[House Document 105-212]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 2d Session  - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-212


 
                            STATUS ON IRAQ

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)





February 5, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, February 3, 1998.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
November 26, 1997, to the present.
    My last report included the U.N.-Iraq stand-off which began 
on October 29, 1997, when the Iraqi government announced its 
intention to expel all U.S. personnel working in Iraq for the 
U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM). Iraq's apparent aim was to 
force UNSCOM's withdrawal or to significantly restrict its 
ability to function effectively and independently, thereby 
establishing an environment under which Iraq would restore its 
capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) without 
restriction. In November, the members of the U.N. Security 
Council thwarted this effort through joint diplomacy and the 
use of Security Council resolutions--backed by the deployment 
of forces in the Gulf. This resulted in the Iraqi government's 
explicit commitment, on November 20, 1997, to allow UNSCOM 
inspectors, including those who are U.S. citizens, to return 
unhindered to their duties.
    In violation of that commitment and of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 and subsequent resolutions, 
including 707, 1134, and 1137, Iraq has attempted again to 
dictate the composition of UNSCOM inspection teams and the 
terms of its compliance with Council resolutions. In addition, 
Iraq has persisted in its efforts to defy the Council by 
unilaterally imposing unacceptable conditions on the operations 
of UNSCOM. This report covering the last 60 days reflects the 
failure of the Government of Iraq to live up to its obligations 
under all applicable UNSC resolutions and its continued 
hindrance of UNSCOM's work.
    In December 1997, the Iraqi government reiterated its 
longstanding refusal to allow any access to all so-called 
``Presidential'' sites, and said it would limit access to so-
called ``sensitive'' sites by UNSCOM inspectors.
    On January 5, 1998, an inert rocket-propelled grenade 
struck a building in Baghdad that houses various U.N. elements, 
including UNSCOM headquarters, but caused no injuries. The 
Iraqi government denied responsibility but has yet to arrest 
any suspects.
    On January 12, the Government of Iraq refused to cooperate 
with an UNSCOM inspection team, declaring that the team was 
dominated by too many ``Anglo-Saxons''. The team had been 
investigating, among other things, allegations that Iraq may 
have used human beings as experimental subjects in chemical and 
biological warfare development.
    On January 17, the Iraqi government declared a Jihad (holy 
war) against U.N. sanctions and called for 1 million Iraqi 
citizens to undergo military training to prepare for any 
consequences.
    During the last 60 days, UNSCOM launched two special 
inspection teams that once again targeted Iraq's ``Concealment 
Mechanism'' in order to ferret out WMD programs and documents 
that UNSCOM--and we--believe Iraq stubbornly retains. It became 
clear that the Iraqis had no intention of cooperating with 
these inspections as specifically called for in the most recent 
UNSCRs on the topic--Resolutions 1134 of October 23 and 1137 of 
November 12. The teams were stopped en route, denied access, 
and prevented from video-taping equipment movement or document-
destruction activity at suspect sites.
    Ambassador Butler, UNSCOM's Executive Director, traveled to 
Baghdad on December 12, 1997, and again on January 19, 1998, to 
attempt to obtain Iraqi assurance that UNSCOM can resume its 
work unhindered, including unfettered access to 
``Presidential'' and ``sensitive'' sites. Following the January 
19 meetings, the Iraqis continued to defy and challenge UNSCOM 
by refusing to discuss access to ``Presidential'' sites until 
after Technical Meeting talks have concluded in April. As 
Ambassador Butler reported to the Security Council on January 
22, the talks were characterized by moments ``of abuse and 
denunciation of UNSCOM and its professional officers; an 
attempt to apportion literally all blame to UNSCOM, past and 
present, for the fact that the disarmament task has not been 
completed and sanctions on Iraq remained in force.'' Throughout 
the UNSC has expressed its support for UNSCOM and its mission 
in five unanimous Presidential Statements since October 1997.
    This record of intransigence is only the latest chapter in 
the long history of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its 
obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions. Without full 
disclosure and free access to all sites UNSCOM and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with to inspect, the 
ongoing monitoring and verification mandated by relevant 
UNSCresolutions, including Resolutions 687, 707 and 715, cannot 
effectively be conducted. UNSCOM must be allowed to continue to 
investigate all of Iraq's programs until it can verify with absolute 
certainty that all the equipment has been destroyed and that all the 
capabilities have been eliminated. Otherwise, Iraq eventually will be 
free to develop the capacity to strike at any city in the Middle East, 
delivering biological, chemical and possibly even nuclear weapons.

                      biological/chemical weapons

    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are currently the 
most troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate 
dual-use nature of the technology: biological and chemical 
agents can easily be hidden within civilian sectors, such as 
the pharmaceutical and pesticide industries. Iraq continues to 
prevent full and immediate access to sites suspected of 
chemical or biological warfare activities. UNSCOM is still 
unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile warheads 
filled with biological agents--anthrax and botulinum toxin--
have been destroyed.

                  nuclear weapons and delivery systems

    The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should 
``close the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections, but 
there are still many uncertainties and questions that need to 
be resolved. Iraq has failed to answer critical questions on 
nuclear weapons design and fabrication, procurement, and 
centrifuge enrichment; to provide a written description of its 
post-war nuclear weapons procurement program; and to account 
for major engine components, special warheads, missing 
propellants, and guidance instruments that could be used to 
assemble fully operational missiles.

