[Analytical Perspectives]
[Crosscutting Programs]
[7. Credit and Insurance]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]



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                         7. CREDIT AND INSURANCE

  Federal credit and insurance programs are alternatives to direct 
spending programs as means of achieving a variety of policy objectives. 
Federal credit programs offer direct loans and loan guarantees to 
support a wide range of activities including housing, education, 
business and community development, and exports. At the end of 2006, 
there were $251 billion in Federal direct loans outstanding and $1,120 
billion in loan guarantees. Through its insurance programs, the Federal 
Government insures bank, thrift, and credit union deposits, guarantees 
private defined-benefit pensions, and insures against other risks such 
as natural disasters.
  The Federal Government also permits certain privately owned companies, 
called Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), to operate under Federal 
charters for the purpose of enhancing credit availability for targeted 
sectors. GSEs increase liquidity by guaranteeing and securitizing loans, 
as well as by providing direct loans. In return for advancing certain 
social goals and possibly improving economic efficiency, GSEs enjoy 
various special privileges, such as possible borrowing from Treasury at 
Treasury's discretion, exemption from State and local income taxation, 
and favorable regulatory treatments of their securities. These 
privileges may leave observers with the impression that GSE securities 
are risk-free. GSEs, however, are not part of the Federal Government, 
and GSE securities are not federally guaranteed. By law, GSE securities 
carry a disclaimer of any U.S. obligation.
  This chapter discusses the roles of these diverse programs and 
assesses their effectiveness and efficiency.
    The first section emphasizes the roles of Federal credit and 
          insurance programs in addressing market imperfections that may 
          prevent the private market from efficiently providing credit 
          and insurance. Federal programs are more useful where market 
          imperfections remain serious even though the continued 
          evolution and deepening of financial markets may have in part 
          corrected many of the imperfections.
    The second section interprets the results of the Program 
          Assessment Rating Tool (PART) for credit and insurance 
          programs in relation to their distinguishing features.
    The third section discusses individual credit programs and 
          GSEs intended to support four sectors: housing, education, 
          business and community development, and exports. The 
          discussion focuses on program objectives, recent developments, 
          performance, and future plans for each program.
    In a similar format, the final section reviews Federal 
          deposit insurance, pension guarantees, disaster insurance, and 
          insurance against terrorism and other security-related risks.

           I.  FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN CHANGING FINANCIAL MARKETS

The Federal Role

  In most cases, private lending and insurance companies efficiently 
meet economic demands by allocating resources to their most productive 
uses. Market imperfections, however, can cause inadequate provision of 
credit or insurance in some sectors. Federal credit and insurance 
programs improve economic efficiency if they effectively fill the gaps 
created by market imperfections. On the other hand, Federal credit and 
insurance programs that do not effectively address market imperfections 
can be unnecessary, or can even be counter-productive--they may simply 
do what the private sector would have done in their absence, or 
interfere with what the private sector would have done better. Federal 
credit and insurance programs also help disadvantaged groups. This role 
alone, however, may not be enough to justify credit and insurance 
programs; to help disadvantaged groups, direct subsidies are generally 
more effective and less distortionary.
  Relevant market imperfections include insufficient information, 
limited ability to secure resources, imperfect competition, and 
externalities. Although these imperfections can cause inefficiencies, 
the presence of a market imperfection does not mean that Government 
intervention will be always effective. To be effective, a credit or 
insurance program should be carefully designed to reduce inefficiencies 
in the targeted area without causing inefficiencies elsewhere.

  Insufficient Information. Financial intermediaries may fail to 
allocate credit to the most deserving borrowers if there is little 
objective information about some of the borrowers. Some groups of 
borrowers, such as start-up businesses and some families, have limited 
incomes and credit histories. Many creditworthy borrowers belonging to 
these groups may fail to obtain credit or be forced to pay excessively 
high interest. For very irregular events, such as natural and man-made 
disasters, there may not be sufficient information to estimate the 
probability and magnitude of the loss. This pricing difficulty may 
prevent insurers from covering those risks at reasonable premiums.
  Limited Ability to Secure Resources. The ability of private entities 
to absorb losses is more limited than

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that of the Federal Government, which has general taxing authority. For 
some events potentially involving a very large loss concentrated in a 
short time period, therefore, Government insurance commanding more 
resources can be more credible and effective. Such events include 
massive bank failures and some natural and man-made disasters that can 
threaten the solvency of private insurers.
  Imperfect Competition. Competition can be imperfect in some markets 
because of barriers to entry or economies of scale. Imperfect 
competition may result in higher prices of credit and insurance in those 
markets.
  Externalities. Decisions at the individual level are not socially 
optimal when individuals do not capture the full benefit (positive 
externalities) or bear the full cost (negative externalities) of their 
activities. Education, for example, generates positive externalities 
because the general public benefits from the high productivity and good 
citizenship of a well-educated person. Pollution, from which other 
people suffer, is clearly a negative externality. Without Government 
intervention, people will engage less than socially optimal in 
activities that generate positive externalities and more in activities 
that generate negative externalities.

Effects of Changing Financial Markets

  Financial markets have become much more efficient through 
technological advances and financial services deregulation. By 
facilitating the gathering and processing of information and lowering 
transaction costs, technological advances have significantly contributed 
to improving the screening of credit and insurance applicants, enhancing 
liquidity, refining risk management, and spurring competition. 
Deregulation, represented by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Act of 1997 and the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999, has increased competition and prompted efficiency-improving 
consolidation by removing geographic and industry barriers.
  These changes have reduced market imperfections. The private market 
now has more information and better technology to process it; it has 
better means to secure resources; and it is more competitive. As a 
result, the private market is more willing and able to serve a portion 
of the population traditionally targeted by Federal programs. The 
benefits of technological advances and deregulation, however, have been 
uneven across sectors and populations. To remain effective, therefore, 
Federal credit and insurance programs need to focus more narrowly on 
those sectors that have been less affected by financial evolution and 
those populations that still have difficulty in obtaining credit or 
insurance from private lenders. The Federal Government also needs to pay 
more attention to new challenges introduced by financial evolution and 
other economic developments. Even those changes that are beneficial 
overall often bring new risks and challenges.
  The need for the Federal government to address the information problem 
has diminished steadily over the years. Nowadays, lenders and insurers 
have easy access to large databases, powerful computing devices, and 
sophisticated analytical models. This advancement in communication and 
information processing technology enables lenders to evaluate risk more 
objectively and accurately. Also, potential borrowers tend to have 
access to a much wider array of possible local, national, and global 
lenders. As a result, most borrowers can easily obtain credit at a fair 
interest rate reflecting their risk. The improvement, however, may be 
uneven across sectors. Credit scoring (an automated process that 
converts relevant borrower characteristics into a numerical score 
indicating creditworthiness), for example, is considered as a 
breakthrough in borrower screening. While credit scoring is widely 
applied to home mortgages and consumer loans, it is applied to a limited 
extent for small business loans and agricultural loans due to the 
difficulty of standardizing unique characteristics of small businesses 
and farmers. It is also possible that banking consolidation adversely 
affects those borrowers with unique characteristics; small, local banks 
could serve those borrowers better if they had more borrower-specific 
information gained through long-term relations. With technological 
advances such as computer simulation, pricing catastrophe risks has 
become easier, but it remains much more difficult than pricing more 
regular events such as automobile accidents. It is still difficult for 
insurers to estimate with confidence the probability of a major natural 
disaster occurring. The difficulty may be greater for man-made disasters 
that lack scientific bases.
  Financial evolution has also improved private insurers' ability to 
deal with catastrophic losses. Using financial derivatives such as 
options, swaps, and futures, private entities can manage and share 
various types of risk such as price risk, interest rate risk, credit 
risk, and even catastrophe-related risk. An insurer can distribute the 
risk of a natural or man-made catastrophe among a large number of 
investors through catastrophe-related derivatives. However, the market 
for catastrophe-related derivatives is still small, and it has not 
eliminated the difficulty of absorbing catastrophic losses yet. To 
address this difficulty, reinsurance may be preferred to direct 
provision of insurance because it involves less intervention.
  Imperfect competition is much less likely to justify Federal 
involvement than was the case only a few years ago due to financial 
deregulation and improved communication and financing technology. 
Financial deregulation removed geographic and industry barriers to 
competition. As a result, major financial holding companies offer both 
banking and insurance products nationwide. Internet-based financial 
services have further lowered the cost of financial transactions and 
reduced the importance of physical location. These developments have 
been especially beneficial to small and geographically isolated 
customers who could not afford to bear large transactions costs and 
otherwise had limited access to

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financial services. In addition, there are more financing alternatives 
for both commercial and individual borrowers that used to rely heavily 
on banks. Venture capital, for example, has become a much more important 
financing source for small businesses. Finance companies have also 
become a prominent player both in business and consumer financing.
  Problems related to externalities may persist because the price 
mechanisms that drive the private market by definition ignore the value 
of externalities. Externalities, however, are a general market failure, 
rather than a financial market failure. Thus, credit and insurance 
programs are not necessarily the best means to address externalities, 
and their effectiveness should be compared with other forms of 
Government intervention, such as tax incentives and grants. In 
particular, if a credit program was initially intended to address 
multiple problems, including externalities, and those other problems 
have been alleviated, there may be a better way to address any remaining 
externalities.
  Overall, the financial market has become more efficient and safer. 
Financial evolution and other economic developments, however, are often 
accompanied by new risks. Federal agencies need to be vigilant to 
identify and manage new risks to the economy and to the Budget. For 
example, financial derivatives enable their users either to decrease or 
to increase risk exposure. If some beneficiaries of Federal programs use 
financial derivatives to take more risk, the costs of Federal programs, 
especially insurance programs, can rise sharply. The sheer size of some 
financial institutions has also created a new risk. While well-
diversified institutions are generally safer, even a single failure of a 
large private institution or a GSE, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the Federal Home Loan Banks, could shake the entire financial market. A 
more visible risk to the Budget today is posed by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). PBGC has a large shortfall in assets and 
projected earnings relative to the claims it is already obligated to pay 
due to unfavorable developments in recent years and to flaws in program 
structure that the Administration proposes to remedy.

            II.  PERFORMANCE OF CREDIT AND INSURANCE PROGRAMS

  The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) has evaluated 977 Federal 
programs, including 34 credit programs and seven insurance programs. The 
PART evaluates programs in four areas (program purpose and design, 
strategic planning, program management, and program results) and assigns 
a numerical score (0 to 100) to each category. The overall rating 
(effective, moderately effective, adequate, ineffective, or results not 
demonstrated) is determined based on the numerical scores and the 
availability of reliable data.
  The ratings for credit and insurance programs are clustered around the 
middle; 78 percent of credit and insurance programs (compared with 58 
percent for other programs) are rated ``adequate'' or ``moderately 
effective,'' while only seven percent (17 percent for other programs) 
are rated ``effective.'' These results suggest that most credit and 
insurance programs meet basic standards, but need to improve. In 
individual categories, credit and insurance programs have scored 
noticeably low in program purpose and design and high in program results 
relative to other programs.

                                             SUMMARY OF PART SCORES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Purpose
                                                                        and     Strategic    Program    Program
                                                                       Design    Planning  Management   Results
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
Credit and Insurance Programs
  Average..........................................................       78.5       74.2        86.0       55.7
  Standard Deviation...............................................       19.9       24.0        18.4       19.0
 
All Others Excluding Credit and Insurance Programs
  Average..........................................................       87.1       75.0        82.2       48.2
  Standard Deviation...............................................       18.4       24.6        17.9       26.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Some key features distinguish credit and insurance programs from other 
programs. Credit and insurance programs are intended to address 
imperfections in financial markets. They also face various risks, such 
as uncertain default rates and erratic claim rates. Interpreting PART 
results in relation to these features should help to identify 
fundamental problems and to devise effective solutions.

  Program Purpose and Design. To be effective, credit and insurance 
programs should serve those who deserve to be served but are left out by 
the private market due to market imperfections. Extending credit to 
those who are not creditworthy, for example, would result in economic 
inefficiencies and large budget costs. Lending to those who can obtain 
credit at a reasonable rate in the private market would be unnecessary 
and might interfere with the market mechanism. To achieve intended 
outcomes without causing unintended consequences, therefore, credit and 
insurance programs need to be carefully designed; they should target the

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intended beneficiaries, and all parties in the transaction should face 
the correct incentives.
  The PART indicates that most credit and insurance programs have clear 
purposes (not necessarily economically justifiable purposes) and address 
specific needs. Many credit and insurance programs, however, fail to 
score high in program design. Some are duplicative of other federal 
programs or private sources, and some offer inadequate incentive 
structures.

  Strategic Planning. Financial markets have been evolving to serve 
target populations of Federal programs better and increasingly apply 
advanced technologies to risk assessments. Credit and insurance programs 
need to adapt to these new developments quickly. Falling behind, Federal 
programs can be left with many beneficiaries who do not really need 
Government help and with those who post greater risk as private entities 
attract better-risk beneficiaries away from Federal programs.
  In subcategories of strategic planning, while most credit and 
insurance programs effectively execute short-term strategies, they are 
less effective in pursuing long-term goals that may be more critical in 
adapting to new developments. Other weaknesses are found in conducting 
stringent performance evaluation and tying budgets to performance 
outcomes.

  Program Management. Risk management is a critical element of credit 
and insurance programs. The cashflow is uncertain both for credit and 
insurance programs. The default rate and the claim rate can turn out to 
be significantly different than expected. Credit programs also face 
prepayment and interest rate risks. These risks must be carefully 
managed to ensure the program cost stays within a reasonable range.
  Credit and insurance programs show strengths in basic financial and 
accounting practices, such as spending funds for intended purposes and 
controlling routine costs. However, some weaknesses are found in areas 
that are more critical for effective risk management, such as collecting 
timely information and using sophisticated financial tools.

  Program Results. The main difficulty in evaluating program performance 
is measuring the net outcome of the program (improvement in the intended 
outcome net of what would have occurred in the absence of the program). 
Suppose that an education program is intended to increase the number of 
college graduates. Although it is straightforward to measure the number 
of college graduates who were assisted by the program, it is difficult 
to tell how many of those would not have obtained a college degree 
without the program's assistance. Credit and insurance programs face an 
additional difficulty of estimating the program cost accurately. In 
evaluating programs, the outcome must be weighed against the cost. In 
the above example, the ultimate measure of effectiveness is not the net 
number of college graduates produced by the program but the net number 
per Federal dollar spent on the program. Thus, an inaccurate cost 
estimate would lead to incorrect program evaluation--an underestimation 
(overestimation) of the cost would make the program appear unduly 
effective (ineffective). Results for credit and insurance programs need 
to be interpreted in conjunction with the accuracy of cost estimation.
  Program results, the most important category of performance, are 
generally weak for credit and insurance programs despite a higher 
average score than that of other programs. Many credit and insurance 
programs have difficulty in achieving performance goals and lack 
objective evidences of program effectiveness. These problems may partly 
result from the difficulty of measuring net outcomes. With reliable 
outcome measures, it should be easier to set achievable goals and 
demonstrate effectiveness.

