[House Document 104-131]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





        104th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House 
Document 104-131



        CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO
 
                      WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

     NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
 PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS 
 OF MASS DESTRUCTION'') AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS IS TO 
  CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1995, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 
                                1622(d)




  November 8, 1995.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
(``weapons of mass destruction'') and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 
and declared a national emergency under the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under 
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary 
date of its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal 
Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its 
continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues 
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. 
Therefore, I am hereby advising the Congress that the national 
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in 
effect beyond November 14, 1995. Accordingly, I have extended 
the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12938 
and have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal 
Register for publication.
    As I described in the report transmitting Executive Order 
No. 12938, the Executive order consolidated the functions of 
and revoked Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, 
which declared a national emergency with respect to the 
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and Executive 
Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which declared a 
national emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons, and their means of delivery.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) 
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant 
to the emergency declaration. Additional information on 
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the annual Report on 
the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report,'' and 
the annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 
308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
    The three export control regulations issued under the 
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in 
force and continue to be used to control the export of items 
with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or 
unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    In the 12 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 
26 additional countries ratified the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) for a total 
of 42 of the 159 signatories; the CWC must be ratified by 65 
signatories to enter into force. I must report my 
disappointment that the United States is not yet among those 
who have ratified. The CWC is a critical element of U.S. 
nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in our effort 
to end the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and 
use of chemical weapons. As we have seen this year in Japan, 
chemical weapons can threaten our security and that of our 
allies, whether as an instrument of war or of terrorism. The 
CWC will make every American safer, and we need it now.
    The international community is watching. It is vitally 
important that the United States continue to lead the fight 
against weapons of mass destruction by being among the first 65 
countries to ratify the CWC. The Senate recognized the 
importance of this agreement by adopting a bipartisan amendment 
on September 5, 1995, expressing the sense of the Senate that 
the United States should promptly ratify the CWC. I urge the 
Senate to give its advice and consent as soon as possible.
    In parallel with seeking Senate ratification of the CWC, 
the United States is working hard in the CWC Preparatory 
Commission (PrepCom) in The Hague to draft administrative and 
implementing procedures for the CWC and to create a strong 
organization for verifying compliance once the CWC enters into 
force.
    The United States also is working vigorously to end the 
threat of biological weapons (BW). We are an active participant 
in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and Their Destruction (BWC) Ad Hoc Group, which was 
commissioned September 1994 by the BWC Special Conference to 
draft a legally binding instrument to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. 
The Group convened its first meeting in January 1995 and agreed 
upon a program of work for this year. The first substantive 
meeting took place in July, making important progress in 
outlining the key issues. The next meeting is scheduled for 
November 27 to December 8, 1995. The U.S. objective is to have 
a draft protocol for consideration and adoption at the Fourth 
BWC Review Conference in December 1996.
    The United States continues to be active in the work of the 
29-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime, and 
attended the October 16-19 AG consultations. The Group agreed 
to a United States proposal to ensure the AG export controls 
and information-sharing adequately address the threat of CBW 
terrorism, a threat that became all too apparent in the Tokyo 
subway nerve gas incident. This U.S. initiative was the AG's 
first policy-level action on CBW terrorism. Participants also 
agreed to several amendments to strengthen the AG's harmonized 
export controls on materials and equipment relevant to 
biological weapons, taking into account new developments since 
the last review of the biological weapons lists and, in 
particular, new insights into Iraq's BW activities.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief 
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the only way 
to achieve a permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states 
adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that 
their national activities support these goals.
    Australia Group participants are taking steps to ensure 
that all relevant national measures promote the object and 
purposes of the BWC and CWC, and will be fully consistent with 
the CWC upon its entry into force. The AG considers that 
national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-related 
items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of the 
CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the 
acquisition of chemical weapons. Moreover, inasmuch as these 
measures are focused solely on preventing activities banned 
under the CWC, they are consistent with the undertaking in 
Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible 