                           u.s. force levels

    The U.S. has led international efforts to secure UNSCOM the 
access and cooperation it must have to do its job. As a 
demonstration of our resolve, the aircraft carriers USS NIMITZ, 
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, their accompanying battle group 
combatant ships, and additional combat aircraft have remained 
in the region. On January 15, the Government of the United 
Kingdom dispatched the aircraft carrier HMS INVINCIBLE and 
escort ships to the Gulf via the Red Sea.
    United States force levels in the region include land- and 
carrier-based aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious 
task force, a Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion 
task force, and a mix of special operations forces deployed in 
support of USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection 
throughout the region, additional military security personnel 
have been deployed for continuous rotation. USCINCCENT 
continues to monitor closely the security situation in the 
region to ensure adequate force protection is provided for all 
deployed forces.
    The U.S. and its coalition partners continue to enforce the 
no-fly zone over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and 
Operation Southern Watch. In response to a series of Iraqi no-
fly zone violations in October and November 1997, we increased 
the number of aircraft participating in these operations. There 
have been no observed no-fly zone violations during the period 
covered by this report. We have repeatedly made clear to the 
Government of Iraq and to all other relevant parties that the 
U.S. and its partners will continue to enforce both no-fly 
zones.
    United Nations Security Council Resolution 949, adopted in 
October 1994, demands that Iraq not use its military or any 
other forces to threaten its neighbors or U.N. operations in 
Iraq and that it not redeploy troops or enhance its military 
capacity in southern Iraq. In view of Saddam's accumulating 
record of brutality and unreliability, it is prudent to retain 
a significant U.S. force presence in the region to deter Iraq 
and respond rapidly to possible Iraqi aggression or threats 
against its neighbors.
    We again take note of and welcome H. Res. 322 of November 
13, 1997, expressing the sense of the House that the U.S. 
should act to resolve the crisis in a manner that assures full 
Iraqi compliance with UNSC resolutions regarding the 
destruction of Iraq's capability to produce and deliver WMD. 
While the increased forces in the region give us a wide range 
of military options we remain committed to exhausting all 
diplomatic options before resorting to other alternatives.

                               sanctions

    United Nations sanctions against Iraq were imposed as the 
result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It has been necessary to 
maintain them because of Iraq's failure to comply with all 
relevant UNSC resolutions, including those ensuring the 
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of Iraq's WMD.
    The Iraqi regime continues to insist on the need for rapid 
lifting of the sanctions regime, despite its record of 
noncompliance with its obligations under relevant resolutions, 
out of alleged concern for the well-being of the Iraqi people, 
claiming that malnutrition and inadequate medical care are the 
direct result of internationally imposed sanctions.
    To the contrary, since their inception, the sanctions 
against Iraq have exempted food and medicines--evidence of the 
concern of the U.S. and the international community for the 
welfare of the Iraqi people. In August 1991, when Iraq claimed 
that it was unable to pay for its food needs, the Security 
Council adopted UNSCR 706 (and later 712), authorizing Iraq to 
sell limited amounts of petroleum on the international market, 
with the proceeds to be used to purchase humanitarian supplies 
and to fund vital U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The 
Government of Iraq, however, ignored the needs of its own 
people by refusing to accept UNSCR's 706 and 712.
    In April 1995 the Security Council proposed a new oil-for-
food offer to Iraq in UNSCR 986, sponsored by the U.S. and 
others. UNSCR 986 authorized the sale of up to $1 billion of 
oil every 90 days for a total of $2 billion during a 180-day 
period for Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and other 
``humanitarian items'' for its people, and to fund specified 
U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq delayed 
implementation of UNSCR 986 for a year and a half, until 
December 1996.
    Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime has continued to 
obstruct and delay the relief plan. The regime delayed oil 
sales for two months in June and July 1997 under the second 
phase of the program (UNSCR 1111), and again for over one month 
in December 1997 and January 1998 under the third phase (UNSCR 
1143).
    The United States has consistently made clear our openness 
to improving the oil-for-food program to better meet the 
essential needs of Iraq's civilian population. The Secretary 
General has just submitted a report to this effect to the 
Council. We are prepared to consider carefully and favorably 
the Secretary General's suggestions to improve and expand the 
program. Expanding 986 would serve our humanitarian and 
strategic interests. First, the sanctions regime is aimed at 
the threat Saddam poses--not the Iraqi people. We should do 
whatever we can to ease their plight, consistent with our 
interests. Second, expanding 986 will make it more difficult 
for Saddam to use the plight of his people as a propaganda card 
in the Middle East and so help us shore up the anti-Saddam 
coalition. Third, by expanding oil-for-food, we will broaden 
and strengthen the U.N.'s grip on Iraq's revenues and 
expenditures, tightening the leash on Saddam and making it more 
difficult for him to divert funds to the military and WMD.
    Implementation of UNSCR 1051 continues. It provides for a 
mechanism to monitor Iraq's efforts to reacquire proscribed 
weapons capabilities by requiring Iraq to notify a joint 
UNSCOM/IARA unit in advance of any imports of dual-use items. 
Similarly, U.N. members must provide timely notification of 
exports to Iraq of dual-use items.
    The Multinational Interception Force (MIF), operating under 
the authority of UNSCR 665, is aggressively enforcing U.N. 
sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest 
component of this international naval force, augmented by ships 
and aircraft from Australia, Canada, Belgium, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Member states of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council support the MIF by providing logistical 
support and shipriders who ensure that merchant ships do not 
deviate from their recorded courses to legal ports and by 
pulling vessels caught violating sanctions into member state 
ports.
    Since my last report, the MIF has intercepted five 
sanctions violators in the Gulf. Ships involved in smuggling 
often utilize the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF 
inspections. We have given detailed reports of these illegal 
activities to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New York.
    The volume of illegal smuggling of petroleum products from 
Iraq continues to increase. Iraq is working to improve loading 
facilities in the Shatt Al Arab waterway and the continuing 
cooperation of the smugglers with Iran frustrates the naval 
forces which are restricted to international waters to carry 
out their duties. We estimate that over 200,000 metric tons of 
gasoil and other petroleum cargoes leave Iraq illegally each 
month. Profits from this illegal trade support Saddam at the 
expense of the Iraqi people.
    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), 
established pursuant to UNSCR 687 and 692, continues to resolve 
claims against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. The UNCC has issued almost 1.3 million 
awards worth approximately $6 billion. Thirty percent of the 
proceeds from the oil sales permitted by UNSCR's 986, 1111, and 
1143 have been allocated to the Compensation Fund to pay awards 
and to finance operations of the UNCC. To the extent that money 
is available in the Compensation Fund, initial payments to each 
claimant are authorized for awards in the order in which the 
UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date, 455 
U.S. claimants have received an initial installment payment, 
and payment is in process for an additional 323 U.S. claimants.