                      III.  CREDIT IN FOUR SECTORS

                    Housing Credit Programs and GSEs

  Through housing credit programs, the Federal Government promotes 
homeownership among various target groups, including low-income people, 
minorities, veterans, and rural residents. Housing GSEs increase 
liquidity in the mortgage market.

Federal Housing Administration

  In June 2002, the President issued America's Homeownership Challenge 
to increase the number of first-time minority homeowners by 5.5 million 
through 2010. During the first three and a quarter years since the goal 
was announced, nearly 2.5 million minority families have become 
homeowners. Through 2006, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development's (HUD's) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) helped almost 
542,000 of these first-time minority homebuyers through its loan 
insurance funds, mainly the Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund. FHA 
mortgage insurance guarantees mortgage loans that provide access to 
homeownership for people who lack the traditional financial resources or 
credit history to qualify for a home mortgage in the conventional 
marketplace. In 2006, FHA endorsed purchase and refinance mortgages for 
more than 425,000 households. For purchase mortgages, over 79 percent 
were for first-time homebuyers and about 31 percent were for minority 
buyers. FHA also endorsed over 76,000 home equity conversion mortgages 
for elderly homeowners.
  While FHA has been a primary mortgage source for first-time and 
minority buyers since the 1930s, its loan volume has fallen 
precipitously in the past four years. This is due in part to lower 
interest rates that have made uninsured mortgages affordable for more 
families. Moreover, private lenders--aided by automated underwriting 
tools that allow them to measure risks more

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accurately--have expanded lending to people who previously would have 
had no option but FHA--those with few resources to pay for downpayments 
and/or weaker credit histories that the private sector considered too 
risky. The development of new products and underwriting approaches has 
allowed private lenders to offer loans to more homebuyers. While this is 
a positive development when the private sector is offering favorable 
terms, some borrowers either end up paying too much or receiving unfair 
terms.
  As private lenders have expanded their underwriting to cover more 
borrowers, FHA's business has changed. First, the percentage of FHA-
insured mortgages with initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of 95 percent 
or higher has increased substantially, from 62.7 percent in 1995 to 78 
percent in 2006. Second, the percentage of FHA loans with downpayment 
assistance from seller-financed nonprofit organizations has grown 
rapidly, from 0.3 percent in 1998 to nearly 33 percent in 2006. Recent 
studies show that these loans are riskier than those made to borrowers 
who received downpayment assistance from other sources. In 2006, FHA's 
cumulative default claim rate for its core business is projected to have 
risen from approximately 10 percent to 12 percent.
  The FHA single-family mortgage program was assessed in 2005 using the 
PART. The assessment found that the program was meeting its statutory 
objective to serve underserved borrowers while maintaining an adequate 
capital reserve. However, the program lacked quantifiable annual and 
long-term performance goals that would measure FHA's ability to achieve 
its statutory mission. In addition, both the PART and subsequent reports 
by the General Accountability Office and the Inspector General noted 
that the program's credit model does not accurately predict losses to 
the insurance fund, and that despite FHA efforts to deter fraud in the 
program, it has not demonstrated that these steps have reduced such 
fraud.
  In response to these findings, FHA measured its 2006 performance 
against new goals, such as the percentage of FHA Single Family loans for 
first-time and minority homeowners, and exceeded its goals. FHA has also 
improved the accuracy of its annual actuarial review claim and 
prepayment estimates. In 2007, it will continue to develop performance 
goals for fraud detection and prevention.

Proposals for Program Reform

  In order to enable FHA to fulfill its mission in today's changing 
marketplace, the Administration has introduced legislation that will 
give FHA the ability to respond to current challenges to homeownership 
among its traditional target borrowers: low and moderate-income first-
time homebuyers. FHA has already taken steps, within its current 
authority, to streamline its paperwork requirements and remove 
impediments to its use by lenders and buyers. However, additional 
reforms will enable it to expand homeownership opportunities to its 
target borrowers on an actuarially sound basis.
  To remove two large barriers to homeownership--having limited savings 
for a downpayment or impaired credit--the Administration again proposes 
new FHA mortgage products. These products will replace the current flat 
premium structure with one that varies with the risk of default as 
indicated by the percentage of downpayment to the loan amount or 
borrower credit quality. This will create more opportunities for 
potential homeowners who may face limited mortgage options. For example, 
first-time buyers with a strong credit record but little savings could 
finance a higher percent of the purchase than FHA currently allows. 
Alternatively, a borrower with a poor credit history could qualify for 
more favorable terms by accumulating savings for a larger downpayment.
  This flexible premium structure, which is tiered risk-based pricing, 
is a way to more fairly price the FHA guarantee to individual borrowers. 
It creates incentives (lower premium payments) for borrowers to take 
steps to improve their credit or save more for a downpayment. At the 
same time it eliminates the current incentive for higher risk borrowers 
to use FHA because they are undercharged relative to the risk they pose. 
FHA proposes to base its mortgage insurance premiums upon a borrower's 
consumer credit score from Fair, Isaac, and Company (FICO), and on the 
amount and source of downpayment (e.g., the borrower's own resources, 
relatives, employer, non-profit organization or public agency). Mortgage 
insurance premiums will be based on FHA's historical experience with 
similar borrowers. This change will decrease premiums for many of FHA's 
traditional borrowers, thereby increasing their access to homeownership.
  This price structure has many advantages. First, FHA will reflect a 
borrower's risk via the mortgage insurance premium, not through a higher 
interest rate as done in the subprime market. With mortgage insurance, 
borrowers will pay a market rate of interest, and, as a result, will 
incur lower monthly payments and lower total costs than if they paid a 
higher mortgage interest rate throughout the life of the loan. Second, 
by using this pricing structure, FHA will promote price transparency. 
Each borrower will know why they are paying the premium that they are 
being charged and will know how to lower their borrowing costs--i.e., by 
raising their FICO score or their downpayment. Third, risk-based pricing 
will allow FHA to review the performance of its programs annually in 
conjunction with the preparation of its credit subsidy estimates and 
adjust its premiums as necessary to assure the financial soundness of 
the MMI Fund.
  A reformed FHA will adhere to sound management practices that include 
a new framework of standards and incentives tied to principles of good 
credit program management. Further, the proposed reforms will better 
enable FHA to meet its objective of serving first-time and low-income 
home buyers by managing its risks more effectively.


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VA Housing Program

  The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) assists veterans, members of 
the Selected Reserve, and active duty personnel to purchase homes as 
recognition of their service to the Nation. The program substitutes the 
Federal guarantee for the borrower's down payment. In 2006, VA provided 
$23.5 billion in guarantees to assist 135,151 borrowers.
  Since the main purpose of this program is to help veterans, lending 
terms are more favorable than loans without a VA guarantee. In 
particular, VA guarantees zero downpayment loans. VA provided 90,399 
zero downpayment loans in 2006.
  To help veterans retain their homes and avoid the expense and damage 
to their credit resulting from foreclosure, VA intervenes aggressively 
to reduce the likelihood of foreclosures when loans are referred to VA 
after missing three payments. VA's successful actions resulted in 54 
percent of such delinquent loans avoiding foreclosure in 2006.

Rural Housing Service

  The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Housing Service (RHS) 
offers direct and guaranteed loans and grants to help very low- to 
moderate-income rural residents buy and maintain adequate, affordable 
housing. The single-family guaranteed loan program guarantees up to 90 
percent of a private loan for low- to moderate-income (115 percent of 
median income or less) rural residents. In 2006, nearly $4.3 billion in 
assistance was provided by RHS for homeownership loans and loan 
guarantees; $3.07 billion in guarantees went to more than 31,000 
households, of which 30 percent went to very low and low-income families 
(with income 80 percent or less than median area income).
  Additionally in 2006, Hurricane Supplemental loans and guarantees 
totaling $260 million allowed nearly 2,500 households to obtain homes. 
In addition, $19 million of low-interest loans and grants was used to 
repair more than 2,300 homes of families in need. In addition, RHS 
granted moratoriums on payments, and sheltered survivors in its 
inventory properties to provide relief.
  Historically, RHS has offered both direct and guaranteed homeownership 
loans. Beginning in 2008, RHS will only offer guaranteed loans. The 
budget provides no funding for the 502 direct single family housing loan 
program. The direction of Rural Development's single-family housing 
mortgage assistance over the last two decades has been towards 
guaranteed loans. The single-family housing guaranteed loan program was 
newly authorized in 1990 at $100 million and has grown into a $3 billion 
plus loan program annually, equaling that of the Veterans Affairs (VA) 
guaranteed housing loan program. Meanwhile the single-family direct loan 
program has been stagnant at approximately a $1 billion loan level.
  Solely utilizing guarantees for single-family housing mortgage is 
consistent with the other Federal homeownership programs. In fact, there 
are no Federal single family direct loan home ownership programs for 
urban areas. Furthermore, financial markets have become more efficient 
and increased the reach of mortgage credit to lower credit qualities and 
incomes. While some rural areas remain isolated from broad credit 
availability, these areas are shrinking as broadband internet access and 
correspondent lending grow. Therefore, relying on the private banking 
industry to provide this service, with a guarantee from the Federal 
government, is a more efficient way to deliver that assistance.
  To replace the loss of assistance to the very low- to low-income rural 
borrowers still seeking assistance for mortgage credit, the 
Administration expects to propose legislation to authorize a subsidized 
guaranteed single-family housing program.
  For the already established 502 guarantee programs in 2008, RHS will 
increase the guarantee fee on new loans to 3 percent from 2 percent. 
This allows the loans to be less costly for the Government without a 
significant additional burden to the borrowers, given that they can 
finance the fee as part of the loan. The guarantee fee for refinance 
loans remains 0.5 percent. Funding in 2008 is requested at an increased 
amount of $4.8 billion for purchase loans to compensate for no funding 
for direct loans.
  RHS also offers multifamily housing loans and guarantees to provide 
rural rental housing, including farm labor housing. The farm labor 
housing combined grant and loan level will provide $18 million in 2008 
for new construction as well as repair and rehabilitation. RHS also 
expects to be able to guarantee $200 million in multifamily housing 
construction loans for 2008. RHS will continue to propose funding and 
legislative changes to address the preservation issues surrounding the 
over 40-year old program. A long-term initiative has been developed to 
revitalize the 17,000-property portfolio. During 2008, $28 million will 
be directed to the revitalization initiative, primarily to assist 
existing residents in properties leaving the program. No funds are 
requested for the direct rural rental housing program because fixing the 
current portfolio is the first priority.
  RHS partnered with its multifamily program borrowers and made 
available all the vacant units in the loan portfolio to house evacuees 
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Costs were covered by an emergency 
allotment of rental assistance for a six-month period. Multifamily 
Programs instituted a number of waivers designed to ease the regulatory 
burden for housing evacuees on an emergency basis. RHS housed over 3,000 
families in RHS-financed housing

Government-Sponsored Enterprises in the Housing Market

  Homeownership has long been recognized as an important part of the 
American economy and part of the American dream. However, it has not 
always been within reach for the average American. During the Great 
Depression, housing markets were in turmoil. A typical mortgage required 
a downpayment of around 50 percent and a balloon payment of principal 
within a few years. Limitations in financial and communication 
technology

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and restrictions on financial institutions made it difficult for surplus 
funds in one part of the country to be shifted to other parts of the 
country to finance residential housing. Starting in 1932, the Congress 
responded by creating a series of entities and programs that together 
promoted the development of long-term, amortizing mortgages and 
facilitated the movement of capital to support housing finance.
  A key element of this response was the creation of the Federal Housing 
Administration in 1934. Another element was the establishment of several 
entities designed to develop secondary mortgage markets and to 
facilitate the movement of capital into housing finance. These entities, 
known today as Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), were chartered 
by the Congress with a public mission, and endowed with certain benefits 
that give them competitive advantages when compared with fully private 
companies.
  The Federal Home Loan Bank System, created in 1932, is comprised of 
twelve individual banks with shared liabilities. Together they lend 
money to financial institutions--mainly banks and thrifts--that are 
involved in mortgage financing to varying degrees, and they also finance 
some mortgages on their own balance sheets. The Federal National 
Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae, created in 1938, and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or Freddie Mac, created in 1970, were 
established to support the stability and liquidity of a secondary market 
for residential mortgage loans. Together these three GSEs currently are 
involved, in one form or another, with nearly one half of the $10-plus 
trillion residential mortgages outstanding in the U.S. today. Their 
market share peaked at 54 percent in 2003, after which management and 
internal control problems started to surface.
  As with other financial institutions, the Congress also established 
regulatory regimes to ensure the safety and soundness of the housing 
GSEs. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), 
established in 1992 as an independent agency within the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The 
Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), established in 1989, oversees the 
Federal Home Loan Bank system. Numerous reports and studies have pointed 
to various shortcomings with the current regulatory structure for the 
housing GSEs. The Administration is proposing to strengthen this 
structure and combine OFHEO and FHFB into a new regulator.

Mission

  The mission of the housing GSEs is to support certain aspects of the 
U.S. mortgage market. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's mission is to promote 
affordable housing, respond to private capital markets, and provide 
liquidity and stability to the secondary mortgage market. Currently, 
they engage in two major lines of business.

            1. Credit Guarantee Business--Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
          guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest on 
          mortgage-backed securities (MBS). They create MBS by either 
          buying and pooling whole mortgages or by entering into swap 
          arrangements with mortgage originators. Over time these MBS 
          held by the public have averaged about one-quarter of the U.S. 
          mortgage market.

            2. Mortgage Investment Business--Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
          manage retained mortgage portfolios composed of their own MBS, 
          MBS issued by others, and whole mortgages. As of June 30, 
          2006, these retained mortgages totaled $1.4 trillion. Given 
          Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's serious accounting, internal 
          control, risk management, and systems problems, the growth of 
          these portfolios is temporarily constrained through consent 
          agreements with OFHEO.

  The mission of the Federal Home Loan Bank System is broadly defined as 
housing finance, and the System also has specific requirements to 
support affordable housing. The Federal Home Loan Banks have not grown 
mortgage asset portfolios as large as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Their 
principal business remains lending to regulated depository institutions 
and insurance companies engaged in residential mortgage finance to 
varying degrees.

