[Analytical Perspectives]
[Budget Reform Proposals]
[15. Budget Reform Proposals]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


  In April of last year, the Administration sent to the Congress budget 
enforcement legislation in the form of the proposed Spending Control Act 
of 2004. The Administration plans to re-propose that legislation with 
appropriate revisions. This chapter provides an overview of that updated 
legislation, and describes other budget reform proposals supported by 
the Administration. Certain administrative steps are planned to require 
agencies to propose offsets for regulatory actions that would increase 
mandatory spending.
  In addition, the Administration requests that the Congress include the 
following budget enforcement proposals as part of its budget resolution:
    Discretionary caps that include separate defense, 
          nondefense, highway and mass transit categories.
    Adjustments to the discretionary caps for program integrity 
          activities.
    Limits on advance appropriations within the discretionary 
          caps.
    A new scoring rule to ensure that funding shortfalls do not 
          accumulate in the discretionary Pell Grant program in future 
          years.
    A separate category for Project BioShield to ensure that 
          funding is not reduced and used as an offset for other 
          discretionary spending.
    A pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement for all legislation that 
          changes mandatory spending.
    A stricter standard for emergency designations and a 
          requirement that the President and the Congress concur in 
          those designations.
    Extension of expiring tax provisions in the 2001 and 2003 
          tax cut bills in the budget resolution baseline.
    Exclusion of discretionary funding for emergencies from the 
          budget resolution baseline.
    A point of order against legislation that worsens the long-
          term unfunded obligation of major entitlement programs.

                           Discretionary Caps

  The Administration proposes to set limits for 2005 through 2010 on net 
discretionary budget authority (BA) and outlays equal to the levels 
proposed in the 2006 Budget. Legislation that exceeds the discretionary 
caps would trigger a sequester of non-exempt discretionary programs. 
Table 15-1 displays the total levels of discretionary budget authority 
and outlays proposed for 2005 through 2010. This approach would put in 
place a budget framework for the next five years that ensures 
constrained, but reasonable growth in discretionary programs. For 2005 
through 2007, separate defense (Function 050) and nondefense categories 
would be enforced. For 2008-2010, there would be a single cap for all 
discretionary spending. In addition, a separate category for 
transportation outlays, financed by dedicated revenues, would be 
established for 2005 through 2009. The proposal discontinues separate 
caps established for conservation programs in 2001 through an amendment 
to the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA).

                                     

                         Table 15-1.  GENERAL PURPOSE DISCRETIONARY CAPS AND ADJUSTMENTS
                                        (Amounts in billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      2005 \1\    2006      2007      2008      2009      2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Discretionary Spending Categories:
 
  Discretionary Category:
 
    Defense Category (Function 050):
      Budget authority..............................     420.2     438.8     462.6        NA        NA        NA
      Outlays.......................................     463.5     444.3     446.1        NA        NA        NA
 
    Nondefense Category:
      Budget authority..............................     402.5     400.7     402.2        NA        NA        NA
      Outlays.......................................     427.1     435.5     429.1        NA        NA        NA
 
      Proposed Cap Adjustments:
        SSA Continuing Disability Reviews:
          Budget authority..........................        NA     0.189     0.203        NA        NA        NA
          Outlays...................................        NA     0.166     0.201        NA        NA        NA
 
        IRS Tax Enforcement:
          Budget authority..........................        NA     0.446     0.514        NA        NA        NA
          Outlays...................................        NA     0.415     0.509        NA        NA        NA
 
        Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control:
          Budget authority..........................        NA     0.080     0.120        NA        NA        NA
          Outlays...................................        NA     0.080     0.120        NA        NA        NA
 

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        Unemployment Insurance Improper Payments:
          Budget authority..........................        NA     0.040     0.040        NA        NA        NA
          Outlays...................................        NA     0.034     0.040        NA        NA        NA
 
    Subtotal, Nondefense Category, with Adjustments:
      Budget authority..............................     402.5     401.5     403.1        NA        NA        NA
      Outlays.......................................     427.1     436.1     430.0        NA        NA        NA
 
