[House Document 105-169]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
105th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-169
CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION''--(WMD)) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS
IS TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1997, PURSUANT TO 50
U.S.C. 1622(d)
November 12, 1997.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
(``weapons of mass destruction''--(WMD)) and of the means of
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order 12938, and
declared a national emergency under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the
national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its
declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and
transmit to the Congress a notice of its continuation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
Therefore, I am advising the Congress that the national
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on
November 14, 1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in
effect beyond November 14, 1997. Accordingly, I have extended
the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 and
have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal
Register for publication.
The following report is made pursuant to section 204(c) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent
pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional information
on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons
(CBW) nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent
annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.''
Chemical and biological weapons
The three export control regulations issued under the
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) remained fully
in force and continue to be applied in order to control the
export of items with potential use in chemical or biological
weapons or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction.
Chemical weapons continue to pose a very serious threat to
our security and that of countries friendly to us. On April 29,
1997, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction (the ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or
(CWC)) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165 signatories
as original States Parties. The United States was among their
number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on
April 25. As of November 5, 104 countries had become States
Parties.
Russia did not complete its legislative approval process in
time to be among the original CWC States Parties. In our March
meeting in Helsinki, President Yeltsin did, however, assure me
of his understanding of the importance of the CWC to Russia's
own security. On October 31, 1997, the Russian Duma (lower
house) approved ratification of the CWC. On November 5, 1997,
the Russian Federation Council unanimously approved the CWC and
the Russian government deposited its instrument of
ratification. Russia's ratification makes it possible for
Russia to join the United States in playing a leadership role
in ensuring that all of the Convention's benefits are realized.
Given Russia's financial situation during this difficult
period of transition to a market economy, serious concerns have
been raised about the high cost of environmentally sound
destruction of the large stocks of chemical weapons Russia
inherited from the former Soviet Union. Through the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program, we are working with Russia to help
address these complex problems, and we will continue to do so
now that Russia has ratified the CWC.
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) has been established to achieve the object and purpose
of the CWC, to ensure the implementation of its provisions and
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States
Parities. The executive organ of the OPCW, the Executive
Council, has met five times since May to oversee decisions
related to inter alia data declarations, inspections, and
organizational issues. The United States plays an active role
in ensuring effective implementation of the Convention.
The CWC is an ambitious undertaking by the world community
to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. Its
members have committed themselves to totally eliminating
chemical weapons stocks and production facilities, prohibiting
chemical weapons-related activities, banning assistance for
such activities and restricting trade with non-Parties in
certain relevant chemicals. Destruction of U.S. chemical
weapons stocks is moving forward. Other CWC States Parties have
now taken on a similar task, and we are working hard with the
other members of the CWC to make membership in this treaty
universal.
The United States is determined to ensure full
implementation of the concrete measures in the CWC that will
raise the costs and the risks for any state or terrorist
attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related activities.
The CWC's declaration requirements will improve our knowledge
of possible chemical weapons activities, whether conducted by
countries or terrorists. Its inspection provisions provide for
access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations,
thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and
stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically
isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain
key chemicals. The relevant Treaty provision is specifically
designed to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to
join the rest of the world in eliminating the threat of
chemical weapons.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in
the international effort to reduce the threat from biological
weapons. We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group
striving to create a legally binding protocol to strengthen and
enhance compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
``Biological Weapons Convention'' or (BWC)). This Ad Hoc Group
was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The
Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November 1996, commended
the work done by the Ad Hoc Group and urged it to complete the
protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review
Conference to be held in 2001. A draft rolling text was
introduced by the Chairman at the July Ad Hoc Group session.
Work is progressing on insertion of national views and
clarification of existing text, largely drawn from the
consultative phase of Ad Hoc Group work since 1994. Three-week
sessions are scheduled January, July, and September of 1998.
Another 2-week session will be scheduled for either March or
December of 1998. Early completion of an effective BWC protocol
is high on our list of nonproliferation goals.
The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia
Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation
regime. Last year, the United States supported the entry into
the AG of the Republic of Korea, which became the group's 30th
member in time for the October 1996 plenary.
The United States attended this year's annual AG plenary
session from October 6-9, 1997, during which the Group
continued to focus on strengthening AG export controls and
sharing information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At
the behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth
political-level discussion of CBW terrorism during the 1995
plenary session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack
earlier that year. At the 1996 plenary, the United States urged
AG members to exchange national points of contact for AG
terrorism matters. At the 1997 plenary, the AG accepted a U.S.
proposal to survey all AG members on efforts each has taken to
counter this threat.
The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to
achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to
ensure that their national activities support this goal.
AG participants continue to seek to ensure that all
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of
the BWC and CWC. The AG nations reaffirmed their belief that
existing national export licensing policies on chemical
weapons-related items fulfill the obligation established under
Article I of the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any
way, the acquisition of chemical weapons. Given this
understanding, the AG members also reaffirmed their commitment
to continuing the Group's activities now that the CWC has
entered into force.
The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue to
provide briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional
consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to
further awareness and understanding of national policies in
these areas.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely
intelligence and other reports of trade in chemical weapons-
related material and technology that might require action,
including evaluating whether sanctions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991
were warranted. In May 1997, we imposed sanctions on seven
Chinese entities and one Hong Kong company for knowingly and
materially contributing to Iran's CW program through the export
of dual-use chemical precursors and/or chemical production
equipment and technology. In September 1997, we imposed
sanctions on a German citizen and a German company determined
to have been involved in the export of chemical production
equipment to Libya's CW program.