Risks That GSEs Face and Cause

  Like other financial institutions, the GSEs face a full range of 
risks, including market (interest rate) risk, credit risk, and 
operational risk. Several of the Federal Home Loan Banks and Fannie Mae 
have faced serious market risks due to inadequate hedging. More 
recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have faced serious operational 
risk. Due to earnings manipulation, poor accounting systems, lack of 
proper controls, lack of proper risk management, and misapplication of 
accounting principles, earnings at Fannie Mae were misstated by $6.3 
billion through June of 2004, and at Freddie Mac by $5.0 billion through 
December of 2002.
  The GSEs also pose risks to the financial system. Systemic risk is the 
risk that unanticipated problems at a financial institution or group of 
institutions could lead to problems more widely in the financial system 
or economy--the risk that a small problem could multiply to a point 
where it could jeopardize the country's economic well-being. The 
particular systemic risk posed by the GSEs is the risk that a 
miscalculation, failure of controls, or other unexpected event at one 
company could unsettle not only the mortgage and mortgage finance 
markets but other vital parts of the financial system and economy. To 
understand this risk, one must understand the interdependencies among 
the GSEs and other market participants in the financial system and the 
lack of market discipline imposed on the GSEs because investors perceive 
that the GSEs are implicitly backed by the U.S. Government.
  The GSEs are among the largest borrowers in the world. As of September 
2006 their combined debt and guaranteed MBS totaled $5.2 trillion, 
higher than the total publicly held debt of the United States. The inves

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tors in GSE debt include thousands of banks, institutional investors 
such as insurance companies, pension funds, and foreign governments, and 
millions of individuals through mutual funds and 401k investments. Based 
on the prices paid by these investors, they act as if the Federal 
Government guarantees GSE debt. In fact, there is no such guarantee or 
Federal backing of GSE debt.
  Because investors act as if there is an ``implicit guarantee'' by the 
Federal Government to back GSE debt, investors on average lend their 
money to the GSEs at interest rates roughly 30 to 40 basis points less 
($300-$400 less per year for every $100,000 borrowed) than to other 
highly rated privately held companies. In addition, investors do not 
demand the same financial disclosures as for other privately owned 
companies. Neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac currently file quarterly 
earnings reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, though 
Fannie Mae is required to and Freddie Mac volunteered to. Yet there has 
been no significant impact on the pricing of GSE debt securities. This 
lack of market discipline facilitates the growth of the GSE asset 
portfolios, thereby increasing systemic risk.

Retained Asset Portfolios Have Significantly Grown While Achieving 
Little for the GSEs' Housing Mission

  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have used their funding advantage to amass 
large retained asset portfolios. Together these GSEs have more than $1.5 
trillion in debt outstanding, almost entirely for the purpose of funding 
these portfolios. From 1990 through 2005, the GSEs' competitive funding 
advantage enabled them to increase their portfolios of mortgage assets 
ten-fold, which far exceeds the growth of the overall mortgage market. 
Due to the risks associated with the portfolios, the Administration is 
proposing that the new regulatory structure empower the regulator to 
address and mitigate these risks.
  As chart 7-1 shows, almost 54 percent of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's 
combined retained mortgage portfolio at the end of 2005 was comprised of 
holdings of their own guaranteed MBS, which could easily be sold.

                                     


  The function of these portfolio holdings is largely to increase 
profits, not facilitate affordable housing. In 1992, the Congress 
broadened Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's mission to include promoting 
affordable housing. To measure this performance, the Congress mandated 
that HUD establish three affordable housing goal targets that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac must meet each year. HUD has also implemented home 
purchase subgoals to encourage homeownership opportunities for first-
time homeowners and minority homeowners. Given that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have a mission to help more families achieve homeownership 
as well as to expand rental opportunities, their retained portfolios 
should be tied to that mission. However, currently only about 30 percent 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's retained portfolio holdings would be 
eligible to qualify for any of the affordable housing goals. About half 
of the MBS issued by others and whole loans qualify toward their 
affordable housing goals. Their performance under the housing goals over 
time indicate that Fannie

[[Page 75]]

Mae and Freddie Mac should be doing more to help mission-targeted 
families achieve homeownership or acquire affordable rental housing.

Debt Issuance Subject to Treasury Approval

  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fund their portfolios by issuing debt, and 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury has the responsibility to review and 
approve these GSEs' debt-issuances. The Treasury Department's debt 
approval authority is contained in Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's 
Charter Acts, and the Department has approved Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac's debt on a regular basis. Treasury is developing a more formalized 
approach to their debt approval authority. As part of that approach, 
Treasury is developing new debt approval procedures to enhance the 
clarity, transparency, standardization, and documentation of Fannie 
Mae's and Freddie Mac's debt issuances.

Thin Capital Cushions Need Reform

  The risks of the GSEs' large portfolios are exacerbated because they 
are not required to hold cushions of capital against potential losses 
comparable to the capital requirements for other large financial 
institutions. Where commercial banks that are part of a financial 
holding company must hold a 5 percent capital-to-total assets cushion, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's requirement is half that, while FHLB's is 4 
percent. The risk-based capital requirements for the GSEs also differ 
dramatically from those applicable to commercial banks. This highlights 
an important shortcoming of the statutory framework governing Federal 
oversight of the GSEs. The minimum capital and risk-based capital rules 
for the GSEs were written into law in 1992. Much has changed since then 
with regard to financial risk analysis, risk modeling, and capital 
requirements for comparable financial institutions. The reforms proposed 
by the Administration would repeal the statutory risk-based capital 
stress test, and would provide the new GSE regulator with the authority 
and flexibility to establish new risk-based capital requirements for the 
GSEs to help ensure that they operate with sufficient capital and 
reserves to support the risks that arise in the operations and 
management of each enterprise. A world-class regulator needs the 
flexibility and authority to change both the risk-based and minimum 
capital requirements without undue restriction in response to changing 
conditions.
  Although the GSEs' mortgage investments are of relatively low default 
risk, other types of risk in the GSEs' asset portfolios are substantial. 
Mortgage portfolios carry considerable interest-rate risk, partly 
because of the risk that homeowners may prepay their mortgages through 
refinancing or home sales. This risk can be mitigated--for example, 
through purchase of interest-rate hedges--but the GSEs protect 
themselves against only some of the interest rate risk of their 
portfolios. Moreover, hedges are imperfect because predicting interest-
rate movements and mortgage refinancing activity is difficult. As GSE 
asset portfolios have grown in size, the GSEs' participation in the 
market for hedging instruments has become dominant enough to cause 
interest rate spikes in the event that a GSE needs to make large and 
sudden adjustments to its hedging position.

New Activities and Technological Development Require Oversight

  Over the last decade, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have begun engaging 
in a wide range of new activities that were not anticipated when their 
charters were written. To address these changes, HUD developed a new 
activity review initiative under its general regulatory authority. HUD 
has reviewed a number of business initiatives at Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, including international activities; partnership offices; senior 
housing; skilled nursing facilities; employer assisted housing plans; 
third party real-estate-owned programs; Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (CMBS); Asset-Backed Securities (ABS); multifamily variable-
rate bond certificates; and whole loan REMICs. HUD concluded that some 
of these activities were not authorized. For example, HUD's review of 
the GSEs' Commercial MBS programs resulted in OFHEO seeking Freddie 
Mac's divestiture of certain CMBS holdings, and HUD ordered Fannie Mae 
to end its third party Real-Estate-Owned program based on its review. In 
2007, HUD will complete a Financial Activities Review that will provide 
a baseline of information on Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's business and 
program activities. As part of this review, HUD will examine specific 
transactions to determine whether they are consistent with Fannie Mae's 
and Freddie Mac's charter authorities. The Administration proposes to 
move this authority to the new regulator.
  Because of their enormous presence in the secondary market, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac are able to exert significant leverage in the primary 
mortgage market. First, their unparalleled size in the residential 
mortgage market gives the GSEs a unique level of access to market 
information. The applicability of that information to the management of 
mortgage risk gives them a competitive edge in the development of new 
technology that can change relationships between primary market 
participants as well as the distribution of economic returns between the 
primary and secondary markets. Second, their funding advantage enables 
the GSEs to borrow at reduced rates in order to make investments in new 
areas at below-market prices, thus discouraging competition while 
gaining experience in those areas.
  Through the development and delivery of new technology to the industry 
and by leveraging their funding advantage, there is potential for the 
GSEs to expand their business beyond the limitations of their Charter 
Acts, which prohibits both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from originating 
mortgages. Loan origination is the central function of the primary 
mortgage market, and the GSEs' charter acts clearly restrict them to the 
secondary mortgage market. However, technological advancements have 
blurred the line that defines where

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the primary market ends and the secondary market begins. A new level of 
clarity is required to establish the permissible activities under the 
Enterprises' charter acts, including the development of intellectual 
property.

New Regulatory Authority

  The Administration continues to support broad reform of the GSE 
supervisory system. In particular, the Administration supports 
establishing a new regulator for all three of the housing GSEs that 
would combine safety and soundness authority with oversight of their 
respective housing missions. The new regulator must have enhanced powers 
comparable to those of other world-class financial regulators, 
including, among others, the ability to put a GSE into receivership 
should it fail, authority to establish and adjust appropriate capital 
standards, and new product authority. A new regulator must also have 
clear authority to address and mitigate the risks posed by the GSEs' 
retained portfolios. Finally, a new regulatory structure must ensure 
that the GSEs are adhering to their affordable housing mission.

                        Education Credit Programs

  The Federal Government guarantees loans through intermediary agencies 
and makes direct loans to students to encourage postsecondary education 
enrollment. The Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), created 
in 1972 as a GSE to develop the secondary market for guaranteed student 
loans, was privatized in 2004.
  The Department of Education helps finance student loans through two 
major programs: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program and the 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Student Loan (Direct Loan) program. 
Eligible institutions of higher education may participate in one or both 
programs. Loans are available to students regardless of income. However, 
borrowers with low family incomes are eligible for loans with additional 
interest subsidies. For low-income borrowers, the Federal Government 
subsidizes loan interest costs while borrowers are in school, during a 
six-month grace period after graduation, and during certain deferment 
periods.
  The FFEL program provides loans through an administrative structure 
involving over 3,600 lenders, 35 State and private guaranty agencies, 
and over 5,000 participating schools. In the FFEL program, banks and 
other eligible lenders loan private capital to students and parents, 
guaranty agencies insure the loans, and the Federal Government reinsures 
the loans against borrower default. Lenders bear three percent of the 
default risk, and the Federal Government is responsible for the 
remainder. The Department also makes administrative payments to guaranty 
agencies and, at certain times, pays interest subsidies on behalf of 
borrowers to lenders.
  The William D. Ford Direct Student Loan program was authorized by the 
Student Loan Reform Act of 1993. Under the Direct Loan program, the 
Federal Government provides loan capital directly to nearly 1,100 
schools, which then disburse loan funds to students. The program offers 
a variety of flexible repayment plans including income-contingent 
repayment, under which annual repayment amounts vary based on the income 
of the borrower and payments can be made over 25 years with any residual 
balances forgiven.
  In 2006, the Congress passed reconciliation legislation reducing 
excess subsidies in the FFEL program and helping to make both programs 
more effective. The reforms included a reduction in the percentage of 
Federal guarantee provided against default in recognition of the strong 
repayment record for student loans today and an elimination of 
unnecessary and costly loan subsidy provisions that allowed some loan 
holders to have exorbitant financial returns on loans funded through 
tax-exempt securities. In recognition of the fact that federal subsidies 
remain higher than necessary to ensure that loans are available to 
students in this profitable and competitive market, the 2008 Budget 
proposes to reduce interest subsidies paid to FFEL lenders by 50 basis 
points. The 2008 Budget also proposes to reduce default insurance from 
97 percent to 95 percent, and increase the origination fee lenders pay 
on consolidation loans. To rationalize federal subsidies to guaranty 
agencies, the Administration proposes to shift the basis of account 
maintenance fee payments from the balance of loans guaranteed to a cost-
per-unit formula, and reduce the amount guaranty agencies can retain on 
the defaulted loans they collect. These savings will be used to provide 
significant benefits to students such as raising the Pell Grant maximum 
award to $5,400, increasing Academic Competitiveness Grant awards by 50 
percent, and offering higher loan limits.

         Business and Rural Development Credit Programs and GSEs

  The Federal Government guarantees small business loans to promote 
entrepreneurship. The Government also offers direct loans and loan 
guarantees to farmers who may have difficulty obtaining credit elsewhere 
and to rural communities that need to develop and maintain 
infrastructure. Two GSEs, the Farm Credit System and the Federal 
Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, increase liquidity in the 
agricultural lending market.

Small Business Administration

  The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps entrepreneurs start, 
sustain, and grow small businesses. As a ``gap lender`` SBA works to 
supplement market lending and provide access to credit where private 
lenders are reluctant to do so without a Government guarantee. 
Additionally, SBA helps home and business-owners, as well as renters, 
cover the uninsured costs of recovery from disasters through its direct 
loan program.
  The 2008 Budget requests $464 million, including administrative funds, 
for SBA to leverage more than $29 billion in financing for small 
businesses and disaster victims. The 7(a) General Business Loan program 
will support $17.5 billion in guaranteed loans while the 504

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Certified Development Company program will support $7.5 billion in 
guaranteed loans for fixed-asset financing. SBA will supplement the 
capital of Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs) with $3 billion 
in long-term, guaranteed loans for venture capital investments in small 
businesses. At the end of 2006, the outstanding balance of business 
loans totaled $67 billion.
  SBA seeks to target assistance more effectively to credit-worthy 
borrowers who would not be well-served by the commercial markets in the 
absence of a Government guarantee to cover defaults. SBA is actively 
encouraging financial institutions to increase lending to start-up 
firms, low-income entrepreneurs, and borrowers in search of financing 
below $150,000. SBA's outreach for the 7(a) program has been successful: 
Average loan size has decreased from about $230,000 in 2001 to $152,000 
in 2006, while the annual number of new loans has grown from 43,000 to 
over 90,000 during the same time period.
  During the past few years, SBA has implemented several initiatives to 
streamline operations by increasingly delegating responsibilities to 
lenders and centralizing operations while managing and mitigating risk. 
In 2003, SBA implemented a state-of-the-art Lender Loan Monitoring 
System (LLMS) under the newly formed Office of Lender Oversight. This 
office uses LLMS to evaluate individual SBA lenders by tracking the 
expected risk of SBA guaranteed loans in their portfolios relative to 
expected performance of those loans. The office employs a variety of 
analytical techniques to ensure sound financial management by SBA and to 
hold lending partners accountable for performance. These techniques 
include portfolio performance analysis, selected lender risk reviews, 
credit scoring to compare lenders' performance, and industry 
concentration analysis. Starting in FY 2004, SBA began consolidating its 
loan making, servicing and liquidating functions from 69 District 
Offices into several combined centers. Consolidation has reduced costs, 
increased timeliness of processing, and standardized how loans are 
handled. In 2006, SBA completed the elimination of its several billion 
dollar backlog of loan liquidations resulting from defaulted guarantees. 
In 2007, SBA is working with contractor support to identify additional 
processes that could be reengineered to reduce costs, improve quality, 
and expedite processing.
  To address major challenges in making and disbursing loans resulting 
from the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA initiated the Accelerated 
Disaster Response Initiative to identify and implement process 
improvements to quicken the delivery of disaster assistance. As a result 
of customer feedback and analysis of best business practices, SBA 
piloted a case management approach. Using case management, in which a 
team of SBA staff work with a borrower from initial application through 
loan disbursement, SBA can better serve disaster applicants and monitor 
the processing of loans. SBA has also implemented numerous productivity 
metrics to track the status of loans in processing and identify areas 
that require management intervention or additional resources.
  By 2008, SBA expects to implement an Internet-based loan application 
system that will facilitate the collection of data from disaster victims 
and speed processing. This investment complements investments that SBA 
made through 2006 in the Disaster Credit Management System.
  The Budget proposes to build upon the success of the zero-subsidy 7(a) 
program by making the Microloan program self-financing through modest 
increases to the interest rate paid by program intermediaries. The 
Administration is also proposing authorizing legislation to enable the 
secondary market guarantee (SMG) program to charge nominal fees on 
lenders seeking to pool loans; fees are expected to be less than or 
comparable to fees in other secondary market programs and will help 
stabilize the program from the need to make frequent administrative 
changes.

