[Senate Document 104-7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





        104th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - Senate 
Document 104-7



                               VETO-S. 21

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                               RETURNING
 
WITHOUT MY APPROVAL S. 21, THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SELF-DEFENSE ACT 

                                OF 1995


 


                August 11, 1995.--Ordered to be printed
To the Senate of the United States:
    I am returning herewith without my approval S. 21, the 
``Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995.'' I share 
the Congress' frustration with the situation in Bosnia and am 
also appalled by the human suffering that is occurring there. I 
am keenly aware that Members of Congress are deeply torn about 
what should be done to try to bring this terrible conflict to 
an end. My Administration will continue to do its utmost with 
our allies to guide developments toward a comprehensive 
political settlement acceptable to all the parties. S. 21, 
however, would hinder rather than support those efforts. It 
would, quite simply, undermine the chances for peace in Bosnia, 
lead to a wider war, and undercut the authority of the United 
Nations (U.N.) Security Council to impose effective measures to 
deal with threats to the peace. It would also attempt to 
regulate by statute matters for which the President is 
responsible under the Constitution.
    S. 21 is designed to lead to the unilateral lifting by the 
United States of the international arms embargo imposed on the 
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the United 
States has supported the lifting of the embargo by action of 
the U.N. Security Council, I nonetheless am firmly convinced 
that a unilateral lifting of the embargo would be a serious 
mistake. It would undermine renewed efforts to achieve a 
negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation 
of the conflict there, including the almost certain 
Americanization of the conflict.
    The allies of the United States in the U.N. Protection 
Force for Bosnia (UNPROFOR) have made it clear that a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States 
would result in their rapid withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading 
to its collapse. The United States, as the leader of NATO, 
would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in 
that withdrawal, thereby putting thousands of U.S. troops at 
risk. At the least, such unilateral action by the United States 
would drive our allies out of Bosnia and involve the United 
States more deeply, while making the conflict much more 
dangerous.
    The consequences of UNPROFOR's departure of a unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo must be faced squarely. First, the 
United States would immediately be part of a costly NATO 
operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is 
complete, the fighting in Bosnia would intensify. It is 
unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting while the 
Bosnian government received new arms and training. Third, under 
assault, the Bosnian government would look to the United States 
to provide arms and air support, and, if that failed, more 
active military support. Unilateral lift of the embargo would 
lead to unilateral American responsibility. Fourth, intensified 
fighting would risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-
reaching implications for regional peace. UNPROFOR's withdrawal 
would set back fresh prospects for a peaceful, negotiated 
solution for the foreseeable future. Finally, unilateral U.S. 
action under these circumstances would create serious divisions 
between the United States and its key allies, with potential 
long-lasting damage to these important relationships and to 
NATO.
    S. 21 would undermine the progress we have made with our 
allies and the United Nations in recent weeks to strengthen the 
protection of the safe areas in Bosnia and improve the 
provision of humanitarian assistance. NATO has agreed to the 
substantial and decisive use of air power to protect Gorazde, 
Sarajevo, and the other safe areas. The U.N. Secretary General 
has delegated his authority to the military commanders on the 
ground to approve the use of air power. The British and French, 
with our support, are deploying a Rapid Reaction Force to help 
open land routes to Sarajevo for convoys carrying vital 
supplies, strengthening UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its 
mission. These measures will help provide a prompt and 
effective response to Serb attacks on the safe areas. This new 
protection would disappear if UNPROFOR withdraws in response to 
the unilateral lifting of the embargo.
    Events over the past several weeks have also created some 
new opportunities to seek a negotiated peace. We are actively 
engaged in discussions with our allies and others on these 
prospects. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo now would 
jeopardize these ongoing efforts.
    Unilaterally disregarding the U.N. Security Council's 
decision to impose an arms embargo throughout the former 
Yugoslavia also would have a detrimental effect on the ability 
of the Security Council to act effectively in crisis 
situations, such as the trade and weapons embargoes against 
Iraq or Serbia. If we decide for ourselves to violate the arms 
embargo, other states would cite our action as a pretext to 
ignore other Security Council decisions when it suits their 
interests.
    S. 21 also would direct that the executive branch take 
specific actions in the Security Council and, if unsuccessful 
there, in the General Assembly. There is no justification for 
bringing the issue before the General Assembly, which has no 
authority to reconsider and reverse decisions of the Security 
Council, and it could be highly damaging to vital U.S. 
interests to imply otherwise. If the General Assembly could 
exercise such binding authority without the protection of the 
veto right held in the Security Council, any number of issues 
could be resolved against the interests of the United States 
and our allies.
    Finally, the requirements of S. 21 would impermissibly 
intrude on the core constitutional responsibilities of the 
President for the conduct of foreign affairs, and would 
compromise the ability of the President to protect vital U.S. 
national security interests abroad. It purports, 
unconstitutionally, to instruct the President on the content 
and timing of U.S. diplomatic positions before international 
bodies, in derogation of the President's exclusive 
constitutional authority to control such foreign policy 
matters. It also attempts to require the President to approve 
the export of arms to a foreign country where a conflict is in 
progress, even though this may well draw the United States more 
deeply into that conflict. These encroachments on the 
President's constitutional power over, and responsibility for, 
the conduct of foreign affairs, are unacceptable.
    Accordingly, I am disapproving S. 21 and returning it to 
the Senate.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, August 11, 1995.

                                
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