    Discretionary Category:
      Budget authority..............................        NA        NA        NA     886.6     907.9     919.8
      Outlays.......................................        NA        NA        NA     889.3     905.6     971.4
 
  Highway Category:
    Outlays.........................................      32.1      34.4      34.9      36.0      39.3        NA
 
  Mass Transit Category: \2\
    Outlays.........................................       7.2       6.9       6.5       6.9       7.0        NA
 
Total, All Discretionary Categories:
  Budget authority..................................     822.7     840.3     865.7     886.6     907.9     919.8
  Outlays...........................................     929.9     921.7     917.4     932.2     951.9     971.4
 
Project BioShield Category:
  Budget authority..................................       2.5  ........  ........  ........       2.2  ........
 
Memorandum: 2005 Hurricane Supplemental
  Budget authority..................................      11.9  ........  ........  ........  ........  ........
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The discretionary budget authority for Division B of the Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
  Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 (PL 108-324) and for emergencies in the Consolidated
  Appropriations Act, 2005 (PL 108-447) are displayed separately on a memorandum line.
\2\ Includes prior-year outlays from general fund budget authority provided in years prior to 2005. Outlays from
  general fund budget authority for 2005 and beyond are included in the Discretionary Category.

  Program Integrity Cap Adjustments.--An improper payment occurs when 
Federal funds go to the wrong recipient, the recipient receives an 
incorrect amount of funds, or the recipient uses the funds in an 
improper manner. Approximately 92 percent of improper payments are 
overpayments. The Administration has made the elimination of improper 
payments a major focus. Federal agencies have begun to review Federal 
programs to evaluate the risk of improper payments, have developed 
measures to assess the extent of improper payments, and have initiated 
processes and internal control improvements to enhance the accuracy and 
integrity of payments. For the first time, agencies have reported the 
results of these efforts, pursuant to the Improper Payments Information 
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-300).
  The results of the agency assessment have been aggregated into a 
government-wide report entitled Improving the Accuracy and Integrity of 
Federal Payments. (The full text of the report can be found at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/financial/fia--improper. html.) In 2004, the 
agencies reported a total of $45.1 billion in improper payments. This 
represents a 3.9 percent improper payment rate. Almost two-thirds of 
those improper payments are in four programs: Medicare, Unemployment 
Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, and Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance.
  In the context of the Administration's efforts to eliminate improper 
payments, the Administration is proposing adjustments for spending above 
a base level of funding within the discretionary levels for several 
program integrity initiatives, specifically those efforts for continuing 
disability reviews (CDRs) in the Social Security Administration, 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax enforcement, the Health Care Fraud 
and Abuse Control Program (HCFAC) in the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services and Unemployment Insurance improper payments in the 
Department of Labor. These cap adjustments provide an effective way to 
ensure that limited resources are applied to activities that reduce 
error and generate program savings.
  In the past decade, there have been a variety of successful efforts to 
ensure dedicated resources for program integrity efforts. These efforts 
include cap adjustment funding for Social Security continuing disability 
reviews and integrity efforts associated with the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). These initiatives have led to increased savings for the 
Social Security program and an increase in enforcement efforts in EITC.

[[Page 237]]

  Additional spending on program integrity initiatives has proven to 
reduce erroneous payments in these programs. For example, the Social 
Security Administration reports that every $1 expended on CDRs has 
produced a $10 return to taxpayers. The Administration's proposed 
adjustments for program integrity activities will total $755 million in 
budget authority in 2006 and $877 million in budget authority in 2007.
  Transportation Category.--The Administration's proposal for 
discretionary caps includes separate categories for spending on Federal 
Highway and Mass Transit programs. The Transportation levels will be 
financed by dedicated revenues over the six-year period from 2004 
through 2009. This structure is consistent with the estimates provided 
in the 2006 Budget. Table 15-2 displays the Administration's 
Transportation proposal. The proposal discontinues the annual adjustment 
reflecting updated revenue estimates that was in the previous 
authorization, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21).