USDA Rural Infrastructure and Business Development Programs

  USDA provides grants, loans, and loan guarantees to communities for 
constructing facilities such as health-care clinics, day-care centers, 
and water systems. Direct loans are available at lower interest rates 
for the poorest communities. These programs have very low default rates. 
The cost associated with them is due primarily to subsidized interest 
rates that are below the prevailing Treasury rates.
  The program level for the Water and Wastewater (W&W) treatment 
facility loan and grant program in this Budget is $1.5 billion. These 
funds are available to communities of 10,000 or fewer residents. The 
Budget reflects a significant change in the method for determining the 
interest rate charged on such loans, from a three-tiered structure 
(poverty, intermediate, and market) depending on community income to an 
interest rate that is 60 percent of the market rate not to exceed five 
percent. This change is expected to reduce the loan repayment costs 
substantially for most communities, at a lower loan to grant ratio. The 
Community Facility Program is targeted to rural communities with fewer 
than 20,000 residents. It will have a program level of $512 million in 
2008.
  USDA also provides grants, direct loans, and loan guarantees to assist 
rural businesses, including cooperatives, and to increase employment and 
diversify the rural economy. In 2008, USDA proposes to provide $1 
billion in loan guarantees to rural businesses that serve communities of 
50,000 or less. USDA also provides rural business loans through the 
Intermediary Relending Program (IRP), which provides loan funds at a one 
percent interest rate to an intermediary, such as a State or local 
government agency that, in turn, provides funds for economic and 
community development projects in rural areas. Overall, USDA expects to 
retain or create 38,795 jobs in 2008 through its Business and Industry 
guarantee and the IRP loan programs.


[[Page 78]]


Electric and Telecommunications Loans

  USDA's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) programs provide loans for rural 
electrification, telecommunications, distance learning, telemedicine, 
and broadband, and also provide grants for distance learning and 
telemedicine (DLT).
  The Budget includes $4.1 billion in direct electric loans for 
distribution, transmission, and modification of existing generation 
facilities, $690 million in direct telecommunications loans, $300 
million in broadband loans, and $25 million in DLT grants.
  Since 1992, RUS electric loans have been used primarily to finance 
transmission, distribution, and upgrades to generation facilities. 
During this time, generation has been deregulated and has become a more 
commercial operation. With the increased needs for all aspects of 
electricity provision and to ensure adequate funding for rural areas, 
RUS loans will continue to focus on transmission, distribution, and 
upgrading generation facilities. Construction of new generation 
facilities should be financed through the commercial market.
  The Rural Telephone Bank successfully dissolved in FY2006. All stock 
was redeemed during 2006. Loans approved in prior years, but not 
disbursed are still available for borrowers.

Loans to Farmers

  The Farm Service Agency (FSA) assists low-income family farmers in 
starting and maintaining viable farming operations. Emphasis is placed 
on aiding beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers. FSA offers 
operating loans and ownership loans, both of which may be either direct 
or guaranteed loans. Operating loans provide credit to farmers and 
ranchers for annual production expenses and purchases of livestock, 
machinery, and equipment. Farm ownership loans assist producers in 
acquiring and developing their farming or ranching operations. As a 
condition of eligibility for direct loans, borrowers must be unable to 
obtain private credit at reasonable rates and terms. As FSA is the 
``lender of last resort,'' default rates on FSA direct loans are 
generally higher than those on private-sector loans. However, in recent 
years the loss rate has decreased to 2.9 percent in 2006, compared to 
3.1 percent in 2005. FSA-guaranteed farm loans are made to more 
creditworthy borrowers who have access to private credit markets. 
Because the private loan originators must retain 10 percent of the risk, 
they exercise care in examining the repayment ability of borrowers. As a 
result, losses on guaranteed farm loans remain low with default rates of 
0.4 percent in 2006, as compared to 0.45 percent in 2005. The subsidy 
rates for these programs have been fluctuating over the past several 
years. These fluctuations are mainly due to the interest component of 
the subsidy rate.
  In 2006, FSA provided loans and loan guarantees to approximately 
27,730 family farmers totaling $3.15 billion. The number of loans 
provided by these programs has fluctuated over the past several years. 
The average size for farm ownership loans has been increasing. The 
majority of assistance provided in the operating loan program is to 
existing FSA farm borrowers. In the farm ownership program, new 
customers receive the bulk of the benefits furnished. In 2008, FSA 
proposes to make $3.4 billion in direct and guaranteed loans through 
discretionary programs.
  FSA uses the Farm Business Plan (FBP) to perform financial planning, 
analysis, and management of the loan portfolio. Several enhancements of 
the web equity FBP were put into service in 2006. These include a youth 
loan credit action and availability of additional reports. In 2007, the 
FBP will be modified to enable credit reports to be ordered on 
applicants to expedite application processing. FSA is continuing its 
comprehensive project to streamline all farm loan program regulations, 
handbooks, and information collections. This is a major effort to 
streamline the program and reduce the burden for both applicants and the 
Agency, resulting in an improvement in loan processing efficiencies.

The Farm Credit System and Farmer Mac

  The Farm Credit System (FCS or System) and the Federal Agricultural 
Mortgage Corporation (FarmerMac) are Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
(GSEs) that enhance credit availability for the agricultural sector. The 
FCS provides production, equipment, and mortgage lending to farmers and 
ranchers, aquatic producers, their cooperatives, related businesses, and 
rural homeowners, while Farmer Mac provides a secondary market for 
agricultural real estate and rural housing mortgages.

The Farm Credit System

  The financial condition of the System's banks and associations remain 
sound. The ratio of capital to assets decreased to 15.7 percent as of 
September 30, 2006 from 16.8 percent for the same period ended in 2005 
as asset growth outpaced capital growth. As of September 30, 2006, 
capital consisted of $2.2 billion in restricted capital held by the Farm 
Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC) and $22.0 billion of 
unrestricted capital--a record level. Nonperforming loans decreased, and 
earnings increased, although rising short-term interest rates and 
competitive conditions compressed interest margins. The examinations by 
the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), the System's Federal regulator, 
also show the strong financial condition of FCS institutions. As of 
September 2006, all FCS institutions had one of the top two examination 
ratings (1 or 2 in a 1-5 scale). Assets grew at a brisk pace (9.5 
percent annual rate) over the past four years, while the number of FCS 
institutions decreased due to consolidation. In September 2002, there 
were seven banks and 104 associations; by September 2006, there were 
five banks and 96 associations.
  The FCSIC ensures the timely payment of principal and interest on FCS 
obligations. FCSIC manages the Insurance Fund which supplements the 
System's capital and the joint and several liability of the System 
banks. As of September 30, 2006, the assets in the

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Insurance Fund totaled $2.243 billion. Of that amount $40 million was 
allocated to the Allocated Insurance Reserve Accounts (AIRAs). As of 
September 30, 2006, the Insurance Fund as a percentage of adjusted 
insured debt was 1.78 percent in the unallocated Insurance Fund and 1.81 
percent including the AIRAs. This was below the Secure Base target of 2 
percent. During 2006, growth in System debt outpaced the capitalization 
of the Insurance Fund that occurs through investment earnings and the 
accrual of premiums.
  Over the 12 month period, ending September 30, 2006, the System's 
loans outstanding grew by $12.6 billion, or 12.3 percent, while over the 
past three years they grew by $24.6 billion, or 26.9 percent. As 
required by law, borrowers are also stockholder owners of System banks 
and associations. As of September 30, 2006, the System had 459,635 
stockholders. Loans to young, beginning, and small farmers and ranchers 
represented 12.3, 19.4, and 29.2 percent, respectively, of the total 
dollar volume of farm loans outstanding at the end of 2005. The 
percentage of loans to beginning farmers increased in 2005, while 
percentages to young and small farmers were slightly lower. Young, 
beginning, and small farmers are not mutually exclusive groups, and 
thus, cannot be added across categories. Providing credit and related 
services to young, beginning, and small farmers and ranchers is a 
legislative mandate and a high priority for the System.
  The System, while continuing to record strong earnings and capital 
growth, remains exposed to a variety of risks associated with its 
portfolio concentration on agriculture and rural America. While this 
sector is currently healthy, it is subject to risk due to rapidly rising 
farm real estate prices, volatile commodity prices and input costs, 
uncertainty regarding changes in government farm policy and trade 
agreements, weather-related catastrophes, animal and plant diseases, and 
off-farm employment opportunities.

Farmer Mac

  Farmer Mac was established in 1988 to facilitate a secondary market 
for farm real estate and rural housing loans. The Farm Credit System 
Reform Act of 1996 expanded Farmer Mac's role from a guarantor of 
securities backed by loan pools to a direct purchaser of mortgages, 
enabling it to form pools to securitize. This change increased Farmer 
Mac's ability to provide liquidity to agricultural mortgage lenders.
  Farmer Mac continues to meet core capital and regulatory risk-based 
capital requirements. Farmer Mac's total program activity (loans 
purchased and guaranteed, AgVantage bond assets, and real estate owned) 
as of September 30, 2006, totaled $7.1 billion. That volume represents 
an increase of 38 percent from program activity at September 30, 2005. 
Of total program activity, $2.1 billion were on-balance sheet loans and 
agricultural mortgage-backed securities, and $5.0 billion were off-
balance sheet obligations. Total assets were $4.9 billion at the close 
of the third quarter, with nonprogram investments accounting for $2.7 
billion of those assets. Farmer Mac's net income for first three 
quarters of 2006 was $23.9 million, a decrease of 39 percent from 
restated amounts for the same period in 2005.
  In November 2006, Farmer Mac restated its financial results for 2005 
and other periods to remove the impact of accounting for derivatives as 
hedges against interest rate movements. As a result, there could be 
significant fluctuation in net income in future periods. However, Farmer 
Mac does not expect the accounting change to impact its ability to carry 
out its business plans or have any effect on its business model.

                      International Credit Programs

  Seven Federal agencies--the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of the 
Treasury, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-
Import Bank, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)--
provide direct loans, loan guarantees, and insurance to a variety of 
foreign private and sovereign borrowers. These programs are intended to 
level the playing field for U.S. exporters, deliver robust support for 
U.S. manufactured goods, stabilize international financial markets, and 
promote sustainable development.

Leveling the Playing Field

  Federal export credit programs counter subsidies that foreign 
governments, largely in Europe and Japan, provide their exporters, 
usually through export credit agencies (ECAs). The U.S. Government has 
worked since the 1970's to constrain official credit support through a 
multilateral agreement in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). This agreement has significantly constrained direct 
interest rate subsidies and tied-aid grants. Further negotiations 
resulted in a multilateral agreement that standardized the fees for 
sovereign lending across all ECAs beginning in April 1999. Fees for non-
sovereign lending, however, continue to vary widely across ECAs and 
markets, thereby providing implicit subsidies.
  The Export-Import Bank attempts to ``level the playing field'' 
strategically and to fill gaps in the availability of private export 
credit. The Export-Import Bank provides export credits, in the form of 
direct loans or loan guarantees, to U.S. exporters who meet basic 
eligibility criteria and who request the Bank's assistance. USDA's 
Export Credit Guarantee Programs (also known as GSM programs) similarly 
help to level the playing field. Like programs of other agricultural 
exporting nations, GSM programs guarantee payment from countries and 
entities that want to import U.S. agricultural products but cannot 
easily obtain credit.

Stabilizing International Financial Markets

  In today's global economy, the health and prosperity of the American 
economy depend importantly on the stability of the global financial 
system and the economic health of our major trading partners. The United 
States can contribute to orderly exchange arrangements and

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a stable system of exchange rates through the International Monetary 
Fund and through financial support provided by the Exchange 
Stabilization Fund (ESF).
  The ESF may provide ``bridge loans'' to other countries in times of 
short-term liquidity problems and financial crises. A loan or credit may 
not be made for more than six months in any 12-month period unless the 
President gives the Congress a written statement that unique or 
emergency circumstances require the loan or credit be for more than six 
months.

Using Credit to Promote Sustainable Development

  Credit is an important tool in U.S. bilateral assistance to promote 
sustainable development. USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) 
allows USAID to use a variety of credit tools to support its development 
activities abroad. DCA provides non-sovereign loan guarantees in 
targeted cases where credit serves more effectively than traditional 
grant mechanisms to achieve sustainable development. DCA is intended to 
mobilize host country private capital to finance sustainable development 
in line with USAID's strategic objectives. Through the use of partial 
loan guarantees and risk sharing with the private sector, DCA stimulates 
private-sector lending for financially viable development projects, 
thereby leveraging host-country capital and strengthening sub-national 
capital markets in the developing world. While there is clear demand for 
DCA's facilities in some emerging economies, the utilization rate for 
these facilities is still very low.
  OPIC also supports a mix of development, employment, and export goals 
by promoting U.S. direct investment in developing countries. OPIC 
pursues these goals through political risk insurance, direct loans, and 
guarantee products, which provide finance, as well as associated skills 
and technology transfers. These programs are intended to create more 
efficient financial markets, eventually encouraging the private sector 
to supplant OPIC finance in developing countries. OPIC has also created 
a number of investment funds that provide equity to local companies with 
strong development potential.

Ongoing Coordination

  International credit programs are coordinated through two groups to 
ensure consistency in policy design and credit implementation. The Trade 
Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC) works within the Administration 
to develop a National Export Strategy to make the delivery of trade 
promotion support more effective and convenient for U.S. exporters.
  The Interagency Country Risk Assessment System (ICRAS) standardizes 
the way in which agencies budget for the cost associated with the risk 
of international lending. The cost of lending by the agencies is 
governed by proprietary U.S. Government ratings, which correspond to a 
set of default estimates over a given maturity. The methodology 
establishes assumptions about default risks in international lending 
using averages of international sovereign bond market data. The strength 
of this method is its link to the market and an annual update that 
adjusts the default estimates to reflect the most recent risks observed 
in the market.

Self-Sufficient Export-Import Bank

  The Budget estimates that the Bank's export credit support will total 
$18.7 billion, and will be funded entirely by receipts collected from 
the Bank's customers. The Bank estimates it will collect $146 million in 
2008 in excess of expected losses on transactions authorized in 2008 and 
prior years. These amounts will be used to: (1) cover the estimated 
costs for that portion of new authorizations where fees are insufficient 
to cover expected losses; and (2) to cover administrative expenses.