                              human rights

    The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be 
cause for grave concern. Reports that the Government of Iraq 
used humans as experimental subjects in its chemical and 
biological weapons programs have been noted above. Credible 
reports from numerous, independent sources indicate that the 
Government of Iraq also may have summarily executed anywhere 
from 800 to 1,500 political detainees in November and December 
1997. Opposition groups have alleged that many of those killed 
were servingsentences of 15-20 years for such crimes as 
insulting the regime or membership in an opposition political party. 
Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur for Iraq for the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission and Bacre Ndiaye, the Commission's Special Rapporteur 
for Summary Executions, are investigating these reports.
    Iraq's repression of its Shi'a population continues, with 
policies that are destroying the Marsh Arabs' way of life in 
southern Iraq and the ecology of the southern marshes. Iraq 
continues to stall and obfuscate rather than work in good faith 
toward accounting for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country 
nationals who disappeared during or after the occupation of 
Kuwait, and nearly 5,000 Iranian prisoners of war captured by 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. The Government of Iraq shows no 
sign of complying with UNSCR 688, which demands that Iraq cease 
the repression of its own people. The U.N. Human Rights 
Commission's Special Rapporteur on Iraq reported to the General 
Assembly his particular concern that extra-judicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions and the practice of torture continue to 
occur in Iraq.
    Led by various independent Iraqi opposition groups and 
nongovernmental organizations, the INDICT campaign--which seeks 
to document crimes against humanity and other violations of 
international humanitarian law committed by the Iraqi regime--
continues to gain momentum.
    Regarding northern Iraq, the cease-fire between the Kurdish 
parties, established November 24, 1997, as the result of U.S. 
efforts, continues to hold. In recent weeks, both Massoud 
Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) have made positive, forward-looking statements on 
political reconciliation, which may signal a willingness to 
settle some of their differences. We will continue our efforts 
to reach a permanent settlement through mediation in order to 
help the people of northern Iraq find the permanent, stable 
accommodation which they deserve, and to minimize the 
opportunities for Baghdad and Tehran to insert themselves into 
the conflict and threaten Iraqi citizens in this region. The 
Peace Monitoring Force--sponsored by the U.S., Great Britain 
and Turkey under the Ankara process and comprising Iraqi 
Turkomans and Assyrians--remains in garrison.

                               conclusion

    Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and 
security. As I told the American people in my recent State of 
the Union address, our country is united in its view that 
Saddam Hussein cannot defy the will of the world. He has used 
weapons of mass destruction before. We are determined to deny 
him the capacity to use them again. I remain determined to see 
Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations under U.N. 
Security Council resolutions.
    I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts 
and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this 
important issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                William J. Clinton.

                                
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