                   Table 15-2.  TRANSPORTATION CATEGORY FOR HIGHWAYS AND MASS TRANSIT SPENDING
                                        (Amounts in billions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      2004 \1\  2005 \1\    2006      2007      2008      2009
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Category:
 
  Highways:
    Obligation Limitations..........................      34.6      35.2      35.9      37.3      39.8      45.9
    Outlays.........................................      30.7      32.1      34.4      34.9      36.0      39.3
 
  Mass Transit: \2\
    Obligation Limitations..........................       5.8       6.7       6.8       6.5       7.0       7.6
    Outlays.........................................       6.8       7.2       6.9       6.5       6.9       7.0
 
Memorandum:
  Discretionary budget authority for mass transit
   not under the Transportation Guarantee:
    Budget authority................................       1.5       1.0       1.0       1.6       1.7       1.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Administration's SAFETEA proposal for Highway and Mass Transit programs applies to 2004 through 2009.
\2\ Includes prior-year outlays from general fund budget authority provided in years prior to 2005. Outlays from
  general fund budget authority for 2005 and beyond are included in the Discretionary Category.

  Advance Appropriations.--An advance appropriation becomes available 
one or more years beyond the year for which its appropriations act is 
passed. BA is recorded in the year the funds become available and not in 
the year of enactment. Too often, advance appropriations have been used 
to expand spending levels by shifting budget authority from the budget 
year into the subsequent year and then appropriating the BA freed up 
under the budget year discretionary cap to other programs. The effect of 
these advance appropriations is to limit the amount of discretionary BA 
available in subsequent years, thereby reducing future funding options 
available to both Congress and the President. From 1993 to 1999, an 
average of $2.3 billion in discretionary budget authority was advance 
appropriated each year. In 1999, advance appropriations totaled $8.9 
billion and increased to $23.4 billion in 2000.
  Because this budget practice distorts the debate over Government 
spending and misleads the public about spending levels in specific 
accounts, the President's budget proposals and the 2002 Congressional 
Budget Resolution capped advance appropriations at the amount advanced 
in the previous year. By capping advance appropriations, increases in 
these and other programs can be budgeted and reflected in the year of 
their enactment. This year, the Administration proposes that total 
advance appropriations, excluding Project BioShield, continue to be 
capped in 2006 through 2010. Instead of capping total advance 
appropriations at the 2002 level, the Administration will propose a cap 
on advance appropriations of $22,602 million. This is the level of 
advance appropriations provided for 2007 in the President's 2006 Budget.
  In addition, the Administration will also score the second--year 
effect of appropriations language that delays obligations of mandatory 
budget authority as advance appropriations that count against the 
discretionary caps. Appropriations acts often include provisions that 
delay obligations of mandatory BA from one year to the next. The first 
year is appropriately scored as a discretionary savings because it is 
included in an appropriations act and it reduces spending in that year. 
However, this is usually a temporary delay, and the funds become 
available for spending in the second year. Under this proposal, the 
second-year impact would be treated as an advance appropriation and 
scored against the discretionary caps. This will correct an 
inconsistency in the current practice where savings are scored in the 
first year, but the second year impact is reclassified in the subsequent 
budget as mandatory and not scored against the discretionary caps.
  To enforce the level of advance appropriations, the discretionary cap 
proposal provides that total funding for advance appropriations 
(including obligation delays) provided in an appropriations act for 2006 
through 2010 that is in excess of the Administration's limit on advance 
appropriations of $22,602 million will count against the discretionary 
cap in the year enacted, not against the year the funds first become 
available.
  Federal Pell Grants.--The Pell Grant program provides grant aid to 
more than five million postsecondary students each year to help pay for 
their education. Pell

[[Page 238]]