exchange of chemical materials and related information for 
purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
    The AG agreed to continue its active program of briefings 
for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on 
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and 
understanding of national policies in these areas.
    The United States Government determined that two foreign 
companies--Mainway Limited and GE Plan--had engaged in chemical 
weapons proliferation activities that required the imposition 
of sanctions against them, effective May 18, 1995. Additional 
information on this determination is contained in a classified 
report to the Congress, provided pursuant to the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991.
    The United States carefully controlled exports which could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such 
proposed transfers consistent with the Guidelines of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR Partners 
continued to share information about proliferation problems 
with each other and with other possible supplier, consumer, and 
transshipment states. Partners also emphasized the need for 
implementing effective export control systems.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination 
with its MTCR partners in multilateral efforts to combat 
missile proliferation by nonmembers and to encourage nonmembers 
to export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. 
Three new Partners were admitted to the MTCR with U.S. support: 
Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
    In May 1995, the United States participated in an MTCR team 
visit to Kiev to discuss missile nonproliferation and MTCR 
membership criteria. Under Secretary of State Davis met with 
Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Hryshchenko in May, July, and 
October to discuss nonproliferation issues and MTCR membership. 
As a result of the July meeting, a United States delegation 
traveled to Kiev in October to conduct nonproliferation talks 
with representatives of Ukraine, brief them on the upcoming 
MTCR Plenary, and discuss U.S. criteria for MTCR membership. 
From August 29--September 1, the U.S. participated in an 
informal seminar with 18 other MTCR Partners in Montreux, 
Switzerland, to explore future approaches to strengthening 
missile nonproliferation.
    The MTCR held its Tenth Plenary Meeting in Bonn October 10-
12. The Partners reaffirmed their commitment to controlling 
exports to prevent proliferation of delivery systems for 
weapons of mass destruction. They also reiterated their 
readiness for international cooperation in peaceful space 
activities consistent with MTCR policies. The Bonn Plenary made 
minor amendments to the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in 
the light of technical developments. Partners also agreed to 
U.S. initiatives to deal more effectively with missile-related 
aspects of regional tensions, coordinate in impeding shipments 
of missile proliferation concern, and deal with the 
proliferation risks posed by transshipment. Finally, MTCR 
Partners will increase their efforts to develop a dialogue with 
countries outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence 
to the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile 
proliferation risks.
    The United States has continued to pursue my 
Administration's nuclear nonproliferation goals with success. 
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) agreed last May at the NPT Review and Extension 
Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and without 
conditions. Since the conference, more nations have acceded to 
the Treaty. There now are 180 parties, making the NPT nearly 
universal.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues its efforts to 
improve member states' export policies and controls. Nuclear 
Suppliers Group members have agreed to apply technology 
controls to all items on the nuclear trigger list and to adopt 
the principle that the intent of the NSG Guidelines should not 
be undermined by the export of parts of trigger list and dual-
use items without appropriate controls. In 1995, the NSG agreed 
to over 30 changes to update and clarify the list of controlled 
items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Annex. The NSG also 
pursued efforts to enhance information sharing among members by 
establishment of a permanent Joint Information Exchange group 
and by moving toward adoption of a United States Department of 
Energy-supplied computerized automated information exchange 
system, which is currently being tested by most of the members.
    The increasing number of countries capable of exporting 
nuclear commodities and technology is a major challenge for the 
NSG. The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement of 
all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, to 
control nuclear exports in accordance with the NSG guidelines. 
Members continued contacts with Belarus, Brazil, China, 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Ukraine 
regarding NSG activities. Ambassador Patokallio of Finland, the 
current NSG Chair, led a five-member NSG outreach visit to 
Brazil in early November 1995 as part of this effort.
    As a result of such contacts, the ROK has been accepted as 
a member of the NSG. Ukraine is expected to apply for 
membership in the near future. The United States maintains 
bilateral contacts with emerging suppliers, including the New 
Independent States of the former Soviet Union, to encourage 
early adherence to NSG guidelines.
    Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses 
directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred 
by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive Order 
No. 12938 during the period from May 14, 1995, through November 
14, 1995.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 8, 1995.
                                [NOTICE]

    Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction

    On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order No. 12938, I 
declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass 
destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. 
Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
and economy of the United States, the national emergency 
declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond 
November 14, 1995. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) 
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 
continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 
No. 12938.
    This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and 
transmitted to the Congress.

                                                William J. Clinton.
    The White House, November 8, 1995.

                                
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