                         IV. INSURANCE PROGRAMS

                            Deposit Insurance

  Federal deposit insurance promotes stability in the U.S. financial 
system. Prior to the establishment of Federal deposit insurance, 
failures of some depository institutions often caused depositors to lose 
confidence in the banking system and rush to withdraw deposits. Such 
sudden withdrawals caused serious disruption to the economy. In 1933, in 
the midst of the Depression, the system of Federal deposit insurance was 
established to protect small depositors and prevent bank failures from 
causing widespread disruption in financial markets. Since its creation, 
the system has undergone a series of reforms, most recently in 2006.
  While the deposit insurance system for banks and thrifts today is 
generally sound and well managed, inherent weaknesses in the system 
prompted the Administration to propose, and the Congress to enact, the 
Deposit Insurance Reform Act (part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005) 
in February 2006. This package of reforms had several effects: it 
consolidated the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) 
insurance funds (the Bank Insurance Fund and Savings Association 
Insurance Fund) into a new Deposit Insurance Fund, set new parameters on 
how the consolidated fund would be managed, adjusted the way that 
premiums for deposit insurance were calculated to ensure that all banks 
would pay premiums for Federal insurance on their insured deposits, and 
allowed for an increase of the coverage limits for Federal deposit 
insurance. These new authorities allow the FDIC to better manage the 
Deposit Insurance Fund and help avoid strain on financial institutions 
by spreading the cost of deposit insurance over time instead of having a 
potential for sharp premium increases when the economy may be under 
stress. The FDIC issued several new regulations during 2006 to implement 
the reforms in 2007.

[[Page 81]]

  The FDIC insures deposits in banks and savings associations (thrifts). 
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) insures deposits 
(shares) in most credit unions (certain credit unions are privately 
insured). FDIC and NCUA insure deposits up to $100,000 per account. 
Under the Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, the deposit insurance 
ceiling for retirement accounts will be increased to $250,000. In 
addition, beginning in 2010, and every five years thereafter, FDIC and 
NCUA will have the authority to increase deposit insurance coverage 
limits for retirement and non-retirement accounts based on inflation if 
the Boards of the FDIC and NCUA determine such an increase is warranted. 
As of September 30, 2006, FDIC insured $4.1 trillion of deposits at 
8,743 commercial banks and thrifts, and NCUA insured $529 billion of 
deposits (shares) at 8,462 credit unions.

Current Industry Conditions

  The banking and thrift sector has been in the midst of a sustained run 
of record profits and strong balance sheets. During calendar year 2006, 
insured banks and thrifts continued to report record-high net earnings, 
with the industry's two highest-ever quarterly profits reported in the 
second and third quarters of 2006. In 2005 and 2006, no banks or thrifts 
failed--the longest period without a failure in the 73-year history of 
the FDIC. As of September 30, 2006, the FDIC classified 47 institutions 
with $4 billion in assets as ``problem institutions'' (institutions with 
the highest risk ratings), a historical low both in the number of 
institutions and dollar-value of assets thus classified.
  Despite these strong fundamentals, some risks remain. In particular, 
the residential real estate market has been showing signs of significant 
weakness in recent months, with several regional markets experiencing 
slower sales and stagnant or even falling property prices. According to 
the National Association of Realtors, U.S. median house prices stayed 
essentially flat during the second half of 2006, after four and half 
years when growth rates nationwide exceeded five percent. In addition, 
after the steady series of interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve in 
2005 and 2006, higher short-term interest rates are beginning to squeeze 
the interest margins of many banks (The interest margin is the 
difference between the interest rates the banks charge for loans and the 
interest rates that they pay to depositors).
   This tightening has begun to erode the proceeds from banks' core 
business. Not only are higher interest rates squeezing banks, they are 
also squeezing borrowers. During the past few years, banks have issued 
an increasing number of non-traditional mortgages, i.e., loans that have 
adjustable payment terms that allow borrowers to have lower initial 
payments, while their overall debt burden stays constant or even 
increases. Studies have suggested that in the first half of 2006, as 
many as 30 percent of mortgages issued nationally were non-traditional. 
Federal regulators, including the Federal Reserve, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), 
and FDIC, and industry analysts have been vocal in highlighting the 
spread of non-traditional lending products, and warned lenders and 
borrowers about the additional risks these products can pose if not 
properly managed. The regulators have raised these issues in testimony 
before Congress and in a variety of public forums, including guidance 
issued to the industry.
  The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has reported that, as 
competition in lending has intensified, banks have been easing their 
standards for extending loans to individuals and businesses. This has 
led to concerns about maintaining credit quality in the nation's lending 
markets. Separate, but related concerns have arisen in the area of 
``subprime'' lending--loans to consumers with poor credit histories or 
who belong to groups that may not have previously had access to 
financing. This segment of the market has seen substantial growth in 
recent years, providing greater opportunity to these borrowers, but 
loans to subprime borrowers historically have higher rates of default. 
Although lenders charge higher rates of interest to subprime borrowers 
to compensate for the risk of default, with increased competition the 
spread (or additional interest charged) on subprime lending has fallen 
and may not fully cover the potential risk.
  In order to address some of these potential problems, especially in 
non-traditional mortgages and easing lending standards, during 2006 the 
Federal banking regulators (the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the FDIC, the OCC, and the OTS) issued guidance to banks 
and thrifts on managing exposure to non-traditional mortgages, and on 
the appropriate disclosure to consumers of clear and balanced 
information about the risks of these products. The regulators also 
issued guidance on commercial real estate which sought to mitigate 
potential problems with rising concentrations of lending in commercial 
real estate, an issue of regulatory concern in a number of smaller and 
mid-sized community banks.
  Also worthy of note is the increasing consolidation of the U.S. 
banking industry in recent years. As banks have merged or been acquired, 
the largest institutions have accounted for a growing share of total 
assets--whereas in 1984 depository institutions with over $10 billion in 
assets accounted for 42 percent of total assets in the industry, by 2004 
the share of those institutions had risen to 73 percent. This has 
enabled larger banks and other institutions to diversify more 
effectively and obtain financing from the capital markets, but it has 
also meant that the failure of a single large insured institution could 
put a significant strain on the resources of the Federal deposit 
insurance funds.

Recent Changes to Federal Deposit Insurance Funds

  Under the Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, the FDIC's Bank 
Insurance Fund (BIF) and its Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) 
were merged into the new Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) in June 2006.

[[Page 82]]

At the end of September 2006, the DIF reserve ratio (ratio of insurance 
reserves to insured deposits) stood at 1.22 percent--$1.2 billion below 
the level that would meet the target reserve ratio. Under new authority 
provided by the passage of the Deposit Insurance Reform Act, the FDIC 
Board voted to establish a new set of premiums for the industry to 
recapitalize the DIF. The new premiums range from a minimum of five 
basis points (five cents per $100 of assessable deposits) up to as high 
as 43 basis points based on the assessed risk of an institution. The 
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 provided depository institutions 
that had paid deposit insurance premiums prior to 1996 (the last year 
the FDIC collected premiums) with $4.7 billion in credits toward 
premiums, most of which will likely be used by 2009. Taking these 
credits into consideration, the FDIC is expected to collect 
approximately $1.5 billion in new revenue during fiscal 2007 and 2008 
combined.
  The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF), the Federal 
fund for credit unions that is analogous to the DIF for banks and 
thrifts, ended fiscal year 2006 with assets of $6.7 billion and an 
equity ratio of 1.29 percent, approaching the NCUA-set target ratio of 
1.30 percent. Over the past five years, the NCUSIF's equity ratio has 
gradually risen from about 1.27 percent, reflecting strong performance 
(and therefore few losses due to failures) in the credit union industry.

Current Regulatory Issues

  A number of major regulatory initiatives are currently underway in the 
banking sector, which are likely to have a significant impact on the 
banking sector as a whole and, by extension, on the Federal deposit 
insurance system. For example, the Federal banking regulators (the 
Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC and OTS) continue to work on a rulemaking 
that would implement the ``International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework'' (``Basel II'').
  Since equity capital serves as a cushion against potential losses, 
banks with riskier asset portfolios should hold more equity capital. The 
original Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) adopted in 1989 is an 
international accord among financial regulators establishing a uniform 
capital standard for banks across nations. Under Basel I, bank assets 
are grouped into a small number of broad risk categories. A bank's 
regulatory capital requirement is tied to the amount of its asset 
holdings in each risk category.
  During 2006, the Federal banking regulators proposed two separate but 
related rulemakings to implement the Revised Basel Capital Accord: the 
``Basel II'' framework and an intermediate ``Basel 1A'' framework.
  In the proposed Basel II rule, U.S. regulators are considering 
requiring the ten or so largest banks (including those that have major 
international operations, complex financial structures and expertise) to 
use an advanced internal ratings-based approach to calculate their 
credit risk capital requirements. The Basel II rulemaking would allow 
for greater sensitivity to risk in the portfolios banks hold. Rather 
than grouping assets into broad risk categories, capital requirements 
would be tied to banks' internal assessments of the likelihood and 
severity of default losses from the assets they hold. The rules are also 
intended to allow capital requirements to more accurately account for 
the benefits or risk-mitigation activities undertaken by banks. The 
rulemaking would also require banks to hold capital to cover operational 
risk, which is not covered under the existing (Basel I) requirements.
  Implementation of the Basel II standard in Europe is scheduled to 
begin during 2007, more than a year before U.S. implementation would 
likely begin, and this delay has led to concerns about a competitive 
imbalance between U.S. and foreign banks. There are also concerns about 
competitive imbalance between U.S. banks, and for that reason, banks 
other than the ten largest U.S. banks would be able to choose between 
adopting the ``Basel II'' standard, the current ``Basel I'' system, and 
an alternative ``Basel 1A'' standard.
  The ``Basel 1A'' standard is intended to be more risk-sensitive than 
Basel I, but easier to implement than Basel II. The ``Basel 1A'' 
standard would provide additional risk-sensitivity through use of 
external credit ratings, and internal risk measures for some types of 
assets (i.e., loan-to-value ratios for mortgages). This new standard 
would allow banks to potentially lower their capital requirements and 
provide small- and mid-sized banks a means to stay competitive with the 
larger Basel II banks. The regulators are proposing to make the Basel 1A 
standard optional for banks, meaning that no small or medium-sized bank 
would be required to change its capital regime.
  The proposed text of both rules has been released for public comment, 
and regulators hope to finalize these rules in the near future.

                           Pension Guarantees

  The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures pension 
benefits of workers and retirees in covered defined-benefit pension 
plans sponsored by private-sector employers. PBGC pays benefits, up to a 
guaranteed level, when a company with an underfunded pension plan meets 
the legal criteria to transfer its obligations to the pension insurance 
program. PBGC's claims exposure is the amount by which qualified 
benefits exceed assets in insured plans. In the near term, the risk of 
loss stems from financially distressed firms with underfunded plans. In 
the longer term, loss exposure results from the possibility that healthy 
firms become distressed and well-funded plans become underfunded due to 
inadequate contributions, poor investment results, or increased 
liabilities.
  PBGC monitors companies with underfunded plans and acts to protect the 
interests of the pension insurance program's stakeholders where 
possible. Under its Early Warning Program, PBGC works with companies to 
strengthen plan funding or otherwise protect the in

[[Page 83]]

surance program from avoidable losses. However, PBGC's authority to 
prevent undue risks to the insurance program is limited.
  As a result of a flawed pension funding system and exposure to losses 
from financially troubled plan sponsors, PBGC's single-employer program 
incurred substantial losses from underfunded plan terminations in 2001 
through 2006. The table below shows the ten largest plan termination 
losses in PBGC's history. Nine of the ten have come in the past five 
years. The program's deficit at 2006 year-end stood at $18.1 billion \1\ 
compared to a $9.7 billion surplus at 2000 year-end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ The 2006 year-end single-employer program deficit of $18.1 billion 
was less than the $22.8 billion deficit at the end of 2005. The 
improvement in PBGC's financial condition was driven primarily by the 
airline relief provisions in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which 
resulted in large plans previously classified as probable terminations 
being changed from the probable classification to the reasonably 
possible classification in FY 2006. This credit was partially offset by 
$3.1 billion in financial losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  

               LARGEST TEN CLAIMS AGAINST THE PBGC'S SINGLE-EMPLOYER INSURANCE PROGRAM, 1975-2006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     Percent  of
                                                               Fiscal Years  of                         Total
                        Top 10 Firms                          Plan  Terminations  Claims  (by firm)     Claims
                                                                                                     (1975-2005)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
  1.  United Airlines.......................................               2005      $7,484,348,482      22.90%
  2.  Bethlehem Steel.......................................               2003       3,654,380,116      11.20%
  3.  US Airways............................................         2003, 2005       2,690,222,805       8.20%
  4.  LTV Steel *...........................................   2002, 2003, 2004       2,136,698,831       6.50%
  5.  National Steel........................................               2003       1,275,628,286       3.90%
  6.  Pan American Air......................................         1991, 1992         841,082,434       2.60%
  7.  Weirton Steel.........................................               2004         690,181,783       2.10%
  8.  Trans World Airlines..................................               2001         668,377,105       2.00%
  9.  Kaiser Aluminum.......................................               2004         600,009,879       1.80%
  10.   Kemper Insurance....................................               2005         568,417,151       1.70%
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
Top Ten Total...............................................  ..................     20,609,346,871      63.20%
All Other Total.............................................  ..................     12,017,433,400      36.80%
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
  TOTAL.....................................................  ..................    $32,626,780,271     100.00%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent.
Data in this table have been calculated on a firm basis and include all plans of each firm.
Values and distributions are subject to change as PBGC completes its reviews and establishes termination dates.
* Does not include 1986 termination of a Republic Steel plan sponsored by LTV.
 
Sources: PBGC Fiscal Year Closing File (9/30/06), PBGC Case Administration System, and PBGC Participant System
  (PRISM).

  In February 2005 the Administration proposed comprehensive reforms to 
address structural flaws in the statutory plan funding requirements and 
in the design of the insurance program. The proposal sought to 
strengthen funding for workers' defined-benefit pensions; provide more 
accurate information about pension liabilities and plan underfunding; 
and enable PBGC to meet its obligations to participants in terminated 
pension plans. Many of the President's reforms were incorporated into 
the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, enacted in February 2006, and 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), enacted in August 2006.
  The legislation made significant structural changes to the retirement 
system. But while the PBGC has sufficient liquidity to meet its 
obligations for a number of years, neither the single-employer nor 
multiemployer program has the resources to satisfy fully the agency's 
long-term obligations to plan participants.
  Further reforms are needed to address the $19 billion gap that still 
exists between PBGC's liabilities and its assets. The Budget reproposes 
non-enacted premium reforms from the Administration's comprehensive 
pension reform proposal that were not included in the DRA or the PPA, 
including:
    Authorizing PBGC's Board of Directors to set the variable 
          premium rate.
    Extending the variable rate premium to a plan's non-vested 
          as well as its vested liabilities.
  These reforms will improve PBGC's financial condition and safeguard 
the future benefits of American workers. The Administration is committed 
to pension reform that will ultimately restore the PBGC to solvency.