Grant funding is discretionary and is provided through the annual 
appropriations process. If a Pell-eligible student enrolls in school, 
however, he or she is automatically eligible for a need-based award up 
to the maximum award set in appropriations (currently $4,050). Pell 
Grant cost estimates are based on the February Budget's technical and 
economic assumptions; the Budget includes both the cost estimate for the 
budget year and revised cost estimates for prior years. In recent years, 
Pell Grant appropriations have been insufficient to cover program costs, 
creating an estimated $4.3 billion funding shortfall through the 2005-
2006 award year.
  In the FY 2006 Budget, the Administration is proposing a comprehensive 
package of reforms to the Federal student aid programs, including Pell 
Grants. In Pell, the Budget proposes to increase the $4,050 maximum 
award by $100 in FY 2006 and $500 over the next five years. The Budget 
also proposes to retire the estimated $4.3 billion funding shortfall in 
Pell through the 2005-2006 award year. The Budget requests mandatory 
budget authority for the additional funding from these Pell Grant 
proposals, which are offset by reforms to the Federal student loan 
programs that increase benefits to students while making these programs 
more cost effective. This mandatory funding for Pell Grants is 
contingent on adoption of the scoring rule discussed below, which will 
prevent future underfunding of Pell Grant program costs.
  The Pell Grant program would remain discretionary. With the exception 
of the proposed funding to increase the maximum award by $500 over the 
next five years, the Administration would oppose efforts to convert Pell 
Grants into a mandatory program. Discretionary funding would still be 
required to support the cost of a $4,050 Pell Grant maximum award. 
Additional discretionary appropriations would also be needed to support 
any cost increases in the base Pell Grant program--due to increased 
enrollment, maximum award increases provided in appropriations, or other 
policy changes.
  To ensure that funding shortfalls do not accumulate in the Pell Grant 
program in future years, the Administration is proposing to score 
appropriations at the amount needed to fully fund the award level set in 
appropriations acts, if the amount appropriated is insufficient to fully 
fund all awards. This amount would be increased to cover any funding 
shortfalls from previous years and reduced by any surpluses carried over 
from previous years. If the amount appropriated exceeded the estimated 
full cost, the amount appropriated would be scored against that year, 
and the surplus would carry over as a credit against the following 
year's cost estimate. The new scoring rule would only apply to Pell 
Grant costs beginning with the 2006-2007 award year. The existing 
shortfall would be funded as described above.
  The Pell Grant scoring rule is a necessary component of the 
Administration's student aid reforms. It will ensure that Pell Grants 
costs are fully funded each year, which means that funding shortfalls 
will be paid for and will not accumulate in future years. The 
Administration believes that mandatory funding should not be used for 
Pell Grants unless this new budget scoring rule is in place.
  Project BioShield Category.--The Administration proposes to create a 
separate BEA category for budget authority for Project BioShield, which 
received an advance appropriation for 2005 of $2.5 billion and for 2009 
of $2.2 billion in P.L. 108-90, the 2004 Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act. Because the success of this program in providing for 
the development of vaccines and medications for biodefense depends on an 
assured funding availability, it is critical that this funding not be 
diverted to other purposes. The Administration's proposal to create a 
separate category will help ensure that funding for this program is not 
reduced and used as an offset for other discretionary spending.

                     Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Extension

  The Administration proposes to subject all legislation that changes 
mandatory spending to a pay-as-you-go requirement, so that such 
legislation, in total, does not increase the deficit. This proposal is 
modeled after the PAYGO requirement in the BEA, except that it does not 
apply to tax legislation. It also does not permit mandatory spending 
increases to be offset by tax increases. The Administration does not 
support increasing the tax burden on the American people and, therefore, 
proposes to remove tax legislation from the PAYGO calculation.
  The five-year impact of any proposals affecting mandatory spending 
would continue to be scored. Table 15-3 displays the President's 
mandatory spending proposals. Legislation that exceeds the pay-as-you-go 
requirement in the current year and the budget year would trigger a 
sequester of direct spending programs. The 2006 Budget identifies as 
``PAYGO'' only legislative proposals that change mandatory spending.

