard-line nationalists--especially in the 
Republika Srpska--are increasingly marginalized. Independent 
media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000 
refugees and displaced person ahve returned home--110,000 in 
1997. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have 
been taken into custody.
    Progress has been particularly dramatic since the 
installation of a pro-Dayton, pro-democracy Government in 
Republika Srpska in December. Alreadly, the capital of 
Republika Srpska has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka; media 
are being restructured along democratic lines; civil police are 
generally cooperating with the reform process; war criminals 
are surrendering; and Republika Srpska is working directly with 
counterparts in the Federation to prepare key cities in both 
entities for major returns of refugees and displaced persons.
    At the same time, long-standing obstacles to inter-entity 
cooperation also are being broken down: a common flag now flies 
over Bosnian institutions, a common currency is being printed, 
a common automobile license plate is being manufactured, and 
mail is being delivered and trains are running across the 
inter-entity boundary line.
    Although progress has been tangible, many of these 
achievements still are reversible and a robust international 
military presence still is required at the present time to 
sustain the progress. I am convinced that the NATO-led force--
and U.S. participation in it--can be progressively reduced as 
conditions continue to improve, until the implementation 
process is capable of sustaining itself without a major 
international military presence.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, March 3, 1998.


    

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