                           Disaster Insurance

Flood Insurance

  The Federal Government provides flood insurance through the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Flood insurance is available to homeowners and businesses in 
communities that have adopted and enforced appropriate flood plain 
management measures. Coverage is limited to buildings and their 
contents. By

[[Page 84]]

the end of 2006, the program had over 5.3 million policies in more than 
20,200 communities with over $1 trillion of insurance in force.
  Prior to the creation of the program in 1968, many factors made it 
cost prohibitive for private insurance companies alone to make 
affordable flood insurance available. In response, the NFIP was 
established to make affordable insurance coverage widely available. The 
NFIP requires building standards and other mitigation efforts to reduce 
losses, and operates a flood hazard mapping program to quantify the 
geographic risk of flooding. These efforts have made substantial 
progress. However, structures built prior to flood mapping and NFIP 
floodplain management requirements, which make up 26 percent of the 
total policies in force, pay less than fully actuarial rates.
  DHS is using three strategies to increase the number of flood 
insurance policies in force: lender compliance, program simplification, 
and expanded marketing. DHS is educating financial regulators about the 
mandatory flood insurance requirement for properties that are located in 
floodplains and have mortgages from federally regulated lenders. These 
strategies have resulted in policy growth of nearly 14 percent in 2006 
with nearly 660,000 new policies. The most significant participation 
increases were in vulnerable coastal states, such as Mississippi (58 
percent, 25,371 policy increase), Texas (30 percent, 140,834 policy 
increase), Louisiana (25 percent, 98,096 policy increase), and Florida 
(11 percent, 208,716 policy increase). However, the program has also 
seen significant growth within some in-land states such as Idaho (24 
percent, 1,357 policy increase), based on greater awareness of the need 
for flood insurance protection.
  DHS also has a multi-pronged strategy for reducing future flood 
damage. The NFIP offers flood mitigation assistance grants to assist 
flood victims to rebuild to current building codes, including base flood 
elevations, thereby reducing future flood damage costs. In addition, two 
grant programs targeted toward repetitive and severe repetitive loss 
properties not only help owners of high-risk property, but also reduce 
the disproportionate drain on the National Flood Insurance Fund these 
properties cause through acquisition, relocation, or elevation. As a 
result of the 2005 hurricane season, the number of repetitive and severe 
repetitive loss properties increased significantly, and the Budget 
proposes to expand the severe repetitive loss grant program to mitigate 
the future impact of these high-risk properties. DHS is working to 
ensure that all of the flood mitigation grant programs are closely 
integrated, resulting in better coordination and communication with 
State and local governments. Further, through the Community Rating 
System, DHS adjusts premium rates to encourage community and State 
mitigation activities beyond those required by the NFIP. These efforts, 
in addition to the minimum NFIP requirements for floodplain management, 
save over $1 billion annually in avoided flood damages.
  The program's reserve account, which is a cash fund, has sometimes had 
expenses greater than its revenue, forcing the NFIP to borrow funds from 
the Treasury in order to meet claims obligations. However, since the 
program began in 1968 until 2005, the program has repaid all borrowed 
funds with interest. However, hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma 
generated more flood insurance claims than the cumulative number of 
claims from 1968 to 2004. These three storms resulted in over 234,000 
claims with total claims payments expected to be approximately $21 
billion. As a result, the Administration and the Congress have increased 
the borrowing authority to $20.8 billion to date in order to make 
certain that all claims could be paid.
  The catastrophic nature of the 2005 hurricane season has also 
triggered an examination of the program, and the Administration has 
worked with the Congress to improve the program, based on the following 
principles: protecting the NFIP's integrity by covering existing 
commitments; phasing out subsidized premiums in order to charge fair and 
actuarially sound premiums; increasing program participation incentives 
and improving enforcement of mandatory participation in the program; 
increasing risk awareness by educating property owners; and reducing 
future risks by implementing and enhancing mitigation measures. Although 
flood insurance reform was not achieved in 2006, the Administration 
looks forward to continuing to work with the Congress to enact program 
reforms that further mitigate the impact of flood damages and losses.

Crop Insurance

  Subsidized Federal crop insurance administered by USDA's Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) assists farmers in managing yield and revenue 
shortfalls due to bad weather or other natural disasters. The program is 
a cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the private 
insurance industry. Private insurance companies sell and service crop 
insurance policies. These companies rely on reinsurance provided by the 
Federal Government and also by the commercial reinsurance market to 
manage their individual risk portfolio. The Federal Government 
reimburses private companies for a portion of the administrative 
expenses associated with providing crop insurance and reinsures the 
private companies for excess insurance losses on all policies. The 
Federal Government also subsidizes premiums for farmers.
  The Budget includes a proposal to implement a participation fee in the 
Federal crop insurance program. The proposed participation fee would 
initially be used to fund modernization of the existing information 
technology (IT) system and would supplement the annual appropriation 
provided by the Congress. Subsequently, the fee would be shifted to 
maintenance and would be expected to reduce the annual appropriation. 
The participation fee would be charged to insurance companies 
participating in the Federal crop insurance program; based on a rate of 
about one-half cent per dollar of premium sold, the fee is expected to 
be sufficient

[[Page 85]]

to generate about $15 million annually beginning in 2009. The existing 
IT system is nearing the end of its useful life and recent years have 
seen increases in ``down-time'' resulting from system failures. Over the 
years, numerous changes have occurred in the Federal crop insurance 
program; the development of revenue and livestock insurance, for 
example, has greatly expanded the program and taxed the IT system due to 
new requirements, such as daily pricing, which were not envisioned when 
the existing IT system was designed. These new requirements contribute 
to increased maintenance costs and limit RMA's ability to comply with 
Congressional mandates pertaining to data reconciliation with the Farm 
Service Agency. The participation fee will alleviate these problems.
  There are various types of insurance programs. The most basic type of 
coverage is catastrophic coverage (CAT), which compensates the farmer 
for losses in excess of 50 percent of the individual's average yield at 
55 percent of the expected market price. The CAT premium is entirely 
subsidized, and farmers pay only an administrative fee. Higher levels of 
coverage, called buy-up coverage, are also available. A premium is 
charged for buy-up coverage. The premium is determined by the level of 
coverage selected and varies from crop to crop and county to county. For 
the 10 principal crops, which account for about 80 percent of total 
liability, the most recent data shows that over 75 percent of eligible 
acres participated in the crop insurance program.
  RMA offers both yield and revenue-based insurance products. Revenue 
insurance programs protect against loss of revenue stemming from low 
prices, poor yields, or a combination of both. These programs extend 
traditional multi-peril or yield crop insurance by adding price 
variability to production history.
  USDA is continuously trying to develop new products or expand existing 
products in order to cover more types of crops. In 2006, a Livestock 
Risk Protection for Lamb pilot was introduced, and Adjusted Gross 
Revenue-Lite was made available in five additional States. In addition, 
two new Group Risk Protection risk management tools for pasture, 
rangeland, and forage protection were approved for the 2007 crop year. 
These innovative pilot programs are based on vegetation greenness and 
rainfall indices and were developed to provide livestock producers the 
ability to purchase insurance protection for losses of forage produced 
for grazing or harvested for hay. RMA also expanded the Group Risk 
Income Protection plans for cotton, wheat, and grain sorghum for the 
2007 crop year. And, it is expected that the Livestock Gross Margin 
pilot program will be expanded to include cattle in 2007. RMA is also 
making substantial improvements to the Florida Fruit Tree pilot program 
to enhance coverage and make it more effective for loss due to 
hurricane. RMA continues to pursue a number of avenues to increase 
program participation among underserved States and commodities by 
working on declining yield issues and looking at discount programs for 
good experienced producers who pose less risk.
  For more information and additional crop insurance program details, 
please reference RMA's web site: (www.rma.usda.gov).

                Insurance Against Security-Related Risks

Terrorism Risk Insurance

  On November 26, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). The Act was designed to address 
disruptions in economic activity caused by the withdrawal of many 
insurance companies from the marketplace for terrorism risk insurance in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Their 
withdrawal in the face of great uncertainty as to their risk exposure to 
future terrorist attacks led to a moratorium on many new construction 
projects, increasing business costs for the insurance that was 
available, and substantially shifting risk--from reinsurers to primary 
insurers, and from insurers to policyholders (e.g., investors, 
businesses, and property owners). Ultimately, these costs were borne by 
American workers and communities through decreased development and 
economic activity.
  The Act established a temporary, three-year Federal program that 
provided a system of shared public and private compensation for insured 
commercial property and casualty losses arising from acts of terrorism 
(as defined by the Act). Under the Act, insurance companies offering 
commercial property and casualty insurance policies were required to 
make available to their policyholders coverage for losses from acts of 
terrorism. In the event of a terrorist attack on private businesses and 
others covered by this program, the Federal Government would initially 
cover 90 percent of the insured losses above each insurance company's 
deductible (as specified in the Act). The Act also provided authority 
for the Department of the Treasury to recoup any Federal payments via 
surcharges on policyholders in future years. In December 2005, the 
Congress passed and the President signed the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Extension Act, which extended the program for two years, through 
December 31, 2007, and substantially narrowed the scope of the program.
   The 2005 Act significantly reduced taxpayers' exposure by excluding 
certain lines of insurance from Federal coverage: commercial automobile, 
burglary and theft, surety, professional liability, and farm owners 
multiple peril insurance were removed from the program altogether. In 
addition, the 2005 Act increased insurers' deductibles from 15 percent 
of direct earned premiums for calendar year 2005 to 17.5 percent in 2006 
and 20 percent in 2007. The extension also decreased the Federal co-
payment for insured losses above the insurers' deductibles from 90 
percent of insured losses in calendar year 2005 and 2006 to 85 percent 
of insured losses in 2007.
  The new legislation also increased the trigger amount for Federal 
payments, from the original $5 million in aggregate insured losses from 
an act of terrorism to

[[Page 86]]

$50 million in calendar year 2006 and $100 million in calendar year 
2007. TRIA imposes a cap of $100 billion on total insurer losses from 
terrorist attacks that the Federal program would cover. Under the 
statute, the Congress would determine the procedures to govern any 
payments for losses beyond $100 billion in separate legislation.
  In addition to the reforms to the scope of the program, the 2005 Act 
required the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to 
conduct a study on the availability and affordability of terrorism risk 
coverage under the program and to report the results to the Congress by 
September 30, 2006. The PWG report found that the program had achieved 
its goals of supporting the insurance industry post September 11, 2001 
and that the market for terrorism risk insurance (in terms of 
availability and affordability) has improved since September 11, 2001. 
The TRIA program was never intended to be permanent, but rather was 
intended to help stabilize the insurance industry during a time of 
significant transition. It has been successful in providing a temporary 
transition to allow for greater market development.

Airline War Risk Insurance

  After the September 11, 2001 attacks, private insurers cancelled 
third-party liability war risk coverage for airlines and dramatically 
increased the cost of other war risk insurance. In addition to a number 
of short term responses, the Congress also passed the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296.) Among other provisions, this Act required 
the Secretary to provide additional war risk insurance coverage to air 
carriers insured for Third-Party War Risk Liability as of June 19, 2002, 
as authorized under existing law. The Continuing Appropriations Act for 
FY 2007, as amended (P.L. 109-383) further extended the requirement to 
provide insurance coverage through the duration of the resolution, 
February 15, 2007, and the program is expected to be continued through 
at least August 31, 2007. Acting on behalf of the Secretary, the FAA 
insurance policies made available under this Act cover: (i) hull losses 
at agreed value; (ii) death, injury, or property loss to passengers or 
crew, the limit being the same as that of the air carrier's commercial 
coverage before September 11, 2001; and (iii) third party liability, the 
limit generally being twice that of such coverage. The Secretary is also 
authorized to limit an air carrier's third party liability to $100 
million, when the Secretary certifies that the loss is from an act of 
terrorism.
  This program provides airlines with financial protection from war risk 
occurrences, and thus allows airlines to meet the basic requirement for 
``adequate liability coverage'' found in most aircraft leases and in 
government regulation. Without such coverage, many airlines might be 
grounded. Currently, aviation war risk insurance coverage is generally 
available from private insurers, but premiums are significantly higher 
in the private market. Private insurance is also available for third-
party liability and for occurrences involving weapons of mass 
destruction, albeit to a lesser extent.
  Currently 75 air carriers are insured by the Department of 
Transportation. Coverage for individual carriers ranges from $80 million 
to $4 billion per carrier, with the median insurance coverage at 
approximately $1.8 billion per occurrence. Premiums collected by the 
Government for these policies are deposited into the Aviation Insurance 
Revolving Fund. In 2006, the Fund earned approximately $169 million in 
premiums for insurance provided by DOT, and it is anticipated that an 
additional $99 million in premiums will be earned in 2007. At the end of 
2006, the balance in the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund available for 
payment of future claims was $742 million. Although no claims have been 
paid by the Fund since 2001, the balance in the Fund would be inadequate 
to meet either the coverage limits of the largest policies in force ($4 
billion) or to meet a series of large claims in succession. The Federal 
Government would pay any claims by the airlines that exceed the balance 
in the Aviation Insurance Revolving Fund. The Administration does not 
support a straight extension of this program, which crowds out private 
sector mechanisms for managing risk. The Administration is committed to 
working with the Congress to reform this program, and to ensure that air 
carriers more equitably share in the risks associated with this program.

[[Page 87]]





                                     

                    TABLE 7-1.  ESTIMATED FUTURE COST OF OUTSTANDING FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
                                            (In billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Estimated                        Estimated
                                                  Outstanding   Future Costs of    Outstanding   Future Costs of
                  Program                            2005             2005            2006             2006
                                                                Outstanding \1\                  Outstanding \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Direct Loans: \2\
Federal Student Loans.........................             113               11             116               16
Farm Service Agency (excl. CCC), Rural                      43                9              43               10
 Development, Rural Housing...................
Rural Utilities Service and Rural Telephone                 34                2              38                2
 Bank.........................................
Housing and Urban Development.................              12                2              11                3
Export-Import Bank............................              10                5               7                2
Public Law 480................................               9                4               8                4
Agency for International Development..........               8                3               7                3
Commodity Credit Corporation..................               3                1               2                1
Disaster Assistance...........................               4                1               7                2
VA Mortgage...................................               1  ...............               1  ...............
Other Direct Loan Programs....................              11                3              12                4
 
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Direct Loans............................             247               41             251               47
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
 
Guaranteed Loans: \2\
FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund............             336                2             317                3
VA Mortgage...................................             206                3             211                3
Federal Student Loans.........................             289               31             325               52
FHA General/Special Risk Insurance Fund.......              90                3              98                1
Small Business \3\............................              73                2              67                2
Export-Import Bank............................              36                2              36                2
International Assistance......................              22                2              22                2
Farm Service Agency (excl. CCC), Rural                      30                1              31  ...............
 Development, Rural Housing...................
Commodity Credit Corporation..................               2  ...............               3  ...............
Maritime Administration.......................               3  ...............               3  ...............
Air Transportation Stabilization Program......               1                1  ..............  ...............
Government National Mortgage Association        ..............                *  ..............                *
 (GNMA) \3\...................................
Other Guaranteed Loan Programs................               8                1               6                1
 
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 88]]

 
Total Guaranteed Loans........................           1,096               48           1,120               66
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Federal Credit..........................           1,343               89           1,371              113
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* $500 million or less.
\1\ Direct loan future costs are the financing account allowance for subsidy cost and the liquidating account
allowance for estimated uncollectible principal and interest. Loan guarantee future costs are estimated
  liabilities for
loan guarantees.
\2\ Excludes loans and guarantees by deposit insurance agencies and programs not included under credit reform,
  such
as CCC commodity price supports. Defaulted guaranteed loans which become loans receivable are accounted for as
  direct loans.
\3\ GNMA data are excluded from the totals because they are secondary guarantees on loans guaranteed by FHA, VA
  and RHS. Certain SBA data are excluded from the totals because they are secondary guarantees on SBA's own
  guaranteed loans.