[[Page 239]]



                                          Table 15-3.  PAYGO PROPOSALS
                                    (Cost/Savings(-) in millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     2005     2006     2007     2008     2009     2010   2005-10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outlay Effects of Tax Proposals \1\...............  ......      -16    3,607    5,594    6,738    7,380   23,303
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Reform \1\...  ......   -2,195   -3,702   -3,495   -3,226   -2,916  -15,534
Medicaid and State Children's Health Insurance         225    1,112   -1,549   -3,699   -4,214   -4,417  -12,542
 Program..........................................
User Fee Proposals................................  ......     -824   -1,384   -1,482   -1,617   -1,593   -6,900
Student Loan Reforms and Pell Grant Increase......     557   -1,172   -2,001   -1,752   -1,337     -986   -6,691
Byrd Amendment Repeal.............................  ......   -1,608   -1,615   -1,624     -855     -865   -6,567
Extension of Spectrum Auction Authority...........  ......  .......  .......    1,083   -2,156   -3,239   -4,312
Commodity Credit Corporation and Crop Insurance...  ......     -587     -991     -982     -738     -674   -3,972
Allowing Power Marketing Administrations to Charge  ......      -40     -157     -446   -1,145   -1,406   -3,194
 Market Rates.....................................
Southern Nevada Land Sales........................  ......     -227     -418     -636     -641     -642   -2,564
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families                100      277      329      352      361      357    1,776
 Reauthorization..................................
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, lease bonuses....  ......  .......   -1,201       -1     -101       -1   -1,304
Other Proposals...................................     -62      -66       36      127      257      688      980
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------
  Total...........................................     820   -5,346   -9,046   -6,961   -8,674   -8,314  -37,521
 
  Total, 2005 and 2006............................  ......   -4,526  .......  .......  .......  .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Affects both receipts and outlays. Only the outlay effect is shown here.

     Include Stricter Standard For Emergency Designation in the BEA

  When the BEA was created, it provided a ``safety valve'' to ensure 
that the fiscal constraint envisioned by the BEA would not prevent the 
enactment of legislation to respond to unforeseen disasters and 
emergencies such as Operation Desert Storm, the series of hurricanes 
that struck Florida this fall, or the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. If the President and the Congress separately designated a spending 
or tax item as an emergency requirement, the BEA held these items 
harmless from its enforcement mechanisms. Initially, this safety valve 
was used judiciously, but in later years its application was expanded to 
circumvent the discretionary caps by declaring spending for ongoing 
programs as ``emergencies.''
  The Administration proposes to include in the BEA a definition of 
``emergency requirement'' that will ensure high standards are met before 
an event is deemed an ``emergency'' and therefore exempt. This 
definition should include the following elements: the requirement is a 
necessary expenditure that is sudden, urgent, unforeseen, and not 
permanent. These elements, all of which would be used for defining 
something as an emergency, are defined as follows:
    necessary expenditure-an essential or vital expenditure, not 
          one that is merely useful or beneficial;
    sudden-quickly coming into being, not building up over time;
    urgent-pressing and compelling, requiring immediate action;
    unforeseen-not predictable or seen beforehand as a coming 
          need (an emergency that is part of the average annual level of 
          disaster assistance funding would not be ``unforeseen''); and
    not permanent-the need is temporary in nature.
  This definition codifies the criteria for an emergency that have been 
the standard for a number of years. It is designed to preclude funds 
from being declared an emergency for events that occur on an annual or 
recurring basis. For example, even though it is not possible to predict 
the specific occurrence of fires, tornados, hurricanes, and other 
domestic disasters, it is reasonable to assume that a combination of 
domestic disasters will occur in any given year that require funding 
equal to the five-year average for disaster relief. Funding at this 
five-year average, therefore, should not be considered an emergency 
under this definition. On the other hand, the five-year average for 
domestic disasters will not accommodate the level of funding necessary 
to address a large and relatively infrequent domestic disaster, like the 
series of hurricanes that struck Florida this past fall. Under this 
definition for emergencies, spending for extraordinary events could be 
classified as emergency funding. In the end, classification of certain 
spending as an emergency depends on common sense judgment, made on a 
case-by-case basis, about whether the totality of facts and 
circumstances indicate a true emergency.
  In addition, the Administration proposes that the definition of an 
emergency requirement also encompass contingency operations that are 
national security related. Contingency operations that are national 
security related include both defense operations and foreign assistance. 
Military operations and foreign aid with costs that are incurred 
regularly should be a part of base funding and, as such, are not covered 
under this definition.
  The Administration proposal also would require that the President and 
Congress concur in designating an emergency for each spending proposal 
covered by a designation. This would protect against the ``bundling'' of 
non-emergency items with true emergency spending. If the President 
determines that specific proposed emergency designations do not meet 
this definition, he would not concur in the emergency designation and no 
discretionary cap adjustment or PAYGO exemption would apply.

