    [House Document 105-223]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    105th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-
    223

                      CERTIFICATION OF U.S. ARMED FORCES
                             CONTINUED PRESENCE IN
                            BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

                                   __________

                                    MESSAGE

                                      FROM

                       THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                  TRANSMITTING

     HIS CERTIFICATION THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES,
      AFTER JUNE 30, 1998 IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO
      MEET THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

     March 4, 1998.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
       Committees on International Relations and Appropriations, and ordered
       to be printed

                                    --------

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    59-011                     WASHINGTON : 1998

    To the Congress of the United States:
        I hereby certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed
    forces, after June 30, 1998, in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
    required in order to meet the national security interests of
    the United States, and that it is the policy of the United
    States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as,
    civil police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
        This certification is presented pursuant to section 1203 of
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
    Public Law 105-85, and section 8132 of the National Defense
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Public Law 105-56. The
    information required under these sections is in the report that
    accompanies this certification. The supplemental appropriations
    request required under these sections is being forwarded under
    separate cover.
        America has major national interests in peace in Bosnia. We
    have learned from hard experience in this turbulent century
    that America's security and Europe's stability are intimately
    linked. The Bosnian war saw the worst fighting--and the most
    profound humanitarian disaster--on that continent since the end
    of the Second World War. The conflict could easily have spread
    through the region, endangering old Allies and new democracies
    alike. A larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability
    of the NATO alliance itself and crippled prospects for our
    larger goal of a democratic, undivided, and peaceful Europe.
        The Dayton framework is the key to changing the conditions
    that made Bosnia a fuse in a regional power keg. It is
    decisively in American interests to see Dayton implemented as
    rapidly as feasible, so that peace becomes self-sustaining.
    U.S. leadership is as essential to sustaining progress as it
    has been to ending the war and laying the foundation for peace.
        I expect the size of the overall NATO force in Bosnia and
    Herzegovina will remain similar to that of the current SFOR.
    However, the U.S. contribution would decline by about 20
    percent, as our Allies and partners continue to shoulder an
    increasing share of the burden.
        Although I do not propose a fixed end-date for this
    presence, it is by no means open-ended. Instead, the goal of
    the military presence is to establish the conditions under
    which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of
    a major NATO-led military force. To achieve this goal, we have
    established concrete and achievable benchmarks, such as the
    reform of police and media, the elimination of illegal pre-
    Dayton institutions, the conduct of elections according to
    democratic norms, elimination of cross-entity barriers to
    commerce, and a framework for the phased and orderly return of
    refugees. NATO and U.S. forces will be reduced progressively as
    achievement of these benchmarks improves conditions, enabling
    the international community to rely largely on traditional
    diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives
    and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and
    negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over
    the longer term.
        In fact, great strides already have been made towards
    fulfilling these aims, especically in the last ten months since
    the United States re-energized the Dayton process. Since
    Dayton, a stable military environment has been created; over
    300,000 troops returned to civilian life and 6,600 heavy
    weapons have been destroyed. Public security is improving
    through the restrucuturing, retraining and reintegration of
    local police. Democratic elections have been held at all levels
    of government and hard-line nationalists--especially in the
    Republika Srpska--are increasingly marginalized. Independent
    media and political pluralism are expanding. Over 400,000
    refugees and displaced person ahve returned home--110,000 in
    1997. One third of the publicly-indicted war criminals have
    been taken into custody.
        Progress has been particularly dramatic since the
    installation of a pro-Dayton, pro-democracy Government in
    Republika Srpska in December. Alreadly, the capital of
    Republika Srpska has been moved from Pale to Banja Luka; media
    are being restructured along democratic lines; civil police are
    generally cooperating with the reform process; war criminals
    are surrendering; and Republika Srpska is working directly with
    counterparts in the Federation to prepare key cities in both
    entities for major returns of refugees and displaced persons.
        At the same time, long-standing obstacles to inter-entity
    cooperation also are being broken down: a common flag now flies
    over Bosnian institutions, a common currency is being printed,
    a common automobile license plate is being manufactured, and
    mail is being delivered and trains are running across the
    inter-entity boundary line.
        Although progress has been tangible, many of these
    achievements still are reversible and a robust international
    military presence still is required at the present time to
    sustain the progress. I am convinced that the NATO-led force--
    and U.S. participation in it--can be progressively reduced as
    conditions continue to improve, until the implementation
    process is capable of sustaining itself without a major
    international military presence.

                                                    William J. Clinton.
        The White House, March 3, 1998.