[House Document 105-223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-
223
CERTIFICATION OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
CONTINUED PRESENCE IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
__________
MESSAGE
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
HIS CERTIFICATION THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES,
AFTER JUNE 30, 1998 IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO
MEET THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
March 4, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committees on International Relations and Appropriations, and ordered
to be printed
--------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59-011 WASHINGTON : 1998
To the Congress of the United States:
I hereby certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed
forces, after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
required in order to meet the national security interests of
the United States, and that it is the policy of the United
States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as,
civil police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This certification is presented pursuant to section 1203 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
Public Law 105-85, and section 8132 of the National Defense
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-56. The
information required under these sections is in the report that
accompanies this certification. The supplemental appropriations
request required under these sections is being forwarded under
separate cover.
America has major national interests in peace in Bosnia. We
have learned from hard experience in this turbulent century
that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately
linked. The Bosnian war saw the worst fighting--and the most
profound humanitarian disaster--on that continent since the end
of the Second World War. The conflict could easily have spread
through the region, endangering old Allies and new democracies
alike. A larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability
of the NATO alliance itself and crippled prospects for our
larger goal of a democratic, undivided, and peaceful Europe.
The Dayton framework is the key to changing the conditions
that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional power keg. It is
decisively in American interests to see Dayton implemented as
rapidly as feasible, so that peace becomes self-sustaining.
U.S. leadership is as essential to sustaining progress as it
has been to ending the war and laying the foundation for peace.
I expect the size of the overall NATO force in Bosnia and
Herzegovina will remain similar to that of the current SFOR.
However, the U.S. contribution would decline by about 20
percent, as our Allies and partners continue to shoulder an
increasing share of the burden.
Although I do not propose a fixed end-date for this
presence, it is by no means open-ended. Instead, the goal of
the military presence is to establish the conditions under
which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of
a major NATO-led military force. To achieve this goal, we have
established concrete and achievable benchmarks, such as the
reform of police and media, the elimination of illegal pre-
Dayton institutions, the conduct of elections according to
democratic norms, elimination of cross-entity barriers to
commerce, and a framework for the phased and orderly return of
refugees. NATO and U.S. forces will be reduced progressively as
achievement of these benchmarks improves conditions, enabling
the international community to rely largely on traditional
diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives
and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and
negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over
the longer term.
In fact, great strides already have been made towards
fulfilling these aims, especically in the last ten months since
the United States re-energized the Dayton process. Since
Dayton, a stable military environment has been created; over
300,000 troops returned to civilian life and 6,600 heavy
weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving
through the restrucuturing, retraining and reintegration of
local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels
of government and hard-line nationalists--especially in the
Republika Srpska--are increasingly marginalized. Independent
media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000
refugees and displaced person ahve returned home--110,000 in
1997. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have
been taken into custody.
Progress has been particularly dramatic since the
installation of a pro-Dayton, pro-democracy Government in
Republika Srpska in December. Alreadly, the capital of
Republika Srpska has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka; media
are being restructured along democratic lines; civil police are
generally cooperating with the reform process; war criminals
are surrendering; and Republika Srpska is working directly with
counterparts in the Federation to prepare key cities in both
entities for major returns of refugees and displaced persons.
At the same time, long-standing obstacles to inter-entity
cooperation also are being broken down: a common flag now flies
over Bosnian institutions, a common currency is being printed,
a common automobile license plate is being manufactured, and
mail is being delivered and trains are running across the
inter-entity boundary line.
Although progress has been tangible, many of these
achievements still are reversible and a robust international
military presence still is required at the present time to
sustain the progress. I am convinced that the NATO-led force--
and U.S. participation in it--can be progressively reduced as
conditions continue to improve, until the implementation
process is capable of sustaining itself without a major
international military presence.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, March 3, 1998.