[[Page 240]]

                                Baseline

  The Administration proposes several changes to Section 257 of the BEA, 
which establishes the requirements for the baseline:
    Assume extension of all expiring tax provisions in the 
          Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and 
          certain provisions in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
          Reconciliation Act of 2003. This proposal is consistent with 
          the BEA baseline rules for expiring mandatory spending and for 
          excise taxes dedicated to a trust fund. Except for a few 
          relatively small mandatory programs, the BEA assumes that 
          mandatory spending and excise taxes dedicated to a trust fund 
          will be reauthorized and extends them in the baseline. The 
          2001 Act and 2003 Act provisions were not intended to be 
          temporary, and not extending them in the baseline raises 
          inappropriate procedural road blocks to extending them at 
          current rates.
    Add a provision to exclude discretionary funding for 
          emergencies from the baseline. Instead, the baseline would 
          include emergency funding only for the year in which it was 
          enacted. The current requirement is for the discretionary 
          baseline estimates for the budget year and the outyears to 
          assume the current year appropriated level, adjusted for 
          inflation. This is reasonable for ongoing programs, where the 
          need is expected to continue into the future. For emergencies, 
          since the need should be for a short duration, the baseline 
          rules build unnecessary funding into the baseline estimates 
          for the years after the need has been addressed and passed. In 
          effect, the current rule biases the baseline in favor of 
          higher discretionary spending.
    Correct the overcompensation of baseline budgetary resources 
          for pay raise-related costs due to the way in which these 
          costs are inflated. The current requirement, which provides a 
          full year's funding for pay raises in the budget year and 
          beyond, was written when Federal pay raises were scheduled to 
          take effect on October 1, at the start of each fiscal year. 
          However, this requirement is now inappropriate because the 
          effective date for pay raises is now permanently set by law as 
          the first pay period in January. By treating pay raises that 
          begin on January 1 as if they take effect for the entire 
          fiscal year, the baseline overstates the cost of providing a 
          constant level of services.
    Eliminate the adjustments for expiring housing contracts and 
          social insurance administrative expenses. Most multi-year 
          housing contracts have expired or have been addressed since 
          the BEA was first enacted in 1990, so the adjustment is no 
          longer needed. The adjustment for social insurance 
          administrative expenses is also inconsistent with the baseline 
          rules for other accounts that fund the costs of 
          administration. These programs should not be singled out for 
          preferential treatment.

                     Long-term Unfunded Obligations

  The Administration proposes new measures to prevent enactment of 
legislation that worsens the long-term unfunded obligations of Federal 
entitlement programs. As discussed in Chapter 13 of this volume, 
``Stewardship,'' spending by the Government's major entitlement 
programs, particularly Social Security and Medicare, is projected to 
rise in the next few decades to levels that cannot be sustained, either 
by those programs' own dedicated financing or by general revenues. The 
Administration's proposed measures would prevent further legislative 
increases in the long-run fiscal imbalance.
  Congress has already acted to require a more comprehensive review of 
the Medicare program's finances and to require the Medicare trustees to 
issue a warning when general revenue Medicare funding is projected to 
exceed 45 percent of Medicare's total expenditures. The Budget proposes 
to build on this reform by establishing a new enforcement measure to 
analyze the long-term impact of legislation on the unfunded obligations 
of major entitlement programs and to make it more difficult to enact 
legislation that would expand the unfunded obligations of these programs 
over the long-run. These measures would highlight proposed legislative 
changes that appear to cost little in the short run but result in large 
increases in the spending burdens passed on to future generations.
  First, the Administration proposes a point of order against 
legislation which worsens the long-term unfunded obligation of major 
entitlements. The specific programs covered would be those programs with 
long term actuarial projections, including Social Security, Medicare, 
Federal civilian and military retirement, veterans disability 
compensation, and Supplemental Security Income. Additional programs 
would be added once it becomes feasible to make long-term actuarial 
estimates for those programs.
  Second, the Administration proposes new reporting requirements to 
highlight legislative actions worsening unfunded obligations. These 
requirements would require the Administration, as part of the 
President's Budget, to report on any enacted legislation in the past 
year that worsens the unfunded obligations of the specified programs.