The United States continues to cooperate with its AG
partners in stopping shipments of proliferation concern. By
sharing information through diplomatic and other channels, we
and our AG partners have been successful in interdicting
various shipments destined to CBW programs.
Missiles for weapons of mass destruction delivery
During the reporting period, the United States carefully
controlled exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery
systems for weapons of mass destruction and closely monitored
activities of potential missile proliferation concern. We also
continued to implement U.S. missile sanctions law, in cases
where sanctionable activity was determined to have occurred. In
August 1997, we imposed sanctions against two North Korean
entities determined to have engaged in missile proliferation
activities. Similar sanctions imposed in May 1996 remain in
effect against two entities in Iran and one entity in North
Korea for transfers involving Category II Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Annex items.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to
share information about proliferation problems with each other
and with other potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment
states. Partners also emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems. This cooperation has resulted
in the interdiction of missile-related materials intended for
use in missile programs of concern.
The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's
June 1997 Reinforced Point of Contact Meeting (RPOC). At the
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in useful discussions of regional
missile proliferation concerns, as well as steps the Partners
could take to increase transparency and outreach to nonmembers.
In July 1997, the United States also played a leading role
at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshop on the licensing and
enforcement aspects of transshipment. The workshop was
successful in focusing attention on the enforcement problems
raised by proliferators' misuse of transshipment and fostered a
productive exchange of ideas on two countries can better
address such activity.
The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination
with its MTCR partners to combat missile proliferation and to
encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to adhere to the
MTCR Guidelines. Since the last report, we have continued our
missile nonproliferation dialogue with China, the Republic of
Korea (ROK), North Korea (DPRK), and Ukraine. In the course of
normal diplomatic relations, we also have pursued such
discussions with other countries in Central Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia.
In June 1997, the United States and the DPRK held a second
round of missile talks, aimed at freezing the DPRK's indigenous
missile development program and curtailing its missile-related
export activities. The DPRK appeared willing to consider limits
on its missile-related exports, in return for sanctions-easing
measures, but did not engage in discussion of limits on its
missile development program. We intend to pursue further
missile talks with the DPRK.
In July 1997, we held another round of nonproliferation
talks with the ROK. These talks were productive and made
progress toward facilitating ROK membership in the MTCR.
In response to reports that Iran had acquired sensitive
items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile
development program, the United States intensified its high-
level dialogue with Russia on this issue. We held a number of
productive discussions with senior Russian officials aimed at
finding ways the United States and Russia can work together to
prevent Iran's ballistic missile development program from
acquiring Russian technology and equipment. This process is
continuing.
Nuclear weapons
In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the
spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th U.N. General Assembly on
September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated over
the previous 2\1/2\ years in the Conference on Disarmament in
Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this U.N. resolution (158-
3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and
marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On
September 24, 1996, I and other international leaders signed
the CTBT in New York.
During 1997, CTBT signatories have conducted numerous
meetings of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna, seeking to
promote rapid completion of the International Monitoring System
established by the Treaty. On September 23, I transmitted the
CTBT to the Senate, requesting prompt advice and consent to
ratification.
The CTBT will serve several United States national security
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons;
end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security.
The CTBT marks an historic milestone in our drive to reduce the
nuclear threat and to build a safer world.
Formal preparation for the year 2000 Review Conference for
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
began in 1997 with the first of three annual Preparatory
Committee meetings of the Parties to the Treaty. The United
States is committed to working to ensure that the 2000 NPT
review Conference will further strengthen the NPT and reinforce
global nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Since the 1995 NPT
Conference, eight additional states have joined the NPT,
leaving only five states worldwide currently outside the NPT
regime. The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee added China to
its membership in 1997.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continued its efforts to
upgrade control lists and export control procedures. NSG
members confirmed their agreement to clarifications to the
nuclear trigger list to accord with trigger list changes agreed
to by the members of the NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee, and
the International Atomic Energy Agency published these
understandings on September 16, 1997. The NSG also is actively
pursuing steps to enhance the transparency of the export regime
in accordance with the call in Principles 16 and 17 of the 1995
NPT Review and Extension Conference.
The NSG held an export control seminar in Vienna on October
8 and 9, 1997, which described and explained the role of the
NSG (and the Zangger Committee) in preventing nuclear
proliferation. The NSG also continued efforts to enhance
information sharing among members regarding the nuclear
programs of proliferant countries by (1) ``officially'' linking
the NSG members through a dedicated computer network allowing
for real-time distribution of license denial information, and
by (2) creating a separate session for exchange of information
on the margins of the NSG plenary meeting.
NSG membership will increase to 35 with the acceptance of
Latvia. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement
of all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime,
to control nuclear and nuclear-related exports in accordance
with the NSG guidelines.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses
directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order
12938 during the semiannual reporting period.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, November 12, 1997.
Notice
----------
Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared
a national emergency with respect to the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons.
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the means of delivering them continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy,
and economy of the United States, the national emergency
declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14,
1995 and November 14, 1996, must continue in effect beyond
November 14, 1997. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d)
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am
continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order
12938.
This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and
transmitted to the Congress.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, November 12, 1997.