[[Page 89]]


                                  Table 7-2.  REESTIMATES OF CREDIT SUBSIDIES ON LOANS DISBURSED BETWEEN 1992-2006 \1\
                                                 (Budget authority and outlays, in millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Program                      1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                DIRECT LOANS:
 
Agriculture:
  Agriculture credit insurance fund.........        2      -31       23  .......      331     -656      921       10     -701     -147       -2      -14
  Farm storage facility loans...............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1       -7       -8        7       -1  .......
  Apple loans...............................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -2        1  .......        *        *        *
  Emergency boll weevil loan................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1        *        *        3  .......
  Distance learning and telemedicine........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1       -1       -1        1        7  .......
  Rural electrification and                       -37       84  .......      -39  .......      -17      -42      101      265      143     -197  .......
   telecommunications loans.................
  Rural telephone bank......................  .......       10  .......       -9  .......       -1  .......       -3       -7       -6      -17  .......
  Rural housing insurance fund..............       46      -73  .......       71  .......       19      -29     -435      -64     -200      109  .......
  Rural economic development loans..........  .......        1  .......       -1        *  .......       -1       -1  .......       -2        *  .......
  Rural development loan program............  .......  .......  .......       -6  .......  .......       -1       -3  .......       -3       -2  .......
  Rural community advancement program \2\...  .......        8  .......        5  .......       37        3       -1      -84      -34      -73  .......
  P.L. 480..................................      -37       -1  .......  .......  .......      -23       65     -348       33      -43     -239      -26
  P.L. 480 Title I food for progress credits      -38  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......     -112      -44  .......  .......  .......
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance.........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -19       -1       -3  .......        1      -15      -12
 
Defense:
  Military housing improvement fund.........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *       -4       -1
 
Education:
  Federal direct student loan program: \3\
    Volume reestimate.......................  .......  .......  .......       22  .......       -6  .......       43  .......  .......  .......  .......
    Other technical reestimate..............        3      -83      172     -383   -2,158      560  .......    3,678    1,999      855    2,827    2,674
  College housing and academic facilities     .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       11
   loans....................................
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster assistance.......................  .......  .......  .......  .......       47       36       -7       -6        *        4        *        *
 
Interior:
  Bureau of Reclamation loans...............  .......  .......  .......  .......        3        3       -9      -14  .......       17        1        *
  Bureau of Indian Affairs direct loans.....  .......  .......  .......        1        5       -1       -1        2        *        *        *        1
  Assistance to American Samoa..............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *        *  .......        2
 
State
  Repatriation loans........................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -4
 
Transportation:
  High priority corridor loans..............  .......  .......       -3  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
  Alameda corridor loan.....................  .......  .......  .......  .......      -58  .......  .......  .......      -12  .......  .......  .......
  Transportation infrastructure finance and   .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       18  .......  .......  .......        3      -11        7
   innovation...............................
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement     .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -5      -14      -11       -1
   program..................................
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial             .......  .......  .......  .......        1  .......  .......        *       -1        *       -1        1
   institutions fund........................
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program fund.....       76      -72      465     -111      -52     -107     -697       17     -178      987      -44      -76
  Native American veteran housing...........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -3        *        *        *        1
  Vocational Rehabilitation Loans...........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *        *        *       -1        1
 
Environmental Protection Agency:
  Abatement, control and compliance.........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        3       -1        *       -3        *        *        *
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Foreign military financing................  .......       13        4        1      152     -166      119     -397      -64      -41       -7       -6
  U.S. Agency for International Development:
    Micro and small enterprise development..  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *  .......        *  .......  .......  .......
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
    OPIC direct loans.......................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -4      -21        3       -7       72
  Debt reduction............................  .......  .......  .......  .......       36       -4  .......        *      -47     -104       54       -3
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans............................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1       -2        1       25  .......      -16       -4
  Disaster loans............................  .......  .......     -193      246     -398     -282      -14      266      589      196       61      258
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank direct loans...........       37  .......  .......  .......     -177      157      117     -640     -305      111     -257     -227
  Federal Communications Commission.........  .......  .......    4,592      980   -1,501     -804       92      346      380      732      -24       11
 
              LOAN GUARANTEES:
 
Agriculture:
  Agriculture credit insurance fund.........       12      -51       96  .......      -31      205       40      -36      -33      -22     -162       20

[[Page 90]]

 
  Agriculture resource conservation           .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        2  .......        1       -1        *        *  .......
   demonstration............................
  Commodity Credit Corporation export            -426      343  .......  .......  .......   -1,410  .......      -13     -230     -205     -366     -232
   guarantees...............................
  Rural development insurance fund..........  .......       -3  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       34  .......
  Rural housing insurance fund..............        7      -10  .......      109  .......      152      -56       32       50       66       44  .......
  Rural community advancement program \2\...  .......      -10  .......       41  .......       63       17       91       15       29      -64  .......
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance.........................  .......  .......       -2  .......  .......       -3       -1        3        *        1        *        1
  Emergency steel guaranteed loans..........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       50        *        3      -75      -13
  Emergency oil and gas guaranteed loans....  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        *        *        *        *        *       -1        *
 
Defense:
  Military housing improvement fund.........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -3       -1       -3       -5
  Defense export loan guarantee.............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -5  .......  .......
  Arms initiative guaranteed loan program...  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       20
 
Education:
  Federal family education loan program: \3\
  Volume reestimate.........................      535       99  .......      -13      -60      -42  .......      277  .......  .......  .......  .......
  Other technical reestimate................       60  .......  .......     -140      667   -3,484  .......   -2,483   -3,278    1,348    6,837   -3,399
 
Health and Human Services:
  Heath center loan guarantees..............  .......  .......  .......  .......        3  .......        *        *  .......        1        *        *
  Health education assistance loans.........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -5      -37      -33      -18      -20
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee.............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -6        *       -1        *       -3       -1        *
  Title VI Indian guarantees................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1        1        4        *       -4
  Community development loan guarantees.....  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       19      -10       -2        4
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance.............  .......     -340  .......    3,789  .......    2,413   -1,308    1,100    5,947    1,979    2,842      636
  FHA-general and special risk..............     -110      -25      743       79  .......     -217     -403       77      352      507      238   -1,254
 
Interior:
  Bureau of Indian Affairs guaranteed loans.  .......       31  .......  .......  .......      -14       -1       -2       -2        *       15        5
 
Transportation:
  Maritime guaranteed loans (Title XI)......  .......  .......  .......      -71       30      -15      187       27      -16        4      -76      -11
  Minority business resource center.........  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        1  .......        *        *  .......        *
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization program..  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      113     -199      292     -109      -38
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit fund program.....      334     -706       38      492      229     -770     -163     -184   -1,515     -462     -842     -525
 
International Assistance Programs:
  U.S. Agency for International Development:
    Development credit authority............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......       -1  .......        1       -3       -2        2
    Micro and small enterprise development..  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        2       -2  .......       -3
    Urban and environmental credit..........       -7  .......      -14  .......  .......  .......       -4      -15       48       -2       -5      -11
    Assistance to the new independent states  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -34  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
     of the former Soviet Union.............
    Loan Guarantees to Israel...............  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......      -76     -111      188       34
    Loan Guarantees to Egypt................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        7       14
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation:
    OPIC guaranteed loans...................  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......        5       77       60     -212      -21     -149
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans............................      257      -16     -279     -545     -235     -528     -226      304    1,750    1,034     -390     -268
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank guarantees.............       13  .......  .......  .......     -191   -1,520     -417   -2,042   -1,133     -655   -1,164     -579
 
                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................      727     -832    5,642    4,518   -3,641   -6,427   -1,854     -142    3,468    6,008    9,037   -3,111
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Less than $500,000.
\1\Excludes interest on reestimates. Additional information on credit reform subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.
\2\Includes rural water and waste disposal, rural community facilities, and rural business and industry programs.
\3\Volume reestimates in mandatory programs represent a change in volume of loans disbursed in the prior years.


[[Page 91]]


                                   Table 7-3.  DIRECT LOAN SUBSIDY RATES, BUDGET AUTHORITY, AND LOAN LEVELS, 2006-2008
                                                                (In millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      2006 Actual                   2007 Estimate                  2008 Proposed
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Agency and Program                                 Subsidy                        Subsidy                        Subsidy
                                                              Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan
                                                             rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.......................      8.03         80       989      9.47         94       995      9.88         97       977
  Farm storage facility loans..............................     -0.62         -1       111      0.25  .........        74      1.12          1        93
  Rural community advancement program......................      5.90         83     1,406      9.00         90     1,009  ........  .........  ........
  Rural electrification and telecommunications loans.......     -0.50        -31     6,080     -0.71        -38     5,377     -0.51        -24     4,790
  Distance learning, telemedicine, and broadband program...      2.14          7       333      1.94         22     1,155      2.15          6       300
  Rural water and waste disposal...........................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........     14.20        153     1,080
  Rural community facility.................................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........      5.55         17       302
  Rural housing assistance grants..........................     46.76          2         4     47.82          4         8  ........  .........  ........
  Farm labor...............................................     44.59          9        20     47.95          5        10     43.26          6        14
  Multifamily housing revitalization.......................     46.76          1         2     47.82          1         2  ........  .........  ........
  Rural housing insurance fund.............................     14.57        199     1,357     13.22        195     1,463     17.23          7        39
  Rural development loan fund..............................     43.02         15        34     44.07         15        33     42.89         14        34
  Rural economic development loans.........................     19.97          5        25     21.84          5        23     22.59          7        33
  Public law 480 title I direct credit and food for             67.92         27        39  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........
   progress................................................
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance........................................     -3.34         -4       138     -6.21         -5        75    -10.58         -1         8
 
Defense--Military:
  Defense family housing improvement fund..................      2.56          2        78     28.40        251       883     26.38         61       233
 
Education:
  College housing and academic facilities loans............  ........  .........        15     57.72        179       310  ........  .........  ........
  Federal direct student loan program......................      4.98      1,807    36,305      2.43        474    19,503      2.35        509    21,636
 
Health and Human Services:
  State grants and demonstrations..........................    100.00        140       140    100.00          1         1  ........  .........  ........
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster assistance direct loan..........................     75.00        953     1,271      1.18  .........        25      1.73  .........        25
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance............................  ........  .........         3  ........  .........        50  ........  .........        50
 
State:
  Repatriation loans.......................................     64.99          1         1     60.14          1         1     60.22          1         1
 
Transportation:
  Federal-aid highways.....................................      8.50          4        42      5.05        121     2,400      5.00         79     1,581
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement program..........  ........  .........       155  ........  .........       200  ........  .........       600
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions fund........     37.47  .........         1     37.47          1         3     37.52          1         2
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Housing..................................................      2.27          3       163      5.25         18       335      3.86         20       539
  Native American veteran housing loan.....................    -13.79         -1         4    -13.46         -1         4    -14.48         -1         4
  General operating expenses...............................      1.59  .........         3      2.00  .........         3      2.16  .........         3
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Debt restructuring.......................................  ........         29  ........  ........         84  ........  ........        255  ........
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation..................      3.63          7       193      2.74         10       350      3.22         16       500
 
Small Business Administration:
  Disaster loans...........................................     14.64      1,286     8,785     17.73        471     2,659     16.27        173     1,064
  Business loans...........................................      7.17          1        20     10.21          1        10  ........  .........        25
 
Export-Import Bank of the United States:
  Export-Import Bank loans.................................      1.79          1        56     34.00         17        50     33.01         17        50
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................................       N/A      4,625    57,773       N/A      2,016    37,011       N/A      1,414    33,983
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\  Additional information on credit subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.
N/A = Not applicable.


[[Page 92]]


                                  Table 7-4. LOAN GUARANTEE SUBSIDY RATES, BUDGET AUTHORITY, AND LOAN LEVELS, 2006-2008
                                                                (In millions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      2006 Actual                   2007 Estimate                  2008 Proposed
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Agency and Program                                 Subsidy                        Subsidy                        Subsidy
                                                              Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan     Subsidy    budget     Loan
                                                             rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels   rate \1\  authority   levels
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.......................      3.12         67     2,147      2.39         65     2,624      2.54         62     2,450
  Commodity Credit Corporation export loans................      4.88         71     1,453      3.00         61     1,990      2.63         63     2,440
  Rural community advancement program......................      3.99         38       933      4.02         48     1,197  ........  .........  ........
  Rural water and waste disposal...........................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........     -0.82         -1        75
  Rural community facility.................................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........      3.68          8       210
  Rural housing insurance fund.............................      1.29         41     3,173      1.26         62     4,998      0.57         29     5,049
  Rural business and industry..............................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........      4.32         43     1,000
  Rural business investment................................      7.72          2        24  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........
  Renewable energy.........................................      6.45          2        24      6.49         10       154      9.69         19       195
 
Education:
  Federal family education loan............................     12.74     17,274   135,576      6.65      5,860    88,062      3.88      3,861    99,481
 
Energy:
  Title 17 innovative technology loan guarantee program....  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........     9,000
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health resources and services............................      3.50  .........         2      3.42  .........         8  ........  .........  ........
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee fund.......................      2.42          5       190      2.35          5       251      2.42          6       367
  Native Hawaiian Housing Loan Guarantee Fund..............  ........  .........  ........      2.35          1        43      2.42          1        41
  Native American housing block grant......................     12.26          2        13     11.99          2        17     12.12          2        17
  Community development loan guarantees....................      2.20          5       220      2.17          3       136      2.20          1        45
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance............................     -1.70       -880    51,783     -0.37       -164    44,418     -0.83       -680    81,996
  FHA-general and special risk.............................     -1.74       -504    28,702     -2.01       -413    20,499     -2.54       -242     9,514
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loan...................................      4.75          5       117      6.45          5        87      6.52          5        86
 
Transportation:
  Minority business resource center program................      1.85  .........         2      1.82  .........        18      2.03  .........        18
  Federal-aid highways.....................................  ........  .........  ........      3.90          8       200      5.90         12       200
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement program..........  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........       100
  Maritime guaranteed loan (title XI)......................  ........  .........  ........      5.93          4        67  ........  .........  ........
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Housing..................................................     -0.32        -73    23,500     -0.36       -102    28,260     -0.37       -108    29,104
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Loan guarantees to Israel................................  ........  .........  ........  ........  .........     1,000  ........  .........     1,000
  Development credit authority.............................      3.66          6       159      5.45          6       110      6.03         21       348
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation..................     -1.96        -13       661     -1.22        -12       950     -0.78         -8       950
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans...........................................  ........  .........    19,936  ........  .........    28,000  ........  .........    28,000
 
Export-Import Bank of the United States:
  Export-Import Bank loans.................................      1.16        141    12,094      0.06         10    15,860     -1.95       -367    18,714
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................................................       N/A     16,189   280,709       N/A      5,459   238,949       N/A      2,727   290,400
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 ADDENDUM: SECONDARY GUARANTEED LOAN COMMITMENT LIMITATIONS
 
GNMA:
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities loan guarantee..     -0.23       -188    81,739     -0.21       -181    86,000     -0.27       -209    77,400
SBA:
  Secondary market guarantee...............................  ........  .........     3,633  ........  .........    12,000  ........  .........    12,000
                                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, secondary guaranteed loan commitments...........       N/A       -188    85,372       N/A       -181    98,000       N/A       -209    89,400
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\  Additional information on credit subsidy rates is contained in the Federal Credit Supplement.
N/A = Not applicable.