                             Line-Item Veto

  A perennial criticism of the Federal Government is that spending and 
tax legislation contain too many provisions benefiting a relative few 
which would likely not become law if considered as a stand-alone bill. 
The persistence of special interest items diverts resources from higher 
priority programs and erodes the confidence of citizens in Government. 
Appropriations bills, especially those considered at the end of the 
congressional session, often attract special interest spending items 
that could not be enacted on their own.

[[Page 241]]

  The President proposes that Congress correct this state of affairs by 
providing him and future Presidents with a line item veto that would 
withstand constitutional challenge. From the Nation's founding, 
Presidents have exercised the authority to not spend appropriated sums. 
However, Congress sought to curtail this authority in 1974 through the 
Impoundment Control Act, which restricted the President's authority to 
decline to spend appropriated sums. Although the Line Item Veto Act of 
1996 attempted to give the President the authority to cancel spending 
authority and special interest tax breaks, the U.S. Supreme Court found 
that law unconstitutional. The President's proposal would correct the 
constitutional flaw in the 1996 Act.
  Specifically, the President proposes a line-item veto linked to 
deficit reduction. This proposal would give the President the authority 
to defer new spending whenever the President determines the spending is 
not an essential Government priority. All savings from the line-item 
veto would be used for deficit reduction, and they could not be applied 
to augment other spending.

                      Other Budget Reform Proposals

  Joint Budget Resolution.--A joint budget resolution would set the 
overall levels for discretionary spending, mandatory spending, receipts, 
and debt in a simple document that would have the force of law. Under 
the current process, the Congress annually adopts a ``concurrent 
resolution,'' which does not require the President's signature and does 
not have the force of law.
  A joint budget resolution could be enforced by sequesters requiring 
automatic across-the-board cuts to offset any excess spending, similar 
to the BEA. It would bring the President into the process at an early 
stage, require the President and the Congress to reach agreement on 
overall fiscal policy before individual tax and spending bills are 
considered, and it would give the budget resolution the force of law.
  Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations.--Only twice in the last 50 
years have all appropriation bills been enacted by the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Because Congress must enact these bills each year, it 
cannot devote the time necessary to provide oversight and fully address 
problems in Federal programs. The preoccupation with these annual 
appropriations bills frequently precludes review and action on 
authorization legislation and on the growing portion of the Budget that 
is permanently funded under entitlement laws. According to the 
Congressional Budget Office, the Congress has appropriated about $170 
billion for fiscal year 2005 for programs and activities whose 
authorizations of appropriations have expired.
  In contrast, a biennial budget would allow lawmakers to devote more 
time every other year to ensuring that taxpayers' money is spent wisely 
and efficiently. In addition, Government agencies would receive more 
stable funding, which would facilitate longer range planning and 
improved fiscal management. Under the President's proposal for a 
biennial budget, funding decisions would be made in odd-numbered years, 
with even numbered years devoted to authorizing legislation.
  Government Shutdown Prevention.--For 23 out of the past 24 years, 
Congress has not finished its work by the October 1st deadline, the 
beginning of the new fiscal year. When Congress fails to enact 
appropriations bills, it funds the Government through ``continuing 
resolutions'' (CRs), which provide temporary funding authority for 
Government activities usually at current levels until the final 
appropriations bills are signed into law.
  If Congress does not pass a CR or the President does not sign it, the 
Federal Government must shut down. Important Government functions should 
not be held hostage simply because of an impasse over temporary funding 
bills. In the responsible process the President envisions, there should 
be a back-up plan to avoid the threat of a Government shutdown, although 
the expectation is that appropriations bills still would pass on time as 
the law requires. Under the President's proposal, if an appropriations 
bill is not signed by October 1 of the new fiscal year, funding would be 
automatically provided at the lower of the President's Budget or the 
prior year's level.
  Reserve for Fully Accruing Federal Employees' Retirement.--Both the 
President's 2003 and 2004 Budgets proposed to correct a long-standing 
understatement of the true cost of thousands of government programs. For 
some time, the cost of benefits accruing under the Federal Employee's 
Retirement System (FERS) and Military Retirement System (MRS) and a 
portion of the accruing benefits of the old Civil Service Retirement 
System (CSRS) have been properly allocated to the affected salary and 
expense accounts, but the remainder (a portion of CSRS, other small 
retirement systems, and all civilian and military retiree health 
benefits) has been charged to central accounts. The full cost of 
accruing benefits should be allocated to the affected salary and expense 
accounts, so that budget choices for program managers and budget 
decision makers are not distorted by understated cost information. The 
Administration recommends that this be re-examined and proposes to work 
with the Congress to develop a solution that addresses the concerns 
raised by Congress and others with the Administration's previous 
proposals.
  The 2005 Budget included a very limited proposal that would require 
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), a fully fee-funded agency, to use 
the fees it collects to cover the current accruing cost of post-
retirement annuities, and health and life insurance benefits. Congress 
enacted this provision for 2005, and the 2006 Budget proposes that this 
PTO provision be made permanent. Similarly, the Postal Civil Service 
Retirement System Funding Reform Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-18) requires the 
Postal Service to cover the full accruing cost of post-retirement 
annuities for its CSRS employees. In addition, the 2006 Budget proposes 
to use the pension savings provided to the Postal Service by P.L. 108-18 
that would otherwise be held in escrow in 2006

