[House Document 105-169]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



105th Congress, 1st Session  - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-169


 
        CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO 
                     WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

     NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
 PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION''--(WMD)) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS 
   IS TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1997, PURSUANT TO 50 
                             U.S.C. 1622(d)





  November 12, 1997.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed


To the Congress of the United States:
    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
(``weapons of mass destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and 
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the 
national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its 
declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and 
transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues 
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. 
Therefore, I am advising the Congress that the national 
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on 
November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in 
effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended 
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and 
have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal 
Register for publication.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent 
pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information 
on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons 
(CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent 
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
Chemical and biological weapons
    The three export control regulations issued under the 
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully 
in force and continue to be applied in order to control the 
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological 
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction.
    Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to 
our security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29, 
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction (the ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or 
(CWC)) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 signatories 
as original States Parties. The United States was among their 
number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on 
April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States 
Parties.
    Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in 
time to be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March 
meeting in Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me 
of his understanding of the importance of the CWC to Russia's 
own security. On October 31, 1997, the Russian Duma (lower 
house) approved ratification of the CWC. On November 5, 1997, 
the Russian Federation Council unanimously approved the CWC and 
the Russian government deposited its instrument of 
ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for 
Russia to join the United States in playing a leadership role 
in ensuring that all of the Convention's benefits are realized.
    Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult 
period of transition to a market economy, serious concerns have 
been raised about the high cost of environmentally sound 
destruction of the large stocks of chemical weapons Russia 
inherited from the former Soviet Union. Through the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program, we are working with Russia to help 
address these complex problems, and we will continue to do so 
now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
    The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW) has been established to achieve the object and purpose 
of the CWC, to ensure the implementation of its provisions and 
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States 
Parities. The executive organ of the OPCW, the Executive 
Council, has met five times since May to oversee decisions 
related to inter alia data declarations, inspections, and 
organizational issues. The United States plays an active role 
in ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
    The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community 
to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its 
members have committed themselves to totally eliminating 
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities, prohibiting 
chemical weapons-related activities, banning assistance for 
such activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in 
certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical 
weapons stocks is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have 
now taken on a similar task, and we are working hard with the 
other members of the CWC to make membership in this treaty 
universal.
    The United States is determined to ensure full 
implementation of the concrete measures in the CWC that will 
raise the costs and the risks for any state or terrorist 
attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related activities. 
The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our knowledge 
of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by 
countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for 
access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, 
thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and 
stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically 
isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain 
key chemicals. The relevant Treaty provision is specifically 
designed to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to 
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of 
chemical weapons.
    The United States also continues to play a leading role in 
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological 
weapons. We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group 
striving to create a legally binding protocol to strengthen and 
enhance compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the 
``Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This Ad Hoc Group 
was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The 
Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended 
the work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete the 
protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review 
Conference to be held in 2001. A draft rolling text was 
introduced by the Chairman at the July Ad Hoc Group session. 
Work is progressing on insertion of national views and 
clarification of existing text, largely drawn from the 
consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since 1994. Three-week 
sessions are scheduled January, July, and September of 1998. 
Another 2-week session will be scheduled for either March or 
December of 1998. Early completion of an effective BWC protocol 
is high on our list of nonproliferation goals.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia 
Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation 
regime. Last year, the United States supported the entry into 
the AG of the Republic of Korea, which became the group's 30th 
member in time for the October 1996 plenary.
    The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary 
session from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group 
continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and 
sharing information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At 
the behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth 
political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during the 1995 
plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack 
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged 
AG members to exchange national points of contact for AG 
terrorism matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S. 
proposal to survey all AG members on efforts each has taken to 
counter this threat.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief 
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to 
achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all 
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to 
ensure that their national activities support this goal.
    AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all 
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of 
the BWC and CWC. The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that 
existing national export licensing policies on chemical 
weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under 
Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any 
way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given this 
understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment 
to continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has 
entered into force.
    The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to 
provide briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional 
consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to 
further awareness and understanding of national policies in 
these areas.
    During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely 
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-
related material and technology that might require action, 
including evaluating whether sanctions under the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 
were warranted. In May 1997, we imposed sanctions on seven 
Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for knowingly and 
materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the export 
of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production 
equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed 
sanctions on a German citizen and a German company determined 
to have been involved in the export of chemical production 
equipment to Libya's CW program.
    The United States continues to cooperate with its AG 
partners in stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By 
sharing information through diplomatic and other channels, we 
and our AG partners have been successful in interdicting 
various shipments destined to CBW programs.

Missiles for weapons of mass destruction delivery

    During the reporting period, the United States carefully 
controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction and closely monitored 
activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also 
continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions law, in cases 
where sanctionable activity was determined to have occurred. In 
August 1997, we imposed sanctions against two North Korean 
entities determined to have engaged in missile proliferation 
activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain in 
effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North 
Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items.
    During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to 
share information about proliferation problems with each other 
and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment 
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing 
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted 
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for 
use in missile programs of concern.
    The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's 
June 1997 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the 
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in useful discussions of regional 
missile proliferation concerns, as well as steps the Partners 
could take to increase transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
    In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role 
at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and 
enforcement aspects of transshipment. The workshop was 
successful in focusing attention on the enforcement problems 
raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment and fostered a 
productive exchange of ideas on two countries can better 
address such activity.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination 
with its MTCR partners to combat missile proliferation and to 
encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the 
MTCR Guidelines. Since the last report, we have continued our 
missile nonproliferation dialogue with China, the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Ukraine. In the course of 
normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such 
discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the Middle 
East, and Asia.
    In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second 
round of missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous 
missile development program and curtailing its missile-related 
export activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits 
on its missile-related exports, in return for sanctions-easing 
measures, but did not engage in discussion of limits on its 
missile development program. We intend to pursue further 
missile talks with the DPRK.
    In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation 
talks with the ROK. These talks were productive and made 
progress toward facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
    In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive 
items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile 
development program, the United States intensified its high-
level dialogue with Russia on this issue. We held a number of 
productive discussions with senior Russian officials aimed at 
finding ways the United States and Russia can work together to 
prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from 
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is 
continuing.

Nuclear weapons

    In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on 
September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over 
the previous 2\1/2\ years in the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this U.N. resolution (158-
3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and 
marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On 
September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed 
the CTBT in New York.
    During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous 
meetings of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to 
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System 
established by the Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the 
CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to 
ratification.
    The CTBT will serve several United States national security 
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain 
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; 
end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the 
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. 
The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the 
nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
    Formal preparation for the year 2000 Review Conference for 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
began in 1997 with the first of three annual Preparatory 
Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The United 
States is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT 
review Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce 
global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the 1995 NPT 
Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT, 
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT 
regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to 
its membership in 1997.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to 
upgrade control lists and export control procedures. NSG 
members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the 
nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed 
to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency published these 
understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is actively 
pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime 
in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference.
    The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October 
8 and 9, 1997, which described and explained the role of the 
NSG (and the Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear 
proliferation. The NSG also continued efforts to enhance 
information sharing among members regarding the nuclear 
programs of proliferant countries by (1) ``officially'' linking 
the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing 
for real-time distribution of license denial information, and 
by (2) creating a separate session for exchange of information 
on the margins of the NSG plenary meeting.
    NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of 
Latvia. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement 
of all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, 
to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance 
with the NSG guidelines.

Expenses

    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses 
directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred 
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 
12938 during the semiannual reporting period.
                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 12, 1997.


                                 Notice

                              ----------                              


    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared 
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. 
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means of delivering them continue to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 
1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in effect beyond 
November 14, 1997. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) 
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 
continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 
12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.
                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 12, 1997.

                                
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