[[Page 93]]


                                             Table 7-5.  SUMMARY OF FEDERAL DIRECT LOANS AND LOAN GUARANTEES
                                                                (In billions of dollars)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Actual                                                Estimate
                                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               1999       2000       2001       2002       2003       2004       2005       2006       2007       2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
Direct Loans:
  Obligations.............................       38.4       37.1       39.1       43.7       45.4       42.0       56.3       57.8       37.0       34.0
  Disbursements...........................       37.7       35.5       37.1       39.6       39.7       38.7       50.6       46.6       31.4       32.9
  New subsidy budget authority............        1.6      (0.4)        0.3          *        0.7        0.4        2.1        4.7        2.0        1.4
  Reestimated subsidy budget authority \1\        1.0      (4.4)      (1.8)        0.5        2.9        2.6        3.8        3.1        3.6  .........
  Total subsidy budget authority..........        2.6      (4.8)      (1.5)        0.5        3.5        3.0        6.0        7.8        5.5        1.4
 
Loan guarantees:
  Commitments \2\.........................      252.4      192.6      256.4      303.7      345.9      300.6      248.5      280.7      239.0      290.4
  Lender disbursements \2\................      224.7      180.8      212.9      271.4      331.3      279.9      221.6      256.0      210.1      256.0
  New subsidy budget authority............          *        3.6        2.3        2.9        3.8        7.3       10.1       17.2        5.2        2.4
  Reestimated subsidy budget authority \1\        4.3        0.3      (7.1)      (2.4)      (3.5)        2.0        3.5        7.0      (6.8)  .........
  Total subsidy budget authority..........        4.3        3.9      (4.8)        0.5        0.3        9.3       13.6       24.2      (1.6)        2.4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Less than $50 million.
\1\ Includes interest on reestimate.
\2\ To avoid double-counting, totals exclude GNMA secondary guarantees of loans that are guaranteed by FHA, VA, and RHS, and SBA's guarantee of 7(a)
  loans sold in the secondary market.


[[Page 94]]


                 Table 7-6. DIRECT LOAN WRITEOFFS AND GUARANTEED LOAN TERMINATIONS FOR DEFAULTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    In millions of dollars       As a percentage of outstanding
                                               --------------------------------             loans \1\
              Agency and Program                                               ---------------------------------
                                                   2006       2007      2008       2006        2007       2008
                                                 Actual     Estimate  Estimate   Actual      Estimate   Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             DIRECT LOAN WRITEOFFS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........         45         78        70        0.67       1.21       1.15
  Commodity Credit Corporation fund...........  ..........  ........        -1  ..........  .........      -0.05
  Rural community advancement program.........          9          4         4        0.10       0.04       0.03
  Rural electrification and telecommunications          9   ........  ........        0.02  .........  .........
   loans......................................
  Rural development insurance fund............          1          1         1        0.05       0.05       0.06
  Rural housing insurance fund................         90         99       112        0.36       0.40       0.45
  Rural development loan fund.................          3          2         1        0.69       0.45       0.21
  Debt restructuring..........................        130   ........  ........       24.95  .........  .........
 
Commerce:
  Economic development revolving fund.........          1          1  ........       10.00      14.28  .........
 
Education:
  Student financial assistance................         14         14  ........        4.33       4.34  .........
  Perkins loan assets.........................  ..........  ........        54  ..........  .........  .........
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Revolving fund (liquidating programs).......  ..........         1         1  ..........      16.66      25.00
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities....          4         24        20       40.00     342.85     285.71
 
Interior:
  Indian direct loan..........................  ..........         1         1  ..........       4.34       5.00
 
Labor:
  Pension benefit guaranty corporation fund...         87         93        93  ..........  .........  .........
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program............         31          3         3        3.07       0.33       0.25
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Debt restructuring..........................  ..........         2        29  ..........       0.81      12.03
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....         15          6        15        2.41       0.82       1.78
 
Small Business Administration:
  Disaster loans..............................        107         33        61        2.93       0.48       0.85
  Business loans..............................          2          2         2        1.09       1.11       1.28
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Debt reduction (ExIm Bank)..................        776         58       107       73.34      19.07      42.29
  Export-Import Bank..........................      1,112         36        36       12.43       0.58       0.67
  Spectrum auction program....................  ..........        50       150  ..........      11.70      41.89
  Tennessee Valley Authority fund.............          1          1         1        2.08       1.92       1.72
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, direct loan writeoffs..............      2,437        509       760        1.11       0.22       0.32
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
 
   GUARANTEED LOAN TERMINATIONS FOR DEFAULT
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........         37         48        48        0.35       0.47       0.45
  Commodity Credit Corporation export loans...         24         52        61        0.97       1.72       1.91
  Rural community advancement program.........        115        135       158        2.44       3.01       3.41
  Rural housing insurance fund................        249        107       242        1.69       0.68       1.52
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance...........................          4   ........  ........       12.50  .........  .........
 
Defense--Military:
  Procurement of ammunition, Army.............         11         15  ........       42.30      78.94  .........
  Family housing improvement fund.............  ..........         7         7  ..........       1.40       1.43
 
Education:
  Federal family education loans..............      5,614      6,962     7,671        1.94       2.14       2.12
 
Health and Human Services:
  Health education assistance loans...........         16         24        21        0.93       1.74       1.92
  Health center loan guarantees...............  ..........         1  ........  ..........       2.63  .........
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee...............          1          1         1        0.52       0.27       0.17
  Native American housing block grant.........  ..........         2         2  ..........       2.40       2.17
  FHA--Mutual mortgage insurance..............      5,381      5,722     6,250        1.60       1.80       1.98
  FHA--General and special risk...............      1,034      1,535     1,767        1.15       1.57       1.78
 

[[Page 95]]

 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loans.....................          1          5         5        0.31       1.57       1.47
 
Transportation:
  Maritime guaranteed loans (Title XI)........  ..........        35        32  ..........       1.19       1.16
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Veterans housing benefit program............      2,207      5,792     5,382        1.07       2.74       2.36
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Micro and small enterprise development......          1   ........         1        7.14  .........      16.66
  Urban and environmental credit program......         32         11        12        1.93       0.72       0.86
  Development credit authority................  ..........         2         2  ..........       0.98       0.73
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....        118        200        55        3.28       4.94       1.22
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans..............................      1,200      1,141     1,151        1.63       1.69       1.60
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank..........................        217        225       225        0.60       0.61       0.58
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, guaranteed loan terminations for        16,262     22,022    23,093        1.07       1.43       1.44
     default..................................
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, direct loan writeoffs and               18,699     22,531    23,853        1.08       1.28       1.30
     guaranteed loan terminations.............
                                               =================================================================
 
  ADDENDUM: WRITEOFFS OF DEFAULTED GUARANTEED
     LOANS THAT RESULT IN LOANS RECEIVABLE
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund..........          3          5         7        5.76       7.81      10.00
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance...........................          5   ........  ........       13.88  .........  .........
 
Education:
  Federal family education loans..............        990      1,121     1,185        4.40       4.57       4.70
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA--Mutual mortgage insurance..............  ..........         9         1  ..........       2.25       1.69
  FHA--General and special risk...............        276         25        22        6.23       0.51       0.35
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed loans.....................          1          2         2        7.69      11.11      10.00
 
Treasury:
  Air transportation stabilization guaranteed          39         54  ........       31.20      72.00  .........
   loans......................................
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....          1          8        11        0.46       2.29       2.98
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans..............................      1,012        281       279       19.04       5.52       5.35
  Pollution control equipment.................          8   ........  ........       40.00  .........  .........
 
Other Independent Agencies:
  Export-Import Bank..........................          4   ........  ........        3.41  .........  .........
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total, writeoffs of loans receivable......      2,339      1,505     1,507        6.18       3.85       3.72
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Average of loans outstanding for the year.


[[Page 96]]


                      Table 7-7. APPROPRIATIONS ACTS LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT LOAN LEVELS \1\
                                            (In millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              2006         2007          2008
                            Agency and Program                              Actual      Estimate      Estimate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         DIRECT LOAN OBLIGATIONS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.....................................         936          933           917
  P.L. 480...............................................................          39  ............  ...........
 
Commerce:
  Fisheries finance......................................................         138           75             8
 
Education:
  Historically black college and university capital financing............         208          216   ...........
 
Homeland Security:
  Disaster assistance....................................................       1,270           25            25
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  FHA-general and special risk...........................................          50           50            50
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance..........................................          50           50            50
 
State:
  Repatriation loans.....................................................           1            1             1
 
Transportation:
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement direct loans...................  ..........  ............          600
 
Treasury:
  Community development financial institutions fund......................          11            8             6
 
Veterans Affairs:
  Vocational rehabilitation..............................................           3            3             3
  Native American loans..................................................          30           30   ...........
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans.........................................................          20           10            25
                                                                          --------------------------------------
    Total, limitations on direct loan obligations........................       2,756        1,401         1,685
                                                                          --------------------------------------
 
                        LOAN GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS
 
Agriculture:
  Agricultural credit insurance fund.....................................       2,147        2,622         2,450
 
Energy:
  Title 17 innovative technology loan guarantees.........................  ..........  ............        9,000
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Indian housing loan guarantee fund.....................................         116          158           367
  Title VI Indian Federal guarantees.....................................          17           17            17
  Native Hawaiian Housing Loan Guarantee Fund............................          36           36            41
  Community development loan guarantees..................................         135          136   ...........
  FHA-general and special risk...........................................      35,000       35,000        35,000
  FHA-mutual mortgage insurance..........................................     185,000      185,000       185,000
 
Interior:
  Indian guaranteed and insured loans....................................         117           87            86
 
Transportation:
  Minority business resource center......................................          18           18            18
  Railroad rehabilitation and improvement loan guarantees................  ..........  ............          100
 
International Assistance Programs:
  Development credit authority...........................................         700  ............          700
 
Small Business Administration:
  Business loans.........................................................      19,936       28,000        28,000
                                                                          --------------------------------------
    Total, limitations on loan guarantee commitments.....................     243,222      251,074       260,779
                                                                          ======================================
 
        ADDENDUM: SECONDARY GUARANTEED LOAN COMMITMENT LIMITATIONS
 
Housing and Urban Development:
  Guarantees of mortgage-backed securities...............................     200,000      100,000       100,000
Small Business Administration:
  Secondary market guarantees............................................      12,000       12,000        12,000
                                                                          --------------------------------------

[[Page 97]]

 
    Total, limitations on secondary guaranteed loan commitments..........     212,000      112,000       112,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data represents loan level limitations enacted or proposed to be enacted in appropriation acts. For
  information on actual and estimated loan levels supportable by new subsidy budget authority requested, see
  Tables 7-3 and 7-4.


[[Page 98]]


       Table 7-8.  FACE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LENDING \1\
                        (In billions of dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Outstanding
                                                       -----------------
                                                          2005     2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
           Government Sponsored Enterprises
 
Fannie Mae \2\........................................      N/A      N/A
Freddie Mac \3\.......................................      N/A      N/A
Federal Home Loan Banks...............................      574      621
Farm Credit System....................................       92      105
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total.................................................      N/A      N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not available.
\1\ Net of purchases of federally guaranteed loans.
\2\ Financial data for Fannie Mae is not presented here because
  following a restatement of financial data for 2001-2004, audited
  financial results for 2005 and 2006 have not been released.
\3\ Financial data for Freddie Mac is not presented here because
  following the release of previous earnings restatements, audited
  financial statements for 2005 and 2006 have not been released.


[[Page 99]]


  Table 7-9.  LENDING AND BORROWING BY GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
                               (GSEs) \1\
                        (In millions of dollars)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Enterprise                               2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
                           LENDING
 
Federal National Mortgage Association: \2\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation: \3\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
 
Farm Credit System:
  Agricultural credit bank:
    Net change..............................................       3,642
    Outstandings............................................      28,763
  Farm credit banks:
    Net change..............................................       9,383
    Outstandings............................................      76,185
  Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation:
    Net change..............................................       1,933
    Outstandings............................................       7,059
 
Federal Home Loan Banks: \4\
  Net change................................................      21,302
  Outstandings..............................................     743,855
 
Less guaranteed loans purchased by:
  Federal National Mortgage Association: \2\
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
  Other:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
 
                          BORROWING
 
Federal National Mortgage Association: \2\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation: \3\
  Portfolio programs:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
  Mortgage-backed securities:
    Net change..............................................         N/A
    Outstandings............................................         N/A
 
Farm Credit System:
  Agricultural credit bank:
    Net change..............................................       4,381
    Outstandings............................................      32,847
  Farm credit banks:
    Net change..............................................      13,015
    Outstandings............................................      94,376
  Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation:
    Net change..............................................         623
    Outstandings............................................       4,554
 
Federal Home Loan Banks: \4\
  Net change................................................      39,094
  Outstandings..............................................     944,039
 

[[Page 100]]

 
                       DEDUCTIONS \5\
 
Less borrowing from other GSEs: \5\
  Net change................................................         N/A
  Outstandings..............................................         N/A
Less purchase of Federal debt securities: \5\
  Net change................................................         N/A
  Outstandings..............................................         N/A
Federal National Mortgage Association: \5\
  Net change................................................         N/A
  Outstandings..............................................         N/A
Other: \5\
  Net change................................................         N/A
  Outstandings..............................................         N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = Not available.
\1\ The estimates of borrowing and lending were developed by the GSEs
  based on certain assumptions that are subject to periodic review and
  revision and do not represent official GSE forecasts of future
  activity, nor are they reviewed by the President. The data for all
  years include programs of mortgage-backed securities. In cases where a
  GSE owns securities issued by the same GSE, including mortgage-backed
  securities, the borrowing and lending data for that GSE are adjusted
  to remove double-counting.
\2\ Financial data for Fannie Mae is not presented here because
  following a restatement of financial data for 2001-2004, audited
  financial results for 2006 have not been released.
\3\ Financial data for Freddie Mac is not presented here because
  following the release of previous earnings restatements, audited
  financial statements for 2006 have not been released.
\4\ The net change in borrowings is derived from the difference in
  borrowings between 2006 and the Federal Home Loan Banks' audited
  financial statements of 2005.
\5\ Totals and subtotals have not been calculated because a substantial
  portion of the total is unavailable as described above.