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and beyond, to put the Postal Service on a path that fully funds its 
substantial retiree health benefits liabilities.
  Results Commission/Sunset Commission.--The Federal government's 
ability to serve the American people is often hampered by poorly 
designed programs or uncoordinated, overlapping programs trying to 
achieve the same objective. Overlapping jurisdictions in the Executive 
Branch and Congress provide daunting hurdles to legislative remedies to 
the poor performance of duplicative programs. Because the potential for 
savings and productivity are great, the Administration is proposing two 
mechanisms for realizing the opportunity to improve performance and 
control cost in a systematic and expedited fashion.
  The Administration plans to propose legislation that gives the 
President the authority to propose Results Commissions. These 
commissions would consider and revise Administration proposals to 
improve the performance of programs or agencies by restructuring or 
consolidating them. Congress would approve individual Results 
Commissions to address single program or policy areas where duplication 
and the overlapping jurisdictions of Executive Branch agencies or 
Congressional committees hinder reform. Proposals approved by the 
commission would then be approved by the President and considered by 
Congress under expedited procedures.
  The Administration also proposes a Sunset Commission to provide a 
process by which programs undergo the regular scrutiny brought about by 
having to defend their existence. Programs would be reviewed according 
to a schedule enacted by Congress. The Commission would consider 
proposals to retain, restructure, or terminate programs. Programs would 
automatically terminate according to the schedule unless Congress took 
some action to reauthorize them.

                         Administrative Actions

  Budget Discipline for Agency Administrative Actions.--A significant 
amount of Federal policy is made via administrative action, which can 
increase Federal spending, often on the order of tens of billions of 
dollars in entitlement programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. Although 
known costs are incorporated into the Budget baselines of various 
programs, agencies frequently launch unplanned for and costly proposals. 
Often, these costs are not reflected in the baseline, or are not 
accompanied by other actions that would pay for the proposed change. 
This results in increased spending and deficits.
  Support for restoring a PAYGO requirement for mandatory spending is 
integral to the Administration's commitment to reducing the deficit and 
enforcing fiscal discipline. Toward that end, the Office of Management 
and Budget plans to establish an internal review process that requires 
agencies, when proposing substantial administrative decisions that 
increase mandatory spending, to propose other offsetting administration 
decisions that reduce mandatory spending.